

STRATAGEM IN ASYMMETRY:
NONSTATE ARMED GROUPS' USE OF DECEPTION

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty
of
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

By

DEVIN DUKE JESSEE

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

AUGUST 2011

Dissertation Committee
Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (The Fletcher School), Chair
Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (The Fletcher School), Reader
Dr. Rohan K. Gunaratna (Rajaratnam School of International Studies), Reader

CURRICULUM VITAE

DEVIN D. JESSEE

EDUCATION

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL, TUFTS UNIVERSITY **MEDFORD, MA**
Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations Current

- Dissertation title: “Stratagem in Asymmetry: Nonstate Armed Groups’ Use of Deception”
- Fields of study: international security, negotiation/conflict resolution, and international organizations. Comprehensive exams passed in May 2006.

M.A. in Law and Diplomacy May 2005

- Thesis title: “Strengthening the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Regimes”
- Fields of study: international security and negotiation/conflict resolution

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY **PROVO, UT**
B.A. in International Politics (Minor in History) August 2003
summa cum laude

ACADEMIC HONORS

FLETCHER SCHOLARSHIP 2003 – 2004, 2007 – 2011

- Awarded by The Fletcher School based on merit and need.

EISENHOWER-ROBERTS FELLOWSHIP 2008 – 2009

- Awarded to Ph.D. students from selected universities to support the intellectual growth of potential leaders.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY PROVOST FELLOWSHIP 2005 – 2007

- Awarded to a small number of outstanding Tufts doctoral students.

- H. B. EARHART FELLOWSHIP** 2003 – 2006
- Intended to encourage young academics to pursue careers in a social science or the humanities.
- FRANK ROCKWELL BARNETT FELLOWSHIP** 2004 – 2006
- Awarded by the International Security Studies Program at The Fletcher School for academic excellence.
- SASAKAWA FELLOWSHIP** 2004 – 2005
- The Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship is awarded to outstanding students with a high potential for leadership.
- VALEDICTORIAN, BYU DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE** 2003
- CANDIDATE, RHODES SCHOLARSHIP** 2002
- BYU HERITAGE SCHOLARSHIP** 1997 – 2003
- A full tuition scholarship awarded to a small number of incoming BYU freshmen that distinguished themselves in high school.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

- ANALYST** **WASHINGTON, DC**
United States Federal Government May 2004 – Present
- INSTRUCTOR** **MEDFORD, MA**
Tufts University September – November 2005
- Taught an eight-week course on WMD proliferation for Tufts University's Osher Institute for Lifelong Learning.
- RESEARCH/TEACHER'S ASSISTANT** **PROVO, UT**
BYU Department of Political Science August 2002 – August 2003
- Helped conduct a nationwide electronic survey of over 1000 high school teachers to research the extent and effects of international politics instruction in U.S. secondary schools.
 - Created a course outline for using Homer's *Odyssey* as a text for analysis in political philosophy.
 - Helped organize a conference of scholars on improving pedagogy of general education.
 - Teacher's assistant for *Theories of International Relations*, *Philosophy of Law*, *Introduction to Western Political Thought*, and *Introduction to American Government*.

MEDIA PROJECT MANAGER **PROVO, UT**
KBYU Television October 2000 – August 2002

- Supervised the creation of 41 video and film projects for nonprofit community and government organizations.
- Worked as an intermediate between the production studio and the public.

RESEARCH AND LIAISON INTERN **KIEV, UKRAINE**
Center for Religious Info. and Freedom June – August 2001

- Researched issues of religious tolerance, translated Russian documents, taught English, and helped organize a weeklong conference on religious tolerance for university-aged students.

NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ASST. **SALT LAKE CITY, UT**
2002 Winter Olympics, Asst. to the Republic of Uzbekistan
October 2000 – March 2002

- Interpreted Russian, assisted the athletes at venues, conducted tours and office work, and acted as a liaison between the team and the Salt Lake Organizing Committee.

CHURCH REPRESENTATIVE **EASTERN UKRAINE**
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
January 1998 – February 2000

- Taught religion and engaged in community service and humanitarian aid.
- Served as an English instructor and interpreter.
- Supervised approximately 115 volunteers.

AUTHORED WORKS

PUBLISHED WORK

- Devin D. Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 367–88, doi: 10.1080/09546550600751941.

MASTERS THESIS

- “Strengthening the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Regimes,” January 18, 2005, available at <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2005/Jessee1.pdf>.

SELECTED GRADUATE SCHOOL MANUSCRIPTS

- “Deception as an Element of Strategy: A Literature Review,” manuscript for Independent Study on Deception Literature, The Fletcher School, December 15, 2005.

- “Negotiating with Terrorists: Past Insights and Future Implications,” manuscript for Independent Study on Negotiating with Terrorists, The Fletcher School, November 5, 2005.
- “Al-Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception,” manuscript for Seminar on U.S. Intelligence, Terrorism, and National Security, The Fletcher School, December 4, 2004.
- “Strengthening the International Nonproliferation Regime,” manuscript for Seminar on Proliferation-Counterproliferation and Homeland Security Issues, The Fletcher School, May 3, 2004.
- “International Organizations as Mechanisms of Prevention: The Role of International Organizations in Crisis Management,” manuscript for Seminar on Crisis Management and Complex Emergencies, The Fletcher School, December 9, 2003.
- “Technology and Transnational Organized Crime,” manuscript for Seminar on Technology and International Security, The Fletcher School, December 9, 2003.

ABSTRACT

The primary question this dissertation seeks to answer is: What *factors* affect *whether* nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) employ deception and *what kind* of deception strategy they target against an adversary?

The thesis proposes the endgame theory of deception, which is called such because it argues that for NSAGs engaging in deception, outcome is more important than process, planners, or target levels, and NSAGs sometimes use tactical or operational measures to achieve strategic results. The theory states that given an NSAG's aim to use deception against a state target, then five requirements summarized by Abram Shulsky—strategic coherence, an understanding of the target, an infrastructure to coordinate deception and security, channels to feed false information, and the ability to receive feedback—as well as the target's counterdeception capabilities and the threat presented to the NSAG by the target are the primary factors that affect whether the NSAG can engage in behaviorally targeted deception (BTD) or status quo deception (SQD), two new models proposed as part of the theory, and the likelihood it will use one deception type over the other.

With BTD, the deceiver employs deception to change a target's behavior. In SQD, the deceiver employs deceptive tactics to keep an adversary on a status quo course until the deceiver can affect a chosen end.

This study tests these propositions against al Qaeda's, Hezbollah's, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's use of deception in historical cases. The study's findings suggest that if an NSAG fulfills Shulsky's requirements, it will be able to engage in deception; however, to use SQD, it can maintain less robust channeling and feedback capabilities than would often be needed for BTD. The paper finds that weak target counterdeception helps make deception possible for the NSAG, and also concludes that the threat level presented by the target to the NSAG is the primary variable that determines what kind of deception—BTB or SQD—the NSAG chooses; high threat appears to increase incentives for the NSAG to turn to BTB.

This work is intended to add to the academic literature about deception and to propose a theory that national security scholars and practitioners can use to help predict when and what types of deception an NSAG adversary could use in the current era of asymmetric warfare.

To my love Keri.
Thank you for all your support.

And to Ruth Ann and Lizzie,
who waited patiently while Dad did his homework.
Now we can play.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank several entities that provided, either directly to me or indirectly through the Fletcher School, generous funding that helped during my doctoral studies: the Eisenhower Institute; the H. B. Earhart Foundation and my Earhart sponsor, Dr. Noel B. Reynolds at Brigham Young University; the Sarah Scaife Foundation; and The Fletcher School and Tufts University.

I thank the scholars and practitioners who allowed me to interview or consult with them in person, on the telephone, or via e-mail: Dr. Tom Marks at the National Defense University; Dr. Matthew Levitt at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Rohan Gunaratna at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University (Australia); and Mr. Ranapriya Abeyasinghe, at the International Center for Strategic Defense (Sri Lanka). I also thank Miriam Seltzer and Brian Hawkins for their assistance with formatting.

Last, I thank the director of the Fletcher School Ph.D. program, Jenifer Burckett-Picker, and my dissertation committee—Drs. Richard Shultz, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Rohan Gunaratna—for their ample support and assistance.

CONTENTS

CURRICULUM VITAE.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	x
CONTENTS.....	xi
TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS	xiii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Problem Statement and Research Question	1
Definitions.....	2
Theory and Thesis.....	7
Methodology	9
Basic Explanation of Findings.....	16
Layout	19
CHAPTER 2: DECEPTION IN LITERATURE	20
Introduction.....	20
Defining Deception.....	20
Deception in History: From Antiquity Through the Cold War.....	24
Deception in an Era of Asymmetric Warfare	30
The Nature of Deception.....	40
Deception Theory.....	44
The Ethics of Deception.....	67
Conclusions.....	72
CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY	73
Two Models in the Endgame Theory.....	73
Questions and Thesis	82
Dependent/Independent Variable (DV/IV) Framework	84
Case Study Layout	100
Conclusions.....	101
CHAPTER 4: AL QAEDA’S USE OF DECEPTION TO UNDERTAKE THE ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001	103
Historical Introduction: Azzam’s Afghan Jihad to Bin Ladin’s Global Jihad	105
Deception as Part of the 9/11 Attacks.....	124
Deception Analysis	139
Conclusions.....	161

CHAPTER 5: DECEPTION IN HEZBOLLAH’S STRATEGY AGAINST ISRAEL, 2000–2006.....	165
Historical Introduction: 1982–2000.....	166
Day-to-Day Deceptions	178
Deception 1: Bunkers and War, 2000–2006.....	183
Deception 2: Targeting Politics Through Casualty Counts	207
Deception Analysis	220
Conclusions.....	236
CHAPTER 6: DECEPTION IN THE LTTE STRATEGY AGAINST INDIA AND SRI LANKA, 1987–1991.....	238
Historical Introduction: The Road to 1987	239
Deception 1: Entering the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord.....	259
Deception 2: Shell Game with Arms	271
Deception 3: Becoming the ‘Good Guy’ to Get the IPKF Out.....	280
Deception 4: Ensuring India Stayed Out—The Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi	296
Deception Analysis	303
Conclusions.....	319
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS	322
Cases Assessed Against Theory.....	322
Secondary Research Questions	330
Avenues for Future Research.....	333
Final Comments	335
APPENDIX 1: CASE STUDIES AND OTHER WORKS ON DECEPTION ..	337
APPENDIX 2: GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF THE ENDGAME THEORY OF DECEPTION	340
SOURCES CITED.....	341

TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS

Table 1: Increasing Counterdeception’s Effectiveness.....	68
Table 2: Review of Biases and Their Implications for Deception.....	69
Table 3: Basic Effects of IVs/CV on Likelihood of BTD/SQD	100
Table 4: The 9/11 Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables	161
Table 5: Hezbollah’s Bunker Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables	234
Table 6: Hezbollah’s Casualty Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables.....	236
Table 7: The LTTE’s Accord Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables	316
Table 8: The LTTE’s Arms Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables	317
Table 9: The LTTE’s Deception Working with the GSL Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables.....	318
Table 10: The LTTE’s Deception in the Gandhi Assassination Operation Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables	319
Figure 1: A Typology of Perception	55
Figure 2: Proposed Relationship Between Threat Intensity and Type of Deception Preferred by an NSAG	95
Figure 3: Interaction of Study Variables in a Situation in Which BTD is Not Possible and NSAG Must Rely on Existing Capabilities (IV ₁) to Undertake SQD	98
Figure 4: Interaction of Study Variables in a Situation in Which Both BTD/SQD Are Possible for NSAG or NSAG Has Ability to Develop Capabilities (IV ₁) as It Wishes.....	98
Map 1: Hezbollah Missile Ranges	200

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement and Research Question

Political entities have incorporated deception as an element of military strategy since antiquity. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, posited: “All warfare is based on deception. . . . [S]upreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. . . . This is the method of attacking by stratagem.”¹ Deception traditionally has been a tool of the weaker party in war, used to level the playing field or turn the tables for the underdog.² Since the Cold War’s end, the world has seen a proliferation of nonstate armed groups (NSAGs)—terrorists, militias, insurgents, and crime organizations—that strategically threaten nation states.³ These actors employ deception for the same reasons that states use the stratagem: as a tool to achieve given ends.

This dissertation will address two primary issues associated with NSAGs’ use of deception. First, deception is understudied and little theory exists. This work

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, in Alistair McAlpine, ed., *The Ruthless Leader* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), 220–5.

² See Michael Handel, “Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective,” *Intelligence and National Security* 2, no. 3: 40–1.

³ Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah and Itamara Lochard, *Armed Groups: A Tier One Security Priority*, INSS Occasional Paper 57 (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004), 17–31, accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf>.

will add to the small body of deception literature by positing a theory that presents new models for understanding deception. Hopefully by so doing it will open new avenues for study in a field—deception research—that has been largely ignored for some years.

Second, within the traditional framework of strategic, operational, and tactical deception, this paper will examine the degree to which NSAGs can use strategic deception and will challenge the term’s traditional definition. How do we classify operations that involve tactical deception but result in strategic surprise? This analysis underscores the concept that the level of deception used does not determine the level of outcome—tactical deceptions can achieve strategic results.⁴

In examining these issues, this dissertation focuses on answering the following question: **What *factors* affect *whether* NSAGs employ deception and *what kind* of deception strategy they target against an adversary?**

Definitions

Several key terms used throughout are defined here:

Behaviorally targeted deception (BTD): A deception intended to change the behavior of a target by making the target misperceive reality, which misperception then induces it to alter its course of action.

Counterdeception: The practices of detecting deception in order to counter it and/or turning it back on the deceiver—for example, by using multiple channels

⁴ In the words of deception expert J. Bowyer Bell, “The central command regularly uses denial and deception in tactical decisions, although a combination of tactical deceptions may have a strategic impact.” “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 141.

of intelligence, operating double-cross systems, etc.⁵ In this analysis, all of the entities that employ counterdeception against NSAGs are states, and in all cases the counterdeception involved the states working (or not) to detect deception. In no cases do the states studied herein understand the NSAG deceptions sufficiently to turn them back on the NSAG deceivers.

Deception: A dual process of simulation and dissimulation, aimed at a chosen target and employed as necessary to make the target misperceive the truth of a situation and act in a way that supports the deceiver's overall strategy.⁶ (See chapter 2 for more about this definition.)

Deceiver: Also known as the deception planner, the entity that crafts the deception to be used against a target. NSAGs are the deceivers in this study.

⁵ See J. Bowyer Bell, "Toward a Theory of Deception," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 276–7, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1080/08850600390198742; Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 294–327, accessed August 10, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600359>; and J. C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned into Double Agents*, with a foreword by Norman Holmes Pearson (New York: The Lyons Press, 2000).

Author's note: In this work when multiple authors are cited, they are separated with semicolons, and the last is preceded with "and," as above. When this paper cites an author's work that includes multiple secondary citations, the secondary citations are separated by semicolons, but the last is not preceded with "and"; in this way the reader can differentiate between multiple sources and a source with multiple secondary citations. See footnote 31 as the first case with multiple secondary citations. I attempted whenever possible to include relevant secondary citations, but I no doubt missed some. In cases wherein the works I consulted provided incomplete secondary citations, when including the secondary cites here, I completed them if I could find the full citation.

With regard to completing secondary citations and in general, I extensively consulted *Google*, *Google Books*, *Amazon.com*, and library websites to find author names, publication data, citations, and other information in cases when I did not have the works in question on hand.

⁶ See Devin D. Jessee, "Deception as an Element of Strategy: A Literature Review" (unpublished manuscript for Independent Study on Deception Literature, The Fletcher School, December 15, 2005), 4.

Denial: “Refers to the attempt to block all information channels by which an adversary could learn some truth”⁷ Denial and status quo deception are similar, with a key difference being that denial is used to protect oneself and maintain day-to-day operations while status quo deception is employed to achieve a given strategic end and can involve offensive techniques.

Endgame theory of deception: Posits the models of behaviorally targeted deception and status quo deception and explains the factors that make their use possible for an NSAG and that make one type more or less likely than the other in any given situation of use. It is called the endgame theory because it argues that for NSAGs, the deception’s outcome is more important than process, planners, or target levels, and NSAGs sometimes use tactical or operational measures to achieve strategic results.

The endgame theory states that given an NSAG’s aim to use deception against a state target, then five requirements summarized by Abram Shulsky—strategic coherence, an understanding of the target, an infrastructure to coordinate deception and security, channels to feed false information, and the ability to receive feedback⁸—as well as the target’s counterdeception capabilities and the threat presented to the NSAG by the target are the primary factors that affect whether the NSAG can engage in behaviorally targeted or status quo deception and the likelihood it will use one deception type over the other.

⁷ Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 15.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 29–32.

Nonstate armed group (NSAG): A generic term for a terrorist, militia, international crime, or insurgent organization.⁹

Operational: Often used to describe an accumulation of tactical measures. In the realm of decision making, operational actions may still be of interest to the highest levels of an entity’s decision-making structure, but midlevel actors will be most involved at the operational level (e.g., in the operational theatre of war).

Operational deception: Deception used as part of an operational campaign. In this study, NSAGs are described as using operational deception in cases when they employ sophisticated deception on multiple levels, often to maintain day-to-day operations, that is not necessary to achieve the given strategic end sought in the case at hand.

Self-deception: A self-induced misperception of reality.¹⁰

Shulsky’s requirements: Abram Shulsky summarized five “requirements for successful deception” that will be tested in this thesis: strategic coherence, understanding the adversary, organizational infrastructure for deception and

Shulsky’s Requirements:
(1) strategic coherence
(2) understanding the adversary
(3) organizational infrastructure for deception and security measures
(4) channels to reach the adversary
(5) feedback

security measures, channels to reach the adversary, and an ability to receive feedback about the deception.¹¹

⁹ Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, *Armed Groups*, 17–31.

¹⁰ See Barton Whaley, figure entitled “A Typology of Perception,” in “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 181, copied from Barton Whaley, *A Typology of Misperception* (draft, March, 1980), with thanks noted to Lewis Reich, formerly with the MATHTECH Division of Mathematica, Inc. As Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and John A. Sawicki explained, “Misperception that is not the result of willful deception perpetrated by others becomes the basis for self-deception.” “Perception and Misperception: Implications for Denial and Deception: A Literature Survey and Analysis” (unpublished manuscript), 9.

Status quo deception (SQD): A deception intended to keep a target from correctly perceiving reality so it remains on an existing course of action—the status quo—until the deceiver can perform an action assumed to be beneficial to its own strategy.

Strategic: An action or item considered important enough to affect the perceptions and behavior of the highest-level decision makers within a given entity (e.g., strategic nuclear weapons, strategic thought).

Strategic deception: As traditionally understood, deception planned at the highest levels of the deceiving entity and aimed at the highest levels of the target.¹² This study posits that *strategic deception* should be defined as deception intended to make the target misperceive reality so that it acts in a way detrimental to or fails to act in a way beneficial to its highest interests. Strategic deception can be undertaken using tactical, operational, or strategic methods. (Strategic deception has several varying definitions that will be explored in more detail in chapter 2, the literature review.)

Strategic end: The outcome of a deception operation whereby the target is affected at the highest levels, even if the deceiver employed tactical or operational methods. In many cases, the strategic end sought will be strategic surprise or strategic change to government policy.

Tactical: An action or item that would occur or be found in a localized setting. In the realm of decision making, low-level actors will be most involved at the tactical level (e.g., tactical theatre of war).

¹¹ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 29–32.

¹² Ibid., 17, 26.

Tactical deception: Simple deception, usually aimed at a target that occupies a low level in the target organization. This study argues that even though deceptions may be tactical, they can still result in strategic ends.

Target: The entity that is to be deceived. In this dissertation, the target is usually a country's government.

Theory and Thesis

The endgame theory of deception proposes two new models of deception—called behaviorally targeted deception (BTD) and status quo deception (SQD). As noted in the above definitions section, a deceiver will use BTD when it wants to change the behavior of a target by making the target misperceive reality, which misperception then induces the target to chart an altered course of action. A deceiver will also use SQD to make a target misperceive reality, but in that case the misperception is intended to keep the target on an existing course of action—the status quo—without interference until the deceiver can perform an action assumed to be beneficial to its larger strategy.

The thesis of this study is that given an aim by an NSAG to use deception against a state target, the factors that determine whether BTD/SQD are possible and the type most likely to be used in a given situation are Shulsky's five requirements, the target's counterdeception capabilities, and the threat presented by the target to the deceiver.

Because there are two dependent variables in this thesis (possibility and likelihood of BTD/SQD use) and two independent variables (fulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and intensity of threat from the target), it is developed by

exploring two subtheories. Both work under an assumption that an NSAG wants to use deception. The first subtheory states that given a permissive counterdeception environment, an NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's requirements makes it able to manipulate its target's perception of reality and thereby engage in strategic BTD/SQD. There can be differences in the strength to which the NSAG fulfills the conditions: sophistication of channels to feed false information and ability to receive feedback need not be as developed for SQD as would often be necessary for BTD.

Possibility of BTD/SQD correlates with chance of success. If an NSAG fulfills Shulsky's conditions and faces weak counterdeception from a target, its deception has a good chance of success.

The second subtheory gets at what type of deception the NSAG will use, positing that conditions of high threat cause increased chance of destruction and thereby raise incentives for the deceiver to create a deception plan involving BTD so it can change its adversary's behavior. Conversely, when chance of harm is low, the likelihood increases that the NSAG will create a plan involving SQD to keep its target on a status quo course until it can achieve its desired strategic end. The reason for this is that SQD requires simpler capabilities to construct than does BTD—it is easier for the deceiver to reinforce the target's existing perceptions than to make the target change behavior—and in situations of low threat, the NSAG will have few incentives to expend its resources on the more difficult type of deception (BTD).¹³

¹³ See Heuer, "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception" 298; and Bell, "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 129–30, 139–40, 160–1.

Methodology

Steven Van Evera proposed seven dissertation purposes in his *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*: theory-proposing, theory-testing, literature-assessing, policy evaluative or policy prescriptive, historical explanatory, historical evaluative, and predictive.¹⁴ This dissertation incorporates elements of several of these. It proposes and tests the endgame theory, including by testing Shulsky's propositions, which are part of a subtheory. Chapter 2 is a literature review. Policymakers and government professionals could use the theory to better understand deception, although the dissertation itself is not policy prescriptive. Inasmuch as the cases are historical, the thesis covers historical explanatory and evaluative elements, but it also attempts to determine the elements that can help predict NSAGs' use of BTD/SQD in the future.

Cases: This paper employs the case study method because it works when large-*n* datasets cannot be realistically acquired, which is the case with information about NSAG use of deception.¹⁵ Van Evera posited multiple case selection criteria that provide alternatives to the researcher in choosing what cases to employ in theory testing:

(1) data richness; (2) extreme values on the independent variable, dependent variable, or condition variable; (3) large within-case variance in values on the independent, dependent, or condition variables; (4) divergence of predictions made of the case by competing theories; (5) the resemblance of case background conditions to the conditions of current policy problems;

¹⁴ Steven Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 89–94.

¹⁵ For more on use of case studies and different types of case studies, see Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred. I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 7, *Strategies of Inquiry* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–137.

(6) prototypicality of case background conditions; (7) appropriateness for controlled comparison with other cases (mainly using Mill's method of difference); (8) outlier character; (9) intrinsic importance; (10) appropriateness for replication in previous tests; and (11) appropriateness for performing a previously omitted type of test.¹⁶

The cases in this study fulfilled a few of these criteria:¹⁷ The cases were chosen in large part because data about the study variables was available and there was enough of it to make conclusions about NSAGs' use of deception. In Van Evera's terminology, the cases were chosen for data richness.

Second, the cases clarify predictions made by a separate theorist. As will be shown in later chapters, deception expert J. Bowyer Bell posited that NSAGs rarely use strategic deception because their resources are focused on maintaining denial. When they do employ deception, Bell argued, it is because "the times are right or more often the assets are in place."¹⁸ Bell's thesis is technically not presented as formal theory, but the cases in this paper were chosen in part to help create a more structured explanation about the factors that make strategic deception possible than times being right and assets in place.

And third, since the variables are similar in the three cases, the author expected to be able to compare and contrast them, allowing, in Van Evera's terms, for a degree of controlled comparison (see below for more on this).¹⁹

¹⁶ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 77–8; see details of each type through p. 88.

¹⁷ Author's note: When I started researching the cases, I was not brushed up on Van Evera's terminology and did not think of choosing cases in these terms. It was not until the testing was complete that I reread Van Evera and determined that some of these criteria applied at the time I chose cases.

¹⁸ Bell, "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 129–31, 139–40.

¹⁹ Van Evera explained how "case selection follows John Stuart Mill's 'method of difference' or 'method of agreement.'" *Guide to Methods*, 57, citing (n. 20) John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 388–406; Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press,

Three cases are used to test the relevance of the thesis: al Qaeda's, Hezbollah's, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE's) employment of deception. The groups represent a range of NSAG types. Al Qaeda is a transnational terrorist organization with a pan-Islamic vision. Hezbollah is a militia/transnational terrorist organization driven foremost by its anti-Israeli stance and has become adept at politics. The LTTE was a nationalist insurgency.

The al Qaeda case looks at deception used to undertake the 9/11 attacks. The Hezbollah case includes two subcases examining Hezbollah's use of deception in preparation for the 2006 war with Israel and the group's use during the war of false casualty counts most likely intended to influence audiences into thinking that more civilians were dying than was the case in reality.

Both the al Qaeda and Hezbollah cases also include vignettes discussing the groups' employment of operational deception in financial matters; these vignettes help demonstrate the difference between tactical or operational measures and strategic BTD/SQD.

The LTTE case looks at the LTTE's deceptive dealings with India and Sri Lanka in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The case includes four subcases examining the group's entry into the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, its use of a shell

1985), 2: 21–58. Van Evera stated that “one can select cases to allow their pairing for controlled comparison, that is, for the method of difference (cases have similar characteristics and different values on the study variable) or the method of agreement (cases have different characteristics and similar values on the study variable). The method of difference, being the stronger of the two, is usually preferred.” *Ibid.*, 84.

This study would generally conform to the method of agreement for the subtheory examining possibility of deception use since the NSAGs in all of the cases studied fulfill Shulsky's conditions and can use deception. It would use both the method of agreement and difference for the subtheory looking at likelihood of BTD/SQD because the values of the study variables—threat and likelihood—differ depending on the case, but there are enough cases studied to be able to compare across cases.

game to hide its weaponry once the accord was in place, its partnering with the government of Sri Lanka to get India off its territory, and its use of deception to undertake the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

Testing: Van Evera also provided three methods for using cases to test theories: “controlled comparison, congruence procedures, and process tracing.”²⁰ In controlled comparison, “the investigator explores paired observations in two or more cases, asking if values on the pairs are congruent or incongruent with the theory’s predictions. For example, if values on the independent variable (IV) are higher in case *A* than case *B*, values on the dependent variable (DV) should also be higher in case *A* than *B*.”²¹ This dissertation uses this method to an extent. It takes cases where the dependent variables are already given, looks at the independent variables and shows that expected correlations occur between the independent and dependent variables. With regard to the subtheory addressing likelihood of BTD/SQD use, it provides examples in which threat was both high and low and correlates this with the type of deception expected. Testing of the subtheory addressing possibility of BTD/SQD use shows that fulfilling Shulsky’s conditions correlates with deception being possible when the counterdeception environment allows.

In this study there is not a strong case *B* to demonstrate an example of the complete nonfulfillment of one or more of Shulsky’s requirements correlating with a situation in which an NSAG could not use deception of either type. There

²⁰ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 56. Author’s note: As with case selection, I admit that it was not until the research was complete that I determined that some of these methods applied to the way the way I had structured the cases.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 56–7.

is one example in which the LTTE's flawed strategic coherence and inability to smartly use feedback ended the deception sooner than the LTTE probably intended, and a second subcase shows that one of Hezbollah's deceptions failed against one of its targets in the face of strong counterdeception, but in all of the cases, the NSAGs fulfilled Shulsky's requirements to a degree and at least were able to attempt deception. The omission of a case in which deception was not possible at all is a weakness of the study that will be discussed in greater detail below.

Congruence procedures are used when "the investigator explores the case looking for congruence and incongruence between values observed on the independent and dependent variable and values predicted by the test hypothesis." These procedures can be of two types. The first is "comparison to typical values," in which the values are higher than the surrounding world.²² The second uses "multiple within-case comparisons."²³ In this study, the author's discovery of subcases over the course of researching the groups' use of deception allows for the employment of this second type of congruence procedure. The thesis will examine subcases of deception for the Hezbollah and LTTE studies and show how the study variables changed over the course of time for the group in question.²⁴

²² Ibid., 58

²³ Ibid., 61

²⁴ Author's note: I did not intend to use this method of testing when first choosing the cases, but as I discovered subcases to examine, this method became possible. Additionally, as noted above, it was not until after the testing was complete and I was reviewing Van Evera that I considered the testing in the terms Van Evera described.

This paper also employs the third method that Van Evera described—process tracing. In this method, “the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence in each step.”²⁵ The historical overview and deception analysis in the cases detail some of the factors that influenced the NSAGs’ use of deception.

Limitations and weaknesses: The primary weakness in this study is that for the first subtheory (possibility of BTD/SQD use), it selects on the dependent variable.²⁶ It looks at groups that can and do employ BTD and SQD.²⁷ It will show examples in which BTD was not possible, but in these cases BTD also will be the less likely choice, and we would not expect the NSAG to develop capabilities necessary for BTD use if it did not need that type. While the study does contain examples of deception that is attempted but fails, it contains no cases in which both BTD and SQD are completely impossible.

The author chose from the beginning of the research to focus on cases in which deception was used. This was in part because the author assessed that

²⁵ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 64.

²⁶ See *ibid.*, 46.

²⁷ Author’s note: I originally included a vignette in the Hezbollah chapter briefly looking at Hezbollah’s use of denial in its kidnapping operations in the 1980s, which posited that Hezbollah’s nonfulfillment of some of Shulsky’s conditions might have kept it from being able to use strategic BTD/SQD. However, having found data discussing Hezbollah’s use of deception in the 2006 war with Israel and having chosen to focus on cases of BTD/SQD use, I abandoned research on the kidnapping case and never fully developed it into an example of an NSAG possibly being unable to employ BTD/SQD. Since the subcase could not be used effectively, I omitted it from the Hezbollah chapter. I nevertheless credit a colleague for recommending Magnus Ranstorp’s *Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, with a foreword by Terry Waite, CBE (New York: Palgrave, 1997), which is cited heavily herein, and for recommending other Hezbollah hostage-related literature.

being able to compare deceptions across cases would be of most use in examining NSAG employment of deception. Nevertheless, future scholarship would be well served to explore cases in which deception is not possible for NSAGs and test these cases against the endgame theory.

Second, as is common in social science research, while the cases show what appears to be correlated interaction between the independent and dependent variables, they do not prove irrefutably that there are no other causes that could have determined the outcomes in question. This is a challenge for any social study and is duly noted, but is not such a hindrance that this research program fails.

Third, in the course of the research the author found that al Qaeda and Hezbollah used fairly complex deception methods in their financing. Because the deceptions were structured primarily to maintain day-to-day operations and were not necessary to obtain the strategic ends studied in those cases, they are labeled operational measures, not strategic BTD/SQD. This works within the parameters of the endgame theory; however, it is not entirely satisfying because the deceptive methods were strategic in many other ways. Future scholarship may be well served to create a third model that accounts for complex deceptions that are important to the group's survival but that are not necessary to obtain a specific end against a specific target.

Last, this thesis does not present grand theory. The theory is probably applicable to state-to-state deception, which gives it broader utility than assessing NSAG deceptions, but it otherwise is a niche theory in the overall realm of

international relations scholarship. The author knew this from the beginning and chose to embark on the endeavor anyway because it does add to an important field, deception research, which is relatively understudied.

Basic Explanation of Findings

The cases in this work suggest the following:

Shulsky's conditions determine if an NSAG can engage in deception and the degree to which an NSAG fulfills them can vary depending on the deception type.

In the studies, the NSAGs for the most part fulfilled all five of Shulsky's conditions and were able to use strategic deception of both types; however, to employ SQD, sometimes the NSAGs used fewer and simpler channels than would theoretically be required for a BTM. Additionally, to succeed at SQD the NSAGs in some cases needed only to receive passive feedback—observe the continuation of the status quo—and did not require a complex feedback mechanism to judge whether a target was accepting the deception.

With regard to the theoretical notion that BTM many times requires more complex feedback and channeling capabilities than does SQD, the information available from two proposed BTMs studied supports the notion, but not strikingly so. In one case with Hezbollah, the group used simple but sufficient media channels to get its message to the Israeli public and decision makers, and it possibly had a mechanism to receive feedback in press reporting.²⁸ In a second

²⁸ See Judith Palmer Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.C. Taurus, 2004), 161, citing (n. 14) an interview with Hassan Ezzeddin, Director of Hezbollah's media department, November 20, 2001, Haret Hareik, Beirut, Lebanon.

case with the LTTE, the NSAG had strong channeling capabilities but used passive feedback.

Even though none of the groups studied entirely lacked Shulsky's requirements, the LTTE's strategic coherence broke down over the course of one of its deceptions, and in the same deception it was able to obtain feedback but used it poorly in continuing the operation; these weaknesses helped bring the deception to a rapid conclusion.

Target counterdeception affects whether an NSAG can use deception; weak counterdeception works in the deceiver's favor. A target's counterdeception capability degrades a deceiver's ability to succeed at deception, often by degrading its ability to fulfill Shulsky's conditions. Target counterdeception was weak in all of the cases in which groups in this study succeeded at deception. In the one case in which the target's counterdeception was strong—Israel's robust measures against a Hezbollah casualty count deception—the NSAG deception failed to deceive that target. Additionally, in the failed LTTE deception, even though its target's counterdeception capability was generally weak, its adversary had enough information to at least suspect that the LTTE was engaged in deception.

A target's self-deception helps a deceiver succeed. In all of the cases wherein deception was successful, the target suffered from a degree of self-deception. Self-deception clearly weakens a target's counterdeception capabilities.

Increased threat leads to increased chance of BTM. As deceivers face increasingly dangerous threat scenarios, their incentives rise to use BTM to

change the threatening target behavior. In two subcases in which Hezbollah and LTTE attempted a proposed BTM, the group either faced (LTTE) or probably perceived itself as facing (Hezbollah) untenable threat scenarios. Additionally, in all cases in which SQD was used, the deceivers faced or perceived themselves as facing low to moderate threats. Therefore, threat appears to be a key factor determining what kind of deception the group will employ.

Sometimes plan comes first; sometimes capabilities do. The findings in the cases indicate that the dependent variables in the research question and thesis could be reversed—i.e., by looking at likelihood of deception type used first and possibility of use second—and they would be just as relevant as currently stated. In some cases, the NSAG created a deception plan and then developed its capabilities to undertake that plan. In other cases, the NSAG had to structure a plan around its existing capabilities because, based on circumstances, it did not have time to develop alternatives.

Nonstate armed groups prefer SQD when they use deception. Even though the cases studied are a small-*n* sample that may not be representative of deception generally, they nevertheless suggest that NSAGs overall are more likely to attempt SQD than BTM because the groups studied more frequently favored SQD use over BTM use. They used SQD in all cases in which threat was low or moderate, turning to BTM only when the threat was high. The theoretical explanation for this is that SQD is preferred because it is easier to employ, as described above. The findings suggest that for most NSAGs that use strategic

deception, they either lack the capabilities to engage in BTD or are not under sufficient threat to warrant its use.

Layout

This study begins with a review of literature that discusses deception in history; deception as an element of asymmetric warfare; the nature of deception; deception theory, including a discussion of perception and misperception; and the ethics (and lack thereof) associated with the use of deception. The dissertation next presents the endgame theory by defining the variables in detail, explaining the research questions, positing subtheories and testable hypotheses, mapping the theory, and proposing expected outcomes with regard to NSAGs' use of deception.

After that the dissertation examines the endgame theory's study variables in context of the cases, presenting the cases in order of the complexity of the deceptions used and quantity of subcases. It begins with al Qaeda's deceptions to undertake the 9/11 attacks. Next it looks at Hezbollah's deceptions before and during the 2006 war with Israel. The case studies end with LTTE deceptions against India and Sri Lanka in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The study concludes by examining the subtheories and research questions proposed against the findings in the case studies, and reviewing avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2

DECEPTION IN LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter will first discuss definitions of *deception* and move into a brief review of deception in history. It will then assess the utility of deception in an era of asymmetric warfare. After that, it will review the nature of deception and examine the use of deception as an element of strategy and as a force multiplier. Fourth, the chapter will explore deception theory and discuss hiding and showing, elements of effective deception, perception and misperception, self-deception, and counterdeception. The chapter will round out by considering the ethics of deception.²⁹

Defining Deception

Teasing out the similarities and differences in various definitions of *deception* will help frame the importance of several subsequent sections of this paper. Abram Shulsky broadly defined *deception*: “‘Deception’ . . . refers to the effort to cause an adversary to believe something that is not true, to believe a ‘cover story’ rather than the truth, with the goal of leading him to react in a way that serves

²⁹ Author’s note: This chapter was originally crafted as “Deception as an Element of Strategy: A Literature Review” (unpublished manuscript for Independent Study on Deception Literature, The Fletcher School, December 15, 2005).

one's own interests"³⁰ Joseph Caddell similarly penned, "Deception depends on two criteria: first, it is intentional; and, second, it is designed to gain an advantage for the practitioner."³¹ The U.S. Department of Defense defined *deception* as "those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests."³² These definitions all evoke two similar criteria: First, deception is used to mislead. Second, any action taken by the target as a result of misunderstanding fostered by deception is intended to be contrary to the target's best interests.

Shulsky compared *deception* to *denial*, its close counterpart in the deception literature: "'Denial' refers to the attempt to block all information channels by which an adversary could learn some truth . . . thus preventing him from reacting in a timely manner."³³ *Denial* is still a type of deception, as J. Bowyer Bell noted: "Denial is often considered a separate form—as in Deception and Denial (D&D)—but . . . denial is simply hiding—every ruse denies the target-observer

³⁰ Abram Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 15.

³¹ Joseph W. Caddell, *Deception 101: Primer on Deception* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 1, citing (n. 1) Col. Michael Dewar, *The Art of Deception in Warfare* (Newton Abbot, Devon, UK: David & Charles Publishers, 1989), 9–22; Jon Latimer, *Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2001), 1–5; James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Novi, *Victory and Deceit: Deception and Trickery at War* (San Jose, CA: Writers Club Press, 2001), 1–31.

³² U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (April 12, 2001), amended through June 13, 2007, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01514.html>.

³³ Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," 15.

insight into objective reality.”³⁴ Michael Handel, in writing about what he called *active* and *passive* deception, the latter essentially being denial, showed that denial is an important type of deception: “Passive deception is primarily based on secrecy and camouflage, on hiding and concealing one’s intentions and/or capabilities from the adversary. . . . [A]ctive types of deception are dependent on the success of the passive deception. . . . In contrast to passive deception, active deception normally involves a calculated policy of disclosing half-truths supported by appropriate ‘proof’ signals or other material evidence.”³⁵

Caddell noted that these elements of dissimulation and simulation (hiding and showing) apply to terrorists’ use of deception: “Terrorists rely on both active and passive deception to operate and to survive. Passive deception includes the use of aliases, secure methods of communication, and bases in areas both difficult to reach and observe. Active deception may include diversions, conditioning, and cover—often in combination.”³⁶

Other authors focused on the perception-related aspects of deception. Barton Whaley wrote: “Deception is the distortion of perceived reality. . . . The task . . . of deception is to profess the false in the face of the real.”³⁷ Bell added to this in positing the role of alternative realities, saying that deception is a conscious

³⁴ J. Bowyer Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 269, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1080/08850600390198742.

³⁵ Michael Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 133–4, citing (n. 37) Seymour Reit, *Masquerade: The American Camouflage Deceptions of World War II* (New York: Hawthorn, 1978); Geoffrey Barkas, *The Camouflage Story* (London: Cassell, 1952) (italics original).

³⁶ Caddell, *Deception 101*, 12; on hiding and showing being synonymous with simulation and dissimulation, see J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, with a new introduction by J. Bowyer Bell (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 61.

³⁷ Barton Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 182. Author’s note: I thank Erik Dahl for recommending this and several other sources that I used in this dissertation.

process to offer a target an alternative reality that, if accepted as truth, will help the deceiver achieve some advantage.³⁸

A related corollary to deception creating misperception is that misperception must then lead the target to *act* in a way desirable to the deceiver. Dudley Clarke best enunciated this notion: “Whatever [the commander] chooses, the main point is that his ‘object’ must be to make the enemy do something. It matters nothing what the enemy THINKS, it is only what he DOES that can affect the battle. It is therefore wrong, and always wrong, for any Commander to tell his Deception Staff to work out a plan ‘to make the enemy think we are going to do so-and-so.’”³⁹ Clarke then gave an example:

In the early part of 1941 General Wavell [in North Africa] wanted the Italian reserves drawn to the South in order to ease his entry into Northern Abyssinia. He considered this might be done by inducing them to *reinforce* the captured province of British Somaliland, and he gave instructions for a Deception Plan to be worked to persuade the Italians that we [the British] were about to invade Somaliland. Deception was new then and on the surface that appeared to all concerned to be a perfectly laudable object. The Plan, innocently ignoring the real object of influencing the location of the enemy reserves, was entirely successful; but the results were totally unexpected. In face of the threatened invasion, the Italians *evacuated* British Somaliland.⁴⁰

Michael Howard, in *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, applied this concept specifically to warfare and showed how deception must be targeted toward supporting a grander strategy: “The commander who wishes to impose his will on the enemy—which is, after all, the object of all military operations—will seek also to *deceive* him; to implant in the adversary’s mind an erroneous image

³⁸ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 247.

³⁹ Brig. Dudley Clarke, letter to Maj. Gen. Lowell Books of the U.S. Army, File RG319, *Cover and Deception*, Folder 77, Box 43, Entry 101, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, DC, letter from Lt. Col. E. J. Sweeney to Col. W. A. Harris, December 18, 1946, excerpt in Michael Handel, “Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective,” *Intelligence and National Security* 2, no. 3 (July 1987): 89.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 90 (italics added).

which will not only help to conceal his true capabilities and intentions but will lead that adversary to act in such a way as to make his own task easier.”⁴¹

Moving from the general to the particular, Richards J. Heuer explained deception by its use, breaking it down into military, political, peacetime, and wartime deception. He noted further, however, that the most important distinction is the *target* of the deception, not the type of operations: “I believe the *most* useful distinction is based on the target of the deception. Deception aimed broadly at policymakers, opinion-makers (including intelligence analysts), and the general public on one side, is fundamentally different from deception aimed specifically at the intelligence collector or intelligence analyst.”⁴²

Taking these definitions into account, a precise summary definition of the ideal deception can be posited: *Deception is a dual process of simulation and dissimulation, aimed at a chosen target and employed as necessary to make the target misperceive the truth of a situation and act in a way that supports the deceiver’s overall strategy.*⁴³

Deception in History: From Antiquity Through the Cold War

Deception has been an element of strategy since ancient times. One of the oldest written accounts involving deception probably is the story of Pharaoh Ramses falling into an ambush as he led forces against the Hittites.⁴⁴ Homer’s

⁴¹ Michael Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), ix (formatting of dashes manipulated).

⁴² Richards J. Heuer, Jr., “Commentary,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 34.

⁴³ See below for more about some of the elements that make up this definition, particularly it being a dual process of simulation and dissimulation, and the role of misperception in deception.

⁴⁴ Recounted in Latimer, *Deception in War*, 6.

tales of the Trojan Horse and Odysseus's use of disguise are timeless and favorite accounts of deception. The Old Testament is filled with stories of deceit in every aspect of life—including war, politics, religion, romance, and espionage—beginning with the serpent beguiling Eve.

Plato is the most notable of the early Greeks to deal with deception on a philosophical level, asking most famously through Socrates in *The Republic* whether a “noble lie” could be used by elites to bring peace and justice to a society that otherwise may not be able to handle the truth—a question still relevant and debated today.⁴⁵

In ancient China, Sun Tzu's *Art of War* is the first account specifically considering the use of deception as an element of strategy in warfare. His thesis, as noted at the beginning of this dissertation, says the acme of strategy is to deceive the enemy so well that he surrenders without fighting. Sun Tzu wrote:

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is superior in strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. . . .

. . . [T]he skillful leader subdues his enemy's troops without any fighting⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Many liberals accuse neoconservative disciples of the contemporary philosopher Leo Strauss of espousing this doctrine. See, as an extreme example, Earl Shorris, “Ignoble Liars: Leo Strauss, George Bush, and the Philosophy of Mass Deception,” *Harper's Magazine*, June 2004, 65–71. For additional discussions of Straussian thought, see Tom Barry, “A Philosophy of Intelligence: Leo Strauss and Intelligence Strategy,” *IRC Right Web* (Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, February 12, 2004), accessed May 18, 2011, <http://rightweb.irc-online.org/pdf/0402nsai.pdf>; and Steven J. Lenzner and William Kristol, “Leo Strauss: An Introduction,” *Perspectives on Political Science* 33, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 204–14, accessed July 2, 2011, Academic OneFile.

⁴⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, in Alistair McAlpine, ed., *The Ruthless Leader* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), 220–1, 224.

Deception was used heavily by civilizations in the era surrounding and since the time of Jesus Christ. Julius Sextus Frontinus, a Roman author, devoted his second volume of *Stratagems* to the chronicling of deceptions. The Byzantines held pride in their use of deception. Emperor Leo VI wrote treasonous letters and sent them to enemy officers, framing them for espionage. The Mongols were masters of deception, using false rumors and horses with dummy riders to inflate their numbers. In Africa, Shaka of the Zulus delighted in luring enemies into ambushes.⁴⁷

For the Middle Ages, Niccolo Machiavelli is credited as a seminal author of deception strategies. Although *The Prince* is his most famous book (and it contains advice related to deception), *The Art of War* touches more specifically on the subject. As Jon Latimer summarized, Machiavelli “rejected the values that underpinned medieval warfare [i.e., Christian chivalry] and took an entirely practical view of the subject, with victory as the sole criterion for success and an acceptance of every type of trickery as legitimate. Machiavelli described the ideal commander as one capable of constantly devising new tactics and stratagems to deceive and overpower the enemy.”⁴⁸

⁴⁷ The data in this paragraph is derived from Latimer, *Deception in War*, 8–12, 25–6, citing (ns. 6–7, 11–13, 40–2) Archibald P. Wavell, *The Good Soldier* (London: Macmillan, 1948), 36; Sir Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, vol. 1 (London: Methuen, 1978), 172, 201–5; James Chambers, *The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe* (London: Cassell, 1988), 79–80; David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Collins Encyclopaedia of Military History*, 4th ed. (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 372–3; Norman Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), 326; Donald R. Morris, *The Washing of the Spears* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965), 53, 63.

⁴⁸ Latimer, *Deception in War*, 14, citing (n. 18) Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, a rev. ed. of the Ellis Farnsworth trans., with an introduction by Neal Wood (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1965), xxv. See also M. R. D. Foot: “Machiavelli put deceit high among the characteristics that would be necessary to a successful ruler; and even though he has become a byword for immorality, he remains favorite reading for those who seek greatness in politics—of

An interesting trend developed after the Middle Ages, as deception slowly became a lost art on more than operational levels until the World Wars. The two greatest military strategists of the nineteenth century—Napoleon Bonaparte and Carl von Clausewitz—were both ambivalent toward deception, preferring instead decisive battle. Bonaparte, to his credit, early on was a master of maneuver and feigning weakness,⁴⁹ but this use of deceit eventually fell by the wayside, turning instead to a preference for overwhelming force by the time he was crowned emperor.⁵⁰

Clausewitz was only slightly better. He recognized that deception might be a trump card for weaker parties (a theme to be explored in detail below):

The weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes. In a state of weakness and insignificance, when prudence, judgment, and ability no longer suffice, cunning may well appear the only hope. The bleaker the situation, with everything concentrating on a single desperate attempt, more readily cunning is joined to daring. Released from all future considerations, and liberated from thoughts of later retribution, boldness and cunning will be free to augment each other to the point of concentrating a faint glimmer of hope into a single beam of light which may yet kindle a flame.⁵¹

Nevertheless, unless one's army was in dire straits, Clausewitz preferred decisive battle to diversions. He felt that superiority in numbers was instead the key to victory: "To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress

which strategy is a part." "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Democratic Regimes," in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 97.

⁴⁹ For a discussion of this and more on Napoleon's use of deception, see Latimer, *Deception in War*, 24–5, citing (ns. 34–9) David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 78–80, 146; David G. Chandler, *Atlas of Military Strategy: The Art, Theory and Practice of War, 1618–1878* (Don Mills, ON: Collier Macmillan Canada/Fortress Publications, 1980), 98, 100–1; Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 40–2.

⁵⁰ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 12.

⁵¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 203, quoted in Handel, "Intelligence and Deception," 124, n. 7.

an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with scale of the deception. Normally they call for more than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the desired effect. It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time merely to create an illusion: there is always the risk that nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be available when they are really needed.”⁵²

Ultimately, despite his assertion that “surprise lies at the root of all military activity without exception,” Clausewitz seemed to eschew deception generally.⁵³

Deception would be used extensively on operational levels during the American Civil War and would become a key factor keeping the milquetoast John McClellan out of the South for longer than necessary.⁵⁴ For example, as Latimer noted, “The guns McClellan’s spies had assured him were trained on the capital [Washington, D.C.] were nothing more than stripped logs, painted black with wagon wheels tacked onto the side.”⁵⁵

In World War I, with the exception of a few magnificent ruses, deception was ignored at great cost as armies decimated each other in trenches. The exceptions, however, would begin a momentum toward again recognizing deception as a crucial element of grand strategy;⁵⁶ this recognition would come to fruition during the Second World War and the Cold War.⁵⁷

⁵² Clausewitz, *On War*, 203, quoted in Handel, “Introduction,” 5, n. 18.

⁵³ Quoted in Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, ix.

⁵⁴ See Latimer, *Deception in War*, 26–31.

⁵⁵ Latimer, *Deception in War*, 27, citing (n. 43) Geoffrey. C. Ward, Ric Burns, and Ken Burns, *The Civil War* (London: Bodley Head, 1991), 76–80.

⁵⁶ *Grand strategy* is defined as the coordinated use of all resources—military, political, economic, etc.—to achieve a given policy. See B. H. Liddle Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1954), 335–6.

⁵⁷ Handel, “Introduction,” 5–6.

Two of the best examples of deception in World War I are the British use of the “haversack ruse” (in which a British officer “managed to ‘lose’ a haversack containing carefully prepared documents in a staged encounter with a Turkish patrol”) to make the Germans believe the British would attack at Gaza instead of Beersheba,⁵⁸ and a bluff employed to get British troops safely out of the Dardanelles during the Gallipoli campaign.⁵⁹ The British would make good use of the lessons learned in World War I to engage in strategic deception during World War II.⁶⁰

Volumes have been written on strategic deception in the Second World War, including examinations of Operation Mincemeat, Operation Fortitude, the British Double-Cross System, ruses associated with Operation Barbarossa, and other classic deceptions. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union, as well as many other states, engaged in elaborate deceptions and counterdeceptions. Brief descriptions of several case studies during these periods will be included in appendix 1, and many of the lessons learned during these periods are outlined below.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 7–8, citing (n. 23) Cyril Falls, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, part 1 (London: H.M.S.O., 1930), 30–1; Archibald P. Wavell, *The Palestine Campaign*, 3rd ed. (London: Constable, 1936), 106; Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 280–1; Richard H. Meinerzhagen, *Army Diary 1899–1926* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960); Sir, Maj. Gen. George Aston, *Secret Service* (New York: Cosmopolitan Books, 1930), Chap. 16, 201–16; Yigal Shefi, “Deception and Stratagem in the Third Battle of Gaza,” *Maarachot* (Hebrew) IDF Journal, Nos. 302–303 (March/April 1986): 56–61.

⁵⁹ Latimer, *Deception in War*, 114–8, citing (ns. 22–7) Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956), 263, 287–8; Michael Hickey, *Gallipoli* (London: John Murray, 1995), 322, 327–34; Jock Haswell, *The Tangled Web: The Art of Tactical and Strategic Deception* (Wendover, U.K.: John Goodchild, 1985), 75–6.

⁶⁰ Handel, “Introduction,” 5–6.

Deception in an Era of Asymmetric Warfare

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the Cold War was ending and the United States had just completed a hugely successful conventional war against Iraq, two writings correctly predicted a significant change in warfare that would slowly be seen but not be clearly evident until the attacks of September 11, 2001. The use of deception has become a key element of this changing nature of warfare.

First, in the late 1980's, William Lind and several U.S. Marine Corps coauthors questioned whether warfare might be entering a new "generation." They posited that it had evolved from traditional line-and-column warfare (the first generation) to firepower and attrition (second generation), to the era of maneuver (third generation). They speculated that a fourth generation of warfare was perhaps emerging, with a hallmark of general battlefield disorder. They proposed that one of the key goals in fourth-generation warfare is to collapse "the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him."⁶¹ Additionally, they predicted that "the tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent's political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be critically important to isolate the enemy from one's own homeland because a small number of people will be able to render a great damage in a very short time."⁶²

⁶¹ William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, Capt. John F. Schmitt, Col. Joseph W. Sutton, and Lt. Col. Gary I. Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *The Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no. 11 (November 2001, reprinted from October 1989): 65–8, accessed July 7, 2011, ProQuest Direct Complete. See also Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 12–3.

⁶² Lind et al., 67.

Lind et al. proposed that terrorism might be a classic manifestation of this new warfare; they wrote that “terrorism must seek to collapse the enemy from within[,] as it has little capability (at least at present) to inflict widespread destruction.”⁶³ With prescience, they noted that warfare would be difficult for traditional democratic societies to wage against terrorists because “if we treat them within our laws, they gain many protections; if we simply shoot them down, the television news can easily make them appear to be the victims. . . . If we are forced to set aside our system of legal protections to deal with terrorists, the terrorists win another sort of victory.”⁶⁴

The questions they posed and the hypotheses they posited gained some traction in the 1990s and were developed more fully by 2004, with Thomas Hammes’ landmark book on fourth-generation warfare, to be discussed below.

Second, Martin van Creveld introduced a similar thesis in 1991, which also would be generally ignored until after September 2001. His basic message was simple yet controversial at the time: conventional Clausewitzian and strategic nuclear warfare—and all of the advanced technology and strategy that accompany those forms of fighting—would, in the future, become irrelevant and would be supplanted by low-intensity conflict. “We are entering an era,” he wrote in 1991, “not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocs, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups.”⁶⁵

Van Creveld with prescience noted:

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 68.

⁶⁵ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), ix.

In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by “professionalism” than by fanatical, ideologically based loyalties. . . . [W]ar will become a much more direct experience for most civilians They will be affected not just accidentally or incidentally or anonymously from afar, . . . but as immediate participants, targets, and victims. . . . Future low-intensity combat is also likely to make increased use of weapons that are prohibited today Armed conflict . . . will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large scale conventional war It will be a war of listening devices and of car bombs, of men killing each other at close quarters, and of women using their purses to carry explosives It will be protracted, bloody, and horrible.⁶⁶

Richard Shultz and Andreas Vogt wrote that van Creveld’s predictions were “flatly rejected as the musing of an eccentric intellectual. . . . A review of *The Transformation of War* prepared for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy charged that van Creveld was not ‘a balanced strategic thinker,’ had ‘scant evidence for his view,’ and made ‘numerous unsubstantiated assertions.’”⁶⁷ Nevertheless, van Creveld was spot on.

The warfare Van Creveld described would, within a decade, become widely known as “asymmetric,” meaning there was an imbalance of symmetry between the firepower and strategy of the “terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers,” and the conventional forces fighting them.⁶⁸ Although the conventional forces could dominate the battle space with firepower—a “third generation” concept—the

⁶⁶ Ibid., 197, 203–4, 212 (grammar slightly altered).

⁶⁷ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andreas Vogt, “The Real Intelligence Failure on 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First,” in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 408–9.

⁶⁸ It is unclear who coined the term “asymmetric warfare.” *Wikipedia* indicated that it originated from Andrew Mack, “Why Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200, accessed July 6, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880>. *Wikipedia*, “Asymmetric Warfare,” accessed July 9, 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare#cite_note-0.

armed groups could still win the war because they employed “fourth-generation” strategy that focused on collapsing the enemy from within.

Thomas Hammes revisited the concept of fourth-generation warfare in 2004, although rather than presenting the concept as a question, as Lind and his coauthors had done, Hammes laid out a thesis defining fourth-generation warfare as follows:

It uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. . . . Unlike previous generations, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy—measured in decades rather than months or years.⁶⁹

Shultz and Andrea Dew built upon the themes of asymmetric and fourth-generation warfare in writing that “the way war has been waged has changed.”⁷⁰ They particularly emphasized that modern militaries should not continue to fight according to traditional warfare. In more modern language than van Creveld, Shultz et al. updated the nomenclature about today’s warriors, arguing that the primary actors in today’s wars are nonstate armed groups (NSAGs)—terrorists, insurgents, militias, and organized criminals:⁷¹

The terms nonstate actor and nonstate armed group refer to groups that challenge the authority of states, challenge the rule of law, use violence in unconventional, asymmetrical, and indiscriminate operations to achieve their aims, operate within and across state boundaries, use covert intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, and have factional schisms that affect their ability to operate effectively. . . .

⁶⁹ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 208.

⁷⁰ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andrea Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1.

⁷¹ Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard, *Armed Groups: A Tier One Security Priority*, INSS Occasional Paper 57 (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004), 17–31, accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf>.

. . . [T]hey represent nontraditional security challenges that are unlike the conventional ones presented by states.⁷²

These theses are pivotal for this dissertation for three reasons: First, NSAGs are the primary actor that this dissertation will study. Second, fourth-generation, asymmetric warfare increasingly is practiced by NSAGs. Finally, in order to “directly attack the minds of enemy decision makers,” deception becomes an important tool for NSAGs because deception is used to affect decision makers’ perspectives.

Deception as a force multiplier: NSAGs are the “weaker parties” of today’s warfare—those that employ asymmetric tactics more than any other. Because they lack the ability to challenge states on conventional military levels, their use of deception contributes to the asymmetric nature of the fight with them.⁷³

Whereas the more powerful often struggle to incorporate deception as an element of strategy, the weak rely on it for survival.

As noted above, Clausewitz believed deception should be used as a last resort to restore hope to the hopeless. Although the premise of when to use it is debatable, Clausewitz is correct in writing that deception does give the weaker party a trump card. In this sense deception is a force multiplier, as noted by Handel: “When all other elements of strength in war are approximately equal, deception will amplify the available strength of a state—or allow it to use its force more economically by achieving victory at a lower cost and with fewer casualties. If opponents are unequally matched, deception (and surprise) can enable the

⁷² Shultz and Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias*, 10, citing (n. 30) Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, *Armed Groups*.

⁷³ Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 7–8.

weaker side to compensate for its numerical and other inadequacies. For this reason, the side that is at a disadvantage usually has the more powerful incentive to resort to deceptive strategy and tactics.”⁷⁴

Despite being a weapon of the weak, there is nothing that says only the weak can employ deception. Walter Jajko argued that some believe “the United States as a superpower obviously has no *need* to resort to such desperate . . . efforts. . . . [T]he result is to deprive the nation of a valuable instrument of statecraft.”⁷⁵

Why would the powerful have no need to resort to deception? The answer is partly ethical (discussed below) and partly a function of alternate sources of power. As J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley noted, the powerful forget about guile when they can rely on brute force: “The powerful do not have to use deception because they have . . . other means of control including naked coercive force. Generally, the greater the relative degree of naked power an individual has over others, the less he will tend to rely on deception. . . . It is generally true of individuals that the more force they command, the less they will resort to fraud.”⁷⁶

This overreliance on brute force, however, has been an Achilles heel for many great powers. Bell and Whaley noted that once Napoleon was crowned emperor, “he forgot his guileful and most successful use of armies and came to depend on the sheer force of his big battalions.”⁷⁷ In the Vietnam War, as Latimer

⁷⁴ Handel, “Introduction,” 40–1 (formatting of dash manipulated).

⁷⁵ Jajko, “Commentary,” 117 (italics added). See also Walter Jajko, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning,” *Comparative Strategy* 21, no. 5 (Oct.–Dec. 2002): 351–63, doi: 10.1080/01495930290043092.

⁷⁶ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 11–12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

explained, deception generally did not fit into strategic U.S. military doctrine.⁷⁸ Handel argued that this inability to use deception actually leads to the atrophy of power: “While the tendency of more powerful states to rely more on ‘brute force’ can be understood, it certainly cannot be justified. The strong and powerful need not waste their strength or increase their own costs just because they are stronger. Strength not accompanied by stratagem and deception will become sterile and will inevitably decline.”⁷⁹

For those that do employ deception, it brings large dividends at little cost, as deception is one of the cheapest elements of strategy. Not only does it save resources for the deceiver, but also forces the target to expend resources less effectively, as Handel discussed: “Effective deception will cause the adversary to waste his resources, to spread his forces thinly, to vacate or reduce the strength of his forces at the decisive point of attack, to tie considerable forces up at the wrong place at the worst time; it will divert his attention from critical to trivial areas of interest, numb his alertness and reduce his readiness, increase his confusion, and reduce his certainty. In short, *reducing the cost for the deceiver implies increasing the cost for the deceived.*”⁸⁰

NSAGs’ deception capabilities: Roy Godson and James Wirtz wrote that deception is a strategic instrument for NSAGs: “For terrorist or criminal

⁷⁸ Latimer, *Deception in War*, 283–90. However, the United States did not entirely forego the use of deception during the Vietnam War; for a discussion of some deceptions employed, see Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

⁷⁹ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 124.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 143 (italics original). Latimer also joked about the low cost of deception: “According to modern British Army doctrine, effective deception requires the commitment of significant resources to convince an enemy. One can only assume that its authors have never studied the art of deception.” *Deception in War*, 305.

organizations, D&D [denial and deception] is a strategic instrument, much in the same way as the navy or nuclear weapons are strategic instruments for the United States. Criminals and terrorists use D&D as a strategic instrument to shape the environment so that they can better achieve their objectives.”⁸¹

Although deception is a strategic instrument, it need not be targeted in strategic ways. Bell wrote that illicit groups rarely engage in strategic deception as traditionally understood because their resources more frequently go toward achieving effective denial.⁸² For nonstate actors, denial is an existential necessity: “The more the organization is perceived as illicit, the more necessary is denial.”⁸³

This limits an organization’s ability to engage in strategic deception:

Deceptions are rare for those . . . hampered by the restrictions and costs imposed by the secrecy of the clandestine world. . . . To deploy deception, there must be time to plan, organize, or attempt the novel. However, time is in short supply for many clandestine groups. Some manage to conduct serious deception planning because the times are right or more often the assets are in place. . . . Most terrorists who are being hunted and are on the run may not have . . . [sufficient] assets [to engage in deception]. Strategic denial consumes so much time and resources that revolutionaries often cannot afford the investment in deception planning.⁸⁴

Bell also stated that once cover (denial) is blown, nonstate groups find it difficult to employ any type of deception.⁸⁵ He used as an example the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993: “Once the World Trade Center had alerted the American authorities, the cost of secrecy continued to erode capacity but more important the cover of the faith was useless against policy and intelligence filters

⁸¹ Godson and Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” 2.

⁸² J. Bowyer Bell, “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 129–31, 139–40.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 139–40.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 135–6.

now aware of the potential risks from the fundamentalists.”⁸⁶ As will be shown in chapter 4, despite the filters being aware of risks from fundamentalists, the filters were not strong enough to detect other covers and deceptive tactics employed by the 9/11 hijackers.

This study will posit that Bell’s assertion that strategic deception only occurs when “times are right or . . . assets are in place” can be sharpened to become more predictive. Specifically, time and resource constraints are part of more complex issues related to deception, including the NSAG’s overall capabilities, the threat environment, and the target’s counterdeception efforts. Additionally, under the concept of status quo deception (SQD), NSAGs probably could employ strategic deception more frequently than Bell’s arguments would allow.

Even though Bell’s proposal can be sharpened, this thesis nevertheless agrees that time and resource constraints restrict an NSAG’s ability to operate freely, and argues that because of constraints needed to remain illicit, NSAGs will engage in the least resource-intensive types of deception possible in order to achieve their given objectives; because of this, they will usually turn to SQD, as discussed in more detail below and in chapter 3.

Bell did concede that tactical deceptions sometimes have strategic results: “Denial makes everything possible, and on occasion tactical deception makes the spectacular possible for the revolutionary.”⁸⁷ This thesis will build on this theme, arguing that it is often tactical deception that makes the spectacular possible, and if the “spectacular” is something like a strategic attack undertaken with tactical

⁸⁶ Ibid., 148.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 160.

measures that were well planned and organized, perhaps we should consider calling the operation in question strategic.⁸⁸

Articles by Richard Shultz and Ruth Margolies Beitler as well as this author build on the theme that tactical means can result in strategic ends. Shultz and Beitler showed that tactical deceptions were used to help achieve strategic surprise in the East Africa embassy bombings and 9/11 attacks, and this author showed that al Qaeda *intentionally* employs tactical deception to achieve strategic ends, a spectacular example of which was the surprise on 9/11.⁸⁹

Despite a relatively secure understanding of deception as it relates to state warfare, much remains to be learned regarding deception in asymmetric environments. States can employ it against NSAGs just as they can against each other, but questions remain regarding what factors affect armed groups' use of deceptive stratagem against states.⁹⁰ As Robert Pfaltzgraff and John Sawicki wrote:

To the extent that the literature does address international relations, it does so almost exclusively with a state-centric focus. For example, the question of how the leaders of *states* have practiced deception against their counterparts is the

⁸⁸ Within the framework of Bell's analysis, Bell's definition of strategic deception matches most closely with what this thesis calls BTD. He would argue that BTD happens rarely because NSAGs are so consumed with maintaining denial. In this paper's terminology, that is like saying the dangers of counterdeception make it difficult for an NSAG to fulfill Shulsky's requirements. Next, Bell said that because deception is rare, NSAGs are more likely to undertake a strategic surprise by using strategic denial. In this paper, depending on the goals and methods used, strategic denial can be similar to or synonymous with SQD. Therefore, the assessments are similar, but use different terminology. Ultimately, both this author and Bell agree that using deceptive tactics intended to change a target's behavior is more difficult than using deception to stay under the radar. *Ibid.*, 129–31, 138–50, 159–61.

⁸⁹ See Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai'da's Operations," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8, no. 2 (June 2004): 56–79, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue2/jv8n2a6.html>; and Devin D. Jessee, "Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 367–88, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1080/09546550600751941.

⁹⁰ See Foot, "Democratic Regimes," 113.

center of attention. What is missing is an extensive consideration of nonstate actors, notably terrorist organizations as well as the media. Because terrorist organizations are inherently weaker than states, and especially the United States, they rely extensively on denial and deception, as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as other targets, so amply demonstrate.⁹¹

The Nature of Deception

Deception as an element of strategy: Using deception to help fulfill a coherent strategy assures at least four advantages, according to Latimer: first, deception gives freedom of action when the adversary believes one is doing something else. Second, by employing this freedom of action, deception can be used to delude the enemy. Third, this delusion allows the deceiver to obtain surprise. All of this leads to the ultimate goal—deception saves lives for the deceiver.⁹²

Even when deception is used as an element of strategy, some debate exists about the role of deception in relation to tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Traditionally, deception permeates war at the tactical level. As Latimer posited, “At the very lowest level of war the soldier should be a good shot and a bad target.”⁹³ As noted above, Bell wrote that nonstate actors generally employ deception at tactical and operational levels in order to foster denial that allows for necessary clandestinity, and that nonstate groups generally are unable to engage in strategic deception because of constraints created by a resulting lack of time, money, and experience.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and John A. Sawicki, “Perception and Misperception: Implications for Denial and Deception: A Literature Survey and Analysis” (unpublished manuscript), 49.

⁹² Latimer, *Deception in War*, 62, citing (n. 4) Haswell, *The Tangled Web*, 23.

⁹³ Latimer, *Deception in War*, 101, see also 102–3; and Walter Jajko, “Commentary,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 119.

⁹⁴ Bell, “Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” 129–62.

Under classic definitions of *strategic deception*, Bell's hypothesis may be correct, but this begs the question of whether classic definitions of the term are valid. Traditionally, *strategic deception* is, as explained by Shulsky, based on "a high level of importance."⁹⁵ It is planned at the highest levels and targets the highest levels: "A 'strategic' deception is one aimed at the highest levels of government or of the military chain of command [T]he subject of the deception effort must be something of sufficient importance that a high-level official . . . would typically deal with personally. . . . Thus, 'strategic' deception would not include deception aimed at a lower-level officer, such as commander of a division or below, nor at the operational level of an intelligence agency."⁹⁶ Shulsky also stated that "strategic denial and deception involve much effort and imply that the highest levels of the deceiver state (or nonstate organization) are involved in planning the deception initiative."⁹⁷

Some take issue with this conception of strategic deception as it relates to both states and nonstate actors. For states, warfare has changed much in the last century, and today—with asymmetric warfare—tactical, operational, and strategic campaigns tend to blend seamlessly.⁹⁸ To reiterate what Lind et al. predicted in

⁹⁵ Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," 17.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26. Similarly, Godson and Wirtz stated, "D & D is strategic if it directly affects the national fortune and interests. . . . Strategic deception is thus aimed at the highest levels of a government or of the military chain of command" Godson and Wirtz, "Strategic Denial and Deception," 2. See also Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki, "Perception and Misperception," 6, which also quotes Godson and Wirtz.

⁹⁸ See Jajko, "Commentary," 116. As Barton Whaley also noted, "How uniform are the practice and effects of stratagem along the strategic-to-tactical dimension? Few theorists—and I think none today—make a rigid distinction between tactics and strategy. In general, they are defined not as separate and contrasting categories but as two extremes of a continuum. Indeed, there has been an incipient trend since World War II to return to the pre-Napoleonic continuum—tactics, grand tactics, strategy, grand strategy." *Stratagem: Deception in Surprise and War* (Boston: Artech House, 2007), 129.

the late 1980s, “The tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent’s political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be critically important to isolate the enemy from one’s own homeland because a small number of people will be able to render a great damage in a very short time.”⁹⁹

Nina Stewart also called traditional understandings of these terms into question: “There are instances where the lines blur between strategic and tactical deception. General Schwarzkopf’s ‘Hail Mary’ feint [an operational deception] to divert Iraqi attention from the main axis of U.S. attack was briefed and cleared by the Joint Chiefs and the Commander-in-Chief. . . . With the trend toward nonstate actors establishing new, heretofore unseen complex alliances, the distinction blurs further.”¹⁰⁰

Traditional concepts of *strategic deception* become even more problematic when intentionally tactical or operational deceptions are employed to achieve strategic surprise. An example is al Qaeda’s operation on September 11, as will be discussed in chapter 4. Al Qaeda terrorists practiced tactical deceptions in their travel, communications, and so forth, and the combination of these ultimately concluded with strategic surprise. Would the methods used to undertake the attacks on 9/11 be considered tactical or strategic?¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” 67.

¹⁰⁰ Nina Stewart, “Commentary,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 37.

¹⁰¹ Bell agreed with this notion: “A combination of tactical deceptions may have a strategic impact. . . . A little cover until the operational moment can be adequate if the authorities do not even know the threat exists.” “Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” 141, 144. See also Shultz and Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise”; and Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends.”

The U.S. military provided a definition that applies more effectively to the use of deception in fourth-generation warfare, stating that *strategic deception* is “deception which disguises your *basic* objectives, intentions, strategies, and capabilities.”¹⁰² This is a useful definition because it shies away from who the planners or targets are, and instead focuses on the purpose of the deception. The military said that operational deception “confuses or diverts an adversary in regard to a *specific* operation or action you are preparing to conduct,” and that tactical deception “misleads others while they are *actively involved* in competition with you, your interests, or your forces.”¹⁰³

These definitions are useful when considering situations of fourth-generation warfare because under them, tactical methods can result in both tactical and strategic deception. If the action is undertaken with the intent to mislead about general capabilities, it could be considered strategic. For example, if terrorist planners include tactical operations as part of a strategy to obtain strategic surprise, the overall deception campaign may be more appropriately labeled *strategic*. However, these definitions not perfect because it is possible to conceive of a situation in which deception achieves a given strategic end while the two actors are involved in active competition.

This thesis posits that *strategic deception* should be defined as *deception intended to make the target misperceive reality so that it acts in a way detrimental*

¹⁰² *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, amended as of June 9, 2004, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>, quoted in Caddell, *Deception 101*, 17, n. 20 (italics original).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* (italics original).

to or fails to act in a way beneficial to its highest interests. Strategic deception can be undertaken using tactical, operational, or strategic methods.

Deception Theory

Paucity of theory: Although anecdotal writing about deception campaigns is the stuff of best-selling books (see appendix 1 for a partial list), few authors have attempted a broad theory of deception. Some of the first attempts were published in 1982. Barton Whaley authored a short article called “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” and Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig opened a collected work about deception with a frequently cited theoretical chapter titled “Propositions on Military Deception.”¹⁰⁴ The same year, Bell and Whaley published a book examining deception theory and practice called *Cheating* (later reprinted as *Cheating and Deception*).¹⁰⁵ Bell then revisited and augmented his and Whaley’s works in an article in 2003 titled “Toward a Theory of Deception.”¹⁰⁶

As Bell noted in the introduction to *Cheating and Deception*, their attempt at theory was a foray into new territory: “In some sense, we began at the beginning, an exercise enormously rare in an analytic world often crowded with models and theories. In deception matters, however, no one had thought to extend social

¹⁰⁴ Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” 178–92; and Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” in *Strategic Military Deception*, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 3–30; see also the other theoretical chapters in *Strategic Military Deception*. Daniel and Herbig noted that their and others’ theoretical perspectives in *Strategic Military Deception* were originally crafted between fall 1979 and spring 1980. *Strategic Military Deception*, xi–xii.

Separately, in 1969, Whaley posited a theory of stratagem, but this was more a theory about how a practitioner should undertake deception rather than a theoretical exploration of what deception is. See Whaley, *Stratagem*, 67–79.

¹⁰⁵ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*. First published as J. Barton Bowyer [pseud.], *Cheating: Deception in War & Magic, Games & Sports, Sex & Religion, Business & Con Games, Politics & Espionage, Art & Science* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982).

¹⁰⁶ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 244–80; see comments in *ibid.*, n. 1 on p. 279.

science methods to the subject.”¹⁰⁷ This book is still the most serious attempt at creating a theory of deception that applies universally rather than in specific subfields (such as military deception or financial deception).

Hiding, showing, and more: The basis of Bell and Whaley’s theory is that all deception is structured by two elements: hiding the real (dissimulation) and showing the false (simulation). Simulation cannot occur without dissimulation because, as the authors noted, “all deception and cheating involves hiding.”¹⁰⁸

Each of these categories is then subcategorized. Hiding can be broken down into three parts: (1) Masking “occurs when the real is hidden by blending in with a background, integrating itself with the surroundings, or, best of all, seeking invisibility.” (2) Repackaging: “When the real is hidden by repackaging, the new package may be perceived in various ways, as dangerous or harmless or simply irrelevant.” (3) Dazzling: The process of “confounding a pursuit” when masking and repackaging fail. In nature, an example is when an octopus uses its ink to dazzle a predator long enough to escape from danger.¹⁰⁹

Showing also can be subdivided thrice: (1) Mimicking: When “a replica of reality is created by selecting one or more characteristics of the real in order to achieve an advantageous effect.” For example, “a cloud of dust can stand for an army or a trumpet call for a charge.”¹¹⁰ (2) Inventing: “The false is displayed through the fashioning of an alternative reality and not simply through the mimicking of the existing reality.” A classic example is the British creation of

¹⁰⁷ Bell, introduction to *Cheating and Deception*, by Bell and Whaley, xvi.

