

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

The last six years have been turbulent ones in U.S. strategic nuclear policy. In each of our policy's three key components — doctrine, force modernization, and arms control — the Reagan administration has expended a great deal of energy in efforts that were too often contradictory and counterproductive, turning its back on longstanding U.S. policies in pursuit of ideologically driven dreams. It implemented a vigorous, though not always wise, program of strategic modernization that often was inconsistent with its arms control objectives. The administration has thrown longstanding deterrence policy into turmoil by championing the Strategic Defense Initiative, a program which after four years has yet to be given a clear and consistent focus. In strategic arms control, the administration has squandered important negotiating advantages by arms control tactics and objectives that have seemed more calculated to prevent progress than to promote it. The result has been no agreements after more than six years in office. As the last quarter of the Reagan administration draws to a close, it is time to plan the strategic nuclear policy agenda for the 1990s. This article reviews how U.S. strategic policy has fared under the Reagan administration and argues that important changes are necessary if we are to meet our security needs in the 1990s.

DOCTRINE

The first two years of the Reagan administration saw a spirited defense of U.S. deterrence doctrine, both to justify its strategic modernization program and to respond to the nuclear freeze movement. This defense certainly had its low points, however, especially when administration officials talked about limiting nuclear war to Europe, or a full U.S. recovery from all-out nuclear war in four years. The nuclear freeze movement succeeded in getting its message of the horrible threat of nuclear war across to the president, but sadly he responded in a way that has multiplied our security problems.

On March 23, 1983, the president announced his vision for escaping from the nuclear dilemma: the Strategic Defense Initiative was to be a technological fix to the very human problem of war in the nuclear age. The president gave almost no warning to either the Defense or State Departments, which in the

previous several months had analyzed the feasibility of the forerunner to SDI known as High Frontier and found major problems in that concept. The president thus created a doctrinal schizophrenia that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved, since SDI and traditional deterrence theory are incompatible at their core despite varied attempts by administration theorists to give substance to the emperor's new doctrinal clothes.

The flaws of a defense-based nuclear posture had been known for many years, and none of them have been adequately addressed by SDI. Foremost among these are its inability to deal with either air-breathing or covertly delivered weapons, the extreme vulnerability of space-based components to counterattack, and its general vulnerability to countermeasures. In addition, the transition from offense to defense dominance would be very unstable: whichever side attained a credible defense first would have the ability to attack and destroy the other while protecting itself from a retaliatory attack. Knowing this, the inferior side would have a substantial incentive to attack the other side before it deployed its SDI shield. To his credit, President Reagan appreciated this last wrinkle early on, although this led him to make some bizarre policy statements about U.S. willingness to share our SDI technology — surely to be among our most sensitive secrets — with the Soviets “at cost” to ensure that the United States would not have a unilateral advantage.

The fact that SDI was a presidentially inspired concept created almost instant paralysis in the Executive Branch's normal evaluation procedures. As a result, agencies that had only months before been downplaying the feasibility of a robust strategic defense suddenly had to start supporting the concept. There simply was no bureaucratic future in taking any actions that might highlight embarrassing shortcomings in what quickly became the president's pet program. One important exception to this was the set of criteria laid out by Paul Nitze two years after SDI's inception: any SDI system must be survivable, and it must be “cost-effective at the margin,” that is, it must cost the attacker more to add a unit of offense than it costs the defender to defend against that unit. These “Nitze criteria” were immediately welcomed by supporters of traditional deterrence policy because they were both eminently sensible and provided a focal point for opposition to the more extravagant objectives of some SDI supporters. They also were enacted into law by Congress, thereby thwarting the attempt by some in the administration to substitute the more ill-defined criterion of “affordability” for the sensible Nitze criteria.

The administration's recent dalliance with pursuing an early deployment of SDI has done further damage to the pillar of arms control, the ABM Treaty, but it has also spawned an extension of the Nitze criteria. In explaining administration policy on early deployment, Secretary of State Shultz has added two more criteria for SDI: each phase of any phased deployment must be stabilizing and must fit into the SDI architecture envisioned for the complete

system. Unfortunately, these sound criteria are unlikely to play a major role in this administration's decisions regarding SDI. Recent accounts of the deliberations of the president and his National Security Council colleagues suggest that belief in the moral and technological virtues of SDI is the predominant consideration in the Executive Branch. This attitude ignores the lessons of history in the nuclear age.

