

BOOK REVIEWS

Development of International Humanitarian Law. By Geza Herczegh, translated by Sandor Simon and Lajos Czank. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1984, 230 pp., index, \$21.00.

Reviewed by MARC WELLER

Socialist theory of international law is basically conservative. Of course, its specific doctrines are subject to change, parallel to readjustments in Marxist Leninist ideology.¹ But basic notions of jurisprudential theory, such as the emphasis of positive sources of international law, remain uncompromised. At the same time, new developments in international relations and international law create a constant tension between theoretical justification and the demands of ideological consistency.

This tension can be easily observed in the scholarly writings of Soviet authors.² For although ideology and legal doctrine often coincide in other countries of the Eastern Bloc as well, there is generally room for nuances in legal reasoning in these countries.

Perhaps it is these subtleties which make the work of less doctrinal authors more credible to readers educated in a Western legal tradition. Geza Herczegh's book, first published in Hungary, makes such an attempt to reconcile ideological justification with methods and doctrines of international law which are acceptable to non-socialist theorists and practitioners in the field of humanitarian law. And it reflects the tensions which such an endeavor can entail.

The author begins with an overview of the development of humanitarian law, denying the legal character of early humanitarian rules. Interestingly enough, however, he uses a natural law argument to make this denial, stating that these early humanitarian rules "were devoid also of the underlying idea that protection is equally extended to every man just by reason of his being a man."³ This argument contradicts the one adopted a few pages later in line with socialist doctrine. There, he affirms

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1. See the overview given by Zofia Maclure, "Soviet International Legal Theory — Past and Present," 5 *Fletcher Forum* 49 (1981).
2. The most comprehensive exposition of Soviet international legal doctrine can be found in G. TUNKIN, *THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* (1974).
3. G. HERCZEGH, *DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW* 5 (1984).

socialist literature which "has categorically rejected the natural-law conception and has exposed the real social and class relations" hidden behind it.⁴ What exactly these class relations are remains unclear.

Herczegh's rather simplistic contention that the underlying social factors within national societies alone caused the growth of the humanitarian idea in the nineteenth century is simply not convincing. For example, it is difficult to believe that Henry Dunant founded the organization which eventually became the International Committee of the Red Cross because he realized that soldiers were too valuable as potential members of the work-force to be wasted on the battlefield.⁵

Later in the book, however, Herczegh again slightly contradicts his argument by reminding us of related moral and cultural values which also contributed to the development of humanitarian ideals.⁶ Thus he drifts back towards natural law ideals, after having paid his tribute to the requirements of socialist doctrines.

Other parts of his historical presentation are both incomplete and biased. In Grotius, for instance, Herczegh sees only a reflection of a "dark and dismal picture of the rules of warfare" of his time.⁷ He supports this assertion with some citations from Grotius' treatise, while omitting other equally — and perhaps more — relevant quotations from the same book.⁸ Reference to different sections of Grotius' work would, for example, easily rebut Herczegh's assumption of an overly permissive framework of legal theory concerning the treatment of individuals in war.

Herczegh's treatment of the theoretical foundation of humanitarian law (chapter II) presents another somewhat contradictory argument. On the one hand, he recites the socialist assertion that the implementation of human rights provisions lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of each individual state. On the other hand, he distinguishes humanitarian law from human rights and places the former under the "*direct* international protection of the fundamental rights of man."⁹ When discussing situations in which humanitarian law applies to internal conflicts, Herczegh retreats from this distinction without much convincing justification. In these cases, he claims again that humanitarian law is more analogous to human rights law, in other words, subject purely to national discretion.¹⁰ When treating wars of national liberations though, the picture looks

4. *Id.* at p. 26.

5. *Id.* at p. 27.

6. *Id.* at p. 28.

7. *Id.* at p. 16.

8. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, *DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS* bk. III, ch. 5 (1625).