¹⁰⁸ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 48–9, 61.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 49–50.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 67.

“The Man Who Never Was” (Operation Mincemeat; see appendix 1 for brief synopsis of literature about the operation). (3) Decoying: Actions taken to lure an enemy away from the discovered real, such as when a bird flutters away, seemingly injured, to lure a predator away from her eggs.¹¹¹

Bell and Whaley then showed how these categories are used in deception: “Now while there are only six *kinds* of cheating [explained above], there is only one *way* to cheat. To cheat, one chooses from one or more of the six categories one or more CHARACTERISTICS and fashions this into a RUSE that creates an ILLUSION of either COVER or EFFECT.”¹¹²

Characteristics are the defining features of a person, place, or thing. For example, the characteristics of a human are a body, appendages, hair, breath, etc. A *ruse* “is the process of choosing first the appropriate category, such as dazzling or mimicking, and then the necessary number of CHARCS [characteristics] to create either a COVER or an EFFECT.”¹¹³ The *ruse* is the deception plan, and it will either end in *cover* (hiding, dissimulation) or *effect* (what the target will see). The authors noted that all ruses “fall into five categories: unnoticed, benign, desirable, unappealing, and dangerous.”¹¹⁴ For example, “some RUSES of war create for the planner an EFFECT seen as UNAPPEALING—two enemy armies instead of one or, for the butterfly, where nature is the planner, markings—big eyes—that are perceived by the predator as dangerous or unappealing, such as

¹¹¹ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 50–61. These six categories are presented with slightly different names in Bell’s article, although he essentially means the same thing. See Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 259–61.

¹¹² Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 64 (italics original).

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 67 (italics original).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 68 (formatting manipulated).

those that mimic distasteful bugs. . . . [T]he RUSE fashioned by the planner creates a COVER or an EFFECT for the potential victim who, it is hoped, will accept the ILLUSION.”¹¹⁵ The *illusion* is the false reality the deception target accepts.

“Successful deception requires a goal beyond deceit alone,”¹¹⁶ so a deception goal—one that fits into a grand strategy—must be chosen before deception planners begin their work. Once the goal is chosen, these elements of a deception can be placed in a deception loop involving seven elements: (1) A *category of deception* is chosen and from that (2) *characteristics* of the deception are decided upon from a possible spectrum. (3) A *ruse* is devised and (4) fed to the target through *channels* that will reach the target (5) with the purpose of creating an *illusion* (6) as an element of *stratagem* in order to achieve (7) the chosen *goal* that is part of grand strategy. The target is deceived in reverse order, as Bell and Whaley showed with the example of a general giving orders:

Captain, take your men to the left and stir up some dust. Major, give him an hour and then attack on the right.

. . . The general wants to surprise the enemy and win the battle as part of a grand strategy to achieve total victory. To do so he resorts to a deception stratagem that confuses to the point of attack in the enemy’s mind because they accept the ILLUSION of EFFECT by glimpsing in the air (CHANNEL) the false “army” created by the captain’s RUSE, a cloud of dust. The dust cloud is the chosen characteristic, CHARC, from the MIMICKING category.¹¹⁷

In Bell’s later article he added a few additional insights that help better explain this theoretical framework. First, he took the elements of this deception loop and fed them into a larger cycle: (1) The recognition of the need for

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 72.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 70–1 (formatting manipulated).

deception. (2) Planning and constructing a ruse that will be channeled within a decision arena. (3) The target accepts or rejects the ruse as an illusion. (4) The planner receives feedback and (5) analyzes that feedback, which makes the continuation of the cycle possible.¹¹⁸ Although some of these elements (1–3) are present in the loop explained above, the recognition that feedback and analysis are necessary in effective deceptions is an important aspect of deception theory.

Further, Bell spoke in some detail about the importance of the channel as well as the possible response spectrum of the target. “A channel,” he wrote, “is at times more crucial than the ruse, and more easily neglected by the planners. There is no use in sending duplicitous semaphore signals to the blind, or building dummy tanks that are not noticed by air reconnaissance.”¹¹⁹ Bell wrote that the target will respond with denial, ignorance, or acceptance.¹²⁰ It is then up to the deception planner to have mechanisms in place to receive feedback on the response in order to analyze the deception and make needed changes to future deceptions: “The target response in all cases is to the illusion, not to the ruse, and so acceptance is beyond the reach of the deception planner who must rely on feedback, visible or not, to determine the impact.”¹²¹

Daniel and Herbig—A- and M-type deceptions: Daniel and Herbig presented a theoretical model of deception types that was more complex than Bell and Whaley’s model, but still useful heuristically. In their theory, they distinguished

¹¹⁸ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 252. Whaley also presented a somewhat more involved cycle in “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” 189.

¹¹⁹ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 258.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 266–7.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 270.

between two variants of deception: “ambiguity-increasing,” or “A-type,” and “misleading,” or “M-type.”¹²²

A-type deception “confuses a target so that the target is unsure as to what to believe. It seeks to compound the uncertainties confronting any state’s attempt to determine its adversary’s wartime intentions.”¹²³ An example Daniel and Herbig provided is the deceptions associated with the Normandy invasion in World War II. The Allies engaged in numerous deceptions in order to increase Hitler’s ambiguity about where an invasion would occur, forcing him to keep much-needed forces in reserve throughout various parts of Europe until the actual invasion was long past.¹²⁴

M-type deception is almost the opposite—its purpose is to reduce ambiguity about a false course of action in order to get an adversary to focus all of its energies on that one contingency. The example they provided is German deceptions associated with Operation Barbarossa that were intended to convince the Russians that Germany was focusing its efforts on Britain and would not attack the Soviet Union without first issuing an ultimatum.¹²⁵

Necessary elements of deception: Several authors have outlined what they consider the most important elements a deceiver must account for in order to effectively engage in deception. Many of these are institutional capabilities related to the deception cycles explained above.

¹²² Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 5–7.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 6, citing (ns. 5–6) “Plan ‘Bodyguard’: Overall Deception Policy for the War against Germany,” RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 385 (6-25-43) Section 1, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, DC; Charles Cruikshank, *Deception in World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 92–7, 185–9.

¹²⁵ Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 6, quoting (n. 9) Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973), 242.

Abram Shulsky summarized five factors necessary for successful strategic deception that this dissertation will test:¹²⁶ First, the deceiver must have strategic coherence: “The deceiver must have some coherent strategic plan in mind to achieve his own objectives; otherwise, he cannot determine how he wishes the target to act. . . . The deceiving government or group must have the ability to forge a coherent policy that all departments, ministries or agencies within it can be required to follow.”¹²⁷ This plays into the theme that deception should not be divorced from strategy, as Shulsky noted: “Once the deceiver has decided on his own strategy, the deception operation must induce an opponent to take a complementary course of action.”¹²⁸ In short, the deception must be incorporated into a grand strategy.¹²⁹

Bell’s notion that armed groups can use deception when “the times are right or more often the assets are in place” probably applies within several of the factors outlined by Shulsky, but falls particularly well within this concept of having strategic coherence.¹³⁰ NSAGs that have experience, ability to plan, and funding will also be able to create coherent strategic deceptions. Conversely, those that are so hunted that they employ all their energy and resources to hide from authorities will have less freedom to engage in deception. As Bell explained: “The more illicit and hidden the group, the more difficulty members have organizing strategic deception. . . . [O]nce an asymmetrical conflict arises, the

¹²⁶ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 29.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ See Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 70–71; and Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends,” 368–9. See footnote 56 for the definition of *grand strategy*.

¹³⁰ Bell, “Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” 139.

resources demanded by denial, maintenance of the organization, or normal operations absorb most organizational resources.”¹³¹

Second, Shulsky noted that the deceiver must understand the adversary: “The deceiver must understand the target well enough to know what kinds of misinformation are likely to deceive and lead the opponent to act in the desired manner. . . . In addition, the deceiver must have some sense of how the target, assuming he swallows the bait, will react.”¹³²

Other authors also have emphasized this point. Ewen Montagu, in *The Man Who Never Was* and *Beyond Top Secret Ultra*—two monographs about British deception operations in World War II—“repeatedly emphasized the need to match the bait to the character and level of sophistication of the intended victim.”¹³³

Michael Handel wrote: “Deception requires that an individual or an organization . . . be able to see things from the enemy’s vantage point.”¹³⁴ And Michael Howard posited that the deceiver “will . . . try to get inside the mind of the enemy commander, assess that commander’s appreciation of the position on both sides, and then provide for the enemy, through all available channels, the information that will lead him to make the dispositions which will best conform to his plan.”¹³⁵

¹³¹ Ibid., 130; see also 139–40, 149–50.

¹³² Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 29–30.

¹³³ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 135, speaking about *Beyond Top Secret Ultra*, but it is true for both monographs. See Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was*, with a foreword by Gen. the Rt. Hon. Lord Ismay, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954); and *Beyond Top Secret Ultra*, with a foreword by Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978).

¹³⁴ Ibid., 136.

¹³⁵ Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, ix.

Understanding the adversary requires the deceiver to have an effective intelligence system.¹³⁶ Michael Howard considered intelligence, along with security, to be one of two pillars of effective deception.¹³⁷

Third, to practice successful deception the deceiver must have an organizational infrastructure supportive of deception and security: “Deception,” wrote Shulsky, “involves coordinating messages on many channels,” and therefore requires an oversight organization. In order to engage in effective deception, the deceiver must have an intelligence (or counterintelligence) structure that can (a) ensure information about the deception operation is not lost to the adversary (i.e., provide security) and (b) engage in the actual deception planning.¹³⁸

Writing about security, M. R. D. Foot explained that “secrecy is a recurring theme . . . ; it has always been regarded . . . as the indispensable condition for adequate deception.”¹³⁹ Speaking of counterintelligence deception planners, Roy Godson argued that they play an important role in helping channel the deception effectively: “Counterintelligence specialists . . . are in an advantageous position to craft and send out specially selected messages” because they are the ones most likely to know “what the target’s intelligence service ‘sees and hears.’”¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Howard believed this is difficult: “For those directing the war, to make a sufficiently accurate assessment of enemy capabilities and intentions to impose on him a deception plausible enough to affect his actions is normally so difficult that it has seldom even been attempted.” *Ibid.*, x.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, ix–x.

¹³⁸ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 30–1.

¹³⁹ Foot, “Democratic Regimes,” 105. See also Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, with a new introduction by Roy Godson (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 236.

¹⁴⁰ Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, 237.

Fourth, the deceiver must have information channels, either established or ad hoc, by which the ruse can reach the adversary.¹⁴¹ This is naturally correlated with many of the elements mentioned above, including understanding an adversary and having effective intelligence and counterintelligence structures in place. It also is related to security because, as Shulsky noted, “To the extent that the deceiver has good security, the number of uncontrolled channels from which the target can receive information can be reduced.”¹⁴² This increases the relative importance of available channels the deceiver can exploit and enhances the target’s desire to develop new channels, hence providing the deceiver opportunities to take advantage of double agents and other false information sources.¹⁴³

Finally, Shulsky echoed Bell’s assertion that the deceiver must have methods to receive feedback.¹⁴⁴ This allows the deceiver to decide whether the illusion was accepted and what the next plan of action should be. Without a feedback capability, the deceiver is essentially “flying blind” with each subsequent deception. “Good feedback,” wrote Shulsky, “may be the single most important requirement for a successful deception operation.” Shulsky noted, however, that “feedback need not involve an intelligence channel. The target’s overt actions may be all that is needed to know whether a deception is succeeding.”¹⁴⁵ This thesis will argue that NSAGs primarily rely on this informal type of feedback.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 31.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 31–2.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 32. As Paul H. Moose stated similarly, “The ordinary feedback that is part of the natural interplay between two sides is one way to estimate the normal trends of the channels of communications and of the opposing side’s decision maker in order to be able to better predict his

This dissertation will test Shulsky's propositions. It will show whether the NSAGs examined in the case studies maintained and used these capabilities, and will assess what role they played in affecting the groups' abilities to employ deception.

Perception and misperception: As Richards Heuer assessed, "The mind is poorly 'wired' to deal effectively with inherent uncertainty (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog fabricated by denial and deception operations)."¹⁴⁷ Because of these uncertainties, we form perceptions and misperceptions that can be manipulated.

Whaley introduced a typology of perception in which he outlined how misperception can lead to both deception and self-deception (see figure 1). Misperception can be induced either by an outside actor ("other induced") or self-


future behavior." "A Systems View of Deception," in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 143.

¹⁴⁶ Despite the importance in theory of being able to receive feedback, Daniel and Herbig wrote that in reality it might not be essential. Speaking of findings from a series of cases examined in *Strategic Military Deception*, they stated: "A factor in the success of strategic deceptions given particular weight in the theoretical chapter was the availability of reliable feedback for the deceiver. Unexpectedly, these case studies do not support the importance of this factor. Few even mention the absence of feedback, and none stress its presence as decisive." "Deception in Theory and Practice," in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 361.

¹⁴⁷ Jack Davis, introduction to *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, by Richards J. Heuer, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), xx, accessed June 20, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf>.

Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki also summed up Heuer's arguments: "First, the human mind is poorly equipped to deal . . . with . . . uncertainty Second, even if we are aware of the possibility of cognitive biases, including our tendency to perceive and accept information that confirms what we already believe, such awareness by itself does not enable us automatically to cope with uncertainty Third, there are tools and techniques that can improve our ability to analyze complex issues about which information is incomplete, ambiguous, or simply wrong . . ." "Perception and Misperception," 4, citing (n. 4) Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*.

induced. If self-induced, it can lead to self-deception (to be discussed below); if induced by an outside party, it can lead to deception.¹⁴⁸



Whaley, summarizing the work of British neuropsychologist R. L. Gregory, further explained that the process of perception and misperception involves five steps:

- 1) The environment continuously transmits a chaotic cascade or spectrum of discrete data
- 2) Our sensors (intrinsic such as eye and ear as well as extrinsic such as seeing-eye dogs or radar sets) detect certain portions of some of these spectra.
- 3) These bits and scraps of received data are transmitted (with slight delay but often considerable distortion) to the brain.
- 4) The brain discards most of these data but processes some immediately and stores it in memory.
- 5) The brain then develops hypotheses about the environment by drawing inferences from new as well as stored data.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Whaley, "Toward a General Theory of Deception," 180. As Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki explained, "The goal of the deceiving party is to substitute a 'created fictional ('notional') picture of some relevant aspect of the dupe's world for the picture of the world the dupe would otherwise perceive.'" "Perception and Misperception," 7, quoting (n. 9) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development and Mathtech, Inc., *Misperception Literature Survey* (Washington DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1979), 5. CIA and Mathtech also stated: "To successfully deceive, the deceiver must see to it that the potential dupe misperceives." *Misperception Literature Survey*, 1.

¹⁴⁹ Whaley, "Toward a General Theory of Deception," 180, citing (n. 12) Richard L. Gregory and Ernst H. Gombrich, eds., *Illusion in Nature and Art* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), 51, 55.

If the brain discards the wrong data or fails to develop correct hypotheses, misperception and its possible outcomes are the result.

Bell wrote that deception is an attempt to alter reality: “Physical . . . reality consists of the accepted pattern determined by both physiological and psychological means. . . . Deception is the conscious, planned intrusion of an illusion seeking to alter a target’s perception of reality, replacing objective reality with perceived reality. . . .”¹⁵⁰ The deceiver’s role is to “offer a convincing option . . . that will impose a new reality on the target and so manipulate a desirable response.”¹⁵¹ The advantage in this attempt “falls to the cheater because the cheated person misperceives what is assumed to be the real world.”¹⁵²

Handel noted that deception operations may fail to obtain their objectives, but they rarely fail.¹⁵³ Whaley wrote that when they do fail, it is because “the target takes no notice of the offered data, notices but judges it irrelevant, misunderstands its intended meaning, or detects its method.”¹⁵⁴ Said differently, deception operations fail when the deceiver fails to induce a misperception for the target.

Five important lessons about perception and misperception and their relationship with deception can be gleaned from Robert Jervis’s seminal work,

Perception and Misperception in International Politics:

¹⁵⁰ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 244.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 254.

¹⁵² Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 47.

¹⁵³ Handel, “Introduction,” 35. Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whaley developed a quantitative study that essentially proposed the same conclusion—that even when targets had warning of a pending attack, it was still very likely the deceiver would be able to achieve surprise. “Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases,” in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 190–1.

¹⁵⁴ Barton Whaley, “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Authoritarian and Transition Regimes,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 90.

1. Our actions are based on perceptions of our surrounding environment, and often are biased by mind-sets. As Jervis noted, “Someone may fail to leave a burning house . . . because of abnormalities in either his goals (he wants to die) or his perceptions (he cannot smell smoke or feel heat).”¹⁵⁵ With deception, if the deceiver is able to affect the target’s perception of its environment, the target is more likely to take actions beneficial to the deceiver but detrimental to the target. With the burning house example, if the deceiver can either do something that would make the victim want to die, or mask the smell and the heat, deception could be employed to kill the victim.

Richards Heuer focused on how mind-sets can make one vulnerable to both deception and self-deception. As Heuer wrote, “The disadvantage of a mind-set is that it can color and control our perception to the extent that an experienced specialist may be among the last to see what is really happening when events take a new and unexpected turn. . . . Mind-sets can be quick to form but resistant to change.”¹⁵⁶

2. Our sources of information and the channels by which the information is conveyed affect our ability to accept information as true. “Experiments have found that a message that seems to make sense will be accepted regardless of to whom it is attributed, but one with a questionable content is apt to be accepted only if it comes from a respected source.”¹⁵⁷ With deception, the source of the

¹⁵⁵ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 39.

¹⁵⁶ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 5, 10; last sentence was a subtitle in original (spelling changed from “mindset” to “mind-set”).

¹⁵⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 123, citing (n. 20) Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 1955.

information and channel by which it is conveyed to the target both affect the target's willingness to believe that information. As discussed above, access to channels is a necessary element to engage in strategic deception.

3. It is human nature to see what we believe by rejecting evidence that does not confirm preexisting beliefs and by looking for evidence that does confirm those beliefs; both of these can lead to self-deception. Jervis stated that “we ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, our beliefs, and deny its validity.”¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, “if an actor expects a phenomenon to appear, he is likely to perceive ambiguous stimuli as being that phenomenon.”¹⁵⁹

Both of these predispositions benefit a deceiver. Information that could tip a target off to a deceiver's true intentions may be overlooked if the target believes something else to be true. On the other hand, if a target is expecting a course of action, all a deceiver needs to do is feed the target information indicating that this course of action is being played out, and the target will likely accept that information—rather than possible alternatives—as the truth. As Jervis noted, “an actor who is trying to surprise another should find out what the other expects him

¹⁵⁸ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 143. Speaking of cognitive consistency theory, Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki wrote that premature closure is “the tendency to make decisions that discount alternative interpretations of information or to rely on hypotheses that result in decisions before conclusive evidence is available that would support, modify, or refute them.” “Perception and Misperception,” 29. A similar definition is provided in CIA and Mathtech, *Misperception Literature Survey*, 15, and 48, citing (n. 65) Barton Whaley, “Covert German Rearmament” (unpublished manuscript, 1978).

¹⁵⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 153. CIA and Mathtech stated that “Jervis’ . . . hypothesis emphasizes the basic premise of cognitive consistency theory: how information is perceived and analyzed depends strongly on the perceiver's theories and expectations about the world.” *Misperception Literature Survey*, 67, referencing Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (April 1968): 454–79.

to do and then do something else rather than try to alter the other's predictions about what he will do."¹⁶⁰

This predisposition to accept information that confirms one's preexisting beliefs makes one particularly vulnerable to self-deception. Heuer wrote: "Deception seldom fails when it exploits a target's preconceptions. . . . It is far easier to lead a target astray by reinforcing the target's existing beliefs, thus causing the target to ignore the contrary evidence of one's true intent, than to persuade a target to change his or her mind."¹⁶¹ In fact, said Bell and Jajko, once people have well-established preconceived notions, a reliance on perceived reality can lead one to easily reject hard evidence.¹⁶² Deception needs only to support incorrect preconceptions; reliance on incorrect preconceptions is self-deception.

¹⁶⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 180.

¹⁶¹ Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 294, 298, accessed August 10, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600359>; first sentence is part of the abstract in the original.

Throughout this dissertation, Heuer's work is cited to support the proposition that it is easiest to deceive by reinforcing existing beliefs, but several other authors have discussed the issue. For example, Daniel and Herbig penned: "Examples of deceptions that successfully played on a target's predispositions are much more numerous than those that reversed a target's expectations. This suggests that the former are the norm and the latter are exceptions." "Propositions on Military Deception," 23. CIA and Mathtech discussed the principle of inducing an opponent to maintain preconceptions and called it "Magruder's Principle," as named by Ronald Lewin. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development and Mathtech, Inc. *Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore* (Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1980), 5–9, citing (n. 5) Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). N. 5 on p. 47 of *Deception Maxims* quotes Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War*, 309, 315, saying he was referring to "the classic situation which General Magruder exploited at Gaines's Mill [in the Civil War]: they had merely to persuade the enemy to continue to believe what he already wanted to believe." The same note explains that Lewin referenced Bruce Catton, *This Hallowed Ground* (Gallanz, 1957), 142. See also Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki, "Perception and Misperception," 4–5 (Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki reference *Deception Maxims*); and CIA and Mathtech, *Misperception Literature Survey*, 68, referencing Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception."

¹⁶² Bell, "Toward a Theory of Deception," 248; and Jajko, "Commentary," 122. Jajko noted, "Reality never kept men from self-deception, for which there is ample scope in international intercourse." "Commentary," 122. For more on this topic, see also CIA and Mathtech, *Misperception Literature Survey*, 38–45.

This thesis posits that NSAGs use SQD more frequently than behaviorally targeted deception (BTD) because of this predisposition to confirm preexisting beliefs. Since it is easier, as Heuer indicated, to lead a target astray than to make it change its mind, and since NSAGs' resources are generally taxed in order to stay clandestine, as Bell suggested,¹⁶³ NSAGs will prefer SQD unless BTD is absolutely necessary to overcome an existential threat.

Those who are unwilling to consider possible alternatives to perceived reality are the most vulnerable to self-deception. Speaking of dictators' particular weakness for self-deception, Handel wrote: "Eventually . . . [autocrats who are unwilling to accept others' views] receive only the information they want to hear and consequently lose touch with reality, creating conditions which ultimately lead to self-deception and to their own defeat."¹⁶⁴

This is not to say that only dictatorships fall prey to self-deception. Democracies have shown a propensity to do so as well. As Bell noted regarding the first World Trade Center bombing, "the idea that something cannot happen here or to us" was a particular weakness of the United States. "Ignorance and innocence," he wrote, "made the American operations of a few badly trained zealots possible."¹⁶⁵ The case of Great Britain in World War II is an even more poignant example: as the British ran German double agents in the Double-Cross System, the Germans were practicing similar measures in reverse. As Shulsky

¹⁶³ Bell, "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 129–30, 139–40, 160–1.

¹⁶⁴ Handel, "Intelligence and Deception," 142.

¹⁶⁵ Bell, "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 149.

and Schmitt pointed out, this “shows how strong is the psychological resistance to the idea that one is being deceived.”¹⁶⁶

4. Satisficing and bounded rationality make one vulnerable to deception. In addition to the fact that humans tend to look for evidence that supports preexisting beliefs, we also are prone to find the simplest answers to complex questions and accept them as the best answer. As Jervis wrote: “[Herbert] Simon’s concept of satisficing can be applied to perceptions as well as to the later stages of decision making. People do not compare a large number of images to see which best explains all the evidence. Rather they adopt the first one that provides a decent fit. Only when the image fails very badly are alternatives examined. Until and unless this happens, the good (or even the adequate) inhibits the consideration of the better.”¹⁶⁷ Because people tend to satisfice, they are less likely to accept alternative hypothesis that could reveal a deception operation.

Simon’s theory of bounded rationality also is important to the study of deception. Inasmuch as man is limited by his mental capacity and ability to take in and mentally process external stimuli, “we construct a simplified mental model of reality and then work with this model. We behave rationally within the

¹⁶⁶ J. C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned into Double Agents*, with a foreword by Norman Holmes Pearson (New York: The Lyons Press, 2000); and Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), 121–2, citing (ns. 56–7) Herman J. Giskes, *London Calling North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953), 194; H. M. G. Lauwers, “Epilogue,” in Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*; M. R. D. Foot, *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940–46*, rev. ed. (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), 130–34; Leo Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide: The Story of the S.O.E.’s Code War* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 112–25, 146–48.

¹⁶⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 191 (spelling changed from “decision-making” to “decision making”); for Simon’s original work, see Herbert A. Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,” *Psychological Review* 63, no. 2 (1956): 129–38, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1037/h0042769.

confines of our mental model, but this model is not always well adapted to the requirements of the real world.”¹⁶⁸

This is useful for the deceiver because he or she needs only to employ a little creativity to get outside the bounds of our rationality.¹⁶⁹ The attacks on 9/11 are an excellent example. Before then, terrorism generally was not viewed as a tool of mass destruction. As Brian Jenkins wrote in the mid-1970s, “Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead.”¹⁷⁰ The attacks of September 11 debunked that proposition.

5. Great change is most likely in cases when discrepant information arrives in a large quantity, rather than in small amounts. As Jervis wrote, “Greater change will result when discrepant information arrives in a large batch than when it is considered bit by bit. In the former case, the contradictions between it and the prevailing view will be small enough to go unnoticed, be dismissed as unimportant, or necessitate at most slight modifications (e.g. addition of exceptions to the rule).”¹⁷¹ For the process of deception, this means it is easier to deceive a target by feeding a small amount of false information at a time—

¹⁶⁸ Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 2–3, citing (ns. 13–14) Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957); James G. March, “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice,” in *Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions*, ed. David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹⁶⁹ CIA and Mathtech stated: “The potential deceiver should be aware that the existing theories and images of an opponent will determine, to a great extent, what the adversary notices. . . . If the deception planner is aware that an opponent is unable to imagine a certain event or development occurring, then this missing concept . . . can be exploited in order to achieve some degree of deception or surprise.” *Misperception Literature Survey*, 68, 74. See also Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki, “Perception and Misperception,” 34 (Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki reference *Misperception Literature Survey*).

¹⁷⁰ Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism,” in *International Terrorism and World Security*, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), reprinted in *The Use of Force*, 6th ed., ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 79.

¹⁷¹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 308.

conditioning the target—rather than by dumping a large amount of information on the target all at once.¹⁷²

Counterdeception: The practices of detecting deception and/or turning it back on the deceiver are known as counterdeception.¹⁷³ In reality, it is difficult to detect deception, yet theoretically it is possible and some steps can be taken to avoid becoming a deception target.¹⁷⁴ The value of engaging in counterdeception ultimately depends on the cost of being deceived, as Whaley and Jeffrey Busby explained: “When the costs of being deceived are high, the benefits of detecting deception are correspondingly high.”¹⁷⁵

In 2002, Whaley and Busby wrote the most comprehensive counterdeception theory, “Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and Theory,”¹⁷⁶ which subsumed earlier theoretical dapping on the subject by Whaley and others.¹⁷⁷ Their counterdeception theory is relatively simple and revolves around finding incongruities with reality: “Every deception operation necessarily leaves at least two clues: incongruities about what is hidden; and incongruities about what is displayed in its stead. The analyst requires only the appropriate sensors and mind-set (cognitive hypotheses) to detect and understand the meaning of these

¹⁷² Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki, “Perception and Misperception,” 15, 17–8; CIA and Mathtech, *Misperception Literature Survey*, 23, 71–3, referencing Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception”; and CIA and Mathtech, *Deception Maxims*, 9, 11, 13, citing (n. 26) Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” 465–6.

¹⁷³ See Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 276–7.

¹⁷⁴ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 137, citing (n. 52) Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 1969), 135.

¹⁷⁵ Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby, “Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and Theory,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 185.

¹⁷⁶ Whaley and Busby, “Detecting Deception,” 181–221.

¹⁷⁷ See, for example, Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” 190; Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 327–32; and Theodore R. Sarbin, “Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counterdeception,” in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 151–73.

clues.”¹⁷⁸ In order to find the incongruities about what is hidden and what is displayed, one must realize that characteristics in a deception do not match reality: “Each real thing has a large but finite number of identifiable characteristics Its imitation shares at least one and often many of these characteristics. But every imitation will lack at least one characteristic that marks the real thing and will usually have additional charcs [characteristics] not present in the original. Even the most perfect clone lacks two characteristics—it is not the first and it has a different history.”¹⁷⁹ Detecting deception, then, is the process of recognizing incongruities in the characteristics of what is hidden and what is displayed.

Detecting incongruities occurs through either passive or active counterdeception processes, as described by Bell: “Passive counterdeception is composed of a repeated scan of perceived reality, seeking false patterns, hidden threats, anomalies, and evidence of deception planning, rather like a radar sweeping an arena, seeking an enemy in a blip. . . . Active counterdeception measures seek out those who might plan deception, based on their record and aspirations.”¹⁸⁰ Once one has found “those who might plan deception,” active counterdeception also involves penetrating their deception planning processes in order to become appraised of possible deceptions against oneself.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Whaley and Busby, “Detecting Deception,” 191.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹⁸⁰ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 276 (spelling of “counter-deception” changed to “counterdeception”).

¹⁸¹ See Whaley and Busby, “Detecting Deception,” 204. Moose stated: “One should attempt to unmask deception by the use of counterdeception. This might be done by initiating preliminary activities that indicate either the lie has been believed or it has been rejected. “A Systems View of Deception,” 147.

If one is a deception planner, one seeks to reinforce the idea that the target's active and passive counterdeception measures are working efficiently. Because passive measures are the most common type of counterdeception mechanism, it is important for deception planners to make targets believe these mechanisms have not been compromised.¹⁸² For example, if the target sees nothing on the radar screen, he is more likely to be surprised when the bombing begins than if he sees blips on the screen. Stealth technology reinforces the illusion that passive counterdeception measures are working.

The statement that “counterdeception . . . is in theory always possible” leaves little comfort for one trying to find incongruities in perceived reality.¹⁸³ Several deception specialists have departed from the theoretical to recommend various practical suggestions that counterdeception practitioners can take into account when plying their craft. Because the suggestions are all different, they are summarized in table 1. The only consistent recommendation all authors state or imply involves the need to increase awareness of deception among the populace, decision makers, and intelligence analysts.

The paradoxical problem with increasing alertness is that “excessive alertness to the possibility of deception can” make people become so paranoid they discount true information.¹⁸⁴ Handel recounted an example: “After the success of the Allied deception operation covering their landing in Sicily (Operation Mincemeat), the Germans became overly sensitive to the possibility of being deceived. When the detailed plans of the impending landing in Normandy fell

¹⁸² Latimer, *Deception in War*, 107.

¹⁸³ Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” 190.

¹⁸⁴ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 144–5.

into their hands via the British Embassy in Ankara . . . they were convinced that this was yet another clever Allied deception; consequently, they refused to accept the detailed plan as authentic.”¹⁸⁵

Handel believed the only way to counter this problem of paranoia is to unmask the deception—“to find out how it is being implemented.”¹⁸⁶ This, of course, requires an amazing intelligence capability. Whether it is possible to create an intelligence-gathering system effective enough to uncover every deception is doubtful.

Heuer noted that analysts must also be wary of cognitive biases that weaken their ability to notice deceptions; conversely, deception planners must be aware of the same biases because it is these biases held by the target that make the planner’s job possible.¹⁸⁷ In this case, *bias* “refers to any form of mental error that is not random, but is consistently and predictably in the same direction.”¹⁸⁸ Heuer summarized the most common biases related to deception/counterdeception in four general categories (see table 2): Perceptual biases, biases in estimating probabilities, biases in evaluating evidence, and biases in attributing causality.¹⁸⁹

Counterdeception can also be used to reverse the deception process on the original deceiver, as Bell noted: “Counterdeception becomes tangled with deception. . . . Counterdeception is an inherent obstacle to the acceptance of an

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 144. Conversely, Anthony Cave Brown asserted that the information the Germans acquired in Ankara did not contain enough detail to compromise the Normandy invasion, and in fact the British might have fed some of it to the Germans’ source. See *Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2002), 391–405.

¹⁸⁶ Handel, “Introduction,” 75.

¹⁸⁷ Heuer, “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception,” 294–325. Heuer recommended creating a counterdeception staff to help intelligence analysts in this regard (ibid., 323–4)—see table 1.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 301.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 294–316.

illusion. The shrewd deception planner will consider this factor, and the wise will be aware that a counterdeception planner may be involved in deception through the shaping of a ruse-of-response: manipulating the image seemingly received, and so turning the ruse on the deceiver. There is thus an element of counterdeception in both dispatching the ruse and in responding to the illusion.”¹⁹⁰

Counterdeception, then, has two essential components: First, counterdeception is the process of detecting deception by noticing inconsistencies in perceived reality. Second, counterdeception is the process of turning the deception back on the adversary as a ruse-of-response.

The Ethics of Deception

Although deception is “a significant part of all human behavior” and clearly a useful element of strategy for states and nonstate actors, it still is considered a generally unethical practice.¹⁹¹ It has not always been so. In classic antiquity, stratagem was a common element of conflict for many actors. With the advent of Christianity and chivalry, deception became dishonorable in Western societies.¹⁹² As Bell and Whaley have written: “Western history always deplores the cheat, the

¹⁹⁰ Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 277–8 (spelling of “counter-deception” changed to “counterdeception”).

¹⁹¹ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, xxxvii; for an interesting philosophical discussion regarding the ethics of deception, see Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).

¹⁹² Handel, “Introduction,” 2, citing (n. 8) G. P. R. James, *The History of Chivalry* (New York: A. L. Fowle, 1900), 28. Theodore Sarbin noted: “Storytelling is properly associated with fiction, fantasy, and pretending. . . . In America, at least, such a point of view is associated with the Puritan tradition. Both playfulness and feigning were discouraged as improper conduct. One might look into the relics of the Puritan tradition for cues to the apparent lack of interest in grand strategic deception among American military planners.” “Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counterdeception,” 159.

Table 1: Increasing Counterdeception’s Effectiveness

Author(s)	Ways to Increase the Effectiveness of Counterdeception Measures¹⁹³
Handel ¹⁹⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Consider the most obvious and reasonable directions from which an adversary may attack, even if evidence contradicts that.• Be wary of information that falls neatly into a single pattern that excludes other, no less reasonable possible courses of action.• Take caution because more intelligence channels may add more “noise” or additional deceptions.• Do not put confidence in conclusions drawn from a small body of data.• Avoid overreliance on one source of information.• Do not rely only on nonmaterial (e.g., verbal) evidence.• Do not rely on agents not directly seen or interviewed.• Check reports that seemed right at first then were wrong about something, but with a good explanation.• Controllers should heed opinions of lower-level analysts.• Know the enemy’s limitations and capabilities.
Godson and Wirtz ¹⁹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increase awareness about deception among elected officials and policymakers.• Increase awareness among the public and mass media.• Increase awareness about the danger of revealing information on intelligence methods.• Train intelligence collectors, analysts, and managers in detecting deception.• Within intelligence communities, increase study of deception history and theory.
Heuer ¹⁹⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Improve intelligence collection.• Increase analysts’ alertness to deception.• Depend more on tactical indicators than strategic assumptions to predict surprise actions.• Rely on cognitive aids to analysis.• Create a counterdeception staff that is responsible with representing the deception perspective, hence helping to overcome cognitive bias.

¹⁹³ This is not a comprehensive list.

¹⁹⁴ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 137–8; and Handel, “Introduction,” 35–8, 55.

¹⁹⁵ Godson and Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” 10–12.

¹⁹⁶ Heuer, “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception,” 318–25.

Table 2: Review of Biases and Their Implications for Deception	
<i>Bias</i>	<i>Implication</i>
<i>Perceptual Biases</i>	
Perceptions are influenced by expectations. More information, and more unambiguous information, is needed to recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one.	It is far easier to reinforce a target's existing preconceptions than to change them.
Perceptions are quick to form but resistant to change. Once an impression has been formed about an object, event, or situation, one is biased toward continuing to perceive it in the same way.	It is far easier to reinforce a target's preconceptions than to change them. Ability to rationalize contradictory information may offset risks of security leaks.
Initial exposure to ambiguous or blurred stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available.	Impact of information can be affected by the sequence used in feeding it to a target.
<i>Biases in Estimating Probabilities</i>	
Probability estimates are influenced by availability—how easily one can imagine an event or remember instances of the event.	Employees of watch offices will generally overestimate the probability of whatever they are watching for. Cases of deception are more memorable, hence more available, than instances when deception was not employed.
Probability estimates are anchored by some natural starting point, then adjusted in response to new information. Normally they are not adjusted enough.	It is easier to reinforce a target's existing preconceptions than to change them.
<i>Biases in Evaluating Evidence</i>	
People have more confidence in conclusions drawn from a small body of consistent data than from a larger body of less consistent information.	Deceiver should control as many information channels as possible to limit discrepant information available to the target. Deception can be effective even with small amount of information.
Less-than-perfectly-reliable evidence is often processed as though it were wholly reliable.	Judgments may be overconfident.
People have difficulty factoring the absence of evidence into their judgments.	For deception planners, errors of omission are less serious than errors of commission. To detect deception, analyze what inferences may be drawn from fact that some evidence is <i>not</i> observed.
Impressions tend to persist even after the evidence on which they are based has been fully discredited.	Consequences of a security leak may not be as serious as might otherwise be expected.
<i>Biases in Attributing Causality</i>	
Events are seen as part of an orderly, causal pattern. Extent to which other countries pursue a coherent, goal-maximizing policy is overestimated. Randomness, accident, and error tend to be rejected as explanations.	As a causal explanation, deception is intrinsically satisfying because it is so orderly and rational.
Behavior of others is attributed to the nature of the person or country, while our own behavior is attributed to the nature of the situation.	It is satisfying to attribute deviousness and malevolence to our enemies, and if they are devious and malevolent, of course they engage in deception.
Source: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach," <i>International Studies Quarterly</i> 25, no. 2 (June 1981), 315-6, accessed August 10, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600359 .	

liar, the fraud and fake, and favors the true, the noble and the good: the frontal joust over the surprise foray.”¹⁹⁷

In democratic societies in general and the United States in particular, deception often is considered by the populace to be unethical and against American values, even when its advantages are clear.¹⁹⁸ Further, it is absolutely illegal to deceive one’s own, as Godson noted: “In a democracy . . . the deceivers cannot mislead their own voters and legislators about policy either intentionally or even inadvertently.”¹⁹⁹

Bell showed an American aversion to deception in describing how hard it was to find funding for research on the subject:

Most interesting of all was the establishment’s feeling that deception was not an appropriate tool—not simply that it was politically unwise to be caught investigating deception and thereby, perhaps, advocating it, but that truth was an American weapon and the contemplation of deception might well endanger national interests. . . .

. . . ‘Irangate’ would illustrate that however seductive the idea of lying for the public good may be, the American public prefers truth in governance. The Iran-Contra affair also showed how poorly Americans manage deception.²⁰⁰

From a public standpoint in a democracy, the use of deception is almost never acceptable except in time of war when national interests are at stake. Once war erupts, the moral fence often is shortened and “deception . . . [is] seen as an accepted and integral part of any rational conduct of war,” because it at least

¹⁹⁷ Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 2.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, xxxvii; see also Latimer, *Deception in War*, 286, citing (ns. 46–7) Roger Beaumont, *Maskirovka: Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception* (Stratech Studies: Texas A&M University, 1982), 42; Paul Melshen, “Pseudo-Operations: The Use by British and American Armed Forces of Deception in Counter-Insurgencies, 1945–1973,” PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995, 301.

¹⁹⁹ Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, 236.

²⁰⁰ Bell, introduction to *Cheating and Deception*, by Bell and Whaley, xxvii.

saves lives and at most brings victories.²⁰¹ Whaley summed up the sentiment in stating: “I find that while all major occidental and oriental military cultures assume stratagem to be somehow immoral, none have unilaterally forsworn it. Sheer expediency has always proved sufficient justification.”²⁰² As Dudley Clarke showed in his draft memoirs, deception can be employed for extensive good as an element of strategy: “The secret war was waged rather to conserve than destroy; the stakes were the lives of the frontline troops, and the organization which fought it was able to count its gains from the number of casualties it could avert.”²⁰³

Policymakers, even in democracies, generally hold more complex views of deception and employ it as a tool of strategy to protect valued national interests even in peacetime. For example, every country has interests to protect intelligence secrets. Considering the damage that can accrue to a nation’s security if these are compromised, deceptive techniques (denial, if nothing else) are an essential tool used in their protection.²⁰⁴ Authoritarian states and NSAGs employ deception less discriminately.

As Bell showed above, there is a danger in using deception because it engenders mistrust at home and abroad. As Handel posited: “Those who frequently deceive quickly lose credibility.”²⁰⁵ In an ironic paradox to this,

²⁰¹ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 122; Bell and Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, 3.

²⁰² Whaley, *Stratagem*, 53.

²⁰³ In David Mure, *Master of Deception* (London: William Kimber, 1980), 87, quoted in Latimer, *Deception in War*, 311, n. 32.

²⁰⁴ For an interesting diatribe against those who leak national security secrets, see James J. Bruce, “The Impact on Foreign Denial and Deception of Increased Availability of Public Information about U.S. Intelligence,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 229–40.

²⁰⁵ Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” 139.

however, trusted parties might ultimately be better at deception: “The more one has a reputation for honesty—the easier it is to lie when one wants to. . . . [O]r even more briefly: Honest people/states can deceive the best.”²⁰⁶

Conclusions

This dissertation will employ this literature review by proposing a new theoretical framework based on elements described above that will help determine the factors that lead to NSAGs’ use or nonuse of deception. Despite what has been highlighted above as the current scholarship on deception, in comparing the scholarly literature to other literatures, it is interesting so little has been written about the topic. This is especially intriguing when considering the role deception plays in policy and strategy for states, nonstate actors, and people generally. In writing about the paucity of deception research, Bell concluded that “deception should be, but is not, a more amenable subject to investigation; it is not divorced from either power or great events.”²⁰⁷

Better scholarship is particularly necessary in the realm of deception as used by NSAGs. The current literature on their utilization of deceptive techniques is weak at best. Considering NSAGs’ increasing employment of asymmetric warfare against states, we should expect to see more and more use of deception by NSAGs. Understanding how they deceive states will be vital in winning conflicts with these enemies.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 139.

²⁰⁷ Bell, introduction to *Cheating and Deception*, by Bell and Whaley, xxxii.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

A primary goal of this dissertation is to clarify the nature of deception as used by nonstate armed groups (NSAGs). This chapter will propose a new theory of deception—the *endgame theory of deception*—and explain two models that are important elements of this new theory. The theory proposed herein is an attempt to build on the literature related to deception described in chapter 2. It will draw on previously enunciated themes associated with the nature of deception, the role of perception and misperception, and the effects of counterdeception, among other factors. While this theory specifically focuses on factors that influence NSAGs' use of deception, future scholarship may show that it can be applied when studying state deceptions.

This theory will be used when examining the three case studies in chapters 4, 5, and 6. As the theory is explained below, this chapter will propose the thesis, research questions, study variables, hypotheses, and propositions to be examined in the case studies.

Two Models in the Endgame Theory

The endgame theory is based around the simple notion that in conflict, actor A's strategy is structured to make its adversary, actor B, conduct its strategy in a

way perceived by A as beneficial. Deception can be employed in one of two ways to further that goal: (1) A uses deception to make B initiate a change in behavior B believes is the best course of action for itself but that actually helps A; or (2) A uses deception to make it possible to carry out a given action that will make B *want* to change even if there is a possibility change may be detrimental to B's own interests. These premises reflect Jervis's proposition, explained in chapter 2, that someone might fail to leave a burning house because he cannot smell smoke (scenario 1) or wants to die (scenario 2)—in this case, deception is employed to further either motive.²⁰⁸ In a variation on #2, the deceiver also might use deception to carry out an action that is not intended to make the target want to change, but will nevertheless be detrimental to the target.

The models presented below apply to deceptions of any type—tactical, operational, or strategic—that create one of these two outcomes. This dissertation focuses on the importance of the deceit's result—an intended influence on the target's policy and strategy—rather than on who the planners are or who the targets are. (See the discussion of *strategic deception* in chapter 2.) The theory therefore is dubbed *the endgame theory of deception*.

Model 1—Behaviorally targeted deception: In the model of behaviorally targeted deception (BTD), the purpose of the deception is to change the behavior of a target by making the target believe something false, which belief then induces the target to chart an altered course of action. In other words, the deception's purpose is to create a misperception that leads the target to take actions it

²⁰⁸ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 111.

otherwise would not have taken. This behavioral change occurs before the target realizes it has been deceived. In many cases, the change occurs before a strategic surprise, although surprise need not be the immediate byproduct of deception. BTD is predominantly active in nature (i.e., planting false information) vice passive (hiding true information) because it is the provision of false information—stimuli—that the target receives and processes.

An example of a BTD is the case of Operation Mincemeat, wherein the British used a deception to make the invasion of southern Europe possible in 1942. The British could not invade without a change in German behavior because German troops were amassed on the Mediterranean coast of Europe and were expecting a British attack near Sicily. The British therefore engaged in an elaborate deception wherein they floated to shore off the coast of Spain the body of a supposedly downed British airman carrying documents that actually were false. The British assumed correctly the papers would eventually pass through Spanish into German hands. The false documents indicated a British invasion would come in Greece and Sardinia. The deception was so successful that the German high command ordered a change in behavior by moving troops from France to Greece, ships from Sicily to the Aegean, and by taking other measures to protect Greece, making the defense of Sicily light enough the British could regain a toehold on the European continent. In this case the Germans did not realize they had been duped until after the behavioral change.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ See Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was*, with a foreword by Gen. the Rt. Hon. Lord Ismay, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954).

This model also works for deceptions by NSAGs. A potential example is the Cali drug cartel's use of deception against the Columbian people and government. As the government focused in the 1990s on disrupting the cartels, the Cali leaders used a successful deception to co-opt the government and convince the populace that extradition of leaders to the United States was unconstitutional, that Cali was the "kinder and gentler" of the two primary drug organizations (the other being the Medellin Cartel), and that lenience was a viable option for dealing with the Cali. In reality, the Cali kingpins were just as ruthless as their counterparts in the Medellin, but the successful deception led the government to go easier in prosecuting Cali leaders than Medellin leaders. In this case the government was deceived into focusing its heavy-handedness on the Medellin cartel.²¹⁰

Model 2—Status quo deception: The purpose of a status quo deception (SQD) is to make the target misperceive reality so it remains on an existing course of action—the status quo—without interference until the deceiver can perform an action assumed to be beneficial to its larger strategy. In many cases the deceiver may presume that this action will force a change on its adversary. The deceiver uses deception, both active and passive, to keep the status quo from changing because the status quo is advantageous to its needs. The target in this case will not change behavior until after it has been duped and will not know it has been the object of a deception until a surprise moment occurs.²¹¹ Perception and

²¹⁰ Robert J. Nieves, "Commentary," in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 163–6.

²¹¹ As Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and John A. Sawicki noted, referencing Robert Jervis's *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), an "insight from Jervis holds that misperception occurs most easily when the object that is the basis for deception or the means to be utilized is known to exist only by the perpetrator of the

misperception also are important for SQD. In this case, the deceiver must reinforce existing beliefs of the deceived so the target does not change its status quo behavior.

A state example of SQD is the deceptions associated with Operation Barbarossa. Germany used the nonaggression pact with the U.S.S.R. to continue a guise of good relations while it slowly massed its forces on the Soviet border in preparation for the invasion in June 1941. Germany employed various deceptions to keep the Soviets in a benign relationship (the status quo) until it could mount a surprise attack. Examples include expanded trade with the U.S.S.R. in the run-up to the attack in order to hide true intentions and a fake operation against Britain to make the Soviets think the Germans were preoccupied.²¹² In this case, Germany's strategic goal was to afflict a blow on the U.S.S.R. from which it would be unable to rebound. Germany used deception to continue the status quo until it was prepared to invade, thereby capitalizing on the Soviets' lack of preparation for an attack and delivering a strike from which the U.S.S.R. almost did not recover.²¹³

This thesis proposes that an NSAG example of SQD is al Qaeda's use of deception to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks, and it will use this as a test case. Al Qaeda employed mostly passive, tactical deceptions to keep its operatives

deception. Closely related is the idea that deception is most easily undertaken either when its existence is not suspected or its likelihood is not considered to pose a serious threat." Perception and Misperception: Implications for Denial and Deception: A Literature Survey and Analysis" (unpublished manuscript), 18.

²¹² Russel H. S. Stolfi, "Barbarossa: German Grand Deception and the Achievement of Strategic and Tactical Surprise Against the Soviet Union, 1940-1941," in *Strategic Military Deception*, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 195-223.

²¹³ See Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973).

inconspicuous long enough to carry out the operation.²¹⁴ Al Qaeda presumed—wrongly—that an attack would influence U.S. policy in a way beneficial to al Qaeda’s ideology.²¹⁵ The U.S. government took a status quo course beneficial to al Qaeda by not engaging in counterterrorism measures that significantly threatened al Qaeda until it was too late, when strategic surprise had already been achieved. (Chapter 4 expounds on these propositions.)

SQD can involve both passive and active ruses. A fine line that is marked only by a subtle difference of intentions exists between passive status quo deception and denial. With the introduction of SQD, this dissertation proposes a slightly more nuanced conception of denial: in this case, a group uses denial to protect itself, not toward ends more than strategic survival in a hostile environment. As Bell pointed out, all illicit groups use denial to avoid detection from authorities—the more illicit the group, the greater the need for denial.²¹⁶ A group uses SQD when it aims to keep itself under the radar in order to conduct a specific act targeted at an adversary. Ultimately the actions are similar, but the intentions differ—one is defensive (denial) and one is offensive (SQD).

This distinction is necessary to explain NSAGs’ use of tactical deceptions that obtain strategic results. Bell argued that most groups focus almost entirely on denial and rarely use deception,²¹⁷ as noted in chapter 2, yet many armed groups are interested in using capabilities of denial to do more than simply defend

²¹⁴ See Devin D. Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 367–88, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1080/09546550600751941.

²¹⁵ See Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 311.

²¹⁶ J. Bowyer Bell, “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 134–5.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 139–40, 160.

themselves, and often their actions are geared toward a strategic end. SQD, even used on a tactical level, can be dangerous for a targeted adversary. Bell admitted that sometimes the combination of several tactical deceptions can result in strategic surprise, but he downplayed this as a regular occurrence.²¹⁸ This dissertation agrees that most NSAGs focus their energies on denial, but also argues that with the advancement of fourth-generation warfare, NSAGs' use of SQD will become increasingly common as NSAGs attempt to conduct operations intended to strategically harm their adversaries.

A common element—self-deception: Self-deception is manifest in both the BTD and SQD models. In a purely theoretical case of self-deception, instead of actor A using deception against actor B, the latter deludes itself so completely to the actions of A that no deception is necessary.²¹⁹

In the field of perception and misperception, self-deception becomes a force multiplier for BTD and SQD operations particularly when NSAGs employ SQD to reinforce preexisting beliefs. This supports the theoretical notion explained in chapter 2 that, within the realm of perception and misperception, it is easier to reinforce existing beliefs than to force a complete change in a target's viewpoints.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Ibid., 141. Bell also essentially described SQD in explaining how an NSAG could employ denial to undertake strategic deception: "To achieve strategic deception, illicit organizations must deploy denial as a base to fashion a variety of ruses that can lull the authorities into assuming compromise is possible or that the movement possesses hidden assets." Ibid., 139. This thesis argues that denial can be used as a base to fashion ruses of various other varieties as well.

²¹⁹ For help developing this theoretical conception, the author credits Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., discussion with the author, Cambridge, MA, June 21, 2006.

²²⁰ See Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 298, accessed August 10, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600359>. As Daniel and Herbig noted, in cases wherein the targets "were strongly predisposed to believe things that deceptions merely reinforced, the line between the target's self-

Operation Fortitude—employed to service the Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II—serves as an apt example of how a deceiver can use a target’s self-deception to increase its own advantage. The Allies worked diligently to create misperceptions regarding where the D-Day invasions would occur, but those deceptions were made even more effective by German convictions that they would happen at the Pas de Calais. By using deception to reinforce this belief, the Allies were able to rely on a healthy amount of German self-deception to assist with their plan. When German leaders did get indications of the true plot, like when the plans fell into their hands in Ankara, they nevertheless remained unconvinced. They stayed steadfast in their misperception even after the invasion long enough for the Allies to gain a toehold in France.²²¹

A focus on deceptions that result in strategic ends: In order for BTD to create a strategic shift in governmental behavior, policymakers ultimately must be deceived.²²² Low-level governmental actors generally do not create strategic changes in policy—they may become deceived, and they may pass their misperceptions on to leaders, but only if the policymakers act based on the

deception and deception achieved by the deceiver may grow thin.” “Deception in Theory and Practice,” in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 361.

²²¹ See Roger Hesketh, *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign*, with an introduction by Nigel West (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2000); Michael Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 103–133, 185–200; Michael Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 144; and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development and Mathtech, Inc. *Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore* (Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1980), 5–6, citing (ns. 16–18) L. F. Ellis, *Victory in the West*, vol. 1, *The Battle of Normandy* (London: HMSO, 1962), 128; Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 437; quoting Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), 354.

²²² In the case of democracies, if the populace is deceived it can pressure the government to change behavior, although unless the government also falls to the deception or is weak, it probably will attempt to debunk the false indicators that are creating the pressure for change.

incorrect information do government strategies change.²²³ The deception becomes strategic once it affects national-level policies. This paper will look at cases in which a deceiver aimed to change a target's policy (BTD) by influencing the perceptions and calculations of senior governmental decision makers. In this sense, it is strategic deception as traditionally understood.²²⁴

This contrasts with SQD—an NSAG can keep senior decision makers in a government on a status quo course by engaging in tactical measures that dupe low-level targets, hence ensuring that correct information does not make it to the strategic level. This thesis will examine cases in which both low and high-level decision makers were duped by SQD.²²⁵

The primary focus of this dissertation will be cases where deception is employed to achieve strategic ends; however, it will also include two vignettes showing how al Qaeda and Hezbollah used tactical or operational deception, and will do so to demonstrate the difference between tactical or operational measures and strategic BTD/SQD.

²²³ Exceptions to this maxim certainly exist. See Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). See also discussions of organizational theory in Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki, "Perception and Misperception," 19–24; and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development and Mathtech, Inc., *Misperception Literature Survey* (Washington DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1979), 12, 28–33. For the purpose of parsimony, this dissertation will assume it is the leaders of government who dictate strategic governmental policy, especially in matters of war and peace.

²²⁴ See Abram Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 17–8.

²²⁵ An example of what the thesis will not follow is tactical surprise as described by Bell: "Deception is readily found in tactical operations. . . . Such tactical deception, over time, can become quite sophisticated. What is most often sought, however, is simple surprise rather than combining a series of ruses in a grand tactical campaign." "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 160. This study will focus more on the "grand tactical campaign" than the "simple surprise," even though the outcome of the grand tactical campaigns studied is surprise.

Questions and Thesis

The following research program creates the remainder of the theoretical foundation on which this dissertation will be based.

Primary research question: As noted in chapter 1, the primary question of this study is: What factors affect *whether* NSAGs employ deception and *what kind* of deception strategy they target against an adversary?

The *whether* portion of this question can be broken into two aspects: First and most simply, the NSAG must want to use deception. If it does not want to employ deception, it will not do so. This also affects *what kind* of strategy (BTD/SQD) the group will use—if it will not use deception, then there will not be a deception strategy employed.

A desire to use deception is driven by existence of conflict between an NSAG and a state that creates conditions under which the NSAG would benefit from manipulating its target's perception of reality in order to make the state change its behavior (BTD) or continue acting in a way beneficial to the deceiver until a given end can be achieved (SQD).²²⁶ If the deceiver does not want to change its adversary's perceptions, there is no need for deception. In this study, an aim to use deception is considered an antecedent condition and is treated as a given.²²⁷ It

²²⁶ As Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki stated, "Those who would deceive an opponent gain incentives to do so as the stakes of the conflict increase" "Perception and Misperception," 33, citing (n. 50) Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 89.

²²⁷ The variable types and theory mapping methods used in this thesis were inspired by Stephen Van Evera's *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7–15. Van Evera defined the term *antecedent condition* as "a phenomenon whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis." *Ibid.*, 9–10. He noted (*ibid.*, 9, n. 5) that he took the term from Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science* (New York, NY: Free Press,

will not be explicitly tested since deception is used in all of the cases studied, but the process tracing will make evident the conditions that made deception a desirable tool for the NSAGs.

The second factor affecting whether an NSAG will use deception is its capability to do so. If it is not capable of engaging in deception, it will not do so. This study will focus on this factor by looking at the elements that make deception possible or that keep an NSAG from being able to employ it.

With these conditions enunciated and the BTD/SQD framework developed, the primary research question can be restated as: What factor(s) make the use of BTD or SQD possible for an NSAG and what factor(s) make BTD or SQD the more likely type used in any given situation?

Secondary research questions: Other questions that this work will address include:

Q1: Do NSAGs employ tactical deceptions that result in strategic surprise or other strategic ends?

Q2: Do NSAGs engage primarily in BTD or SQD? Why do they prefer one type of deception to another?

Q3: What distinguishes NSAGs that engage in BTD from those that use SQD?

1965), 246–7 and passim. The reader should see Van Evera for additional explanations and insights regarding other variable types listed in this work.

In addition to consulting Van Evera, in crafting the theory and methodology this author also consulted W. Phillips Shively, *The Craft of Political Research*, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002); and Michael Corbett, *Research Methods in Political Science: An Introduction Using MicroCase*, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001).

It appears that another term for *antecedent condition* is *antecedent variable*; Corbett defined this as a variable “that occurs before the independent variable and the dependent variable” and can “affect the independent variable and alter its relationship with the dependent variable” or can affect both the independent and dependent variables in a spurious relationship. *Research Methods in Political Science*, 63–4.

Q4: Can NSAGs use BTD or SQD that targets the highest levels of government? If not, why not?

Q5: What factors keep an NSAG from using deception of either type?

Thesis: The thesis of this study is that given an aim by an NSAG to use deception against a state target, the factors that determine whether BTD/SQD are possible and the type most likely to be used in a given situation are Shulsky's five requirements, the target's counterdeception capabilities, and the threat presented by the target to the deceiver.

Shulsky's five elements were described in chapter 2, and include strategic coherence, an understanding of the target, an infrastructure for coordinating deception and security, channels to feed false information, and the ability to receive feedback. Target counterdeception capabilities are the actions taken by the target to keep from being duped by the deceiver. Threat is created by target actions that could harm the deceiver.

Dependent/Independent Variable (DV/IV) Framework

The endgame theory is actually a compilation of two subtheories because there are two dependent and two independent variables studied. The dependent variables are whether an NSAG can engage in BTD or SQD (called *possibility* of BTD/SQD use) and what type it will be most likely to use (called *likelihood* of use). The independent variables are fulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and intensity of threat from the target.²²⁸

²²⁸ Author's note: In originally crafting the endgame theory, I lumped together all the variables in one model. After completing the chapters, I decided that it was poorly constructed

Dependent variable₁—possibility: *Possibility* is the ability to engage in a BTD or SQD. Possibility of using BTD or SQD will be measured with a simple yes/no descriptor for each of the cases.

Independent, intervening, and antecedent variables₁—Shulsky’s requirements, ability to affect perceptions, and counterdeception environment: This dissertation proposes that the primary independent variable affecting *possibility* an NSAG can successfully enact a strategic BTD or SQD is fulfillment of the five requirements that Shulsky summarized. The intervening variable²²⁹ becomes the NSAG’s ability to affect the target’s perceptions of reality. Stated simply, if an NSAG fulfills Shulsky’s conditions, it will have the ability to affect its target’s perceptions, and therefore will be capable of deceiving.

This thesis posits that an NSAG must fulfill all five of Shulsky’s conditions to engage in both BTD and SQD. The group will need to have strategic coherence (factor 1), meaning that it must have a grand strategy against the target and its deception plan must be part of that strategy. It also must understand the target well enough to deceive (factor 2), and must have an infrastructure to undertake the deception and provide basic security (factor 3). In the case of NSAGs, their infrastructure for deception and security measures can be much simpler than states usually employ, but still must be present.

and too complex. I therefore split it into two parts and refined it, with good results. I did not radically change my predictions about interactions between the variables. For a basic discussion of the need to separate independent variables, see “Independent and Dependent Variables,” *Cool-Science-Projects.com*, accessed July 13, 2011, <http://www.cool-science-projects.com/independent-and-dependent-variables.html>.

²²⁹ Defined by Van Evera as “a variable framing intervening phenomenon included in a causal theory’s explanation. Intervening phenomena are caused by the IV and cause the DV.” *Guide to Methods*, 11. See also Corbett, *Research Methods in Political Science*, 63.

For NSAGs, the differences between being able to use BTM versus SQD are determined by the strength that the NSAG fulfills conditions 4 and 5—channels available to feed false information and a mechanism necessary to obtain feedback. For BTM, the NSAG must have channels of information that eventually reach the target’s top decision makers because it is they who change the target’s behavior.

Pfaltzgraff and Sawicki discussed the utility of increasing a deception’s effectiveness by employing as many channels as possible; this applies most appropriately to BTM: “Because deception depends on effective utilization of channels of communication, the first step, as Reginald V. Jones reminds us, is to find what channels of communication the enemy has available and then to make certain that you provide as many clues as possible in as many of these channels as possible.” Multiple channels might make the chance of a successful deception more likely, but effectively using them is also more difficult than manipulating a single channel: “Deception becomes more complicated as the number of channels of information available to the victim increases, since it becomes more difficult to control or manipulate a message that is transmitted in various forms across a large number of information channels.”²³⁰

For SQD, the channels can be fewer and more tactical—the NSAG need only provide false information that reaches the lowest level of the target’s infrastructure necessary to conduct whatever actions are needed to achieve its

²³⁰ “Perception and Misperception,” 7, 8 citing (n. 12) Reginald V. Jones, *The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1928), 216–217. The CIA and Mathtech called this tension between the difficulty and payoff of controlling multiple channels “Jones’ Lemma,” named after Reginald Jones. CIA and Mathtech, *Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore*, 20–1, quoting (n. 35) Reginald V. Jones, “The Theory of Practical Joking—Its Relevance to Physics,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Physics* (June 1967): 7.

strategic end, and will most likely not feed information into more channels than is necessary.²³¹ In some cases the channels will be similar to those necessary for BTD, but this need not always be the case.²³²

With feedback, observing continuation of the status quo—passive feedback—is all that is necessary to engage in SQD.²³³ An NSAG need not have a dedicated mechanism to obtain and assess feedback more than members’ ability to observe that the target remains on a status quo course.²³⁴ For BTD, passive feedback may be sufficient, but in some cases of BTD, to determine whether a deception is

²³¹ William Reese called deceptions that use a single simple channel “protodeceptions”: “Some deceptions, which R. V. Jones describes as telephone hoaxes, involve a single channel. In these deceptions a sequence of indicators is passed through a single channel guardian who is also the target of the deception. . . . As only a single channel guardian is involved, the validity process is unitary rather than multiple. Since all indicators passed are under the deceiver’s direct control, problems of dissonance are minimized.” “Deception Within a Communications Theory Framework,” in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 111, citing (n. 5) Reginald V. Jones, “The Theory of Practical Joking – An Elaboration” *Bulletin of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications* 11 (1975): 10–17.

²³² Author’s note: I admit to some postcase theorizing here. When originally conceiving the theory, I expected that feedback would be the primary difference between the two types, but in developing the case studies it became clear that there often was a difference in channeling types as well.

²³³ Speaking of the D-Day deceptions, CIA and Mathtech quoted a statement by Ronald Lewin that supports the idea of passive feedback, although in this case the Allies had Ultra’s help in observing the status quo: “On Sherlock Holmes’ famous principle about the importance of the dog that did not bark in the night, the significant fact for the deceivers in London was that no such major movement of troops from Norway was disclosed on Ultra up to and beyond the time of D-Day. Here was clinching evidence that the deception plans were working.” Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 310, quoted in CIA and Mathtech, *Deception Maxims*, 35, n. 52.

Author’s note: I originally determined that no feedback at all was necessary for SQD, arguing that continuation of the status quo was the feedback, but in considering that proposition after testing was complete, it became clear that the NSAG still must observe the continuation of the status quo. I therefore developed the idea of passive feedback—observing the continuation of the status quo—after reviewing Shulsky’s thoughts on the matter: “The target’s overt actions may be all that is needed to know whether a deception is succeeding.” Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 32.

²³⁴ See also Moose, “A Systems View of Deception,” 143. There is a possibility, of course, that the target recognizes the deception and continues along the status quo as a counterdeception measure so the deceiver does not become witting of the target’s knowledge of the deception, but if the target is facing something like a strategic attack, this course of action is unlikely. Further, working this possibility into the framework introduces excessive complexity and will be left out for reasons of parsimony.

succeeding an NSAG will need to take active measures to obtain feedback from the target.²³⁵

The combination of the factors affects whether an NSAG can engage in BTM or SQD. If an NSAG cannot fulfill all five conditions, it probably will not be possible to successfully engage in either type of deception because it will not have the capabilities to effectively manipulate its target's perceptions. If it can fulfill the conditions but because of weaker capabilities does not have access to channels that would reach the target's decision makers—a necessary factor to make them change their decision-making processes—SQD will be possible but BTM might not be. Passive feedback can work in either case, although the chances an NSAG will need active feedback increase if it chooses BTM because BTMs are more complex.

Said more intuitively, because tricking a government to change a policy or strategy is difficult, an NSAG probably will need more complex deception capabilities to engage in BTM than to use SQD.

If an NSAG is attempting to fulfill Shulsky's conditions and thereby engage in deception, the primary external factor that will prohibit it from doing so is the target's counterdeception capabilities. In a hypothetical case in which counterdeception capabilities are perfect (i.e., a perfect police state),²³⁶ successful

²³⁵ Interestingly, Daniel and Herbig suggested that feedback might not be as necessary as many authors suggest: "A factor in the success of strategic deceptions given particular weight in the theoretical chapters [of *Strategic Military Deception*] was the availability of reliable feedback for the deceiver. Unexpectedly, these case studies do not support the importance of this factor." "Deception in Theory and Practice," 361. This statement particularly supports the notion that, especially for SQD, a passive feedback capability will usually suffice for the deceiver.

²³⁶ As Whaley and Bell both noted, this is uncommon. Whaley stated: "Even the most repressive of states . . . has small areas of freedom." "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Authoritarian and Transition Regimes," in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic*

deception is not possible because the counterdeception measures will prohibit the NSAG from fulfilling Shulsky's conditions.²³⁷ Conversely, in an environment of no counterdeception, strategic BTD/SQD are possible if the NSAG fulfills Shulsky's conditions. Counterdeception capabilities, then, are an antecedent condition²³⁸ because they affect the workings of the IV on the DV.

To some extent, counterdeception could be explained within the context of Bell's assertion that groups struggle to devote time and resources to deception because of constraints required to maintain their illicit nature.²³⁹ If an NSAG cannot fulfill Shulsky's conditions because the group's adversary practices such as strong police, military, and intelligence measures—all part of the target's counterdeception capabilities—that the group struggles to undertake basic functions, then it might not be able to use BTD or SQD. If it cannot use either type, it might instead focus on denial or tactical and operational deception strategies.²⁴⁰

Denial and Deception, 42. Bell wrote: "Only the most authoritarian governments are apt to discover a threat beforehand. In open societies, radical groups are tolerated and religious freedom offered to sects. Thus, cults, lone assassins, secret splinter groups and obscure factions are secure because they are unsought and unseen. Coercion, surveillance and authority cannot prevent their first act. Only the strictures of civil society and the morality of suspicious neighbors can sometimes stop clandestine groups from launching the first attack." "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 139.

²³⁷ If nothing else, the deceiver would not be able to know the target's vulnerabilities well enough to deceive because the target would not have vulnerabilities. In more realistic cases, the target would be able to cut off a deceiver's channels or restrict its ability to receive feedback.

²³⁸ See footnote 227. In the realm of antecedents, target counterdeception is curious because it only affects the DV through its suppressive effect on the IV. If there is strong counterdeception, deception is probably not possible. On the other hand, lack of counterdeception does not itself make deception possible; for that, it is also necessary for the NSAG to fulfill Shulsky's conditions.

Author's note: I thank a colleague for helping me come to the conclusion that counterdeception is an antecedent variable.

²³⁹ Bell, "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 139–40, 160.

²⁴⁰ Even though counterdeception is a factor that affects a deceiver's ability to use deception, counterdeception may not hinder it entirely. Research by Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whaley suggested that even when targets receive warnings of pending attacks, there is still a high probability they will fail to uncover deceptions and surprises associated with the attacks.

Hypothesis related to possibility of BTD/SQD use: The hypothesis related to this first subtheory is that there is a positive relationship between an NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and its ability to undertake a strategic BTD or SQD plan, taking into account the proposed differences in necessary capabilities between BTD/SQD and controlling for the target's counterdeception capabilities. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between an NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and its ability to use deception.

The full subtheory, then, is that given a permissive counterdeception environment, an NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's requirements makes it able to manipulate its target's perception of reality and thereby engage in strategic BTD/SQD.

Theoretical map: Subtheory₁ can be mapped as follows:

DV₁ = possibility of BTD or SQD use

IV₁ = fulfillment of Shulsky's five requirements:

a = strategic coherence

b = understand target

c = organization

d = channels

e = feedback

IntV₁ = ability to affect target's perception

Condition Variable₁ (CV₁) = strength of target's counterdeception capabilities²⁴¹

"Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases," in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 191; and Daniel and Herbig, "Deception in Theory and Practice," 361.

²⁴¹ Van Evera defined this as "a variable framing an antecedent condition. The values of condition variables govern the size of the impact that IVs or IntVs [intervening variables] have on DVs and other IntVs." *Guide to Methods*, 11. In other words, it is the value of counterdeception capabilities (weak/moderate/strong) that affects an NSAG's ability to fulfill Shulsky's five conditions and therefore impacts possibility of deception use. Van Evera also noted that condition variables are known as "suppressor" variables, "meaning that controlling values on these variables suppresses irregular variance between independent and dependent variables." *Ibid.*, n. 7 on p. 11, citing P. McC. Miller and M. J. Wilson, *A Dictionary of Social Science Methods* (New York: John Wiley, 1983), 110.

$$(a + b + c + d + e) \rightarrow \text{IntV}_1 \rightarrow \text{DV}_1$$

$$\quad \quad \quad \times$$

$$\quad \quad \quad \text{CV}_1$$

OR

(strategic coherence + understand target + organization + channels + feedback) → ability to affect target perception → possibility of BTD/SQD use, depending on counterdeception environment

As explained above, the strength of *d* and *e* can be weaker when $\text{DV}_1 = \text{SQD}$ than when $\text{DV}_1 = \text{BTD}$.

Possibility vs. success: For the purposes of this dissertation, *possibility* usually is synonymous with at least partial chance of success at the deception. Shulsky stated that the five conditions are the “main requirements for successful deception.”²⁴² If an NSAG fulfills Shulsky’s requirements and is working in an environment of low counterdeception, the chances that the NSAG will succeed at its deception plan are good. This dissertation focuses on the factors affecting the *possibility* of deception’s use instead of the *success* of such because it more directly addresses the question of what factors affect whether an NSAG *can* employ deception.

Subtheory₁ expectations and tests: The first subtheory leads to the expectation that if Shulsky’s five elements are all necessary for the use of BTD or SQD, we should see the employment of these types of deception by NSAGs only if they fulfill all five conditions. Additionally, if a target’s counterdeception capabilities play a role in limiting whether NSAGs can engage in BTD or SQD, we should see restrictions on their use in cases where an NSAG is an adversary with a target that uses highly sophisticated counterdeception.

²⁴² Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 29.

The cases will test these propositions, looking for the presence of the five factors, given the caveats about strength for BTM versus SQD mentioned above. They also will evaluate the counterdeception environment and watch for any evidence that deception is possible despite strong adversary counterdeception.

Shulsky's requirements will be measured with a "yes/no" descriptor for each of the factors, indicating whether the NSAG fulfills that condition or not, and in some cases an explanation will be included to show the degree to which the group fulfills the condition. For example, a group might fulfill requirement five (feedback mechanism) inasmuch as the group can tell if the status quo changes, but its ability is weak because it has no additional mechanism to receive and assess feedback.

Counterdeception can be assessed by examining the number and quality of counterdeception initiatives a target uses against a deceiver. Counterdeception capabilities will be measured on a scale of weak (low) to strong (high) sophistication.

The cases at times will also discuss evidence showing the working of the intervening variable—the NSAG's ability to affect the target's perceptions as a result of fulfilling Shulsky's requirements. This variable can be measured on a scale of capability. For simplicity, this factor will not be explicitly tested.²⁴³

The tests are fairly strong in strength—if deception is possible despite the NSAG not fulfilling Shulsky's requirements or in spite of a strong

²⁴³ Author's note: I admit that I refined the theory after the testing was complete, and had not originally built the intervening variables into the case studies. Rather than revamping the cases, I chose to allow the narrative to show the working of the intervening variables without explicitly testing for them.

counterdeception environment, the hypothesis can be flunked.²⁴⁴ Technically, the test is not perfect because it does not prove that other factors cannot be at play that could make deception possible or impossible. Nevertheless, Shulsky's factors and the counterdeception variable leave little room for alternative explanations.

As noted in chapter 1, a weakness of this study is that it tests on the dependent variable to a degree—it looks only at cases in which at BTM or SQD was possible. In a couple of the cases the deception did not succeed perfectly, but the armed group was always able to attempt it and it always succeeded at least in part. Each case will nevertheless aim to show how the strength of the independent variable correlated with possibility of use. Future research would do well to examine cases in which both types of deception were not possible and test the IV against this outcome.

Dependent variable₂—likelihood: The dependent variable in the second subtheory is called likelihood, referring to the type of deception (BTM or SQD) around which the deceiver will most likely craft its deception plan against an

²⁴⁴ According to Van Evera, strong tests are both certain and unique: A *certain* prediction is an unequivocal forecast. The more certain the prediction, the stronger the test. The most certain predictions are deterministic forecasts of outcomes that must inexorably occur if the theory is valid. If the prediction fails, the theory fails, since failure can arise only from the theory's nonoperation. A *unique* prediction is a forecast not made by other known theories. The more unique the prediction, the stronger the test. The most unique predictions forecast outcomes that could have no plausible cause except the theory's action. If the prediction succeeds, the theory is strongly corroborated because other explanations for the test outcome are few and implausible. Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 31.

In this case, subtheory₁ is certain but possibly not unique since other explanations have not been shown to be nonexistent or faulty, so I labeled it fairly strong.

On falsification, see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91–196.

adversary.²⁴⁵ This study assumes that in most cases the deceiver will use the most likely type, although exceptions can occur, and these will be discussed below.


*Independent and intervening variables*₂—*threat posed to a target, chance of destruction, and incentive levels*: This thesis proposes that the level of threat posed by a target to the deceiver is the primary variable affecting what type of deception plan the NSAG creates. The intervening variables are the chance of destruction the NSAG faces and the resulting level of incentive to change its adversary's behavior.