One of the most primal instincts in the nuclear age has been the drive by each superpower to assure the credibility of its offensive forces. That is chiefly what drove the United States to put multiple warheads on its missiles, to ensure that we could overwhelm the crude Soviet missile defense system we saw them developing 20 years ago. It is what has driven both the Soviets and the United States to develop mobile ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), as missile accuracies became good enough to render fixed silo-based ICBMs exceedingly vulnerable.

One of the best examples of this drive to maintain offensive nuclear credibility and the resultant dynamic between offense and defense has been the competition between U.S. strategic bomber forces and Soviet air defenses. Over the years, the Soviets have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in air defenses in repeatedly vain attempts to blunt the U.S. strategic bomber threat. When the Soviets shot down Gary Powers with their newly developed SA-2 surface-to-air missile in May 1960 and proceeded to blanket their nation with this latest advance in strategic defense technology, the response of the United States was hardly to throw in the strategic towel. Rather, we modified our fleet of B-52 bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace at low altitudes where SA-2 radars could not detect them, and we equipped the B-52s with enhanced radar jammers and other protective capabilities. We also ended the B-70 bomber program, despite immense Air Force and congressional resistance, because the high-altitude B-70 would have been too vulnerable to Soviet defenses.

Since then, we have continued to improve our bomber forces in response to further Soviet air defense improvements. Two recent major improvements are the air-launched cruise missile and the Stealth bomber. These measures have cost us much less than the Soviets have spent on air defense, with the result that our Strategic Air Command still has high confidence that most of our alert bombers will be able to execute their missions.

There are several lessons for our strategic doctrine that we can draw from our experience with strategic bombers. One is that neither side is likely to allow the other to significantly blunt its offensive capabilities without responding with whatever changes in technology, tactics, and targeting are necessary to restore those offensive capabilities. The second is that the same technological advances that will open up new capabilities in strategic defense will also open up new capabilities for the offense. For example, SDI defenses will likely be effective against the space-based components of an adversary's SDI long before

they are effective against ballistic missiles. Thus, the same breakthrough technology that the Reagan administration is counting on to help SDI will help the offense as well. The third lesson is that defensive measures against nuclear weapons usually cost much more than the offensive countermeasures to them. These lessons have been demonstrated time and again throughout the history of strategic bombers. The burden of proof is clearly on Star Wars supporters to explain why this pattern would not repeat itself if we proceed to change once and for all to a defense-based deterrent.

Which direction then makes the most sense for U.S. policy on strategic defense for the 1990s? At a minimum, given the high stakes involved, we should avoid sharp breaks with traditional deterrence policy unless we have good reason to believe the conditions necessary for the success of a new policy will be at hand in the near future. Accordingly, we should not dismantle our reliance upon offensive nuclear power, either in terms of our declaratory policy or through actual deployments, until we are confident that defenses would provide at least as effective and resilient a deterrent. Clearly we are a long way from such a situation. In the meantime, it is in our security interest to expend a prudent amount for basic research on strategic defense. Such research would:

1. Hedge against a Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty;
2. Give the Soviets added incentive to comply with the ABM Treaty by demonstrating the risks and uncertainties they would face if the treaty were ended (current administration actions have certainly reinforced this incentive);
3. Improve our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty by helping us to better analyze raw intelligence data on Soviet defensive technology;
4. Keep open the possibility of making defensive technology advances that would make strategic defense both feasible and desirable.

One important benefit of this return to traditional U.S. policy would be a strengthening of ties with our allies. The Reagan administration's pursuit of security through strategic defense, especially as seen by its proposals at Reykjavik to ban all ballistic missiles, has frightened our NATO allies and thus damaged the credibility of U.S. leadership in NATO. However, such a return should not serve as a signal for business as usual in the NATO alliance.