9. Herczegh, *supra* note 3, at 63 (emphasis in original).

10. *Id.* p. 65.

different. According to Herczegh, these internal struggles should be considered "international, but not inter-state conflicts."¹¹

Relying on resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and an extraordinary interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Herczegh claims that guerrillas have a right to struggle against "oppression."¹² States are obliged to give aid to this "just cause." But again, this statement is qualified:

It remains certain, however, that international law must secure the implementation of self determination, but it must respect also the sovereignty of states and must not give pretext for interference in the internal affairs of a foreign state.¹³

Formally at least, the author accords humanitarian law the status of the highest norms of international law; to his mind, its basic principles have acquired the status of *jus cogens*.¹⁴ Thus states cannot contract out of their obligations arising from those preemptory norms of humanitarian law.¹⁵ But the author does not demonstrate persuasively how this legal development could have taken place in spite of drastic violations of humanitarian rules since 1939. His assertion that such violations were "imperialist practices" does not refute the fact that they were indeed practices of states capable of creating or derogating law in the international sphere.¹⁶ Whether or not those states are labelled "imperialistic" is quite irrelevant to customary law or *jus cogens*.

In the next chapter, Herczegh reviews some of the more recent developments in the field of humanitarian law, leading up to the two Geneva Protocols of 1977. His remarks about "safeguards" of the Geneva law are most interesting. He rejects the legal basis of so-called belligerent reprisals if their outcome affects civilians. In this context, reprisals are practices otherwise unlawful under humanitarian law, but which have been adopted to make an adversary refrain from continuing illegal actions already initiated. If undertaken against privileged persons (those covered by the 1949 Geneva law), Herczegh points out, reprisals would thus violate *jus cogens*.¹⁷

The following presentation of the 1977 Protocols and the preceding negotiations reveals Herczegh's inside knowledge on the subject. He was

11. *Id.* p. 95.

12. *Id.* p. 88.

13. *Id.* p. 96.

14. *Id.* p. 81.

15. *See, e.g., Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law*, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1966).

16. Herczegh, *supra* note 3, at 139.

17. *Id.* p. 102.

present at some of the preparatory meetings and negotiating sessions and at times he reaches critical conclusions from a practitioner's perspective. Quite correctly, he points to the contradiction of having highly technical regulations governing the conduct of soldiers which might not be comprehensible to those actually engaged in hostilities.¹⁸ These soldiers are not only expected to fight according to these complex rules — if they fail to do so, they incur individual responsibility for war crimes.

When referring to the controversial point of including a special paragraph (Article 1(4) of Protocol I) on peoples "fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self determination," Herczegh's views appear a little too simplistic.¹⁹ This is because the author does not analyze the corollary of that provision, Article 96(30) of Protocol I, which accords "unilateral rights" to the "authority" representing peoples mentioned in Article 1(4).²⁰ Herczegh seems to accept the resurrection of "just war" doctrines in humanitarian law without much hesitation.

In the following chapter, Herczegh focuses specifically on the protection of civilians. He states that the 1977 Protocols confirmed the traditional distinction between combatants and civilians in armed conflicts, despite increased technological and political challenges to that doctrine.²¹ The author also devotes considerable attention to the rule of proportionality which was incorporated into Protocol I in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b)(iii). These provisions justify belligerent acts which could foreseeably harm civilians and damage their property, if the expected military benefits are significant enough. Herczegh argues strongly that the protection of civilians should take precedence over evaluations of military necessity.²² He notes with regret that "[s]ince the appraisal of this is necessarily and inevitably dependent on the subjective opinion of the attacking forces . . . the civilian population may possibly have to pay a very big price for it."²³

The status of guerrillas under international humanitarian law is Herczegh's next major subject. He reviews the relevant negotiating history of Protocol I and favors a wide application of Article 44.²⁴ This broad interpretation of Article 44 of Protocol I would place guerrillas under the protection guaranteed by combatant status, even if they do not strictly

18. *Id.* p. 124.

19. *Id.* p. 130.

