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# A NATO for the 21<sup>ST</sup> Century

## Toward a New Strategic Concept

JAMIE SHEA

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NATO will mark its sixtieth anniversary in 2009. Naturally, NATO insiders want this to be a dignified occasion, as befits an alliance that has contributed so much to international as well as European security over the past six decades. But celebrations are meaningless without a continuing sense of purpose. That means demonstrating results in dealing with today's pressing security challenges, and not just recalling the successes of yesterday. So what in particular does NATO have to collectively produce to have something significant to celebrate in 2009?

### NATO IN AFGHANISTAN

First and foremost, more effort and better organization for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is required.<sup>1</sup> It is NATO's most challenging mission and success is not guaranteed simply because NATO has deployed troops in that country. Failure would be dangerous, not just for the security of Afghans but also for NATO's own members and for the Alliance's ability to take on similar missions of this type beyond its borders in the future. If governments and publics are to stay the course, NATO will need to demonstrate significant progress by 2009 in making Afghanistan secure so that reconstruction can achieve real, visible improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans.

This means that NATO member states will have to deploy more forces. At the moment, NATO has one soldier for every one thousand Afghans. This is not enough to prevail quickly against the Taliban—even if they have little chance of defeating NATO—or to uphold the security environment

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*Jamie Shea is Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), headquartered in Brussels, Belgium.*

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for development to take off. Most counterinsurgency manuals stipulate a minimum ratio of one soldier for every 50 in the local population. That noted, the military advice is that the Alliance does not require thousands of additional forces either, as welcome as that would be in an ideal world. Success or failure hinges on very little—for instance, a few tactical reserve battalions, some more attack helicopters, or extra engineering units. And if NATO nations could only lift the remaining caveats on the forces that are already there and give the commanders more tactical flexibility, NATO would be able to get even more benefit from the considerable military investment that it is already making.

Recently, NATO's military posture in the south of Afghanistan has improved following the decision of the United States to postpone the departure of forces from its 10th Mountain Division. This should help the Alliance cope with the expected Taliban "spring offensive." Poland has also deployed a tactical reserve battalion and the United Kingdom is looking to increase its already large commitment alongside Canada and the Netherlands. Calls by NATO's Secretary General on all allies to step up to the table are showing some results. Germany is proposing to send Tornado aircraft and others have agreed to send forces to the south in emergency situations. However, Afghanistan will be a long commitment and NATO will need to be able to call upon a much larger pool of nations ready to move to the south and west. Moreover, the troops to be provided must be equipped with war-fighting and peacekeeping capabilities, both of which are required for twenty-first century conditions.

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Pakistan is also vital to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and all sides must do a better job of managing the long border through better aerial surveillance and joint liaison teams. This means that NATO will not only need to have close military cooperation with Pakistan—something that is emerging via the Tripartite Commission and the recently established Joint Operations Intelligence Cell in Kabul—but it will also need to engage the country at the political level as well.<sup>2</sup> The recent actions that Pakistan has taken against the Taliban on its side of the frontier are an encouraging sign, but success will depend on developing a genuinely joint approach rather than isolated actions in response to Western pressures.

Afghanistan will also need more constant attention from the highest

political levels to coordinate overall grand strategy and to speak directly to its neighbors. The appointment by the United Nations of a respected senior envoy to coordinate international reconstruction efforts would be most welcome. The G8 nations, who have already assumed responsibilities on the ground for issues such as counternarcotics and the demobilization of militias, can also meet from time to time to better coordinate their efforts. Germany, which currently occupies the presidency of both the EU and the G8, and which is one of the largest troop-contributing nations in Afghanistan, is ideally placed to lead this effort.

NATO also has to get a substantial training program off the ground for the Afghan National Army, as this is its only viable handover strategy. At around 30,000 regular troops the Army is currently no larger than ISAF. It has to be a much larger, better trained and better equipped force if it is going to assume the main security burden. The Alliance decided on such a training program at its Riga Summit in November 2006, but it needs to make sure that it is up and running without delay.<sup>3</sup> That means making sure that it is properly resourced and can support all echelons of the Afghan National Army, from the generals in their headquarters to the soldiers in the field. It is also beyond question that success in Afghanistan will remain elusive if we focus only on body counts and military operations. Development and reconstruction are also essential (though security is a prerequisite for both tasks). Because of this, Afghanistan will require substantial aid money.