For many years the superiority of U.S. strategic forces has allowed every NATO country, ourselves included, the luxury of underfunding the requirements for conventional forces. Under the doctrine of "extended deterrence," the U.S. nuclear umbrella was extended to cover our allies as well. The day of U.S. strategic superiority has passed, and major asymmetries in NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force capabilities carry far more risk today than

was true two decades ago. While NATO's conventional inferiority is not as bad as a simpleminded comparison of static measures like numbers of tanks or tactical aircraft might suggest, the downward trend in U.S. and NATO defense spending since 1985, if continued, may well lead to a serious problem in NATO conventional force capabilities by the early 1990s. The continuing refusal of the Reagan administration to come to grips with the budget crisis we are facing makes it very likely that the real shrinkage that has characterized the defense budget for the last two years will continue for the next two.

As a result, one of the first defense tasks facing a successor administration will be to halt the current erosion in U.S. conventional defense capabilities in a way that will gain Congressional approval and elicit similar efforts from our allies. Under the 1978 NATO Long Term Defense Program, each member pledged to increase its defense spending by 3 percent annually. While useful up to a point, this budget goal drew attention to the input side of the defense equation instead of the far more important output side. After all, NATO is defended by soldiers and tanks and equipment and tactics, not by dollars and marks and guilders and pounds.

A new approach should focus instead on a series of output-related objectives, such as ammunition stocks, weapons production, readiness rates, and others. Not only would this be more directly related to NATO's real defense needs, but it would also encourage NATO to seek out more efficient ways of achieving its objectives. Japan as well must shoulder a greater proportion of its own defense. Japan's recent decision to allow its defense budget to exceed 1 percent of its GNP is a welcome development, but it still is not enough. At a time when Japan is running a huge trade surplus with the United States, the American taxpayer will not long tolerate the thought that he is in effect subsidizing that trade surplus.

FORCE MODERNIZATION

For 25 years, the philosophy of U.S. offensive strategic nuclear forces has been to maintain three independent means of delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union. Except for a few dangerous days in Reykjavik when President Reagan nearly abandoned our land-based and sea-based missiles without bothering to check with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this philosophy continues to the present. Our triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers has served our defense interests well, despite an ebb and flow in the relative standings of each component. Indeed, this ebb and flow underscores the need for having some overlap in strategic force capabilities.

Candidate Reagan campaigned hard on the idea that Jimmy Carter had neglected U.S. strategic forces so that America faced a critical "window of vulnerability" in the early 1980s. Yet despite his campaign rhetoric, President Reagan made only modest changes in ongoing strategic modernization plans.

Ironically, the net effect of these plans was to leave the United States with slightly fewer strategic warheads by the end of his first term than would have been the case under Carter administration plans. In addition, President Reagan added two programs of doubtful worth, the B-1B bomber and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, and one of much greater utility, the Small ICBM program ("Midgetman"), though it has been under constant attack within his administration.

On ICBMs, the Reagan administration dropped the Carter administration's controversial Multiple Protective Shelter basing scheme for the MX missile and cut the number to be deployed from 200 to 100. In addition, dismantling was begun on our 53 older Titan II ICBMs. For bombers, the administration continued the development of the Stealth bomber and air-launched cruise missile and revived on a crash basis the development of the B-1B bomber. Our force of 79 B-52D model aircraft also were taken out of operation. In submarine missiles, the administration continued the production of the Trident I and the development of the Trident II, though it reduced the production rate of the Trident submarine from 1.5 to 1 per year. A nuclear land-attack version of the Tomahawk cruise missile was also to be developed, despite Navy misgivings about its utility. Also, our remaining Polaris missile submarines were taken out of strategic status. Funding for strategic defense was increased, but with no change in doctrine, and strategic warning and communications funding was increased, the latter move receiving wide praise.

The net result of the Reagan strategic modernization programs announced in October 1981 was basically a continuation of the programs underway in the Carter administration. The only differences were that the B-1 bomber and nuclear Tomahawk programs were added, the MX and Trident programs were reduced, and three older strategic systems were taken out of operation during the period which Candidate Reagan claimed would be the height of America's nuclear vulnerability. The retirement of the three older systems presaged the finding of the Scowcroft Commission 18 months later, that there was in fact no window of vulnerability in the early or mid-80's. Thus the retirements posed no danger to U.S. security.