This study assumes that some level of conflict is always present to NSAGs. As the intensity of threat increases and eventually becomes existential—meaning the target is taking actions that, if not averted, could lead to the deceiver's destruction—the NSAG will increasingly be fighting for survival. If the NSAG cannot make the target change its threatening behavior, the NSAG risks destruction; it therefore will have more incentive to use BTD than SQD under conditions of high threat because it will want the target to change behavior. The less an NSAG is threatened, the more incentive it will have to engage in SQD since SQD requires less complex capabilities than BTD, as discussed above.

Likelihood will be measured on a continuum of increased/decreased likelihood. As the NSAG is under more or less stress, BTD or SQD will develop as the most likely choice.

²⁴⁵ Author's note: I considered calling this DV *type of deception used*, but ultimately rejected this option even though it is synonymous with *likelihood* because *likelihood* is a more appropriate term for assessing deceptions that have not yet occurred. Additionally, *likelihood* takes into account factors not measured in this study that can affect whether the most likely type of deception is actually the one used, as discussed in "*Subtheory*₂ *expectations and tests*."

Hypothesis related to likelihood of BTD/SQD use: The hypothesis related to the second subtheory is that there is a positive relationship between intensity of the threat that the target presents to the deceiver and chance of BTD use and an inverse relationship between intensity of threat and chance of SQD use (see figure



2). The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between intensity of threat and chance of BTD or SQD use.

To state the full subtheory, conditions of high threat cause increased chance of destruction

and thereby raise incentives for the deceiver to create a deception plan involving BTD so it can change its adversary’s behavior. Conditions of low threat do not present high chance of harm to the deceiver, and because SQD is easier to employ, conditions of low threat increase the likelihood the NSAG will choose the simpler path and create a plan involving SQD to keep its target on a status quo course until it can achieve its desired strategic end.²⁴⁶

Subtheory₂ map: Subtheory₂ can be mapped as follows:

- DV₂ = likelihood of BTD or SQD use
- IV₂ = intensity of threat
- IntV_{2a} = chance of destruction
- IntV_{2b} = level of incentive to change adversary behavior

$$IV_2 \rightarrow IntV_{2a} \rightarrow IntV_{2b} \rightarrow DV_2$$

OR

²⁴⁶ See below for discussion of when *possibility* can become an antecedent condition affecting *likelihood*.

intensity of threat → chance of destruction → increased, static, or decreased
incentive to change adversary behavior → likelihood of BTD or SQD use

Subtheory₂ expectations and tests: If threat from a target plays a role in what kind of deception is used, we should expect to find groups using one type of deception—BTD or SQD—more than the other when the threat is measured at significant levels (high or low) of intensity. Specifically, we should expect to find more BTD use when threat is high and more SQD use when threat is low. In cases when threat is moderate, we can expect to see either type used if capabilities allow.

Threat will be measured on a spectrum of high to low threat by examining the target's policy and strategy against a deceiver. If, for example, a state has a policy to destroy an NSAG and is devoting significant resources toward that goal, the threat intensity for the NSAG will be high, possibly even existential.²⁴⁷

As with the previous subtheory, the intervening variables—in this case, chance of destruction and level of incentive to change an adversary's behavior—will be examined qualitatively as part of the case. They will be discussed in the sections about the threats faced by the NSAG in question. Like threat, these variables can be measured on a spectrum of low to high, but for simplicity they, like the other subtheory's intervening variable, will not be explicitly tested.²⁴⁸

For testing, this paper's cases will examine the threat level the NSAG was under at the time that it planned and undertook the deception and will explore whether the deception type used correlated with that predicted by the hypothesis.

²⁴⁷ Author's note: In testing, I found that not only is the *actual* threat important, but also the deceiver's *perception* of the threat.

²⁴⁸ See footnote 243.

This test is moderate in strength because if an NSAG is under low threat and chooses BTM, the hypothesis flunks, but it does not necessarily flunk if the NSAG is under high threat and chooses SQD.²⁴⁹

The test's strength is moderated by alternative explanations of why an NSAG would have high incentives to choose BTM but would instead use SQD. This would particularly happen if BTM is not possible for the deceiver but SQD is possible.

As an example, NSAG A is in a state of low-level conflict with target B that escalates unexpectedly and quickly reaches an existential level for A. When this happens, A would have strong incentives to structure a BTM to change B's behavior. However, a BTM may not be possible because A does not have the channels and feedback capabilities developed to a degree necessary to engage in BTM. At this point, the deceiver has a few alternatives. It can go forward with a BTM and probably fail. It can abort the plan and not use deception. Or it can craft a plan using SQD if SQD is possible.²⁵⁰


In reality, the decision cycle is probably not so complex that an NSAG crafts a BTM plan, decides its capabilities are insufficient, and then chooses SQD. In most cases, especially if the NSAG needs to use the deception immediately, NSAGs will understand their capabilities and will craft a deception plan that works around

²⁴⁹ Author's note: I chose to call it moderately strong because it is fairly certain but not entirely unique since there are so many other factors that could play into the deception type used, as described later in this section. See footnote 244 about Van Evera's explanation of strong tests in discussion of subtheory₁'s testing.

²⁵⁰ If a deceiver has the option of abandoning a plan that would not succeed and instead choosing a different plan that could succeed, in most cases it will switch from a BTM to an SQD because if BTM is not possible, SQD still might be. If the circumstances of deception are similar and SQD is not possible, BTM also is not possible, but that would not preclude the deceiver from using a BTM in which the goals and details of the deception were different.

those capabilities. At times like this, possibility affects likelihood—if only one type of deception (SQD) is possible, it also becomes the most likely to be used (see figure 3).²⁵¹

On the other hand, if an NSAG aims to undertake a deception but one or both types are not possible, it can try to improve its capabilities in order to make the preferred type of deception possible if time and resources allow.²⁵² In that case, possibility does not affect likelihood (see figure 4).²⁵³



In testing, a phenomenon in which an NSAG would have high incentive to use BTD but instead opts for SQD can be sufficiently explained if the NSAG does not have the capabilities for BTD. If it has the capabilities to engage in BTD and is under extremely high threat but structures an SQD regardless, the hypothesis will fail.

²⁵¹ In cases in which an NSAG is constrained by its capabilities, *possibility* becomes an antecedent condition affecting subtheory₁ through the DV *likelihood*.

²⁵² In this sense, Bell was correct in stating that deception is possible for armed groups that are favored by time and resources. See Bell, “Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” 139–40.

²⁵³ In both cases, *likelihood* also affects IV₁ (Shulsky’s conditions) because it plays into the deception plan, which itself becomes part of the first factor—strategic coherence. In the case depicted in figure 3, the plan is dependent on whichever type is most likely. In the case depicted in figure 4, the deception plan is informed by whichever type is most likely. In this manner, the variables become somewhat interdependent.

Other factors also can affect likelihood of a particular deception's use, but in a less systematic manner than possibility of deception use. The deceiver may not function as a rational actor (e.g., may choose BTM—the more difficult type—even though SQD would suffice), may have incorrect perceptions of threat, may lack creativity in crafting deception, etc. These cannot all be tested for, but the researcher must be cognizant of the possibility that they exist lest the test fail because of a fluke reason.

Summary: To state the entire endgame theory in causal terms, the level of threat presented by a deceiver to a target is the primary factor that determines whether the NSAG will incorporate BTM or SQD into its deception plan as long as the NSAG has or can develop the capabilities—Shulsky's factors—necessary to undertake that type of deception. If the counterdeception environment permits and the NSAG fulfills Shulsky's requirements, deception becomes possible.

Once we add in the assumption about intent to use deception, the thesis can be simplified and restated: Given an NSAG's aim to use deception against a state target, the factors that determine whether BTM/SQD are possible and the type most likely to be used in a given situation are Shulsky's five requirements, the target's counterdeception capabilities, and the threat faced by the deceiver.

Table 3 combines the two subtheories in order to show how the three variables affect the second dependent variable—likelihood of BTM/SQD use.

The graphic in appendix 2 also maps the primary factors in the endgame theory.

		Likelihood of:	
		BTD	SQD
Intensity of threat posed by target:	↑↑	↑	↓
	↓↓	↓	↑
NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's requirements:	All five	↔	↔
	1-3 strong, 4-5 to lesser degree	↓	↑
	< 1-5	↓	↓
Strength of target counterdeception:	↑↑	↓	↓
	↓↓	↔	↔

Table 3: Basic Effects of IVs/CV on Likelihood of BTD/SQD

Key:

↑ = increased likelihood of use

↓ = decreased likelihood of use

↔ = neither increased nor decreased likelihood of use

Case Study Layout

The case studies in the dissertation will begin with a historical overview that helps the reader understand the NSAG's goals and strategy at the time it undertook deception. They will explore the group's goals and the level of threat it faced, and will then examine the actual deceptions. The cases will end by showing how each of the study variables were manifest, and will determine whether the type of deception used matches the type the endgame theory would have predicted. Each subcase will conclude by collapsing and simplifying the findings into the following matrix, which includes the study variables—threat, Shulsky's requirements, target counterdeception, and possibility and likelihood of BTD/SQD use:

Table X: Description ²⁵⁴						
Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
low/mod./high	yes/no	yes/no	yes/no	yes/no	yes/no	weak/moderate/strong

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>possible/not possible</i>	<i>BTD/SQD most likely</i>

Conclusions

The endgame theory of deception adds to academic literature on deception for two reasons: First, by positing the concept of SQD, it provides a framework under which tactical deceptions nevertheless can achieve strategic ends. It shows that deception is not solely used to force a target to change a course of action (BTD). Instead, deception also can be used, under the SQD model, as an offensive measure to keep the target on a course beneficial to the deceiver until the deceiver can obtain a specific strategic end.

Second, the theory is important because it reiterates or posits variables that affect a target’s ability to use deception and the choice of what kind of deception to employ. Understanding these variables makes it possible for both academics and policymakers to recognize conditions under which a group might have the

²⁵⁴ If a national security scholar or practitioner were to use this model to determine whether BTD or SQD might be employed at a current or future time by an NSAG, one additional variable would need to be added to the top row to account for the factor assumed as a given in the thesis—that the NSAG aims to use deception to manipulate the target’s perception of reality. Unless the scholar or practitioner actually knew that the NSAG planned to use deception, he or she would have to make an assumption about whether it would want to use deception based on current conflict conditions. This variable could therefore be called “Conflict Conditions?” and would be short for “Do conflict conditions create a situation in which deception would be a desirable strategy for the NSAG?” The variable could be measured with a yes/no descriptor, and if the answer is yes, then the practitioner could assume that the NSAG would want to use deception.

capabilities to employ deception and to predict what type of deception it might try, and thereby make counterdeception efforts more effective.

CHAPTER 4

AL QAEDA'S USE OF DECEPTION TO UNDERTAKE THE ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

With the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda entered the annals of successful surprise attacks, which are few in history—for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the surprise Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1969, and the crossing of the Zionist Bar-Lev line in 1973.

—Abu 'Ubeid al Qurashi (a reportedly senior aide to Usama Bin Ladin),
“Fourth-Generation Wars”²⁵⁵

Al Qaeda is a radical Islamic terrorist group, led from its inception to shortly before the time of this writing by Usama Bin Ladin. Despite Bin Ladin's death in May 2011, the group no doubt still aims to establish an Islamic caliphate after forcing the United States to abandon its influence in Islamic countries and driving

Author's note: When quoting others, I standardized proper nouns such as “Usama Bin Ladin” and “al Qaeda,” as well as selected Arabic words. I also corrected some typographical errors and standardized formatting and spelling. I left the original formatting and spelling in the citations. See the sources cited for the original text.

This chapter draws on some of the research conducted for and mirrors aspects of my article “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 367–88, doi: 10.1080/09546550600751941; as well as “Al-Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception” (manuscript for Seminar on U.S. Intelligence, Terrorism, and National Security, The Fletcher School, December 4, 2004).

²⁵⁵ Abu 'Ubeid al-Qurashi, “Fourth-Generation Wars,” *Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War*; in The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “Bin Ladin Lieutenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa'ida's Combat Doctrine,” *Special Dispatch* no. 344 (February 10, 2002), accessed August 19, 2011, <http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page+archives&ID=SP34402>. MEMRI cites *Al Quds al Arabi* (London), February 9, 2002, in noting that Qurashi was a senior aide to Bin Ladin.

the overthrow of Muslim regimes sympathetic to Westernization.²⁵⁶ As part of its strategy to obtain that objective, it conducted the devastating attacks against targets in the eastern United States on September 11, 2001, the consequences of which will continue to affect international relations for some time. The success of the 9/11 attacks required the use of a simple but well-organized SQD.

The endgame theory predicts that an armed group will be most likely to use SQD at times when it is not under existential threat if it fulfills Shulsky's five necessary conditions in a permissive counterdeception environment. To use SQD, it would not need complex channels to feed false information or an advanced feedback mechanism, although it can engage in SQD if these capabilities are advanced.

This chapter examines whether these factors held in the case of al Qaeda's deceptions preceding the 9/11 attacks, and determines that they did. It will begin with a historical introduction that shows the development of al Qaeda's objectives

²⁵⁶ See Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 221–2, referencing “sources” and “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020,” which Atwan said had been posted on the Internet by Mohammad Ibrahim Makkawi and extracts of which were published in *Al Quds al Arabi* on March 11, 2005. The Jamestown Foundation noted that the article, entitled “Al-Qaeda Has Drawn Up Working Strategy Lasting Until 2020,” was actually written by Bassam al Baddarin for *Al Quds al Arabi* and that it was based on “the assorted writings of al Qaeda’s ‘strategic brain’ Mohammad Makkawi,” a.k.a. Sayf al Adel. Stephen Ulph, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategy Until 2020,” *Terrorism Focus* 2, no. 6 (May 5, 2005), accessed August 20, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=181&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=238&no_cache=1. See also Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 245, 247, referencing an interview of Bin Ladin by CNN’s Peter Arnett in Pakistan, March 1997; “English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Blog, at *Weekllystandard.com*, October 12, 2005, accessed July 13, 2011, <http://www.weekllystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpul.asp>; Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends,” 368–9; and Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism,’” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14, no. 1 (2003): 24–5, accessed July 12, 2011, doi: 10.1080/09592310412331300546, citing (ns. 11, 13) Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War: Ideology, Rage, and the Assault on America,” in *How Did This Happen: Terrorism and the New War*, ed. James Hodge Jr. and Gideon Rose (NY: Public Affairs, 2001), 31–52; Christopher Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 189.

and strategy over time. It will then describe types of deception the organization employed in the run-up to the 9/11 attacks and will focus on al Qaeda's use of deception in organizing the operatives' travel. The chapter will close by looking at the deception within the framework of the endgame theory, and present general conclusions on the case.

Historical Introduction: Azzam's Afghan Jihad to Bin Ladin's Global Jihad

Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty.

—Usama Bin Ladin, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places"²⁵⁷

Development of radical Islam: Bin Ladin's reasons for attacking America on September 11, 2001 are based in a radical Islamic consciousness. This consciousness, in a loose and somewhat symbolic sense, extends to some 318 years prior, when Ottoman armies—the last vestige of a renowned past begun with the establishment of Islam in 610 AD—were forced to retreat during a battle begun on September 11, 1683 from Vienna, their farthest advance into Christian territory. Muslims from that loss onward slowly witnessed a rise of Christian society that overshadowed the era of Islam's peak and, particularly during the twentieth century, led Muslim states toward Westernization.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Osama Bin Laden, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places [variant: Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places]," *Al Quds al Arabi*, August 1996, abridged copy in Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: Harper, 2005), 264.

²⁵⁸ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 171.

Al Qaeda's thinking is rooted in the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was appalled by what he viewed as the subjugation of Islam by Western societies:

The white man crushes us underfoot while we teach our children about his civilization, his universal principles and noble objectives. . . . We are endowing our children with amazement and respect for the master who tramples our honor and enslaves us. Let us instead plant the seeds of hatred, disgust, and revenge in the souls of these children. Let us teach these children from the time their nails are soft that the white man is the enemy of humanity, and that they should destroy him at the first opportunity.²⁵⁹

Bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri would refer to these alleged Western, non-Islamic subjugators as infidels, and al Qaeda would portray itself as defender of Muslims everywhere.²⁶⁰

Qutb developed several key themes that are present in al Qaeda's ideology today: (1) Qutb's ultimate goal was to return Islam to its origins—wherein the state was governed by Islamic law, *Sharia*—to escape degradation brought on by modern values, characterized foremost by the separation of the sacred from the secular in government.²⁶¹ As al Qaeda expert Lawrence Wright noted, “Islam could not abide such divisions. In Islam, . . . divinity could not be diminished without being destroyed. . . . Muslims had forgotten this in their enchantment with the West. Only by restoring Islam to the center of their lives, their laws, and their government could Muslims hope to recapture their rightful place as the dominant culture in the world.”²⁶² To achieve this it would require the imposition

²⁵⁹ Quoted in Wright, *Looming Tower*, 23.

²⁶⁰ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 129; “English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Letter”; and Wright, *Looming Tower*, 210, quoting Bin Ladin.

²⁶¹ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 23–4.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 24.

of *Sharia* on society to force a reshaping of its values; otherwise the nations would remain in *jahiliyya*—“the pagan world before the Prophet received his message.”²⁶³ This thinking underpins al Qaeda’s goal to establish an Islamic caliphate ruled by *Sharia*.²⁶⁴

(2) Qutb believed that the Egyptian state under Gamal Abdel Nasser, by accepting aspects of modernity, had denied Islam. Further, those who served the state denied God and were therefore non-Muslims. “In Qutb’s mind, he had excommunicated them from the Islamic community. The name for this in Arabic is *takfir*. Although that is not the language used, the principle of excommunication, which had been used to justify so much bloodshed within Islam throughout its history, had been born again”²⁶⁵ Bin Ladin’s thinking on this aspect evolved over the course of his life, but his acceptance was clear by August 1995, when he published a manifesto essentially calling King Fahd of Saudi Arabia an infidel and apostate.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Ibid., 27.

²⁶⁴ See Wright, *Looming Tower*, 175. For more about Qutb’s influence over Bin Ladin, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 51, citing (ns. 12–13) Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (American Trust Publications, 1990); Sayyid Qutb, “The America I Have Seen” (1949), reprinted in Kamal Abdel Malek, ed., *America in an Arab Mirror: Images of America in Arabic Travel Literature: An Anthology* (Palgrave, 2000); National Public Radio broadcast, “Sayyid Qutb’s America,” May 6, 2003 (online at www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_1253796.html).

Author’s note: This chapter’s footnotes will list relevant sources cited in *9/11 Commission Report* and products by the 9/11 Commission staff, but these sources will not be replicated in the dissertation’s bibliography. I have standardized the dates for citations in 9/11 Commission products, but otherwise have attempted to leave the formatting as written originally, including use of upper/lower case letters, quotation marks, and parentheses. In cases where the original cites multiple secondary sources (as above), this product separates the citations with semicolons. See *9/11 Commission Report*, 449–50 for an explanation of the report’s citation conventions.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 29.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 209; and Usama bin Muhammad bin Laden, “An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle,” July 11, 1995, translation available from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed August 5, 2011, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-000103-Trans.pdf>. See below for information about how Bin Ladin’s thinking evolved.

(3) Qutb argued that a vanguard of activists should initiate an Islamic revival.²⁶⁷ Years later, in 1988, Usama Bin Ladin’s mentor Abdullah Azzam wrote on this theme: “Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. . . . This vanguard constitutes the solid base (*al Qaeda al Sulbah*) for the expected society.”²⁶⁸ Bin Ladin almost certainly envisioned his group becoming that “solid base” and vanguard.

Bin Ladin in the Soviet era: In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Bin Ladin joined other Middle Eastern jihadists in resisting the occupation. Being from a wealthy Saudi family and having connections to generous Arab benefactors, Bin Ladin helped facilitate the travel of fighters to Afghanistan, giving money to an organization called the Bureau of Services, which operated a recruiting network on several continents under the direction of Bin Ladin and his mentor, Abdullah Azzam.²⁶⁹ On multiple trips to Saudi Arabia, Bin Ladin encouraged thousands of Saudis to volunteer for jihad.²⁷⁰ By the mid-1980s, Bin

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 35. For Qutb’s original work, see Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: Millat Book Centre), or any other publisher’s version.

²⁶⁸ Abdullah Azzam, “Al Qaeda al Sulbah” (“The Solid Base”), *Jihad* 41 (1988), quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 75 (italics added).

²⁶⁹ Staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (hereafter 9/11 Commission staff), “Overview of the Enemy: Staff Statement No. 15,” 1, accessed November 16, 2010, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_15.pdf; see also Atwan, *Secret History*, 43. Bergen noted that Bin Ladin was a cofounder of the Bureau of Services (variant: Services Office). *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 78.

²⁷⁰ Atwan, *Secret History*, 43–4.

Ladin expanded his activities by bringing in construction equipment from Saudi Arabia that he used to build training facilities and other infrastructure.²⁷¹

Azzam and Bin Ladin diverged in their views regarding the path of the Arab *mujahidin*. Bin Ladin and many of the Arabs held the view that after they defeated the Soviets, their next task was to take the jihad elsewhere and establish societies ruled by *Sharia*. He financed the establishment of an all-Arab camp at Jaji, Afghanistan, at the end of 1986 as a step toward creating an Arab force; Azzam opposed the measure.²⁷² As the war in Afghanistan drew to a close in the late 1980s, Bin Ladin wanted to move the fight to other communist areas, including Kashmir, the Philippines, and Central Asian republics.²⁷³ Azzam supported “the reclamation of once-Muslim lands from non-Muslim rule” but remained committed to seeing an Islamic government installed in Afghanistan even as the jihadist factions began fighting each other.²⁷⁴

Bin Ladin first met Ayman al Zawahiri in Pakistan in 1986.²⁷⁵ Zawahiri had fled to Peshawar, Pakistan, after serving three years in prison for activities associated with the al Jihad group that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981.²⁷⁶ He first spent a year in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and then moved

²⁷¹ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 121, citing (n. 37) Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 78.

²⁷² Wright, *Looming Tower*, 111–3. Wright stated: “Each man was beset by a powerful and impractical dream. . . . Bin Ladin was already thinking of the future of jihad, and the Jaji camp was his first step toward the creation of an Arab legion that could wage war anywhere. Until now, he had subordinated his dream to the goals of the older man, but he was beginning to feel the tug of destiny.” Ibid., 111–2.

²⁷³ Ibid., 131.

²⁷⁴ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 74; and McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 125.

²⁷⁵ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 63, quoting an interview of Jamal Ismail, March 2005, Islamabad, Pakistan (originally cited in 26, n. 4).

²⁷⁶ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 50–8.

to Peshawar where he worked at a Red Crescent hospital.²⁷⁷ In Peshawar, Zawahiri reconnected with al Jihad leaders, and during his association with this group his own ideology shifted from supporting the overthrow of the regime in Egypt only to using violence to destroy the *takfiris*.²⁷⁸ Zawahiri later took over leadership of al Jihad, also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Tanzim al Jihad.²⁷⁹

Zawahiri played an important role pushing Bin Ladin toward global jihad and against Azzam's views.²⁸⁰ Zawahiri and the Egyptians who surrounded him espoused the most radical form of global jihad—"the violent overthrow of governments across the Muslim world they deemed 'apostate,' a concept of jihad that Azzam and many of his followers rejected, as they wanted no part in conflicts between Muslims."²⁸¹

Bin Ladin would later accept this ideology.²⁸² As Wright stated: "The dynamic of the two men's relationship made Zawahiri and Bin Ladin into people they would never have been individually; moreover, the organization they would create, al Qaeda, would be a vector of these two forces, one Egyptian and one

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 57–8, 60, 122.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 124–6.

²⁷⁹ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Al-Jihad al-Islami," updated February 2008, accessed November 16, 2010, <http://cns.miis.edu/archive/wtc01/aljihad.htm>.

²⁸⁰ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 63; and 68, quoting an interview of Osama Rushdie by Paul Cruikshank, August 9, 2005, London, United Kingdom (originally cited in 67, n. 29).

²⁸¹ Ibid., 74.

²⁸² Atwan wrote: "Al Zawahiri has had an enormous influence on Bin Ladin . . . His ideology was unique at that time in that it combined a Salafi-*jihadi* outlook with pan-Arab radicalism . . . As his relationship with Zawahiri strengthened, Bin Ladin's strategy widened to include any arena or circumstance where he could damage the U.S. or its interests. The idea of global *jihad*, which now informs al Qaeda's strategy, has its origins here." *Secret History*, 50.

Saudi. Each would have to compromise in order to accommodate the goals of the other; as a result, al Qaeda would take a unique path, that of global jihad.”²⁸³

Al Qaeda’s establishment: In August 1988, Bin Ladin and a small number of sympathizers held three days of meetings to officially organize a new group that operated with a vision to expand the jihad out of Afghanistan.²⁸⁴ The new group, which the members called al Qaeda, became operational on September 10, 1988, 13 years before the 9/11 attacks.²⁸⁵ Al Qaeda’s founding goals were “to establish the truth, get rid of evil, and establish an Islamic nation.”²⁸⁶

The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989. Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia from Pakistan that November—the same month Abdullah Azzam and his son were assassinated by unknown assailants²⁸⁷—and began supporting an insurgency to overthrow the Marxist government of Yemen.²⁸⁸

Gulf War I: The al Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al Suri in 2004 wrote that Bin Ladin supported the Saudi establishment through the late 1980s, but his views changed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.²⁸⁹ The United States’ staging

²⁸³ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 127.

²⁸⁴ Wright asserted that a very small group of insiders covertly formed al Qaeda in May 1988, but it did not become official until that August. *Ibid.*, 133.

²⁸⁵ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 78, 80–1, citing (ns. 13–4) and quoting from the “Tareek Osama documents,” parts of which are available in the Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States of America v. Enaam Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. Ill., filed January 6, 2003) (originally cited in *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 75, n. 3). In n. 3 on p. 446, Bergen indicated that the law firm Motley Rice retained the remaining parts of the documents. This author accessed the proffer at *Findlaw.com* on July 2, 2011, <http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/bif/usarnaout10603prof.pdf>.

²⁸⁶ Quoted in Wright, *Looming Tower*, 142.

²⁸⁷ See Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, xxii.

²⁸⁸ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 153–4.

²⁸⁹ Abu Musab al Suri, *The International Islamic Resistance Call*, published on the Internet, December 2004, quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 114–5 (originally cited in 82, n. 17). For more on Abu Musab al Suri, see Paul Cruikshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab

of troops in Saudi Arabia was the defining event that turned Bin Ladin against the United States and Muslim regimes that showed it support. Bin Ladin had dated his hatred of America to 1982, when the United States supported Israel in the invasion of Lebanon, but he did not become violently hostile to America until after 1990.²⁹⁰ Wright narrated the events:

With the Iraqi army poised on the Saudi border, Bin Ladin wrote a letter to the king beseeching him not to call upon the Americans for protection; he followed this with a frenzied round of lobbying the senior princes. . . .

. . . U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney flew to Jeddah with a team of advisors, including General Norman Schwarzkopf, to persuade the king to accept American troops to defend Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf showed satellite images of three armored Iraqi divisions inside Kuwait, followed by ground troops—far more manpower, he contended, than the number needed to occupy such a small country. The Saudis had intelligence that several Iraqi reconnaissance teams had already crossed the Saudi border.

Crown Prince Abdullah advised against letting the Americans enter the country for fear they would never depart. In the name of the President of the United States, Cheney pledged that the troops would leave as soon as the threat was over, or whenever the king said they should go. That promise decided the matter.

“Come with all you can bring,” the king implored. “Come as fast as you can.”

In early September, weeks after American forces began arriving, Bin Ladin spoke to Prince Sultan, the minister of defense, in the company of several Afghan *mujahidin* commanders and Saudi veterans of that conflict. It was a bizarre and grandiose replication of General Swarzkopf’s briefing. Bin Ladin brought his own maps of the region and presented a detailed plan of attack, with diagrams and charts, indicating trenches and sand traps along the border to be constructed with the Saudi Binladin Group’s extensive inventory of earth-moving equipment. Added to this, he would create a *mujahidin* army made up of his colleagues from the Afghan jihad and unemployed Saudi youth. “I am ready to prepare one hundred thousand fighters with good combat capability within three months,” Bin Ladin promised Prince Sultan. “You don’t need Americans. You don’t need any other non-Muslim troops. We will be enough.”

“There are no caves in Kuwait,” the prince observed. “What will you do when he lobbs missiles at you with chemical and biological weapons?”

“We will fight him in faith,” Bin Ladin responded.

Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 1 (2007): 1–14, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1080/10576100601049928.

²⁹⁰ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 151.

...
... [Bin Ladin also presented his plan to Prince Turki, who] laughed in disbelief.²⁹¹

With this, suggested Abu Musab al Suri, Bin Ladin turned against the Saudi state, disgusted also that some of the Saudi clergy supported the monarchy, making them, in Bin Ladin's eyes, traitors to their religion. To Bin Ladin, allowing Christian troops on the Arabian Peninsula—in violation of the Prophet Mohammad's dying statement, "Let there be no two religions in Arabia"—was heresy.²⁹² Abdel Bari Atwan, who interviewed Bin Ladin for the London-based *Al Quds al Arabi*, related: "Bin Ladin told me that the Saudi government's decision to invite U.S. troops to defend the kingdom and liberate Kuwait was the biggest shock of his entire life. He could not believe that the House of Al Saud could welcome the deployment of 'infidel' forces on Arabian Peninsula soil, within the proximity of the Holy Places, for the first time since the inception of Islam."²⁹³

²⁹¹ Ibid., 156–8. Atwan disagreed with this account:

Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Bin Ladin swiftly dispatched another letter to the Al Saud outlining his strategy for protecting the kingdom against inevitable Iraqi aggression. Bin Ladin told me about this letter himself. He also offered the services of his Arab veterans, who would in turn train Saudi volunteers for war. Disregarding Bin Ladin's earlier remarkable prescience, the royal response was dismissive, ridiculing both the letter and its author and warning Bin Ladin not to interfere. The seeds of enmity were sown in this second humiliation. (Many commentators have written about a stormy face-to-face meeting between Bin Ladin and Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the defense minister. I have not been able to find any sources to corroborate this information). *Secret History*, 161–2.

²⁹² On Crown Prince Faisal co-opting the clergy, Wright stated:

He was freer to act than his predecessor because his own piety was unquestioned, but he was wary of extremists who were constantly policing the thoughts and actions of mainstream Saudi society. From the point of view of some fervent believers, the most insidious accomplishment of Faisal's reign was to co-opt the *ulema*—the clergy—by making them employees of the state. By promoting moderate voices over others, the government sought to temper the radicalism spawned by the tumultuous experience of modernization. Faisal was such a powerful king that he was able to force these changes on his society at a stunning pace. *Looming Tower*, 87.

The Prophet Mohammad's comment is quoted in *ibid.*, 158.

²⁹³ Atwan, *Secret History*, 45. Atwan stated further:

Suri argued that the Islamic clerics gave the Saudis their legitimacy, and the Saudis gave legitimacy to the American presence in the Peninsula. It was “a losing battle,” in Suri’s words, to confront the state, so al Qaeda’s strategy was to attack the American presence, as the Saudis would be forced to defend the U.S. troops, and in doing so would “lose their legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims.” Al Qaeda’s aim was for the allegedly corrupt clerical establishment to fall thereafter.²⁹⁴

Suri explained that Bin Ladin believed if he could affect the fall of the United States, “all the components of the existing Arab and Islamic regimes will fall as well. Therefore he was convinced of the necessity of focusing his effort on fighting jihad against America. He then started to call upon those around him to the idea of fighting the war against the ‘Head of the Snake,’ as he would call it, rather than against ‘its many tails’ (i.e. the authoritarian governments of the Middle East).”²⁹⁵

Sudan years: Under growing tension with the Saudi establishment, Bin Ladin left for Pakistan in early 1991 “under the pretext of attending an Islamic

Bin Ladin also feared that by welcoming U.S. troops onto Arab land the Saudi government would be subjecting the country to foreign occupation—in an exact replay of the course of events in Afghanistan, when the Communist government in Kabul invited Russian troops into the country. Just as Bin Ladin had taken arms to fight the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, he now decided to take up arms to confront the U.S. troops on the Arabian Peninsula. At this point Bin Ladin decided to stop advising the Saudi officials on what actions they should or should not take. He felt communication with them had become utterly futile.

. . . [R]enowned Saudi cleric Sheikh bin Uthaymin had issued a *fatwa* stating that it was obligatory for every Muslim, particularly those from the Arabian Peninsula, to prepare for battle against the ‘invaders.’ Bin Ladin decided to use this *fatwa* as a means of mobilizing youths to travel to Afghanistan and train for combat, and a considerable number of Saudis heeded the call. *Ibid.*, 45–6.

²⁹⁴ Suri, *International Islamic Resistance Call*, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 115–6. See also Atwan, *Secret History*, 46.

²⁹⁵ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 116.

gathering,”²⁹⁶ but his stay was short and that December he moved to Sudan, his followers quickly joining him, where he undertook construction and agricultural projects.²⁹⁷

Once in Sudan, Bin Ladin’s efforts to target the United States escalated.

In late 1992, al Qaeda bombed U.S. soldiers at the Goldmohur Hotel in Aden, Yemen.²⁹⁸ Around the same time, Bin Ladin assessed America was using the entrée of troops into Somalia to occupy the Horn of Africa—not for humanitarian reasons—and he allowed al Qaeda to become involved in events there.²⁹⁹ He told Atwan that “his Afghan Arabs had been involved in the 1993 ambush on American troops in Mogadishu ‘There were successful battles in which we inflicted big losses on the Americans, and we preyed on them’ He said he thought the U.S. had displayed a singular lack of courage by pulling out of Somalia immediately afterwards.”³⁰⁰ Bin Ladin’s claims may have been somewhat exaggerated—al Qaeda experts Peter Bergen and Lawrence Wright both wrote that al Qaeda’s role was one of training the Somalis who carried out the operation, not heavy combat, and *The 9/11 Commission Report* similarly stated that al Qaeda sent weapons and trainers.³⁰¹

²⁹⁶ *9/11 Commission Report*, 57, citing (n. 33) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, September 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, September 26, 2003; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, November 10, 1996.

²⁹⁷ Atwan, *Secret History*, 47.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

²⁹⁹ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 170.

³⁰⁰ Atwan, *Secret History*, 36.

³⁰¹ Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 22; Wright, *Looming Tower*, 188; and *9/11 Commission Report* 60, citing (n. 45) Intelligence report, Bin Ladin’s Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support, April 30, 1997.

In early March 1994, King Fahd revoked Bin Ladin's Saudi citizenship, and soon thereafter the Saudi government froze his assets.³⁰² Bin Ladin in turn further changed his focus from political activism against the Saudi state to a full-on military campaign, as related by Atwan: "Mohammad Atef [Bin Ladin's military commander] . . . told me that . . . Bin Ladin felt he . . . faced two clear options: he could return to Saudi Arabia to spend the rest of his life either in detention or under house arrest, or he could begin a full-on military campaign against his enemies, which he would continue until he was captured or killed. From then on, according to Atef, Bin Ladin's focus shifted from political activism. He began to concentrate on building a considerable military organization to carry out operations against U.S. military, administrative and business targets, initially on the Arabian Peninsula."³⁰³

Return to Afghanistan: Atwan claimed al Qaeda funded al Jihad's assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June of 1995 and launched an attack on a foreign worker compound in Riyadh the same year.³⁰⁴ As noted earlier, in August 1995 Bin Ladin published a manifesto against King Fahd in which he "made a legalistic case . . . that the king himself was an infidel."³⁰⁵

³⁰² Wright, *Looming Tower*, 195; and Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 45.

³⁰³ Atwan, *Secret History*, 49. For more on Atef, see Khaled Dawoud, "Mohammed Atef: Egyptian Militant who Rose to the Top of the al-Qaida Hierarchy," *Guardian*, November 19, 2001, accessed November 18, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituaries.afghanistan>.

³⁰⁴ Atwan, *Secret History*, 77–8.

³⁰⁵ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 209; see also bin Laden, "An Open Letter to King Fahd."

Al Qaeda possibly was involved in the bombing of a Saudi National Guard office in Riyadh in late 1995 that killed five Americans and two Indians.³⁰⁶

When Bin Ladin learned of Saudi-Sudanese negotiations to return him to Saudi Arabia, he felt compelled to leave and returned to Afghanistan, where he received safe haven under the protection of Mullah Omar and the Taliban.³⁰⁷

Abdullah Azzam's son claimed that upon arrival in Afghanistan, Bin Ladin "wrote a letter to Mullah Omar, saying, 'I want to come to your areas, but I need a promise from you that you are going to protect me, you will never surrender me.' Mullah Omar sent him an answer, 'You are most welcome. We will never give you up to anyone who wants you.'"³⁰⁸

In August 1996, Bin Ladin presented the first of three *fatwas* on America in his "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."³⁰⁹ In the declaration Bin Ladin stated that the presence of Coalition

³⁰⁶ Atwan, *Secret History*, 50, reported three Americans were killed, but McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 158, and Wright, *Looming Tower*, 211 reported five; see these sources as well as Atwan, *Secret History*, 168, for information about the attack.

³⁰⁷ Atwan, *Secret History*, 50–1, 168. The 9/11 Commission staff expanded on the reasons Bin Ladin left Sudan: "His departure resulted from a combination of pressures from the United States, other western governments, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, all three of which faced indigenous terrorist groups supported by Bin Ladin. "Staff Statement No. 15," 6. Atwan asserted that al Qaeda bombed the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 to retaliate for having to leave Sudan. *Secret History*, 169. Although Hezbollah is usually credited with the bombings, *9/11 Commission Report* indicated Atwan's assertion may have some credibility because "there are also signs that al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown." 60, citing (n. 48) CIA analytic report, "Khobar Bombing: Saudi Shia, Iran, and Usama Bin Ladin All Suspects," CTC 96-30015, July 5, 1996; DIA analytic report, Defense Intelligence Threat Review 97-007, July 1996; Intelligence report made available to the Commission; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 224–5, 300–2.

³⁰⁸ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 164, quoting (n. 4) an interview of Hutaifa Azzam, September 13, 2005, Amman, Jordan. For more on Bin Ladin gaining sanctuary with the Taliban, see Michael Sheuer, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, rev. ed., with a foreword by Bruce Hoffman (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 167–70.

³⁰⁹ Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda*, 56.

troops in the Arabian Peninsula was “one of the worst catastrophes to befall Muslims since the death of the Prophet.”³¹⁰ He laid out his case against the West:

It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims’ blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. . . .

The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet, is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places [referring to the presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia]. . . .

The presence of the U.S.A. Crusader military forces on land, sea and air in the states of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world.

My Muslim Brothers: The money you pay to buy American goods will be transformed into bullets and used against our brothers in Palestine. . . .

More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable [UN sanctions during the 1990s] imposed on Iraq and its nation. . . .

My Muslim Brothers of the World: Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy—your enemy and their enemy—the Americans and the Israelis.³¹¹

At an unidentified date in 1996, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, an independent *mujahid* who fought with Bin Ladin in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and whose nephew, Ramzi Yousef, masterminded the failed 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, showed up in Afghanistan. He renewed acquaintance with Bin Ladin and presented a variety of plot ideas to attack the United States, including a proposal to crash airliners into buildings using trained pilots. Bin Ladin did not immediately accept Mohammad’s idea.³¹²

³¹⁰ Quoted in Wright, *Looming Tower*, 234.

³¹¹ Bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places,” quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 164–6, n. 5 (bracketed text is Bergen’s; first set of brackets is parentheses in original).

³¹² McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 167; Wright, *Looming Tower*, 236. See also *9/11 Commission Report*, 147–9. McDermott indicated that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad might have received the idea directly from Abdul Hakim Murad or from Murad via Mohammad’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef. Either way, McDermott asserted that Murad first pitched to Yusuf an idea of dive-

In February 1997, Bin Ladin issued a second statement, personally challenging U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and praising suicide fighters.³¹³ In March of that year, in an interview with CNN's Peter Arnett and Peter Bergen, Bin Ladin clarified his intentions: "We have focused our declaration on striking at the soldiers in the country of the Two Holy Places [Mecca and Medina]. . . . The country of the Two Holy Places has in our religion a peculiarity of its own over the other Muslim countries. In our religion, it is not permissible for any non-Muslim to stay in our country. Therefore, even though American civilians are not targeted in our plan, they must leave. We do not guarantee their safety."³¹⁴ When Arnett asked Bin Ladin if he would call off his jihad if America left Arabia, Bin Ladin stated, "The reaction came as a result of the aggressive U.S. policy toward the entire Muslim world, not just the Arabian Peninsula," meaning Bin Ladin expected America to disengage with Muslims everywhere.³¹⁵

In February 1998, Bin Ladin, Zawahiri acting as the head of al Jihad, and the leaders of three other jihadist groups under the banner of the "World Islamic Front" pronounced the third *fatwa*, another declaration of war entitled "Jihad

bombing an airplane into the Pentagon or Central Intelligence Agency, and later Yusuf took Murad to meet Mohammad, who took interest in his flight training. *Perfect Soldiers*, 139–40, citing (n. 27) McDermott's copies of transcripts of Murad's interrogations by Philippine intelligence, January 1995, and summaries of Murad's interrogation with FBI, April 1995.

³¹³ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 56, quoting (n. 68) Tim McGirk, "Afghanistan," *Time*, August 31, 1998.

³¹⁴ Quoted in Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 19–20 (bracketed text original). Despite his mention of Saudi Arabia, Bin Ladin cited American support for Israel as his first cause for declaring war. See Wright, *Looming Tower*, 247, referencing Arnett interview.

³¹⁵ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 245, 247, referencing Arnett interview.

Against Jews and Crusaders.”³¹⁶ Zawahiri wrote the call to arms, and it showed that Zawahiri’s vision of a global jihad had, as Atwan noted, “moved to the forefront of the evolving al Qaeda ideology.”³¹⁷ The *fatwa* gave three reasons al Qaeda should attack the United States: the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula, America’s continuing involvement in Iraq, and American support to Israel.³¹⁸ In this *fatwa* al Qaeda took the progression of Islamic radical thought to its most aggressive end—the ideology had evolved from a time at the end of the Soviet occupation when Bin Ladin disliked but did not actively target America, to a focus on American interests in the Arabian Peninsula, to targeting American troops, to finally condoning the death of civilians: “We hereby give all Muslims the following judgment: The judgment to kill and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country. . . . In the name of Allah, we call upon every Muslim, who believes in Allah and asks for forgiveness, to abide by Allah’s order by killing Americans and stealing their money anywhere, anytime, and wherever possible.”³¹⁹ Zawahiri’s assistant heard Bin Ladin describe the honing of al

³¹⁶ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 176–7, citing (n. 24) “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement,” *Al Quds al Arabi*, February 23, 1998, available from the Federation of American Sciences online archives, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>; and Atwan, *Secret History*, 54, 79. This author accessed the Federation of American Sciences archive version on January 5, 2011.

³¹⁷ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 259; and Atwan, *Secret History*, 79. According to *9/11 Commission Report*, the *fatwa*’s language had been in negotiation between the World Islamic Front’s parties for some time. 69, citing (n. 88) “World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad,” *Al Quds al Arabi*, February 23, 1998; closing statement by Assistant U.S. Attorney Ken Karas, *United States v. bin Laden*, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5369, 5376–7).

³¹⁸ As noted in Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 58–9; see “World Islamic Front Statement” for original prose.

³¹⁹ “World Islamic Front Statement,” quoted in Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 99, n. 20 (the translation is slightly different from the translation on the Federation of American Sciences website noted in footnote 316). Wright explained that Bin Ladin’s imam, Abu Hajer, was the mastermind behind the 1996 and 1998 documents:

Qaeda's goals toward the United States: "I myself heard Bin Ladin say that our main objective is now limited to one state only, the United States, and involves waging a guerrilla war against all U.S. interests, not only in the Arab region but also throughout the world."³²⁰

This unprecedented call was legally questionable under Islamic law—while Bin Ladin was on safe ground calling for the expulsion of American troops from Muslim lands, to extend the argument to allow the killing of Americans everywhere was new, and Bin Ladin technically was not a religious scholar. But the call did not take long to gain legitimacy. In March 1998, about 40 Afghan clergy issued a *fatwa* declaring jihad against America, and a group of Pakistani clerics followed with a similar *fatwa* a month later.³²¹

In May 1998, Bin Ladin publicly announced in a press conference "that he had 'formed with many other Islamic groups and organizations in the Islamic world a front called the International Islamic Front to do jihad against the Crusaders and Jews,'" referring to the alliance that issued the *fatwa* three months

Abu Hajer had the greatest spiritual authority, by virtue of having memorized the Quran, but he was an electrical engineer, not a cleric. Nonetheless, Bin Ladin made him head of al Qaeda's *fatwa* committee It was on Abu Hajer's authority that al Qaeda turned from being the anticommunist Islamic army that Bin Ladin originally envisioned into a terrorist organization bent on attacking the United States, the last remaining superpower and the force that Bin Ladin and Abu Hajer believed represented the greatest threat to Islam.

. . . . Abu Hajer's two *fatwas*, the first authorizing the attacks on American troops and the second, the murder of innocents, turned al Qaeda into a global terrorist organization. Al Qaeda would concentrate not on fighting armies but on killing civilians. The former conception of al Qaeda as a mobile army of *mujahidin* that would defend Muslim lands wherever they were threatened was now cast aside in favor of a policy of permanent subversion of the West. The Soviet Union was dead and communism no longer menaced the margins of the Islamic world. America was the only power capable of blocking the restoration of the ancient Islamic caliphate, and it would have to be confronted and defeated. *Looming Tower*, 170–1, 175.

³²⁰ Quoted in Wright, *Looming Tower*, 261.

³²¹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 102; see 99–102. See also Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 62–3.

prior.³²² At the press conference, the sons of the blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman—a firebrand Egyptian cleric and hero to al Qaeda who was incarcerated in the United States for his role supporting the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—distributed copies of their father’s will. In it Rahman stated harshly: “Cut off all relations with [the Americans, Christians, and Jews], tear them to pieces, destroy their economies, burn their corporations, destroy their peace, sink their ships, shoot down their planes and kill them on air, sea, and land.”³²³ This statement solidified for al Qaeda the legitimacy of its call to attack Americans, and no doubt was reflected in later al Qaeda attacks using airplanes, against ships, and in numerous places on land.³²⁴

Later that same year, al Qaeda conducted its most high-profile attack against American interests to that time—the August 7, 1998 attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed over 200 people.³²⁵ The U.S. administration responded by bombing with cruise missiles al Qaeda compounds in Afghanistan and a Sudanese chemical plant that the U.S.

³²² Nic Robertson, “Previously Unseen Tape Shows bin Laden’s Declaration of War,” CNN, August 20, 2002, quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 202, n. 32.

³²³ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 202, citing (n. 33) an interview of Ismail Khan, September 1998, Islamabad, Pakistan; and 204–5, quoting from a copy of the will that Bergen obtained at the press conference (bracketed text original).

³²⁴ See Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 206–8 on Rahman and his *fatwa*’s influence in al Qaeda. Bergen stated:

Sheikh Rahman’s *fatwa* to attack the U.S. economy and American aviation was an important factor in the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda’s Egyptian leaders wanted to exact revenge on the United States for the imprisonment and ‘ill treatment’ of their spiritual guide. At the same time, Sheikh Rahman gave his followers his spiritual sanction for terrorist attacks. Sheikh Rahman’s *fatwas* are the nearest equivalent that al Qaeda has to an ex cathedra statement by the Pope. As someone with a doctorate in Islamic law—for Islam is a religion of laws much like Orthodox Judaism—Sheikh Rahman was able for the first time in al Qaeda’s history to rule that it was legally permissible, and even desirable, to carry out attacks against American planes and corporations, exactly the type of attacks that took place on 9/11. Indeed, up until 9/11 al Qaeda had confined its attacks to American governmental and military targets and had eschewed attacks on American corporations and airliners. *Ibid.*, 208.

³²⁵ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 177.

government believed to be making ingredients for chemical weapons that al Qaeda sought.³²⁶ Bin Ladin swore to repay the missile strikes in a manner that would “deal a blow to America that would shake it to its very foundations,” possibly referring to what would become the 9/11 operation.³²⁷

In January 2000, al Qaeda attempted a failed bombing of the USS *The Sullivans* in harbor at Aden, Yemen, but remained undeterred and successfully completed an attack against the USS *Cole* in October, killing 17 sailors.³²⁸ Two individuals involved in the plot—Tewfiq bin Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) and Khalid al Mihdhar—escaped.³²⁹ Khallad was slated to become one of the 9/11 hijackers but failed to obtain a U.S. visa. Mihdhar succeeded and became one of the hijackers on the flight flown into the Pentagon.³³⁰ In June 2001, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri’s organizations merged formally, cementing the two men’s ideologies and strategies.³³¹

By this time, planning for the 9/11 attacks had been in process for about two years. In early 1999, Bin Ladin had Khalid Sheikh Mohammad travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where Bin Ladin informed him that he could proceed with planning to attack the United States using aircraft. That spring, Mohammad

³²⁶ “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan,” *CNN.com*, August 21, 1998, accessed February 1, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02/>. Since the bombings, the chemical plant’s links with Bin Ladin have generally been discounted. See Karl Vick, “Sudan Plant’s Tie with bin Laden Disputed,” *Washington Post*, October 22, 1998, A29, accessed January 18, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/sudan102298.htm>.

³²⁷ Atwan, *Secret History*, 55; quote is from Atwan, not Bin Ladin.

³²⁸ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 180; and 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 15,” 8.

³²⁹ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 310.

³³⁰ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 209; and 9/11 Commission Report, 2–4, 8–10, 155–6.

³³¹ “Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda (the Base),” *GlobalSecurity.org*, accessed June 27, 2011, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>; see also Wright, *Looming Tower*, 336.

met with Bin Ladin and his military commander, Mohammad Atef, to develop initial targets, which included the White House, Pentagon, U.S. Capitol, and World Trade Center.³³² The plot became known as the “planes operation.”³³³ By December 1999, Bin Ladin and Atef had chosen the key individuals to conduct the operation—Mohammad Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Ramzi Binalshibh, and Nawaf al Hazmi.³³⁴ Binalshibh failed to obtain a U.S. visa and instead became the key intermediary between the remaining hijackers and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.³³⁵

Deception as Part of the 9/11 Attacks

As noted in the theory chapter, an NSAG’s aim to use deception is driven by the existence of conflict between an NSAG and a state that creates conditions under which the NSAG would benefit from manipulating its target’s perception of reality in order to make the state change its behavior or continue acting in a way acceptable to a deceiver until a given end can be achieved. The preceding section shows that by the time al Qaeda began planning the 9/11 attacks, these conditions

³³² 9/11 Commission staff, “Outline of the 9/11 Plot: Staff Statement No. 16,” 2, accessed November 18, 2010, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_16.pdf; Wright, *Looming Tower*, 308; *9/11 Commission Report*, 149–50, citing (n. 16) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, January 9, 2004; and 155, citing (n. 40) Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, August 18, 2003, February 20, 2004, April 30, 2004; Intelligence report, selection of the 9/11 targets, August 13, 2003 (citing KSM interrogation).

³³³ *9/11 Commission Report*, 154, citing (n. 39) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, August 18, 2003. For a detailed account of the planning, see *United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui*, Cr. No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va.) exhibit 941 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s interrogation summaries used in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial), edited version in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 415–9, n. 5.

³³⁴ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 179; and *9/11 Commission Report*, 166, citing (ns. 92–3) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, December 10, 2002, March 4, 2003, March 31, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, February 20, 2004; see also Wright, *Looming Tower*, 309–10.

³³⁵ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 201–2.

held. Al Qaeda was in a state of conflict with the United States and was in a position to benefit from manipulating U.S. perceptions of reality so it could conduct a strategic surprise. The following sections will demonstrate that its choice to use deception before the 9/11 attacks was partly conscious and also an element of its institutional culture of deception and security, and in all aspects was in harmony with its grand strategy.

Threat to al Qaeda and its objectives: The United States was targeting al Qaeda by the time Bin Ladin and Atef chose the lead hijackers in late 1999. The CIA had a devoted Bin Ladin targeting unit, Alec Station, and the FBI's New York division held indictments against Bin Ladin for the 1996 bombing against U.S. personnel at the Saudi National Guard training center and for the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.³³⁶ Before the 1998 bombings, the CIA developed plans for a capture operation that the CIA's senior management did not consider viable.³³⁷ America's cruise missile attack against al Qaeda positions in Afghanistan after the bombings killed 20–30 people but missed Bin Ladin.³³⁸

The 9/11 Commission wrote of CIA operations that might have stopped attacks on the U.S. embassies in Albania and Uganda and noted that several al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists were captured in August and September 1998, among

³³⁶ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 3, 273; and "Osama bin Laden: A Chronology of His Political Life," *Frontline*, accessed July 9, 2011, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/etc/cron.html>.

³³⁷ *9/11 Commission Report*, 114, citing (n. 30) Richard Clark interview (December 18, 2003); CIA cable, "Info from State on Status of Political Approvals for [Tribals]," May 29, 1998; Jeff interview (December 17, 2003); James Pravitt interview (January 8, 2004); George Tenet interview (January 22, 2004); Samuel Berger interview (January 14, 2004).

³³⁸ *9/11 Commission Report*, 117, citing (n. 46) NSC email, Clark to Kerrick, "Timeline," August 19, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (January 14, 2004).

other successes.³³⁹ In the fall of 1999, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a new strategy against al Qaeda, called “The Plan,” which “proposed continuing disruption and rendition operations worldwide. It announced a program for hiring and training better officers with counterterrorism skills, recruiting more assets, and trying to penetrate al Qaeda’s ranks. The Plan aimed to close gaps in technical intelligence collection (signal and imagery) as well. In addition, the CIA would increase contacts with the Northern Alliance rebels fighting the Taliban.”³⁴⁰

Nevertheless, it seems that al Qaeda did not perceive a significant threat from U.S. efforts.³⁴¹ To the contrary, al Qaeda appears to have been frustrated with the lack of a U.S. response to the *Cole* attack. Mohammad Atef in November 2000 explained al Qaeda’s thinking to Ahmad Zaidan, Al Jazeera’s bureau chief in Pakistan: “We did [the USS] *Cole* [attack] and we wanted [the] United States to react. And if they reacted, they are going to invade Afghanistan and that’s what we want. We want them to come to our country, and then we know that they would have bases in Pakistan, in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan. And they are going to hit Afghanistan from these countries. And then we will start holy war against the

³³⁹ *9/11 Commission Report*, 127, citing (n. 103) Benjamin and Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, 261, 264; Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror* (Free Press, 2004), 183; CIA talking points, “CIA Operation Results in Capture of Two Bin Ladin Operatives,” July 7, 1998; CIA memo, Jeff to Tenet, “Biweekly Developments in CT Policy,” July 15, 1998; NSC memo, Benjamin to Berger, October 9, 1998; CIA report, “Apprehension of Senior UBL Lieutenant in Germany,” September 22, 1998; NSC memo, NSC email, Clarke to Berger, September 17, 1998; Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, October 17, 2002; NSC email, Clark to Berger, September 25, 1998.

³⁴⁰ *9/11 Commission Report*, 142, citing (n. 191) CIA briefing materials, “Executive Summary for UBL Conference,” September 16, 1999.

³⁴¹ Gunaratna did note that the group after the East Africa embassy bombings stood on less sure ground outside of its safe haven in Afghanistan: “Although Usama has felt the need to expand his operations, security threats to it curbed many of its overt activities, and he and al Qaeda became increasingly clandestine, choosing to operate through front, cover and sympathetic organizations, the exception being its activities in Afghanistan.” *Inside Al Qaeda*, 78.

Americans, exactly like the Soviets.”³⁴² Similarly, Atwan wrote that “Bin Ladin’s stated objective back in 1996 when I met him was to ‘bring the US to fight on Muslim soil,’” which would mobilize the *mujahidin* and create a devastating war of attrition for the United States.³⁴³ From this perspective, America did not pose a significant threat to al Qaeda as it prepared for the 9/11 attacks. Not only was al Qaeda not feeling particularly pressured, it *wanted* to use the 9/11 attacks to provoke America into a war.

Bin Ladin’s view of America’s military record in post-Vietnam conflicts no doubt also colored his perspective toward the threat from America as he planned the September 11 attacks. In his mind, America had shown an unwillingness to accept casualties in war. He stated as early as 1989: “America went to Vietnam, thousands of miles away, and began bombing them in planes. The Americans did not get out of Vietnam until after they suffered great losses. Over sixty thousand American soldiers were killed until there were demonstrations by the American people. The Americans won’t stop their support of Jews in Palestine until we give them a lot of blows. They won’t stop until we do jihad against them.”³⁴⁴ Along these lines, he potentially thought that striking America on its homeland

³⁴² Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 255, quoting interview of Zaidan (bracketed text is Bergen’s and this author’s).

³⁴³ Atwan, *Secret History*, 221–2, quoting Bin Ladin and referencing “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020.” See also Ulph, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategy Until 2020,” who questions how much of “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020” was written before September 11. This author judges that Mohammad Atef’s comment before September 11 about provoking America into invading Afghanistan is enough to suggest that at least that part of “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020” was developed before September 11.

³⁴⁴ Quoted in Wright, *Looming Tower*, 151, which also noted that at this early date, he then tempered his speech to call for a boycott of American products and a public relations campaign. See pp. 145 and 153 to establish the date of this comment. See also pp. 187–9 on Bin Ladin’s views about America’s weakness when it came to casualties.

would lead the U.S. people to pressure the government to reconsider its policies in the Middle East and other Muslim lands.³⁴⁵

In short, by the time al Qaeda began preparing for the 9/11 attacks, Bin Ladin's first goal was to end American influence in Muslim lands, as shown above. To achieve this objective, he expected the attacks would either force a "retreat from the Middle East along the lines of the U.S. pullout from Somalia in 1993, or a full-scale American ground invasion of Afghanistan similar to the Soviet invasion of 1979, which would then allow the Taliban and al Qaeda to fight a classic guerrilla war."³⁴⁶

Institutionalized culture of deception: Al Qaeda institutionalized a culture of deception and security from the beginning of new recruits' training. Before being inducted, new members chose an alias so no one—including other al Qaeda members—knew a person's true identity.³⁴⁷ Of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohammad Atta chose Abu Abdul Rahman, Ziad Jarrah became Abu Tareq, Marwan al Shehhi was Abul Qaqa, and Ramzi Binalshibh chose Obeida al Emerati.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ Khalid Sheikh Mohammad's interrogation summaries, used in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial, support this notion: "[Khalid] Sheikh Mohammad said that the purpose of the attack on the Twin Towers was to 'wake the American people up.' Sheikh Mohammad said that if the target would have been strictly military or government, the American people would not focus on the atrocities that America is committing by supporting Israel against the Palestinian people and America's self-serving foreign policy that corrupts Arab governments and leads to further exploitation of the Arab/Muslim peoples." U.S. v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 418.

³⁴⁶ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 311; see also 308–9, quoting (n. 27) Sayf al Adel in Fuad Hussein, *Al Zargawi: The Second al Qaeda Generation*, serialized in *Al Quds al Arabi*, June 8 to July 15, 2005; and *ibid.*, 309, quoting the videotaped will of Abdul Aziz al Omari, broadcast by Al Jazeera on September 10, 2002.

³⁴⁷ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 79. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad used multiple aliases, as shown by Gunaratna: in one case Mohammad "introduced himself as a trader of holy water from Medina," and another al Qaeda member knew Mohammad as "Munir Ibrahim Ahmad" who was "operating" as "Abdul Majid Madni." *Ibid.*, xxvii, citing "Background of Accomplice Detailed," *Friday Times*, Lahore, April 3, 1995, 3.

³⁴⁸ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 172, citing (n. 5) the Mounir el-Motassadeq trial and German Federal Criminal Police (BKA) and FBI files reported by Yosri Fouda, *Top Secret: The*

Much of the al Qaeda training focused on teaching the recruits tactical denial strategies to help them avoid detection in a hostile environment, and the operatives who undertook the 9/11 attacks used elements of the training in their deceptions, as will be discussed below.

British authorities in 1999 captured an al Qaeda training manual at the home of Anas al Liby, an al Qaeda computer expert and surveillance trainer living in Birmingham who escaped a British police raid on his house.³⁴⁹ The manual, entitled *Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants (Military Series)*,³⁵⁰ contains lessons on topics such as forging documents, counterfeiting currency, cover, compartmentalization, use of code, and collecting intelligence from overt and clandestine means.³⁵¹ The 9/11 hijackers most likely had access to a copy of the manual while training in Afghanistan, and even if not they no doubt were trained in the methods the manual discussed.

As will be shown in more detail in the chapter on Hezbollah, Shiite practice allows dissimulation (*taqiyya*) in dangerous situations. Al Qaeda, a Sunni group,

Road to September 11, aired on Al Jazeera, September 11, 2002. McDermott did not note Nawaf al Hazmi's alias, probably because Hazmi joined the plot separately.

³⁴⁹ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 210, citing (n. 63) United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al., No. 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), Testimony of Jamal al Fadl, February 6, 2001.

³⁵⁰ The original translation does not contain parentheses around "military series." See *Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants (Military Series)*, 2, reprinted translation in *The al-Qaeda Documents*, vol. 1 (Alexandria, VA: Tempest Publishing, 2002), 7. The translated manual was originally entered as evidence in the East Africa embassy bombings trial (United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al., No. 98 Cr. 1023 [LBS] [S.D.N.Y. 2001], Government Exhibit 1677-T).

³⁵¹ *Declaration of Jihad*, 22–3, 26–39, 75–98 in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 27–8, 31–44, 73–97. Omar Sheikh, who is believed to have had a role in the Daniel Pearl kidnapping, "told his interrogators that he was trained in the following: surveillance/counter surveillance; the art of disguise; interrogation; cell structure; secret rendezvous techniques; hidden writing techniques; cryptology and codes; unarmed combat; and moving (how to enter a room by kicking open the door, falling to the floor and shooting a target)." Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 281.

approves of *taqiyya*-like practices to an extent.³⁵² The training manual condones under certain circumstances participation in some activities restricted under orthodox Islam:

How can a Muslim spy live among enemies if he maintains his Islamic characteristics? How can he perform his duties to Allah and not want to appear Muslim?

Concerning the issue of clothing and appearance (appearance of true religion), Ibn Taimia—may Allah have mercy on him—said, “If a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from [those around him]. The [Muslim] man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, provided his action brings a religious benefit of preaching to them, learning their secrets and informing Muslims, preventing their harm, or some other beneficial goal.”

Resembling the polytheist in religious appearance is a kind of “necessity permits the forbidden” even though they [forbidden acts] are basically prohibited. . . .³⁵³

Vignette—operational deception in fundraising and finance: Al Qaeda’s fundraising and finance operations are a good example of the use of deceptive practices in daily operations that do not meet the threshold of strategic BTD or SQD.

Al Qaeda codified instructions about the use of funding in its training manual. Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna summarized “five financial security principles” mentioned therein: “funds should be divided between those invested for financial return and the balance—operational funds—that should be saved and spent only on operations; operational funds should not all be put in one place; only a few of the organization’s members should know the location of the funds;

³⁵² Tom Diaz and Barbara Newman, *Lightning Out of Lebanon: Hezbollah Terrorists On American Soil* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 44; and Andrew Campbell, “‘*Taqiyya*’: How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West,” *National Observer* no. 65 (Winter 2005), 11–23, accessed July 9, 2011, http://www.nationalobserver.net/2005_winter_ed3.htm.

³⁵³ *Declaration of Jihad*, 77, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 76 (bracketed text original).

while carrying large amounts of money precautions should be taken; any money should be left with nonmembers and spent only when needed.”³⁵⁴

Al Qaeda at the time of the 9/11 attacks had several different methods to raise money, including revenues from companies and from charities, according to Gunaratna.³⁵⁵ The 9/11 Commission reported that al Qaeda relied on a group of fundraisers who obtained most of their money from the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.³⁵⁶ Al Qaeda introduced deception into its fundraising by deceiving donors about how the funds would be used: “Some individual donors knew, and others did not, the ultimate destination of their donations. Al Qaeda and its friends took advantage of Islam’s strong calls for charitable giving, *zakat*. These financial facilitators also appeared to rely heavily on certain imams at mosques who were willing to divert *zakat* donations to al Qaeda’s cause.”³⁵⁷

Additionally, al Qaeda obtained money from corrupt charities through two mechanisms: In the first, al Qaeda had complete control of the charity—such as the al Wafa charity, which was controlled by al Qaeda operatives and wittingly channeled al Qaeda money through its access to the group’s bank accounts.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁴ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 84, citing (n. 8) *Declaration of Jihad*.

³⁵⁵ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 17.

³⁵⁶ *9/11 Commission Report*, 170, citing (n. 115) Frank G. interview, March 2, 2004; CIA analytic report, Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations, CTC 2002-40117CH, November 14, 2002.

³⁵⁷ *9/11 Commission Report*, 170–1, citing (n. 116) Frank G. interview, March 2, 2004; CIA analytic report, “Identifying al-Qa’ida’s Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report,” CTC 2002-40029CH, February 27, 2002. See also John Roth, Douglas Greenberg, and Serena Wille, *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission*, 20–1, accessed June 29, 2011, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf.

³⁵⁸ *9/11 Commission Report*, 170, citing (n. 120) Frank G. interview, March 2, 2004; CIA analytic report, Financial Links of Al Qaeda Operative, CTC 2002-30060CH, June 27, 2002.

Another example was described by Cindy Sher and Minda Block:

The second was subtler—al Qaeda would rely on sympathizers to skim funds from foreign branches of large international charities that practiced poor oversight of locally generated funds, such as the Saudi Arabia–based al Haramain Islamic Foundation.³⁵⁹

To move the money to the core group in Afghanistan, al Qaeda primarily relied on *hawala* and couriers, but also employed the charities.³⁶⁰ Once received, al Qaeda stored its money in a variety of banks, according to Gunaratna.³⁶¹

Enaam Arnaout, whom prosecutors have linked to Osama Bin Ladin, entered a surprise guilty plea to racketeering conspiracy at a federal courthouse in Chicago . . . , admitting in court that not all money collected by his organization went to humanitarian causes.

Arnaout, the director of the Benevolence International Foundation, entered his guilty plea to the first count of the indictment, just as U.S. District Judge Susanne Conlon was about to begin jury selection for the trial.

. . .

During the news conference, Fitzgerald referred to a list of evidence—including documents and photographs—that he said links the foundation to al Qaeda.” “Outcome of Terror-Financing Case Satisfies Jewish Officials in Chicago,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 12, 2003, accessed February 11, 2011, ProQuest (469100261).

Of note, Arnaout pled guilty without admitting affiliation with al Qaeda. See Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 87–113.

³⁵⁹ *9/11 Commission Report*, 170, citing (ns. 118–9) CIA analytic report, “How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,” CTC 99-40003, January 27, 1999; CIA analytic report, “Gauging the War against al-Qa’ida’s Finances,” CTC 2002-30078CH, August 8, 2002; CIA analytic report, paper on Al-Haramain, CTC 2002-30014C, March 22, 2002; CIA analytic report, “Al Qa’ida’s Financial Ties to Islamic Youth Programs,” CTC 2002-40132HCX, January 17, 2003; CIA analytic report, Al Qaeda Financial Network, CTC 2002-30014C, March 22, 2002. See also Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 21; and Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 8–9, 16–7, 80–1.

For more on how Saudi Arabia responded to some of the financial weaknesses in its system that al Qaeda exploited, see Gawdat Bawgat, “Oil and Militant Islam: Strains on U.S.-Saudi Relations,” *World Affairs*, 165, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 115–22, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/i20672657>.

³⁶⁰ Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 25; the authors elaborated: Hawala became particularly important after the August 1998 East Africa bombings increased worldwide scrutiny of the formal financial system. Bin Ladin turned to an established hawala network operating in Pakistan, in Dubai, and throughout the Middle East to transfer funds efficiently. Hawalas were attractive to al Qaeda because they, unlike formal financial institutions, were not subjected to potential government oversight and did not keep detailed records in standard form. . . .

. . .

Al Qaeda used couriers because they provided a secure way to move funds. Couriers were typically recruited from within al Qaeda and could maintain a low profile—perhaps because of their background, language skills, ethnicity, or documentation—and so, ideally, no outsiders were involved or had knowledge of the transaction. They usually did not know the exact

Al Qaeda used approximately \$400,000–500,000 to undertake the 9/11 attacks, according to an estimate by the 9/11 Commission.³⁶² The U.S. government was unable to trace the exact origin of the funds—they most likely came from sources similar to those noted above—and the 9/11 Commission staff said evidence pointed to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad as the focus of disbursements.³⁶³ The group got the money to the hijackers in three ways: wire or bank transfers, the plotters physically carrying cash upon entry into the United States, and through the use of debit and credit cards.³⁶⁴

Once in the United States, the hijackers employed the U.S. banking system. Most of the transferred money came from facilitators in the United Arab Emirates

purpose of the funds. A single courier or several couriers might be used, depending on the route and the amount of money involved. *Ibid.*, 25–6.

³⁶¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 83, citing (ns. 5–7) U.S. Department of State fact sheet on Bin Laden entitled “Osama bin Laden: Islamic Extremist Financier,” August 14, 1996, 2; Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1999), 180, 192, 211–2; *United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al.*

³⁶² *9/11 Commission Report*, citing (n. 110) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 25, 2003. The 9/11 Commission staff broke down the estimate as follows:

The hijackers spent more than \$270,000 in the United States, and the costs associated with Moussaoui were at least \$50,000. The additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred by the plot leader and facilitators, and the expenses incurred by would-be hijackers who ultimately did not participate. For many of these expenses, we have only a mixture of fragmentary evidence and unconfirmed reports, and can make only a rough estimate of costs. Adding up all the known and assumed costs leads to a rough range of \$400,000 to \$500,000. This estimate does not include the cost of running training camps in Afghanistan where the hijackers were recruited and trained or the marginal cost of the training itself. For what its worth, the architect of the plot, KSM, put the total cost at approximately \$400,000, including the money provided to the hijackers and other facilitators, although apparently excluding Moussaoui. Although we cannot know if this estimate is accurate, it seems to be reasonable, given the information available. Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 143–4.

See also 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 16,” 11. The hijackers remitted approximately \$15,000 in unused funds to al Qaeda shortly before the attacks. See Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 86, citing (ns. 16–17) Victoria Griffith, Peter Spiegel, and Hugo Williamson, “How the Hijackers Went Unnoticed,” *Financial Times*, November 29, 2001.

³⁶³ 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 16,” 12. Marwan al Shehhi personally provided a small amount of the funding—roughly \$10,000 from his military salary—to support his own role in the plot. Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 144.

³⁶⁴ Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 133.

(U.A.E.) and Germany.³⁶⁵ Only in one sense—with the use of aliases—did the al Qaeda facilitators use deceptive tactics in funding the 9/11 hijackers. One of the facilitators in the Emirates, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, used an alias when sending \$114,500 in multiple wire transfers to some of the hijackers in 2000. Ramzi Binalshibh, in Germany, used an alias when sending \$14,000 in two installments to Zacarias Moussaoui—who was arrested before the 9/11 attacks and whose intended role in them or in possible subsequent attacks has never been fully determined³⁶⁶—in August 2001. Additionally, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad used a supplemental Visa card applied for in an alias to withdraw funds remitted from the hijackers to al Qaeda shortly before the operation.³⁶⁷

With this the deception ended. The al Qaeda plotters did not use deception to move or spend the money, and al Qaeda did not use *hawala* to fund the hijackers.³⁶⁸ As *The 9/11 Commission Report* stated, “They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection methods in place at the time.”³⁶⁹ In the *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, the 9/11 Commission staff wrote: “The hijackers and their financial facilitators used anonymity provided by the huge international and domestic financial system to move and store their money through a series of unremarkable transactions. The existing mechanisms to prevent abuse of the financial system did not fail. They

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ At his sentencing, Moussaoui said he had been part of a plot to crash an airplane into the White House, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammad said Moussaoui was actually intended to take part in a second wave of attacks. BBC News, “Profile: Zacarias Moussaoui,” April 25, 2006, accessed June 27, 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4471245.stm>.

³⁶⁷ Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 133–5; n. 161 on p. 142.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 139–40.

³⁶⁹ *9/11 Commission Report*, 169, citing (n. 110)—possibly not about this point—Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 25, 2003; Adam Drucker interview (January 12, 2004); FBI Report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” February 29, 2004, 20–2.

were never designed to detect or disrupt transactions of the type that financed 9/11.”³⁷⁰

In short, al Qaeda employed deceptive practices to obtain money that it might have used to undertake the 9/11 attacks and the facilitators used aliases, but the group otherwise relied on the anonymity provided by the worldwide banking system to hide the hijackers’ activities once they were in America.³⁷¹

This thesis will not assess most of al Qaeda’s day-to-day deceptive activities or its use of financial deception against the endgame theory’s variables. Many of the day-to-day deceptive activities—like using aliases—fall into the realm of simple denial. In the case of financing, once the hijackers entered the United States, they for the most part did not rely on deception, and most of the deceptive practices they did employ in fundraising—like those targeted at donors and banks—were tactical or operational, not undertaken with the intent to bring about a specific strategic end against those targets.

Even though one target of the financial deceptions was the international finance system, of which the United States was a part, al Qaeda would have engaged in financial deceptions with or without the 9/11 operation in the works and probably with or without the United States as an adversary. Additionally, the

³⁷⁰ Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 131.

³⁷¹ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler described the al Qaeda hijackers’ final deception: “According to a cell phone call made from a passenger on one of the planes, the hijackers engaged in one last act of deception. They forced the pilots from the cockpit while ushering the passengers to the back of the plane telling them that if their demands were met, the passengers would be released without harm.” “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qai’da’s Operations,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8, no. 2 (June 2004): 73, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue2/jv8n2a6.html>, citing (n. 137) Kate Zernike and Don Van Natta, Jr., “Hijackers’ Meticulous Strategy of Brains, Muscle and Practice,” *New York Times*, November 4, 2001, A1.

group possibly could have funded the 9/11 attacks with money provided by witting donors and not relied on deception at all.

The group's financial deceptions resulted in a strategic benefit for al Qaeda—money to finance operations—but the endgame theory looks at the effect on the target. In this case, the finance operations would be best called an operational measure in the finance theatre of the war against their enemies.

Understanding al Qaeda's day-to-day deceptions is nevertheless useful because it shows the difference between strategic BTD/SQD and tactical or operational deceptions. In the case of tactical and operational measures, they are employed on a frequent basis to engage in long-running activities necessary for the daily functioning of the organization, regardless of whether the measures strategically affect an adversary's behavior. Strategic BTD/SQD is always intended to bring about the latter.

Travel-related deceptions preceding the 9/11 attacks: In the context of the endgame theory, this study looks at one case in which the al Qaeda operatives put their institutionalized practices of deception to work to undertake complex but fairly tactical measures that directly contributed to their ability to complete the 9/11 attacks: travel deceptions.