Finally, NATO needs to achieve better concerted planning between the military aspects of peace-building and the civilian aspects. No peace survives for long without jobs, electricity, roads, and teachers in schools. The military can do some of this work on a short-term basis and NATO's 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams have proven their value; but the essential services that improve the lives of Afghans and effective government institutions need the support of the civilian reconstruction agencies.<sup>4</sup> Toward this end, in late January 2007, NATO held a major meeting at the ministerial level in Brussels in which the EU Council and Commission, the UN, and the World Bank took part. There is also now a Policy Action Group on the ground in Kabul to ensure better-coordinated action. It is heartening that after much theological debate the Allies have finally all agreed on the need for this comprehensive approach. But they do not have the time for more theorizing. It is urgent that they put this comprehensive approach into effect through more coordinated and effective activity on the ground, and more coordinated strategic planning at headquarters. What they should be seeking in particular is more mutual transparency in planning, the exchange of liaison officers, the establishment of common task

forces, and the conclusion of more memoranda of understanding between the leading organizations in certain areas.

We truly need this comprehensive approach—not just as a debating issue at international security conferences but as a real operational culture that we practice day in and day out. No institution is self-sufficient. None can succeed alone or in isolation, in marked contrast to the Cold War days when NATO could rely solely on its own members to carry out its core Article 5 self-defense missions.<sup>5</sup> Each institution is only as good as its network of relationships and its ability to leverage not only its own efforts but also the contributions of others.

### **BUILDING THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP**

The same need for more coordination and for international organizations to work better together applies to NATO's other major mission: Kosovo. In view of what will undoubtedly be a turbulent transition to its new status, Kosovo will continue to require a substantial NATO military force on the ground after the UN Security Council has decided on Kosovo's future status. Former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari, the UN negotiator, has already called on the Alliance to also play a major role in shaping a future Kosovo security force to ensure that it is not only well trained to keep the peace but is also under democratic control. The EU, for its part, is about to launch a mission there in support of police, judicial, and public administration reform. But it will be difficult to make progress in Kosovo if NATO and the EU do not talk to each other at both the political as well as the working level, and establish clear lines of responsibility between EU police and NATO military forces. This cooperation will have to be seamless if NATO and the EU face major violence or riots.

The political factors behind the current deadlock in the NATO-EU relationship are well known and, frankly, are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. They are very much bound up with the issue of Cyprus and of Turkey's negotiations toward membership in the European Union. It will be easier for the EU to address the issue of its relationships with other organizations once it has decided how to resolve the question of what to do with its current constitutional treaty following the 2005 referenda's failure in France and The Netherlands. That noted, NATO-EU cooperation cannot wait for these long-term strategic questions to be settled. There is far too much pressing work to be done in the meantime. Afghanistan, where the EU has just agreed to launch a police training mission to complement NATO's own efforts in the field of the training of the Afghan army, and

Kosovo, where the EU will soon take over from the current UN administration, clearly point to the need for NATO and the EU to establish much closer relations as soon as possible. With 21 common members following the EU's recent enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania, there is even less reason why such a substantive dialogue cannot take place.

The North Atlantic Council and the Political Security Committee of the EU should already be meeting frequently to map out a common strategy and to ensure that they have liaison arrangements on the ground. Indeed, this bottom-up approach to cooperation, driven by immediate operational requirements, might help foster a closer working relationship between NATO and the EU when it comes to other issues as well. For instance, there is the question of how to integrate the Balkans into Euro-Atlantic structures. Persuading Serbia in this respect to turn its back on the past, to settle once and for all the war crimes issues still pending from the wars of the 1990s, and to get on with a serious program of domestic reforms will be key to the stability of the entire region. The same applies to helping other countries there—such as Croatia, Albania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—that hope to join NATO in 2008 (and the EU somewhat later), but that will still need substantial monitoring and assistance to keep their reforms on track. Another issue is the future of the respective enlargement processes of each organization beyond the Balkans, particularly in looking at countries in the immediate neighborhood of NATO and the EU, such as Ukraine. Broader issues in which both organizations have a stake, such as dealing with international terrorism and the future of the non-proliferation regime, would also benefit from more robust inter-institutional dialogue.