By early 1983, the administration found itself unable to choose a basing mode for the MX and appointed a blue-ribbon panel, the President's Advisory Commission on Strategic Forces, also known as the Scowcroft Commission. Their April 1983 report called for, *inter alia*, the basing of 100 MX missiles in silos as an interim measure and the development and deployment of the small ICBM as a long-range answer to the ICBM vulnerability problem. Congress originally approved 100 silo-based MX ICBMs but later thought better of it and limited the approval to 50. As a result, in late 1986 the administration sought funding for basing the second 50 MX missiles on railroad cars.

While strategic modernization plans depend upon a variety of factors, five stand out. Candidate programs for strategic modernization must be *survivable* against the likely Soviet threat; they must be *stabilizing*; they must have *inherent flexibility* to adapt to a changing strategic, political, and arms control environment; they must be *affordable*; and they must be *acceptable* to the electorate and its elected representatives. Those strategic programs that became controversial in the last decade failed on one or more of these criteria. For example, the silo-based MX was controversial because it failed all but the affordability criterion. On the other hand, the Trident I missile and air-launched cruise missile score well on all counts and thus encountered very little opposition. With these criteria in mind, a sensible strategic modernization strategy for the 1990s can be constructed.

A more coherent and balanced pace of modernization should encompass continued Trident submarine construction at a rate of one per year, with a force objective of no more than 20 Tridents, and fewer if we can negotiate 50 percent cuts in strategic arms with the Soviets. With 24 missiles per submarine, the Trident will pose an awkward problem once an arms agreement is reached that embodies the 50 percent reductions we are currently seeking. If we want to maintain a credible ICBM force through the 1990s, as I believe we should, then submarines would not likely be allocated more than 3,000-3,500 of the 4,500 ballistic missile warheads allowed by the current framework under discussion in Geneva. Thus there would be room for only 15-18 Tridents, half our current level of missile-firing submarines. Furthermore, only 50-70 percent of these would be on patrol at any given time. And if subsequent agreements can reduce warhead levels even further, this "too many eggs in too few baskets" problem becomes even more worrisome, especially given likely Soviet advances in anti-submarine warfare.

The Scowcroft Commission warned four years ago of the danger of concentrating our submarine assets in too few platforms and recommended that research "begin now (1983) on smaller ballistic missile-carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident." The Reagan administration has failed to act on this recommendation, leaving the United States with a widening and potentially dangerous contradiction between our force modernization and arms control policies. Accordingly, a new administration must correct this failure by initiating research on a new, smaller successor to the Trident submarine.

Sadly, the Reagan administration also has failed to see the contradictions between its force modernization and arms control policies for ICBMs. It has sought sharply lower warhead ceilings in Geneva at the same time that it has pushed for the deployment of 100 MXs, with 1,000 warheads, in vulnerable fixed silos. Under a ballistic missile warhead ceiling much lower than today's levels, those 1,000 MX warheads would crowd out a like number of far more

survivable Midgetman or Trident warheads. This problem becomes more pronounced if future agreements lower warhead ceilings even more. To make matters worse, the Reagan administration is seeking in Geneva to ban mobile ICBMs, which undercuts both the mobile Midgetman and rail-mobile MX programs it is pursuing.

A more coherent policy for ICBMs is urgently needed. This should include continued development and ultimate deployment of the Midgetman ICBM, though its estimated cost suggests that more cost-effective ways of deploying it should be thoroughly examined. In addition, Midgetman deployment need not and should not be compressed into a brief time span, as occurred with the Minuteman program. Deployment of about 50 percent per year would maintain a warm production base that would provide important leverage in arms control negotiations. This level could be adjusted to reflect factors such as the block retirement of our Poseidon submarine force in the mid-1990s. In the context of sharply reduced warhead levels, vulnerable silo-based MX missiles make less sense than ever. They should accordingly be replaced by more survivable systems as early as possible.

For the bomber leg of our triad, development and deployment of the Stealth bomber should continue, as should the second-generation air-launched cruise missile. Deployment rates should be dictated by a number of considerations, including the size of the deficit. In addition, continuing attention must be paid to command and control, particularly for our submarine force.

In strategic defense we must overhaul the Strategic Defense Initiative to make it conform with long-standing U.S. deterrence policy as well as the Nitze criteria. No consideration should be given to shifting our strategy to defense-based deterrence unless there is a clear prospect that the technology is available and will work, and that the existing criteria of system survivability, cost-effectiveness, stability, and cohesiveness can be satisfied. Programmatically this means a heavy SDI emphasis on basic research, with options to hedge against a Soviet ABM treaty breakout, at a cost of about \$2 billion to \$3 billion.

