

PEACE EDUCATION IN FRAGILE STATES

A case study of the influence of global discussions of peace education in conflict settings on national education policy and local NGO efforts in Afghanistan

A Thesis

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CURRICULUM VITAE

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- Coursework at the Harvard Graduate School of Education: *Education in Armed Conflict*, with Professor Sarah Dryden-Peterson; *Human Rights in Education* with Professor Felisa Tibbitts; Training on INEE Minimum Standards
- Teaching Assistant for Professor Eileen Babbitt in 2013: *Conflict Resolution in Practice* course: developed a new curriculum for the course, coached the students, and co-organized a problem-solving workshop for representatives of peace and human rights NGO leaders based in Israel.

Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (ESSEC) **1997-2001**
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UNESCO – Education Sector, Division for Inclusion, Peace and Sustainable Development
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- Review and analysis of existing research and studies on lessons learned from the promotion and implementation of global citizenship education in countries affected by crisis situations, with particular attention to initiatives benefiting the refugee population (2016)
- Mapping of education for peace and conflict prevention programs in 46 countries in Africa: desk study offering (1) a mapping and analysis of existing policies, practices, resources, approaches and stakeholders; (2) recommendations indicating a way forward for the next activities of UNESCO's Intersectoral Platform: Culture of Peace and Non-violence (2013)

TINA ROBIOLLE-MOUL

Afghan Women Leaders Capacity-Building Program **2009-2014** **Co-founder, Program Manager and Expert Facilitator** Afghanistan and France

Founded, designed, and managed a capacity-building program aimed at enhancing Afghan Women's political participation by improving their leadership and conflict management skills and developing a collaborative network:

- Led an exploratory trip to Kabul in April 2009, designed program proposal, and obtained a \$100,000 grant from the U.S. State Department, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and French Parliament
- Designed one-week program conducted in 2011 in France for 10 Afghan women parliamentarians including a three day capacity-building seminar at ESSEC in partnership with ESSEC IRENE, and two major conferences attended by 1,000 participants (including one at ESSEC)
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- Designed a Simulation for the **Climate and Security Partnership Workshop** Fall 2012
- Mission for the **Initiative for a Cohesive Leadership in the DRC:** 2010
 - Facilitated a “cohesive leadership forum” for 70 local leaders of the North Kivu region
- Missions for the **Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)** in Burundi: 2004-2010
 - **Education:** Conflict Resolution curriculum for secondary schools (USAID East Africa grant – 2009 & 2010)
 - Developed at the request of Burundi's Minister of Education a joint proposal with UNESCO for a four-year program aimed at revising, testing and scaling up the national civic education curriculum
 - Trained 80 secondary schools teachers
 - Led a validation meeting with the Minister of Education and Ministry's key partners
 - Designed and analyzed curriculum pilot test in 10 schools with 1,100 students
 - Trained 20 teachers of 10 pilot schools
 - Designed curriculum and teaching materials – teachers' and students' manuals
 - Led extensive field research to develop a Conflict Resolution (CR) curriculum (analyzed existing curricula in other countries; interviewed Burundian teachers, students, unions, and officials of the Ministry of Education (MoE), consulted with UNESCO education experts) and facilitated workshop on collaborative decision-making for main stakeholders of the program
 - **Governance** (2005 & 2006):
 - Facilitated workshop with ESSEC IRENE for the Government, the President of Burundi and parliamentarians
 - **Elections** (2004 & 2010):
 - Led workshop for Army and Police high commands to secure the 2010 elections
 - Facilitated workshops with ESSEC IRENE on collaborative decision-making for the leaders of Burundi's 33 political parties in lead-up to Constitutional Referendum and elections of 2005
 - **Security** (2004-2006):
 - Facilitated workshops with ESSEC IRENE in the techniques required for effective leadership and collaborative decision-making for top officers of the newly integrated High Command of the Army, for members of the high command of the Burundi's National Police Force,
 - Facilitated workshops with ESSEC IRENE to strengthen the capacities of 96 ex-combatants and UN military observers to work collaboratively as members of Joint Liaison Teams responsible for monitoring the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration process (DDR)

TINA ROBIOLLE-MOUL

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2001-present

As a member of the **Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation (IRENE)**, I design syllabus, give lectures and facilitate interactive seminars for graduate students, Diplomats and Military Officers in France:

- **ESSEC Graduate School of Management:**
 - *Negotiation* course for MBA and BBA students
 - Teambuilding and Leadership seminar for Advanced Master's degree students
 - *Manager as Negotiator* workshop proposed by the ESSEC Executive Education Program
- **Ecole de Guerre (French Ministry of Defense):** *Negotiation and Conflict Management* seminar
- **Institut Diplomatique et Consulaire (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs):** *Diplomatic Negotiation: Methods and Practice*
- **French National Public Administration School (ENA):**
 - *Negotiation and Mediation* course for ENA's first year students
 - *Practice of International Negotiation* seminar for foreign diplomats
- **National Institute of Territorial Studies (INET):** *Negotiation and Mediation* course
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CONFERENCES AND PUBLICATIONS

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- **Robiolle-Moul, T.** (2010). "Building a sustainable peace: the Burundi Leadership Training Program" presented at the Conflict Studies conference organized by the University of Massachusetts – Boston, MA
- Colson A., B. Dupré, A. Lempereur, and **T. Robiolle-Moul** (2006). "Conflict Management Techniques" presented at the ESSEC IRENE 10th anniversary conference with Mrs. Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Peace Prize (2003) – Paris, France
- Wolpe H., A. Lempereur, S. McDonald, E. McClintock, and **Robiolle-Moul T.** (2005). "Burundi Leadership Training Program" presented at the conference organized by ESSEC IRENE and Harvard's Program On Negotiation (PON) – Paris, France (November 2005)
- **Robiolle-Moul, T.** (2004). "Women's role in negotiations" presented at the conference organized by ESSEC IRENE: Talleyrand, prince of negotiators – Paris, France

Selected Publications

- **Robiolle-Moul, T.** (2015). *Promoting a culture of peace and non-violence in Africa through education for peace and conflict prevention: Phase 1: Mapping - final report.* UNESCO: Paris.
- **Robiolle-Moul, T.** (2012). "Peace Education in Fragile States: a study of the reasons for the lack of national school-based peace education programs in fragile states." MA Thesis, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation assesses the influence of international standards and guidance on peace education on education policy and practice at the national and local levels in a fragile state. It also explores the critical factors that affect this influence—or the lack thereof. Utilizing a vertical case study approach that draws comparisons across multiple levels, this research examines the case of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2015. The author explored the origins and content of these recommendations at the global level, investigated their influence at the national level, and assessed what then is implemented at the local level through the work of a local non-governmental organization (NGO).

While there has been a growing presence of peace education in international recommendations and instruments promulgated by the United Nations, this study demonstrates how challenging it is for the international community to coordinate and harmonize its discourse on peace education—let alone to influence significantly a fragile state’s national education policy and practice. The international community’s recommendations on peace education had only a limited influence on the Afghan government’s education policy and practice. At the local level, the global recommendations did influence the work of a local Afghan NGO, Help the Afghan Children, and its peace education program launched in 2002. The success of this program has triggered the interest of the Ministry in developing and testing a national school-based peace education curriculum that could be taught in all government schools in the country. However, the lack of resources and political

will represent a great obstacle for the program to be scaled up at the national level. Overall, this vertical study underlined different potentials for the integration of peace education in schools at the national versus the local level.

As a critical case, Afghanistan provided sufficient positive conditions to implement some global recommendations on peace education, despite the complexity of the local context. The critical factors that explain the limits of this influence are not specific to Afghanistan and can be found in other fragile states. If they are not addressed, the international community will face similar obstacles to the integration of peace education in other fragile states.

DEDICATION

To the loving memory of my grandmothers, Marie-Thérèse and Zahra, who beautifully exemplified peace education principles and will be forever missed.

To the children of Afghanistan and other conflict-affected and fragile states who long for peace, struggle every day to go to school, and deserve so much more.

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Earning a Ph.D. has been quite a journey and I feel a deep sense of gratitude toward the people who have given me the opportunity to reach this turning point in my life.

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The author welcomes feedback. Please address comments to:

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Map No. 3958 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS June 2011 / Department of Field Support Cartographic Section.
 Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis.pdf>

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CHAPTER I – Introduction

A. Problem Statement and Significance of the Study

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has faced new types of conflicts. While most conflicts had been inter-state, *new wars*¹ started to proliferate and the international community encountered more intrastate conflicts. Development aid agencies began an ambitious effort to engage in domestic processes related to governance and conflict management.² Unfortunately, global priorities and investments are still more reactive than proactive, despite considerable efforts already invested in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While scholars such as Michael Lund insist on the importance of conflict prevention,³ the international community still spends just \$1 on conflict prevention for every \$1,885 it spends on military budgets.⁴

According to Barnett Rubin, structural conflict prevention programs can reduce risk by addressing state level structures (political, economic, social, and cultural) that are sources of conflict.⁵ Elise Boulding adds that we need to move from

¹ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Polity Press, 2012).

² Peter Uvin, “Development and Security: Genealogy and Typology of an Evolving International Policy Area,” in *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, by Hans G. Brauch (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 151–64.

³ Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

⁴ From Dr. Lisa Schirch and Dr. Michael S. Lund’s May 2009 Statement to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. The average is based on research found in the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict’s *The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Ed. Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, 1999).

⁵ Barnett R. Rubin, *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2002).

socialization for war to socialization for peace.⁶ Accordingly, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler stress that preserving peace in countries that have emerged from civil conflict requires a greater focus on social policies.⁷ Education is a significant instrument for increasing the focus on social policy. However, in fragile or conflict-affected states, the delivery of education services is frequently undermined, and a state's failure to provide access to education creates grievances that can lead to conflict.⁸

There is a complex relationship between education and conflict. Education can be part of the problem as well as part of the solution.⁹ Conflict has devastating impacts on education, but education has the potential to contribute to conflict prevention.¹⁰ An analysis of civil wars over the period 1965-1999 showed that a “country which has ten percentage points more of its youth in school – say 55 % instead of 45% – cuts its risk of conflict from 14% to around 10%.”¹¹ As a result, a range of actors including United Nations (UN) agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), research institutions, multilateral and bilateral donors, have increased attention on improving education responses in situations of fragility.¹²

⁶ Elise Boulding, *Cultures of Peace, the Hidden Side of History*, 1st ed. (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2000).

⁷ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” *European Economic Review* 48 (2004): 1125–45.

⁸ Clayton Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006): 733–54.

⁹ Alan Smith and Tony Vaux, *Education, Conflict, and International Development* (London: Department of International Development, 2003).

¹⁰ Mario Novelli and Alan Smith, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone* (New York: UNICEF, 2011), http://www.educationandtransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/EEPCT_PeacebuildingSynthesisReport.pdf.

¹¹ Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000), 7.

¹² Kerstin Tebbe, “Global Trends for Education to Support Stability and Resilience: Research, Programming and Finance,” *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (2009).

Indeed, in the delivery of education services, fragile states suffer from the same types of challenges as other developing countries, but their vulnerabilities render these challenges even more salient and require even more attention.¹³

While access to education is one major component of the complex interplay between education and conflict/fragility, other dimensions of education – such as quality, relevance, management, or equity – are of equal importance. The ultimate measure of success in school lies in what children learn and the quality of their education experience.¹⁴ In any context, a good-quality education positively influences an individual's physical and psychosocial health and his/her potential for the future. Nevertheless, education is even more important in fragile contexts, where these virtuous effects strengthen individuals' capacity to cope with their challenging circumstances.¹⁵ This is particularly important for education's role in mitigating conflict. Indeed, while an education system in itself does not cause war, its deficiencies can exacerbate the wider grievances, social tensions and inequalities that drive societies in the direction of violent conflict. According to UNESCO's *Education for All Global Monitoring Report (EFAGMR) 2011*, when teaching methods and materials are reinforcing prejudice, intolerance, and a distorted view of history, schools become a breeding ground for violence and young people become a pool of potential recruits for armed groups.¹⁶ It is therefore essential to

¹³ Yolande Miller-Grandvaux, "Education and Fragility: A New Framework Vol. 4, No. 1," *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (2009).

¹⁴ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010 – Reaching the Marginalized* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2010).

¹⁵ Rebecca Winthrop and Elena Matsui, *A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States* (Washington, DC: Center for Universal Education at Brookings, 2013).

¹⁶ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2011).

go beyond education service delivery as a mitigating or exacerbating factor in conflict and fragility. Some studies confirm that formal education systems have a vital role to play in building peace in countries affected by armed conflict: “Not only can education mitigate the impact of conflict by providing safe spaces and developmental opportunities for children; it can also actively transform the roots of conflict and build peace.”¹⁷ As a result, education’s conflict-mitigation role can only be fulfilled by using well-designed education programming and high-quality education activities. Schools can then provide an entry point for encouraging conflict resolution, tolerance, and respect for human rights—especially through peace education programs and conflict-sensitive education.¹⁸

While a substantial body of literature promotes school-based peace education programs and the need for conflict sensitivity in education, there is still a gap between theory and practice, and a lack of prioritization of education in post-conflict peacebuilding. There are only a few national school-based peace education programs in fragile states. While UNESCO’s EFAGMR 2008 called for the prioritization of peace education programs,¹⁹ the 2011 version regrets the still widely neglected role of education in “preventing armed conflict and promoting rebuilding of societies” because this neglect increases the “risk of a return to violence.”²⁰ UNESCO also underscores how armed conflict is diverting public

¹⁷ Kendra Dupuy, *Education for Peace: Building Peace and Transforming Armed Conflict through Education System* (Save the Children Norway, 2008).

¹⁸ Save the Children, *Delivering Education for Children in Emergencies* (International Save the Children Alliance, 2008), 4.

¹⁹ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2008 – Education for All by 2015, Will We Make It?* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2007), 137.

²⁰ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 245.

funds from education into military spending, emphasizing concerns about the merging of national security concerns and international development policies.²¹

Nevertheless, in recent years, the international community has increasingly promoted education as a core component of peacebuilding.²² Peace education has made its way into global policy recommendations, sometimes through different terms such as conflict-sensitive education or education for peacebuilding. UNESCO has officially made the culture of peace and peace education one of its priorities. The International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), in partnership with various actors, spearheads an initiative that underscores the need for conflict sensitivity in education particularly in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. UNESCO co-organized with INEE in April 2013 a High Level Symposium on Conflict-sensitive Education that gathered 200 high-level participants representing ministries of education and other government bodies, as well as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, UN agencies, bilateral development organizations, the private sector, civil society organizations, and leading national and international agencies promoting education in emergency and fragile contexts. The participants endorsed by acclamation the Paris Symposium Declaration on Conflict-sensitive Education²³ that calls for the prioritization of conflict-sensitive education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. USAID published a checklist for conflict sensitivity in education

²¹ Ibid., 2.

²² Ibid., 37.

²³ The full text of the Paris Symposium Declaration on Conflict Sensitive Education is available at: http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/Declaration_-_Paris_Symposium_on_Conflict_Sensitive_Education_Final.pdf

programs.²⁴ The official launch in 2012 of UNICEF's key report on the role of education in peacebuilding²⁵ marked also the start of its four-year *Peacebuilding, Education, and Advocacy* program that tested the report's recommendation in fourteen countries, and aimed at strengthening policy and practice in education for peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts. More generally, UN's commitment to peace education was reinforced through the UN *Global Education First* initiative driven by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on September 26, 2012 on the margins of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly. At the launch, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced he secured over US\$1.5 billion in commitments from Member States, for this initiative. The main objective of *Global Education First* is to make education a top priority on the global political agenda and to boost progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on education, and henceforth the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This initiative also places the promotion of "Global Citizenship" as one of its top three priorities. "Fostering Global Citizenship" implies "transforming the way people think and act;" giving education a "central role in helping people to forge more just, peaceful, tolerant and inclusive societies;" and providing people with "the understanding, skills and values they need to cooperate in resolving the interconnected challenges of the 21st Century,"²⁶ a definition that closely relates to peace education.

²⁴ USAID, *Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education Programs* (USAID, 2013).

²⁵ Novelli and Smith, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*.

²⁶ For more information, please visit the U.N. Secretary-General's Global Education First Initiative's website at: <http://globaleducationfirst.org/priorities.html>

There is a large body of literature on global education policy, and a fair amount of advocacy literature on peace education and conflict-sensitive education in fragile states, but not much that situates the latter in the former. Dana Burde notes that, since establishing an education system that provides equal access to all citizens is a key ingredient of a democratic state, scholars who explore state- and peacebuilding would appear to have a strong motivation to understand education; however, education has received limited attention from even these more specialized subfields.²⁷ In particular, there are no studies on peace education in Afghanistan, and no analyses across levels of how different actors at different levels respond to policy reforms like peace education. According to Barakat et al., the bulk of the literature on education and conflict is focused on a small number of geographic areas that receive a disproportionate amount of attention, and research on peace education initiatives often focuses on Northern Ireland or Israel-Palestine.²⁸ This doctoral research will address these gaps in the literature by asking the following research question: How have global discussions of peace education in conflict settings influenced national education policy and local NGOs efforts in Afghanistan since 2002, and why is that so? Using a vertical case study approach that calls for comparisons across multiple levels and organizations, this doctoral research will first assess the influence of global discussions on peace education on education policy and practice in schools, at the national and local levels in a fragile state such

²⁷ Dana Burde, "Editorial Note," *Journal on Education in Emergencies* 1, no. 1 (2015), 6.

²⁸ Bilal Barakat, Zuki Karpinska, and Julia Paulson, *Desk Study: Education and Fragility* (Oxford, UK: Conflict and Education Research Group (CERG), 2008) 17.

as Afghanistan; and second, it will explore the critical factors that shape this influence, or the lack thereof.

Since the beginning of the intervention by international forces in 2001, Afghanistan has made great strides in confronting a legacy of war, privation and violence. Yet, despite its progress, the country is still in a fragile transition, with much work yet to be done to consolidate the tenuous peace and ensure security. As USAID's top recipient, and one of the largest beneficiaries of international aid,²⁹ Afghanistan has the means to leverage conflict-sensitive education and education for peace in its peacebuilding efforts. The country did experience the negative instrumentalization of education in the 1980-90s through the printing and distribution of textbooks with violent content,³⁰ and while government authorities have engaged in efforts to revise textbooks these past few years, education is still a target of direct attacks and threats.³¹ The current national curriculum framework indicates that education "has to promote values such as peace and equip students for fighting against all forms of discrimination."³² Moreover, in April 2013, the Permanent Delegation of Afghanistan to UNESCO endorsed the *Paris Declaration on Conflict-Sensitive Education* that calls for the prioritization of conflict-sensitive education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. However, there is still progress to be made to ensure that education in Afghanistan is conflict-sensitive. Studying the case of Afghanistan in depth will help assess and understand the complex

²⁹ OECD, *Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation* (Paris: OECD, 2014).

³⁰ Craig Davis, "'A' Is for Allah, 'J' Is for Jihad," *World Policy Journal* 19, no. 1 (2002): 90–94.

³¹ Marit Glad, *Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan; Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation* (CARE/World Bank/Afghan Ministry of Education, 2009).

³² UNESCO, *World Data on Education - 7th Edition 2010/11– Afghanistan* (Paris: UNESCO IBE, 2011), 3, http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Islamic_Republic_of_Afghanistan.pdf.

internal and external influences that shape education policy and practice in a post-conflict education system, particularly in the field of education and peacebuilding.

B. Definitions

Global Policy Recommendations and Global Discussions

In this research, “global policy recommendations” and “global discussions” refer to policies and best practices promoted by scholars, international NGOs, UN bodies (mostly UNICEF, UNESCO, and UNHCR), the World Bank, or bilateral donor institutions such as USAID.

Peace Education and Conflict-Sensitive Education

The definition of peace education used in this research is the one developed by Susan Fountain for UNICEF: “the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavior changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level.”³³

The term “peace education” often refers to a wide variety of activities, and different organizations do not always use the same term. Other terms such as conflict-sensitive education or peacebuilding education may be used. Nevertheless, these terms all refer to activities that are components of peace education as defined by Fountain. As a result, peace education will be used as an umbrella term in this research.

INEE’s definition of conflict-sensitive education builds on Sarah Dryden-Peterson’s reflection on the concept of “sensitivity to conflict”. According to her, it must include efforts to transform structures, behaviors, and attitudes not only towards an absence of overt conflict, but also towards the presence of peace, with attention to both visible and structural forms of violence and inequalities.³⁴

³³ Susan Fountain, *Peace Education in UNICEF* (New York: United Nations Children’s Fund, 1999), 1.

³⁴ Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “Conflict-Sensitive Approach: ‘Do No Harm’ or Transformation?,” *INEE Blog*, 2012, http://www.ineesite.org/index.php/post/blog_conflictsensitive-approach-do-no-harm-or-transformation/.

Accordingly, for the term “conflict-sensitive education,” I will use the following definition: “Conflict-sensitive education is the process of:

- Understanding the context in which education takes place;
- Analyzing the two-way interaction between the context and education programs and policies (development, planning, and delivery); and
- Acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of education policies and programming on conflict, within an organization’s given priorities.”³⁵

“Acting to minimize negative impacts” is similar as the “Do No Harm” principle,³⁶ which calls for making all decisions with an awareness of how they will affect social tensions that may contribute to conflict. “Maximize positive impacts” refers to the idea that education can actively transform such tensions and support peace, such as learning respect for diversity, and local, national and global citizenship.³⁷

Education policy and practice in Afghanistan

This research will focus mostly on education policy and practice in the formal education sector, which includes primary and secondary schools. The formal education sector in Afghanistan comprises traditional government schools as well as village-based schools. Traditional government schools are large-scale public schools designed to serve numerous children from multiple villages. These are

³⁵ International Institute for Educational Planning, *INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education* (Paris: IIEP-UNESCO, 2013), 12.

³⁶ Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

³⁷ Morton Sigsgaard, *Conflict-Sensitive Education Policy: A Preliminary Review* (Doha: EAA, 2012), 7-8.

currently the main providers of education.³⁸ Village-based schools are public schools designed to serve only the children living in close proximity to the school. One of the major educational interventions supported by international aid agencies, their goal is to increase exposure to the official government curriculum in rural areas, particularly among girls.³⁹ The formal education sector is also composed of two distinct structures: the General Education system and the Islamic Education system. This research will focus on the General Education system. Chapter III will provide explanations for this selection and the limitations it entails.

Considering the definition used in this research for conflict-sensitive education, education policy and practice will be considered conflict-sensitive if they promote equitable access to all levels of education, ensure that curriculum, teaching and language are conflict-sensitive; and strengthen emergency preparedness (including protecting education from attacks).⁴⁰

The choice to focus on school-based education programs seemed natural, notably because it is the best way to reach the largest number of children, and, as Daniel Bar-Tal stresses, schools are often the “only institution that society can formally, intentionally, and extensively use to achieve this mission (i.e. peace education).”⁴¹

³⁸ Dana Burde and Leigh L. Linden, “Bringing Education to Afghan Girls: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Village-Based Schools,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5, no. 3 (2013), http://www.leighlinden.com/Afghanistan_Girls_Ed.pdf.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Sigsgaard, *Conflict-Sensitive Education Policy: A Preliminary Review*, 17.

⁴¹ Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Elusive Nature of Peace Education,” in *Peace Education: The Concepts, Principles and Practices around the World*, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002).

Fragile States

While addressing fragility is a high priority for international policy-makers, there is not a single definition of “fragile states” or “fragility”. Most of the definitions are built on a “policy-relevant typology” which emphasizes a *lack of political will* and/or *lack of capacity* in the state, specifically in regards to the provision of key services to its population.⁴² For instance, the British Department for International Development (DFID) defines fragile states as ones in which “the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor,” where core functions include service entitlements, justice and security.⁴³ In fragile states, where economic imbalances are extreme, literacy rates are low and basic universal education is a goal rather than a reality.

The notion of “fragile states” used in this research will combine DFID’s definition and the one used by the World Bank, which underscores the occurrence of ongoing violence: “Fragile states is the term used for countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict. Ongoing armed conflicts affect three out of four fragile states.”⁴⁴

⁴² Jacqueline Mosselson, Wendy Wheaton, and Paul St. John Frisoli, “Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature,” *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (April 2009), 2, <http://www.equipl23.net/jeid/articles/8/Mosselson-EducationFragilitySynthesisLiterature.pdf>

⁴³ DFID, *Reducing Poverty by Tackling Social Exclusion. A DFID Policy Paper* (London: DFID, 2005). In this definition, the term “government” refers to both central and local governmental entities.

⁴⁴ Available on the World Bank’s website.

C. Origins of the study

Between 2004 and 2012, I worked extensively as a consultant for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) and the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP). In this capacity, I was deeply involved in the development of a conflict resolution curriculum designed to instill a culture of dialogue and non-violent conflict management among students at secondary schools in Burundi in 2009 and 2010. Funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) at the request of the Burundian Minister of Education, this curriculum was tested in ten secondary schools, and received very positive feedback from students and teachers. Consequently, the Minister of Education endorsed the curriculum and requested the BLTP's collaboration in the extension of the program to all secondary schools in Burundi. It was the first time I had the chance to work on a peacebuilding program dedicated to children, and I realized that if such a program was successful, it could become a robust example for post-conflict reconstruction and prove essential for a peaceful future of fragile states. Indeed, the theory of change in such peace education programs is often described as follows: if youth develop a new way of thinking and seeing conflict thanks to peace education, and begin to exhibit new behavior that could give them the ability to work better together, then they will contribute to change the structures and cultural practices in their communities or societies, and enjoy sustainable peace and development in their country.⁴⁵ Yet, despite their sustained efforts, the Wilson

⁴⁵ John Paul Lederach, Reina Neufeldt, and Hal Culbertson, *Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit* (Mindanao: Joan Kroc Institute for Peacebuilding, Notre Dame University and Catholic Relief Services, 2007).

Center and the BLTP never succeeded in finding the funding needed to scale up the program to the national level. Donors' rationale for their refusal was often the lack of tangible evidence that such a program could have a significant and lasting impact.

Nevertheless, the qualitative data we gathered over a few months demonstrated a substantial potential for this type of educational peacebuilding program. It demonstrated short-term positive results, but we did not have the opportunity to pursue the program further to assess its longer-term impact. As a result, it convinced me to develop my knowledge in the field of peacebuilding and human security so I could dedicate the rest of my career to peace education. Consequently, I decided to devote my doctoral research to this puzzle: how can we explain the lack of national school-based peace education programs in fragile states? And what are the critical factors that can explain this gap between theory and practice?

My experience in Burundi and the literature on peace education designated the lack of serious impact evaluation as a major issue, so I was eager to pursue a study of the long-term impact of such programs. However, I soon recognized I would not be able to secure the necessary means for a rigorous multi-methods research based on a large data sample that would be taken seriously. Therefore, I decided to position my doctoral study at the policy level instead to explore not only the origins of the global recommendations on peace education, but also how they travel from the international level to the national and local levels. I realized that such a study could shed light on critical factors that may be underestimated for this gap between

theory and practice. I still hope that, later on, I will have the opportunity to pursue this initial goal as well.

When the time came to select a case for this study, I first looked for examples of conflict-affected countries where a peace education program could be found at both national and local levels. I read about the peace education program that a local NGO had been running for more than a decade with the support of the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE). Its location particularly caught my attention. Interested in giving back to my native region, I had developed and implemented a capacity-building program dedicated to Afghan women parliamentarians whose objective was to strengthen and promote the political participation of women in Afghanistan. As a result, stories about education and schools in Afghanistan naturally resonated with me.

When I first traveled to Afghanistan in April 2009, I had the chance to visit a school in the Wardak Province that had been damaged during the war and had been rebuilt with the help of the French government. Eight years after the intervention by the international community, the scars of war were still present inside and outside the school walls. Rusted old war tanks still laid around the neighborhood. Their tracks were embedded in the roads, and served as speed bumps. Big white check marks placed on the walls of the village houses indicated that the area had been cleared of land mines. Hanging in the schoolyard, the bell used to signal the start and end of the class periods was simply a spent artillery shell casing (see Appendix A for pictures). Unfortunately, this school was far from being an exception in Afghanistan. Many other ones were in far worse condition. At the

time, I wondered to what extent schools offered an adequate learning environment for children in Afghanistan and any fragile states affected by conflict, and how a peace education program could be taught successfully in such a context. In addition to my previous experience with Afghanistan and my knowledge of the Persian language, this NGO's holistic model involving the community, and their efforts to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of the program on their beneficiaries convinced me to explore further Afghanistan as a case study. This decision was finalized when I found elements of peace education in the Afghan national education policy for the general education system.

D. Overview of Chapters

Chapter I introduces the central research question that guided this study: how have global discussions of peace education in conflict settings influenced national education policy and local NGOs efforts in Afghanistan since 2002, and why is that so? Subsequent chapters explain how this research will seek to answer this research question and address key implications of the research for peace education in Afghanistan and fragile states.

Chapter II reviews the relevant literature and situates this study in the fields of education in fragile states, peace education, and global education policy. It explains the gap in the literature that this dissertation addresses, and introduces the research questions it aims to answer.

Chapter III presents the methods that this dissertation uses to answer these research questions. It clarifies the choice of a single site case study and the motives behind the case selection. The chapter then presents an overview of the qualitative

methodological approach employed for this study, and summarizes the research design, data collection and procedures for analysis.

The following four chapters constitute the core of this dissertation, presenting empirical findings from my analysis. **Chapter IV** first presents what the global recommendations on peace education in fragile states are. Then, it explores how peace education became a topic of global policy discussions, in order to assess the strength of global policy recommendations in this field. **Chapter V** establishes the context for the case study, providing background information about Afghanistan, including its recent conflict history and the state of the country's educational system. **Chapter VI** analyzes the Afghan national government's engagement in peace education policy and practice to assess and understand the influence of global policy recommendations, or the lack thereof. Finally, **Chapter VII** looks at the origin, design, and implementation of a peace education program developed by a local NGO in schools in Afghanistan; the influence of the cultural, social and political context on the program's content and implementation; the influence of global policy recommendations on the program; and the program's potential to influence national education policy and practice .

Chapter VIII concludes this dissertation by reviewing the main findings, and suggests directions for future research on peace education in fragile states. It is my hope that the issues, tensions, and concerns uncovered in this investigation will help guide the mainstreaming of peace education in fragile states, and will add to the literature on school-based peacebuilding policy and practice in fragile contexts. A systematic, carefully researched study of the development and implementation of

peace education policy and practice in a complex context such as Afghanistan could pay important dividends for the UN, and all actors involved in state- and peacebuilding programs in post-conflict and fragile state settings. This research will be applicable to Afghanistan, and possibly to other post-conflict countries aiming to reform or rebuild after a protracted war.

CHAPTER II – Literature Review

A. Introduction

This dissertation draws from the literature on education in emergencies and reconstruction as well as the broader analysis of education in fragile states. While education is undoubtedly impacted by conflict and state fragility, a lack of quality education can also act as a contributing factor to conflict and fragility. Therefore, this literature review will be an opportunity to explore the complex relationship between education and conflict. It will also investigate peace education theory, including a brief review of the literature on peacebuilding, to present how peace education is related to peacebuilding rhetorically, and to underline the gap between theory and practice. In order to situate this study in a broader context, the literature on global education policy will be studied as well, paying special attention to the politics of educational change and to the dialectic between external pressures and internal dynamics. Indeed, given the intensity of globalization processes and the interconnections among international organizations, governments, and legal institutions, educational programs cannot be implemented nor analyzed without taking into consideration the tremendous international forces that affect educational reforms. As a result, this literature review will draw our attention to processes of local adaptation, modification, and resistance to global forces in education. Finally, this chapter will underscore the gap in the literature that this doctoral research aims to address, and present the research questions that will guide data collection and analysis.

B. Education in Fragile States

In the past few years, the number of children living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts has rapidly increased: globally, an estimated 230 million children currently live in countries and areas affected by armed conflicts.⁴⁶ In fragile states, education services are often disrupted or are of such low quality that they fail to remain relevant, especially when survival and security concerns become priorities for families.⁴⁷ While conflict-affected fragile states account for 22 percent of the world's primary school-age population, they represent one-half of all children who were denied an education in 2011—and their share of the global out-of-school population is rising, up from 42 percent in 2008.⁴⁸ The situation for secondary schooling in such contexts is no better: one-third of the world's out-of-school adolescents of lower secondary school age lived in conflict-affected countries in 2011.⁴⁹ Most of those out of primary or secondary school in conflict-affected areas are girls.⁵⁰ Overall, children of primary school age in fragile and conflict-affected

⁴⁶ UNICEF, “Children and Emergencies in 2014: Facts and Figures,” 2015, www.unicef.org/media/files/UNICEF_Children_and_Emergencies_2014_fact_sheet.pdf.

⁴⁷ Jackie Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 5, no. 2 (2007): 187.

⁴⁸ UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and Education for All Global Monitoring Report (EFA GMR), *Progress in Getting All Children to School Stalls, but Some Countries Show the Way Forward*, EFA GMR Policy Paper 14, UIS Fact Sheet 28 (Paris: UNESCO, 2014), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002281/228184e.pdf>.

⁴⁹ UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF, *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children* (Montreal: UIS, 2015), p. 47, <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Documents/oosci-global-report-en.pdf>.

⁵⁰ UNESCO, *Children Still Battling to Go to School*, EFA GMR Policy Paper 10 (Paris: UNESCO, 2013), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002216/221668E.pdf>.

situations are nearly three times more likely to be out-of-school than children in other parts of the developing world.⁵¹

The combination of conflict, poverty and discrimination often creates detrimental consequences for children.⁵² In conflict-affected countries, children are more likely to be poor, malnourished, in generally poor health or out-of-school.⁵³ Indeed, one child in three in such settings does not go to school, compared to one in 11 in other low-income countries.⁵⁴ Furthermore, secondary school enrollment rates in conflict-affected fragile states are nearly a third lower than in other developing countries and far lower for girls.⁵⁵

Despite these alarming statistics, there is still a lack of prioritization of education in fragile states. Comprehensibly, the UN often gives a preference to security and political reforms in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Global security concerns, rather than poverty and need, are increasingly responsible for driving the international aid system agenda.⁵⁶ An analysis of the UN Peacebuilding Fund allocations confirms this trend and reveals that social programming, such as education, received less than 14 percent of the money allocated by the Fund in

⁵¹ World Bank, *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf.

⁵² UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World* (UNICEF and Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, New York, 2009), 18, www.unicef.org/publications/files/Machel_Study_10_Year_Strategic_Review_EN_030909.pdf.

⁵³ UNICEF, *Progress for Children. Beyond Averages: Learning from the MDGs* (New York: UNICEF, 2015), 6, [http://www.unicef.org/lac/Progress_for_Children_No._11_22June15\(2\).pdf](http://www.unicef.org/lac/Progress_for_Children_No._11_22June15(2).pdf).

⁵⁴ Save the Children, *The Future Is Now: Education for Children in Countries Affected by Conflict* (London: Save the Children, 2010).

⁵⁵ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 173.

2010.⁵⁷ Moreover, there is no consensus on the timing and sequencing of education programming in conflict-affected countries.⁵⁸ There is a lack of appreciation for the role education can play in the immediate post-conflict period, and sometimes a lack of attention to education in peace agreements.⁵⁹ Even if it makes sense to prepare for and initiate longer-term education development processes as early as possible in the post-conflict period makes sense, education is rarely seen as a high priority at this stage.⁶⁰ As a result, education still receives only 2 percent of humanitarian aid and there is a large funding gap of US\$4.8 billion.⁶¹ Donors favor low-income countries rather than those affected by conflict: even if they comprise almost half of the world's population of out-of-school children, conflict-affected and fragile states receive less than one fifth of education aid.⁶²

While education and conflict is an area that NGOs have been actively working in for a considerable length of time,⁶³ it is still a relatively recent field of academic study.⁶⁴ Indeed, an increasing body of grey literature and academic research has

⁵⁷ Alan Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review* (New York: UNICEF, 2011), 23.

⁵⁸ Novelli and Smith, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*, 34.

⁵⁹ Joanna Wedge, *Where Peace Begins: Education's Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (London: Save the Children, 2008).

⁶⁰ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 8.

⁶¹ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 204; European Commission, “EU Supports Educational Projects for Children in Situations of Emergency,” *European Commission - Press Release Database*, April 5, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1229_en.htm.

⁶² Save the Children Alliance, *Last in Line, Last in School: How Donors Are Failing Children in Conflict-Affected Fragile States* (London: International Save the Children Alliance, 2007), https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Last_in_Line_2009_1.pdf.

⁶³ Pauline Rose and Martin Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice. Centre for International Education*, Prepared for the DAC Fragile States Group Service Delivery Workstream Sub-Team for Education Services, 2006, 1, https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Education_and_Fragile_States.pdf.

⁶⁴ Christopher Talbot, “Recent Research and Current Research Gaps,” *Forced Migration Review*, no. 22 (2005); World Bank, *The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and -Driven Development, Operations Evaluation Department* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005);

examined education delivery in difficult contexts since the mid-1990s. Against the background of violent crises in many parts of the world, the specific protection and education needs of children in complex emergencies became more salient in the general consciousness.⁶⁵ A “field in its infancy,”⁶⁶ it exists at the intersection of “policy, programming, research, and scholarship in the areas of education in development, humanitarian aid, child rights and child protection.”⁶⁷

Various terms have been used to name this field: *education for reconstruction*,⁶⁸ *education in emergencies*,⁶⁹ *education and conflict*,⁷⁰ *education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction*,⁷¹ *emergency education*,⁷² *education in crisis situations*,⁷³ and *education in fragile states*.⁷⁴ Because education systems are inextricably related to the states and societies they serve, I have decided to select the latter designation. When states are fragile, and when armed conflicts arise, the education system becomes unreliable. Therefore, fragile states present specific

Kathryn Tomlinson and Pauline Benefield, *Education and Conflict: Research and Research Possibilities* (Slough: National Foundation for Educational Research, 2005); Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn, *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict* (London, Overseas Development Institute, 2003).

⁶⁵ Klaus Seitz, *Education and Conflict: The Role of Education in the Creation, Prevention and Resolution of Societal Crises—consequences for Development Cooperation* (Eschborn, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2004), 34.

⁶⁶ Tomlinson and Benefield, *Education and Conflict: Research and Research Possibilities*.

⁶⁷ Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” 183.

⁶⁸ Nina Arnhold et al., *Education for Reconstruction: The Regeneration of Educational Capacity Following National Upheaval* (Oxford: Symposium Books., 1998).

⁶⁹ Margaret Sinclair, *Planning Education in and after Emergencies* (Paris: UNESCO IIEP, 2002).

⁷⁰ Lynn Davies, *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos* (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004); Tomlinson and Benefield, *Education and Conflict: Research and Research Possibilities*.

⁷¹ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction* (London: INEE, 2004), <http://ineeserver.org/page.asp?pid=1240>.

⁷² Fumiyo Kagawa, “Emergency Education: A Critical Review of the Field,” *Comparative Education* 41, no. 4 (2005): 487–503.

⁷³ Dana Burde, *Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping the Field* (Washington, DC: Creative Associates/United States Agency for International Development, 2005).

⁷⁴ Rose and Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education.

challenges for education that need to be taken into account when designing, planning, and implementing new education policies. In this section, I will first present a brief history of the field. Then I will review the literature that analyzes the complex relationship between education, conflict and state fragility. Finally, I will present the goals, results and challenges of international aid for education in fragile states in order to understand the possible reasons for these persistent poor results and continuing struggle in the education sector.

1. Background and Evolution of the Field

In order to understand the current state of education in fragile states, and to offer some insights on its potential evolution in the near future, Rebecca Winthrop and Elena Matsui conduct a brief historical review that distinguishes three phases in the development of the field.⁷⁵ This review notably reveals how the field started with a general consideration of education in fragile and conflict-affected states, and then focused more and more its attention on the “do no harm” principle and conflict sensitivity in education.

First, the “proliferation phase” (1948 to mid-1990s) was mostly characterized by grassroots refugee education with no systematic policies on education. Winthrop and Matsui note that even the 1990 Education for All meeting at Jomtien, Thailand, did not specifically look at the issue of children affected by crisis or conflict. Indeed, Bensalah et al. add that “the tone was optimistic and there was little mention of education in emergencies, just a reference in Article 3 of the

⁷⁵ Winthrop and Matsui, *A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States*, 14.

Declaration to removing educational disparities for underserved groups including refugees; those displaced by war; and people under occupation.”⁷⁶

Second, the “consolidation stage” (mid-1990s to mid-2000s) offered increased attention to the need to protect children during emergencies and humanitarian crises. Winthrop and Matsui recall Graça Machel’s key 1996 report to the UN that identified a number of important ways that conflict impacts education.⁷⁷ The report also advised that UNESCO’s expertise in educational curricula development and teacher training should be “utilized by operational agencies in all phases of conflict.”⁷⁸ A subsequent UNESCO study for the World Education Forum in Dakar⁷⁹ also acknowledged the massive impairment of education endeavors due to a wave of armed conflicts and civil wars, which was not really given enough consideration at the 1990 World Education Forum in Jomtien.⁸⁰ As a result, the 2000 World Education Forum also sought to provide increased global attention to education in fragile states. Primary school completion and gender parity were incorporated into the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later that year. Winthrop and Matsui claim that, at this point, it became “no longer an acceptable policy position for a state to only educate some of its young people.”⁸¹ Consequently, governments paid an increased attention to improving access to

⁷⁶ Kacem Bensalah et al., *Education in Situations of Emergency and Crisis: Challenges for the New Century*, Reissue of Thematic Study (Paris: UNESCO, 2001).

⁷⁷ United Nations, *Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (The Machel Study)*, A/51/306 (New York: United Nations, 1996).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 298.

⁷⁹ UNESCO, *International Consultative Forum on Education for All / Thematic Studies: Education for All 2000 Assessment - Executive Summaries* (Paris: UNESCO, 2000).

⁸⁰ Seitz, *Education and Conflict: The Role of Education in the Creation, Prevention and Resolution of Societal Crises—consequences for Development Cooperation*, 34.

⁸¹ Winthrop and Matsui, *A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States*, 17.

education. However, they still did not focus on improving the quality of learning taking place inside schools.⁸² The Inter-agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) emerged following the commitments made at the 2000 World Conference on Education for All and in recognition of the neglect of education within international humanitarian response. Along with other institutions and scholars, INEE insisted education should be considered the fourth pillar of humanitarian response to conflict – alongside the three recognized pillars of food, shelter and health – while it is linked with longer-term development goals.⁸³ Although INEE focuses on emergency situations, that focus has inevitably raised the importance of continuity and early planning for transition to a post-emergency environment.⁸⁴ Despite promising developments, the “consolidation stage” focused only on advocating for education’s inclusion as part of humanitarian response, without analyzing the political nature of education.

Third, the “collaboration stage” (from the mid-2000s to the present) started to integrate other sectors and sets of actors, including security specialists and development actors concerned about fragile states. The growing recognition that development and humanitarian interventions could have negative impacts on affected populations led to increased commitments to “do no harm” and greater attention to conflict sensitivity in education. In the education sector, this movement was mostly built on Bush and Saltarelli’s seminal study that shed light on the “two

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Eldrid Midttun, *Education in Emergencies and Transition Phases: Still a Right and More of a Need* (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2000).

⁸⁴ Rose and Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education, 1.

faces” of education and its potential role in both fueling and mitigating conflict.⁸⁵ As a result, discussions moved beyond access and paid increased attention to education’s role in fragile contexts: they “not only focused on the benefits of educational continuity for children in humanitarian settings but also on how education interfaces with complex processes such as peacebuilding and statebuilding.”⁸⁶ Since then, the linkages between education, conflict, and state fragility have been supported by a significant body of research, and development actors started to explore ways to meet the MDGs in fragile contexts, tackling the issue of educational continuity amid crisis. According to Winthrop and Matsui, education in fragile and conflict-affected states was discussed for the first time in a 2007 meeting with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), sponsored by the Canadian government.⁸⁷ Following up on that meeting, a working group on education and fragility was set up through INEE in 2008 to pursue this dialogue among various agencies and organizations working on education interventions in fragile states. Both bilateral and multilateral development agencies have been instrumental in this dialogue and in the development of policy and programs dedicated to education in conflict-affected and fragile states. Among the various initiatives undertaken since then, INEE published a framework for analyzing education and fragility in 2011,⁸⁸ based on the framework developed by the United

⁸⁵ Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children* (Florence, Italy, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2000), <http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/insight4.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Winthrop and Matsui, *A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States*, 19.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses* (INEE, 2011), http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/documents/store/Analytic_frameworkof_Education_and_Fragility.pdf.

States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Fast-Track Initiative.⁸⁹ Furthermore, INEE released in 2013 a “resource pack” that included a set of guidelines and principles for integrating conflict sensitivity in education policy and programming in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.⁹⁰ The increased attention to education in fragile states was confirmed in 2010, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the right to education in emergencies, urging the international community to implement strategies and policies to ensure the realization of the right to quality education for all children living in emergencies and conflict-affected countries.⁹¹ Since then, several other important actors on the international scene started to consider education in contexts of conflict and fragility a priority, contributing to the rise of this issue on the global policy agenda.⁹² Lene Buchert notes that a number of international agencies have redirected the focus of their international development assistance to contexts understood as fragile, or as being in a conflict or post-conflict situation.⁹³ For example, DFID planned to direct 50 percent of its aid for education to conflict-affected and fragile states.⁹⁴ Moreover, Menashy and Dryden-Peterson add that key high-profile individuals have contributed to the elevation of this issue on the global agenda: for instance, in

⁸⁹ USAID, *Education and Fragility: An Assessment Tool* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2006), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadh913.pdf.

⁹⁰ This resource pack is available on INEE’s website: <http://www.ineesite.org/en/conflict-sensitive-education>

⁹¹ United Nations General Assembly, *The Right to Education in Emergency Situations*, Resolution A/64/L.68 (New York: United Nations, 2010), <http://www.unesco.org/education/postconflict/educationinemergencies.pdf>.

⁹² Francine Menashy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “The Global Partnership for Education’s Evolving Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States,” *International Journal of Educational Development* 44 (2015): 82.

⁹³ Lene Buchert, “Introduction—Understanding Education, Fragility and Conflict,” *Prospects* 43 (2013): 5–15.

⁹⁴ DFID, *Learning for All: DFID’s Education Strategy 2010–2015* (London: DFID, 2010).

2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon selected former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown as Special Envoy on Global Education to lead the newly established *Global Education First Initiative*, which identifies sustaining education in humanitarian crises, especially conflict, as a key action to addressing the global education emergency.⁹⁵

Despite great education needs in fragile and conflict-affected states, and a stronger emphasis on this issue as a key item on the global policy agenda, humanitarian aid for education remains limited,⁹⁶ and improving education in fragile states remains a serious challenge for the international community.

2. Education, Conflict and State Fragility: A Complex Relationship

a) The Impact of Conflict and State Fragility on Education

Following the 1996 Machel Study, several reports⁹⁷ have shined a spotlight on the violence that children suffer in armed conflicts and the threat of attacks on education.⁹⁸ For instance, UNESCO's 2011 Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report (GMR) explains how education is a silent victim of armed conflict and how the damage to education lasts long after conflicts have ended.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Menashy and Dryden-Peterson, "The Global Partnership for Education's Evolving Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States," 82.

⁹⁶ Liesbet Steer and Katie Smith, *Financing Education: Opportunities for Global Action* (Washington DC: Brookings, 2015), 37
<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/07/financing-for-education-steer-smith/FinancingForEducation2015.pdf?la=en>.

⁹⁷ Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, *Children: The Invisible Soldiers* (Stockholm: Save the Children, 1996); Save the Children, *Rewrite the Future: Education for Children in Conflict-Affected Countries* (London: Save the Children, 2006).

⁹⁸ Brendan O'Malley, *Education under Attack* (Paris: UNESCO, 2007); Brendan O'Malley, *Education under Attack* (Paris: UNESCO, 2010).

⁹⁹ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*.

The effects of fragility and conflict on education are devastating both in the short-term and over the long term.¹⁰⁰ Threats to education include the deliberate targeting and destruction of schools, as well as the killings of teachers and children.¹⁰¹ A report by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) presents the vast scale of attacks on education worldwide: six countries in particular – Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Syria – were heavily affected, with more than 1,000 attacks on schools, staff and students from 2009 to 2012 in each country.¹⁰² In Afghanistan alone, 553 schools (almost 10 percent) serving 275,000 students were closed due to insecurity in 2012, and the number is probably higher today.¹⁰³

Educational institutions often have symbolic value: they may face attacks because of their supposed ideological content, or because they are seen to support new government structures (for instance, if they are being used as polling stations during elections).¹⁰⁴ Education is a public good generally considered to be provided by the state.¹⁰⁵ As such, scholars note that, given the educational system’s dual

¹⁰⁰ Menashy and Dryden-Peterson, “The Global Partnership for Education’s Evolving Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.”

¹⁰¹ O’Malley, *Education under Attack*, 2007; UNESCO, *Protecting Education from Attack: A State of the Art Review* (Paris: UNESCO, 2010).

¹⁰² GCPEA (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack), *Education Under Attack 2014* (New York: GCPEA, 2014).

¹⁰³ Arne Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, Paper Prepared for the Oslo Summit on Education and Development in Oslo, Norway, 2015, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FINANCING%20EDUCATION%20IN%20AFGHANISTAN.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ Save the Children, *Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children’s Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States* (London, UK: Save the Children, 2012), 3, https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Breaking-the-Cycle-of-Crisis-low-res_0.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Multiple Faces of Education in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts* (New York, Paris, and Geneva: INEE, 2010), 9, http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/INEE_Multiple_faces_of_ed_in_conflict-affected__fragile_contexts_FINAL.pdf.

roles as a site for daily interaction between the population and the state and as a barometer of the state's commitment to educate its people, they have the symbolic value of (re)establishing state legitimacy.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, schools may be targeted in efforts to undermine government legitimacy.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, girls' schools, female students, and teachers may be specifically targeted by radical Islamists.¹⁰⁸ These tremendously unsafe conditions often prevent children from going to school and result in the abandonment of schooling as families fear for their children's safety or have to flee for their survival. Indeed, conflict means that children in school are more likely to drop out,¹⁰⁹ with only 65 percent of children in conflict-affected countries reaching the final grade of primary school, compared with 86 percent across other developing countries.¹¹⁰

Children who miss school during episodes of armed violence tend not return.¹¹¹ As a result, conflict-affected and fragile states countries have some of the lowest literacy levels in the world. In the long run, these communities suffer from the creeping erosion of vital educational resources—human as well as financial—and the cumulative and life-long impact on the children who miss months, or even

¹⁰⁶ Dupuy, *Education for Peace: Building Peace and Transforming Armed Conflict through Education System*; Barakat, Karpinska, and Paulson, *Desk Study: Education and Fragility*.

¹⁰⁷ Smith and Vaux, *Education, Conflict, and International Development*; USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies* (USAID, 2006), <http://www.beps.net/publications/Education%20in%20fragile%20states%20case%20studies.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Dana Burde, "Preventing Violent Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Considering the Role of Community-Based Education," in *Protecting Education from Attack: A State of the Art Review*, by UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO, 2010).

¹⁰⁹ Save the Children, *Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children's Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States*, 3.

¹¹⁰ UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF, *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children*, 66.

¹¹¹ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*.

years, of schooling.¹¹² Deteriorated living conditions considerably raise the levels of child malnutrition, and have negative impacts on children's physical and mental health.¹¹³ Indeed, widespread human rights violations against children during conflict, such as rape and sexual violence or the recruitment of child soldiers, lead to psychological trauma.¹¹⁴ As a result, even when families find a way for their children to pursue their schooling, these severe conditions disturb children's capacity to learn. Moreover, in such contexts, the quality of education is usually so poor that it leads to poor learning outcomes. Consequently, conflict exacerbates issues of poverty and the lack of an educated and skilled workforce.¹¹⁵

Another important issue affecting education in conflict-affected and fragile states is corruption. While there is poor access to education in fragile states, demand for basic education remains high. The education sector is often one of the largest beneficiaries of public resources and one of the largest employers of public servants in these countries, making the potential impact of corruption great.¹¹⁶ Marie Chene notes that there is a growing interest in exploring the relationship between corruption, education and fragility but still relatively little empirical evidence demonstrating the linkages between them.¹¹⁷ In such contexts plagued by

¹¹² UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF, *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children*, 45.

¹¹³ Michael Wessells and Anne Edgerton, "What Is Child Protection? Concepts and Practices to Support War-Affected Children," *Journal of Developmental Processes* 3, no. 2 (2008): 2–12; Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (2010).

¹¹⁴ Wessells and Edgerton, "What Is Child Protection? Concepts and Practices to Support War-Affected Children."

¹¹⁵ Save the Children, *Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children's Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States*, 3.

¹¹⁶ Rose and Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education.

¹¹⁷ Marie Chene, *Fighting Corruption in Education in Fragile States* (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012),

low transparency, the education system is a prime site for corruption through paying for “ghost” teachers and schools, misappropriated funds, fraudulent school construction contracts, and other dishonest schemes.¹¹⁸ Additionally, schools are often a site where children become accustomed to the practice of corruption: for instance, at the teacher-student level, it can take the form of favorable treatment or good grades/promotion in exchange for payment, services or sexual favors.¹¹⁹ As a result, and because it is one of the most frequent contact points between large parts of the population and the state, the education system can be one of the most visible signs of larger state corruption.¹²⁰ Enabled by conflict and fragility, corruption undermines the legitimacy of the state and erodes public trust in institutions, with a damaging impact on the institution building process.¹²¹ Widespread corruption can be, in turn, conducive to recruitment by non-state armed groups and radicalization. For instance, in Nigeria, the government’s high rate of corruption and neglect of citizen welfare also feeds the extremist narrative.¹²² Indeed, leaders of Boko Haram often refer to the corrupt attitudes of the modern elites trained at secular schools where they have acquired Western education and who are currently in positions of power.¹²³ In its drive to recruit members, the

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/fighting_corruption_in_education_in_fragile_state
S.

¹¹⁸ Barakat, Karpinska, and Paulson, *Desk Study: Education and Fragility*, 9.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ OECD, *Integrity in State Building* (Paris: OECD, 2009), <http://www.u4.no/recommended-reading/integrity-instatebuilding-anti-corruption-with-a-statebuilding-lens/>.

¹²² Freedom Onuoha, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*, USIP Special Report (United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 7, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf.

¹²³ Ibid.

organization encourages school dropouts and presents a narrative about corruption that easily appeals to impoverished, alienated, and jobless Muslim youth.¹²⁴

To conclude, children in conflict-affected and fragile states find themselves in a “cycle of crisis.”¹²⁵ The loss of education due to conflict deprives them of at least some protection from the sexual exploitation, physical attacks, and recruitment into armed groups.¹²⁶ High levels of illiteracy make children and adolescents more susceptible to manipulation and recruitment into extremist groups.¹²⁷ And because they miss the chance to acquire vital skills for the future, and see their employment prospects and future earnings diminish,¹²⁸ this may aggravate the risks of an outbreak or renewal of violent conflict.¹²⁹ As a result, education has the potential to play a critical role when a country attempts to transition from relief to development.¹³⁰

b) The Role of Education in Conflict and State Fragility

While education is undoubtedly impacted by conflict and state fragility, a lack of quality education can also act as a contributing factor to conflict and fragility.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Save the Children, *Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children's Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States*.

¹²⁶ UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF, *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children*, 66.

¹²⁷ Onuoha, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*, 8-9.

¹²⁸ Patricia Justino, *Violent Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation*, CRPD Working Paper 8 (Leuven, Belgium: Centre for Research on Peace and Development, University of Leuven, 2011), <https://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/12/80/wp08.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Patricia Justino, Marinella Leone, and Paola Salardi, “Short- and Long-Term Impact of Violence on Education: The Case of Timor Leste,” *World Bank Economic Review* 28, no. 2 (2013): 320–53.

¹³⁰ Mary A. Mendenhall, “Education Sustainability in the Relief-Development Transition: Challenges for International Organizations Working in Countries Affected by Conflict,” *International Journal of Educational Development* 35 (2014), 76.

According to Jackie Kirk, “education is at the same time cause, effect, problem and possible solution.”¹³¹ Various scholars have investigated the ways in which education may increase or mitigate the risk of conflict.¹³² After reviewing the literature on education and conflict, Smith et al. have identified three major ways in which education can have a positive or negative impact on conflict. First, education can serve as a powerful tool for ideological development; second, education can serve as an “instrument for providing the knowledge and skills necessary for economic development and societal mobility” (this could entail increased social tensions if access to education is not equal); and, third, education is a “means by which social and cultural values are transmitted from generation to generation and, depending on the values concerned, these may convey negative stereotypes or encourage attitudes that explicitly or implicitly condone violence or generate conflict.”¹³³

(1) Education: A Potential Contributing Factor to Conflict and State Fragility

According to Peter Buckland who conducted a study on education and post-conflict reconstruction for the World Bank, “Schools are almost always complicit

¹³¹ Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” 188.

¹³² Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*; Smith and Vaux, *Education, Conflict, and International Development*; Davies, *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos*; Marc Sommers, “*It Always Rains in the Same Place First*”: *Geographic Favoritism in Rural Burundi*, Africa Program Issue Briefing 1 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005); USAID, *Education and Fragility: An Assessment Tool*; Barakat, Karpinska, and Paulson, *Desk Study: Education and Fragility*; Miller-Grandvaux, “Education and Fragility: A New Framework Vol. 4, No. 1”; Mosselson, Wheaton, and St. John Frisoli, “Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature.”

¹³³ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 19.

in conflict (...) They can reproduce skills, values, attitudes and social relations of dominant groups in society; accordingly they are usually a contributory factor in conflict.”¹³⁴ Education can contribute to conflict and state fragility in various ways. Lynn Davies examines the complex relationship between education and conflict; she notably looks at how schools are engaged in what she calls “war education.”¹³⁵ She concludes, “Education indirectly does more to contribute to the underlying causes of conflict than it does to peace. This is through reproduction of economic inequality and the bifurcation of wealth/poverty; through the promotion of a particular version of hegemonic masculinity and gender segregation and through magnifying ethnic and religious segregation or intolerance.”¹³⁶ Bush and Saltarelli came to similar conclusions when they identified seven distinct negative roles for: uneven distribution of education and educational opportunities; use of education as a form of cultural repression; denial of education as a weapon of war; manipulation of history for political purposes; manipulation of textbooks; images of ethnic groups in ways, which convey dominance and ethnic segregation.¹³⁷ Some of these negative roles of education are detailed hereafter.

In most contexts, education is viewed as a responsibility of the state.¹³⁸ The basic education system is often the largest, most widespread, and most visible state institution in a country, permeating even remote regions.¹³⁹ It represents

¹³⁴ Peter Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), xv.

¹³⁵ Davies, *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos*.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 203.

¹³⁷ Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*.

¹³⁸ Rose and Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education.

¹³⁹ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 85.

government in every community, from urban centers to remote villages. However, as Smith and Vaux underscore, “Simply providing education does not ensure peace.”¹⁴⁰ The perception of inadequate educational service often becomes a grievance that exacerbates state fragility: for instance, a quantitative study of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone confirms that lack of educational opportunity was among the reasons ex-combatants joined the Revolutionary United Front.¹⁴¹ The lack of educational access has the potential to create resentment among the population as well as to exacerbate the underlying fragility of a nation and reignite conflict.¹⁴² It negatively affects an already tenuous government legitimacy, and provides opportunities for radicalization. Adolescents with no possibilities to attend school have limited job opportunities and are therefore a latent factor of instability, which is recognized by several conflict analysis tools. The World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework lists “high youth unemployment” among its nine conflict risk indicators,¹⁴³ and the UN’s Interagency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations includes the lack of equal economic and social opportunities in its examples of structural factors influencing conflict.¹⁴⁴ For instance, this radicalization risk can be observed in Pakistan where a failing state’s education system facilitates the growth of militant groups; they establish parallel educational

¹⁴⁰ Smith and Vaux, *Education, Conflict, and International Development*, 10.

¹⁴¹ Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone / June-August 2003” (Columbia University, Stanford University, PRIDE, 2004), http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/Report1_BW.pdf.

¹⁴² Mendenhall, “Education Sustainability in the Relief-Development Transition: Challenges for International Organizations Working in Countries Affected by Conflict,” 76.

¹⁴³ World Bank, *Conflict Analysis Framework* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 7.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations, *Interagency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations* (United Nations, 2004).

or training institutions and, are thus able to fill a vacuum left open by low levels of public education provision.¹⁴⁵

Education systems also have the potential to entrench or exacerbate existing inequalities and prejudices. Competition for education can be a source of tension.¹⁴⁶ Where educational opportunities are denied to the population, or to certain sections of the population, the risks of instability are high.¹⁴⁷ The mobilization of ethnicity through schooling is a relatively common phenomenon.¹⁴⁸ For example, in Burundi, access to education remains unequal along ethnic lines.¹⁴⁹ Rwanda is another case of political manipulation of the education system. Both formal and informal education channels and materials, including textbooks, were used to incite ethnic hatred before the 1994 genocide.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the content of educational materials can be used to instill a logic and culture of violence and an unquestioning hatred of others.¹⁵¹ For instance, in Afghanistan, school textbooks were developed in the 1980s and used to instill a logic and culture of violence. As Jeaniene Spink shows, after the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, in the urgency to ensure that children were able to go to school, little attention was given

¹⁴⁵ Raheem ul Haque, *Youth Radicalization in Pakistan*, Peace Brief 167 (United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 3, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf.

¹⁴⁶ UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World*, 176.

¹⁴⁷ Kirk, "Education and Fragile States," 188.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁴⁹ Tony Jackson, *Equal Access to Education: A Peace Imperative for Burundi* (London: International Alert, 2000), 5, http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/equal_access_to_education.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Anna Obura, *Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda* (Paris: UNESCO IIEP, 2003).

¹⁵¹ UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World*, 176.

to what the children were returning to.¹⁵² In 2002-03, an internationally-led education campaign failed to remove messages of hate and intolerance from curricula, and this socialization of intolerance may continue to exacerbate social tensions over time.¹⁵³ According to Burde, even if it is not clear to what extent teaching hate and violence is a direct causal mechanism for producing violent conflict, “There is strong evidence that using textbooks to create a culture of intolerance and hate is likely to increase public support for militancy, particularly when these messages are framed in religious lessons exhorting young people to engage in violence and defend their faith.”¹⁵⁴

In addition to these ways in which education is an indirect conduit for violence against children and their communities, and a contributing factor in the ongoing instability of a country or region, schools can also become a place for direct forms of violence against children than can lead to fragility, such as corporal punishment, bullying, and sexual violence.¹⁵⁵ A number of scholars and agencies have studied the impacts of school-related violence, and explain how it can drive conflict.¹⁵⁶ For instance, Clive Harber warns against the worldwide dominant authoritarian model

¹⁵² Jeaniene Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” *Journal of Peace Education* 2, no. 2 (2005): 200.

¹⁵³ Morton Sigsgaard, *Education and Fragility in Afghanistan* (INEE and IIEP/UNESCO, 2009), 20, http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/education_and_fragility_in_afghanistan.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ Dana Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

¹⁵⁵ Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” 189.