The 9/11 Commission staff quoted from a CIA report from 2002: “The ability of terrorists to travel clandestinely—including to the United States—is critical to the full range of terrorist activities, including training, planning, communications, surveillance, logistics, and launching attacks. . . . [A]l-Qaeda and other extremist groups covet the ability to elude lookout systems using documents with false

identities and devoid of travel patterns that would arouse suspicion.”³⁷² The staff later noted that al Qaeda travel tactics were distinguished by a reliance on travel facilitators, document forgers, and the group’s ability to adapt techniques as necessary to defeat screening mechanisms.³⁷³

By the time of the 9/11 operation, the group had a well-organized system for assisting travel. According to the 9/11 Commission staff’s monograph about the 9/11 terrorists’ travel, al Qaeda had a division that oversaw passports and host country issues, and it altered travel documents, including passports, visas, and identification cards. Al Qaeda also collected passports from members going to fight in Afghanistan that it gave to others if their original owners were killed. Several of the group’s training courses taught operatives how to forge documents and alter passports; “the purpose of all this training was twofold: to develop an institutional capacity for such techniques and to enable operatives to make necessary adjustments in the field.”³⁷⁴

The 9/11 hijackers engaged in deceptions associated with their travel documents. They hid or removed visas from countries that looked suspicious as they worked to enter the United States, and several of the hijackers tampered with their documents. Before going to the United States some of the hijackers

³⁷² Thomas R. Eldridge et al., *9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (August 21, 2004), 55, accessed December 6, 2010, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf, quoting (n. 79) CIA analytic report, “Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism,” December 31, 2002.

³⁷³ Eldridge et al., *9/11 and Terrorist Travel*, 55.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 56, citing (ns. 84, 86–88) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, September 9, 2003; CIA analytic report, “Al Qaeda Travel Issues,” January 2004, 1; Intelligence report, Collection of Passports, June 7, 2002; CIA analytic report, Analysis of Passports, 1, 3; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, November 12, 2003; Intelligence Report, Information on travel, training and indoctrination in training camps in Afghanistan, November 19, 2001; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainees, April 11, 2002.

“claimed that their passports had been stolen and so received new ones. They lied in order to conceal their travels to Afghanistan, which might have aroused suspicion.”³⁷⁵ Khalid Sheikh Mohammad had Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar use two sets of passports—Yemeni for travel from Pakistan to Malaysia and Saudi for their leg to the United States—in order to avoid trouble caused by Pakistani markings.³⁷⁶ Mohammad Atta had been trained in and mastered the skill of removing stamps and visas from passports.³⁷⁷ Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari’s passports were doctored, and the 9/11 Commission staff estimated that six others had passports that showed some clue of their al Qaeda affiliation.³⁷⁸

The hijackers also deceptively violated various immigration statutes. Three of the hijackers falsely stated on their visa applications that they had never before applied for a U.S. visa.³⁷⁹ The 9/11 Commission staff noted that “during their stays in the United States at least six of the 9/11 hijackers violated immigration laws.” Ziad Jarrah failed to adjust his status from tourist to student, and Atta and Marwan al Shehhi applied for student visas but left the country and returned on

³⁷⁵ Shultz and Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise,” 70, citing (n. 91) Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 105; see also McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 57.

³⁷⁶ *9/11 Commission Report*, 158, citing (n. 56) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 29, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, August 18, 2003.

³⁷⁷ *U.S. v. Moussaoui*, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 417.

³⁷⁸ 9/11 Commission staff, “Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United States: Staff Statement No. 1,” 2, accessed December 6, 2010, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_1.pdf.

³⁷⁹ 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 1,” 4. However, p. 5 noted that the “false statements may have been intentional, to cover up the applicants’ travel on old passports to suspect locations like Afghanistan for terrorist training. On the other hand, these statements may have been inadvertent. During this period, Saudi citizens often had their applications filled out and submitted by third parties. Most importantly, evidence of the prior visas or travel to the United States actually would have reduced concern that the applicants were intending to immigrate, so consular officers had no good reason to deny the visas or travel.”

tourist visas. Hani Hanjour arrived on a student visa to attend an English language school, which he did not do. Nawaf al Hazmi and Satam Suqami both overstayed their terms of admission.³⁸⁰

In what the 9/11 Commission staff would note was “consistent with the instructions in their training manuals,” several of the hijackers also obtained fake documents while in the United States. Eighteen of the 19 hijackers acquired U.S. identification documents that helped them in a variety of routine but necessary tasks; some of these identifications were acquired by fraud.³⁸¹ For example, three of the hijackers employed a fake Virginia address to obtain identification cards.³⁸²

Deception Analysis

The travel deceptions associated with the 9/11 attacks were rudimentary and probably would fit well into traditional concepts of denial and tactical deception, yet they achieved more than simply helping al Qaeda remain a viable organization—they shaped al Qaeda’s success undertaking a strategic surprise against the United States. In Bell’s words, the “combination of tactical deceptions . . . [had] a strategic impact.”³⁸³ They fall into the model of SQD because al Qaeda employed the deceptive methods to keep the U.S. government on a status quo course until the group could undertake a strategic attack intended to influence U.S. policy. This section will assess al Qaeda’s deceptions—particularly with

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 8.

³⁸¹ *9/11 Commission Report*, 390.

³⁸² Shultz and Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise,” 72, citing (n. 123) Robert Handley, “Traces of Terror: The Fugitive,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2002, A20.

³⁸³ J. Bowyer Bell, “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors,” in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 141.

regard to travel measures—in the context of the endgame theory’s independent variables.

Threat environment: As described above, al Qaeda leaders were disappointed that America had not retaliated after the *USS Cole* bombing and were *looking* to provoke an invasion of Afghanistan with the 9/11 attacks in order to start a war that they judged would bring America to its knees.³⁸⁴ Short of war, it is possible that no threat level would have been high enough to deter al Qaeda’s efforts. Therefore, the threat posed by America at the time of the 9/11 attacks, particularly in al Qaeda’s perception, was low.

This shows the importance of perception on the part of both the deceiver and deceived. Even if the United States posed an existential threat to al Qaeda, it was the group’s *perception* of the threat that would play into its choice of deception methods.

Had al Qaeda been under severe threat and realized it, Bin Ladin might not have been so eager to provoke the United States. He might have instead chosen to use an alternative method, potentially including BTM, to try and get America off Muslim lands. But his perceptions of American unwillingness to accept casualties in Vietnam and Somalia,³⁸⁵ combined with an opportunity to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. homeland who could wreak a devastating attack before America realized their designs, no doubt led him to choose a path involving SQD.

³⁸⁴ Atwan, *Secret History*, 221–2, quoting Bin Ladin and referencing “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020”; Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 255, quoting interview of Zaidan; *ibid.*, 308–9, quoting (n. 27) Sayf al Adel in Fuad Hussein, *Al Zarfawi*; and *ibid.*, 309, quoting will of Abdul Aziz al Omari.

³⁸⁵ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 151, 187–9; and Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I know*, 311.

Shulsky requirement #1—strategic coherence: Al Qaeda practiced strategic coherence in its planning for the 9/11 attacks. At the time of the attacks, al Qaeda foremost wanted to pressure the U.S. government to withdraw from Muslim lands and affairs. Bin Ladin hoped the attacks and their aftermath would force a change in U.S. policy, either by creating U.S. internal pressure to leave Muslim lands or starting a war that would force America’s retreat. Either scenario would then allow the overthrow of Islamic regimes sympathetic to Westernization and the eventual reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate.³⁸⁶

On the deception side, the plan was simple. The operatives were trained and instructed to use deceptive methods as necessary to keep America on a complacent footing vis-à-vis al Qaeda until the group could undertake the attacks. In this way the deceptions played to al Qaeda’s overall strategy.³⁸⁷

Shulsky requirement #2—understand the adversary: Al Qaeda understood U.S. institutions and practices well. Gunaratna wrote on al Qaeda’s information gathering about its targets that a “hallmark of an al Qaeda attack is its huge investment in the planning and preparatory stages. To ensure success, al Qaeda has an elaborate, highly skilled organization for mounting surveillance and reconnaissance of targets. After gathering critical data on the intended target, its cadres study it patiently and meticulously before rehearsing and executing an

³⁸⁶ See U.S. v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 418; Atwan, *Secret History*, 221–2, quoting Bin Ladin and referencing “sources” and “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020”; Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 255, quoting interview of Zaidan; *ibid.*, 308–9, quoting (n. 27) Sayf al Adel in Fuad Hussein, *Al Zarfawi*; and *ibid.*, 309, quoting will of Abdul Aziz al Omari.

³⁸⁷ See Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends,” 368–9.

operation.”³⁸⁸ This description no doubt also holds for al Qaeda’s ability to undertake successful deception.

Al Qaeda knew the degree of deception necessary to successfully infiltrate its operatives into the United States, get them the training they needed, and undertake the attacks of September 11. As the 9/11 Commission staff’s monograph about terrorist travel asserted, “By 2000, when al Qaeda began inserting participants in the September 11 plot into the United States, their operational knowledge of our immigration, visitor, and border systems was considerable.”³⁸⁹

Al Qaeda understood that successfully targeting America would require the operatives to be circumspect. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad knew that U.S. authorities were not looking for operatives who might have fought in previous jihads, but he and the head of an al Qaeda training camp indicated that the group purposefully selected operatives with clean records who would not be known to international security agencies in order to avoid raising alerts as they entered and operated in the United States.³⁹⁰

Gunaratna wrote that al Qaeda was aware the FBI monitored Muslim communities in the United States, so it kept the operatives away from Islamic strongholds and built a new network that had no connection to then-existing

³⁸⁸ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 10.

³⁸⁹ Eldridge et al., *9/11 and Terrorist Travel*, 54. McDermott also provided an illustrative anecdote on the 9/11 hijackers obtaining identification cards to facilitate their operations: “The hijackers knew that local identification made the purchase of everything, notably airline tickets, easier to accomplish with less scrutiny. A number of them—seven of the nineteen—went to Virginia specifically to get identification cards or driver’s licenses, having determined Virginia was a particularly easy place to do so. One way they might have known this was from Mohammed Belfas, the Hamburg man who had been a mentor to Atta. Belfas had gotten a Virginia license at precisely the same office in precisely the same manner the year before.” *Perfect Soldiers*, 221–2.

³⁹⁰ *9/11 Commission Report*, 234, citing (n. 101) Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, February 18, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, January 7, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, February 8, 2003.

extremist networks in America.³⁹¹ Khalid Sheikh Mohammad taught some of the hijackers about Western culture and travel,³⁹² and they comported themselves in dress and demeanor like average foreign visitors to the country, not radicals. They all entered the country under a cover, most as tourists.³⁹³ As Peter Bergen wrote, “These were not . . . impoverished suicide bombers of the type usually seen in the Palestinian *intifada*. Instead, they were generally well educated, technically savvy young men who blended all too well into various American communities in California, Florida, and Virginia. They did not wear the full beards of the typical Islamist militant, but were clean-shaven. They worked out at gyms, ordered in pizza, and booked their flights on the Internet. Some even drank on occasion In short, the hijackers looked and acted like the increasingly diverse United States of the twenty-first century.”³⁹⁴

Shulsky requirement #3—organizational infrastructure for deception and security measures: Al Qaeda, while probably smaller and more decentralized in

³⁹¹ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 138.

³⁹² *9/11 Commission Report*, 157, citing (n. 51) Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, March 24, 2003 and June 15, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, August 21, 2003.

³⁹³ Federation for American Immigration Reform, “Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists,” updated February 2004, accessed December 7, 2010, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersc582. For example, Mihdhar and Hazmi stated that they were students from Saudi Arabia who were planning to study English in the United States. *9/11 Commission Report*, 217, citing (n. 16) Caysan Bin Don interview, April 20, 2004; FBI report of investigation, interview of Isamu Dyson, October 8, 2001.

³⁹⁴ Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 29. Speaking of al Qaeda training to this end, Eldridge et al. wrote that Abu Zubaydah, al Qaeda’s senior operational planner, “told travelers to cut their hair, to shave their beards and mustaches, and to always be polite. He told them what kinds of clothes to wear, what kinds of airline tickets to purchase, how to alter their appearances, and what to carry in order to avoid attracting suspicion from border authorities. He tried to recruit operatives who spoke the language of the country whose travel documents he provided them. Zubaydah said he spared no expense on operational travel.” *9/11 and Terrorist Travel*, 57, citing (n. 102) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, May 23, 2002, Oct. 29, 2002, and Nov. 7, 2002. The exception to all of this is the cases of Hazmi and Mihdhar, whom Khalid Sheikh Mohammad instructed to seek assistance at local mosques in California, and then expected them to break any ties before relocating eastward. *9/11 Commission Report*, 215–6, citing (n. 6) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.

operations than the other groups studied later in this paper, nevertheless had a structure for coordinating its deceptive activities, as Wright noted: “One can appreciate the ambition of al Qaeda by looking at its bureaucratic structure, which included committees devoted to military affairs, politics, information, administration, security, and surveillance.”³⁹⁵

In addition to fostering in its operatives a culture of deception, as discussed above, al Qaeda also inculcated a culture of security in its operatives’ training. Al Qaeda’s training manual contained sections on communicating and traveling safely, living a cover, compartmentalization, and use of code, among other skills.³⁹⁶ It stated: “The more solid is the security plan, the more successful [the work] and the fewer the losses.”³⁹⁷ It noted the conditions necessary for a security plan to succeed: “A. Realistic and based on fact so it would be credible to the enemy before and after the work. B. Coordinated, integrated, cohesive, and accurate, without any gaps, to provide the enemy [the impression of] a continuous and linked chain of events. C. Simple so that the members can assimilate it. D. Creative. E. Flexible. F. Secretive.”³⁹⁸

The 9/11 operatives showed particular adeptness at compartmentalization and communications security:

Compartmentalization: The al Qaeda training manual stated: “Cell or cluster methods should be adopted by the Organization. It should be composed of many

³⁹⁵ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 142.

³⁹⁶ *Declaration of Jihad*, 26–42, 53–4, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 31–47, 58–9.

³⁹⁷ *Declaration of Jihad*, 57, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 62 (bracketed text original).

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.* (bracketed text original).

cells whose members do not know one another, so that if a cell member is caught the other cells would not be affected and work would proceed normally.”³⁹⁹

Except for its planners and those involved in the plot, very few people knew of the 9/11 operation before it occurred.⁴⁰⁰ Wright noted: “Al Qaeda had developed a management philosophy that it called ‘centralization of decision and decentralization of execution.’ Bin Ladin decided on the targets, selected the leaders, and provided at least some of the funding. After that, the planning of the operation and the method of attack were left to the men who would have the responsibility of carrying it out.”⁴⁰¹ Khalid Sheikh Mohammad gave Atta enough latitude in his decision making that frequent consultations were not necessary, and he forbade the other operatives from contacting Pakistan.⁴⁰²

The pilots knew the full plan, but the remaining hijackers (the “muscle hijackers”) only knew that they would conduct a martyrdom operation. According to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, “To prevent any leakage of information, they were not informed of many details. We told them that brother Abu Abdul Rahman [the lead hijacker, Mohammad Atta] would provide them with details at a later stage.”⁴⁰³ They were informed about the plot shortly beforehand.⁴⁰⁴

³⁹⁹ *Declaration of Jihad*, n. 2 on p. 30, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 35.

⁴⁰⁰ *9/11 Commission Report*, 236, citing (n. 109) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, February 23, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, April 2, 2004; see also Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends,” 382.

⁴⁰¹ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 318.

⁴⁰² U.S. v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 417.

⁴⁰³ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 304, quoting (303, n. 22) a statement by Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in *The Road to September 11* (bracketed text original).

⁴⁰⁴ U.S. v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 421.

Before that, they were trained to conduct multiple types of attacks so their exact mission would not be compromised if they were caught.⁴⁰⁵

Al Qaeda also kept connections between the hijackers to a minimum. Atta maintained communication with the largest number of hijackers; the remainder had little interaction with each other.⁴⁰⁶ Atta also forbade the operatives from contacting their loved ones, although Ziad Jarrah ignored him and retained contact with his girlfriend and family.⁴⁰⁷

Compartmentalization possibly saved the 9/11 operation from compromise. Zacarias Moussaoui had received money from Binalshibh, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammad had not allowed him to contact the other operatives. Had he been in association with the others, the links might have been discovered, compromising the network.⁴⁰⁸

Communications security: On communication, the al Qaeda training manual stated: “It is well known that in undercover operations, communication is the mainstay of the movement for rapid accomplishment. However, it is a double-

⁴⁰⁵ *9/11 Commission Report*, 236, citing (n. 109) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, February 23, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, April 2, 2004.

⁴⁰⁶ Shultz and Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise,” 69, citing (n. 76) Valdis E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” *Connections* 24, no. 3 (2002): 46, <http://www.orgnet.com/mappingterroristnetworks.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁷ *9/11 Commission Report*, 246–7, 249, citing (n. 153) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, November 1, 2003 and October 11, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, October 31, 2002. See also Elizabeth Neuffer, “Hijack Suspect Lived a Life, or a Lie,” *Boston Globe*, September 25, 2001, accessed June 20, 2011, ProQuest (81980493); and Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Translation of Interview, Conducted by German Authorities, of the Girlfriend of Ziad JARRAH,” September 18, 2001, now declassified and available from *Intelwire.com*, accessed November 7, 2011, <http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2001-09-18-FBI-translation-aysel-senguen-jarrah.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁸ Roth, Greenberg, and Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing*, 135; and *9/11 Commission Report*, 247, citing (n. 163) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, November 7, 2002, February 13, 2003, and February 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003. For more on the case against Moussaoui, see *United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui*, superseding indictment, Cr. 01-455-A (E.D. Va., 2002), accessed November 30, 2010, http://f11.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/moussaoui/usmouss_71602spind.pdf.

edged sword: It can be to our advantage if we use it well and it can be a knife dug into our back if we do not consider and take the necessary security measures.”⁴⁰⁹

The 9/11 plotters relied on couriers and face-to-face meetings to pass the most important messages from the hijackers in the United States. When this was not possible, they passed some messages via coded language in conversation.⁴¹⁰ For example, in early July 2001 Mohammad Atta met Binalshibh in Spain, presumably to discuss the developing attack plot.⁴¹¹ A month later, in early August, Atta and Binalshibh discussed how to purchase airplane tickets, assignment of the muscle hijackers to teams, and the question of whether to target the White House. They reportedly conducted the conversation using “coded language, pretending to be students discussing various fields of study: ‘architecture referred to the World Trade center, ‘arts’ the Pentagon, ‘law’ the Capitol, and ‘politics’ the White House.”⁴¹²

Atta called Binalshibh in mid-August 2001 with a date for the attacks, and conveyed the information via riddle/code: “a message of two branches, a slash,

⁴⁰⁹ *Declaration of Jihad*, 29, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 34.

⁴¹⁰ For training manual guidance on the use of couriers, secret meetings, and codes, among other communication-related topics, see *Declaration of Jihad*, 30–8, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 35–43. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad trained at least one of the hijackers—Hani Hanjour—in the use of code words. *9/11 Commission Report*, 226, citing (n. 61) Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, February 20, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 15, 2003.

⁴¹¹ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 222.

⁴¹² *9/11 Commission Report*, 248, citing (n. 166) Intelligence reports, interrogation of KSM, August 12, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogations of Binalshibh, September 11, 2003 (two reports). In n. 166 on p. 531, the 9/11 Commission commented that “Binalshibh . . . has denied that *law* and *politics* referred to two separate targets; he claims that both terms referred to the U.S. Capitol, even though in the context of the exchange it seems clear that two different targets were contemplated.” According to Timothy Thomas, Al Jazeera reported that the conversation went along the following lines: “The semester begins in three more weeks. We’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering.” “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,’” *Parameters* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 119, accessed June 20, 2011, Academic OneFile (A99233031), citing (n. 25) Yossi Melman, “Virtual Soldiers in a Holy War,” *Ha’aretz*, September 17, 2002, <http://www.haaretz.com>.

and a lollipop” (11/9, as 9/11 would be conveyed in the non-American style of writing).⁴¹³ On August 29, Atta called Binalshibh and confirmed that the plan was a go, and Binalshibh sent a courier, Zakaria Essabar, to Afghanistan with a letter to inform Khalid Sheikh Mohammad of the attack date. Essabar was not informed of the message’s details and did not have foreknowledge of the attacks.⁴¹⁴ Essabar arrived in time, as Bin Ladin later related that he had learned of the impending attacks on the previous Thursday, September 6.⁴¹⁵ Atta reportedly called Mohammad on September 10 and, using coded phrases, Mohammad gave Atta the go-ahead for the attack the following day.⁴¹⁶

Shulsky requirement #4—channels to reach the adversary: The channels al Qaeda needed to feed false information were generally part of the systems that the

⁴¹³ *9/11 Commission Report*, 249, citing (n. 172) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, October 1, December 17, and December 21, 2002. Bergen quoted Binalshibh relating a slightly different riddle, stating that Atta said, “‘Two sticks, a dash, and a cake with a stick down. What is it?’ I [Binalshibh] said: ‘You wake me to tell me this puzzle?’ As it turns out, sticks is the number 11, a dash is a dash, and a cake with a stick down is the number 9. And that was September 11th.” *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 304, quoting (303, n. 22) a statement by Ramzi Binalshibh in *The Road to September 11*. See also Atwan, *Secret History*, in which Binalshibh claimed this was one of Atta’s dreams. 111, citing (n. 9) an interview with Al Jazeera, September 15, 2002.

⁴¹⁴ *9/11 Commission Report*, 249, citing (n. 172) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, October 1, December 17, and December 21, 2002; McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 229, citing (n. 57) Ramzi Binalshibh interview with Yosri Fouda in Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, *Masterminds of Terror* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), 215; 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 16,” 17–8 (page numbers not noted in original McDermott cite); and U.S. v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 421.

⁴¹⁵ “Transcript of Usama bin Laden Video Tape,” December 13, 2001, 3; in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 103. This document was originally released by the U.S. Department of Defense. “News Release: U.S. Releases Videotape of Osama bin Laden,” December 13, 2001, accessed July 13, 2011, http://web.archive.org/web/20060625223529/http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b12132001_bt630-01.html; transcript accessed July 13, 2011, <http://web.archive.org/web/20060623051212/http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/d20011213ubl.pdf>.

⁴¹⁶ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, xxxi, citing (n. 52) Daniel Rubin and Michael Dorgan, “Terrorists’ Sept. 11 Plot a Many Tentacled Creature,” *Tribute News Service*, September 8, 2002, 1, based on interviews with unnamed U.S. intelligence officials. For more on Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Ramzi Binalshibh’s use of codes, see 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 16,” 16. Interestingly, Mohammad reportedly “did not like using codes in routine messages or e-mails,” and instead preferred that “the operatives be normal to the maximum extent possible in their dealings” U.S. v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A, exhibit 941, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 417.

group deceived. Al Qaeda targeted its travel deception at the U.S. entry and immigration systems to get operatives into the country and to keep them there. The main consumers of its false information were U.S. government officials who processed the hijackers' paperwork. It was also necessary for the hijackers to provide flight school administrators and acquaintances with cover stories that hid their true reason for being in the United States.⁴¹⁷

Al Qaeda did not try to feed the United States false information about the actual attacks—there was no attempt to plant a false attack date or *modus operandi*. In this sense, sophisticated channels for feeding false information were not necessary.

Shulsky requirement #5—receive feedback: Al Qaeda had some capabilities at the time that it undertook deception to receive and analyze feedback, although because of the nature of the deceptions, it was not required to expend significant resources doing so and it could rely on observation of the status quo (passive feedback). The al Qaeda training manual instructed operatives in overt and clandestine information collection methods, and al Qaeda possibly had operatives dedicated to following current events.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ See McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 195–7.

⁴¹⁸ See *Declaration of Jihad*, 80–98, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 79–97. Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos (an arrested al Qaeda member) stated: “We had been divided into several groups. There was a technological group. I did a test to become part of that group, but the person in charge, who was an Egyptian electronics engineer, did not like what I did and failed me. They put me in the analysis group where I had to read all the newspapers and give my analysis about what to do.” Castanheira and Ferreira, “Exterterrorista Portugues Confessa-se,” quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 118 (117, n. 10). Hamid Mir, Bin Ladin’s biographer, stated, “So I said, ‘Okay, so you watch Larry King show?’ He [Bin Ladin] said, ‘Yes, I am fighting a big war and I have to monitor the activities of my enemy through these TV channels.’” Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 318, quoting (n. 16) an interview of Hamid Mir, May 11, 2002 and March 2005, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Once the attack operatives were in the United States, Atta and the other lead hijackers had only to ensure that their subordinates were not arrested—if they had been, as was Moussaoui, Atta would know that somehow the deception failed. Even then, again as Moussaoui’s arrest shows, all was not lost thanks to the group’s security efforts. The only feedback al Qaeda needed to assure that the plot had gone off successfully was confirmation that the attacks had occurred, and Bin Ladin received this feedback personally via the radio:

We were at [. . . *inaudible* . . .] when the event took place. We had notification since the previous Thursday that the event would take place that day. We had finished our work that day and had the radio on. It was 5:30 p.m. our time. I was sitting with Dr. Ahmad Abu al Khair. Immediately, we heard the news that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. We turned the radio station to the news from Washington. The news continued and no mention of the attack until the end. At the end of the newscast, they reported that a plane just hit the World Trade Center.

. . .
. . . After a little while, they announced that another plane had hit the World Trade Center. The brothers who heard the news were overjoyed by it.⁴¹⁹

Target counterdeception capabilities: The United States practiced fairly weak counterdeception against al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks. U.S. counterdeception weaknesses fall into four categories: failure to collect information, failure to share information, failure to adapt the U.S. travel system to the threat, and failure to adapt the U.S. bureaucracy to the threat.

Failure to collect information: Despite U.S. activities targeting al Qaeda, the U.S. and international intelligence community failed to obtain enough details about the 9/11 plot in a timely enough manner to detect the presence of all the hijackers or disrupt the attacks. Al Qaeda had three primary nodes that, if

⁴¹⁹ “Transcript of Usama bin Laden Video Tape,” 3–4, in *al-Qaeda Documents*, 103–4 (bracketed text is in parentheses in original).

penetrated, probably would have yielded the information necessary to reveal the plot—the core group around Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, the facilitators in Germany and the United Arab Emirates, and the hijackers in America.

The group in Afghanistan reportedly remained difficult to penetrate with human assets because of barriers posed by loyalty, kinship, and the group members' fanaticism.⁴²⁰ According to Wright, “the CIA had no one inside al Qaeda or the Taliban security that surrounded Bin Ladin. The agency did have some contacts with a few Afghan tribesmen”⁴²¹

The facilitators for the most part did not come onto the radar until after the attacks. Domestically, had the FBI investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui developed after his arrest on August 16, 2001, the FBI might have discovered the connections between Moussaoui and Ramzi Binalshibh.⁴²² Based on a tip from Moussaoui's flight instructor, the FBI agent handling the case suspected Moussaoui possibly was planning to hijack an airplane, but it was unclear whether he could be imprisoned, so the agent worked with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to have him detained on immigration charges.⁴²³ The investigation delayed as the FBI tried to obtain evidence against Moussaoui from the governments of France and the United Kingdom, where he had

⁴²⁰ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 192, talking about the Sudan years, but it likely applies to the years closer to 9/11 as well.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁴²² *9/11 Commission Report*, 247, citing (n. 163) Intelligence reports, interrogations of Binalshibh, November 7, 2002, February 13, 2003, and February 27, 2003; Intelligence report, Interrogation of KSM, July 2, 2003.

⁴²³ *9/11 Commission Report*, 247, citing (n. 159) FBI report, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” February 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 90; DOJ Inspector General interview of John Weess, Oct. 22, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum, “Moussaoui, Zacarias,” August 31, 2001; and 273, citing (ns. 92–3) DOJ Inspector General interview of Harry S., June 6, 2002; DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, August 19, 2001; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 128.

previously lived, in hopes something would surface showing him as an agent of a terrorist group or foreign power, as this would allow the FBI to obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant to exploit his computer.⁴²⁴ By the time of the attacks, the FBI had received information from France that Moussaoui had connections to the Chechen commander Ibn al Khattab, but did not believe this was sufficient to justify a FISA warrant.⁴²⁵ The FBI renewed its request to the United Kingdom after the attacks, and the British provided information that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan—a data point that almost certainly would have changed the case had it been available in August 2001.⁴²⁶

With one notable exception described below—the case of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi—the other U.S.-based plotters also did not come to the attention of the United States before the attacks.

Even though it did not collect the details necessary to take action, the U.S. intelligence community nevertheless received multiple indicators that al Qaeda was planning an operation. According to two examples by Wright, multiple foreign governments or entities—to include the Taliban foreign minister—warned the United States that al Qaeda was planning an attack, and the National Security

⁴²⁴ *9/11 Commission Report*, 273–4, citing (n. 94) DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 138.

⁴²⁵ *9/11 Commission Report*, 274, citing (ns. 96–7) FBI electronic communication, Request to contact U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, August 18, 2001; DOJ Inspector General interview of Greg J., July 9, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Moussaoui investigation, August 22, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Moussaoui investigation, August 30, 2002.

⁴²⁶ *9/11 Commission Report*, 275, citing (n. 105) FBI letterhead memorandum, Zacarias Moussaoui, September 11, 2001; British Security Service memo, re: Zacarias Moussaoui, September 12, 2001; information provided to the Commission by the British government; British liaison telex, “Zacarias Moussaoui—Background Information,” September 13, 2001; Joseph H. interview (May 4, 2004).

Agency (NSA) collected increasing “chatter” among extremists.⁴²⁷ Additionally, an FBI agent in Phoenix in July 2001 sent a communication to FBI headquarters, the CIA, and FBI agents in New York warning “of the possibility of a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Ladin to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges” and suggesting, among other things, that FBI make “a list of Arab students who had sought visas for flight training.” FBI and CIA ran name checks on individuals listed in the memo, but made no connections to the 9/11 plotters.⁴²⁸

The intelligence community also did not fail to warn that an attack was imminent. By September 11, President Bush had received 40 Presidential Daily Briefs since the first of that year on the topic of Bin Ladin, according to the 9/11 Commission, the most notable of which (on August 6) stated that Bin Ladin was “determined to strike in [the] U.S.”⁴²⁹ From the spring onward the CIA and other intelligence and policy community members warned in multiple venues that an attack was imminent, although for the most part the concern was that U.S. interests would be attacked overseas.⁴³⁰

Failure to share information: Information compartmentalization, concerns about the legal use of information, and a culture of collection that focused more on monitoring and less on disruption underpinned the U.S. intelligence

⁴²⁷ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 337–8.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, 350–1; first quote is Wright quoting the memo, second quote is this author quoting Wright. The 9/11 Commission, after investigating the circumstances surrounding the memo, determined that “if the memo had been distributed in a timely fashion and its recommendations acted on promptly, we do not believe it would have uncovered the plot. It might well, however, have sensitized the FBI so that it might have taken the Moussaoui matter more seriously the next month.” *9/11 Commission Report*, 272.

⁴²⁹ *9/11 Commission Report*, 254, 261.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, 255–63.

community's reluctance to share information about al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks. *The 9/11 Commission Report* and Wright's *Looming Tower* both provide examples of U.S. intelligence community members failing to share information they collected about the plot. The most widely cited example in these and other texts involves the case of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi's entry into the United States.

The CIA learned in 1999 that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda members and suspected that Mihdhar planned to travel in early 2000 to the United States. In March, the CIA received word of Hazmi's travel to America that January, but failed to alert the FBI or State Department of its suspicions about Mihdhar's intent to travel or about Hazmi's U.S. entry.⁴³¹

In June 2001, the CIA passed to FBI photographs taken in January 2000 while Mihdhar and Hazmi were in Malaysia meeting with Khallad and other al Qaeda operatives:⁴³²

"John" [CIA] gave three Kuala Lumpur surveillance pictures to "Jane" [FBI] to show to . . . New York agents. She was told that one of the individuals in the photographs was someone named Khalid al Mihdhar. She did not know why the photographs had been taken or why the Kuala Lumpur travel might be significant, and she was not told that someone had identified Khallad [who was unable to enter the United States] in the photographs. When "Jane" did some research in a database for intelligence reports, Intelink, she found . . . original NSA reports on the planning for the meeting. Because the CIA had not

⁴³¹ Wright, *Looming Tower*, 310–2; and *9/11 Commission Report*, 181–2, citing (ns. 52–4) CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates," February 11, 2000; CIA cable, "UBL Associates: Identification of Possible UBL Associates," March 5, 2000; Joint Inquiry testimony of George Tenet, October 17, 2002, 110–2; DOJ Inspector General interview of John, November 1, 2002.

⁴³² Wright, *Looming Tower*, 310–1; and *9/11 Commission Report*, 181, citing (ns. 45–6) CIA cables, "Identification of UBL associate Khalid Transiting Dubai," January 4, 2000; "UBL Associate Travel to Malaysia—Khalid Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Mihdhar," January 5, 2000; "Arrival of UBL Associate Khalid Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Mihdhar," January 6, 2000; CIA cable, "UBL Associates Travel to Malaysia and Beyond—Khalid Bin Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Mihdhar," January 6, 2000.

disseminated reports on its tracking of Mihdhar, “Jane” did not pull up any information about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa or about travel to the United States by Hazmi or Mihdhar.

...

The only information “Jane” had about the meeting—other than the photographs—were the NSA reports that she found on Intelink. These reports, however, contained caveats that their contents could not be shared with criminal investigators without the permission of the Justice Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). Therefore “Jane” concluded that she could not pass on information from those reports to the agents. This decision was potentially significant, because the signals intelligence she did not share linked Mihdhar to a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East. The agents would have established a link to the suspected facility from their work on the embassy bombings case. This link would have made them very interested in learning more about Mihdhar. . . .

“Dave,” the CIA analyst, knew more about the Kuala Lumpur meeting. He knew that Mihdhar possessed a U.S. visa, that his visa application indicated that he intended to travel to New York, that Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles and that a source had put Mihdhar in the company of Khallad. No one at the meeting asked him what he knew; he did not volunteer anything. He told investigators that as a CIA analyst, he was not authorized to answer FBI questions regarding CIA information. “Jane” said she assumed that if “Dave” knew the answers to questions, he would have volunteered them. The New York agents left the meeting without obtaining information that might have started them looking for Mihdhar.⁴³³

FBI did not learn of Mihdhar and Hazmi’s presence in the homeland until later that summer, when an FBI officer working at CIA, “Mary,” was asked by a CIA manager to review materials relating to the meeting Mihdhar and Hazmi had in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and found the March 2000 cable stating that Hazmi had traveled to the United States. She then with “Jane” queried the INS and was told that Mihdhar had also entered the country.⁴³⁴ FBI began searching for

⁴³³ *9/11 Commission Report*, 268–9, citing (ns. 69, 71–2) DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, November 4, 2002, July 16, 2003; DOJ Inspector General interview of Steve B., September 16, 2002; CIA records, audit of cable databases; CIA email, Dave to John, timeline entries, May 15, 2001; DOJ Inspector General interview of Dave, October 31, 2002.

⁴³⁴ *9/11 Commission Report*, 269–70, citing (ns. 73–5) DOJ Inspector General interview of Mary, October 29, 2002; CIA cable, Khalid’s passport, January 4, 2000; CIA cable, Mihdhar’s visa application, January 5, 2000; CIA cable, Hazmi entered U.S., March 6, 2000; CIA records, audit of cable databases; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, November 4, 2002. For more details on this matter, see *9/11 Commission Report*, 266–72, 355–6; 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff

Mihdhar and Hazmi immediately, but because the case was designated an intelligence vice criminal case, “Jane” was erroneously unwilling to share information about it with criminal agents familiar with al Qaeda and experienced with hunting down suspects. The 9/11 Commission speculated that had the criminal agents also been allowed to investigate the matter, Mihdhar and Hazmi possibly could have been located before the 9/11 attacks.⁴³⁵

The fact that CIA knew Mihdhar was in the United States but did not raise sufficient flags to have him investigated demonstrates what Gunaratna described as a culture of collection over disruption that prevailed at the time. Gunaratna wrote that the international intelligence community was “suffering from the Cold War legacy of ‘monitoring spies’ as opposed to disrupting terrorist support operations”⁴³⁶

Failure to adapt the U.S. travel system: The 9/11 Commission “found that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by

Statement No. 1,” 5; and Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 261. In another example of failed information sharing, the FBI and CIA had intelligence about al Qaeda’s travel and passport practices, but did not disseminate this information to consular, immigration, or customs officials who could have used it to screen applicants to enter the country. 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 1,” 3.

⁴³⁵ *9/11 Commission Report*, 270–2, citing (ns. 77–85) DOJ Inspector General interviews of Jane, July 16, 2003; November 4, 2002; attachment to FBI email, Jane to Craig D., “Re: FFI Request,” August 28, 2001; FBI electronic communication, “Request to Open a Full Field Investigation,” August 28, 2001; FBI email, Craig D. to John L., “Fwd: Re: FFI Request,” August 28, 2001; FBI email, John L. to Steve and others, “Fwd: Red: FFI Request,” August 28, 2001; DOJ Inspector General interviews of Steve B., September 16, 2002; November 14, 2002; Jane interview (July 13, 2004); FBI email, Jane to John L., “Fwd: Re: FFI Request,” August 29, 2001; FBI email, Jane to Steve, NSLU Response, August 29, 2001; DOJ Inspector General interview of Sherry S., November 7, 2002; FBI emails between Steve B. and Jane, re: NSLU Response, August 29, 2001; DOJ IG 9/11 Report, July 2, 2004, p. 339; NSC email, Carlene C. to Richard K., “Response to FBI Sanitization Request,” August 28, 2001; DOJ Inspector General interview of Robert F., December 18, 2002; FBI electronic communication, Los Angeles lead, September 10, 2001; FBI report, financial spreadsheet re: 9/11 hijackers, undated; South Hackensack, N.J., Police Department report, Detective Bureau Report, October 17, 2001 (case no. 20018437); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, February 14, 2003.

⁴³⁶ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 309.

border authorities.” It also noted that four to 15 of the hijackers could have been intercepted had authorities scrutinized their travel documents and patterns, and more effective use of U.S. government database information could have identified three of them.⁴³⁷ In Mihdhar’s case, in January 2000, the U.S. consulate in Jeddah had been asked about his visa status as part of a terrorism investigation, but neither the requester nor the consulate noted this in the State Department’s TIPOFF watchlist. When he applied again the next year, nothing in the system flagged that there had been a previous terrorism-related inquiry about him.⁴³⁸

The Commission also reported that al Qaeda exploited flaws in U.S. immigration law, and “found that had the immigration system set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or what they claim to be—and ensuring routine consequences for violations—it could have potentially excluded, removed, or come into further contact with several hijackers who did not appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors.”⁴³⁹ For example, at least six of the hijackers violated immigration law after arriving by engaging in actions such as overstaying visas or failing to adjust visa status, yet there were no successful mechanisms in place at the time to detect or act upon the violations.⁴⁴⁰

Terry McDermott explained that the successful denial of one of the plotters—Ramzi Binalshibh, a Yemeni—also demonstrated that the border control system was overly focused on preventing economic migration. Consular officers who interviewed Binalshibh for a visa denied him entry because they determined he

⁴³⁷ *9/11 Commission Report*, 384.

⁴³⁸ 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 1,” 5.

⁴³⁹ *9/11 Commission Report*, 384.

⁴⁴⁰ 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 1,” 8.

might attempt to take an American job.⁴⁴¹ The 9/11 Commission staff noted: “Our immigration system before 9/11 focused primarily on keeping individuals intending to immigrate from improperly entering the United States. In the visa process, the most common form of fraud is to get a visa to visit the United States as a tourist and then stay to work and perhaps become a resident. Consular officers concentrated on interviewing visa applicants whom they suspected might leave and not return.”⁴⁴² In contrast, Saudis and Emiratis rarely attempted to obtain work in the United States or overstay their term of visit, so the hijackers from those countries—17 of the 19—received little scrutiny from consular officers.⁴⁴³

The 9/11 Commission Report summed up the weaknesses in the U.S. travel entry system: “Two systemic weaknesses came together in our border system’s inability to contribute to an effective defense against the 9/11 attacks: a lack of well-developed counterterrorism measures as part of border security and an immigration system not able to deliver on its basic commitments, much less support counterterrorism.”⁴⁴⁴

Bureaucratic failures and self-deception: A variety of bureaucratic failures contributed to or enhanced the other failures noted above, and it is within this category that we see that America suffered a degree of self-deception. For example, the FBI before 9/11 was driven by a culture that promoted focus on

⁴⁴¹ McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 201.

⁴⁴² 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 1,” 3.

⁴⁴³ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “11 September 2001 Hijackers,” accessed December 7, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/DCI_18_June_testimony_new.pdf; and 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 1,” 3.

⁴⁴⁴ *9/11 Commission Report*, 384; see also Eldridge et al., *9/11 and Terrorist Travel*, 46.

traditional crimes, not counterterrorism.⁴⁴⁵ The CIA struggled with shrinking budgets and new hires better suited for agent recruitment or working with foreign liaison services than counterterrorism.⁴⁴⁶ The United States in general did not view counterterrorism as a priority at the time.

The various agencies' internal cultures led them to look for the threat in the wrong place and, reflecting a self-deception that foreign entities did not significantly threaten domestic targets, the agencies suffered from a disparity in response to the threat reporting. The U.S. government took a variety of actions overseas to disrupt possible plots, but less was done domestically.⁴⁴⁷ As the 9/11 Commission noted, "The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domestic threats. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S. interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat that was coming was not from sleeper cells. It was foreign—but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the United States."⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁵ *9/11 Commission Report*, 74, citing (n. 12) Dan C. interview (August 27, 2003); Ruben Garcia interview (April 29, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of William Gore, October 24, 2002.

⁴⁴⁶ *9/11 Commission Report*, 92. The Bush administration in 2000 decided to propose an increase in counterterrorism funding for all the national security agencies. See *ibid.*, 202, citing (n. 183) CIA memo, "History of Funding for CIA Counterterrorism," August 12, 2002; NSC memo, Clarke to Vice President Cheney, February 15, 2001.

⁴⁴⁷ *9/11 Commission Report*, 263.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.* The report gives a more detailed example:

The Attorney General told us he asked [Acting FBI Director Thomas] Pickard whether there was intelligence about attacks in the United States and that Pickard said no. Pickard said he replied that he could not assure Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in the United States, although the reports of threats were related to overseas targets. Ashcroft said he therefore assumed the FBI was doing what it needed to do. He acknowledged that in retrospect, this was a dangerous assumption. He did not ask the FBI what it was doing in response to the threats

On the whole, the United States struggled to understand al Qaeda's plans and the U.S. system was ill equipped to recognize the deceptions as they occurred. Its sophistication to detect al Qaeda's deception would be considered weak in the parlance of the endgame theory.

Assessing the deceptions within the BTD-SQD framework: The endgame theory of deception would predict that if al Qaeda was not (or, in this case, did not perceive itself as being) under existential threat, regardless of U.S. efforts against it, it most likely would attempt SQD because it would have no need to change its enemies' behavior in order to undertake strategic surprise. It would predict SQD as possible if al Qaeda fulfilled Shulsky's conditions and if counterdeception capabilities against al Qaeda's intentions were weak.

In this case, these factors all held. The 9/11 attacks can probably be viewed as the gold standard for an NSAG's use of SQD to achieve a strategic end. The case shows that it is not necessary for an NSAG to have complex channels to feed false information or sophisticated mechanisms to receive feedback in order to successfully engage in deception. The al Qaeda operatives simply had to feed a cover story to U.S. government officials, school administrators, and acquaintances

and did not task it to take any specific action. He also did not direct the INS, then still part of the Department of Justice, to take any specific action.

In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI's efforts. The public was not warned. *Ibid.*, 265, citing (ns. 53–4) Thomas Pickard interviews, January 21, 2004 and April 8, 2004; John Ashcroft meeting, December 17, 2003; John Ashcroft testimony, April 13, 2004; Michael Rolince interview, April 12, 2004; Marion Bowman interview, March 6, 2004.

Shultz and Beitler noted: "A crucial problem, which aided successes such as the East Africa embassy bombings and September 11, was self-deception. Although officials knew that the U.S. homeland could be targeted, they were concerned with other types of attacks including truck bombs or strikes using weapons of mass destruction." "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise," 74, citing (n. 138) Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25, no. 5 (September 2002), 306.

in order to carry out the deception that they had benign intentions in America. These limitations might have restricted the group from using BTD, but that was not the most likely type of deception to be used.

Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./ Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
perceived as low	Yes	yes	yes	yes, simple but sufficient	yes, passive	weak

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>SQD possible</i>	<i>SQD most likely</i>

Conclusions

The difference between basic denial and SQD becomes apparent with al Qaeda's deceptions before the 9/11 attacks. The group used many types of denial and deception that do not meet the strategic threshold because they were not intended to affect a strategic outcome against a given target—like its employment of deceptive methods in its financing operations. The 9/11 operatives used somewhat tactical measures to get into and operate in the United States, but they had an end in mind that resulted in strategic surprise for the United States, and because of this these measures fall into the paradigm of strategic SQD as defined in this paper. The 9/11 deceptions also show the importance of the independent variables in the endgame theory—had the threat against the group been different or America's counterdeception capabilities been more robust, the group might have attempted a different type of deception or no deception at all.

The United States was not the only self-deceived entity with regard to the attacks on September 11. Bin Ladin expected America after 9/11 would either leave Muslim lands or launch an invasion of Afghanistan that would result in it being defeated in a war of attrition, much as the Soviet Union had been defeated in Afghanistan.⁴⁴⁹ His primary miscalculations were the method of the U.S. response—which did not involve a Soviet-like invasion—and the lack of sufficiently widespread Muslim support for his actions.⁴⁵⁰ The attacks on 9/11 ultimately led to the Taliban regime’s demise, the destruction of Bin Ladin’s sanctuary and camps in Afghanistan, and the decentralization of al Qaeda.⁴⁵¹

At the time of this writing, the war in Afghanistan continues but might change with Bin Ladin’s death. Al Qaeda and the Taliban fight defiantly but are not near victory. Muslims have not risen to challenge their regimes and the Western world.⁴⁵² The advanced degree of Bin Ladin’s delusions before his death were evident in his will, written in December 2001: “Despite the setbacks that God has inflicted upon us, these painful blows [the East Africa embassy bombings, World Trade Center destruction, and attack on the Pentagon] will mark the beginning of the wiping out of America and the infidel West after the passing of tens of years,

⁴⁴⁹ Atwan, *Secret History*, 221–2, quoting Bin Ladin and referencing “Al Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020”; Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 255, quoting interview of Zaidan; *ibid.*, 308–9, quoting (n. 27) Sayf al Adel in Fuad Hussein, *Al Zarqawi*; and *ibid.*, 309, quoting will of Abdul Aziz al Omari.

⁴⁵⁰ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 311; and Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 69.

⁴⁵¹ Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, xxxiii; and 9/11 Commission staff, “Staff Statement No. 15,” 11; see also Suri’s musings on al Qaeda’s loss in *The International Islamic Resistance Call*, in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 387, n. 11.

⁴⁵² Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 392–3.

God willing.”⁴⁵³ By the passing of the first 10 years, Bin Ladin is dead and al Qaeda, now led by Zawahiri, appears to be on the defensive.⁴⁵⁴

In the spring of 2010, then-CIA director Leon Panetta stated that al Qaeda in Pakistan had been so battered that it would be incapable of another 9/11-style attack.⁴⁵⁵ In July 2011, as Secretary of Defense, Panetta said the United States was “within reach of defeating the al Qaeda network.”⁴⁵⁶ If we combine al Qaeda’s operational weaknesses with the death of Bin Ladin, it is probably accurate to say that the group is under extreme threat from the West. Conditions are probably conducive to a situation in which al Qaeda would view as beneficial a BTM against the United States that would reduce Western targeting efforts against it. That said, BTM would probably be impossible for al Qaeda because America improved so significantly its counterdeception and counterterrorism capabilities after the 9/11 attacks, at the same time that al Qaeda’s own capabilities were so degraded. It could attempt another SQD, possibly to undertake another strategic attack, but success with an SQD would require a great deal more sophistication than the tactics the group used to undertake the 9/11 operation for the same reasons it probably cannot conduct a BTM.

⁴⁵³ Quoted in Wright, *Looming Tower*, 372; see also 371.

⁴⁵⁴ Mary Beth Sheridan, “Zawahiri Named New al-Qaeda Leader,” *Washington Post*, June 16, 2011, accessed August 23, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/al-zawahiri-named-new-al-qaeda-leader/2011/06/16/AGNk87WH_story.html.

⁴⁵⁵ James Gordon Meek, “CIA Director Leon Panetta: Battered Al Qaeda On Defense, Can’t Attack U.S.,” *New York Daily News*, March 18, 2010, accessed July 2, 2011, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2010/03/18/2010-03-18_cia_head_battered_qaeda_cant_attack.html.

⁴⁵⁶ Politico Staff, “Panetta on al Qaeda,” *Politico*, July 9, 2011, accessed July 13, 2011, http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0711/no_kabul_ffcdb7fc-8b72-4dd4-bebe-63db92595e3b.html (quote is from the text of the *Politico* article).

Nevertheless, deception remains the tool of the weak, and until al Qaeda is eradicated, the international community must remain vigilant to its attempts to deceive, as well as to our own tendency to self-deceive, lest we fall victim to another strategic surprise.

CHAPTER 5

DECEPTION IN HEZBOLLAH'S STRATEGY AGAINST ISRAEL 2000–2006

They [Hezbollah] are experts at deception. Everyone will think they won no matter what. That's how you win when there's a few thousand of you and 50,000 of us.

—Israeli soldier on the 2006 Second Lebanon War⁴⁵⁷

Hezbollah is a radical Shiite militia based primarily in southern Lebanon that has battled Israel and various internal Lebanese enemies since its founding in 1982. Hezbollah's objectives are to destroy Israel, remove Western influences from Lebanon, and establish an Islamic state. The group openly recognizes that the last of these goals is currently unattainable.⁴⁵⁸

After a scene-setting historical introduction, this chapter will look at Hezbollah's use of deception. In the first of two subcases, it will describe a

Author's note: When quoting others, I standardized proper nouns such as "Hezbollah," corrected typographical errors, and standardized formatting and spelling. I left the original formatting and spelling in the citations. See the sources cited for the original text. I thank Matthew Levitt for allowing me to interview him.

⁴⁵⁷ Quoted in Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 50, accessed June 28, 2011, <http://carl.army.mil/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf>.

⁴⁵⁸ See Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 242; Judith Palmer Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.C. Taurus, 2004), 19; and "Civil War and Resistance [Interview with Hassan Nasrallah by *Al-Khaleej* (Dubai)]," March 11, 1986, in *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri, with an introduction by Nicholas Blanford (London: Verso, 2007), 32–3.

successful SQD undertaken between 2000 and 2006 to conceal bunkers and other areas that played a strategic part in Hezbollah's battle with Israel in the 2006 war, also called the Second Lebanon War. In the second subcase, the chapter will describe a possible BTM that was most likely intended to deceive media audiences about the number of Hezbollah dead during the 2006 war; this deception was only partly successful. The chapter will conclude with a deception analysis in which these two operations are assessed within the context of the endgame theory's variables.

Historical Introduction: 1982–2000

Hezbollah's creation: In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time in five years and in doing so expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had employed the area as a safe haven and staging ground for attacks against Israel.⁴⁵⁹ The Shiite residents of southern Lebanon, wearied by PLO control, welcomed the initial occupation because it signaled the end of guerrilla activity along the border and brought economic benefits to the region as refugees returned and the construction industry improved. The initial Lebanese optimism waned, however, when Israel failed to withdraw from southern Lebanon, engendering fear that Israel would occupy the area as it had Jordan's West Bank and Syria's Golan Heights in 1967.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁹ Nicholas Blanford, introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 4.

⁴⁶⁰ Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 14–16.

The same month Israel invaded, and partially in response to the invasion,⁴⁶¹ a breakaway faction of the Lebanese Islamic Amal Party (hereafter Amal) merged with a network of radical Shia from other Lebanese movements.⁴⁶² Run by a select group of clergy trained in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, the new umbrella group became Lebanon's foremost radical Shiite movement, known as Hezbollah—the “Party of God.”⁴⁶³

Hezbollah at that time constituted an alliance of member factions rather than a hierarchical organization. As Hezbollah scholar Augustus Richard Norton described, Hezbollah was “less an organization than a cabal” during this timeframe and was comprised of young, committed revolutionaries who received ample support from Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria.⁴⁶⁴ Hezbollah viewed itself in contrast to Amal, which it perceived as corrupted by politics.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶¹ See Gilbert Achcar with Michel Warschawski, *The 33-Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Consequences* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 5. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged in 2006 that Hezbollah was formed in part as reaction to the Israeli operations: “When we entered Lebanon . . . there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.” Quoted in Alyssa Fetini, “A Brief History of: Hizballah,” *Time*, June 8, 2009, accessed January 23, 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1903301,00.html>. This author originally read the quote in Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 33, quoting “*Newsweek*, July 18, 2006,” although Norton did not include the *Newsweek* article in his reference list, and this author could not find a *Newsweek* article published on July 18, 2006, suggesting it may have been incorrectly cited by Norton.

⁴⁶² As described by Nicholas Blanford: “Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, the leadership of Amal, which was headed by Nabih Berri, decided to cease resisting the Israeli advance and join a ‘national salvation’ government grouping representatives of most political parties and sects. The decision aggravated a growing schism within Amal’s ranks between the secular-oriented leadership, under Berri, and those, such as cofounder Hussein Mussawi, who sought to Islamicise the movement.” Introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, 5.

⁴⁶³ Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, with a foreword by Terry Waite, CBE (New York: Palgrave, 1997), 25–6, 30; see also U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, May 2002, accessed July 9, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁴ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 34–35.

⁴⁶⁵ Achcar with Warschawski, *33 Day War*, 20–22.

Early on, Hezbollah aimed to foment a revolt against the Israeli occupation and rid Lebanon of Western forces, which had occupied parts of the country under United Nations authority after Israel's short first attempt to expel the PLO in 1978.⁴⁶⁶ Extremists affiliated with the Hezbollah movement—the group remained decentralized until the mid-1980s⁴⁶⁷—are credited with three violent attacks against Western interests that occurred within 18 months of the group's establishment: the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 bombings of U.S. and French military compounds.⁴⁶⁸ Additionally, Hezbollah destroyed the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) headquarters in early November 1983, and the group claimed that this helped force Israel's decision in January 1985 to withdraw to sections of southern Lebanon.⁴⁶⁹ According to Hezbollah expert Magnus Ranstorp, the IDF's withdrawal to the south, coupled

⁴⁶⁶ Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 13, 20–1; United Nations, “UNIFIL Background,” accessed July 10, 2011, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml>; “Operation Litani,” *Ynetnews.com*, accessed July 10, 2011, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3686831,00.html>; and Blanford, introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 4.

⁴⁶⁷ See Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East, ed. Mehrzad Boroujerdi (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 83, citing (n.7) Ahmad al-Musawi, “Man Antum Hizbullah?” (Who Are You, Hizbullah?) *Al-Shira'a*, no. 1 (April 3, 2000): 29; and Norton, *Hezbollah*, 34, 72.

⁴⁶⁸ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 38, 137, citing (38, n. 53) *FBIS*, August 1994; Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 83, citing (ns. 7–8) Al-Musawi, “Man Antum Hizbullah?” (“Who Are You, Hizbullah?”), *Al-Sharia'a* no. 1 (April 3, 2000), 28–9.

Ranstorp noted that Hezbollah denied responsibility for bombings against the American and French military facilities. *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 60. It nevertheless lauded the actions. After the bombings, Hezbollah official Hussein Moussawi stated: “I proclaim loud and clear that the double attack of Sunday is a valid act. And I salute, at Death's door, the heroism of the kamikazes, which they are; they are now under the protection of the All Powerful one and of the angels.” Quoted in draft copy of the *United States Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport (BIA) Terrorist Act of October 23, 1983* (publication information not available), 38, quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 92, n. 26.

⁴⁶⁹ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 39, citing (n. 59) “Nass al-Risla al-Maftuha Allati Wajjaha Hizb Allah Ila al-Mustad Afin Fi Lubnan Wa al-Alam” (“Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb'allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World”), February 16, 1985, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Free Press, 1987), 171–3; *al-Nahar al-arabi wa-al-duwali*, March 18–24, 1985.

with the previous withdrawal of U.S. forces in February 1984, “was viewed as a major achievement by Hezbollah and Iran as no other force had been able to accomplish the expulsion of both the United States and Israel from its soil.”⁴⁷⁰

Manifesto and aftermath: Hezbollah remained covert for three years after its creation, not revealing itself publicly until February 1985, when it published “An Open Letter to All the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World,” and outlined its objectives, namely: (1) to expel Western (particularly American and French) interests from Lebanon; (2) to subordinate the right-wing Lebanese Social Democratic Party (i.e. Phalange), which amidst bitter intergroup rivalries Hezbollah accused of committing “crimes . . . against Muslims and Christians”; (3) to establish a democratic system per se—although in the manifesto Hezbollah called on all people to choose an Islamic government; and (4) to end the Israeli occupation and ultimately destroy the Israeli state.⁴⁷¹ Hezbollah’s plan was set to proceed in four stages, as explained by Ranstorp: “armed confrontation with Israel; overthrow of the Lebanese regime; the liberation of any form of intervention by the Great Powers in Lebanon; and finally the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon which will be joined by other Muslims in the creation of a greater Islamic community”⁴⁷²

In the same year, Hezbollah also announced a militant wing, the Islamic Resistance. In its announcement, Hezbollah openly admitted that its members

⁴⁷⁰ Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon*, 40, citing (n. 61) *al-Nahar*, June 5, 1985.

⁴⁷¹ “An Open Letter to All The Oppressed in Lebanon and the World,” February 16, 1985, available from *Likoed Nederland*, accessed January 23, 2010, <http://www.likud.nl/ref24a.html>.

⁴⁷² Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon*, 48, citing (n. 95) Martin Kramer, “Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah,” in *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, ed. David Menshari (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 119.

answered calls of *jihad* when they arose.⁴⁷³ Until that time the fighters had been part of a conglomeration of violent activists under the Lebanese National Resistance organization. Shortly after its establishment, the Islamic Resistance claimed that Israel's decision to withdraw was a victory for Islam and a foreshadowing of Jerusalem's liberation.⁴⁷⁴

Even after Hezbollah published its manifesto, it remained on a denial footing because, as a young and fragile organization, it still lacked sufficient legitimacy to work in the open.⁴⁷⁵ As Hezbollah expert Hala Jaber noted in a historical overview of the group, "Even after the publication of its manifesto, very little was yet known or revealed about the group. Hezbollah continued to conceal the identities of its leaders. There was no press office to visit, no obvious official to interview and no listing in the telephone directory."⁴⁷⁶ Na'im Qassem, the group's deputy secretary general, explained concerns that Hezbollah would be defeated if it shed its clandestine behavior at that time: "Up until 1985, Hezbollah was not yet a single entity that could stand up and speak for itself. We used to work without anyone knowing who we were or who was related to whom. We were still weak and had we been discovered we would have certainly been struck down. So, naturally, we remained closed within ourselves and kept a distance.

⁴⁷³ Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 19, 54; p. 54 is quoting from the announcement on February 16, 1985.

⁴⁷⁴ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 39, citing (n. 59) additional sources explained in footnote 469.

⁴⁷⁵ This closely follows J. Bowyer Bell's description of young armed groups: "The more the organization is perceived as illicit, the more necessary is denial." "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors," in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 133.

⁴⁷⁶ Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 61; see also Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 22.

We worked on forming a line of continuation amongst us, so that if one of us was hit, there was always another able person to carry on from where the first left off.”⁴⁷⁷

Hezbollah’s actions in the mid-1980s to the early 1990s remained militant, focused foremost on ridding Western influence from Lebanon and consolidating power in its areas of control amidst a civil war that had started in 1975 before Hezbollah’s creation and would not be resolved until 1991.⁴⁷⁸ Many of Hezbollah’s operations were reportedly run with the strong support of the Iranian regime.⁴⁷⁹ Hezbollah and affiliated groups conducted a number of violent actions, including the skyjacking of a TWA jetliner in 1985, suicide attacks, and a series of kidnappings.⁴⁸⁰ Hezbollah fought to gain dominance over its rivals in the civil war—being accused, for example, of assassinating several Communist activists and engaging in bloody battles with ideologically more similar groups such as Amal.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁷ Quoted in Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 62.

⁴⁷⁸ Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 81, citing (n. 3) an interview with Na’im Qasim. Since deception is the focus of this analysis, it gives admittedly short shrift to the civil war in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s actions to consolidate power during this war. For a brief description and timeline of the civil war, see Tore Kjeilen, “Lebanese Civil War,” *Looklex Encyclopedia*, accessed July 8, 2011, http://lexicorient.com/e.o/leb_civ_war.htm; for more on Hezbollah’s history during this time period, see Norton, *Hezbollah*.

⁴⁷⁹ As Norton noted, “It is generally easier to trace much of the terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s to Iran than to Hezbollah.” *Hezbollah*, 77. Norton also quoted Robert Baer’s views, which are strong regarding the role of Iran in key operations during the 1980s: “It’s not that Hezbollah is doing terrorism out of Lebanon. They didn’t do the U.S. Embassy in 1983 or the Marines. It was the Iranians. It’s a political issue [in the U.S.] because the Israelis want the Americans to go after Hezbollah.” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 2003, quoted in Norton, *Hezbollah*, 78 (bracketed text original). See also Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon*, 54, for discussions of Iran’s role in hostage taking.

⁴⁸⁰ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 42–3; 73–4; Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon*, 60 (Ranstorp’s work discusses Hezbollah’s hostage-taking activities generally); and Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 81, citing (n. 3) Thomas H. Greene, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), chap. 8.

⁴⁸¹ Achcar with Warschawski, *33 Day War*, 22.

Hezbollah remained under pressure to stay covert as the civil war came to a close in 1991, but this began to change. The severe operating limitations it experienced because of its covert posture, combined with the withdrawal of foreign troops and the ascendance in Iran of the more “pragmatic” Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani after Khomeini’s death in 1989, led Hezbollah to reorient itself from a focus on hostagetaking to anti-Israeli resistance. It shifted its primary goals from evicting the foreign presence in Lebanon and establishing an Islamic state to combating the Israeli occupation. At the same time, Hezbollah developed a less hostile relationship with other organizations and was forced by Iran and Syria into an alliance with Amal.⁴⁸²

Entering politics: In 1992, Hezbollah, after deep internal debate and the eventual blessing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, decided to contest the elections, a popular move among the Shiite community that won it several seats.⁴⁸³ As Norton explained:

⁴⁸² Ibid., 23; Norton, *Hezbollah*, 45; and Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon*, 121, 125–6, citing (n. 82) Shireen T. Hunter, “Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance,” in *Iran and the Arab World*, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 210; John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 256; *Middle East International*, February 3, 1989; SANA [Syrian Arab News Agency] (Arabic), 1435 gmt 30 Jan 89-SWB ME/0373, February 1, 1989.

Judith Palmer Harik wrote:

Unlike other fundamentalist organizations, replacing the Lebanese government with an Islamic Republic was never the leadership’s main preoccupation despite the emphasis placed on this issue by the leadership in the 1980s. However important it was for the mullahs that formed Hezbollah to resist the inroads of secularism by populating Islam, Lebanon’s structural restraints, the large Christian community, and the traditional antipathy between Shiite and Sunni effectively precluded the achievement of this important goal.

Instead, Hezbollah leaders made their sacred obligation to conduct jihad against ‘the usurpers of Muslim lands’—the Israelis—their top priority. Since that struggle would require broad national backing it was thought to be more important to soft-pedal the idea of a republic ruled by Muslim religious law for Lebanon and to accede to the kind of reforms the Muslim-leftist coalition was stressing. *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 19.

⁴⁸³ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 98–102; for more on the internal debate, see Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 56–7, citing (n. 8) Judith Harik and Hilal Khashan, “Lebanon’s Divisive

The 1992 elections posed a crucial question for Hezbollah: Should the party adhere to its previous denunciation of the confessional electoral system as corrupt, and reject participation, or seize the moment and compete in the election? . . . [T]he most influential Shi‘i cleric in Lebanon, Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, had been espousing a pro-election position for years. Fadlallah argued that, because revolutionary transition to Islamic rule and an Islamic state was impossible in the diverse Lebanese society, gradual reformation was necessary. And that, insisted Fadlallah, required participating in the political system.⁴⁸⁴

Hezbollah entered politics and, again with Iran’s assistance, began providing social services to the civilian populace, developing into a more mature, Janus-faced organization that battled the Israelis on one hand and assisted Lebanese civilians on another—what Ahmad Hamzeh called an action mode of “militancy and pragmatism.”⁴⁸⁵ Using Iranian funds, Hezbollah established a number of social services that competed with and ultimately surpassed Amal’s, which actions helped the party develop a base of popular support and improve its financing.⁴⁸⁶ By the beginning of the 2006 war, Hezbollah had established an impressive infrastructure of social activities, as described by Eyal Zisser:

Hezbollah had fourteen representatives in the parliament, more than four thousand representatives in local municipal councils, an education system with dozens of schools and about one hundred thousand students, a health system with dozens of hospitals and clinics caring for half a million people a year, a banking system, marketing chains, and even pension funds and insurance companies. [Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan] Nasrallah has devoted much of his energy in the last decade to building up this movement, or domestic empire, as it were.⁴⁸⁷

Democracy: The Parliamentary Elections of 1992,” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 15, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 50.

⁴⁸⁴ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 98–99.

⁴⁸⁵ Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 135; and Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 147.

⁴⁸⁶ Achcar with Warschawski, *33 Day War*, 21–2.

⁴⁸⁷ Eyal Zisser, “Nasrallah’s Defeat in the 2006 War: Assessing Hezbollah’s Influence,” *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (Winter 2009), accessed May 26, 2011, <http://www.meforum.org/2054/nasrallahs-defeat-in-the-2006-war>, citing (n. 17) Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 44–79.

Hezbollah itself has provided mixed messages on its purpose for entering politics. The group has hinted that its entrée onto the political scene shows that the goals established in its 1985 manifesto have become dated and that the letter no longer guides the party's strategy.⁴⁸⁸ In 2003, Nasrallah denied that the party continued to aim for an Islamic republic in Lebanon: "We believe the requirement for an Islamic state is to have an overwhelming popular desire [for it], and we're not talking about fifty percent plus one, but a large majority. And this is not available in Lebanon and probably never will be."⁴⁸⁹ On the other hand, Nasrallah also has indicated that politics were just a new venue to achieve the group's goals, noting that Hezbollah's participation in politics was a move to try and "topple the government through peaceful means."⁴⁹⁰

Enemies of Hezbollah and many Western scholars generally agree that the latter message is most true, positing that Hezbollah's goals have not radically changed and the shift toward a more multifaceted strategy is actually a deception in which Hezbollah is working to overthrow the current system.⁴⁹¹ As Ranstorp explained:

The movement's political wing participated in the autumn 1992 Lebanese elections, in which they scored a surprising electoral success. The eight elected Hezbollah parliamentary representatives were obliged to pursue a strategy based on three principles: "putting pressure on the government to

⁴⁸⁸ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 46.

⁴⁸⁹ Quoted in Assaf Kfoury, "Meeting Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah: Encounter with a Fighter," in *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*, ed. Nubar Hovsepian, with a foreword by Rashid Khalidi (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008), 82.

⁴⁹⁰ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 58. Quote from *Agence France-Presse*, February 24, 1994, quoted in *ibid.*, n. 120.

⁴⁹¹ Hamzeh quoted Immanuel Sivan in noting that Hezbollah believes in "one man, one vote, one time." Emmanuel Sivan, "The Holy War Tradition in Islam," *Orbis* 4, no. 2 (spring 1998): 171–95, accessed June 20, 2011, Expanded Academic ASAP (A20575545), quoted in Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* 112, n. 103. Hamzeh cites pp. 17–22, although this appears to have been in error.

support the anti-Zionist resistance, opposing the idea of negotiation with Israel, and urging the government to assist people living in war-stricken areas.” Hezbollah’s shift in strategy should not be viewed as an ideological departure from its pan-Islamic goal of creating an Islamic Republic in Lebanon but rather a carefully crafted move, which has been officially blessed by Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei, to facilitate a revolution from within the Lebanese political system.⁴⁹²

Judith Palmer Harik argued in *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* that Hezbollah’s “changing face” was a deliberate strategy to fracture the “terrorist myth,” and by entering the electoral system and providing social services Hezbollah gained a buffer from Israeli and American pressure: “A pragmatic group of Lebanese mullahs carefully planned and interwove militant policies toward Israel and cooperative ones toward the Lebanese authorities and other Lebanese groups to achieve their goal. That goal . . . was the immunization of Hezbollah’s jihad strategy from just the sort of pressure the USA used against Lebanon in autumn 2001.”⁴⁹³ If this is the case, regardless of whether Hezbollah aims to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon or is content to play politics, its military wing can continue to pursue Israel’s destruction under the protection that its overt assistance functions provide.⁴⁹⁴

Hezbollah’s external security organization, which Norton said is autonomous from the party but tied closely to Iranian intelligence, also demonstrated that its

⁴⁹² Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon*, 58, citing (n. 119) interview with Sheikh Nasserallah by IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency], 1745 gmt 13 Oct 92—SWB ME/1512, October 15, 1992. Norton noted: “The bald fact is that the 1985 program has not been explicitly replaced. The result is that skeptics and opponents of the party are left with a picture of ambivalence and, perhaps, dissimulation, which have only been sharpened by Hezbollah’s behavior in the twenty-first century.” *Hezbollah*, 46.

⁴⁹³ Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 2, 52, 195. Hamzeh noted: “Politics for Hezbollah is purely utilitarian rather than ideological or religious.” *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 124.

⁴⁹⁴ Even the U.S. Department of State’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism* conceded that Hezbollah is resigned to working within the political system, noting that Hezbollah “has expressed its unwillingness to work within the confines of Lebanon’s established political system; however, this stance changed with the party’s decision in 1992 to participate in parliamentary elections.” U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*.

resistance against Israel could be taken to the international level with the bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 of the Israeli Embassy and Argentine Israelite Mutual Association, respectively.⁴⁹⁵ While Hezbollah has denied responsibility for both operations, as it did with others, most experts agree that Hezbollah conducted the operations with Iran's support.⁴⁹⁶

Israeli withdrawal in 2000: In 1999, Israel elected Ehud Barak as prime minister under a campaign promise to end Israel's presence in southern Lebanon. In May 2000, after failed attempts to negotiate a withdrawal from Lebanon as part of an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement, Israel withdrew unilaterally from the country. Israel had attempted to make secret preparations for the withdrawal so it would come as a surprise to Hezbollah and increase the chances Israel was not chased out, but in late May, Israel's proxy force, the Southern Lebanon Army, lost a key stronghold, Taibe, to hundreds of Shia from the north, and this set off a domino reaction of losses that led Israel to run for the border as the security zone collapsed. Israel withdrew entirely by May 24.⁴⁹⁷

Two days after the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah held a victory parade in the southern town of Bint Jbayel. Nasrallah gave an infamous keynote address in which he stated: "In order to liberate your land . . . you can impose your demands

⁴⁹⁵ See Norton, *Hezbollah*, 78–9.

⁴⁹⁶ See Anti-Defamation League, "Investigation Finds Iranian, Hezbollah and Syrian Involvement in 1994 Bombing of Argentine Jewish Community Center," October 2003, accessed July 1, 2011, http://www.adl.org/Terror/terror_buenos_aries_attack.asp.

⁴⁹⁷ Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon*, trans. Ora Cummings and Moshe Tlamin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 17–26; and Norton, *Hezbollah*, 88–90.

on the Zionist aggressors. . . . Israel may own nuclear weapons and heavy weaponry, but, by God, it is weaker than a spider's web."⁴⁹⁸

At the time of the withdrawal, Israeli intelligence reportedly estimated that Hezbollah possessed approximately 7,000 rockets, most short-range, with about 100 intermediate-range rockets that had the capacity to target Haifa and Hadera.⁴⁹⁹

Continuing resistance: After Israel's withdrawal, Hezbollah engaged in a second internal debate about whether to continue resistance operations or focus on politics. Nasrallah consulted with Khamenei, who approved Hezbollah's continuation of resistance, and Hezbollah used as its pretext for ongoing anti-Israel operations the fact that Israel kept control of the disputed territory of Shebaa Farms, located in the northern Golan Heights on the border with Lebanon.⁵⁰⁰ Additionally, Hezbollah claimed that it must stay armed to play a role as the "Protector of the South," arguing that the resistance and the Lebanese Army were Lebanon's strategic defense. This line of argument allowed it to avoid disarmament.⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁸ *Associated Press*, May 26, 2000, quoted in David Makovsky, "Part I: Israel's Policy and Political Lessons from the War," in David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, *Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment*, Policy Focus #60 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2006), 11, n. 3, accessed June 4, 2011, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus60.pdf>. See also Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 38; and Sanu Kainikara and Russell Parkin, *Pathways to Victory: Observations from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict* (Tuggeranong, A.C.T., Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2007), 37, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Publications/Details/26/Pathways-to-Victory-Observations-from-the-2006-Israel-Hezbollah-Conflict.aspx>.

⁴⁹⁹ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 23.

⁵⁰⁰ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 90–1. Many critics of this strategy argued that periodic attacks on Israel were unjustified. See Norton, *Hezbollah*, 117.

⁵⁰¹ Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, 234, citing (n. 46) Daniel Sobelman, *New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizballah After the Withdrawal from Lebanon*, Memorandum no. 69 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, January 2004), 82–3. This author accessed *New Rules of the Game* on July 2, 2011, <http://www.inss.org.il/upload>

Day-to-Day Deceptions

Hezbollah's "dual nature" (sociopolitical and military) is an image created from multiple complex deceptions that are built into Hezbollah's day-to-day operations, and the Janus-faced organization has shown itself to be both mature and dangerous as it has increasingly fostered its international image as a "changed" group.⁵⁰²

Matthew Levitt, in stating that Hezbollah is not open about its operations, asked an important rhetorical question: "What do they do that is not a deception?" Everything Hezbollah does in the public domain, he explained, involves denial and deception, and any overt operations in which Hezbollah is engaged—including its humanitarian efforts—are a front.⁵⁰³ To some extent, this is the case with all of the groups examined in this study, but it is unique with Hezbollah because the group has a political wing that plays politics, and has a social services organization that helps people. Because of this, Hezbollah's deceptions run

/(FILE)1190276456.pdf. (Azani incorrectly noted that *New Rules of the Game* was published in 2003.)

⁵⁰² Azani noted:

The 2008 model of Hezbollah is one of pragmatic terrorist organization that is far more dangerous than that of the revolutionary Hezbollah of the 1980s. In fact, the movement hasn't abandoned its goals, but has changed its pace of application. It operates simultaneously within the Lebanese political system and outside it, a fact that grants it an activity range in both arenas. The movement's pragmatic appearance has deceived and continues to deceive researchers and players in the international system. The movement's entry into the Lebanese political system was perceived by many as a first and important step pinpointing moderation and a change of the extreme ideological hardliner. Hezbollah even carried out a series of activities in order to emphasize the change that it had seemingly undergone. It has been investing, and still invests, from the early 1990s, significant efforts into blurring its pan-Islamic terroristic image while simultaneously building an image of a legitimate Lebanese organization fighting against an occupying army. During the 1990s, it minimized the scope of its terroristic activities against Western targets in Lebanon and abroad and executed strictly 'qualitative' and confidential activities of terrorism while refraining from accepting responsibility for their performance and denying any connections to activity and operations. *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God*, 246.

⁵⁰³ Matthew Levitt, telephone interview by author, September 17, 2009, Reston, VA (hereafter "Levitt interview").

deeper than al Qaeda or the LTTE's. Most of these deceptions are employed to maintain its day-to-day operations and are not targeted at a specific adversary. They therefore do not fall into the paradigm of strategic BTD/SQD, but are useful to compare with the more strategic operations.

