One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform

Ezra F. Vogel, with a contribution by John Kamm.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, 510 pp., $29.95.

Reviewed by William C. Kirby

Ezra Vogel's first book on modern Guangdong province, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968*[1], was a superb work of historical and sociological research that chronicled two great transitions: the onset of Communist rule in the birthplace of the Guomindang, and the near-destruction of that authority by the Maoist "cultural" revolution of 1966-69. Vogel's new book examines the economic counter-revolution of the past ten years, in which Guangdong has been, at minimum, "one step ahead" of the rest of China.

A short review cannot easily do justice to the richness of this volume, which establishes new scholarly standards for foreign studies of Chinese reforms in the Deng Xiaoping era. Based on extensive field work, interviews, and relevant provincial publications, it is perhaps above all an impressive study in economic geography. It provides a nuanced account of patterns of economic and social change in the different regions of this large province of 60 million people.

Part I, "The Winds of Change," stresses how reaction to the Cultural Revolution provided political legitimacy to initial reform efforts. While Vogel emphasizes the negative impact of the late Maoist era, the attempted reforms chronicled in the book are in many cases indictments of the four decades of Communist rule of Guangdong, and constitute, among other things, an attempt to restore the province's pre-1949 relative autonomy vis-à-vis the center and its position as a leader in Sino-foreign intercourse. For the latter effort the proximity and influence of Hong Kong, the "south wind" of change in Guangdong, provides the Cantonese an incomparable advantage in reform. Vogel's second chapter offers one of the best brief accounts available of Hong Kong's modern development in the larger Chinese context.

Following an account of the history of reform policy in Guangdong during the past decade, Part II, the heart of the book, addresses "Patterns of Change" across the province. Here it becomes clear how complicated, unpredictable and simply different the reform process has been in different areas. Thus, among the special economic zones, Shenzhen has never even remotely fulfilled its initial (quite unrealistic) mission of attracting foreign capital and the most modern technology at little cost to China; instead, it has amounted largely

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1. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1969.

to a northern service and manufacturing extension of Hong Kong. It has also provided a unique arena for experimentation and innovation in areas ranging from labor-management relations to banking services to urban planning and architecture, that may eventually be most important for their influence in other parts of China. The Zhuhai zone has been less creative and more careful politically: it has been to Shenzhen in terms of economic development what Macau has been to Hong Kong, that is, a poor cousin. Shantou (Swatow), a relatively weaker competitor for foreign investment than either Shenzhen and Zhuhai, has made a virtue of its limitations, and founded its recent growth on low-tech agricultural export processing.

It appears that the "special" nature of the special economic zones entailed a degree of supervision of their highly publicized experiments from Beijing that both speeded the zones' early development and limited their potential to respond rapidly to new economic opportunities. In contrast, although the Inner Delta communities described in chapter five began the reform decade relatively disadvantaged in terms of national support, these "country cousins" enjoyed tighter local networks of information, patronage and investment linked to Hong Kong and, working primarily outside state plans, much greater bureaucratic flexibility. The story of their remarkable growth through export processing and marketing, founded in part on generations of commercial activity linked to international markets before 1949, makes for the most interesting part of the book. As Vogel writes, "[M]uch as Guangdong wanted to acquire modern technology, the brutal fact was that its most promising niche in the world economy in the late 1980s was in labor-intensive industry" (p. 181). Here the great success stories are found not in Shenzhen but in Dongguan and lesser-known localities of the Inner Delta and in prefectural capitals (chapter seven).

Canton (Guangzhou) itself is another story altogether, and the chapter devoted to it makes comparatively depressing reading. This "tired old man" (p. 196) was in no position to lead reform after forty years of economic reorientation, systematic neglect of infrastructure and successive layers of bureaucracy. It is difficult to imagine how any major city, let alone one with Canton's cosmopolitan history, could so disadvantage itself through such negligible investment in housing, transportation and communications. Yet, as Vogel showed in his first book, Canton was (and is) not being run just for Cantonese. Despite enough growth in its collective and private sectors to encourage significant in-migration in recent years, Canton's experience demonstrates how chill winds from Beijing may still limit local enterprise and initiative.

Other chapters focus on the lesser developed mountain regions that constitute more than 70 percent of continental Guangdong; the dramatic development of the Hainan "frontier;" the organization of foreign trade (written by John Kamm); and the social changes and stresses that have accompanied reform. Vogel concludes with a study of comparative "takeoffs" in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the "Guangdong-Hong Kong region." To perhaps oversimplify this very stimulating comparison, Vogel finds that Guangdong's

relative disadvantages stem to a considerable degree from the basic principles and historic practice of the PRC (e.g. a large, unwieldy authoritarian government; a loyalty-based [as opposed to meritocratic] economic bureaucracy; inadequate investment in human resources and economic infrastructure), while its recent performance and future hope are closely tied to Hong Kong. The great "passion for change" in these years has emerged from the ever-greater "intertwining" of the Guangdong and Hong Kong economies, which together now constitute one of the most dynamic regions of growth in the world (pp. 443-45). As a result, Guangdong as a whole, if not every part of it, has made remarkable progress in circumventing political constraints to growth in the past decade. Vogel is optimistic that this fast upward trend *can* continue, particularly as labor costs rise in its East Asian economic rivals. Whether it *will* continue, however, depends on how developments in Beijing affect Hong Kong's and Guangdong's future prosperity. As Vogel notes in a sober preface added after June 4, 1989: "The developments in Guangdong in the first decade of reform demonstrate how much its citizens can achieve . . . if political circumstances give them the opportunity."

If the first decade of reform proves to be its last, this will be an important book for future historians of China. At present it can also be recommended strongly to economists, sociologists, policymakers, and the general reader with a serious interest in contemporary China.

The Deceptive Lure of Détente

Marian Leighton

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, 260 pp., with index, $35.00.

Reviewed by Robert Charles

The philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin opened his 1966 essay on Tolstoy's view of history with a gloss on fragments from a Greek poet: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Tolstoy's troubled genius, Berlin suggested, stemmed from the fact that he "was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog."[1]

No such internal tensions would seem to trouble the thought and outlook of Marian Leighton, a specialist on Soviet foreign policy currently working as an intelligence analyst with the United States Department of Defense. Judging from the argument which she presents in *The Deceptive Lure of Détente*, Leighton appears to belong, both by nature and conviction, to the company of intellectual hedgehogs.

What is the "big thing" that Leighton knows and insists upon throughout her survey of recent Soviet-American relations? She argues that détente, as defined and applied by the Soviet Union under Brezhnev and again under Gorbachev, was and is nothing less than a tool to lull Western suspicions and thus ease pressures for increased defense expenditures and other measures designed to combat the growth of Soviet military power. While it exercises a powerful and recurring fascination upon Western statesmen and businessmen alike, détente, Leighton contends, is impossible on theoretical grounds, for "the superpowers' views of détente diverge in every category from the substantive to the semantic" (p. 2). Furthermore, it is reprehensible on moral grounds, since it gives an aura of legitimacy to a regime that "rejects the norms and values of the Judeo-Christian ethic and is more in tune with the Byzantine tradition of the East" (p. 166). In essence, Leighton calls for something akin to the 1917-1933 policy of not recognizing the Soviet Union.

Leighton's polemic against détente is advertised as a magisterial review of the history of détente that will provide an important counterpoint to the warm embrace of Gorbachev's new Soviet Union. Substitute "melancholic" or "melodramatic" for "magisterial" and one has a more accurate portrayal of Leighton's reading of Soviet-American relations in the 1970s.

Leighton contends that the Kissinger-Nixon policy of détente represented a failure of nerve and a "virtual abandonment by the United States of a containment policy." Aided by "trade, technology transfer and credits from

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1. Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966), 1-4.

the West on an unprecedented scale . . . under the cover of détente, the Soviet Union moved outward geopolitically from the Eurasian heartland to seek hegemony all along its periphery and into the insular regions of the globe" (p. 18). By 1980, the United States — crippled by the arms control lobby, failing to use its economic and agricultural power "as leverage to pry concessions from Moscow," pressured by its European allies to seek accommodation "vis-à-vis the largest and most powerful creature in the woods," and renouncing "efforts to encourage or coerce the USSR to respect human rights," — was all but ready to concede world domination to the Soviet Union and to throw itself into the dustbin of history.

The Reagan administration, in a reversal, was dedicated to the proposition that, in the words of one official, "[détente] has been a failure."[2] Yet the new leadership quickly withdrew from its get-tough stance by lifting restrictions on grain exports imposed by President Carter in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Following the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him in March 1981, Reagan began his "détentist musings" as he was urged by his wife and Senator Paul Laxalt toward a "higher destiny — one day to work out a meaningful relationship with the Soviets" (p. 192). The Reagan administration slid deeply into neo-détente during its second term, showing "unwarranted solicitousness toward the Soviets," a compulsion to seek new arms control agreements culminating in the 1987 INF treaty, and an inability to "subordinate commerce to geopolitics" (p. 206).

All this bodes ill for the future, contends Leighton: "That Moscow succeeded in converting Ronald Reagan, a 'hardline' anti-communist, from a critic of the 'Evil Empire' to an apostle of détente suggests that future US administrations may fail to muster the political will to withstand the Soviet Union's charm offensive" (p. 233). To assist American leaders resist the deceptive lure (or fatal attraction?) of détente, Leighton offers seven guidelines: "know your adversary," "avoid mirror-imaging," "never underestimate the significance of ideology," "do not engage in efforts at behavior modification," "new personalities do not signify new policies," "do not place excessive faith in summits," and "beware of the Soviets as negotiating partners" (pp. 203-225).

What is one to make of *Deceptive Lure*, with its skepticism about the possibilities and desirability of better Soviet-American relations and its certainty that détente can only benefit the Soviet Union, and its extremely tendentious view of recent history? It may just be that "the fox, for all his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog's one defense."[3] If so, then Leighton's single big thing may be a salutary and timeless antidote to theories advanced by advocates of détente of an East-West convergence, or an ever-widening "community of interests." As such, *Deceptive Lure* restates, albeit with less flair, the need for caution once expressed as follows by the satirist Ambrose Bierce: "The most menacing political condition is a period of international

2. Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, as quoted in Leslie H. Gelb, "NATO is Facing a Paralysis of Will, Experts Contend," *New York Times*, 12 July 1981, A1.

3. Berlin, 1.

amity. Let us have a little less of the 'hands across the sea' and a little more of that elemental distrust which is the security of nations."[4]

So while it would not be wise to dismiss the hedgehog's single insight, this reviewer's intellectual sympathies and convictions are more with the fox. What would "knowing many things" rather than one big thing on détente and the larger subject of Soviet-American relations entail? Two thoughts come to mind.

First, a less exclusively ideological approach to understanding Soviet foreign policy is certainly in order. Leighton makes a cogent plea that we "never underestimate the significance of ideology," yet there is an equal danger of *overestimating* the significance of ideology for explaining Soviet foreign policy goals and behavior. While such a narrow focus may simplify her analysis, it limits its value as a guide to understanding the sources and evaluating the results of Soviet world conduct. Leighton despairs at what she sees as the American abandonment of containment, yet she herself seems to disregard the sage advice offered in the opening paragraph of George F. Kennan's seminal post-World War II article calling for such a policy: "The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology *and* circumstance" (emphasis added) and that both must be taken into account if Soviet conduct "is to be understood and effectively countered."[5] In taking seriously this less simplistic approach to understanding Soviet foreign policy, Leighton would come closer to fulfilling the spirit of her quite appropriate admonition to "know your adversary."

A second suggestion is that she think through, and apply more carefully, her call to "avoid mirror-imaging." Leighton is rightly concerned that American policymakers not assume that Soviet leaders think and act like Americans. Yet in warning Americans to avoid recasting the Soviets in their own political and ideological image, she again moves to the opposite extreme. Leighton intimates that unless Americans recast themselves in the Soviet image and ideological world view, unless we mirror-image the Soviets, they will inevitably get the better of us "useful idiots," as Lenin referred to statesmen and businessmen who favored links with the Soviet Union. Her rationale? Entertaining worst-case assuptions about the Soviet Union will "help us to guard against unpleasant surprises; it will also put us on the same wavelength as the Soviets themselves (who attribute the darkest motives to the United States) and thus might even help to promote mutual understanding" (p. 226). It is indeed ironic that she is calling for this at the time when Francis Fukuyama is suggesting that we have arrived "at the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government"![6]

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4. Ambrose Bierce, *The Enlarged Devil's Dictionary*, ed. E. J. Hopkins (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 314-315.
5. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947), reprinted in George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 107.
6. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 4.

Examples of this kind of subtle surrender, of accepting the Soviet world view (as Leighton reads it) as normative, abound in this book. For example, since in the Leninist view politics is a zero-sum game, then the United States also must embrace this perspective and jettison its silly ideas of developing a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets. Since in the Soviet view détente is simply a way of triumphing over capitalism while avoiding nuclear holocaust, then only a cowardly and totally misguided concern for its own survival could inspire the United States to seek a more cooperative relationship with its mortal rival. Since statesmen and businessmen who favor ties and business with the Soviet Union were to Lenin no more than useful idiots and "rope-sellers," then they must really be no more than fools. Leighton bemoans the "hostage-type mentality" found in Western Europe. Yet one would be hard-pressed to find a more blatant example than *Deceptive Lure* of conceding the intellectual and moral initiative, of going beyond mental accommodation to subservience to what seems to be a fast-fading ideology.