¹⁵⁶ Fiona Leach et al., *An Investigative Study of the Abuse of Girls in African Schools*, Education Research Report 54 (London: DFID, 2003); Clive Harber, *Schooling as Violence: How Schools Harm Pupils and Societies* (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2004); Government of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), UNICEF, and Save the Children, *Disciplining the Child: Practices and Impacts* (Pakistan: Government of NWFP, 2005); UNICEF, *Corporal Punishment in Schools in South Asia* (Kathmandu: UNICEF, ROSA, 2011); Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *World Report on Violence against Children* (Geneva: United Nations, 2006), www.violencestudy.org.

of schooling, and reports that it provides the context for education's role in the reproduction and perpetration of violence.¹⁵⁷

(2) The Positive Role of Education on State Fragility and Conflict

Collier's analysis of civil wars over the period 1965-1999 shows that a "country which has ten percentage points more of its youth in school – say 55 % instead of 45% – cuts its risk of conflict from 14% to around 10%."¹⁵⁸ Other scholars have also provided some empirical evidence suggesting that expanding access to education has a general pacifying effect on conflict and civil war.¹⁵⁹ More recently, Clayton Thyne tested two ways by which education might affect the probability of civil war onset: first, "educational investment provides a strong signal to the people that the government is attempting to improve their lives, which is apt to lower grievances"; and second, "education can generate economic, political, and social stability by giving people tools with which they can resolve disputes peacefully, making them less likely to incur the risks involved in joining a rebellion."¹⁶⁰ The results of the test delivered evidence for both reducing grievances and generating

¹⁵⁷ Harber, *Schooling as Violence: How Schools Harm Pupils and Societies*, 38.

¹⁵⁸ Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*.

¹⁵⁹ Orlando J. Perez, "Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala," *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (2003): 627–644; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 563–595; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2004): 253–273; James Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2004): 138–151; Michael Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?," *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2004): 337–356.

¹⁶⁰ Thyne tested this theory by examining the effect of educational expenditures, enrollment levels, and literacy rates on the probability of civil war onset from 1980 through 1999. See Thyne, "ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999," 733.

stability, providing strong support for the argument that education has pacifying on society.¹⁶¹ As a result, some contend that, with well-designed education programming and high quality education activities, schools can provide an entry point for encouraging conflict resolution, tolerance, and respect for human rights.¹⁶² Indeed, the content and methods of imparting education have a role in mitigating fragility.¹⁶³ While the *Machel Study* had already suggested Education for Peace as one kind of educational initiative that might have constructive peacebuilding impacts in 1996,¹⁶⁴ it is only in recent years that education has been increasingly mentioned as a core component of peacebuilding, and therefore as a contribution for building sustainable peace.¹⁶⁵ Peace Education can have positive effects on students' attitudes, and teachers have the ability to impart values of tolerance for cultural differences and acceptance of diversity as well as fostering critical thinking and interactive skills among learners.¹⁶⁶ The transition from conflict to peace is a key opportunity to revise the school curricula and make space for peace education. According to Margaret Sinclair, renewal of curricula and pedagogy can harness the positive potential of education and teaching.¹⁶⁷ She explains that this renewal may include the removal of past biases and initiatives to improve pedagogy and enrich

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Save the Children, *Delivering Education for Children in Emergencies*, 4.

¹⁶³ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Multiple Faces of Education in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts*, 9.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations, *Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (The Machel Study)*, para 255-258.

¹⁶⁵ Novelli and Smith, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*, 37.

¹⁶⁶ Wedge, *Where Peace Begins: Education's Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*. The next section that reviews the literature on Peace Education will provide more details on Peace Education programs goals, types, and approaches.

¹⁶⁷ Margaret Sinclair, "Protecting through Curriculum: A Call for Collaboration," in *Protecting Education From Attack, a State-of-the-Art Review*, by UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO, 2010), 280.

the curriculum with skills, values and concepts in the areas of conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian principles and responsible citizenship.¹⁶⁸

For Bush and Salterelli, the “positive face” of education goes beyond the provision of education for peace programs. They claim that the provision of good quality education includes the conflict-dampening impact of educational opportunity, the promotion of linguistic tolerance, the nurturing of ethnic tolerance, or the ‘disarming’ of history, in addition to peace education.¹⁶⁹ Another study also confirms that formal education systems have a vital role to play in building peace in countries affected by armed conflict: “Not only can education mitigate the impact of conflict by providing safe spaces and developmental opportunities for children; it can also actively transform the roots of conflict and build peace.”¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, in 2009, the UN Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict placed the “provision of basic services,” including education, among the five recurring priorities for peacebuilding.¹⁷¹ Phillips et al. distinguish three roles that education can play in the post-conflict reconstruction phase: physical reconstruction of school buildings, ideological reconstruction, and psychological reconstruction.¹⁷² Indeed, there is a growing appreciation that “reconstruction is not simply about replacing the physical infrastructure of schools, but needs to

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*.

¹⁷⁰ Dupuy, *Education for Peace: Building Peace and Transforming Armed Conflict through Education System*, 2.

¹⁷¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, A/63/881–S/2009/304 (New York: United Nations, 2009), <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/s2009304.pdf>.

¹⁷² Arnhold et al., *Education for Reconstruction: The Regeneration of Educational Capacity Following National Upheaval*.

include opportunities for rebuilding human relations and inclusive education systems.”¹⁷³ Participatory processes both in classrooms and in school management practices have the potential to build practices of cooperation and reciprocity within schools as well as in the broader society.¹⁷⁴ While education seems to have the potential to facilitate reconciliation processes, a deeper understanding of the exact role of education in contributing to reconciliation processes has yet to be developed.

The complex relationship between education and the nation-state also explains the complex relationship between education and conflict. Mass public education is a goal of virtually every government in the world today, because public education is key to the operation of the modern state.¹⁷⁵ Because school education aims to create a common understanding of identity, common schooling is necessary for the establishment of a modern political community, including a national government.¹⁷⁶ As Benedict Anderson wrote, the nation is “an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign...it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”¹⁷⁷ This communion is possible only when vast numbers of people are exposed to the same ideas through the system of mass public schooling.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, the quality of mass schooling is considered a positive

¹⁷³ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding*, *Literature Review*, 22.

¹⁷⁴ Wedge, *Where Peace Begins: Education's Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*.

¹⁷⁵ Tony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, “Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State,” *Comparative Education Review* 42, no. 2 (2005): 129–47.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed (London: Verso, 1983), 6–7.

¹⁷⁸ Waters and LeBlanc, “Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State.”

factor for economic development. As Chauvet and Collier have demonstrated, secondary education increases the probability that a country will experience substantial economic reform; in order to emerge, reform may need a critical mass of reasonably well educated people.¹⁷⁹

Along the same lines, Buckland stresses education's critical role in the wider reconstruction of society, from building peace and social cohesion to facilitating economic recovery and getting the country onto an accelerated development track.¹⁸⁰ Other scholars have also insisted on the unique role of schooling in socialization.¹⁸¹ Schools and classrooms can provide the space in which people of different origins can be brought together and taught how to live and work together peacefully.¹⁸² Schools are therefore sites of "social interactions where meaning is constructed in a particular cultural context" and thus "schools also serve to support existing power structures and to socialize young people" to their roles in these relations.¹⁸³ At a national level, education underpins the maintenance and reproduction of political, economic and social structures.¹⁸⁴ According to Mosselson et al., education provides both challenges and opportunities to working

¹⁷⁹ Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier, "Education in Fragile States," Paper Commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2008, Education for All by 2015: Will We Make It? (UNESCO, 2007), 5, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001555/155518e.pdf>.

¹⁸⁰ Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 27.

¹⁸¹ Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, vol. 5, 5 vols. (Beverly Hills; London: Sage Publications, 1977); Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays* (London, UK: New Left Books, 1971); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (London, UK: Tavistock, 1977); Paul E. Willis, *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1981).

¹⁸² Thyne, "ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999."

¹⁸³ Fida Adely, "The Mixed Effects of Schooling for High School Girls in Jordan: The Case of Tel Yahya," *Comparative Education Review* 48, no. 4 (2004): 353.

¹⁸⁴ Dupuy, *Education for Peace: Building Peace and Transforming Armed Conflict through Education System*, 29.

in fragile contexts, and thus without some reflection on the role and function of education, work in the education sector runs the danger of reproducing the factors that contributed to fragility in the first place.¹⁸⁵ In addition to contributing to a stronger civil society, better governance, and economic growth, the delivery of education services enhances the legitimacy of government, both local and national: when families in a post-crisis environment have access to quality education, they credit government and feel some security; in a deteriorating environment, the decay of good schools signals that government is failing.¹⁸⁶

In conclusion, high-quality education systems can help prevent civil unrest and encourage conflict resolution, tolerance and reconciliation. They can also reduce both poverty and inequality, and lay the foundations for good governance and effective institutions.¹⁸⁷ Quality education that is free, safe and accessible to all children and young people is not only a basic right before, during and after conflict but also a necessary component of prevention and sustainable peacebuilding.¹⁸⁸ However, Smith and Vaux, among others, stress the need for a more detailed analysis of local contexts in order to determine whether education will actually promote conflict prevention.¹⁸⁹ This recognition of the potential duality of education's impact on conflict and state fragility led the international community to increase its attention to education aid in such contexts with mixed results. The

¹⁸⁵ Mosselson, Wheaton, and St. John Frisoli, "Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature," 6.

¹⁸⁶ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 1.

¹⁸⁷ Rose and Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education, 2, 3, 4, 7, 22.

¹⁸⁸ UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World*, 176.

¹⁸⁹ Smith and Vaux, *Education, Conflict, and International Development*.

next section will explore the goals, results, and challenges of providing international aid for education in fragile states, in order to understand the possible reasons why international aid achieves persistent poor results and has not been able to overcome challenges in the education sector.

3. International Aid for Education in Fragile States

Usually considered a critical social service for which delivery in fragile states is a particular challenge, education is now mentioned in most policy papers on fragile states.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, governments that have lost the will and/or the capacity to deliver education services require assistance from the international community in providing those services.¹⁹¹ Jeanne Vickers stresses that, in times of conflict, governments can spend ten times more on each member of the armed forces than they spend on each child's education.¹⁹² Worse, during conflict periods, some states such as Somalia or Cambodia practically reduced their public spending on education to zero.¹⁹³ While the attention to and investments in education in conflict-affected and fragile states have increased in recent years, international aid for education remains limited and education's role in humanitarian, peacebuilding, and reconstruction interventions remains neglected. Progress towards the Education for All goals has been slowest in conflict-affected and fragile states.¹⁹⁴ Even in conflict-affected countries where considerable progress has been made in

¹⁹⁰ Kirk, "Education and Fragile States," 183.

¹⁹¹ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 1.

¹⁹² Jeanne Vickers, *Women and War* (London: Zed Books, 1993).

¹⁹³ United Nations, *Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (The Machel Study)*, para 187.

¹⁹⁴ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2015 - Education for All 2000–2015 – Achievements and Challenges* (Paris: UNESCO, 2015).

expanding access, primary school completion rates are low.¹⁹⁵ In Afghanistan, for example, of those children initially enrolled, 54 percent drop out during the first four years of school.¹⁹⁶

Reisman and Janke stress that “most education programming, whether in emergency or transitional settings at the policy, systems, professional development, or service delivery level, does not take education’s potential role in conflict into account, either during the planning stages or once education activities are underway.”¹⁹⁷ However, as presented earlier in this chapter, education has a critical role to play in the wider reconstruction of society, from building peace and social cohesion to facilitating economic recovery and getting the country onto an accelerated development path. Buckland stresses that it “places very considerable expectations on educational systems at a time when they are themselves seriously debilitated by the effects of conflict. The challenges facing educational systems in such contexts are enormous, and the potential for failure to deliver on these expectations is high.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Karen E. Mundy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson, eds., *Educating Children in Conflict Zones: Research, Policy, and Practice for Systemic Change: A Tribute to Jackie Kirk* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2011).

¹⁹⁶ Amir Mansory, *Drop out Study in Basic Education Level of Schools in Afghanistan* (Kabul: Swedish committee for Afghanistan, 2007).

¹⁹⁷ Lainie Reisman and Cornelia Janke, “Conflict-Sensitive Teacher Education: Viewing EDC’s Experience with the South Sudan Teacher Education Project through a Conflict-Sensitive Lens,” *Journal on Education in Emergencies* 1, no. 1 (October 2015): 146–47.

¹⁹⁸ Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 26-27.

a) Recent Evolution

As Peter Uvin notes, the response to 9/11¹⁹⁹ did lead to the creation of explicit new security frameworks,²⁰⁰ strengthening the security agenda within the donors' community. Therefore, the geopolitical motivations behind fragile states discourse cannot be ignored.²⁰¹ USAID, for instance, makes very explicit links between fragile states and terrorism. The agency has provided one of the strongest arguments for addressing fragile states as a national security strategy:

“When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world (...) There is perhaps no more urgent matter facing USAID than fragile states, yet no set of problems is more difficult and intractable. Twenty-first century realities demonstrate that ignoring these states can pose great risks and increase the likelihood of terrorism taking root. At least a third of the world's population now lives in areas that are unstable or fragile. This poses not only a national security challenge but a development and humanitarian challenge.”²⁰²

During the same period, aid for education has seen a shift from the concept of assistance to an approach focused on development. Scholars such as Mary Joy Pigozzi have strongly advocated for such a change in paradigm in times of emergency, crisis, and war: “Education is not a relief activity; it is central to human

¹⁹⁹ 9/11 refers to the series of attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001.

²⁰⁰ Uvin, “Development and Security: Genealogy and Typology of an Evolving International Policy Area,” 4.

²⁰¹ Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” 186.

²⁰² USAID, *Fragile States Strategy* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2005), 1.

and national development and must be conceptualized as a development activity.”²⁰³ Christopher Talbot added that the relief-development dichotomy is an artificial one.²⁰⁴ Marc Sommers insisted that, as a long-term endeavor, education needs to be planned in that long-term way.²⁰⁵ As a result, in addition to the security agenda, Rose and Greeley identified three other policy agendas and listed their education focus (please see Figure 1).²⁰⁶ As they explain, while overlap exists among these agendas, the plurality of objectives underscores the importance of aid prioritization and coordination in fragile states.²⁰⁷

Over the past few years, education has played an increasingly important role in the broader security agenda thanks to a wider recognition of education’s potential contribution to peacebuilding. Rose and Greeley explain that:

“The security agenda for fragile states focuses on education's role in renewing the social contract between a government and its citizens. By contrast, the humanitarian agenda demands fast action on education service delivery. As post-emergency conditions improve, transitions to the EFA and MDG agenda may become more feasible. However, both these sector-specific agenda depend upon peace and state capacity. The agenda are

²⁰³ Mary Joy Pigozzi, *Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach*, UNICEF Working Paper Series, UNICEF/PD/ED99-1 (New York: UNICEF, 1999), i.

²⁰⁴ Christopher Talbot, “Editorial: Responding to Emergencies,” *International Institute for Educational Planning Newsletter* XX, no. 3 (2002), http://www.iiep.unesco.org/sites/default/files/nl_2002-3_en.pdf.

²⁰⁵ Marc Sommers, *Coordinating Education during Emergencies and Reconstruction: Challenges and Responsibilities* (Paris, UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004), 93.

²⁰⁶ Rose and Greeley, *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice*. Centre for International Education, 2.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

interlocking in this sense but there are also trade-offs between these priorities.”²⁰⁸

Agenda	Education Focus
Security Agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • negative and positive political use • national identity formation • disaffected youth • religious schooling • social cohesion
Humanitarian Agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • community-based engagement • schools as safe spaces
Education For All Agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rights-based approach • addressing exclusion • active citizenship, tolerance, and peace-building
Millennium Development Goals Agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • national growth and poverty reduction; focus on primary schooling

Figure 1: Agenda for support to education in Fragile States.²⁰⁹

While there has been a shift in global policy toward prioritizing education in settings of fragility and conflict in the past few years, international aid still neglects this sector. Education has been a lower priority than other sectors in humanitarian crises: the visibility and importance of education in emergencies have grown, particularly with attention given to the Syrian refugee crisis, but education has not yet been established as a key humanitarian sector.²¹⁰ Indeed, there is still a strong debate about the necessity to include education in frontline humanitarian aid responses: one of the counter-arguments is that immediate responses are too often disconnected from longer-term development plans for the education sector.²¹¹ Some scholars argue that education is not prioritized enough in such settings

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Avenir Analytics, “A Review of Donors’ Humanitarian Policies on Education” (Commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children, August 2014).

²¹¹ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 18.

because of the UN peacebuilding agenda's strong focus on security, electoral and economic reforms related to its liberal peace orientation. However, for scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler, preserving peace in countries that have emerged from civil conflict requires a greater focus on social policies.²¹² Education is an important instrument of such policies. Yet, the 2011 Education for All Global Monitoring Report expresses concerns about the linking of security and development agendas, and the merging of national security concerns and international development policies, showing how armed conflict is diverting public funds from education into military spending.²¹³

Education in fragile states often suffers from a severe funding gap. Although aid for education increased substantially during most of the past decade, it has shown signs of decline in recent years.²¹⁴ Relative to 2010, when worldwide aid to education peaked at US\$14 billion, a large number of donors have decreased their aid disbursements to the education sector,²¹⁵ after deprioritizing education within their aid budgets.²¹⁶ The Official Development Assistance (ODA) for education in settings of conflict and fragility has historically been low, and actual aid commitments did not follow the recognized need and the rhetorical prioritization of education in such settings.²¹⁷ Indeed, consistently low amounts of aid are

²¹² Collier and Hoeffler, "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies."

²¹³ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 2.

²¹⁴ Steer and Smith, *Financing Education: Opportunities for Global Action*, 5.

²¹⁵ UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF, *A Growing Number of Children and Adolescents Are out of School as Aid Fails to Meet the Mark*, EFA GMR Policy Paper 22 / Fact Sheet 31 (UNESCO, 2015), 8, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002336/233610e.pdf>.

²¹⁶ UNESCO, *Trends in Aid to Education: Lessons for Post-2015*, EFA GMR Policy Paper 11 (UNESCO, 2013), 1, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002253/225300E.pdf>.

²¹⁷ Menashy and Dryden-Peterson, "The Global Partnership for Education's Evolving Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States."

committed to education in fragile states when compared to other low-income countries.²¹⁸ Making good governance a prerequisite for assistance lowers the amount of international aid invested in fragile states: not only do fragile states receive less than one fifth of all global aid to education, but out of the total amount of aid allocated to fragile states, on average just 5 percent went to education, compared to 10 percent in other low-income countries.²¹⁹ A weakening commitment to education by many donors threatens progress. In recognition of the serious underfunding of education in emergencies, International Organizations and UN agencies have joined forces under the banner of *Education Cannot Wait*. They have called for an increase of the percentage of humanitarian aid given through appeals for education to 4 percent, doubling the levels at the start of the decade. Yet, donors have failed to reach this target, and in 2013, education's share of humanitarian funding through the appeals process stood at just 1.95 percent.²²⁰

Burde stresses that the importance of education as an element of humanitarian action has rarely been acknowledged and this inattention has prevented education aid from reaching its full potential for eliminating suffering during conflicts; it accounts, in part, for its underfunding, relative to other forms of humanitarian aid.²²¹ As a result, the scale of the response to the impact of armed conflict on

²¹⁸ Victoria Turrent, "Financing Universal Primary Education: An Analysis of Official Development Assistance in Fragile States," *International Journal of Educational Development* 29, no. 4 (2009): 360.

²¹⁹ Save the Children Alliance, *Last in Line, Last in School: How Donors Are Failing Children in Conflict-Affected Fragile States*, vi.

²²⁰ Global Education Cluster, "Education Cannot Wait. Financing Education in Emergencies – Challenges and Opportunities," 2013, http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/Education_Cannot_Wait_-_Financing_Education_in_Emergencies_Challenges_and_Opportunities.pdf.

²²¹ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 27.

education has been seriously inadequate. The lack of progress in education for children in conflict-affected countries serves as a constant reminder of the failure of political will, effective policies, adequate resourcing, and logistics, to tackle this problem.²²²

b) Challenges for International Education Aid in Fragile States

Education policy and programming in fragile contexts often requires difficult choices and compromises.²²³ The size of a national education system, as well as its cultural, social and economic dimensions, makes it one of the most difficult state institutions to govern and manage.²²⁴ INEE has identified several specific educational activities that need to be addressed to mitigate conflict and fragility: planning, service delivery, resource mobilization, and system monitoring.²²⁵ However, conflict adds a substantial additional burden to the daunting challenges of education development and reform. The scale of the reconstruction required, the urgency to avoid a relapse into violence, and the extremely difficult operating conditions call for strategies and programs that address not only the usual development challenges but also the specific problems created by conflict.²²⁶ In

²²² UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF, *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children*, 66.

²²³ Lynn Davies, *Understanding Education's Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*, IIEP Research Paper (Paris: UNESCO IIEP, 2011), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191504e.pdf>.

²²⁴ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 85.

²²⁵ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

²²⁶ Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 26-27.

such contexts, the international community faces serious challenges in education delivery.

(1) Statebuilding Dilemmas

Some challenges are similar to the dilemmas that Paris and Sisk identify for statebuilding programs: footprint and duration, participation, dependency, and coherence (or the need for coordination).²²⁷ As they explain, these dilemmas cannot be avoided; but they can be managed if properly anticipated.

Donors and international organizations often face the central challenge of local control over the allocation of education spending. While rebuilding an education system can help build and maintain state legitimacy, education programs for post-conflict countries may by-pass that same state.²²⁸ Sommers warns that “quite often, well-resourced international NGOs and UN agencies charge into the countryside with funding, supplies, expertise and humanitarian mandates, frequently leaving local officials feeling left in the dust.”²²⁹ When faced with weak governance, donors tend to favor the “projectization of aid” in order to avoid unreliable state apparatus, but this may result in the fragmentation of initiatives and lost opportunities to build local capacity.²³⁰ While acknowledging the genuine desire to build the state and strengthen national pride and ownership, donors have to recognize that government ownership and participation may mean a highly

²²⁷ Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, eds., *Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Challenges of Postwar Peace Operations* (New York; London: Routledge, 2009).

²²⁸ Burde, *Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping the Field*, 26.

²²⁹ Marc Sommers, “Education Free-for-All,” *Forced Migration Review* 22 (January 2005), 14.

²³⁰ Davies, *Understanding Education’s Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*.

inefficient or even corrupt use of resources.²³¹ Indeed, absorptive capacity may be weak and affected by problems of corruption and nepotism.²³² However, when the state is already fragile, missing the local capacity building opportunity may add a destabilizing influence instead of increasing stability.²³³

The aid footprint, duration, and dependency are also problematic during this phase and present constant challenges for donors.²³⁴ Donors and international agencies face particular problems providing continued support for education in fragile states.²³⁵ Sommers identifies the possible erosion of “the capacity and morale of education ministries” because of the “departure of better-qualified civil servants for well-paid jobs with international organizations.”²³⁶

Finally, Burde notes the lack of coordination among international aid agencies providing services during crises and post-conflict reconstruction and the problems associated with it.²³⁷ Successfully providing education in emergencies is often complicated by the lack of coordination with reconstruction.²³⁸ According to Sommers, this can be explained by the following factors:

“Due to their often-overlapping mandates, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP and/or UNHCR have been known to wage turf wars, which can be the

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Lynn Davies, “Capacity Development in Education in Fragile Contexts,” Working Paper (ETF/GTZ/INEE, 2009), [http://www.etf.europa.eu/pubmgmt.nsf/\(getAttachment\)/278378C19FEA93D6C1257611002F8192/\\$File/NOTE7UVHDR.pdf](http://www.etf.europa.eu/pubmgmt.nsf/(getAttachment)/278378C19FEA93D6C1257611002F8192/$File/NOTE7UVHDR.pdf).

²³³ Burde, *Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping the Field*, 26.

²³⁴ Davies, *Understanding Education’s Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*.

²³⁵ Save the Children, *Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children’s Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States*, 3.

²³⁶ Sommers, “Education Free-for-All,” 14.

²³⁷ Burde, *Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping the Field*, 27.

²³⁸ Sommers, “Education Free-for-All,” 14.

starting point for unhelpful, and seemingly avoidable, power struggles. Indeed, research and analysis suggest that the challenge of defining roles and responsibilities between and among UN and international NGO actors ultimately arises from an atmosphere of underlying mistrust and competition. Moreover, in the scramble for favourable media attention – and the funding it helps secure – rhetoric about cooperation and coordination may be bypassed in practice.”²³⁹

Burde adds that numerous reports now recommend “increased coordination among international agencies” in order to improve the delivery of educational services in these circumstances.²⁴⁰ Despite the level and intensity of attention that has been given to the problem of coordination in multiple contexts, for Burde the question is less about identifying the problem, but rather why it persists. According to her, reasons range from the practical to the structural: first, in such fragile contexts, it is already difficult to track projects with a limited or inexistent central accounting system, and the presence of multiple donors representing multiple countries providing grants to multiple NGOs can make it even harder; second, during and after a conflict has ended, UNICEF, in conjunction with the local MOE, usually becomes the “lead agency” for coordinating projects related to the education system, but international NGOs and bilateral agencies are simply expected – not required – to coordinate with UNICEF and the ministry.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Lynne Bethke and Braunschweig, *Global Survey on Education in Emergencies* (New York, NY: Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EF363080A6398C29C1256E7C0046A8FF-Ed_Emerg.pdf.

²⁴¹ Burde, *Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping the Field*, 27.

In addition to these dilemmas, the post-conflict environment presents particular challenges for education programs in terms of determining priorities due to the range of issues demanding attention, the urgency for action, the complexity of the context, and the limits on human, institutional, and financial resources.²⁴² Two issues of prioritization are worth mentioning here, as they appear to be frequently encountered in such fragile settings. First, there is significant tension between access and quality: “Expanding access to basic education may come at the expense of teacher training, learning areas linked to mitigation of fragility such as civic, peace, or human rights education, and secondary and higher education, which can provide the higher-level capacity development needed to tackle fragility.”²⁴³ Second, there is tension between centralization and decentralization: “Central control can play an important role in providing cohesive direction and regulation, but may result in dangerous concentration of power; conversely, decentralization gives ownership to communities and their schools, but may increase ethnic or religious fragmentation, and result in inefficiency due to lack of local capacity.”²⁴⁴

Appropriate prioritization and sequencing of interventions is therefore key to successful post-conflict reconstruction in education.²⁴⁵ Buckland provides a few suggestions on how to manage the question of sequencing in post-conflict reconstruction:

²⁴² Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 36.

²⁴³ Davies, *Understanding Education’s Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁴⁵ Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 35-36.

- “First, focus on the basics to get the system functioning so that the return of children and youth to school can be seen as an early “peace dividend” that will help to shore up support for peace.
- Second, acknowledge the importance of symbolism in education and provide bold symbolic actions (such as purging textbooks) that signal that the reform of the system has started.
- Third, build recognition that reform of education is a long-term, incremental, and ongoing process that takes decades and that must be led from within the country as consensus develops on the wider development vision of that society.
- Fourth, focus from the beginning on building reform capacity, which includes supporting the participation of communities, local authorities, and other stakeholders in the educational reform dialogue. This can be initiated in early phases when there is a general anxiety about reform of the system, but not the political coherence, administrative capacity, civil society commitment, or financial and institutional resources required to implement systemic reform.”²⁴⁶

(2) Right to Education versus Child Protection

Another challenge that is frequently overlooked in the literature on education in fragile states is the challenge of balancing the right to education and child protection. Education is considered a right that must be protected as well as a way

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

of protecting children's "sense of normalcy" along with their other rights. As a result, the notion that education must be protected and prioritized during emergencies has gained force over the past two decades.²⁴⁷ However, Sonja Grover contends that "the suggestion by Save the Children and other NGOs that education cannot wait in any instance for the State's post-conflict development phase, but must be delivered also in the midst of intense conflict and despite high levels of organized terrorist activity, belies the fact that security cannot always be adequately provided to schoolchildren in that circumstance."²⁴⁸ She adds that in some cases, schoolchildren are not only being used as propaganda tools by terrorists in their global terror campaign, but also by states leading the so-called 'war on terror' when they claim alleged progress in stabilization and development of the conflict-affected state in question and place schoolchildren in harm's way.²⁴⁹ Grover insists on looking beyond the "right to education" rhetoric, which she considers "something of a smokescreen for the international community's prioritizing of education over the schoolchildren's personal security in certain conflict-affected States."²⁵⁰ According to her, the right to education should not be prioritized above the right to security of the person of the children:

"No party has the legal right under international humanitarian and human rights law to downgrade the child's fundamental rights to survival and protection from serious physical and psychological trauma. (...) Doing so,

²⁴⁷ Sonja C. Grover, *Schoolchildren as Propaganda Tools in the War on Terror: Violating the Rights of Afghani Children Under International Law* (Berlin; Heidelberg; New York: Springer, 2011), ix.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

it can be argued, renders those responsible for the children's school attendance in such insecure circumstances in the midst of armed conflict co-perpetrators in the grave international crimes associated with any terror attack that does occur on the school site the children attend."²⁵¹

Without going as far as Grover, Susan Nicolai underlines the importance of child protection in emergency and post-conflict programming as well, stressing that "child protection should be an integral part of emergency education activities and a fundamental criterion in the approval of a programme by NGO staff, host governments and donors."²⁵² She provides a list of essential measures, such as the revision of curricula that have perpetuated divisions and fueled conflict, the creation of child-friendly spaces in schools, and a code of conduct for teachers to ensure they do not abuse children or resort to corporal punishment.²⁵³ She also calls for the designation of schools as "safe areas" and asserts that protagonists of conflict should be "warned that the Rome Statutes allow the International Criminal Court to prosecute as war criminals those who target schools and educational facilities."²⁵⁴ Amalia Fawcett also wonders if the international community should risk protection through education.²⁵⁵ She insists that there needs to be a systematic analysis of pre-conflict realities, cultural ramifications and economic aspects before designing and implementing an education program in emergencies.²⁵⁶

²⁵¹ Ibid., 134.

²⁵² Susan Nicolai, "Education That Protects," *Forced Migration Review* 22 (January 2005), 12.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Amalia Fawcett, "Risking Protection through Education?," *Forced Migration Review* 22 (January 2005).

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 14.

4. Conclusion

Despite recent positive developments in the field of education in fragile states, there is still progress to be made if we want to exploit fully education's positive potential for mitigating conflict and state fragility. For instance, Ginsburg et al. appreciate the greater focus on educational quality, increasingly defined less in terms of inputs and processes and more in terms of its relation to student learning outcomes.²⁵⁷ However, they regret that “the focus on learning outcomes has tended to focus narrowly on academic knowledge and skills (particularly literacy and numeracy), and not included explicit attention to developing awareness, commitments, and capacities related to transforming national and global society in order to achieve human rights for all.”²⁵⁸ Mary Mendenhall asserts that international organizations working in the field of education in fragile states need to continue their efforts “to advocate for the fiscal, political, and social resources that they need to better respond to the educational needs of children and youth affected by conflict.”²⁵⁹ Education can have implications not only for peace, but also for conflict depending on the way it is provided and the content it is transmitting. There is strong evidence of the critical role of that education plays in post-conflict peacebuilding, and conflict-sensitive education, including peace education, is essential for successful peacebuilding efforts.

²⁵⁷ Mark Ginsburg, Stephen F. Moseley, and Mary Joy Pigozzi, “Introduction: Reforming Education for Transformation: Opportunities and Challenges,” *Development* 53, no. 4 (2010): 451–56.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 454.

²⁵⁹ Mendenhall, “Education Sustainability in the Relief-Development Transition: Challenges for International Organizations Working in Countries Affected by Conflict,” 76.

C. Peace Education

Peace education is often used as a term to describe the educational contribution to peacebuilding.²⁶⁰ Both concepts have received increased attention and continued to evolve in recent years. First, this section will briefly review the literature on peacebuilding in order to present how peace education is related to peacebuilding and underline the gap between theory and practice. It will then explore the literature on peace education, and review the goals and approaches of peace education. Finally, this section will end with a discussion of the challenges and critiques that peace education faces today.

1. Peacebuilding and Education

a) Theories and Evolution of Peacebuilding

The concept of peacebuilding originated in Johan Galtung's research in the mid-1970s.²⁶¹ In his earlier work (presented in Figure 2), he referred to an extended concept of violence that led to an extended concept of peace by distinguishing the concepts of *personal violence* and *structural violence*, and the notions of *negative peace* (the absence of personal violence) and *positive peace* (the absence of structural violence, or in other words, structural changes addressing the social injustices that may cause violence).²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Anne Isaac, *Education and Peacebuilding - A Preliminary Operational Framework, for the Canadian International Development Agency* (CIDA, 1999), 2.

²⁶¹ Johan Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding," in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research*, ed. Johan Galtung, vol. II (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1976).

²⁶² Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969), 183.




Figure 2: Galtung's Extended Concepts of Violence and Peace.²⁶³

Galtung defined peacebuilding as activities that aim at creating positive and sustainable peace by addressing and removing the root causes of violence: “Structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.”²⁶⁴

John Paul Lederach later expanded the understanding of peacebuilding by insisting on the idea that peacebuilding is a comprehensive dynamic and social process that involves transforming relationships:

“(Peacebuilding) encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” 297.

Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct.”²⁶⁵

The concept of conflict transformation is important in Lederach’s research and for the concept of peacebuilding. It refers to an ongoing process of change from negative to positive relations, behavior, attitudes and structures.²⁶⁶ He stresses that peacebuilding is not just “ending something that is not desired,” but “building relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures.”²⁶⁷

Over the years, other scholars have also offered important contributions to the concept of peacebuilding and the notion of sustainable peace. Boulding adds the idea that peacebuilding creates “new kinds of social space in society for new behaviors and new social relations, broadly conceived.”²⁶⁸ Eileen Babbitt includes peacebuilding as part of the international conflict resolution efforts whose goals are “to use means other than violence to settle both interstate and intrastate disputes, and to transform the relationships of disputing parties such that resort to violence is less likely in the future.”²⁶⁹ On the concept of sustainable peace, Uvin underlines the long-term commitment and vision required by the process of promoting peace: “Sustainable peace is not something that can be produced rapidly.”²⁷⁰ Going

²⁶⁵ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 84-85.

²⁶⁶ John Paul Lederach, “Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework,” in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York: St. Martin’s Press/ Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 201-222.

²⁶⁷ Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 84-85.

²⁶⁸ Boulding, *Cultures of Peace, the Hidden Side of History*, 56.

²⁶⁹ Eileen Babbitt, “The Evolution of Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding,” *Negotiation Journal* 25, no. 4 (2009), 540.

²⁷⁰ Peter Uvin, *Synthesis Report: The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict* (Paris: OECD, 1999), 7.

beyond Galtung's concept of positive peace, Bellamy and Williams defined self-sustaining peace as "a peace that can endure without major international assistance," it occurs "when a state and society is able to resolve conflict without violence."²⁷¹

Accordingly, the concept of peacebuilding has also evolved within the UN. The term was officially introduced in 1992 by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*. Along with three other overarching tasks of the UN (i.e. preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping), the idea of *post-conflict peacebuilding* is presented as "an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."²⁷² In 1995, the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* expanded the concept to address all phases of conflict and insisted on the need to create structures for the institutionalization of peace. This report of the UN Secretary-General even refers to education as a form of post-conflict peacebuilding: "Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities."²⁷³

In 2001, following some of the recommendations of the *Brahimi Report*,²⁷⁴ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan added an individual dimension to the goal of peacebuilding operations. He said that this goal was not only "to build the social,

²⁷¹ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Polity, 2010), 232.

²⁷² United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, A/47/277 - S/24111 (United Nations, 1992), para. 21.

²⁷³ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, A/50/60 - S/1995/1 (United Nations, 1995), para. 56.

²⁷⁴ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (United Nations, 2000).

economic and political institutions” but also the “attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts.”²⁷⁵ Defining self-sustaining peace as the stage when “the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully,”²⁷⁶ the UN Secretary-General considered it the ultimate goal of UN peace operations. The *Capstone Doctrine* reinforces this idea and emphasizes the long-term aspect of this process stressed by Uvin: “Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace.”²⁷⁷ UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon explored further this question of time in a report dedicated to peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. He underlined how the immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity for peacebuilding efforts that is strategic and should not be missed: “If countries develop a vision and strategy that succeeds in addressing (the core areas of peacebuilding) it increases the chances for sustainable peace – and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict.”²⁷⁸ He also emphasized that the success of this strategy relies on the national ownership of the process, and the coherence, efficiency, and reactivity of international actors. Following this progressive integration of peacebuilding as one of the core activities of the UN, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) were established in 2006.²⁷⁹ Since its inception, the

²⁷⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General: No Exit Without Strategy*, S/2001/394 (United Nations, 2001), para. 11.

²⁷⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General: No Exit Without Strategy*, para. 10.

²⁷⁷ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines – Capstone Doctrine* (United Nations, 2008), 18.

²⁷⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, para. 3.

²⁷⁹ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1645*, S/RES/1645 (United Nations, 2005); United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/60/180*, A/RES/60/180 (United Nations, 2005).

PBF has played an important role in providing financing to countries emerging from conflict or conflict-affected countries, as well as in advancing strategic alignment between the UN and the International Financial Institutions.²⁸⁰ Through funding for political, governance, security and macroeconomic reforms, these structures provide support to countries in the immediate post-conflict period.

The UN conception of peacebuilding is often criticized because of its close relation to the concept of *liberal peace*. In recent years, scholars have studied the impact of peacebuilding initiatives. While Roland Paris considers liberal peacebuilding to be doing more good than harm, he underscores its limitations and the sometimes negative effects of focusing exclusively on electoral and economic reforms.²⁸¹ Global events of the past decade have also reinforced security as another important priority for UN peace operations. The focus of the most recent World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development is an example that confirms this trend.²⁸² Oliver Richmond contends that the nature of the peace that is being installed in conflict zones through UN peace operations is more *virtual* than *positive*: “Often policy makers and electorates are satisfied by a virtual peace in which structural violence may be present if they believe it is ‘virtuous’, despite the fact that the actors that peace has been visited upon may not agree themselves.”²⁸³ After examining practical experiences of peacebuilding programs,

²⁸⁰ United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, A/69/968-S/2015/490 (United Nations, 2015), para. 112, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/968.

²⁸¹ Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²⁸² World Bank, *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development*.

²⁸³ Oliver Richmond, “UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus,” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004), 96.

Anderson and Olson find that success at the programmatic level does not translate into success in terms of Peace Writ Large (i.e., when the society as a whole is more just, more sustainable, and less violent).²⁸⁴ They explain that the current peacebuilding challenge is to bridge this gap.²⁸⁵ Accordingly, Rob Ricigliano stresses that the challenge is “not making peace, at least in some partial sense; rather, the difficulty is making peace last.”²⁸⁶ He considers that the current peacebuilding approach is not as effective as it could be and explains this inefficiency through the piecemeal and fragmented approach to complex violent conflict. For Ricigliano, if systems thinking was applied and peacebuilding practitioners were creating synergy among their programs, peacebuilding approaches would become more dynamic and adaptive as the societies they are trying to affect.²⁸⁷ Finally, the lack of coordination is also a criticism of the international community’s peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, Ian Harris claims that “given the proliferation of organizations interested in conflict, there is the potential for overlap and confusion between the different mandates and levels of resources of institutions such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, and World Bank.”²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 2003), 13.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 61. They notably underline that “Peace programs that are not consciously and directly linked to the large and long-term goal of peace will very often miss the mark. They may do some good for some people, but they will make very little real contribution to the realization of Peace Writ Large.”

²⁸⁶ Rob Ricigliano, *Making Peace Last: A Toolbox for Sustainable Peacebuilding* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 5.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁸ Ian Harris, “The Promises and Pitfalls of Peace Education Evaluation,” in *Transforming Education for Peace*, ed. Jing Lin, Edward J. Brantmeier, and Christa Bruhn (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing Inc., 2008), 62.

b) Education as a Conflict Prevention Approach to Peacebuilding

While the concept of “prevention” was already present in the *Agenda for Peace*, was promoted by various scholars, and was the focus of the 1997 strategic *Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict* issued by the Carnegie Commission,²⁸⁹ it was not until the mid-2000s that it started to become recognized as an important goal for the international community. In 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the idea of a “culture of prevention.”²⁹⁰ Various scholars also started to cite prevention as the way forward in terms of protecting children.²⁹¹ In 2008, the President of the Security Council released the following statement: “The Security Council stresses...the need to adopt a broad strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner, in order to enhance the protection of children on a long-term basis.”²⁹²

While there are debates around the definition of conflict prevention, and serious challenges facing this endeavor, scholars such as Lund insist that it should not lead to an abandon of conflict prevention.²⁹³ Indeed, since 2010, at least 15 conflicts have erupted or reignited, while the cost of violence around the world reached an astounding US\$14.3 trillion in 2014.²⁹⁴ The costs associated with preventing conflicts are often much smaller than the costs of dealing with a conflict that has

²⁸⁹ Carnegie Commission, *Executive Summary of the Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (NY: Carnegie Corporation of NY, 1997).

²⁹⁰ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General: Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict*, A/60/891 (New York: United Nations, 2006).

²⁹¹ Pinheiro, *World Report on Violence against Children*, 6.

²⁹² United Nations, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2008/6 (New York: United Nations, 2008), 1.

²⁹³ Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*.

²⁹⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Trends Report: World at War* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2015), www.unhcr.org/558193896.html.

escalated to widespread violence.²⁹⁵ The opportunities for conflict prevention are numerous. Educational institutions can be included in the “structural prevention” approach promoted in the 1997 Carnegie Commission Report and in the “target prevention concept” as defined by Rubin.²⁹⁶ In particular, structural conflict prevention programs can reduce the risk of conflict by addressing state level structures (political, economic, social, and cultural) that are potential sources of violence.²⁹⁷ Boulding adds that we need to move from socialization for war to socialization for peace.²⁹⁸ Accordingly, Collier and Hoeffler stress that preserving peace in countries that have emerged from civil conflict requires a greater focus on social policies.²⁹⁹

Interestingly, the UN released three major reports on peace and security in 2015 that called for greater attention to conflict prevention. First, in *Uniting our Strengths for Peace*, the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) stressed that “the prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the international community, and yet it has not been sufficiently invested in.”³⁰⁰ Then, in *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the UN’s Peacebuilding

²⁹⁵ Research has indicated that an early investing in conflict prevention is, on average, 60 times more cost effective than intervening after violence erupts: From Dr. Lisa Schirch and Dr. Michael S. Lund’s May 2009 Statement to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. The average is based on research found in Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., *The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1999).

²⁹⁶ Rubin, *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action*.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Boulding, *Cultures of Peace, the Hidden Side of History*.

²⁹⁹ Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.”

³⁰⁰ United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (United Nations, 2015), 11, http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf.

Architecture urged the UN system to place much greater emphasis on conflict prevention, recognizing that preventing conflict is considerably less expensive, in both human and financial terms, than responding to crises.³⁰¹ Importantly, it included conflict prevention in the actual definition of sustaining peace: “Sustaining peace should be understood as encompassing not only efforts to prevent relapse into conflict, but also efforts to prevent lapse into conflict in the first place.”³⁰² The report notably insisted that the Peacebuilding Commission should “actively seek opportunities where it can help to bring needed attention to early conflict prevention priorities at the regional, subregional, and country levels.”³⁰³ It also recognized the important role that educational institutions can play in preventing conflict.³⁰⁴ Finally, the *Global Study on Women, Peace and Security* regrets that the practice of conflict prevention and resolution continues to focus on neutralizing potential spoilers and perpetrators of violence instead of investing in resources for peace, which includes social policies.³⁰⁵

While education is a significant instrument of such policies, as we have seen in the previous section, the role of education in the mitigation of conflict has been neglected. The following two reports explore education policies and practices in

³⁰¹ United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, para. 7(b) and 7(f).

³⁰² *Ibid.*, para. 7(a).

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, para. 143.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 48.

³⁰⁵ United Nations, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (UN Women, 2015), 47, <http://wps.unwomen.org/~media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf>.

fragile states, and underscore the shortcomings in the field of education and peacebuilding.

***UNESCO's 2011 Education for all Global Monitoring Report
(EFAGMR)³⁰⁶***

Produced annually by an independent team and published by UNESCO, the EFAGMR is a well-known and respected reference in the education field that aims to inform, influence and sustain genuine commitment towards the Education for All MDG and now the education targets in the SDGs. Each year, the report focuses on a main theme, and in 2011, the focus was Education and Armed Conflict. The 2011 report examines the damaging consequences of conflict for education, and identifies the following core needs: to combat violations and attacks on education; to address problems with funding, security and the humanitarian aid system; to identify opportunities to support post-conflict peacebuilding, and to unlock the potential of education to act as a force for peace.

Although the 2008 EFAGMR called for the prioritization of peace education programs,³⁰⁷ the 2011 report notes that the role of education in “preventing armed conflict and promoting rebuilding of societies” was still widely neglected.³⁰⁸ It acknowledges that there is no simple relationship between what happens in schools and the susceptibility of societies to armed conflict, but it contends that neglecting the role of education in peacebuilding increases the risk of a return to violence.

³⁰⁶ The report has been renamed since then, and is currently known as the Global Education Monitoring report (GEM).

³⁰⁷ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2008 – Education for All by 2015, Will We Make It?*, 137.

³⁰⁸ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 245.

The report recognizes the wide promotion of peace education programs, especially by UNESCO and UNICEF, which tried to reinforce the role of schools as a force for peace.³⁰⁹ However, the lack of rigorous evaluation of such programs' effectiveness has hindered their development.³¹⁰ Still, the report mentions studies that have shown that peace education can “reduce student aggression, bullying and participation in violent conflict, and increase the chances that students will work to prevent conflict.”³¹¹ Therefore, it encourages not only stronger engagement and coordination by Governments, aid donors, and UN agencies such as UNESCO and UNICEF, but also the allocation of greater funding for these programs. The report even identifies a potential source of funding in the UN Peacebuilding Fund. While the emerging international architecture for peacebuilding has started to include education,³¹² the field has continued to suffer from a certain neglect in the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The report concludes the specific chapter dedicated to Education and Armed Conflict with the idea that education can play a key role in supporting wider statebuilding processes and longer-term peacebuilding, but it needs greater visibility in wider peacebuilding efforts.³¹³

UNICEF report on the role of Education in Peacebuilding

³⁰⁹ Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*.

³¹⁰ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 245.

³¹¹ Lynn Davies, “Evaluating the Link between Conflict and Education,” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2, no. 2 (2005): 42–58; Barakat, Karpinska, and Paulson, *Desk Study: Education and Fragility*; cited in UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 245.

³¹² United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, para. 17.

³¹³ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 249.

Largely funded by the government of the Netherlands, UNICEF commissioned this study to evaluate the role of education in peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts, based on academic, programming and evaluation literature; and to assess how education interventions and programming could have a stronger role in the UN peacebuilding architecture.³¹⁴ During 2010 and 2011, the study reviewed research and program literature and then conducted three country case studies (in Lebanon, Nepal, and Sierra Leone). The literature review also identified a gap between theory and practice, recognizing that peacebuilding theory does not have a strong influence on education programming.³¹⁵ While academic literature is more explicit about the need for post-conflict transformation, the program literature places a stronger emphasis on protection and reconstruction.³¹⁶ As a result, this triggers different types of intervention: “Transformation requires a more explicit commitment to political, economic and social change than forms of reconstruction that simply replace infrastructure destroyed by conflict.”³¹⁷ Consequently, in these fragile contexts, most education programming is not designed from a clear peacebuilding perspective.

The report also notes that the contribution of education to peacebuilding can be defined in terms of “programming directed towards education-sector governance and/or reform.”³¹⁸ There is a growing awareness among donors that, in situations of conflict, the political environment makes a purely technical approach to

³¹⁴ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 11.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

programming insufficient. The report then therefore questions “the extent to which the education system reproduces previous structures and power relations, or whether it will provide a basis for peacebuilding through the establishment of new arrangements.”³¹⁹ The answer seems to lie in paying more attention to education sector reform in the peacebuilding agenda, and engaging early since the “window of opportunity to initiate change in the immediate post-conflict period is limited.”³²⁰ However, the report adds that short-term approaches should not undermine longer-term development, for example, by reconstructing the education system in ways that “reproduce or reinforce inequalities and lack of trust between groups.”³²¹

One of the main findings of the study concerns the lack of integration of UNICEF in the UN peacebuilding agenda. The synthesis report claims this is for the following reasons: “UN priority with security and political reforms in the immediate post-conflict period; a lack of appreciation of the role of education in the immediate post-conflict period; and reservations on the part of UNICEF country staff of becoming too closely identified with a military presence; a desire to maintain some institutional autonomy; and the ability of UNICEF to access resources independently.”³²² The report concludes that education can play a crucial role in peacebuilding in all phases of conflict, outlining how it can help prevent conflict and contribute to long-term peace, and makes the case for access to quality education as a right that should be maintained even in the most complex conditions.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid., 44.

³²² Novelli and Smith, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*, 33.

If not enough attention is not given to education sector reform, it can undermine all peacebuilding processes and contribute to a relapse in conflict.

While UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had included the provision of administrative and social services amongst the five recurring priorities for peacebuilding in the years immediately following conflict,³²³ social services such as education have only recently been recognized as a tool that the international community should leverage in its peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.³²⁴ Peace education, in particular, has received more attention. The next section will review the main goals, approaches and critiques of peace education.

2. Peace Education: goals, approaches and critiques

In 1996, the *Machel Study* suggested Education for Peace as one kind of educational initiative that might have constructive peacebuilding impacts.³²⁵ This section will present the main goals of peace education, and review its various types and approaches.

a) Goals of Peace Education

Boulding explains that “the differences in wants, needs, perceptions, and aspirations among individuals and among groups...require a constant process of conflict management in daily life at every level from the intrapersonal (each of us

³²³ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, para. 3.

³²⁴ United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, *Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding* (New York: UN-PBSO, 2012), www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peace_dividends.pdf.

³²⁵ United Nations, *Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (The Machel Study)* para 255-258.

has many selves), to the family and the local community, and on to the international community.”³²⁶ There is consequently a constant need for conflict management, and peace education may satisfy this need. While it is a broad term that encompasses various forms and types of activities,³²⁷ peace education is based on a belief shared by many educators that their work is critical to transforming the way societies manage conflict.³²⁸ As a result, peace education is often presented as a means to provide people with non-violent alternatives for managing conflicts as they develop knowledge, attitudes and skills necessary to resolve conflict peacefully.³²⁹ In that sense, the overarching goal of peace education can be defined as sustainable peace—making it comparable to the goal of peacebuilding.³³⁰ Indeed, peace education is frequently described as an approach to peacebuilding³³¹ and the term is often used as a term to designate the educational component of peacebuilding.³³² The literature review stresses the similarity of peace education and peacebuilding programs end goals as “peace writ-large.”

One of the founders of peace education as a field of study, Betty Reardon considers peace education a process that prepares children and youth for global responsibility and helps them to accept responsibility to work for a just, peaceful

³²⁶ Boulding, *Cultures of Peace, the Hidden Side of History*, 89.

³²⁷ These themes are often gathered under the umbrella of peace education: conflict resolution education, peace and disarmament education, education for mutual understanding, education for international understanding, cooperation and peace, global education, citizenship or civic education, coexistence education, peace and human rights education, multicultural education.

³²⁸ Mari Fitzduff and Isabella Jean, *Peace Education State of the Field and Lessons Learned from USIP Grantmaking* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011), 8.

³²⁹ Ian Harris and John Synott, “Peace Education for a New Century,” *Social Alternatives* 21, no. 1 (January 2002), 3-6.

³³⁰ Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” 297.

³³¹ Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education State of the Field and Lessons Learned from USIP Grantmaking*, 6.

³³² Isaac, *Education and Peacebuilding - A Preliminary Operational Framework, for the Canadian International Development Agency*, 2.

and viable global community.³³³ Building on cooperative learning³³⁴ and themes such as citizenship and inter-group relationships, she considers the ultimate aim of peace education to be addressing both overt and structural violence in society. Harris emphasizes the importance of thinking positively about peace “as a state of being within their control” rather than thinking about violence as a problem to be controlled.³³⁵ According to him, peace education can give children exposed to violence a positive image of alternatives. He adds that peace educators have both short- and long-term goals: “in the short term, school personnel use peacekeeping strategies to stop violence; in the long term, they want children to acquire peacemaking skills and to be motivated to build a more peaceful world.”³³⁶ Harris lists ten goals for peace education: “to appreciate the richness of the concept of peace; to address fears; to provide information about security systems; to understand violent behavior; to develop intercultural understanding; to provide for a future orientation; to teach peace as a process; to promote a concept of peace accompanied by social justice; to stimulate a respect for life; and to end violence.”³³⁷

³³³ Betty Reardon, *Educating for Global Responsibility: Teacher-Designed Curricula for Peace Education, K-12* (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1988).

³³⁴ Betty Reardon, “Pedagogy as Purpose: Peace Education in the Context of Violence,” in *Education for Peace*, ed. Peadar Cremin (Limerick: Educational Studies Association of Ireland, 1993).

³³⁵ Ian Harris, *Peace Education* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1988).

³³⁶ Ian Harris, “Types of Peace Education,” in *How Children Understand War and Peace*, ed. Amiram Raviv, Louis Oppenheimer, and Daniel Bar-Tal (San Francisco, Calif: Jossey-Bass., 1999), 300.

³³⁷ Ian Harris, “Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,” in *Peace Education: The Concepts, Principles and Practices around the World*, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 20.

b) Peace Education: Types and Approaches

Numerous disciplines, theories, and pedagogical approaches have influenced peace education. As a result, scholars do not always agree on the boundaries of the field, situated at the intersection of and drawing on other fields such as educational research and theory, international education, and peace research and peace studies.³³⁸ This presents a difficulty for conducting an impact evaluation or comparison of peace education programs.

Several authors have tried to identify different categories of peace education programs. First, Ian Harris presents different types of peace education strategies influenced by the context of violence that peace educators are confronted with. He breaks down these strategies into five types of peace education: *global peace education* (closely aligned to international studies); *conflict resolution programs* (helping children resolve interpersonal conflicts constructively, including through activities such as peer mediation); *violence prevention programs* (aimed at creating a safe school climate); *development education* (including human rights education or environmental studies, with the objective of building peaceful communities through the promotion of an “active democratic citizenry that is interested in equitably sharing the world’s resources”); and *non-violence education* (trying to counter the preeminent culture of violence, and building on the idea of positive peace).³³⁹ Second, Alan Smith identifies five categories of peace education programs that are parallel to Harris’ typology: *skills-based* (including

³³⁸ Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education State of the Field and Lessons Learned from USIP Grantmaking*, 8.

³³⁹ Harris, “Types of Peace Education,” 302-307.

communication and conflict resolution skills); *multicultural and intercultural* (including diversity and mutual understanding); *human rights; civic education, citizenship, and education for democracy*; and *education for international development*.³⁴⁰ However, Monisha Bajaj and Belinda Chiu state that areas such as human rights education, environmental education, conflict resolution, disarmament education and development education focus on different issues and should be clearly distinguished from one another.³⁴¹ They recognize their common aim of developing skills, values, and awareness that help achieve a positive peace, but they prefer to call them “co-disciplines” of peace education.³⁴² Third, Daniel Bar Tal and Yigal Rosen consider a choice between two models for peace education that depends on the political-societal conditions confronting peace educators: *direct and indirect peace education*.³⁴³ In challenging contexts, *indirect peace education* can be used as it does not directly address the conflict, but instead focuses on themes such as identity, ecological security, violence, empathy, human rights, and conflict resolution skills. However, when political-societal conditions allow for direct reference to the conflict, it is possible to use *direct peace education*: “All the themes of the intractable conflict that contributed to the development and maintenance of the culture of conflict and served as barriers to its peaceful resolution.”³⁴⁴

³⁴⁰ Alan Smith, “Education for Diversity: Investing in Systemic Change Through Curriculum, Textbooks, and Teachers,” in *Promoting Social Cohesion through Education: Case Studies and Tools for Using Textbooks and Curricula*, ed. Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006).

³⁴¹ Monisha Bajaj and Belinda Chiu, “Education for Sustainable Development as Peace Education,” *Peace & Change* 34, no. 4 (2009): 441–55.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 442.

³⁴³ Daniel Bar-Tal and Yigal Rosen, “Peace Education in Societies Involved in Intractable Conflicts: Direct and Indirect Models,” *Review of Educational Research* 79, no. 2 (2009), 563.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

There are three main approaches to the pedagogical implementation of peace education in schools: *a separate subject in the curriculum* (knowledge- and/or skill-based), *spread across the curriculum*, and/or *a whole-school approach*. Whenever possible, these three approaches are combined³⁴⁵ because practitioners consider that it is preferable to embrace all three.³⁴⁶ Indeed, Harris explains that school personnel can infuse an awareness of peace into all levels of schooling: “They can teach about peace (curriculum) to pupils of all ages; at the micro level, they can use peace techniques to run their classes (classroom climate); and at the macro level, they can run schools peacefully (school climate).”³⁴⁷ He adds that a supportive school climate is one of the conditions for the success of a peace education program. Schools principals can also extend it to the community by sponsoring workshops for parents in positive parenting skills. Such complementary efforts are important because much violence is found outside the school. They help reinforce the alternatives to violence that children are learning in class once they are outside the school walls.

This brief overview of the various programs and pedagogical approaches to peace education illustrates the “diverse array of scholarly perspectives, programmatic considerations, and underlying values” noted by Bajaj.³⁴⁸ She calls for renewed attention to *critical peace education*: “a reclaimed critical peace education in which attention is paid to issues of structural inequality and empirical

³⁴⁵ Fountain, *Peace Education in UNICEF*, 39-40.

³⁴⁶ Diane Bretherton, Jane Weston, and Vic Zbar, “Peace Education in a Post-Conflict Environment: The Case of Sierra Leone,” *Prospects* XXXIII, no. 2 (June 2003), 224.

³⁴⁷ Harris, “Types of Peace Education,” 307.

³⁴⁸ Monisha Bajaj, “Critical Peace Education,” in *Encyclopedia of Peace Education*, ed. Monisha Bajaj (New York: Columbia Teacher’s College, 2008), 135.

study aimed towards local understandings of how participants can cultivate a sense of transformative agency assumes a central role.”³⁴⁹ She believes that a “contextualized and situated perspective on peace education can only further enhance the legitimacy and validity of the knowledge generated in the field.”³⁵⁰ Bajaj adds that the advantage of such an approach is that it encourages peace education to be more “flexible, responsive, and relevant in discussions of educational policy, teacher education, and grounded practice within and beyond schools.”³⁵¹

c) Critiques of Peace Education

Peace education programs have been criticized for various reasons. Some scholars question the impact of peace education for children living in fragile states when conflict shapes adult role models’ behavior.³⁵² Zvi Bekerman argues that adults are the ones needing to be educated for peace.³⁵³ Sinclair recognizes that offering the same peace education program to both children and adults whenever possible would be ideal, but she insists that schooling alone still represents a “strong communication tool.”³⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Jo Boyden and Paul Ryder question one of the main assumptions behind the theory of change of peace education programs

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 143.

³⁵¹ Monisha Bajaj, “‘Pedagogies of Resistance’ and Critical Peace Education Praxis,” *Journal of Peace Education* 12, no. 2 (2015), 157.

³⁵² Marc Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth,” in *Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries*, ed. Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, and Daiana Cipollone (Geneva: UNHCR, 2001); Jason Hart, *Children’s Participation in Humanitarian Action: Learning from Zones of Armed Conflict* (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2004), [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Childprotection/\\$file/E05.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Childprotection/$file/E05.pdf).

³⁵³ Zvi Bekerman, “Are There Children to Educate for Peace in Conflict-ridden Areas? A Critical Essay on Peace and Coexistence Education,” *Intercultural Education* 16, no. 3 (2005), 241.

³⁵⁴ Sinclair, “Protecting through Curriculum: A Call for Collaboration,” 280-281.

taught in schools: that change at the individual level will affect the whole society.³⁵⁵ Sinclair acknowledges this questioning of the relevance of such changes at the individual level to conflict between groups.³⁵⁶ And Gavriel Salomon claims that this question is one of the key challenges for peace education: there needs to be a “ripple effect whereby the impact of peace education programs spreads to wider social circles of society.”³⁵⁷ Moreover, at the individual level, he stresses that some scholars argue that “the hardened set of convictions about one’s identity, righteous beliefs, and historical moral superiority, is apparently not very susceptible to change.”³⁵⁸ As a result, peace education programs may not reach their goals. Finally, on the content of peace education materials, some scholars such as Sommers criticize their potential Western bias.³⁵⁹

Facing such a range of criticism, Harris recommends lowering expectations about the efficacy of peace education: “Peace education can help people understand the causes of conflict and generate potential solutions, but conflicts must be transformed through a complicated process of agreement, reconciliation, compromise, and forgiveness if they are to be resolved and overcome.”³⁶⁰ Beyond these forms of criticism against the actual concept of peace education, the next

³⁵⁵ Jo Boyden and Paul Ryder, *The Provision of Education to Children Affected by Armed Conflict* (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 1996), 55-56.

³⁵⁶ Sinclair, “Protecting through Curriculum: A Call for Collaboration,” 280-281.

³⁵⁷ Gavriel Salomon, “Four Major Challenges Facing Peace Education in Regions of Intractable Conflict,” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 17, no. 1 (2011): 46–59.

³⁵⁸ Jon A. Krosnick and Richard E. Petty, “Attitude Strength: An Overview,” in *Attitude Strength*, ed. Jon A. Krosnick and Richard E. Petty (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1995), 1–24; Cited in Gavriel Salomon, “Does Peace Education Really Make A Difference?,” *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 12, no. 1 (2006): 45.

³⁵⁹ Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth.”

³⁶⁰ Harris, “Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,” 23.

section will present a series of challenges to the implementation of peace education programs in fragile states that are worth exploring.

3. Key challenges for peace education in fragile states

The same key challenges that impede access to good-quality education in fragile states can explain the lack of formal peace education programs in the field. The review of the literature reveals three types of challenges that can impede the implementation of peace education in fragile states: technical, political and institutional.

a) Technical Challenges

Technical challenge may take four different forms.

First, school infrastructures may suffer from a lack of classrooms and teaching materials due to war damages and poor economic conditions.³⁶¹ One evaluation of a peace education program in Indonesia commissioned by UNICEF explained that the late timing of the printing of the revised textbook as a major challenge to the implementation of the program.³⁶²

Second, there are several potential difficulties related to teachers. There may be a lack of teachers notably because of non- and/or low payment,³⁶³ as well as the inadequacy of policies for recruitment, training, upgrading qualifications, rates of

³⁶¹ Bretherton, Weston, and Zbar, "Peace Education in a Post-Conflict Environment: The Case of Sierra Leone," 225.

³⁶² Catheryn Ashton, *Evaluation Report Program Pendidikan Damai* (UNICEF, 2002), 8.

³⁶³ Bretherton, Weston, and Zbar, "Peace Education in a Post-Conflict Environment: The Case of Sierra Leone," 223.

pay, and terms and conditions of employment.³⁶⁴ Teacher's morale and motivation can be affected by various factors in conflict and fragile settings. In most fragile states, the conflict has prevented teachers from getting regular training. Therefore, teacher training materials must be simple and easy to understand.³⁶⁵ Moreover, the pedagogy of peace education involves child-centered and participatory teaching methods that are very different from the authoritarian methods that many teachers reproduce.³⁶⁶ These methods are incompatible with the learning objectives of peace education because they prevent open debate amongst pupils and hinder development of the critical thinking skills needed for independent thought.³⁶⁷ Sommers insists on the slowness of the process of change, even when such programs are well received by teachers: "Altering the fundamentally hierarchical structure of the relationship between teacher and student proved especially difficult and culturally sensitive."³⁶⁸

Third, when peace education is designed as a separate subject in the curriculum, it has to compete with other subject areas that are considered more important and suffers from a lack of time in the school schedule.