Naturally, the pace and scope of strategic modernization will depend upon how the Soviet threat evolves and what arms control agreements are reached. Our goal, however, must remain a resilient and survivable triad of strategic forces. In this regard, it is important to note the profound effect that SDI and the end of the ABM Treaty could have on strategic modernization.

Opening up the ABM Treaty and pursuing a Star Wars shield would reopen the Pandora's box of strategic offensive problems that we have avoided for the last 15 years under the ABM Treaty. A good example of this is the Trident II, a submarine-based missile that the Navy successfully flight-tested in January and plans to deploy beginning in 1989. With its long range, multiple warheads, high accuracy, and high survivability, it is perhaps the peak of the missile builder's art. Once developed, it is difficult to see why we would need

to develop another new type of submarine-based missile for many years. Other than minor improvements, there is little that we would want such a missile to do that the Trident II could not do — as long as the ABM Treaty remains in effect.

All that changes, however, if the ABM Treaty is further eroded or ended entirely. In such an environment we would be rightly suspicious of Soviet intentions and would certainly hedge our offensive missile forces against a possible Soviet SDI. This would generate innumerable new requirements for both land-based and sea-based missiles. The need for countermeasures like fast-burning booster engines, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and decoys and other penetration aid packages, would create the need for a whole new generation of successors to the Trident II, and every other ballistic missile in our arsenal, even before the ABM treaty fully collapsed. This would create the same type of competitive environment that we now have in the bomber world, but to an even greater extent. There would be years of offensive production and deployment to catch up with in the missile defense world that the ABM Treaty has to date prevented both sides from exploiting.

The comparative stability that characterizes the missile world today would be replaced by feverish instability that would leave us, after having spent hundreds of billions, less secure than at present. If we insist on spurring our technological horses still faster toward an ever-receding mirage of strategic stability through SDI, we will ultimately find ourselves with a thin glitzy exterior shielding a hollow interior of economic and strategic chaos.

ARMS CONTROL

One of the greatest disappointments of the last six years has been the failure of the Reagan administration to reach any new nuclear arms control agreement and the major erosion that has occurred in existing agreements. It has been 15 years now since the SALT I agreements were signed in 1972, the last arms agreements that were ratified. The prospects for a new strategic arms agreement under this administration do not look good, though they look more favorable for an agreement covering intermediate-range weapons. There is cause for concern that public support for arms control and a prudent nuclear deterrent may wane in the face of such limited accomplishment.

The fault is not so much arms control itself as what it is asked to accomplish. The desire for agreements, and to outdo one's predecessor, is so great that administrations tend to fall into the trap of seeking to do too much too soon. Too often the result is that nothing is accomplished. Arms control is a tricky business, intimately involved with the essential underpinnings of our security as a nation and an alliance leader. By their very nature, negotiations tend to be drawn out, making necessary a much greater degree of continuity from one administration to the next than has actually taken place.

Ambitious new goals, no matter how worthy, can represent such a major change to the status quo that they are perceived with great caution and suspicion by key players in the negotiating process. Prospects for achieving these goals are accordingly dimmed. Seeking to accomplish such goals in a short period of time also plays into the hands of the opponents of arms control. There are two ways to ensure that no progress in arms control is ever made: one is to refuse to negotiate, and the second is to insist that the mountain of arms control be climbed in a single step. By artful use of the second approach, arms control opponents in this administration have been able to stymie the kind of progress that most people want.

This is not to say that ambitious goals are undesirable — far from it. Rather, it is a call for us to seek to reach those goals through a series of steps, and not through one big leap. Such a “staircase” approach to arms control seems better suited to the natural reluctance that accompanies any arms agreement, and thus more likely to reach the goals we want arms control to accomplish. This staircase approach to arms control is discussed below.

When the Reagan administration took office, it did so in alarm over the danger inherent in previous efforts at arms control, despite the fact that those efforts were supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Reagan administration also pledged to do better. As President Reagan said in 1981 to the National Press Club:

While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where . . . previous efforts left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress . . . And let us see how far we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals.