It is tragic, both for individuals and nations, to "know your adversary" so well that the equally important injunction to "know yourself" is forgotten (it does not figure among her seven guidelines). Leighton and other Westerners inclined to oversimplify and imitate would do well to ponder the concluding lines of the Kennan essay cited above, which are as relevant to seasons of détente as they are to ones of Cold War: "The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation."[7]

One searches in vain for evidence of such breadth of vision and confidence in the face of challenge in the pages of *Deceptive Lure*. Should Leighton again take up the topic of détente, this reviewer hopes that she will adopt a little more of the curiosity of the fox and shed some of the single-mindedness of the hedgehog. True, the resulting analysis may be of less promotional use to the Department of Defense than is *The Deceptive Lure of Détente*. The result might be a little more of what many people outside the Pentagon still understand to be "intelligence."

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7. Kennan, 128.

Germany's Past and Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy

Edwina S. Campbell

Washington, D.C.: Pergamon Brassey's, 1989, 236 pp., including bibliography and index, $35.00.

A German Identity, 1770-1990

Harold James

New York: Routledge, 1989, 240 pp., including notes and index, $25.00.

Reviewed by Michael Klees

To future historians in the field of German studies, 1988 and 1989 may well be remembered as the "era of newspapers," a reference to how many times Germany made the headlines in news publications worldwide. Not only were several important anniversaries commemorated, but they unfolded in the context of a deteriorating international order. Indeed, the end of post-war Europe seemed to be arriving too quickly for book- or even article-length analysis. Though there was no concise concept of what the "new" Europe would look like, the perception prevailed that Germany would occupy a central position. It is to be welcomed, then, that two recently published books have successfully cut through the drama of current events to deal with the core issue of Germany's place and identity. In the title of her book, *Germany's Past And Europe's Future: The Challenges Of West German Foreign Policy*, Dr. Edwina Campbell, senior researcher at Eagle Research Group and former US Foreign Service Officer, closely connects Germany's fate with that of Europe. Her brilliant analytical account of the determinants of West German diplomatic history centers around the legacy of the German past and the chances contained in the "Locarno Model." *A German Identity, 1770-1990* by Harold James, assistant professor of history at Princeton University, presents a broader cultural and political analysis of what "German Identity" has meant at every point in history since the "Enlightened Century."

Why this interest now in the German identity? What makes this topic noteworthy, even unique? What is the connection to Europe's future? On November 9, 1988 Philipp Jenninger, then speaker of the West German Parliament, in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the "Reichskristallnacht," the huge Nazi-organized *pogrom* directed at Germany's Jews, gave

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a speech in which he attempted to recreate the atmosphere of the time. His concern was not to justify this gloomy event in German history but to acknowledge the fact that such acts of racist violence were implemented by fellow Germans with whom one could identify, though not sympathize. These acts and their implications now could be understood and accepted as facts, and responsibility taken for them. Jenninger's frank treatment of this highly sensitive subject exposed such raw nerves that he was forced to resign immediately. What is important to the careful observer of the German scene is not that Jenninger's clumsy attempt failed but that it was undertaken at all. The collectively repressed (therefore more powerful) memory of the twelve-year long criminal regime of the "Thousand Year Reich" began to find its way into general awareness and acceptance. Jenninger's speech was a hallmark in the opening of Germany's repressed relationship with itself beyond the birth of modern Germany at "Hour Zero" (May 8, 1945).

To some of us this opening up may seem unimportant. Yet, Campbell correctly starts her book from the premise that the United States will have to deal with a Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) responding to problems of the 1990s based on the experiences of the 1930s and '40s. Campbell asserts that " . . . from the very beginning, in 1949, Bonn's foreign policy has dealt fundamentally with only one question: definition of an acceptable role for Germans . . . " (p. xix). Thus, the main theme of her analysis is the emergence of Bonn's foreign policy as being driven significantly by fundamental questions of legitimacy. Campbell sets out by defining the postwar foreign policy problem (part one). She points to the extremely limited room for maneuver of the FRG's new foreign policy. At the time Konrad Adenauer was able to convince France that Germany posed no threat, thus proving her limited maneuverability to be an asset, not a liability. With such a foreign policy, the FRG's identity as a Western state, firmly integrated into an emerging Western Alliance and European Community, was predetermined. Even in 1969, with the beginning of *Ostpolitik,* the distinction between partnership in the West and dialogue with the East was maintained.

Coupling these foreign policy determinants correctly with problems of guilt and responsibility for the Nazi period, the reality of a divided Europe, the non-existence of a German nation-state, and Germany's traditionally problematic "bridge" function between East and West, Campbell continues in part two to examine the legitimacy-diplomacy connection during a period of greater FRG room for maneuver. She shows how four lessons drawn from the beginning of the Federal Republic's existence corresponded to the "happiest" time (1925-1929) of the Weimar Republic:

> . . . the importance of building good personal relations between political leaders; establishing multilateral institutions; forgoing demands for immediate and parallel bilateral concessions; and creating broad public support for détente in both countries (p. 54).

It was in the Swiss town of Locarno that Germany, France, and Britain, from 1925 to 1929, periodically (and successfully) negotiated their economic, ter-

ritorial, and, most important, psychological differences. Applied to the Franco-German detente in the 1950s, these same lessons were used when Bonn set out in the 1970s to establish ever closer relations with the East, including the *Deutschlandpolitik* with the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

West German allies as much as West Germans themselves were surprised and psychologically unprepared when in the 1980s the success of *Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik* tended to cause West Germans to distinguish between German and Western interests. Several recent occasions revealed this new "Germanisized" national interest: NATO's short-range missile modernization dispute coining the slogan, "the shorter the ranges, the deader the Germans"; the astonishing rise of the nationalistic "Republican Party"; and, of course, the dramatic flight of over 50,000 East Germans in the fall of 1989, in addition to the projected 100,000 *legal* emigrations. The "German Question" is once again a problem to be reckoned with.

By focusing almost exclusively on the West, the nature of post-war West German foreign policy has been rather artificial. Indeed, Campbell's argument rests upon the central fact that a reawakening of German interests traditionally located in the center of Europe, rather than in the West alone, has progressed with a seemingly pre-programmed dynamic. This more "natural" re-extension of German interests goes hand in hand with attempts, such as Jenninger's, to integrate a cruel past and is reinforced by the retreat of both superpowers from central Europe. The author, however, shows that the dynamic does not mark the return to "old" German malaises, such as violent nationalism and fears of encirclement. Rather, all of German foreign policy is saturated by a "mindset," which forever will determine German identity and whose implications, according to Helmut Schmidt, other West Europeans do not fully grasp. Campbell writes:

> The spirit Bonn wishes to exorcise is the image of Germany in the eyes of its neighbors, especially in the west, as the one nation in Europe that has not, on the balance, made a positive contribution to the history of the continent. The name of Germany brings to mind the name of Auschwitz. West Germans . . . are clearly torn between believing the negative image and wanting to believe a more positive one (p. 161).

This central dichotomy, the author argues, causes Germans of all nations to reject the use of force as a means to an end. Forced to find a role for themselves in a European and world order, still ultimately based on the use of force, West Germany has come to see Franco-German entente and the European Community not "as an end in itself, (but) . . . as a model for cooperation throughout the continent" (p. 162). This is where in her analysis the lessons of Locarno come into play (part four). Bonn has developed

> . . . a new understanding of Locarno. No longer seen by the foreign policy practitioners of the Federal Republic as solely a choice for western Europe — which it was, in the two historical contexts of

> the 1920s and 1950s — Locarno became a process of establishing cooperative relationships between countries mutually dependent on each other for their survival, whether they liked it or not. *This concept of Locarno is the dominant characteristic of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic today* (emphasis added, p. 183).

The merit of Campbell's book lies in the fact that she is able to demonstrate that Germans, in engaging in a "healing process of their societal neurosis," have not forgotten their past but have used this memory to learn the lessons of Locarno. Thus the "German Condition" is changed now fundamentally and irreversibly. In other words, an extension of German interests from Western Europe into Central Europe does not imply the revival of the old, but the continuation and completion of the new. Campbell argues convincingly that the future of Europe, like the German past, lies on both sides of the Elbe. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* goal is no longer the reunification of Germany per se but the encouragement of political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and changes in the character of East-West borders. Bonn's role in the future of Europe would then be, along with Paris, one of leadership. Campbell concludes her book by realizing that such a role would

> . . . enable West Germans to live more honestly and openly with the legacy of Auschwitz because their country will have helped to restore to Europe the future of which it was once nearly deprived by events in Germany's past (p. 202).

German identity in a broader sense is analyzed in Harold James' interpretive essay on German culture and political culture over a 220-year stretch of history. Pushing far beyond the West German state in time and space, German identity necessarily must refer back to the much more fundamental question of Ernst Moritz Arndt's famous dictum: What is the German's fatherland? James begins to answer this question by stating Germany's lack of national justification in any existing institutions. Defining nationalism as depending "on the application of imagination to formulate, and indeed, sometimes invent, shared traditions (a common culture) . . . shared history, or a common language" (p. 8), he rightly concludes that the set of attributes defining national character invariably involves idealization and myth-making. If national identity can be made to reside in political and institutional arrangements, there will be no need to search for an elusive national character. Such searches, however, are exactly what describe most of modern German history. James shows, for example, how eighteenth century Germans, in many respects, were still living in the afterglow of medieval cosmopolitan and universal tradition, self-consciously defining themselves against other nationalities or assuming substitute identities from France, Greece, England, America or elsewhere.

Central to James' thesis is the theme of cycles in German history, born of consecutive generations' rejection of former images, and the strong influence of the economy on German nationalism. Such nationalism, first appearing in a vague expression of cultural characteristics to counter French predominance, turned into an emphasis on economic performance as the unifying force which

would "sustain the social community essential to national integration" (p. 216). It is economics in Germany, along with the progress in transportation, which created a unit large enough to contain a nation-state. James proves that the German nation, state and economy in the 'Second Empire' were mutually reenforcing. Indeed, the economic collapse during the Weimar years lead to a reemergence of "political and cultural ideals of national existence . . . in very radical guises" (p. 217) as manifested in the twelve-year Nazi dictatorship. The author concludes that it is this cycle of answers to problems, moving from cultural, to political, to economic and then back to a series of cultural claims, which marks Germany's unique identity. The author answers the question of a *Sonderweg* (special path), inexorably leading to 1933 and 1945, with a warning that "we should treat any claim of this sort with some initial scepticism" (p. 210). Like Campbell, James concludes his analysis with an optimistic reference to modern Germany:

> If national identity is seen not as the outcome of a self-conscious process of formulation, which leads to a single correct solution, but rather as the business of reconciling different perceptions and life-styles within the framework of a common social life, the political explosives are deprimed. Ending a tortured quest for *the* German identity, *the* German national development, would provide a calmer and more stable political setting. In other words, a parliamentary system with conflicts, clashes and unharmonious disputes may operate as a focus of national legitimacy centred on institutions and on the constitution. If this is true, then Germany is better prepared to deal with the opportunities and strains of a new international role than at any time in the past (p. 209).

The books approach the subject of German identity and Germany's future role from quite different angles. Harold James provides a cultural-historical perspective which locates German uniqueness predominantly in the historical absence of reliable and stable institutions and in a subsequent peculiar cycle of identities over the past 200 years. Elevating our point of view into more distant realms and shedding light on the broader relief of German history, he finds nothing exceptional in "Germanness." Applied to current events, when one German economy is booming and the other is relatively stable, his interpretation is not completely satisfying in explaining the reopening of the "German Question."

Edwina Campbell, in a more specifically focused essay, conveys much sensitivity toward the particular German psychological condition at the end of the 1980s. Her very elaborate and skillful analysis manages to disentangle the complex network of both psychological and practical determinants of a qualitatively-changed West German foreign policy.

Against a storm of excitement and concern regarding Germany's place in a future Europe, both accounts provide a balanced, calm and optimistic outlook for Germany's role in the international system. Both are highly recommended as well-informed, skillful and thought-provoking contributions.

The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey

Yeşim Arat

Cranbury, New Jersey: Asssociated University Presses, 1989, 158 pp., including index, $26.50.

Reviewed by Isenbike Togan

Women in Republican Turkey have attracted the attention of many social scientists and historians because of the visible role they play in Turkish society. Political life constitutes one area where Turkish women are not as active, however. In a welcome addition to studies on women in Turkey, Yeşim Arat explores the reasons behind women's apparent lack of interest and participation in politics within the framework of a patriarchal society (pp. 20, 117). At the same time, she introduces new information about women who are active in politics. Adhering to a broad definition of patriarchy, defined as a society that endorses male supremacy, she explores the ways in which the prevailing organization of society affects women in politics (p. 20). Her findings show that, paradoxically, patriarchy serves as a source of encouragement to women in politics as well as an impediment:

> Men shaped women's political participation at different stages of their social and political life; however, this shaping meant that men facilitated as well as obstructed women's political involvement. The unequal power relation between men and women that was a handicap at the macro level was instrumental in drawing women into politics at the micro level (p. 117).