At a time when the EU is developing its own military forces, such as the recently launched EU battle groups, and initiating its own defense research and investment programs via the newly created European Defence Agency, it also makes sense to avoid duplication as far as possible with what NATO is already doing. For example, the high-quality deployable forces that NATO is seeking to acquire through its NATO Response Force would also be useful to the EU for its battle groups. It makes sense, therefore, to have common force generation processes, common training programs, and common systems of certification. In this way both NATO and the EU would stand a higher chance of having the forces available for short notice deployments. Better cooperation would also help to identify the most urgent missions, given the limited number of troops. For instance, is it more urgent for Europe to be sending troops to NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan or to UN operations in Africa or elsewhere? In an ideal world,

the answer of course would be both. The danger, however, is to conduct too many under-resourced missions simultaneously when a few extra battalions in, say, Afghanistan would mean the crucial difference between success and failure.

In short, although pundits often like to present NATO and the EU as two rivals anxious to prove their supremacy over each other, they are in reality much more interdependent. NATO needs the civilian expertise and resources of the EU, whereas the EU needs NATO's larger military formations to create the secure environment that can allow its civilian efforts to flourish. The challenge in the months ahead is to bring political agendas and working practices more into line with this fundamental reality.

### STABILITY OPERATIONS TAKE CENTER STAGE

NATO today is increasingly used by its members to organize military stabilization operations. Afghanistan and Kosovo will keep NATO countries occupied for some years yet. Success in both places will also largely determine NATO's future credibility as an instrument of choice for handling important security challenges.

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Afghanistan and Kosovo, however, will not be NATO's last operations. When we look at the international security climate today, one thing stands out: there is an increasing demand for international stabilization missions, both to resource the ones already underway and to be able to launch new ones.

Some pundits wrote off the UN as a major peacekeeper after the setbacks in Bosnia and Somalia. Yet in 2007 the UN is back to its peacekeeping high point with 18 missions currently ongoing involving 74,000 Blue Helmets. If the UN becomes engaged in Darfur and in Somalia, this number will go well above 100,000 troops. Taken together, NATO, the EU, and the African Union (AU) have around 75,000 troops in the field. The current trend in international security is increasingly toward the "hybrid mission." For instance, NATO and the EU are working together to stabilize Bosnia and sharing police and military tasks in Afghanistan. NATO and the EU are also providing the logistics and planning capacities to the AU in Darfur. In addition, the UN is trying to form a joint mission with the AU in Darfur, notwithstanding the resistance of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir. The EU recently completed a

mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assist the UN during the recent presidential elections. The UK and France have also intervened on occasion in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast to assist international missions that have gotten themselves into trouble. Consequently, the demands on an organization like NATO are not only widening geographically but requiring many novel and ad hoc institutional arrangements as well.

Afghanistan also shows that these missions are becoming more complex, more distant, and more dangerous. The Balkans were essentially peaceful by the time NATO troops were deployed. In Afghanistan, by contrast, counterinsurgency has become a serious challenge. The Allies who undertook major counterinsurgency operations during the period of decolonization after World War II are going back to the history manuals to relearn the lessons of how to win the hearts and minds of local populations and to separate the hard-nosed militants from the mass of potential recruits. Afghanistan shows clearly the need for improved intelligence and more effective psychological and information operations to counter the propaganda of the Taliban and secure the support and cooperation of the local tribal elders.