Scholars assert that Hezbollah practices a form of the ancient Shiite convention of *taqiyya*, a tradition allowing the Shia to conceal their religion at times of persecution. As Diaz and Newman explained: "When there is a danger of loss of life or property, *taqiyya* allows Shiites to disguise their true beliefs and adapt to the mode of the dominant society, while mentally reserving their true beliefs."⁵⁰⁴ In this case, Hezbollah uses deception in all of its seemingly legitimate activities while reserving its true intentions toward Lebanon and Israel.

Vignette—operational deception in fundraising and finance: As with the al Qaeda case, an examination of Hezbollah's financial operations provides a good example of a nonstate organization that uses somewhat complex deception as part of its daily operations. Like with al Qaeda's financial deceptions, most of its deception in financial matters falls into the operational realm because it is used to maintain daily operations but probably would not be absolutely necessary for any one strategic operation. Nevertheless, examining Hezbollah's deception in finance shows the difference between tactical and operational deception and strategic BTD/SQD.

⁵⁰⁴ Tom Diaz and Barbara Newman, *Lightning Out of Lebanon: Hezbollah Terrorists On American Soil* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 44; see also Andrew Campbell, "'Taqiyya': How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West," *National Observer* no. 65 (Winter 2005), 11-23, accessed July 9, 2011, http://www.nationalobserver.net/2005_winter_ed3.htm.

Hezbollah uses charities and front companies to hide fundraising for its legitimate activities and political programs as well as for its military and terrorist operations.⁵⁰⁵ A U.S. Treasury official noted that “we don’t buy into the frame of mind that you can distinguish between the military and social arms. Money is fungible.”⁵⁰⁶

One probable example is the group’s Martyr’s Foundation, which originally was established to provide assistance to the wives and children of those killed fighting Israel’s occupation in the 1980s and more recently has acknowledged providing charitable funds to the families of suicide bombers.⁵⁰⁷ The Martyr’s Foundation now reportedly is a key conduit for Hezbollah funding from Iran through an Iranian front bank (Bank Saderat) and has been cut off access to U.S. banking institutions by the Treasury Department.⁵⁰⁸ According to Norton, “A significant portion of Iranian support is for Hezbollah’s militia wing,” suggesting that while some of the Iranian funding may be used for social services, a portion probably also goes to its armed activities.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁵ See *Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List*, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence and Policy, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), accessed July 12, 2011, <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/lev062007.htm>.

⁵⁰⁶ Pat O’Brien, quoted in Andrew Higgins, “Branded Terrorist, Microcredit Czar Keeps Lending,” *The Wall Street Journal*, available from *Pittsburg Post Gazette*, December 28, 2006, accessed August 17, 2009, <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06362/749639-82.stm>. Hezbollah also fundraises for its military operations in a more overt manner through the Islamic Resistance Support Organization, a fundraising arm for the group’s militant wing that was blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Department in August 2006 after the war ended. See Higgins, “Branded Terrorist”.

⁵⁰⁷ Higgins, “Branded Terrorist”; on the issue of claiming to provide funds to suicide bombers, see also Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, *The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances*, Policy Focus #89 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2008), 54, accessed June 3, 2011, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus89.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁸ Higgins, “Branded Terrorist”; on Saderat being an Iranian front, see Matthew Levitt, “Hiding Terrorist Activity,” *Middle East Strategy at Harvard* (blog), January 6, 2009, accessed July 1, 2011, <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/hiding-terrorist-activity/>.

⁵⁰⁹ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 110.

In the U.S. Treasury press release about its designation of the Martyr's Foundation, the Treasury Department stated that "in addition to fundraising responsibilities, senior Martyrs Foundation officials were directly involved in Hezbollah operations against Israel during the July–August 2006 conflict. In addition, a Lebanon-based leader of the Martyrs Foundation has directed and financed terrorist cells in the Gaza Strip that worked with Hezbollah and PIJ [the Palestinian Islamic Jihad]." The press release also said the designation included the Dearborn, Michigan-based Goodwill Charitable Organization, which was a front organization that reported to the Martyr's Foundation and took donations from Hezbollah supporters in the United States.⁵¹⁰

Hezbollah's Al Qard Al Hassan Association credit agency, which provides microcredit loans, and its Yousser Company for Finance and Investment, which provides investment money, together with an accounting center and research branch are known as Bayt al Mal (house of money). In 2006, the Treasury Department designated Yousser and Bayt al Mal (but not Al Qard), saying that they functioned as Hezbollah's "unofficial treasury, holding and investing its assets and serving as intermediaries between the terrorist group and mainstream banks."⁵¹¹

Other sources provide additional detail on Yousser's shady relationship with mainstream banks. According to news sources, a lawsuit filed in mid-2008 against the Lebanese-Canadian Bank (LCB) by victims of Hezbollah terror

⁵¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Twin Treasury Actions Take Aim at Hizballah's Support Network," July 24, 2007, accessed January 16, 2009, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/200772410294613432.htm>.

⁵¹¹ Higgins, "Branded Terrorist," quoting Stuart Levey.

attacks claims that the bank allowed Hezbollah-affiliated charities to transfer funds prior to and during the 2006 war—implying that some of the money was probably used for military purposes. The suit also “contends that since 2004, LCB permitted the Yousser Company for Finance and Investment and the Martyrs Foundation . . . to open and maintain accounts at LCB, and to freely transfer many millions of dollars of Hezbollah funds and to carry out millions of dollars in financial transactions, within and without Lebanon, by means of wire transfers, letters of credit, checks and credit cards provided by LCB.”⁵¹²

Hezbollah also has used deception to get help from development organizations for Jihad al Bina, its construction arm.⁵¹³ According to the U.S. Treasury Department, “In cases when intended solicitation targets were thought to object to the group’s relationship with Hezbollah and the Iranian government, the organization employed deceptive practices, applying in the name of proxies not publicly linked to Hezbollah.”⁵¹⁴

This chapter will examine deceptions employed before and during the conflict against Israel in 2006. Had Hezbollah engaged in a specific financial deception employed as part of its grand strategy to defeat Israel in that conflict, that deception very likely would have fallen within the BTD/SQD paradigm. Without

⁵¹² Sam Orez, “Canadian Victims of Hizbollah Missile Attacks Bring First-Ever Civil Action Against Lebanese Bank in Montreal,” *The Cutting Edge*, July 21, 2008, accessed July 2, 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=656&pageid=&pagename=>. See also “Lawsuit Targets Bank Over Alleged Hezbollah Ties,” *CTV News*, July 7, 2008, accessed July 2, 2011, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20080707/terror_lawsuit_080707/; and Summons and Complaint, Yaakov Licci et al. v. Am. Express Bank Ltd. et al. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed July 11, 2008), accessed June 4, 2011, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/Licci_v_AMEXBank_Complaint.pdf.

⁵¹³ Levitt, “Hiding Terrorist Activity.”

⁵¹⁴ Quoted in *ibid*.

that, however, its day-to-day financial deceptions trend more toward being tactical or operational measures.

The endgame theory is intended to predict when a covert group—which already uses denial throughout its operations—will enhance the use of that denial and include active deception in order to obtain strategic surprise or a similar strategic end (SQD) or to change an adversary’s actions (BTD). The following cases will show examples of when Hezbollah has turned its deception from denial or daily ruses toward one of these models, with mixed success.

Deception 1: Bunkers and War, 2000–2006

Hezbollah’s ability to maintain the intensity of its rocket fire on Israel became the measure of its success in the Second Lebanon War.

—Uzi Rubin, “The Rocket Campaign Against Israel During the 2006 Lebanon War”⁵¹⁵

The Second Lebanon War lasted for 34 days and ended in a cease-fire, resulting in neither side achieving its strategic objectives, although Israel is considered by most scholars to be the greater loser because it was unable to achieve its stated goals once war began. Hezbollah’s relative military success was due to its strategic use of short-range rockets and its ability to hold ground throughout much of southern Lebanon during Israeli ground offensives. Hezbollah was able to employ short-range rockets and stay in position in part because it conducted a sophisticated SQD before the war to create a system of

⁵¹⁵ Uzi Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign Against Israel During the 2006 Lebanon War*, *Mideast Security and Policy Studies*, no. 71 (Ramat Gan, Israel: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, June 2007), 21, accessed June 3, 2011, <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS71.pdf>.

underground bunkers, tunnels, and rocket emplacements that protected its men and materiel during hostilities.

Previous literature: While this analysis will look specifically at two instances of deception associated with the Second Lebanon War, a separate paper—Captain David Acosta’s 2007 Naval Postgraduate School masters thesis—examines Hezbollah’s use of deception broadly during the war, and, since Acosta’s assessment is the only known paper focused on Hezbollah’s deceptions in this venue, it warrants a few words of overview and analysis.⁵¹⁶ Acosta examined Hezbollah’s denial operations, the bunker deception (which will be further detailed below), an electronic warfare bluff, Hezbollah’s manipulation of the media, and attempts to use deception on the Internet. Acosta’s analysis primarily looked at the deceptions within the framework of Daniel and Herbig’s model. His section on the bunkers is short and explanatory, and while interesting, it lacks detail on how and why Hezbollah built bunkers under Israel’s eyes and about the strategic outcome of this deception. This assessment will work to fill those gaps.

Acosta argued that Hezbollah engaged in a successful bluff to make Israel think for a time that it could intercept its secure electronic communications. Hezbollah reportedly intercepted less secure communications and reported openly available information in a way that made it look as if it was intercepting secure signals.⁵¹⁷ Acosta examined Hezbollah’s psychological operations in the war,

⁵¹⁶ David A. Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War” (masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007), accessed June 3, 2011, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469918&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>. Author’s note: I credit Acosta’s thesis for providing ideas and sources that helped me formulate this study.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 45–9.

with particular emphasis on how Hezbollah controlled the story and on how the Western media itself took part in the deception by either publishing half-truths or by actually altering the story line.⁵¹⁸ This analysis will pick up this theme later in the chapter. And finally, Acosta looked at Hezbollah's activities on the Internet during the conflict. While not a strong case of deception, Hezbollah, he posited, "turned to hiding and hijacking in the Internet"⁵¹⁹ In describing Hezbollah's "hiding and hijacking" activities, Acosta noted that "this case provides the possibility for a new type of deception, one in which the deceiver attempts to purely conceal themselves."⁵²⁰ This "new type of deception," it could be argued, is the SQD posited within the endgame theory of deception.

Acosta's analysis is well written and on point. To provide additional analytic insight on the use of deception in the 2006 war, this work will focus on the bunker deception by examining how and why Hezbollah went about deceiving Israel, and will more thoroughly explore the deception's outcome by showing the bunkers' role during the war. In addition, by examining the deception within the endgame model, this assessment will show that the bunker deception had strategic effects because it allowed Hezbollah to fire rockets continuously into Israel. Acosta called the bunker deception tactical, but this analysis will show that it could be considered a strategic matter.⁵²¹ As Uzi Rubin noted, "The Second Lebanon War demonstrated that, when used in massive numbers against civilian targets, artillery

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., 50–8.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., 59.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., 60.

⁵²¹ Ibid., 45.

rockets have a strategic impact.”⁵²² This paper will then look at one specific instance of Hezbollah’s psychological operations that Acosta does not examine in detail—Hezbollah’s falsifying of casualty statistics. The analysis will agree with Acosta that the media played a catalytic role that helped Hezbollah’s propaganda operations.

Threat to Hezbollah and its objectives: After the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and Hezbollah’s decision to continue resistance operations, Hezbollah almost certainly recognized that the Islamic Resistance’s destruction remained a top Israeli objective. At that time, Hezbollah retained its long-term goals—which still called for the eventual “liberation” of Jerusalem and destruction of Israel—and it justified the continued expansion of its military infrastructure by claiming that it needed to help liberate the Shebaa Farms, free Lebanese prisoners from Israeli detention, and assist the Palestinian resistance.⁵²³ Doing so also served to help it maintain its stature among the Lebanese.⁵²⁴ Hassan Nasrallah claimed that a strong military created for Hezbollah a “balance of deterrence with Israel.”⁵²⁵

⁵²² Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 29.

⁵²³ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 232–3, referencing Hassan Nasrallah’s “victory” speech on May 26, 2000; and Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 47. As Harel and Issacharoff stated, “Journalists who have met with Nasrallah on more than one occasion reckon that the enormous interest he shows in Lebanese politics, his current focus on the return of the Sha’aba Farms (Mount Dov) to Lebanon, and the release of the Lebanese prisoners are proof that he has never (nor will he ever) relinquished the dream of liberating Jerusalem.” *34 Days*, 36.

⁵²⁴ Makovsky, “Israel’s Policy and Political Lessons,” 10.

⁵²⁵ Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), “Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah Boasts of the Organization’s Ability to Maintain a Balance of Deterrence with Israel. By Doing That He Justifies, in the Internal Lebanese Arena, Its Refusal to Disarm and Repels the Demands of His Opponents, the Supporters of the ‘New Order’ in Lebanon,” May 28, 2006, accessed January 23, 2010, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e0506.pdf.

From 2000 to 2006, both Hezbollah and Israel attacked each other, and Hezbollah engaged in kidnapping operations, although the two kept their violence to a managed tit-for-tat level.⁵²⁶ Most of Hezbollah's attacks occurred in the Shebaa Farms. Hezbollah supporters also erected signs facing Israel that carried phrases like, "If you come back, we'll come back," and Hezbollah sponsored taunting and stone throwing at Israeli troops.⁵²⁷

Nicholas Blanford noted that "Hezbollah's intention was to needle the Israelis without goading them into a massive response which could backfire on the party's domestic popularity. Israel had to take into account that if it reacted disproportionately to Hezbollah's attacks, the party could unleash its arsenal of thousands of rockets—some of them long-range—into northern Israel."⁵²⁸ Nasrallah calculated that Israel would not risk a rocket attack.⁵²⁹ In 2002 Nasrallah bragged, "We have created a balance of terror with the help of the Katyusha, a weapon which is likened in military science to a water pistol."⁵³⁰ "The 'balance of terror,'" concluded Blanford, "along the Blue Line [border] helped ensure a period of tense stability for nearly six years."⁵³¹

⁵²⁶ As Harik noted, in one interesting case after the 2000 elections, "Nasrallah announced that a Hezbollah operative had lured electronics specialist Elhan Tannenbaum, a retired colonel in the Israeli reserves, into Lebanon and then had him arrested by party security forces. Apparently Tannenbaum had met a member of the Party of God in Switzerland and was deceived into thinking he would be willing to cooperate with Israel as a double agent. According to Nasrallah, Tannenbaum's detention was meant to raise the morale of Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons." *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 155, possibly citing (n. 3) *L'Orient-LeJour*, October 19, 2000, 3.

⁵²⁷ Norton, *Hezbollah*, 91–2.

⁵²⁸ Blanford, introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 9.

⁵²⁹ Anthony Shahid, "Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations: Militia Leaders Caught Off Guard by Scope of Israel's Response in War," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2006, accessed July 1, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/07/AR2006100701054.html>.

⁵³⁰ Quoted in Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 32.

⁵³¹ Blanford, introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 9.

Despite the tense stability, Hezbollah calculated that Israel would invade again at an indeterminate time and, in doing so, would rely primarily on air power and precision artillery weapons.⁵³² At the end of the 2006 war, Nasrallah confirmed that Hezbollah had anticipated an eventual Israeli invasion: “We have assumed since the year 2000 that a day like this would come, but we did not know when. . . . Our evaluation and understanding led us to believe that the day would come when Israel would launch a large-scale attack, and annihilate the resistance that had achieved a historic victory against them in 2000.”⁵³³

Hezbollah almost certainly recognized that its ultimate survival in the face of another Israeli invasion would require preparation. As Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman highlighted, “A brief incursion by tens of thousands of IDF soldiers might suffer a handful of losses to guerrilla ambushes, but in the meantime, it could roll up the entirety of Hezbollah’s primary rocket force, end the coercive campaign against Israeli cities, then withdraw before its own casualties became prohibitive either. So Hezbollah set about the construction of a brute force defensive capability in southern Lebanon that might be able to delay an Israeli invasion long enough to enable a coercive strategy to succeed.”⁵³⁴ Hezbollah’s preparations hinged on the assumptions that Israeli society could not accept heavy casualties and IDF fighting would be based on air power and artillery—leading

⁵³² Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 16.

⁵³³ “[Hassan Nasrallah] Interview with New TV,” August 27, 2006, in *Voice of Hezbollah*, 395–6.

⁵³⁴ Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2008), 51, accessed June 28, 2011, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=882>.

Hezbollah to prepare for a war of attrition in which Hezbollah would aim to weaken Israelis' resolve and fracture the image of an invincible Israel.⁵³⁵

In sum, during the period from the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 to the beginning of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Israel posed a minimal threat to Hezbollah, engaging in only in light hostilities. Hezbollah calculated that Israel would invade again at an unspecified time; the group therefore took preparations to reduce the severity of the threat when an invasion came. These preparations involved the creation of artillery lines and a network of ground forces “strategically established to engage Israel in a war of attrition that would reach deep into Israeli territory, stall Israeli ground incursions, and inflict as many Israeli casualties as possible.”⁵³⁶ By the time the war began, Hezbollah’s preparations were sufficient to keep Israel from destroying the Islamic Resistance over the short term. The first deception examined here—the construction of infrastructure for hiding and storing men and materiel—occurred as part of these preparations.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ Amir Kulick, “Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension,” *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 3 (November 2006), accessed September 10, 2009, <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=88&print=1>; and Anthony H. Cordesman, with George Sullivan and William D. Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War* (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 30, 2007), 34.

⁵³⁶ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 32, citing (n. 28) Kulick, “Hizbollah vs. the IDF.”

⁵³⁷ Nasrallah made statements before and after the war that highlighted the group’s confidence in its preparations. At the beginning Nasrallah stated: “You wanted open warfare, and we are going into open warfare. We are ready for it, a war on every level. To Haifa, and, believe me, to beyond Haifa, and to beyond beyond Haifa.” This probably was a reference to Hezbollah’s long-range missile capabilities. Nasrallah continued: “Not only we will be paying a price. Not only our houses will be destroyed. Not only our children will be killed. Not only our people will be displaced. Those days are past. That was how it was before 1982, and before the year 2000.” “Address of General Secretary of Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah” July 14, 2006, translated by Muhammad Abu Nasr, available from *Information Clearing House*, accessed July 3, 2011, <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14007.htm>. *Information Clearing House* indicates that the Arabic original of the speech originated at <http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/phpfolder/loadpage.php?page=JOU214.html>, although was this site discontinued as of July 3,

The bunker deception: Hezbollah's preparations in 2000 to 2006 included updating its arsenal—stockpiling roughly 12,000-14,000 mostly Iranian-made long-range and Syrian-made short- and intermediate-range rockets by the eve of the war⁵³⁸—and training in those weapons; conducting methodical surveillance against Israeli operations near the border;⁵³⁹ creating border defenses, minefields, arms caches, support bases, observation posts, checkpoints, and patrols;⁵⁴⁰ mining highways;⁵⁴¹ and building an infrastructure of “bunkers, tunnels, and firing positions”⁵⁴² in southern Lebanon. Most of the rockets stockpiled were the short-range 107 and 122-millimeter “Katyusha” artillery rockets.⁵⁴³

2011. This author originally found the speech at the website *Electronic Intifada*, accessed January 25, 2010, <http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicalspeeches/447.shtml> (site discontinued).

After the war Nasrallah said: “We logically and naturally assumed that, when Israelis waged such a destructive war, they would cut off all supply lines, and isolate areas and towns, which is why we spent the years between 2000 and 2006 preparing ourselves for such a contingency. We made sure that the capabilities we needed for a long war were available to us, and they still are. . . . Our level of preparedness was very high, and was based on the assumption of a long-drawn-out battle.” “Interview with New TV,” 396–7.

⁵³⁸ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 10–11; in 2005 Nasrallah claimed to have 12,000 (quoted in Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 335); Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 17; Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 4–5, citing (n. 3) Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yitzhak Ben Israel, “The Hizbullah Rocket War July 12th – August 14th, The Land Battle” (lecture presentation at the 32nd Tel Aviv Workshop for Science, Technology and Defense on the topic of “The Land Battle in the Age of Technology,” January 16, 2007); Maj. Gen. (Res.) Giora Romm, *A Short History of the Second Lebanon War*, Fisher Institute of Strategic Aerospace Analysis, Publication No. 22 (Israel: The Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, December 2006). One estimate this author found went as high as 20,000 (Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 48), although that was the exception. Rubin said that Hezbollah started stockpiling its rockets after the death of Hafez Assad. *Rocket Campaign*, 4.

⁵³⁹ Shahid, “Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations.”

⁵⁴⁰ William M. Arkin, *Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 2007), 26, accessed June 28, 2011, <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/lps91120/arkin.pdf>. Arkin cited several other articles but they appear to be on related but not directly relevant topics.

⁵⁴¹ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 47, citing (n. 16) Andrew Exum, *Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment*, Policy Focus #63 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2006), 4. This author accessed *Hizballah at War* on June 28, 2011, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus63.pdf>.

⁵⁴² Blanford, introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 9.

⁵⁴³ On the rockets, see Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 48, as well as Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*.

Hezbollah employed deception to create an infrastructure of elaborate, well-prepared bunkers that were located near the border with Israel—in some cases as close as one kilometer.⁵⁴⁴ Estimates vary on the total number of bunkers—one author said that they numbered in the dozens to possibly hundreds.⁵⁴⁵

The bunkers ranged in style from modified caves to large underground complexes with concrete walls, electricity, running water, air conditioning, and communications systems.⁵⁴⁶ They included multiple secret entry and exit points, internal chambers, and concealed firing positions.⁵⁴⁷ Hezbollah grouped them into networks “self-sufficient in terms of weapons, ammunition, food, water and medical supplies in anticipation of a protracted campaign.”⁵⁴⁸ Hezbollah’s communications systems were supported by fiber optic cable and satellite telephones in order to resist electromagnetic jamming and similar traditional means of communications disruption.⁵⁴⁹ One commentator noted that “nearly four weeks into the war, Hezbollah’s communications networks were still

⁵⁴⁴ “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, October 24, 2006, accessed June 29, 2011, IHS Jane’s.

⁵⁴⁵ Nicholas Blanford, “Call to Arms: Hizbullah’s Efforts to Renew Weapons Supplies,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, April 18, 2007, accessed June 29, 2011, IHS Jane’s. Alistaire Crooke and Mark Perry estimated that Hezbollah created “600 separate ammunition and weapons bunkers” in south Lebanon, although this author has been unable to find additional information corroborating such a high number. “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 1: Winning the Intelligence War,” *Asia Times Online*, October 12, 2006, accessed May 26, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html.

⁵⁴⁶ Blanford, “Call to Arms”; and “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”

⁵⁴⁷ Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign*, 65.

⁵⁴⁸ “Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance,” *Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor*, September 5, 2006, accessed June 20, 2011, IHS Jane’s; see also “Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force,” *Intelligence Online* no. 529 (August 25, 2006), accessed July 2, 2011, LexisNexis Academic.

⁵⁴⁹ Maj. Gen. G. D. Bakshi, “Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-2 : Israeli Response,” *Indian Defence Review* 22, no. 1 (August 26, 2007), accessed August 29, 2011, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2007/04/israel-hezbollah-conflict-part-2-israeli-response.html> (site discontinued), with note (n. 29) that was unavailable online. This author was unable to locate a version that included the notes. See also Col. David Eshel, “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War,” *Defense Update*, 2007, accessed July 2, 2011, http://defense-update.com/analysis/Lebanon_war_1.htm.

operating at points only 500 meters from the Israeli border and in spite of repeated bomb strikes”⁵⁵⁰ According to *Jane’s*, in one case near Labboune, after the August 14 cease-fire, the IDF discovered a bunker with “firing positions, operations rooms, connecting tunnels, medical facilities, ammunition and weapons stockpiles, ventilation and air conditioning, bathrooms with hot and cold running water and dormitories—enough to keep a large number of fighters underground without requiring resupply for many weeks.”⁵⁵¹

As part of its complex bunker system, Hezbollah prepared well-camouflaged rocket firing positions for its short-range Katyushas. These sites were frequently located in areas that provided natural cover in addition to any man-made camouflage that was emplaced by Hezbollah. Some of them included launch tubes that could be hydraulically raised from the ground and then lowered and covered—sometimes with a fire-retardant blanket to hide the detectable heat signature—after the launch was complete, and some were as elaborate as the other bunkers in their entrances, exits, running water for the rocket crews, cement fortification, etc.⁵⁵² Each launcher was individually targeted, and Hezbollah

⁵⁵⁰ Eshel, “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War.”

⁵⁵¹ “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess,” citing the IDF.

⁵⁵² Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign*, 65; Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 12, 48; and “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.” In describing an example of a well-concealed tunnel, Harel and Issacharoff wrote: “The entranceway to Hezbollah’s tunnel system on a steep slope near the village of Rashaf in southern Lebanon was hidden by a large rock. In order to reach the dark opening to the vast bunker, Nicholas Blanford, a correspondent for the American newspaper *Christian Science Monitor*, had to practically crawl on his hands and knees through dense vegetation and scrub oaks to the top of the hill. He squeezed through a crevice and found himself in one of the ‘nature reserves,’ as the Israelis termed them.” (*34 Days*, 45).

created enough launcher systems—media reports ranged from 40 to 150, according to one author—to target most populated areas in northern Israel.⁵⁵³

Hezbollah used deception to create the bunker system without Israel's knowledge. Alistaire Crooke and Mark Perry wrote that some of Hezbollah's bunkers were constructed openly, "under the eyes of Israeli drone vehicles" and under observation of sympathetic Lebanese. For the most part, the authors argued, "these bunkers were decoys. The building of other bunkers went forward in areas kept hidden from the Lebanese population. The most important command bunkers and weapons-arsenal bunkers were dug deeply into Lebanon's rocky hills—to a depth of 40 meters."⁵⁵⁴ Acosta called this "a classic example of military deception."⁵⁵⁵

A former U.N. spokesman, Timur Goksel, noted that in two locales near the border in 2001–2002, Hezbollah overtly brought out excavating equipment and dug tunnels into the limestone in plain sight. "We were meant to see these things," he said. "They were not making any effort to stop us looking." Further away, Goksel asserted, Hezbollah was constructing additional bunkers that were employed successfully for operations against Israel. Goksel noted, "Looking back, they really fooled us on that one."⁵⁵⁶

Hezbollah used several deceptive methods to create its secret bunker system. It primarily worked in off-limits or little-noticed areas. In one case, Hezbollah

⁵⁵³ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 9, citing (n. 9) Ze'ev Schiff, "How the IDF Blew Chance to Destroy Short-range Rockets," *Haaretz*, September 5, 2006.

⁵⁵⁴ Crooke and Perry, "How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 1" (which is also quoted secondarily in Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 43, n. 110).

⁵⁵⁵ Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 43.

⁵⁵⁶ Quoted in Shahid, "Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations" (which is also quoted secondarily in Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 44, n. 113).

closed off traffic for over three years.⁵⁵⁷ In other areas, Hezbollah simply constructed the structures in remote areas and at night. Reports alleged that villagers in some areas were kept awake by the sound of explosions as Hezbollah dynamited new areas.⁵⁵⁸ *Jane's* wrote, in part discussing the same bunker near Labboune noted above:

Following the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah created a number of security zones along the Blue Line, mainly in the more remote areas of the frontier with extensive ground cover and tucked into rocky valleys and ravines. Access to these areas for non-Hezbollah operatives was denied, often by armed and uniformed fighters manning small checkpoints on approach tracks and roads. Even UNIFIL peacekeepers were prevented from patrolling or flying over Hezbollah's security zones. While it was known that Hezbollah was constructing fortifications in these areas . . . the extent of the work was seriously underestimated by the IDF, UNIFIL and independent observers.

A good example of Hezbollah's bunker network was built on an unpopulated hillside at Labboune, named after a long-ruined farmstead, located 4 km from the coast. In August 2003, Hezbollah sealed off the hillside to all but UN traffic, declaring it a closed military zone. During the July–August conflict, Katyusha rockets were launched daily from the Labboune hillside, just a few hundred meters from the border, until the ceasefire. The IDF directed multiple air strikes and intense artillery bombardments against the hill but was unable to quell the rocket fire.⁵⁵⁹

This bunker was within eyesight of the U.N. border observation complex and the IDF border compound, but unknown to Israel until after its destruction.⁵⁶⁰ A UNIFIL officer told *Jane's*: “We never saw them build anything. They must have brought in cement by the spoonful.”⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁷ Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah and the IDF: Accepting New Realities Along the Blue Line,” *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* (Summer 2006), quoted in Arkin, *Divining Victory*, 48, n. 28.

⁵⁵⁸ Blanford, “Hizbullah and the IDF,” quoted in n. 21 of Arkin, *Divining Victory*, 26; and Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah’s Resilience Built on Years of Homework,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 11, 2006, accessed July 2, 2011, LexisNexis Academic.

⁵⁵⁹ “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶¹ Quoted in “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess” (which is also quoted secondarily in Acosta, “The Makara of Hizbullah,” 44, n. 114; and Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 137.)

One assessment alleged that Israeli satellite imagery was unable to detect Hezbollah's bunker constructions because they occurred "under the guise of road and infrastructure work."⁵⁶² While this assertion makes logical sense, no additional known publications are available to back it up or provide additional detail.

The successful creation of the bunker and firing position systems were arguably central to Hezbollah's ability to remain viable throughout the 34 days of the conflict. They allowed Hezbollah the opportunity to strike Israel strategically, particularly with the Katyusha rockets, as is shown next.

War begins: Hezbollah started the 2006 war with the ambush on July 12 of an IDF patrol on the Israeli side of the border. The ambush coincided with heavy shelling along the border used as a decoy operation and with the decommissioning of the security cameras in the area. In the ambush, Hezbollah killed three IDF soldiers and kidnapped two—Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. IDF pursued the captors across the border approximately two hours later but by then the Hezbollah members involved had escaped.⁵⁶³

The abduction was part of Nasrallah's operational objectives for Hezbollah at that time. Nasrallah focused heavily, to the point where Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff called it an obsession, on establishing conditions whereby Israel would be willing to give back captured Hezbollah fighters; his plan called for kidnappings that would later enable prisoner swaps.⁵⁶⁴ Nasrallah probably saw kidnappings as necessary to help justify Hezbollah's continuing armament—this

⁵⁶² "Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force."

⁵⁶³ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 4–5, 12–13.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

was a period in which many within the Lebanese government were calling for its disarmament—and to improve its image within the country.⁵⁶⁵

The morning of the abduction, Al Manar, Hezbollah's television station, announced the kidnapping and stated, "We've kept our promise to free our soldiers,"⁵⁶⁶ and Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah had been planning the operation for five months.⁵⁶⁷ "We surprised no one," Nasrallah said. "We've been saying for a year that we'd kidnap Israeli soldiers. . . . From the beginning of the year we've placed the capture of soldiers at the top of our priorities in order to bring about the release of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners."⁵⁶⁸ Hezbollah spokesmen announced in television interviews that the group was interested in a prisoner exchange.⁵⁶⁹

Israel had no intention of allowing Hezbollah to so blatantly orchestrate a prisoner swap. Nasrallah did not expect Israel to invade, and the IDF retaliated in

⁵⁶⁵ Makovsky, "Israel's Policy and Political Lessons," 10; and Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 56.

⁵⁶⁶ Quoted in Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 75.

⁵⁶⁷ Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign*, 32.

⁵⁶⁸ Quoted in Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 83. A year prior, Hezbollah operatives had been caught planning abductions in the Shebaa Farms (ibid., 5) and in 2005 Nasrallah declared that 2006 would be dedicated to freeing prisoners (Makovsky, "Israel's Policy and Political Lessons," 10), but Nasrallah gave warning that something new was afoot. In a meeting on June 8, at a time when many in the Lebanese government were calling for Hezbollah's disarmament, Nasrallah made an offhand comment, little noticed by most present, that Israeli prisoners must be kidnapped and used as bargaining chips. Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 56. As explained by Shahid, "He didn't say it to take approval," said Boutros Harb, a member of parliament, who sat three seats away from Nasrallah. . . . 'He mentioned it like you'd write in the margins of a text.'" "Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations." Several days later Nasrallah confirmed that his cryptic reference to the parliament was intended as such: "I told them on more than one occasion that we are taking the issue of the prisoners seriously, and that abducting Israeli soldiers is the only way to resolve it. Of course, I said this in a low key tone. I did not declare in the dialogue: 'In July I will abduct Israeli soldiers.' This is impossible." The Middle East Media Research Institute, "Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: I Told Lebanese Political Leaders We Would Abduct Israeli Soldiers," *Special Dispatch* no. 1211 (July 25, 2006), accessed January 25, 2010, <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1751.htm>.

⁵⁶⁹ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 75.

a far stronger manner than Nasrallah anticipated.⁵⁷⁰ Hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel would last from July 12 to August 14, 2006.⁵⁷¹

Wartime objectives: Israel wanted to destroy Hezbollah, and if this was not possible, to at least cripple and disarm it. As Sanu Kainikara and Russell Parkin described, Israel aimed “to deal a debilitating blow to Hezbollah. It may be incorrect to depict it as the destruction of Hezbollah, but it is clear that the IDF planned their campaign with a view to making the Hezbollah completely irrelevant militarily, politically, socially and economically, at least for the next two decades.”⁵⁷²

Israel was concerned about Hezbollah’s rocket capability and wanted to mitigate that threat.⁵⁷³ Israel also aimed to free the kidnapped soldiers, force Lebanon to assert more authority over its territory, and restore credibility lost in the withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005.⁵⁷⁴ Within the first week of the conflict, the prime minister listed Israel’s conditions for an end to hostilities: “return of the kidnapped soldiers, an unconditional cease-fire, deployment of the Lebanese army in the entire south of the country, and the

⁵⁷⁰ Zisser, “Nasrallah’s Defeat in the 2006 War,” citing (n. 10) *Al-Manar*, February 6, 2008; see also Shahid, “Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations.”

⁵⁷¹ Hezbollah and Lebanese sources usually claim the war lasted 33 days, vice 34, because they probably do not consider the initial kidnappings as part of the conflict.

⁵⁷² Kainikara and Parkin, *Pathways to Victory*, 58.

⁵⁷³ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War,” working draft for outside comment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 17, 2006, 16, accessed January 25, 2010, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060911_isr_hez_lessons.pdf.

⁵⁷⁴ Yusuf Fernandez, “The July War Series, Part IV – Hezbollah’s Strategic Victory,” *Al-Manar.com*, August 10, 2009, accessed January 25, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=98486&language=en>; Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 9, 19, 22, 29; and Cordesman, “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War,” 3–9.

ouster of Hezbollah from the south according to [U.N. Security Council] Resolution 1559.”⁵⁷⁵

Israel’s strategy did not, at first, include a ground invasion. IDF leadership had developed a philosophical concept of operations that relied heavily on air power and ultimately was aimed at targeting Hezbollah’s centers of gravity. As Harel and Issacharoff explained:

The new operational concept was intended to transform the concept of winning and the means of setting about it. . . . Victory would be achieved by applying a chain of “springboards” and “effects” on the rationale of the enemy’s system. The IDF’s most advanced technologies—precision fire (especially from the air, but also from ground-based missiles), command and control systems, observation and intelligence-gathering devices—would make the capture of territory obsolete. . . . Simultaneous, multidirectional strikes would be aimed at the heart of the enemy: the perception of its leaders. Technological superiority would ensure victory and save the lives of Israeli troops that would have been lost in close contact with the enemy.⁵⁷⁶

The strategy failed, however, in part because it was so philosophically obtuse that most officers and soldiers could not understand it.⁵⁷⁷

Israel’s objectives to cripple Hezbollah and to secure the return of the soldiers served to help Hezbollah set up a counterobjective—survival and the infliction of as many Israeli casualties as possible.⁵⁷⁸ As long as Hezbollah could survive Israeli attempts to destroy it and secure release of the prisoners, Israel would thereby fail in achieving its objectives. On July 21, Nasrallah stated in an interview with Al Jazeera:

If the resistance survives, this will be a victory. If its determination is not broken, this will be a victory. If Lebanon is not humiliated, if its honor and

⁵⁷⁵ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 107–8.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵⁷⁷ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 23–28.

⁵⁷⁸ Exum, *Hizballah at War*, 8, quoted in Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 81, n. 3.

dignity remain intact, if Lebanon continues to face all alone the strongest military force in the region, and if it perseveres and refuses to accept any humiliating terms in the settlement of this issue—this will be a victory. If we are not militarily defeated, this will be a victory. As long as a single missile is launched from Lebanon to target the Zionists, as long as a single fighter fires his gun, as long as someone plants an explosive device for the Israelis, this means that the resistance still exists.⁵⁷⁹

To achieve this objective, Hezbollah implemented a two-part strategy that was possible thanks to the success of its deceptive actions. First, it barraged northern Israel with intense rocket fire from short and intermediate-range rockets. This served to both damage Israeli morale and to force it to launch a ground offensive, which Hezbollah was prepared to meet. Once the ground offensive started, Hezbollah used well-planned defense operations to hold back the offensive.⁵⁸⁰ Neither element of this strategy would have been possible had Hezbollah not made its preparations in the years beforehand—which it was able to do by using deception.


Operation SPECIFIC GRAVITY: In the predawn hours of July 13, Israel launched Operation SPECIFIC GRAVITY targeting Hezbollah's Iranian-made long-range launchers, many of which had been hidden in the homes of Hezbollah operatives. Israel also bombed observation posts, compounds in Beirut, and roads and bridges leading from the south.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁹ Quoted in "Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah."

⁵⁸⁰ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 31.

⁵⁸¹ Col. David Eshel (IDF Retd.), "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later: Electronic Warfare in the Second Lebanon War," *Journal of Electronic Defense* 30, no. 7 (July 2007): 30, 32; Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 18, citing (n. 30) Aluf Benn, "Report: IAF Wiped Out 59 Iranian Missile Launchers in 34 Minutes," *Haaretz*, October 24, 2006; and Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign*, 30, citing (n. 43) Arkin, *Divining Victory*, 63, 73, and appendix C. The author thanks the Association of Old Crows, which administers the *Journal of Electronic Defense*, for a complimentary electronic copy of Eshel's "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later."

Israel had good reason to target the longer-range missiles because the largest of them could reach as far as 200 km, essentially the length of the country.⁵⁸² The primarily Syrian-made intermediate-range rockets (with a range of 45–100 km, sometimes also called “long-range”⁵⁸³) posed a significant threat to Israel because they could target the population center of Haifa, be fired in a concentrated salvo, and because they contained warheads designed to kill as many as possible (see map 1).⁵⁸⁴ Israel did not try to target Hezbollah’s short-range Katyusha capability; this would be a costly error.⁵⁸⁵



Estimates vary on the success of SPECIFIC GRAVITY. Most agree that Israel destroyed a large number of Hezbollah’s long-range launchers. Israel hit 59 launchers concealed in the homes of activists and Shiite families in south Lebanon

⁵⁸² Bakshi, “Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-2”; and “Hezbollah’s Rocket Force,” *BBC News*, July 18, 2006, accessed June 3, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5187974.stm. Hezbollah possessed several types of rockets: the 45 km Raad, 50 km Fajr 3, 70 km Fajr 5, and the 120, 200, and 400 km Zelzal 1, 2, and 3 (Bakshi, “Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-2”).

⁵⁸³ Rubin (*Rocket Campaign*) used the term “long-range” to describe any rockets with a range over 20 km, but in order to keep these distinct from the rockets that could reach up to 200 km, this analysis keeps the definitions separate.

⁵⁸⁴ Jeffrey White, “Part II: Military Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War,” in David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, *Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment*, Policy Focus #60 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2006), 40–1, 48, accessed June 4, 2011, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus60.pdf>.

⁵⁸⁵ See Kainikara and Parkin, *Pathways to Victory*, 64.

in the first 34 minutes of strikes.⁵⁸⁶ This operation was supposed to stop a strategic rocket attack against Israel.⁵⁸⁷

In the realm of the endgame theory, it could be argued that Israel practiced strong counterdeception *on this issue* because Hezbollah was so unsuccessful in hiding such a large number of launchers. Those launchers destroyed were correctly targeted thanks to highly accurate intelligence, as Col. David Eshel (IDF Retd.) noted:

Some of these activities were monitored throughout the years by Israeli UAVs, and this intelligence provided important targeting information for preemptive strikes. Intelligence was so accurate that pilots were briefed on their specific targets with special map displays pointing directly to the rooms where rockets had been located. GPS data was calibrated to square-meter precision, which was preprogrammed in JDAM bomb coordinates. This measure of precision-enabled, point-target destruction of the hidden rockets occurred with near 100 percent accuracy. At the outbreak of the war, local “sleeper” cells went into action, with special forces using lasers to “paint” targets, which then were attacked by Israeli fighter jets.⁵⁸⁸

Israel’s hyperaccurate intelligence about the long-range rockets stands in stark contrast to its intelligence about the bunkers and short-range rockets. In the deception analysis below this study will examine the causes of Israel’s failure with regard to the smaller rockets.

Rocket and ground war: Uzi Rubin provided a counterargument about SPECIFIC GRAVITY, suggesting that while it did succeed in destroying a large number of launchers, it had little *effect* on Hezbollah’s rocket firings during the war. He first posed three hypotheses about why Hezbollah failed to fire long-

⁵⁸⁶ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 91, citing (n. 1) David Makovsky (work not noted, although Makovsky makes this observation in “Israel’s Policy and Political Lessons,” n. 5 on p. 19).

⁵⁸⁷ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 18.

⁵⁸⁸ Eshel, “The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later,” 30, 32.

range Iranian rockets: (1) there were no rockets (implausible); (2) they were *all* destroyed (a hypothesis the IDF discounted); or (3) Iran did not allow Hezbollah permission to use the rockets to avoid scrutiny from the international community at a time when the community was debating sanctions against Iran's nuclear program. Rubin argued that the latter hypothesis is most likely.⁵⁸⁹ If this hypothesis is correct, then even if the Israeli operation successfully targeted most Iranian-made long-range missile launchers, Hezbollah potentially could have fired the remaining long-range missiles had Iran allowed it to do so.

Israel was less successful against intermediate-range (45–100 km) rockets during SPECIFIC GRAVITY and continued targeting them as the war progressed. Hezbollah shot a number of intermediate-range rockets during the hostilities and hit population centers on more than one occasion.⁵⁹⁰ Rubin assessed that if the IAF operation against rockets with a range of longer than 20 km had been as successful as Israel had claimed—estimates suggest that Israel hit half to two thirds of the intermediate-range launchers rockets by the war's end⁵⁹¹—the intensity of intermediate-range rocket fire should have slowed or stopped as Israel targeted the launchers.⁵⁹² Various other reports indicated that some of the targeted launchers were dummies, and Israel might not have had a correct estimate of the number of intermediate rockets when the war started.⁵⁹³ Rubin showed that Hezbollah fired intermediate-range missiles—not to speak of short-

⁵⁸⁹ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 6–7; Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 92; see also Kainikara and Parkin, *Pathways to Victory*, 54.

⁵⁹⁰ See Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 5; and White, "Military Implications," 48.

⁵⁹¹ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 91.

⁵⁹² Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 24.

⁵⁹³ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 122; "Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess"; Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 25–6; and Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 10–11.

range Katyushas—at a constant rate throughout the war, indicating that the fire suppression effort was ultimately not successful enough to impact Hezbollah’s use of intermediate-range rockets.⁵⁹⁴

Israel followed SPECIFIC GRAVITY with several weeks of air strikes, first focusing on known Hezbollah-affiliated locations and then broadening its target packages to include Lebanese infrastructure. Israeli troops made occasional short-range forays into southern Lebanon, but not until August 11—only three days before a cease-fire took effect—did Israel launch a ground invasion. The IDF started the invasion as Israel, Lebanon, the United States, and the U.N. Security Council finalized terms for a cease-fire, which called for an expanded UNIFIL force to join Lebanese armed forces in replacing Israeli troops and keeping peace in southern Lebanon.⁵⁹⁵

During the war, Hezbollah fired more short-range Katyusha rockets (with a rough range of 25 km) than anything else. Altogether, Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 rockets at a consistent rate of about 130 per day.⁵⁹⁶ The only lull in the rocket fire occurred during a two-day cease-fire on July 31 and August 1, 2006, which had the unintended effect of showing that Hezbollah retained surprisingly strong command and control over its tactical forces.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁴ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 21.

⁵⁹⁵ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 215–224; see also U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1701, “The Situation in the Middle East,” August 11, 2006, accessed July 12, 2011, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵⁹⁶ Estimates do vary: 4228 (“Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess”); “nearly 4000” (“Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance”); and 3970 (“Home Front Command: Return to Routine in all the North’s Population Centers,” *Ynet News* [Hebrew], August 14, 2007, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3291201,00.html, quoted in Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 10, n. 12).

⁵⁹⁷ “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess”; and “Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance.” On command over tactical forces, see Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 170.

The destruction caused by the rockets negatively impacted life in northern Israel and caused significant economic damage. Fifty-three Israelis (41 civilians) were killed, 250 wounded, and thousands injured. Between 100,000 and 250,000 civilians temporarily fled to other parts of Israel and approximately one million stayed in or near shelters.⁵⁹⁸

Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan noted that the rocket firing had little individual lethality—Rubin assessed it averaged 72 rockets fired per fatality⁵⁹⁹—but cumulatively the effect was disastrous: “Israel did . . . suffer significant cumulative casualties and suffered serious economic damage in the north. For example, the town of Qiryat Shemona took some 370 hits (about one-tenth of all rockets fired), and much of the north was evacuated, sheltered, or came to an economic halt. A total of 2000 apartments were damaged, some 10–15 percent of the businesses in the north could not meet their August payroll, the overall economic cost quickly rose to billions of dollars, and early postwar predictions put the national cost as a drop in Israel’s GDP growth from 6 percent to 4.5 percent.”⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁸ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 14.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁰⁰ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 103, citing (n. 33) “Rockets Fell on Tuscany,” *Economist*, August 19, 2006, 44. According to Noe: As far as casualties were concerned, by late December 2006, *Associated Press* reported that, “More than 1,000 Lebanese civilians and combatants died during the summer war between Israel’s army and Hezbollah guerrillas, according to tallies by government agencies, humanitarian groups and *The Associated Press*. Israeli authorities put the death toll for the Jewish state at 120 military combat deaths and 39 civilians killed by Hezbollah rockets fired into northern Israel during the July 12–14 Aug conflict. Both sides have revised their figures of Lebanon’s war dead. The latest Lebanese and AP counts include 250 Hezbollah fighters that the group’s leaders now say died . . .” *Voice of Hezbollah*, in n. 1 on p. 378, quoting “Lebanon Sees More than 1,000 War Deaths,” *Associated Press*, December 28, 2006, which Noe accessed online.

Hezbollah's ability to keep an unmitigated barrage of rockets fired at Israel is counted by most scholars as a success for the organization, and Hezbollah capped this barrage with a peak number of rockets—roughly 250—on the last day of fighting.⁶⁰¹ After hostilities ended, analysts assessed that Hezbollah still retained over 7000 Katyushas—enough to keep firing for over another month at the rate it achieved during the war.⁶⁰²

Hezbollah also was able to sufficiently combat the Israeli ground invasion even though Israel did achieve some tactical victories during the course of the war. Israel was unable to defeat the strong Hezbollah physical presence—bolstered by its prewar preparations—that included the use of minefields, mined highways, antitank missiles, and small arms fire to hold back or repel several Israeli incursions and inflict heavy casualties on the IDF during its pre-cease-fire invasion.⁶⁰³

Hezbollah set up an effective command structure within south Lebanon.

According to Cordesman et al., it “divided southern Lebanon into several sectors

⁶⁰¹ See Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 3–4. Nasrallah had made it clear that Hezbollah aimed for a psychological victory:

What is important in the ground war is the number of losses we inflict upon the Israeli enemy. I say to you: No matter how deep the ground incursion that the Israeli enemy might accomplish—and this enemy has great capabilities in this area—it will not accomplish the goal of this incursion—preventing the shelling of the settlements in the north of occupied Palestine. This shelling will continue, no matter how deep the ground incursion and the reoccupation that the Zionist enemy is trying to accomplish. The occupation of any inch of our Lebanese land will further motivate us to continue and escalate the resistance. The arrival of the army of the Zionists in our country will enable us to inflict more harm on it, its soldiers, its officers, and its tanks. The Middle East Media Research Institute, “Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah on Al-Manar TV Last Night: ‘What is Important in the Ground War is the Number of Losses We Inflict Upon the Israeli Enemy,’” *Special Dispatch* No. 1214 (July 27, 2006, accessed January 26, 2010, <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1754.htm>).

⁶⁰² Kainikara and Parkin, *Pathways to Victory*, 61. Harel and Issacharoff estimated that Hezbollah had at least 12,000 Katyusha rockets alone to start with. *34 Days*, 48.

⁶⁰³ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 47, citing (n. 16) Exum, *Hizballah at War*, 4. See Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign* for more on Hezbollah's fighting in the war. See Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 215–240 on both sides' actions during the short invasion.

composed of about 12 villages each. . . . [T]hose sectors were then divided into subsectors of 2 or 3 villages each.” As noted earlier, Hezbollah fighters communicated with Beirut through fiber optic lines that were resistant to interference, and also used tactical radios and improvised codes to communicate.⁶⁰⁴ Hezbollah was able to fight the war without calling in reserve units; as one commentator noted, “The entire war was fought by one Hezbollah brigade of 3,000 troops, and no more. The Nasr Brigade fought the entire war. Hezbollah never felt the need to reinforce it.”⁶⁰⁵

Hezbollah also gained from events that turned international opinion toward a cease-fire. Israel suffered a particular public relations blow on July 30, after bombing a compound at Qana filled with civilians. Qana came as a break for Hezbollah at a time when Nasrallah was under pressure from the international community—including many Arab countries—to come to Israel’s terms. Harel and Issacharoff related:

The tragedy enabled Hezbollah to avoid an agreement that might have been interpreted as ignominious surrender: the organization’s unconditional expulsion from southern Lebanon, the introduction of an international force that was permitted to open fire according to Article 7 of the United Nations Charter, and an arms embargo on the country. Once again the Arab public, large sections of the Lebanese citizenry, and, to a certain degree, even the international community lent their support to Hezbollah.⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰⁴ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 135, citing (n. 99) interviews; reporting in *Jane’s* sources; Barbara Opall-Rome, “Combating the Hizballah Network,” *Defense News*, October 9, 2006, 6.

⁶⁰⁵ Quoted in Alistaire Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 2: Winning the Ground War,” *Asia Times Online*, October 13, 2006, accessed May 26, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html. See Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign*, especially pp. 62–72, on Hezbollah’s effectiveness as a fighting organization in 2006. The authors engaged in a balanced and informative analysis that looks at the group’s fighting strengths and weaknesses.

⁶⁰⁶ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 165.

Summary—impact of the deception: The crux of Hezbollah’s capabilities to fight in the war was centered in its ability to fire a continuous barrage of rockets across the border and defend territory before and during the Israeli invasion.⁶⁰⁷ Hezbollah’s prewar preparations were central to this, and its use of deception in creating bunkers played a large role in those preparations. Israel had intended to force a situation wherein Hezbollah faced an existential threat from Israel’s air power from the war’s start, but Hezbollah was able to prepare for this threat and thereby mitigate the danger that it faced over the course of the conflict.⁶⁰⁸ The threat toward Hezbollah might have changed if the conflict had been allowed to continue for another month or longer—indeed, the pending change from a manageable to possibly existential threat possibly drove Hezbollah to engage in the next deception assessed below—but because the war was settled with a cease-fire after 34 days, Hezbollah’s ability to survive is generally perceived as a success for the organization.

Deception 2: Targeting Politics Through Casualty Counts

The second deception examined in this chapter was a possible BTM that Hezbollah might have intended to demoralize Israel and bring international pressure against it to engage in a cease-fire. Hezbollah probably targeted the deception at the Israeli state, its people, and the international community. The deception involved creating a false show of strength by hiding its true number of casualties and reporting incorrect numbers of dead fighters. The deception met

⁶⁰⁷ See Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 30–1.

⁶⁰⁸ Kainikara and Parkin, *Pathways to Victory*, 58.

with mixed success. Some within the international community bought Hezbollah's propaganda, but Israel did not.

Changing threat: Hezbollah's preparations for an eventual war made it possible to survive in the short term, but Israel's invasion nevertheless surprised Nasrallah, who did not think that Israel would risk a Hezbollah rocket attack.⁶⁰⁹ Over the long term, Hezbollah probably did not relish the prospects of a multiyear occupation of Lebanon similar to the one that ended in 2000, and if one had developed, the group would have faced serious damage at the hands of Israel and the Lebanese populace. Hezbollah's leadership, while willing to prosecute the war as long as necessary, almost certainly had to face the question of what it would do once its store of rockets was exhausted and its bunkers were found out. Would it covertly import more rockets? Change to a campaign primarily using small arms? How would it convince the Lebanese government and international community to let it continue fighting over the long term?

A long-term war would represent a shift for the worse in the threat level Israel posed against Hezbollah. Over the course of continued conflict the possibility that it would be defeated or marginalized would change from manageably moderate to severe, and because of this it was probably imperative for Hezbollah that Israel change its actions and remove itself, or be removed, from the war.

Since this is an unproven assessment of Hezbollah's calculations following the start of the conflict, this dissertation will assert that the group probably perceived itself as facing an increasingly higher threat scenario as the conflict

⁶⁰⁹ Shahid, "Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations."

continued. If this is true, the conditions would have been ripe for it to attempt a deception that would lead Israel to change its behavior.

Use of media: Hezbollah for years has turned to its media apparatus to target public opinion. The Hezbollah media structure consists of multiple websites, a radio station, and its flagship television service, Al Manar.⁶¹⁰ Al Manar functions under a senior supervisory committee chaired by Nasrallah and is dedicated to publicizing Hezbollah activities and international events that can be used to paint Israel and its allies negatively.⁶¹¹ Al Manar claimed on its website: “Al Manar is the first Arab establishment to stage an effective psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy.”⁶¹² As Al Manar expert Avi Jorisch noted, “Al Manar is propaganda in its most undiluted form. Every aspect of Al Manar’s content, from news to filler, is fine-tuned to present a single point of view: that of a militantly Islamist sponsor, consistently urging the recourse to violent ‘resistance’ as the only legitimate response to Israel’s existence and the U.S. presence in the Middle East.”⁶¹³

Al Manar’s propaganda contains deceptive material, although a portion of that material is intended for sympathetic or vulnerable audiences and probably is not

⁶¹⁰ Gabriel Weimann, “Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah’s Online Campaign,” 11, 14, accessed January 26, 2010, <http://cmsprod.bgu.ac.il/NR/rdonlyres/34396BDB-6C0E-4931-A077-697451885123/34393/Weimannedited.pdf>.

⁶¹¹ Maura Conway, “Cybercortical Warfare: The Case of Hizbollah.org” (paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research [ECPR] Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, UK, March 28 – April 2, 2003), 12, accessed August 29, 2011, <https://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/edinburgh/ws20/Conway.pdf>.

⁶¹² Quoted in Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 36.

⁶¹³ Avi Jorisch, “Al-Manar, Hizbullah TV, 24-7,” *Middle East Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2004), accessed January 26, 2010, <http://www.meforum.org/583/al-manar-hizbullah-tv-24-7>.

meant as part of a strategy of deception as examined in the endgame theory.⁶¹⁴ For example, Al Manar characterized the attacks of September 11 as part of the “resistance” against the United States, and has claimed that 4,000 Jews were absent from the World Trade Center, implying that the attacks were part of a larger Jewish conspiracy.⁶¹⁵ This message would have been targeted toward an audience already vulnerable to believing such bunk, not toward convincing populations in the West.

Another portion of Hezbollah’s propaganda is partially fact-based material that has been twisted, embellished, or presented in a way that evokes stronger reactions from the target audiences than it would if presented in an otherwise objective manner—“propaganda” in its most classic sense.⁶¹⁶ Similarly, Hezbollah is known for controlling the information environment in order to present a prepackaged message, and this represents a good case of tactical denial. Marvin Kalb described an example of this with regard to a media tour provided by Hezbollah:

Foreign correspondents were warned, on entry to the tour, that they could not wander off on their own or ask questions of any of the residents. They could only take pictures of sites approved by their Hezbollah minders. Violations, they were told, would be treated harshly. Cameras would be confiscated, film or tape destroyed, and offending reporters would never again be allowed access to Hezbollah officials or Hezbollah-controlled areas.

⁶¹⁴ See Avi Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 27–30, 51. Jorisch noted that Al Manar is waging a public relations campaign against the United States. *Ibid.*, 51.

⁶¹⁵ Jorisch, “Al-Manar”; and Bryan Curtis, “4,000 Jews, 1 Lie—Tracking an Internet Hoax,” *Slate.com*, October 5, 2001, quoted in Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred*, 39, n. 108. Curtis is quoting from the website *Information Times*, which credited the information to Al Manar and other sources. This author was unable to find the *Information Times* article, but accessed Curtis’s article on June 20, 2011, <http://slate.msn.com/?id=116813>.

⁶¹⁶ Good examples of Hezbollah twisting partially fact-based material to vilify the United States can be found in Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred*, 51–61.

. . . At one point, apparently on cue, a Hezbollah minder signaled for ambulances to rev up their engines, set off their sirens and drive noisily down the street. The scene was orchestrated, designed to provide a photo op, and reporters went along for the ride. It was for them a rare look “inside” Hezbollah. For Hezbollah, it was another successful play to the gallery.⁶¹⁷

Hezbollah’s ability to manipulate media and present a single message during the 2006 war was notable. As Acosta explained with regard to Hezbollah’s tight control over media, it “allowed Hezbollah to tell their story better than Israel, because there was only one story to tell and then only told by a few high ranking people in Hezbollah’s organization.”⁶¹⁸

Targeting morale: Hezbollah by 2006 knew the importance of targeting the morale of the Israeli public and its armed forces, as Israel was most likely to abandon the conflict if the war was viewed as unimportant or, more likely, unwinnable.⁶¹⁹ During the previous Israeli occupation, Hezbollah published accurate reports about Israeli military activities—along with its other propaganda material—targeted at families of Israeli soldiers. This helped influence the Israeli public to pressure the government to leave Lebanon.⁶²⁰ This success no doubt

⁶¹⁷ Marvin Kalb, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” *Faculty Research Working Paper Series*, February 2007, 18–19, accessed January 26, 2010, <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP07-012> (site discontinued), citing (ns. 35–6) Anderson Cooper, “Hezbollah Remains Secretive Organization,” *Anderson Cooper 360 on CNN*, August 9, 2006. Kalb noted that only Anderson Cooper saw through the hoax (“The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006,” 19, citing [n. 36] Cooper, “Hezbollah Remains Secretive Organization”). (Kalb is also quoted secondarily in Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah,” 52, ns. 135–6.)

⁶¹⁸ Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah,” 42; see also Kalb, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006,” 18–23.

⁶¹⁹ In many ways Hezbollah reverted to a psychological operation theme it had turned to during Israel’s first occupation, as described by Ron Schleifer: “In appealing to its enemy audience Hezbollah’s strategic aim was to persuade Israel’s decision makers to quit the southern Lebanese security region. In order to achieve this, they targeted the Israeli political establishment, but also various groups within Israeli society in the hope that the latter would eventually force their government to withdraw from Lebanon.” “Psychological Operations: A New Variation On an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 1 (2006): 8, accessed June 20, 2011, doi: 10.1080/10576100500351185.

⁶²⁰ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 224. As Hoffman explained:

was not lost on Hezbollah, and the group probably aimed for a similar achievement during the 2006 war.

Deception—cooking the books with casualty counts: A third portion of Hezbollah’s propaganda is actively deceptive. In at least one case during the 2006 war, Hezbollah’s propaganda appears to have been used as part of an organized deception dealing with the group’s casualty counts. In this deception, Hezbollah possibly attempted to convince audiences that many individuals killed by the Israeli military were actually Lebanese civilians, not Hezbollah fighters.

Israeli operations killed over 1,000 Lebanese during the war. The most commonly held view is that most of these were civilians; however, an article by Steven Stotsky challenged this view and suggested that Israeli estimates—which

Hezbollah propaganda efforts, directed at Israeli audiences back home—and specifically at the mothers of IDF troops serving in southern Lebanon—are widely regarded as having been influential in generating public pressure on the Israeli government to withdraw from Lebanon. ‘By means of the Internet,’ Ibrahim Nasser al Din, a Hezbollah military leader, claimed, ‘Hezbollah has succeeded in entering the homes of Israelis, creating an important psychological breakthrough.’ This quote appeared in an article published in a leading Israeli newspaper, which further reported how parents of IDF soldiers serving in Lebanon regularly visited the Hezbollah site to get a version of the news unvarnished by Israeli military censors. Ibid., citing (ns. 158 and 159) Edward Lucas, “Deadly Image Which Could Give Hezbollah the Edge,” *Scotsman* (Edinburgh), April 14, 2000; Tanya Willmer, “Soldiers Mothers Pray Their Own Battle Over After Israel Ends Its Vietnam,” *Agence France-Presse*, May 24, 2000; Bill Maxwell, “Good Women Help Bring War’s End,” *Albany Times Union*, June 5, 2000; Yariv Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann, “www.terrorism.com,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 315, who cited information from the Hezbollah website that appeared in *Yediot Ahronot* on December 16, 1998.

Tsfati and Weimann wrote: “The organization [Hezbollah] knows that many Israelis visit the site, whose address is published in Israeli media. Hezbollah publishes its records of murdered Israelis, maintains electronic connections with Israelis, and appeals to Israeli parents whose sons serve in the Israeli army, all with the aim of causing demoralization.” “www.terrorism.com,” 325, accessed July 9, 2011, doi: 10.1080/10576100290101214.

See also Shingo Hamanaka, “Public Opinion Behind the Deterrence: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Study of the Israeli Policy Towards Lebanon,” *Munich Personal RePEc Archive* Paper No. 16800 (August 13, 2009): 9–11, accessed June 29, 2011, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16800/1/MPRA_paper_16800.pdf. Hamanaka stated: “According to Kaye . . . , Israeli groups, particularly the Four Mothers movement, exerted domestic pressure on the government to withdraw from Lebanon. These groups were organized by war bereaved or ordinary people who questioned the significance of Israel’s military presence in Lebanon. Ibid., 9, citing Dalia Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli Decision to Withdraw from Southern Lebanon: Political Leadership and Security Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 117, no. 4: 561–85.

indicated that approximately half were Hezbollah fighters—might be close to accurate. Stotsky’s findings propose that Hezbollah attempted to deceive Israeli and international audiences about the number of fighters killed.⁶²¹

This analysis argues that this effort could fall within the paradigm of BTM if Hezbollah engaged in the deception with the intent to influence Israeli decision making in its favor. Hezbollah possibly hoped that these efforts would make it look like it had lost fewer fighters than it had in reality. The goal would be to lead the Israeli public and decision makers to assess that Hezbollah had a relatively undiminished fighting capacity, and they would thereby question whether continued fighting was worthwhile. Additionally, the deception would lead international observers to assess that Israel was killing more civilians than was actually the case, and it thereby might create increased pressure by international actors on Israel to agree to a cease-fire in order to protect Lebanese civilians. As Stotsky noted, “Hezbollah and its supporters have reason to exaggerate the number of Lebanese civilian casualties: it promotes the charge that

⁶²¹ Steven Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon,” *Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA)*, September 7, 2006, accessed July 11, 2011, http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=2&x_outlet=8&x_article=1195. For the official United Nations report citing Lebanon’s casualty count as 1,191, see U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council, Report A/HRC/3/2, “Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled ‘Human Rights Council’: Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S2-1,” November 23, 2006, 3, accessed June 25, 2011, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.3.2.pdf>.

On the matter of a deceiver using media to deceive a variety of targets, not just governments, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and John A. Sawicki wrote, “The printed word as well as television and the Internet are increasingly powerful suppliers and transmitters of information to official and broader audiences. Because entities outside . . . government are . . . subject to . . . psychological phenomena . . . , they also can be the objects, initiators or purveyors of denial and deception. . . . To the extent that the paradigm encompasses states as well as actors other than states, the targets for denial and deception are multiplied.” “Perception and Misperception: Implications for Denial and Deception: A Literature Survey and Analysis” (unpublished manuscript), 50. See also Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah,” 64–5.

Israel uses reckless and disproportionate force, and at the same time bolsters Hezbollah's reputation by understating their battlefield losses."⁶²²

To be a BTM, the casualty deception would need to be, in the words of Robert Pfaltzgraff, a "consciously contrived effort" to change Israeli behavior.⁶²³ There is insufficient information about Hezbollah's internal calculations to definitively conclude that the efforts were part of a grander deception plan and not just part of routine denial.⁶²⁴ This analysis therefore posits that Hezbollah's activities were a possible BTM.

At the height of the war, Nasrallah invited the Al Jazeera Beirut bureau chief to his location and provided a televised interview in which he stated: "I would like to tell you and the viewers that when a martyr falls, we inform his family and we then announce this. We do not hide our martyrs until the end of battle. We have never done this. On the contrary, we always take pride in our martyrs."⁶²⁵ When we combine this statement with information showing that Hezbollah published false casualty statistics and engaged in proactive activities to hide its true number of casualties, it is feasible to argue that the group engaged in an orchestrated deception.

According to Stotsky, as of August 6, 2006, Hezbollah admitted to losing 53 fighters in the conflict. Israel stated that 196 Hezbollah fighters—individually

⁶²² Stotsky, "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon."

⁶²³ The author attributes the phrase "consciously contrived effort" to Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., discussion with the author, June 21, 2006, Cambridge, MA.

⁶²⁴ In a denial operation, Hezbollah's leadership would have said something like, "We need to hide the true number of our casualties because it makes us look weak to reveal them." In a deception operation, the calculation would be, "Let's hide our true number of casualties because it will make Israel look bad and, with domestic Israeli and international pressure involved, might make Israel reconsider continuing engagement in the war."

⁶²⁵ Weimann, "Hezbollah Dot Com," 9, citing G. Jiddu-Bin, *Interview with Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah*, aired on Al Jazeera, July 20, 2006.

identified by name—plus others who were unknown had been killed. After the conflict, international news outlets, mirroring Hezbollah’s accounting, reported 68–74 fighters lost, and Israel said that 532 identified fighters plus 200 others had been killed.⁶²⁶

An August 4 article in the United Kingdom’s *Daily Telegraph* reported that many of Hezbollah’s wounded had been taken to hospitals in Syria in order to hide true casualty numbers, and the *Telegraph* noted that it had seen actual casualty lists. Further, Lebanese newspapers reportedly obtained copies of the lists but Hezbollah pressured them to not publish. After the war, the *Telegraph* reported that Hezbollah member funerals had been staggered, and some were interred without a funeral for later reburial.⁶²⁷

In one probable case of deception, medical authorities and human rights investigators put the death toll at 29 after the Qana bombing, with only one fighting age male (17) among the dead. During the funeral, three or four (depending on the source) coffins were draped with Hezbollah flags, and a Hezbollah official stated that they were killed in other locales. This suggests that some civilians were not interred to allow for the burial of Hezbollah members.

⁶²⁶ Aron Heller, *Associated Press*, August 9, 2006; Abraham Rabinovich, *Washington Times*, September 27, 2006; *Associated Press*, “Lebanese Troops Begin Patrol at Israeli Border,” available from *Foxnews.com*, August 18, 2006, accessed July 10, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,209143,00.html; *Agence France-Presse*, cited in untitled article at *Turkishpress.com*, August 19, 2006, accessed August 24, 2011, <http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=138277>; all quoted or cited in Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon.”

⁶²⁷ Con Coughlin, “Teheran Fund Pays War Compensation to Hizbollah Families,” *The Telegraph*, August 4, 2006, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1525593/Teheran-fund-pays-war-compensation-to-Hizbollah-families.html>; and Patrick Bishop, “Peacekeeping Force Won’t Disarm Hizbollah,” *The Telegraph*, August 22, 2006, accessed January 26, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1526970/Peacekeeping-force-wont-disarm-Hizbollah.html>; both quoted in Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon.”

The question remains why Hezbollah would bury fighters who died in a different locale instead of burying the civilians, and hints at possible efforts for a shell game with casualties.⁶²⁸

Stotsky counted Hezbollah funerals reported in news sources. If Nasrallah had been correct in stating that Hezbollah announces the death of its fighters, its accounting of the fighters would at least match funeral statistics. Printed evidence of every funeral was nonexistent, but Stotsky found published reports on the deaths of at least 162 fighters—far more than the news estimates in the 68–74 range reported after the end of hostilities.⁶²⁹

In December 2006, Hezbollah admitted to having lost 250 members—far more than its original estimate.⁶³⁰ By that time the damages to Israel, if there were any, would have been done and Hezbollah would lose little by admitting its actual losses.

Matthew Levitt stated that the casualty deception, being “on the level of psyop [psychological operation],” falls on “the lowest end of the deception scale.”⁶³¹ It was a psychological operation, but in this case it is difficult to characterize it as simply being “low end.” Each case of denying information about the burial of a fighter was tactical. The publication of false numbers would be at least operational, especially given that Hezbollah decision makers were almost

⁶²⁸ Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon,” citing Red Cross and hospital officials, MSNBC, and Voice of America correspondent Challiss McDonough.

⁶²⁹ Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon.”

⁶³⁰ *Associated Press*, “Hezbollah Official: 250 Militants Killed During Lebanon War,” available from *Haaretz.com*, December 15, 2006, accessed January 26, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/801699.html>, cited in “Hezbollah Acknowledges Higher Losses Than Previously,” SNAPSHOTS a CAMERA Blog, December 18, 2006, accessed July 2, 2011, http://blog.camera.org/archives/2006/12/hezbollah_acknowledges_higher.html. See also Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, n. 1 on p. 378, quoting “Lebanon Sees More than 1,000 War Deaths.”

⁶³¹ Levitt interview.

certainly witting. The staggering of fighters' burials and secretly sending the wounded to Syria suggest activities more complex than a simple propaganda operation. Ultimately the ruse was not intended to influence soldiers on the ground in a specific location. It was probably intended to influence Israel's society and policymakers and the international community, and in this sense it was a strategic matter. This thesis argues that it represented a good example of a blend of tactical, operational, and strategic deception efforts.

Impact of the deception: The deception met with mixed results. The game did not fool the Israeli government, which consistently assessed higher numbers of Hezbollah casualties, and the Israeli public did not develop the same opposition to the war as during the previous occupation of Lebanon.⁶³²

Middle Eastern regimes were at first critical of Hezbollah, but as the war progressed they caved to pressure from their populations and took an increasingly sympathetic line toward the group; Hezbollah's propaganda efforts might have contributed to this.⁶³³

The international press's reporting is a different story. In a case of partial self-deception probably fed by Hezbollah's tight control over its message and by general bias against Israel, over the course of and after the war, many international news sources printed casualty estimates that more closely mimicked Hezbollah's than Israel's counts of lost Hezbollah fighters, or would note Israel's

⁶³² See Stotsky, "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon"; and Hamanaka, "Public Opinion Behind the Deterrence"; and "Israel Threatens to Expand Military Effort Against Hezbollah," *PBS Newshour*, originally aired August 9, 2006, transcript accessed July 2, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec06/israel_08-09.html.

⁶³³ Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 53–4; and Kalb, "The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006," 12–16.

estimates in ways that seemed to discount them. Additionally, the news sources tended to stress the high number of civilian casualties—another message emphasized by Hezbollah’s media apparatus—in their reporting.⁶³⁴ It appears to have had a positive effect for Hezbollah, because by the end of the war international actors were pressuring Israel to come to a cease-fire agreement, in part because it was viewed as too heavily targeting Lebanese civilians.⁶³⁵ The deception possibly played a role in this perception.

Coda—outcome of the war: Hezbollah’s deceptions played an important role in helping the group survive to a cease-fire, but in the end the war was a loss for both parties. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah achieved the objectives they entered with.⁶³⁶ Israel did show impressive intelligence and military capabilities with its attack against the Fajr missile system.⁶³⁷ The cease-fire harmed Hezbollah’s relative strength in southern Lebanon by getting the group to agree to the presence of the Lebanese military and a larger UNIFIL force after the war.

Nevertheless, Israel neither destroyed nor crippled the Islamic Resistance, and it failed to win the return of its captured soldiers—it was not until a lopsided prisoner swap in July 2008 that Israel received the bodies of Goldwasser and Regev.⁶³⁸ Israel did pressure Lebanon to assert more state-like authority, but

⁶³⁴ Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon”; and Kalb, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006,” 12–16.

⁶³⁵ See Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 34, 76, 163, 165, 167, 251.

⁶³⁶ Not all analysts agree. Gary Gambill in the *Mideast Monitor* argued that both sides made significant gains. “Implications of the Israel-Hezbollah War,” *Mideast Monitor* 1, no. 3 (September–October 2006), accessed January 28, 2010, http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_2.htm.

⁶³⁷ Also with its ability to move special forces behind Lebanese lines during the fighting. Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 259.

⁶³⁸ “Regev and Goldwasser to Receive Military Funerals Thursday,” *Haaretz.com*, July 20, 2008, accessed January 28, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1002425.html>.

rather than restoring the credibility lost during the withdrawals of 2000 and 2005, Israel ended in an even worse state. By the end of the hostilities it was clear to both the Israeli public and international community that the Israeli military and political decision-making structure was not prepared to effectively fight a war.⁶³⁹

Hezbollah did obtain its stated objective of survival. With some over-exaggeration with regard to Israel's successes against Hezbollah, Weimann characterized the psychological victory:

“We won a strategic and historic victory, without any exaggeration,” declared Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in August 2006, several days after the fighting ceased. This was a rather strange way to describe the outcome of an Israeli attack that destroyed much of the terrorist army's military infrastructure, laid waste its operational strongholds and bunkers, killed untold numbers of Hezbollah fighters and culminated in a “ceasefire” that effectively allows international forces to prevent the return of Hezbollah to southern Lebanon. Nonetheless, in line with the tradition of the Hezbollah campaign, Nasrallah was referring to the psychological victory. What constituted “victory” for Hezbollah were the mediated war images, ranging . . . from dead Lebanese children in a house bombed by Israeli planes to the deserted streets of a northern Israeli town whose residents were forced to leave their homes after numerous missile attacks.⁶⁴⁰

Hezbollah also failed to obtain a prisoner swap at the time that it hoped, and it made no advances on the long-term destruction of Israel. In fact, with the new presence of the Lebanese military and bolstered UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah ultimately lost ground, and the war left two thirds of the country's populace—representing most groups except the Shia—calling for the Islamic Resistance's dismantlement.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁹ See Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 165.

⁶⁴⁰ Weimann, “Hezbollah Dot Com,” 18–19.

⁶⁴¹ “Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess.”

Deception Analysis

This section will examine the endgame theory's variables against Hezbollah's deceptions during the Summer War of 2006.

Threat environment: The threat environment for Hezbollah changed between the time of the bunker deception and the casualty deception. Hezbollah decided to undertake the bunker deception when it and Israel were engaged in tit-for-tat attacks, mostly over the Shebaa Farms. Hezbollah expected that Israel would someday invade southern Lebanon, but there were no indicators that such an invasion was imminent. The threat to Hezbollah at that time was minimal—Hezbollah expected future problems with Israel, but Israel did not pose an existential threat. The conditions were prime for it to keep Israel on a status quo course while it prepared for a potential future conflict.