This paradox lies at the core of her book, which has the merit of being both readable and well-organized. Arat first discusses her theoretical framework, then introduces the reader to the specific conditions which define patriarchal relations in Turkey as well as the perceptions related to women holding public office. She then presents the issues and problems encountered by these women with a description of the careers of specific women in politics. The chapters on the politicians are drawn from interviews conducted by the author, as well as from a fresh evaluation of the relevant literature, and present the reader with a vivid picture of the conditions within which these women function. Having acquired a familiarity with the Turkish situation at an anecdotal level, the reader then is brought to terms with the author's theoretical framework once more. At this juncture, Arat also subjects the validity of her own theoretical approach to further examination by comparing it with

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what other theories might have offered. Under the rubric of "alternative explanations," she examines the applicability of the socialization theory and Marxist approaches to her research. She concludes that patriarchal theory offers insights into the issue of women's political participation that other theories might not have yielded, because

> . . . the inequality between men and women is determined not merely by their relationship to production but rather to reproduction and this inequality based on gender is critical in explaining how women can or cannot move from the private to public realm (p. 121).

The author's elucidation of gender inequality in Turkish society (chapters three to seven) is both stimulating and thought-provoking. Here, the author presents us with cases that illuminate the paradox, and address the complexities of the position of women in Turkey, who live in a society that is patriarchal and yet also encourages women's participation in politics and shows respect to women in politics. However, the limited number of women in politics in Turkey sets certain limits to the understanding of the full implications of the paradox. The author, however, skillfully avoids these limitations by first defining women politicians as a "ruling minority" and then by showing us that the ruling minority is not monolithic. This section of the book (chapter four) is highly stimulating for it provides some answers while raising more questions for further research.

In the chapters dealing directly with the women politicians, Arat distinguishes between two types: members of Parliament (MPs) and members of the Municipal Councils (MCs). Arat deals with a limited number of politicians, for she was able to interview only eighteen of the forty MPs and twelve of the fifty-one MCs who are women. Nevertheless, she finds differences between these two groups, touching upon a neglected aspect of Turkish politics, as well as of women's studies. Her survey makes it strikingly clear that the MPs are educated, affluent and often well-connected politically. They are often better off economically than their male colleagues. Also, many have entered elections directly, as opposed to having worked upward within the organization of a specific party.

The MPs are women with a great amount of self-esteem, and are very much aware of their role in society. Quite remarkably, these elite women acknowledge male authority to such an extent that one wonders whether it is the authority rather than the gender, in this case male, that is more important. The MPs come from families with less assertive father figures who encouraged their daughters to participate in politics. These women are assertive and active in politics, yet they are relatively unconcerned with the domination by men of many issues. This tendency is especially apparent in one passage:

> Well we have a patriarchal family at home. I give much respect too . . . in fact I am the one who makes him the patriarch. I mean I am the one who makes the family patriarchal. That was what I

> saw in my family from my father, and I did the same thing to my husband (p. 76).

Further, the MPs acknowledge the encouragement and support of male figures in their own success. Moreover, the same MPs blame women for their limited participation in politics: Arat writes that "the parliamentarians charged that women did not use the opportunities they had and did not support one another, or that they did not try hard enough to become candidates" (p. 111).

The MPs speak from a position of authority that is both earned and given, as the following quotation indicates:

> "They respected me. In fact they called me "hanım bey" [Lady sir]. My name became hanım bey. [*Once, upon her objection to this form of address when her husband was around, as it was confusing, at least for her*—IT], the village headman stood up again, still very serious. "You" he said, "Since you are our representative to the parliament, you are a bey [sir]," and sat down. They had granted me the title of being a sir. This is, I believe, their way of accepting and supporting women (p. 107).

Many such quotations embellish the book, throwing light on women's issues in Turkey as well as raising questions related to their role in upholding the prevailing systems of authority in society. Yet whether this situation may be explained within the context of the "Islamic authoritarian background" from which Turkish society emerged as a secular, westernizing state (p. 9), as the author holds, is an issue that demands study from different angles. The whole question of authority in Turkish culture remains unresolved and needs to be amended by a thorough historical perspective before the position of women and their role vis-à-vis authority can be assessed.

In contrast, the MCs in Arat's study come from economically less affluent families. Their positions bring them little income, thus requiring strong political commitment. They are not always married (as the MPs are); some are widowed, some are divorced and others have remained single. Their socialization took place not so much under a weak father figure as it did under a strong mother figure. Those who married have husbands who support their political involvements. They also worked upward within party organizations. These women voice their concern in proportionally higher numbers about male obstruction and various forms of inequality in Turkish society.

The dynamism based on interactive differences among women in politics in Turkey distinguishes Yeşim Arat's work, and stimulates further research. More work of this kind is needed to deconstruct the myth of Turkish women as a homogeneous group. Scholars of Turkey need to know more about the different types of women in the country, and especially groups like the MCs who can tell us more about women's roles in local politics. In *The Patriarchal Paradox*, Yeşim Arat presents detailed information. Recognizing the limitations of her sample, she does not make sweeping generalizations, but what she points out is striking. At the same time, she is careful to present her

assumptions and her theoretical framework. Arat concludes that "the problem of women's small numbers in politics remains" (p. 123): further research on local politics will indicate whether the issues that Yeşim Arat uncovers have lasting implications for future developments.

Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia

Mahnaz Z. Ispahani

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989, 286 pp., $29.95.

Reviewed by Andrew C. Hess

At a time when one book on Asian politics after another announces the importance of global conflict or disengagement, transnational business along the Asian rim, or communications innovations to span the continent's vast spaces, it is refreshing to have one's feet placed firmly on well-defined ground. This is exactly what Mahnaz Ispahani does in five elegantly written chapters dedicated to understanding the politics of land routes in modern Inner Asia. Also worthy of note is the political context within which this highly informed discussion of Asian geopolitics takes place: each of the Asian states knotted together by the mountainous geography of Central Asia seems bent upon intensive rather than extensive development. Is this book a recasting of archaic Victorian geopolitical concerns or a clairvoyant anticipation of a future Asian Great Game?

Whatever the answer to that question, the author contributes greatly to the understanding of current events by driving the reader to the map. At the core of her study of Inner Asia's political evolution is an examination of how land routes have facilitated political, ideological, economic and social change. But the playing fields for this analysis of the exchange between politics, technology and geography are not the open steppes of Eurasia but the brutal deserts and contorted mountains curving from Baluchistan to Bhutan. Since this is an area of the world that challenges the most advanced civil engineering techniques, it is also possible to study the effects on history and politics of the geographical barrier: the antiroute. Here one must adopt the physical vocabulary of the frontier, and learn not only where Afghanistan is, but also locate such places as Gwadar, Chaman, Gilgit, Aksai Chin, Kodari and other places whose history is preserved more often in lonely cemeteries than in books.

Ispahani's localities are far from being remote in terms of the modern politics of routes in Asia's borderlands. All of them figure in the expansion of access and the declining relevance of difficult terrain as a buffer between the great Asian powers surrounding the state which Ispahani places at the hub of Inner Asian politics: Pakistan.

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To illustrate this point and draw together the lessons of her examination of the development of land routes in the Southern, Central and West Asian frontiers, the author comes to a number of broad conclusions. Clearly, the Soviet entry into Afghanistan provoked a conflict in which the struggle for control over routes proved the importance of access, both for Soviet troops and supplies as well as the Afghan resistance. Yet this same conflict demonstrates as well how the mountainous regions of the Hindu Kush and Pakistan's Northwest Frontier — the area of the Durand Line — no longer act as barriers, as antiroutes.

While twentieth century warfare on the highlands of Inner Asia underlined the enduring but diminishing significance of routes, it is also important to note a corollary: regions employed as antiroutes are increasingly penetrated by modern roads not for the purpose of economic development but rather to meet challenges to security. During the nineteenth century the aridity of Baluchistan and the daunting geography of the northern and western regions of Kashmir attracted little attention in terms of economic possibilities. As reservoirs of tribal politics they occasionally became a battlefield for regional conflict and not much more. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the expansion of Quetta and increased investment in Baluchistan. Early in the post-World War II period, China's attempts to strengthen its position along its Central Asian borders not only provoked the construction of the Karakoram Highway through some of the world's most difficult terrain, but also encouraged expensive economic development in mountainous areas with thin populations. Set in the context of modern politics, these two examples yield a further generalization: once regional conflict becomes linked with international politics, then efforts to expand access increase dramatically, encouraging changes in economic, social and cultural structures.

Not to be ignored either are the demands of state-building in the modern era, as expressed in the growth of access to the internal frontiers of each of the Inner Asian states. Tribes in Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan regularly resist the extension of central authority into their territories via roads in a continuing effort to prolong their autonomy.

Most important, however, the history of modern routes in Inner Asia heralds the rise of new and unstable conjunctions of powers. The greater access of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan removes that country as a buffer between Pakistan and the great power to the northwest. Meanwhile, China continues to expand its control over its borders with India and to penetrate the buffer states along the southern edge of Tibet. Soviet and Chinese expansion has already spawned two regional conflicts, one of which, the Afghan war, has drawn in the United States and its regional allies, while the other has pitted the two future superpowers of Asia, India and China, against each other.

To capture the politics resulting from this closure of Inner Asian frontiers, the author picks Pakistan as the nation at the center of events. Yet all her arguments could equally have been employed in a non-national format had she reinterpreted the frontier arguments of Owen Lattimore and placed Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan among those states being squeezed by the great

European and Asian powers. Similarly, the interesting point concerning the dangerous trade-off that access produces between security and development also needs expansion: the record of states that have restricted access — Afghanistan, Ethiopia, etc. — has not produced evidence that such a policy yields either security or development. Rather, it may intensify problems in both areas. This suggests that the real issue is how political elites manage modernization.

For this reviewer, the value of this excellent study far outweighs any criticisms based upon the scope of its arguments. This book not only anticipates the future politics of Southwest Asia, but also introduces us to a gifted writer.

Revitalizing International Law

Richard A. Falk

Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989, 241 pp., including index and list of publications of the Princeton Center of International Studies, $27.95.

Reviewed by Alfred P. Rubin

Richard A. Falk, Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, is one of the most prolific and original publicists of our generation. This book is a well-conceived and well-organized collection of eleven of his speeches and essays arranged to show the development of his thinking on several different topics. The essays are coherent and well worth some study. The following criticisms represent disagreement only with Falk's model of international society and the role of "law" and "lawyers" in it, not the subtlety of his model or the clarity with which he presents his views.

The first essay is Falk's major statement on the obsolescence of classical thinking, particularly neo-positivism, which he believes dominated international legal thought until recently. Originally published by the *Yale Law Journal* in 1975, it presents neo-naturalism as a "new paradigm" for thinking about international society, representing the wave of the future even though tenaciously resisted by traditionalists. The neo-naturalism he sets out is based on the sociological model of Harold Lasswell as applied to international law by Myres McDougal. The principal point seems to be that the classical distinctions between value-based morality and "law" have eroded (or are eroding) and the legal profession is playing (or should play) an increasing role as the formulator of the new "law." He proposes the general adoption of the "World Order Models Project" as the "central-guidance option" for lawyers, statesmen and anybody else interested in peace, justice and ecological well-being. He views this model as "populist," distinguishing it from the models preferred by governmental elites and successful business people. Since I have serious reservations about the social value-moral insights of lawyers equivalent to the reservations I feel about the moral insights of nearly all "populist" leaders, I have some difficulty understanding the optimism with which this proposal is made.

The link between Falk's liberal values and the popular will seems to me more tenuous than the author would assume. Indeed, Falk mentions McDougal's very "conservative" conclusions regarding American policy as one of the factors leading to what he believes to be wide adoption of this model, while seeming to ignore the corollary that if the model does not help resolve

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arguments about relative values among those adopting it, it cannot be said to lead to much improvement in actual policy choices. Even if it did help in analyzing values for the sake of policy choices, it would still leave unanswered the question of why popularly selected or elected governments would choose to rely on the judgment of lawyers in questions of high policy where clarity of analysis is frequently less important than responsiveness to important constituencies. Falk seems to be arguing that lawyers as a class would do better than political scientists or politicians as a class. It looks more like an argument for intellectual dominance over policy by a group of which Falk is a member than a detached analysis of the intellectual trends of our time. It is also very unlikely to persuade anybody except the lawyers who think they would gain policy control by the argument. Who else would agree with his statement in the second essay, "However haltingly, we are slowly moving toward a world where the jurists will emerge as the new priesthood of a more orderly and fairer world political system" (p. 65)?

Part II consists of two essays lamenting the truly lamentable fact that statesmen in practice seem uninfluenced by their countries' commitment to the provisions of the United Nations Charter forbidding recourse to force except in self-defense. The first, a speech delivered in October 1980, uses as its starting point the failure of any Western political leaders (indeed, anybody at all in the UN) to condemn Iraq as an aggressor for its military action against Iran in September 1980, which started the bloody and futile Gulf War. But Falk never mentions that part of that unwillingness was the political price that Iran was paying for contempt of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) orders requiring Iran to release the American hostages held in Tehran. Despite ICJ provisional measures of December 15, 1979, and judgment of May 24, 1980, the hostages were actually released only in January 1981. The law enforcement system was at work against Iran at the time, and thus Falk's concern that the positive law of the Charter was undermined by the refusal of the other parties to use Charter institutions is difficult to understand; Iran was notoriously and contemptuously violating its own commitments under the same document, particularly its commitment under article 94.1, to comply with the decision of the Court in a case to which it was a party. It is also difficult to take seriously Falk's arguments regarding the need to enhance the capacity of citizens to demand a lawful foreign policy. When proposals were made repeatedly, loudly and vainly during the 1980s to do precisely that by increasing regional activities of the American Society of International Law, the leading organization in the US for international legal education, Falk was among the silent majority in the society. The two essays in this part seem, therefore, somewhat disconnected from the realities which they purport to address.