20. See Rubin, Book Review, 9 *Fletcher Forum* 475 (1985) (discussing relationship between Arts. 96(3) and 1(4)).

21. Herczegh, *supra* note 3, at 149 (discussing, e.g., Arts. 48 & 51 of Protocol I).

22. *Id.* at p. 156.

23. *Id.* at p. 160.

24. *Id.* at p. 199.

comply with the traditional criteria which distinguish combatants from non-combatants. Here, he skims over the ambiguities of Articles 43 and 44 of Protocol I a bit too lightly:

It can happen, of course, that the other Party to the conflict nevertheless denies [the status of prisoner of war to guerrillas] and prosecutes them for common criminal acts. However the burden of proof lies on the capturing Party, and in case of compliance in good faith with international obligations it is hardly possible to deny them the rights accorded to prisoners of war.²⁵

A codification should have made the scope of interpretation as narrow as possible. As it stands, Protocol I leaves the fate of guerrillas in the hands of the power which captures them. The guidelines established are quite open to unilateral interpretation by the party which is pitted against underground fighters. Under such a broad interpretation, that party might hesitate to enhance the status of opposing forces by considering them legitimate soldiers.

The last two chapters of the book deal with Protocol II and again, the question of reprisals. Herczegh sees in Protocol II a reasonable compromise between the need to protect individuals during times of internal hostilities and the desire of many states to keep international law out of this area as much as possible.²⁶ Although Protocol II extends the protection granted by the 1949 Geneva law only to a limited degree, he properly classifies it as a step in the right direction.

Regarding belligerent reprisals, the author states only that the Protocols represent an incomplete attempt to outlaw such acts completely. To him belligerent reprisals are still necessary as sanctions in today's decentralized international system to enforce humanitarian law.²⁷ Taken together with his earlier remarks on military necessity and reprisals against privileged persons and objects, this position — realistic as it may be — reveals a certain conflict in his views.

In conclusion: Herczegh has written a concise text on the subject of international humanitarian law. But his book, like the subject itself, is not free of contradictions. For readers desiring a clear and concise introduction to humanitarian law, then, it is probably inappropriate. But Herczegh's work should not be dismissed merely because his reasoning reflects contradictions in socialist legal theory, at times. The value of the book lies in its challenge to Western scholars to formulate responses.

25. *Id.*

26. *Id.* at p. 217.

27. *Id.* at p. 227.

The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law.
Edited by Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend. Winchester, MA:
Allen & Unwin, 1985, 252 pp., \$12.50.

Reviewed by ANDREW D. BURTON

For generals and military historians, the study of yesterday's wars provides lessons for how tomorrow's will be fought. The origins of World War I trench warfare were found in the battles of the American Civil War; the modern U.S. Navy relies on the aircraft carrier, reflecting its success in the Pacific against Japan rather than perhaps a more sober assessment of its military value in the 1980s.¹

How then should we view the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict between Argentina and Great Britain? In both its colonial origins and the style and conduct of its fighting, it presented an astonished world with an anachronistic spectacle with which Lord Palmerston might have been familiar. He might not have recognized the Exocet missile, and there was no United Nations attempting to mediate at the outbreak of the Crimean War. He would, however, have understood the dispatching of a combined task force to recover a British colony appropriated by another regime — though whether he would have approved of this response, or the drift in British policy which led to the crisis, is less clear.

As the editors make clear in their preface, this book does not attempt to provide a definitive history of the conflict. Rather, it is a collection of essays grouped under the headings of the legal, diplomatic, and strategic aspects of the war: five essays comprise the legal and the strategic sections, and there are four essays on the diplomatic questions. The book concludes with an essay by Anthony C. Arend examining the connection between the three aspects.