The threat changed with the beginning of the war. Israel surprised Hezbollah with the destruction of the long-range and many of the intermediate-range missiles, and, according to Israeli intelligence officials, Nasrallah at first did not know whether Israel knew about the short-range Katyushas.⁶⁴² Additionally, even as it probably became apparent that the bunkers and short-range rocket firing positions were safe, Nasrallah no doubt faced hard choices about what to do once the remaining missile stocks were depleted. Would it risk importing new rockets from Iran and Syria? Would Iran and Syria risk sending new rockets to Hezbollah with the prospect of a possible Israeli retaliation? What would happen once Israel started an impending full-scale ground invasion?

⁶⁴² Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 115–116, quoting “senior members of Israeli Intelligence.”

All of these issues possibly created a bleak picture for Hezbollah. By the time of the Israeli attack on Qana, when international support turned in Hezbollah's favor, Hezbollah was facing the prospects of being damaged heavily by an Israeli ground invasion or forced into a cease-fire that would require the disarmament of the group's military wing. Neither of these was acceptable, and as every day of the conflict continued, it became an increasingly existential problem. In this case, the conditions were ripe for Hezbollah to try and change Israeli behavior.

Shulsky requirement #1—strategic coherence: Hezbollah's bunker deception was orchestrated before the war under a strategy of preparation for an expected Israeli invasion. As part of that strategy, Hezbollah correctly predicted that Israel would depend on air power, was vulnerable to heavy pressure on its northern settlements, and would not accept high military casualties; all of these factors played to its hiding and use of short-range rockets.⁶⁴³

The casualty deception was most likely part of a strategy of survival. Hezbollah probably hoped to make itself look strong while simultaneously presenting the illusion that many of the dead Hezbollah fighters were actually civilians. This in turn might demoralize the Israeli public and create sympathy among other states to pressure the Israeli regime into a cease-fire.

In both senses the group demonstrated strategic coherence.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴³ Hanan Awarekeh, "Muqawama, Hezbollah's Winning Strategy during Leb. War," *Al-Manar.com*, September 10, 2008, accessed January 28, 2010, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=59390&language=en>; Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 16; Kulick, "Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension"; and Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 34.

⁶⁴⁴ A counterargument could be made that the casualty deception actually lacked strategic coherence because the group did not coordinate publications about funerals with its public statements, but this author considered that to be more of an issue affected by Shulsky requirement #3—having an infrastructure for coordination—than of strategic coherence. See Abram Shulsky,

Shulsky requirement #2—understand the adversary: Hezbollah’s impressive intelligence-gathering infrastructure helped it correctly anticipate Israel’s strategy throughout the war and predict that Israel would eventually need a ground campaign.⁶⁴⁵ Hezbollah engaged in successful human, signals, and open source intelligence operations during the war.⁶⁴⁶ This knowledge in turn was crucial to the way Hezbollah structured its deceptions.

Hezbollah has been known for recruiting agents, mostly Arabs, within Israel who provide information, and also using drug dealers and criminals to assist with its human intelligence gathering operations.⁶⁴⁷ Hezbollah reportedly bolstered its spy network during the 2000–2006 interim.⁶⁴⁸ One anecdotal example of Hezbollah’s recruitment efforts was described as follows:

[An] outstanding example . . . [of] recruitment was the network operated around Omar el Heib, a Bedouin who served as a lieutenant colonel in the IDF and was sentenced to 15 years in prison on espionage charges Using Lebanese drug dealers, Hezbollah transferred dozens of kilograms of narcotics to Heib's network, which was tasked with gathering intelligence on IDF positions and smuggling these across the border, in exchange. Israeli analysts pointed out, that the accurate Hezbollah rocket attacks on IDF military installations, such as the air force monitoring station on Mount Meron, which

“Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 29–31.

⁶⁴⁵ Kulick, “Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension,” cited in Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 32, n. 27.

⁶⁴⁶ See below for sources on these three aspects. As noted by Christopher Hamilton, “One of the findings of the recent conflict in Lebanon has been the emergence of a very capable intelligence apparatus on the part of Hezbollah which was used against the Israelis. This intelligence apparatus showed great skill in collecting clandestine intelligence inside Israel and in rapidly exploiting this intelligence on the battlefield.” “Hezbollah’s Global Reach” (Testimony for hearing of the House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade [source says “Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation”]), September 28, 2006, accessed June 4, 2011, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/262.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁷ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 50; and Levitt interview. See also Diaz and Newman, *Lightning Out of Lebanon*, 97.

⁶⁴⁸ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 21; see also “Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force.”

was attacked at the outset of the war, must have been made possible through local intelligence reports delivered by HUMINT agents.⁶⁴⁹

Hezbollah reportedly developed an impressive signals and counter-signals intelligence capability and was able to monitor telephone calls between troops and their families on cellular telephones.⁶⁵⁰ Hezbollah's information gathering operations were also successful thanks to assistance from Iran and Syria.⁶⁵¹ Midway through the war, the commander of the IDF division that guarded the border noted to the press that his troops discovered Iranian-made intelligence gathering and other technical equipment, including "eavesdropping devices, computers, modern communications equipment, up-to-date and detailed military maps of Israeli strategic targets, and even lists of telephone numbers inside Israel."⁶⁵²

As early as 1996, Hezbollah established a media monitoring and analysis capability to help bolster its psychological operations. As Harik explained, "A special bureau . . . monitors the Israeli media and gathers information that might be useful for the purpose of psychological warfare."⁶⁵³ Assuming that this

⁶⁴⁹ Eshel, "Hezbollah's Intelligence War"; see also Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), "Crime and Terrorism: During the Current Confrontation in Lebanon, Hezbollah Again Used the Drug Trade to Collect Intelligence in Israel," August 10, 2006, accessed June 25, 2011, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_100806e.htm.

⁶⁵⁰ Crooke and Perry, "How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 1"; and Eshel, "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later." It is unclear if Crooke and Perry are referencing the reported signals capability that was eventually proven to be hype, as explained by Acosta ("The Makara of Hizballah," 45-9).

⁶⁵¹ Levitt interview; and Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 143, citing (n. 119) Ze'ev Schiff, "Hezbollah Listened in on IDF Beepers, Cell Phones," *Haaretz*, October 4, 2006, <http://www.haaretz.com>. See also Eshel, "Hezbollah's Intelligence War"; and Diaz and Newman, *Lightning Out of Lebanon*, 96-7.

⁶⁵² Eshel, "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later," 30.

⁶⁵³ Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 161, citing (n. 14) an interview with Hassan Ezzeddin, Director of Hezbollah's media department, November 20, 2001, Haret Hareik, Beirut, Lebanon.

capability remained in place in 2006, Hezbollah probably could have used it to assess the impact of its psychological operations, including its casualty ruse, during the war.

Altogether Hezbollah satisfied the requirement to know its enemy, and this played a nontrivial role in its ability to survive the 2006 conflict.

Shulsky requirement #3—organizational infrastructure for deception and security measures: Hezbollah has a strong security apparatus and, in the words of Tom Diaz and Barbara Newman, has “extensive and sophisticated systems of defensive and offensive counterintelligence.”⁶⁵⁴ According to Eshel, Hezbollah’s counterintelligence department includes a signal security entity that ensures members do not use communications technology that can be intercepted.⁶⁵⁵

Penetrating Hezbollah is reportedly difficult because of the strong network of bonds among Lebanese that make it difficult for outsiders to develop a cover story. Additionally, Hezbollah employs extensive vetting and screening techniques for its operatives, including through interrogation, background investigations, checking with acquaintances, and administering tests of loyalty.⁶⁵⁶

During the 2006 war, Hezbollah had a formal chain of command that was able to issue orders and change plans, although the group was prepared to allow its units autonomy to conduct operations if the command and control infrastructure was disrupted.⁶⁵⁷ Hezbollah benefited from strict compartmentalization that was particularly enhanced after 2000 in preparation for war, according to Eshel,

⁶⁵⁴ Diaz and Newman, *Lightning Out of Lebanon*, 95.

⁶⁵⁵ Eshel, “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War.”

⁶⁵⁶ Diaz and Newman, *Lightning Out of Lebanon*, 96

⁶⁵⁷ Biddle and Friedman, *2006 Lebanon Campaign*, 59, citing (n. 120) interviews with Israeli military officials.

although Hezbollah has compartmentalized since its early days.⁶⁵⁸ Ranstorp wrote that it was difficult to gain useful information about the organization in the aftermath of the U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut in 1983 and the kidnapping of William Buckley in 1984 because of the group's "compartmentalized structure and obsession with security."⁶⁵⁹

Hezbollah's strong operational and information security measures have been an obstacle for Israel's efforts to infiltrate agents into Hezbollah.⁶⁶⁰ Hezbollah also reportedly tightened its security in the years prior to the war, probably increasing the difficulty for Israel to target the group.⁶⁶¹

Hezbollah's security and organization with regard to the bunker deception is notable. In addition to the precautions taken to keep construction from Israeli and U.N. attention, "no single commander knew the location of each bunker and each distinct Hezbollah militia unit was assigned access to three bunkers only—a primary munitions bunker and two reserve bunkers, in case the primary bunker was destroyed. . . . No single Hezbollah member had knowledge of the militia's entire bunker structure."⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁸ Eshel, "Hezbollah's Intelligence War."

⁶⁵⁹ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon*, 156, citing (n. 57) an unattributable interview with a senior IDF official.

⁶⁶⁰ See Yoaz Hendel, "Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War," *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 3 (November 2006), accessed July 3, 2011, <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=90>, citing (ns. 4–5, 7) S. Kadmon, "Looking for the Guilty Party," *Yediot Ahronot*, September 8, 2006; Ze'ev Schiff, "How We Missed Destroying the Short Range Rockets," *Haaretz*, September 3, 2006; speech by Nasrallah on May 23, 2006, available at www.moqawama.org.

⁶⁶¹ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 142, citing (n. 118) "Hizbullah's Intelligence Apparatus," *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, August 11, 2006.

⁶⁶² Crooke and Perry, "How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 1" (which is also quoted secondarily in Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 42, n. 106).

Conversely, Hezbollah failed to sufficiently coordinate its casualty numbers deception.⁶⁶³ It did not lack coordination entirely—it practiced some coordination in matters like possible staggering of funerals,⁶⁶⁴ but the group did an insufficient job having its units coordinate funerals of the fighters with press about the funerals and with its official casualty statistics. Even though these inconsistencies made it possible to lay bare the Hezbollah deception, they did not become fully clear until after the war, so the deception ultimately failed against Israel because of strong Israeli counterdeception, not because of poor coordination.⁶⁶⁵

Shulsky requirement #4—channels to reach the adversary: The casualty numbers deception is a good example of Hezbollah’s attempts to restrict information channels. As has been described above, Hezbollah tried to ensure that only the story it wanted released was given to the press, thence limiting the information channels available to its adversaries.⁶⁶⁶ If it had not been for reporting about funerals, it might have been difficult to determine whether Hezbollah’s numbers were accurate.

Since the bunker deception was an SQD, it theoretically would not require Hezbollah to have sophisticated channels to feed false information, although in this case the group might have. As noted above, Hezbollah possibly undertook some bunker excavating in plain sight—presumably with the intent to be seen—

⁶⁶³ Even though the requirement is technically to have an infrastructure for coordination, this assessment assumes that if the coordination failed, it lacked a competent enough infrastructure. See Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 30–1.

⁶⁶⁴ Bishop, “Peacekeeping Force Won’t Disarm Hizballah,” quoted in Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon.”

⁶⁶⁵ See Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon.”

⁶⁶⁶ Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah,” 42; and Kalb, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006,” 18–23.

while secretly building bunkers in other locales.⁶⁶⁷ Additionally, while giving insufficient verifiable details, Crooke and Perry wrote that “during two years from 2004 until the eve of the war, Hezbollah had successfully ‘turned’ a number of Lebanese civilian assets reporting on the location of major Hezbollah military caches in southern Lebanon to Israeli intelligence officers. In some small number of crucially important cases, Hezbollah senior intelligence officials were able to ‘feed back’ false information on their militia’s most important emplacements to Israel—with the result that Israel target folders identified key emplacements that did not, in fact, exist.”⁶⁶⁸ If this is true, it is a classic example of a deceiver manipulating information channels against a target.

Shulsky requirement #5—receive feedback: There is little information on Hezbollah’s ability to receive feedback from its deception operations. With regard to the bunker deception, Harel and Issacharoff wrote that when Israel successfully targeted Hezbollah’s long-range missiles and launchers, Nasrallah was concerned because he did not know whether Israel knew about the Katyushas.⁶⁶⁹ Only after it became clear that Israel was not going to target them would Nasrallah have known that the deception worked, suggesting that Hezbollah had a weak capability to receive feedback, and probably relied on passive feedback only. In this case, it probably was not necessary for the group to have sophisticated feedback techniques—as long as Israel did not target its

⁶⁶⁷ Shahid, “Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations” (which is also quoted secondarily in Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah,” 44, n. 113); Blanford, “Hizbullah and the IDF,” quoted in Arkin, *Divining Victory*, 48, n. 28 and 26, n. 21; Blanford, “Hizbullah’s Resilience Built on Years of Homework”; and “Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.”

⁶⁶⁸ Crooke and Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 1” (which is also quoted secondarily in Acosta “The Makara of Hizballah,” 44, n. 112; and in Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 121, n. 20).

⁶⁶⁹ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 116, quoting unnamed senior Israeli intelligence officials.

bunkers and rocket firing positions, it would know the deception worked—and that was a sufficient outcome for an SQD.

Hezbollah's ability to monitor feedback was probably more robust with the casualty ruse, supporting the theoretical notion that with BTM, sometimes more complex feedback capabilities are necessary. If Hezbollah had only looked at Israel's actions (passive feedback), it might not have known whether the casualty ruse was having the intended effect. Hezbollah probably did not have access to Israeli decision makers, but it possibly did have the capability to monitor and analyze media reporting, as suggested above, and if so it would have been able to tell whether Israeli and international press were accepting the casualty "story."⁶⁷⁰ At the height of the war, Hezbollah might have been pleased with how willingly the international press accepted the Islamic Resistance's point of view.

Target counterdeception capabilities: The counterdeception environment facing Hezbollah before the 2006 war can probably be best described as moderate. Many sources suggest the Israeli intelligence services did a remarkable job before and during the war that no doubt helped prevent an even more disastrous outcome for Israel. A good example was Israel's ability to locate many of the Iranian-made long-range rockets and to target them at the beginning of the

⁶⁷⁰ See Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 161, citing (n. 14) Ezzeddin interview. After Stotsky's article laying out the compelling case that Hezbollah had been deceptive, Hezbollah published its statistic of 250. It is unknown whether Hezbollah published the number in response to the article or for some other reason. See Stotsky, "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon"; and "Hezbollah Acknowledges Higher Losses Than Previously." See also Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, n. 1 on p. 378, quoting "Lebanon Sees More than 1,000 War Deaths."

war. Most commentators agree that the Israeli failure to win the war was more a failure of leadership than intelligence.⁶⁷¹

That said, Israel suffered from a few key failures that hindered its ability to engage in more effective counterdeception, particularly with regard to Hezbollah's bunker operation.⁶⁷² First, Israel failed to collect sufficient information on the location of the short-range and intermediate-range rockets. Israel succeeded at destroying many of the long-range rockets because it knew where they were hidden. Israel focused its intelligence collection on urban structures and found rockets in the homes of Hezbollah activists, but paid insufficient attention to border activities.⁶⁷³ This was a particular failure for the IAF, whose jets and unmanned aerial vehicles would have been most responsible for detecting the creation of bunkers.⁶⁷⁴

This failure was in part due to a decision *not* to look, as related by Yoaz Hendel: "In wishing to avoid crossing the border and causing provocations, and in the drive to exercise patience, low altitude photo reconnaissance missions for intelligence gathering were curtailed, as were missions by field intelligence gathering units and other operations that might have been perceived as

⁶⁷¹ See Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 70. As Harel and Issacharoff noted, "Leaderships always err, especially when under pressure." Ibid. See also Blanford, introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 11.

⁶⁷² In looking at Hezbollah's denial operations, Acosta used many of the same examples noted. See Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 40–43.

⁶⁷³ See Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 12. Eshel noted: "Mossad and air force intelligence had achieved an unprecedented standard of high-precision intelligence on the hideouts of Hezbollah medium- and long-range rockets, most of them carefully camouflaged. Many of these rockets essentially were 'embedded' inside civilian homes, where the organization had 'rented' rooms. Examples of such concealments were later shown in aerial reconnaissance photos and video images of secondary explosions during Israeli Air Force attacks of apparently innocent farmhouses—explosions that revealed the existence of stored explosives." "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later," 30.

⁶⁷⁴ "Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess"; see also "Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance."

aggressive.”⁶⁷⁵ Additionally, the IDF was still devoting significant resources toward the Palestinian front.⁶⁷⁶ An Israeli brigade commander noted, “We didn’t even post a lookout in Lebanon. We put no pressure on Hezbollah and this is why we found it so problematic to collect information on them. [The enemy] leaves gaps when it’s under pressure and this causes it to make mistakes. Nothing was interfering with Hezbollah. The fence in Lebanon was a barrier for us, not for them.”⁶⁷⁷

Israel appears to have succeeded at penetrating Hezbollah in the areas where it wanted. Particularly with regard to the long-range missiles, Israel did well. As Cordesman et al. explained:

Top-level Israeli intelligence personnel and officers stated that most aspects of the Hezbollah buildup did not surprise them in the six years following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Some sources indicate that over the years Israeli intelligence had built up an extensive network of informants inside Hezbollah that monitored land and naval arms transfer and that Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman even had “sleeper cells” in the forward area that provided targeting data during the fighting.

...
... Israeli intelligence was ... able to identify and successfully target the majority of long-range rocket sites and depots at the beginning of the war with the help of Mossad sleeper cells.⁶⁷⁸

Had Israel directed its human penetrations against the bunker network and short-range missiles, it might have won the war.

Second, the Israeli intelligence apparatus failed to disseminate to the military much of the information that it had on the bunkers. Had it done so, Hezbollah’s

⁶⁷⁵ Hendel, “Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War,” citing (n. 12) A. Eichner, “Intelligence Corps Commander: Palestinians Attempt to Imitate Lebanese Model,” *Yediot Ahronot*, September 11, 2006.

⁶⁷⁶ Hendel, “Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War.”

⁶⁷⁷ Quoted in Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 65 (bracketed text original).

⁶⁷⁸ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 115, 141–2, citing (n. 70) “Israeli Intelligence in the Second Lebanon War,” *Jane’s Intelligence Digest*, September 15, 2006.

deception would probably have failed. Harel and Issacharoff relay the account of Maj. (Res.) Amit Ze'evi finding a well-built bunker and his father, Maj. Gen.

Ahron Ze'evi (Farkhash), who had been former chief of presumably IDF intelligence, remembering that the intelligence service had prepared files on some of the bunkers. As the authors explained:

The question of distributing intelligence on the nature reserves [an Israeli term for the bunkers] had been discussed several times by Military Intelligence [MI] in the years prior to the war. After the 2003 arrest of a commanding officer of the Northern Command's tracker unit, suspected of aiding Hezbollah, Ze'evi had feared the Command was still exposed. In order to prevent the Lebanese from knowing that some IDF secrets had been uncovered, it was decided to keep detailed information on the nature reserves with MI and Northern Command Intelligence rather than distribute it among the units. A mock-up of a Hezbollah bunker system was constructed in the northern training facility at Elyakim and used by units preparing for fighting in Lebanon. Specific information on the reserves was kept in crates, with instructions to pass it on to the troops in case of war. But the information did not reach the units in time.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁹ Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 133; on "nature reserves," see pp. 11–2, 45. See also Hendel, "Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War"; and Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 137, 141. Eshel also described this issue:

IDF Military Intelligence gathering units 504 (HUMINT) and 8200 (SIGINT) were both tasked with obtaining vital intelligence on Hezbollah forward deployments in South Lebanon, and their work was significant during the initial stages of the war. For six years, since the IDF withdrew from its 'security zone' in South Lebanon, Israel's intelligence community, including Mossad, Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, had watched Hezbollah's movements along the border, including the arrival of arms shipments from Iran via Syria. Observation posts along the border followed construction work of fortifications along the 'Blue Line' and deployment of advanced COMINT equipment monitoring communications inside Israel. The material which was collected over the years was carefully depicted in top secret intelligence dossiers, providing information on Hezbollah bunkers and communications networks along the border line. One dossier even carried code maps in which every Hezbollah bunker was indicated. The problem was, as it is so often in military bureaucracy, that the dossiers were so secret that they did not reach the tactical command level until later in the war. "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later," 32.

If it is true that Israel knew about "every" Hezbollah installation, then Hezbollah's deception was a complete failure and the only problem for Israel was in the dissemination of information. The above assessment appears to be an outlier, however, and most authorities assert that Israel did not know about many of the bunkers.

It is unlikely that Israel had detailed information on all of Hezbollah's bunkers, but its failure to disseminate intelligence about those it knew about only served to keep Hezbollah's deception from failing.

Third, Israel fell to a self-deception regarding the importance of Hezbollah's short-range rockets. Its leadership considered the Hezbollah rocket forces to be poorly trained and containable by the Israeli military during an invasion.⁶⁸⁰ Before the war, Israel failed to emplace technology that would have detected stationary launchers' locations.⁶⁸¹ Near the beginning of the war, the Israeli chief of staff dismissed the Katyushas as "an irrelevant threat."⁶⁸² This was perhaps the most costly and incorrect calculation Israel made during the war. Had Israel taken seriously the threat of Hezbollah's Katyusha capability, it most likely would have devoted additional resources to find the rockets—leading it to the bunkers and short-range rocket emplacements.

Israel was not the only actor to fall to bias and self-deception. Elements of the international community, particularly some of the international press, too willingly accepted Hezbollah's version of events during the war, and this helped allow Hezbollah's media to shape the terms of the story being told with the casualty deception.⁶⁸³ Ironically, with regard to that same deception, Israel's counterdeception was notable. Israel was not deceived, and the state even

⁶⁸⁰ Kainikara and Parkin, *Pathways to Victory*, 64.

⁶⁸¹ Rubin, *Rocket Campaign*, 28.

⁶⁸² Quoted in Harel and Issacharoff, *34 Days*, 188; see also "Hezbollah's Rocket Force," *BBC News*.

⁶⁸³ Stotsky, "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon"; Kalb, "The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006," 12–16, 18–23; and Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 42.

published lists with names of Hezbollah casualties.⁶⁸⁴ Because of this, the casualty deception did not work as well as Hezbollah probably had hoped.

Assessing the deceptions within the BTQ-SQD framework: In review, from 2000 to 2006, Israel posed a minimal threat to Hezbollah and focused its attention on the Palestinian issue. Hezbollah fulfilled Shulsky's requirements—it practiced strategic coherence with a plan that called for preparations for a war against Israel, its intelligence gathering apparatus allowed it to “know the enemy,” and it had a strong security system and a capability to feed Israel false information. Hezbollah potentially had an effective media collection and analysis capability but an inadequate ability to obtain more than passive feedback from its clandestine deceptions. Israel maintained moderate counterdeception capabilities. It remained deeply concerned about the threat of long-range rockets and did attempt to infiltrate Hezbollah and gain information about these systems, with some success. Nevertheless, Israel's counterdeception efforts were weak with regard to Hezbollah's short-range rocket capabilities, and this oversight allowed Hezbollah to successfully engage in the bunker deception.

The endgame theory's predictions support Hezbollah's choice of an SQD since the threat against Hezbollah was fairly low. The group before the war had no need to change Israel's behavior as the two engaged in a managed tit-for-tat conflict. The endgame theory also would posit that SQD was possible since the group fulfilled Shulsky's requirements sufficiently to use SQD. Israeli counterdeception could have reduced Hezbollah's chance of success had it targeted the short-range rockets as intently as it focused on the long-range

⁶⁸⁴ Stotsky, “Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon.”

missiles. Part of Hezbollah’s success was due to Israel’s self-deception and bias because it disregarded the importance of the Katyushas.

Table 5: Hezbollah’s Bunker Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables						
Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
low	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes, passive	moderate

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>SQD possible</i>	<i>SQD most likely</i>

Once war started, the threat shifted for Hezbollah. In the short term, Hezbollah was able to manage that threat with its rocket attacks, but it probably knew that if the war continued for an extended time it would face either destruction by Israel or pressure from the Lebanese government or international community to disarm.

The group therefore engaged in a possible BTM with the casualty ruse. Hezbollah potentially expected that the deception—which was probably intended to create a false show of strength and imply that Israel was killing more Lebanese civilians than was actually the case—would be a factor that increased support within Israel and the international community for a cease-fire instead of continued fighting. Hezbollah almost certainly targeted the ruse at the Israeli government, its populace, and the international community.

Hezbollah had a strategic plan—survival—and knew its enemy. It practiced good security but did not do a stellar job coordinating casualty statistics with fighter funerals, which made it possible for at least one commentator (Stotsky) to count funerals and call Hezbollah’s bluff about how many fighters had been

killed. It had the ear of the international community in the one channel that particularly mattered—the media—and Israel no doubt followed its public statements even if it did not believe them.⁶⁸⁵ Its capability for obtaining feedback involved its ability to judge the extent to which people bought its casualty deception, and if it had a media collection and analysis capability, that would have been sufficient.

Israel's counterdeception capabilities were strong against Hezbollah's casualty ruse because Israel kept such good tabs on which Hezbollah fighters had been killed in battle. This contrasted sharply with some elements of the international press, which remained vulnerable to Hezbollah's messaging about the number of fighters killed.⁶⁸⁶

The endgame theory would predict that Israel's strong counterdeception and Hezbollah's limitations in its ability to coordinate the casualty ruse could limit the success of Hezbollah's deceptive effort. This appears to be the case—the deception was only a partial success, although this is more attributable to Israel's counterdeception than Hezbollah's mistakes in coordination. The international press bought Hezbollah's story, but Israel and its populace did not. The deception was still a net gain for Hezbollah because Israel ultimately called for a cease-fire in part due to international pressure to stop the fighting.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.; Kalb, "The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006," 12–16, 18–23; and Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah," 42.

⁶⁸⁶ Stotsky, "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon"; and Kalb, "The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006," 12–16, 18–23.

Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./ Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
probably assessed by Hezbollah as high	yes	yes	partial, with faults	yes, controlled primary channel (media)	yes	(Israel) strong (intl. comm.) weak

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>both possible if infra. sufficient</i>	<i>BTD most likely</i>

Conclusions

Hezbollah’s use of deceptions during the 2006 Summer War speaks to the effectiveness of the asymmetric warfare model. As Cordesman et al. noted: “The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict strongly suggests that the emphasis on high technology, conventional war fighting, or the ‘revolution in military affairs’ . . . [is] fundamentally flawed. This misplaced reliance especially applied to force transformation efforts based on using technology—particularly precision long-range strike capabilities and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—as a substitute for force numbers and for human skills and presence.”⁶⁸⁷

This chapter assessed against the endgame theory’s variables two attempts at high-level deception during the 2006 Summer War. It showed an effective use of SQD in which Hezbollah hid its bunkers as it prepared for conflict with Israel. It also showed a partially successful BTD—it was able to sell its false propaganda

⁶⁸⁷ Cordesman, Sullivan, and Sullivan, *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*, 2.

about Lebanese casualties to some actors within the international community, but not to Israel, probably because of the difference in Israeli vs. international counterdeception mechanisms in place at the time.

A takeaway from this case that mirrors that from the al Qaeda chapter is that in order to fall within the strategic BTD/SQD paradigm, a group must use deception to affect a strategic surprise or similar measure against a particular target, versus using deception only to survive the daily challenges of being an illicit group. The chapter's finance vignette demonstrates the difference between these more operational measures and strategic BTD/SQD.

The case also reiterates the importance of perception on a deceiver's decision to use deception. In the case of the casualty ruse, Hezbollah was not under immediate existential threat, but probably was concerned that if the war continued for a sufficient amount of time it would be so, and this potentially drove some of its calculations in using the casualty ruse.

And last, the case again shows the role of self-deception and bias in the success of a deceiver's operation. Israel misjudged the importance of Hezbollah's short-range rockets. The international media fell to probable biases against Israel that influenced its reporting of casualty statistics. This suggests that self-deception and bias are factors that could be considered when looking at the counterdeception environment—the lower the target's level of self-deception, the better its counterdeception capabilities.

CHAPTER 6

DECEPTION IN THE LTTE STRATEGY AGAINST INDIA AND SRI LANKA 1987–1991

The LTTE must be credited with a near-maniacal sense of motivation. No other fighters in the world today go around popping cyanide pills as easily as they do. Is the LTTE, led by legendary Prabhakaran, the greatest guerrilla force of its time? Certainly, is the ungrudging answer. The finesse with which they have now humbled the Sri Lankan security forces and earlier, more than matched the awe and might of the IPKF [Indian Peace Keeping Force] must find it a place in the Mao Tse Tung Hall of Revolutionary fame.

—Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, commanding officer
of the IPKF infantry division in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka⁶⁸⁸

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a radical Tamil secessionist group based in northern and eastern Sri Lanka that engaged in insurgency with the government of Sri Lanka (GSL) from the 1970s until its defeat in 2009. Throughout its existence the Tigers advocated the creation of an independent Tamil state (*Eelam*) in northern and eastern Sri Lanka and the LTTE aimed to be the sole governor of that state.

Author's note: When quoting others, I standardized proper nouns such as "Prabhakaran" and "*Eelam*" (italicized when not used as part of an organization's name), corrected typographical errors, and standardized formatting and spelling. I left the original formatting and spelling in the citations. See the sources cited for the original text. In addition, I owe thanks to Rohan Gunaratna, Tom Marks, Shanaka Jayasekara, and Ranapriya Abeyasinghe for their conceptual and substantive insights.

⁶⁸⁸ Quoted in Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh (Retd.), *Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 159; original source not noted.

This chapter will discuss the LTTE's use of deception in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of a broader strategy aimed at achieving these objectives. It will assess the LTTE's use of BTM to stop the Sri Lankan military from destroying it in 1987 and subsequent SQDs to fake its attempt to conserve its arsenal, evict the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka in the late 1980s and assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. All of the deceptions examined in this chapter were somehow associated with the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which allowed Indian peacekeepers into Sri Lanka to help manage the Sinhala-Tamil conflict. The LTTE deceived to show interest in and agree to the accord, hid its weapons to pretend like it was abiding by the accord, worked with the GSL to get India out of Sri Lanka and essentially end the accord, and assassinated Rajiv Gandhi to ensure that a measure similar to the accord would not be enacted at a later time.

Historical Introduction: The Road to 1987

The buildup of Tamil-Sinhalese tensions: The small, teardrop-shaped island of Sri Lanka, located just off the southern coast of India, has been for centuries the home of two main ethnic groups—majority Buddhist Sinhalese and minority Tamils, both of which have Indic roots. Sri Lankan history usually dates to around the sixth century B.C., with colonization by Aryans from the Indian states of Orissa and Bengal. Buddhism arrived in the third century B.C. and Tamil

invaders from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu by the twelfth century A.D.

dominated the north and east of the island.⁶⁸⁹

When Portuguese colonizers arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505, three kingdoms composed Sri Lanka: Kandy in the central highlands, Kotte on the west coast, and Jaffna in the north. The Dutch took over much of the island in the 1600s except for the central highlands, and were replaced by the British East India Company in 1796. The central Kandian kingdom fell to the British in 1815 and the island was unified under British rule with its administrative center at Colombo. On February 4, 1948, the island gained its independence as the Commonwealth of Ceylon.⁶⁹⁰

After independence, tensions developed between the ruling Sinhalese and the Tamils as the Ceylonese government enacted a variety of discriminatory policies toward Tamils.⁶⁹¹ As Rajesh Kadian noted, “In 1956 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was elected [prime minister] on a ‘Sinhala only’ platform. . . . After his election the Two Language Policy [allowing both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages] was abandoned; by 31 December 1960 Sinhala was to become the sole official language. . . . [N]o Tamil member was included in the cabinet.”⁶⁹² In 1957,

⁶⁸⁹ Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 3rd ed., with a foreword from Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, MC (Noida, India: Trishul Publications, 2001), 8–9.

⁶⁹⁰ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 9; and “Sri Lanka,” *Wikipedia*, accessed July 2, 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_lanka.

⁶⁹¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 137–8, citing (ns. 42, 44) Rohan Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna*, with an introduction by Ralph Buultjen (Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), 16–18, 27; Rohan Gunaratna, “The Conflict in Sri Lanka, 1982–Present” (unpublished paper prepared as part of a project on how terrorism escalates conducted at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews [Scotland]), March 1997, 1–2; Patrick Brogan, *The Fighting Never Stopped* (New York: Vintage, 1990), 228–9; Mackenzie Briefing Notes, “Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World” (Toronto: Mackenzie Centre, December 1995), 2.

⁶⁹² Rajesh Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peacekeepers at War* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1990), 61.

Bandaranaike agreed to a compromise pact that recognized Tamil as the language of the minority and contained provisions for devolution to northern and eastern provinces, but he abandoned the agreement before it was implemented. In 1960, Tamil bureaucrats were forced to resign after refusing to work or take tests in Sinhalese.⁶⁹³

In 1971, the government instituted a system of standardized test scores that advantaged Sinhalese students, eventually resulting in the decline of Tamil student admission to national universities. The 1972 Republican Constitution established Buddhism as the state's official religion, reiterated that Sinhalese would be the official language, and changed the name of Ceylon to Sri Lanka, the ancient Sinhalese name for the island.⁶⁹⁴ Around the same time the government took over Tamil plantations and excluded Tamils from land distribution policies.⁶⁹⁵

By 1972, a Tamil insurgency organized primarily by students had developed in Sri Lanka and resulted in the creation of around 30 separatist groups.⁶⁹⁶ One of

⁶⁹³ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 61–2.

⁶⁹⁴ S. C. Shandrahasan, "Tamil Eelam: Right to Self Determination," 1979, available from *Tamilnation.org*, accessed October 18, 2008, <http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/tamileelam/7900chandrahasan.htm> (site discontinued); and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 137–8, citing (ns. 42–3) the same sources noted in footnote 691, as well as Christine Niven, John Noble, Susan Forsyth, and Tony Wheeler, *Sri Lanka: A Lonely Planet Travel Survival Kit* (Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet, 1996), 9–10. It is in n. 43 on p. 329, citing Niven, that Hoffman explained that Sri Lanka was the Sinhalese name.

Author's note: I have cited several documents that I found at *Tamilnation.org* before it was discontinued, presumably because of the LTTE's defeat. *Tamilnation* no doubt obtained the materials from other primary sources, but I have been unable to find the same documents at any sites more authoritative than *Tamilnation*.

⁶⁹⁵ Maj. Shankar Bhaduri and Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim (AVSM), with Lt. Gen. Mathew Thomas (PVSM, AVSM, VSM), ed., *The Sri Lankan Crisis* (New Delhi: Lancer Press, 1990), 21. The author attribution on the book's cover indicates that Thomas was an editor and not an author, so the text will only refer to Bhaduri and Karim.

⁶⁹⁶ Sources differ on how many groups actually developed. Hoffman stated 36 while Kadian stated 27. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 138, citing (n. 44) Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka*, 27; and Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 64.

these, established in 1972 by Chetti Thanabalasingham, was called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT).⁶⁹⁷ Thanabalasingham created the TNT with “the purpose of silencing pro-government Tamils, eliminating Tamil police informants and their Sinhalese police handlers, and staging armed demonstrations against the Sinhalese government.”⁶⁹⁸

A roughly twenty-year-old Velupillai Prabhakaran led the military wing of the TNT under Thanabalasingham.⁶⁹⁹ Prabhakaran rose to prominence as a Tamil insurgent when, on July 27, 1975 at the age of 21, he and two others killed the pro-government mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah. The next year Thanabalasingham was arrested, and in May 1976 Prabhakaran took control of the TNT. At that time he renamed the group, calling it the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and in April 1978 the LTTE came out of the shadows, claiming responsibility for 11 previous killings, including Duraiappah’s. Shortly after its

⁶⁹⁷ Anton S. Balasingham, with statistics supplied by S. Subramanian, *Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle* (Madras: Makkal Acchakam, 1983), 25; Rohan Gunaratna, *International Dimension of the Sri Lankan Conflict: Threat and Response* (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001), 5; Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 64; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 139, citing (n. 50) Rohan Gunaratna, “The Rebellion in Sri Lanka: Sparrow Tactics to Guerrilla Warfare (1971–1996)” (unpublished manuscript, no date); Rohan Gunaratna, *Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency* (Colombo: Alumni Association of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies and London: International Foundation of Sri Lankans United Kingdom, 1997), 8–9.

Gunaratna indicated that even though the LTTE claimed to have been originated in 1972 as the TNT, they did not begin to operate until 1974; Hoffman also used this date for the TNT’s founding. Rohan Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” December 1998, available from *The Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, accessed July 3, 2011, <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articleid=57>; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 139, citing (n. 50) sources noted above.

Balasingham claimed that Prabhakaran founded the TNT; Gunaratna echoed this in *International Dimension*, in contradiction to what he wrote in “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” wherein he claimed that Thanabalasingham was the founder. Balasingham, *Liberation Tigers*, 25; Gunaratna, *International Dimension*, 5; and Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency.”

⁶⁹⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 139, citing (ns. 49–50) sources noted in footnote 697 as well as U.S. Department of Defense, *Terrorist Group Profiles* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120.

⁶⁹⁹ Prabhakaran was born November 26, 1954, according to Balasingham (*Liberation Tigers*, 26).

attack claim, the GSL banned the LTTE and then, after a bank raid by the LTTE in December 1978, repealed that statute and replaced it with the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gave the government broad authorities to battle the Tigers and other militant groups.⁷⁰⁰

The LTTE announced itself at a crucial period in Tamil history. The Tamil United Liberation Front—the primary Tamil political party, established in 1976—lost credibility in 1977 when it was unable to protect Tamils from anti-Tamil pogroms. The militants thereafter gained traction as protectors of the people.⁷⁰¹

Tiger attacks continued during the late 1970's and early 1980's. The year 1981 was particularly violent, with the LTTE killing ruling United National Party (UNP) candidates, "Tamil traitors," and security forces during local elections, and the GSL responded with bloody reprisals.⁷⁰² The TULF won the majority of seats in Tamil areas, but as D. R. Kaarthykeyan noted, by that time it had lost legitimacy with the Tamil militants and their supporters: "The majority Sinhalese, again, failed to take advantage of the TULF's readiness to settle for something

⁷⁰⁰ Gunaratna, "International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency"; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 139, citing (n. 51) "Masked Gunmen Kill Jaffna Mayor," *Daily News* (Colombo), July 28, 1975; Balasingham, *Liberation Tigers*, 25; M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 3rd ed. (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004), 48–9; and M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas*, 3rd ed. (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002; reprint, 2004), 65. Gunaratna noted that from 1975 to the violence in 1983, "the LTTE killed more Tamils than Sinhalese: they were mostly Tamil government officials, especially policemen, and informants." *International Dimension*, 5. Speaking of Jaffna as a hotbed of Tamil nationalism, Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas stated: "The Jaffna Peninsula remains an island within an island and here the roots of separatism are extremely deep." *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 15.

⁷⁰¹ Rajan Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka – An Inside Account*, with a foreword by Dr. Brian Seneviratne (Claremont, CA: The Sri Lankan Studies Institute, 1990; reprint, 1992), 18, 28; and D. R. Kaarthykeyan and Radhavinod Raju, *Triumph of Truth: The Rajiv Gandhi Assassination*, with a foreword by M. N. Venkatachaliah (New Delhi: New Dawn Press, Inc., 2004), 164–5. Although this book has a coauthor, it was written as Kaarthykeyan's first-hand account, and therefore the text will only refer to Kaarthykeyan. On the TULF, see also "History," *Tamil United Liberation Front*, accessed July 10, 2011, <http://tamilunitedliberationfront.org/history/>; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 138, citing (n. 45) interviews with LTTE suicide cadre, December 1997 and February 2003, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

⁷⁰² Kaarthykeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 166.

substantially less than independence—genuine autonomy within a united Sri Lanka. This not only weakened the TULF politically but also confirmed the militants' view that the Tamils would never get justice from the Sinhalese. The LTTE was convinced that the TULF had no role to play in the fight for *Eelam*.”⁷⁰³

The Tigers in early 1983 called for an election boycott that was successful in Tamil areas. Ninety percent of the electorate, under pressure from the Tigers, reportedly failed to vote, and the Tigers disrupted meetings with the TULF leader, Amirthalingam. In a foreshadowing of things to come, it became clear the Tigers were not interested in a political path that would not lead to an independent *Eelam*.⁷⁰⁴

As 1983 progressed, tensions built between the GSL and insurgents. Around 21 May, 1983, the Defense Ministry announced that “the armed forces and the police in the North are to be given legal immunity from judicial proceedings and wide ranging powers of search and destroy,” according to Rajan Hoole et al.⁷⁰⁵ This allowed security forces the power “to cremate bodies of people shot by them without revealing their identities or carrying out inquests.”⁷⁰⁶

An LTTE attack on a convoy of Sri Lankan soldiers on the night of July 23, 1983 in retaliation for the death of one of Prabhakaran's close associates started the LTTE and GSL down a path that brought India to the island. The Tiger leadership laid an ambush that resulted in the death of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers—at

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., citing (n. 24) Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra* (edition unspecified), 34.

⁷⁰⁵ Quoted in Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 58; original source not noted.

⁷⁰⁶ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 58

that time the most deadly attack ever on the Sri Lankan Army by Tamil militants.⁷⁰⁷

Sri Lanka erupted into chaos. An anti-Tamil pogrom developed in Colombo and nearby areas, with over 3,000 Tamils reportedly killed, 18,000 Tamil homes destroyed and 150,000 displaced.⁷⁰⁸ Mobs attacked Tamil properties and businesses, and Tamil political prisoners were killed.⁷⁰⁹ The government under President Jayewardene made no serious efforts to stop the killing. In the midst of the violence, Parliament passed the Sixth Amendment to the Republican Constitution of 1978, saying all Members of Parliament (MPs) must “take an oath to safeguard the unity, integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka and eschew the promotion of separatism,” effectively unseating all the TULF MPs.⁷¹⁰ This violence became “a turning point in relations between the Tamil and Sinhala nations. It led to the collapse of Tamil parliamentary politics and the assumption of the armed struggle as the mode of political struggle.”⁷¹¹ Thousands of young Tamils flocked to the insurgent groups, and LTTE propaganda aimed at sowing discord between Tamils and the federal government and used the message that Tamils would not be safe without their own state.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁷ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 89–90.

⁷⁰⁸ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 167; see also Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 69.

⁷⁰⁹ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 68–9.

⁷¹⁰ Bradman Weerakoon, *Premadasa of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1992), page not noted, quoted in Rohan Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies*, 2nd ed. (Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1994), 389 (388, n. 1); and Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 4.

⁷¹¹ Adele Balasingham, *The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance*, 2nd ed. (Mitcham, England: Fairmax Publishing Ltd., 2003), 2.

⁷¹² Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 140, citing (n. 57) Gunaratna, *Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency*, 10–12; Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka*, 32–3.

An influx of Tamil refugees—approximately 115,000—poured in to Tamil Nadu, India, where the Indian government warmly welcomed them.⁷¹³ As the IPKF’s Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh later noted, “This large scale massacre resulted in India’s involvement in the ethnic strife as there was a migration of over one lakh [100,000] Tamil refugees into the Indian State of Tamil Nadu and the generation of a demand from that State for immediate Indian involvement with a view to stopping the genocide of brother Tamils.”⁷¹⁴ Over the next four years, India would watch events in Sri Lanka and intervene with the protection of Tamils being a key justification.

In 1984, the Tamils proposed a “government in exile” in Madras that the Indians refused to support, but Sri Lanka nevertheless imposed a blockade along the maritime boundary with India and sought Chinese political and military support for GSL policies.⁷¹⁵ During the same year, Prabhakaran engaged in an act that later would play an invaluable role in the LTTE’s deception after the signing of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord—in February 1984 he started his own shipping line. As Kaarthikeyan explained:

The main aim was to clandestinely ship arms, explosives, sophisticated communication equipment and other materials from the arms bazaars to the LTTE’s stronghold in Jaffna. There was a wide coastline around *Eelam* that could be exploited for clandestine landings. For obvious reasons, the ships could not appear to belong to the LTTE or to carry arms. Therefore, companies were floated in some parts of the world without getting into legal tangles. These ships would carry general cargo and earn profits for the LTTE. But their trips could also be manipulated to touch cities where the LTTE’s arms and other war materials would be clandestinely loaded, and when these

⁷¹³ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 69.

⁷¹⁴ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 17.

⁷¹⁵ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 69.

ships neared Tamil Nadu or Sri Lankan coasts, LTTE cadres could collect the weapons in small, mechanized boats.⁷¹⁶

The LTTE's ability to independently procure arms—without the assistance of India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)—not only foiled the GSL's blockade, but also made it possible for the Tigers to remain armed once relations turned sour with India.

By 1985, Sri Lanka was in a “virtual state of civil war and constitutional breakdown.”⁷¹⁷ In early 1985, Colombo banned any boats more than 200 yards off shore, decimating the Tamil fishing industry. Shortly thereafter, the GSL announced plans to colonize the north with 30,000 settlers that would be provided military protection as well as personal paramilitary training.⁷¹⁸

During May 1985, the GSL embarked on an operation to wrest Velvettiturai, Prabhakaran's hometown, from Tiger control. In early May, the Sri Lankan armed forces attacked Velvettiturai, killing over 250 Tamils. Within a week the Tigers retaliated, hijacking two buses to Anuradhapura—“the heart of Sinhala culture”—and killing 150 Buddhist worshipers at the sacred Bodhi tree and its nearby temple.⁷¹⁹ Kadian describes the tit-for-tat that followed:

Hundreds of Tamils were killed in reprisals in different incidents across the country. But these civilians were not the only casualties that month; the Sri Lankan Army, too, was jolted. For the first time the LTTE and TELO [Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization] guerrillas launched frontal attacks against army camps in Jaffna. That was not all; the guerrillas snapped the Colombo–Jaffna railway link. The militants also threatened to drive foreign investment out of the island and publicized their intention of destroying the tourist trade as well. Tea-buying firms were fed a false rumor that the tea packages were poisoned; this led to a fall of tea prices at the Colombo auction. . . . [T]he

⁷¹⁶ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 168

⁷¹⁷ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 109.

⁷¹⁸ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 72–3.

⁷¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 74.

Tamil militants' successes made the vaunted Sinhala diplomatic and military buildup look hollow. Jayewardene had little choice but to turn to Delhi for succor.⁷²⁰

The Sri Lankan government, India, and the Tamil groups agreed to a set of negotiations at Thimphu, the capital of Bhutan. The Tamils banded together under an umbrella alliance called the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), composed of the four major Tamil groups—the LTTE, TELO, Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), and Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). In addition to the ENLF, India, and Sri Lanka, also present were the Peoples' Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), a group formed from a breakaway faction of the LTTE, and the TULF.⁷²¹

The Tamils articulated several demands at the talks, which revolved around devolution of power and creation of equality for the Tamil people: (a) making the provinces the primary unit of devolution; (b) remedying inequalities created by the “Sinhala only” policy; (c) linking the northern and eastern provinces into one unit constituted as the “Tamil homeland”; (d) devolving administrative and financial affairs; (e) returning lands to the Tamils that were forcibly taken by the GSL; (f) recognizing Tamil as an official language; (g) providing proportional representation for the Tamils in the security and civil services; and (h) repealing the Sixth Amendment, thereby allowing the Tamils to return to government.⁷²²

According to former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka J. N. Dixit, the GSL

⁷²⁰ Ibid., 74–5

⁷²¹ Ibid., 75.

⁷²² J. N. Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002), 27–8.

representatives avoided discussing the Tamil demands and ensured “a drift in negotiations with a view to lulling the Tamils into some sense of calm.”⁷²³

The talks failed but many of the Tamils’ demands would be reiterated in later negotiations. The Tamil representatives walked out in August 1985 amidst allegations that the GSL had violated a previously declared cease-fire by massacring 400 civilians in Vavunia and Trincomalee.⁷²⁴ As Hoole et al. noted, “The government, caught in the trap of its own ideology, could envisage participation in negotiations only from a position of strength vis-à-vis the Tigers. That is why negotiations set up at the dictates of India and pressure from the international community were a failure.”⁷²⁵ Intermittent talks continued through 1986, but nothing would produce a solution to the insurgency.⁷²⁶

Indian covert intervention: India’s first intervention—which was covert—in Sri Lanka was triggered by the mass violence in 1983. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to offer unilateral assistance to the militants after the GSL rebuffed her offers to intervene.⁷²⁷ As the IPKF’s Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh later noted, “Indira Gandhi decided to offer all-out help to the militant groups and sought to control the ethnic conflict by the systematic training and arming of Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Thus the government of India stepped in, taking over the training of militants from the state government of Tamil Nadu.”⁷²⁸ Gandhi

⁷²³ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 28.

⁷²⁴ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 75–7.

⁷²⁵ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 350.

⁷²⁶ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 75–7.

⁷²⁷ Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 20, 22.

⁷²⁸ Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 22. Shanaka Jayasekara called this the “Indira Doctrine.” Shanaka Jayasekara, e-mail message to author, January 28, 2008.

provided the militant leaders with political asylum, and they set up new offices openly in Tamil Nadu.⁷²⁹

India's strategy was to exert influence in the ethnic conflict by building up the weaker party—the Tamils—but it had no intention of letting any of the groups get strong enough to threaten Indian interests, particularly in Tamil Nadu. India therefore played the militant groups off one another and tried to make them dependent on India for arms and support.⁷³⁰

RAW offered assistance first to TELO because it reportedly had “a large criminal element and was politically unsophisticated.”⁷³¹ As an Indian diplomat involved in India's Sri Lanka policy at the time noted, “TELO, which has no goals and no ideology, was the perfect private army for RAW.”⁷³² The LTTE and the other groups followed shortly after and were sent to training institutions in various parts of India where they received an array of paramilitary training that was provided, at times, by RAW and the Indian Intelligence Bureau (India's internal intelligence agency) directly.⁷³³ RAW in part sent them to different camps to control the input of information: “RAW offered training in separate packages on different terms to the different groups, and thus not only intensified intergroup rivalry, but also ensured a diffused buildup of trained personnel, so that no one movement should get ahead of others militarily.”⁷³⁴

⁷²⁹ Anita Pratap, *Island of Blood: Frontline Reports from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Other South Asian Flashpoints* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 70.

⁷³⁰ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 341; and Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 346.

⁷³¹ *Time* (April 3, 1989), quoted in Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 103, n. 7; original author and article name not cited.

⁷³² *Ibid.*

⁷³³ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 105; and Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 17–18.

⁷³⁴ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 346.

Prabhakaran was deeply bothered by the fact that India was training multiple groups and feared it would undermine his own supremacy. As M. R. Narayan Swamy noted, “The LTTE considered itself a genuinely homegrown group built brick by brick by Prabhakaran. He had apprehensions that India’s involvement would elevate the other Tamil groups to the same level as the LTTE, both tactically as well as strategically. Being obsessed with centralized control, Prabhakaran did not like the idea of being bracketed with groups he considered less consequential than the LTTE.”⁷³⁵

According to Rohan Gunaratna, from 1983 to 1987 Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and strong LTTE supporter M. G. Ramachandran paid the LTTE 200,000,000 Indian rupees.⁷³⁶ “It is from this money,” wrote Gunaratna, “that the LTTE bought arms, ammunition, explosives, and three ships to ferry their arsenal to the war zone.”⁷³⁷ In addition to the funding the LTTE received from Ramachandran, by 1985 it had displaced the other Tamil militant groups in soliciting funds from Tamil expatriates.⁷³⁸

With the extra assistance, the LTTE emerged as the strongest of the militant groups, quickly became independent from Indian intelligence, and Prabhakaran started distancing it from India. Even though the Indian government had been providing the LTTE with weapons and training, he realized India’s training of the Tamil groups was only an element of Indian foreign policy and, with foresight

⁷³⁵ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 191.

⁷³⁶ According to exchange rates on December 31, 1987 of 12.75 Rs/US\$, 200,000,000 rupees would have been worth approximately \$15.7 million. U.S. Federal Reserve, “Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Foreign Exchange Rates: H.10 India Historical Rates,” December 29, 1989, accessed June 25, 2011, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/hist/dat89_in.htm.

⁷³⁷ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 418.

⁷³⁸ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 106.

characteristic of Prabhakaran, perceived that “India would one day try to foist a solution on the Tamils that would be detrimental to his own interests. . . . Even as he accepted military assistance from India and money from Indian politicians, he avoided falling into their orbit.”⁷³⁹ After the failed talks at Thimphu, Prabhakaran was asked the question of what he would do if India stopped supporting Tamils and answered: “India’s sympathy is a morale booster, but should India withdraw support it would not mean the end of our liberation struggle. After all we did not start our liberation movement with India’s support or with the help of some other external forces.”⁷⁴⁰

When Rajiv Gandhi took over after his mother’s assassination in 1984 he eventually closed the training camps, further weakening India’s leverage over the Tigers.⁷⁴¹ India by 1986 had essentially lost control of the LTTE and turned on it in an effort to rein it in. As part of this endeavor, RAW gave additional assistance to the rival groups and strengthened ties with Sri Lankan intelligence.⁷⁴² Although it would try during the IPKF era, India would never again have significant leverage over the Tigers.

LTTE dominance among Tamil groups: Although Prabhakaran did assent to LTTE participation in the ENLF in order to present a united front at the Thimphu talks, “he was bitter that the Indian . . . [government] was creating[, by bringing

⁷³⁹ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 267–8.

⁷⁴⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*, 130.

⁷⁴¹ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 7.

⁷⁴² Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 341–3, possibly citing (343, n. 2) personal staff of the Indian High commissioner, Colombo, 1998, confidential source. Gunaratna explained that by October 1986, RAW assessed the conflict in Sri Lanka was “getting out of manageable proportions” because of LTTE actions, so Indian intelligence told the Sri Lankans the LTTE was planning to assault the Jaffna Fort, which was occupied by Sri Lankan soldiers. Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 343, quoting (n. 1) RAW, New Delhi, 1991, personal communication.

all the groups to the table, a] . . . level playing field among the guerrilla groups.”⁷⁴³ The ENLF was defunct within about a year of the LTTE’s joining, by April 1986.⁷⁴⁴

Even while the LTTE ostensibly was working with these groups at Thimphu, as the LTTE shot from the India’s control it turned its focus toward the other Tamil groups. The LTTE was bitter that India decided to arm multiple groups and train TELO first. Prabhakaran assessed that LTTE had suffered the most, and LTTE ideology did not allow for multiple groups with equal authority. With regard to leadership of the insurgency, “the LTTE’s objective was to emerge as the only group fighting for *Eelam* so that India or Sri Lanka did business only with it.”⁷⁴⁵

Fed by hostility toward other Tamil insurgent groups, the LTTE attempted and almost succeeded at eliminating them.⁷⁴⁶ During the mid-1980s, as Depinder Singh noted, “Armed clashes between rival Tamil groups were a common phenomenon both within Sri Lanka and in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu.”⁷⁴⁷ The LTTE justified its actions against the other groups by claiming that they were “undisciplined and criminals” and by the time the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord was

⁷⁴³ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 120.

⁷⁴⁴ “Tamil Eelam Struggle for Freedom: Eelam National Liberation Front,” at *Tamilnation.org*, accessed October 23, 2008, <http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/enlf.htm> (site discontinued).

⁷⁴⁵ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 171, citing (n. 27) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, “India and the Tamil Eelam Crisis,” *A Nation Betrayed* (publication information unavailable).

⁷⁴⁶ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 345, 349.

⁷⁴⁷ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 20–1.

signed, it had assassinated leaders and eliminated cadres—upwards of 800—from TELO, EPRLF, and PLOT.⁷⁴⁸

By 1986, the Tamil fratricide reached “epidemic proportions” and the LTTE emerged as the dominant guerrilla group.⁷⁴⁹ As Hoole et al. explained, “Not only was the nation cleaved on a regional basis, but also the intensified intergroup rivalries ultimately culminated in the LTTE annihilating group after group with brutality unparalleled in the history of liberation struggles. . . . The Tigers not only brutally eliminated other movements but they also suppressed any other opinion among the people. . . . Though the LTTE seemed to have ascended to dominance, it was not an organic growth. It was achieved by terror.”⁷⁵⁰

By July 1987, of the five main Tamil groups, none of them except the LTTE were militarily significant.⁷⁵¹ The LTTE had struggled by defeating the others one by one to become the “main guerrilla force to challenge the Sri Lankan forces,” and its aim to retain this dominance would develop as a driving factor in its work to deceive the GSL and force India out of Sri Lanka.⁷⁵²

Buildup to an accord—the threat develops: Indian pressure on the Tamils to find a political solution continued in late 1986. In August, a TULF delegation shuttled back and forth between Colombo and New Delhi and attempted to create a measure agreeable to Colombo by which the Sri Lankan Constitution could be amended and provincial councils established. The Indians strongly supported the

⁷⁴⁸ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 21; Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 76; and Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 171, citing (n. 27) LTTE, “India and the Tamil Eelam Crisis.”

⁷⁴⁹ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 76; and Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 106–7.

⁷⁵⁰ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 349.

⁷⁵¹ The main groups were LTTE, TELO, EPRLF, EROS, PLOT. Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 23–4.

⁷⁵² Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 18.

plan, but Prabhakaran was livid: “Why does the TULF participate in talks with the Sri Lankan government?” he asked.⁷⁵³

In October 1986, *The Hindu’s* G. K. Reddy warned the LTTE that India’s patience with LTTE intransigence toward negotiations with Sri Lanka was wearing thin, noting that there would be a point when India would no longer be able to support the Tamil cause if the Tamils did not agree to a settlement. Within a day, Prabhakaran retaliated with an unexpected move: “The LTTE announced that it would take over the civil administration in Sri Lanka’s north in January 1987 and set up a ‘Tamil Eelam Secretariat’ to coordinate the work of all government departments.” This came on the heels of a declaration less than a week earlier that the LTTE would set up over a hundred courts and would issue Tamil currency.⁷⁵⁴

On November 1, 1986, a street fight between EPRLF members and local residents in Madras culminated in a shooting in which an Indian was killed. The shooting marked a turning point for Indian patience for the Tamil groups, which had largely taken advantage of their presence in Tamil Nadu until that point. After a failed meeting with Ramachandran, on November 8, Indian police commandos raided 30 Tamil camps within Tamil Nadu and seized their weapons. Shortly thereafter, Ramachandran ordered police to seize the LTTE’s high-frequency communications equipment, and in retaliation Prabhakaran launched a hunger strike. Ramachandran capitulated, returning the communication

⁷⁵³ Quoted in Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 212; the remainder of the information in this paragraph came from pp. 212–3.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 213.

equipment and arms. Prabhakaran left India—where he had lived for four years—on January 3, 1987.⁷⁵⁵

Two days previous—on New Year’s Day, 1987—the Tigers began an effort to make good their promise to take over the civil administration of Jaffna by taking over traffic control. Sri Lanka initially responded with a fuel embargo of northern Sri Lanka, leading the LTTE to suspend its effort.⁷⁵⁶ As Swamy indicated, the fuel embargo, which remained in place after the LTTE backed down, had crushing consequences on the Tamil populace:

The situation in Jaffna rapidly deteriorated. Within a fortnight, all bus traffic came to a halt because of the fuel embargo. Food prices shot up. Potatoes disappeared from the Jaffna market. The fishing industry, the mainstay of thousands in the Tamil northeast, ground to a standstill as motorized trawlers could not be put to sea. Jaffna officials hired bullock carts to transport food. One liter of petrol was sold for 115 rupees; the price came down after traders began bribing soldiers to smuggle petrol into the peninsula. The Sri Lankan government was, however, unrelenting. In February, it banned the movement of all spare parts, steel and hardware into Jaffna to cripple the LTTE’s weapons factories. It had already banned the transport of aluminum to Sri Lanka’s north.⁷⁵⁷

The GSL launched a major assault on January 8, 1987 to wrest Jaffna from Tiger control. Sri Lankan army troops set up camps between Jaffna’s strategic chokepoint, Elephant Pass, and Vavuniya and threatened the LTTE throughout the northeast. By March 7, the Sri Lankan army threatened Jaffna. A week later, Rajiv Gandhi sent a special emissary, Dinesh Singh, to Sri Lanka and he held a one-on-one, closed-door session with Jayewardene. It is unknown what Singh discussed with Jayewardene, but afterwards Jayewardene declared a ten-day cease-fire set to begin on April 10. In between the March 13 Singh-Jayewardene

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid., 214–223.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., 225.

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid.

meeting and April 10, the Tigers worked to retain control of Jaffna, but suffered at least one setback as a grenade thrown by unknown assailants severed the leg of Prabhakaran's Jaffna commander, Kittu. Taking random vengeance, the LTTE massacred members of EPRLF it had been holding prisoner in Jaffna.⁷⁵⁸

The LTTE abrogated the cease-fire on April 17, 1987 by killing 126 Sinhalese passengers riding in buses and trucks from Trincomalee to Colombo. Of the dead, 75 were military personnel on leave; the rest were their family members. On April 20, 18 Sinhalese civilians were killed in Trincomalee district, and on April 21 a bomb in Colombo's main bus terminal killed over 100 people, although the government blamed the bombing on EROS.⁷⁵⁹

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa vowed vengeance. He told Parliament, "We have listened long enough. We have waited long enough. The time has come to wipe out this cancer from our midst. . . . We will not negotiate with the Tamil terrorists until they surrender their weapons."⁷⁶⁰ To answer the bus terminal bombing, Jayewardene ordered air attacks on Jaffna. Planes bombed and the army shelled the peninsula heavily. The navy shelled coastal strongholds. Jaffna was heavily damaged and thousands fled. Residents covered the peninsula with trenches in which they took shelter during the attacks.⁷⁶¹

On May 26, the GSL launched an operation labeled by Jayewardene as the "final solution" against the Tamil problem.⁷⁶² As Maj. Shankar Bhaduri and Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim noted, "This phase envisaged breaking . . . the militants'

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid., 225–230.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid., 232.

⁷⁶⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ Ibid., 233.

⁷⁶² Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 109, 111.

stranglehold on Jaffna Peninsula in general, but of outstanding political importance, Jaffna town in particular.”⁷⁶³

The Sri Lankan armed forces engaged in a full-force assault meant to pose an existential threat to the LTTE. Within seven days, the GSL controlled the Vadamarachchi region, and the Tigers were forced to retreat. Prabhakaran narrowly escaped death. On May 31, 1987, the LTTE tacitly conceded its defeat in a public statement and sought assistance from its TELO and EPRLF prisoners to stop the onslaught. The Sri Lankan army kept the LTTE on the offensive, and the BBC quoted the army as expecting to take Jaffna within two days.⁷⁶⁴ By June 1, the LTTE was on the rocks.

India made it clear that it would not allow Jaffna’s fall. On May 28, Rajiv Gandhi held a press conference warning that India would intervene if necessary to safeguard Tamils against the Sri Lankan military offensive. Jayewardene responded by saying, “India can go to hell.” On June 1, Dixit told Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali that “India would not allow the capture of Jaffna and the persecution of [the] civilian population there.”⁷⁶⁵ Indian politicians began to worry that Tamil Nadu would take independent action to help the Tamils, and Gandhi decided to do something concrete.⁷⁶⁶

Gandhi sent humanitarian aid—“a flotilla of 19 fishing boats [under Red Cross flags] loaded with 38 tons of pulses, bread, vegetables, milk, rice, salt,

⁷⁶³ Ibid., 111.

⁷⁶⁴ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 234–5; Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 82; Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 125–6; and Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 19.

⁷⁶⁵ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 98. Dixit reported that the meeting occurred on June 10, but this almost certainly was a typo, as he then described follow-on events that occurred on June 2.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid.

kerosene and match boxes.”⁷⁶⁷ The Sri Lankan government told India “that it would consider the sending of relief supplies a violation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁷⁶⁸ Sri Lanka’s Navy did not allow the ships to make passage to Jaffna.⁷⁶⁹

On June 3, India decided to airdrop the humanitarian supplies and gave Sri Lanka only a few hours warning on June 4 before the planes took to the air. The GSL—under threats from India not to interfere—watched as its Tamil rivals received much-needed supplies. Sri Lanka then stopped its military operations, temporarily sparing the LTTE and other groups from destruction, but still threatened the Tigers strategically.⁷⁷⁰ Indo–Sri Lankan relations remained tense for a month, and the deception soon began.⁷⁷¹

Deception 1: Entering the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord

Right now I am small. I need India’s help to grow.

—Prabhakaran to journalist Anita Pratap⁷⁷²

The first deception examined in this chapter was a successful BTD in which the LTTE, while under extreme threat, initiated and participated in negotiations in order to escape destruction at the hands of Sri Lanka’s military.

⁷⁶⁷ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 236.

⁷⁶⁸ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 101.

⁷⁶⁹ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 236.

⁷⁷⁰ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 102–5, 112.

⁷⁷¹ For an interesting analysis from the time period about how the protracted ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka fit into a conceptual framework to understand the nature of internal South Asian conflicts, see Kumar Rupesinghe, “Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF),” *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 337–50, accessed June 20, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424003>.

⁷⁷² Pratap, *Island of Blood*, 68.

Threat to LTTE and its objectives: The LTTE faced an existential threat from Sri Lankan military forces by the time India dropped its supplies. Even afterward, the situation in Jaffna remained extremely dire for the LTTE. It was still unknown whether Sri Lanka would finish the Tigers off despite Indian objections. Dixit reported that the LTTE had been “pushed into a corner of the Jaffna peninsula Government forces were strategically and tactically dominating the area. The LTTE apparently felt that the withdrawal of Indian support and the assertive posture of Sri Lanka could only be neutralized by their agreeing to some sort of compromise, even if it was only an interim tactical maneuver.”⁷⁷³

At that time, the Tigers had two goals: First, to create an independent state of Tamil *Eelam*; this had been LTTE’s primary objective since its beginning. The LTTE noted in 1983: “We are committed, since the inception of our movement, to an armed revolutionary struggle to achieve our ultimate objective, i.e., the establishment of an independent sovereign socialist State of Tamil *Eelam*.”⁷⁷⁴ The LTTE never deviated from this policy.⁷⁷⁵

The LTTE by late 1986 articulated its goal for an independent state in much broader terms than a simple *Eelam* in northern Sri Lanka, as Dixit explained: “A significant articulation of its higher political aspirations had started emerging in

⁷⁷³ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 117–8.

⁷⁷⁴ Balasingham, *Liberation Tigers*, 42; see also p. 26. In a separate manifesto the LTTE wrote that “total independence of Tamil Eelam” was their primary objective and that they had an economic secondary objective: “abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the establishment of a socialist mode of production ensuring that the means of production and exchange of our country becomes the ownership of our people.” Tamilila Vitutalaippulikal (Association), *Towards Liberation: Selected Political Documents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (Sri Lanka?: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 1984), 7. Despite the Marxist rhetoric, the LTTE never showed a serious interest in establishing a socialist state.

⁷⁷⁵ As Tom Marks noted in March 2008, Prabhakaran never deviated from this goal—he would only favor settlement and agree to stop fighting if his adversaries gave in to his terms. Tom Marks, interview by author, March 31, 2008, Washington, DC (hereafter “Marks interview”).

LTTE publicity material by the end of 1986. This was that the fulfillment of Tamils' aspirations could start with the initial step of the creation of *Eelam* in Sri Lanka, while the ultimate aim remained the creation of 'Greater Tamil *Eelam*,' linking Tamil Nadu, the northeastern provinces of Sri Lanka and the areas of Tamil population in Southeast Asia and in Mauritius."⁷⁷⁶

Second, the LTTE wanted to be the sole authority in its Tamil *Eelam*.⁷⁷⁷ The Indian actions preceding a cessation of hostilities by the GSL led the LTTE to turn temporarily to other groups for assistance, as noted above, but strategically it had all but destroyed or subjugated the various other Tamil groups by mid-1987. The Indian humanitarian intervention did not immediately threaten the LTTE's supremacy, but the later Indo–Sri Lanka Accord would by putting other Tamil groups on equal footing vis-à-vis India, as discussed below.

Surviving was the one implicit but important pretext to achieving these two goals. Inasmuch as the Sri Lankan and Indian governments could defeat the LTTE as an organization, the LTTE was forced into confronting this problem as part of its strategy. Conversely, if complicity with India or Sri Lanka would promote the LTTE's survival, then working with either government posed potential benefits for the Tigers, even if collaboration was nothing more than a front or deception. Prabhakaran showed his Machiavellian thought processes on the LTTE relationship with India during an interview with Anita Pratap that occurred long before the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord:

⁷⁷⁶ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 81; see also p. 335.

⁷⁷⁷ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 78; see also Marshall R. Singer, "Sri Lanka in 1991: Some Surprising Twists," *Asian Survey* 32, no. 2 (1992): 169, accessed June 28, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645215>.

Prabhakaran came across as ruthless, cunning and brutal, but he was also clearly a master tactician and a brilliant strategist. . . .

In the course of our meeting, he told me, “Eventually, I will have to battle India.” This was years before the Indian troops were sent to Sri Lanka, even before Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister. It was the time when RAW . . . was training, arming and funding the LTTE.

I was shocked and told him so. How could he bite the hand that fed him? Not only was it ungrateful, would it be suicidal?

“Even more than Sri Lanka, India will not allow us to create Tamil *Eelam* because of its own fifty-five million Tamils in Tamil Nadu state,” he replied.

Then why was he taking India’s help? “Right now I am small. I need India’s help to grow.”⁷⁷⁸

Indian objectives before the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord: India became overtly involved in Sri Lanka for several reasons. The most frequently articulated reason was because it viewed the Tamil crisis as a threat to its internal unity. Indian policymakers worried that if the Tamils succeeded at achieving *Eelam*, it could stoke secessionist sentiment within Tamil Nadu. As Dixit noted: “There was a perception that if India did not support the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka and if the government of India tried to question the political and emotional feelings of Tamil Nadu there would be a resurgence of Tamil separatism in India.”⁷⁷⁹ Second, a correlated Indian goal was to protect the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Gandhi sent Dixit a message saying, “India should remain firm about preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. India should not be seen as a party to contributing to the break up of a small neighboring country.”⁷⁸⁰

Because of this strategic objective, India had no intention of allowing the LTTE to achieve Tamil *Eelam*—which could be detrimental to both India and Sri Lanka’s goals. “India’s desire,” said Dixit, “was to help Sri Lanka resolve its

⁷⁷⁸ Pratap, *Island of Blood*, 68.

⁷⁷⁹ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 328.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 65.

ethnic problem and preserve its unity, stability and territorial integrity.”⁷⁸¹

Gandhi also made it clear that India would “not allow an *Eelam* in Sri Lanka. The maximum we will talk about is the kind of autonomy that is available to states in India.”⁷⁸² Inasmuch as India had articulated from day one that it would not allow the Tigers to achieve *Eelam*, LTTE involvement with India in the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord clearly had to include elements of deception, as the Tigers were wise enough to know that Indian policy would not evolve to encompass their view and strong enough to not allow their own position on *Eelam* to weaken.

Third, India got involved in Sri Lanka because it was concerned if it did not get involved, other states would. India worried Sri Lanka would turn to the United States for support and allow it to gain undue influence in Sri Lanka: “It was feared that if the Americans were allowed a toehold, they would activate the oil wells at Trincomalee and perhaps establish a base in the Indian Ocean.”⁷⁸³

India also was concerned America would act as a broker for Sri Lanka to bring in Israeli military advisers and believed “Sri Lanka [would] . . . provide strategic intelligence gathering facilities against India in the proposed Voice of America broadcasting station to be established in that country.”⁷⁸⁴

Finally—and most apparent in its efforts to assist the Tamils—India became involved in Sri Lanka for humanitarian reasons sparked in part by the pressure placed on the Indian government by its own Tamils. As Dixit noted, “We had to respect the sentiments of the 50 million Tamil citizens of India. We felt that if we

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷⁸² Quoted in Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 150.

⁷⁸³ Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 24, citing (n. 12) J. N. Dixit, “IPKF in Sri Lanka,” *U.S.I. Journal* 119, no. 49 (1989): 249–50.

⁷⁸⁴ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 20.

did not rise in support of the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, we are not standing by our own Tamils”⁷⁸⁵

Sri Lankan objectives: The GSL’s primary objective was to protect the unity of Sri Lanka; on this point the Indians and Sinhalese were in agreement. To the GSL, this meant disarming the Tigers. Second, for Colombo, neutralizing the LTTE also was necessary to relieve pressure on the Sri Lankan military because Jayewardene was dealing with a Sinhalese insurgency as well, led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in southern Sri Lanka. He strongly wished to quell the Tamil problem so he could focus on his other war. Finally, Sri Lanka wanted to stop the aid and sanctuary provided to the Tamils by India.⁷⁸⁶ The GSL clearly knew that as long as the Tamils had external assistance, particularly from India, they would be able to rebuild from losses.

These three parties’ goals collectively set the foundation for the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord.

Creating the accord: In late June, Dixit received indicators that the LTTE had conveyed a message to N. Ram, Associate Editor of the *Hindu*, hinting it would be willing to negotiate if the GSL agreed to several proposals, including stopping military operations, merging the northern and eastern provinces and recognizing them as a Tamil homeland, devolving power to Tamils, recognizing Tamil as an official language, emplacing an interim Tamil administration in the northern/eastern provinces, and providing Tamils proportional representation in the security and public services. The message, according to Dixit, suggested that

⁷⁸⁵ Dixit, “IPKF in Sri Lanka,” 249–50, quoted in Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 85, n. 1.

⁷⁸⁶ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 24.

the LTTE would forego its insistence on *Eelam* and would agree to a cease-fire if these demands were met.⁷⁸⁷ This was the beginning of a BTD to change the Sri Lankan government's behavior.

India and Sri Lanka both fell to self-deception in believing the LTTE would give up its goal of *Eelam*. As noted above, the LTTE had iterated from its inception that its primary goal was the establishment of an independent Tamil state, and Prabhakaran made it clear he was willing to use others to achieve his objectives. At the time, however, both parties were so interested in ending the violence that they were willing to overlook the stated goals of the group in order to believe the LTTE might actually be willing to negotiate a peace agreement.

Gamini Dissanayake, one of Jayewardene's cabinet ministers, introduced Jayewardene to Ram, who persuaded Jayewardene to negotiate with the militants. Throughout early July 1987 various officials within the GSL worked with, and against, Dixit to hammer out basic tenets of an accord that generally acquiesced to the above-noted Tamil demands and that also included several concessions to ameliorate Indian geostrategic concerns. Several members of the Sri Lankan cabinet, particularly Prime Minister Premadasa, were vehemently opposed to an accord, saying Sri Lanka was selling out to India, but in the end—under intense pressure from India—Jayewardene approved an outline and they decided to approach the Tigers.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁷ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 118; see also Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 155.

⁷⁸⁸ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 185–7, citing (186, n. 3), Sinha Ratnatunga, *The Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanka Experience* (Canberra: International Fellowship for Social and Economic Development, 1988); and Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 119–141.