NATO has also had to rethink the military role in reconstruction by giving money to its military commanders to do essential post-conflict reconstruction work that would normally be left to civilian international agencies, if only they were present in these dangerous areas. Instead of one mission, there are, in reality, several missions. Peacekeeping is required in the north of the country, but combat and counterinsurgency operations are needed in the south. Moreover, NATO and national militaries have to support and work side-by-side with NGOs and civilian relief agencies on the ground. Providing adequate resources for all of these “missions within the mission” and getting the balance right among them will be the key to success.

#### **FIVE LESSONS FOR NATO GOING FORWARD**

Getting it right in Afghanistan is essential not only for NATO's present but also for its future. Operations are driving NATO's transformation by making both its strengths and its weaknesses much more visible. Five major lessons have come to light that NATO must integrate fully within its bureaucracy and working culture in the months ahead if it is to be truly fit for the purpose of becoming an expeditionary alliance. If NATO decides to issue a new Strategic Concept at its sixtieth anniversary summit in 2009, these five lessons would undoubtedly need to be the core of this document.

The first is the need for more and better political consultation among the Allies. NATO is now involved on three continents and in countries and cultures that were never on its radar screen during the Cold War. It is not only NATO's military commanders but also its diplomats and planners who need a much better understanding of the environment in which they are now operating. This can only come from more focused meetings fed by better intelligence sharing and better political analysis, leading to franker discussions with fewer diplomatic niceties. NATO's summits and ministerial meetings can no longer afford mainly to bless pre-cooked decisions, but must be an opportunity for the kind of open dialogue which alone can correctly identify the challenges that NATO faces and therefore generate the troops, money, and political will essential for success.

Moreover, NATO's political consultations should not be limited only to areas where it has deployed troops. Any issue, such as Iran, which is posing a present or potential challenge to the security of its members, should automatically be part of NATO's political consultation agenda. We cannot change the world if we do not understand it properly. This will also mean that NATO should hire more experts on the Middle East and Southwest Asia to work alongside the considerable number of experts on the former Soviet Union and the Balkans whom the Alliance has inherited from its old twentieth-century missions.

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The second lesson is to push ahead with defense transformation. At its Riga Summit last November, the Alliance made important conceptual breakthroughs. It published a document on Comprehensive Political Guidance describing the missions that NATO defense planners need to prepare for.<sup>6</sup> NATO also embraced more common funding for its missions to spread burdens more equitably. It declared its NATO Response Force fully operational and agreed to procure its own strategic airlift capabilities based on the U.S. C-17 aircraft. But it is not enough simply to declare these initiatives. They also have to be implemented and sustained in practice, especially when it comes to something like the NATO Response Force, which rotates among NATO's member states every six months.<sup>7</sup>

NATO defense transformation also has to be better tied to supporting the Alliance's ongoing operations. During the Cold War, defense planning dealt with possible future contingencies. Today, it needs to be responsive to present challenges as well; for instance, the urgent need to find better protection for troops against improvised explosive devices and better



tactics and equipment to combat militias in urban environments. NATO also needs to make better use of its command structure to share operational experience and expertise among Allies and suggest novel ways of producing more capabilities. Hardware issues such as equipment and armaments will always be important, but NATO also needs to look at the added value of collective solutions, such as multinational logistics, role specialization, intelligence sharing, and the use of the NATO Response Force not only as a tool for experimentation but also as a real fighting force that can be used when NATO is under pressure—for instance, as a reserve in Afghanistan.

Defense transformation and running operations at the same time cannot be done on the cheap. NATO needs to provoke a political debate among its members on how to resource their ambitions through a combination of national, multinational, and commonly funded solutions. Traditional concepts of burden sharing must be revisited so that they reflect not only defense budget levels but also real effectiveness and concrete outputs. This means establishing agreed priorities, but it also means making better use of both national and collective budgets. In this respect, the fact that today only 6 of 26 Allies have achieved the NATO target of 2 percent of GDP allocated to their defense budgets is a worrying sign.

The third lesson concerns NATO's partnerships.<sup>8</sup> NATO today is an expanding community of 57 countries, with more partners than Allies, and is promoting the security interests of nearly one-third of all the countries in the world. Eighteen partners currently contribute to NATO missions and provide 10 percent of all forces. If NATO can intensify and expand this community in the next few years, it will have laid the basis of a new permanent coalition of states that have developed the practice and culture of working together to solve some of the world's most pressing security problems.