Part III consists of four essays dealing with the laws of war in relation to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. He is against them all, as we all must be, but finds to be illegal much that is not forbidden by treaty, by custom accepted as law, by general principles recognized by civilized nations, or by the non-polemical writings of publicists. He asserts there to be an

"overwhelming normative consensus now operative in international society [to] *legally* condemn all contemplated roles for nuclear weapons, except possession as a hedge against nuclear blackmail" (emphasis added, p. 111). He finds that conclusion binding on all states by virtue of the de Martens clause of the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions by which cases not covered by the positive rules are stated to be governed by "the general principles of the law of nations, derived from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience." The use of nuclear weapons, like the use of all weapons in war, is greatly restricted by the law based on these and other criteria, but not forbidden. Indeed, the usages of our time and the current dictates of public conscience seem to be as bloody and genocidal as at any time in the history of mankind, with the possible exception of Genghis Khan's campaigns in the Middle East. Nor do the general principles of law or the laws of humanity, if there are any, do more than forbid inflicting superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering in war. Falk's condemnation of a strategy based on mutual assured destruction and targeting cities whose destruction would produce more suffering than military advantage is, in my opinion, correct as a matter of law. It would have been more persuasively argued, however, if based on the positive and natural law instead of on excessive generalities and emotion.

The other three articles in this section are far more powerful because of their moderation. In discussing biological weaponry, Falk exposes the evasive positions taken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Senate Hearings in 1975 and lets them speak for themselves regarding American actions in apparent violation of the Biological Weapons Convention of April 10, 1972. If the reader does not see the mindset leading to the futile and self-defeating mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the Iran-Contra outrage, it is not because of Falk's restraint, but a simple refusal to understand how unrestrained authority inevitably leads to abuses of that authority. His analysis of the risks to world ecology and neutral states in an age in which nuclear war is possible leads to the conclusion that these states have a legal interest in arms control. The argument, by its very moderation, is compelling and well worth reading by all interested in the subject. The concluding article in this section describes attempts to create positive law inhibitions on environmental modification for military purposes and is technically precise and careful in its wording. Annexes to the essays on biological warfare and environmental modification reproduce the essential documents.

The last section, entitled "Accountability," contains two essays, one on human rights as applied to groups (especially so-called indigenous peoples) and the other on the continued importance of the Nuremberg Principles to fix personal accountability on statesmen for their illegal actions taken in a public capacity. The first is essentially a plea that the practice of governments to disregard the established interests of ethnic minorities should be stopped. An underlying assumption is that "governments" are culpable and populations are not, which seems odd seeing that among the principal offenders are the American and Australian governments, about as representative as any on earth.

The plea is more in the line of consciousness-raising than suggesting realistic solutions, unless it is realistic to suggest the replacement of "statist" international law with law pronounced and enforced by lawyers and judges empowered by sources not specified. There is no apparent awareness that for every commission appointed by Sean MacBride, the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize winner, or other good souls, another would be appointed by the majority who fancies it would lose by accepting the reality of indigenous peoples' rights. And the decision as to whose conclusions are to be enforced would be made by people, even if lawyers, who might not agree with Falk's scale of humane values. We seem to have come back to the McDougal approach and the assumption that defies all human experience — that lawyers can reason together and agree on moral values that can be imposed on society as a whole.

The short final essay concludes with a draft pledge of lawyers and jurists to

> . . . work in our professional roles and as citizens for the effective application of the Nuremberg Principles, that acts in violation of these principles are punishable as crimes . . . and that crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity are to be condemned, prevented and prosecuted by the enforcement of international law . . . .[W]e pledge to resist the commission of crimes of state, including especially preparations for war waged with nuclear weapons, and seek the establishment of a legal framework in international society to assure the impartial and rigorous application of the Nuremberg Principles (p. 226).

Well, I guess. But until I know who selects the tribunals or other decision-making bodies, and who defends my interests in the period before they produce a result favorable to my continued existence on a basis that I can agree is "just," I'd prefer to grapple with the devils I know.

Democracy and Its Critics

Robert Dahl

New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989, 397 pp., including notes, appendix, bibliography and index, $29.95.

Reviewed by Arnaud Blin

Robert Dahl, Yale professor and leading political theorist, is certainly not a critic of democracy even if democracy does not entirely escape his own criticisms. In this excellent book, Dahl sets out to define democracy, to show why it is the best form of government, why there are no better alternatives and how democracy as we know it could be improved substantially.

From the outset, the author distinguishes ideal democracy from democracy in the real world. While the former can sit quietly between Plato's *Republic* and Thomas More's *Utopia*, it is the latter which is of interest to us and which Dahl puts through a severe and rigorous examination. While few of us may actually need convincing, the author nevertheless feels compelled to prove his theory of democracy. After more than thirty years of reflection on the topic, Dahl has acknowledged all the criticisms that have come out against democracy since the time of Plato, be they adversarial or sympathetic, and he deals with each of them in a methodological and thorough manner. Fortunately for the reader, Dahl does not attempt to systemize what cannot be reduced to a system. He treats the topic at hand in a very traditional fashion, free of the graphs or mathematical equations he cherished in his earlier books. Using dialogues and dialectics, theoretical reasoning as well as historical evidence, his approach is both normative and empirical.

Democracy has evolved from different sources — classical Greece, Rome and the Italian city-states, the idea and institutions of representative government, and the logic of political equality. Consequently, it is a theory laden with contradictions. Those looking for a picture-perfect doctrine of the state can go back to Marx or Hegel or wait for better days: Dahl does not pretend to offer the ultimate theory, and even as one finishes the book, many questions remain open for debate.

A theory offering many inconsistencies is bound to find a number of critics. Its adversaries question the entire concept while sympathetic critics question certain key aspects. The former include anarchists and proponents of "guardianship," or rule by a superior, chosen elite. Anarchists contend that the state is coercive and as such should be avoided, to which Dahl responds that in the imperfect world we live in, coercion is inevitable and that a good state (i.e. a democratic one) will minimize coercion and be better than no state at all.

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Regarding guardianship, Dahl argues that people have the capacity to rule themselves and that an elite able to make better decisions effectively cannot be created, so "guardianship" is unattainable.

The adversarial critics addressed, the author offers his theory of democracy, or of the democratic process, as he calls it. Producing the best feasible political system, superior to any other in that it promotes freedom and human development as no feasible alternative can, the theory is the "surest way . . . by which human beings can protect and advance the interests and goods they share with others" (p. 311). Dahl advances five criteria which are absolutely necessary if such a democratic process is to exist: effective participation, voting equality at the decisive stage, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and finally, inclusion in the democratic process of all adults except transients and persons proven to be mentally defective.

Dahl seeks then to examine his theory's problems and limits, thereby responding to the second set of critics. Such problems include majority rule and minority domination. He acknowledges the idea that majority rule is an imperfect way of reaching collective decisions. After running through a set of other alternatives, drawn from both theoretical and empirical examples (supermajorities, majorities limited by federalism, consensus), however, Dahl concludes that no single rule for reaching collective decisions is superior to another, and that none, including majority rule, is a prerequisite for the democratic process. Is minority domination inevitable, then, even in a democracy? This theory has been argued thoroughly by people such as Mosca and Pareto, and although Dahl asserts that theories of dominance cannot prove that minority domination is inevitable, he does not provide us with a sweeping counterargument which would invalidate them.

Dahl devotes a significant amount of space to a description of democracy as it is practiced by nation-states in the contemporary world. Since what we usually call democracies fall short of the standards of the democratic process in terms of enlightened understanding or effective participation, for example, and because democracy in Marxist countries has other meanings, Dahl prefers the term *polyarchies*. Broadly speaking, a polyarchy differs from other forms of governments in that participatory citizenship is extended to a higher proportion of adults, whose rights include the opportunity to oppose or vote out of office the highest officials in the government. It can be understood as a set of institutions necessary for large-scale democracy. Polyarchies have developed in societies characterized by modernity and pluralism and tend to last if they can withstand their first twenty years of existence. For the future this means that old polyarchies will probably survive, while recent ones may disappear and new ones emerge.

The book concludes with an interesting description of an advanced (though fictitious) democratic country which would meet more extensively than contemporary polyarchies the five criteria of the democratic process, thereby ensuring real political equality among its citizens. In this state, the gap between policy elites and the people would be narrowed by modern telecommunications, providing greater opportunities for citizens to be well-informed

and to participate. A point which may stir controversy is Dahl's proposal to extend democracy to the economic order or more simply put, the workplace, of his supposed state. One would associate that more with today's authoritarian states than with a democracy; it would seem to have no place in a state characterized by the democratic process.

Dahl concludes that such a state, far from being a utopia, is perfectly feasible in the real world, but would require an involved government with sufficient political resources to grant its citizens equal participation. To achieve this political equality the state would concentrate on reducing causes of strong political inequalities such as those "caused to an important degree by the distribution of economic resources, positions, and opportunities and by the distribution of knowledge, information and cognitive skills" (p. 324).

This book comes as close to a complete treatment of democracy as possible. It is bound to become a classic on the subject as well as an indispensable tool for future generations of political scientists. Democratic theory is riddled with problems, and many will still be debated in the future, but knowing what they are will undoubtedly enhance our comprehension of what democracy is, where it comes from, and where it is going.

Liberalism and the Moral Life

Edited by Nancy L. Rosenblum

Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1989, 302 pp., including index, $32.50.

Reviewed by Mark Tunick

In the 1988 US presidential campaign "liberal" became a pejorative label intended to identify those indifferent to or even skeptical of shared values and traditions. Liberals defend the rights of individuals to pursue their own conception of the good life, and this means opposing practices and laws that impose on some what is but one view of the world. Critics charge liberals with subverting our shared traditions and values with a nihilism made palatable by the idea that "pluralism" is in fact being defended. Yet in international politics liberal democracy is praised by these same critics as the antidote to a fatally-flawed Marxist utopianism. As Nancy Rosenblum points out in her introduction to this new volume of essays, the challenge faced by modern political theorists who defend liberalism is nowadays posed not mainly by Marxists, but by Catholics, civic republicans and communitarians who uphold "traditions of shared meanings," which liberalism is said to subvert (p. 4). The essays in this collection, all written by leading political theorists who defend some version of liberalism, take up more or less directly the question of whether liberalism can defend with consistency a conception of the moral life.

It is easy to see the difficulty liberals face by considering the problem of ethical relativism. Are domestic critics of liberals, who are willing to go to war to fight oppressive practices in other countries, and yet defend their own society's traditions and customs, acting paradoxically? Are they advocating liberalism in international affairs, but on the home-front an antiliberal provincialism, or communitarianism? Isn't the critic of liberalism who defends, for example, laws proscribing homosexual sodomy by appealing to our Judeo-Christian tradition, committed by the demands of consistency to accepting what counts as tradition in any society, even if that tradition is cruel and oppressive?

In her essay, "The Liberalism of Fear," Judith Shklar offers a conception of liberalism that offers a coherent defense to the liberal-critic. Shklar's view of liberalism is a political doctrine that wishes to secure "freedom from the abuse of power and intimidation of the defenseless" (p. 27). Guided by this principle, liberals must reject particular traditions, such as the Indo-European caste system, but need not take any particular view of tradition in general. Under-

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stood in this way, liberalism can criticize traditions of cruelty. The liberal is committed neither to uphold what has always existed as habit or custom, nor to reject traditions which, while reflecting a particular conception of the good life, do not intimidate or instill fear. While this approach may be helpful, the principle does not offer enough certainty to practitioners who need to determine the limits of justified state coercion: the state may act justly to reduce fear and cruelty. This rules out state-inflicted torture, but does it exclude legal punishment? Shklar suggests that punishment is justified to prevent greater cruelty, yet does this help us decide whether to punish the flagburner or the woman who has an abortion?

Benjamin Barber ("Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent") is dissatisfied with Shklar's "negative" view of liberalism. Where Shklar argues that liberalism opposes cruelty and fear, Barber thinks liberalism should be *for* something, specifically, a "healthy politics of community" (p. 60). Shklar finds room in liberalism for a moral life based on non-oppression, but Barber defends a liberalism with a far more vivacious and positive moral life. (Shklar, to be fair, confesses that the "liberalism of fear" she describes is less exhilarating, but more *urgent*, given the pervasive cruelties in the world (p. 38). This requires a reconceptualization of liberalism that no longer sees the centrality of consent. Liberalism, as commonly understood, is often considered anti-republican because, argues Barber, it depends on the idea of consent: laws of practices are justified not because they reflect the wisdom of the ages, as Burke argued, but because we consent to them. Barber thinks a politics based on individual consent is destructive of the republic because "it obstructs common willing" (p. 59), rather than seeing ourselves as fellow members sharing a public space, we care only to protect our own privacy. Barber's solution is an alternative view of liberalism founded on participation rather than consent. In his often inspiring and richly metaphoric essay ("chirping away from his solitary branch against the din of rival birds [the libertarian] produces only cacophony," p. 65), Barber calls for a liberalism that is consistent with republicanism, with a strong sense of community and shared values achieved by a participation going beyond mere consent by voting. He adds that mere involvement is not enough. We have to come to use "we language" not "me language" (p. 65). At times Barber seems to cross over that indeterminate boundary distinguishing liberals and communitarians, and seems subject to one of the criticisms Stephen Holmes, in his essay against antiliberals, casts upon the latter: vagueness. What precisely is entailed in realizing a republic of "We's"? A change in consciousness? Compelling Jehova's Witnesses to pledge the flag (cf. p. 231)?