On July 19, 1987 Indian First Secretary Hardeep Puri flew to Jaffna to brief Prabhakaran on the negotiations between India and Sri Lanka. After listening to Prabhakaran reiterate his belief in a need for a Tamil state, Puri informed him about the deal:

The Sri Lankan president had agreed to sign an agreement with India that would seek to meet Tamil aspirations. The pact would concede that Sri Lanka was a multiethnic and multireligious plural society and not a Sinhala-Buddhist state, recognize Tamil ethnicity, and grant the status of an official language to Tamil. The president had also agreed to merge the northern and eastern provinces . . . to form a single administrative unit where Tamils would constitute a majority. The new province, like Indian states, would have its own legislative council and a chief minister. Of course, in return the LTTE would have to renounce violence and lay down arms.⁷⁸⁹

Prabhakaran's initial reaction was to note that he could not accept the agreement unless Sri Lanka disbanded its military units in the Vadamarachchi region and pulled back to positions held before the beginning of military operations. In addition, Prabhakaran wanted Tamil refugees resettled. Puri agreed and extended an invitation for Prabhakaran to meet Gandhi, which the Tigers accepted, but four days later, when Puri returned to Jaffna, Prabhakaran had hardened his demands. Prabhakaran reiterated that he was not willing to give up the concept of a Tamil *Eelam* and noted a concern that disarmament would lead to the Tigers' destruction. Nevertheless, he agreed to visit India.⁷⁹⁰

Prabhakaran was not told that all of the Tamil guerrilla groups had been invited to India, which wanted all of the groups, including the LTTE, to back its peace efforts.⁷⁹¹ This would prove a fatal flaw of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, as

⁷⁸⁹ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 157.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 158–9; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 188, quoting Yogaratnam Yogi (no citation provided).

⁷⁹¹ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 160.

allowing the other groups both legitimacy and the eventual ability to regroup would undermine the Tigers' goal to become the only authority in northeastern Sri Lanka.

A copy of the accord was presented to Prabhakaran on July 25 and he rejected it. Dixit, in a moment of frustration with Prabhakaran, threatened that the pact would be signed with or without the Tigers and said, "You have deceived us four times," referring to past negotiations the Tigers had rejected. In an interesting statement of strategy that would foreshadow the Tigers' later actions to destroy the accord, Prabhakaran replied, "That means we have saved our people four times."⁷⁹²

On July 28, 1987, Prabhakaran met with Gandhi to explain his concerns about the accord. Gandhi promised Prabhakaran funding, a majority share in the northeastern administration, and permission for the LTTE leadership to keep their small arms in order to assure their personal safety.⁷⁹³ Prabhakaran agreed to support the accord.

The other Tamil groups had agreed to the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord earlier on the 28th. The next day Gandhi flew to Colombo—leaving Prabhakaran in New Delhi—where he and Jayewardene signed the accord, which included the following elements:

- i) The recognition of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

⁷⁹² Quoted in *ibid.*, 162.

⁷⁹³ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 191–2; Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 163; and "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Ch. 34: Accord and Its Ramifications," *Asia Times Online*, April 6, 2002, accessed January 9, 2008, at <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD06Df04.html> (hereafter "Accord and Its Ramifications"), citing an unspecified edition of Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 243–4.

- ii) The union of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single administrative unit for the period of one year with an elected provincial council, a Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.
- iii) Cessation of hostilities throughout the island within forty-eight hours. The surrender of all arms held by Tamil militants within seventy-two hours to authorities designated by the Sri Lankan government. Lifting of the emergency in the North and East by 15 August and the confinement of Sri Lankan army and other security personnel to their barracks.
- iv) A referendum to be held in the Eastern Province to enable the Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese residing there to decide whether they wished to remain a part of the province. This referendum was to be held by 31 December 1988.
- v) Elections for the new Provincial Council to be held within three months in the presence of Indian observers.
- vi) A general amnesty for all Tamil militants, including those detained or convicted.
- vii) Repatriation of 130,000 Tamil refugees from India to Sri Lanka.
- viii) Equal status for Tamil and English, with Sinhala as an official language.
- ix) India to provide Sri Lanka with military assistance to implement these proposals. In addition, India undertook to “guarantee” these resolutions and cooperate not only in their implementation but also in joint naval patrolling to prevent Tamil militants from infiltrating from India into Sri Lanka.
- x) India to prevent its territory from being used by the Tamil militants.⁷⁹⁴

Prabhakaran was returned to Jaffna on August 2,⁷⁹⁵ and on August 4 he gave a landmark speech to a throng of Tamils, stating:

This Agreement contains elements that determine the political destiny of the *Eelam* Tamils. That is why we are strongly opposed to the Agreement since it was concluded without taking into consideration our views and the opinion of our people. . . .

. . . The mode of our heroic struggle, fought for the last 15 years and built on the blood and sacrifice of our fighters, is to be dismantled in a few days time. . . . Therefore, we refused to lay down arms. . . .

⁷⁹⁴ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 15–6.

⁷⁹⁵ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 229.

. . . The Indian prime minister has given me certain pledges. He has offered to guarantee the security of our people. I trust his sincerity. I have faith in his assurances. We trust that the government of India will not allow the Sinhala racist state to resume genocidal violence against our people. It is because of this trust we have decided to lay down our weapons to the Indian Peace Keeping Force.⁷⁹⁶

Indicating near the end of his speech that this would only be temporary, he added, “I have an unshakable faith that only an independent state of Tamil *Eelam* will provide a permanent solution to the problem of the Tamil *Eelam* people. Let me make it absolutely clear to you that I will continue to struggle for the cause of Tamil *Eelam*.”⁷⁹⁷

These statements set up the Tigers’ deception and India’s self-deception. As the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord took shape, the Tigers had three options: (1) Reject the accord (go with the previous status quo) and get destroyed. (2) Accept the accord and fail to achieve their goals of Tamil *Eelam* and dominance. (3) Say they would accept the accord and disarm with the goal of stopping the violence until they could regain their military strength.⁷⁹⁸ The Tigers eventually took the latter path because the accord itself would not give them what they wanted. Even though the LTTE gave indicators it had no intention to keep the accord and even though Gandhi clearly fell to a self-deception in believing it would, the LTTE was the first to pitch through N. Ram the idea of negotiations and did agree to the accord, thereby averting destruction at home. In this sense, it clearly was

⁷⁹⁶ Velupillai Pirabakaran, “On the Indo Sri Lanka Accord” (speech given at Suthumalai Amman Temple Grounds, August 4, 1987), available from *Tamilnation.org*, accessed May 27, 2008, <http://www.tamilnation.org/ltte/vp/87suthumalai.htm> (site discontinued).

⁷⁹⁷ Pirabakaran, “On the Indo Sri Lanka Accord.”

⁷⁹⁸ As Gunaratna noted, the LTTE knew if they did not agree to Indian proposals, they would be targeted heavily. The LTTE could be harmed by India, but was not dependent on India, as India presumed. Rohan Gunaratna, telephone interview by author, July 26, 2008, Reston, VA (hereafter “Gunaratna interview”).

deceptive—it used a deception to alter its adversary’s behavior that, left unchecked, would have led to its destruction. In the terminology of the endgame theory, this was a BTD.

An initial contingent of over 6,600 Indian troops entered Sri Lanka to throngs of welcoming Tamils the day after the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord was signed. As the *Asia Times* noted, “The Indian soldiers were received as protectors and guardian angels by the war-weary and battle-ravaged Tamils of the Northern province. They hugged and garlanded the soldiers in a display of emotion.”⁷⁹⁹

This chapter will examine three more deceptions perpetrated by the LTTE to regain strength and get India out of Sri Lanka. It will first look at a deception designed as an element of its decision to accept the accord—the LTTE’s efforts to hide the fact that it was not surrendering arms as specified under the accord’s conditions. Then it will assess the Tigers’ success at getting the IPKF out by duping the GSL into thinking it was ready to enter politics. Finally, it will examine deceptions used as part of a strategic operation to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. At the end of these three studies the chapter will examine the entirety of the LTTE’s deception efforts within the theoretical framework posited in chapter 3.

⁷⁹⁹ “Accord and Its Ramifications.”

Deception 2: Shell Game with Arms

LTTE . . . had no intention of surrendering arms

—Maj. Shankar Bhaduri and Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim (AVSM),
*The Sri Lanka Crisis*⁸⁰⁰

The aspect of the Indo–Sri Lanka most affecting LTTE interests was the stipulation that all Tamil groups would surrender arms within 72 hours. The timeline immediately fell by the wayside, given that Prabhakaran was not returned to Jaffna until August 2, 1987.⁸⁰¹ The LTTE arms deception—an SQD—involved making it look like the group was willing to surrender arms while simultaneously hiding its stocks and actively trying to acquire new arms. The deception was successful for a time, but ultimately failed because the LTTE was unable to hide its weapons as long as it probably would have liked before it became clear to all parties that it had no intention of disarming.

Because the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord was in force, the threat level against the LTTE was lessened but not removed entirely. It could be considered moderate: while the LTTE had obtained a reprieve from the existential threat posed by the GSL in the run-up to the accord, it still faced the prospect of being targeted by India if it did an insufficient job convincing New Delhi that it was abiding by Prabhakaran’s agreements.

Prabhakaran told the Indian force commander, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, that upon his return to Jaffna, he “would start the process of handing over weapons by personally handing over the heaviest machine gun”⁸⁰² A symbolic surrender

⁸⁰⁰ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 20.

⁸⁰¹ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 249.

⁸⁰² Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 48.

ceremony did take place on August 5, but Prabhakaran did not attend as he had promised. Instead, Yogaratnam Yogi, the LTTE's political chief, arrived that morning at the Palaly military complex with two truckloads of weapons. Yogi unceremoniously placed a pistol on the table—so abruptly that the journalists did not catch it on film—and the Sri Lankan Defense Secretary, Sepala Atygalle, subsequently pronounced an amnesty for 5,400 Tamils wanted for political crimes or terrorism.⁸⁰³ Swamy described the weapons that were handed over:

The weapons given up by the LTTE included locally made mortar shells, AK-47s, German-made G-3 rifles, RPGs, .303 rifles, 5-calibre machine guns, 30-calibre machine guns, 7.92 machine guns, 7.62 general purpose machine guns, rocket launchers and six-inch, four-inch, three-inch and 82mm mortars. Most of them were made in India. . . .

. . . Most of the surrendered weapons were obsolete. Some were those which had been seized by the Tamil Nadu police in November 1986 from other militant groups and later passed on to the Tigers on MGR's [Ramachandran's] orders. The *Jane's Defence Weekly* had reported earlier in 1987 that the LTTE possessed over two dozen types of rifles and machine guns, including the American M-16s and M-60s, Baretta model 12 submachine guns and tons of mines and grenades. The LTTE's area leaders were also known to carry pistols or revolvers. There was no trace of any of these at Palaly.⁸⁰⁴

A day later the LTTE came under pressure from Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh to surrender the remainder of its weapons. Initially Prabhakaran refused but Singh threatened to disarm the Tigers by force.⁸⁰⁵ Gunaratna provided a fascinating account of how the LTTE worked its deception after being told that a failure to hand over arms would result in the IPKF using force to disarm the rebels:

Prabhakaran called a meeting that evening at the LTTE political headquarters which continued well beyond midnight. There were definitely over 100

⁸⁰³ "Accord and Its Ramifications"; and Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 169.

⁸⁰⁴ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 253.

⁸⁰⁵ Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka*, 11; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 219. Gunaratna noted that the LTTE was not genuine in its efforts to surrender weapons, did so as a result of Indian pressure, and only gave over those that were not useable. Gunaratna interview. Singh denied threatening to disarm the Tigers by force. *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 46–7.

bicycles and several vehicles outside the headquarters, and it was an emergency meeting for area leaders of Jaffna and their close associates. As the author [Gunaratna] watched, their personal armaments, mostly revolvers and pistols and a few automatic rifles—AK-47 and T-56 weapons—were collected by a team of LTTE cadres led by Navinan, an assistant to Thileepan, the LTTE political leader. But the truth was different. Only Prabhakaran and his area commanders and senior leaders . . . knew that it was all staged, but they were all tight lipped. Even senior LTTE cadres did not know Prabhakaran’s plan. These weapons were not to be handed over to the IPKF the next day, but for the LTTE to grease them, wrap them in polythene and bury them.⁸⁰⁶

Gunaratna wrote elsewhere about the second surrender ceremony the next day: “Unlike the first day, Dilip Yogi was not present but Kumarappa, the Jaffna LTTE commander, and his close associate Narayan had come to Palaly. There were two other LTTE members who handed over about 20 weapons, mostly automatic rifles, but I noted that none of those collected the night before were handed in. This was significant.”⁸⁰⁷

And so it continued. However, reports surfaced that the LTTE was playing a shell game with its arms, hiding them when the IPKF was not looking. The *Times* of London reported that Tamils were burying their arms, and the deadline for surrender was subsequently pushed back to August 15, although this too eventually fell by the wayside.⁸⁰⁸

The LTTE stalled whenever asked about their apparent duplicity. When Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh would inquire about the progress of LTTE arms surrenders,

⁸⁰⁶ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 219.

⁸⁰⁷ Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka*, 11.

⁸⁰⁸ “Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Ch. 35: Accord to Discord,” *Asia Times Online*, April 13, 2002, accessed June 26, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html> (hereafter “Accord to Discord”). The same article noted that an additional contributing factor to the delayed deadline was “a dispute among Tamil groups over the make up of the transitional government.”

they would tell him, “We are collecting the weapons and will hand them over soon,” but this never occurred.⁸⁰⁹

In early September 1987, Depinder Singh began receiving intelligence about unusually large sales of grease and polythene, and he believed the LTTE was greasing and caching weapons for later use. When Singh confronted Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader initially was startled, but then denied the allegation, blaming it instead on the other groups.⁸¹⁰

By September, Singh reported that the LTTE was receiving a large shipment of weapons from offshore:

By mid September we had reasonable proof that the LTTE had imported a consignment of some 700 rifles, ammunition and explosives from Singapore, implying that either the orders were placed and purchases made after the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord was signed or no effort was made to cancel the orders if these were placed earlier. The stocks had been unloaded on the high seas from the *Illana*, a ship the LTTE had procured, into smaller boats which made their way into the numerous coves that dot the coast of Sri Lanka and from there the weapons were ferried to caches.⁸¹¹

As noted earlier, Prabhakaran apparently had an independent procurement capability, run by a secret wing of the organization whose task it was to clandestinely obtain weapons and explosives. Swamy reported that this section eventually developed into the LTTE’s intelligence wing, and he wrote that much of the LTTE’s arms and ammunition were “smuggled through LTTE-owned ships that operated under commercial cover and were registered in countries as far away as Honduras.”⁸¹²

⁸⁰⁹ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 255; see also Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 219.

⁸¹⁰ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 76 (quoted secondarily in Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 255, n. 3).

⁸¹¹ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 77.

⁸¹² Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 108–110, 196; see also Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 168.

Accounts differ about the volume of arms actually handed over by the LTTE and vary between 15% and 85%, depending on the source (the LTTE claimed the higher number). Altogether, the LTTE surrendered approximately 400–600 weapons, which almost certainly was a small portion of its arsenal, although it is unclear how many arms it started with.⁸¹³ Given the LTTE’s largely undiminished capability to continue fighting, the lower percentage probably is most accurate.

Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, in contrast, wrote that the LTTE surrendered arms until August 21, 1987, at which time the RAW recommenced arming rival groups, leading to intergroup violence and the end of the weapons surrender.⁸¹⁴ This might have been true, but regardless Singh appears to have fallen to self-deception in thinking the LTTE might have continued in surrendering weapons, as that almost certainly was not its plan.⁸¹⁵ Even as the LTTE was telling India that it was still working on collecting arms, LTTE leaders publicly were saying they had no intention of surrendering weapons.⁸¹⁶ For example, “On August 11, Jaffna newspapers quoted an LTTE spokesman as saying that the LTTE would not fully give up its weapons. ‘Yes, we made that statement,’ a defiant Prabhakaran told

⁸¹³ “Accord to Discord”; Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 220–1, citing (220, n. 1) D. B. S. Jeyaraj, *Frontline*, September 5–18, 1987; Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 27; Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 163; Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka*, 73; and Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 146, 157, citing Dixit interview with J. B. S. Jeyaraj in *Sunday Island*, August 30, 1987.

⁸¹⁴ Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 47–8.

⁸¹⁵ Gunaratna noted that the LTTE never had the intention to disarm and used the other Tamil groups as an excuse even though they never posed a serious threat. He said all agreed to abide by the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, all surrendered their weapons, and all were militarily insignificant—except the LTTE. In Gunaratna’s words, “The LTTE used all the excuses in the world.” Gunaratna interview. See also Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 219; and Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 131–2.

⁸¹⁶ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 169–70.

the *Frontline* magazine. ‘It is better to fight and die than surrender the weapons in an insecure environment and die on a mass scale.’”⁸¹⁷

The LTTE acted increasingly belligerent. By late August 1987, the LTTE had become alarmed that the IPKF allowed other Tamil groups, including EPRLF, PLOT, Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), and TELO to open offices, viewing these groups as a threat to its supremacy.⁸¹⁸ In mid-September, it engaged in a swift and effective operation against several rival groups, including EPRLF, PLOT, and ENDLF. India condemned the actions. The LTTE then launched a propaganda campaign accusing the IPKF of colluding with the GSL, calling the remnants of most other groups “antisocial elements,” and alleging that RAW secretly supported them with the goal of destroying the Tigers.⁸¹⁹ In a bold move, the LTTE also called on hardline elements of the other groups to leave their leadership and join the LTTE:

Each and every leader of the several factions, who both singly and collectively became victim of the selfish, scheming manipulations of the Indian intelligence service, is as guilty [as the service itself]. These power-drunk leaders became prawns in the hands of India and they then functioned and still function as quislings.

. . . Dear comrades, reject these treacherous leaders who have deserted the *Eelam* cause

Beloved comrades in arms, we welcome you wholeheartedly. Join us and swell the ranks of the LTTE⁸²⁰

⁸¹⁷ Quoted in Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 252; original *Frontline* source not noted.

⁸¹⁸ “Accord to Discord.”

⁸¹⁹ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 259–60. As Hoole et al. noted, “Not only did the LTTE seem to possess plenty of arms, they seemed also to be able to move about freely over a wide area notwithstanding the IPKF, and use the arms against other militias. *The Broken Palmyra*, 157.

⁸²⁰ Velupillai Pirabakaran, “Call to Other Tamil Liberation Groups,” September 25, 1987, available from *Tamilnation.org*, accessed May 27, 2008, <http://www.tamilnation.org/lte/vp/870925liberation.htm> (site discontinued).

By September 1987, it had no doubt become clear to all parties involved—including the Indians—that the LTTE had no intention of surrendering its weapons. This deception was coming to an end.

As time passed from the signing of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, the LTTE had been forced to balance dual priorities: hiding its arms from India and pretending to abide by the accord while simultaneously showing enough anti-India rhetoric and action against other groups to convince its supporters that it was still viable.⁸²¹ This second imperative weakened its ability to deceive because it fractured the group’s strategic coherence—the deception, public statements, and belligerent actions could not be in complete sync.⁸²² Additionally destructive for the deception was the fact that the LTTE’s adversaries had channels of information the LTTE did not control that indicated it was being deceptive—such as Depinder Singh’s above-noted intelligence that the LTTE was greasing and caching weapons. To some degree, this information worked in the favor of the IPKF’s counterdeception capabilities.

On September 15, 1987, the LTTE announced that its Jaffna political commander, Amirthalingam Thileepan, would fast until several demands were met, including the end of Sinhalese colonization in Tamil areas.⁸²³

⁸²¹ As Hoole et al. noted in describing the death of Amirthalingam Thileepan, discussed below, “The LTTE felt a need to prove that its members were still willing to die and that it had not lost its grip.” *The Broken Palmyra*, 100.

⁸²² For a discussion of how public statements must be in harmony with official actions, see Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 29.

⁸²³ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 260; and “The Unwanted Peacekeepers,” *Sunday Times*, November 12, 2000), accessed January 14, 2008, at <http://sundaytimes.lk/001112/plus8.html>.

Thileepan undertook his fast on a podium near a temple in Jaffna and used it to denounce the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord: “The accord has been brought by our enemies to dampen the national fervor whenever it shows sign of boiling over. Today the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord is to suppress the peoples’ thirst for liberation. Our aim is to chase away the Indians and to fly our own flag of freedom in [Jaffna] fort.”⁸²⁴

The LTTE reportedly “wanted a dominant role in the interim government with executive powers, together with the exclusion of other militant groups” and got it with Thileepan’s help, as India announced it would give the LTTE 7 of 12 seats.⁸²⁵

Prabhakaran accepted the deal, which became public even as Thileepan died. As they previously had agreed, the LTTE submitted three names for Jayewardene to decide between for the post of chief administrator, but were upset when Jayewardene did not select their favorite pick.⁸²⁶ The efforts fell apart.

Events came to a head on October 3, 1987, when a group of senior LTTE members, including regional commanders Pulendran and Kumarappa, rendezvoused with the *Illana* to pick up a consignment of weapons off the coast of Sri Lanka. On their return, the Sri Lankan Navy interdicted them and took them into custody. The GSL wanted to send them to Colombo for questioning, and asserted that the men had violated the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord by transporting weapons. The LTTE reacted by saying that the only men on the boat who were

⁸²⁴ Quoted in “Accord to Discord” (bracketed text original); see also Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 261.

⁸²⁵ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 366; and Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 261–2.

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*, 262–5; and Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 32.

armed were Kumarappa and Pulendran, who were allowed to carry arms under the terms of the accord, but the GSL did not relent.⁸²⁷

Indian officials, including Dixit, tried to prevent the GSL from transporting the cadres to Colombo, but to no avail. In the meantime, the IPKF convinced the Sri Lankan military to allow Anton Balasingham, the LTTE ideologist, to visit the prisoners, who told him that they would prefer to die using cyanide over being submitted to Sri Lankan torture and execution. Balasingham reported the news to an extremely upset Prabhakaran, who agreed to have Balasingham and another cadre take them cyanide capsules. On October 5, shortly before they were to be flown to Colombo, all 17 cadres took the cyanide capsules and 12, including Kumarappa and Pulendran, died.⁸²⁸ This triggered violence in Sri Lanka's north and east, with LTTE cadres killing Sri Lankan police and military personnel and kidnapping and murdering five Indian commandos.⁸²⁹

This event ended the first phase of IPKF presence in Sri Lanka and the LTTE's arms deception—which had failed in buying the LTTE much time.⁸³⁰ After the mass suicide, Jayewardene and Gandhi decided to “forcibly disarm the militants”: “Indian Defense Minister Pant was told politely but firmly by Jayewardene to incapacitate the LTTE or take its soldiers back.”⁸³¹ To the LTTE's misfortune—much of which it brought on itself by being too belligerent

⁸²⁷ Gunaratna, *International Dimension*, 6; Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 33; and Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 188–9.

⁸²⁸ Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 137–9; Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 209–11; and Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 64–7.

⁸²⁹ Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 75–6; and Pakistan Military Consortium, “India's Peace Keeping Mission in Sri Lanka: India's Vietnam,” accessed June 20, 2011, at <http://www.pakdef.info/pids/pids2/research/ipkf.html>.

⁸³⁰ On the beginning of operations against the LTTE, see Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 123.

⁸³¹ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 240; Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 267.

and not willing enough to compromise in order to string India along—its period of respite and armament had been too short. It was only a little over two months from the signing of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord in late July 1987 to the death of its senior cadres in early October. As the IPKF unleashed its military, it became clear that this deception had ended too soon and another more strategic deception became necessary.

Deception 3: Becoming the ‘Good Guy’ to Get the IPKF Out

The fall of Jaffna was a major setback for Prabhakaran. His prestige plummeted and his confidence caved in. He was convinced that the Indian military could not be beaten on the battlefield. It called for an extraordinary concoction of deceptive stratagem, daredevilry, double-dealing and diplomacy to push the Indians out.

—M. R. Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*⁸³²

The IPKF had virtually finished them off. They were gasping for breath in the jungles. It was we who provided the oxygen to them.

—Sri Lankan Minister of State for Defense Ranjan Wijeratne⁸³³

Once it became clear that the LTTE would not disarm, the group again came under pressure, this time from Indian forces, and it engaged in a second SQD—this one successful—in which it entered an agreement with the GSL in order to rearm and to get Indian troops off Sri Lankan territory.

The threat intensifies: After the death of the LTTE cadres, Gandhi took the initiative to disarm the LTTE and enforce the provisions of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord. An IPKF offensive called Operation Pawan began on October 10, 1987,

⁸³² Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 194.

⁸³³ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 442, quoting (n. 1) J. R. Jayewardene, as revealed by Ranjan Wijeratne, 1991; personal communication. On his title, see The General Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation, “About Late General Ranjan Wijeratne,” accessed July 10, 2011, <http://www.ranjanwijeratnefoundation.org.lk/about-ranjan.html>.

attacking LTTE television and radio stations, printing presses, and other Tamil militant camps at the beginning of an effort to capture Jaffna.⁸³⁴ The IPKF later became less evenhanded and allowed other Tamil groups to assist with its operations, which groups used the opportunity to take revenge on the Tigers.⁸³⁵

Prabhakaran ordered his cadres to fight to the last and desperately tried to replenish his ranks as the IPKF made a steady advance, but the LTTE lost badly in its attempts to fight the IPKF conventionally.⁸³⁶ Despite heavy losses, severe brutality against civilians, and at least one disastrously failed operation,⁸³⁷ the IPKF captured Jaffna by October 26, 1987, forcing the remaining LTTE cadres to flee to the forests of Vavunia and prepare there to engage in extended guerrilla operations.⁸³⁸ Bhaduri and Karim indicated that the LTTE left behind a small political presence in Jaffna town and the Peninsula that worked through underground channels, and Lt. Gen. S. C. Sardeshpande wrote that a few cadres remained to conduct guerrilla warfare, but their military hold was broken.⁸³⁹

After Jaffna was secured, radio intercepts indicated the LTTE was badly damaged and short on both food and supplies. In addition, they had lost “knowledge, expertise and spirit of the movement” that was difficult to replace later.⁸⁴⁰ As Col. John Taylor, an Indian officer assigned to the IPKF, noted, the

⁸³⁴ Dates vary between October 8 and 10, depending on the account. Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 66; “Accord to Discord”; Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 85–6; and Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 143.

⁸³⁵ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 286.

⁸³⁶ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 193.

⁸³⁷ This was a failed assault by Indian commandos on LTTE’s headquarters at Jaffna University; see Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 272–3 on the operation and p. 275 on Indian brutalities.

⁸³⁸ “Accord to Discord”; Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 79.

⁸³⁹ Bhaduri Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 81; Lt. Gen. S. C. Sardeshpande, UYSM, AVSM (Retd.), *Assignment Jaffna* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992), 72.

⁸⁴⁰ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 412; and Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 20.

IPKF experienced significant successes in these early days of operations: “The IPKF had successfully eliminated the middle order leadership of the LTTE and broken their stronghold over the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE was forced to take refuge in the jungles of the North and East. The Elephant Pass was open for the first time after the LTTE had taken control of Jaffna. Movement of goods from the South, East and West was made possible after a long period of time.”⁸⁴¹

It became clear after the conquest of Jaffna that the Tigers had not surrendered all their arms. India uncovered approximately 2,000 arms scattered in caches around the peninsula. Harkirat Singh wrote of “large recoveries” in December 1987 of weapons hidden by the Tigers that suggested it was prepared for a long war. He noted that the ammunition was stored in large quantities 3–4 feet underground, and weapons and ammunition also were hidden in lagoons after being preserved in polythene and grease.⁸⁴² As Rajesh Kadian commented, “this unearthing of weapons could not hide the bitter truth; the LTTE cadres were still armed and at large.”⁸⁴³

Once the IPKF cemented control over Jaffna, it continued its operations against the now-underground Tigers as they began a fairly effective guerrilla campaign. India increased its military strength from October 1987 to February 1988 to 15 brigades (70,000 official personnel).⁸⁴⁴ The IPKF threatened the LTTE to a point that in late April 1988, Prabhakaran admitted in a written

⁸⁴¹ Col. John Taylor (Retd.), “India’s Vietnam: The IPKF in Sri Lanka,” *Rediff.com*, accessed June 28, 2011, at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/23lanka.htm>.

⁸⁴² Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 157.

⁸⁴³ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 51.

⁸⁴⁴ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lanka Crisis*, 109; and “Sri Lanka: Foreign Military Presence,” data as of October 1988, accessed June 4, 2011, at <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13286.html>. The latter source also indicated the actual presence climbed to well over 100,000 troops.

message to an international conference in London that the LTTE was again facing destruction:

We have been fighting to defend ourselves against a formidable military apparatus whose sophistication in war technology and in manpower is far superior to ours. . . .

...

. . . Our political struggle of self determination, which is a product of a lengthy evolutionary history extending over forty years, a product of national campaigns, of mass agitations, of revolutionary armed resistance, *is faced with the danger of being stamped out*. The ultimate consequence of the Indian intervention is the grave danger of the complete subjugation of our people to the dictatorial dominance of the Sinhala ruling class and the perpetuation of oppression, state terror and genocide.⁸⁴⁵

Dixit reported that by January 1989, the IPKF had essentially taken control of the whole Northeastern Province and contained the LTTE in Vavunia's forests, allowing only sporadic violence from the Tamil areas that actually was lighter than in Sinhalese areas under the continuing JVP insurgency.⁸⁴⁶ While the LTTE by this time may not have been as weak as Dixit asserts (it was still "killing Indian troops, its rivals and Sinhalese civilians with chilling regularity," according to Swamy), it definitely was not improving.⁸⁴⁷

Several political developments also affected anti-LTTE actions during this time period. The JVP sparked violence and civil discord in the Sinhalese areas of central and southern Sri Lanka to protest the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, pulling GSL resources away from the north and east. On July 31, 1988, the GSL announced that provincial council elections would be held in the Tamil provinces even

⁸⁴⁵ Velupillai Pirabakaran, "Message to the Conference from Velupillai Pirabakaran, Leader of Tamil Eelam," April 25, 1988 (written message to The Tamil National Struggle & the Indo Sri Lanka Peace Accord, an international conference at the Middlesex Polytechnic, London, April separand May 1, 1988), available from *Tamilnation.org*, accessed May 27, 2008, at <http://www.tamilnation.org/conferences/UK88/vp.htm> (site discontinued) (italics added).

⁸⁴⁶ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 283.

⁸⁴⁷ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 286.

without LTTE participation, and they were scheduled for November 1988. On September 10, Jayewardene announced that the two Tamil provinces would be merged to create a Northeastern Province. Jayewardene also decided not to run for reelection in December 1988.⁸⁴⁸

The provincial election occurred, but was not strongly contested and lost the hoped-for legitimacy because the winners did not represent the people. The only Tamil groups to register were the EPRLF and ENDLF, and they won 41 and 12 seats, respectively (compared to the ruling UNP winning only one seat), and formed a coalition provincial government under the leadership of Varadaraja Perumal. Because it had been militarily marginalized by the IPKF, the LTTE was unable to sabotage the election or its run-up with violence. India supported the new provincial government—it was seen by LTTE supporters as being a political extension of the Indian occupation—while the GSL did almost nothing, ironic given that the EPRLF was the one Tamil group which categorically denounced violence. Instead, the GSL allowed Perumal's government to flounder.⁸⁴⁹ In December 1988, the UNP won the presidential elections and the former prime minister, Premadasa, took control from Jayewardene in January 1989.

In addition to the provincial council and presidential elections, Sri Lanka also held parliamentary elections in February 1989 wherein the UNP obtained a majority but in which India manipulated the vote in Tamil areas in order to help EROS—which it also strongly favored—to win 12 Parliamentary seats.

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid., 284–5; and Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 123.

⁸⁴⁹ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 287–93; Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 125–6; Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 429; Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 252–3; and Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 209.

Interestingly, India supported the EPRLF for the provincial council elections, but spurned an EPRLF-TULF coalition for the parliamentary elections four months later—apparently to its detriment, as EROS immediately criticized India and the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord after its victories.⁸⁵⁰ All of this harmed the LTTE. As Sardeshpande noted, “The month of March ’89 witnessed a significant pause. The people and the LTTE had to reconcile to the reality of three elections and the NEPC [Northeastern Provincial Council, under Perumal] installed in Trincomalee, while significant changes had come about in Colombo. The IPKF was proving too costly for the LTTE.”⁸⁵¹

Changing threat, changing strategy: By early 1989, the LTTE had been forced deep underground and needed assistance to get the IPKF out of Sri Lanka. Under these conditions, the group faced another existential threat and the endgame theory would predict that it would look for another BTD; however, it was handed a fortunate break that changed the threat scenario and that it twisted on the giver—the GSL—to its advantage.

When Premadasa took over the presidency from Jayewardene, he settled on a decidedly different strategy with regard to India, which proved to be the LTTE’s saving grace. Premadasa believed Sri Lankans should resolve problems internally without foreign interference and strongly objected—even during his days as prime minister—to the Indian presence in Sri Lanka. He informed Dixit shortly after his

⁸⁵⁰ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 296–8.

⁸⁵¹ Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna*, 85.

accession to the presidency that he proposed to undertake direct negotiations with the LTTE to solve the conflict.⁸⁵²

According to Dixit, in probably mid-March 1989, Premadasa sent a message to the LTTE indicating the GSL was willing to engage in negotiations with the LTTE to end hostilities with India. He suggested the GSL would stop targeting the LTTE militarily, hold political discussions, provide the LTTE with arms and intelligence, and ensure the conferment of authority on the LTTE and the removal of the Northeastern Provincial Council.⁸⁵³

Premadasa's motives in extending the offer and the LTTE's motives in accepting it were surprisingly similar—both aimed to use the other in order to get India out.⁸⁵⁴ Premadasa in the near term also wanted to stall actions against the LTTE so he could concentrate on fighting the JVP insurgency, which was focused on opposing the Indian intervention under the pretext that it was an invader.⁸⁵⁵

As Dixit noted, “The *leitmotif* of [the GSL] . . . supporting the LTTE against the IPKF and against other Tamil groups was to, first, ensure the withdrawal of the IPKF and the destruction of other Tamil groups and, once the LTTE was the lone surviving Tamil political and military group, to isolate it and destroy it also.”⁸⁵⁶ Swamy wrote that the new LTTE strategy was almost identical:

When the LTTE suffered serious reverses at the hands of the IPKF, Prabhakaran completely changed his front like a drowning man. He grabbed

⁸⁵² Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 274, 277.

⁸⁵³ *Ibid.*, 287. Whether Dixit's dates are correct is difficult to verify. As noted below, the deal became public in April.

⁸⁵⁴ This would neither be the first nor the last time the LTTE would use negotiation as a tactical measure to regain its strength. See P. Sahadevan, “On Not Becoming a Democrat: The LTTE's Commitment to Armed Struggle,” *International Studies* 32, no. 3 (July 1995): 250, accessed June 29, 2011, doi: 10.1177/0020881795032003003.

⁸⁵⁵ See Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 283.

⁸⁵⁶ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 233.

the olive branch extended to him by an overconfident Premadasa. But in his mind he was very clear that his stratagem to talk peace was only to get the common and mightier enemy out. When sympathizers questioned the need to get friendly with the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE explained that the negotiations should be likened to the truce the Chinese communists forged with their foe Chiang Kai-Shek to oust the Japanese from China. Once the IPKF was out of the way, the LTTE could take care of the Sri Lankan state.⁸⁵⁷

The negotiations between the groups became public by April, when Premadasa announced a unilateral cease-fire in celebration of the Tamil-Sinhalese New Year and asked India to follow suit. The LTTE rejected the cease-fire, saying it would not stop hostilities until Indian troops left Sri Lanka. Premadasa in June made a public announcement demanding an Indian withdrawal and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Ranjan Wijeratne invited the LTTE for peace talks. The LTTE leadership accepted the offer and requested the GSL make necessary arrangements. In late June, the GSL and LTTE jointly declared a bilateral cessation of hostilities.⁸⁵⁸

In June and July 1989, Premadasa and Gandhi exchanged a series of somewhat hostile public letters in which Premadasa noted that the LTTE had announced a cessation of hostilities and asked India to stop targeting the Tigers. India rejected the Sri Lankan moves and refused to depart Sri Lanka, arguing that the conditions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that had brought India to the island had not yet been satisfied. India noted that both governments needed to concur on a pullout, that Sri Lanka had not yet devolved power to the Tamils, and that the LTTE had not yet disarmed. Premadasa contended that a continued Indian

⁸⁵⁷ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 319; see also Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 208–9.

⁸⁵⁸ Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 213–4, 239; and Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 134.

presence after he had requested its withdrawal was a violation of international law.⁸⁵⁹

In the latter half of 1989 Gandhi ratcheted up the pressure on the Tigers, despite requests from the GSL to stop, and the Tigers were able to cache in on this to rearm. Adele Balasingham, spouse of the LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham, described passionately (and certainly with a fair amount of bias from the LTTE perspective) the series of events that allowed the LTTE to regain power:

Confronted by three forces—the Indian, Sri Lankan and the Tamil National Army [TNA, an India-supported, anti-LTTE Tamil militia in northern and eastern Sri Lanka]—the LTTE guerrillas faced the most difficult time in the history to date of their armed struggle. The Sri Lankan military threat could be overcome by entering into a cease-fire agreement with Premadasa. . . . But to engage a formidable conventional military they needed arms and ammunition. At least they had to hold on until the Indians were withdrawn from the Tamil homeland. Apart from the role as the LTTE's chief negotiator, Bala [Anton Balasingham] was now given an extremely sensitive task, that of procuring weapons from the movement's hitherto historical enemy.

. . .
. . . Bala . . . [requested] Mr. Hameed [the GSL's primary contact and negotiator to the LTTE] for an urgent meeting in his hotel room to discuss the possibility of armed assistance from the government for the LTTE to face the military threat posed by the Indian forces and the Tamil National Army. . . . The LTTE was running out of ammunition and the IPKF had inducted heavy concentrations of combat troops along with contingents of Tamil paramilitaries in the jungles of Mullaitivu. . . . Was it possible for Mr. Premadasa, asked Bala, to provide arms and ammunition to the LTTE to defend themselves against the current joint assault by the IPKF and the Tamil National Army?
. . . [T]he President was willing to help.⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁹ Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 134–5; and Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 178. For a reproduced copy of the letters, see Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 373–381; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 290–305.

⁸⁶⁰ Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 235, 243–4.

From June 1989 the GSL began supplying weapons to the LTTE.⁸⁶¹ This process continued until the LTTE was strong enough again to turn on Premadasa.

Swamy described this bizarre turn of events:

The large quantity of military weapons handed over to the LTTE by the Premadasa regime included T-56 and M-16 rifles, mortar shells, rocket propelled grenades, [and conventional] grenades besides several thousand rounds of ammunition. Once Premadasa agreed to the initial request, like a reluctant father to his prodigal son, Prabhakaran pressed for more and more, taking on the role of a patriotic Sri Lankan determined to drive away the invading Indians. The LTTE sought Colombo's help to import equipment from Singapore and demanded concertina wire, batteries, cement, concrete and even handcuffs. All requests were approved and acted upon. It was during this period the LTTE, without Colombo's knowledge, quietly laid a network of agents and sleepers who would one day wreak havoc in Sri Lanka.⁸⁶²

The weapons were passed to the LTTE by the Sri Lankan military, which was at times upset over the new alliance the GSL was forming with the LTTE, especially since the LTTE still occasionally attacked Sri Lankan forces, despite the cease-fire. Gunaratna noted that the troops guarding border villages complained the government was giving new weapons to the LTTE while still providing troops with outdated arms. In addition, the LTTE attacked frontline troops and civilians using the very weapons provided by the GSL. In addition to the weapons, the GSL gave the LTTE leaders first-class accommodations in Colombo and provided the LTTE with 30–40 vehicles and Rs 200 million; and in

⁸⁶¹ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 293–4, citing (294, n. 1) personal communications with Ranjan Wijeratne, A. C. S. Hameed, Bradman Weerakoon, Bernard Tilakeratne and Cyril Ranatunge, 1991. Gunaratna noted, “By this time, the LTTE appeared to be convinced that Premadasa was genuine in his moves to solve the ethnic crisis. Obviously, the LTTE leaders in Colombo were privy to the efforts by Premadasa, and had communicated this to Prabhakaran and to his associates.” *Ibid.*, 303. In Gunaratna's 2008 interview with this author, he appeared to have backtracked somewhat from this line of reasoning. Gunaratna interview.

⁸⁶² Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 209.

early 1990, the GSL made arrangements for Prabhakaran's wife, who had been in exile, to return to Sri Lanka.⁸⁶³

Events moved quickly. Rajiv Gandhi lost reelection as Indian prime minister and was replaced by V. P. Singh in December 1989. A month later the government of India announced it would withdraw from Sri Lanka by the end of March 1990. The GSL and LTTE agreed that as the Indians withdrew, the LTTE would take over administration of the Northeastern Province until new (and presumably more legitimate) elections could be held.⁸⁶⁴

As the IPKF began withdrawing, the LTTE worked to regain control of Jaffna and eastern Sri Lanka.⁸⁶⁵ Also at the time, Premadasa emphasized to the LTTE that armed resistance would no longer be necessary once India was gone and that the LTTE needed to enter the political mainstream. In what was possibly the final aspect of this deception, the LTTE indicated that they would get involved in politics and even created a political party—the People's Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT).⁸⁶⁶ Simultaneously, the LTTE took over control of northeastern Sri Lanka from the TNA even as the TNA begged for assistance from Colombo and New Delhi.⁸⁶⁷

⁸⁶³ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 300, 303–4, citing (300, n. 2) M. K. D. S. Gunawardene, SLFP MP for Trincomalee District in Parliament; Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 291; and Sahadevan, "On Not Becoming a Democrat," 275, citing (n. 77) Chandrika Kumaratunga, interview in *India Today*, May 15, 1995, 59.

⁸⁶⁴ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 291.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 292.

⁸⁶⁶ Gunaratna originally rejected this notion, writing that, "Contrary to the school of thought that the LTTE was never interested in entering the democratic mainstream, public events organized by the LTTE clearly demonstrated that the LTTE was preparing politically to fight the elections." *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 395. In 2008, Gunaratna said that even if they were interested in entering politics, it was still only considered a step on the road to an independent state—they would not compromise on *Eelam*. Gunaratna interview.

⁸⁶⁷ Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 246–7, 249.

The Indian military departed Trincomalee on March 24, 1990.⁸⁶⁸ The LTTE and GSL continued political discussions even as it became clear that one side would have to defect in this game of chicken. Issues dominating the political discussions included the repeal of the Sri Lankan Constitution's Sixth Amendment—which would have required the Tigers to swear allegiance to a unitary state, an action they were unwilling to take—and the dissolution of Perumal's government in the northeast, which the Tigers desired. Premadasa, while theoretically willing to repeal the Sixth Amendment, did not have the support in Parliament to do so, and the LTTE began to claim that he was stalling on a political solution.⁸⁶⁹

The LTTE leadership justified to its followers its claimed decision to enter the political process by saying that it was only an interim step. Balasingham told the Sri Lankan negotiator, A. C. S. Hameed, "Once we become the elected representatives of the people, we can negotiate for a permanent solution that will involve the crucial issue of a security arrangement for the Tamil people."⁸⁷⁰

The LTTE set itself up to deceive the GSL either way. If the GSL conceded to its political demands, participation in politics would allow it to push for an independent state and probably secede from Sri Lanka after a period of rule.

⁸⁶⁸ See Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 316. The Pakistan Military Consortium indicated that the departure was on March 31. "Indian Peace Keeping Mission in Sri Lanka." Regardless, India pulled out by its deadline of March 31, 1990.

⁸⁶⁹ Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 253–4, 256; see also Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 389–90.

⁸⁷⁰ Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 258. In the spring of 1990, Prabhakaran told the same thing to *Time* magazine: "*Question*: Have you given up the demand for an independent *Eelam*? *Prabhakaran*: We have not. *Question*: Then what are you talking to Premadasa for? How can you enter the democratic mainstream if you still cling to your separatist cause? *Prabhakaran*: Our demand for self-determination will not be an impediment for us to enter the political process." *Time*, April 9, 1990, 33, quoted in Sahadevan, "On Not Becoming a Democrat," 278, n. 85 (formatting manipulated).

Gunaratna noted that the LTTE employed a “step by step” strategy, and if entering political councils benefited the LTTE and brought them one step closer to *Eelam*, they would enter. One cadre told Gunaratna that they wanted Tamil *Eelam* but could not do it in one step, noting instead, “We go step by step.”⁸⁷¹ This is the path Balasingham suggested the LTTE would take.⁸⁷² Conversely, if the GSL did not concede to LTTE demands for withdrawal of the Sixth Amendment and dissolution of the NEPC, the LTTE was well prepared to restart hostilities.

By April 1, 1990, when Prabhakaran gave a victory speech on the withdrawal of India, the LTTE had done very well with its deceptive alliance. In addition to all the arms, money, and materiel provided to it by the GSL, for the first time in its history it gained full control of northeastern Sri Lanka. By mid-November 1989 it had routed the TNA and Perumal’s government had become worthless.⁸⁷³ “The LTTE began to hold pocket meetings throughout the northeast. The LTTE recommenced their newspapers, the TV, and the radio station. Sri Lankan forces had to receive permission from LTTE regional commanders to move in the Tamil areas. The Sri Lankan forces were subjected to searches at the LTTE checkpoints.”⁸⁷⁴ The LTTE had returned Sri Lanka to a state that it had been in before the Indian intervention, including the receipt of political and materiel

⁸⁷¹ Gunaratna interview.

⁸⁷² Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 258.

⁸⁷³ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 308–9; Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 292; and Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 308–16. Perumal even attempted to unilaterally declare *Eelam*, although his efforts failed and he fled to Mauritius on March 10, 1990. Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 314–6.

⁸⁷⁴ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 391.

support from Tamil Nadu. It worked essentially to eliminate the leadership of the other groups, cementing its dominance.⁸⁷⁵

In the April 1 speech, Prabhakaran continued to take an ambivalent approach—not yet calling for resumed war against Sri Lanka, but also indicating it was not ready to lay down arms.⁸⁷⁶ At the same time, other indicators made it clear the LTTE was quietly preparing for war and had not abandoned its deceptive strategy. Sri Lankan intelligence reported that the LTTE was moving cement and concrete to the north and east and constructing bunkers. One of Prabhakaran’s deputies told some Tamils that the LTTE had allied with the Sri Lankan government only to get India out and that the LTTE had “no commitment to Premadasa.” Prabhakaran went one step further: “For our growth we can use anyone,” he said, “but those who help us should not benefit from us.”⁸⁷⁷

Peace deteriorated rapidly. Premadasa began to worry that despite all of the arms passed to Prabhakaran, the latter was showing no signs of being ready to disarm. Premadasa got pressure from hardliners who assessed—correctly—that he had been duped. He decided to open negotiations with other groups, and, as trust deteriorated, began pushing more troops into the Tamil regions.⁸⁷⁸ The LTTE began expressing concerns that it and the Tamil populace were being led into a “peace trap”:

⁸⁷⁵ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 293–5.

⁸⁷⁶ Prabhakaran’s speech was printed in the *Sunday Times* (Colombo), April 8, 1990, and reprinted in K. J. Rajasingham, “Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Chapter 43: Aftermath of the Indian Withdrawal,” *Asia Times Online*, June 8, 2002, accessed August 7, 2011, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DF08Df01.html>; also reprinted in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 391–4, citing (391, n. 3) *Sunday Times*, Colombo, April 8, 1990.

⁸⁷⁷ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 213.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 218; see also Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 434, citing (n. 1) an interview with Ranjan Wijeratne “two days before he was killed.”

As the process of formulating legislation to dissolve the NEPC and recall the Sixth Amendment was taking time, the LTTE was becoming increasingly impatient and alleged that they were being led into a “peace trap.” On [the] ground, the Sri Lankan Security Forces were attempting to move in to fill the security vacuum created by the departing IPKF. Incidents were gradually building up. Complaints ranging from the deterioration of discipline among the junior LTTE cadres to reports in the press of LTTE abducting army officers and soldiers and the LTTE assaulting policemen in the East were becoming frequent.

...
... Later when Ranjan Wijeratne, the most powerful minister in the Premadasa government, requested the LTTE to lay down their arms, Prabhakaran as well as the LTTE were totally disgusted. After that point, they were just waiting for an opportunity to resume the war. They suspected that if such an opportunity did not come their way, they would be in a “peace trap” as the LTTE’s popularity had dropped remarkably after the departure of the IPKF.⁸⁷⁹

The deception was complete. India had left. The LTTE was again strong and the GSL no longer posed an existential threat. Tensions were growing. It was time for Prabhakaran to rise up and fight back.⁸⁸⁰

Two months after Prabhakaran’s April 1 victory speech, on June 10, 1990, the LTTE resumed its war against the Sri Lankan state, claiming that the Sri Lankan army had moved out of its barracks and using a domestic quarrel as reason to take the offensive. In a surprise attack, the LTTE hit police stations, two naval bases, and 16 army camps.⁸⁸¹ In the end it executed 450 policemen who had surrendered to it willingly.⁸⁸² As Swamy noted, “Once the IPKF left the scene, . . . [t]he

⁸⁷⁹ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 397, 436–7.

⁸⁸⁰ For an analysis of Prabhakaran’s thinking on this matter, see Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 435–6, citing (435, n. 1; 436, n. 1) Anton Balasingham at a meeting in Jaffna in May 1990.

⁸⁸¹ Pratap, *Island of Blood*, 90; see also *Someone Else’s War: An Account of Eelam War II and the Latter Stages of IPKF Operations Against the LTTE Which Preceded It, Based on the Reports of the University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna* (Colombo: Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality, 1994), 30. Tom Marks noted that the LTTE “cease-fire” ended with major operations that clearly had been staged and must have required preparation. Marks interview.

⁸⁸² Gunaratna, *International Dimension*, 6.

Tigers unleashed a killing inferno.” That inferno also included a brutal vendetta war against other Tamil groups and Sri Lankan officials, including Minister Wijeratne, whom the LTTE assassinated.⁸⁸³

Prabhakaran made a statement on October 6, 1990, the third anniversary of Pulendran and Kumarappa’s (as well as 15 others’) suicides, and vowed to fight until an independent state was established.⁸⁸⁴ By this time the LTTE had resurrected a full-scale insurgency: “Three months after the LTTE reneged the peace pact with Colombo, General Ranatunge, the Defense Secretary, revealed that 667 policemen were killed by the LTTE, 352 missing and 1,283 were injured. He also said that 352 soldiers were killed and 1,154 injured, respectively. He added that 572 civilians were killed and 249 injured. Of the militants, 1,459 were killed and 382 injured. Intelligence assessed that within three months of the hostilities breaking out on June 11, 1990, nearly 3,000 had been killed.”⁸⁸⁵

A Tiger manifesto published in 1978 asserted that “armed liberation struggle is the only viable and effective path open to us to liberate our homeland.”⁸⁸⁶ Some time after hostilities had resumed the well-known Indian journalist Anita Pratap interviewed Prabhakaran and asked him why he had abrogated the peace with Premadasa. Prabhakaran’s reply made it clear that his deceptive strategy had all along reflected the group’s 1978 declaration:

I asked Prabhakaran the question that had been haunting me for a year and a half: Why hadn’t he opted for peace when it was in his grasp? After all,

⁸⁸³ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 318–9; and Gunaratna, *International Dimension*, 6–7.

⁸⁸⁴ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 219.

⁸⁸⁵ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 448.

⁸⁸⁶ Tamilila Vitutalaippulikal (Association), *Towards Liberation*, 7. In a tract published later, the LTTE also asserted that “military terrorism [on the part of the GSL] is the only answer to the Tamil demand [for *Eelam*] and that the nonviolent foundation of the Tamil political agitation is a weak and impotent structure against the barrel of the gun.” Balasingham, *Liberation Tigers*, 20.

Premadasa had virtually given *Eelam* to them on a platter. Prabhakaran denied that they had started the war and labored the Tiger version of events, that the Sri Lankan army had violated their agreement and come out of their barracks. And anyway, he said, “We don’t want *Eelam* on a platter. We will fight and win *Eelam*.”

That then was the crux of the matter, the reason for the fresh violence. Prabhakaran did not want anybody else’s version of *Eelam*—he wanted his own, an *Eelam* that he liberated militarily. “Thousands of my boys have laid down their lives for *Eelam*. Their death cannot be in vain. They have given their life for this cause, how can I betray them by opting for anything less than *Eelam*?” he asked.⁸⁸⁷

Deception 4: Ensuring India Stayed Out—The Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi

Sivarasan had sent a terse message to Pottu [Omman], swearing upon the ‘sweet’ name of his leader Prabhakaran, that no stigma would be attached to the LTTE on their account.

—D. R. Kaarthikeyan on the LTTE’s intention to hide its hand in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, *Triumph of Truth*⁸⁸⁸

The perceived return of a threat: Rajiv Gandhi left office in December 1989 and was replaced by V. P. Singh, who himself resigned shortly less than a year later, in November 1990, and then Chandra Shekar took over as the Indian prime minister. Shekar resigned in March 1991, sparking a new election cycle.⁸⁸⁹

The LTTE, in resumed war with the GSL, worried that if Gandhi was reelected he would push to revive the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord and reintroduce the

⁸⁸⁷ Pratap, *Island of Blood*, 94–5.

Author’s note: I thank Ranapriya Abeyasinghe for encouraging me (in an e-mail on October 24, 2007) to examine Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination as a case.

⁸⁸⁸ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 94.

⁸⁸⁹ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 457, 459; *Shandra Shekar*, accessed July 3, 2011, <http://www.chandrashekar.com/>; T. R. Andhyarujina, “President and Choice of Prime Minister,” *Delhi Compass* (blog), February 28, 2009, accessed July 3, 2011, <http://blogs.thehindu.com/delhi/?p=15279>. This author read about the successions on at least one other website, but could not re-locate it when completing the footnotes.

IPKF.⁸⁹⁰ In this event, it would be unlikely the LTTE could again deceive India or the GSL regarding its intentions, and it would face destruction, this time under a possible joint Indo–Sri Lankan offensive.

The LTTE’s concerns probably were grounded in reality.⁸⁹¹ Gandhi pressured Shekar “to dismiss the pro-LTTE [Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.] Karunanidhi and impose President’s rule in Tamil Nadu in 1991 . . .”⁸⁹² and Gandhi’s Congress (I) Party’s election manifesto said that the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord would be, in Kaarthykeyan’s words, “the cornerstone of the party’s Sri Lanka policy if voted to power.”⁸⁹³ As Kaarthykeyan, the lead Indian investigator during the assassination, explained:

Nearly a thousand LTTE cadres got killed during the LTTE-IPKF war, and the LTTE was virtually bottled up in the jungles with Prabhakaran on the run. After *Eelam War II* started, no one knew if Premadasa would seek military aid from India, invoking the provisions of the accord he had earlier spurned. Rajiv Gandhi might even go after the LTTE’s global operations for purchase of arms for their war effort. Rajiv Gandhi in power could have put an end to the LTTE’s dreams. Prabhakaran would never allow that to happen. This was the motive for the LTTE to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi.⁸⁹⁴

Anita Pratap interviewed Gandhi less than two weeks before his death and he expressed to her his concerns about the Tigers: “‘Keep this to yourself, the Tigers are sending feelers to me for reconciliation,’ he said. ‘Are you responding to them?’ I asked. ‘You know, the bottom line is, the Tigers are intransigent. I don’t trust them,’ said Rajiv. His instincts were right. Ten days later, he was

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid., 459–60; Rupesinghe, “Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia,” 343; Kaarthykeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 124–5, 132; p. 132 references a cassette recording of Yogaratnam Yogi.

⁸⁹¹ Singer would disagree, as he wrote that the possibility Gandhi would send troops again to Sri Lanka was “so remote as to have been virtually unimaginable.” “Sri Lanka in 1991,” 169.

⁸⁹² Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 460.

⁸⁹³ Kaarthykeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 125.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid., 156.

dead. Assassinated by the Tigers. They feared he would win the election and, if returned to power, would crack down on them.”⁸⁹⁵

While the threat from India was low, LTTE used an SQD to eliminate Gandhi.

Deceptions made possible Gandhi’s killing: The “feelers” Gandhi referenced were part of a deception scheme hatched by Prabhakaran and targeted at killing Gandhi. The LTTE implemented the scheme almost to perfection. If it had not been for one mistake by an actor involved in the operation—the photographer—India might not have solved the mystery behind the LTTE’s complicity as quickly as it did.

In 1990 in Jaffna, the LTTE first developed the plot to assassinate Gandhi following reports that Gandhi might return to power.⁸⁹⁶ Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief, Pottu Omman, came up with the initial plan and Omman’s deputy for the women’s wing, Akila, selected a woman named Dhanu—who had previously trained in an LTTE camp in India—to be the suicide bomber.⁸⁹⁷ They chose a man named Sivarasan to lead the team.⁸⁹⁸ Gunaratna described the series of preparatory events in late 1990 and early 1991:

Two LTTE teams were dispatched to Rameshwaram [India] as refugees. Included in these teams, sent in September 1990, were B. Robert Pias and S. Jayakumara, two LTTE leaders, to prepare for the operation. [According to Swamy, the two teams, unwitting of their role in the plot, rented out safe houses that would later be used for the operatives involved in the assassination.⁸⁹⁹] Two Indian Tamils who were trained by the LTTE in Jaffna returned to Madras in December. Sivarasan, who planned the operation in January and February, left for Jaffna and returned to Madras with gold for

⁸⁹⁵ Pratap, *Island of Blood*, 125.

⁸⁹⁶ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 322–3.

⁸⁹⁷ Gunaratna, *International Dimension*, 7.

⁸⁹⁸ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 156.

⁸⁹⁹ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 222–3.

financing the operation in March 1991. V. Siriharan . . . , an expert in explosives, arrived in February.⁹⁰⁰

The “feelers” Gandhi noted were sent in March 1991 when two LTTE cadres—under direction from Prabhakaran and the LTTE’s representative in London, Kittu—sought meetings with Gandhi under the pretext of patching up old differences. Prabhakaran directed his friend Kasi Anandan, a Madras-based LTTE Central Committee member, to meet with Gandhi and convey Prabhakaran’s best wishes for the elections, and Anandan succeeded in arranging a meeting on March 5. A few days later, a London-based Tamil banker with LTTE ties, Arjuna Sittampalam, met with Gandhi and passed the message that the Tigers were willing to smooth relations with him. Both meetings were intended to gauge Gandhi’s thinking on the elections and probably to try and put him at ease about their intentions. More importantly, the meetings might have been intended to throw investigators off the LTTE’s scent after the assassination by casting doubt on the motive and creating the question in people’s minds: “Why would the LTTE kill a leader it was trying to reforge ties with?”⁹⁰¹

⁹⁰⁰ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 460.

⁹⁰¹ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 226; Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 155; Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 333; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 460–1, citing (460, n. 1; 461, n. 1) *The Tamil Times*, May 15, 1991; Statement by the Chief Investigating Officer, CBI, SIT, SCB, Madras, May 20, 1992. While most accounts allege that the meetings were intended to throw the scent off the LTTE, at least one account suggests that this was only an aftereffect, and that in fact the meeting between Anandan and Gandhi was more benign in intention. As Kaarthikeyan explained:

Sivarasan had told Murugan [another individual involved in the assassination] that Kasi Anandan, the LTTE’s Central Committee member had met Rajiv Gandhi in March 1991, and had sent a report to Prabhakaran. According to this report, it would be in the LTTE’s interests to have good relations with Rajiv Gandhi. Prabhakaran was angry and had said that Kasi Anandan deserved to be thrown out of the organization. Prabhakaran also said that Rajiv Gandhi deserved to die at the hands of a woman. It was a fact that Kasi Anandan had met Rajiv Gandhi on 5 March 1991 and given a favorable report of his meeting to Prabhakaran. This we came to know after we spoke to Kasi Anandan. Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 74–5.

If this was the case, the LTTE's use of envoys was a strategic element of the overall deception. However, over the long term the envoys' actions did not have as strategic an impact as more tactical methods used to infiltrate the operatives and undertake the actual bombing. As will be shown next, any benefit intended from the envoys' actions was short lived, while the tactical measures resulted in Gandhi's death—a permanent strategic blow to India.

On April 28, 1991, all the key players in the operation met in Madhakal, Sri Lanka, and received a briefing from Pottu Omman, in which they were told to obey Sivarasan. Two days later, they took a clandestine boat to Kodiakkarai, India.⁹⁰² In early May, Sivarasan and the women involved, including Dhanu, conducted two dry runs of the operation against V. P. Singh at election rallies. According to one account, Dhanu was able to touch Singh's feet at one of the rallies.⁹⁰³ Gunaratna explained the remainder of preparatory events:

Gandhi's visit to Sriperumbudur was announced on May 19, and the assassination team met at Nalini's [a female Indian supporter] house and finalized the plans on May 20. . . . The next day Dhanu, Subha [a female Tamil Tiger], and Sivarasan offered prayers at a temple near Villivakkam. They were joined by Nalini and Haribabu, the Indian Tamil photographer, who bought a sandalwood garland, which would help the assassin to gain access to the VIP target. Together the five-member team left for Sriperumbudur [on May 21]. . . . By having a scribbling pad in his hand and a cloth shoulder bag at his shoulder, Sivarasan gave the impression that he was a journalist. . . . While waiting to garland Gandhi, Dhanu befriended Latha Kannan, a congress worker, and her daughter Kokila Vani.⁹⁰⁴

⁹⁰² Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 77

⁹⁰³ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 461, possibly citing (n. 5) Minharz Merchant, *Rajiv Gandhi: The End of a Dream* (New Delhi: Viking, 1991); see also Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 228.

⁹⁰⁴ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 461, 464, possibly citing (461, n. 5) Merchant, *Rajiv Gandhi*.

Dhanu was dressed in a *salwar kameez* covering a denim belt that contained the explosive RDX, a half kilogram of .2mm shot, and wires and a double-toggle switch.⁹⁰⁵ Dhanu made her way past security and executed the operation, as described by Kaarthikeyan:

After receiving greetings from his male party workers and admirers, Rajiv Gandhi reached the women's line, where a few women party functionaries greeted him. Kokila, standing next to them with her mother, read out . . . [a] poem. The bespectacled woman in the *salwar kameez* [Dhanu] was just behind Kokila and stepped towards Rajiv Gandhi. As Anusuya [a female security officer] tried to hinder the woman with her hand, Rajiv Gandhi signaled against it and asked her to relax. As Anusuya stepped back slightly, the bespectacled woman [Dhanu] moved and was now in front of Rajiv Gandhi. She placed the sandalwood garland around his neck. She then bent as if to touch Rajiv Gandhi's feet The time was 10:20 p.m. As she bent down, there was a sudden and deafening sound, with fire and smoke rising to about 20 feet at the spot where Rajiv Gandhi stood. As the smoke lifted, there was no sign of any life near where Rajiv Gandhi had been standing.⁹⁰⁶

The LTTE immediately denied involvement in the attack. Kittu and the LTTE spokesman in London, Anton Balasingham, both issued denials, with Balasingham offering condolences, expressing shock, denying that there were any LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu who could have conducted the operation, and saying, "I am certain that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are not connected with this assassination."⁹⁰⁷ The LTTE's previous efforts to build public rapport with

⁹⁰⁵ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 23.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid., 16–7. Hoffman wrote: "Prabhakaran's idea to design a suicide vest that would allow an attacker to approach his or her target without being detected is said to have come from viewing a *Death Wish*-like movie, released for the South Asian film market. In the movie, a beautiful girl apparently presents a bouquet of flowers to the president of the United States. As she offers the bouquet, she kills herself and the president with a bomb concealed beneath her clothing." *Inside Terrorism*, 143, citing (n. 77) interview conducted with former LTTE cadre in Colombo, December 1997.

⁹⁰⁷ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 30; original source not noted.

Gandhi apparently threw off the scent for a time—on May 25, *The Hindu* questioned whether the LTTE would had a motive for killing Gandhi.⁹⁰⁸

If it had not been for one mistake by the operation's photographer, the Indian investigative team might not have been so fortunate in fixing the blame on the LTTE. Kaarthikeyan explained the circumstances:

After *The Hindu* published the first photograph of Haribabu [the photographer], a journalist got in touch with us and expressed his doubts about a *kurta pyjama* clad man [Sivarasan]. The journalist knew Haribabu. He and some colleagues had gone to Sriperumbudur and had run into Haribabu. Haribabu had greeted the journalist at the meeting site and introduced the *kurta pyjama* clad man as a business partner of another mutually known freelance photojournalist. The next day the journalist called the photojournalist, who was supposed to be the *kurta pyjama* clad man's business partner, and inquired about the latter. The photojournalist acknowledged that Haribabu had borrowed his Chinon camera but as to the *kurta pyjama* clad man, he knew nothing. . . . He knew Haribabu was a ward of the Chennai-based Subha Sundaram, who was known to have close links with the LTTE.⁹⁰⁹

In addition, a friend of Haribabu's went to his house looking for a photograph, but all of his belongings had been removed. The friend was directed to Haribabu's sister's house, where he found LTTE literature and other material connecting him to the Tigers, which the friend pouched to the Tamil Nadu police.⁹¹⁰ These clues were the first solid evidence the LTTE was behind the assassination. The investigation proceeded rapidly from that point onward.⁹¹¹

The tactical deceptions that enabled the Gandhi assassination show again that tactical means can result in strategic ends. Ironically, however, Gandhi's

⁹⁰⁸ As noted in Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 30. When the identity of the assassin later became clear, the LTTE also attempted a cover-up to hide her LTTE affiliation, but with little success. See Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 128–30 for details.

⁹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁹¹¹ While a full account of the investigation is too extensive to examine in this dissertation, readers are directed to Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, which is an immensely interesting account of the events.

assassination hardly benefited the LTTE. It staved off his return to power, but because the LTTE's hand was revealed in the operation, they lost a large degree of support in Tamil Nadu and even Sri Lanka. Gunaratna speculated that had the LTTE failed to assassinate Gandhi, it would have had better chances of achieving *Eelam* over the long term.⁹¹²

Deception Analysis

Over the course of a little less than five years, from 1987 to 1991, the LTTE employed deception as a key element of its strategy to retain dominance in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, including in its efforts to avert continued targeting by the GSL, keep enough arms to remain military viable, remove India from Sri Lanka, and assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. This section will analyze the factors involved in creating these deceptions.

Threat environment: The threat to the LTTE has been examined above. Before it reached out to India indicating it was willing to enter an agreement, it was facing an untenable situation and could not allow the actors to think it would continue in intransigence. In the case of the arms deception, the LTTE faced a midlevel threat—it was neither existential because the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord was in place, nor was it benign. The LTTE also negotiated with Colombo under a moderate threat—it originally was existential because if it had not negotiated it would have been destroyed by the IPKF, but at the same time the GSL's overtures ameliorated some of the pressure on the LTTE, especially after it accepted Premadasa's offer. With Gandhi's assassination, the threat was fairly low but the

⁹¹² Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 366.

LTTE perceived it would become high, and the assassination was intended to keep the threat from India from reaching another existential threshold.

Shulsky requirement #1—strategic coherence: As noted above, the LTTE’s strategic plan involved two elements: creating an independent Tamil state and becoming the sole authority within that state. The implicit prerequisite to achieving these goals was survival. Its aim to survive and gain strength vis-à-vis its adversaries drove its deceptions, and in most of its deceptions it practiced strategic coherence. The one exception is the shell game with arms, which failed. After the deception began, the LTTE’s public statements and belligerent actions did not track with its official line that it was disarming, and it quickly became clear to India and Sri Lanka that the group retained its weapons.

Shulsky requirement #2—understand the adversary: Having been trained by India and having interacted with Sri Lanka for decades, and with operatives in Tamil Nadu and an excellent intelligence network in both northeastern Sri Lanka and in Colombo, the LTTE understood its targets far better than they knew it. Prabhakaran almost certainly knew that both parties were driven by a strong desire to see the LTTE disarm, and he used this to the LTTE’s advantage in creating deceptions.

Shulsky requirement #3—organizational infrastructure for deception and security measures: The LTTE’s infrastructure was well known for its tightness and obedience to Prabhakaran. The infrastructure for coordination was fairly simple—Prabhakaran and his top advisers made the decisions and dictated them securely from on high.

The LTTE employed several security measures that protected its operations, including the following:

Vigilance: The LTTE members were loyal and under strict orders not to fraternize with Indian intelligence, and India was unable to penetrate Prabhakaran's decision-making circle.⁹¹³ As Swamy noted, "Prabhakaran never allowed any Indian official to come too close to the LTTE so as to preclude possible infiltration. He also saw to it that none of his colleagues was won over by Indian intelligence."⁹¹⁴ LTTE members were banned from interacting with RAW agents without prior authorization. Prabhakaran employed antibugging devices so visiting Indian officials could not bug his office. LTTE groups would not allow Indian military intelligence to spend the night with them.⁹¹⁵ Sardeshpande summed up the problem well: "Sources in Sri Lanka could not be bought or cultivated by money, wine, sex, or any other conventional means. High levels of education, motivation, conviction and political awareness ensure this."⁹¹⁶

Compartmentalization: LTTE cadres were trained to operate on a need-to-know basis and were "compartmentalized sufficiently enough for denial of area wide information"⁹¹⁷ There are some indicators Prabhakaran at times might have even kept his ultimate intentions a secret from some of his top advisors,

⁹¹³ Marks noted that the LTTE command and control was so strict that cadres would be executed if found acting against LTTE policies, even in matters as personal as their sex lives. "Nothing major . . . [happened]," said Marks, "without it being scripted." Marks interview.

⁹¹⁴ Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 212; see also Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 128; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 219.

⁹¹⁵ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 110, 172.

⁹¹⁶ Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna*, 13; see also p. 12.

⁹¹⁷ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 130; see also Pratap, *Island of Blood*, 98.

particularly his political wing.⁹¹⁸ Balasingham's wife suggested in her book about the LTTE's history that Balasingham was quite convinced that entering the political process was the next step the Tigers would take after negotiating with Premadasa, yet this is not what happened.⁹¹⁹ Hoole et al., in fact, wrote that Prabhakaran's relationship with Balasingham was stormy, and according to Prabhakaran, Balasingham was used "to explain rather than direct the course of armed struggle."⁹²⁰

In the case of the Gandhi assassination, very few even in the LTTE's intelligence group knew what was taking place. Sivarasan also held details closely. The advance parties Sivarasan sent to India did not know that each other existed. The LTTE's Political Group in Chennai was kept totally out of the picture during planning and execution. In the case of Nalini, until Sivarasan was sure he could trust her he told her that the LTTE was greeting all Indian politicians to befriend them. After the assassination, many senior leaders were told that the LTTE was not responsible.⁹²¹

Secure communications: Although the Indians were able to intercept some LTTE communications, the Tigers did practice good communication security.⁹²²

⁹¹⁸ See Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 89. Gunaratna said that, at least with regard to the arms surrender, the political wing bought Prabhakaran time, but that ultimately Prabhakaran was a military man and that for him the two most important sections of the LTTE were the military and intelligence wings. Gunaratna interview.

⁹¹⁹ See Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 205–61. For further discussion on the issue of differences between the two wings, see Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 79, 210 (the latter page is quoted secondarily in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 234, n. 1).

⁹²⁰ Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 183, quoting Prabhakaran; see also Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 163, citing (n. 11) interview with Romesh Bhandari.

⁹²¹ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 141–2, 157; and Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 223.

⁹²² Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna*, 10; see also Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 321. Singh explained how the IPKF successfully monitored some LTTE communications in *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 159–60.

When necessary, instructions from the leadership were encoded and sent via high-frequency communications sets. The LTTE used remote retransmission facilities so that even if a transmission was detected, its ultimate source would be secure.⁹²³

The network of radio operators was closely guarded and outsiders were not allowed to passively listen in. Prabhakaran rarely gave orders himself, and after the Indians began intercepting Tiger communications he was forced to stay away from the radio set and instead send couriers to an operator.⁹²⁴

During the assassination operation, the LTTE operators in Tamil Nadu and the leadership in Sri Lanka communicated using coded messages. Indian intelligence picked up secret communications as early as January 1991 from an unregistered radio station operating on HAM frequencies somewhere near Chennai. The LTTE used alphanumeric codes and jumped frequencies, making it impossible for Indian intelligence to intercept whole messages, let alone decipher them.⁹²⁵

Multiple bases of operation and cover: The LTTE had two secret bases of operation in India, and cover during the operation to murder Gandhi.⁹²⁶ The assassination team was in India under cover as refugees and, in another example, the LTTE bought a coffee grinding shop for one of their Indian operatives to help establish his cover.⁹²⁷

Shulsky requirement #4—channels to reach the adversary: The LTTE's channels were usually direct and strategic. It had representatives who either were

⁹²³ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 45–6, 134.

⁹²⁴ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 203.

⁹²⁵ Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, xii, 40, 55–6. At first only small portions of the communications were deciphered, but success improved with increased efforts at code breaking following the assassination. See *ibid.*, 40.

⁹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 54.

in direct contact with New Delhi and Colombo or knew someone who could get them in contact quickly. For example, the LTTE was able to convey a message to India indicating interest in negotiations.⁹²⁸ After the IPKF entered Sri Lanka, the LTTE had cadres who liaised directly with the Indian military until war resumed—including Prabhakaran, who personally told India that the LTTE was going to finish handing in its weapons soon.⁹²⁹ During the LTTE-GSL talks it had representatives in Colombo, and with the assassination it used Anandan and Sittampalam to engage in direct meetings with Gandhi.⁹³⁰ As Bhaduri and Karim noted, “Unlike the overt picture of complete intransigence, the LTTE higher leadership did keep channels open to all sides: Colombo, Madras and New Delhi. They played upon one fatal weakness that was publicly discernible: the pulling of a diplomatic coup by one side. They constantly tantalized to deceive.”⁹³¹

With regard to control of information channels, the LTTE to a large degree held the advantage vis-à-vis its adversaries because its security was so good and methods so effective. Had India been able to decode LTTE messages sooner, Gandhi might not have been assassinated because the messages made clear what the LTTE intended.⁹³² India and Sri Lanka were unable to penetrate Prabhakaran’s decision-making circle. Because decisions were so highly compartmentalized, in most of the deceptions discussed above, the LTTE’s adversaries were generally at the mercy of what the LTTE was telling them.

⁹²⁸ Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 118; see also Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 155.

⁹²⁹ See Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 172.

⁹³⁰ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 303; Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 226; and Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 155.

⁹³¹ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 128.

⁹³² See Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 227; and Kaarthikeyan and Raju, *Triumph of Truth*, 40.

The one probable exception regarded the arms deception. As noted above, the press was reporting that the LTTE was cheating on its agreement, and Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh had enough information about the LTTE's activities to make him question Prabhakaran about whether the LTTE was really surrendering its arms.⁹³³

Shulsky requirement #5—feedback: The LTTE did not have strong bureaucratic structures dedicated to receiving feedback, but it did appear to have some capabilities. It clearly received feedback on the progress of its operations.⁹³⁴ Prabhakaran and his cadres kept informed of events:

Like a head of state, Prabhakaran met his commanders daily to review strategy and planning. He closely monitored the situation in the territory he controlled besides getting reports about the rest of Sri Lanka and neighboring India It was compulsory—as it has been for years—for LTTE cadres to listen to the BBC Tamil Service and Radio Veritas, a Catholic radio station in the Philippines, to learn how their Tamil struggle was rated in the world. Prabhakaran got daily briefings on international developments. A group regularly translated books and publications that the LTTE chief could not read in the original language.⁹³⁵

Prabhakaran was able to get firsthand feedback from his actions when deciding to enter the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord. He clearly understood that unless he entered an agreement, war would continue. His feedback was immediate once he did agree—Sri Lanka changed its posture and stopped targeting the LTTE. In this case, the LTTE's immediate receipt of information that its deception was working would probably be considered passive feedback. The endgame theory proposes that to successfully engage in BTD, sometimes feedback capabilities

⁹³³ “Accord to Discord”; and Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 66.

⁹³⁴ Tom Marks noted that the LTTE had an intelligence chief, ran agent nets, and had people who analyzed what the enemy was doing. Marks interview.

⁹³⁵ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 216–7.

that go beyond passive feedback are necessary, but that is not the case in this example.