The legal section of the book features articles on a fairly wide range of issues: the historical analysis of the dispute; the belligerents' respective claims to legal acquisition of the islands; and the observance of the laws of war by both Britain and Argentina. In an excellent article titled "The Strategic Role of Legal Principles," Thomas M. Franck considers the weight of the Argentine appeals to the idea of "anti-colonialism." He also examines the British argument suggesting that the Argentine seizure of the islands would set a dangerous precedent for future territorial disputes throughout the world, had it been allowed to succeed. This

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1. "Article Critical of Carriers Stamped 'Secret' by Navy," *Washington Post* 4 May, 1982, quoted in Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1983), p. 509.

argument prevailed, at least in as much as the British were able to steer Resolution 502 through the Security Council. The point was made by Ambassador Maina from Kenya: "If we bend the principle of decolonisation of peoples to look like the redistribution of territories, this Organization is in real trouble."²

The diplomatic section of the book includes a general summary of Anglo-Argentinian negotiations up to the invasion and the various peace proposals up to the British landing at San Carlos, an account of the American attempt to mediate the dispute, and an essay on the position adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) during the dispute. An article by Inis L. Claude, Jr. reviews the part the United Nations played in seeking a peaceful resolution of the dispute, and shows how that organization made a number of shifts in its position. From an apparently firm stand over the principle that member nations not resort to force in the settlement of disputes, Claude argues "the collective security slogan 'Thou shalt not commit aggression, but shall resist it' gave way to the quasi-pacifistic slogan 'Thou shalt neither commit nor resist aggression.'"³

Both Argentina and Great Britain repeatedly emphasized their desire for peace; why then were the successive mediation attempts of Secretary Haig, President Belaunde-Terry of Peru and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar of the U.N. unsuccessful? Despite protestations that they were ready to compromise, both countries were willing to accept a peace only on their own terms. In rejecting the compromise proposals, the Argentines made three fundamental assumptions. Foremost among these was the calculation that the British would not fight. If by some mischance they did, the Argentines believed that the United States would remain neutral, or would lean towards Argentina out of pan-American solidarity. David C. Gompert, who was involved with Haig's mission, is clear on this point: "Undoubtedly, Argentina misread Washington almost as badly as they did London."⁴ Finally, Argentina counted on the approval of the 'anti-colonial' Third World nations at the U.N. for their occupation of the islands.

Even in this assumption they were to be sadly disappointed. Franck quotes one Indian diplomat as saying, "We just don't take these resolutions very seriously. . . . We vote for theirs so they'll vote for ours."⁵

2. Thomas M. Franck, "The Strategic Role of Legal Principles," in *The Falklands War*, eds. Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 26.

3. Inis L. Claude, Jr., "U.N. Efforts at Settlement of the Falklands Islands Crisis," in *The Falklands War*, p. 129.

4. David C. Gompert, "American Diplomacy and the Haig Mission: An Insider's Perspective," in *The Falklands War*, p. 109.

5. Franck, "The Strategic Role of Legal Principles," p. 31.

Srilal Perera's article on the role of the OAS in the conflict reveals that the Latin American members of the Organization were long on pious declarations of solidarity, but short on the practical support offered to their fellow member. Argentina did receive Panamanian support in the Security Council: casting the sole dissenting vote against Resolution 502, Ambassador Illeuca attributed the British Prime Minister's intractability to "the glandular system of women."⁶

If we reject this argument, the question remains: why did the British go to war? Dav S. Zakheim's essay in the strategic section assigns the British government's action, which was backed up at the time by overwhelming public support, to wounded pride and the desire to avenge a national humiliation. Zakheim goes on to discuss the military lessons of the conflict, and examines at some length the 'anachronistic' nature of the war. Many analysts have questioned the future role of surface naval forces and amphibious troops. Zakheim is convincing in his rebuttal of these critics. His essay emphasizes that the British were outstanding at improvising and maintaining flexibility in the use of their forces. Despite attenuated lines of communication, they were able to supply their units better than the Argentines. In the operational sphere, advantages in training, leadership, and morale proved crucial. And finally, the war disproved the idea that democracies can not fight a successful limited war: the only obstacle, it seems, is to make sure that the war is a popular one.