Fourth, the organizational structure of formal educational systems can make it difficult to introduce peace education into the curriculum: "the division of

³⁶⁴ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 29-33.

³⁶⁵ Bretherton, Weston, and Zbar, "Peace Education in a Post-Conflict Environment: The Case of Sierra Leone," 225.

³⁶⁶ Harber, *Schooling as Violence: How Schools Harm Pupils and Societies*.

³⁶⁷ Lindsay McLean Hilker, *The Role of Education in Driving Conflict and Building Peace: The Case of Rwanda*, Paper Commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, the Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education (UNESCO, 2010), 2.

³⁶⁸ Marc Sommers, "Children, Education and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict," *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit Working Papers – Paper n°1*, June 2002, 8.

knowledge into specific subjects; teachers with specific competencies in these subjects; the grouping of students into classes; and the division of time into periods and breaks.”³⁶⁹ According to Magnus Haavelsrud, these challenges may require structural changes to the formal educational systems before peace education can be introduced.

b) Political Challenges

Political challenges can also take various forms. On the one hand, it concerns the content of what is taught can be challenging. Scholars such as Paulo Freire consider education in general to be a political act. For him, schooling is never neutral; it always serves some interests and impedes others.³⁷⁰ This concept is exacerbated in the case of peace education. In some contexts, the word “peace” carries political connotations and the underlying value assumption in the definition of peace education may not be universally shared. Indeed, peace education theory assumes that the “peaceful resolution of conflict and prevention of violence, whether interpersonal or societal, overt or structural, is a positive value to be promoted on a global level through education.”³⁷¹ Political influences have had strong negative impacts on the education system in past and current conflicts. Denial of education can be used as a weapon of war, and manipulation of history for political purposes can often be considered a principal driver of conflict.³⁷² The

³⁶⁹ Magnus Haavelsrud, “Conceptual Perspectives in Education,” in *Encyclopedia of Peace Education*, ed. Monisha Bajaj (New York: Columbia Teacher’s College, 2008), 64.

³⁷⁰ Paulo Freire, *The Politics of Education: Culture, Power, and Liberation* (South Hadley, Mass: Bergin & Garvey, 1985).

³⁷¹ Fountain, *Peace Education in UNICEF*, 3.

³⁷² Bush and Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*, 11.

way that these issues are addressed in the post-conflict period will have an “influence on the level of trust in government as well as an impact on the likelihood of return to violence.”³⁷³ Consequently, governments of fragile states may be suspicious of the nature of peace education programs. Salomon adds that the concept of peace education is also based on an assumption of relative symmetry between the two sides of a conflict.³⁷⁴ He explains that when there is not such symmetry due to significant inequalities between the two sides, peace education and political action merge. Therefore, education for peacebuilding may go beyond the basic objectives of peace education: “A peacebuilding analysis may diagnose the need for deep structural and institutional changes, and this inevitably means attempts to change existing power relations within a society.”³⁷⁵ This, of course, can raise suspicions and generate resistance from different groups, including the government, political and armed groups, and local communities and parents.

On the other hand, the political challenge of peace education goes beyond the content of what is taught and includes the concepts of ownership and long-term sustainability: “Choices about policy, resource levels and allocation, education philosophy, and organizational power are intensely political.”³⁷⁶

³⁷³ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 29-33.

³⁷⁴ Gavriel Salomon, “The Nature of Peace Education,” in *Peace Education: The Concepts, Principles and Practices around the World*, ed. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 11.

³⁷⁵ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 43.

³⁷⁶ John Gillies, *The Power of Persistence: Education System Reform and Aid Effectiveness* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2010), 38.

c) Institutional Challenges

A lack of political will is often responsible for the education funding gap in fragile states. This lack of political will on the part of donors and governments can be explained by a failure to conduct serious impact evaluation as well as a lack of prioritization—not just supporting education in conflict-affected and fragile states, but also supporting peace education within both education and peacebuilding programs.

Lack of serious impact evaluation

The literature review stresses the difficulty of evaluating peace education programs, notably in fragile states.³⁷⁷ The complexity of these programs leads to a lack of rigorous impact evaluation studies. As a result, donors are often reluctant to fund these programs arguing that there is not enough evidence that these have a positive medium- and long-term effect. A study commissioned by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) Peace Education Reference Group also underscores this scarcity of good evaluation. According to this report, the evaluation challenge is largely due to the lack of consistency in standards or methods used for evaluating peace education programs, as a result, few of the available impact evaluations are usable for the development of theory.³⁷⁸

For Bar-Tal, the main explanation for the difficulty in evaluating the achievements of such programs lies in their fundamental objectives, which mainly

³⁷⁷ Davies, *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos*, 163.

³⁷⁸ Global PE/CRE Research Evaluation Project, *2009 Report for GPPAC Peace Education Reference Group* (GPPAC, 2009).

relate to the internalization of values, attitudes, skills, and behavior patterns.³⁷⁹ In other words, the effectiveness of peace education has to be judged by the effect it has upon students. This requires rigorous follow-up studies to help determine if students actually “transfer their learning to the real world and act in ways that contribute to the creation of peaceful cultures.”³⁸⁰ But behavior change takes time. Smith argues that it is unrealistic to expect programs such as human rights education, citizenship, and peace education to have an immediate impact because they represent a “complex matrix of education initiatives that address key themes and values that could have a preventative effect in the long term.”³⁸¹ Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of peace education requires longitudinal studies that not only measure change during and immediately after these programs, but also quite some time after they have ended, giving students several years to become adults and enter political life. Almost no organization has the capacity to bear the cost of such an evaluation process. In their review of evaluation methodologies used for conflict resolution programs in general, Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice confirm that attempting to determine the impacts of such programs raises the bar too high for most organizations, as it requires substantial and often unavailable resources.³⁸²

While some research studies on conflict resolution education in the United States show that it has a positive effect on school climate and on overall academic

³⁷⁹ Bar-Tal, “The Elusive Nature of Peace Education,” 34.

³⁸⁰ Ian Harris, “Evaluating Peace Education” (AERA, Chicago, 2003), 3.

³⁸¹ Alan Smith, *Education and Conflict*, Hink Piece for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 (UNESCO, 2009), 12.

³⁸² Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play* (INCORE International Conflict Research, 2002), 39.

performance,³⁸³ similar studies in fragile states are not available yet. UNICEF stresses how the unstable context of conflict-affected societies represents a further difficulty of measuring program impact.³⁸⁴

This lack of tangible impact evaluation studies also represents an obstacle for scaling-up of school-based peace education programs.³⁸⁵ A 2011 report on peace education for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) underlines how these programs struggle to find the necessary means and political will to scale up their efforts.³⁸⁶ This report stresses the difficulty of finding successful models of peace education and the lack of baselines necessary for proper evaluation, leading donors to increase their pressure on the organizations who conduct such programs to demonstrate lasting results. As a result, there are growing concerns that “if the field is unable to show its effectiveness, funders may lose faith and shift their resources to other pertinent subjects (climate change, anticorruption, and so on).”³⁸⁷

Lack of prioritization of peace education programs

On the one hand, peace education programs are competing with other peacebuilding tools oriented toward adults. Children and Youth are the future leaders of communities and societies, but adults are the ones currently in charge. Therefore, the need for fast results contributes to the low priority placed on peace education programs within the broader context of peacebuilding.

³⁸³ Harris, “Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,” 23.

³⁸⁴ Smith et al., *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding, Literature Review*, 25.

³⁸⁵ Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth,” 171.

³⁸⁶ Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education State of the Field and Lessons Learned from USIP Grantmaking*, 24.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

On the other hand, there is also a low priority placed on peace education programs within broader education programming. According to Harris, this can be explained by cultural and economic pressures on formal school systems to include more math and science so that school graduates can compete in the high-tech global economy, and as a result, the educational insights provided by peace activist educators have largely been ignored.³⁸⁸ This phenomenon is often described now as the *market orientation of education*.³⁸⁹ Another explanation that Harris provides for this low priority on peace education is the fact that violence is still an acceptable way of solving conflicts in many societies: “Nations prefer to spend money on arms rather than to invest in development strategies that will address some of the sources of structural violence that are creating so much violence (and school failure) throughout the world.”³⁹⁰ Unfortunately, promoting positive peace through peace education is a long-term strategy; it does not show immediate results. According to Harris, peace education will not become a priority in school reform efforts until a “powerful cultural shift moves humans away from a fear-based response to conflict and toward a compassionate response to interpersonal, social, and political problems.”³⁹¹

The objective of “building peaceful, just and inclusive societies” is included in the UN *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* adopted in September 2015.³⁹²

³⁸⁸ Ian Harris, “History of Peace Education,” in *Encyclopedia of Peace Education*, ed. Monisha Bajaj (New York: Columbia Teacher’s College, 2008).

³⁸⁹ Pasi Sahlberg, “Teaching and Globalization,” *Managing Global Transitions* 2, no. 1 (2004): 65–83.

³⁹⁰ Harris, “Types of Peace Education,” 314.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 315.

³⁹² United Nations General Assembly, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1 (New York: United Nations, 2015).

To reach the SDGs, a particular focus has been placed on education through Goal 4: “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.”³⁹³ The *Education 2030 Framework for Action* is at the heart of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* and is considered essential for the success of all SDGs.³⁹⁴ It depicts education as “inclusive and as crucial in promoting democracy and human rights and enhancing global citizenship, tolerance and civic engagement as well as sustainable development.”³⁹⁵ While the term peace education is not mentioned in this particular statement, the concept transpires here and is clearly mentioned in some of targets and policy recommendations for Goal 4, detailed in Chapter IV. Such global targets for education are parts of international reform efforts. The literature on global education policy will be reviewed briefly in the next section to obtain a better grasp of the influence of globalization on education policy-making processes in conflict-affected contexts.

D. Global Education Policy

Globalization, the international community and best-practice discourse are all intractably connected to the various settings under which education and conflict is studied.³⁹⁶ To improve our understanding of the education policy-making processes in conflict-affected and fragile states, this section will briefly review part

³⁹³ Ibid., 14.

³⁹⁴ United Nations, *Education 2030 Framework for Action* (United Nations, 2015), article 4, 4, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/ED_new/pdf/FFA-ENG-27Oct15.pdf.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., article 26, 9-10.

³⁹⁶ Jeremy Rappleye and Julia Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour,” *Research in Comparative and International Education* 2, no. 3 (2007), 253.

of the literature on global education policy that addresses the nexus of international reform efforts and national-level adoption and implementation of education policy.

1. The Internationalization of Education Politics

Due to globalization, the combination of economic restructuring in the world economy and the powerful ideological conceptions of how educational delivery needs to be changed is having a significant impact on educational systems worldwide.³⁹⁷ Under the impulse of international institutions, globalization affects the overall delivery of schooling, from transnational paradigms to national policies and local practices. Martin Carnoy and Diana Rhoten note that the relationship between the globalized political economy and the nation-state is at the heart of the relationship between globalization and education in the current historical conjuncture: “Increasingly, the state shifts power up to regional organizations or down to local governments and is less and less able to equalize the interests of various identities represented in the nation-state. It pushes the problems of ethnic conflict to the local level and increasingly limits its responsibility to develop the economic environment in which individuals can increase their material well-being.”³⁹⁸ This problem is even more serious in fragile states.

Carnoy and Rhoten insist that educational changes in response to globalization share certain defining parameters but still vary greatly across regions, nations, and localities: “Policies prescribed by the same paradigm but applied in different

³⁹⁷ Martin Carnoy and Diana Rhoten, “What Does Globalization Mean for Educational Change? A Comparative Approach. Guest Editorial Essay,” *In Comparative Education Review* 46, no. 1 (2002), 2.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

contexts produce different practices.”³⁹⁹ As a result, they emphasize the strategic urgency of recognizing differences in capacity and culture at the national, regional, and local levels, in order to avoid unintended and unexpected consequences for educational practice.⁴⁰⁰ Rhoten also underscores the need to take context into account. She stresses that policies implemented in constantly changing environments are “uniquely defined and burdened with idiosyncratic histories, politics, and structures of particular localities (...) Unless we are prepared to continue with a blind faith in policy ideals and a blind eye toward policy potentialities and realities, we must develop generalizable frameworks that can account for relationships between context and outcomes.”⁴⁰¹

2. Politics of Educational Change: a Dialectic between External Pressures and Internal Dynamics

Educational policy-making in conflict-affected and fragile states is often characterized by what is called “transfer” in the field of global education policy. This includes both the transfer of conflict into the educational domain, as demonstrated earlier, and the transfer of educational policy-making imperatives from a range of actors, including actors from the international community.⁴⁰² This section will explore the concepts of educational transfer and policy borrowing to improve our understanding of policy processes in situations affected by conflict. It

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Diana Rhoten, “Education Decentralization in Argentina: A ‘Global-Local Conditions of Possibility’ Approach to State, Market, and Society Change,” *Journal of Education Policy* 15, no. 6 (2000): 616.

⁴⁰² Rappleye and Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour,” 253.

will then present the existing dialectic between external pressures for change and internal dynamics of change in the context of education policy.

In the past decade, various scholars have started to analyze the nexus of international reform currents and national-level adoption and implementation of education policy.⁴⁰³ According to Taylor et al., there are three general categories to take into account when considering the role of policy in progressive change in the education sector: (a) external pressures for change, including the incentive and context for change; (b) internal dynamics of change, including the role of leadership in the change process and the strategies employed within organizations to facilitate change; and (c) institutionalization of change as it is expressed through a dialectic between external pressures and internal dynamics.⁴⁰⁴

In the field of comparative education, these external pressures or “foreign influences” have been studied through the notion of “educational transfer” that can be defined as the deliberate movement of educational ideas, institutions or practices

⁴⁰³ Gita Steiner-Khamsi, ed., *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2004); Gita Steiner-Khamsi and Ines Stolpe, *Educational Import: Local Encounters with Global Forces in Mongolia* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Roger Dale, “Specifying Globalization Effects on National Policy: Focus on the Mechanisms,” *Journal of Education Policy* 14, no. 1 (1999): 1–17; Frances K. Vavrus and Lesley Bartlett, eds., *Critical Approaches to Comparative Education: Vertical Case Studies from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009); Jeremy Rapple, “Catalysing Educational Development or Institutionalizing External Influence? Donors, Civil Society and Educational Policy Formation in Nepal,” *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 9, no. 1 (2011): 27–49; Gita Steiner-Khamsi and Florian Waldow, *World Yearbook of Education 2012: Policy Borrowing and Lending* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Antoni Verger and Mario Novelli, *Campaigning for Education for All: Histories, Strategies and Outcomes of Transnational Advocacy Coalitions in Education* (The Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2012); Antoni Verger, Mario Novelli, and Hulya Kosar-Altinyelkin, eds., *Global Education Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and Policies* (New York: Continuum, 2012); Edwards Jr., “International Processes of Education Policy Formation: Analytic Framework and the Case of Plan in El Salvador,” *Comparative Education Review* 57, no. 1 (2013): 22–53; Carolyn A. Brown, ed., *Globalisation, International Education Policy & Local Policy Formation: Voices from the Developing World* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).

⁴⁰⁴ Sandra Taylor, *Educational Policy and the Politics of Change* (New York; London: Routledge, 1997), 163.

across international borders.⁴⁰⁵ It relates to the concepts of “Policy Borrowing” (what can be learned and imported from elsewhere) and “Policy Lending” (what can be taught and exported to elsewhere).⁴⁰⁶ According to Jeremy Rappleye and Julia Paulson, the literature on educational transfer seeks to understand processes through which educational policies and practices are transferred across contexts and between countries, taking into account the actors behind these processes and “the ways policies are changed, resisted and indigenized.”⁴⁰⁷ They add that scholars interested in the study of educational transfer, such as Burde, Gita Steiner-Khamsi, and Ines Stolpe, explore the ways in which globalization, the international community, and best-practice discourse inform and transform understandings of educational borrowing practices.⁴⁰⁸

The spectrum of educational transfer that David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs developed was a first attempt to present the various possible forms of educational transfer (see Figure 3).⁴⁰⁹ They explain that policy borrowing may be conceived as a continuum: at the one end of the spectrum, there is “imposed educational transfer”, which might emerge from totalitarian or authoritarian rule, and at the other end, foreign practices that are “introduced through influence.”⁴¹⁰ This

⁴⁰⁵ Steiner-Khamsi, *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*, 201.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁰⁷ Rappleye and Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour,” 253.

⁴⁰⁸ Steiner-Khamsi, *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*; Dana Burde, “International NGOs and Best Practices,” in *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*, ed. Gita Steiner-Khamsi (New York: Teachers College Press, 2004), 173–87; Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, *Educational Import: Local Encounters with Global Forces in Mongolia*.

⁴⁰⁹ David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs, eds., *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives* (Oxford: Symposium Books, 2004).

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

spectrum caught the attention of Rappleye and Paulson who interpreted it through the context of conflict:

“For example, one might locate the various pieces of the education and conflict puzzle in instances of ‘imposed’ transfer (colonialism generally offers an example here, as do the cases of Eastern Europe and/or Central Asia during the time of the Soviet Union, and the Chinese rule of Tibet), transfer ‘required under constraint’ (such as Japan’s occupation of Manchuria, the American occupation of Germany and Japan following the Second World War (Shibata, 2005) or, arguably, the current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan) and transfer ‘negotiated under constraint’ (with most aspects of aid and loan assistance to countries which have recently experienced conflict, such as Sierra Leone or Nepal, appearing as examples).”⁴¹¹




Figure 3: Spectrum of educational transfer.⁴¹²

⁴¹¹ Rappleye and Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour,” 253.

⁴¹² Phillips and Ochs, *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives*.

The literature on education policy borrowing and lending questions the value of importing and exporting educational policies by analyzing who benefits from these arrangements and testing the effectiveness of adapting one country's policies in other countries. Steiner-Khamsi stresses how, in low-income countries, there is external pressure to reform in certain ways, and to view the international community that exerts such a pressure as a reference point—a very different pattern from that experienced in economically developed countries.⁴¹³ She insists that strong pressure from the international community often takes the form of international agreements: “Whether and how these externally induced reforms are locally implemented is an issue of great importance. Borrowing is not copying. It draws our attention to processes of local adaptation, modification, and resistance to global forces in education.”⁴¹⁴

Burde goes further in her analysis of this tension between external pressure and internal dynamics, and resistance that is sometimes produced by the former. She explains that, on the one hand, international workers must adhere to “best practices” that are established based on previous experiences of international agencies and generally accepted by program donors. This can be a way to justify or legitimize the transfer of an educational model from one country to another.⁴¹⁵ On the other hand, Burde adds that the same international workers must also include local representatives in critical decisions about program design and implementation in

⁴¹³ Steiner-Khamsi, *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*, 5.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁵ Burde, “International NGOs and Best Practices,” 173-175.

order to encourage genuine local “ownership” of externally supported projects.⁴¹⁶ She says that the tension remains between local versus international decision-making. Logically, the same dilemma applies to the role of international development NGOs in the process of transferring education reforms. John Boli and George Thomas contend that these organizations can be considered transnational bodies that “enact cultural models,” setting in motion specific processes that link the global with the local and increasingly penetrate “even the most peripheral social spaces.”⁴¹⁷ However, Burde notes that other scholars warn of the need to “question the empirical reality beneath globalizing discursive tactics and program models,” claiming that the discourse of international NGOs leaves a significant portion of potential participants out of the global dialogue, or conversely, may activate some to participate in ways that challenge notions of convergence.⁴¹⁸ Indeed, scholars such as Jurgen Schriewer⁴¹⁹ or Steiner-Khamsi⁴²⁰ claim that it is crucial to distinguish between language and practice in studying the convergence of educational reform in order to determine what actually is converging – action or discourse.

Similarly preoccupied with the issue of international influences as well, Edwards Jr. et al have observed that they are not alone in determining policy

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ John Boli and George M. Thomas, *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999), 5.

⁴¹⁸ Burde, “International NGOs and Best Practices,” 173-175.

⁴¹⁹ Jurgen Schriewer, “World System and Interrelationship Networks: The Internationalization of Education and the Role of Comparative Inquiry,” in *Educational Knowledge: Changing Relationships between the State, Civil Society, and the Educational Community*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 305–43.

⁴²⁰ Gita Steiner-Khamsi, “Re-Framing Educational Borrowing as a Policy Strategy,” in *Internationalisation*, ed. Marcelo Caruso and Heinz-Elmar Tenorth (Frankfurt/ M: Lang, 2002), 272–99.

outcomes, and that attributing significant powers of influence to certain international organizations should not be done too hastily.⁴²¹ Indeed, they note that their influence is “heightened or reduced depending on both the structural constraints on the reform context and on the predilections of key governmental policy actors.”⁴²² They add that developments in the underlying political and economic context affect the environment in which the formation and implementation of policy occurs, and these influence not only the preferences of State government officials but also the nature of the spaces in and through which the technical aspects of reform are elaborated.⁴²³ As a result, they advise that the study of policymaking and implementation at a given point in time cannot be fully conducted without incorporating into the analysis “(a) the ways in which constraints upon a particular country have changed over time and (b) the way that the state (or the institutions that make up the government) may have changed or otherwise been reconstituted over the course of many years (e.g., through the influence of particularly powerful international actors and/or other political-economic forces).”⁴²⁴ They regret that the process of policy implementation is understudied, and provide several possible reasons for this neglect. They reaffirm what Penny et al. have observed—many state officials seem to hold “a strange assumption that once a directive or plan or strategy is on paper, and has been affirmed by an

⁴²¹ D. Brent Edwards Jr., Julián Antonio Victoria Libreros, and Pauline Martin, “The Geometry of Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Political Economy of Three Education Reforms in El Salvador during 1990–2005,” *International Journal of Educational Development* 44 (2015): 28–41.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 39.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

authority, action and outcomes will ‘automatically’ follow.”⁴²⁵ At the end of their three case studies of policy implementation in the education sector, Edwards Jr. et al develop three hypotheses: implementation can be “extensive,” “moderate,” or “minimal,” depending not only on “political, institutional and technical dimensions of reform, but also on the larger political-economic context in which that reform takes place and the ways in which international actors are often influential across multiple dimensions.”⁴²⁶ They conclude by recommending that actors in charge of the education reform not only account for political, institutional, and technical dimensions of education reform, but also for the larger, political and economic context in which that reform takes place and the ways in which international actors are often influential across multiple dimensions.⁴²⁷

Agreeing with this principle that “context matters,” Rappleye and Paulson claim the central tension that lies at the heart of comparative and international education is “the belief in the ideal of being able to ‘learn from elsewhere’ constrained by the realization that contextual differences make importing ‘best practices’ observed elsewhere extremely problematic (...) Education and conflict, as an emerging field within comparative education, cannot escape this paradox.”⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵ Alan Penny et al., “Education Sector Reform: The Ugandan Experience,” *International Journal of Educational Development* 28, no. 3 (2008): 282.

⁴²⁶ Edwards Jr., Victoria Libreros, and Martin, “The Geometry of Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Political Economy of Three Education Reforms in El Salvador during 1990–2005,” 39.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Rappleye and Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour,” 268.

E. Synthesis

The literature on education in fragile states demonstrates the vital role that formal education systems have to play in building peace in countries affected by armed conflict. Depending on the way it is provided and the content it transmits, it can be a powerful tool to help mitigate conflict. However, while the critical role of education in post-conflict peacebuilding has become evidence, the literature also underscores how education can also play a negative role, potentially fueling conflict. As a result, scholars have developed the concept of conflict-sensitive education, which includes peace education, and is essential for the success of peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, the literature on peace education reaffirms how peace education can be considered the educational contribution to peacebuilding. Additionally, the literature review on education in fragile states demonstrates the existence of major impediments to education in these areas. Poverty, child labor, distance from school, gender or cultural discrimination, and the existence of conflict, all represent serious obstacles to the enrollment of children in school, so it is no surprise that the number of out-of-school children and dropout rates are still significantly higher in fragile and conflict-affected states.⁴²⁹ These impediments to education in such contexts therefore challenge the implementation of school-based peace education programs as well.

Finally, the literature on global education policy underscores the challenges of global educational reforms, particularly in low-income countries and fragile states.

⁴²⁹ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 – The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 6.

It addresses the nexus of international reform currents and national-level adoption and implementation of education policy, and it helps understand to what extent global policy recommendations have a chance to influence national education policy.

There is a large body of literature on global education policy, and a fair amount of advocacy literature on education in fragile states and peace education, but not much that situates peace education in the context of fragile states. From 1994 to 2010, only 1 percent of articles in peace and conflict studies journals and 0.5 percent of articles in international studies journals addressed education beyond North America and Europe.⁴³⁰ As Burde notes, because establishing an education system that provides equal access to all citizens is a key ingredient of a democratic state, scholars who explore state- and peacebuilding would appear to have a strong motivation to understand education; however, education has received limited attention from even these more specialized subfields.⁴³¹ Notably, there are no studies of peace education in Afghanistan, and no analyses across levels of how different actors at different levels respond to policy reforms like peace education. Barakat et al. add that the bulk of the literature on education and conflict is focused on a small number of geographic areas that receive a disproportionate amount of attention. Indeed, Research on peace education initiatives often focuses on Northern Ireland or Israel-Palestine.⁴³² This doctoral research will address this gap in the literature by tackling the following research question:

⁴³⁰ King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*.

⁴³¹ Burde, "Editorial Note," 6.

⁴³² Barakat, Karpinska, and Paulson, *Desk Study: Education and Fragility*.

How have global discussions of peace education in conflict-affected fragile states influenced national education policy and local NGOs efforts in Afghanistan, and why is that so?

In order to answer this main research question, the following questions must be answered first:

- *RQ1a: What are the recommendations on peace education in global policy discussions?*

At the international level, this research will explore what the recommendations on peace educations are, notably to assess the strength of global policy recommendations in this field.

- ***RQ1b: How has the national Afghan government engaged in peace education policy and practice?***

At the national level, this study will analyze the national Afghan government's engagement in peace education policy and practice to assess and understand the influence of global policy recommendations, or the lack thereof.

- ***RQ1c: What does peace education look like at the local level in Afghanistan?***

At the local level, this research will look in particular at the origin, design and implementation process of a peace education program in schools; the influence of the cultural, social and political context on the program's content and implementation; the possible influence of global policy recommendations; and the opportunity for this program to influence national education policy and practice.

In answering these questions, this research will explore the influences of each level on the others. It will examine the direct influence of international discourses on local initiatives that eventually bypass the nation-state, and the potential influence that these local initiatives have on national policies. The following chapter on the methodology used for this research presents the ways in which this study sought to develop a broader understanding of the critical factors affecting the inclusion of peace education in education policy and practice in a fragile state such as Afghanistan.

CHAPTER III – Methodology

A. Introduction

The goal throughout this study was to answer the following question: *How have global discussions of peace education in conflict settings influenced national education policy and local NGOs efforts in fragile states such as Afghanistan, and why is that so?* Tackling this question required exploring processes, activities and events that are at the origin of the current situation, an inquiry that called for a case study approach.⁴³³ Qualitative research methods were best suited to tackle this question because they emphasize the qualities of entities, processes and meanings that cannot be experimentally examined or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency.⁴³⁴

In an effort to develop a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the inclusion of peace education in education policy and practice in a fragile state such as Afghanistan, this research conducts a multi-level analysis through a vertical case study approach. Developed by Frances Bartlett and Lesley Vavrus to study global education policy, this method calls for "simultaneous comparisons of similarities and differences, across multiple levels"⁴³⁵ and the "concomitant commitment to micro-level understanding and to macro-level

⁴³³ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 3rd Edition (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc., 2009), 177.

⁴³⁴ Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 4th edition (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2011), 8.

⁴³⁵ Frances K. Vavrus and Lesley Bartlett, "Comparatively Knowing: Making a Case for the Vertical Case Study," *Current Issues in Comparative Education* 8, no. 2 (2006), 99.

analysis."⁴³⁶ This approach recognizes the need for attention to the vertical, horizontal, and transversal elements of the object of study.⁴³⁷ It incorporates three elements: “vertical attention across micro-, meso-, and macro-levels, or scales; a horizontal comparison of how policies unfold in distinct locations; and a transversal, processual analysis of the creative appropriation of educational policies across time.”⁴³⁸ Drawing from socio-cultural studies of “policy as practice,” it understands policy as “a deeply political process of cultural production engaged in and shaped by social actors in disparate locations who exert incongruent amounts of influence.”⁴³⁹ Finally, this method seemed appropriate for the inquiry because it required attention to both policy formation and implementation or appropriation “during which social actors interpret and selectively implement policies, thereby adapting ideas and discourses developed in a different place and potentially at a different historical moment in accordance with their own interests as well as symbolic, material, and institutional constraints.”⁴⁴⁰

In this chapter, I will first explain the criteria I used to select Afghanistan for this case study, then I will present this vertical case study and the methodological approach employed for each level of analysis – including participant selection, data collection and analysis techniques. The chapter will end with a review of the role of the researcher and the limitations of the study.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., 96.

⁴³⁷ Frances K. Vavrus and Lesley Bartlett, “Transversing the Vertical Case Study: A Methodological Approach to Studies of Educational Policy As Practice,” *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (2014): 131–47.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 131.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., 132.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

B. Case Selection

Rather than comparing several country cases, I have chosen to study the case of Afghanistan in depth as a way to assess and understand the complex internal and external influences that shape education policy and practice in a post-conflict education system—particularly in the field of education and peacebuilding. Selecting Afghanistan for this research was relevant because it can be considered a critical case (i.e., one with strategic importance in relation to the general problem)⁴⁴¹ for several reasons. First, Afghanistan did experience the negative instrumentalization of education through the printing and distribution of textbooks with violent content during the war. As a result, in 2002, much had to be done to build a conflict-sensitive education system. The country therefore offered an opportunity for peace education to be the “educational contribution to peacebuilding” described in the previous chapter. Second, while financial challenges constrain peace education programs in other fragile states, Afghanistan has received some of the largest flows of international aid, mostly from USAID, one of the greatest advocates for conflict sensitivity in education among donors. This provides valuable ground for studying national educational reforms that encompass the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in education policy and practice, including through peace education. Finally, the country is one of the rare fragile states where a school-based peace education initiative can be found at the local level, with more than a decade of history and with the goal to be included in the national curriculum. Indeed, thanks to grants from various institutions and

⁴⁴¹ Denzin and Lincoln, *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 307.

private donors, Help the Afghan Children (HTAC), a non-profit and non-governmental organization with headquarters in Kabul, has been conducting school-based peace education programs in several provinces. Since 2002, with the support of the Afghan MoE and local communities, HTAC established peace education programs successfully in more than 70 schools located in six different provinces. In 2011, HTAC obtained the approval of the MoE for the design and testing of a national peace education curriculum that would teach secondary school students non-violent responses to conflict. The MoE requested testing of this peace education curriculum, now available in Dari and Pashto, in several provinces before examining the possibility of an implementation at the national level. Developed in 2012, this curriculum received very positive feedback from students and teachers in the schools where it was first tested in 2013. In June 2014, HTAC started a three-year pilot program in a second location. As a result, at the local level, this doctoral research focuses primarily on HTAC's peace education program for the following reasons: HTAC's long-term involvement in peace education programs in Afghanistan, the content and rare whole-school approach of their program, the influence of global policy recommendations on HTAC's activities, and the recent efforts towards the creation of a national peace education curriculum. Rather than an evaluation of HTAC's program, this research explores its origins, design and implementation processes, as well as its interactions with other actors, in order to understand better its longevity and potential for expansion at the national level.

The period covered by this case study starts with the fall of the Taliban regime and the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

(UNAMA) in 2002.⁴⁴² UNAMA's original mandate and structure encompassed UN assistance in a broad range of areas, including the education sector, in order to facilitate the work of the Interim Administration chosen during the 2001 Bonn Conference.⁴⁴³ As a result, if global recommendations on peace education could have an influence on education policy and practice in Afghanistan, it would be after 2002.

C. The Vertical Case Study

This research offers a multilevel analysis through a vertical case study approach. As a result, the primary source of data is qualitative and was collected through semi-structured interviews. Secondary sources are qualitative as well (public documents and reports). Indeed, in addition to the interviews conducted at the international level, and at the country level in Afghanistan, I collected and reviewed numerous documents. The document collection and review process took place before, during, and after field visits to Afghanistan.

An inductive analysis, described as “discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one's data,”⁴⁴⁴ guided the overall data analysis process for two main reasons. First, because of the gap in the literature that this research aimed to address, I could not make preliminary hypotheses grounded in theory that would allow for a fully deductive approach. Second, while I did have some intuition about

⁴⁴² United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1401, S/RES/1401* (United Nations, 2002), <https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/28%20March%202002.pdf>.

⁴⁴³ United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2002/278 (United Nations, 2002), <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/S20022781.pdf>.

⁴⁴⁴ Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2006), 159.

the potential findings this research may unveil, an inductive approach helped me stay open-minded so I would not miss any key information by being too directive in my inquiry. Nevertheless, parts of the process were deductive as well. Indeed, John Creswell writes that, in such qualitative research, while the process begins inductively, deductive thinking also plays an important role as the analysis moves forward: the researcher works back and forth between the themes and the data until a comprehensive set of themes is established, then deductively, the researcher looks back at the data from the themes to determine if more evidence can support each theme or whether they need to gather additional information.⁴⁴⁵

1. Data Collection

a) International Level

At the international level, the goal was to answer RQ1a (*What are the recommendations on peace education in global policy discussions?*) in order to assess the strength of global policy recommendations in this field. The literature review had offered elements that provided information on the organizations that were major actors in these discussions at the global level. I completed my inquiry by further exploring their official reports and press communications for two main reasons: (a) to refine my interview guides (provided in Appendix B), and select the key informants I wanted to interview in depth, and (b) to have the possibility to complete and triangulate the data collected through interviews. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 experts working for a range of organizations,

⁴⁴⁵ Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 175.

including UN agencies, International NGOs, and bilateral agencies. A purposive sampling strategy was utilized to ensure the inclusion of individuals who possessed the expertise required to answer my questions—something that could not have been done with randomized techniques.⁴⁴⁶ Whenever possible, I conducted the interviews in person; otherwise, the conversation was done over the phone or via Skype.

b) Data collection in Afghanistan

Data collection in Afghanistan (both at the national and local levels) consisted of two essential phases. During the first phase, I conducted background readings, searching for pertinent documents related to the political, educational, and developmental history of Afghanistan, as well as information relating to the current state of the Afghan education system and current donor activities in Afghanistan in the education field. These documents included published books, academic literature, donor country plans and assessments, and reports of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, I collected information from websites of bilateral donor agencies, multilateral organizations (such as the UN or the World Bank), and of the Afghan MoE. I used these documents to situate the case and provide background information on Afghanistan, presented in Chapter V.

The second phase mostly consisted in conducting semi-structured interviews, during two field trips to Kabul, in order to obtain information pertaining to the sub-research questions RQ1b (*How has the national Afghan government engaged in*

⁴⁴⁶ Joseph A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, 2nd Edition (Thousands Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2005).

peace education policy and practice?) and RQ1c (*What does peace education look like at the local level in Afghanistan?*), as explained hereafter. These interviews were conducted in Kabul with 62 individuals, including 22 officials of the MoE, 6 parliamentarians, 3 members of the High Peace Council, 9 representatives of local NGOs, 6 education experts working for international NGOs, 5 representatives of bilateral donors, 3 education experts working for UN Agencies, 2 school directors, and 6 teachers. While I used a specific template of questions (provided in Appendix B), I also allowed individuals to take the discussion in the directions they felt was most relevant to their own experience or organization.

In June 2014, I conducted a first field trip to Afghanistan to start collecting data at the national and local levels. The relative chaos related to the second round of that year's presidential election could have been problematic for the success of this trip. Indeed, the election process, taking place that same month, had created an unstable security climate where various international organizations had requested that their foreign staff leave temporarily the country. Several bombing attacks occurred while I was in Kabul. Moreover, some key officials at the MoE were also involved in the electoral campaign, so, conducting interviews with them was not always an option due to their busy schedules. Nevertheless, it was a fruitful trip for several reasons. First, it helped me obtain a better picture of the current situation of the education sector in Afghanistan, and the way it has been and still is impacted by conflict. I was also able to start assessing to what extent peace education is included in education policies and programming of the general education system. As a result, I could identify the key candidates for follow-up interviews in order to

explore the critical factors that could explain the current situation. Having developed a good preliminary network in Kabul thanks to my previous work with Afghan women parliamentarians, I did not encounter any problems conducting the interviews that comprised the bulk of my research at the national and local levels. The presence of my mother and colleague, Fahimeh, during most of the interviews was extremely valuable as she translated from Dari to French when needed. Consequently, I was able to conduct interviews with MoE senior officials, members of HTAC's team, and representatives of local and international NGOs, donors, and UN Agencies (namely UNICEF and UNESCO respective country offices in Afghanistan). Interviews with representatives of UN and donor agencies and International NGOs working in Afghanistan provided particular insight into the way these organizations position themselves to provide education services as well as their views on peace education in the context of Afghanistan. With the help of HTAC staff, I also had the chance to visit two schools participating in HTAC's pilot peace education program. This was an opportunity to interview school directors and teachers participating in the pilot. During these visits, I was invited to attend a peace education session and observe the pedagogy, the students' participation, and the general teaching and learning conditions. Last but not least, this trip was an opportunity to present my research project to the research advisory board of the MoE. This meeting was part of a new process set up at the MoE in order to improve communication and develop exchanges between the MoE and external researchers studying questions related to the Afghan education system.

Thanks to the findings from this exploratory trip, I was able to define better my research questions and finalize my dissertation proposal.

Another field trip to Kabul was needed to go deeper in this inquiry and address newly refined research questions. It was also a chance to hear about the results and progress of HTAC's pilot peace education program one year later. However, conducting this subsequent trip revealed to be more challenging. In the fall of 2015, I flew to France where I had several meetings set up with contacts at international agencies. From there, I was supposed to fly to Kabul with Fahimeh, who would be helping me with the translation from Dari into French. However, because of the multiple attacks that occurred in Afghanistan while I was in Paris, and the risk level that my profile represented, we decided I stay in Paris. As a back-up plan, Fahimeh offered to travel alone to Afghanistan in order to help organize meetings while she was in Kabul. Thanks to Fahimeh's knowledge of my research, and her work with me as a translator during the first trip in 2014, she was able to help me collect invaluable data for my dissertation. Her knowledge of the country and trustworthy contacts in Afghanistan were also instrumental for her safety during this challenging trip. Thanks to our previous trips to Afghanistan, and her contacts in Kabul, she was able to organize phone meetings with key informants and I while she was in their office. Her presence helped ensure that the meetings would take place and that we would be able to use her cell phone if the landline connection failed during the meeting. The smaller time difference between France and Afghanistan helped with this process. Sometimes, when the phone conversations were not possible, she did conduct the interviews following the interview guides I

had created and shared with her. We were to work with an Afghan translator who helped with the interviews in Pashtu and the transcription of the recordings. These meetings in Afghanistan provided a great update of and complement to the data collected in 2014, and helped me finalize the data collection phase at the country level.

2. Data Analysis

The data analysis in this dissertation is both descriptive and explanatory. It is descriptive in the sense that it seeks to explain what has been happening regarding the influence of global discussions on peace education. It is also explanatory because it seeks to identify patterns and possible explanations for why these global discussions and recommendations have or have not influenced education policy and practice in a fragile state such as Afghanistan.

The process of investigation I employed for this study was more iterative than linear. Following Joseph Maxwell's "interactive model", previous phases of research served to "inform subsequent phases," and findings were "continuously re-examined alongside threats to validity and negative or discrepant cases, the latter being consciously sought to expand on, or to adapt, previous analyses."⁴⁴⁷

Once I managed to address the three sub-research questions through the data collection phase, I finalized the data analysis to answer the main research question. Prior to collecting data, I had created a general list of key words and categories drawn from the literature review. Then, I followed Creswell's recommended steps

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., 3.

for data analysis in a qualitative study.⁴⁴⁸ First, I organized the data for analysis, transcribing interviews, typing up field notes, and sorting the data into different types depending on the sources of information. Second, I read through all the data collected, not only to help me reflect on the overall meaning of the data, but also to build “patterns, categories and themes from the bottom up by organizing the data into increasingly more abstract units of information.”⁴⁴⁹ Third, during the coding phase, I used the key words and categories that reflected the findings of the literature review to develop a categorization process, refining these general categories into more defined groups, and isolating key phrases or excerpts from the interviews that could be relevant to those particular categories. These categories helped me generate patterns that then formed the basis for the findings presented in Chapters IV, VI and VII.

3. Validity

To establish validity of insights and findings, this study relied upon the triangulation of data from a variety of sources using different methods (e.g., interviews, observations, documents, and field notes).⁴⁵⁰ The range and diversity of stakeholders and documents, both within the case and across levels, contributed to the objective of developing a broad understanding of the influence that global policy recommendations have on peace education on education policies and practices in a fragile state such as Afghanistan. Member checking (also known as

⁴⁴⁸ Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 186-187.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴⁵⁰ James Beebe, *Rapid Assessment Process: An Introduction* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001).

informant feedback or respondent validation) was also used to ensure internal validity and establish trustworthiness, as it provided participants with the opportunity to “review material for accuracy and palatability.”⁴⁵¹

As for the external validity or transferability of this research, some possibilities can be anticipated here. While different conflict-affected and fragile states have unique characteristics, governments still face common challenges that face in the transition phase from war to peace, particularly in the education sector. Moreover, the strategic selection of a critical case, such as Afghanistan, provides the possibility to formulate the following type of generalization: “If it is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases.”⁴⁵² Despite the challenges that the country faces, Afghanistan offers good conditions for global policy recommendations on peace education to have an influence on national and local education policy and practice. As a result, if this study finds out that these global policy recommendations do not have an influence in this country, they are unlikely to have an influence in countries with less favorable conditions. Similarly, if this study finds that these global policy recommendations do have an influence in a context as complex as Afghanistan’s, it is likely that they will have an influence on national and local policy in less challenging settings. An analysis of the reasons for this influence, or the lack thereof, will help further the analysis and provide recommendations that could be beneficial to other fragile states.

⁴⁵¹ Robert E. Stake, *The Art of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), 115.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

D. Role of the Researcher

It is important for this qualitative research to identify how the study may have been affected by my role as the researcher, both with regard to my identity as well as my social location during the study along the insider/outsider continuum.⁴⁵³ Creswell insists that researchers should “explicitly identify reflexively their biases, values, and personal background, such as gender, history, culture, and socioeconomic status that shape their interpretations formed during a study.”⁴⁵⁴ Although I sought to employ rigorous standards for data collection and analysis in this study, my own identity and perspectives may have affected this research endeavor through informant perception and reactivity to me, and I cannot fully account for how participants perceived my project or me. There did not seem to be any major obstacles regarding my social location during the interviews with the educational experts at the international level, thus, this section will explore the fieldwork part of the research.

My personal background seemed to be mostly an asset while conducting this research in the field, and positively affected the interactions with Afghans in Kabul. First, in a society that greatly values family, the presence of my mother, and our collaboration in this research and other projects, was appreciated and praised. Our knowledge of the culture and the language also created a favorable atmosphere for the meetings. Of course, our accents quickly gave away our Iranian origin and

⁴⁵³ Liora Bresler, “The Interpretive Zone in International Qualitative Research,” in *Research Ininternational Education: Experience, Theory and Practice*, ed. Liora Bresler and Alexander Ardichvili (New York: Peter Lang., 2002), 39–82.

⁴⁵⁴ Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 177.

could have been an obstacle sometimes. While our affiliation with Iran, a Muslim State, certainly played a positive role, it could also have been an issue. Indeed, the geopolitical role of Iran in the region, and the history between Iran and Afghanistan, have created some tensions and suspicions towards Iranians for some Afghans. However, the fact that we were also French, and had been living in France for almost 40 years, probably mitigated these potential concerns. During the interviews, in respect for family and elders, I allowed my mother to introduce both of us. One of the first things participants were interested to confirm was the fact that she was Muslim. We could tell that the positive answer reassured them and helped reinforce the relative trust they were offering us from the start. We also benefited from our efforts to adopt a low profile and blend in the local society as much as possible, thanks to our clothes, the absence of make-up, and our appreciation for local meals.

Being a woman could have been an obstacle sometimes. In such a patriarchal culture, some men tend to be reluctant to interact with women and to speak without restraint. However, I felt that the actual topic of my research and the focus on children lessened this impact. Moreover, the fact that my mother was with me probably helped mitigate my character as an independent young woman that could have been problematic. Another possible hurdle could have been my affiliation with an American university. Some participants who may be resentful of U.S. foreign policy and presence in Afghanistan could have considered it a negative factor that would have limited their willingness to share their views freely with me.

However, it seems that this effect was counterbalanced by my French and Iranian origins.

Finally, while our network was a great and essential asset to open the right doors in a limited time, it has probably hindered interactions with some individuals I was interested to interview during the second field trip. Our connection with some members of a parliamentary commission named by President Ghani in the spring of 2015 to investigate corruption at the MoE may have created a certain level of suspicion in the minds of a few individuals who became hard to reach. We had designed and facilitated a training program for newly elected Afghan women parliamentarians in 2011, and have maintained the contact with them ever since. One of them subsequently became a member of this commission.

E. Limitations of the Study

Security represented the greatest constraint for my study. Because of the poor security conditions, I had to restrict my research geographically to Kabul Province, and I was not able to conduct research in other locations where HTAC had implemented its peace education program in the past. These challenging conditions also limited the time I could spend in the field, or in Kabul, as I was advised not to spend more than two or three weeks at a time in Kabul. As a result, there are certain key informants I was not able to interview. This limitation affected my data collection at the national and local levels. While I was able to meet at least one representative of all the main departments of the MoE, I was not able to meet anyone at the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This limited my inquiry about its potential role and influence in the integration of peace education in the national

curriculum. At the local level, this time constraint prevented the administration of an extensive survey near students, parents, and teachers. This additional data could have shed light on the actual presence of peace education in government schools in addition to the efforts of HTAC after school hours.

Considering this limited time spent in the field due to security constraints and a resource limitation that affected the number of field trips I could undertake, I also decided to focus this research on the General Education system. While this limitation did not affect this research's findings, studying the education policy and the curriculum developed for the Islamic education system would have helped improve our knowledge of the presence of peace education in the formal education system in Afghanistan.

Additionally, while it would have been interesting to compare two different local organizations involved in peace education programs, the initial data collected during my first field trip in June 2014 did not establish the existence of any comparable programs. In 2015, another local organization seemed to be conducting similar after-school programs, but this discovery came late in the data collection process, and I decided to focus on the study of one local NGO in greater depth. As a result, while it could have been developed a step further, the horizontal element of the vertical case study has been exploited within the study of this NGO's activities in Afghanistan. The horizontal comparison element of the vertical case study was applied to HTAC's presence in several provinces.

The language constraint was well managed during the field research. Indeed, while I cannot fully understand Dari, the fact that I speak Farsi was very helpful to

establish a good atmosphere during the interviews. Working with a translator helped complement the gaps in my understanding, and her familiarity with my research and the local context was critical: it saved me time, increased my confidence in the quality of the translation and follow-up questions, and gave me important indications on the cultural context.

Finally, phone interviews were not ideal as the direct contact and body language clues that are important components of any conversation were absent. While I always suggested the use of Skype or other video conference tools, it was not always an option for technical reasons.

Despite these constraints, the information that I was able to access included multiple perspectives and opinions from varying angles, which was sufficient to yield answers to the research questions of this dissertation. The following chapters will present the data generated by the methodological approach presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV – Peace Education in Fragile States: a Global Perspective

A. Introduction

“A culture of peace will be achieved when citizens of the world understand global problems, have the skills to resolve conflicts and struggle for justice non-violently, live by international standards of human rights and equity, appreciate cultural diversity, and respect the Earth and each other. Such learning can only be achieved with systematic education for peace.”

– Hague Appeal for Peace, Global Campaign for Peace Education⁴⁵⁵

The *Hague Appeal for Peace* is an international network of organizations and individuals dedicated to the abolition of war and making peace a human right.⁴⁵⁶ It coordinates the *Global Campaign for Peace Education*, launched at the Hague Appeal for Peace Civil Society Conference in May 1999. The Campaign aims at facilitating the introduction of peace and human rights education into all educational institutions. It started because, despite several important international recommendations and instruments promulgated since 1974, few national educational institutions and policy makers had fulfilled their commitments to include peace education in their national curriculum. The Campaign is conducted through a global network of education associations, as well as regional, national and local task forces of citizens and educators, that lobby and inform ministries of

⁴⁵⁵ For the full Campaign statement, visit: <http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/about/>

⁴⁵⁶ More information about the Hague Appeal for Peace is available at: <http://www.haguepeace.org/>

education and teacher education institutions about these international recommendations and instruments, as well as the materials that have been developed to implement peace education programs in all learning environments.⁴⁵⁷

The literature review presented earlier in this dissertation underlined the increase in attention to education in fragile states over the past two decades, and how peace education has gained a certain momentum in global discussions. In order to assess if and how these discussions and recommendations influence the education policies and practices of a particular country, it is essential to take a moment to understand the substance of these recommendations. This chapter will explore the recommendations on peace education in global policy discussions in order to assess the strength of global policy recommendations in this field and to consider the possible impediments to implementation.

B. The Normative Imperative for Peace Education in UN Documents

Several major documents and norm-setting decisions of the UN validate the normative imperative to conduct peace education programs. These documents clearly state that education is the right of every child, even in the most difficult circumstances. Some scholars contend that peace education is a particularly important right for every child. Various scholars, such as Betty Reardon,⁴⁵⁸ James Page,⁴⁵⁹ and Marc Sommers, argue that peace education is a “component of a

⁴⁵⁷ More information about the Global Campaign for Peace Education is available at: <http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/>

⁴⁵⁸ Betty Reardon, “Human Rights as Education for Peace,” in *Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. George J. Andreopoulos and Richard Pierre Claude (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 255–61.

⁴⁵⁹ James Page, “The United Nations and Peace Education,” in *Encyclopedia of Peace Education*, ed. Monisha Bajaj (New York: Columbia Teacher’s College, 2008), 76.

child's right to education."⁴⁶⁰ Page states that the first fundamental recognition of peace education lies within the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*: "Education shall be directed ... to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship ... and shall further the activities of the UN for the maintenance of peace."⁴⁶¹

The 1959 *Declaration of the Rights of the Child* reaffirms this idea by stating that a child has the right to an education that will develop a "sense of moral and social responsibility."⁴⁶² Additionally, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* indicates that the education of the child shall be directed to the "preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin."⁴⁶³

In 1994, the UN Secretary-General ordered a study on the impact of armed conflict on children. Named after its author, the *Machel Study* was conducted with the support of UNICEF and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights. Released in 1996, it provided important guidance on children's education and reaffirmed the importance of peace education:

"Both the content and the process of education should promote peace, social justice, respect for human rights and the acceptance of responsibility.

Children need to learn skills of negotiation, problem-solving, critical

⁴⁶⁰ Sommers, "Peace Education and Refugee Youth," 167.

⁴⁶¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (United Nations, 1948), article 26 (2).

⁴⁶² United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on the Rights of the Child*, Resolution 1386 (XIV) (New York: United Nations, 1959), article 7.

⁴⁶³ United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, Resolution 44/25 (New York: UNICEF, 1989), Article 29.1 (d).

thinking and communication that will enable them to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence. To achieve this, a number of countries have undertaken peace education programmes. While such initiatives are not always successful, they are indispensable to the eventual rehabilitation of a shattered society.”⁴⁶⁴

The report recognized that peace education may not always be successful, nor enough on its own, but it insisted that laying the groundwork for peace through education is essential in post-conflict settings and for conflict prevention. The study also advised that UNESCO’s expertise in educational curricula development and teacher training should be “utilized by operational agencies in all phases of conflict.”⁴⁶⁵

Over the years, the commitment of the UN to peace education has increased gradually and reached a certain momentum with the proclamation of the *International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010)*. Through several resolutions, the UN General Assembly has gone increasingly further in its recommendations on peace education. First, in December 1994, it proclaimed 1995 the “United Nations Year for Tolerance,”⁴⁶⁶ and 1995-2004 the “United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education.”⁴⁶⁷ A year later, welcoming UNESCO’s transdisciplinary project entitled “Towards a culture of peace” (in particular unit 1, entitled “Education for peace, human rights,

⁴⁶⁴ United Nations, *Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (The Machel Study)*, para. 255.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 298.

⁴⁶⁶ United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/49/213* (New York: United Nations, 1994).

⁴⁶⁷ United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/49/184* (New York: United Nations, 1994).

democracy, international understanding and tolerance”), resolution 50/173 encouraged the international community to “take all necessary action to ensure education for peace, human rights, democracy, international understanding and tolerance.”⁴⁶⁸ Then, in December 1996, the UN General Assembly went further, calling for the promotion of a culture of peace “based on the principles established in the Charter of the UN, respect for human rights, democracy, tolerance, dialogue, cultural diversity and reconciliation, and efforts to promote development, education for peace, the free flow of information and the wider participation of women, as an integral approach to prevent violence and conflicts and to contribute to the creation of conditions for peace and its consolidation.”⁴⁶⁹ Adopted without a vote in 1997, resolution 52/13 defined the “culture of peace” as consisting of the following elements:

“values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society.”⁴⁷⁰

That same year, several Nobel Peace Prize Laureates published a manifesto, *Culture of Peace through Education*, stating that the only way to fight violence

⁴⁶⁸ United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/50/173* (New York: United Nations, 1995).

⁴⁶⁹ United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/51/101* (New York: United Nations, 1996).

⁴⁷⁰ United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/52/13* (New York: United Nations, 1997).

with non-violence was education.⁴⁷¹ It contributed to a wider realization that the attainment of peace was not merely an institutional problem, but rather one that required cultural change.⁴⁷² This mobilization encouraged the UN General Assembly to adopt, in 1998, resolution 52/15, which declared 2000 the *International Year for the Culture of Peace*. In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus the norm-setting resolution 53/243 on *The Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*. It stressed the essential role of education in building a culture of peace, and recommended specific actions for fostering a culture of peace through education.⁴⁷³ While the term “peace education” was not specifically stated, article B/9(b) included an action that encompass the goals of peace education: “Ensure that children, from an early age, benefit from education on the values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life to enable them to resolve any dispute peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity and of tolerance and non-discrimination.”⁴⁷⁴ The Declaration also specified the role of UNESCO, which includes the promoting a culture of peace (article A/5), the provision of technical cooperation upon request on the revision of educational curricula (article B/9(e)), and encouraging and strengthening efforts aimed at developing values and skills conducive to a culture of peace (article A/5B/9(f)).

Since then, the UN General Assembly plenary has adopted resolutions on the subject every year, asserting and re-affirming the commitment of the totality of the

⁴⁷¹ Cited in Harris, “Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,” 21.

⁴⁷² Page, “The United Nations and Peace Education,” 81.

⁴⁷³ United Nations, *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*, Resolution A/RES/53/243 (New York: United Nations, 1999), article B/9, <http://cpnn-world.org/resolutions/resA-53-243B.html>.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, article B/9(b).

UN Member States for building a culture of peace.⁴⁷⁵ In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the *Follow-up to the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Culture of Peace*.⁴⁷⁶ This document, in addition to reaffirming the messages of the 1999 document, the Assembly encouraged the UN “peacebuilding architecture to continue to promote peacebuilding activities and to advance a culture of peace and non-violence in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts at the country level.”⁴⁷⁷ It also urged the authorities to provide education in children’s schools that built “a culture of peace, including lessons in mutual understanding, tolerance, active citizenship and human rights.”⁴⁷⁸ This time, peace education was clearly mentioned as an activity that contributes to further promoting a culture of peace and non-violence.⁴⁷⁹ The UN General Assembly encouraged actors who have conducted such activities to “continue and further strengthen and expand their efforts.”⁴⁸⁰

While it did not clearly define peace education activities, the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* did call for the active promotion of a culture of peace in its article 6.⁴⁸¹ Its successor, the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*,

⁴⁷⁵ Previous UN resolutions on a culture of peace (adopted under the UN General Assembly agenda item entitled “Culture of peace”): resolutions 56/5 of 5 November 2001, 57/6 of 4 November 2002, 58/11 of 10 November 2003, 59/143 of 15 December 2004, 60/3 of 20 October 2005, 61/45 of 4 December 2006, 62/89 of 17 December 2007, 63/113 of 5 December 2008, 64/80 of 7 December 2009, 65/11 of 23 November 2010, 66/116 of 12 December 2011, 67/106 of 17 December 2012, 68/125 of 18 December 2013 and 69/139 of 15 December 2014.

⁴⁷⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Follow-up to the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*, Resolution A/70/L.24 (New York: United Nations, 2015), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/L.24&referer=http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&Lang=E.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., Article 7.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., Article 6.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., Article 8.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ United Nations General Assembly, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, A/RES/55/2 (New York: United Nations, 2000), <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf>.

includes the promotion of a culture of peace as well, particularly in one of the targets of Goal 4, dedicated to education (target 4.7):

“By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development.”⁴⁸²

To reach this target, the *Education 2030 Framework for Action* does refer directly to peace education. First, it insists that it is essential to strengthen education’s contribution to the fulfilment of human rights, peace, responsible citizenship, gender equality, sustainable development and health.⁴⁸³ Then, it explains that these goals can be reached through Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and Global Citizenship Education (GCED), which “includes peace and human rights education.”⁴⁸⁴

The evolution from the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* to the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* towards a clearer promotion of concepts related to peace education reflects a progression that can also be observed in other resolutions adopted in recent years. Indeed, not all the resolutions that promoted the culture of peace expressly presented the use of education, and particularly peace education, as a means towards this goal. However, several resolutions adopted

⁴⁸² United Nations General Assembly, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, 17.

⁴⁸³ United Nations, *Education 2030 Framework for Action*, article 61.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, article 62.

recently include elements recommending peace education or the “co-disciplines” that Bajaj mentioned. For instance, resolution 68/127 on a *world against violence and violent extremism* “calls upon all States to ... support all actions at the local, national, regional and international levels, ... to foster understanding, tolerance and non-violence, inter alia, through programmes and institutions in the fields of education...”⁴⁸⁵ Another of its articles goes even further:

“The vital importance of education, including human rights education, as the most effective means of promoting tolerance, in preventing the spread of extremism by instilling respect for life and promoting the practice of non-violence, moderation, dialogue and cooperation, and encourages all States, the specialized agencies of the UN and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute actively to this endeavour by, inter alia, placing emphasis on civic education and life skills as well as democratic principles and practices at all levels of formal, informal and non-formal education.”⁴⁸⁶

Furthermore, in September 2012, at the *High Level Forum on the Culture of Peace* at the UN, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed that a key ingredient in building culture of peace is education: “through education, we teach children not to hate. Through education, we raise leaders who act with wisdom and compassion. Through education, we establish a true, lasting culture of peace.”⁴⁸⁷ One week later,

⁴⁸⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *A World against Violence and Violent Extremism*, Resolution 68/127 (New York: United Nations, 2014), article 7, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/53aa9cc44.pdf>.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, article 8.

⁴⁸⁷ Ban Ki-moon, *Remarks to Opening Session of the General Assembly High-Level Forum on the Culture of Peace* (New York: United Nations, 2012),

on the margins of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly, he launched the UN *Global Education First* initiative, which reinforced UN's commitment to peace education with over US\$1.5 billion in commitments to make education a top priority on the global political agenda and to boosting progress towards the MDG on education. This initiative also places the promotion of "Global Citizenship" as one of its top three priorities, implying "transforming the way people think and act;" giving education a "central role in helping people to forge more just, peaceful, tolerant and inclusive societies;" and providing people with "the understanding, skills and values they need to cooperate in resolving the interconnected challenges of the 21st Century,"⁴⁸⁸ a definition that closely relates to peace education.

More recently, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, and security, which urges greater representation by young men and women in the prevention and resolution of conflict.⁴⁸⁹ International NGOs such as Search for Common Ground conducted significant advocacy efforts that led to the drafting and adoption of this resolution. Several observers welcomed the shift in the narrative on youth that this resolution creates. For instance, Ahmad Alhendawi, the UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, said: "Youth have for too long been cast away as either the perpetrators of violence or its victims. With this resolution the Security Council recognizes the important contributions that young people make in countering violent extremism and supporting peacebuilding efforts around the

http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1648#.VrowdNQUXwo.

⁴⁸⁸ For more information, please visit the U.N. Secretary-General's Global Education First Initiative's website at: <http://gloaleducationfirst.org/priorities.html>

⁴⁸⁹ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security*, S/RES/2250 (New York: United Nations, 2015), <http://unoy.org/wp-content/uploads/SCR-2250.pdf>.

world.”⁴⁹⁰ In order to do so, through this resolution, the UN Security Council urges Members States to support various measures, including the delivery of quality education for peace,⁴⁹¹ the institution of mechanisms that promote “a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue that involve youth and discourage their participation in acts of violence, terrorism, xenophobia, and all forms of discrimination,”⁴⁹² and the “investment in building young persons’ capabilities and skills to meet labour demands through relevant education opportunities designed in a manner which promotes a culture of peace.”⁴⁹³ The same month, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon went even further in his *Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Terrorism*.⁴⁹⁴ He urged all Member States to develop a national plan of action for preventing violent extremism, developed in a multidisciplinary manner that includes the input of ministries of education and educational leaders.⁴⁹⁵ Moreover, he recommended that Member States prevent the subversion of the work of educational institutions by terrorists and “take appropriate measures against all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief, as exhibited in particular in the curricula of formal and non-formal educational institutions, and textbooks and teaching methods.”⁴⁹⁶ He insisted that education should “include teaching respect for human rights and

⁴⁹⁰ See the website of the Office of the Secretary-Generals Envoy on Youth: <http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/12/global-reactions-to-security-council-resolution-2250-on-youth-peace-and-security/>

⁴⁹¹ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security*, para. 12.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, para. 13.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 17.

⁴⁹⁴ United Nations, *Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Terrorism*, A/70/674 (United Nations, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 44(a).

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 50(j).

diversity, fostering critical thinking, promoting media and digital literacy, and developing the behavioural and socioemotional skills that can contribute to peaceful coexistence and tolerance.”⁴⁹⁷ To that end, he recommended that Member States:

“Implement education programmes that “promote “global citizenship”, soft skills, critical thinking and digital literacy, and explore means of introducing civic education into school curricula, textbooks and teaching materials,” and “build the capacity of teachers and educators to support this agenda.”⁴⁹⁸

Finally, he instructed UN entities to:

“Support Governments seeking to develop and implement education programmes that promote civic education, soft skills, critical thinking, digital literacy, tolerance and respect for diversity, including, for example, peace education modules for the use of school-age children, in order to promote the culture of non-violence.”⁴⁹⁹

C. The international Community and Peace Education

The commitment of the UN and the international community in general to peace education has increased gradually over the years. This section will first discuss the role of UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR in the promotion of peace education. Indeed, as the principal UN agencies with a mandate for education

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 54.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 54(b).

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., para. 58(h).

and children, UNESCO and UNICEF are the most involved in peace education programs. It will then explore the efforts of some influential donors in the education sector, and assess whether they endorse peace education in their strategy and communication. Finally, it will present two examples of international networks, instrumental in the field of peace education.