With the arms deception, because Prabhakaran and his cadres were in direct contact with Indian officials, Prabhakaran was able to directly make decisions based on what that interaction entailed. For example, when it became clear that the LTTE's first offering of weapons was not enough to appease the IPKF, India threatened to resume hostilities. The LTTE thereby provided another consignment of weapons.⁹³⁶

The LTTE appears to have failed, however, in effectively using the feedback to continue the shell game with arms because within only a couple months after the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord's signing, India initiated hostilities against the LTTE. If it had effectively used the feedback it no doubt received, the LTTE would have known that its public statements and actions were too belligerent and it needed to do more to string India along. There is no evidence that Prabhakaran wanted hostilities to start at that point rather than at a later time, so this deception probably failed in part because the LTTE did not make good use of feedback.

With the deception against Premadasa, Prabhakaran's negotiating team could pass messages to him,⁹³⁷ and in this case the LTTE monitored the discussions and resumed hostilities at the time of its choosing. Prabhakaran presumably could have continued stringing Colombo along had he chosen to, so in this example the LTTE used the feedback from the negotiations successfully.

⁹³⁶ Gunaratna, *War and Peace in Sri Lanka*, 11; Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 219.

⁹³⁷ See Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 303; and Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*, 243-4.

The assassination operation was much simpler—as long as Sivarasan and his team were not apprehended, the deception was working. Since this operation was an SQD, the group could theoretically rely on passive feedback.

Counterdeception capabilities of the adversaries: The most essential element of counterdeception for India and the GSL was having sufficient intelligence to know that their adversary was attempting to deceive. Without knowledge that the deceptions were taking place, India and Sri Lanka could do nothing to stop them. In the case of India, with the exception of the arms deception, its intelligence apparatus generally failed at understanding Sri Lankan capabilities and intentions. Added to this, Gandhi fell to a clear self-deception in thinking the LTTE would hold up its end of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, and this further blunted the effects of India’s counterdeception capabilities. With the GSL, Premadasa was warned about the LTTE’s bluff, but he created his own blinders by falling to a self-deception that he could disarm the Tigers.⁹³⁸ As Premadasa’s representative to the LTTE, Hameed, noted to Gunaratna, “We were convinced in our own mind that the talks would succeed.”⁹³⁹

The IPKF was poorly prepared to collect against the LTTE. It had trained LTTE cadres but had neglected to take their photographs or keep files on them. As Depinder Singh lamented, “Considering the fact that our intelligence agencies had equipped the LTTE and given the latter’s dependence upon support from Tamil Nadu, there was an inexcusable failure of intelligence. We should have

⁹³⁸ Ranasinghe Premadasa, letter dated July 4, 1989 to Rajiv Gandhi, in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 301; also in Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 379; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 284.

⁹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 293–4.

been capable of infiltrating their ranks and divining, in time, at least what their intentions were if not influencing their decisions.”⁹⁴⁰ Even more strategically, Kadian reported that India largely ignored Sri Lanka from an intelligence perspective until just before it became involved militarily. While it compiled intelligence dossiers on other nearby island states such as Mauritius and Seychelles, it was not until after 1985 that it compiled one on Sri Lanka.⁹⁴¹

The IPKF had not maximized on learning about the LTTE when it had a chance, but the LTTE did not make the same mistake. The LTTE failed to gain major penetrations in Indian decision-making circles, but because the LTTE had been trained by India, it “knew the standard psychology, the combat strategies and the weaponry of the Indian soldier”⁹⁴²

India fell to the mistake of relying on the Tamil groups as a single source of intelligence. IPKF officers accused RAW of relying on friendly Tamil groups for information because its officers were unwilling to go out alone. India’s inability to penetrate the decision-making circles of the LTTE and its use of poor sources, including journalists, to get the information it did receive forced India to rely on the LTTE and other Tamil groups for information.⁹⁴³ In one example, in the case of the arms surrender there was no way for the IPKF to verify whether the LTTE intended to give up its arsenal. RAW had no data on the number or quality of arms acquired from non-Indian sources.⁹⁴⁴ As Bhaduri and Karim iterated: “How

⁹⁴⁰ Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 176.

⁹⁴¹ Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 110.

⁹⁴² Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 237.

⁹⁴³ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 110; Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 108, and Hoole et al., *The Broken Palmyra*, 346.

⁹⁴⁴ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 61; see also 54; Kadian, *India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 109.

is anybody to know that the disarming [and] surrendering process is complete, if arms source(s) remain unknown?”⁹⁴⁵ If it had not been for reporting that the group was not surrendering arms, the IPKF might have been blind to the deception.

The IPKF’s failure of intelligence collection resulted in a failure of analysis. One officer recalled regarding the beginning of the war: “The general feeling we had, courtesy of RAW, was that the LTTE’s morale was low and that it did not have the capacity to fight us (IPKF).”⁹⁴⁶ Tom Marks noted that RAW had “a totally flawed intelligence process that . . . [produced] estimates that . . . [were] fantasy.” IPKF soldiers were told they were going to manage simple things like feuds among chicken robbers, Marks said, and that they were going to separate squabbling farmers. Instead, they walked into a major war.⁹⁴⁷ Indian army intelligence also failed analytically, as the LTTE noted in a publication: “Indian army intelligence miscalculated the LTTE’s strength, firepower and its fierce determination to resist.”⁹⁴⁸

In fairness to India, its military intelligence did eventually become more effective at collecting tactical information about the LTTE. As Sardeshpande noted: “As the first step towards improving our intelligence acquisition, we started Tamil classes of three months duration for selected men from units as a high priority item, without waiting for Overall Force. . . . Large-scale use of radio communications by the LTTE enabled us to listen in to their conversations,

⁹⁴⁵ Bhaduri, Karim, and Thomas, *The Sri Lankan Crisis*, 31.

⁹⁴⁶ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 110.

⁹⁴⁷ Marks interview.

⁹⁴⁸ Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Political Wing), *You Too India* (Madras: Publisher not noted, 1988), quoted in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 246, n. 1.

identify their voice signatures, radio nets, purpose and general locations and areas of activity. That gave use a fairly good assessment of the militants' strength, areas of operations, types of activity, leaders in terms of who-is-who and who-does what."⁹⁴⁹

Unfortunately for the IPKF, these successes were insufficient to detect or counter the LTTE's deception. Altogether, Sardeshpande wrote that the Indian intelligence failure in Sri Lanka was fivefold: organizational, preparational, integrational, operational, and technological.⁹⁵⁰

Ironically, RAW did get one assessment correct that went unheeded—it warned Premadasa that peace talks with the LTTE would only last a short period. In April 1989, it assessed that the LTTE was only looking for an opportunity to regain its strength. Premadasa disregarded the warning, however, hoping that the LTTE really did want peace.⁹⁵¹ "I'm confident," said Premadasa, "that I will be able to ensure that the LTTE will give up their arms after the Indian Armed Forces have withdrawn."⁹⁵² Within this self-deception of Premadasa's lay the counterdeception failure of the GSL.

In the case of the Gandhi assassination, India had indicators something was afoot from intercepted radio communications but it did not take sufficient action to break them before Gandhi's death, as Swamy explained:

In March and April, the Intelligence Bureau's Madras office pressed its New Delhi headquarters to quickly break the LTTE code. "The [LTTE] Int

⁹⁴⁹ Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna*, 10; see also Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 321. See also Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 159–60.

⁹⁵⁰ Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna*, 13–4.

⁹⁵¹ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 284.

⁹⁵² Premadasa, letter dated July 4, 1989 to Gandhi, in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 301; also in Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 379.

[intelligence] group are killers,” warned one Bureau appeal to New Delhi. But no one paid heed. One of the LTTE messages, decoded *after* Gandhi was killed, was a revealing one-liner from the daring Sivarasan to his boss Pottu Amman: “Nobody [in India] knows about our operation.” Another very explicit message, intercepted on May 7 but again deciphered after Gandhi perished, was a vow by Sivarasan: “If I return to Jaffna, it will be as Pottu Amman’s man, having achieved the incredible feat of assassinating a world leader!”⁹⁵³

Within Tamil Nadu, Indian intelligence knew who all of the LTTE cadres were; if Sivarasan had employed the existing network, he might have been found out. He relied instead on a network he created himself, and sent an advance party to secure hideouts for him.⁹⁵⁴ India again became the victim of its own intelligence failure—because it did not have sources close to Prabhakaran, it could not find out about the plotting for Gandhi’s death.

Assessing the deceptions within the BT-D-SQD framework: The endgame theory of deception posits that the aforementioned factors determine what kind of deception an actor will use against a target. The first deception—the LTTE pretending to accept the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord—was a BT-D, and the endgame theory would expect as much since the group was under severe or existential threat. The theory proposes that the BT-D was possible since the LTTE fulfilled all five of Shulsky’s requirements and counterdeception was low. In this case, the LTTE put out feelers about a possible reconciliation and entered the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, thereby changing Sri Lanka’s behavior from offensive to neutral and India’s behavior from concerned to more friendly. The LTTE no longer was under threat of destruction once the accord was signed.

⁹⁵³ Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind*, 227 (bracketed text is in parentheses in original).

⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 224.

Table 7: The LTTE's Accord Deception Assessed Against the Endgame Theory's Variables						
Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./Sec.?	Channels?	Receive/ Analyze Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
high	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	weak

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>both possible</i>	<i>BTD most likely</i>

With the next deception, the endgame theory would predict that, presuming it had the capabilities to conduct either type, the LTTE could have chosen an SQD or another BTM since the threat level it faced after it signed the accord was moderate—neither low nor severe. In this case, it opted for an SQD—the shell game with arms. It was able to begin the deception because it sufficiently satisfied Shulsky’s requirements and Indian counterdeception was fairly weak. With the accord in place, the arms deception was not intended to change the strategic behavior of either the IPKF or the LTTE. It simply was intended to buy the LTTE time to replenish its strength and gain materiel until it again could fight to achieve *Eelam*.

The deception failed in duration, however, because the LTTE’s public statements and belligerent activities did not match its stated policy to disarm and there was sufficient information in public and intelligence channels for India to become suspicious that it was cheating on its commitment.⁹⁵⁵ This information was the only notable element contributing to India’s counterdeception capabilities. The case shows the importance of using feedback, because even

⁹⁵⁵ “Accord to Discord”; Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, 76–7; Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*, 252, 259–60; Pirabakaran, “Call to Other Tamil Liberation Groups.”

though the LTTE had the capability to receive feedback about whether its adversaries believed it had given up its weapons, it maintained the deception poorly, being too open about its unwillingness to disarm and too belligerent toward its adversaries. Because of this, the deception most likely fell apart before Prabhakaran would have wanted it to.

Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./ Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
moderate	flawed once deception began	yes	yes	yes, but did not control all	yes, but did not use feedback effectively	generally weak except for info. that LTTE was cheating

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>both possible</i>	<i>roughly equal likelihood</i>

The deception against Premadasa is interesting because the threat environment and LTTE capabilities developed in such a way that the endgame theory would predict the LTTE should again have turned to BTM. In this case, however, Premadasa's actions in offering an olive leaf preempted this and once again lessened the level of threat for the LTTE to a moderate level. In addition, while Indian counterdeception was strong in this case—RAW even warned Premadasa about entering negotiations—the GSL's counterdeception was neutralized by Premadasa's self-deception.⁹⁵⁶

⁹⁵⁶ Premadasa, letter dated July 4, 1989 to Gandhi, in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 301; also in Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 379; and Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 284.

The theory would predict that with the lower but still moderate threat, the LTTE again could go either way with the deception used. In this case, it chose an SQD that tracked with the GSL’s new policy of rapprochement, keeping the negotiations on track long enough to rearm. This is a good case of an SQD that involved much more than denial strategies. The LTTE was forced to take active measures, possibly to include its creation of a political party, to keep the GSL on the status quo course. This case also shows the utility of the endgame theory in predicting events—if Premadasa had not reached out to the LTTE first, it would have predicted that the LTTE might attempt a BTD to reverse the IPKF’s brutal targeting against it.

Table 9: The LTTE’s Deception Working with the GSL Assessed Against the Endgame Theory’s Variables						
Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra. for Dec./ Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
moderate	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	weak

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>both possible</i>	<i>roughly equal likelihood</i>

The Gandhi operation is a clear example of an SQD. The threat level from India to the LTTE was low at the time of the operation and the group assassinated Gandhi to keep that threat level from rising. The group fulfilled Shulsky’s conditions, and Indian counterdeception capabilities were actually stronger during this period than others, but still were insufficient to recognize what was occurring.

Table 10: The LTTE's Deception in the Gandhi Assassination Operation Assessed Against the Endgame Theory's Variables						
Threat	Strategic Coherence?	Understand Target?	Infra for Dec./Sec.?	Channels?	Receive Feedback?	Target Counter-deception
low	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes, passive	weak to moderate

<i>BTD/SQD Possible?</i>	<i>BTD/SQD Likely?</i>
<i>both possible</i>	<i>SQD most likely</i>

Conclusions

In many ways, it is . . . “strategic thought” encompassing ingredients from remorseless deception to ruthlessness which . . . made the LTTE survive. . . . Even in the LTTE’s war with the Indians, it was this strategy and not their strength which wore down the IPKF militarily, psychologically and morally. This in turn led to the wearing down of India and Sri Lanka politically, economically and diplomatically. Finally, the LTTE succeeded.

—Rohan Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*⁹⁵⁷

The driving factor behind LTTE operations during the 1987–1991 time period was Prabhakaran’s single-minded goal to create and rule an independent Tamil state. Viewed through this prism, it is clear that each time it entered negotiations or showed other concessions to India and Sri Lanka it did so with this ultimate goal in mind and had no intention to settle for less than *Eelam*. It entered the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord in part to stop GSL targeting; it tried to hide its arms until it could regain its strength; it negotiated with Premadasa to get India out; and it killed Rajiv Gandhi to ensure India would not return. All four of these actions involved deception.

This case highlights several aspects of the endgame theory. Two especially involve the deception to negotiate with Premadasa in order to get India out: First,

⁹⁵⁷ Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 412.

SQD can involve active measures, and an example might be the LTTE starting a political party. And second, as with the other cases in this study, the self-deception that Premadasa fell to before the LTTE reinitiated hostilities shows that a high level of self-deception only weakens one's ability to effectively engage in counterdeception.

A third takeaway from this case is that in situations of moderate threat, wherein the endgame theory predicts that the likelihood of SQD and BTD might be roughly equal, in many instances an NSAG may still prefer SQD. This study provides a small-*n*, statistically insignificant sample of data, but in the two instances in which the LTTE faced a moderate threat, it chose an SQD. This may be because, as noted in earlier chapters, SQD is theoretically easier to undertake. This thesis therefore posits that SQD is the preferred type of deception for NSAGs in most cases except when the threat from the target is extremely high.

Following the failure in 2006 of several years of peace talks brokered by Norway, the GSL reinitiated intense targeting of the Tigers, slowly regaining territory. In May 2009, Sri Lankan military forces took the last of the LTTE-held territory in northeast Sri Lanka and killed Prabhakaran, ending the LTTE.⁹⁵⁸ Before its destruction, threat conditions were ripe for it to attempt another BTD, but by that time the GSL had been so frequently deceived that its counterdeception measures were probably strong. The LTTE's own capabilities

⁹⁵⁸ Jay Shankar, "Prabhakaran's 'Unforgiving Ruthlessness' Undercut Tamil Cause," *Bloomberg News*, May 18, 2009, accessed June 3, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNWLx8SjRXgg&refer=home>. See also M. R. Narayan Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2010).

were degraded as it came under increasingly heavy pressure, and it no doubt got to a point that it could no longer effectively engage in deception.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation began by asking the question: What *factors* affect *whether* NSAGs employ deception and *what kind* of deception strategy they target against an adversary? To answer this question, the study presented the endgame theory, which proposes that given an NSAG's aim to use deception, then Shulsky's five conditions, the target's counterdeception capabilities, and the level of threat the NSAG is facing affect whether it can engage in deception and what type of deception—status quo or behaviorally targeted—it will prefer.⁹⁵⁹

Cases Assessed Against Theory

The study examined al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the LTTE's use of deception in the context of this theory. The al Qaeda case looked at al Qaeda's use of status quo deception (SQD)—in particular its employment of travel deceptions associated with manipulated documentation and the use of cover—to get its operatives in place to conduct the 9/11 attacks. It found that most of the deceptions were tactical in nature, but it argued that the overall deception operation could be considered strategic, considering what the group accomplished.

⁹⁵⁹ For Shulsky's requirements, see Abram Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," in *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 29–32.

The second case consisted of two subcases examining Hezbollah's use of deception in the 2006 war with Israel. The first subcase showed an SQD in which Hezbollah used denial and deception to create a series of bunkers and rocket firing positions very close to the border with Israel without getting caught. The bunkers and positions played a strategic role in the war because they hid short-range rockets; Israel was not prepared for the strategic impact the short-range rockets had during the war. The second subcase was a possible behaviorally targeted deception (BTD) in which Hezbollah attempted to hide the true number of its casualties, potentially to influence Israeli decision making about whether to continue fighting.⁹⁶⁰ This deception only succeeded in part; parts of the international press and community accepted Hezbollah's casualty statistics, but Israel did not because of strong Israeli counterdeception measures.

The final case detailed four subcases of deception that the LTTE used against India and Sri Lanka in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the first subcase, a BTD, Sri Lankan armed forces posed an existential threat to the LTTE, so it deceptively offered to engage in negotiations that led to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the introduction of Indian peacekeepers. The remaining subcases were all SQDs. The second subcase looked at the LTTE's deceptions to hide and continue stockpiling weapons even as it ostensibly engaged in disarmament. This deception probably did not continue as long as the LTTE's leadership would have wanted because the group showed poor coherence between its official position and public statements, and it became overly belligerent toward its adversaries,

⁹⁶⁰ This assessment calls it a "possible" BTD because there is insufficient information about Hezbollah's internal decision making to determine if it was specifically intended to change Israeli behavior or was just part of a denial effort.

leading to a resumption of hostilities. The third subcase showed how the LTTE employed deception to partner with the Sri Lankan government in order to get Indian troops out of Sri Lanka and to restock its weapons supply, and was a good example of a deception that succeeded in large part thanks to the adversary's self-deception. The final subcase showed how the group used mostly tactical deceptions to make possible the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

The endgame theory was broken into two subtheories because there are two dependent variables studied (possibility of deception's use and likelihood the NSAG would prefer either BTM or SQD) and two independent variables studied (fulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and level of threat from the target). The first subtheory proposed that given a permissive counterdeception environment, an NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's requirements makes it able to manipulate its

Shulsky's Requirements:

- (1) strategic coherence
- (2) understanding the adversary
- (3) organizational infrastructure for deception and security measures
- (4) channels to reach the adversary
- (5) feedback

target's perception of reality and thereby engage in strategic BTM/SQD. The related hypothesis stated that there is a positive

relationship between an NSAG's fulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and its ability to undertake a strategic BTM or SQD, taking into account that SQD does not require as strong of channeling and feedback capabilities as would often be necessary for BTM, and also controlling for the target's counterdeception capabilities.

In testing, this study expected that if Shulsky's five elements are all necessary for the use of BTM or SQD, we would see the employment of these types of

deception by NSAGs only if they had all five elements. Additionally, if a target's counterdeception capabilities played a role in limiting whether NSAGs can engage in BTD or SQD, we would see restrictions on their use in cases when an NSAG was an adversary with a target that used highly sophisticated counterdeception.

The cases support the proposition that Shulsky's factors are necessary for both BTD and SQD and that the NSAGs' capabilities can be less robust to succeed at SQD. The groups satisfied all five of Shulsky's conditions to greater or lesser degrees at least at the beginning of the cases studied. In all of the cases the groups had strategic coherence, knew the enemy well enough to deceive, and had some sort of organization that helped plan the deceptions and taught the operatives security. The LTTE arms deception most likely failed because the LTTE's strategic coherence broke down over the course of the deception. The Hezbollah casualty ruse was eventually revealed because of its weak infrastructure for coordinating the deception, although the deception's failure against Israel was because of Israeli counterdeception, not poor coordination.⁹⁶¹

The groups also maintained channels to feed false information and feedback mechanisms, but the strength of the capabilities differed across the cases. In the al Qaeda case, an SQD, the group's channels to feed false information to the United States were few and tactical, and primarily comprised feeding information to the travel and immigration systems that the group deceived. The groups relied

⁹⁶¹ See Steven Stotsky, "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon," *Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA)*, September 7, 2006, accessed July 11, 2011, http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=2&x_outlet=8&x_article=1195.

on passive feedback in multiple cases of SQD, supporting the hypothesis that to engage in SQD the NSAG needed neither multiple, complex channels to feed false information, nor sophisticated feedback mechanisms. The LTTE arms deception, an SQD, shows the importance of both elements. India had channels of information outside of what the LTTE controlled that indicated the group was cheating on its commitments, and the LTTE did a poor job of acting on feedback. The LTTE received feedback about its shell game with arms, but it took too few actions to string its adversaries along with the deception.

With regard to the theoretical proposition that BTD often requires more complex channeling and feedback capabilities than does SQD, the Hezbollah casualty ruse did not include particularly special channels—it used its media apparatus, and this would have been enough to get the message to Israeli decision makers. The group possibly had an ability to monitor feedback in press reporting, which would be considered more advanced than if it could only watch Israeli actions to tell if the deception was working.⁹⁶² The LTTE, conversely, had access to robust channels to feed false information—including access to its adversaries' leadership—but in its deception to enter the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, the group largely relied on passive feedback. This shows that, as the theory predicted, passive feedback sometimes suffices for BTDs.

⁹⁶² See Judith Palmer Harik, *The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.C. Taurus, 2004), 161, citing (n. 14) an interview with Hassan Ezzeddin, Director of Hezbollah's media department, November 20, 2001, Haret Hareik, Beirut, Lebanon.

The proposition that BTDs often require more complex channeling and feedback mechanisms, then, is supported, but not strikingly so. A larger-*n* study would be necessary to look for patterns among multiple cases of BTB.

In sum, the hypothesis that the five elements are necessary to engage in deception is not flunked, and while the failed LTTE deception supports the notion that a lack of the variables would make it impossible for a group to conduct deception, additional research looking at groups struggling with a greater lack of capabilities is probably still needed.

With regard to the role of counterdeception, in all of the cases wherein a group succeeded at deception—BTB or SQD—its target suffered with weak to at best moderate counterdeception capabilities. Hezbollah's casualty ruse, a possible BTB, succeeded in convincing parts of the international press and community, which had weak counterdeception, but did not prevail against Israel, which practiced strong counterdeception. With the failed LTTE arms deception, India practiced generally weak counterdeception, but did receive enough information to become suspicious about the LTTE's activities, so in this sense counterdeception played a role in that deception's failure.

The cases also indicate that self-deception and bias are factors that can be considered when looking at the counterdeception environment. The less self-deceived the target, the better counterdeception it is likely to practice. Alternatively, the more self-deceived is the deceiver with regard to the target's capabilities, the less likely it is to succeed at deception. For example, the LTTE's actions that were made to suggest that it was willing to work with the government

of Sri Lanka to get India to leave the island largely succeeded because the Sri Lankan prime minister was self-deceived that the Tigers were genuine. Both the United States and Israel fell to self-deceptions regarding al Qaeda and Hezbollah's capabilities as well. The United States in particular did not consider the possibility of a homeland attack, and Israel discounted the threat posed by Hezbollah's short-range rockets and took insufficient measures to search for bunkers that hid them.

The cases support the notions that deception is possible in cases of weak counterdeception and that strong target counterdeception hampers an NSAG's ability to use deception. Nevertheless, additional research would be well served to test the hypothesis in cases wherein the counterdeception environment was so strong that it prevented NSAGs from attempting deception at all.

The second subtheory proposed that conditions of high threat cause increased chance of destruction and thereby raise incentives for the deceiver to create a deception plan involving BTM so it can change its adversary's behavior. Conversely, when chance of harm is low, the likelihood increases that the NSAG will create a plan involving SQD to keep its target on a status quo course until it can achieve its desired strategic end. The reason for this is that SQD requires simpler capabilities, to include types of channels to feed false information as well as feedback mechanisms, and it is easier for a deceiver to maintain a target's incorrect perceptions of reality—SQD—than it is to make a target change its

mind—BTD.⁹⁶³ Because NSAGs have limited resources, they will choose the simpler deception type except in cases when BTD is absolutely necessary.⁹⁶⁴

The related hypothesis stated that there is a positive relationship between intensity of the threat that the target presents to the deceiver and chance of BTD use and an inverse relationship between intensity of threat and chance of SQD use.

In testing, the study expected to find groups using one type of deception—BTD or SQD—more than the other when the threat was measured at significant (high or low) levels of intensity. Specifically, it expected that there would be more BTD use when threat was high and more SQD use when threat was low. In cases when threat was moderate, it expected to see either type used if capabilities allowed.

In every case studied in which an NSAG faced or perceived itself as facing a low threat from its adversary, it employed SQD. In the cases in which NSAGs used or attempted BTD—the LTTE's ruse feigning complicity with the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and possibly Hezbollah's casualty deception near the end of the Second Lebanon War—the group faced (LTTE) or probably perceived itself as facing (Hezbollah) an existential threat. In none of the cases did the NSAGs face a high threat and choose to use SQD, or a low threat and choose BTD. The endgame theory's hypothesis about threat, then, was supported, suggesting that

⁹⁶³ See Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 298, accessed August 10, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600359>.

⁹⁶⁴ See J. Bowyer Bell, "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors," in Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 129–30, 139–40, 160–1.

threat from a target faced by a deceiver affects whether the target chooses BTD or SQD.

In the two cases wherein the group faced a moderate threat, it turned to SQD. Two cases are not enough to develop a statistically significant correlation, but they suggest that despite the theoretical notion that either type of deception could be preferable in cases of moderate threat, NSAGs might instead prefer SQD except when threat is extremely high. This could probably be explained because SQD is easier to employ.

The caveat proposed in the theory section that possibility of use could affect likelihood did not play out in the cases studied. The caveat stated that if BTD is the most likely type but is not possible for the deceiver, the NSAG might instead turn to SQD if it is possible. The cases only examined instances in which the most likely type of deception was used or in which the likelihood of one type or the other was assessed as roughly equal.

Secondary Research Questions

The case studies also help answer five secondary questions proposed in the theory chapter. The first asked whether NSAGs employ tactical deceptions that result in strategic surprise or other strategic ends. The cases demonstrate that they definitely do, suggesting that it perhaps is time to reconsider classical definitions of *strategic*—which usually have focused on the deceptions' targets and planners—and consider the intent and impact of the operation as being a better

indicator of whether something is strategic than the targets of the incorrect information.⁹⁶⁵

The al Qaeda case is the best example of an NSAG using fairly tactical methods to engage in what became a strategic SQD; al Qaeda's deception allowed the group to undertake the 9/11 attacks. The LTTE's use of several tactical measures to undertake the Gandhi assassination provides a similar example. In these cases, the deceptions themselves were not the strategic event—9/11 and the Gandhi bombing were—but they did enable these events.

The vignettes looking at deception in al Qaeda and Hezbollah finance operations also show the opposite—that groups employ complex deceptive methods that do not reach a strategic threshold. In these cases, the groups engaged in what this study calls operational deception—ruses meant to help the group maintain day-to-day operations that were not intended to change a target's behavior or to keep it on a status quo course until a particular end could be achieved.

The second secondary question addressed whether NSAGs engage primarily in BTD or SQD, asking also why they might prefer one type of deception to another. A large-*n* study would most effectively answer this question, but from the cases presented here, it appears that NSAGs generally prefer SQD, as noted above. In all cases wherein threat was low or moderate, the NSAGs used SQD. As explained earlier, NSAGs probably prefer SQD because unless BTD is necessary, it is the easier type to employ.

⁹⁶⁵ For a discussion of the traditional definition, see Chapter 2.

The third question asked what distinguishes NSAGs that engage in BTM from those that use SQD. In this study's cases, there was not a significant difference in the capabilities (Shulsky's factors) between the groups that used BTM vice SQD; indeed, in both cases in which a group attempted BTM (the LTTE's entry into the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and possibly Hezbollah's casualty ruse), the same groups also engaged in SQD. The theory states that BTM sometimes requires more complex feedback and channeling capabilities. The information in the cases supported this notion, but not in a compelling manner.

The fourth question sought to address whether NSAGs can use BTM or SQD that targets the highest levels of a state's government. The LTTE case in particular demonstrated that NSAGs can use both BTM and SQD that target the highest levels of a state's government. The leadership of the LTTE deceived the prime ministers of both Sri Lanka and India into believing that it was genuine about supporting a cessation of hostilities and disarmament. Its leadership for a short time deceived the Indian military into believing that it was in the process of giving up its weapons. It deceptively engaged directly with the Sri Lankan government to take measures that forced India from the island, and low-level LTTE cadres used deception as part of an assassination operation that ended the life of a prominent and probably soon-to-be reelected Indian politician, Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE targeted the highest levels of its targets' governments with both SQD and BTM.

The final question asked what factors keep an NSAG from using deception of either type. The theory posits that a lack of intent to use deception (the assumed

factor in the thesis), a nonfulfillment of Shulsky's requirements, and a counterdeception environment that is so nonpermissive as to make deception impossible would keep an NSAG from using deception of either type. As noted previously, the cases certainly support these notions, but a weakness of this study is that it focuses on cases in which deception was possible or at least possible enough to attempt. Future research would do well to continue testing the propositions that not fulfilling Shulsky's requirements and the existence of very strong target counterdeception environment make BTM or SQD impossible entirely.⁹⁶⁶

Avenues for Future Research

Much research remains to refine and continue testing the endgame theory. The first step for future studies would be to test the theory against cases in which an NSAG would have had strong reason to employ deception or even chose to but did not do so. This type of study would allow the researcher to continue testing the assertions that fulfillment of Shulsky's requirements and the target's strength at counterdeception affect a deceiver's ability to engage in deception, and would be particularly useful for the endgame theory if the inability to use deception correlates with a nonfulfillment of Shulsky's conditions and/or an extremely strong counterdeception environment.

⁹⁶⁶ Hezbollah's failure to succeed at the casualty ruse—in which counterdeception was strong—supports the proposition about counterdeception. Nevertheless, even though Hezbollah failed at deceiving Israel's government with the casualty ruse, the counterdeception was not so perfect that the deception was impossible to undertake altogether.

Because the cases studied herein primarily showed examples of SQD, future research would be well served to look in more detail at BTDs in order to tease out additional insights about the differences between the deception types. In corollary with this, future research also would benefit from finding cases in which an NSAG would have had cause to use BTB but instead employed SQD. Doing so would allow the researcher to determine the degree to which other factors besides threat might affect NSAGs' decisions to use one type of deception or the other.

Another avenue of study would be to test the endgame theory in cases of deception employed by states against states. There is recorded information dating back millennia regarding state use of deception, providing multiple cases that the variables could be tested against.

A quantitative study would be useful in testing the endgame theory because it would present the opportunity to test the variables against a large-*n* dataset.⁹⁶⁷ Creating a well-structured quantitative study would be most effective if the researcher included state-to-state deception, because the amount of material to draw from would be much larger.

Finally, additional examination of what this thesis has called operational deception might be worthwhile. These deceptions do not fall within the paradigm of strategic BTB/SQD because they are not intended to achieve specific strategic ends against a target, yet they at times are complex and vitally important for the day-to-day functioning of the NSAG. The examples used in this study are the

⁹⁶⁷ Quantitative studies have been undertaken in the context of state-to-state deception, but not to test the endgame theory. See, for example, Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception in Surprise and War* (Boston: Artech House, 2007); and Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whaley, "Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases," in *Strategic Military Deception*, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982): 177–94.

deceptions that al Qaeda and Hezbollah used in finance operations. Some future variation of the endgame theory might develop a third model that incorporates complex deceptions that are vital for the deceiver but not part of a plan to change an adversary's behavior.

Final Comments

This study was in part structured to expand on Bell's statement that when NSAGs engage in strategic deception, it is because "the times are right or more often the assets are in place."⁹⁶⁸ This thesis proposes more concrete, testable variables that affect an NSAG's use of strategic deception than times being right and assets being in place. It also emphasizes that even if NSAGs employ primarily tactical methods, their ruses can still be ranked with classical strategic deceptions as that term has been understood historically if they result in obtaining specific strategic ends.⁹⁶⁹

Bell stated: "Denial makes everything possible, and on occasion tactical deception makes the spectacular possible for the revolutionary."⁹⁷⁰ With the concept of SQD, this study fleshes out this assertion and provides a framework under which tactical methods, regardless of whether they fall into the traditional notions of denial or deception, can achieve strategic ends. It shows that deception is not solely used to force a target to change a course of action because that target had been duped (BTD), although NSAGs can do that too. Instead, under the SQD model, deception can be used as an offensive measure to keep the target on a

⁹⁶⁸ Bell, "Nonstate and Illicit Actors," 129–31, 139.

⁹⁶⁹ See *Ibid.*, 141.

⁹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.

course beneficial to the deceiver until the deceiver can carry out a specified strategic end.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new framework was needed for understanding deception in the context of asymmetric warfare. Rigid concepts of tactical, operational, and strategic were no longer sufficient to explain the actions of nonstate adversaries who do not think in those terms. This study was intended to fill this gap, and hopefully it has improved the scholarly and professional knowledge base surrounding the use of stratagem in asymmetry.

APPENDIX 1

CASE STUDIES AND OTHER WORKS ON DECEPTION⁹⁷¹

(See the sources cited section for full citations.)

The Art of War (Niccolo Machiavelli)

Discusses examples of how deception can be used in war.

The Art of War (Sun Tzu)

Underscores deception as an element of strategy and shows how a commander should employ deception against adversaries.

Beyond Top Secret Ultra (Ewen Montagu)

Chronicles several of World War II's well-known deceptions, including Operation Mincemeat, the Double-Cross System, etc., as told by one of Britain's deception planners (Montagu).

Bodyguard of Lies (Anthony Cave Brown)

An account of intelligence and deception in World War II. Examines Allied denial and deception operations from early in the war through August 1944.

Codeword Barbarossa (Barton Whaley)

Incorporates discussion about German deceptions against the Soviet Union before the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941.

Deception in War (John Latimer)

Includes an overview of the history of deception, deception theory, types of deception, case studies, and a prediction regarding the future of deception. In addition to vignette examples within each of the thematic chapters, Latimer's case studies include Operation Bodyguard, the Soviet use of *maskirovka*, and deception in asymmetric warfare.

"Deception in Warfare" (Janet L. Seymour, bibliographer)

A bibliography about deception in war. Includes references to books, articles, etc., which contain case studies, theoretical materials, and other information on deception.

⁹⁷¹ Author's note: This list is by no means comprehensive. I simply included here sources that I came across in my own research on this topic.

Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Roy S. Godson)

An examination of Soviet disinformation campaigns, including the U.S.S.R.'s use of international front organizations, agents of influence, and forged documents.

The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned into Double Agents (J. C. Masterman)

The account of how British intelligence penetrated and used to its advantage Germany's spy network in Britain during World War II.

Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign (Roger Hesketh)

Recounts the deceptions surrounding the D-Day invasion, as written by Hesketh—a key participant in Operation Fortitude.

Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (Sissela Bok)

An interesting philosophical look at the ethics of deception.

“The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War” (David A. Acosta)

An assessment of deceptions that Hezbollah used against Israel before and during the Second Lebanon War.

The Man Who Never Was (Ewen Montagu)

A description of Operation Mincemeat, the British deception operation in which the British planted fake documents on a body meant to be discovered by the Germans.

Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent (H. John Poole)

An examination of how Iraqi and Afghani insurgents employ deceptive tactics.

Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory (Ben Macintyre)

A contemporary look at Operation Mincemeat. (See *The Man Who Never Was*.)

The Prince (Niccolo Machiavelli)

Posits deceit as an instrument used by an effective ruler.

The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (Richard H. Shultz, Jr.)

A depiction of, among other things, American deceptions against the North Vietnamese. Also includes an evaluation of North Vietnam's control of American agents in a double-cross system.

Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (Barton Whaley)

A theoretical and descriptive examination of deception and surprise in warfare; includes an appendix consisting “of the 115 known instances of surprise and/or deception from 1914 to 1968.”

Strategic Deception in the Second World War (Michael Howard)


A reprint of a volume from Britain’s official history of intelligence in World War II. It discusses multiple Allied deception operations during the war.

“Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai’da’s Operations” (Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler)

Shows how al Qaeda employed tactical deceptions in order to achieve strategic surprise with the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998 and the attacks of September 11, 2001.

APPENDIX 2

GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF THE ENDGAME THEORY OF DECEPTION



SOURCES CITED

- Abeyasinghe, Ranapriya. E-mail message to author, October 24, 2007.
- Achcar, Gilbert, with Michel Warschawski. *The 33-Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Consequences*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007.
- Acosta, David A. "The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War." Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007. Accessed June 3, 2011. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469918&Location=U2&doc =GetTRDoc.pdf>.
- Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List*. 110th Cong. 2007. Statement of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence and Policy, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Accessed July 12, 2011, <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/lev062007.htm>.
- "Address of General Secretary of Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah." July 14, 2006. Translated by Muhammad Abu Nasr. Available from *Information Clearing House*. Accessed July 3, 2011. <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14007.htm>.
- Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999.
- The al-Qaeda Documents*. Vol. 1. Alexandria, VA: Tempest Publishing, 2002.
- "Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda (the Base)." *GlobalSecurity.org*. Accessed June 27, 2011. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>.
- al-Qurashi, Abu 'Ubeid. "Fourth-Generation Wars." *Al-Ansar: For the Struggle Against the Crusader War*. In The Middle East Media Research Institute, "Bin Ladin Lieutenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa'ida's Combat Doctrine," *Special Dispatch* no. 344 (February 10, 2002). Accessed August 19, 2011. <http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page+archives&ID=SP34402>.

Author's note: This source list includes the books or documents that I personally consulted, with the exception that in some cases when I used information from a source that quoted directly from a secondary source, I listed both sources. For the most part, I did not list secondary works that were cited but not quoted by the works that I consulted; nor did I list interviews, press articles, or television broadcasts quoted by the works that I consulted. I refer the reader to this paper's footnotes for the full citations.

- Associated Press*. "Hezbollah Official: 250 Militants Killed During Lebanon War." Available from *Haaretz.com*, December 15, 2006. Accessed January 26, 2010. <http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/801699.html>.
- _____. "Lebanese Troops Begin Patrol at Israeli Border." Available from *Foxnews.com*, August 18, 2006. Accessed July 10, 2011. http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,209143,00.html
- "Asymmetric Warfare." *Wikipedia*. Accessed July 9, 2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare#cite_note-0
- al Suri, Abu Musab. *The International Islamic Resistance Call*. Published on the Internet, December 2004. Quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 114–6, 387–8 (387, n. 11) (originally cited in 82, n. 17).
- "An Open Letter to All the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World." February 16, 1985. Available from *Likoed Nederland*. Accessed July 1, 2011. <http://www.likud.nl/ref24a.html>.
- Andhyarujina, T. R. "President and Choice of Prime Minister." *Delhi Compass* (blog), February 28, 2009. Accessed July 3, 2011. <http://blogs.thehindu.com/delhi/?p=15279>
- Anti-Defamation League. "Investigation Finds Iranian, Hezbollah and Syrian Involvement in 1994 Bombing of Argentine Jewish Community Center." October 2003. Accessed July 1, 2011. http://www.adl.org/Terror/terror_buenos_aries_attack.asp.
- Arkin, William M. *Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 2007. Accessed June 28, 2011. <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/lps91120/arkin.pdf>.
- Atwan, Abdel Bari. *The Secret History of al Qaeda*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006.
- Awarekeh, Hanan. "Muqawama, Hezbollah's Winning Strategy During Leb. War." *Al-Manar.com*, September 10, 2008. Accessed January 28, 2010. <http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=59390&language=en>.
- Azani, Eitan. *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Azzam, Abdullah. "Al Qaeda al Sulbah" ("The Solid Base"). *Jihad* 41 (1988). Quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 75.

- Bakshi, Maj. Gen. G. D. "Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-2 : Israeli Response." *Indian Defence Review* 22, no. 1 (August 26, 2007). Accessed August 29, 2011. <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2007/04/israel-hezbollah-conflict-part-2-israeli-response.html> (site discontinued).
- Balasingham, Adele. *The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance*. 2nd ed. Mitcham, England: Fairmax Publishing Ltd., 2003.
- Balasingham, Anton S. *Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle*. Madras: Makkal Acchakam, 1983.
- Barry, Tom. "Leo Strauss and Intelligence Strategy." *IRC Right Web*. Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, February 12, 2004. Accessed May 18, 2011. <http://rightweb.irc-online.org/pdf/0402nsai.pdf>.
- Bawgat, Gawdat. "Oil and Militant Islam: Strains on U.S.-Saudi Relations." *World Affairs* 165, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 115–22. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/i20672657>
- Bell, J. Bowyer. "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 129–62.
- _____. Introduction to the Transaction edition of *Cheating and Deception*, by Bell and Whaley, ix–xxxiv.
- _____. "Toward a Theory of Deception." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 244–79. Accessed June 20, 2011. doi: 10.1080/08850600390198742.
- Bell, J. Bowyer, and Barton Whaley. *Cheating and Deception*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991. First published as J. Barton Bowyer [pseud.]. *Cheating: Deception in War & Magic, Games & Sports, Sex & Religion, Business & Con Games, Politics & Espionage, Art & Science*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- Bergen, Peter L. *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*. New York: Touchstone, 2002.
- _____. *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader*. New York: Free Press, 2006.
- Bhaduri, Maj. Shankar, and Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim (AVSM), with Lt. Gen. Mathew Thomas (PVSM, AVSM, VSM), eds. *The Sri Lankan Crisis*. New Delhi: Lancer Press, 1990.

- Biddle, Stephen, and Jeffrey A. Friedman. *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2008. Accessed June 28, 2011. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=882>.
- Bin Laden, Osama. "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places [variant: Declaration of Jihad on the Americans Occupying the Country of the Two Sacred Places]." *Al Quds al Arabi*, August 1996. Abridged copy in McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers*, 253–65. Also quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 164–6, n. 5.
- bin Laden, Usama bin Muhammad. "An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle." July 11, 1995. Translation available from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Accessed August 5, 2011. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002-000103-Trans.pdf>.
- Bishop, Patrick. "Peacekeeping Force Won't Disarm Hizbollah." *Telegraph.co.uk*, August 22, 2006. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1526970/Peacekeeping-force-wont-disarm-Hizbollah.html>.
- Blandford, Nicholas. "Call to Arms." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, April 18, 2007. Accessed June 29, 2011. IHS Jane's.
- _____. "Hizbullah and the IDF: Accepting New Realities Along the Blue Line." *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* (Summer 2006). Quoted in Arkin, *Divining Victory*, 48, n. 28, and 26, n. 21.
- _____. "Hizbullah's Resilience Built on Years of Homework." *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 11, 2006. Accessed July 2, 2011. LexisNexis Academic.
- _____. Introduction to *Voice of Hezbollah*, by Noe, 1–13.
- Bok, Sissela. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
- Bruce, James J. "The Impact on Foreign Denial and Deception of Increased Availability of Public Information about U.S. Intelligence." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 229–40.
- Caddell, Joseph W. *Deception 101: Primer on Deception*. Carlisle, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

- Cambell, Andrew. “‘*Taqiyya*’: How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West.” *National Observer* no. 65 (Winter 2005), 11–23. Accessed July 9, 2011. http://www.nationalobserver.net/2005_winter_ed3.htm
- Castanheira, Jose Pedro, and Antonio Pedro Ferreira. “Exterterrorista Portugues Confessa-se.” *Expresso*, April 13, 2002. Quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 117–20, n. 10.
- Cave Brown, Anthony. *Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day*. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2002.
- “Civil War and Resistance (Interview with Hassan Nasrallah by *Al-Khaleej* [Dubai]).” March 11, 1986. In Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 23–33.
- Clarke, Brig. Dudley. Letter to Maj. Gen. Lowell Books of the U.S. Army. File RG319. *Cover and Deception*. Folder 77, Box 43, Entry 101. Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, DC. Letter from Lt. Col. E. J. Sweeney to Col. W. A. Harris, December 18, 1946. Excerpt in Handel, “Introduction,” 88–90.
- Conway, Maura. “Cybercortical Warfare: The Case of Hizbollah.org.” Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, UK, March 28 – April 2, 2003. Accessed August 29, 2011. <https://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/edinburgh/ws20/Conway.pdf>.
- Corbett, Michael. *Research Methods in Political Science: An Introduction Using MicroCase*. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War.” Working draft for outside comment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 17, 2006. Accessed January 25, 2010. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060911_isr_hez_lessons.pdf.
- Cordesman, Anthony H., with George Sullivan and William D. Sullivan. *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War*. Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 30, 2007.
- Coughlin, Con. “Teheran Fund Pays War Compensation to Hizbollah Families.” *Telegraph.co.uk*, August 4, 2006. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1525593/Teheran-fund-pays-war-compensation-to-Hizbollah-families.html>.
- Crooke, Alistaire, and Mark Perry. “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 1: Winning the Intelligence War.” *Asia Times Online*, October 12, 2006. Accessed May 26, 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html.

- _____. "How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 2: Winning the Ground War." *Asia Times Online*, October 13, 2006. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html.
- Cruikshank, Paul, and Mohannad Hage Ali. "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30 (2007): 1–14. Accessed June 20, 2011. doi: 10.1080/10576100601049928.
- Curtis, Bryan. "4,000 Jews, 1 Lie—Tracking an Internet hoax." *Slate.com*, October 5, 2001. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://slate.msn.com/?id=116813>.
- Daniel, Donald C., and Katherine L. Herbig, eds. *Strategic Military Deception*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.
- _____. "Propositions on Military Deception." In Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 3–30.
- Davis, Jack. Introduction to *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, by Heuer, xiii–xxv.
- Dawoud, Khaled. "Mohammed Atef: Egyptian Militant Who Rose to the Top of the al-Qaida Hierarchy." *Guardian*, November 19, 2001. Accessed November 18, 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/19/guardianobituaries.afghanistan>.
- Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants (Military Series)*. Translated sections reprinted in *The al-Qaeda Documents*, 6–99. Originally entered as Government Exhibit 1677-T. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al. No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). Southern District of New York, 2001.
- "Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, October 24, 2006. Accessed June 29, 2011. IHS Jane's.
- Diaz, Tom, and Barbara Newman. *Lightning out of Lebanon: Hezbollah Terrorists on American Soil*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2005.
- Dixit, J. N. *Assignment Colombo*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002.
- _____. "IPKF in Sri Lanka." *U.S.I. Journal* 119, no. 49 (1989): 248–62. (This author cannot recall how he determined that Dixit's article covered pp. 248–62.) Quoted in Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*, 85, n.1.

- Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In *Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Fred. I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Vol. 7, *Strategies of Inquiry*, 79–137. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
- Eldridge, Thomas R., Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel, II, Janice L. Kephart, Kelly Moore, Joanne M. Accolla, and Alice Falk. *9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. August 21, 2004. Accessed December 6, 2010. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf.
- "English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." The Blog, at *Weekllystandard.com*. October 12, 2005. Accessed July 13, 2011. <http://www.weekllystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp>
- Eshel, Col. David (IDF Retd.). "The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later: Electronic Warfare in the Second Lebanon War." *Journal of Electronic Defense* 30, no. 7 (July 2007): 26–7, 30, 32–4.
- _____. "Hezbollah's Intelligence War." *Defense Update*. 2007. Accessed July 2, 2011. http://defense-update.com/analysis/lebanon_war_1.htm.
- Exum, Andrew. *Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment*. Policy Focus #63. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2006. Accessed June 28, 2011. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus63.pdf>.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Translation of Interview, Conducted by German Authorities, of the Girlfriend of Ziad JARRAH." September 18, 2001. Now declassified and available from *Intelwire.com*. Accessed July 1, 2011. <http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2001-09-18-FBI-translation-aysel-senguen-jarrah.pdf>.
- Federation for American Immigration Reform. "Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists." Updated February 2004. Accessed December 7, 2010. http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuece ntersc582.
- Fernandez, Yusuf. "The July War Series, Part IV – Hezbollah's Strategic Victory." *Al-Manar.com*, August 10, 2009. Accessed January 25, 2010. <http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=98486&language=en>.
- Fetini, Alyssa. "A Brief History of: Hizballah." *Time*, June 8, 2009. Accessed January 23, 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1903301,00.html>.

- Foot, M. R. D. "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Democratic Regimes." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 95–114.
- Gambill, Gary C. "Implications of the Israel-Hezbollah War." *Mideast Monitor* 1, no. 3 (September-October 2006). Accessed January 28, 2010. http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_2.htm.
- The General Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation. "About Late General Ranjan Wijeratne." Accessed July 10, 2011. <http://www.ranjanwijeratne.foundation.org.lk/about-ranjan.html>.
- Godson, Roy, and James J. Wirtz, eds. *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
- _____. "Strategic Denial and Deception." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 1–14.
- Godson, Roy. *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*. With a new introduction by Roy Godson. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001.
- Gunaratna, Rohan. *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies*. 2nd ed. Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1994.
- _____. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Berkley Books, 2003.
- _____. "International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency." December 2, 1998. Available from *The Institute for Counter-Terrorism*. Accessed July 3, 2011. <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articlelet.cfm?articleid=57>.
- _____. *International Dimension of the Sri Lankan Conflict: Threat and Response*. Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001.
- _____. Telephone interview by author, July 26, 2008, Reston, VA.
- _____. *War and Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna*. With an introduction by Ralph Buultjen. Colombo: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987.

- Hamanaka, Shingo. "Public Opinion Behind the Deterrence: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Study of the Israeli Policy Towards Lebanon." *Munich Personal RePEc Archive* Paper no. 16800 (August 13, 2009). Accessed June 29, 2011. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16800/1/MPRA_paper_16800.pdf.
- Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.
- Hamilton, Christopher. "Hezbollah's Global Reach." Testimony for hearing of the House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade (source says "Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation"), September 28, 2006. Accessed June 4, 2011. <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/262.pdf>
- Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. *In the Path of Hizbullah*. Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East, edited by Mehrzad Boroujerdi. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
- Handel, Michael. "Intelligence and Deception." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 122–54.
- _____. "Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective." *Intelligence and National Security* 2, no. 3 (July 1987): 1–92.
- Harel, Amos, and Avi Issacharoff. *34 days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon*. Translated by Ora Cummings and Moshe Tlamin. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Harik, Judith Palmer. *The Changing Face of Terrorism*. London: I.C. Taurus, 2007.
- "[Hassan Nasrallah] Interview with New TV." August 27, 2006. In Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 378–410.
- Hendel, Yoaz. "Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War." *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 3 (November 2006). Accessed July 3, 2011. <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=90>.
- Hesketh, Roger. *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign*. With an introduction by Nigel West. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2000.
- Heuer, Richards, Jr. "Commentary." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 33–6.

- _____. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. Accessed June 20, 2001. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychoIntelNew.pdf>.
- _____. "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach." *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 294–327. Accessed August 10, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600359>.
- "Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force." *Intelligence Online* no. 529 (August 25, 2006). Accessed July 2, 2011. LexisNexis Academic.
- "Hezbollah Acknowledges Higher Losses Than Previously." *SNAPSHOTS a CAMERA Blog*, December 18, 2006. Accessed July 2, 2011. http://blog.camera.org/archives/2006/12/hezbollah_acknowledges_higher.html.
- "Hezbollah's Rocket Force." *BBC News*, July 18, 2006. Accessed June 3, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5187974.stm.
- Higgins, Andrew. "Branded Terrorist, Microcredit Czar Keeps Lending." *The Wall Street Journal*. Available from *Pittsburg Post Gazette*, December 28, 2006. Accessed August 17, 2009. <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06362/749639-82.stm>.
- "History." *Tamil United Liberation Front*. Accessed July 10, 2011. <http://tamilunitedliberationfront.org/history/>
- "Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance." *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, September 5, 2006. Accessed June 20, 2011. IHS Jane's.
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- "Home Front Command: Return to Routine in All the North's Population Centers." *Ynet News* (Hebrew), August 14, 2007. www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3291201,00.html. Quoted Rubin. *Rocket Campaign*, 10, n. 12.
- Hoole, Rajan, Daya Somasundaram, K. Sritharan, and Rajani Thiranagama. *The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka – An Inside Account*. With a foreword by Dr. Brian Seneviratne. Claremont, CA: The Sri Lankan Studies Institute, 1990. Reprint, 1992.
- Howard, Michael. *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995.

- “Independent and Dependent Variables.” *Cool-Science-Projects.com*. Accessed July 13, 2011. <http://www.cool-science-projects.com/independent-and-dependent-variables.html>.
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.). “Crime and Terrorism: During the Current Confrontation in Lebanon, Hezbollah Again Used the Drug Trade to Collect Intelligence in Israel.” August 10, 2006. Accessed June 25, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_100806e.htm.
- _____. “Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Boasts of the Organization’s Ability to Maintain a Balance of Deterrence with Israel. By Doing that He Justifies, in the Internal Lebanese Arena, Its Refusal to Disarm and Repels the Demands of his Opponents, the Supporters of the ‘New Order’ in Lebanon.” May 28, 2006. Accessed January 23, 2010. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e0506.pdf.
- “Israel Threatens to Expand Military Effort Against Hezbollah.” *PBS Newshour*, August 9, 2006. Transcript accessed July 2, 2011. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec06/israel_08-09.html.
- Jaber, Hala. *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Jajko, Walter. “Commentary.” In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 115–22.
- _____. “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning.” *Comparative Strategy* 21, no. 5 (October–December 2002): 351–63. doi: 10.1080/01495930290043092.
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “Al-Jihad al-Islami.” Updated February 2008. Accessed November 16, 2010. <http://cns.miis.edu/archive/wtc01/aljihad.htm>.
- Jayasekara, Shanaka. E-mail message to author, January 28, 2008.
- Jenkins, Brian M. 1975. “International Terrorism.” In *International Terrorism and World Security*, edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975. Reprinted in *The Use of Force*, 6th ed., edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, 77–84. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004.
- Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

- Jessee, Devin D. "Al-Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception." Manuscript for Seminar on U.S. Intelligence, Terrorism, and National Security, The Fletcher School, December 4, 2004.
- _____. "Deception as an Element of Strategy: A Literature Review." Unpublished manuscript for Independent Study on Deception Literature, The Fletcher School, December 15, 2005.
- _____. "Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 3 (September 2006): 367–88. Accessed June 20, 2011. doi: 10.1080/09546550600751941.
- "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement." *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, February 23, 1998. Available from Federation of American Sciences online archives. Accessed January 5, 2010. <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.
- Jorisch, Avi. "Al-Manar, Hizbullah TV, 24-7." *Middle East Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2004). Accessed January 26, 2010. <http://www.meforum.org/583/al-manar-hizbullah-tv-24-7>.
- _____. *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah's Al-Manar Television*. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.
- Karthikeyan, D. R., and Radhavinod Raju. *Triumph of Truth: The Rajiv Gandhi Assassination*. With a foreword by M. N. Venkatachaliah. New Delhi: New Dawn Press, Inc., 2004.
- Kadian, Rajesh. *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco*. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1990.
- Kainikara, Sanu, and Russell Parkin. *Pathways to Victory: Observations from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict*. Tuggeranong, A.C.T., Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2007. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Publications/Details/26/Pathways-to-Victory-Observations-from-the-2006-Isreal-Hezbollah-Conflict.aspx>.
- Kalb, Marvin. "The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict." *Faculty Research Working Paper Series*, February 2007. Accessed January 26, 2010. <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP07-012> (site discontinued).
- Kfoury, Assaf. "Meeting Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah: Encounter with a Fighter." In *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*, edited by Nubar Hovsepian, 75–85. With a foreword by Rashid Khalidi. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008.
- Kjeilen, Tore. "Lebanese Civil War." *Looklex Encyclopedia*. Accessed July 8, 2011. http://lexicorient.com/e.o/leb_civ_war.htm.

- Kulick, Amir. "Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension." *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 3 (November 2006). Accessed September 10, 2009. <http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=88&print=1>.
- Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs." In *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, 91–196. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
- Latimer, Jon. *Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War*. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2001.
- "Lawsuit Targets Bank Over Alleged Hezbollah Ties." *CTV News*, July 7, 2008. Accessed July 2, 2011. http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20080707/terror_lawsuit_080707/.
- Lenzner, Steven J., and William Kristol. "Leo Strauss: An Introduction." *Perspectives on Political Science* 33, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 204–14. Accessed July 2, 2011. Academic OneFile.
- Levitt, Matthew. "Hiding Terrorist Activity." *Middle East Strategy at Harvard* (blog). January 6, 2009. Accessed July 1, 2011. <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/hiding-terrorist-activity/>.
- _____. Telephone interview by author, September 17, 2009, Reston, VA.
- Levitt, Matthew, and Michael Jacobson. *The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances*. Policy Focus #89. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2008. Accessed June 3, 2011. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus89.pdf>.
- Lewin, Ronald. *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. Quoted in U.S. CIA and Mathtech, *Deception Maxims*, 35.
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Political Wing). *You Too India*. Madras: Publisher not noted, 1988. Quoted in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 246, n. 1.
- Liddle Hart, B. H. *Strategy*. New York: Praeger, 1954.

- Lind, William S., Col. Keith Nightengale, Capt. John F. Schmitt, Col. Joseph W. Sutton, and Lt. Col. Gary I. Wilson. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." *The Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no. 11 (November 2001, reprinted from October 1989): 65–8. Accessed July 7, 2011. ProQuest Direct Complete.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Art of War*. A revised edition of the Ellis Farnsworth translation, with an introduction by Neal Wood. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001.
- _____. *The Prince*. In McAlpine, *The Ruthless Leader*, 18–118.
- Macintyre, Ben. *Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory*. New York: Harmony Books, 2010.
- Mack, Andrew. "Why Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200. Accessed July 6, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880>.
- Makovsky, David. "Part I: Israel's Policy and Political Lessons from the War." In David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, *Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment*, 1–31. Policy Focus #60. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2006. Accessed June 4, 2011. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus60.pdf>.
- Marks, Tom. Interview by author, March 31, 2008, Washington, DC.
- Masterman, J. C. *The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned into Double Agents*. With a foreword by Norman Holmes Pearson. New York: The Lyons Press, 2000.
- Matthews, Matt M. *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*. The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 26. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008. Accessed June 28, 2011. <http://carl.army.mil/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf>.
- McAlpine, Alistair, ed. *Three Classics of Strategy and Power*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000.
- McDermott, Terry. *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It*. New York: Harper, 2005.

- Meek, James Gordon. "CIA Director Leon Panetta: Battered Al Qaeda On Defense, Can't Attack U.S." *New York Daily News*, March 18, 2010. Accessed July 2, 2011. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2010/03/18/2010-03-18_cia_head_battered_qaeda_cant_attack.html.
- The Middle East Media Research Institute. "Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: I Told Lebanese Political Leaders We Would Abduct Israeli Soldiers." *Special Dispatch* no. 1211 (July 25, 2006). Accessed January 25, 2010. <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1751.htm>.
- _____. "Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah on al-Manar TV Last Night: 'What is Important in the Ground War is the Number of Losses We Inflict Upon the Israeli Enemy.'" *Special Dispatch* No. 1214 (July 27, 2006). Accessed January 26, 2010. <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1754.htm>.
- Mockaitis, Thomas R. "Winning Hearts and Minds in the 'War on Terrorism.'" *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14, no. 1 (2003): 21–38. Accessed July 12, 2011. doi: 10.1080/09592310412331300546.
- Montagu, Ewen. *Beyond Top Secret Ultra*. With a foreword by Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978.
- _____. *The Man Who Never Was*. With a foreword by Gen. the Rt. Hon. Lord Ismay, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954.
- Moose, Paul H. "A Systems View of Deception," in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 136–50.
- Mure, David. *Master of Deception*. London: William Kimber, 1980. Quoted in Jon Latimer, *Deception in War*, 311, n. 32.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.
- Neuffer, Elizabeth. "Hijack Suspect Lived a Life, or a Lie." *Boston Globe*, September 25, 2001. Accessed June 20, 2011. ProQuest (81980493).
- Nieves, Robert J. "Commentary." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 163–6.
- Noe, Nicholas, ed. *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*. Translated by Ellen Khouri, with an introduction by Nicholas Blanford. London: Verso, 2007.
- Norton, Augustus Richard. *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

- “Operation Litani.” *Ynetnews.com*. Accessed July 10, 2011. <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3686831,00.html>
- Orez, Sam. “Canadian Victims of Hizbollah Missile Attacks Bring First-Ever Civil Action Against Lebanese Bank in Montreal.” *The Cutting Edge*, July 21, 2008. Accessed July 2, 2011. <http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=656&pageid=&pagename=>.
- “Osama bin Laden: A Chronology of His Political Life.” *Frontline*. Accessed July 9, 2011. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/etc/cron.html>.
- Pakistan Military Consortium. “India’s Peace Keeping Mission in Sri Lanka: India’s Vietnam.” Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://www.pakdef.info/pids/pids2/research/ipkf.html>.
- Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. Discussion with the author, Cambridge, MA, June 21, 2006.
- Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and John A. Sawicki, “Perception and Misperception: Implications for Denial and Deception: A Literature Survey and Analysis.” Unpublished manuscript.
- Pirabaharan, Velupillai. “Call to Other Tamil Liberation Groups.” September 25, 1987. Available from *Tamilnation.org*. Accessed May 27, 2008. <http://www.tamilnation.org/lte/vp/870925liberation.htm> (site discontinued).
- _____. “Message to the Conference from Velupillai Pirabaharan, Leader of Tamil Eelam.” April 25, 1988. Written message to The Tamil National Struggle & the Indo Sri Lanka Accord, an international conference at the Middlesex Polytechnic, London, April 30 and May 1, 1988. Available from *Tamilnation.org*. Accessed May 27, 2008. <http://www.tamilnation.org/conferences/UK88/vp.htm> (site discontinued).
- _____. “On the Indo Sri Lanka Accord.” Speech given at Suthumalai Amman Temple Grounds, August 4, 1987. Available from *Tamilnation.org*. Accessed May 27, 2008. <http://www.tamilnation.org/lte/vp/87suthumalai.htm> (site discontinued).
- Poole, H. John. *Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent*. With a foreword by Maj. Gen. Ray L. Smith, USMC (Retd.). Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press, 2005.
- Politico Staff. “Panetta on al-Qaeda.” *Politico*, July 9, 2011. Accessed July 13, 2011. http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0711/no_kabul_ffcdb7fc-8b72-4dd4-bebe-63db92595e3b.html.

- Prabhakaran, Velupillai. Speech, April 1, 1990. *Sunday Times* (Colombo), April 8, 1990. In K. J. Rajasingham, "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Chapter 43: Aftermath of the Indian Withdrawal." *Asia Times Online*, June 8, 2002. Accessed August 7, 2011. <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DF08Df01.html>. Also in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 391–4 (391, n. 3).
- Pratap, Anita. *Island of Blood: Frontline Reports from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Other South Asian Flashpoints*. New York: Penguin Books, 2001.
- Premadasa, Ranasinghe. Letter dated July 4, 1989 to Rajiv Gandhi. In Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 301–2. Also in Dixit, *Assignment Colombo*, 379–80.
- "Profile: Zacarias Moussaoui." *BBC News*, April 25, 2006. Accessed February 5, 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4471245.stm>.
- Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. New Delhi: Millat Book Centre.
- Ranstorp, Magnus. *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*. With a foreword by Terry Waite, CBE. New York: Palgrave, 1997.
- Reese, William. "Deception Within a Communications Theory Framework." In Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 115–35.
- "Regev and Goldwasser to Receive Military Funerals Thursday." *Haaretz.com*, July 20, 2008. Accessed January 28, 2010. <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1002425.html>.
- Robertson, Nic. "Previously Unseen Tape Shows Bin Laden's Declaration of War." CNN, August 20, 2002. Quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 202, n. 32.
- Roth, John, Douglas Greenberg, and Serena Wille. *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission*. Accessed December 6, 2010. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf.
- Rubin, Uzi. *The Rocket Campaign Against Israel During the 2006 Lebanon War*. Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 71. Ramat Gan, Israel: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, June 2007. Accessed June 3, 2011. <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS71.pdf>.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar. "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF)." *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 337–50. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424003>.

- Sahadevan, P. "On Not Becoming a Democrat: The LTTE's Commitment to Armed Struggle." *International Studies* 32, no. 3 (July 1995): 249–81. Accessed June 29, 2011. doi: 10.1177/0020881795032003003.
- Sarbin, Theodore R. "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counterdeception." In Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 151–73.
- Sardeshpande, Lt. Gen. S. C., UYSM, AVSM (Retd.). *Assignment Jaffna*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992.
- Schleifer, Ron. "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 1–19. Accessed June 20, 2011. doi: 10.1080/10576100500351185.
- Seymour, Janet L., bibliographer. "Deception in Warfare." Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. Accessed July 2, 2011. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/decwar/dwtoc.htm>.
- Shahid, Anthony. "Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations: Militia Leaders Caught Off Guard by Scope of Israel's Response in War." *Washington Post*, October 8, 2006. Accessed July 1, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/07/AR2006100701054.html>.
- Shandra Shekar*. Accessed July 3, 2011. <http://www.chandrashekhar.com/>.
- Shandrasahsan, S. C. "Tamil Eelam: Right to Self Determination." 1979. Available from *Tamilnation.org*. Accessed October 28, 2008. <http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/tamileelam/7900chandrasahsan.htm> (site discontinued).
- Shankar, Jay. "Prabhakaran's 'Unforgiving Ruthlessness' Undercut Tamil Cause." *Bloomberg News*, May 18, 2009. Accessed June 3, 2011. <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNWLx8SjRXgg&refer=home>.
- Sher, Cindy, and Minda Block. "Outcome of Terror-Financing Case Satisfies Jewish Officials in Chicago." *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 12, 2003. Accessed February 11, 2011. ProQuest (469100261).
- Sheriden, Mary Beth. "Zawahiri Named New al-Qaeda Leader." *Washington Post*, June 16, 2011. Accessed August 23, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/al-zawahiri-named-new-al-qaeda-leader/2011/06/16/AGNk87WH_story.html.
- Sherwin, Ronald G., and Barton Whaley. "Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases," in Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 177–94.

- Sheuer, Michael. *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*. Rev. ed., with a foreword by Bruce Hoffman. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006.
- Shively, W. Phillips. *The Craft of Political Research*. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002.
- Shorris, Earl. "Ignoble Liars: Leo Strauss, George Bush, and the Philosophy of Mass Deception." *Harper's Magazine* (June 2004): 65–71.
- Shulsky, Abram. "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 15–33.
- Shulsky, Abram N., and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2002.
- Shultz, Richard, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard. *Armed Groups: A Tier One Security Priority*. INSS Occasional Paper 57. U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004. Accessed August 2, 2011. <http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf>.
- Shultz, Richard H., Jr. *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam*. New York: HarperCollins, 1999.
- Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Andrea Dew. *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Andreas Vogt. "The Real Intelligence Failure on 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First." In *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, edited by Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 405–28. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2002.
- Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Roy S. Godson. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984.
- Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Ruth Margolies Beitler. "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai'da's Operations." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8, no. 2 (June 2004): 56–79. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue2/jv8n2a6.html>
- Simon, Herbert A. "Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment." *Psychological Review* 63, no. 2 (1956): 129–38. Accessed June 20, 2011. doi: 10.1037/h0042769.

- Singer, Marshall R. "Sri Lanka in 1991: Some Surprising Twists." *Asian Survey* 32, no. 2 (1991): 168–74. Accessed June 28, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645215>.
- Singh, Lt. Gen. Depinder. *IPKF in Sri Lanka*. 3rd ed. With a foreword by Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, MC. Noida, India: Trishul Publications, 2001.
- Singh, Maj. Gen. Harkirat (Retd.). *Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold*. New Delhi: Manohar, 2007.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. "The Holy War Tradition in Islam." *Orbis* 4, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 171–94. Accessed June 20, 2011. Expanded Academic ASAP (A20575545). Quoted in Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah*, 112, n. 103.
- Sobelman, Daniel. *New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah After the Withdrawal from Lebanon*. Memorandum no. 69. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, January 2004. Accessed July 2, 2011. [http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1190276456.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1190276456.pdf). Cited in Azani, *Hezbollah*, 234, n. 46.
- Someone Else's War: An Account of Eelam War II and the Latter Stages of IPKF Operations Against the LTTE which Preceded It, Based on the Reports of the University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna*. Colombo: Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality, 1994.
- "Sri Lanka: Foreign Military Presence." Data as of October 1988. Accessed June 4, 2011. <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13286.html>.
- "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Ch. 34: Accord and Its Ramifications." *Asia Times Online*, April 6, 2002. Accessed January 9, 2008. <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD06Df04.html>.
- "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Ch. 35: Accord to Discord." *Asia Times Online*, April, 2002. Accessed June 26, 2011. <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html>.
- Staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. "Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United States: Staff Statement No. 1." Accessed December 6, 2010. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_1.pdf.
- _____. "Outline of the 9/11 Plot: Staff Statement No. 16." Accessed November 18, 2010. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_16.pdf.
- _____. "Overview of the Enemy: Staff Statement No. 15." Accessed November 16, 2010. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_15.pdf.

- Stewart, Nina. "Commentary." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 36–9.
- Stolfi, Russel H. S. "Barbarossa: German Grand Deception and the Achievement of Strategic and Tactical Surprise Against the Soviet Union, 1940-1941." In Daniel and Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, 195–223.
- Stotsky, Steven. "Questioning the Number of Civilian Casualties in Lebanon." *Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA)*, September 7, 2006. Accessed July 11, 2011. http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=2&x_outlet=8&x_article=1195.
- Summons and Complaint. Yaakov Licci et al. v. Am. Express Bank Ltd. et al. New York Supreme Court, filed July 11, 2008. Accessed June 4, 2011. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/Licci_v_AMEXBank_Complaint.pdf.
- Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. In McAlpine, *The Ruthless Leader*, 217–61.
- Swamy, M. R. Narayan. *Inside an Elusive Mind*. 3rd ed. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004.
- _____. *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas*. 3rd ed. Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002. Reprint, 2004.
- _____. *The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2010.
- "Tamil Eelam Struggle for Freedom: Eelam National Liberation Front." Available from *Tamilnation.org*. Accessed October 23, 2008. <http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/enlf.htm> (site discontinued).
- Tamilila Vitutalaippulikal [Association]. *Towards Liberation: Selected Political Documents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam*. Sri Lanka?: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 1984.
- "The Tareek Osama Documents." Sections in the Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States of America v. Enaam Arnaout. No. 02-CR-892. Northern District of Illinois, filed January 6, 2003. Remainder retained by the law firm Motley Rice. Quoted in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 75–81, n. 2. This author accessed the proffer at *Findlaw.com* on July 2, 2011, <http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/bif/usarnaout10603prof.pdf>.
- Taylor, Col. John (Retd.). "India's Vietnam: The IPKF in Sri Lanka." *rediff.com*. Accessed June 28, 2011. <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/23lanka.htm>.

- Thomas, Timothy L. "Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of 'Cyberplanning.'" *Parameters* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 112–23. Accessed June 20, 2011. Academic OneFile (A99233031).
- "Transcript of Usama bin Laden Video Tape." December 13, 2001. In *The al-Qaeda Documents*, 101–7. Originally published by the United States Department of Defense. "News Release: U.S. Releases Videotape of Osama bin Laden." December 13, 2001. Accessed July 13, 2011. http://web.archive.org/web/20060625223529/http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b12132001_bt630-01.html. Transcript accessed July 13, 2011. <http://web.archive.org/web/20060623051212/http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/d20011213ubl.pdf>.
- Tsfati, Yariv, and Gabriel Weimann. "www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (2002): 317–332. Accessed July 9, 2011. doi: 10.1080/10576100290101214.
- Turkishpress.com*, August 19, 2006. Accessed August 24, 2011. <http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=138277>
- Ulph, Stephen. "Al-Qaeda's Strategy Until 2020." *Terrorism Focus* 2, no. 6 (May 5, 2006). Accessed August 20, 2011. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=181&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=238&no_cache=1.
- United Nations. "UNIFIL Background." Accessed July 10, 2011. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml>
- "The Unwanted Peacekeepers." *Sunday Times*, November 12, 2000. Accessed January 14, 2008. <http://sundaytimes.lk/001112/plus8.html>.
- U.N. Security Council. Resolution 1701. "The Situation in the Middle East." August 11, 2006. Accessed July 12, 2011. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement>.
- U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council. Report A/HRC/3/2. "Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled 'Human Rights Council': Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S2-1." November 23, 2006. Accessed June 25, 2011. <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.3.2.pdf>.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "11 September 2001 Hijackers." Accessed December 7, 2010. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/DCI_18_June_testimony_new.pdf.

- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development and Mathtech, Inc. *Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore*. Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1980.
- _____. *Misperception Literature Survey*. Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1979.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Draft copy of the *United States Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport (BIA) Terrorist Act of October 23, 1983*. Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 92, n. 26.
- _____. *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. April 12, 2001, amended through June 13, 2007. Accessed June 20, 2011. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01514.html>.
- U.S. Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*. May 2002. Accessed July 9, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf>.
- U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Twin Treasury Actions Take Aim at Hizballah's Support Network." July 24, 2007. Accessed January 16, 2009. <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/200772410294613432.htm>.
- U.S. Federal Reserve. "Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Foreign Exchange Rates: H.10 India Historical Rates." December 29, 1989. Accessed June 25, 2011. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/hist/dat89_in.htm
- "U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan." *CNN.com*, August 21, 1998. Accessed February 1, 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02/>.
- United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui. Cr. No. 01-455-A. Eastern District of Virginia. Exhibit 941. Edited version in Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, 416–25, n. 5.
- _____. Superseding Indictment. Cr. 01-455-A. Eastern District of Virginia, 2002. Accessed November 30, 2010. <http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/moussaoui/usmouss71602spind.pdf>.
- van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Van Evera, Steven. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.

- Vick, Karl. "Sudan Plant's Tie with bin Laden Disputed." *Washington Post*, October 22, 1998, A29. Accessed January 18, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/sudan102298.htm>.
- von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Quoted in: Handel, "Intelligence and Deception," 124, n. 7; Handel, "Introduction," 5, n. 18; Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, ix. (Howard did not note the translation he quoted, and the author did not have on hand the notes page to Handel's "Introduction" to determine whether it cites the Paret translation, but the author presumes that both quoted from that translation.)
- Weerakoon, Bradman. *Premadasa in Sri Lanka: A Political Biography*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1992. Quoted in Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, 389 (388, n. 1)
- Weimann, Gabriel. "Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah's Online Campaign." Accessed January 26, 2010. <http://cmsprod.bgu.ac.il/NR/rdonlyres/34396BDB-6C0E-4931-A077-697451885123/34393/Weimannedited.pdf>.
- _____. *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006.
- Whaley, Barton, and Jeffrey Busby. "Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and Theory." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 181–221.
- Whaley, Barton. *Codeword Barbarossa*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973.
- _____. "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Authoritarian and Transition Regimes." In Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, 41–94.
- _____. *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*. Boston: Artech House, 2007.
- _____. "Toward a General Theory of Deception." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1982): 178–92.
- White, Jeffrey. "Part II: Military Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War." In David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, *Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment*, 35–58. Policy Focus #60. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2006. Accessed June 4, 2011. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus60.pdf>.

- “Sri Lanka.” *Wikipedia*. Accessed July 2, 2011. Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_lanka.
- Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.
- Zisser, Eyal. “Nasrallah’s Defeat in the 2006 War: Assessing Hezbollah’s Influence.” *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (Winter 2009). Accessed May 26, 2011. http://www.meforum.org/2054/nasrallahs-defeat-in-the-2006-war#_ftn17.