A separate objection common to consent-based liberalism, such as Locke's, is that individuals are already born into a community and are shaped by its customs and habits. Values are not chosen; they are given to us and shape who we are. Locke's picture of a state of nature from which individuals emerge to make a social contract is rejected by communitarians who argue that individuals never exist outside society but are shaped by it. We can not literally consent to what shapes us.

In a difficult (though lucid) essay that makes an important contribution to the liberal-communitarian debate, Charles Taylor shows how to defend a liberalism that nevertheless accepts the communitarian critique of Locke's idea of a pre-social individual. Locke had what Taylor calls an "atomistic ontology," a view of community as nothing but a collection of isolated individuals which Taylor rejects in favor of a holistic ontology that sees individuals as situated in communities which help shape who they are. Atomistic liberalism can neither account for patriotism, nor the sense of community identity manifest in such events as citizen outrage at Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair. Taylor defends a liberalism that accounts for such phenomena, but which nevertheless advocates individualist, as opposed to collectivist, political values. By separating out the distinct issues of ontology and advocacy, Taylor shows how a liberal advocating pluralism and individual rights can nevertheless believe that individuals aren't atoms but are socially shaped.

Stephen Holmes makes much the same point in saying that liberalism is a political doctrine advocating individualism; it is not a descriptive sociology denying that man is a social animal. Liberals may demand a judge to ignore a race or religion but do not claim being black or Catholic is irrelevant to a person's life (cf. p. 239).

Liberalism and the Moral Life is an important new contribution to liberal thought. It encourages and helps us to rethink what it is to be a liberal.

International Institutions and State Power

Robert O. Keohane

Boulder and London: Westview Press, 270 pp., including index, $38.50.

Reviewed by Tamsin Smith

Robert O. Keohane's most recent publication, *International Institutions and State Power*, beckons and enlightens both sophisticated scholar and new student. The book is a self-directed retrospective of the intellectual development during the past decade of a leading theorist in international relations. This collection of essays examines international relations through the lens of what Keohane calls "Neoliberal Institutionalism." A conceptual framework focusing on the institutionalized character of world politics, it seeks to account for the existence of post-hegemonic cooperation through an exploration of the relationship between political power and economic interdependence. Keohane prescribes domestic politics, "path-dependence" (the inertial determinants of a state's policy) and historicity as variables that must be incorporated systematically into any study of changing patterns of cooperation. In order to facilitate such an analysis, he adopts a microeconomic approach, centering upon the origins, functions and interactive implications of international relations.

Chapter one, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," delineates and defends Keohane's core approach to world politics and its emphasis on international institutions. He argues that though international systems admittedly lack centralized authority, and states continue to be the primary actors in contemporary world affairs, the institutionalization of patterns of cooperation and discord cannot be discounted as an influential factor in the analysis of world politics. State actions are dependent upon and, in many cases, defined by both formal and informal understandings of institutional behavior. Established rules, norms or conventions provide the necessary frameworks and channels for the creation of international agreements. Keohane defends the Neoliberal Institutionalist as one who recognizes the difficulty of attaining or maintaining international agreements, made possible only through cooperative and communicative opportunities.

Whereas chapter one introduces the reader to Keohane's study of politics through theory, chapter two describes the author's outlook through personal intellectual history. This account of the author's thoughts, hopes, experiences and expectations as a student of political interaction is both interesting and illuminating, as it states explicitly the normative justification for his research. Keohane writes:

> We study world politics not because it is easily amenable to scientific investigation, but because human welfare, the fate of our

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> species, and the future of the fragile global ecology itself depend on the ability of human beings to cope successfully with economic interdependence, nuclear weapons, and the world environment (p. 21).

The essays in part one reflect an increasing awareness of and emphasis upon the significance and complexity of institutions as the impetus for action in world affairs. After an effective critique of neorealism, chapter three defines a method of analysis which retains the characteristic simplicity of structural realism and its emphasis on power, but also focuses on the systemic contexts and structural components that influence human behavior and may provide a basis for insight and prediction. The tendencies of complex interdependence are such that incentives and restraints may originate less from sources of power per se than from variations in systemic characteristics, such as levels and quality of information.

Microeconomic theory is a current that runs through Keohane's essays and provides a practical framework of data upon which to build a more integrated understanding of international relations. Chapters four, five and six bring these economic influences into bold relief. Chapter four examines the degree to which shifts in power can account for patterns of change in international economic regimes between 1967 and 1977. The causal argument of hegemonic stability theory is disproved by historical instances in which changes in trade do not always correspond to changes in the international political structure. In chapter five, the rational-choice tradition of hegemonic stability theory is discredited again as an origin of international regimes. The metaphor of supply and demand in the world's uncertain political marketplace is used to explain the reciprocal relationship between powerful and less powerful regimes; such supply and demand revolves around the source and desire for high-quality information, internalized norms of honesty and open, more inclusive governmental relationships.

While the essays in part one seek to clarify theory, the essays that comprise part two strive to connect theoretical inquiry with historical analysis. Chapter eight examines economic growth and political disintegration in antebellum America. Chapter nine focuses on oil policy in the 1940s and chapter ten examines US foreign economic policy in the 1950s. These final "historical" chapters illustrate the impact of domestic sources of policy, which are capable of both thwarting and shaping governmental initiatives on system structure. Keohane argues that it was America's cold war strategy of hegemonic leadership that led to its "self-liquidation" and permitted a transfer of trade dominance to Europe, Japan and the Middle East. He laments that America in the 1960s and 1970s continued to cling to an irreconcilably defunct policy instead of working to regroup and reconsider its position in terms of domestic necessity. Likewise, America in the 1980s continues to resist change and is in similar danger. Keohane warns:

> Internal measures — to adjust to change, to build up industrial strength through investment and technological development to bring energy consumption and production more closely into balance

> — are necessary conditions for successful reassertion of U.S. leadership. As in the 1950s, interdependence can be managed only if the resources are available, if investments in national power, as well as in wealth, have been made. If capabilities are lacking, slogans about leadership will be to no avail (p. 253).

Keohane's call for renewed interest in and attention to international organizations, regimes and conventions is not only of significant theoretical importance, but its contemporary utility is all the more undeniable as 1992 draws closer. The issue-linkages that Keohane sets out as a source of mutual-interest negotiations can only be realized through institutionalized cooperation; therefore, Neoliberal Institutionalism may prove to have great applicability to issues of security. The author's most satisfying essays are those that join theory and analysis because it is through his historical critiques and present-day characterizations that the reader is most able to recognize the validity of Keohane's ideas. While the essays do overlap to a certain extent, the collection as a whole is pertinent, informative and thought-provoking.

The Soviet Naval Threat to Europe: Military and Political Dimensions

Edited by Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. Watson

Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, 383 pp., including index, $46.50.

Reviewed by Graham M. Kinahan

Bruce and Susan Watson have produced an important single-volume study documenting the evolving nature of the Soviet naval threat to the security of Europe. The well-researched chapters, contributed by a host of European and American experts such as John Erickson, William F. and Harriet Fast Scott, Siegfried Breyer, and Jean Labayle-Couhat, make for a work that is both broad in scope and rich in detail. The authors successfully synthesize the diverging opinions on this complex subject into an intelligent and highly readable volume.

The central theme of *The Soviet Naval Threat to Europe* is that, while NATO maritime forces are getting weaker, "the Soviets are building a 'world-class' navy, one that has great flexibility, great power, and global reach" (p. 319). For example, the latest generation of surface and sub-surface combatants can support a variety of missions; Soviet naval strategists can now contemplate more than the traditional "sea-denial" role for their fleets. With so much evidence of change in the Soviet navy, it is unclear what the best strategy for the Western Alliance should be. The editors point out that measuring Soviet capabilities is only part of the equation. The Soviet navy's mission and how well it jockeys for limited budgetary resources must also be taken into account.

Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, director of naval intelligence, has written that "in times of prosperity, when outside forces did not threaten, Moscow has turned to building navies," both in the early 1950s and under Brezhnev. "When the economy failed or a threat arose on the border, the navy languished," as for example, during two decades after the revolution, under Khrushchev, and possibly under Gorbachev as well.[1]

In a chapter on Soviet naval strategy, Peter Tsouras speculates that the Soviet navy curtailed its global operations to concentrate its assets closer to Europe and Northeast Asia. Furthermore, by adopting a plan of "fleet against the shore" — striking at the enemy's presumed point of weakness — the USSR will exacerbate problems for Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, countries that have scaled back the size of their navies. The news, however, is not all bad. The authors indicate that the Soviets apparently need improve-

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1. Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, US Navy, "A Nuclear War-Fighting Treatise," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (May 1989): 136.

ment in several areas: they lack carrier-based air cover, good command and control (especially to coordinate with other Warsaw Pact navies), and solid decision-making ability at the navy mid-management level.

Sections of the Watsons' book include a review of Soviet naval strategy, hardware, operations and the threat to individual nations from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, providing a veritable *tour d'horizon* of the role and missions of the Soviet navy. The pictures, tables, and appendices serve to highlight various aspects of what is already a highly readable text. This book complements more technical and authoritative works, such as *Jane's Fighting Ships* and *Combat Fleets of the World.* The book includes a handy listing of enemy order of battle for the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. In addition to a concise chapter on mine warfare, A. D. Baker III has compiled a complete listing of Soviet ship type designators, in both Russian and English, and a listing of the ship classes within each designator.

For all of its strengths, this book has at least one serious shortcoming. Having gone to press just as the full impact of significant political and economic changes was being felt in the Soviet Union, the authors were not able to defend their thesis against new pronouncements on naval matters emanating from Moscow. Specifically, the editors and contributors note that with Fleet Admiral Vladimir N. Chernavin at the helm, the Soviet navy is bound to grow in new directions, but they missed an opportunity to comment on the Moscow publication of *The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment*, a late 1988 publication representing the "old" thinking, authored by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov.

Given the context of the newly proclaimed Soviet "defensive doctrine," the Soviet navy must compete actively with ground forces in the debate over what level of military force is "reasonably sufficient." Gorshkov's *The Navy* clearly does not represent what is acceptable to those who may become dominant in Soviet military doctrine. Nevertheless, *The Navy* is an important addition to the ongoing debate because it attempts to articulate what role the Soviet navy should play in new national missions. The analyst Michael MccGwire has said,

> [I]n 1983, the Soviets finally acknowledged that the assumptions that had shaped foreign policy since 1971 were no longer valid. They could not evade the fact that in restructuring their forces to better avoid nuclear escalation in the event of world war, the Soviets had greatly increased tension, thereby making such a war more likely.[2]

Since Moscow now believes security and superpower status are to be achieved through economic strength and diplomatic stature, the former missions of the Soviet navy have been reworded and reordered to accommodate changing times.

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2. Michael MccGwire, "Gorshkov's Navy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (September 1989): 44.

The jury is still out, but it would appear that under Gorbachev, military security will be achieved via the twin instruments of arms control and a doctrine of defensive sufficiency. Moreover, Soviets will try to reduce Western military strength through negotiation and by minimizing their threat, thus encouraging the West's military alliances to splinter. If successful, the Soviet Union may still achieve net military advantages, but at a much lower cost.

The real question is then, does *The Soviet Naval Threat to Europe*, like Gorshkov's *The Navy*, reflect the "old political thinking" that Mikhail Gorbachev has been so determined to jettison? If so, then it does not reflect the radical reorientation of military doctrine that many would argue was decided by early 1987 and expressed in Gorbachev's United Nations speech in December 1988, where he announced unilateral force reductions.

Despite this omission, Bruce and Susan Watson have compiled a valuable guide, especially for those who wish to know more about Soviet naval hardware, and the maritime policies and geopolitical outlook of the fifteen countries surveyed.

Russia Observed: Collected Essays on Russian and Soviet History

Richard Pipes

Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, 240 pp., with index, $32.95.

Reviewed by Daniel Satinsky

Perestroika, *glasnost* and *democratsia* have spawned a minor cottage industry for academics engaged in Soviet studies. Suddenly, the stodgy, staid Soviet Union is witnessing profound change, and a torrent of publications has followed. In light of the continuing developments, there has been an unavoidable tendency to evaluate each new publication on the Soviet Union on the basis of how well it explains current behavior.

Russia Observed does not fall into the genre of quick fix explanations of the Gorbachev reform era. Rather, it illustrates a methodology for historical analysis, utilized by Pipes throughout his career, which is relevant to understanding the current climate in the Soviet Union. The material, which spans the length of Pipes' academic career, ranges from "The Russian Military Colonies, 1810-1831," written in 1950, to "Catherine II and the Jews: The Origins of the Pale of Settlement," which appeared in the journal *Soviet Jewish Affairs* in 1975.