Countries like Japan, Australia, .....  
and South Korea are now coming forward and offering to intensify their cooperation with NATO and to provide both troops and resources to its operations. More long-standing partners in Europe such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria are also looking to take partnership to the next stage. NATO is in-

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creasingly the hub of a sophisticated security network, building confidence and common approaches across continents. The Riga Summit opened up a new perspective to make this network truly global by embracing partners from virtually anywhere, provided they are willing to make a contribution

to NATO operations. But these partners will obviously expect “representation” in exchange for “taxation.” So NATO will have to see how far it invites them to be a regular part of its political consultations and defense planning, as well as decide how far they should be involved in command positions in operational headquarters. This will inevitably raise the question of whether the distinction between traditional allies and partners is becoming increasingly blurred, and whether this really matters in terms of NATO’s formal collective defense arrangements.

The other issue will be how far these new partners want to become involved in NATO’s traditional military business, such as interoperability, harmonizing of doctrines, and common exercises. Yet these difficult issues should not deter NATO from pushing boldly ahead in engaging partners such as Australia or Japan that obviously have the resources to make a major contribution to NATO’s burden sharing. The political benefits seem enormous in comparison to the modesty of the resources required.

One partner requiring special attention has always been, and will remain, Russia. President Putin’s criticisms of the Alliance in his speech at the Munich International Security Conference last February may give the impression that NATO and Russia are still antagonists nearly 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is not the case. NATO has come a long way with Russia in the 10 years since it signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act and five years since it established the NATO-Russia Council. The fact that Russia now participates in NATO’s Article 5 collective defense mission in the Mediterranean—operation Active Endeavor—says a lot.<sup>9</sup>

Yet it is also true that there is a great deal of unfulfilled potential. NATO and Russia could do much more together in operations, in making their forces interoperable in peace-support missions, in supporting each other in disasters and emergency situations, in exchanging intelligence on terrorist threats, and in consulting on defense against proliferation. This spring will mark the two anniversaries in the NATO-Russia relationship. It is an opportunity not just for a high-level ceremonial meeting but also an encouragement to establish clearer priorities, and to make a bigger and better effort to make NATO-Russia cooperation more visible to public opinion, especially in Russia.

The fourth lesson is that there is a major future role for NATO to play in the fields of education and training. In addition to the Afghan National Army, NATO is helping to train Iraqi security forces at a dedicated facility near Baghdad. It also now has a good track record in security sector reform, having mentored the formation of an integrated Bosnian army and general staff, and having helped several countries in the Balkans through the

establishment of military assistance missions. At the Riga Summit, NATO took a new initiative to offer training to the Mediterranean and Gulf countries. It has also been in contact with the African Union, which would like to develop a longer-term relationship with NATO in capacity building. Training can help these countries and organizations build viable security structures to cope with their own problems, and can also turn them into the partners and force contributors of the future. But there is good training and bad training, and success requires genuine expertise as well as large-scale resources.

Finally, as NATO looks toward its future and its new Strategic Concept, it will have to have a debate on what security policy experts are now calling "the new Article 5" or "collective defense without borders." NATO's posture during the Cold War was relatively straightforward. It waited to be attacked and was then postured to repel the invaders from its territory to return to the status quo. However, a massive conventional attack against NATO territory is the least likely scenario that the Alliance faces today. Indeed, the first time NATO activated its Article 5 collective defense clause was immediately after September 11, 2001, in response to aggression against the United States from a non-state actor. This pledged the Allies to respond not on their own territory but thousands of miles away in Afghanistan. Similarly, today the threats to NATO's populations are from contingencies such as terrorist attacks, including chemical or biological agents, nuclear or conventional missiles, uncontrolled migration, energy supply disruptions, and even natural disasters brought on by global warming that were not part of NATO's original Article 5 concept.