1. The United Nations and Peace Education

a) UNESCO

Along with Culture and Science, Education is one of the main pillars of UNESCO's mission. Culture of peace and non-violence is one of its main strategic themes. Since its inception, UNESCO has implemented a two-pronged strategy in the field of peace education based on standard-setting work on the one hand and establishing practical activities and partnerships on the other. Committed to international peace, UNESCO's attachment to peace education has been reinforced throughout the years by important recommendations and declarations that laid much of the groundwork for the UN declarations and resolutions presented earlier.⁵⁰⁰

The link between peace education and UNESCO can also be found in UNESCO's constitutional mandate. The Constitution starts with the following statement: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the

⁵⁰⁰ UNESCO, *Recommendation Concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-Operation and Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, Recommendation Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at the 18th Session (Paris: UNESCO, 1974); UNESCO, *World Congress on Disarmament Education: Final Document and Report* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980).

defences of peace must be constructed.”⁵⁰¹ This is followed by the idea that “the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.”⁵⁰² For UNESCO, the learning objectives of peace education may include “an understanding of the manifestations of violence, the development of capacities to respond constructively to that violence and specific knowledge of alternatives to violence.”⁵⁰³ Consequently, this approach to peace education insists on the development of respect (the development of respect for self and for others) as well as specific skills (specific communication, cooperation and behavioral skills used in conflict situations).

The notion of peace education was evoked by UNESCO under various terms even before the organization was fully established. Indeed, the Preparatory Commission for the establishment of UNESCO spoke of “education for peace and security,” however, in the UNESCO programme established in 1946, the term “Education for International Understanding” replaced this earlier notion that was

⁵⁰¹ UNESCO, *Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* (London: United Nations, 1945), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ UNESCO, *UNESCO'S Work on Education for Peace and Non-Violence: Building Peace through Education*, ED-2008/WS/38 (Paris: UNESCO, 2008), 3, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0016/001607/160787e.pdf>.

considered too political.⁵⁰⁴ In 1954, an expert committee recommended that the concept should be “education for international understanding and cooperation.”⁵⁰⁵

In 1968, the label became “the education for international understanding, cooperation and peace” following the terms used in resolution 1.27 of the 15th session of the General Conference of UNESCO.⁵⁰⁶ Indeed, it specifies that, through its Director-General, UNESCO is authorized to “further the development of education for international understanding and co-operation in schools and teacher-training institutions, devoting special attention to the role of education in promoting peace and combating the harmful effects of colonialism and racialism and to teaching about the aims and work of the organizations of the United Nations system.”⁵⁰⁷ Four years later, the 17th General Conference considered it was desirable to adopt an international instrument on education for international understanding, co-operation and peace. It recommended that it should take the form of a recommendation to Member States, and should also “cover education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms.”⁵⁰⁸ Adopted in 1974, the *Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* was adopted by the General Conference at its 18th session.

⁵⁰⁴ UNESCO, *How to Foster Global Citizenship?*, SangSaeng 37 (UNESCO APCEIU, 2013), 10, <http://www.unescoapceiu.org/sangsaeng/>.

⁵⁰⁵ UNESCO, *Final Report of the Expert Committee on Education for International Understanding and Co-Operation* (UNESCO, 1955), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001261/126161EB.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁶ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference's 15th Session* (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), 26, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114047E.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁸ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference's 17th Session* (Paris: UNESCO, 1972), 24, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114044E.pdf>.

Recommendation 74, as it is now known, is also important in the history of peace education because it promotes a culture of peace and tolerance at all levels of schooling, and within the formal and non-formal sectors. It notably sets out guiding principles, and exhorts Member States to:

“formulate and apply national policies aimed at increasing the efficacy of education in all its forms and strengthening its contribution to international understanding and co-operation, to the maintenance and development of a just peace, to the establishment of social justice, to respect for and application of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to the eradication of the prejudices, misconceptions, inequalities and all forms of injustice which hinder the achievement of these aims.”⁵⁰⁹

In 1980, the 21st General Conference started to employ the term “education for peace and mutual understanding” when inviting Members States to include guidelines in school curricula and in teacher training courses.⁵¹⁰ It also requested that UNESCO’s Director-General take into account the UN General Assembly’s *Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace* of 1978:⁵¹¹

“(i) by intensifying efforts to promote the production of textbooks in the spirit of education for peace, respect for national identity and sovereignty, mutual understanding and the dialogue of cultures, and the elimination of racial and others forms of prejudice;

⁵⁰⁹ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference’s 18th Session* (Paris: UNESCO, 1974), 149, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114040E.pdf>.

⁵¹⁰ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference’s 21st Session* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 108, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114029e.pdf>.

⁵¹¹ United Nations, *Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace* (United Nations, 1978), <http://www.un-documents.net/a33r73.htm>.

- (ii) by giving special attention, in Associated Schools activities, to education for peace, respect for human rights, disarmament and mutual understanding;
- (iii) by carrying out studies on the state of education for peace in universities and higher educational establishments.”⁵¹²

Held in 1989 on the initiative of UNESCO in Côte d’Ivoire, the *International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men* was at the origin of the *Yamoussoukro Declaration on Peace in the Minds of Men*, which brought together delegates from the five continents to discuss peace and human security. The Congress urged States to include “peace and human rights components as a permanent feature in all education programmes.”⁵¹³ The concept of a culture of peace⁵¹⁴ made its first formal appearance in this declaration. In 1995, the 28th General Conference of UNESCO affirmed that the major challenge at the close of the 20th century was the transition from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace.⁵¹⁵ This General Conference endorsed the *Declaration of the 44th session of the International Conference on Education* of October 1994. The most important element of this Declaration is the *Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy* that clearly states that “education must develop the ability of non-violent conflict resolution.”⁵¹⁶ According to this framework, introducing

⁵¹² UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference’s 21st Session*, 108.

⁵¹³ UNESCO, *Yamoussoukro Declaration on Peace in the Minds of Men* (UNESCO, 1989), 2, <http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/yamouss.pdf>.

⁵¹⁴ The term “peace culture” is employed in this document.

⁵¹⁵ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference’s 28th Session* (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 13.

⁵¹⁶ UNESCO, *Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy* (UNESCO, 1995), 9, http://www.unesco.org/education/nfsunesco/pdf/REV_74_E.PDF.

“true education for citizenship” into curricula at all levels is necessary to reach this goal. Moreover, the declaration insists on the idea that vulnerable groups such as “abandoned children, street children, refugee and displaced children and economically and sexually exploited children” should not be forgotten.”⁵¹⁷ Another essential element is training personnel at all levels of the education system in education for peace, human rights, and democracy.⁵¹⁸ Finally, the Declaration recognizes that this subject area is not the sole responsibility of the education system, and that it should collaborate with the family, the media (including traditional channels of communication), the world of work, and NGOs.⁵¹⁹ UNESCO developed eight areas of action necessary for this transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace.⁵²⁰ The first of these is the Culture of Peace through Education.

Considering that the promotion of a Culture of Peace is the expression of its fundamental and “soft power” mandate, UNESCO naturally became the lead agency for the implementation of all UN resolutions related to the “culture of peace” and thus for the programs associated with the *International Decade for a Culture of Peace*. In 1999, the Organization launched its own intersectoral and interdisciplinary *Programme of Action for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence*.⁵²¹ The knowledge gained and the best practices identified in the implementation of the *International Decade for a Culture of Peace*⁵²² encouraged UNESCO to

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., 12.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁵²⁰ Harris, “Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,” 21.

⁵²¹ United Nations, *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*.

⁵²² Ibid., para. 79.

conduct this program again in 2012.⁵²³ Instrumental in this endeavor is the Intersectoral Platform for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence, a mechanism created to pool expertise and resources from the whole Organization, thus creating an effective instrument to operate holistically across all the fields of competence of UNESCO.⁵²⁴ UNESCO aims at “raising awareness among governments and donors at high-level policy fora of the need to prioritize the development of inclusive education systems which impart the skills of dialogue, tolerance, mutual respect, and reconciliation as one of the most effective tools for peacebuilding and reconciliation, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction efforts,”⁵²⁵ and at “providing policy advice on how to integrate the values and principles of a culture of peace into education policies and plans.”⁵²⁶ The areas of action proposed, developed and coordinated by its Intersectoral Platform include the following: the improvement of the access to formal and non-formal education, with an emphasis on quality education for all and education on human rights; the revision of textbooks; the development of teacher-training handbooks that contribute to fight intolerance, stereotyping, discrimination, and violence in schools and beyond; and the promotion of exchange on education for peace, human rights, and tolerance using information and communications technologies and social media networks.⁵²⁷

⁵²³ United Nations, *Draft Resolutions Volume 2012-2013*, Document 36/C5 Add. (United Nations, 2011), 107.

⁵²⁴ UNESCO, *UNESCO's Programme of Action Culture of Peace and Non-Violence: A Vision in Action* (Paris: UNESCO, 2013), 17, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002177/217786e.pdf>.

⁵²⁵ United Nations, *Draft Resolutions Volume 2012-2013*, 203.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁷ UNESCO, *UNESCO's Programme of Action Culture of Peace and Non-Violence: A Vision in Action*, 14.

Indeed, UNESCO promotes peace education activities by helping Member States “integrate a holistic vision of quality education that promotes the values of a culture of peace at all levels of their education systems.”⁵²⁸ Through its Education Sector, UNESCO’s support to peace education encompasses different dimensions: cooperation with Member States at the international, regional and national levels; networking, advocacy and research; policy and information exchange; and textbooks, learning materials and curricula development.⁵²⁹ UNESCO works particularly closely with the INEE, which plays a critical role in coordinating and supporting the efforts of member agencies and individuals working together to ensure the right to education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. Founded in 1953, UNESCO’s Associated Schools Project Network (ASPnet), is a network that encourages peace education and involves more than 10,000 educational institutions in 181 countries.⁵³⁰

In 2009, UNESCO decided to establish the *Mahatma Gandhi Institute of Education for Peace and Sustainable Development* (MGIEP) as a Category I Institute, in India.⁵³¹ The mission of the Institute is to strengthen the educational and knowledge base to promote education for peace and sustainable development and to contribute to the peace education and sustainable development-related research and capacity building needs of Member States with a focus on Asia and the Pacific region. The proposal to set up the Institute was recommended by

⁵²⁸ UNESCO, *UNESCO’S Work on Education for Peace and Non-Violence: Building Peace through Education*, 4.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵³⁰ See UNESCO’s website: <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/networks/global-networks/aspnet/>

⁵³¹ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference’s 35th Session* (Paris: UNESCO, 1999), 32.

UNESCO's Executive Board and endorsed by the 35th Session of General Conference of UNESCO in October 2009. Approved by India's Union Council of Ministers in 2011, the center was inaugurated in 2012. Since then, UNESCO MGIEP has developed activities in research, knowledge sharing, capacity building and policy formulation in the areas of education for peace, sustainability and global citizenship. The center particularly aims to place concepts of Peace and Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship at the heart of education systems of Member States.⁵³²

Since the launch of the UN Global Education First initiative, "Global Citizenship" has often replaced the terms "Education for Peace" or "Peace Education". In UNESCO's *Education Strategy 2014-2021*, one of the three strategic objectives is to empower learners to be "creative and responsible global citizens."⁵³³ In order to accomplish this objective, UNESCO announced a plan to "considerably scale up its actions to support Member States in developing effective education systems that help learners acquire knowledge, skills, values, attitudes and behaviours that are necessary for forging more peaceful, inclusive, equitable and sustainable societies," particularly through global citizenship education (GCE).⁵³⁴ The report describes GCE as a "framing paradigm that encapsulates how education can develop the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes learners need to secure more just, peaceful, tolerant and inclusive societies."⁵³⁵ It explains that GCE can take

⁵³² See UNESCO MGIEP's website for more information: <http://mgiep.unesco.org>

⁵³³ UNESCO, *Education Strategy 2014-2021* (UNESCO, 2014), 31, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002312/231288e.pdf>.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 45–47.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

various forms depending on contexts, regions, and communities, and employs concepts and methodologies already applied in other areas, such as human rights education and peace education.⁵³⁶ The goal is to increase the integration of GCE in education policies, programs, teaching practices, learning materials and the learning environment.⁵³⁷ UNESCO has developed several tools to support efforts by Member States to mainstream GCE elements, including peace education, into education systems through technical guidance. For instance, UNESCO developed a guide in 2011 to help Member States integrate conflict and disaster risk reduction into education sector planning. According to this guide, conflict and disaster risk reduction can be grouped into three areas: prevention, mitigation, and preparedness/readiness. Peace education is listed as an activity that can be undertaken to “avoid the adverse impact of conflict or disaster.”⁵³⁸ In the same vein, the *Safety, Resilience, and Social Cohesion: A Guide for Curriculum* was published in 2015 to present strategies on how to mainstream conflict and disaster risk reduction measures in the education sector planning process.⁵³⁹ These include advice for Ministries of Education on how to include peacebuilding topics in national textbooks or supplementary materials in a way that allows teachers to utilize them even in difficult classroom conditions and with little training. Another example of such efforts is the UNESCO-USA-Brazil project, *Teaching Respect for All*, which designed a curricular framework to fight racism and promote tolerance

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ UNESCO-IIEP, *Guidance Note for Education Planners – Integrating Conflict and Disaster Risk Reduction into Education Sector Planning* (Paris: UNESCO IIEP, 2011), 11, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002286/228650E.pdf>.

⁵³⁹ UNESCO-IIEP, *Safety, Resilience, and Social Cohesion: A Guide for Curriculum Developers* (Paris: UNESCO IIEP, 2015), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002348/234808e.pdf>.

that countries can adapt to their respective contexts and needs.⁵⁴⁰ The most recent project to date that focused specifically on peace education was dedicated to African Member States. *Promoting a culture of peace and non-violence in Africa through education for peace and conflict prevention* project consisted of two phases. First, existing policies and resources on education for peace and conflict prevention in Africa were mapped. This mapping confirmed that while numerous programs on peace education and life skills were implemented in countries after a conflict took place, the integration of peace education into national education systems was incomplete.⁵⁴¹ Second, a Resource and Development Capacity Package was developed to assist Member States in integrating or strengthening peace education programs in their national education systems to promote peace and prevent future conflict.⁵⁴² The package contained technical guidelines and capacity-development training modules on policy, program design and curriculum planning to integrate peace and conflict prevention into all aspects of the education system. These are just a few examples of the multiple publications that UNESCO has developed to support Member States in their efforts to include peace education in their national education strategy.

⁵⁴⁰ More information and materials are available on UNESCO's website:
<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/human-rights-education/resources/projects/teaching-respect-for-all/>

⁵⁴¹ Tina Robiolle-Moul, *Promoting a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence in Africa through Education for Peace and Conflict Prevention: Phase I* (Paris: UNESCO, 2015),
<http://education4resilience.iiep.unesco.org/en/node/719>.

⁵⁴² UNESCO, *Education for Peace: Planning for Curriculum Reform* (UNESCO, 2015),
<http://www.ibe.unesco.org/sites/default/files/resources/education-for-peace-2015.pdf>.

b) UNICEF

Guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF's main mission is the protection of these rights, especially in situation of emergencies.⁵⁴³ UNICEF's emphasis on the role of peace education grew stronger in the 1990s. In 1990, the Jomtien Conference was a major milestone in the international dialogue on the place of education in human development policy. UNICEF joined forces with UNESCO, the World Bank, the UN Development Programme and the UN Population Fund, to convene delegates from 155 countries and representatives from some 150 governmental and non-governmental organizations, who came together to adopt the *1990 World Declaration on Education for All*. Also known as the *Jomtien Declaration*, it advances the idea that basic learning needs include not only essential learning tools such as literacy and numeracy, but also the basic learning content such as knowledge, skills, values and attitudes required to live and work in dignity and to participate in development. The Declaration adds that the satisfaction of these needs notably empowers individuals in any society and confers the following responsibilities upon them:

“to further the cause of social justice, ... to be tolerant towards social political and religious systems which differ from their own, ensuring that commonly accepted humanistic values and human rights are upheld, and to work for international peace and solidarity in an interdependent world.”⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴³ See UNICEF's mission statement at: http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_mission.html

⁵⁴⁴ UNESCO, *World Declaration on Education for All Adopted by the World Conference on Education for All: Meeting Basic Learning Needs* (UNESCO, 1990), article 1.

Since 1990, UNICEF's vision of quality basic education has clearly integrated peace education to a greater degree.⁵⁴⁵ In 1996, following the recommendations of the *Machel Study*, UNICEF adopted peace education as part of its antiwar agenda: "Disputes may be inevitable, but violence is not. To prevent continued cycles of conflict, education must seek to promote peace and tolerance, not fuel hatred and suspicion."⁵⁴⁶ Additionally, in 1999, through its *Future Global Agenda for Children*, the Organization insisted on the idea that education and learning processes help "challenge the culture of violence that threatens to destroy family and community life in so many countries."⁵⁴⁷ That same year, UNICEF issued a working paper that presented a definition of peace education, based on what had been learned from experiences in the field:

"Peace education is an essential component of quality basic education that aims to build the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values that will enable young people to prevent violence, resolve conflict peacefully, and promote social conditions conducive to peace and justice. ... Peace education is a right of all children, not only those living in situations of armed conflict. It is a long-term process that can take place in any learning environment."⁵⁴⁸

UNICEF's current definition of peace education goes even further. Consistent with UNICEF's concept of rights-based, child-friendly learning environments, it

⁵⁴⁵ Fountain, *Peace Education in UNICEF*, 1.

⁵⁴⁶ UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNICEF, 1996), 41.

⁵⁴⁷ UNICEF, *The Future Global Agenda for Children: Imperatives for the Twenty-First Century* (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 1999).

⁵⁴⁸ Fountain, *Peace Education in UNICEF*, 38.

describes peace education as schooling and other educational initiatives that serve the following purposes:

- “Function as ‘zones of peace’, where children are safe from violent conflict
- Uphold children’s basic rights as outlined in the CRC
- Develop a climate that models peaceful and respectful behavior among all members of the learning community
- Demonstrate the principles of equality and non-discrimination in administrative policies and practices
- Draw on the knowledge of peace-building that exists in the community, including means of dealing with conflict that are effective, non-violent, and rooted in the local culture
- Handle conflicts in ways that respect the rights and dignity of all involved
- Integrate an understanding of peace, human rights, social justice and global issues throughout the curriculum whenever possible
- Provide a forum for the explicit discussion of values of peace and social justice
- Use teaching and learning methods that stress participation, cooperation, problem-solving and respect for differences
- Enable children to put peace-making into practice in the educational setting as well as in the wider community

- Generate opportunities for continuous reflection and professional development of all educators in relation to issues of peace, justice and rights.”⁵⁴⁹

In 2001, in his report on the *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed the powerful role of education in conflict prevention and explained how UNICEF’s activities contributed to this goal. First, he insisted that when young people suffer from limited education and few employment opportunities, it often provides “fertile recruiting ground for parties to a conflict.”⁵⁵⁰ He added that ensuring that civilians are able to continue their education can reduce the risk that they would become “pawns in military action, thereby contributing to further conflict.”⁵⁵¹ He underlined UNICEF’s key use of education in its programs as a strategy for “preventing conflict and intolerance and securing conditions conducive to peace.”⁵⁵² He explicitly recognized that UNICEF was seeking to develop a culture of peace through its programs of education for peace.⁵⁵³

In 2009, another key report presented examples of UNICEF’s efforts in the field of peace education. The *10-Year Strategic Review: Children and conflict in a changing world*, a follow-up to the Machel Study, highlighted an example of UNICEF’s collaboration with local education experts in Aceh, Indonesia, to build conflict resolution and non-violence into the schools curricula. It explained that

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., 5–6.

⁵⁵⁰ Kofi Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council* (United Nations, 2001), article 124, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005902.pdf>.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., article 109.

⁵⁵² Ibid., article 124.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

peace education was offered to refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as in schools in returnee areas so that “returning children and those who have remained can learn to live together again.”⁵⁵⁴

In 2010, taking one step further, UNICEF commissioned a study to determine the role of education in peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts and to assess how education interventions and programming could have a stronger role in the UN peacebuilding architecture.⁵⁵⁵ The findings of the study ultimately served as the foundation for UNICEF’s four-year Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program, launched in 2012. Also called *Learning for Peace* program, it tested programs designed to understand and address the root causes of violent conflict through education and related social services in 14 countries.⁵⁵⁶ The *PBEA 2014 Annual Consolidated Report* stated that, since its inception, the program had significant results in the 14 participant countries, supporting the integration of conflict sensitivity and/or peacebuilding into national and sub-national education; strengthening the capacity of education partners through training and technical assistance; and expanding access to relevant conflict-sensitive education through formal and non-formal education.⁵⁵⁷ The report also noted that the program reached beyond the immediate participant countries, strengthening UNICEF and its

⁵⁵⁴ UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World*, 177.

⁵⁵⁵ More information on this study is available in Chapter II, section B.1.b.

⁵⁵⁶ Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, the State of Palestine, Uganda, Pakistan and Yemen.

⁵⁵⁷ UNICEF, *Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy in Conflict Affected Contexts Programme – UNICEF 2014 Annual Consolidated Report*, 2015, 5, <http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Learning-for-Peace-Global-Annual-Report-2014.pdf>.

partners' capacity to deliver conflict-sensitive education in 46 country and regional offices.⁵⁵⁸

c) UNHCR

Inspired by the conclusion of the *Machel Study*, and with the help of Margaret Sinclair, UNHCR developed its Peace Education Programme (PEP) in 1997 for implementation in Kenyan refugee schools and communities. The PEP was the first concrete tool developed by a UN agency for a direct field implementation of the global recommendations on peace education. The organization realized that while refugees are often the victims of ethnic, religious, or political discrimination, they also carry their own prejudices with them into exile.⁵⁵⁹ This represents a source of conflict in refugee settings that UNHCR hosts. Developing new attitudes, behaviors and skills within the refugee population was not only essential for a more peaceful life in the camps, but also for the future, when hopefully, the refugees would be able to return to their homeland. The promising results obtained in Kenya motivated the Commission to extend the program to other countries.

Later on, UNESCO collaborated with UNHCR⁵⁶⁰ to improve the original program and create the “Inter-Agency Peace Education Technical Support

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁹ Pamela Baxter, “The UNHCR Peace Education Programme: Skills for Life,” *Forced Migration Review* 11 (October 2001).

⁵⁶⁰ Pamela Baxter and Vick Ikobwa, “Peace Education: Why and How?,” *Forced Migration Review* 22 (2005): 22–28; UNESCO, UNHCR, and INEE, *Inter-Agency Peace Education Programme: Skills for Constructive Living – Overview of the Programme* (Paris: UNESCO, 2005), 11–13, <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR22/FMR2213.pdf>.

Programme,” a program adopted by INEE and endorsed by UNICEF as well.⁵⁶¹ This was a valuable opportunity to incorporate the lessons learned from the external evaluation of the original program.⁵⁶² It is this program and the corresponding materials that are available on INEE’s website in its peace education section.⁵⁶³ Since its inception, the program has been incorporated into the education curricula of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and Liberia; it has been operated in at least 13 countries in Africa; and it has been extended to refugee camps in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Kosovo.⁵⁶⁴ Despite its success and requests from education ministries to train trainers so that the PEP can be implemented into national schools as part of the national curriculum, these activities have been limited by a lack of funding and a UNHCR mandate that focuses on displaced populations and returnees.⁵⁶⁵ Because working with such authorities is UNESCO’s role, this UN agency has been working with education ministries towards this goal.

Peace education is still a key component of UNHCR’s education strategy. One of UNHCR’s main goals in its 2012-2016 Education Strategy is quality education, which requires a rigorous and relevant curriculum that includes “both hard skills related to academic disciplines as well as soft skills for peaceful living, human

⁵⁶¹ Antonella Verdiani, *Inter-Agency Peace Education Technical Support Programme: Skills for a Constructive Living* (UNESCO-INEE, 2005), http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/doc_1_Overview_of_the_Programme.pdf.

⁵⁶² Anna Obura, *UNHCR Peace Education Programme: Evaluation Report* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002).

⁵⁶³ The program description and materials are available on INEE’s website at: <http://www.ineesite.org/en/peace-education>

⁵⁶⁴ UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World*, 177.

⁵⁶⁵ Verdiani, *Inter-Agency Peace Education Technical Support Programme: Skills for a Constructive Living*, 26.

rights, and citizenship.”⁵⁶⁶ In order to provide access to quality education, the document stresses the need for schools to provide safe learning environments for children.⁵⁶⁷ Doing so requires attention to the content of the curriculum and structures of education, including conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding, and social integration.⁵⁶⁸ The key activities UNHCR aims to conduct to reach this goal include staff and teacher training that comprise the development of a teacher code of conduct, as well as conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. The latter comprehends two main activities: (a) developing and piloting tools to assess the conflict sensitivity of educational planning and programming; and (b) supporting school communities in incorporating peace education and conflict resolution through a whole-school approach, including an emphasis on sports as a means of “strengthening social ties and the ability to work together within a team while developing tolerance and skills for peaceful co-existence.”⁵⁶⁹

d) The Commission on Human Security

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali appealed to the international community to adopt “an integrated approach to human security” to address root causes of conflict, economic, social and political issues.⁵⁷⁰ Two years later, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) officially introduced the concept of human security in its *Human Development Report*. In this report,

⁵⁶⁶ UNHCR, *UNHCR Education Strategy 2012-2016* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2012), 11, <http://www.unhcr.org/5149ba349.html>.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 14–16.

⁵⁷⁰ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*.

UNDP presented the two pillars of human security: “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.”⁵⁷¹ It also explained that the main domains of human security include income, health, education, and political freedom and democracy. Established in 2001 in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear,” the UN-sponsored Commission on Human Security explored how educational aid, including peace education programs, can lead not only to greater personal advancement, but also help prevent violent conflict.⁵⁷² In 2003, Co-Chairs Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen presented the Commission’s Final Report, *Human Security Now*, to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. They recommended more attention to activities that are chronically underfunded, such as education, reconciliation, and coexistence.⁵⁷³ They insisted that “the teaching of mutual respect” should be one of the four priorities for action in the educational efforts that can help further human security.⁵⁷⁴ They underscored the importance of the curriculum’s content and the role of teachers, and how they can “raise awareness of the social environment and provide the tools to address problems.”⁵⁷⁵ Finally, the report asserted that education must do more than convey information; it “must also kindle compassion, cultivate mutual respect, host open-mindedness, advance

⁵⁷¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York/Oxford: UNDP/ Oxford University Press, 1994), 24,
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.

⁵⁷² Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003),
http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/chs_final_report_-_english.pdf.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 121.

clarity of thought, foster determination and develop resolve.”⁵⁷⁶ Through the teaching of mutual respect and solidarity, the educational system should inculcate tolerance using well-thought curricula taught by well-trained and open-minded teachers who practice methods of teaching that respect diversity.⁵⁷⁷ To do so, the report encouraged the international development institutions that support education to make additional resources available to governments that wish to undertake such reforms, underlining how “promoting education in the short term can avoid undermining human security in the longer term.”⁵⁷⁸

2. Peace Education in the Education Strategy of Major Donors in Afghanistan

The United States through USAID, the United Kingdom through DFID, Germany through GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), and the World Bank through the International Development Association (IDA), are the four largest donors in the education sector in Afghanistan.⁵⁷⁹ This section will explore if and how their respective education strategies leverage peace education.

a) USAID

In the last decade, USAID has participated in the effort to develop a new paradigm for education that addresses the risks of conflict and the need to mitigate

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., 126.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., 141.

⁵⁷⁹ OECD, *Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region* (OECD, 2015), 16, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/4%20Asia%20-%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202015.pdf>.

these risks. For instance, in 2006, USAID issued the *Education and Fragility Assessment Tool* to help identify the links between education and fragility in failing, failed or recovering countries.⁵⁸⁰ However, it was only in 2011, that USAID made an explicit reference in its strategy to the impact of crises on education and the impact of education on crises. Of its three key goals, Goal 3 focused on expanding the access to basic education of underserved groups, especially in crisis and conflict environments.⁵⁸¹ The organization realized that (a) about half of USAID’s assistance goes to countries affected by conflict and fragility, so this needs to be taken into account at the strategic level, and (b) unequal access to education services can and often does lead to feelings of marginalization and grievances. Thus, it is a logical continuation of the USAID’s security efforts on counterterrorism.

To support this key goal, the Organization developed the *Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education Programs*, a guiding framework that helps reduce unnecessary and harmful actions, and provides the key steps to “promote inclusion and increase equitable access to education in conflict and crisis environments.”⁵⁸² This framework goes beyond access; it also increases attention to education’s content, including peace education—even if the term is not directly mentioned.⁵⁸³ Indeed, USAID defines conflict-sensitive education as an education that

⁵⁸⁰ USAID, *Education and Fragility: An Assessment Tool*.

⁵⁸¹ USAID, *USAID Education Strategy 2011-2015* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2011), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ946.pdf.

⁵⁸² Valerie Haugen and Nina Papadopoulos, *Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education Programs* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2013), 2, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/USAID_Checklist_Conflict_Sensitivity_14FEB27_cm.pdf.

⁵⁸³ Interview with an international education specialist involved in the elaboration of the checklist (September 17, 2015).

“encompasses policies, activities, and approaches that promote equitable access to educational opportunity and curricula based on skills and values that support peace and social cohesion.”⁵⁸⁴ The document adds that a conflict-sensitive education program may also work “to actively transform tension and support peace by teaching respect for diversity, as well as local, national, and global citizenship.”⁵⁸⁵ One of the seven categories of the checklist is dedicated to “curricula, teaching and learning.”⁵⁸⁶ Users of the checklist are invited to check three aspects: (a) whether learning materials are vetted for inclusion of content on safety and protection, crisis prevention, peacebuilding and social cohesion; (b) whether methods promote inclusion; and (c) whether language of instruction is unifying rather than divisive.⁵⁸⁷

Developed at the global level, this checklist has been shared with all USAID missions worldwide to help them develop and maintain “a deeper, context-specific understanding of the underlying sources of conflict and their interaction, influence on, and impact within the education domain.”⁵⁸⁸ They are also warned that, because conflict-sensitive education strategies can be controversial, this process requires a broad dialogue and buy-in from a wide range of education actors.⁵⁸⁹ Moreover, the document underscores the probable need for more political traction and donor and stakeholder coordination than the Education Ministry alone can generate.⁵⁹⁰ The

⁵⁸⁴ Haugen and Papadopoulos, *Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education Programs*, 2.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

same year, USAID also published guidelines on how to integrate conflict and fragility analysis into broader education system analysis.⁵⁹¹

Another effort to support Goal 3 was the formation of the USAID Education and Conflict Network (USAID ECCN), described as a “community of practice composed of USAID staff, implementing partners, and other stakeholders working to improve equitable access to education in the world’s crisis and conflict-affected environments.”⁵⁹² This group is meant to complement the efforts of other networks such as INEE by providing resources to a smaller, more USAID-related community while also gathering and distributing key information to larger audiences. In addition to exchanging ideas and best practices, the group also organizes field workshops to improve participants’ knowledge about, use of, and collaboration around initial and ongoing conflict analysis for education programming.

b) DFID

In the provision of quality education for all, DFID’s priority is equality, with special attention paid to girls’ education and to fragile states. In the last decade, the organization’s focus shifted to assistance towards fragile states fragile and conflict-affected countries. DFID’s bilateral aid program is aligned to fragile states furthest from meeting the education MDG: out of the 57 million children not

⁵⁹¹ Cynthia Koons, *Guidelines on How to Integrate Conflict and Fragility Analysis into Education System Analysis: A Proposed Companion Guide* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2013), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JW1Z.pdf.

⁵⁹² See USAID ECCN’s dedicated website for more information: <http://eccnetwork.net/>

enrolled in school worldwide, 35 million are in DFID education priority countries (which comprises Afghanistan) including 16 countries considered fragile states.⁵⁹³

Over the years, DFID has acknowledged the importance of education in conflict prevention and the need to ensure that education will not play a negative role.⁵⁹⁴

The organization insists that:

“In fragile and conflict-affected states, education can help lessen tension, promote peace and rebuild lives. But unequal access to education can also exacerbate tensions. It is vital to support service delivery through partnerships with communities and non-state providers in ways that support, rather than threaten, the gradual re-emergence of state capacity. This is an essential component of well conceived and well coordinated context and country specific strategies.”⁵⁹⁵

DFID has developed an integrated approach to building peaceful states and societies that encompass several objectives, which include addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility. In the education sector, this means: ensuring that the education system and curricula “do not exacerbate societal divisions or conflict legacies, but widen social and economic mobility; and encouraging “approaches to learning that strengthen tolerance of differences and resilience to

⁵⁹³ DFID, *Education Position Paper: Improving Learning, Expanding Opportunities* (DFID, 2013), 7, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225715/Education_Position_Paper_July_2013.pdf.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁹⁵ DFID, *DFID's Education Strategy 2010-2015* (DFID, 2010), 13, <http://www.ungei.org/resources/files/educ-strat.pdf>.

extremist ideologies.”⁵⁹⁶ While this can be interpreted as peace education, neither this specific term or any commonly associated terms are mentioned in the most recent Education Strategy (2010-2015) that focuses on three strategic priorities: (1) access to a basic cycle of primary and lower secondary education, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states; (2) quality of teaching and learning, particularly for basic literacy and numeracy; and (3) skills so that young people benefit from opportunities, jobs and growth.⁵⁹⁷

c) GIZ

On behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), GIZ is implementing education programs in many fragile and conflict-affected states. BMZ recognizes the dual role that education plays in conflict, and aims to leveraging its positive function. It considers education “one of the crucial fundamental prerequisites for the emergence of democratic societies and for peaceful coexistence.”⁵⁹⁸ In 2004 plan of action, *Civil conflict prevention, conflict solution and post-conflict peace-building*, BMZ stressed the insufficient operationalization of UNESCO’s model of a culture of peace within its own activities in the field,⁵⁹⁹ and announced that it intended “to attach greater

⁵⁹⁶ DFID, *Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper* (DFID, 2010), 56, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67694/Building-peaceful-states-and-societies.pdf.

⁵⁹⁷ DFID, *DFID’s Education Strategy 2010-2015*.

⁵⁹⁸ Bundesregierung, *Working Together to Strengthen Security and Stability through Crisis Prevention: 1st Federal Government Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”* (Berlin: BMZ, 2006), 56, https://www.civcap.info/fileadmin/user_upload/Germany/Aktionsplan-Bericht1-en.pdf.

⁵⁹⁹ Bundesregierung, *Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”* (Berlin: BMZ, 2004), 49.

significance to peace education activities within the framework of development cooperation in the education sector.”⁶⁰⁰ As a result, in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, and South Africa, GIZ started supporting peace education projects designed to “improve primary school education but which also cover the prevention of violence in schools and extracurricular education, trauma counselling and reconciliation work, as well as political and social education.”⁶⁰¹

In its 2010-2013 Education Strategy, BMZ renewed its emphasis on education in fragile states, asserting that it sees a “special responsibility in the education sector in fragile states and states currently experiencing conflicts.” Because violent conflicts hamper the effectiveness of education systems, destroy the education system and prevent millions of children attending school, it added that it would therefore “dovetail education promotion closely with its efforts to promote peace and prevent crises, and with democracy and good governance activities.”⁶⁰²

GIZ recognizes the importance of conflict-sensitive education in fragile states in the development of peaceful societies.⁶⁰³ It prioritizes teacher education and development according to the post-2015 agenda, and helps ministries of education develop modern, participatory teaching, and learning methods that are both gender-

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., 50.

⁶⁰¹ Bundesregierung, *Working Together to Strengthen Security and Stability through Crisis Prevention: 1st Federal Government Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,”* 56.

⁶⁰² BMZ, *Ten Objectives for Education BMZ Education Strategy 2010-2013* (Berlin: BMZ, 2010), 7, https://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/Presse/BMZ_Bildungsstrategie_Entwurf_engl_3.pdf.

⁶⁰³ BMZ, *Sector Programme Education* (BMZ, 2014), <https://www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/giz2014-en-faltblatt-30-sektorvorhaben.pdf>.

sensitive and conflict-sensitive.⁶⁰⁴ It also developed a project on *Education for social cohesion and transformation* that includes peace education activities.⁶⁰⁵ Moreover, its other project, called *Education and conflict transformation – learning to live together in peace*, helps recipient countries integrate both peace education, and education for human rights and democracy in the curricula used in schools, provide pre- and in-service teacher training in countries, which have been suffering protracted conflicts or crises; and develop appropriate teaching and learning materials, and provide.⁶⁰⁶

d) The World Bank

In 1960, the World Bank established the International Development Association (IDA) to help the world's poorest countries by providing loans and grants for programs that “boost economic growth, reduce inequalities, and improve people's living conditions.”⁶⁰⁷ A multi-issue institution, IDA supports various types of development activities that include primary education. Fragile and conflict-affected countries are one of the IDA's four thematic areas for the 2014-2017 period.

⁶⁰⁴ BMZ, *BMZ Education Strategy: Creating Equitable Opportunities for Quality Education*, BMZ Paper 7 (BMZ, 2015), 13, http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/strategies/Strategiepapier355a_07_2015.pdf.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 15; GIZ, *Education and Conflict Transformation – Learning to Live Together in Peace* (GIZ, 2011), <https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2011-en-education-conflict-transformation.pdf>.

⁶⁰⁶ GIZ, *Education and Conflict Transformation – Learning to Live Together in Peace*.

⁶⁰⁷ For more information, please see the website of the World Bank: <http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html>

In the view of the World Bank, education systems are “rarely neutral in terms of social cohesion and the building of democratic traditions.”⁶⁰⁸ Instead of simply restarting the pre-conflict education system, the Bank emphasizes the need for “transformative approaches that will help societies become more inclusive and pluralistic and therefore less likely to fall back into violent conflict.”⁶⁰⁹ While there is no mention of peace education or related activities in the World Bank’s Education Strategy 2020,⁶¹⁰ it is identified as one of the available educational strategies for promoting “social cohesion and the construction of democratic traditions” on the World Bank’s website.⁶¹¹ As a result, peace education is not selected as an element of the global strategy, but can be found on a case-by-case basis at the program level. The organization has also played a prominent role in funding peace education programs in fragile states. For instance, it supported the development of a “Peace Education Kit” for use in schools in Sierra Leone.⁶¹² According to a World Bank senior education specialist, one reason for the absence of peace education at the global strategy level is the confusion about the actual concept of peace education.⁶¹³

⁶⁰⁸ Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer, ed., *Promoting Social Cohesion through Education* (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2006), 124, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6985/354060Promotin101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?sequence=1>.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ World Bank, *Learning for All Investing in People’s Knowledge and Skills to Promote Development: Education Strategy 2020* (World Bank, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/ESSU/Education_Strategy_4_12_2011.pdf.

⁶¹¹ World Bank, “Education and the World Bank,” *World Bank*, accessed January 12, 2016, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20606691~menuPK:1463878~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html>.

⁶¹² Bretherton, Weston, and Zbar, “Peace Education in a Post-Conflict Environment: The Case of Sierra Leone.”

⁶¹³ Interview with a World Bank senior education specialist (March 30, 2016).

3. Influential Coalitions of International Organizations in the Field of Education in Fragile States

Various international NGOs are very active in peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity. Organizations such as Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee, or Search for Common Ground are also particularly involved in educational activities in fragile states. These organizations often join their efforts through international networks that are particularly active in raising awareness about the challenges that education faces in fragile contexts, and in developing tools for education professionals and ministries of education to leverage education's positive role in such contexts. This section will briefly present two major examples of such networks: INEE and GCPEA.

a) INEE

Since its inception in 2000, INEE has grown into an open global network of more than 12,000 individual members (practitioners, students, teachers, and staff from UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, donors, governments and universities) and 130 partner organizations in 170 countries, who work together to ensure the right to education in emergencies and early recovery in the post-crisis period.⁶¹⁴ In 2004, after a large consultative process, INEE defined 19 Minimum Standards for education in emergencies that are currently being used in more than 80 countries.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹⁴ See INEE's website for more information: <http://www.ineesite.org/en/who-we-are>

⁶¹⁵ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction*.

In 2008, the first INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility was established as an inter-agency mechanism to coordinate diverse initiatives and catalyze collaborative action on issues relating to education and fragility. Working group members are selected for a three-year mandate. The current group gathers various organizations that include UN Agencies (UNICEF, UNESCO-IIEP), donors (USAID, DFID, GIZ, and the World Bank), international NGOs (Save the Children, Plan International, and Search for Common Ground), or academic institutions (Teachers College at Columbia University). One of the key roles it plays is to invite its members to share information on their activities and best practices. This is an opportunity to find synergies and harmonize, when possible, the efforts in the field.

Over the years, INEE has published various reports and papers that aim to understanding education's role in fragility and develop tools that can aid in the design and implementation of conflict-sensitive education. For instance, in 2013, through the collaborative efforts of its working groups on Minimum Standards and on Education and Fragility, INEE developed a guidance note on conflict-sensitive education.⁶¹⁶ This document is part of a resource pack on conflict-sensitive education developed for policy makers, planners, and practitioners to support the integration of conflict sensitivity in education policies and programs in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.⁶¹⁷ This resource pack was launched in April 2013 through a High-Level Symposium co-organized in Paris with UNESCO-IIEP. This

⁶¹⁶ International Institute for Educational Planning, *INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education*.

⁶¹⁷ More information on INEE Conflict Sensitive Education Pack is available at: <http://www.ineesite.org/en/conflict-sensitive-education>

event brought together about 200 education stakeholders, including Ministers of Education, ambassadors and representatives from the Permanent Delegations to UNESCO, UN agencies, bilateral organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, academia, and civil society organizations, to discuss the challenges of providing quality education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts and to offer concrete recommendations to promote the implementation of conflict-sensitive education.⁶¹⁸ Participants endorsed by acclamation the *Paris Symposium Declaration on Conflict-Sensitive Education* that calls for the prioritization of conflict-sensitive education in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.⁶¹⁹ This Declaration is considered a landmark in the promotion of a common framework to provide quality education to children, youth, and adults affected by violence and armed conflicts.

Since then, the Working Group on Education and Fragility has continued its activities. It includes the organization of Policy Dialogue Forums on Education and Peace. One such a forum was organized in 2012 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Participants discussed the impact of conflict on education and made recommendations to develop a national education for peace program.⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁸ More information about the High-Level Symposium on Conflict Sensitive Education is available at: <http://www.ineesite.org/en/conflict-sensitive-education/high-level-symposium-on-cse>

⁶¹⁹ The Paris Declaration is available at: http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/Declaration_-_Paris_Symposium_on_Conflict_Sensitive_Education_Final.pdf

⁶²⁰ INEE, *Policy Dialogue Forum on Education and Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Kinshasa: INEE, 2012), 14, http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/Final_Report_-_DRC_Policy_Dialogue_Forum_1.pdf.

b) Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA)

Formed in 2010, GCPEA is an inter-agency coalition composed of organizations – in the fields of education in emergencies and conflict-affected contexts, higher education, child protection, and international human rights and humanitarian law – concerned about ongoing attacks on educational institutions, their students, and staff in countries affected by conflict and insecurity. Its members include Human Rights Watch, the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, and Save the Children.⁶²¹

GCPEA has developed goals and recommendations to aid its expanding network to monitor and report violations; enforce programmatic measures for prevention and protection; and restrict the military use and occupation of schools. GCPEA also develops reports with concrete measures that ministries of education can take to keep schools and universities safe, even in situations of conflict and insecurity. For instance, in 2015, GCPEA published the report *What Ministries Can Do to Protect Education from Attack and Schools from Military Use: A Menu of Actions*, which calls on ministries to take seven key actions to protect education: “analyze the situation and monitor attacks; secure schools; ensure education continuity; support communities in protecting education; be conflict-sensitive; systematize education protection in ministries’ administrative and operational processes; and advocate with other government bodies to support protective

⁶²¹ More information about GCPEA is available at: <http://www.protectingeducation.org/who-we-are>

measures, including state endorsement of the *Safe Schools Declaration*⁶²² and implementation of the *Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict*.⁶²³ This report strongly promotes the use of conflict-sensitive curricula. It entails first examining the relationship, if any, between the curricula, language(s) of instruction, conflict, and attacks on education. Then, ministries are encouraged to reform the curricula so that the content “does not contribute to intergroup tensions, promote a culture of violence, or perpetuate stereotypes.”⁶²⁴ Finally, the report recommends maximizing the curricula’s contributions to a peaceful society by including topics such as peace education, critical thinking, peaceful conflict resolution, or human rights.⁶²⁵

D. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the growing presence of peace education in international recommendations and instruments promulgated by the UN. From the *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace* adopted in 1999 to the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* and its *Education 2030 Framework for Action adopted in 2015*, the UN General Assembly has affirmed several

⁶²² The Safe Schools declaration reaffirms the need for an education that is conflict sensitive, avoids contributing to conflict and pursues a contribution to peace. Opened for endorsements by states at the Oslo Conference on Safe Schools in May 2015, the *Safe Schools Declaration* provides states the opportunity to express broad political support for the protection and continuation of education in armed conflict, and is the instrument by which states can endorse and commit to implement the *Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict*. More information, including the list of states endorsers, is available at: <http://www.protectingeducation.org/guidelines/support>

⁶²³ Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, *What Ministries Can Do to Protect Education from Attack and Schools from Military Use New York* (GCPEA, 2015), http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/what_ministries.pdf.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*

prescriptions for the use of peace education. This chapter has also presented the role that UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR play in the promotion of peace education. While different, these organizations' respective mandates overlap on education in general and peace education in particular. Each has issued documents and reports over the years that have contributed to the global discussions on peace education. As a UN specialized agency with 195 member states, UNESCO's General Conference has also adopted formal recommendations on peace education such as *Recommendation 1974*. UNESCO is also at the origins of another major norm-setting document: the *Declaration of the 44th session of the International Conference on Education* convened by UNESCO and that includes the *Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy*. UNICEF and UNHCR's contributions to the global discussions on peace education have been less formal and rely more on reports and program strategies, but their influence is often stronger than UNESCO's because they provide states with larger funding and programs. These agencies have also tried to find synergies and coordinate their efforts in the field of peace education, such as when UNHCR collaborated with UNESCO to create the Inter-Agency Peace Education Technical Support Program that was endorsed by UNICEF and based on UNHCR's PEP.

All these actions and documents at the UN level influenced international organizations, which realized the need to pay attention to the role of education in fragile and conflict-affected countries. These UN actions have also influenced prominent international donors, such as USAID or GIZ, to endorse conflict

sensitivity and peace education in their respective strategy. In turn, international organizations and donors contribute to the promotion of conflict sensitivity and peace education. Finally, international networks such as INEE and GCPEA have become instrumental in encouraging a certain harmonization of global efforts for education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Looking for synergies, INEE used USAID's framework for analyzing education and fragility. INEE and GCPEA are also each at the origins of some significant global declarations signed by a large number of states, such as the *Paris Declaration on Conflict-sensitive Education* and the *Safe Schools Declaration*.

Despite these efforts, the scope of support for peace education at the international level is still not very robust, and there are serious impediments to the implementation of global recommendations on peace education. First, the lack of mechanisms for inducing states' adherence to these recommendations and policies is problematic. As Page writes, "While the UN's commitment to peace education has become more explicit, it seems rather symbolic."⁶²⁶ For instance, although Member States are encouraged to submit regular reports on the implementation of *Recommendation 74*, the monitoring procedure for its implementation encounters the same challenges other non-binding legal instruments face, particularly a low response rate.⁶²⁷ UNESCO also relies on country offices and the National Commissions for UNESCO to conduct advocacy efforts at the country level, but these mechanisms depend on the skills and motivation of the individuals who serve them. As in any organization, if the staff is not convinced or motivated enough,

⁶²⁶ Page, "The United Nations and Peace Education," 82.

⁶²⁷ Interview September 30, 2015.

success will not follow. And as a result, just having Member States endorse, adopt or sign these declarations and recommendations on peace education does not necessarily mean they will implement them and integrate peace education in their national education policy and practice.

The second major challenge is the lack of coordination and harmonization. While INEE's working group encourages it, finding synergies and coordinating efforts is not done systematically. There are still multiple reports and tools on similar topics that can be overwhelming for a MoE in a fragile state. Indeed, while all these organizations have contributed to the global discussion on peace education, they each have their own mandate, agenda and priorities, and often prefer to develop their own tools. One of the latest examples is USAID's checklist for conflict sensitivity in education issued a few months after INEE released its resource pack on conflict sensitivity in education policy and programming in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. While USAID's document is not directly dedicated to MoEs, its missions abroad are encouraged to use it with the MoEs' staff who may be confused when looking at both tools.

Third, another possible source of confusion is the fact that the actual term "peace education" is not always clearly mentioned in the norm-setting documents presented in this chapter, and it is often labelled under different names. Moreover, some of the tools developed at the international level are too complex for most MoE staff in fragile states that still lack skills and capacity. More generally, there is a lack of clarity around the concept of peace education that can be anticipated at the

country level, which hinders the integration of peace education in a national education policy and practice.

Finally, while peace education or related programs are often enthusiastically recommended, they are not always presented as a top priority of the education strategy at major international organizations such as DFID or the World Bank who are very influential in fragile states, particularly in Afghanistan. Often, as outlined in the literature review, peace education is not considered a higher priority among donors due to the lack of clarity around the concept and the lack of tangible evidence of a significant impact of such programs in the field. These factors may represent the beginning of an answer to the puzzle that this dissertation tries to solve. Chapter VI will explore whether these represent particular impediments for the implementation of global recommendations on peace education in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the next chapter will present an overview of the historical and current situation in Afghanistan, in order to establish the context for the development of this case study.

CHAPTER V – Situating the Case: Afghanistan and the State of Education

A. Introduction

“After a decade of major security, development and humanitarian assistance, the international community has failed to achieve a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan. Despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human security.”

– International Crisis Group⁶²⁸

Written five years ago, this statement could still well summarize the current situation in Afghanistan. Located in the heart of Central Asia, Afghanistan is one of the poorest nations in the world, with more than 36 percent of Afghans living below the poverty line. Estimated at around 32.5 million inhabitant, the Afghan population is young: about 64 percent of the population is less than 24 years old. This is explained by a high population growth rate (2.32 percent)⁶²⁹ and a low life expectancy at birth (51 years old): the world’s lowest after Chad and Guinea-Bissau.⁶³⁰ Despite impressive progress accomplished in recent years, the country

⁶²⁸ International Crisis Group, *Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan*, Asia Report N°210 (International Crisis Group, 2011), i, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/210-%20Aid%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>.

⁶²⁹ CIA, “The World Factbook: Afghanistan,” *Central Intelligence Agency*, accessed March 9, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>.

⁶³⁰ CIA, “The World Factbook: Country Comparison - Life Expectancy at Birth,” *Central Intelligence Agency*, accessed March 9, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html#af>.

still has the world's highest infant mortality rate (115 per 1000 live births).⁶³¹ Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution recognizes 14 ethnic groups, with four main ethnic groups comprising the majority of the population: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. 99.7 percent of Afghans are Muslims (including 85-90 percent Sunni and 10-15 percent Shia Muslims).⁶³² The two official languages are Dari (spoken by 50 percent of the population) and Pashtu (35 percent), while Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen), spoken by 11 percent of the population, are considered the third official language in areas where the majority speaks them.⁶³³

When the Taliban regime fell in 2001, Afghanistan was devastated. It was plagued by a ruined economy, deficient physical and social infrastructures, and devastated health and education services. The country is the world's second largest recipient of ODA,⁶³⁴ and despite progress on some fronts, Afghanistan is still present on all the various fragile states lists.⁶³⁵ In its latest annual *Survey of the Afghan People*, the Asia Foundation found that the proportion of survey participants who consider that "things are going in the wrong direction" surpassed the proportion of survey participants who consider that "things are going in the right direction" for the first time in a decade (see Figure 4). Indeed, a large proportion

⁶³¹ CIA, "The World Factbook: Country Comparison - Infant Mortality Rate," *Central Intelligence Agency*, accessed March 9, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html#af>.

⁶³² CIA, "The World Factbook: Afghanistan."

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ World Bank, "Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US\$)," *The World Bank*, accessed March 9, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2013+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc.

⁶³⁵ Laura Brannelly, Susy Ndaruhutse, and Carole Rigaud, *Donors' Engagement: Supporting Education in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States* (IIEP & CfBT Education Trust, 2009), 31, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001833/183363e.pdf>.

of the Afghan public remains “most concerned about insecurity, corruption, and unemployment.”⁶³⁶ An important increase in the numbers of Afghans applying for an international passport and leaving the country has confirmed these findings: in 2015, Afghans represented the second largest group of those seeking refuge in Europe.⁶³⁷




Figure 4: Measure of “National Mood” (survey participants answer the question: “Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?”).⁶³⁸

To establish the context for the development of the case study presented in Chapters VI and VII, this chapter will first offer a condensed country situation analysis, with a particular focus on the issues of insecurity, corruption, and aid dependency. It will then present the current state of the country's educational system and the main challenges it faces.

⁶³⁶ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People* (The Asia Foundation, 2014), 5, <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf>.

⁶³⁷ Sabra Ayres, “‘Everybody Is Leaving Afghanistan’: Refugees Flee Increasing Violence,” *Al Jazeera America*, October 3, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/3/refugees-flee-afghanistan-in-face-of-increasing-violence.html>.

⁶³⁸ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People* (The Asia Foundation, 2015), 16, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2015.pdf>.

B. Country overview of Afghanistan

1. Historical and Political Background

The geographic location of Afghanistan explains its strategic geopolitical value. Landlocked and positioned at a crossroad between East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, the country experienced various foreign invasions over the centuries. Del Castillo underscores the unusual variety of foreign influences on the development of Afghan nationalism:

“Foreign conquerors; nationalist policies; foreign aid; different ethnics and religions,; economic and social reforms; and the old Silk Route linking China to Rome have combined in complex and different ways throughout Afghanistan’s history to mould the country – including its economy, its politics, its culture, its language, and its people.”⁶³⁹

In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became central to the “Great Game” between the British Empire in the south and east, and the Russian Empire in the north. This led to two costly Anglo-Afghan wars that ultimately resulted in the acceptance of the “Durand Line” by Abdur Rahman, then Amir of Afghanistan, enthroned by the British Empire in 1880. Drawn by the British in 1893 to suit the economic and political interests of the empire, the “Durand Line” became the Afghanistan’s border with British India (today’s Pakistan). Still not recognized in Afghanistan, the border is considered illogical from ethnographic, strategic and geographical perspectives: “If [the Durand Line] cuts across one of the main basins

⁶³⁹ Graciana Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan* (Xlibris, 2014), 17–18.

of the Indus watershed, it splits a nation in two, and it even divides tribes.”⁶⁴⁰ Indeed, it deprived Afghanistan of any rights over the Pashtun tribes living on the other side of the line. Starting in the 1980s, areas on both sides of the Durand Line became sanctuaries for Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs): first for the mujahideen fighting the Soviet troops, and later for the Taliban carrying out attacks on Afghan and international security forces.

Abdur Rahman’s rule (1880-1901) was characterized by a degree of stability that came at the cost of “strong government centralization and harsh punishments for crime and corruption.”⁶⁴¹ Indeed, Abdur Rahman aimed to create a centralized system by eliminating the existing decentralized government structure in which the regions and the tribes enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.⁶⁴² One of Abdur Rahman’s major legacies was the “Pashtunization” of the state under the influence of British politicians who were interested in transforming Afghanistan into a buffer state to protect the political, economic, and strategic interests of the British Empire in India.⁶⁴³ To do so, and under the cover of protecting Afghanistan’s borders with Russia, Britain suggested removing the native tribes living in the border areas and replacing them with Pashtun nomads and farmers from the south.⁶⁴⁴ Afghanistan has always been a rural society, with 74 percent of the population still living in small villages today.⁶⁴⁵ According to Baiza, on the one hand this settlement policy

⁶⁴⁰ William K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan* (New York; London: Oxford University Press., 1950), 189.

⁶⁴¹ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 17.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, 16.

⁶⁴³ Yahia Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901* (Routledge, 2013), 27.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁵ World Bank, “Data: Rural Population (% of Total Population),” *World Bank*, n.d., accessed March 5, 2016.

suiting the British strategy of “divide and rule” by supporting one tribe against the others; and on the other hand, it suited Abdur Rahman’s policy of promoting and expanding the Pashtun’s tribal, political and economic interests over other groups.⁶⁴⁶ This policy had effects that are still felt strongly in Afghanistan, as it resulted in the migration of great numbers of non-Pashtun tribes to neighboring countries.⁶⁴⁷ Baiza underlines how tribalism and tribal elements have remained characteristic features of the state of Afghanistan.⁶⁴⁸ In 1901, Abdur Rahman was succeeded by his son, Habibullah, who remained loyal to Britain and pursued the Pashtunization of the country his father had started. He undertook some modernization programs, particularly in the education sector. In 1919, Habibullah was assassinated and his son, Amanullah, declared himself the new Amir. Deviating from his father and grandfather’s policies in foreign affairs, he declared independence from Britain and pursued even greater modernization efforts that included a reform of the education system. Prior to that time, only the Kabul-based ‘elite’ had access to a modern education going beyond the religious teachings of the Mosques and the other traditional learning techniques of Afghans in the provinces.⁶⁴⁹ Amanullah’s vision of a European-style modern “nation-state” was challenged, and his defiance of tribal chiefs and religious establishments eventually created a rebellion that brought him down in 1929.⁶⁵⁰ He was forced to exile due to the strong opposition he met when he established schools for girls and when he sought

⁶⁴⁶ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 29.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶⁴⁹ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 196.

⁶⁵⁰ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 32.

to control the Islamic schools in the country.⁶⁵¹ Baiza considers this civil war marked the first major regression in Afghanistan because it destroyed the progress made in education and other aspects of public life.⁶⁵² However, what remained under subsequent rulers was the strong tribal character of the state, in which an exclusive preference was given to Pashtun's interests in all aspects of domestic and foreign affairs.⁶⁵³ Eventually, the domination of Pashtun nationalism, deprivation of the non-Pashtun population from accessing national resources, and the state's autocratic rule were challenged by the emergence of various Islamist and leftist parties in the 1960s and 1970s. After World War II, Afghanistan became an economic battleground for Cold War rivalries, as both the Soviet Union and the United States provided large amounts of aid to influence Afghan policies.⁶⁵⁴ In 1978, the leftist People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) staged a military coup and established the *Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*.⁶⁵⁵ The 1978-1992 period was characterized by crises of political legitimacy and the Soviet Union's military and political occupation of Afghanistan, which made the country a battlefield for the proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States.⁶⁵⁶ According to Baiza, the Soviet invasion gave the Islamist parties national and international political legitimacy, and help them secure foreign military, financial, and political support.⁶⁵⁷ This foreign support for the resistance used education as a

⁶⁵¹ Pia Karlsson and Amir Mansory, *Educational Reforms in the Context of Globalisation and in Afghanistan* (Institute of International Education: Stockholm University, 2004), 43.

⁶⁵² Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 33.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 18.

⁶⁵⁵ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 34.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., 35.

political mechanism to fuel the war during the late 1980s and early 1990s through the so-called “Jihad Textbooks”:

“The United States created children’s textbooks (for grades 1-12) designed to inspire militancy, as well as the Alphabet of Jihad Literacy, a series of adult literacy lessons for mujahideen. All were funded and supported by a U.S. government aid project, administered through the University of Nebraska at Omaha, designed in large part to support the Cold War struggle against the Soviets.”⁶⁵⁸

Explicitly violent, these textbooks included a fourth-grade mathematics text that stated, “The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second” and then asked students, “If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a Mujahid, and a Mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead.”⁶⁵⁹ Endorsing a form of violent jihad that had not previously been part of any Afghan religious education,⁶⁶⁰ these textbooks later helped form the basis of Taliban ideology, thereby contributing to the conflict.⁶⁶¹

In 1988, after nine years of Soviet occupation, the Geneva Accords were signed. Encompassing several bilateral agreements, they notably specified the details of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.⁶⁶² When the Soviet Union

⁶⁵⁸ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 55–56.

⁶⁵⁹ Davis, “‘A’ Is for Allah, ‘J’ Is for Jihad,” 93.

⁶⁶⁰ Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, *Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

⁶⁶¹ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 57.

⁶⁶² UNGOMAP, “Afghanistan / Pakistan - UNGOMAP - Background,” *United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)*, 2002, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html>.

effectively withdrew in 1989, the PDPA leadership announced a national reconciliation that ultimately failed to bring peace between the PDPA and resistance parties. In May 1990, in a statement to the U.S. Congress during the Public Hearing on Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan, Rubin provided the following warning:

“The [US] strategy of the past, supplying more weapons through the same channels, through Pakistan to the resistance fronts in Afghanistan, although actually we are not sure where all of the weapons go, and of simply portraying it as a struggle between the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime, on the one hand, and us, the Mujahedeen, Pakistan and the Saudis, on the other, will not lead to peace. Our goal has to be a political settlement in which Afghans chose the government themselves.”⁶⁶³

Del Castillo insists that much damage could have been avoided if that advice had been followed—and later in the 2000s when a military solution was tried again with little chance of success.⁶⁶⁴ She adds that with the communist government in Kabul receiving US\$45 billion in arms from the Soviets during the invasion years, and with the United States and Saudi Arabia providing about US\$10 billion to the mujahideen while the communists were in power, the impact on the local population was severe.⁶⁶⁵ Ultimately, the PDPA collapsed in 1992 and the resistance parties took control of the country, and renamed it “The Islamic State of Afghanistan,” with Burhanuddin Rabbani at its head.⁶⁶⁶ The Soviet school

⁶⁶³ Cited in Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 107.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁶ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 35.

curriculum was then partly revised, and militant Islamic ideas became incorporated into underlying Communist ideology together with the earlier text versions of biased Pashtun histories and cultures.⁶⁶⁷ As a result, students continued to learn of the importance of Trade Unions and Afghan history still revered the histories of the Pashtun Amirs and Kings, whilst instilling in the minds of children a mistrust of the descendants of Ali (the Shi'a sect of Islam) and hatred of all non-Muslims.⁶⁶⁸ The 1992-2001 period was marked by the fragmentation of political authority, state institutions, and national infrastructure.⁶⁶⁹ While the resistance parties tried to put their factional, religious, and ideological differences aside, and work for the creation of a broad-based government, they failed when confronted with deeply divided Islamist parties.⁶⁷⁰ Once again, foreign interference played a role in fueling the internal conflict. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan had lost its strategic significance for the U.S., who mostly left the country in the hands of regional powers.⁶⁷¹ Indeed, both Iran (a Shia theocracy) and Saudi Arabia (a Sunni kingdom) sought to expand their political and religious influence, and exploited the Sunni-Shia divide among the resistance parties for their own political gains.⁶⁷² Moreover, Pakistan needed a friendly Afghanistan government to strengthen its position relative to India and to gain access to Central Asian markets. As a result, the war in Afghanistan produced a “double deadlock of inter-factional

⁶⁶⁷ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 199.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁹ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 35.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁷¹ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

⁶⁷² Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 35.

hostility and foreign interference, which prepared the ground for the rise of a fast-growing Pashtun movement, which became to be known as the Taliban.”⁶⁷³ Rubin underscored the fatal flaw of the 1988 Geneva Accords as the failure to deal effectively with the Afghans' domestic conflict and to establish U.S.-Soviet cooperation in rebuilding Afghanistan.⁶⁷⁴ While Massoud finally managed to defeat most of the militias and restored calm in Kabul by 1995, several years of fighting had caused devastating damages and all kinds of human rights abuses had taken place.⁶⁷⁵

Led by Mullah Omar, the Taliban⁶⁷⁶ movement grew out of Kandahar. Its members were often drawn from madrasas or Islamic theology schools set up in refugee camps in Pakistan.⁶⁷⁷ In 1996, the Taliban defeated the government led by Rabbani and his Defense Minister Massoud,⁶⁷⁸ and set out to create an absolute Pashtun-dominated government, and implement a Wahabi interpretation of Islam mixed with customary laws and traditions. Del Castillo stresses that four years of power had corrupted Massoud's army, which “harassed civilians, stole from shops, and confiscated people's homes.”⁶⁷⁹ This made Kabulis welcome, at first, the Taliban when they entered Kabul, as they considered they were a positive

⁶⁷³ Ibid., 36.