These essays address a variety of topics from disparate historical eras: from pre-revolutionary historical topics such as Russian treatment of the Jews under Catherine II to questions of intellectual history, as in essays on the relationship of Lenin's ideas in his formative years to the broader Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, and on the application of Max Weber's sociological analysis to pre-revolutionary Russia. Three essays treat the post-revolutionary problems of the Soviet multi-national state.

Despite the variety of the subject matter, the principal value of this work, and the thread that holds it together, is the methodology of historical analysis. In his introduction, Pipes describes the beginnings of his career during the early Cold War years. At that time, two general theories of methodology competed in explaining Soviet behavior. One school, propounded by the majority at the Russian Research Center at Harvard in the 1950s, when Pipes joined it, relied heavily on sociological models. The other school, which Pipes favored, championed the use of historical methodology. Pipes writes that he "belonged to a small minority which held that a nation's behavior is shaped mainly by its historical experience and the unique culture that results from it, and that one can no more deduce this behavior from sociological models

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than understand an individual's behavior from generalizations about 'human nature'" (p. 3).

Seen from this point of view, the essays represent pieces of historical inquiry designed not only to illuminate the past, but to draw lessons for the future. This accounts for the polemical tone in some of them. Professor Pipes is not just explicating some historical process, he is also searching for what he sees as the unique historical and cultural contours of Russian history. Taken together, the essays constitute a polemic against what Pipes considers false conclusions regarding Russian or Soviet behavior.

The utility of the historical method is perhaps best illustrated in the 1955 essay "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects." Based on admittedly scanty evidence from interviews with refugees from the region and upon historical analysis, Pipes suggested that the area would grow in importance as an internal problem and that the new nationalities formed under Soviet nationality policy would ultimately prove disruptive for the Soviet state. These conclusions, which ran counter to the conventional wisdom of the period, prophesied recent developments in the region.

It seems clear that historical analysis is crucial to any comprehensive view of Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Whatever the reader may think of Pipes' early Cold War viewpoint, many will agree that evaluation of the present must rest upon an appreciation of the past. For instance, how much of what is occurring now is in fact "new," and how much is a reassertion of historic Russian or non-Russian forces? Is the current wave of nationalism something new, or merely a re-emergence of trends from the pre-Soviet period? What has been the role of bureaucracy in the construction of the Russian and Soviet states? Is authoritarianism an inherently Russian cultural and political characteristic? Was the Russian state, and is its successor, inherently expansionist? One's conclusions regarding these and other similar historical, political and cultural questions are crucial to a critical understanding of the dizzying events in today's Soviet Union.

Russia Observed certainly will be of primary interest to specialists for its commentaries on several narrow topics in Russian history. It is fair to say that essays such as "Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry" and "The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir Republic, 1917-1920," would appeal mostly to specialists. But to take this narrow, superficial view would be to miss the broader value of the collection taken as a whole.

Russia Observed does not provide answers to questions about the nature of the Soviet state and its future, but it does present the reader with a critical framework for answering them. This framework, and the insightful presentation of the subject matter, make this a valuable contribution to the field of Soviet studies.

Hitler's Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS

Gerhard Rempel

Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989, 354 pp., $39.95.

Reviewed by Emily Copeland

Hitler was obsessed with youth as a political force in history. In 1933, he said:

> I am beginning with the young. We older ones are used up . . . . We are rotten to the marrow. We have no restrained instincts left. We are cowardly and sentimental. We are bearing the burden of a humiliating past, and have in our blood the dull recollection of serfdom and servility. But my magnificent youngsters! Are there finer ones anywhere in the world? Look at these young men and boys! What material! With them I can make a new world (pp. 1-2).

Indeed, the National Socialist (Nazi) party was a party of the young. Gerhard Rempel documents how extensive political indoctrination and bureaucratic organization channeled the energy, drive and commitment of the young in support of Hitler's brazen challenge to humanity and the European balance of power. He argues that the social, political and military resilience of the Third Reich was inconceivable without the Hitler Youth (HJ) and its ability to replenish the ranks and prevent the growth of mass opposition.

The author focuses his analysis on the close relationship which developed between the HJ and Heinrich Himmler's notorious Schutzstaffeln (SS). The former offered a renewable source of politically-conditioned recruits, while the elite SS could offer attractive career opportunities in the exclusive Black Corps. The HJ also proved to be an important tool in implementing the party's program of social control and its economic, agrarian and demographic policies. By the time membership became compulsory in 1939, over 82 percent of all youth between the ages of fourteen and eighteen were already involved in the organization and its affiliates. Through contact with the HJ and, by default with the SS, a generation of German youths became the willing if perhaps naïve implementors of the atrocities ordered by the government.

Rempel's analysis centers on the relationship between two branches of the HJ and the SS. The first of these, the Streifendienst (SRD), or Patrol Service, was established in 1933 as a means to pursue ideological and social deviants, political opponents and non-conformists among German youth. The main

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"enemies" to be pursued were the Catholic youth groups or remnants of non-Nazi youth organizations. SRD objectives were the same as those of the SS within the Nazi movement, including racial indoctrination and suppression of dissent, disloyalty and deviance — in short, social control. SRD candidates had to pass stiff physical and racial standards which also qualified them for admittance to the SS. By 1941 it was clear the SRD was an instrument of SS influence within the HJ, serving as a "feeder organization" for funneling recruits to the SS. All training was conducted by the SS. Indeed, in 1943 the SRD leadership announced that preparation for combat in the SS was now the SRD's principal task. In assessing the effectiveness of the SRD, the author argues that the totalitarian imperative of the HJ could never have been achieved since there was bound to be a "youthful" degree of resistance. Yet, the Nazis were able to impose a degree of control on the young which few societies have been able to match.

Created in 1934, the Landdienst (LD) or Land Service represented the youthful contribution to the Nazi program of reconstructing a racially pure agrarian aristocracy. Practically, the program helped absorb healthy, unemployed urban youth in labor-intensive agricultural activities. Socially, it strove to mix urban and rural youth and imbue them with a desirable character forged by hard work, severe discipline and simple lifestyle. Once youth had discovered such a lifestyle, the argument went, they would remain in the countryside and halt the "flight from the land." By 1937 the HJ had consolidated its position so that the LD was recognized as the exclusive agency for all forms of group agrarian assistance.

Himmler saw an opportunity to utilize the LD in implementing the SS policy of settling Germany's frontiers with properly indoctrinated young peasants. In 1939, a new program distinguished between those boys who would be trained as potential "defense-peasants" and the rest who would tend the fields, introducing a class distinction which contradicted the LD's earlier egalitarian aims. The program enticed youth by promising them free land from the newly-conquered territories in the East. Rempel argues that the SS diverted the Land Service from its long-range economic and social goals into the military might needed to make these future "homesteads" available. The book highlights the degree to which Himmler's demographic engineering policies depended on the HJ and the Association of German Girls (BDM). The HJ and the BDM, for example, participated very eagerly in the "Germanizing" activities in the conquered territories in the East. Under the auspices of the BDM Eastern Action, women moved into the frontier areas to help in the fields, and to teach and explain Germanic values and culture. Rempel concludes that while such work was socially progressive in its practical expression, it was anchored in racist preconceptions. Such policies forcibly established Germanic dominance by displacing people deemed inferior. Thus, the HJ served as a convenient adjunct to Himmler's disastrous goals.

Even with the deepening manpower crisis as the war progressed, the SS was able to assure itself of more than its fair share of recruits. The strong connection between it and the HJ transformed the Land Patrol and the Land

Service into a large pool of talented young labor for the SS. Of course, SS influence over the HJ and its members had limitations; many youth continued to join the army. Nevertheless, HJ leaders continued to work closely with SS leaders and ideals.

The HJ was one of the "successes" of national socialism, for as a result of the socialization the great majority of youth remained enthusiastic for a cause that eventually lost its attraction for older generations. Rempel estimates that 95 percent of the younger generation remained faithful to National Socialist goals and to the war effort even after the disaster at Stalingrad. He reasons that this was possible only through the "experience in the self-contained Hitler Youth . . . which had . . . created a common faith in the rightness of their cause . . . and engendered a loyalty and conformity which brooked relatively little deviation" (p. 105). The author describes the HJ as a generation of misguided idealists whose loyalty was abused in the name of perverted ideals. The HJ generation experienced an unusual form of socialization characterized by intense regimentation and forceful indoctrination. It constricted youthful spontaneity and deflected the thirst for action into mechanized competition and limitless warfare.

Rempel has done an excellent job of compiling a detailed account of the HJ-SS bureaucratic linkages. He proves that the growth of the two depended upon their active collaboration. Perhaps by design, his account is devoid of any explanation as to why youth and their parents were initially so receptive to the HJ. What were the conditions which enabled the HJ, before membership was compulsory, to attract over 82 percent of youth? Once these young men realized what their work actually entailed, did that information not filter back to the rest of the youth? In sum, however, Rempel has produced a scholarly contribution which increases our understanding of the structures which Hitler built to implement national socialism in Germany.

The CIA and American Democracy

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, 338 pp., including notes, bibliography and index, $25.00.

America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society

Loch K. Johnson

New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 344 pp., including bibliography and index, $24.95.

Reviewed by Alexander C. Kemos

The transition between the Reagan and Bush administrations is an excellent point from which to examine the history of the Central Intelligence Agency and the role of intelligence gathering in a democratic society. Most significantly, the expansion of the CIA will likely be viewed as an eight-year period during which the cowboys came back to rule Langley. Furthermore, it is a period reminiscent of what Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones calls the "Golden Age of Operations," the decade of the 1950s, when Kermit Roosevelt, an unemployed mob and a briefcase of money could topple governments.

The challenges posed to a democratic society by a necessarily secretive intelligence apparatus are addressed in two books, *The CIA and American Democracy*, by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, and *America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society* by Loch K. Johnson. Three themes emerge in Jeffreys-Jones' work. The first is the internal debate between liberals and conservatives regarding estimates of Soviet military and economic strength from the 1950s to the 1970s. The second involves the extent to which each president has used the CIA as a scapegoat for failed executive initiatives, as did President Kennedy in the Bay of Pigs operation. A third illustrates the agency's lack of an independent bureaucratic status within the executive branch, with a direct line to the president and members of the cabinet.

Jeffreys-Jones adopts a chronological approach, beginning with the liberal-conservative debate which first appeared during the McCarthy years and then re-emerged during the "missile gap" episode. This debate revealed the friction between those who wished to view Soviet intentions and capabilities from a Cold War perspective, and those who came to believe (correctly) that the CIA

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overestimated Soviet military spending and ballistic missile levels. The author notes that CIA director John Foster Dulles deliberately placed his organization's missile estimates in the area of those made by the Departments of State, Defense, and the Air Force, because of the political necessity to compete with rival intelligence entities. Despite the National Security Act of 1947, which placed the CIA at the head of the "intelligence community," other government agencies continue to gather their own intelligence. *The CIA and American Democracy* describes many instances in which each agency was more concerned with embarassing one of the others in front of the president than with compiling accurate information. Jeffreys-Jones believes that this problem continued to plague the CIA well into the 1980s. Some policymakers have chosen to ignore the CIA altogether. Henry Kissinger, for example, requested information from the agency as raw data untouched by CIA analysts, preferring to interpret events himself.

The Golden Age of Operations of the 1950s and 1960s was followed by the age of congressional oversight and the Reagan era. After 1975 and the period of congressional inquiry, the author maintains that the CIA suffered a period where the recovery of its "good name" (p. 212) was endangered by the policies of the Carter administration, which viewed the agency with "suspicion and restriction" (p. 220). Stansfield Turner, during his tenure as director of central intelligence, favored technology as a source of raw intelligence at the expense of human sources of intelligence, which were considered a distasteful and often dishonorable means of gathering information. This shift placed a strong, perhaps excessive, emphasis on overhead imaging (satellites) and communications intercepts. The latter are the province of the National Security Agency, a more secretive organization that enjoys a larger budget. The great irony of this attempt to sanitize the agency is that the personnel released by Turner were rehired as contract employees during the early 1980s to provide expertise for the CIA's operations under the Reagan doctrine.

Jeffreys-Jones states that "the purpose of this book is to examine those factors which have increased or diminished the effectiveness of the US Central Intelligence Agency" (p. 1). In this sense, Jeffreys-Jones has succeeded. However, this objective is accomplished by scrutinizing bureaucratic and political relationships in Washington, rather than by identifying the new and pressing issues America faces today, such as terrorism, the changing threat posed by the Soviet Union, narcotics and economic relations. Indeed, the preface adequately summarizes the book as "an attempt to fulfill the need for an independent, scholarly appraisal of the Central Intelligence Agency's history and role. It contains no sensational revelations, proceeds in an orthodox chronological manner, and rests on documentary and verifiable sources" (p. ix.). Unfortunately, the serious student of intelligence will find no new ground broken.