The question for NATO is therefore whether it can reinterpret Article 5 to guarantee Alliance solidarity and an organized collective response to these new threats, or whether those responses will be essentially left to bilateral arrangements between the United States and individual Allies or, alternatively, to arrangements among the various members of the European Union. For instance, the United States is currently negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy components of a missile defense system on their territories. This will certainly help to protect much of Europe but not all of Alliance territory and, so far, this missile defense system is not a NATO project. The major challenge for NATO, then, is to determine how it wishes to define itself in the future as an organizer and facilitator of expeditionary missions beyond its territory, and to what degree it wants to return to its core business of defending its own populations. Manifestly, and contrary to the Cold War, defense of populations is now no longer the same thing as defense of territory.

## CONCLUSION: EMBEDDING LESSONS

In conclusion, any NATO policy planner worth his salt would aim to have these five key lessons or processes fully embedded in NATO's structures and working culture by the time of its sixtieth anniversary. A new Strategic Concept would in turn allow the Alliance to show that North America and Europe are re-committing to a NATO that has been adequately transformed to deal not reactively, but proactively, with the new range of threats both within its borders and without. If all Allies are able to

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recognize NATO as their primary instrument for addressing these threats, it should be possible for Canada and the United States to also acknowledge the increasing role of NATO, and Europe in general, as strategic partners. A new Strategic Concept that defines NATO's core missions and priorities should also help to generate the resources necessary to achieve the Alliance's objectives.

Moreover, at a time when public opinion in NATO countries is understandably baffled by the rapid evolution of the Alliance and the increasing diversity of its roles, communicating a clear rationale for NATO in a way that connects with the preoccupations of the public will certainly be helpful.

Without a doubt, this is a heavy agenda. If it were solely for the purpose of keeping an aged and venerable institution alive for a few more years, NATO governments might be able to afford something less than full success. But the stakes are much higher. This agenda is about the ability of Europe and North America to live in peace for the next generation. While challenging, it is also an eminently achievable set of tasks. ■

## ENDNOTES

- 1 For more information on ISAF in Afghanistan, see <[www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html)> (accessed March 10, 2007) and <[www.nato.int/isaf](http://www.nato.int/isaf)> (accessed March 24, 2007).
- 2 The Tripartite Commission includes high-level representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Coalition forces serving in Afghanistan. Representatives from NATO's ISAF participated in a Commission meeting for the first time in June 2006. See U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Press Release, "Tripartite Commission 17th Meeting," June 6, 2006, <<http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h06060601.html>> (accessed March 24, 2007).
- 3 More information about NATO's Riga Summit can be found at <[www.nato.int/docu/comm/2006/0611-riga/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2006/0611-riga/index.htm)> (accessed March 24, 2007).

- 4 The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan serve as focal points for various members of the international community, including non-government humanitarian aid groups, international organizations like the UN, and national militaries, to coordinate efforts toward providing stability across the country in support of reconstruction. More detailed information is available at <[www.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounders/bg005\\_prt.htm](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounders/bg005_prt.htm)> (accessed March 24, 2007).
- 5 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's founding document signed in April 1949, states that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The full text of the Treaty can be found at <[www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm)> (accessed March 25, 2007).
- 6 For the full text of the Comprehensive Political Guidance issued in November 2006, see <[www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm)> (accessed March 25, 2007).
- 7 More information on the NATO Response Force can be found at <[www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html)> (accessed March 25, 2007).
- 8 A good overview of NATO's partnerships is provided in Ronald D. Asmus, ed., *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside*, Riga Papers (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 2006), <[www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=238](http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=238)> (accessed March 25, 2007). The paper includes articles on NATO's relationships with Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Australia, and Japan.
- 9 Active Endeavor is a NATO-led effort in the Mediterranean Sea that utilizes the Alliance's naval forces to detect, deter, and defend against terrorist activity. An informative briefing on the operation is available at <[www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism\\_at\\_sea2006/html\\_en/terrorism\\_sea01.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea2006/html_en/terrorism_sea01.html)> (accessed March 25, 2007).