⁶⁷⁴ Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*.

⁶⁷⁵ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 110.

⁶⁷⁶ “Taliban” means “student of Islam” in Arabic.

⁶⁷⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

⁶⁷⁸ Described as the famous Tajik commander of the Panjshir Valley who had been one of the toughest mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 102.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., 111.

alternative to the existing chaos.⁶⁸⁰ With the support of Bin Laden and Saudi Arabia, the Taliban established the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” While they reestablished security in large parts of the country and reinstalled law and order, they did so at the expense of human rights.⁶⁸¹ Mullah Omar became the *de facto* head of state, but his government was only recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and was denied a seat at the UN General Assembly.⁶⁸² Indeed, the Assembly refused to accept the credentials of the Taliban’s delegation, and consequently, the representative of Rabbani continued to occupy the seat during the Taliban rule.⁶⁸³ The school textbooks were once again revised, this time with financial aid from Saudi Arabia: the new books included most of the content of the earlier books, but they now included more Islamic subjects, all pictures of living things were removed, and most of the new religious textbooks were in Arabic.⁶⁸⁴ The Taliban Ministry of Education focused education on Islamic studies to the exclusion of all other subjects, particularly the ones included under “social studies” (e.g. science, history, and geography).⁶⁸⁵ They also

⁶⁸⁰ Pia Karlsson and Amir Mansory, *Afghan Dilemma: Education, Gender and Globalization* (Institute of International Education: Stockholm University, 2007), 138, <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:197642/FULLTEXT01.pdf>; Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*.

⁶⁸¹ Karlsson and Mansory, *Afghan Dilemma: Education, Gender and Globalization*, 138.

⁶⁸² Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 111.

⁶⁸³ Richard W. Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, *Global Politics in a Changing World*, 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 240.

⁶⁸⁴ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 199.

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*; Adele M. E. Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” *Harvard Educational Review* 79, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 115.

forbid girls to attend school,⁶⁸⁶ and as a result, during this time, a number of self-run secret home-based schools were organized, particularly for girls.⁶⁸⁷

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan also became a haven for international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida. In 1999, in its resolution 1267, the UN Security Council demanded that the Taliban “cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations,” and turn over Osama Bin Laden, head of Al-Qaida, held responsible for the 1998 bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.⁶⁸⁸ It also introduced mandatory sanctions against key members of the Taliban and Al-Qaida. Nevertheless, the Taliban regime resisted, and while it had started as “a savior movement against human rights abuses by corrupted commanders,” it soon engaged in all kinds of abuses, particularly against the Shia Hazara population and against women in general.”⁶⁸⁹ Rubin provides the following explanation of the Taliban’s conduct in power:

“Foreign aid, commercial agriculture (opium) and long-distance contraband provided this newly-armed elite with the opportunity to mobilize resources for a direct exercise of power, which had been out of its reach before. The mosque network enabled it to penetrate society as well.”⁶⁹⁰

⁶⁸⁶ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 200.

⁶⁸⁷ Shon Campbell, *Lost Chances: The Changing Situation of Children in Afghanistan 1990-2000* (New York: UNICEF, 2001), 87–88, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EBBBE884F6CE5172C1256ACB003505E8-gmc-afg-30jun.pdf>.

⁶⁸⁸ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1267, S/RES/1267* (United Nations, 1999), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/300/44/PDF/N9930044.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶⁸⁹ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 111.

⁶⁹⁰ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), xiii.

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan also entered a new period of civil war. Several mujahideen groups created then what is known as the Northern Alliance, a military-political resistance force led by Massoud.⁶⁹¹ Meanwhile, neighboring countries continued to interfere. Rashid explains that “at the heart of this regional stand-off [was] the battle for the vast oil and gas riches of landlocked Central Asia.”⁶⁹² Moreover, Rashid underscores the importance of “the intense competition between the regional states and Western oil companies as to who would build the lucrative pipelines which are needed to transport the energy to markets in Europe and Asia.”⁶⁹³

By September 2001, the Taliban controlled approximately 90 percent of the country. The regime interpreted religious and tribal law in their most conservative forms, crushing women’s rights and denying education to children.⁶⁹⁴ During more than two decades of war, the country’s economy had experienced “political instability, violence, and human rights abuses that killed between one and one and a half million people and wounded or displaced many times that number;” while at the same time, the country required large amounts of food aid due to periodic episodes of drought, a number of earthquakes, and poor crop yields.⁶⁹⁵ Del Castillo

⁶⁹¹ United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan* S/2008/695 (10 November 2008). Available at:

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S2008%20695.pdf>

Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

⁶⁹² Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 331.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan*, S/2008/695 (United Nations, 2008), para. 2,

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S2008%20695.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁵ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 114.

adds that while the licit economy contracted, the illicit drug economy – opium production and trade – expanded rapidly. Indeed, a dual economy emerged with urban areas controlled by the Kabul government on the one hand, and the more isolated rural areas that suffered the large burden of the fighting on the other hand.⁶⁹⁶ She explains that the rural population largely reverted to subsistence agriculture and drug production, which became an ingrained feature of the war economy that would prove difficult to eradicate after 9/11 and is one of the main impediments for the country to reach peace and stability.⁶⁹⁷

2. Afghanistan since 2001

Following the events of 9/11, on September 25 2001, the U.S. Defense Secretary announced that the military action against terrorism will be called *Operation Enduring Freedom* and would eventually combine US, UK and Afghan military efforts.⁶⁹⁸ International military forces entered Afghanistan a few days later, in October. Undergoing U.S. and Britain's airstrikes as well as Northern Alliance' efforts on the ground, the Taliban regime collapsed in November. In December, the UN supported a dialogue in Bonn, Germany, that some have described as a "winners' conference" bringing together representatives from the U.S., Russia, and the six nations surrounding Afghanistan.⁶⁹⁹ On the Afghan side, the Taliban were excluded, and only four Afghan groups were invited to participate

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid., 115.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Cindy C. Combs and Martin W. Slann, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (New York: Facts On File, 2007), 431.

⁶⁹⁹ Larry Goodson, "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 1 (2003): 82–99.

fully in the talks: the Northern Alliance; the Rome Group, representing the former King Zahir Shah; and two smaller coalitions, the Peshawar and Cyprus Group.⁷⁰⁰ This lack of representation had far-reaching consequences, as it notably led to the exclusion of pro-democratic forces from the Bonn process.⁷⁰¹

The Bonn Conference resulted in the signature of the “Bonn Agreement” supported by the UN Security Council and the six countries neighboring Afghanistan.⁷⁰² The 2001 Bonn Agreement resulted in an interim power sharing arrangement and produced a calendar for elections. A Loya Jirga (supreme council) was then convened in Kabul to appoint an interim president and high-level political leaders. The Afghan Interim Authority, led by an appointed Interim President, Hamid Karzai, was inaugurated with a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority, after which presidential elections were to be held. The Agreement also called for the creation of a new constitution, which was adopted by the constitutional Loya Jirga in January 2004. The international community committed to a “light footprint” in terms of both troops and foreign aid. The Bonn Agreement authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that would run parallel to *Operation Enduring Freedom* to help the transitional government maintain security. Underestimating the remaining task in

⁷⁰⁰ OECD, *Statebuilding in Fragile Situations – How Can Donors “do No Harm” and Maximise Their Positive Impact?*, Country Case Study – Afghanistan (OECD, 2009), 3, <http://www.oecd.org/countries/afghanistan/45582618.pdf>.

⁷⁰¹ Thomas Ruttig, *Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan’s Political Parties and Where They Come from (1902-2006)* (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006), 17, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-544-2-30.pdf.

⁷⁰² United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1383*, S/RES/1383 (United Nations, 2001), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/681/09/PDF/N0168109.pdf?OpenElement>; United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1386*, S/RES/1386 (United Nations, 2001), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>.

Afghanistan, the Bush Administration was concerned with the troop needs in Iraq and preferred to pay and arm Afghan proxies to fight their battles, later described as “mostly strongmen and tribal leaders whose long-term loyalty to the state could not be relied upon.”⁷⁰³

In March 2002, in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to be a partner for the government, and help it re-establish structures, systems, and services.⁷⁰⁴ Since then, the UN and other agencies have provided money, technical, and material assistance to support projects for which the Afghan government is generally responsible, including education. With the U.S. government particularly determined to stabilize Afghanistan, many of its efforts were directly administered through USAID, rather than going through the UN:⁷⁰⁵

“The country had a defeated government, a ruined economy, and a wrecked physical and social infrastructure. Roads, businesses, homes, schools, clinics were either destroyed or badly neglected. Only small sections of urban areas had electrical power, and potable water was scarce. Every sector of the economy, including agriculture, energy, industry, and social services, was in dire need of rebuilding. Civil society institutions, including the

⁷⁰³ OECD, *Statebuilding in Fragile Situations – How Can Donors “do No Harm” and Maximise Their Positive Impact?*, 3.

⁷⁰⁴ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1401*. UNAMA’s mission has been extended by the UN Security Council every year since then through UN Security Council resolutions 1471 (2003), 1536 (2004), 1589 (2005), 1662 (2006), 1746 (2007), 1806 (2008), 1868 (2009), 1917 (2010), 1974 (2011), 2041 (2012), 2096 (2013), 2145 (2014), and 2210 (2015).

⁷⁰⁵ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 9.

parliament, the courts, much of the civil service, and most of the educational and health systems, had been destroyed.”⁷⁰⁶

In 2002, President Karzai’s term was extended during the emergency Loya Jirga held in June. Presidential elections were held in 2004 and resulted in Karzai’s election. The next year, Parliamentary elections were held in September and led to the establishment of the 249-seat National Assembly, which was inaugurated in December 2005, marking the formal conclusion of the Bonn political process.⁷⁰⁷ Afghanistan adopted the MDGs five years later than the other UN Member States, and as a result, MDGs targets for Afghanistan run through 2020. Because of the extent to which security overshadows socio-economic progress, “enhancing security” was adopted as the ninth goal, and certain targets and indicators were tailored to local realities.⁷⁰⁸ In 2006, the London Conference on Afghanistan resulted in the adoption of the *Afghanistan Compact*, a medium-term development plan endorsed by the UN Security Council that provided the framework for the commitments of and partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community.⁷⁰⁹ The Compact identified three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity consistent with the MDGs: Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development. Additionally, the Compact pinpointed the narcotics industry as a

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁰⁷ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁷⁰⁸ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Millennium Development Goals Report 2012* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Economy, 2013), 4, <http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/library/mdg/MDGs-report-2012/>.

⁷⁰⁹ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1659*, S/RES/1659 (United Nations, 2006), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1659.pdf>.

crosscutting area of work, which “remains a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond.”⁷¹⁰

Several similar conferences on Afghanistan were held in subsequent years. For instance, the 2010 London Conference identified steps towards greater Afghan leadership in areas ranging from security to economic development, and from governance to regional cooperation.⁷¹¹ At this conference, newly re-elected President Karzai outlined a peace and reintegration program aimed at promoting peace through dialogue, which included the creation of a national high peace council to oversee the reintegration of armed opposition fighters, and the establishment of a peace and reintegration trust fund to provide employment and financial incentives for those who renounced violence.⁷¹² In December 2011, Germany hosted another conference in Bonn. Ten years after Bonn 2001, the UN main agencies, 85 states, and 15 international organizations gathered to discuss the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan Government, which was scheduled to end in 2014.⁷¹³ The participants also reaffirmed that the role of international actors would “evolve further from direct service delivery to support and capacity-building for Afghan institutions, enabling the Government of

⁷¹⁰ The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, “The Afghanistan Compact,” The London Conference on Afghanistan, 2006, 2, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf.

⁷¹¹ Paul Reynolds, “Aims of the London Conference on Afghanistan,” *BBC*, January 28, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8480368.stm.

⁷¹² United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan*, S/2011/55 (United Nations, 2011), para. 7, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/217/44/PDF/N1121744.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁷¹³ The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, “Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade,” The International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, December 5, 2011, para. 5, http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf.

Afghanistan to exercise its sovereign authority in all its functions.”⁷¹⁴ While the transition process was clearly set to end in 2014, the conference communiqué stressed the need for the international community to remain strongly engaged in support of Afghanistan beyond 2014.⁷¹⁵

In 2012, Afghanistan issued its latest report on the MDGs. The report noted “impressive” progress in education and health and “moderate” progress in gender parity, but pointed out lagging progress in reducing poverty, women’s political participation and literacy, as well as sustainable access to safe drinking water, sanitation and resource allocation to MDGs sectors.⁷¹⁶ The same year, the Taliban agreed to open an office in Dubai, as a move towards peace talks with the United States and the Afghan government.⁷¹⁷ Meanwhile, and according to the withdrawal plan, ISAF officially completed its mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, though substantial NATO advisory forces remained to train and mentor the Afghan security forces and institutions through a follow-on NATO-led mission called Resolute Support.⁷¹⁸ While the U.S. government stated in December 2013 that it would soon withdraw from Afghanistan, it ratified a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with newly elected President Ghani on September 30, 2014 that provides for a residual number of foreign forces in the country after 2014.⁷¹⁹ The Obama

⁷¹⁴ Ibid., para. 9.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid., para. 12.

⁷¹⁶ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Millennium Development Goals Report 2012*.

⁷¹⁷ Dion Nissenbaum, Habib Khan Totakhil, and Julian Barnes, “Taliban Agree to Open Office for Peace Talks,” *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2012, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203462304577138431516260746>.

⁷¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,” NATO, December 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.

⁷¹⁹ Afghan Mission, “Afghanistan Signs Security Agreement with the United States,” *Permanent Mission of Afghanistan To the United Nations in New York*, September 30, 2014,

administration announced in 2015 that it would keep the same level of troops in Afghanistan through 2015⁷²⁰ and through most of 2016 with a plan to reduce it in 2017.⁷²¹ However, the recent developments presented hereafter may delay the full withdrawal once more.

3. Current Challenges

Despite impressive advances in certain sectors such as education and health, Afghanistan remains one of the least-developed countries in the world. The health care system remains burdened by war and stressed due to the destruction of infrastructure and the inability to rebuild in some regions.⁷²² In 2014, Afghanistan ranked number 171 out of 188 countries on the UN Global Human Development index, a composite indicator that measures education, life expectancy, and economic performance.⁷²³ Afghans continue to experience a humanitarian crisis.⁷²⁴ While the status of women has improved, the level of female participation in the economy remains far too low, and violence against women is still widespread.⁷²⁵

<http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2014/09/afghanistan-signs-security-agreement-with-the-united-states/#sthash.zfedCOGA.KI8MXts.dpuf>.

⁷²⁰ Michael D. Shear and Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. to Delay Pullout of Troops From Afghanistan to Aid Strikes," *The New York Times*, March 24, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/world/asia/ashraf-ghani-of-afghanistan-wants-us-troops-to-stay-longer.html>.

⁷²¹ Jonathan Landay and Idrees Ali, "Naming of New Taliban Chief Seen Dimming Obama's Hopes for Afghan Peace Talks," *Reuters*, May 25, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-usa-idUSKCN0YG31Z>.

⁷²² Neta Crawford, *War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014* (Brown University: Watson Institute For International Studies, 2015), <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN.pdf>.

⁷²³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2015* (UNDP, 2015), 210, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report_1.pdf.

⁷²⁴ Crawford, *War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014*.

⁷²⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed Partnership*, London Conference on Afghanistan, 2014, 7, <http://www.afghanistan->

Insecurity, weak institutions, corruption and aid dependency pose serious challenges that affect the education system both directly and indirectly. These challenges will be presented hereafter.

a) Insecurity

The year 2015 saw the highest number of casualties among Afghan civilians since the UN started keeping track in 2009.⁷²⁶ Afghanistan is the most insecure country in the world after Syria and Iraq, according to the 2015 Global Peace Index.⁷²⁷ In addition to drug trafficking, which was mentioned previously, the country faces a proliferation of arms trafficking, landmines, rising high (and rising) crime rates and abductions that are legacies of three decades of conflict and violence. Additionally, there is an increase in the number and strength of the attacks against the media. Political factions are still in power in many areas, and they each have their own privatized security forces, outside of central government control. As a result, physical violence by armed militias continues, as does torture by security forces, deadly attacks by the Taliban, hostage taking, and street gangs.⁷²⁸ During the 2014 London Conference on Afghanistan, the newly elected Afghan government presented a reform program warning against the proliferation of criminal networks fueled by narcotics and the illicit sources of income that have

un.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/REALIZING-FINAL-SELF-RELIANCE-25-November-2014.pdf.

⁷²⁶ UNAMA, *Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (United Nations, 2016), 1,

https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc_annual_report_2015_final_14_feb_2016.pdf.

⁷²⁷ Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Peace Index 2015*, 2015, 9.

⁷²⁸ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 7.

entered into strategic alliances seeking to produce instability and state weakness within which they can thrive and spread.⁷²⁹

While the country still suffers from violent attacks by anti-Government organizations, 2015 has also witnessed a rise in intra-insurgent violence. Following the confirmation of the death of Mullah Omar, reports of internal fighting among anti-Government elements in several areas appeared, revolving around disputes about ideological authority as well as financial control of lucrative cross-border smuggling routes.⁷³⁰ Additionally, some fighters now claim an affiliation to Daesh,⁷³¹ and sometimes clashes with their Taliban rivals.⁷³² In December 2015, General Campbell, the U.S. commander of the international coalition supporting Afghan forces, announced there are about 1,000 to 3,000 Daesh fighters in Afghanistan, located principally in Nangarhar Province.⁷³³ Rival criminal networks (including government officials) also compete for drug revenues and natural resources.⁷³⁴ While they have made great progress in improving their capacity, the Afghan army and police continue to face difficulties in maintaining control over the entire national territory.

⁷²⁹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed Partnership*, 6.

⁷³⁰ United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/359–S/2015/684 (United Nations, 2015), para. 14 and 19, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_684.pdf.

⁷³¹ Daesh is an acronym that stands for the Arabic name of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS): al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham.

⁷³² Franz J. Marty, “The Looming Specter of Daesh in Afghanistan,” *Foreign Policy*, February 9, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/the-looming-spectre-of-daesh-in-afghanistan/>.

⁷³³ Michael R. Gordon, “ISIS Building ‘Little Nests’ in Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Secretary Warns,” *The New York Times*, December 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/world/asia/afghanistan-ash-carter.html?_r=0.

⁷³⁴ Davies, *Understanding Education’s Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*, 22.

Informal peace talks with the Taliban have taken place since 2012, but no real progress has been made. A Quadrilateral Coordination Group on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, composed of representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the U.S., was convened to prepare the ground for these peace talks.⁷³⁵ Officially, the Taliban reject any talks, and insist that they will not stop fighting until all foreign troops leave the country: Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who replaced Mullah Omar, laid down preconditions for taking part in any talks as he struggled to overcome factional infighting, with some breakaway groups opposing any negotiations whatsoever.⁷³⁶ Following his death in a U.S. drone strike in May 2016, the Taliban leadership council selected Mullah Haybattullah Akhundzada, a hard-line cleric, as the new Taliban chief who will certainly maintain the same position on the peace talks.⁷³⁷ Moreover, and according to some experts, Akhundzada is “likely to pursue aggressive attacks throughout the summer, intensifying the pressure on Obama to reconsider his plan to withdraw U.S. military trainers and special forces and leave the decision on how to end America's longest war to his successor.”⁷³⁸

⁷³⁵ Office of the Spokesperson, “Joint Press Release of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation,” *U.S. Department of State*, January 11, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251105.htm>.

⁷³⁶ Josh Smith and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban Says Rejects ‘Futile’ Afghanistan Peace Talks,” *Reuters*, March 5, 2016, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-afghanistan-taliban-idUKKCN0W70JF>.

⁷³⁷ Jonathan Landay and Idrees Ali, “Naming of New Taliban Chief Seen Dimming Obama’s Hopes for Afghan Peace Talks,” *Reuters*, May 25, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-usa-idUSKCN0YG31Z>.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*

b) Governance and Corruption

Throughout its modern history, Afghanistan's centralized state structure has coexisted uneasily with a fragmented, decentralized traditional society influenced by tribalism or warlordism.⁷³⁹ Creating a strong central state has been a major goal of the Bonn process, which resulted in extremely vertical and centralized government structures. Consequently, the budget is determined centrally in Kabul, and distributed downwards through ministries while provincial level authorities have very few discretionary funds available to them.⁷⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the state's authority remains fragmented, and many regions are still under the de facto rule of warlords or illegal armed groups who replace the central government.⁷⁴¹ The lack of capacity of state institutions and weakness of subnational structures represent additional challenges. Indeed, despite substantial investments in capacity-building since 2002, government institutions remain weak and face severe challenges in delivering basic services to the Afghan population. In particular, the political turmoil that followed the last presidential elections has seriously affected the people's trust in political institutions. Indeed, the second round of the presidential election between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, held in June 2014, resulted in tensions over allegations of massive fraud, and a serious political impasse with grave destabilizing consequences for the political, security, economic and social

⁷³⁹ Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit, *Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Assessment and Recommendations for Action*, vol. I: Assessment and Recommendations for Action (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004), 1, <http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01061/WEB/IMAGES/AFCIVILS.PDF>; Marie Chene, *Corruption and Decentralisation in Afghanistan* (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2007), 6, <file:///C:/Users/Tina%20Pro/Downloads/expert-helpdesk-148.pdf>.

⁷⁴⁰ Chene, *Corruption and Decentralisation in Afghanistan*, 6.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*

environment of the country.⁷⁴² While the two candidates eventually agreed to create a government of national unity after a U.S.-led mediation process, it took several months to constitute the unity government, and the country has been paralyzed since then by the disagreements and different views between President Ghani and the government Chief Executive Officer Abdullah. Furthermore, due to disputed electoral reforms, parliamentary and provincial elections scheduled for 2015 had to be postponed, and are now tentatively scheduled for late 2016.

A corrupt wartime economy centered on opium production, has resulted in widespread corruption across most sectors.⁷⁴³ Fixing the systemic corruption that has plagued all aspects of life in the country is on the top of Ghani's agenda,⁷⁴⁴ but intensification of the conflict has undermined his government's efforts to fulfil this commitment to fight corruption and improve governance.⁷⁴⁵ In 2015, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country's public sector is perceived to be, ranked

⁷⁴² United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/68/988-S/2014/656 (United Nations, 2014), para. 2, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_656.pdf.

⁷⁴³ Davies, *Understanding Education's Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*, 22; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed Partnership*, 7; Civil-Military Fusion Centre, *Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan* (CMC, 2012), 6, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC-Afghanistan-Corruption-Volume-Feb2012.pdf>.

⁷⁴⁴ The new government articulated its development vision and reform program through its paper "Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership" presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan in December 2014. The paper notably presents the government's plans for tackling corruption and building better governance.

⁷⁴⁵ Haroun Mir and Habib Wardak, "The Perils of Corruption in Afghanistan," *Al Jazeera*, June 24, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/perils-corruption-afghanistan-150623074926689.html>.

Afghanistan number 166 out of 168 countries.⁷⁴⁶ Some studies identify the unprecedented large inflows of international assistance as the source of pressures to spend the money quickly, thereby greatly increasing opportunities for corruption.⁷⁴⁷

While anti-corruption efforts at the highest levels have increased, the proportion of Afghans who say that corruption is a problem in their daily lives is at the highest point in a decade.⁷⁴⁸ Most Afghans report corruption as a major problem in numerous arenas, ranging from 53.3 percent in their neighborhood to 75.7 percent across Afghanistan.⁷⁴⁹ The Asia Foundation's *Survey of the Afghan People* goes even further:

“When asked how often they had paid a bribe, given a gift, or performed a favor for a list of different authorities and situations, 57.6% of Afghans in 2014 say they encountered corruption in their interaction in at least one authority or in a least one situation in the past year. Over half (54.7%) of Afghans who had contact with the judiciary or courts in the past year say they had to pay a bribe, exchange a gift, or perform a favor. A similar percentage (55.1%) experienced corruption in their interaction with municipal or district authorities. Afghans’ experiences with corruption adversely affect their perception of and confidence in various governing institutions.”⁷⁵⁰

⁷⁴⁶ Transparency International, “Corruption by Country / Territory,” *Transparency International*, 2015, <https://www.transparency.org/country/#AFG>.

⁷⁴⁷ USAID, *Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan* (USAID, 2009), 5, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnado248.pdf.

⁷⁴⁸ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 10.

⁷⁴⁹ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 10.

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

Indeed, when asked about the degree of confidence they have in a wide range of institutions, Afghans are least confident (47.3 percent) in government ministries.⁷⁵¹ This growing mistrust feeds into the vicious circle of insecurity. For Sarah Chayes, “Acutely corrupt governance doesn’t just aid terrorist organizations by driving indignant citizens into their arms; it provides haven and logistical support for those very same groups, as officials avert their eyes in exchange for a bribe.”⁷⁵² She adds that Afghan government corruption has been “manufacturing” the Taliban.⁷⁵³

c) Aid Dependency

At the time the Durand Line was established, the British started subsidizing the Afghan state in exchange for local goodwill, particularly in matters of foreign affairs. According to Del Castillo, this historical precedent could be the catalyst of Afghanistan’s increasing addiction to foreign aid.⁷⁵⁴ As the world’s second largest recipient of ODA, its weak economy is still extremely dependent on foreign aid.⁷⁵⁵ International donors have been funding approximately 70 percent of the national budget since 2001, and 16 percent of the GDP comes from remittances.⁷⁵⁶

Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan is the source of continuing debate. Afghan institutions are in dire need of capacity building, but while capacity must be built over an extended period, and the intended outcomes of most capacity-building

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., 10.

⁷⁵² Sarah Chayes, *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 185.

⁷⁵³ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁵⁴ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 17.

⁷⁵⁵ World Bank, “Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US\$).”

⁷⁵⁶ International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), *Sending Money Home to Asia: Trends and Opportunities in the World’s Largest Remittance Marketplace* (IFAD, 2013), 10, <https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/69427b1d-7511-4dad-8fc4-4641b9c678d4>.

programs are stated in terms that most certainly cannot be achieved in two to three years, which appears to be the average duration of projects.⁷⁵⁷ As the longest war in U.S. history, the intervention in Afghanistan has cost about US\$1 trillion,⁷⁵⁸ and the country still remains unstable. Two aspects of U.S. spending in Afghanistan are important to underscore here, and offer some explanations for this failure. First, for many years, reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan has been a fraction of military spending. For instance, between 2001 and 2008, the U.S. military was spending nearly US\$100 million a day in the country, but the average volume of international aid provided by all donors during this period was just US\$7 million per day.⁷⁵⁹ Second, an estimated two-thirds of aid bypassed the Afghan government.⁷⁶⁰ As observed in various fragile states settings, donors do not trust the national institutions, and often channel funds directly to implementing partners or contractors, while 50 percent of operating costs are lost in corporate profit and consultants' salaries.⁷⁶¹ As a result, donors did not always keep the relevant Afghan ministries informed about financial flows, and this situation that has been worsened by a lack of coordination and communication among numerous international actors on the ground.⁷⁶²

⁷⁵⁷ United Nations Development Programme, *Assessment of Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP Contribution - Islamic Republic of Afghanistan* (UNDP, 2009), 92, <http://www.oecd.org/countries/afghanistan/46817736.pdf>.

⁷⁵⁸ Gopal Ratnam, "Poor Planning, Coordination Cited in Afghan Intervention," *United States Institute of Peace*, December 16, 2015, <http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/12/16/poor-planning-coordination-cited-in-afghan-intervention>.

⁷⁵⁹ Matt Waldman, *Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan*, ACBAR Advocacy Series (OXFAM, 2008), 1, https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/ACBAR_aid_effectiveness_paper_0803.pdf.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ Jerome Klassen, and Greg Albo, *Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan* (University of Toronto Press, 2013).

⁷⁶² OECD, *Aid Effectiveness: 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, Country Chapters* (OECD, 2007), <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/39119059.pdf>.

As explained by various scholars such as Francis Fukuyama, providing aid “off-budget” can undermine efforts to build effective state institutions.⁷⁶³ It can also trigger fraud: the office of the U.S. Special Inspector General Monitoring Aid to Afghanistan (SIGAR) has documented several cases of fraud and abuse in both military and non-military programming in Afghanistan, adding up to billions of dollars.⁷⁶⁴ For the World Bank, the fact that large financial inflows have been channeled outside the national budget, with a relatively low level of accountability for their usage, has made international aid a major source of rents, patronage, and political power.⁷⁶⁵ As a result, some observers claim international aid has created a “donor bureaucracy” that competes with the Afghan state, misdirects funds towards private purposes and engenders new forms of national dependency.⁷⁶⁶ Afghanistan’s dependency on international funding for development led to widespread corruption that challenged industrial growth: for instance, opium continues to be the country’s biggest earner, bringing in close to US\$3 billion per year.⁷⁶⁷ And as a country rich in mineral resources, Afghanistan could make mining

⁷⁶³ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).

⁷⁶⁴ Congress created the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. More information can be found on SIGAR’s website:

<https://www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1>

⁷⁶⁵ World Bank, *Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014 - Executive Summary* (World Bank, 2011); Cited in Yama Torabi, *The Growing Challenge of Corruption in Afghanistan - Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People*, Occasional Paper n°15 (The Asia Foundation, 2012), 5,

<https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/FNLcorruptionchapterOccasionalPaperJuly30.pdf>.

⁷⁶⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008), 171.

⁷⁶⁷ Rahim Faiez and Lynne O’Donnell, “Afghan Economic Crisis Looms as Foreign Aid Dollars Depart,” *The Washington Times*, January 26, 2015,

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/26/afghan-economic-crisis-looms-as-foreign-aid-dollar/?page=all>.

the economic bedrock of future development, but criminal gangs are looting mines and selling minerals to neighboring countries at a fraction of global prices, undermining potential for the government to exploit the estimated US\$3 trillion in mineral and petrochemical resources.⁷⁶⁸

In 2010, SIGAR underlined that, while “the majority of prior U.S. assistance bypassed the Afghan government by providing funds directly to contractors and non-governmental organizations, the new U.S. funding approach calls for significantly more U.S. assistance to be channeled through the Afghan government.”⁷⁶⁹ Since the elaboration of the Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) in 2006, the international community recognized the drawbacks associated with excessive centralization, and the international community has engaged in efforts to reinforce the subnational structures.⁷⁷⁰ Channeling aid through these local institutions could have been a solution, but they need a functioning central authority and good governance to succeed. Chene underscores that without national level accountability mechanisms, which can act against corruption and enforce integrity, decentralization in itself can hardly be a successful answer to a weak central authority.⁷⁷¹ Indeed, she stresses that it may lead to public office abuse and rent-seeking activities by local warlords and powerful influential

⁷⁶⁸ William A. Byrd and Javed Noorani, *Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Afghanistan Without Government Revenues or Development Benefits*, Peace Brief 182 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2014), 1, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB182-Exploitation-of-Mineral-Resources-in-Afghanistan-Without-Government-Revenues-or-Development-Benefits.pdf>.

⁷⁶⁹ SIGAR, *U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive US Anti-Corruption Strategy* (SIGAR, 2010), ii, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2010-08-05audit-10-15.pdf>.

⁷⁷⁰ Chene, *Corruption and Decentralisation in Afghanistan*, 6.

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

individuals in order to feed the illegal armed groups that control the illicit opium economy at the local level.

While most donors have been providing more "on-budget" aid these past few years, the political and security transition continues to take a heavy toll on Afghanistan's governance and economy.⁷⁷² The 2011 Bonn conference, the withdrawal of most military forces, and the outreach to the Taliban signaled the end of international involvement—which in turn raised concerns about the future situation in Afghanistan, particularly for women, who could be in danger of losing the little progress they have made, and with a real risk that education gains of the last decade may not be maintained.⁷⁷³

C. The State of Education and the Reconstruction Efforts

In 2001, the international community found an Afghan education system in ruins. It soon became a great priority of the reconstruction efforts,⁷⁷⁴ and while the country did not have the capacity to respond to all six EFA goals by the target deadline of 2015, it sought to achieve the education for all goals by 2020.⁷⁷⁵ This section will explore the current state of the Afghan education system. It will first

⁷⁷² World Bank, *Afghanistan Economic Update* (World Bank, 2015), 5, <http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21894/Afghanistan0economic0update.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

⁷⁷³ Save The Children, *Schools as Zones of Peace: The Challenges of Making Afghan Schools Safe for Education* (Save the Children, 2013), i, <http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/library/schools-zones-peace-challenges-making-afghan-schools-safe-education>.

⁷⁷⁴ Spink, "Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction," 200.

⁷⁷⁵ UNESCO, *Asia and the Pacific Education for All 2015 Regional Review: Final Synthesis Report* (Bangkok: UNESCO, 2015), 13, http://www.edupost2015.cat/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Synthesis-Report-of-EFA-reviews_APA.pdf.

present the strategy for the reconstruction of an education system, and then review the challenges that the Afghan government faces in this endeavor.

1. Strategy for the Reconstruction of the National Education System

a) 2001: an Education System in Ruins

Throughout the twentieth century, destruction of infrastructure and displacement of the population meant only a minority of children received an education, which was largely the preserve of urban male elite.⁷⁷⁶ Del Castillo says that, throughout Afghan history, different rulers, and leaders made efforts at rapid modernization of the economy and society that failed, and these lessons were completely ignored after 9/11.⁷⁷⁷ Often, initiatives designed to modernize the country were perceived as attempts by the center government to gain control over the periphery, and efforts to reform education in particular were seen as bids to impose urban secularization on rural society.⁷⁷⁸ With the rise of communism in the late 1970s, long-held fears of secularization were realized as the Afghan communists, and later the Soviet-backed Afghan government, undertook educational reforms that included cutting the majority of the religious curriculum.⁷⁷⁹ As a result, the Afghan mujahideen made targeting schools and teachers a key feature of their rebellion against the Soviets, people started to

⁷⁷⁶ Susan Wardak and Michael Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*, Paper for INEE Global Consultation, Istanbul, Turkey (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2009), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/7A16B01A302421D64925758E00036099-Full_Report.pdf.

⁷⁷⁷ Del Castillo, *Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan*, 19.

⁷⁷⁸ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 10.

⁷⁷⁹ Karlsson and Mansory, *Educational Reforms in the Context of Globalisation and in Afghanistan*, 43; Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 12.

withdraw first their girls and later their boys from public schools,⁷⁸⁰ and refugees cited changes to the educational system as one of their reasons for fleeing the country.⁷⁸¹ While most Afghans deeply desire greater educational attainment,⁷⁸² they want it on their own terms and not at the expense of local traditions and respect for religion.⁷⁸³ Nevertheless, the post-2001 period started with an initial rush to re-establish schools and high demand for secular education even in the villages.⁷⁸⁴

In 2001, Afghanistan emerged from years of war and instability that destroyed the scarce education infrastructure that existed prior to 1979. The mujahideen rule at the end of the Soviet occupation resulted in factional fighting that destroyed the remaining education system, and the Taliban regime's ban on female participation in the education system compounded the problems of the crippled system by significantly reducing the international support available to Afghans.⁷⁸⁵ By 2001, only about 900,000 students were in school—far fewer than in earlier years.⁷⁸⁶ The whole education system was wrecked⁷⁸⁷ (see Figure 5 for a description of the condition of the MoE's headquarters in Kabul). As USAID observed, “The teacher training system had totally collapsed, the management and policy development

⁷⁸⁰ Karlsson and Mansory, *Educational Reforms in the Context of Globalisation and in Afghanistan*, 43.

⁷⁸¹ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 12.

⁷⁸² Barnett R. Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 8.

⁷⁸³ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 12.

⁷⁸⁴ Antonio Giustozzi, *Nation-Building Is Not for All: The Politics of Education in Afghanistan*, AAN Thematic Report (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010), 2, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/nation-building-is-not-for-all-the-politics-of-education/>.

⁷⁸⁵ American Institutes for Research and Hassan Mohammed, *Education and the Role of NGOs in Emergencies: Afghanistan 1978-2002* (USAID, 2006), 2, <http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC22953.pdf>.

⁷⁸⁶ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 8.

⁷⁸⁷ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 200.

systems had broken down, and regular funding had stopped, leaving schools without textbooks and learning materials, teachers unpaid and schools unsupervised.”⁷⁸⁸ Teachers were mostly unqualified: fewer than half were high school graduates, most used rote-teaching methods, and did not master the subject they were teaching.⁷⁸⁹

All the institutions I visited in Kabul (e.g. the MoE, the MoHE, Kabul University, Kabul Pedagogic Institute) had no equipment and almost no furniture, other than some old tables and chairs and very few old filing cabinets. They also had almost no stationery. ... The offices [of the MoE's Personnel Department] had no windows and had broken doors. In some cases they had plastic sheets on windows to protect the employees from the wind and cold in winter. (Kabul is 2,000 metres high and surrounded by mountains that still had snow in the spring month of May.) They lacked electricity, running water and proper toilets (which makes it extremely difficult for women employees). In some cases, offices were dangerous with wooden floors and ceilings, which were about to cave in. ... Very few employees have ever used a computer ... Most departments and institutions had no relevant information and statistics, even regarding their own departments.

Figure 5: Excerpt from IIEP report on UNESCO mission to Kabul, May 2002.⁷⁹⁰

Despite major progress since then, the task appears daunting. In the last Asia Foundation *Survey of the Afghan People*, over half (59.1 percent) of respondents say they have never attended school: the rate is higher among rural Afghans (65.1 percent) than urban Afghans (40.5 percent), and unsurprisingly higher among women (74.2 percent) than men (42.1 percent).⁷⁹¹ Among all regions, Central/Hazarajat has the highest rate of respondents with no formal education

⁷⁸⁸ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 8.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁰ Cited in Morton Sigsgaard, *On the Road to Resilience: Capacity Development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan* (Paris: IIEP-UNESCO, 2011), 60, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191583e.pdf>.

⁷⁹¹ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 9.

(74.9 percent), while Central/Kabul has the fewest respondents with no formal education (42.2 percent).⁷⁹²

b) Organization and Structure of the new Education System

In 2001, the structure of the government education system that had been in place before the wars remained in place. It consisted of two ministries of education, the MoE and the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), which were responsible for education policies, programs, and services.⁷⁹³ By the end of 2004, the MoE had consolidated 22 departments into five divisions: Coordination and Control; Planning, International Relations, and Construction; Pedagogic Services (teacher training, curriculum, textbooks, publications, printing and distance education); Management Structures (personnel and administration); and specialized directorates such as primary education, secondary education, professional and vocational education, literacy, health, Islamic education, and sciences education.⁷⁹⁴

Following subsequent reforms, four ministries are now responsible for the management of the education system in Afghanistan: the Ministry of the Hajj and Religious Affairs is responsible for pre-school education in mosques; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for pre-school education in nurseries and kindergartens; the MoE is responsible for general education, years 1 to 12; and the MoHE is responsible for post-secondary education services.⁷⁹⁵ So far, there has

⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 8.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 224.

been limited coordination between these ministries on the content of the curriculum and teaching programs they use.⁷⁹⁶

The national education system is composed of two main parallel structures. On the one hand, the General Education system covers 12 years of schooling divided into 3 cycles: primary education (grade 1 through 6); lower secondary education (grade 7 through 9), and upper secondary education (grade 10 through 12).⁷⁹⁷ On the other hand, the Islamic Education system covers 14 years of schooling divided into 2 cycles⁷⁹⁸: Madrasas and Dar-ul-Huffaz⁷⁹⁹ (covering grade 1 through 12), and Dar-ul-Ulums⁸⁰⁰ (covering grade 13 through 14). Additionally, Technical and Vocational Education is available for grades 10 to 14: it focuses on administration, construction, information and communication technologies (ICTs), agriculture, and industry.⁸⁰¹ Literacy and Non-Formal Education offers a one-year literacy program for over-aged learners and adults. Finally, Teacher Education is provided either in Colleges (grades 13 and 14), or through a 5-year Teacher Education program (grade 10 to 14).⁸⁰²

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - Ministry of Education, *The Development of Education – National Report: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan* (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2008), 5, http://www.ibe.unesco.org/National_Reports/ICE_2008/afghanistan_NR08.pdf.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁹ UNESCO, *World Data on Education - 7th Edition 2010/11– Afghanistan*, 5: These schools primarily focus on Quranic studies, memorization of the Quran, and recitation.

⁸⁰⁰ Islamic Education students can continue their studies after grade 12 in Centers of Excellence where they are provided further Islamic Education, but in almost the same format and the same services as in Madrasas

⁸⁰¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - Ministry of Education, *The Development of Education – National Report: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, 6.

⁸⁰² Ibid.

Islamic education has retained a unique influence and control over the educational, political and social environment in Afghanistan.⁸⁰³ Overall, 42 percent of Afghans report having received some Islamic madrasa education.⁸⁰⁴ Imams deliver religious education to the local population through madrasas, and provide religious services to the communities (religious advice and religious rites related to births, weddings, and funerals).⁸⁰⁵ Often described as “terrorist factories”, madrasas have become the subject of great controversy since 9/11. They are often blamed for the recruitment of Afghan youth into militant groups.⁸⁰⁶ Public and private madrasas coexist alongside one another. The public madrasas teach the official government curriculum and can be seen as carriers of the “official” Afghan religious doctrine, traditions, and heritage.⁸⁰⁷ Borchgrevink distinguishes four categories of private madrasas based on their orientation: a) the traditionalist madrasas, primarily apolitical and catering to the religious educational needs of the local communities, which also fund them; b) the fundamentalist madrasas, politicized during the jihad against the Soviets, and maintaining strong bonds with the madrasas in Pakistan; c) the Islamist madrasas, linked ideologically to the Pakistani Deobandi tradition, also emerged during the jihad, often funded by Saudi or other foreign benefactors, and playing a significant role in the mobilization and formation of the Taliban in the 1990s; and d) the neo-fundamentalist madrasas, influenced by Salafist or global jihadist ideas.⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁴ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People*, 9.

⁸⁰⁵ Kaja Borchgrevink, “Transnational Links of Afghan Madrasas: Implications for the Reform of Religious Education,” *Prospects* 43 (2013): 74.

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid., 69.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid., 73.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid., 73–74.

When the Afghan government initiated a comprehensive reform of the Islamic education sector, a number of schools supported by Islamic charities were closed following allegations that they were funding terrorism.⁸⁰⁹ Indeed, the government has limited insight into, and influence over, the way most madrasas are run, as there is no formalized collaboration or dialogue between the government and the private madrasas.⁸¹⁰ The fear of madrasas' perceived link with terrorism was echoed in the MoE's first, second, and third five-year strategic plans, developed with the support of UNESCO and its International Institute of Education Planning. For instance, in the first National Education Strategic Plan (NESP I) for 2006 to 2010, the MoE underscores that "thousands of children are being indoctrinated in hatred and intolerance in madrasas."⁸¹¹

Another important system coexists alongside the national education system: the mosque schools. As Burde underscores, while every village has a mosque, not all villages have a government school.⁸¹² She adds that nearly every mosque has a mullah who not only calls for prayers and manages the affairs of the village, but also runs a small religious school. As a result, practically all children, boys and girls, attend a mosque school when they are in pre-school age to acquire the basics

⁸⁰⁹ Kaja Borchgrevink, *Religious Actors and Civil Society in Post-2001 Afghanistan*, PRIO Paper (Oslo: PRIO, 2007), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252761728_Religious_Actors_and_Civil_Society_in_Post_2001_Afghanistan.

⁸¹⁰ Borchgrevink, "Transnational Links of Afghan Madrasas: Implications for the Reform of Religious Education," 74.

⁸¹¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1385-1389 (2006-2010)* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2007), 11, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_NESP_National_Education_Strategic_Plan.pdf.

⁸¹² Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, 9.

of Islamic education.⁸¹³ Indeed, in some villages, the mosque school is mainly intended for pre-school children, while in others it serves older children and complements the primary school.⁸¹⁴ There have been some attempts to incorporate mosque schools into the national education system, but they still remain outside of existing monitoring and management systems.⁸¹⁵ Consequently, there is no official or harmonized curriculum taught in these schools. Karlsson and Mansour explain that besides teaching the Koran, they prepare young children for the next educational stage (if there is any), teaching them to listen to the teacher, to take turns, to raise their hands when asking etc., and familiarize them with letters and sometimes some basic reading.⁸¹⁶

c) Strategy for the Education Sector: a Tension between Access and Quality

Afghanistan illustrates how a country preparing to emerge from decades of war can decide, together with its donors,⁸¹⁷ that education is a priority.⁸¹⁸ The first Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), essentially a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the country, named education as one of the

⁸¹³ Pia Karlsson and Amir Mansory, *Islamic and Modern Education in Afghanistan - Conflictual or Complementary?* (Institute of International Education: Stockholm University; World Bank, 2008), 8, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/files/edstats/AFGstu08.pdf>.

⁸¹⁴ Karlsson and Mansory, *Afghan Dilemma: Education, Gender and Globalization*, 159.

⁸¹⁵ Dana Burde, Joel A. Middleton, and Rachel Wahl, "Islamic Studies as Early Childhood Education in Countries Affected by Conflict: The Role of Mosque Schools in Remote Afghan Villages," *International Journal of Educational Development* 41 (2015): 72.

⁸¹⁶ Karlsson and Mansory, *Islamic and Modern Education in Afghanistan - Conflictual or Complementary?*, 8.

⁸¹⁷ Chapter VI will explore the role of the international assistance to the Afghan education sector, as well as the relationship between the Afghan MOE and the international community, and the efforts to revise the curriculum.

⁸¹⁸ Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 3.

top three priorities relating to the country's economic and social development (see Figure 6). Since the beginning of the international intervention in 2001, there was an obvious quantitative push for increased access to schooling.⁸¹⁹ It started no later than March 2002, when the Afghan transition government, with the help of the UN and INGOs, launched the first "Back-to-School" (BTS) campaign and, while data are not necessarily reliable, an estimated 1.8 million children came to school, doubling the number from the previous school year.⁸²⁰ While previously denied schooling, girls returned to formal education as part of the BTS campaign.⁸²¹ While the increase in attendance was a great start, it was still less than half the number of children in Afghanistan who should have been going to school, when the national education system could only handle close to two million children.⁸²² The goal was therefore to focus on schools construction, as well as on primary education as a stepping-stone to secondary education.⁸²³ Consequently, the government chose to repeat the BTS campaign in 2003 and 2004, while international security forces contributed to the building and reconstruction of government schools. Military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) served as a vehicle for aid delivery and reconstruction assistance within a security and stabilization strategy, creating a potentially dangerous association between humanitarian and political/military

⁸¹⁹ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

⁸²⁰ IRIN, "Back-to-School Just the Beginning," *IRIN*, March 29, 2002, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2002/03/29/back-school-just-beginning>.

⁸²¹ Khalil Mahshi, "Afghanistan: "So Much to Do with Almost Nothing"," *International Institute for Educational Planning Newsletter XX*, no. 3 (September 2002): 6, http://www.iiep.unesco.org/sites/default/files/nl_2002-3_en.pdf.

⁸²² IRIN, "Back-to-School Just the Beginning."

⁸²³ *Ibid.*

actors.⁸²⁴ This “militarization” of aid delivery added to the climate of insecurity, making these schools potential targets of the AOGs.⁸²⁵

Since that time, significant progress has enabled a push for access to secondary education followed. According to the MoE, from 2001 to 2013, primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary school enrolment rose from 0.9 million to 8.35 million, including 39 percent of girls, out of a school-aged population of 10.33 million.⁸²⁶ This increase has been particularly dramatic for girls’ education, since it started from virtually zero.⁸²⁷ The same sources indicate that the annual number of secondary graduates that has risen from about 10,000 in 2001 to more than 266,000 in 2013, and the MoE estimates it will reach 320,000 in 2015.⁸²⁸ Higher education institutions have also welcomed more students, as an enrollment that has risen from less than 8,000 in 2001 to more than 132,000 in 2013.⁸²⁹ The number of teachers has also significantly increased to reach around 187,000 in 2013 of which 32 percent are females.⁸³⁰

⁸²⁴ Adele Harmer, Victoria DiDomenico, and Abby Stoddard, *Aiding Education in Conflict - The Role of International Education Providers Operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Background Paper Prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 (UNESCO, 2010), 7, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/files/edstats/AFGgmrpap10.pdf>.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁸²⁶ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *Afghanistan: Education for All 2015 National Review* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2015), 2, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002327/232702e.pdf>.

⁸²⁷ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

⁸²⁸ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *Afghanistan: Education for All 2015 National Review*, 2.

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁰ *Ibid.*




Figure 6: Prioritization of Ranking of Sectors in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008-2013 (%).⁸³¹

However, the increase in access was initially done at the expense of quality. Spink reports the following problems with the initial push to increase education:

“The return to school in 2002 and 2003 was a double-edged sword. On the one hand millions of students were, in many cases, for the first time going to school and taking advantage of the BTS drive in Afghanistan. On the other hand, millions of children, who had never been to school, were learning for the first time the principles of intolerance, hatred and division. The whole education initiative in 2002 focused only on access of children to education, with very little consideration for the quality, or content, of tuition received in the classrooms.”⁸³²

⁸³¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008-2013* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008), http://moj.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan_National_Development_Strategy%20ANDS.pdf.

⁸³² Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 203–204.

The textbooks developed in the 1980s by the mujahideen with support from the University of Nebraska–Omaha (UNO) were still used in 2001. While a team of Afghans working for USAID revised them to remove any direct reference to violence, the textbooks still taught mistrust of Shi’a Muslims (through prejudicial references to the descendants of Ali), and they did not include any representation for non-Sunni and non-Pashtun children of their own histories or culture.⁸³³ Additionally, because the U.S. Government stated that they would only support the printing of the non-religious textbooks – despite the fact that all textbooks were full of religious references – religious books that instructed ‘true believers’ to kill all non-Muslims, were not revised as a part of the USAID revisions.⁸³⁴ As Kirk claims, this politically and historically charged example demonstrates the complex geopolitics of state fragility, stability and instability, and how ineffective and/or inappropriate education systems can be both a result of and a contributing factor to instability.⁸³⁵ While newly revised textbooks have been reprinted during the past decade,⁸³⁶ old textbooks are still used and trigger a risk that socialization towards intolerance of difference will exacerbate social tensions over time in Afghanistan given that these messages were not removed.⁸³⁷

Goals of expanding access competed with quality and equity goals for financial resources. The National Development Budget for 2004-05 directed 67 percent of

⁸³³ Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” 190.

⁸³⁴ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction.”

⁸³⁵ Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” 190.

⁸³⁶ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

⁸³⁷ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Multiple Faces of Education in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts*, 11.

the total proposed education funds to buildings and equipment and only 10.5 percent to curriculum and teacher development, with most funds dedicated to teacher training facilities and very little money reserved for teacher training or training materials.⁸³⁸ With a poor quality of schooling, the minister and some of his UN advisors began to question the near-exclusive focus on school construction when other components of education services remained weak: the main problem was a shortage of about 40,000 teachers and an even greater shortage of competent teachers, while not enough attention was being given to the inequitable distribution of education resources.⁸³⁹ Indeed, the enrollment rate was high for both boys and girls in a few of the largest cities (92 percent of school-age boys and 81 percent of school-age girls were enrolled in schools in Kabul), yet, net enrollment rates were less than 20 percent in three provinces, and the net enrollment rate for girls was as low as 1 percent in a few.⁸⁴⁰ As a result, NESP I was more focused on “access to quality education for girls and boys.”⁸⁴¹ Since then, investments have been made to improve quality and relevance of education.⁸⁴² In NESP II, the Ministry aspired to evolve in “a modern, effective, fully funded and accountable institution that facilitates education opportunities for children and adults, without discrimination, across Afghanistan.”⁸⁴³

⁸³⁸ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 12.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁸⁴¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - Ministry of Education, *The Development of Education – National Report: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, 3.

⁸⁴² Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *Afghanistan: Education for All 2015 National Review*, 2.

⁸⁴³ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1389-1393 (2010-2014)* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2010), 1, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_NESP_II_2010-2014_draft.pdf.

Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go to reach certain quality standards. The Afghan government recognizes the sustained low level of education quality, confirmed recently by a study that compared learning assessments between Afghanistan and three peer countries in the region.⁸⁴⁴ While the international community and the government claim education is a priority in Afghanistan, the education sector only receives a small amount of the available funds, and it is among the countries that dedicate the smallest proportion of domestic spending to education.⁸⁴⁵ In the past decade, the education sector has received 9 percent of total aid, and that number has decreased with respect to just the past seven years, during which time education has received the least amount of aid of any government sector.⁸⁴⁶

2. Challenges for the Reconstruction efforts of the Education System

Afghanistan has certainly come a long way in the reconstruction of its education system. However, schools not only reflect and reproduce patterns of inequality through unequal access and unequal outcomes; they also reflect outside realities where violence, corruption, and inefficient bureaucracy are considered “normal” modes of operation, and the result is frequently a lack of trust in the education

⁸⁴⁴ Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 5.

⁸⁴⁵ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 – Teaching and Learning: Achieving Quality for All* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2014), 122, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/225660e.pdf>.

⁸⁴⁶ SIGAR, *U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive US Anti-Corruption Strategy*, i: The infrastructure/natural resources and agriculture sectors received the most aid, with 24% and 18% respectively. Governance, operating budget assistance, economic governance, social protection, education, and health complete the remaining sectors in descending order of aid provided.

system and the State.⁸⁴⁷ Approximately 3.3 million children, more than half of them girls, are still out-of-school, and the share of the population 25 years or older that has completed any level of formal education is less than 7 percent for men and 3 percent for women.⁸⁴⁸ The Afghan education system is still affected by major inequities that include gender, geographic location, and language. In addition to major differences in enrollment between rural and urban areas, the country has the world's highest level of gender disparity in primary education (only 71 girls in primary school for every 100 boys) and only 21 percent of girls complete primary education due to a number of cultural barriers.⁸⁴⁹

A deeper examination of reconstruction efforts reveals serious impediments that still stand in the way of access to quality education for all Afghan children. NESP III underlines the following key barriers to access to education: insecurity, poverty, child labor, lack of schools in remote areas, long walking distance to schools, and harassment of children on the way to schools, and the overall low quality of education.⁸⁵⁰ It adds some specific barriers toward girls' education that include a shortage of female teachers, especially in higher grades, cultural beliefs about girls' education, lack of necessary facilities in schools such as toilets, drinking water, and surrounding walls, and early marriages.⁸⁵¹ While these key

⁸⁴⁷ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

⁸⁴⁸ Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 3.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 2015-2020* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2014), 10–11, [http://moe.gov.af/Content/files/NESP%20III%20Draft-June%2022%2c%202014%20\(English\)\(1\).pdf](http://moe.gov.af/Content/files/NESP%20III%20Draft-June%2022%2c%202014%20(English)(1).pdf).

⁸⁵¹ Ibid.

challenges affect the supply of education services, some also affect the demand for education services. The main challenges are presented hereafter.

a) Insecurity

Without a doubt, insecurity remains the greatest challenge for education in Afghanistan. Fifteen years after the fall of the Taliban regime, education is still threatened. Schools in the south and east of Afghanistan are directly targeted by AOGs, and in remote areas, parents are reluctant to send children, particularly girls, to school, for safety reasons.⁸⁵² Insecurity not only represents an obstacle for the MoE staff who cannot access some parts of the county, but it also hinders the sustained support of international agencies.

Schools, staff, and students are victims of attacks or threats from AOGs. A recent report by the GCPEA documents the vast scale of attacks on education globally, and reveals Afghanistan is among the six most affected countries in the world.⁸⁵³ Joanna Wedge recalls that the destruction of 200 newly built schools in 2004 resulted in 100,000 Afghan children withdrawing from the education system.⁸⁵⁴ More recently, almost 10 percent of schools, normally accommodating 275,000 students, were closed due to insecurity in 2012; the number is probably higher today.⁸⁵⁵ The use of schools as election polling stations⁸⁵⁶ and the offering of education to girls have also inadvertently created physical insecurity, resulting

⁸⁵² Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*.

⁸⁵³ GCPEA (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack), *Education Under Attack 2014*.

⁸⁵⁴ Wedge, *Where Peace Begins: Education's Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, 16.

⁸⁵⁵ Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*.

⁸⁵⁶ Sigsgaard, *On the Road to Resilience: Capacity Development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan*, 54 Schools were still used as voting stations in the last presidential election in 2014 (author's own observation during field visit in Kabul in June 2014).

in targeted attacks by belligerent groups.⁸⁵⁷ Female students have been targeted by acid attacks, and teachers are sometimes taken by force when AOGs want to indoctrinate them politically, causing schools to close or preventing children from attending if they remain open.⁸⁵⁸

While some attacks appear to be the result of tribal or private disputes surrounding the local disbursement of resources, others are targeted because they provide modern (that is, not solely religious) education, especially for girls and women.⁸⁵⁹ In 2006, the spokesperson of the Taliban Leadership Council explicitly threatened to attack schools because of their curriculum:

“In general, the present academic curriculum is influenced by the puppet administration and foreign invaders. The government has given teachers in primary and middle schools the task to openly deliver political lectures against the resistance put up by those who seek independence. The use of the curriculum as a mouthpiece of the state will provoke the people against it. If schools are turned into centers of violence, the government is to blame for it.”⁸⁶⁰

Human Rights Watch also reported anonymous threatening “night letters” delivered clandestinely to school officials in Kandahar, Kapisa, Wardak, and Zabul

⁸⁵⁷ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

⁸⁵⁸ Wedge, *Where Peace Begins: Education's Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*.

⁸⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan* (Human Rights Watch, 2006), 34,

<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf>.

⁸⁶⁰ “Taliban statement warns Afghan government to stop politicization of education,” Afghan Islamic Press Agency, March 25, 2006. Cited in *ibid*.

provinces.⁸⁶¹ In 2008, a report published a printed a copy of a night letter delivered to the principal of a girls' school in Helmand Province (see Figure 7).

“We are requesting the principle of the girl’s school to immediately close the school. In this school, they are teaching infidel books to girls, and we don’t want these girls to become infidels. I, Mullah, for the last time, convey this message to you.

Dear Principal: I don’t want you or the students to die at this young age. Also, tell all teachers not to come to school. If you want to live, dear students and teachers, this is the last warning to you, to not come to this school. And if you are tired of your life, then come, and your blood will be on your hands. I am giving this last warning. Give this letter to the principle of the girls’ school. This is the last time; I am telling you once again that your blood will be on your own hands.

Dear teachers: if you want to live, sit at home. I say this to everyone.”

Figure 7: Copy of a night letter delivered to the principal of a girls’ school in Helmand Province.⁸⁶²

That same year, in an interview with Radio Freedom, Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi told reporters, “We have burnt some schools where anti-Islamic lessons were being taught”, and he further condemned schools where children were taught “wrongly” because of the “many changes” made to the textbooks: “For instance, the letter A used to be for Allah but in these textbooks, A is now used for ‘Anar’ [pomegranate]; J used to be for Jihad, but these books have J for ‘Jowar’ [maize]... We do not permit such changes.”⁸⁶³

CARE identified a number of factors that increase the risk of attacks on schools: attendance by girls, operation by the government, funding from international

⁸⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, *Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan*.

⁸⁶² Senlis Council, *Chronic Failures in the War on Terror: From Afghanistan to Somalia* (Brussels: The Senlis Council, 2008), 71, http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/chronic_failures_war_terror.pdf.

⁸⁶³ Glad, *Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan; Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation*, 7.

military forces, locations along highways (these schools often offer physical protection during firefights that often occur along those roads); and a lack of consultation with communities before the establishment of a school.⁸⁶⁴

The level of priority assigned to getting and keeping schools open in Afghanistan is a politically sensitive issue in the context of high levels of insecurity. Scholars insist that the right to education should not be prioritized above the right to security of the person of the children.⁸⁶⁵ For instance, Grover regrets that a UNESCO publication reports that:

“It is possible to negotiate with rebels, even rebels who seem ideologically opposed to education, to end attacks and reopen schools closed by threats; and second, that giving local communities a sense of ownership of the education process, and of the defense of schools in particular, may reduce the risk of attack.”⁸⁶⁶

In Afghanistan, several actors have chosen to negotiate with the Taliban to ensure safe educational provision.⁸⁶⁷ However, some extremist groups strictly forbid teachers from working under the current ‘puppet’ regime, and recognize only mosques and madrasas teaching radical Islamic education based on textbooks from the *jihād* period and the Taliban regime.⁸⁶⁸ While compromise is not always feasible, negotiations with the Taliban sometimes succeed thanks to the

⁸⁶⁴ Ibid., 52–53.

⁸⁶⁵ Grover, *Schoolchildren as Propaganda Tools in the War on Terror: Violating the Rights of Afghani Children Under International Law*. 134

⁸⁶⁶ O’Malley, *Education under Attack*, 2010, 15; Cited in Grover, *Schoolchildren as Propaganda Tools in the War on Terror: Violating the Rights of Afghani Children Under International Law*, 66.

⁸⁶⁷ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), *Education and Fragility: Common Research Questions for Situational Analyses*.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid.

accommodation of some of their religious reservations, for example, by naming schools as madrasas and teachers as mullahs.⁸⁶⁹ Antonio Giustozzi reports that, from 2007 onwards, the response of Kabul to the challenge has been increasingly inclined towards accommodation, even allowing a degree of de facto control by the Taliban over schools.⁸⁷⁰

Nevertheless, AOGs, including the Taliban, are still responsible for documented attacks against schools, including through use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs); the burning of school buildings; and property, forced closures of schools, and the killing, injuring, intimidation and abduction of educational personnel.⁸⁷¹

b) Lack of Capacity of the Ministry of Education

Expanding the size of the education system and student enrollment signifies an increased need for educated and qualified educational planners and managers at the MoE and at the provincial education offices. Unfortunately, war resulted in a brain drain from Afghanistan.⁸⁷² Most of those staying behind in the management of the education system had been out of contact with modern techniques for too long to be fully productive, and newly recruited younger employees lacked skills and experience.⁸⁷³ Indeed, in 2001, the ministry barely functioned and could not

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁰ Giustozzi, *Nation-Building Is Not for All: The Politics of Education in Afghanistan*, 2.

⁸⁷¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan*, S/2015/336 (United Nations, 2015), para. 44, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/336&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC.

⁸⁷² Karlsson and Mansory, *Educational Reforms in the Context of Globalisation and in Afghanistan*, 54.

⁸⁷³ Mahshi, "Afghanistan: "So Much to Do with Almost Nothing"."

manage the education system, lacking technical expertise and financial resources to implement needed programs.⁸⁷⁴ The near collapse of the MoE structure and systems outside of headquarters added to this challenge.⁸⁷⁵ Provincial education structures were largely staffed largely by “men who had been selected by cronies and hung on to their jobs for decades yet had been cut off from headquarters.”⁸⁷⁶ The tenacity of patronage practices was another factor that contributed to the lack of qualified personnel at the MoE. Combined with the insecurity challenge, it reduced government control of education policy and practice in certain provinces.

The lack of capacity at the MoE resulted in several instances of short-lived reforms that collapsed, slowed down or lost direction.⁸⁷⁷ It also affected the use of the ministry’s development budget.⁸⁷⁸ In 2012, the MoE only spent 32.3 percent of its development budget, and later identified a rather complex range of causes for this low level of spending: 1) delays in receiving funds from donors; 2) time-consuming procurement processes; 3) issuing of budgets for multi-year projects in the first year; 4) delays in transferring budget from the Ministry of Finance to the MoE; 5) lack of available funding in province banks; 6) low capacity of MoE

⁸⁷⁴ USAID, *Delivering Education Services in Fragile States: Lessons from Four Case Studies*, 9.