Loch K. Johnson makes similar observations concerning the power of politics and personality in charting the effectiveness of the CIA throughout various administrations. In *America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society*, Johnson avoids the chronological narrative of Jeffreys-Jones. Instead, he con-

siders the problems of intelligence gathering in a democratic society from the external and internal perspectives. The problems of collection, analysis, and dissemination, or "the Pathologies of the Intelligence Cycle," are viewed first from the standpoint of operations overseas, which are not the main emphasis of the book, and then from the perspective of the contribution the CIA can make to democracy in the United States. The mission of the CIA "is to seek and report the truth to policymakers [sic] so they may better serve the people" (p. 59). To illustrate the obstacles that hinder this contribution, Johnson presents the seven deadly sins of strategic intelligence: the failure to provide policymakers with objective intelligence; the disregard by policymakers for such objective intelligence when it is available; the massive volume of information generated by computers and technical means; the reckless use of covert action; the inadequate protection of intelligence officers overseas; the improper use of intelligence in the US; and the lack of adequate accountability in the intelligence community. After outlining the seven sins, Johnson goes on to say that "at higher levels . . . the CIA is now probably the most closely watched agency in the national security establishment; the FBI, NSA, and others have escaped comparable attention" (p. 74). The challenge to discover "the appropriate balance between 'micromanagement' and proper democratic control" (p. 75) is the subject which occupies the remainder of the book.

The actions taken by Stansfield Turner were an effort to resolve the perceived excesses and shortcomings of both case officers and their sources. The emphasis on technical collection was designed partly to ease the increasing problems posed by covert action in foreign countries, particularly in cases where such operations were divorced from reality. In such instances technical instruments were to become impartial observers and reporters of events on the ground. The Iranian Revolution proved to be a perfect backdrop for such changes: US support for the shah and the misreading of Khomeini's following resulted in bureaucratic paralysis that Iran interpreted as tacit support for the discredited Pahlavi regime.

Despite Turner's policies, the Reagan administration poured money and personnel into the CIA. The renewed emphasis on operations facilitated a foreign policy driven by covert action. The mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the covert sale of weapons to Iran and CIA support for the contras reflected a relationship between executive and legislative branches of government that had been "subverted by unreported covert action" (p. 225).

Johnson argues that the effectiveness of legislative, executive and internal oversight of the CIA is influenced by "personality, experience, structure, and environment" (p. 229). The personality of William Casey and his close friendship with President Reagan guaranteed an atmosphere of adversity and suspicion between the White House and Capitol Hill. This, combined with the structure of the CIA, makes it the "most impermeable federal organization" (p. 232) in Washington today.

A review of the instruments in the oversight process reveals that executive branch organs such as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), and the National Security

Council (NSC), are "three blind mice" (p. 236), and indeed are often active in circumventing legislative restrictions such as the Boland Amendment. Furthermore, there is evidence that internal CIA legal counsel and the inspector general were unaware of the NSC-CIA-White House troika. Instead, Johnson places his faith in the House and Senate intelligence committees to regulate the intelligence community. Regulation and limitation of covert action should be established by "legislators, scholars, and others interested in intelligence policy" (p. 254). Congress should ensure that these limits are observed as it "must further insist on regular hearings, random program audits, and *overseas inspections of CIA operations*" (emphasis added, p. 254).

It is here that Johnson's allegiance becomes obvious. As an ex-Senate Intelligence Committee staffer, he is partial to Congress in this battle. This in itself does not preclude a book with an interesting presentation: Johnson raises interesting points and presents intelligence problems with clarity and perception. His proposed solutions, however, are disappointing. They are recycled legislative wish-lists that would reinforce the CIA's distrust for Congress and vice-versa. "Overseas investigations of CIA operations" would add to the burden on embassy personnel. Imagine a group of Congressmen dropping in on a clandestine meeting in the Middle East: "Pardon me, Mr. Abbas, but would you mind telling my committee about . . . ."

Such a recommendation is also not at all consistent with the author's concern with micromanagement. In reality, the problems between the agency, the executive branch, and Congress are symptomatic of a larger dispute: the ability of the executive to retain some perogative in the conduct of foreign affairs and secret diplomacy. The first part of this dispute concerns the battle for the attention of the president by political appointees and career diplomatic and intelligence specialists. The second is the need to reconcile expedient and privileged executive decisions with the requirements of constitutionality as well as the growing foreign policy fiefdom of legislators.

This is not to be interpreted as an excuse to scorn the law or lawmakers. The Iran-Contra episode demonstrates that the executive branch will circumvent almost any legislative restriction if it so wishes. Johnson correctly questions the relationship between a secret intelligence service and a democracy. Complete executive control of the CIA is antithetical to the ideals of democracy. However, the increasing layers of public and political oversight that are part of congressional involvement is another matter altogether. Such proposals do not solve the problem. They may in fact compound it.

New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Procurement Muddle

Thomas L. McNaugher

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989, 251 pp., including index, $34.95 hardcover and $14.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Gary D. Grant

The unveiling of the Stealth bomber, the B-2, demonstrated the degree to which the technology in our weapons systems has advanced. The aircraft is reported to be almost invisible to Soviet radar. Its reduced radar signature results from a combination of exciting and innovative engineering concepts and high-technology breakthroughs such as the asymmetrical layout of the engine ducts, the use of radar-resistant composite materials, and the unique design of the wings' trailing edge. Yet this uniquely constructed aircraft does more than demonstrate the high state of the art of the US military aerospace industry: it has become the looking-glass into the excesses, intentionally or not, of the weapons acquisition process. At an estimated price tag of upwards of $537 million per unit, it became almost unfathomable to imagine why any weapon would be developed with such a stratospheric price tag.

The flaws in the US weapons acquisition process is the subject which Thomas L. McNaugher addresses in *New Weapons, Old Politics*. McNaugher begins with a chronological analysis of this process, starting with the structure of the system in the days after World War I and then describing the major reform periods in the years that followed. Within the chronology he introduces the flaws which, with only minor changes, have become consistent and debilitating factors in this process. Foremost among them is the conundrum of technology. How does an advanced nation, whose military might is predicated on employing the most sophisticated, and thereby the deadliest, weapons systems, manage the research, development and procurement of these systems?

Weaponry that uses mature technology can be developed within a bureaucratic or governmental framework, but mature technology does not necessarily bring about the most sophisticated weaponry, and consequently might be less than superior to that of one's enemies. Since the Soviet Union has numerically superior forces, technological parity for the US is not adequate. On the other hand, weapons that employ high technology, that push the edge of the research envelope, are extremely difficult to develop in a structured environment. Without condemning the system, McNaugher more than hints that the most successful past weapons purchases have occurred outside the bureaucratic controls that have grown up around the US defense industry. In the early days

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of aircraft development (1920-1945), technology evolved too fast for the government to regulate adequately the design requirements process; it was the aircraft firms themselves which shaped the Air Corps' forces in the interwar years. In later years, geopolitical tensions created an environment where Congress sidestepped the acquisition process and industry again produced very adequate weapons systems.

The problem with high-technology weapons development is that it requires costly, extensive research and development. In the majority of weapons purchases, contracts are on a winner-take-all basis, making the manufacturers hesitant to commit huge outlays of capital without some form of guaranteed return. Thus, manufacturers often push very early on in the research and development phase to have their weapons committed to production, even when fundamental problems remain to be solved. The result is "concurrency," a process of simultaneous research and production which generates enormous cost adjustments and overruns as well as potentially dangerous systems flaws. The US weapons inventory is replete with examples; one egregious case involved over 140 F-111 fighter-bombers which entered into service in Vietnam before their air-intakes were designed properly to prevent stalling.

In addition to high technology, other flaws exist in the weapons acquisition process. Many, if not most of them, are due to the bureaucracy. Constraints imposed on the manufacturers force them to expand their work forces and to adopt non-competitive operational patterns. Congressional requirements that a percentage of contracts be given to small business owners, or minority firms, do not guarantee that they go to the most efficient firms. The resultant disclosures to the general public about hammers selling for $435 appalled almost everyone, but as McNaugher notes, "The practice was wasteful, but the source of the waste was procedural — the failure to purchase spares in efficient sized bundles — not waste and abuse in defense firms" (p. 173).

McNaugher's book is refreshing because of its objectivity. It looks at US weapons acquisition process without the need to politicize the subject. The author does not attack either party as responsible for the huge amounts of waste, nor does he lay exclusive blame on the shoulders of the executive or legislative branch. Unfortunately, that may be one of the two weaknesses of this book; there is not a sufficiently critical examination of the politics involved in weapons purchases. Granted, McNaugher does go into some depth on how Congress must respond to the pressures of its respective constituencies, and how the four branches of the military paternally support specific projects, but this subject is tackled alongside other topics, not independently. The 1989 defense budget negotiations, where the secretary of defense chose not to develop a specific weapons systems, e.g. the V-22 Osprey, and Congress forced it back into the budget, shows just how much politics remains an integral, if not the driving force behind our system purchases. It is an area which warrants further discussion.

Further, the book devotes too little space to the solutions offered, though they are of sufficient merit. McNaugher advocates introducing more competition into the system to take advantage of potential alternatives. He also calls

for increased research and development funding prior to committing to a project, thereby eliminating concurrency problems such as cost overruns; the F-16 fighter was developed in this way. The F-15 was intended to be the US air-superiority fighter, and it became the focus of defense engineering efforts. But when problems arose with its engine, causing cost overruns, Defense Secretary Packard turned to the industry to come up with an alternative, and the F-16 was the result. While this is a welcome example and it is clear that the book is only a survey of present problems, the twenty pages of solutions offered are not presented with the depth of the 180 preceding pages.

New Weapons, Old Politics is interesting in that it is current, topical and objective. With a new state of geopolitics arising globally the US government is in a position to rethink its budgetary priorities. This is not to say that America must downsize its armed forces. In a less volatile environment, however, the country may now have the luxury to arm itself more intelligently, without sacrificing superiority or ability. By using some of the solutions offered by McNaugher, such as increased competition, the United States may be able to meet this goal.

Feminization of the Labor Force: Paradoxes and Promises

Edited by Jane Jenson, Elisabeth Hagen and Ceallaigh Reddy

New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, 296 pp., with index, $14.95.

Reviewed by Theresa Moran

Lately, one cannot escape discussions and articles on women in the work force without encountering ever more depressing euphemisms like the "feminization of inequality" and the "mommy track." In this admirable collection of papers, which grew out of a conference held at Harvard's Center for European Studies, the statistics compiled are so extensive as to quash any doubt that more women are working for less, not only in the United States, but everywhere one might have looked for hope and change. Indeed, the volume's subtitle, *Paradoxes and Promises*, sums up the sorry state of affairs which offers plenty of the former and precious few of the latter. The book points to a myriad of factors which collude against the advancement of women. The authors argue that these changes have at their core a hidden agenda which includes "an attack on women's newly-won positions in political rhetoric as well as action" (p. 6).

Dealing as it does with seven Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the book takes for granted that women are gaining access to the working world. These scholars are concerned with the far thornier issues of the type of world and pay scale faced by working women. Yet while Elisabeth Hagen and Jane Jenson assert in the opening chapter that it is no longer possible to assume that the "average" full-time worker is a man with a dependent family (and one assumes working women also know this), the book makes clear that governments, trade unions and employers have yet to appreciate the significance of this fundamental shift. Acknowledgement of this has not occurred, Hagen and Jenson assert, because "feminization is not a new variable affecting a set of fixed factors, like the organization of the labor market, trade union strategy, state policy, or other things" (p. 5). Indeed, the problem is exacerbated precisely because there is no *quid pro quo* solution to the dilemma that working women face. No one policy will produce the much-needed change. A comprehensive overhaul of opinions and policies toward women is required, and attitudes must evolve to a point where equality is unavoidable and its absence unthinkable.

"Employment in Comparative Perspective" documents the sheer number of women in the work force. The OECD statistics, while unable to reveal the degree of inequality in a given society, nonetheless starkly reveal the abject status of women. For starters, in "all countries, part-time workers are over-

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whelmingly female" (p. 21). This cannot be dismissed as a matter of choice. From 7.7 percent to 25 percent of those part-time female workers seek full-time employment and are "involuntarily" working less. Part-time workers are a boon to most employers as they permit industry to respond more quickly to changing markets and are far cheaper since they do not require the benefits and services provided for full-time staff. Women are discriminated against in two ways: they are subject to the "last-in-first-out" mentality, and they are also denied benefits while employed.

The data on what women do bring home is even more disturbing. In some of the richest countries in the world, women still "earn, on average, about 20-40 percent less than men, despite a slight narrowing of the earnings gap over the last decade" (p. 25). Margaret Thatcher's Britain has the "largest earning gap . . . of the seven countries," keeping women firmly in their place by putting 30.5 percent less in their paychecks. While such numbers fairly scream for attention, Isabella Bakker acknowledges that "such agenda-setting becomes increasingly difficult, however, with the move towards neo-liberalism now being acted out by many governments" (p. 40).

Occupational segregation also vitiates most of the progress women have made in the workplace, and this little-discussed manifestation of sexism grows ever more pervasive. A 1985 OECD study shows clerical and service positions crowded with women while the professional, technical, administrative and managerial fields remain male dominated. In Sweden, noted for its advancement of sexual rights, there is certainly something amiss when "88.6 percent of secretaries are women, 93.8 percent of nursing auxiliaries, 77.9 percent of shop assistants and 89.5 percent of cleaners" (p. 181). Only 5 percent of architects and 3.8 percent of electrical engineers are female. Maybe a bit more freedom of choice in job training, as well as in socialization, is in order.