The tactical genius demonstrated by their armed forces cannot, however, be allowed to obscure the essential bankruptcy of British policy over the previous seventeen years of negotiation with Argentina, when Britain virtually placed the power of veto in the hands of obdurate "Kelpers" and their allies — Conservative back benchers nostalgic for the days of Empire. The Argentine junta hoped to reinvigorate their faltering domestic support: the enthusiastic scrutiny now directed to their role in the "disappearances" by the new civilian leadership may at least have the beneficial effect of convincing other military dictators to avoid similar adventures. The Falklands/Malvinas war can thus be seen as arising from an absence, rather than a continuation, of policy. Perhaps, as Alberto Coll argues, the British might come to see the value of the conflict in demonstrating their resolve and capabilities in meeting a potentially more dangerous Soviet threat, enabling them eventually to accomplish a graceful and honorable transfer of the islands to Argentina, in accord with Great Britain's long-term interests.⁷

6. *Ibid.*, p. 27

7. Alberto R. Coll, "Lessons for the Future," in *The Falklands War*, p. 239.

The other articles in the strategic section, on the potential for rivalry in Antarctica, a plan for a joint U.S.-U.K. trusteeship of the islands, and an extension of the issues in the Falklands crisis to the management of other boundary disputes, are somewhat slight and disappointing. Notwithstanding the last-mentioned article, it would have been useful to have had a comparison of the Falklands conflict with the Anglo-Chinese agreement over the peaceful transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong and the associated territories, due in 1997. In the historical context of the war, the lesson that sovereignty could be peacefully transferred might have ramifications for the future of disputed territories like Belize and Gibraltar. In the meantime, the essays by Franck, Claude, Zakheim and Coll are especially recommended for their success in making sense of what was indeed a very strange little war.

Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race. By William Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1985, 200 pp., \$14.95., and *How to End the Nuclear Nightmare: You Know the Problem, Here is the Solution.* By Stuart Speiser. Croton-on-Hudson, NY: North River Press, Inc., 1984, 290 pp., \$8.95.

Reviewed by NICHOLAS KIRK

In order to convince potential aggressors that the costs of nuclear conflict outweigh the benefits, it seems reasonable to deterrence theorists that the nuclear threat involved must be credible. In recent years, the attempt to bolster this credibility has animated much public concern in the West. Some of this concern has found its way into print, and many books now contribute to the debate. This article reviews two recent publications which approach the question from different perspectives, *Nuclear Battlefields — Global Links in the Arms Race*, by William Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse and *How to End the Nuclear Nightmare — You Know the Problem, Here is the Solution*, by Stuart Speiser.

Arkin and Fieldhouse both work at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. Fieldhouse is to lecture at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute next year, and Arkin has written other books on modern strategic thought. As one would expect from their backgrounds, the authors present a clear discussion of the widespread infrastructure of the forces arrayed to fight the next major war. Also as one would expect, they are less than happy about the enormous resources devoted to these forces, and the result of their analysis is that this preparation has brought the chance of war much closer. They are careful to highlight a powerful reason behind the writing and buying of this kind of book: "a morbid desire to have secret bases and nuclear related facilities . . . to be a target."¹ In 150 pages of text and 120 pages of appendices, the book fuels this "morbid desire," whether or not one's windows are regularly rattled by bombers taking off.

Nuclear Battlefields breaks down the construction and preparation for the use of nuclear weapons into what the authors term "eight categories of activities in the nuclear infrastructure":

1. the arsenals (missiles, ships, aircraft, guns, and warheads) and the bases involved in training, maintenance, storage, and supply of nuclear forces;

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1. William Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1985), p. xv.