⁸⁷⁵ “Each province has an education office responsible for implementing national policies and administering finances allocated by the central government. These Provincial Education Departments (PEDs) are responsible for staffing schools and paying, monitoring, and supervising teachers; they are accountable to both the provincial governors and the central ministry of education. Each PED managed District Education Departments (DEDs).” in *ibid.*, 13.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁷ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*, 7.

⁸⁷⁸ “The Afghan Annual Budget is divided into an ‘operating’ part and a ‘development’ part, the latter solely funded by external donors, although these donors also contribute to the operating budget. (...) The operating budget primarily covers salaries and running costs, and is typically fully utilized by the MOE. The development budget covers investments in the education sector (including school buildings, teacher trainings, textbook development, and printing) though it is highly underutilized.” in Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 10.

departments in developing proposals and determining specifications; 7) technical issues in some contracts; 8) corruption; 9) unrealistic planning and budgeting; and 10) insecurity in some areas.⁸⁷⁹

c) Teachers

The lack of qualified personnel affects the teachers as well. While capacity building via training teachers has been a priority of the MoE in recent years, it remains a major challenge for the ministry, particularly in rural areas: “Most of those who are qualified seek to teach in urban schools, as they find better living conditions, more services easily available (including nurseries for their children), and generally better security.”⁸⁸⁰ Traditional rote learning and memorization remain deeply entrenched and discourage students from asking questions or engaging in inquiring interchanges: “Teachers expound; students listen ... individual expression is thereby dampened, initiatives discouraged, self-confidence crippled, and leadership development muted.”⁸⁸¹ Moreover, while corporal punishment is technically forbidden, it is still commonly used.⁸⁸²

In order to improve education in rural areas, Teacher Training Colleges have been established in all provinces, with an increasing number of “rural satellites”

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid., 6.

⁸⁸¹ Nancy Hatch Dupree, “Education beyond the School Room,” in *Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict*, ed. The Middle East Institute, Viewpoints Special Edition (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2009), 191.

⁸⁸² Corporal punishment is prohibited in schools in article 39 of the Education Act 2008: “Every kind of physical and psychological punishment of students is prohibited even for their correction and chastisement. Violators shall be prosecuted in accordance with the legal provision.” Cited in Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, *Corporal Punishment of Children in Afghanistan*, 2015, 3, <http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/assets/pdfs/states-reports/Afghanistan.pdf>.

colleges in place for those who cannot easily access urban centers.⁸⁸³ However, the majority of students who are accepted into these colleges are students with the lowest grades from secondary school, many of whom failed to enter universities.⁸⁸⁴ While teachers' salaries have increased in recent years, they still remain very low and often dissuade the most qualified individuals from applying since they find more attractive positions elsewhere.

The shortage of female teachers is even more salient. Around 28 percent of teachers are female, but they are concentrated in urban areas, and the ones teaching in rural areas have lower levels of qualification.⁸⁸⁵ As a result, families hesitate to send their girls to school once they reach puberty. The lack of girls' education until the most recent period has meant that very few women qualified to become teachers. In 2008, less than 30 percent of those in initial teacher education were female.⁸⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the government intends to increase the number of female teachers to reach 50 percent of the total number of teachers in the country in the near future.⁸⁸⁷

d) Infrastructures

In 2009, after seven years of reconstruction efforts, only 25 percent of schools were categorized as usable, and thus around half of schooling occurred in tents or open spaces.⁸⁸⁸ Reconstruction and rehabilitation takes time, particularly when it

⁸⁸³ Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 6.

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁵ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*.

⁸⁸⁶ UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 – Teaching and Learning: Achieving Quality for All*, 235.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid., 219.

⁸⁸⁸ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*.

is hampered by attacks on education. Insecurity affects the teaching conditions: in locations where insecurity is higher, less than half of children receive an education in proper facilities.⁸⁸⁹ As a result, in 2013 only 50 percent of government schools operated from dedicated school buildings, while the rest were in open areas, tents, mosques, and private houses; around 30 percent of schools lacked safe drinking water, 60 percent lacked sanitation; and about 31 percent were running on multi-shifts.⁸⁹⁰ Because school facilities are often overcrowded, and some aim to provide segregated learning opportunities for girls and boys, schools frequently function on a shift system: some schools in Kabul have up to four shifts a day.⁸⁹¹ These conditions hinder learning conditions and the quality of the education received by children even in more secure areas, especially when learners and teachers must tolerate extremes of heat or cold under tents, trees or open sky.⁸⁹²

In some rural and remote areas, children simply do not have schools they can attend. This situation also affects refugees and internally displaced persons camps.⁸⁹³ Distance to the closest school is sometimes so great that it impedes access to education for children, particularly for girls. As a result, teachers in community-based or home-based schools play a critical role in extending access to education for children who are unable to access the government schools, especially girls.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁰ Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 6.

⁸⁹¹ Jeaniene Spink, *Situational Analysis: Teacher Education and Professional Development in Afghanistan* (Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit, 2004), 7, <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/431E-Teacher%20Education-Analysis-web.pdf>.

⁸⁹² Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*.

⁸⁹³ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁹⁴ Jackie Kirk and Rebecca Winthrop, "Home-Based School Teachers in Afghanistan: Teaching for Tarbia and Student Well-Being," *Teaching and Teacher Education* 24, no. 4 (2008): 876–88;

e) Poverty

Poverty is another factor that challenges school enrollment. Indeed, families who struggle financially usually cannot afford to send their children to school, and prefer soliciting their help with labor and other activities around the house.⁸⁹⁵ Child labor is a key reason for children being out of school: it includes work in agriculture, but also the worst forms of child labor, such as the forced production of bricks, commercial sexual exploitation, begging, or drug smuggling.⁸⁹⁶ Children also continue to be recruited and used for military purposes by state and non-state groups.⁸⁹⁷

The perceived low quality of education and a shortage of female teachers accentuate this phenomenon.⁸⁹⁸ Afghanistan has made undeniable progress on improving access to education, but a large number of Afghan children are still not attending school. While they are searching for work on urban streets and in fields, they are at risk of exploitation, poor health, and severe injury in the short term,⁸⁹⁹ and in the long term, the lack of schooling negatively affects their future.

Burde and Linden, "Bringing Education to Afghan Girls: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Village-Based Schools."

⁸⁹⁵ Karlsson and Mansory, *Afghan Dilemma: Education, Gender and Globalization*.

⁸⁹⁶ UNICEF, *Children and Women in Afghanistan: A Situation Analysis 2014* (UNICEF, 2014), 42, http://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/SitAn_-_Long_Report-_small_size_.pdf.

⁸⁹⁷ UNAMA, *Annual Report 2013: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (United Nations, 2014), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/feb_8_2014_poc-report_2013-full-report-eng.pdf.

⁸⁹⁸ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*, 9.

⁸⁹⁹ Siddieq Noorzoy, "Afghanistan's Children: The Tragic Victims of 30 Years of War," in *Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict*, ed. The Middle East Institute, Viewpoints Special Edition (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2009), 159.

f) Corruption

Finally, corruption represents a serious challenge in the Afghan education sector, and is diffused within educational institutions (see Figure 8). “Ghost-teachers” and teachers that are double-registered are the two dominant forms of corruption.⁹⁰⁰ In 2010, a survey found that 15 percent of Afghans consider the MoE one of the three most corrupt public institutions in the country,⁹⁰¹ and 10 percent of Afghans surveyed claimed that corruption deprived them or their children of a primary or secondary education. The survey also revealed that the bribes paid to obtain educational services were among the highest in the country.⁹⁰²




Figure 8: Corruption in the Education Sector - Types of Corruption by Level.⁹⁰³

While the MOE has started to address issues regarding “ghost” employees, work disincentives (inadequate salaries driving teachers to focus more on private tutoring), bribes for grades, teacher competency/performance evaluation, and

⁹⁰⁰ Sigsgaard, *Education and Fragility in Afghanistan*.

⁹⁰¹ Integrity Watch Afghanistan, *Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010* (Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2010), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/03AAD8EDB77ECE4BC125775A00426C98-Full_Report.pdf.

⁹⁰² *Id.* at 68.

⁹⁰³ U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, *Corruption in the Education Sector*, U4 ISSUE 4 (U4 Anti-corruption resource centre, 2006), <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2563-corruption-in-the-education-sector.pdf>. Cited in Civil-Military Fusion Centre, *Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan*, 17.

payment of salaries, these all remain serious concerns.⁹⁰⁴ Indeed, in an official presentation for the Afghan parliament in May 2015, the Ministers of Education and Higher Education recognized the existence of ghost teachers and ghost schools, and revealed that former officials were doctoring statistics, embezzling money, and permitting cheating on the university entrance exam.⁹⁰⁵ As a result, all figures based on the MoE data should be considered with caution.

D. Conclusion

According to Andrew Wilder, while much of the news emanating from Afghanistan is negative, and the economic, political and security challenges confronting the Afghan government are sobering, it is also important to remember that much has been achieved since 2001.⁹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, the country still faces serious challenges that include an increasing insecurity, weak institutions and poor governance plagued by corruption, as well as a weak economy that is still highly dependent on international aid. The country's education system has been greatly transformed since 2001, welcoming millions of children to school for the first time. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go to reach the goal of offering quality education for all Afghan children by 2020. The context and challenges presented in this chapter will provide the background for examining the influence of global

⁹⁰⁴ USAID, *Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan*, 6.

⁹⁰⁵ Saleha Sodat, "Education Minister Says Predecessor Falsified Data on Active Schools," *Tolo News*, May 27, 2015, <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19727-education-minister-says-predecessor-falsified-data-on-active-schools>.

⁹⁰⁶ Andrew Wilder, "Assessing the President's Strategy in Afghanistan," (Testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa., December 2, 2015), <http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/12/02/assessing-the-president-s-strategy-in-afghanistan>.

policy recommendations on peace education on the Afghan government's education policy and practice in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI – Peace Education in Fragile States: a Country Perspective

A. Introduction

While international discussions on peace education underscore the important role that education in general and peace education in particular can play in a fragile state, the literature emphasizes the challenging conditions for the integration and the implementation of such program. Although Afghanistan was not among the 51 original Member States of the UN in 1945, the country did become a member shortly thereafter (on November 19, 1946). Afghanistan is also the signatory of all the UN documents that serve as a normative framework for peace education, presented in Chapter IV. This chapter will therefore explore how the Afghan national government has engaged in peace education policy and practice, in order to assess the influence of global policy recommendations – or the lack thereof – on national education policy. To do so, it will first analyze the major education policy documents developed in Afghanistan since 2001. It will then review the content of the primary and secondary education textbooks. Finally, it will assess what critical factors can explain these findings at the education policy and practice levels.

B. Peace Education in the National Education Law and Strategy since

2001

One of the first steps in the reconstruction of the Afghan education sector was a Preliminary Needs Assessment (PNA) for Recovery and Reconstruction of Afghanistan. Completed in December 2001 by a team composed of representatives

from several external funding agencies, it was presented at the Ministerial Meeting held in January 2002 in Tokyo as a framework for donor pledges of assistance.⁹⁰⁷ A Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) was then prepared by April 2002 that provided an analytical framework for the education sector, updated the PNA analysis, developed budget and program projections for the next two fiscal years, and identified and prioritized quick, high-impact projects.⁹⁰⁸

Thanks to the CNA, the government first developed a set of interim policies in key areas to facilitate the rapid expansion and recovery of the educational system and to develop the ability to address the needs of multiple target groups.⁹⁰⁹ The MoE also engaged in a parallel process of developing a long-term strategy, appropriate policies, and a sector development plan.⁹¹⁰

This section will first present the efforts of the Independent High Commission on Education, established by the transitional government of Afghanistan with the support of UNESCO, to work in 2002 and 2003 on recommendations for the future national education policy. It will then review the main education policy and strategy documents developed since 2002 to assess if and how peace education has been included. It will notably describe the evolution of these texts through the years and the precise the role of the international community in this reform process.

⁹⁰⁷ Asian Development Bank, *A New Start for Afghanistan's Education Sector* (Asian Development Bank, 2003), Foreword, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/files/edstats/AFGstu03.pdf>.

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid.: The CNA Mission team of external funding agency representatives was jointly led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) and consisted of education specialists from ADB, the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Community, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the United Nations group represented by the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization from 24 February to 17 March 2002. .

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid., 21.

⁹¹⁰ Ibid.

1. Report of the Independent High Commission on Education (2003)

In November 2002, with the support of UNESCO, the transitional government of Afghanistan established an Independent High Commission on Education to propose policy, objectives and strategies for the “revival and development” of the Afghan education system.⁹¹¹ Funded by the Government of Japan, it was composed of twenty-three Afghan experts in education, science, law and administration, in addition to European and American education experts.⁹¹² The government requested that this Commission study the educational needs of the country and submit proposals related to the following objectives:

- “To identify the needs and problems of education in Afghanistan.
- To formulate principles, policies, and strategies for the development of education.
- To propose the defined objectives, policies and implementing strategies.
- To suggest the means of funding the development of education.
- To prepare a report on the educational objectives and policies for the new Constitution of Afghanistan.”⁹¹³

The Commission held its opening session at UNESCO Headquarters in December 2002. For this occasion, the Director-General of UNESCO introduced the Commission to the international community, and at the invitation of the

⁹¹¹ Saif R. Samady, *Changing Profile of Education in Afghanistan*, 2013, 3,

[http://doc.iiep.unesco.org/cgi-bin/wwwi32.exe/%5Bin=epidoc1.in%5D/?t2000=033829/\(100\)](http://doc.iiep.unesco.org/cgi-bin/wwwi32.exe/%5Bin=epidoc1.in%5D/?t2000=033829/(100)).

⁹¹² UNESCO, “Afghan Minister Presents UNESCO with Report of the Afghan Independent High Commission on Education,” *UNESCO*, 2003, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=16116&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

⁹¹³ Independent High Commission on Education, *The Revival and Development of Education in Afghanistan, Policy, Objectives and Strategies* (Kabul: IHCE, 2003), 2, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001390/139077e.pdf>.

Commission, the UNESCO Assistant Director General for Education, and a number of experts from UNESCO, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and India, made presentations, in the presence of representatives of The World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and UNICEF.⁹¹⁴

The Commission issued its final report in August 2003.⁹¹⁵ This report contains recommendations for the modernization and development of the education system, with a particular emphasis on girls and women's education, and the promotion of education for peace and human rights.⁹¹⁶

The report's first chapter provides an indication of the principles and objectives of education in Afghanistan. Peace education and related principles appear at the start of the chapter. It suggests eleven principles that notably include the following: "the development of the potential of the Afghan people, both men and women," "adaptability to change," "the promotion of human rights," and "multi-ethnic comprehension and a culture of peace."⁹¹⁷ The report then describes each of these principles. For instance, it asserts that "international understanding, mutual respect and cooperation among peoples and countries have become increasingly important for peace, security and development;" and that "it is important to respect the diversity of peoples and nations, and try to understand them, and learn about their history, culture and preoccupations."⁹¹⁸ The report adds that "education should

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

⁹¹⁵ Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, "Education Status and Development Strategies in Afghanistan: A Perspective from Dr. Saif R. Samady, Former Deputy Minister and Chairman of the Independent High Commission of Education," *The Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship* 19, no. 1 (2014): 113.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid.

⁹¹⁷ Independent High Commission on Education, *The Revival and Development of Education in Afghanistan, Policy, Objectives and Strategies*, 9.

⁹¹⁸ Ibid.

promote international understanding and respect among nations, and should teach, both in schools and elsewhere, about the role and work of the UN and its specialized agencies.”⁹¹⁹ It also explains the principle of ethnic diversity, insisting that “education should help foster mutual understanding among people of different backgrounds, and emphasize their common interest in peace, and the need for cooperation in order to develop a prosperous and democratic society.”⁹²⁰ To underscore the importance placed on peace education, the report even states that “the promotion of human rights, multi-ethnic comprehension, and a culture of peace, is a basic principle of Afghan education.”⁹²¹

In the same chapter, the Commission includes “human development” within the objectives of education. Its description includes elements of peace education such as teaching the skills to enable learners to solve problems and make wise decisions, promoting initiative, encouraging teamwork and active involvement in community life, self-reliance, creativity, entrepreneurship, and the ability to adapt to change.”⁹²² It stresses that learning programs should teach “the young and adults about human rights and democracy, the need for equality for men and women, the importance of unity and fraternity in Afghan society, and the need to respect both national and universal goals.”⁹²³

The report’s third chapter (Strategies for the Development of Education) provides more information on what peace education should look like in the Afghan

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

⁹²⁰ Ibid., 10.

⁹²¹ Ibid.

⁹²² Ibid., 14.

⁹²³ Ibid.

education system. Within the section that describes the potential role of a recommended “National Institute for Educational Research, Curriculum and Materials,” a paragraph is dedicated to the need for “Social Studies, Democracy, Peace and Human Rights Education” in a society that has become “polarized by years of conflict,” and whose children have been “raised in a culture of war.”⁹²⁴ It also explains that people who had managed to live together in peace and harmony for centuries were now divided along religious, tribal, ethnic, and racial lines.⁹²⁵ As a result, this report calls for promoting “brotherhood and a culture of peace” and underlines the important role of education in “bringing together the different ethnic groups of the Afghan people, and in the development of a mutual understanding of their common history, religion, and those shared values, which serve to unite them.”⁹²⁶ Consequently, the Commission suggests the establishment of a Division of Social Studies, Democracy, Peace and Human Rights Education, with the following objectives: “prepare guides, teaching and reference materials on the Afghan people, emphasizing their historical bonds, shared values, common interests, and destiny;” “develop a comprehensive educational programme for the promotion of peace, human rights and tolerance, for children, young people and adults;” “prepare guides, teaching materials, and multi-media packages on an appreciation of, and respect for, ethnic diversity, and the promotion of education for conflict resolution and peace;” and “train teachers for teaching about peace, tolerance and democracy, in cooperation with teacher training colleges.”⁹²⁷

⁹²⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

⁹²⁶ Ibid., 30.

⁹²⁷ Ibid., 30–31.

The report also explains the goals and general content of the curriculum for general education. The academic and instructional goals include elements significant for peace education such as learning the skills needed to “solve personal and social problems” and developing “individual interpersonal and social skills.”⁹²⁸ The cultural and artistic goals include learning about the history and culture of other civilizations.⁹²⁹ The description of the civic and social goals of the curriculum are consistent with peace education, such as “developing a willingness to give and receive criticism, be patient and respect the views and opinions of others,” and using “appropriate means for resolving personal and social conflicts peacefully and positively.”⁹³⁰

The next section provides suggestions for the content of specific school subjects. In addition to suggesting “Human Rights and a Culture of Peace” as a separate subject in the school curriculum, the teaching of peace and “good conduct” is also included in the subject of “Islamic studies.”⁹³¹ In the same chapter, the report offers more indications about the way peace and human rights education should be delivered in Afghan schools. The report is very ambitious, insisting that the introduction of peace and human rights education should go beyond curriculum development:

“Human rights and peace education should be the foundation for the democratization of education systems in the national education reforms, with a view to integrating an understanding of human rights with the

⁹²⁸ Ibid., 58.

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

⁹³⁰ Ibid., 58–59.

⁹³¹ Ibid., 60.

practice of them. They include not only curriculum content, but also the educational processes, the teaching methods used, the environment, and the management system where education takes place. This implies a profound reform of education, which affects curricula, the in-service and pre-service training of teachers, textbooks, teaching methods, classroom management, and the organization of the education system at all levels. It demands the practice of human rights throughout the system for learning, and within the entire range of learning environments.”⁹³²

This explains why peace and human rights education are more strongly emphasized than any other school subjects in the entire report. Peace education principles are also included in the section dedicated to higher education, where the Commission says that higher education can “provide a forum where people can discuss and debate, express different views, and learn how to reach a consensus.”⁹³³ It adds that higher education can “foster the civic-mindedness needed for the establishment of a civil society,” and represents an opportunity for young people to “be taught to practice tolerance, mutual respect, and learn about the importance of cultural diversity, the need for harmony, peaceful conflict resolution, and civil discussion.”⁹³⁴ The goals of higher education translate well through these ideas. They include the building of a civil and democratic society, where there is a culture of peace, justice, and respect for human rights, and the promotion and practice of “democratic discussion and peaceful resolution of conflicts.”⁹³⁵ However, this

⁹³² Ibid., 109.

⁹³³ Ibid., 90.

⁹³⁴ Ibid.

⁹³⁵ Ibid., 91.

section does not clearly indicate how these particular goals can be reached, and it does not mention how the content of the curriculum taught at this level includes peace education.

The Commission also integrates peace education in the section that provides guidance on distance education for “children deprived of schooling, and older children whose age has exceeded school entrance requirements.”⁹³⁶ The Commission explains that in addition to radio and television, the education system should also take advantage of additional reading materials on topics dealing with peace and reconciliation that are published and distributed with the help of UNESCO.⁹³⁷

Finally, there are some important elements of the report worth mentioning here that contribute to the development of conflict-sensitive education. First, the report insists on the introduction of the “teaching of mother tongues in primary education in the areas where the majority of the people speaks them.”⁹³⁸ This is particularly important to avoid a sense of discrimination through the education system. It also provides some guidance on the curriculum used in religious schools that demonstrate concern about the activities of some of these schools and the effort to avoid the development of extremism. For instance, the Commission underlines that this curriculum “should be such that they prepare pupils for life in the modern world.”⁹³⁹ Moreover, it recommends that “modern subjects should be included in all grades of religious schools, to enable their students to be better prepared to meet

⁹³⁶ Ibid., 104.

⁹³⁷ Ibid.

⁹³⁸ Ibid., 12.

⁹³⁹ Ibid., 15.

the many challenges of modern life.”⁹⁴⁰ It goes further by adding that it is necessary to “teach the philosophy of Islam, its high principles and ideas, and show how it is compatible with modern knowledge, vocations, inventions and discoveries, with modern economics and technology, and with ideas of equality, justice, democracy, human rights, peace, etc.”⁹⁴¹ The Commission concludes this section by stressing that these topics must be “carefully dealt with in religious subjects, and must be incorporated into the curricula of religious schools.”⁹⁴² With respect to teacher training, the report call for a “democratic” head teacher who “respects all persons and opinions,” and underlines that his/her policy “should be based on respect for the needs of both students and teachers,” and that he or she “should not act arbitrarily, but should guide and help to solve problems, in collaboration with pupils and teachers, and be leaders who can be relied on at all times.”⁹⁴³

While the Commission clearly includes peace education in many levels and aspects of the education system, it does not mention peace education or its principles when describing early childhood education, nor when discussing and technical and vocational education.

Nevertheless, the multiple references to peace education in the report’s recommendations create a potential for the integration of peace education in the national curriculum. These references are consistent with the international recommendations presented in Chapter IV and demonstrate the significant influence of UNESCO in this process. The next sections will review the official

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid., 62.

⁹⁴¹ Ibid.

⁹⁴² Ibid.

⁹⁴³ Ibid., 83.

policy documents that have an impact on Afghanistan's national education policy and practice to assess whether they include peace education. This will help determine to what extent the recommendations of this Commission, which had no legal power, have been included in the 2004 Constitution and the main national education policy documents that followed.

2. The Constitution (2004)

The Afghan Constitution was reviewed and approved by 500 member delegates of the Constitutional Loya Jirga of 2004, during which there were major discussions on education and the need to establish a national framework for a new education system.⁹⁴⁴ The Constitution guarantees all children and youth an equal right to access quality education and it includes specific references to education in several articles. Article 17 insists that the "state shall adopt necessary measures to foster education at all levels." Article 43 stresses that education is "the right of all citizens of Afghanistan" and that "the state shall design and implement effective programs and prepare the ground for teaching mother tongues in areas where they are spoken." Article 44 provides guidance on education for women and minorities. Article 45 says that the state shall "devise and implement a unified educational curricula based on the tenets of the sacred religion of Islam, national culture as well as academic principles, and develop religious subjects curricula for schools on the basis of existing Islamic sects in Afghanistan." Article 46 describes the responsibility of the state in establishing and administering educational institutions,

⁹⁴⁴ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 198.

and explains to what extent other actors can establish and administer parallel educational institutions. Finally, Article 52 is dedicated to healthcare and mentions the need for physical education. The Constitution does not describe education principles or goals in much depth, and does not mention anything about the content of the curriculum that should be taught in Afghan schools, including peace education. As a result, the Constitution does not reflect any of the recommendations on peace education or conflict sensitivity of the Independent High Commission on Education.

3. The Afghanistan Compact (2006)

In 2006, the London Conference on Afghanistan produced the *Afghanistan Compact*, a medium-term development plan endorsed by the UN Security Council that provided the framework for the commitments of and partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community.⁹⁴⁵ It is an important document as it sets the main goals and strategy for the government at the time. The Compact identifies three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity consistent with the MDGs: Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development. Within the second pillar, the Compact underlines the importance of “reinforcing a shared sense of citizenship and a culture of tolerance, pluralism and observance of the rule of law” and announces the implementation of a Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation.⁹⁴⁶ However, the

⁹⁴⁵ United Nations, *UN Security Council Resolution 1659*.

⁹⁴⁶ The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, “The Afghanistan Compact,” 4.

Compact does not provide any details on this plan. The Compact does consider that education is one of the six sectors of the pillar on economic and social development and it goes further than the Constitution by providing some goals for the level of enrollment in schools.⁹⁴⁷ While it does not provide much information about the general content of education or its goals, it stresses that human rights awareness “will be included in education curricula.”⁹⁴⁸

4. Education Law (2008)

Enacted in accordance with the provisions of Articles 17, 43, 44, 45, 46, and 47 of the 2004 Constitution, the goal of the Education Law is to regulate the country's educational affairs. Within its 11 chapters and 52 articles, the Education Law does include key aspects of peace education recommended by the Independent High Commission on Education.⁹⁴⁹

First, Article 2 stipulates the objectives of the Education Law. These include strengthening “the spirit of respect to human rights, protection of the women rights, democracy and elimination of every kind of discrimination, in light of the Islamic values and prevention of addiction to narcotics.” Article 18 presents the objectives of primary education, which include improving and strengthening “Islamic sensation and spirit of patriotism and unity and national solidarity, justice, equality, peaceful coexistence, peace loving, tolerability and self-reliance” and respect for

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid., 10.

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁴⁹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *Education Law* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2008), http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Education_law.pdf.

human and woman rights. Article 20 lists the objectives for secondary education, stressing that it should “develop and expand culture of peace and equality.” Article 33 provides guidance on extracurricular activities that can help “promote students personality and educational level with having the spirit of unity, harmony, equality, sense of understanding, assistance, humanism, patriotism, respect to human and woman’s rights, acquaintance to diverse cultures, participation in social and cultural affairs of the community.” Suggested activities include “workshops and seminars for understanding the charter of the UN, basic declaration of the human right and respect to human dignity.”

As for measures that could contribute to conflict sensitivity in education, Article 32 (3) provides directions on the language of teaching, explaining that in areas where the majority speaks one of the third official languages in the country (Uzbiki, Turkmani, Pashai, Nooristani, Balochi, Pamiry and other languages), there shall be opportunities for teaching the third language as a specific subject in addition to Pashto and Dari. This article asks the MoE to prepare the needed teacher training, textbooks, and teaching materials. Article 39 prohibits any kind of physical and psychological punishment of students “even for their correction and chastisement,” and requests that “violators shall be prosecuted.” Finally, Article 40 prohibits any political activities on education premises. In a stable country, this decision would not be conflict-sensitive as it would be interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of speech and could discourage critical thinking. However, in the context of Afghanistan, this decision is conflict-sensitive

considering the lack of balance or control of these political activities in schools, where AOGs continue to recruit.

5. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008-2013)

A five-year strategy to reduce poverty and promote economic and social development, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy served as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Its seventh chapter presented the strategies and priorities relating to the Economic and Social Development pillar that includes Education. At the time, the government's main priority for this sector was providing equal access to basic education and reducing illiteracy rates.⁹⁵⁰ While the ANDS recognized the impressive expansion of education, it underscored the urgent need to improve the quality of education.⁹⁵¹ As a result, it required placing a higher priority on teacher training and other mechanisms to encourage private sector investment in educational activities.⁹⁵² Once again, no details are provided about what should be taught in schools.

In 2007, an education strategy had been prepared for the ANDS that included the following statement: "Building tolerance of others within Afghanistan and beyond will become a cornerstone in the longer term state building efforts of our country."⁹⁵³ However, this idea was not transferred in the final ANDS, and overall,

⁹⁵⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008-2013*, 113.

⁹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁹⁵² *Ibid.*, 11.

⁹⁵³ Ministry of Education, *Education Sector Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (with Focus on Prioritization)* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2007), 11,

http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_MoE_strategy_English.pdf.

the ANDS did not integrate any of the recommendations on peace education or conflict sensitivity of the Independent High Commission on Education.

6. Afghanistan's National Education Strategic Plans

The MoE, in cooperation with UNESCO and other International Organizations, prepared strategic development plans for primary, secondary, and technical and vocational education (a separate plan was developed by the MOHE for higher education).⁹⁵⁴ The three National Education Strategic Plans (NESP) that have been issued so far are reviewed hereafter.

a) NESP-I (2006-2010)

To meet the 2010 goals set by the Afghanistan Compact, a first five-year strategic plan for the delivery of education services was developed by the MoE, with technical support provided by UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). Due to a serious lack of capacity, the ministry had to rely heavily on foreign support and expertise in all aspects of their services.⁹⁵⁵ During the three years that followed the fall of the Taliban regime, IIEP was a permanent technical partner of the MoE, and provided training workshops as well as technical advice.⁹⁵⁶ The long-term partnership was initiated when the MoE decided to start formulating a sector plan (later to become NESP-I) in 2005.⁹⁵⁷ With financial support from Norway, this exercise was an opportunity to develop the

⁹⁵⁴ Samady, *Changing Profile of Education in Afghanistan*, 3.

⁹⁵⁵ Baiza, *Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901*, 199.

⁹⁵⁶ Sigsgaard, *On the Road to Resilience: Capacity Development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan*, 65.

⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

capacity of the ministry in education sector strategic planning: IIEP would assist the MoE in formulating its first NESP by helping it develop its capacities in plan preparation, implementation, and monitoring at both the education system's central and decentralized levels.⁹⁵⁸ Consequently, NESP-I was a result of the collaboration between three actors: the Afghan MoE, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and IIEP.⁹⁵⁹ Norway not only provided financial assistance, it also offered technical advice: its embassy's successive education representatives gave guidance throughout the NESP-I formulation process, and hosted meetings of like-minded donors to support donor coordination and alignment around a national plan.⁹⁶⁰

Several challenges were encountered during this process: limited financial resources, a lack of reliable educational data that required relying on estimations, and increasing insecurity and tensions on the ground that limited movements in the country.⁹⁶¹ Considering the MoE's frequent priority changes and ongoing internal reforms, the donor's involvement and flexibility proved to be key in the successful development of NESP-I.⁹⁶² At the policy level, the process was guided by a high-level steering committee chaired by the Minister of Education; and at the technical level, the planning tasks were carried out by eight thematic working teams, supported by a technical support team and coordinated by the strategic planning team.⁹⁶³ Meanwhile, continuous formal and informal consultations were taking

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid., 65.

⁹⁵⁹ Ibid., 66.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁶¹ Ibid.

⁹⁶² Ibid.

⁹⁶³ Ibid., 68.

place with donors and NGOs, other ministries, decentralized levels of management, civil society, and the Parliamentary Education Commission.⁹⁶⁴

While NESP-I is now considered a utopian vision of what the education sector could look like, rather than a clearly prioritized plan that stood a realistic chance of reaching its goals,⁹⁶⁵ it did not provide much space for the recommendations of the Independent High Commission on Education on peace education. The document includes two elements that could have helped introduce peace education principles. First, the message from the Minister emphasizes that rebuilding “an education system that will act as a fundamental cornerstone in shaping the future of the country through peace and stability, democracy and good governance, poverty reduction and economic growth” is one of the top priorities of the government. Second, the strategic framework underscores how education can be a powerful unifying force within the rich cultural diversity of Afghanistan while promoting national identity and pride. Nevertheless, the actual term “peace education” is absent from the document and its core principles are hardly present. “Awareness messages on human rights” are mentioned as a component of the pre-service teacher education curriculum related to primary education textbooks,⁹⁶⁶ and in the new curriculum and textbooks for secondary students.⁹⁶⁷ And after stating that “thousands of children are being indoctrinated in hatred and intolerance in madrassas,”⁹⁶⁸ the section dedicated to Islamic Education lists developing a new

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid. Information confirmed in an interview conducted with an official of the Afghan MoE (October 12, 2015).

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid., 78.

⁹⁶⁶ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1385-1389 (2006-2010)*, 59.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid., 66.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid., 11.

curriculum “built on modern principles of inclusion and tolerance” as the highest priority requirement.⁹⁶⁹

As for measures and principles that can be considered conflict-sensitive, the plan insists on the need for gender equity.⁹⁷⁰ It also stresses that the government has decided to pursue a national curriculum as a means of building unity.⁹⁷¹ Finally, it requests that protection officers monitor schools and report on instances of corporal punishment of students, abuse and other rights-related issues.⁹⁷²

b) NESP-II (2010-2014)

NESP-II benefited from the lessons learned during the development process of NESP-I as well as the improved capacity of the MoE.⁹⁷³ While this first strategic planning process demonstrated increased national ownership, this sense of ownership was not uniformly felt within the MoE.⁹⁷⁴ As a result, while large parts of NESP-I were written by national Technical Assistants and international advisers, as opposed to MoE civil servants, NESP-II was mainly the product of the MoE’s efforts.⁹⁷⁵ From the outset, the MoE decided to produce NESP-II with less technical assistance than NESP-I: for the first nine months, the MoE organized its planning process without external support and produced a first draft of NESP-II (2010–2014)

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid., 73.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid., 29.

⁹⁷¹ Ibid., 66.

⁹⁷² Ibid., 56.

⁹⁷³ Interview with a planning specialist at the Afghan MoE (October 10, 2015).

⁹⁷⁴ Dana Holland, *Capacity-Building through Policy-Making: Developing Afghanistan’s National Education Strategic Plan* (Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit, 2010), <http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=455&ContentId=7&ParentId=7&Lang=en-US>. Information confirmed in an interview conducted with a planning specialist at the MoE (October 10, 2015).

⁹⁷⁵ Sigsgaard, *On the Road to Resilience: Capacity Development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan*, 82.

in Dari. Nonetheless, IIEP and other agencies continued to provide support by commenting on the draft NESP-II at various stages and editing the document in English.⁹⁷⁶

The new version begins with a statement about the purpose and vision of the government for this strategic plan. It states that the policies and objectives that have been developed in this document are “based on the national and international commitments of the government,”⁹⁷⁷ something that was not mentioned in NESP-I. Unlike its predecessor, NESP-II does integrate peace education principles and it includes more elements of the recommendations on peace education offered by the Independent High Commission on Education. In its visions for education in Afghanistan, NESP-II stresses that it must “strengthen Islamic morals, national unity, independence, rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy, tolerance, peace and stability.”⁹⁷⁸ It adds that the education system must “promote ethical, emotional, cognitive, physical and social development, and improve the problem-solving, critical thinking skills, creativity and scientific thinking of all students including those with special needs.”⁹⁷⁹ These skills are often cited as the end goals of peace education programs. Peace education is explicitly mentioned once in the whole document, as a crosscutting issue that will be incorporated in the textbooks alongside and human rights, elimination of violence against children and women, environmental protection, counter-narcotics, and HIV.⁹⁸⁰ Human rights is

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid., 83.

⁹⁷⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1389-1393 (2010-2014)*, 1.

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Ibid., 23.

cited again as a crosscutting issue included in the new curriculum,⁹⁸¹ and as an element of the training of the MoE staff.⁹⁸² The notion of “life skills” appears once as a module that is suggested for inclusion in literacy programs, but the document does not provide information about its content or goals.⁹⁸³

c) NESP-III (2015-2020)

The MoE also developed the next strategic plan for the period 2015-2020 through a consultative process, sharing a first draft with development partners for review. The Afghan ownership of the process was increased again and international organizations such as USAID, UNICEF, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JAICA), the British Embassy, and the Canadian Embassy only provided technical opinions once a first draft was finalized.⁹⁸⁴

In the same way that NESP-II introduced its statement about the purpose and vision of the government for this strategic plan, NESP-III also includes a reference to “the national and international commitments of the government.”⁹⁸⁵ When describing what quality means for education in Afghanistan, the document uses a formulation that is similar to what was found in NESP-II’s vision for education: “A fundamental purpose of education in Afghanistan is to strengthen students’ Islamic and national identities, and to promote values such as Taqwa, faithfulness, righteousness, national unity, social justice, human rights, peace, mutual respect,

⁹⁸¹ Ibid., 37 and 74.

⁹⁸² Ibid., 114.

⁹⁸³ Ibid., 98.

⁹⁸⁴ Interview with a planning specialist at the Afghan MoE (October 10, 2015).

⁹⁸⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 2015-2020*, 16.

dialogue, rule of law, social participation, and environment protection.”⁹⁸⁶ The plan adds that the “MoE will also supervise all schools to ensure that the above mentioned values are practiced in schools.”⁹⁸⁷ However, it does not provide information about the methods and means that will be employed to do so.

Overall, NESP-III provides fewer references to peace education and its principles than NESP-II. While the introductory message of the Minister claims that “economic growth, political stability and sustainable peace are directly related to the literacy level of the people and quality of education that is provided especially for young generation,” the document does not explain in depth what this entails.⁹⁸⁸ Peace education is only mentioned once in the whole document, as an element of the “strategies for protecting schools and preventing conflicts,” and the plan recommends “strengthening peace education, conflict resolution, and civic education in curriculum.”⁹⁸⁹ Other strategies that can be considered conflict-sensitive include “reducing gender, ethnic, linguistic, regional, and religious disparities,” and “ensuring the right to education in maternal tongue.”⁹⁹⁰ Similarly, human rights education is no longer cited as an element of the curriculum. Finally, the document clearly states that corporal punishment is prohibited and matters for education quality. The MoE announces that it will conduct internal awareness programs to increase teachers’ and administrators’ knowledge about the negative consequences of corporal punishment and educate them about alternative discipline

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid., 17.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid., 5.

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid., 19.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

strategies, and will also conduct social mobilizations' awareness activities to reduce violence, absenteeism, and dropouts.⁹⁹¹ Overall, NESP-III does not offer detailed measures to ensure the quality or conflict sensitivity of the curriculum and its content.

C. Peace Education in the National Curriculum

The curriculum development process started in 2002 and is still ongoing. This section will examine the primary and secondary general education textbooks developed for government schools to assess if and how peace education has been included. It will also review the curriculum reform process since 2001, and the role of the international community.

1. Development of the first Curriculum Framework

In 2002, curriculum development meant simply ensuring the supply of existing textbooks developed with the technical support of the University of Nebraska-Omaha (UNO), printed cheaply in Pakistan, and distributed with the financial support of USAID.⁹⁹² According to Spink, both UNESCO and UNICEF wanted a substantial revision of the entire Afghan curriculum, but the MoE was reluctant to

⁹⁹¹ Ibid., 17.

⁹⁹² Spink, "Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction"; Dakmara Georgescu, "Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development in Afghanistan," *Prospects* 37, no. 4 (2007): 427–48. Georgescu explains that, as a result, instead of the "Curriculum and Textbook Department", the office in the Ministry of Education in charge of the curriculum was called the "Compilation and Translation Department". Its main functions consisted of "translating" books from neighboring countries and "compiling" sufficiently satisfactory textbooks for students.

cede development of the national curriculum to “outsiders” again.⁹⁹³ She explains that, instead, the Ministry wanted the new curriculum to be developed by Afghans for Afghans and to promote a more moderate version of Islam. After six months of discussions, the MoE realized that it had neither the expertise nor the financial resources to undertake such a huge task alone, and finally accepted an external technical assistance on the condition that curriculum reform would be led by the MoE.⁹⁹⁴ Meanwhile, another set of UNO textbooks was printed with USAID support.⁹⁹⁵ The Minister of Education made this decision despite widespread reservations within the education community in Afghanistan and the existence of two other options: the Basic Competency Learning (BCL) materials and the textbooks developed by Columbia University in the 1970s for grade 1 to 12.⁹⁹⁶ The BCL textbooks had been developed with the support of UNICEF and Save the Children in an effort to move away from the UNO textbooks.⁹⁹⁷ For Spink, “politics gained the upper hand in the education sector in Afghanistan” in 2001–2002: the Minister of Education, a graduate of the University of Nebraska, was lobbied by UNO printing press representatives to ensure that the UNO textbooks would be adopted as the official MoE textbooks, and decided to approve their reprinting.⁹⁹⁸ According to her, these representatives told the Minister that “the

⁹⁹³ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 202.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁵ Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, “From U.S., the ABC’s of Jihad,” *The Washington Post*, March 23, 2002, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/03/23/from-us-the-abcs-of-jihad/d079075a-3ed3-4030-9a96-0d48f6355e54/>.

⁹⁹⁶ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 202.

⁹⁹⁷ Ibid., 201.

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid.

BCL books, which were being advocated by UNICEF to be adopted by the MoE, were not religious enough and that he would face severe repercussions if he approved them,” and that “these books were not Afghan,” as they had not been developed by the MoE.⁹⁹⁹ Spink adds that the Minister and his immediate deputies never read the content of the BCL books or the UNO books, and that the Columbia University books “remained in the basement of the MoE and were never considered for publication.”¹⁰⁰⁰ It was determined that the BCL materials would be used only as supplements.¹⁰⁰¹

Once the MoE began to work on a new curriculum framework for schools in Afghanistan, one of the first steps it took was the creation of a commission made up of 30 MoE staff, Kabul University professors and representatives of UNICEF and UNESCO. This commission traveled to Tehran, Iran to participate in a three-week investigation of curriculum in the Iranian school system.¹⁰⁰² A two-week intensive training workshop (during September–October 2002) for more than 40 Afghan education specialists was organized by UNESCO’s International Bureau of Education (IBE) with the support of the UNESCO Afghanistan Office and the Iranian National Commission for UNESCO.¹⁰⁰³ This study tour contributed to the development of a first draft for a curriculum framework that would later be used to

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid., 202. Based on interviews Spink conducted with Afghan Educationalists at the MoE in Kabul in 2002.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ibid. Because of a lack of data available for this time period, I was not able to find other sources to corroborate these plausible assertions made by Jeaniene Spink, who has worked for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and is now a Principal Research Fellow at the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER).

¹⁰⁰¹ Stephens and Ottaway, “From U.S., the ABC’s of Jihad.”

¹⁰⁰² USAID, *Sharing Perspectives on Curriculum Development in Afghanistan* (USAID, 2003), 1.

¹⁰⁰³ Georgescu, “Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development in Afghanistan”. Georgescu participated in this workshop and provides a detailed account about its process.

develop actual textbooks. In December 2002, the MoE, USAID, and Creative Associates International, Inc., co-organized a five-day national workshop with MoE staff, representatives of UNICEF, UNESCO, and members of key NGOs.¹⁰⁰⁴ USAID, the MoE, the UN Program Secretariat, UNICEF and UNESCO developed the conceptual design of the conference in concert. 123 participants, among them 22 women, joined the workshop, representing 29 organizations in total: the MoE, the MoHE, the Ministry of Information and Culture, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Kabul University, various Kabul schools, USAID, UNICEF, UNESCO, World Food Programme, the UN Programme Secretariat, and various NGOs, including: the Agha Khan Development Network, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Children in Crisis, Creative Associates International, Inc., Educational Concepts International, the International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Save the Children, Solidarité Afghanistan Belgium, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, University of Nebraska/ARRENA, and various other institutions and news agencies.¹⁰⁰⁵ Conceived as a forum for soliciting feedback and stimulating dialogue on the development of a new curriculum, this workshop was an opportunity for the MoE to present its first draft and for the participants to share their ideas.¹⁰⁰⁶ The main outcomes of the workshop were a set of recommendations for the finalization of the curriculum framework and the identification of educational approaches, potential strategies, and

¹⁰⁰⁴ Jones, "Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan," 116; USAID, *Sharing Perspectives on Curriculum Development in Afghanistan*, 1.

¹⁰⁰⁵ USAID, *Sharing Perspectives on Curriculum Development in Afghanistan*, 1–2.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

mechanisms that could be applied in curriculum development and implementation.¹⁰⁰⁷

Among the various comments and feedback received during this workshop and reported in the final report, few elements involve peace education. One comment says that a priority of education policy should be “to teach children to respect others and their beliefs and to promote moral and social responsibility.”¹⁰⁰⁸ Other comments insist that “education on good citizenship should be added”¹⁰⁰⁹ and that “new policy issues, such as human rights, anti-terrorism and anti-drug awareness, promotion of peace and national unity, and health education must be integrated into the curriculum.”¹⁰¹⁰ Conference participants discussed various suggestions for how to include these elements in the curriculum: some suggested incorporating them into Social Studies, Islamic studies, foreign languages or ethics, while others underlined that the method of integration of these subjects in the curriculum should be considered in depth because “it is imperative that these subjects are not lost or neglected in the implementation of the curriculum, due to inadequate planning or insufficient preparation of teachers to achieve these goals.”¹⁰¹¹

After receiving feedback during the workshop, the MoE continued refining the draft curriculum framework in line with these recommendations. In 2003, the MoE Compilation and Translation Department finalized the Curriculum Framework, and

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid., 7.

by the end of June, it was approved by the Transitional Government, thus becoming an official reference document for the Afghan education system.¹⁰¹²

The Curriculum Framework is quite comprehensive and lists important learning outcomes in terms of student competencies, such as what competencies are linked to the knowledge dimension of each lesson; what students should be able to do, how they should develop as persons; what skills and attitudes are important for living and working together; and what skills, knowledge and attitudes are important for transforming oneself and one's society.¹⁰¹³ It did take into account the recommendations provided during the December 2002 workshop by integrating the idea of universal values (such as human rights) and underlining education principles such as equal and fair access to and treatment in schools for students of different ages, ethnic backgrounds, and gender.¹⁰¹⁴ The fact that the framework was also reviewed by the High Independent Commission on Education may explain why it does successfully integrate elements of peace education.

The Curriculum Framework also demonstrates an effort to maintain the connection to Afghan identity and traditions, and the need to base the school curriculum on the Afghan cultural context. In its introduction, the Framework says that “when young people enter the world of work, as a result of the implementation of the new curriculum, they will be good Muslims, civilized human beings and true, self-reliant Afghans.”¹⁰¹⁵ There is also an effort to promote a more moderate vision

¹⁰¹² Georgescu, “Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development in Afghanistan.”

¹⁰¹³ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ministry of Education, *Curriculum Framework - Afghanistan* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2003), 10.

of Islam: the introduction underlines the need to “foster national unity and social cohesion”¹⁰¹⁶ in an effort to cultivate Afghan identity so that “students will reinforce their faith and broaden the Islamic vision and religious principles in a non-extremist way.”¹⁰¹⁷ Consequently, the chapter on Education Policy insists that “children and youngsters in Afghanistan will be educated in compliance with moderate Islamic values and spiritual beliefs, as opposed to extremist and fundamentalist attitudes,”¹⁰¹⁸ This language may reflect the involvement of the international community, but it also highlights a new desire to emphasize peace and unity among Afghan officials and ministers who were part of this consultative process.¹⁰¹⁹

Peace education is present in the education policy where it discusses the importance of education in promoting values such as peace and helping students fight all forms of discrimination.¹⁰²⁰ The expected outcome of the new education policy is also clearly in line with the goals of peace education: “Students will develop as civilized human beings, provided with the knowledge and skills to respect the other, promote participative democracy and human rights for all, reject violence, while understanding and appreciating differences.”¹⁰²¹ The Curriculum Framework recommends new concepts of learning and learner-centered approaches in the classroom that go beyond the traditional rote learning and memorization

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰¹⁷ Ibid., 19.

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid., 17.

¹⁰¹⁹ Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 116. Confirmed during the interviews with Afghan MoE officials in June 2014 and October 2015.

¹⁰²⁰ Ministry of Education, *Curriculum Framework - Afghanistan*, 16.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid., 17.

techniques.¹⁰²² Recommended for peace education programs, these new methods provide a learner-friendly, stimulating learning environment for students' intellectual, spiritual, emotional, physical, and social development.¹⁰²³

Within the Framework, peace education principles and objectives are particularly important to Social and Civic Education. Indeed, Social and Civic Education objectives include the following:

- “cultivating principles of solidarity, peace, brotherhood and co-operation at national and international level;
- respecting laws and protecting one’s rights and the rights of others in a responsible way, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, gender, age, economic/social status, political orientation, etc.;
- developing capacities for responsible and competent participation in religious, economic, social-political and cultural activities through the pursuit of a fair balance between individual interest/benefits and social/collective interests/benefits;
- applying critical thinking and effective communication skills in public dialogue and settling differences of opinion constructively;
- handling diversity and settling conflicts peacefully and constructively;
- developing the capacity for handling Mass Media messages critically;
- improving social creativity skills and cultivating a sustained interest in public matters; and

¹⁰²² Georgescu, “Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development in Afghanistan.”

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

- promoting and enhancing a culture of tolerance and negotiations.”¹⁰²⁴

The recommended study plan for schools comprises eight curriculum areas, including Life Skills, which is described as “a new subject area in the curriculum, aiming at helping students to get familiar with their social, natural and artificial environment and to develop important skills for their personal, social, intellectual and emotional development.”¹⁰²⁵ The study plan also offers optional courses that include Peace and Human Rights education, though without providing a description.¹⁰²⁶ The document explains that optional courses come in addition to the weekly timetable, at students’ request, and in compliance with the school profile and local resources and circumstances.¹⁰²⁷

Finally, many of the expected learning outcomes presented at the end of the document are fully in line with the goals of peace education. For instance, the Framework cites “solving problems creatively,”¹⁰²⁸ “[demonstrating] respect for the others, tolerance and capacity for valuing differences constructively,”¹⁰²⁹ “[manifesting] politeness, kindness, solidarity, sympathy, respect, tolerance, love in social relationships (in family, peer groups, community structures),”¹⁰³⁰ “[addressing] conflict constructively, and [avoiding] cheating, lying, harming others physically or verbally/emotionally,”¹⁰³¹ proving “rigorous and critical thinking,”¹⁰³² and “[demonstrating] solidarity, tolerance, respect and capacity to

¹⁰²⁴ Ministry of Education, *Curriculum Framework - Afghanistan*, 20.

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁰³² *Ibid.*, 44.

engage in fair competitions.”¹⁰³³ Many leaning outcomes that are expected under the objectives of learning to “work together” and to “transform one self and one’s society” are undoubtedly consistent with peace education (See Figure 9).¹⁰³⁴

Competencies – General learning outcomes		Examples
To work together	To accept and approach interdependencies constructively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be able to explain how interdependencies work in different areas of social, economic and cultural life - To be aware of opportunities and risks linked with global interdependencies - To be in contact with students from other countries - To engage in school exchanges
	To approach and manage conflicts constructively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be able to distinguish between different kinds of conflicts - To identify and use appropriate ways to address different kinds of conflicts - To use a mediator - To apologize - To be able to accept apologies - To be able to negotiate and reach reasonable compromises - To be able to make use of participatory decision-making
	To engage in the pursuit of common objectives, based on informed and responsible decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To demonstrate team work skills - To identify problems and situations which require team work - To accept reasonable tasks/roles and meet deadlines - To accept evaluation of team work
	To value pluralism and diversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be able to accept differences in opinions/perspectives - To make prove of capacities for engaging in civil dialogue - To be capable to empathize with others - To be open to cultural exchanges - To be able to identify and build upon common features
	To demonstrate interest for and participate in public/community matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be aware of one’s community problems - To be aware of the role people can play in improving living standards - To participate in public/common actions for solving community problems

¹⁰³³ Ibid., 45.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid., 45–48.

To transform one self and one's society	To demonstrate interest in and act for self-improvement To reflect on, know about and act for improving/preserving the quality of the natural, social and artificial/man-made environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To make proof of positive, constructive attitudes in tackling self-development issues and problems - To be aware of principles and rules for ensuring sustained personal and environmental development
	To demonstrate gender- and age sensitiveness and fight against all forms of discrimination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To manifest self-respect and respect for others regardless of gender, age, religion, ethnicity, social status, occupation, political orientation - To work/engage in actions with others based on mutual respect - To participate in cultural exchanges (celebrations, exhibitions, common events)
	To campaign against unhealthy life styles and against illegal and immoral activities and income resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be aware of risks/dangers linked with different life choices - To avoid and campaign against all kinds of unhealthy/dangerous life choices - To be aware of where and how to get help in case of problems - To manifest and promote religious and ethical conduct at all times
	To participate constructively in cultural, economic and social exchanges world wide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To demonstrate an interest for worldwide exchanges - To be in contact with students from other countries - To demonstrate proficiency in foreign languages - To be able to use modern communication and information technology - To demonstrate respect for one's culture and the culture of others - To demonstrate appropriate work skills for entering the international labor market successfully
	To promote peace, brotherhood and co-operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To demonstrate an interest in promoting peace, brotherhood and cooperation - To engage in actions of cooperation on local, regional, national and international level - To manage peaceful conflict management - To be able to engage in civil dialogue - To be able to address Media messages critically

Figure 9: Expected learning outcomes.¹⁰³⁵

Finally, the Framework also includes the creation of Counseling and Guidance centers within schools for the purpose of “helping students develop appropriate

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid.

knowledge, skills and attitudes for peaceful conflict settling, co-operation, solidarity, fair competition, tolerance and respect (self-respect and respect for others).”¹⁰³⁶

2. First phase of the Curriculum Reform

With the support of multiple donors (including UNICEF, USAID, UNESCO, and DANIDA), the first curriculum development reform launched in mid-2003 with the development of the Curriculum Framework, leading to the re-design of textbooks for Grades 1 and 2, as well as some textbooks for Grades 4 and 5.¹⁰³⁷ In 2003 and 2004, Columbia University Teachers College worked closely with the MoE on this new set of primary school textbooks with financial support from UNICEF.¹⁰³⁸

The curriculum for Life Skills was developed at that time. According to Adele Jones, while there had been several attempts by NGOs to develop peace curriculum for schools and community groups in Afghanistan, the MoE decided to create its own version, entitled Life Skills.¹⁰³⁹ Considering the high number of children dropping out between Grades 1 and 3, this subject was developed to reach a maximum number of children at this point of their education, before giving way to Social Studies for older children.¹⁰⁴⁰

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid., 50.

¹⁰³⁷ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*, 7.

¹⁰³⁸ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 202.

¹⁰³⁹ Adele M. E. Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” *Asia Pacific Journal of Education* 27, no. 1 (2007): 36.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

In 2007, Jones tried to evaluate to what extent these Life Skills textbooks were sufficiently adapted to the Afghan and Muslim culture and tradition.¹⁰⁴¹ Her analysis cited a paper on Islamic Approaches to Conflict Resolution and Peace, that stressed a Western approach, placing more emphasis on competition and not enough on broad social cooperation, and focusing instead on self-determination, political pluralism, and individual rights; where in contrast; whereas Islamic precepts include a view of peace based on “communal solidarity, social justice, faith and cultural pluralism.”¹⁰⁴² She concluded that the books were successful in blending two different approaches to peace and conflict. While the strongest Western approach to conflict resolution is to conceptualize and solve problems, the Islamic approach emphasizes the mending and maintenance of social relationships, restoring relationships, and highlighting shared values.¹⁰⁴³

Jones’ overview of the textbooks developed at the time for Life Skills (grades 1-3) and Social Studies (grades 4-6) confirmed that their content is in accordance with peace education principles and the objectives of the Curriculum Framework presented earlier, but also that they take into account the Afghan culture and context.¹⁰⁴⁴ The content also demonstrates the influence of the rationale for the Life Skills curriculum developed by Columbia’s team of specialists that stresses the need for children to “learn mercy, empathy, personal responsibility, social tolerance

¹⁰⁴¹ Adele M. E. Jones (2007) Muslim and Western Influences on School

Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan, *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, 27:1, 27-40

¹⁰⁴² Ayse S. Kadayifci, Nathan C. Funk, and Abdel Aziz Said, *Islamic Approaches to Conflict Resolution and Peace* (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2002); Cited in Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” 38.

¹⁰⁴³ Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” 38.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 118.

and pride in self and others,” and the importance of “deliberately incorporating these aspects of character building into the formal school curriculum” so that young Afghan citizens will achieve peace, justice, and equality.¹⁰⁴⁵

Jones noted that this can be observed in the Life Skills textbook developed for Grade 1. The introduction summarizes the purpose of the book as an effort to prepare children to build “a society in which they can solve their problems and aversions by becoming responsible thinkers,” to recognize “the worth of others,” and to be “sympathetic and open-minded.”¹⁰⁴⁶ It also highlights mutual understanding, respect and cooperation.¹⁰⁴⁷ Jones underscores that the Grade 2 Life Skills textbook is a continuation of the Grade A textbook: while it reiterates some topics, it adds a greater emphasis on helping at home and in class, as well as decision-making, feelings, personal memories, rights of self and others, and wishes/desires.¹⁰⁴⁸ Two of the most important themes running through the Grade 2 textbook are respect (for self, peers, elders, family members) and conflict resolution.¹⁰⁴⁹

Jones’ review of the textbooks also revealed that the Social Studies curriculum had certain elements in common with the mujahideen curriculum.¹⁰⁵⁰ Moreover,

¹⁰⁴⁵ Columbia University Teachers College, *Rationale for the Life Skills Curriculum*, Unpublished Paper Presented to the MoE Curriculum Department, 2004 Cited in ; Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 117–19.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Department of Compilation and Translation, *Life Skills Grade 2 Textbook* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2006); Cited in Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” 36.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Department of Compilation and Translation, *Life Skills Grade 2 Textbook*; Cited in Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” 36.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Department of Compilation and Translation, *Life Skills Grade 2 Textbook*; Cited in Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” 37.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Department of Compilation and Translation, *Life Skills Grade 2 Textbook*; Cited in Jones, “Muslim and Western Influences on School Curriculum in Post-War Afghanistan,” 38.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 119.

she noted that these lessons see “community” as part of the repeated theme for nation building and praise the Bonn Agreement for “finishing these endless wars” and providing “the beginning of peaceful life [so Afghanis can] . . . enjoy their human rights.”¹⁰⁵¹ She added that some lessons also assert that the “existence of justice” is the best way to maintain lasting peace in a community, while “the existence of a military is able to define the rights of all its citizens without any privileges.”¹⁰⁵² She concluded that Afghanistan's weak judiciary taught young children that a military presence was necessary for peace, even if the military was just as weak.¹⁰⁵³ Jones regrets that, while this curriculum was intended to interest and stimulate young Afghans, and to open up the possibility for the Afghan society to move toward a unified, peaceful state, the curriculum offered little direction as to how actively involve students, and did not provide sufficient time for students to explore each of the topics.¹⁰⁵⁴

The collaboration with Columbia University ended in 2005 with the discontinuation of technical support from the university.¹⁰⁵⁵ According to an interview Spink conducted in 2005 with the MoE’s Director of the Compilation and Translation Department, the MoE asked Columbia to leave, as they felt they “were not specialists.”¹⁰⁵⁶ Funding also started to become scarce, and as a result, the

¹⁰⁵¹ Department of Compilation and Translation, *Social Studies Grade 4* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, 2005), 70–72; Cited in Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 119.

¹⁰⁵² Department of Compilation and Translation, *Social Studies Grade 4*, 73–75; Cited in Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 119.

¹⁰⁵³ Jones, “Curriculum and Civil Society in Afghanistan,” 119.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 117–19.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*, 7.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Spink, “Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction,” 202.

curriculum reform slowed down and came to a standstill in 2005.¹⁰⁵⁷ At the time, the new education curriculum for primary schools was neither finalized for all grades nor printed and disseminated to the provinces, and no work had yet begun on secondary school textbooks where references to violence were most prominent.¹⁰⁵⁸

3. Second Phase of the Curriculum Reform

Although a new Program for Afghanistan, *Reconstruction of the Education System of Afghanistan*, was launched in 2004 with a US\$3.5 million contribution from the United States to UNESCO to reconstruct education in post-conflict societies, its effective implementation only started in 2006. This delay was due to a variety of different factors, including the long negotiations about the program's scope and objectives.¹⁰⁵⁹

With technical assistance from the UNESCO International Bureau of Education (IBE) and funding provided primarily by USAID and DANIDA, the MoE resumed its curriculum reform process in 2006 by focusing on the development of a curriculum for middle and high school students.¹⁰⁶⁰ The goal was not only to produce quality textbooks for secondary students that would reach the schools, but to build the capacity of MoE staff in the design and production of textbooks, while at the same time exploring options for private sector cooperation.¹⁰⁶¹ This process

¹⁰⁵⁷ Georgescu, "Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development in Afghanistan."

¹⁰⁵⁸ Spink, "Education and Politics in Afghanistan: The Importance of an Education System in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction," 202.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Georgescu, "Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development in Afghanistan."

¹⁰⁶⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1385-1389 (2006-2010)*, 66–67.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

started with the development of a new curriculum framework specific to secondary education: a two-week workshop was organized in Kabul in September 2006, where MoE staff and curriculum specialists from UNESCO IBE joined forces.¹⁰⁶² Field visits to Jordan and Iran were also conducted in 2006 and 2007 to learn from existing teaching materials and to consult with international consultants and high-level specialists for different learning areas and subjects.¹⁰⁶³ Finally, public consultations were held on the draft curriculum framework to ensure that the views of relevant stakeholders were considered in the final version.¹⁰⁶⁴

While efforts to develop the curriculum were underway, the process was still too slow to cope with demand. In 2007, the Education Sector Strategy paper that the MoE prepared for the ANDS explained that the destruction of the school infrastructure throughout the country and under-investment in education had resulted in an almost complete absence of teaching and learning materials.¹⁰⁶⁵ In 2008, while the primary school curriculum had been reviewed and revised, and new textbooks had been developed, their production and distribution was still ongoing.¹⁰⁶⁶ Teacher training in the use of the new curriculum still needed to be addressed.¹⁰⁶⁷ Secondary school students were still being taught from an outdated curriculum developed more than 20 years before.¹⁰⁶⁸ And while a new curriculum

¹⁰⁶² Ibid., 68.

¹⁰⁶³ Wardak and Hirth, *Defining the Gaps: The Case of Afghanistan*, 7; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1385-1389 (2006-2010)*, 68.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 1385-1389 (2006-2010)*, 68.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ministry of Education, *Education Sector Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (with Focus on Prioritization)*, 17–18.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008-2013*, 115.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid.

was ready, the development, production and distribution of textbooks, teachers' guides and learning materials would take an additional 12-18 months to complete.¹⁰⁶⁹

4. Current State of the Curriculum Reform

In 2014, NESP-III announced that since 2009, the MoE had “developed, printed, and distributed textbooks for all grades of general education, and teacher guides were available for grades 1-9, and were being developed for grades 10-12.”¹⁰⁷⁰ However, the MoE still faced several challenges: typographical errors in the textbooks, textbooks distribution issues due to a lack of funding and insecurity, and failure to prepare teachers to teach the new curriculum.¹⁰⁷¹ Despite printing enough textbooks, “many students have not received textbooks or have bought copies of textbooks from market.”¹⁰⁷²

As for the content of the existing textbooks, an analysis of copies the MoE made available during field visits and available on the MoE website reveals the incorporation of peace education elements in several subjects. I reviewed the textbooks thanks to a search for keywords related to key aspects of peace education such as tolerance, respect, peaceful conflict resolution, or human rights. Peace education elements were not only found in textbooks dedicated Life Skills and Social Studies, but also in the ones developed to teach the Dari language (in all grades), the Religious Education taught in the General Education system (in all

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 2015-2020*, 10.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷² Ibid.

grades except for grades 1, 3, 4, 11 and 12), and Civic Education (grade 9). The review of these textbooks also unveiled elements that are not conflict-sensitive, particularly in the Religious Education textbooks. Detailed results of this review are available in Appendix C.