This situation is not confined to Scandinavian socialism: a look outside the OECD countries brings even grimmer news. The *Japan Economic Journal* notes that Japan's women are "the most flexible element in the labor pool," working "for much lower wages and less job security than their male counterparts." While the article acknowledges that this is the norm worldwide, it admits that in Japan, "the situation is worse than most."[1]

In the United States, the increase in the numbers of full-time working women earning less than $10,000 annually, from 16.5 percent in 1978 to 19.1 percent in 1986, should stop anyone from gloating about how far women have come in this country.[2] A long groan issues forth from every page: women, no matter what they do, always do more. They work outside and inside the home. This reflects simply and bleakly the unrelenting status quo. Women always wear at least two hats, sometimes three and four as they care for husbands, lovers, children and aging parents. The book dispassionately reveals that relief is nowhere in sight.

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1. T. J. Pempel, "Japan's macro-economic success rests on its unique political structure," *The Japan Economic Journal* (March 29, 1986): 20.
2. "Big bucks or peanuts: the growing wage gap between women," *Business Week*, 19 December 1988, 22.

One does find some compensations, such as maternity benefits, in many OECD countries. The United States, however, as "the only advanced industrial country without a national maternity policy," is a glaring exception. In fact, write Harold Brackman, Steven Erie and Martin Rein, 60 percent of American working women have no rights to any kind of leave when they bear a child (p. 226). That fact, together with the recent brouhaha over the so-called "mommy track," make it clear that either way, women lose, and further, it is society at large that suffers the greatest loss. For those contemplating motherhood, it seems only sisterly to mention that in Italy, *machismo* and cultural stereotypes aside, women "have 20 weeks paid [maternity] leave plus the right to their old jobs" (p. 131). This, however, is not without its price, since employers consequently shy away from promoting women. Then again, the "mommy track" offers women neither professional advancement nor maternity benefits.

Across North America and Western Europe, women are sentenced to part-time work while wanting and needing full-time employment, stuck without benefits in a service sector job or toiling in front of that twentieth century equivalent of the sweatshop sewing machine, the video display terminal. It is hardly a pretty future for the daughters of "Rosie the Riveter."

Feminization of the Labor Force adds to the scholarship of sociology, labor relations and history, but it does not provide answers. Several contributors fault the lack of an "adequately mobilized movement" in promoting such things as equal rights, as well as part-time worker and maternity protection (p. 207). Change is not about to spring forth fully formed from the brow of government or business. In spite of the tiredness of such slogans, this book once again makes it obvious that women, if they are to get anywhere, must unite and fight.

A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies, and Realities

Edited by Peter L. Berger and Bobby Godsell

Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, 349 pp., including bibliography and index, $29.50 hardcover and $16.85 paperback.

Reviewed by Christopher L. Shaw

The pace of change in South Africa inspires analogies with both the tortoise and the hare. Even as the world witnessed the ascendence this past summer of a new president, F. W. De Klerk, and the sprouting of unprecedented, unthinkable hope, first-hand accounts of the continuing oppression proved that, indeed, some things remain the same. *A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies, and Realities* does little to tip the balance in favor of either hope or despair, but effectively illuminates a few of the issues facing both blacks and whites as they struggle to create a society in equilibrium.

The book represents the result of a research project entitled "South Africa Beyond Apartheid," managed by Peter Berger, a noted sociologist at Boston University, and Bobby Godsell, a consultant to Anglo American Corporation. The eight essays by Western and South African authors attempt simultaneously to analyze the competing forces and trends which presently exist in South Africa, and to describe the future development of a political and economic solution to the "chronic crisis" (p. 8). All but one of the essays deal with fundamentally political questions; although the analysis of the present situation varies in quality, each "chapter" investigates an inherently interesting and central group of players or issues.

Lawrence Schlemmer launches the book with an examination of the National Party government. The director of the Centre for Policy Studies at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, Schlemmer examines the sociological underpinnings of the separate territories' failure to fulfill the goals of their designers, and the peculiar nature of reform as enacted thus far by the ruling party. Schlemmer concludes, based on the increase of security forces and the broad variety of ideologies driving the ruling party, that the National Party's propensity to negotiate with the black majority is real and growing, though still embryonic. He predicts that the constitutional stalemate will continue at least until the cost of maintaining the state of emergency proves too much to bear.

The contribution of Heribert Adam on the African National Congress is among the fairest and most compelling analyses in the book. From an enthralling description of the ANC's vast organizational base in Angola, Tanzania and Zambia, Adam proceeds to clarify the ANC's real ideological underpin-

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nings (neither Soviet-inspired nor essentially terrorist) and delineate its shortcomings (among them a lack of revolutionary education and the confused role of religion). A former professor at the University of Natal, Adam currently teaches political science at the University of Vancouver.

Paulus Zulu, a senior research fellow at the University of Natal, provides a succinct disaggregation of the internal resistance movement. Zulu argues convincingly that the movement's three main obstacles are a black middle class, an obscured ideological vision, and a large population of blacks "vulnerable to co-optation by the state," all of which contribute to the "existential helplessness" of the resistance (p. 159, 162).

Less compelling are essays by Helen Zille and a team consisting of John Marcum, Helen Kitchen and Michael Spicer. Zille, a former political correspondent with the *Rand Daily Mail*, provides a thorough but unsatisfying laundry list of various far-right entities, ranging from the Conservative Party to the extremist Afrikaner Resistance Movement (comparisons of which to both the Nazis and the Klu Klux Klan remain conspicuously unnoted here). The elections of 1987 indicated that the right wing was gaining popularity; Zille touches only briefly on this apparent trend and makes no mention of the historical and cultural appeal of such groups to Afrikaners, given their unique Boer heritage. Marcum, Kitchen and Spicer offer proof that the role of external forces, such as the United States, Japan, and even neighboring African countries, will remain necessarily limited given the nature of change underway in South Africa. The argument, although certainly integral in some form to such a compilation, proves to be both flat and self-evident, a result perhaps of authorship by three very different authorities. Marcum is a specialist on southern African politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz; Kitchen serves as the director of the African Studies Programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; and Spicer is a public affairs division manager for Anglo American Corporation.

The essay that concludes the volume proves at once most intriguing and most disappointing. The editors, Peter Berger and Bobby Godsell, attempt to place the South African dilemma in a comparative context. They begin by discrediting many of the preceding paradigms used to describe South Africa, including the American civil rights movement and Rhodesia's metamorphosis into Zimbabwe. The editors then proceed to offer a most promising and innovative analogy of their own, the 1868 Meiji restoration in Japan, which replaced the 700-year-old traditional feudal society with a globally oriented trade economy. The ability of the new men of Meiji — or enlightenment — to avoid bloodshed in this transformation rested on assuaging the ruling class, which exchanged "aristocratic privilege for entrepreneurial opportunity" (p. 279). Although Godsell and Berger might have devoted the entire chapter to this refreshing comparison, their treatment of the subject remains frustratingly brief.

A Future South Africa provides a collection of photographs of a nation in transition: the sharpness of line varies, and the details of images are not always clear, but this collection delineates the basic components of the struggle. No

major actor has been omitted; no major theme is left unexplored. Still, the reader is left with a sense of incompleteness, perhaps because events continue to unfold with such breathtaking speed even as the regime in power seems immovable on the central issues. Published in March 1989, the book makes no mention of F. W. De Klerk and his revisionist murmurs. Early in 1989, a meeting between the President De Klerk and Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu would have seemed only slightly less inconceivable than the release of Walter Sisulu and several other leading anti-apartheid activists, two events which occurred within days of one another last October. The central question, which the book poses implicitly in its title and then deftly sidesteps, is whether such events signal real change. Do they amount to brilliant public relations moves or a fundamental shift in government policy? Does progress toward equity in South Africa more closely resemble the careless, speedy rabbit or the crafty, plodding turtle? The reader of *A Future South Africa* is no closer to an answer to this fundamental question.

Despite these shortcomings in analyzing the present situation, Berger and Godsell clearly place their own bets for the future on the turtle: "Rapid, cataclysmic change is likely to lead to the substitution of one oligarchy by another, not to a democratic regime . . . .The formula [for successful, lasting change] must be seduction, rather than the quick knock-out blow" (p. 295). It is both sad and inevitable that this call for moderation will likely be swallowed up in the increasingly strident cries for justice.

Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order

Robert Springborg

Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1989, 307 pp., including index, $38.50.

Reviewed by Bruce K. Rutherford

Springborg has written an exhaustive, thought-provoking analysis of post-Sadat Egyptian politics, while making an important contribution to the literature on political development. His work transcends the narrow confines of a case study and raises fundamental conceptual questions about the process of modernization in the 1980s and beyond. Particularly relevant are his observations on the political impact of the "new orthodoxy" in economic development — with its heavy emphasis on private sector-oriented development. Springborg indicates that the "new orthodoxy" was a pillar of the Reagan administration's aid policy from the time Hosni Mubarak assumed power in 1981. The $2 billion in annual US economic assistance carried various requirements for "policy consultation," a euphemism for consistent US pressure to strengthen Egypt's private sector. The author argues that these steps toward privatization have reduced the political strength of Mubarak and bolstered an essentially anti-democratic private sector.

Political power in Egypt has always stemmed primarily from the state's control of public largess. With the recent US emphasis on privatization, the regime must now compete with private business as a supplier of cheap housing, jobs, and food. It has been unable to compensate for this reduction in its power. Indeed, the blow to its patronage network occurred at a time when the regime already faced serious challenges to its legitimacy due to a deepening economic crisis, a lack of clear ideology, and a dearth of strong leadership in the wake of Sadat's assassination.

Springborg, however, overemphasizes the impact of US privatization policy on the weakening of the regime's patronage network. Egypt's general economic crisis has played a much more important role in this process than is noted: the regime simply no longer has the resources to sustain its patronage/welfare system. To some extent, the private sector, particularly its Islamic component, has stepped into the breech, contributing to the general dispersal and fragmentation of political and economic power.

This increase in the private sector's power has not necessarily contributed to Egypt's political stability. Indeed, the author contests the theory that privatization of an economy can produce a strong middle class independent from other classes or institutions, thus facilitating the development of a strong

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democratic political party system. In Egypt, neither an autonomous middle class nor a strong party system has emerged. Privatization, under the rubric of the open door policy (*infitah*) has led only to the emergence of a "parasitic bourgeoisie" which relies on manipulation of the state apparatus for its success, rather than entrepreneurial initiative. The book documents how this parasitic bourgeoisie has impeded the development of a strong party system. It prefers to influence the political process more through its network of contacts and bribes, than through an unseemly, open process of political debate.

The parasitic bourgeoisie's aversion to a strong party system complements Mubarak's desire to avoid the development of effective parties which could threaten his already-weakened position. Mubarak has utilized the Egyptian legal code to prevent all five opposition parties from organizing either workers or peasants. Widespread fraud in both local and parliamentary elections has also blocked opposition efforts to gain influence in Egypt's political institutions. As a consequence, the country's party system remains an ineffectual soap box for a tiny fraction of the population — less than 2 percent of Egypt's 55 million people are members of a party.

Springborg concludes that recent steps toward political liberalization do not represent meaningful progress toward democracy. They merely constitute part of Mubarak's strategy to retain his limited power in an increasingly chaotic political arena. Liberalization is a carefully managed tactic of setting newly-emergent interest groups like the *infitah* bourgeoisie against more traditional interest groups (the military, Nasserists, landowners). The tactic is revealed in the rules which underlie political discourse in Egypt; politicians and parties are permitted to criticize one another, but an individual who directly criticizes Mubarak risks government harassment or even arrest. As the opposition dutifully commits political cannibalism, Mubarak emerges atop the pile as dispassionate adjudicator of the national interest. The result is a *de facto* authoritarian regime preoccupied with the delicate task of balancing interest groups off one another. This political structure is poorly suited for dealing with Egypt's many intractable problems. As such, the regime avoids clear stands on key policy issues like economic reform, preferring instead to modify its position depending on which interest group it seeks to manipulate.

The lack of meaningful political leadership from either Mubarak or the opposition has produced a vacuum increasingly filled by Egypt's Islamic groups. Springborg provides a thorough and insightful analysis of this Islamic opposition, focusing particularly on the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. Intriguingly, Springborg concludes that due to severe infighting within the organization the Brotherhood is not a serious long-term political threat to Mubarak.

The author's general prognosis for Egypt is negative. Key economic reforms are unlikely, and the growing cadre of US-trained technocrats is unlikely to change the situation. Springborg reports that these rising stars are shunted usually to lower-level positions in the bureaucracy as part of Mubarak's effort to prevent the pro-American portion of his government from gaining too much power. The book forecasts that Egypt will continue its political frag-

mentation, producing a steady diminution in the regime's legitimacy as it confronts a deepening economic crisis, an Islamic revival, and growing military power and pride. As a result, Mubarak's increasing reliance on the military to maintain order seems likely. The effects of these developments on US-Egyptian relations and Egyptian-Israeli ties go unexamined.

Much of the study's analytical framework is familiar. Springborg is apparently heavily influenced by the views of prominent Egyptian leftists, particularly Mohammad Sid Ahmed and Rifaat al-Said. Nonetheless, he expands on these perspectives by offering a truly comprehensive analysis which considers the role of foreign aid, Islamic groups, political parties, and Egypt's clan-oriented political tradition. Though the layman may find the extensive detail somewhat imposing, the work's broad conceptual framework for interpreting the political impact of privatization is valuable for any student of the politics of less developed nations.