The past six years have shown us how far this administration can go in strategic arms control: nowhere. This administration has pleaded for new weapons, warning Congress and the country that arms control progress hinged on their approval. Many of these weapons made sense. Some of the big-ticket items, like the B-1 and the silo-based MX, did not. And now, after \$1.5 trillion has been spent, we have not only failed to make progress on strategic arms control, we have actually lost ground. This administration is killing SALT II, and it is measuring the ABM Treaty for a coffin.

In offensive arms control, the most urgent need in the short term is to restore the policy of mutual observance of the SALT II and SALT I Interim Accord limits, with proportionate responses to violations where appropriate. This had been the U.S. stated policy until President Reagan announced in May 1986 that the United States would “move beyond” SALT. This decision defies logical explanation and seems totally driven by ideological demands, given that to stay within SALT limits the Soviets dismantled over 550

operational missiles and bombers versus only 48 for the United States. Furthermore, SALT II will require the Soviets to dismantle about 130 more this year alone versus only 32 for the United States. With nothing to take its place, however, abandoning SALT openly invites the Soviets to exceed numerical limits to which they have so far been adhering.

Ironically, one of the first effects of our violating SALT's limits will be to allow the Soviets to increase precisely those weapons that the Reagan administration has rightly and repeatedly labeled the most destabilizing — MIRVed ICBMs. [MIRV stands for multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle. — Ed.] SALT II's limit of 820 MIRVed ICBMs would force the Soviets to dismantle some of their existing 818 MIRVed ICBMs almost immediately after they begin deploying their new SS-24 ICBM later this year. They will be under no such constraints without SALT.

Even the Defense Department's glossy publication *Soviet Military Power* shows that the Soviets could have 5,000 more warheads without SALT than with it. It is no wonder that General Brent Scowcroft, six out of seven living former secretaries of defense (three Republicans and three Democrats), and every one of our NATO allies support continued U.S. and Soviet compliance with SALT until a new agreement is available to take its place. The appropriate response to a violation like the Soviet SS-25 ICBM is to deploy a similar missile, which we are planning to do with the Midgetman.

There is widespread support for at least the concept of 50 percent cuts in strategic weaponry. However, the Soviets have said they will not agree to reductions unless SDI is effectively reined in. And President Reagan has said that he is unwilling to accept any limits of this kind on SDI. Thus, barring major change, strategic arms control seems to have encountered a blind alley as far as this administration is concerned. Is there no way out before President Reagan leaves office?

While the situation does not look promising for the balance of the Reagan administration, there are near-term opportunities for progress that do not require fundamental policy shifts for the major players in this arms control drama. One approach would be to cap warhead levels on both sides at current levels. Both superpowers today have about the same number of warheads, if warheads are defined as at Reykjavik, where missile warheads and air-launched cruise missiles each count as one, and non-cruise missile bombers are counted as one.

A cap at current levels would not restrict modernization plans on either side but would require both sides to dismantle older warheads one for one as they add new ones, thus preventing both sides from adding the couple of thousand warheads they would probably otherwise do even under SALT limits. In addition, a warhead cap would allow the administration to rationally drop SALT, replacing it with something better, while at the same time avoiding a bruising SALT battle with Congress at a time when it is preoccupied with

the unfolding Iran-contra crisis. While not satisfactory over the long run, a cap would serve as a useful interim restraint measure until a more comprehensive agreement is signed and would represent an important arms control achievement for the Reagan administration. Indeed, there are reports that this idea was pushed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in the Reagan administration.

It would be a tremendous mistake for Ronald Reagan's successor to repeat the mistakes of his two predecessors and throw overboard the negotiating advances of the previous administration. U.S. negotiators have made important advances already that form the basis for a major new agreement. A 50 percent cut in warheads on both sides, coupled with a more modest reduction in numbers of missiles and bombers, would represent a major advance for U.S. security interests that would strengthen strategic stability. Such an agreement would certainly require important reductions in Soviet counterforce capabilities and would even require the Soviets to dismantle an important part of their heavy ICBM force, long a sore point in the arms control debate. It is unfortunate that this administration is preventing the attainment of this type of agreement by its obsession with SDI. A new administration would know that the safest and most effective place to eliminate Soviet warheads is at the bargaining table in Geneva, not in outer space. There is no SDI system we could deploy in the next 10 years that would eliminate as many warheads as the 50 percent reduction we could achieve in exchange for a 10-year extension of the ABM Treaty.