Teacher training in peace education was developed with the support of GIZ and UNESCO.¹⁰⁷³ It was piloted in a few teacher-training centers in 2014, and rolled out nationwide in 2015. This training program aimed at introducing the key principles of peace education to Afghan teachers, and did not train them in teaching peace education to their students.

In addition to this review of the Afghan national curriculum, it is important to mention several key characteristics of Afghan history textbooks, even if there are no peace education element in them. Indeed, these books were at the center of a great debate about the conflict sensitivity of the historical content that should be taught to Afghan students. Because there is widespread suspicion of the potential political role played by education, officials were concerned by the possible disagreements that might arise in classrooms and in communities on the interpretation of past events. They struggled to find a way to agree on modern history, so they recently decided to pause history in 1978 and, thus, to omit the Soviet war, the Mujahedeen, the Taliban or the U.S. military presence. “Our recent history tears us apart. We have created a curriculum based on the older history that brings us together, with figures universally recognized as being great,” said Farooq

¹⁰⁷³ Interview with GIZ representative in Afghanistan (November 5, 2015). More information is available at: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14677.html>. Exact figures and results of this training program are not available at this time.

Wardak, then Afghanistan's Education Minister, "these are the first books in decades that are depoliticized and de-ethnicized."¹⁰⁷⁴ Due to his belief in community building through education, Wardak explained that this new curriculum needed to appeal to all Afghans and could contribute to helping bring more than 4 million children currently out of school back to the classroom. Despite broad consensus on this idea, some Afghan scholars and educators have pushed back, claiming the ministry abdicated its academic responsibility.

D. Peace Education in Education Policy and Practice in Afghanistan: Critical Factors

The review of education policy and practice in Afghanistan revealed the influence of international recommendations and discussions on peace education. Indeed, the government has integrated some peace education elements in its national education strategic plans and in its national curriculum. However, this influence remains limited for various reasons that will be detailed hereafter. This analysis is based on the data presented in the first sections of this chapter and on interviews conducted in Afghanistan in 2014 and 2015. The lack of time and resources did not allow for the administration of an extensive survey, but I had the opportunity to talk to 22 individuals positioned in various departments and levels at the MoE, and the analysis that follows is based on the data collected during these interviews.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Kevin Sieff, "In Afghanistan, a New Approach to Teaching History: Leave out the Wars," *The Washington Post*, February 4, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-afghanistan-a-new-approach-to-teaching-history-leave-out-the-wars/2012/02/03/gIQA57KNqQ_story.html.

1. A Limited Presence of Peace Education

While the national education policy has gradually incorporated more peace education elements since the Education Law was promulgated in 2008, the main education policy documents do not provide much detail about peace education and mention it only briefly. The 2003 report of the Independent High Commission on Education largely drew from the global recommendations on peace education, and thus, was influenced by UNESCO's support.¹⁰⁷⁵ However, there is a disconnect between the Commission's recommendations on peace education and what has been adopted in national education strategy and policy. At the national education policy level, peace education is often barely mentioned and is thus far from being a priority.

Peace education has not become an independent subject in the national curriculum, but it is nevertheless present as a crosscutting issue diluted in several school subjects such as Life Skills, Civic Education, Social Studies, Dari and Pashtun language studies, and Religious Education. The review of current textbooks from these subjects has revealed various references to peace education elements that are promising, but the review has also unveiled elements that are not conflict-sensitive, particularly in the Religious Education textbooks.

Peace education's limited presence in national education policy and practice is explained by several factors. First, peace education has suffered from the tension between access and quality (including content) of education in the education

¹⁰⁷⁵ A finding that was confirmed in an interview with a high official at the Afghan National commission for UNESCO (October 12, 2015).

strategy—a common tension in fragile states and post-conflict situations. In the three NESPs published since 2001, the MoE provides ample details about its strategy to increase access, with an important focus on school construction. While the MoE did realize early on that the quality of education was an issue, it did not dedicate as much effort to improving quality, and neither did the international community.¹⁰⁷⁶ This is a consequence of limited funding for the education sector in general, but it is also easier to measure results related to access, and to communicate about tangible figures such as schools constructed or rehabilitated, and children enrolled, than it is to measure the impact of efforts related to education quality. As a result, while serious efforts were dedicated to bringing more children to school every year, lesser attention has been given to what these children would be taught. This issue has affected all subjects, including peace education.

Second, there has been a limited understanding of what peace education really means and entails. The confusion around the concept at the global level is clearly present at the country level as well. Almost all respondents at the MoE demonstrated partial or no understanding of the concept at first. When asked about the presence of peace education in the Afghan education policy, I received two types of answers. Some respondents said that there was no need for a specific peace education subject because there already is Islamic Education, explaining that “Islam is a religion of peace, so peace is already taught in the Religious Education subject.”¹⁰⁷⁷ However, the review of the Religious Education textbooks revealed a

¹⁰⁷⁶ Interviews with a high official at the Policy and Planning department of the Afghan MoE (June 17, 2014) and a UNESCO Afghanistan education specialist (October 12, 2015) officials.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Interviews with Afghan MoE staff (June 2014 and October 2015).

limited presence of peace education elements as well as elements that are not conflict-sensitive. Other respondents requested an explanation of what peace education implies. Both types of answers demonstrated a need to clarify what peace education actually means. Once I clarified the concept, some respondents not directly involved in the curriculum development stated that it was absent from the education policy and the curriculum.¹⁰⁷⁸ Their lack of awareness of the presence of peace education elements and principles in the NESPs, in the curriculum framework, and in several school subjects reveals either a lack of ownership of those documents, or a lack of internal communication within the MoE. After I ensured that my interview subjects understood what peace education means, several respondents added that peace is not the mission of the MoE. One Senior Evaluation Specialist at the Planning & Evaluation Department stated that peace is not the “responsibility” of the MoE, but “if the High Peace Council recommends peace education, we will include it in the curriculum.”¹⁰⁷⁹ Along the same lines, a high official at the Afghan National commission for UNESCO share the following view of peace education:

“Everybody at the MoE believes that peace is only the job of the High Peace Council, and they do not have a clear definition of Peace Education. Even people at the High Peace Council do not have a clear concept of Peace Education for children. There are differences between what we sign with

¹⁰⁷⁸ Interviews with Afghan MoE staff (June 2014 and October 2015).

¹⁰⁷⁹ Interview with a Senior Evaluation Specialist, Research and Evaluation Unit, Planning & Evaluation Department of the Afghan MoE (October 6, 2015).

international communities and then what we practically include in our systems.”¹⁰⁸⁰

The last part of this statement reveals a certain powerlessness of these global recommendations to influence local support for peace education. It also underscores the confusion around the concept of peace education and its goals, and the relative failure of the advocacy efforts of the international community and the individuals directly engaged in this process. The following statement complements these impressions. Someone highly placed at the Afghan permanent delegation at UNESCO did not mention the existing presence of peace education elements in the national curriculum, and even claimed that “peace education has not its place in schools because children and adolescents are not mature enough to understand; that it should be reserved for the university level.”¹⁰⁸¹ This view reveals again a failure to understand what peace education in schools is and what it can achieve. It also confirms one of the limitations of these global recommendations that has been previously underlined in this dissertation. Although the Permanent Delegation of Afghanistan to UNESCO did adopt *Recommendation 74* and endorsed the *Paris Declaration on Conflict-sensitive Education*, if the individuals in the Afghan delegation are not convinced of their value, they will hardly promote the content of these documents or contribute to the advocacy efforts at the country level in order to ensure their implementation. This confirms the fragility of the system and the associated mechanisms that have been in place so far. It can easily prevent

¹⁰⁸⁰ Interview with a high official at the Afghan National commission for UNESCO (October 12, 2015).

¹⁰⁸¹ Interview with a highly placed official in the Afghan permanent delegation at UNESCO (June 23, 2014).

international recommendations and standards from being carried forward at the country level. This situation also demonstrates the importance of the convictions of individuals, and thus who is in charge at a particular time. This conclusion may also be drawn from the story Spink reported about the Minister of Education's 2002 decision to have the UNO textbooks reprinted because of his connection with the University of Nebraska, despite the existence of other options. If this is true, it means that if someone else had been Minister at the time and had been more aware of and concerned of the potentially negative role of educational content, he or she would have probably made a different decision. Noteworthy, the current Minister of Education said that "while some topics related to peace are included in the national curriculum, it is not enough, we need more."¹⁰⁸² Hopefully, this will be translated in concrete actions in the near future to improve the presence and role of peace education in the national education policy and practice in Afghanistan.

Third, the head of the Policy and Planning Department at the MoE explained that the ministry made a decision to proceed gradually with the curriculum reform rather than forcing a radical change upon the Afghan people.¹⁰⁸³ The priority of the ministry was to remove all references to violence and hatred from the textbooks first. This could also explain the limited presence of peace education in the curriculum. Nevertheless, even this goal has not been reached yet, as some textbooks are still not fully conflict-sensitive. Moreover, the ministry decided not to reduce too drastically the space allocated to Religious Education in the study

¹⁰⁸² Interview with the Minister of Education (October 10, 2015).

¹⁰⁸³ Interviews with the head of the Policy and Planning Department at the Afghan MoE (June 17, 2014).

plan considering the history of past curriculum reforms in the country presented in Chapter V. The review of the main national education policy and strategy documents earlier in this chapter also underscored the importance of religion in the education system. While the focus of this research was not specifically the influence of religion on the integration of peace education in the national curriculum, I did not get a sense that it represented a particular obstacle. Further research would be needed to draw a conclusion on this question.

Fourth, the head of the Curriculum Development and Textbooks department also presented the lack of resources as a technical reason for making peace education a crosscutting issue in the curriculum as opposed to a separate subject, since overcrowded classrooms and shift systems in schools do not allow enough time in the school's schedule for an additional subject.¹⁰⁸⁴ He added that when the MoE has to divide available hours between subjects, priority goes to the subjects that are "market oriented".¹⁰⁸⁵ Indeed, the Afghan education system undergoes the same economic pressures underlined by Harris.¹⁰⁸⁶ The MoE envisions a market orientation of the Afghan education system that does not leave much room for subjects such as peace education.

A fifth explanation for the low priority on peace education is the lack of donor support: "The big donors of the Ministry of Education have not had any focus or interest on peace education. They have brought topics like rights, human rights,

¹⁰⁸⁴ Interviews with the head of the Curriculum Development and Textbooks Department at the Afghan MoE (June 17, 2014).

¹⁰⁸⁵ An information confirmed by a UNESCO Afghanistan education specialist (June 5, 2014).

¹⁰⁸⁶ Harris, "History of Peace Education."

women rights and children rights but not peace education.”¹⁰⁸⁷ A Deputy Minister confirmed this view.¹⁰⁸⁸ As a result, funding available for peace education programs has been much lower than for other types of programs. Considering the general lack of resources in the education system, and the levels of corruption in the education sector, this relative lack of interest from donors also contributed to the lack of prioritization at the MoE level. The current drastic reduction in international aid to Afghanistan, and thus to the education sector overall, will certainly exacerbate this trend moving forward.¹⁰⁸⁹

2. A Challenged Implementation of Peace Education in Schools

The presence of peace education elements in some textbooks does not guarantee that these elements will actually be implemented in the classrooms, especially in fragile contexts such as Afghanistan. A number of factors can hinder this implementation. Some of these factors can be identified based on data collected during interviews in Afghanistan, and others are hypotheses, based on the literature and my experience in the field, that I could not test as part of this research because of the insecure climate that prevented a lengthy stay in Afghanistan and a large number of school visits in various provinces. It will be important to empirically explore these factors in further research.

First, and as revealed in official MoE documents, there is a limited circulation of textbooks in Afghanistan for various reasons (e.g. a lack of resources,

¹⁰⁸⁷ Interview with a UNESCO Afghanistan education specialist (October 12, 2015).

¹⁰⁸⁸ Interview with a Deputy Minister at the Afghan MoE (October 13, 2015).

¹⁰⁸⁹ Several respondents at the MoE have underscored their concern for the reduction in funding (October 6 and 7, 2015).

dysfunctions of the system, corruption, or insecurity). As a result, although some textbooks include peace education, the implementation of these principles depends on the presence of these textbooks in schools.

Second, in cases where textbooks make it into schools and in the right amount, the crosscutting format that the ministry adopted for peace education represents a challenge and does not guarantee actual implementation. Indeed, overcrowded classrooms and the resulting shift system reduce the time available for the delivery of the national curriculum. Indeed, the study plan in the Curriculum Framework forecasts that students will spend from 24 hours a week in primary education to 36 hours a week in school in upper secondary education.¹⁰⁹⁰ But overcrowding does not allow students to complete these numbers of hours, particularly in schools with more than two shifts per day.¹⁰⁹¹ When I asked the MoE staff what proportion of schools in Afghanistan can offer the number of hours planned in the Curriculum Framework, I was told unsurprisingly that the data is not available. The lack of teacher qualifications can also hinder the implementation of peace education even if textbooks are available in the schools. The teachers usually concentrate their efforts on topics that they understand best, and as a result, if a topic is diluted in various school subjects, it can easily be skipped. The other reason that could dissuade teachers from teaching topics related to peace education is the associated pedagogy recommended by the textbooks. Because peace education calls for participatory teaching methods and the facilitation of classroom discussions, it is a

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ministry of Education, *Curriculum Framework - Afghanistan*, 28.

¹⁰⁹¹ Something I have observed in the two schools I visited in the Paghman school district (June 9, 2014).

very different approach from the rote teaching method many teachers still practice. My experience with training teachers in Burundi demonstrated that the type of pedagogy recommended by peace education requires serious training and cannot be easily mastered without technical support. If the teachers do not feel comfortable with this method, they can be discouraged. Another source of resistance to this teaching method can come from the school administration, as revealed by a 2013 UNESCO study on schools in Afghanistan. It reports an unfamiliarity of some school principals with the new teaching methods and their preference for the old system of having students repeat after the teacher.¹⁰⁹² Moreover, the fact that peace education topics do not form the basis of national examinations “reduces their importance for both teachers and students as children are focused on exams rather than prepared for the practical aspects of life.”¹⁰⁹³ A final factor that can also explain teachers’ resistance to peace education is the fact that some teachers may also skip the topics because they do not believe these are important or that other topics seem more appropriate for the development of children and their future.

Third, if textbooks are available in schools and teachers actually teach the peace education topics, one must confront questions about the actual and expected impact on students and the community. In particular, the practice of corporal punishment at school and at home goes against peace education’s key principles. Several respondents reported this challenge:

¹⁰⁹² Strand, *Financing Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities for Action*, 6.

¹⁰⁹³ UNESCO, *Learning to Live Together: Education Policies and Realities in the Asia-Pacific* (Paris: UNESCO; UNESCO Bangkok Office, 2014), 74, <http://mgiep.unesco.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Report-Learning-to-Live-Together.pdf>.

“Student reads one thing in book and then observes his/her parents and teachers doing the opposite (corporal punishment) that also causes students to learn what he/she sees not what he/she reads.”¹⁰⁹⁴

“Since teachers in schools are not qualified and intelligent, when students challenge their ability, they lose patience and try to keep them under their control. The only way they know how to stop the students is physical violence, teachers start beating and torturing students in order to feel more powerful. When teachers are not able to answer student’s questions, they commit violence.”¹⁰⁹⁵

E. Conclusion

“We have included peace education and topics like that in schools but it is top to bottom, it does not reach students. Moreover, teachers and parents are not interested in these topics, they only want their child to learn and find a job. Peace education is not a priority in the Ministry, at home, in schools and in the plans.”

Interview with a UNESCO Afghanistan education specialist (October 12, 2015)

This quote summarizes particularly well the findings discussed in this chapter. While the international community’s recommendations on peace education did influence the Afghan government’s education policy and practice, this influence has been limited. At the policy level, peace education is often only briefly mentioned, and the decision was taken to introduce it in the national curriculum as

¹⁰⁹⁴ Interview with a UNESCO Afghanistan education specialist (October 12, 2015).

¹⁰⁹⁵ Interviews with an Afghan local NGO working with Afghan schools (October 8, 2015).

a crosscutting issue, as opposed to a separate subject. Topics related to peace education are included in several textbooks, but their actual implementation in the classrooms promises to be challenging and uncertain. The next chapter will explore efforts by an Afghan NGO to deliver a peace education program offered as a separate subject in schools, in order to assess the provision of peace education at the local level in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER VII – Peace Education in Fragile States: a Local Perspective

A. Introduction

“Educating the Afghan people is the best “weapon” against the Taliban
and the ignorance on which they feed.”

– Suraya Sadeed, Founder of Help the Afghan Children (2010).¹⁰⁹⁶

The literature shows that school-based peace education programs are often criticized for their lack of serious impact evaluation. Help the Afghan Children (HTAC) is one of the rare organizations in the world (and particularly in a fragile state) that has tackled this issue and has developed a mixed-methods evaluation system that includes quantitative indicators. It is also one of the first organizations in Afghanistan that has introduced peace education programs in schools, in partnership with the MoE. More recently, the MoE endorsed HTAC’s proposal to develop and test a peace education curriculum for lower and upper secondary schools (grades 7 through 12). In my interviews with HTAC’s Founder and the organization’s Country Director, they explained that if HTAC is able to provide evidence of the program’s success, the MoE may decide to integrate the peace education program in its national curriculum.¹⁰⁹⁷ This chapter will first present HTAC’s peace education program and assess to what extent it has been influenced by global recommendations on peace education. The chapter will then explore

¹⁰⁹⁶ Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, “Spreading Hope to 120,000 Afghan Children,” *Peace Builder*, March 29, 2010, <https://emu.edu/now/peacebuilder/2010/03/building-schools/>.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Interviews with HTAC’s Founder (March 14, 2014) and with HTAC Country Director (June 3, 2014).

HTAC's recent efforts to scale up its peace education program to the national level, in order to determine whether this local initiative can influence the government's education policy and practice at the national level.

B. Background on HTAC

HTAC is a non-profit and non-governmental organization established in 1993 by Suraya Sadeed, an Afghan-American woman, in response to the terrible conditions of Afghan children she witnessed during Afghanistan's civil war in the early 1990s. Until 2016, HTAC was registered both in the USA and in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹⁸

Throughout its history, HTAC has worked on various types of educational programs that include computer education, teacher training, peace education, environmental education, literacy programs, landmine education, and cultural exchange programs. HTAC has also collaborated with and trained leaders and members of civil society organizations in under-served regions in conflict resolution and peacebuilding skills. Participants in this program reported success at resolving long-standing conflicts both within and between various tribes. Additionally, the organization claims it has provided humanitarian aid and emergency relief to over 2 million children and their families in refugee camps and under-served areas of the Afghanistan since its inception.

¹⁰⁹⁸ HTAC was registered in the U.S. as a non-profit organization with a 501-C-3 status until March 2016. HTAC is still registered as a non-profit organization with the Ministry of Economy in Afghanistan.

The organization's vision is to contribute to an "Afghanistan where all children have equal rights to education and are able to fully contribute to building Afghanistan's civil society."¹⁰⁹⁹ "I believe in the power of education for children, and particularly peace education, and that it is an essential strategy for bringing sustainable peace in Afghanistan," Sadeed told me in an interview.¹¹⁰⁰ She explained that, to fulfill its vision, HTAC has been working with various partners to establish model community-based schools in different regions of Afghanistan. In addition to providing teacher training, and a safe and clean learning environment, HTAC develops and delivers innovative learning programs that provide Afghan children with knowledge, life skills, and tools that help them be better prepared for the future. For HTAC, working in partnership with local communities is critical for the sustainability of its efforts. They encourage community leaders, elders, and parents to take ownership of their schools and of their children's long-term educational welfare. HTAC's knowledge of Afghanistan and the local context is essential for the achievement of its mission. They insist on hiring Afghan professionals living in Afghanistan since they know the culture, speak the language, and are in touch with the country's needs. Thanks to its deep presence in the field, HTAC has developed strong working relationships with officials at national ministries, as well as at the provincial and local levels. They have also built along the years key partnerships with various organizations, individual donors and foundations that are essential for the support of their programs. HTAC's programs

¹⁰⁹⁹ HTAC, "Help the Afghan Children 2014 Annual Report" (HTAC, 2014), 2.

¹¹⁰⁰ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

have been financed mostly through private donations from foundations and the Afghan diaspora in North America.

Since its inception, the organization has been working with communities to build or renovate schools in various and varied provinces that include Kabul, Kapisa, Samangan, Jawzjan, Laghman, Kandahar, Farah, Sar-e-pul, and Baghlan. HTAC's team in Kabul is currently composed of 10 staff members, and includes a managing director, a program manager, a finance manager, a logistics manager, and an accountant.

C. HTAC's Peace Education program

1. Concept and Content

According to HTAC's management team, HTAC started developing one of the first peace education programs in Afghan public schools in 2002, with the support of the MoE and assistance from Dr. Seddiq Weera, an Afghan-Canadian expert in the field.¹¹⁰¹ Sadeed added this program originated following her realization that, in countries like Afghanistan, a vastly under-reported yet significant effect of prolonged conflict has been the severe emotional trauma suffered by tens of thousands of Afghan children who have been, and continue to be exposed to violence.¹¹⁰² For her, "this exposure not only impacts their ability to cope, learn, and develop positive behaviors (e.g. self-esteem, respect for others, patience, forgiveness, and a desire to help others) that will serve them well in adulthood, it

¹¹⁰¹ Interviews with the former Director of HTAC's U.S. operations (February 15, 2012) and with HTAC's Country Director (April 28, 2014).

¹¹⁰² Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

often leads to a devastating cycle of violence and instability when many of these children grow up, angry, resentful, and vulnerable to extremist viewpoints.”¹¹⁰³ As a result, children’s exposure to violence has serious implications; not just for the children themselves, but also for their families and their entire communities. She has observed that when children feel threatened or victimized, and they begin to accept and expect violence as the norm; especially young boys: they begin resorting to aggressive behavior whenever they are unable to resolve their differences.¹¹⁰⁴ Consequently, she believes that if they receive no help, these children grow up believing that violence is the only solution, and thus many of them become highly vulnerable to extremist viewpoints and groups.¹¹⁰⁵ Therefore, she sought to establish an educational program that could teach these children peaceful ways to manage conflicts, leading HTAC to conduct a peace education program based on an integrated approach.

In HTAC’s program, peace education is designed as a separate subject that should be taught in addition to other school subject areas. However, because peace education is not included in the national school curriculum as a separate subject yet, it is taught after school hours by teachers who are teaching other subjects. HTAC’s Country Director explained that participating and trained teachers get a stipend of between \$50 and \$70 per month to teach the peace education curriculum during their free time.¹¹⁰⁶ The program’s key learning objectives include the following:

¹¹⁰³ Interview with HTAC’s Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹⁰⁴ Interview with HTAC’s Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹⁰⁵ Interview with HTAC’s Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹⁰⁶ Interview with HTAC’s Country Director (April 28, 2014).

- “providing tools to help children better cope with the emotional trauma many of them suffer from previous or current exposure to violence;
- teaching children the basic concepts of peaceful everyday living, including the art of non-violent conflict resolution to resolve differences;
- teaching children to accept and respect individual, religious, ethnic, and gender differences;
- training teachers to role model peace education concepts in the classroom;
- providing realistic activities for children where they can apply peace education principles learned in class; and
- working with parents and local communities to support and reinforce peace education principles in the home.”¹¹⁰⁷

HTAC’s peace education curriculum went through two major phases since its inception. In the beginning, it consisted of a six-week program based on a storybook, which then evolved in a larger curriculum developed for grades 7 to 12 and taught weekly during the entire academic year. The latter will be detailed in a later section as part of HTAC’s scaling-up efforts.

In partnership with McMaster University’s Center for Peace Studies based in Canada, under Weera’s supervision, HTAC first developed an illustrated storybook in English called “Journey of Peace” to be used in schools. With content largely influenced by international standards on peace education, the storybook was translated into Dari and Pashto, and then reviewed by several Afghan scholars for

¹¹⁰⁷ Suraya Sadeed, “Peace Education Can Make a Difference in Afghanistan,” in *Education for Global Citizenship*, ed. Education Above All (Doha, Qatar: Education Above All, 2012), 146, http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/EAA_Education_for_Global_Citizenship.pdf.

accuracy. It included several episodes of the responses of an Afghan family to the hardships of war. Following one of the global recommendations on the content of peace education, each episode was deeply rooted in the Afghan culture, and focused on many of the challenges Afghan children face while offering realistic actions children could take to help promote the healing process. The values conveyed in each story were consistent with many aspects of the Afghan culture. They helped the children deal with the consequences of emotions such as anger, fear, or sadness, thanks to the development of behaviors such as maintaining patience, expressing sympathy, mediating conflicts, or apologizing.¹¹⁰⁸ Each story also introduced problem-solving tools children can incorporate and practice both at school and at home (e.g. empathy, cooperation, and acceptance of loss), as well as character-building themes (e.g. affection, self-esteem, forgiveness, and appreciation of virtuous actions) that are reinforced by teachers. In my interview with Sadeed, she explained that not only were these peace stories read and discussed in class, but students also learned to role-play the lessons from the stories either using puppets or participating in mini-theaters.¹¹⁰⁹ According to her, the use of hand puppets helped hold younger students' attention, and allowed views to be expressed more freely through attribution to the puppets. She added that sometimes the teacher invited shy, withdrawn students to play the role of more outspoken characters in order to improve their confidence and self-esteem.¹¹¹⁰ All stories were family-centered so they could be read and shared among families. Sadeed also explained

¹¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁹ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹¹⁰ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014). Sadeed, "Peace Education Can Make a Difference in Afghanistan," 146.

that peace education teachers were trained to build and follow lesson plans (and learning goals) around the core themes for each storybook.¹¹¹¹

HTAC trains teachers through a five-day intensive workshop where they learn how to use these stories to generate participative learning in the classroom to engage students' interest and commitment. HTAC-trained peace education teachers are required to complete a training program where they learn about key concepts, principles and approaches to teach peace to children. Part of the training involves acquiring critical skills and demonstrating positive behaviors both in and out of the classroom; learning the techniques of non-violent conflict resolution; and developing effective communication skills to assist parents to reinforce the principles of peaceful everyday living at home.¹¹¹² This training is also an opportunity to address the all-too-frequent use of corporal punishment practices by many Afghan teachers that represents an obstacle not only for the students' learning conditions, but also to successful implementation of the peace education program, as underscored in the previous chapter.¹¹¹³ HTAC's training helps teachers and principals learn the counterproductive effects of corporal punishment in general and to peace education in particular; as well as how to model key positive behaviors that will build better safety, security, trust, and cooperation among their students.

One important characteristic of the first phase of HTAC's peace education program was the establishment of a *peace room* in all participating schools. Before

¹¹¹¹ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹¹² Sadeed, "Peace Education Can Make a Difference in Afghanistan," 147.

¹¹¹³ HTAC, "Samangan Peace Education Project Description," Unpublished (HTAC, 2009).

the program started, HTAC negotiated with each school's principal to have one classroom dedicated to this program. The room was arranged differently than the other classrooms, and was supposed to be welcoming and stimulating. The walls were decorated with colorful drawings, curtains were added, and the tables and chairs were arranged in a 'U' shape to favor face-to-face interaction. According to Sadeed:

“HTAC learned, early on, that the traditional classroom environment (with the teacher as authority figure and students not able to see and communicate with one another), actually prohibited learning and practicing the principles of peace. So we decided to create a new setting where students could sit around a large table and openly discuss lessons and assignments while the teacher acted more as a group facilitator.”¹¹¹⁴

This room was not only used for the peace education sessions, but also for peer-mediations between students when needed. Sadeed added that this was another tool that HTAC's borrowed from conflict resolution education programs. HTAC's peace education teachers are trained to choose and coach groups of students to assist them in mediating conflicts or potential conflicts among students. Aggressive students are often selected and given the role of mediators so they can learn the valuable lessons and benefits of peaceful problem-solving.¹¹¹⁵ HTAC's Country Director reported that by utilizing this student-centered approach, other students

¹¹¹⁴ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹¹⁵ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

look upon these peer mediators as leaders, which increases their motivation to learn and practice non-violent conflict resolution themselves comes very quickly.¹¹¹⁶

The other important aspect of HTAC's peace education program is its increased inclusiveness and participatory approach over the years. The students and teachers trained in peace education are not the only targets of the program: the whole community is involved. HTAC includes the community through the creation of "community school committees" and thanks to an "orientation" for parents and other teachers at the school. These groups represent secondary targets that are critical for the program's success and sustainability. Through its experience over the years, HTAC has learned that active community involvement by recognized community leaders, elders, parents, teachers, and other influential individuals is essential to community ownership and long-term sustainability of such programs. The mission of these committees is to function as an active bridge between the local community and its school, providing a form of support that builds local ownership of their children's educational welfare.¹¹¹⁷ Each committee is headed by a recognized leader, whom HTAC trains to organize and facilitate meetings, coordinate committee decisions and actions, and interface with HTAC to assess committee effectiveness. Through this process, adults learn to utilize peace-related activities to resolve their own conflicts and reject violence and other forms of aggressive behavior.¹¹¹⁸

¹¹¹⁶ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (June 3, 2014).

¹¹¹⁷ Interview with the former Director of HTAC's U.S. operations (February 15, 2012).

¹¹¹⁸ Sadeed, "Peace Education Can Make a Difference in Afghanistan," 147.

HTAC has also developed parental guides for peace education that serve as a useful tool to understand what their children learn in the peace education program, and to provide them with helpful ideas to discuss these values with their children.¹¹¹⁹ Consequently, HTAC's program extends peace education learning into homes by involving parents as partners with an essential role in facilitating fundamental change in children's attitudes and behaviors. Trained teachers help parents understand the goal of the program and how they can play a "positive role by reinforcing basic peace principles within the home environment."¹¹²⁰

Over the years, the HTAC peace education program evolved continuously through a regular evaluation process that provided important feedback about the program, its strengths and weaknesses. HTAC's team calls it the "continuous improvement cycle" and it uses the following six steps:

1. "Identify a performance area that needs to be improved.
2. Establish a performance improvement goal or objective.
3. Identify and analyze problems or barriers that are preventing performance to be better.
4. Brainstorm and agree on solutions that are likely to improve performance.
5. Redesign, modify and implement the solutions for a set period of time.
6. Measure and evaluate any changes in performance, what is working and why, and what still needs improvement. Then recycle the six steps."¹¹²¹

¹¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹¹²⁰ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹²¹ HTAC, "Jawzjan Peace Education Project Report," Unpublished (HTAC, 2014), 8.

The next section will review the main achievements and challenges that HTAC encountered while implementing its peace education program.

2. Achievements

Since 2002, with the support of the MoE and local communities, HTAC has established peace education programs in 71 schools in six different provinces in Afghanistan: Kabul, Kapisa, Samangan, Jawzjan, Laghman, and Kandahar (see Figure 10).¹¹²² Over 1,300 teachers were trained in peace education, and over 87,000 male and female students have completed the program.¹¹²³ In an interview with HTAC's management team, the Country Director confirmed that in all locations and participating schools, there have been indications of a reduction in violence and aggressive behaviors among students, and a significant decrease or full abandonment of corporal punishment among teachers.¹¹²⁴

HTAC was one of the first organizations to develop quantitative peace education metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of peace education in schools. According to HTAC's Country Director, teachers and HTAC observers measure the impact of peace education on four critical performance areas:

- “Observable aggressive conflicts between students such as fighting, harassment, and bullying,
- potential conflicts resolved peacefully between students,
- positive role modeling by teachers,

¹¹²² Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

¹¹²³ HTAC, “Help the Afghan Children 2014 Annual Report.”

¹¹²⁴ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

- and positive peace-related behaviors demonstrated by students.”¹¹²⁵



Figure 10: Provinces where HTAC has implemented its peace education programs since 2002.¹¹²⁶

HTAC measures and evaluates how effectively students are able to learn and apply peace education principles by utilizing a series of field-tested performance measures and goals where data on specific observable behaviors is continuously tracked, recorded, and reported.¹¹²⁷ While attitudinal surveys bring added value to the overall process, measuring actual changes in behavior over time provides an abundance of data that not only reflects the relative success of peace education efforts are, but also identifies those areas of the program where improvement is

¹¹²⁵ Interview with HTAC’s Country Director (April 28, 2014).

¹¹²⁶ Map No. 3958 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS June 2011 / Department of Field Support Cartographic Section. Available at:

<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis.pdf>

¹¹²⁷ Sadeed, “Peace Education Can Make a Difference in Afghanistan,” 147.

necessary.¹¹²⁸ According to the data collected during the interviews with HTAC's management team and the programs report, HTAC was able to observe the same types of impacts in each location where the peace education program was implemented.

First, the program has a clear effect on the behavior of students towards each other. In one of my interviews with Sadeed, she reported there is often a dramatic reduction in observed aggressive behavior (e.g. fighting, bullying, and harassment) among students – up to 70 percent in the first year alone – and an increase in positive behaviors learned during the program.¹¹²⁹ She also stated that parents of enrolled schoolchildren also report significant positive changes in their behavior at home: previously uncooperative children are now demonstrating respect for elders and siblings, as well as an increased desire to communicate, to be part of the family unit, and to cooperate regarding chores and other responsibilities.¹¹³⁰ Figure 11 provides a powerful example of an anecdotal evidence of this program's impact in addressing ethnic and religious differences in Samangan (see Appendix E for two additional stories narrated by students who participated in the program).

¹¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹¹²⁹ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

¹¹³⁰ Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

“Mehdi, a 7th grader, is a Hazara minority and was considered a stranger by his classmates, who would taunt him: “You are Shiite/Hazara. You are no Afghan.” Such taunts not only impacted his ability to learn in class, but made him feel horrible and he suffered bouts of depression according to his parents. During the course of the program, these same students learned the value of respecting and getting along with others who (like Mehdi), may be different, but are no less worthy. Not only have the taunts stopped, but these students are including Mehdi in their conversations and recreational activities. As a result, Mehdi’s school performance has improved dramatically and he’s expressing happiness with his classmates.”

Figure 11: Anecdotal evidence of the impact of HTAC’s peace education program in Samangan.¹¹³¹

Second, there is an impact on the behavior of teachers towards students, and thus, on the relationships between them. In one of my interviews with HTAC’s country director, he noted that peace education teacher training and coaching has reduced the use of counter-productive corporal punishment practices to almost zero.¹¹³²

Third, this project has a powerful impact on the majority of parents of enrolled students, who, through consistent anecdotal feedback to teachers, successfully reinforce the values of peace at home and in the process. And in the process, the program most likely changed parental attitudes about discipline, communication, and trust with their children (see Figure 12 for an example of such impact in a school in Samangan).

¹¹³¹ HTAC, “Samangan Peace Education Project - Final Report,” Unpublished (HTAC, 2011).

¹¹³² Interview with HTAC’s Country Director (April 28, 2014).

“Sweeta, a 10th grader, comes from a family of 12 whose parents are illiterate and had little respect for the education of girls. Shortly after the peace education program began, Sweeta’s father compelled Sweeta to quit school and help her mother tend to taking care of her 7 younger siblings. At home, Sweeta’s mother (not knowing any better), constantly scolded and used aggressive behavior in disciplining Sweeta and her brothers and sisters. Sweeta’s teacher was aware of Sweeta’s dream of completing high school and how enthusiastic she had been in the peace education class. She invited Sweeta’s parents to school, welcoming them with cups of milk and biscuits and explaining how the program had impacted their daughter. Since the parents couldn’t read the parental guide, the teacher calmly described the contents and key lessons. The parents were so impressed with the positive messages, that they promised they would support their daughter’s return to school. Several months later, they thanked the teacher after observing the impact the program had on Sweeta and her (positive) motivation in helping around the house and caring for her younger siblings. Most-importantly, the parents informed the teacher that they were (now) using positive behaviors around their children and had abandoned hitting and yelling.”

Figure 12: Example of the results of HTAC’s peace education program in Samangan.¹¹³³

Between 2010 and 2011, HTAC received funding to implement its peace education programs in Kandahar and Samangan. In 2010, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded a peace education program in 22 schools in Kandahar. At the end of the project, HTAC reported a 67.6 percent drop in aggressive conflicts between students. The same year, HTAC also started another peace education study in Samangan Province with the support of a grant from the United State Institute of Peace (USIP). Between 2010 and 2011, 315 trained teachers, and 2,800 boys and girls (in grades 7, 8, 9 and 10) in seven targeted schools participated in this peace education program. Additional schools were

¹¹³³ HTAC, “Samangan Peace Education Project - Final Report.”

selected for observation as a control group.¹¹³⁴ An article on USIP’s website listed the following positive results of the Samangan program over this period:

- the average number of observable conflicts between students decreased by 93 percent(from 3,457 per month to 345 per month);
- the average number of observed potential conflicts resolved peacefully between students increased from 100 per month to 2,960 per month;
- the number of teachers observed consistently modeling peace education behaviors increased by 95 percent.¹¹³⁵

According to HTAC, these results were reinforced by the comparison with the results in the control group. This comparison revealed striking differences between the two groups within just a few months of program implementation. These experiences helped HTAC’s team identify best practices and develop a “peace education model” that they believed could serve future consideration for the expansion of peace education into other districts and regions of Afghanistan.

While HTAC’s team took the evaluation task seriously, and designed one of the rare peace education evaluation tool based on a mixed-method approach, it still lacks elements that make it more scientifically rigorous. The management team is conscious of this issue, and invited me to help them design a more rigorous evaluation system. However, once I explained what it should look like and what it would entail, the team realized that they were missing the required financial means and human resources for such an endeavor at the time.

¹¹³⁴ To ensure statistical validity, identical observations were replicated in non-participating local schools and only nominal changes were seen in any of the measured categories.

¹¹³⁵ Jeremy Moore, “Advancing Peace Education in Afghanistan,” *United States Institute of Peace*, May 3, 2011, <http://www.usip.org/publications/advancing-peace-education-in-afghanistan>.

3. Scaling-up efforts to establish a national school-based peace education curriculum in Afghanistan

a) Curriculum Development Process

Since the beginning of its peace education operations in 2002, HTAC has observed striking changes in student and teacher behavior in the participating schools. Not only has the number of aggressive conflicts between students decreased, but teachers also report many cases of students from different ethnic groups establishing strong friendships.¹¹³⁶ Impressed by these sustained positive results along the years on students and local communities, in January 2011, the MoE endorsed HTAC's proposal to develop a national peace education program that would be taught as an independent subject in schools. The MoE officially authorized HTAC to develop a school-based peace education curriculum for grades 7 to 12, and to test it during a five-year period in several diverse provinces (to be selected with the MoE). While the storybook HTAC was previously using had been successful, it was designed for a six-week program and was therefore insufficient to support an independent subject that would be taught during an entire school year in five different grades. According to HTAC's management team, the MoE stated that, at the end of the pilot phase, if the program demonstrated a significant decrease in fighting and other conflicts among youth as well as reducing the use of corporal punishment by teachers, the MoE would seriously consider its introduction in all

¹¹³⁶ Ibid.

public schools across the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.¹¹³⁷ The Ministry encouraged HTAC to collaborate with other organizations conducting peace education activities in Afghanistan in order to combine their efforts and best practices for the development and implementation of a national peace education curriculum.¹¹³⁸

In 2012, HTAC received seed money from USIP that helped finance the development and testing of the national curriculum. Consequently, HTAC recruited a team of international peace education curriculum advisors who helped develop curriculum learning standards¹¹³⁹ and identified best peace education teaching practices from countries around the world that were incorporated into HTAC's existing program.¹¹⁴⁰ As a result, international standards on peace education are present in this curriculum as well, but its content still reflects the Afghan culture and traditions. Subsequently, a Teacher Manual and Student Workbook were developed and printed for each grade in English and translated into Dari. The Teacher Manual is structured around the lessons of the curriculum, and includes objective and learning activities for each lesson. The curriculum plans for two to three lessons per week, and each lesson is meant to be taught in 45 minutes.

After the The MoE Curriculum Department reviewed and approved all translated materials, HTAC conducted preliminary assessments of potential school

¹¹³⁷ Interviews with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014) and with HTAC's Country Director (June 3, 2014).

¹¹³⁸ Interviews with HTAC's Country Director and with HTAC's Peace Education Program Manager (June 3, 2014).

¹¹³⁹ Suraya Sadeed, *National School Based Peace Education Program (NSPEP) for Afghanistan - Curriculum Standards (Grades 7 -12)* (HTAC, 2012).

¹¹⁴⁰ Sadeed, "Peace Education Can Make a Difference in Afghanistan," 148.

sites for the peace education pilot program. Based on the result of the assessment and the feedback from the MoE, Jawzjan Province (in Northern Afghanistan) was selected as the first pilot for the test of the new learning materials.

b) First Pilot Test in Jawzjan

While I was eager to visit and conduct interviews in the pilot schools in Jawzjan, I was not able to travel outside of Kabul for security reasons. As a result, the data presented in this section was collected during interviews with HTAC's Country Director and Peace Education Program Manager in Kabul, and from the program reports they shared with me.

In the first phase of the pilot test, HTAC's Country Director explained that the team followed the same process they had developed for the previous version of the peace education program.¹¹⁴¹ They met with officials in Jawzjan's Department of Education to inform them of the program, the support from the Ministry, and to obtain their buy-in and support. Three school sites were identified, and 900 students (600 boys and 300 girls in grades 7 to 12) were enrolled in the program.¹¹⁴² Jawzjan Department of Education officials reviewed and approved HTAC's curriculum and teaching plan to ensure they met the educational standards of Jawzjan Province, which is a standard procedure in Afghanistan. A project staff supervisor and 15 master trainers in the Jawzjan area were hired and trained during a two-day workshop. Subsequent meetings with the directors of the three selected schools were held to obtain their buy-in and support. Directors were informed that

¹¹⁴¹ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (April 28, 2014).

¹¹⁴² HTAC, "Jawzjan Peace Education Project Report."

HTAC would be collecting baseline data prior to the start of training and the launch of the program launch to measure the delivery of the program and the performance of the curriculum. With assistance from school directors, 12 teachers (four from each school), were selected to participate in a five-day training workshop so they could deliver the new curriculum. They were also asked to fill out a pre-training survey to assess their attitudes toward and knowledge of peace. The same survey was given to them at the completion of the pilot to compare the evolution of their attitudes and behaviors. Additionally, and in accordance with its inclusive and whole-school approach, HTAC's team organized three-hour peace education orientation sessions for all 298 teachers at the three schools.

Once the funds were made available in May 2013, the pilot test started in June and was conducted until November, lasting almost a full school year.¹¹⁴³ HTAC's Peace Education Program Manager reported that HTAC's local team regularly monitored and evaluated the delivery of the program, assessing teacher performance and casually observing how the program was received by the participating students, school directors, and some parents of enrolled children. Students' knowledge of key concepts and skills in conflict management, active listening, and empathy increased.¹¹⁴⁴ And by monitoring students' behavior in the schoolyard, HTAC's team was able to assess to what extent the concepts and skill the students were learning were applied. Once the pilot test was completed, HTAC's team measured the performance of peace education using the same metrics

¹¹⁴³ In the Northern provinces of Afghanistan seriously affected by snow in the winter, the school year starts in April and ends in December, before the weather becomes too challenging for children.

¹¹⁴⁴ Interview with HTAC's Peace Education Program Manager (June 3, 2014).

the team used to obtain the baseline data. The team evaluated and compared the performance results against the original baseline data and subsequent performance goals that were established: results in all four performance areas slightly exceeded target goals (see Figure 13).

- 1) The number of teachers who had abandoned (counter-productive) corporal punishment practices and were role modeling positive, nurturing behaviors in the classroom increased from 60/298 (20.1%) to 244 of 298 (81.9%), exceeding the target goal of 80%.
- 2) The average number of aggressive conflicts among students per month at all three schools decreased from 624 to 185 (70.3% reduction), exceeding the target goal of 200 per month.
- 3) The average number of potentially aggressive conflicts peacefully resolved among students per month increased from 14 to 132, exceeding the target goal of 125 per month.
- 4) The number of all 9,507 students consistently modeling key peace education competencies increased from 210 (2.2%) to 6,795 (71.5%), exceeding the target goal of 70%.

Figure 13: Quantitative results of the pilot test in Jawzjan (2013).¹¹⁴⁵

In my interview with HTAC's Country Director, he stated that in addition to these quantitative measures, his team collected qualitative data through focus group sessions and written feedback from groups of students, teachers and master trainers on the effectiveness of the program, as well as suggestions for improving both the content and delivery of peace education in the future.¹¹⁴⁶ They also obtained anecdotal feedback from parents of enrolled children, provincial and district educators, and officials from the Jawzjan Provincial Department of Education who had been involved in both the training and implementation of the curriculum. Indeed, in an official letter of recommendation, Jawzjan's Provincial Education

¹¹⁴⁵ HTAC, "Jawzjan Peace Education Project Report," 7.

¹¹⁴⁶ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (April 28, 2014).

Director described peace education as one of the most useful programs he had seen and encouraged program stakeholders to continue meeting and learning best practices from one another.¹¹⁴⁷ According to HTAC, feedback was overall very positive and there was an overwhelming support for a continued rollout of the curriculum into other schools and regions of the country.

Encouraged by these results, the MoE confirmed its interest in having HTAC continue piloting the new curriculum in other regions. The organization worked with the MoE to identify potential locations.

c) Second Pilot Test in Paghman

In 2014, following the same decision-making process used in Jawzjan, HTAC and the MoE selected Paghman, a school district of the Kabul province, to conduct a second pilot of HTAC's new peace education curriculum. With financial support from the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), a non-profit organization based in the United States and Canada, HTAC was able to launch a three-year pilot test in eight schools in June 2014.

When I conducted my field research trip, the pilot test in Paghman had started two weeks earlier. I visited two of the eight pilot schools and interviewed six pilot teachers, a Master Trainer, and a Local Coordinator involved in the program. Located one hour driving west of Kabul, Paghman is considered relatively safer than the capital. The road to Paghman reveals greener hills and landscapes. While it was not spared from violence during the war, it has remained a weekend and

¹¹⁴⁷ Interviews with HTAC's Country Director and with HTAC's Peace Education Manager (June 3, 2014).

leisure destination for families living in Kabul. In recent years, the Afghan government has even engaged in several projects and initiatives to develop this area as a tourist destination.

The two schools I visited in Paghman were very different from the one I saw in Wardak in 2009. Children seemed happier and more cheerful, and compared to the austerity of the school in Wardak, these two schools felt much more welcoming—particularly the second school I visited. Despite its lack of resources, the school director maintained a garden with small trees and roses in the center of the school, surrounded by six classrooms. This school felt like a safe haven populated with children who seemed eager to learn and thrilled to be there. Nevertheless, the signs of war were still visible. Hanging over the entrance of the school, the bell used to signal the start and end of the class periods was a spent artillery shell casing, similar to the one I had seen in Wardak. The only difference was the flourishing vines surrounding it. The school was also using two tents as extra classrooms outside of the school walls that did not have any protection from the weather or from potential outside threats. The school director told me he had been asking the MoE without success for funding to expand the school walls.

Since the inception of the pilot test, 24 teachers (15 men and 9 women), and 1,600 students (834 boys and 766 girls) have been trained and have been participating in this peace education pilot program in Paghman (see Figure 14 for detailed numbers). HTAC's team has utilized the same process and evaluation system used in Jawzjan. With the help of participating schools administrators, HTAC was able to build trust with students' parents. HTAC's Country Director

explained that thanks to word-of-mouth communication, local communities were so eager to see the program implemented in their local schools that several schools were candidates for the pilot program.¹¹⁴⁸ Moreover, the number of student volunteers surpassed the number of available spots in the program. Both school directors I interviewed in Paghman stated that once the program started, several parents complained because their children had volunteered to participate and had not been selected.¹¹⁴⁹

	Schools	Male Teachers	Female Teachers	Boys	Girls	Total
1	Khalid Bin Walid	2	1	67	133	200
2	OriaKhail	2	1	133	67	200
3	Abdullah Bin Omar	0	3	0	200	200
4	EbrahimKhail	2	1	133	67	200
5	AbobakerSidiq	3	0	200	0	200
6	Koshkak	1	2	67	133	200
7	Chiltan	2	1	67	133	200
8	Hazrati Osman	3	0	166	34	200
	Totals	15	9	833	767	1,600

Figure 14: Peace Education Trainees in Paghman by the end of 2015.¹¹⁵⁰

The interviews I conducted in the pilot schools in Paghman confirmed the results HTAC’s team reported obtaining in other locations in the past. The six teachers confirmed they had volunteered to participate in the program and seemed very motivated.¹¹⁵¹ They discussed the changes they were starting to notice and reported that they could already observe changes in students’ behaviors in the classroom and with each other in the schoolyard. HTAC’s team also reported

¹¹⁴⁸ Interview with HTAC’s Country Director (June 3, 2014).

¹¹⁴⁹ Interviews with pilot school directors in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

¹¹⁵⁰ HTAC, “Paghman Peace Education Project Report,” Unpublished (HTAC, 2016), 1.

¹¹⁵¹ Interviews with pilot school teachers in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

instances of students using positive peer pressure to begin changing the attitudes and behaviors of siblings at home.¹¹⁵²

One of the two schools I visited had worked with HTAC in the past and had experienced the previous version of its peace education program. As a result, the teachers had more experience with the peace education program and recounted some anecdotal stories of the impact they believed the program had on themselves and on their students. For instance, one teacher in this school shared the following anecdote:

“Once a 12-grade assiduous girl student in my class had been absent for five consecutive days. I was afraid that her family had decided to marry her and put an end to her education, a common situation in Afghanistan for teenage girls. After my husband authorized my visit to the student’s home, I met with the girl’s mother who confirmed that her husband had plans to marry their daughter. I talked with the mother about the advantages of an extended education for her daughter’s future and convinced her to discuss it with the father. A few days later, the student was able to return to school and to complete her 12th grade. I believe that the mediation and communication skills she had learned thanks to HTAC peace education program motivated me to initiate the dialogue with this family. I am convinced that this program has a real transformation capacity on Afghan society and I hope it will be implemented in all the schools in the country.”¹¹⁵³

¹¹⁵² Interviews with HTAC’s Peace Education Program Manager and with HTAC’s Local Coordinator (June 3 and 9, 2014).

¹¹⁵³ Interview with a pilot school teacher in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

Additionally, among the six teachers I interviewed in Paghman, two mentioned how this new content and pedagogy helped them change their mind about using corporal punishment to discipline their students when I asked them about the results of the peace education program in general.¹¹⁵⁴ According to one teacher:

“In my opinion, one of the successes of the peace education program is that I realized there were better ways to discipline students. When I was using the stick to punish a student because he had not done his homework, I was obtaining fear from the students but not the required motivation to have them do their homework all the time. Since I have been teaching peace education, I have observed an increase in the students’ motivation in all the subjects I teach. It seems that this participatory methodology increases their involvement and interest in what we discuss in the classroom.”¹¹⁵⁵

While I did not have the opportunity to interview non-participating teachers working at these two schools, I had the chance to see some of these teachers in the schoolyard and noticed two of them holding sticks. When I mentioned it to HTAC’s Master Trainer, he told me that when he asks these teachers why they carry these sticks, they claim to use the sticks to point at the blackboard so students can better follow the lesson. However, students have told this Master Trainer that these teachers also use them as tools for corporal punishment.¹¹⁵⁶

The increased motivation among students participating in the pilot test was confirmed by another teacher who provided an additional explanation:

¹¹⁵⁴ Interviews with pilot schools teachers in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

¹¹⁵⁵ Interview with a pilot school teacher in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

¹¹⁵⁶ Interview with HTAC’s Master Trainer in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

“The content of the peace education curriculum we teach seems to bring our students some hope. They have been affected by war and are still experiencing tensions in their daily lives. These peaceful conflict management tools gives them an alternative to fleeing or fighting when they face a dispute. They can notably experience the efficiency of dialogue in such situations with their peers.”¹¹⁵⁷

During my visit to Paghman, I was able to observe the students’ motivation and this positive dynamic during one session of the peace education program. The teacher was not yet fully at ease with the interactive pedagogy, but he was clearly trying to have all children participate. Among the 25 boys attending this 45-minute lesson, all of them raised their hands to answer at least one question. All students seemed to be engaged and enjoying the experience. While they demonstrated a clear respect for their teacher, I did not sense fear. Of course, this was a limited period of observation and I did not have the opportunity to interview the students. However, what I observed was consistent with what I experienced during a peace education program conducted in schools in Burundi a few years ago. All the teachers that I interviewed in Paghman said that teaching this course changed their relationships with their students. One of them explained that she feels students are now talking to her more before, during, and after the class:

“I feel that the fact I teach this course has changed the way students perceive me. They seem to trust me more and to be willing to talk with me more.

¹¹⁵⁷ Interview with a pilot school teacher in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

They now ask me for advice about their personal disputes. Sometimes, they even request my help as a mediator.”¹¹⁵⁸

HTAC’s team explained that they believe this change comes not only from the content of the peace education curriculum, but also from its participatory methodology:

“The fact that teachers are now inviting students to ask questions and critically reflect on the themes and issues raised during the class discussions is a significant change comparing to the top-down pedagogy they used before. At first, this new pedagogy was not easy to use for them. They felt the teacher had to appear as if he/she had all the answers and could not be questioned. Now they start to understand that it is acceptable to recognize they do not know something, and this does not mean losing face, especially if they invite the students to reflect themselves and together on the questions raised in class.”¹¹⁵⁹

All the teachers I interviewed also confirmed that the classroom climate has changed to become more peaceful.¹¹⁶⁰ They have also noticed a difference between the students who participate in the peace education program and the others in terms of motivation and grades. However, the two school directors reported some tensions between the students participating in the program and the others who do not understand why they cannot benefit from the program as well. Some parents

¹¹⁵⁸ Interview with a pilot school teacher in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

¹¹⁵⁹ Interviews with HTAC’s Country Director and with HTAC’s Peace Education Program Manager (June 3, 2014) and with HTAC’s Master Trainer and Local Coordinator (June 9, 2014).

¹¹⁶⁰ Interviews with pilot school teachers and directors in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

of these students have also complained and requested to have their children participate in the program. The school directors explained that they hope to expand enrollment to all students at some future point in time.

After two years of testing in Paghman, HTAC's team has observed a greater understanding of peace education concepts among participating teachers, who feel more at ease with the pedagogy and better utilize the tools at their disposal to transfer knowledge and skill-sets to their students.¹¹⁶¹ So far, the pilot test results seem to be in line with the goals of peace education discussed in the literature and included in the global recommendations on peace education. In 2016, HTAC will complete the last year of the pilot program in Paghman and will be able to synthesize lessons learned and best practices that will help the team revise and improve its peace education curriculum.

d) Latest Projects to Date

In my latest interview with HTAC's Country Director, he discussed the organization's plans for the near future.¹¹⁶² In 2015, HTAC secured funding for two new projects that will contribute to its scaling-up efforts, and developed a new strategy for their program to be included in the national curriculum. The Country Director explained that HTAC will attempt change its strategy by not relying solely on the pilot programs in Jawzjan and Paghman to convince the MoE to endorse and include their peace education in the national curriculum. He had analyzed what the

¹¹⁶¹ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

¹¹⁶² Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

main counterarguments from the MoE, and decided to develop solutions to those problems.

First, the South African Medical Research Council (SAMRC) accepted HTAC's proposal to use its school-based peace education program to prevent violence against women and girls in Afghan communities. Funded by DFID, the program will be implemented in four school districts in Jawzjan Province (Sheberghan, Khuja Doko, Aqcha, and Faiz Abad) between 2016 and 2018. The goal of the intervention is to work with girls, boys, women, male leaders, and families to promote understanding of women's rights, and build healthy relationship skills based on peaceful conflict resolution. HTAC's schools-based peace education program will include new modules so it can educate middle school and high school girls (1,500) and boys (2,000) so they learn how to reject violence and embrace peaceful living, with an emphasis on tolerance and respect for girls and women.¹¹⁶³

In accordance with its inclusive approach, HTAC's Country Director stated that the organization would also engage with 150 male community and religious leaders, and provide them with the information and tools to act as positive role models.¹¹⁶⁴ He also explained that the objective of this effort is to teach them peace-building principles for resolving conflicts and disputes, and to help them realize that the involvement of women in community affairs facilitates safer, more secure and more prosperous communities. The program will also collaborate with 3,500

¹¹⁶³ HTAC, "Preventing Violence against Afghan Women and Girls - Project Description," Unpublished (HTAC, 2015).

¹¹⁶⁴ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

community members in the implementation of the project, and provide training to respected community elders so they can work directly with families on healthy relationship skills.

HTAC's Country Director was particularly thrilled about one innovation in this program: a dedicated communications strategy that will include the production of radio drama episodes, as well as round table discussions with religious scholars and representatives of civil society organizations to discuss the rights of women in Islam and Human Rights declarations.

In my opinion, one particularly promising dimension of this program is its improved research element. A local firm, Afghanistan Holding Group, will conduct an evaluation of the project, including baseline, midline and end line surveys of the participants in addition to a control group. The aim of this research is to evaluate HTAC's peace education program in schools in Afghanistan and explore successful methods for countering violence and promoting peaceful living. HTAC's Country Director described the study's objectives as twofold: "1) To determine whether children attending schools with the HTAC intervention reduce their reports of victimization and perpetration of violence and inequitable gender attitudes, and increase their mental wellbeing over two years of the program; and 2) to determine whether teachers who are trained in the HTAC intervention and who teach it improve their life satisfaction, work satisfaction, gender attitudes, classroom management and use of corporal punishment, and sense of hope, and whether post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among teachers influences their response to the

intervention.”¹¹⁶⁵ HTAC has included this new project in its scaling-up strategy, hoping that its results, based on rigorous research conducted by an independent firm, will convince the MoE to integrate its peace education program in the national curriculum taught in all government schools.

Based on its long experience in the field, HTAC’s management team told me they anticipate three main challenges in the implementation of this new program and that they have prepared strategies to minimize their negative impact on the program. First, the security risks are increasing; however, HTAC tries to reduce risks by earning the trust of local communities who can help provide a safer environment. Second, the logistical challenges of working in distant provinces have been minimized thanks to the establishment of self-managed field offices. Third, older male community leaders often resist change, so HTAC encourages more open-minded leaders to use peer pressure in helping others to become more flexible.¹¹⁶⁶

The second project that will also contribute to HTAC’s scaling-up efforts is a two-year teacher training program conducted in partnership with the MoE and funded by USIP. HTAC and the MoE signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2015 that is valid for a period of five years and covers all their programs in government schools as well as this program in the MoE Teacher Training Center.¹¹⁶⁷ The MOU states that 1,800 teachers will be trained in HTAC’s peace education curriculum, and that these teachers will not only be able to teach

¹¹⁶⁵ Interview with HTAC’s Country Director (March 23, 2016).

¹¹⁶⁶ HTAC, “Preventing Violence against Afghan Women and Girls - Project Description.”

¹¹⁶⁷ Interview with HTAC’s Country Director (March 23, 2016).

this subject to their students in grades 7 to 12, but they will also be able to serve as Master Trainers to train other teachers. One of the counter-arguments from the MoE against the scaling-up project was the logistical challenge presented by training a large number of teachers represented. Through this teacher training program, HTAC hopes to convince the MoE to integrate their peace education program as a separate subject in the national curriculum taught in all government schools in the country.

4. Challenges

As a local NGO implementing peace education programs in schools in Afghanistan, HTAC has encountered many of the same political, technical, and institutional challenges that have been discussed in the peace education literature.

a) Political Challenges

Political challenges have presented a serious obstacle for HTAC operations in Afghanistan. The Taliban destroyed one of HTAC's schools a few years ago, and threatened to kill not only HTAC staff, but also teachers trained and supported by HTAC.¹¹⁶⁸ Sadeed explained that "the girls and women are particularly targeted," and that she has been "in awe of the bravery of the students and teachers in persisting at education."¹¹⁶⁹ The organization also encountered resistance from local and national authorities, and from parents who were suspicious of the content of the program. This suspicion centered mostly on the use of puppets in the initial

¹¹⁶⁸ Interview with the former Director of HTAC's U.S. operations (February 15, 2012).

¹¹⁶⁹ Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, "Spreading Hope to 120,000 Afghan Children." Confirmed in an interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

version of the peace education curriculum. HTAC's Country Director recalled that some community members equated the use of puppets with idols worship, and therefore considered them incompatible with Islam.¹¹⁷⁰ Even some teachers participating in the program were reluctant to use the puppets at first. In my interview with one of HTAC's Master Trainers, he recalled how some teachers covered their eyes not to look at the puppets when they were first introduced to them during the teacher training.¹¹⁷¹ Eventually, he was able to reassure them by reminding them he was Muslim as well and by explaining that these puppets were only tools to convey knowledge in a more understandable way for younger students. Sadeed added that, in some areas, some parents were so apprehensive that they decided to pull their girls out of school after the program started, especially in locations where the Taliban were pressuring families not to allow their daughters to attend school. However, after these families observed a positive change in their daughters' attitudes during their brief attendance in the program, they decided to re-enroll them.¹¹⁷² Through these difficulties, HTAC's management team realized that many suspicion came from a misunderstanding of what the program actually was and the organization's own failure to communicate more clearly, rather than issues related to the actual content of the program. Once HTAC had properly introduced communities to the curriculum, and presented them with examples of lessons and exercises their children would experience, they became much more eager to see their children enrolled in the program. The team decided they had to

¹¹⁷⁰ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (April 28, 2014).

¹¹⁷¹ Interview with HTAC's Master Trainer in Paghman (June 9, 2014).

¹¹⁷² Interview with HTAC's Founder (March 14, 2014).

invest more time before the program starts in communication before launching the program in any new locations in order to obtain the buy-in of the main stakeholders.¹¹⁷³ The organization subsequently developed a process that helped anticipate these suspicions and overcome these hurdles. Presented earlier, it consists of including community elders and local and national officials in every step of the program, as well as regular dialogue and collaboration with the parents through the community school committees. Additionally, HTAC has the local government review every single piece of literature that they plan to introduce into the schools. This can be time consuming but it is an essential step for the program's validation and sustainability. Thanks to these efforts, the program now receives considerable help from local religious authorities. For instance, HTAC's Country Director reported that in Paghman, the program benefited from the positive promotion a Mullah made through the speaker of a local Mosque.¹¹⁷⁴ Consequently, political challenges have become less problematic over the years for HTAC. Of course, these results are limited to the particular locations where HTAC has been conducting its efforts. There could be variations across different parts of Afghanistan where some parents or religious leaders could be more suspicious and less enthusiastic about the content of the peace education curriculum. However, the data collected for this research and the results HTAC has obtained in six different provinces reveal a certain support from the local communities once they have a better knowledge of the program. Further research in other provinces and with larger samples would help complement these results.

¹¹⁷³ Interview with the former Director of HTAC's U.S. operations (February 15, 2012).

¹¹⁷⁴ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (June 3, 2014).

b) Technical Challenges

HTAC has also managed to overcome many technical challenges over the years. While damages to school infrastructures could have been an impediment to the creation of a *peace room* in each of the participating schools, HTAC made a strategic decision that resolved this potential difficulty. The organization initially based school selection on the condition of the facilities and made the creation of a *peace room* a prerequisite for the program, negotiated with the school principal. If transforming a classroom into a full-time peace room was not possible, the school could not participate in the program. Nevertheless, HTAC's management team realized that this requirement represented a difficulty when scaling up the program to the national level, since education infrastructure still face many deficits in Afghanistan and this lack of facilities has an impact on school attendance, especially for children living in remote rural areas and in insecure regions. Moreover, it also has an impact on the number of students per class, which makes it difficult to turn one classroom into a *peace room*. As a result, HTAC had to revise its methodology and be flexible on the use of the peace room. In the two pilot schools I visited in Paghman, only one had a peace room (pictures of the materials developed with students and displayed on the walls of this peace room are available in Appendix D). The other school was already struggling to accommodate all students and forced to use tents, so creating a peace room was not an option. When developing the new peace education curriculum for grades 7 to 12, HTAC anticipated this lack of resources of the MoE and the poor conditions of school buildings by ensuring that teachers would not need any other material than

a chalk and a blackboard. The new curriculum also dropped the use of puppets. Even if these two elements are missing, it is still possible to teach the lessons.

However, several serious obstacles remain. First, there is a lack of time available in the national curriculum. It will be challenging to find space for two or three 45-minute sessions in the current study plan, especially in schools operating on multiple shifts. A second technical challenge is teacher capacity and training. HTAC staff has reported hearing teachers complain about the complexity of the peace education teaching materials and the shortness of the training they received.¹¹⁷⁵ And the teacher training provided before the pilot tests in Jawzjan and Paghman was quite short with not much time for teachers to practice. Hopefully, the teacher training program developed for the MoE Teacher Training Centers will be based on a sufficient number of hours.

c) Institutional Challenges

In recent years, the most significant problems that HTAC has faced have been institutional challenges. First, the partnership with the MoE may not be as strong enough to ensure its sustainability. Several officials I interviewed at the MoE did not know about HTAC's program and pilot tests, demonstrating the need for more communication and sturdier ties with the MoE. In order to address this problem, HTAC's Country Director said that he has been building new non-governmental coalitions to help lobby the MoE for the inclusion of their peace education program in the national curriculum.¹¹⁷⁶ While it seems like this strategy should be fruitful

¹¹⁷⁵ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

¹¹⁷⁶ Interview with HTAC's Country Director (March 23, 2016).

in the coming months and years, HTAC must also develop stronger communication and cooperation with the MoE so that a larger number of departments and individuals at the ministry are aware of HTAC's peace education program and its promising results. Second, the teachers' incentive model used by the program limits its sustainability. Because the peace education curriculum is a separate subject that is not yet included in the national curriculum, it can only be taught after school hours, and teachers participating in the program receive a stipend for working extra hours that complements the limited salary they receive from the government. As a result, when program funding is gone, there will not be sufficient financial resources to pay these stipends. One community in the Samangan Province was so motivated and satisfied by the program that they decided to contribute and help fill this financial gap themselves, and were able to pursue the program. Nevertheless, as HTAC's team indicated to me, this is an exception and not the rule. If HTAC's efforts to integrate the program in the national curriculum succeed, peace education will be taught during school hours and there will not be a need to finance stipends for teachers anymore. However, the lack of motivation among teachers due to their low income will remain problematic—particularly if the government is not able to increase their salaries. Third, while HTAC has designed one of the rare quantitative evaluation tools in the field of peace education, it cannot yet be considered scientifically rigorous enough yet. Donors expect trustworthy evidence on the impact of peace education in the field, but rarely provide the means to conduct necessary evaluations. Hopefully, the action-research program that started in April 2016 in partnership with the SAMRC and funding

from DFID will provide tangible evidence and seek to confirm the program's positive impact, but conducting a longitudinal study to provide data on the longer-term impact of the program would be even more effective. Fourth, finding the funds needed to scale up the program to the national level has taken a significant period of time. HTAC's team has felt a change of attitudes among donors, based in part on internal politics and in part on their own priorities. There is a certain degree of donor fatigue in Afghanistan that limits the availability of funding and hence increases competition between programs. Finally, HTAC's office in Kabul encountered significant challenges in 2015 when they had to cease operations in the United States due to a lack of funding and a decision by the Founder to end her collaboration with the organization. In March 2016, the corporation registered in the United States was legally dissolved and terminated. While HTAC was registered separately as a local NGO with the Afghan Ministry of Economy and could therefore continue its programs in Afghanistan despite closing the U.S. office, it found itself without any prospective funding and projects because the U.S. office had been principally responsible for fundraising. As a consequence of the change, the Afghan team had to quickly develop its fundraising, communication, and marketing capacities, which presented a daunting task. For instance, HTAC's website (htac.org) had to be shut down for legal reasons, so they could no longer rely on it to promote their efforts or collect private donations. Once they convinced long-time partners that they were capable of continuing their programs without the U.S. office, they were able to secure some short-term funding, write proposals, and design new programs to provide enough revenues to pay staff members that had

been working without salaries for several months. Thanks to their motivation and perseverance, they were able to take the challenge and overcome these obstacles, including through the launch of a new website (htac.org.af). The departure of HTAC's Founder may be more problematic considering the network she brought to the organization, particularly her contacts at the MoE. However, HTAC's Country Director has focused on building good connections that could be helpful in the near future.

D. Conclusion

HTAC's peace education program has encountered various obstacles over the years, but the organization was able to sustain its operations and introduce peace education to large numbers of children and adults in various locations in Afghanistan. The program has been influenced by global recommendations and international standards on peace education, and HTAC's team ensured that it sufficiently adapted the content of teaching materials to the Afghan context to demonstrate that peace education principles can also be found in Afghan culture and traditions.

The organization also sought to make its program more inclusive by building strong partnerships with the MoE at the national and provincial levels and with local communities in areas where it has implemented its peace education program. These ties have not only allowed for the successful implementation of the program in schools, they have also triggered the interest of the MoE in developing and testing a national school-based peace education curriculum that could be taught in all government schools in the country. Pilot tests of the new version of the

curriculum conducted in two provinces offered positive results thus far, but the MoE is still looking for more evidence of the curriculum's effectiveness. There are many impediments to the integration of peace education as a separate subject in the national curriculum and there is no guarantee that this will happen anytime soon. Some aspects of the program may have only been made possible by the local focus of the initiative, and these may be hard to reproduce on a national scale. This is also true of teacher training, time invested in obtaining local community buy-in, and finding time in the school schedule to teach the program as a separate subject. Nevertheless, HTAC's team has demonstrated flexibility and strong motivation to use the success of its local efforts to influence the national curriculum.

CHAPTER VIII – Conclusion

Using a vertical case study approach, this doctoral research sought to assess the influence of global discussions of peace education on national and local education policy and practice in a fragile state such as Afghanistan. It also explored the critical factors that affect this influence, or the lack thereof. This final chapter will first summarize the findings of the research. It will then present the contributions of this study to the field and offer policy recommendations. Finally, it will propose directions for future research.

A. Summary of Findings

The journey I undertook through the history of global recommendations on peace education and the exploration of the state of peace education in Afghanistan since 2002 has revealed how challenging it is for the international community to coordinate, harmonize and share its own discourse on peace education—let alone to influence significantly a fragile state’s national education policy and practice of peace education.

Chapter IV reviewed the growing presence of peace education in international recommendations and instruments promulgated by the UN, and their increased influence on the strategy of international organizations and bilateral donors through international networks such as INEE of GCPEA. This chapter also demonstrated that this effort at the international level is not very robust, and emphasized the

serious impediments to the implementation of these global recommendations on peace education at the country level.

From the *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace* adopted in 1999 to the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* and its *Education 2030 Framework for Action* adopted in 2015, the UN General Assembly has affirmed its prescriptions on peace education. And UN agencies, such as UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR, have also played a significant role in the promotion of peace education. Because the promotion of a Culture of Peace is the expression of its fundamental “soft power” mandate, UNESCO is the lead UN agency for the implementation of all UN resolutions related to the “culture of peace.” Its General Conference has also adopted formal recommendations on peace education such as *Recommendation 1974*. The contributions of UNICEF and UNHCR to the global discussions on peace education are less formal and rely more on reports and program strategies. Nevertheless, their influence is often stronger than UNESCO’s because they provide states with more funding and programs. These agencies have tried to find synergies and coordinate their efforts in the field of peace education. Their actions and all the documents originated at the UN level have influenced international organizations, who have realized the need to pay close attention to the role of education in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Similarly, the efforts of UN agencies have also influenced significant international donors, such as USAID or GIZ, that have endorsed conflict sensitivity and peace education in their strategies and contribute to the promotion of conflict-sensitive and peace education. Meanwhile, international networks such as INEE and GCPEA have become

instrumental in encouraging harmonization of the global efforts for education in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Despite all these discussions at the international level, there are serious obstacles for the implementation of these global recommendations on peace education. First, there is a lack of mechanisms for inducing states' adherence to these recommendations and policies. For instance, while Member States are encouraged to submit regular reports on the implementation of *Recommendation 74*, its monitoring procedure encounters the same challenges that non-binding legal instruments face, particularly a low response rate. UNESCO also relies on its country offices and the National Commission for UNESCO located at the country level to organize advocacy efforts at the country level. However, these mechanisms depend on the skills and motivation of the individuals who serve them. As in any organization, if the staff is not convinced or motivated enough, success will not follow. Having Member States endorse, adopt, or sign these declarations and recommendations on peace education does not ensure they will implement them and integrate peace education in their national education policy and practice.

The second major challenge is the lack of coordination and harmonization. Although INEE's working group on Education and Fragility encourages and facilitates this process, finding synergies and coordinating efforts is not systematic. There are still multiple reports and tools on similar topics that can be overwhelming and confusing for the MoE of a fragile state. While all these organizations have contributed to the global discussion on peace education, they each have their own mandate, agenda and priorities, and often prefer to develop their own tools.

Third, the concept of peace education itself is another possible source of confusion. The actual term “peace education” is not always clearly used in the norm-setting documents presented in Chapter IV, and is often labeled with different names. Moreover, some of the tools developed at the international level are too complex for most MoE staff in fragile states that still lack the skills and capacity required to use them. More generally, the high degree of complexity and confusion at the international level triggers a lack of clarity around the concept of peace education at the country level, which was confirmed in Chapter VI through interviews with MoE officials in Afghanistan. This confusion hinders the integration of peace education in a national education policy and practice, especially when MoEs are presented with other priority areas, such as gender or environment, that seem more straightforward.

Finally, while peace education or related programs are recommended, they are not always presented as a great priority in the education strategy of major international organizations such as DFID or the World Bank that are influential in fragile states, particularly Afghanistan. Often, and as underlined in the literature review, the lack of clarity around the concept of peace education, and the lack of tangible evidence for the significant impact of such programs, can explain why peace education is not considered a higher priority among donors.

Consequently, these shortcomings at the international level affect the extent to which global recommendations on peace education influence education policy and practice at the country level. Chapter VI studied the Afghan national government’s engagement in peace education policy and practice to assess and understand the

influence of global policy recommendations, or the lack thereof. The review of education policies and practice in Afghanistan revealed that international recommendations and discussions on peace education did have some influence, and that the government has integrated certain peace education elements in its national education strategic plans and in its national curriculum. However, this influence is limited for various reasons.

While Afghanistan's national education policy has included some peace education elements gradually since the 2008 Education Law, the main education policy documents do not provide much detail on peace education and mention it only briefly. And while the 2003 report of the Independent High Commission on Education largely drew from the global recommendations on peace education, and was influenced by UNESCO's support, there is a disconnect between the Commission's recommendations on peace education and the concepts that have been eventually adopted in the national education strategy. This disconnect can be explained in part by the Commission's lack of legal power.

At the national education policy level, peace education is rarely mentioned and is thus far from being a priority. Peace education has not become an independent subject in the national curriculum, although it is present as a crosscutting issue diluted in several school subjects such as Life Skills, Civic Education, Social Studies, Dari and Pashtun language studies, and Religious Education. The review of current textbooks in these subjects has revealed various promising references to peace education elements. However, it also unveiled elements of these textbooks that are not conflict-sensitive, particularly those used in Religious Education.

Several other factors also help explain peace education's limited presence in national education policy and practice in Afghanistan. First, peace education has suffered from the tension between access and quality (including content) of education in the education strategy, a common tension in fragile states and post-conflict situations. While the MoE did realize the need to improve quality, it did not dedicate as much effort to achieving this goal, and neither did the international community. This is largely due to the lack of funding for the education sector in general. It is also easier to measure results related to access and to communicate tangible figures such as schools constructed or rehabilitated, and children enrolled, than to measure the impact of efforts related to the quality of education. As a result, while serious efforts were dedicated to enrolling more children in school every year, less attention has been given to what these children would be taught. This dichotomy has affected all subjects, including peace education.

Second, while the literature stressed that disagreement on the content of peace education is a possible political challenge to its integration in the curriculum, I did not find any evidence that would corroborate this hypothesis. Further research with a larger sample would be interesting to conduct on this matter. More than a disagreement about the content, there is a limited understanding of what peace education actually entails. The interviews I conducted at the Afghan MoE underscored how the confusion around the concept at the global level is also present at the country level. This misunderstanding is coupled with a lack of awareness of the presence of peace education elements and principles in the NESPs, in the curriculum framework, and in several school subjects, which reveals either a lack

of ownership of those documents or a lack of internal communication within the MoE. The confusion around peace education goes as far as attributing sole responsibility to the High Peace Council. The fact that a high official at the Afghan National commission for UNESCO highlighted the existence of differences between what is signed with international community and what is actually included in the national education policy and practice reveals the powerlessness of global recommendations on peace education to influence peace education efforts on the national level. It also underscores the level of confusion around the concept of peace education, thus demonstrating the relative failure of the advocacy efforts by the international community and the individuals directly engaged in this process. Additionally, someone highly placed at the Afghan permanent delegation at UNESCO claimed that peace education has no place in schools because children and adolescents are not mature enough to understand. This also reveals a lack of understanding of what peace education in schools is and what it can achieve. It also confirms one of the limitations of these global recommendations that was underlined earlier. The Permanent Delegation of Afghanistan to UNESCO did adopt *Recommendation 74* and endorsed the *Paris Declaration on Conflict-sensitive Education*, but if the individuals in the delegation are not convinced of the value of these recommendations, they can hardly be expected to promote these documents or contribute to the advocacy efforts at the country level that could help facilitate the implementation of peace education programs. This confirms the fragility of the system and the associated mechanisms that have been in place so far. It can prevent international recommendations and standards from being carried

forward at the country level. It also stresses the importance of the convictions of individuals and thus who is in charge at a particular time. The current Minister of Education expressed some interest in peace education that hopefully will be translated in concrete actions in the near future to improve the presence and role of peace education in the national education policy and practice in Afghanistan.

Third, like other fragile states, Afghanistan opted for a gradual revision of its national curriculum so as not to confront the Afghan people with a radical change. It first placed a priority on removing all references to violence and hatred from the school textbooks. Nevertheless, even this goal has not been reached yet, and some textbooks are still not fully conflict-sensitive.

Fourth, the lack of resources presents a technical rationale for making peace education a crosscutting issue in the curriculum, as opposed to a separate subject. Overcrowded classrooms and the use of a shift system in schools do not allow for enough time in the school's schedule for an additional subject. When the MoE has to divide available hours between subjects, priority goes to the subjects that are "market oriented" because of the economic pressures described by Harris. The MoE envisions a market orientation of the Afghan education system that does not leave much room for subjects such as peace education.

A fifth explanation for placing a low priority on peace education is the lack of importance that it has for donors themselves. As a result, the funding for peace education programs has been much limited than for other types of programs. Considering the general lack of resources in the education system and the levels of corruption in the education sector highlighted in Chapter V, this relative lack of

interest from donors has contributed to low priority on peace education within the MoE. The current drastic reduction in international aid to Afghanistan, and thus to the education sector as well, will certainly exacerbate this lack of prioritization.

Finally, Chapter VII explored the efforts of HTAC, an Afghan NGO delivering a peace education program as a separate subject in schools, in order to assess what peace education looks like at the local level in Afghanistan. Studying this particular case also presented an opportunity to assess the influence of global recommendations on peace education at the local level and to assess the extent to which a local program could influence the national curriculum.

Since 2002, with the support of the Afghan MoE and local communities, HTAC has established a six-week peace education program in 71 schools in six different provinces in Afghanistan (Kabul, Kapisa, Samangan, Jawzjan, Laghman, and Kandahar). The organization sought to make its program inclusive by building strong partnerships with the MoE at the national and provincial levels as well as with all the local communities where the program has been implemented its peace education program. These strong ties have not only allowed for the successful implementation of the program in schools over the years, they have also triggered the interest of the MoE in developing and testing a national school-based peace education curriculum that could be taught in all government schools in the country. With the help of international peace education experts, HTAC expanded its previous curriculum so it could be taught weekly for grades 7 to 12. In partnership with the MoE, two locations have been selected for pilot testing in schools. The results of the test have been positive thus far.

Chapter VII also revealed that the two versions of the program have each been influenced by global recommendations on peace education. HTAC's team opted for a cultural adaptation of the content of the teaching materials, using local proverbs and stories that are easily understood and implemented. This approach has helped participants see the universal nature of peace education principles that already exist within the Afghan culture and traditions. This adaptation has contributed to the success of the program and confirmed that it is an essential step for the development of any peace education curriculum.

Nevertheless, HTAC's program has also encountered many of the same political, technical, and institutional challenges to peace education that were discussed in the literature review in Chapter II.

Political challenges have included physical threats to the program staff and its beneficiaries, with reported Taliban attacks on one of HTAC's schools and threats to kill teachers trained and supported by HTAC. The organization also encountered resistance from local and national authorities, as well as parents who were suspicious of the content of the program at first. They feared this peace education curriculum was opposed to religious and traditional Afghan values. However, this resistance proved to be based on a lack of understanding, as they did not have much information about its content at the time. HTAC has been able to obtain the buy-in from stakeholders through improved communication; closer inclusion of community elders, local and national officials in every step of the program; and a regular dialogue and collaboration with parents through community school committees. The organization realized this was a serious challenge and they should

upfront explain the program's content and demonstrate how it is based on local proverbs and stories inspired by Afghan traditions. This process can be time-consuming but it is an essential step for the program's validation and sustainability. As a result, political challenges currently present a smaller obstacle to program success.

HTAC has also overcome many technical challenges over the years. The organization had to adapt its program methodology when designing a new peace education curriculum for grades 7 to 12 that could be taught in all the schools in the country, since the *peace rooms* it had set up in the previous program were not available everywhere due to Afghanistan's damaged schools infrastructure, as discussed in Chapter V. When developing the new peace education curriculum, HTAC also faced problems due to the lack of resources at the MoE and the schools' poor conditions, but ensured that teachers would not need any other material than a chalk and a blackboard. However, even if the new peace education program is proven successful during the pilot phase, a serious obstacle that remains is the lack of time available for teaching peace education as a separate subject in the national curriculum. It will be particularly challenging to find space for two or three 45-minute sessions in the current study plan, especially in schools affected by the shift system. Another technical challenge is the low level of teachers' capacity and training. HTAC's staff reported hearing teachers complain about the complexity of the peace education teaching materials and the shortness of the training they received. Hopefully, the new teacher training program for the MoE Teacher Training Centers will include a sufficient number of hours.

In recent years, HTAC's greatest obstacles have been institutional challenges. First, the teachers' incentive model that HTAC's program uses may not be sustainable. Because the peace education curriculum is a separate subject that is not yet included in the national curriculum, it can only be taught after school hours, so teachers participating in the program receive a stipend for working extra hours that complements the limited salary they receive from the government. As a result, when the program funding is gone, it is not clear whether there will be sufficient financial resources to fund these stipends, since communities can rarely fill this financial gap themselves. If HTAC's efforts to integrate the program in the national curriculum succeed, peace education will be taught during school hours and there will not be a need to finance stipends for teachers anymore. However, the general lack of motivation on the part of teachers due to their low income will remain if the government is not able to increase their salary, and it will limit the program's impact. Second, while HTAC has designed one of the rare quantitative evaluation tools in the field of peace education, it cannot yet be considered scientifically rigorous. Donors expect tangible evidence they can trust on the impact of peace education in the field, but at the same time, they rarely provide the means to do so. HTAC's team hopes that a new action-research program starting in April 2016, in partnership with the SAMRC and funding from DFID, will help provide tangible evidence of and confirm the program's positive impact. The preferred option would be to conduct a longitudinal study to provide data on the longer-term impact of the program, but this requires financial support that is not yet available. Third, finding funding to scale up the program to the national level has taken some time. There is

a certain degree of donor fatigue in Afghanistan that limits the amount of available funding and hence increases competition between programs. Fourth, HTAC's office in Kabul encountered significant challenges in 2015 when their operational structure in the United States had to cease its activities. While HTAC is registered separately as a local NGO with the Afghan Ministry of Economy and continues to run its programs in Afghanistan despite the termination of the U.S. corporation side of its structure, it found itself without any prospective funding and projects. Consequently, the Afghan team had to develop its fundraising, communication, and marketing capacities. Thanks to their motivation and perseverance, they were able to take the challenge and overcome these obstacles. Finally, although pilot tests conducted in two provinces since 2013 have been encouraging, there are obstacles to the integration of peace education as a separate subject in the national curriculum and there is no guarantee that this will happen anytime soon. HTAC's team understood it should not rely uniquely on these pilot tests to convince the MoE to endorse and include their peace education in the national curriculum. The organization has not enough financial means to make its program attractive enough to the MoE and therefore had to find other options. HTAC expanded its advocacy efforts through non-governmental coalitions that can help lobby the MoE for the inclusion of HTAC's peace education program. The fact that several respondents I interviewed at the MoE did not know about HTAC's program and pilot tests confirms the need for more communication and stronger ties with the MoE.

Overall, this vertical case study identified a clear influence of the international level on the local level, but it also unveiled a limited influence from the

international level on the national level. Several critical factors contribute to these results. First, there is a deficiency of the mechanisms in place to induce national government to adhere to global recommendations on peace education. These mechanisms rely too heavily on the skills and motivation of individuals who represent international bodies at the national level. This deficiency partly triggers the difference between the agreements that a state signs with the international community and what it actually includes in its national education policy and practice. Second, there is a lack of coordination and harmonization at the international level, which can be overwhelming at the national level, especially for a fragile state that still lacks the capacity to deliver basic social services to its population. At the national level, peace education competes with multiple priorities recommended by the international community such as gender sensitivity in education. My study in Afghanistan underlines that the top educational priorities are those associated with greater financial resources from donors, and that underfunded programs such as peace education are subsequently deemed less important. Third, the confusion around the actual concept of peace education identified at the international level affects the MoE's understanding of what peace education really means and entails. This confusion creates another impediment to the prioritization of peace education amongst donors at the international and national levels and when a MoE makes strategic decisions for national education policy. However, this confusion does not affect the outlook for peace education at the local level, due principally to HTAC's specialization and expertise in the field of peace education.

This vertical study also underlined different potentials for the integration of peace education in schools at the national versus the local level. The local level revealed itself more open to the inclusion of a peace education program that is closer to the global recommendations on peace education. Indeed, it seems easier to develop and implement such peace education programs on a smaller scale. The means and resources required for peace education (e.g. time in the national curriculum, time and funding for the teacher training, and time to work on getting the buy-in of the local communities) are harder to obtain on a national scale, particularly in a fragile state. When resources dedicated to peace education are scarce at the national level, it is difficult to imagine how initiatives at the local level, whatever their success, can influence the national level. As a result, despite a strong influence from the international level on the local level, it is hard to expect the single efforts of a local NGO to influence the national curriculum.

As a critical case, Afghanistan offered good conditions for studying the influence of global recommendations on peace education, despite the complexity of the local context. Nevertheless, the influence of these recommendations has been limited so far. The critical factors that explain the limits of this influence are not specific to this particular context, and I believe that if they are not addressed, the international community will face similar obstacles to the integration of peace education in other fragile states.

B. Contributions to the Field

In different ways, this qualitative doctoral research contributes to the academic literature in the fields of education in fragile states, peace education, and global

education policy, by exploring the influence of global recommendations on peace education in fragile states, with a particular focus on the case Afghanistan.

First, this study provides an illustration of various elements of the education in fragile states literature highlighted in Chapter II. The history of Afghanistan confirms the vital role that formal education systems can play in fueling conflict. The Afghan government's efforts to rebuild the national education system since 2002 also demonstrate the impediments facing education in fragile states due to conflict and state fragility. More particularly, this research ventures into the relatively underexplored area of education and corruption and Chene's efforts to examine the relationship between corruption, education, and fragility.¹¹⁷⁷ This case also exemplifies the complexity of providing international aid for education in fragile states. Both the Afghan government and the international community have been facing the same statebuilding dilemmas emphasized by Paris and Sisk,¹¹⁷⁸ and underscored by authors such as Burde, Davies, and Sommers.¹¹⁷⁹ The problems of footprint, aid dependency, government participation, and lack of coordination have surfaced. Finally, despite the large amounts of international aid that the country has received since 2002, the education sector has been relatively neglected and underfunded. As such, this study corroborates Burde's warnings against this inattention that prevents education aid from reaching its full potential.¹¹⁸⁰

¹¹⁷⁷ Chene, *Fighting Corruption in Education in Fragile States*.

¹¹⁷⁸ Paris and Sisk, *Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Challenges of Postwar Peace Operations*.

¹¹⁷⁹ Burde, *Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping the Field*; Davies, *Understanding Education's Role in Fragility. Synthesis of Four Situational Analyses of Education and Fragility: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia*; Sommers, "Education Free-for-All."

¹¹⁸⁰ Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*.

Second, this study fills a gap in the field of peace education by providing rare multi-level data on peace education in Afghanistan. The research on peace education initiatives often focuses on Northern Ireland or Israel-Palestine, and usually sheds light on just one level of the education system, whether national or local. In this research, I have not only explored if and how peace education is integrated in education policy and practice at the national and local levels in Afghanistan, I have also examined global recommendations on peace education, the extent to which they influence what happens at the national and local levels, and why. The multi-level dimension of the study also helped illustrate the various challenges to the implementation of peace education programs in fragile states that have been identified in the literature. This research also showed how these challenges represent critical factors that limit the influence of global recommendations on the national level, particularly the lack of political will and the lack of prioritization of peace education due to the lack of serious impact evaluation that Fitzduff and Jean highlighted.¹¹⁸¹ At the local level in particular, the study confirmed the strategic importance of adapting the curriculum to local context and traditions in order to avoid an opposition based on the content and the “Western bias” criticism highlighted by Sommers.¹¹⁸² More generally, the review of the literature on peace education and this vertical study both underscore how peace education scholars seem to have underestimated the consequences of the lack of clarity around the concept of peace education and this affects the effective

¹¹⁸¹ Fitzduff and Jean, *Peace Education State of the Field and Lessons Learned from USIP Grantmaking*.

¹¹⁸² Sommers, “Peace Education and Refugee Youth.”

diffusion and integration of such programs in national education policy and practice.

Third, this study also seeks to inform the field of global education policy, particularly research on politics of educational change, as there is no cross-level analysis of how different actors at different levels respond to policy reforms like peace education. This research contributes an understanding of the dialectic between external pressures and internal dynamics. It not only provides an example of resistance to global forces that scholars such as Steiner-Khamsi or Burde have stressed,¹¹⁸³ it also sheds light on additional and unexpected explanations for this resistance. Indeed, the study shows that this resistance originates not only at the national level, confirming the importance of context and the role of key government policy actors underscored by Edwards Jr. et al.,¹¹⁸⁴ it also finds its sources in the shortcomings of the international level. Finally, studying the influence of global recommendations on peace education at the national level confirms the importance of distinguishing between language and practice recommended by Schriewer or Steiner-Khamsi when studying the convergence of educational reforms in order to determine what actually converges.¹¹⁸⁵ While I did not have the opportunity to explore the implementation at the local level of national policy on peace education and its elements in the curriculum, I suspect there is a serious disconnect between national policy and local practice that would merit further research. Finally, this

¹¹⁸³ Steiner-Khamsi, *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*; Burde, “International NGOs and Best Practices.”

¹¹⁸⁴ Edwards Jr., Victoria Libreros, and Martin, “The Geometry of Policy Implementation: Lessons from the Political Economy of Three Education Reforms in El Salvador during 1990–2005.”

¹¹⁸⁵ Schriewer, “World System and Interrelationship Networks: The Internationalization of Education and the Role of Comparative Inquiry”; Steiner-Khamsi, “Re-Framing Educational Borrowing as a Policy Strategy.”

study contributes to the efforts of scholars such as Rappleye and Paulson who are engaged in the interpretation of educational transfer in contexts of conflict and fragility.¹¹⁸⁶

More generally, this doctoral research contributes to bridging the gap that both King and Burde identified in the literature on international relations or peace and conflict as they rarely examine questions that relate to education.¹¹⁸⁷

Beyond these contributions to the academic literature, this study also complements the grey literature produced by various organizations working in the fields of education in fragile states and peace education.

Despite the limitations of a single case study, the issues, tensions, and concerns uncovered in this investigation will contribute to the mainstreaming of peace education in fragile states. While this research focuses on Afghanistan, it also has policy implications for all actors involved in similar to reform or rebuild the national education system in other post-conflict countries. The next section will detail these policy implications and recommendations.

C. Policy Implications and Recommendations for Practice

The findings of this research have policy implications at the international, national, and local levels.

First, while international recommendations and instruments promulgated by the UN have placed a stronger emphasis on peace education in recent years, it is still

¹¹⁸⁶ Rappleye and Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour.”

¹¹⁸⁷ King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*; Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*.

not considered a major priority by many international organizations and donors. Therefore, it is hard to expect governments, particularly in fragile states, to give it enough attention. A number of reasons for this low priority on peace education have been discussed in this research. For instance, the market orientation of education represents a serious challenge that the weakness of the advocacy for peace education at the national level exacerbates. Indeed, peace education provides students with skills such as critical thinking or problem-solving, that are important for their “marketability” in the future, but this message still fails to be transmitted to governments. This brings about another issue that also explains the low priority on peace education: the confusion about the concept itself, particularly since it encompasses various types of programs and initiatives. It is no surprise that confusion at the international level leads to confusion at the country level. Peace education scholars and advocates should pursue their reflection on the concept of peace education, and allow these reflections to shape their efforts to promote peace education. The lack of tangible evidence for the impact of peace education programs is a further challenge. Donors interested in peace education programs should consider funding serious action-research that could provide this missing evidence that stands in the way of the mainstreaming of such educational programs.

Second, the general underfunding of education in emergencies poses a serious threat not only to the inclusion of peace education in the national curriculum, but it also endangers its implementation in schools, particularly in fragile states. Indeed, in the case of Afghanistan, the tension between educational access and quality would have been far less serious if more funding were available for the education

sector. Additionally, some of the difficulties encountered in ensuring the presence of textbooks in schools and adequate teacher training would have been lessened with more resources. Nevertheless, to allow these resources to reach their goal, the issue of corruption in the education sector that captivates parts of the funds needs to be tackled at the country level.

Third, peace educators should develop ways to manage peace education and its participatory methodology in the challenging conditions inherent to fragile states. As shown by the experience in Afghanistan, overcrowded classrooms and schools operating on shifts stand in the way of peace education's full integration in the national curriculum and implementation in schools.

Fourth, at the country level, the efforts to integrate peace education elements into the curriculum progressively have not received significant attention. Improved communication within the MoE would increase the recognition of these efforts. Clarifying the essential meaning of peace education would also be quite helpful for the MoE staff. More generally, the MoE should pursue its ongoing work to improve the national curriculum notably to ensure that it becomes fully conflict-sensitive.

Finally, at the local level, HTAC should seek to improve further the monitoring and evaluation processes used for its peace education program so that it can present stronger and serious evidence of its positive impact to donors and to the MoE. The organization should also pursue its advocacy work and communicate more extensively around its programs' achievements.

D. Directions for Future Research

While this study helps shed light on the influence that global recommendations for peace education have on education policy and practice in fragile states such as Afghanistan, it also points to several potential topics for future research.

First, it would be helpful to investigate to what extent the peace education elements currently present in some textbooks in the national curriculum in Afghanistan are actually taught in schools and evaluate their impact.

Second, while the general education system in Afghanistan was the focus of this study, it would be interesting to pursue the same inquiry in the Islamic Education system, especially since it is often the target of strong accusations of fostering extremism. This future research could also contribute to the literature on peace education and religion. Another angle for such research could be the study of the influence of religion on the integration of peace education in the Afghan national curriculum, or the lack thereof. Some answers I received at the Afghan could also be the start of an additional study on Islam and peace education that could yield useful findings for other Muslim countries interested in integrating peace education in their national curriculum.

Third, a follow-up study with HTAC in two years would provide more information on the integration of their peace education program in the national curriculum, in order to assess whether and how programs at the local level can indeed influence the national level.

Fourth, while the literature review provides some potential reasons for the low priority placed on peace education, the lack of serious impact evaluation is one of

the most important ones. A larger and more thorough study could help shed some light on this significant impediment for the integration and implementation of peace education in education policy and practice in fragile states. A serious study of the impact of such programs in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, using a mixed-methods approach, could help bridge the current gap in this field.

Finally, additional case studies using the same research questions developed for this research would provide data on the influence of global recommendations on peace education in other fragile states to complement the present findings.

E. Concluding Thoughts

The *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* aims at “building peaceful, just and inclusive societies,”¹¹⁸⁸ with a particular focus on education through the *Education 2030 Framework for Action*, considered essential for the success of all SDGs.¹¹⁸⁹ Fragile states hardly reached the MDGs, and there will be challenges on the road to the SDGs as well. This doctoral research exposed several key impediments that the international community encounters when rebuilding an education system after years of war, and the specific impediments faced by peace education programs.

This study also revealed the limited influence that global recommendations for peace have education on education policies and practice in fragile states such as Afghanistan. It underlined the need to go further, so that discussions at the

¹¹⁸⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

¹¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *Education 2030 Framework for Action*.

international level help stimulate sustained and meaningful actions at the country level. Nevertheless, this study also highlighted the influence that these global recommendations have on peace education at the local level, and the relentless efforts conducted by a local NGO that may one day succeed in influencing the national curriculum taught in schools in Afghanistan.

The *2030 Framework* considers education as “inclusive and as crucial in promoting democracy and human rights and enhancing global citizenship, tolerance and civic engagement as well as sustainable development.”¹¹⁹⁰ While the specific term peace education is not included in this statement, the concept is reflected in these goals and global education policy recommendations. The recent momentum around global citizenship education that encompasses peace education is another reason to hope that a higher priority will be placed on such programs in the coming years.

¹¹⁹⁰ Ibid., article 26.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Pictures taken during the visit of a school in the Wardak Province (April 2009)



Hanging in the schoolyard, the belt used to signal the start and end of the class periods was simply a spent artillery shell casing (above). Old and rusty war tanks still laid around in the neighborhood (below).





White check marks placed on the house walls indicated that the area had been cleared of land mines (above). Tanks tracks were embedded in the roads, and served as speed bumps (below).



Appendix B: Interview Guides for the field research trips to Afghanistan (2014 and 2015)

1. Interview guides at the national level

a) Interview guide for senior officials working at the Ministry of Education

1. Relationships and Collaboration between the Ministry of Education and International Organizations/International Community:
 - What is happening and why?
 - Is the Ministry working with International Organizations/ the International Community in the field?
 - If so:
 - What type of projects are they partners on? Where are they located?
 - How did the Ministry select the actors they are partnering with?
 - How are the common projects conducted? Who has the lead / makes the main decisions?
 - What are the challenges encountered?
 - What are the main successes?
 - Has this partnership been increasing or decreasing this past decade? Why?
 - If not, why?
 - What does this relationship enable or prevent?
2. Relationships and Collaboration between the Ministry of Education and local NGOs/civil society:
 - What is happening and why?
 - Is the Ministry working with local NGOs/civil society in the field?
 - If so:
 - What type of projects are they partners on? Where are they located?
 - How did the Ministry select the actors they are collaborating with?
 - How are the common projects conducted? Who has the lead / makes the main decisions?
 - What are the challenges encountered?
 - What are the main successes?
 - Has this partnership been increasing or decreasing this past decade? Why?
 - If not, why?
 - What does this relationship enable or prevent?
3. Actions of the Afghan Government on Peace Education:

- What is happening? To what extent has the Afghan Government integrated peace education in:
 - Its national education strategy?
 - The national curriculum taught in schools?
 - In the teacher training?
- If peace education is absent:
 - If peace education absent of the national education strategy:
 - Why? What are the reasons for this absence?
 - Who made the decision not to include it?
 - Are there any talks about including it in the future? If so, when could that be?
 - If peace education is absent of the national curriculum taught in schools:
 - Why? What are the reasons for this absence?
 - Who made the decision not to include it?
 - Are there any talks about including it in the future? If so, when could that be?
 - If peace education is absent of the teacher training:
 - Why? What are the reasons for this absence?
 - Who made the decision not to include it?
 - Are there any talks about including it in the future? If so, when could that be?
- If peace education is present:
 - Since when?
 - What are the reasons that explain the decision of the Government/Ministry to adopt peace education in its policy and practice? (here we are trying to identify if the origin of the inclusion of peace education can be found in the global recommendations)
 - How far is it integrated?
 - In the national education strategy:
 - What is included exactly and which section(s) of the strategic plan?
 - Who/What convinced the Ministry to include it? In other words, why is it included?
 - Where they any concern or any challenges to include it?
 - In the national curriculum:
 - ✓ Who/What convinced the Ministry to include it? In other words, why is it included?
 - ✓ How is it integrated?
 - A separate subject?
 - Infused in several subjects? If so, which ones and why?
 - Another way? If so, how?
 - ✓ What is the content of the curriculum?
 - ✓ What is the teaching pedagogy recommended?
 - In the teacher training:
 - ✓ Which teachers are trained?

- ✓ Since when?
- ✓ How many teachers have been trained or what percentage of the teachers?
- ✓ What is the content and pedagogy used for this training? How was the content of the training developed?
- ✓ Is it a one-time training or will there be follow-up sessions?
- ✓ What are the challenges encountered?
- ✓ What are the results so far? How successful is the training?

4. Is there anything else you want to share with me?

b) Interview guide for policy makers / parliamentarians

1. General questions on the 2002-2015 period:
 - According to you, what are the main accomplishments of the Ministry of Education since the fall of the Taliban regime?
 - What were the main challenges for the ministry during this period (2002-2015), and why?
 - What are the main challenges that remain, and why?
2. Priorities for the education sector:
 - What are the main priorities for the short term, and why?
 - What are the main priorities for the mid-term, and why?
3. What do you think of the role of the international community in the reconstruction of the education sector?
4. The connection between education and conflict :
 - These past years, academic research has been concerned with the connection between education and conflict. It has underlined how conflict can be harmful to education, how education can contribute to conflict, and also how education can prevent conflict when it is conflict-sensitive and thanks to certain subjects. Peace education, conflict-sensitive education, global citizenship are all terms that have been promoted by the international community these past years:
 - Have you heard about peace education?
 - Have you heard about conflict-sensitive education?
 - Have you heard about global citizenship?
 - What is your opinion about these topics? To what extent do you think they can be useful when taught in schools?
 - Background, what can be found in Afghanistan's official texts on education policies and strategies:
 - Article 20 of the 2008 Education Law indicates that the "objectives of the secondary general educational level are notably "develop and expand culture of peace and equality."
 - Moreover, in NESP II, for the first time, peace education is mentioned with the following sentence: "Cross cutting issues such as peace

education, human rights, elimination of violence against children and women, environmental protection, counter-narcotics, and HIV will be incorporated in the textbooks.”

- Finally, NESP III, it is indicated that the MoE will adopt certain strategies for protecting schools and preventing conflicts, including “strengthening peace education, conflict resolution, and civic education in curriculum.” What do you think of this strategy?
 - Do you know how this strategy was developed?
 - What means are being allocated for the implementation of this strategy?
 - What do you think will be the main challenges for the implementation of this strategy?
- To what extent do you support the integration of peace education as an independent subject in the national curriculum in the near future?
 - If so, why? What would be the prerequisite? What are your means at the parliament to make it happen?
 - If not, why? What is preventing it?
- Have you heard about the peace education program developed by the NGO called Help the Afghan Children?
 - If so, what do you think about it?

5. Is there anything else you want to share with me?

2. Interview guide at the local level – HTAC

1. Origin of HTAC general peace education program started in 2002:
 - How did the program start?
 - Who was behind it?
 - Do you confirm there was no other peace education program taught in schools in Afghanistan then?
 - Since HTAC started its peace education program in 2002, have you heard of other organizations that have launched peace education programs in schools as well? If so, which ones? Were their programs similar? What were the differences?
2. Concept and Content:
 - How was the program’s content designed? Who was involved?
 - Did HTAC consider any materials that were successful in other countries and adapt it? If so, which ones and to what extent?
 - What is the pedagogy used for this program?
 - How have you trained the teachers?
3. Results so far & challenges encountered:
 - Could you please detail the history of the program: in what province(s) it started and then what other provinces were selected?
 - Where is the program still taught?

- How did you do to obtain the buy-in of the local community and the positive participation of the schools' principals, teachers and students?
 - How many schools, students, and teachers have been reached in each province (please detail the information per province and per year)?
 - Could you please describe the teacher training content, methodology and duration?
 - What challenges did you encounter:
 - o In the design of the program materials?
 - o In the teacher training?
 - o In the implementation of the program in the schools?
 - Could you detail the results you obtained along the years in each province?
 - What were your principal sources of funding?
 - What are you particularly proud about?
 - If you could go back in time, what would you do differently?
4. Collaboration with the Ministry of Education:
- When the program was launched in 2002, how did you obtain the agreement of the Ministry to work with these schools?
 - Over the years, how did you manage the relationship with the Ministry? Who were you in contact with?
 - What did the Ministry think of your program back in 2002?
 - How did the Ministry's opinion about your peace education program evolve along the years?
5. The new peace education curriculum (including the pilot program in Paghman):
- Origin of the new peace education curriculum:
 - o Why did HTAC revise its curriculum and developed a "national" curriculum?
 - o Please detail the origin and content of the first Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Education.
 - o What convinced the Minister to sign the Memorandum of Understanding? Is it possible to obtain a copy?
 - o Please provide information on the content of the updated version of the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the new Minister of Education. Is it possible to obtain a copy?
 - The new curriculum:
 - o How was the curriculum/teaching materials developed?
 - o Who was involved in the development of the curriculum?
 - o What is the content of the new curriculum?
 - o What is the teaching method that is recommended with it?
 - The process of the pilot test:
 - o How long will the test take place?
 - o Can you provide:

- The names of the provinces where the pilot test has been or is being conducted.
 - The number of schools where the curriculum is tested in each province.
 - The number of teachers trained for the test
 - The number of students who participate in the pilot test.
 - How did you select the provinces for the pilot test?
 - How did you select the teachers for the pilot test?
 - How did you select the students for the pilot test?
 - Results & challenges so far
 - How did you prepare the pilot to ensure the buy-in of the local community and the positive participation of the schools, teachers and students?
 - What challenges have you encountered so far:
 - In the design of the curriculum?
 - In the teacher training?
 - In the implementation of the program in the pilot schools?
 - Have you revised the curriculum already or are you planning to revise it after the end of the pilot test?
 - What results have you obtained so far (please distinguish the results by province)?
 - What goals do you have for the pilot test?
6. The potential of the program to be integrated in the national curriculum (*here we will explore the possible influence of the local on the national*)
- To what extent do you think the peace education curriculum has a chance to be included in the national curriculum in the schools?
 - What are the conditions for its inclusion?
 - What do you do to ensure this can happen?
 - What are the main challenges that could prevent this from happening?
7. Is there anything else you want to share with me?

Appendix C: Detailed results of the peace education and conflict sensitivity analysis of the latest textbooks developed by the Afghan Ministry of Education

Legend: Religious Education is divided between two versions: one for Sunnites marked H, and one for Shiites marked J.
Underscored are the elements that are not conflict-sensitive.
Lines filled in grey mean that no peace education elements could be found in these textbooks.
For some lessons, screenshots of the textbooks have been included, with a translation of the main sentence.


Subject	Grade	Publication Year	Lesson / Page	Title	Description / Verbatim
Religious Education	1 H & J	1390 (2011)			
Religious Education	2 H	1390 (2011)	37/64	Muslims love peace	<p>“Each Muslim has to make efforts to make peace sustainable, which is necessary for prayers, education and the development of the country.”</p> <p>ترین شخص کسی است که برای تحکیم صلح کوشش می کند.</p> <p>“The best individual is the one who makes all the efforts to obtain sustainable peace”</p>
Religious Education	2 J	1388 (2009)	24/66	Peace and Reconciliation	<p>Promotion of sustainable peace.</p> <p>“Muslims have to make efforts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be nice with others - To avoid conflicts and war, - Not to insults others”

					<p>مسلمان باید به دیگران محبت داشته باشد، با همه با روی گشاده و زبان خوش برخورد نماید. بنا بر این، باید تلاش نمایم تا:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • با دیگران خوشرفتاری نمایم؛ • از جنگ و جنال بپرهیزیم؛ • به هیچ کس دشنام ندهیم؛ • با عبارات بد با کسی سخن نگوئیم؛ • با کسی ترشروی نکنیم؛ <p>۶۶</p>
Religious Education	3 H 3 J	1390 (2011) 1389 (2010)			
Religious Education	4 H 4 J	1389 (2010)			
Religious Education	5 H	1389 (2010)	35/56	Peace and Reconciliation	Both lessons provide a reference to verses of the Koran that encourage Peace and Reconciliation efforts.
	5 J	1390 (2011)	17/54	Example of peace in Islam	
Religious Education	5 H	1389 (2010)	39/60	Fairness and Compassion	
	5 J	1390 (2011)	20/60	Cooperation and Aid in Islam	
Religious Education	6 H	1389 (2010)	26/42	Misconduct in Ihram (ceremonies during to pilgrimage to Mecca)	During the haj (pilgrimage), some of the misconducts forbidden are war and the utilization of words that can hurt. ۲. جنگ کردن، و به کاربردن کلماتی که موجب رنجش مخاطب می شود.
	6 H	1389 (2010)	33/52-53	Duties of individuals in the society: 1) Muslims with Muslims 2) Muslims with others	1) Not to make war with other Muslims and in case of war between Muslims, make efforts to obtain peace and reconciliation 2) With non-Muslims: be respectful, be just, and respect their right to have them celebrate their own religious ceremonies

					<p>“a Muslim has a religious responsibility to respect:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not to betray while deal-making - Treat others with justice and fairness” <p>مسلمان و طلیفة دینی و ایمانی دارد که با سایر افراد جامعه - اگر چه پیرو عقیده اسلامی هم نباشند - امور ذیل را رعایت کند: ۱. با ایشان در معامله خیانت نکند. ۲. در مسائل عدلی و قضایی با آنان با عدالت برخورد نماید.</p>
Religious Education	6 J	1390 (2011)	19/56-58	Duties of members of the society	<p>“Members of the society have several duties towards each other: to greet one another, to not hurt each other, to respect ones commitments and promises, not to lie, not to touch the others’ properties, to avoid acts that can hurt others, not to ill say of others”</p>
Religious Education	6 H 6 J	1389 (2010) 1390 (2011)	34/54 20/59-60	Cooperation and Aid in Islam	<p>هدف، ایجاد روح همدردی و معاونت با دیگران است. بنی آدم اعضای یکدیگرند که در آفرینش زیک گوهرند چو عضوی به درد آورد روزگار دیگر عضو ها را نماند قرار</p> <p>6H: Objective of the lesson: create a spirit of compassion et cooperation</p>
Religious Education	6 H	1389 (2010)	35/55	Equality in Islam	<p>Goal: to be familiar with the signification of equality in Islam</p> <p>هدف، آشنایی با مفهوم مساوات و برابری در اسلام است. Islam considers equal in human rights all people of every race, color and where they belong.</p>
Religious Education	6 H	1389 (2010)	37-38/57-58	Bad Habits in Islam	<p>Drinking wine and drug consummation: the consequences on each member of the society and the society as a whole. It is a religious obligation to fight drugs.</p>

					شاگردان می توانند در بارهٔ زبان های شراب نوشی به شخص و جامعه چیزی بگویند؟ زبان های استعمال مواد مخدر امروز به کسی پوشیده نیست، استعمال مواد مخدر یکی از مشکلات بزرگ جهان کنونی را می سازد و سالیانه کشور های بزرگ جهان و سازمان ملل متحد برای مبارزه با مواد مخدر پول هایی هنگفت را اختصاص می دهند و مبارزه با آن به یکی از مسؤولیت های مهم جهانی تبدیل شده است. خوشبختانه در دین مبین اسلام نه تنها مبارزه برضد مواد مخدر یک مسؤولیت انسانی است، بلکه یک وجیبهٔ دینی نیز شمرده می شود.
Religious Education	7	1390 (2011)	37/102	Cooperation and Aid in Islam	۱- مسلمانان برادر و خواهر یکدیگر اند و باید مثل اعضای یک فامیل زندگی کنند. ۲- مسلمان بر مسلمان ظلم نمی کند. ۳- مسلمان برادر مسلمانش را به دشمن نمی سپارد. ۴- مسلمان به فکر رفع نیازمندی و حل مشکلات برادر مسلمان خود می باشد. ۵- مسلمان عیب مسلمان را می پوشاند: هیچ انسانی وجود ندارد که کم و بیش عیبی نداشته باشد، و مسلمان واقعی خوبی ها را بیان می کند و زشتی ها را می پوشاند. <u>To protect other Muslims even if they have done bad things (no one is perfect, but by principle, if the person is a Muslim, they deserve our help)</u>
Religious Education	8	1390 (2011)	34/90-91	Kindness and Violence	Hadith explains the importance of kindness and discouraging violence شستی و خشونت اساس تمام مظالم، دشمنی ها، ستم ها، جنگ ها و اختلافات می باشد؛ لی لطف و رفق هیچگاه باعث ایجاد همچو مشکلات نمی گردد، بلکه با رفق و لطف میتوان برنوع مشکلات را حل نمود؛ بناء برآن پیغمبر اکرم ^ﷺ به رفق و نرمی امر نموده است. ۴. خودداری از زشتی و خشونت: در حالت خشونت و زشتی انسان اعصاب خود را از دست می دهد، واحیاناً کارهای بسیار خطرناک از او صادر می شود، که بعداً از آن پشیمان می گردد، و در بسا اوقات خشونت، خشونت جانب مقابل را ایجاد می نماید، و کار به سرحدی می رسد که هیچ یک از طرفین به آن راضی نمی باشند، پس لازم است از ابتدا خشونت و زشتی را ترک بگوییم و خویشتن را به بردباری، حوصله و رفق در گفتار و کردار عادت دهیم، وحتی در مقابل خشونت نیز از رفق و بردباری استفاده نماییم.
Religious Education	9	1390 (2011)	39/117	Peace and conflict management according to Islam	تعریف صلح: صلح در لغت دور کردن منازعه را می گویند. و در اصطلاح فقهاء صلح عبارت از آن عقدی است که درگیری و منازعه را برطرف سازد. ^(۱) حکم صلح: بر طرف نمودن درگیری و منازعه از میان مردم کار خوب است. ^(۲) Definition of peace in Islam: when we manage conflict through settlement

Religious Education	10	1390 (2011)	13/43	Importance of peace among people	Hadith ۶- آموزش صلح از دیدگاه اسلام ۲- صلح، وحدت را به میان میآورد “Peace is valuable in Islam” “Peace create unity”
Religious Education	11	1390 (2011)	16/57	Girls education	در این حدیثه در مورد حقوق خرد سالان به مسلمانان هدایت داده شده است تا در تربیت و پرورش دختران توجه جدی کرده تربیت دختران را نسبت به پسران اولویت بیشتر داده است تا آنجا که پیامبر ﷺ تربیت دختران را سبب نزدیکی خود و موجودیت آنها را در خانه سبب کامیابی دانسته است؛ زیرا دختران از کودکی تا مرحله عروسی با خطر مواجه اند، اسلام به خاطر مصونیت دختران برای پدر و مادر وظیفه داده است تا مرحله ازدواج توجه جدی با دختران خویش نمایند تا اینکه مورد شکار انسانهای بد اخلاق جامعه قرار نگیرند و در اجتماع مانند سلمان آلات تجارتنی استعمال نشوند. Hadith: “Girls’ education is more important than boys’ education because girls are targets of predators in the society”
			36/126-128	<u>Rights of a husband on his wife</u>	“God is satisfied of a woman who stays at home”
Religious Education	12	1390 (2011)	22/71	<u>Role of women in Jihad</u>	<u>How women should contribute to armed Jihad.</u>
Civic education	7	1390 (2011)			
Civic education	8	1390 (2011)			
Civic education	9	1389 (2010)	4/17	Democracy	
			7-8/29-38	The UN, its mission and organs	In the lesson’s activities, the teacher will ask the students what they think about the level of success of the UN in bringing peace to Afghanistan
			9/39	Afghanistan and the UN	

Civic education	10	No Book available on the MoE's website			
Civic education	11	1390 (2011)			
Civic education	12	No Book available on the MoE's website			
Life Skills	1	1389 (2010)	35/69	Damages of war	Objective of the lesson: students becomes familiar with the damages of war  <p>“Questions for the students:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the damages caused by war? - What are the advantages to avoid war and conflict? - What are the elements that can help bring peace and reconciliation?”
			36/71	Problem Solving	Objective: students can recognize the existence of a problem and find solutions
			38/75	Human being equality	Objective: students becomes familiar with the notion of diversity <p>“We, human beings, man or woman, healthy or handicapped, wealthy or poor, we respect each other.”</p> <p>ما همه انسانها چه مرد چه زن، جور یا معیوب، غریب یا غنی را احترام میکنیم.</p>

			39/77	Reconciliation	Objective: understand the need for reconciliation after war or conflict
Life Skills	2	1389 (2010)	12/23	Children rights	
			33/65	Kindness	
			34/67	Dispute	Objective: students becomes familiar with the notion of dispute and to find ways to solve it without violence اختلاف و دعوا در زنده‌گی ما بسیار واقع می شوند. وظیفه ما اینست که اختلاف و دعوا را بدون جنگ و دشنام رفع کنیم. بهترین راه‌های حل برای یک اختلاف از طریق مفاهمه پیدا می شود. در وقت حرف زدن باید ادب و احترام رعایت شود. The best way to solve a dispute is dialogue. A good dialogue is made with respect and politeness.
			35/69	War	“Calmly, explain the problem; explain your motivations. Once the problem is understood look for solutions. Once several solutions have been found, select the best solution for all the parties involved.” جنگ سبب آزاده‌گی و خفه گی می شود. جنگ سبب صدمه به انسان و خراب شدن یا شکستن چیزها می گردد. در وقت صحبت اول مشکل را شرح دهیم بعد بگوییم که چه می خواهیم. وقتی مشکل را فهمیدیم در جستجوی چند راه حل شویم. وقتی چند راه حل پیدا شد خوبترین راه حل را انتخاب کنیم که مورد قبول هر دو جانب باشد.
			36/71	Active listening	Objective: children understand the importance and advantage of listening, and reinforce their active listening skills. “Not to listen to others is a lack of respect. If you do not listen to the other, you cannot

					<p>understand what they say. When someone speaks, do not look somewhere else, do not interrupt, do not do something else.”</p> <p>هدف: شاگردان اهمیت و مزایای گوش کردن را فهمیده و مهارت گوش کردن بدقت را در خود تقویت کرده بتوانند.</p> <p>به حرف کسی گوش نکردن بی احترامی است و اگر به سخنان کسی گوش ندهیم، سخنان او را نمی فهمیم وقتی کسی با ما حرف می زند باید هر طرف نبینیم، در صحبت او داخل نشویم و با چیزی خود را مصروف نسازیم.</p>
			37/73	Accepting one's mistakes	
			38/75	Apologize	
			39/77	Peace	Objective: Reveal the means for reconciliation after a dispute or a war.
Life Skills	3	1389 (2010)	1/1	Peaceful life	Objective: know peaceful behaviors at school, at home, at the Mosque, in society.
			2/3	Peaceful methods	
			6/11	Individual Rights	Objective: be aware of your rights; recognize your needs and rights.
			8-9/15-18	Recognize and solving problems & conflict	Objective: students can recognize the existence of a problem and find solutions
			10/19-20	Conflict	Objective: How to solve conflicts
			11/21	Forgiveness and reconciliation	Objective: students know the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation
Social studies	4	1389 (2010)	7/16	History of school and education in Afghanistan	“In our country, Afghanistan, education has been existing for a long time. Children were taught in houses and Mosques, and now they are taught in schools”


Social studies	5	1389 (2010)	37/79	Peace and human rights / Peace and life	Peace Understanding –reorganize the difference between peace and war/conflict- to encourage students to like peace “fortunately the Bonn agreement put an end to all sorrow and sadness of these years of war”
			38/81	How to establish peace?	“Which government can stay for a long time? What are the basis of sustainable peace?”
			39/83	Human rights	Objective: what are human rights? Understanding each individual right and respect of others’ rights.
Social studies	6	Un-known	5/10-11	Afghan constitution	
			6/12-13	National unity	
			8/18-19	Bonn conference	
			10/22-23	Urgent Loya Jirga	
			11/24-25	Provisory government	
			29/70-71	Human rights	
Social studies	9	1390 (2011)	2/7	Afghanistan constitution	
			4/17	What is democracy	
			10/43-45	Be familiar with Human rights	Human Rights declaration articles
			11/46-49	Human Rights in Afghanistan	Afghan Human Rights commission

Dari	1	1390 (2011)	90/133	Peace dove	Peace-kindness-friendship. "Dove is the symbol of peace"
Dari	2	1389 (2010)	p. 38	Peace	Conversation with a wise uncle about peace at school and at home, and advice how to avoid violence.
			p. 40	Freedom	Story of a bird in the cage, and incitation to let it free
Dari	3	1389 (2010)	35/69	Peace	Benefits of peace: we need peace to make education and development possible. "We need peace more than everything"
Dari	4	1390 (2011)	p. 146	Human rights	The signification of human rights and respects toward others: "humans have individual and social rights"
			p. 148	Peace and reconciliation	Peace is what all humans need- signification of peace –the damages of war
Dari	5	1390 (2011)	p. 134	Peace	Impact of peace in our life. "Peace is a delicious fruit which offers a calm life with happiness"
			p. 136	Violence	Signification and Impact of violence - damages of armed conflict and how to resolve the differences by dialogue to avoid war
Dari	6	1390 (2011)	36/76	Peace	Peace-reconciliation-agreement with peace we can develop Afghanistan, be educated and live happily: the pupil are asked to write an article about peace
			45/94	National unity	To develop mutual respect to other people's opinions

Dari	7	1390 (2011)	4/13 27/133 28/139	Humanitarianism Mines Peace and security	Brotherhood, equality and mutual respect What are mines- they are the results of conflicts and war-how to recognize them Establish the dialogue about the advantages of these items
Dari	8	1390 (2011)	6/29	Role of education in our life	“In one word, we can say that all human progress (spiritual and material) for thousands of years is thanks to the education”
			21/125	Non exploded mines signs	How to behave with victims of mines.
Dari	9	1390 (2011)	10/61	The susceptible places where mines are	Importance of being tolerant and helpful.
			11/65	Democracy	
			22/141-143	International Human Rights commission-World Human Rights declaration	
			6/23-25	Social justice	Signification of justice and social justice, impact on life: “human society-democracy-independence”
Dari	10	1390 (2011)	10/41-44	Women Rights in Society	Women rights: in society, in Islam. Obligation for Afghanistan to assure the defense of women’s rights, especially since it has signed the UN convention on the fight against women discrimination.
			17/81-86	Mutual understanding and acceptance of the opinion of others	Role of human in society. Respect of brotherhood. Importance of mutual understanding. Understanding

					discrimination. Role of Islam in everyday life.
Dari	11	1390 (2011)	10/47	Oppression	Signification of oppression. Understanding its bad impact on individuals and on society. Signification of violation.
			16/83-86	Social relationships	Signification of social relationships. What will reinforce social relationships and what are the benefits of social relationship reinforcement
			25/133	Psychological effects of mines	Physical handicaps due to mines' - mental impact - how to behave with individuals that are handicapped because of mines
Dari	12	1390 (2011)	5/25-27	Individual and social independence	Signification of social versus individual independence - the limits of independence – the role of education in society's order

Appendix D: Teaching materials found on the walls of the *peace room* of one of the schools visited in Paghman (June 9, 2014)



Problem-solving process:

- Define the problem
- Suggest several solutions
- Select the best
- Take into consideration all parties and ensure their agreement
- Execute the agreement




Bad thoughts:


Bad talk



Good thoughts:

Good talk







Appendix E: Case stories

Case Story # 1:

“My name is Enayatullah son of Mr. Rahmatullah, I am student of grade 7 in Paghman-e-Qashang high school, and one of the peace education trainees during 2011. I used to fight with other boys in the village as well as in school. I made a group comprised of boys; in order to be strong enough in the schools and no one can harm us. The administration of Paghman-e-Qashang high school has informed that, if I continue like this, then they will have to discharge me from the school. One of the days, I was encouraged by one of the peace education teachers to join for attending peace education sessions, while at the beginning, I denied, but few days later, I got enrollment in the peace education program, which was initiated by HTAC. The peace education program was very interesting for me, because playing different roles of the stories and using puppets was like a fun. It gradually impacted on my attitude towards positive change in my behavior at the school and home. Luckily, I was selected as mediator in our class by our peace education instructor. I have gained good experience by practicing conflict solving methods in school. One day, I was returning to my home from school, when I saw two boys (Farid and Jawad) were fighting with each other in our neighborhood. First of all I suggested them to stop fighting and then, I talked separately with each of them. I used the methods for solving the conflict between Farid and Jawad and explained the benefit of peace and the harms of conflict and fighting to them. They both agreed not to fight with each other in the future and shook hands with each other.

Regards,
Enayatullah”

Case Story # 2:

“My name is Fatima Haidari student of grade 8 in Abdullah Bin Omar high school, which is located in Paghman district. This story is about a conflict, which initially happened almost two years ago between me and a girl of a family living in our nearby. The reason for our conflict was over filling of water tanks from a public hand pump. I wanted to fill the water tank first, but the girl was not allowing me and she was telling me that she came first and has to fill first. I told no this is my turn and I came early than you, which caused fighting and abusing each other. This conflict continued for two years and no one tried to solve the tension between us. Although, there were other girls, who had close relation with both of us, but due to low awareness about conflict solving did not attempt to solve the problem. During 2011 a female teacher came to our class and requested the students for enrollment in Peace Education program. When, I saw many girls from our class were attending the peace education program, I also raised my hand and told the teacher that, I will participate in peace education program, but I need to ask my mom and dad. I got permission of my parents for admission in the mentioned program. I regularly participated in peace education sessions and practical rehearsals. I learnt a lot about solving conflicts, mediation and using peaceful methods for solving conflicts in our school, village and family.

This is worth to mention that after participating in the peace education program, I feel positive changes in my behavior with other students, members of my family and village. On the basis of learning and positive change in my mind, I have decided to end the conflict with the girl, I fought two years ago. One day, while she was also going to school, I said hello and greetings to her and apologized for things happened. She looked angry, but accepted my greetings, and then I requested her to come to my home for a lunch and discussing issues in friendly manner. She agreed and two days later on Friday, she came to our home with her small brother and, we had good food and talked a lot and discussed the benefits of peace and disadvantage of conflict.

Thanks, Fatima”

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