At the same time, an important priority will be to reaffirm and update the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The ABM Treaty has well served both U.S. and Soviet interests for the last 15 years. The Reagan administration's attempt to reinterpret the ABM Treaty is nothing less than a shameless attempt to circumvent both the letter and the spirit of the treaty in support of the dubious notion of SDI. Senator Nunn has shown the barrenness of administration arguments in support of its version of the ABM Treaty in a series of three speeches on the Senate floor. The administration's calling its highly questionable interpretation the "legally correct interpretation," when virtually everyone associated with its original negotiation argues otherwise, is Orwell's Newspeak come to life. The true "legally correct interpretation" is the traditional interpretation, as Senator Nunn has so compellingly shown, which needs to be reaffirmed as soon as possible. But that alone will not be enough to shore up the ABM Treaty.

The new technologies that were only a glimmer on the horizon 15 years ago are now near at hand, and some can be ready for testing in just a few years. In addition, the problem of the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk, and the proliferation of phased array radars more generally, suggests that treaty limits on such radars deserve another look. This updating of the ABM Treaty should be an early priority.

In the area of nuclear testing, the decade-long drought in arms control accomplishment must end. Ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties should proceed on an expedited basis. It is unfortunate that the Reagan administration chose to renege on its 1986 commitment to make the ratification of these treaties an early priority for the 100th Congress. Beyond these two treaties, legitimate differences of opinion exist between those who argue for a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and those who argue that continued nuclear testing is essential for U.S. security.

What is often overlooked in the nuclear testing debate is that progress can be made without one side completely giving in to the other. A verifiable cap on the number of tests below current levels, perhaps with a lower testing threshold, would permit the confidence testing that the Reagan administration claims is essential. At the same time, a testing cap would slow the momentum of nuclear testing. Such a phased approach would be more likely to win the support of national security specialists who currently oppose a CTB. Furthermore, we are more likely to achieve a CTB through a series of steps than by one giant leap into the nuclear unknown.

One of the few areas of arms control where Congress has been able to make an important difference is anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon restrictions. Since 1985, Congress has banned the testing of U.S. ASAT weapons against objects in space as long as the Soviets did likewise. The Soviets, on their part, have not conducted such tests since 1982. Given the great and growing U.S. dependence on its satellites for intelligence, communications, and other activities, continuation of this ban is clearly in the U.S. interest. What is missing is the formalization of this regime through a negotiated agreement. Such an agreement should be a high priority for this administration — it must be for the next one.

America sorely needs a mid-course correction in its strategic policy trajectory. Strong and survivable strategic forces are necessary, and there our overall strategic policy is probably in its best shape. But also crucial to our long-term interests is a realistic and coherent doctrine to govern them, which in this Star Wars era is seriously lacking today. No less important is a sensible and fruitful arms control policy, which likewise is not in evidence at present. Western security can survive the shortcomings of current strategic nuclear policy for the balance of the Reagan administration, though not without important damage to vital American interests. A continuation of all elements of this unwise policy into the 1990s would be disastrous in many ways, including its impact on the Soviet Union.

For 70 years this nation has waited for the old Bolsheviks to die off and a new Soviet leader to emerge. Now that one has, one who has already taken major steps to deal with socialist oppressions and the inertia of its centrally planned economy, his ability to continue reforms that we believe are funda-

mental to a new and realistic arrangement between our two nations depends in no small way on our responses. In every regime there are powerful skeptics, to say nothing of outright opponents, and there are many who oppose Gorbachev's *glasnost*. While U.S. responses alone are not the sole determinant of the future of *glasnost*, it is safe to say that if visible, tangible benefits in terms of East-West relations are not visible soon, Gorbachev's tenure will be threatened. But the continuation of the most sensible elements of current U.S. strategic nuclear policy, coupled with the prudent pruning of its most contradictory and dangerous elements, would strengthen U.S. security interests, put U.S.-Soviet relations on a firmer footing, and lead the world into the third millenium with high hopes for lasting peace, security, and freedom.