2. the production complex, which manufactures and designs nuclear warheads and radioactive materials;
3. the research, development, and testing complex comprised of scores of laboratories and test facilities;
4. the surveillance system whose facilities collect information related to nuclear weapons, particularly as a part of ocean surveillance and monitoring foreign nuclear tests (a growing complex of satellite tracking and control stations also supports the nuclear arsenals);
5. the early-warning and "attack-assessment" complex of radars and processing stations which detect and describe attacks;
6. the communication system linking all of these;
7. the planning and command structure which controls the nuclear battlefields;
8. civil defense.²

Using these categories, the authors give a competent assessment of the arsenals deployed by the five major nuclear powers. A breakdown of nuclear weapons totals is given by weapons category and task, with the holdings of the five powers in each category described and supplemented with tables and maps. There is also a description of how a nuclear war might begin, which is mainly devoted to a summary of the command authorities and likely targeting options. Nothing in this discussion is new, however, and much has been published in other books with which the authors have been involved, in particular the *Nuclear Weapons Databook* series.³

New material, though, is presented in earlier sections of the book which discuss how military requirements have driven the need for a greater awareness of the shape and structure of the earth, and why and how physical phenomena are important for modern war planning near space. "Geophysical phenomena such as magnetospheric storms, seismic activity, clouds, winds, atmospheric disturbances and auroras, adversely affect the performance of virtually all military systems,"⁴ the authors state. Mapmaking has also found itself the recipient of military attention, to provide better geodetic information for the "accurate determination of positions, distances and directions for launch sites, tracking sensors and

2. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

3. Thomas B. Cochran et al., *Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume I U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1983), 360 pp., and *Volume II U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production Complex* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1984), 400 pp.

4. Arkin and Fieldhouse, p. 17.

targets."⁵ Along these lines, the authors also provide us with a description of the magnetic properties of the earth, and the importance of magnetic anomaly detection for anti-submarine warfare.

Clearly, the most important link between science and the infrastructure vital to credible war planning is the study of radio propagation characteristics. This is vital to the system used for early warning, attack assessment and battle management known as the Worldwide Military Monitoring, Command and Control System (W.M.M.C.C.S., or "wimmicks"). The authors' summary of tradeoffs between information content, reliability and range under normal conditions and in a degrading environment is by no means exhaustive, but it is given in worthwhile conjunction to an estimate of U.S. military and government plans, methods, and installations for maintaining communications throughout a war.

The most important "survivable" communications media, they state, are the low end of the radio frequency spectrum: low frequency (LF), very low frequency (VLF), and extremely low frequency (ELF) radio. These frequencies have great penetrating ability, and long wavelengths which are reflected by the ionosphere, resulting in a much larger range than other wavelengths permit. These long wavelengths need long antennae for transmitting and receiving, however, but the lowest frequencies (VLF and ELF) are capable of the deep water penetration needed for submarine communication.

Arkin and Fieldhouse also note that the ionosphere is an early casualty of nuclear war, and that in order to provide a reliable trans- and post-attack communication system, a network of LF radios that transmit between antennae without "bouncing" off the ionosphere is being built: the key "enduring" system of this network is the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN). GWEN will be a grid of 300-foot unmanned relay stations, with EMP-hardened LF transmitters and receivers. By transmitting "groundwaves," the radio signals will follow the earth's surface and will continue to function in spite of the nuclear disruption of the ionosphere. By using "automatic diverse routing," the GWEN network of some 300 to 500 relay stations will ensure that there is a "communications backbone even after a nuclear laydown."⁶ In the early chapters of their book, then, Arkin and Fieldhouse display considerable knowledge of new technologies designed for use in a nuclear war.

In contrast, the later chapters of the book discuss regional deployment of nuclear weapons and probable plans for their use. These sections devote

5. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

special attention to naval nuclear forces and the status of West Germany in the transition to nuclear war. There is also a target map of the United States in both counterforce and countervalue plans, neither of which is particularly reassuring for residents of the Northeast corridor.

The book's weaknesses are those that also mark Arkin's earlier work. Some cannot be helped — concentration on the U.S. is inevitable, simply because there is more information on U.S. defense planning in the public domain than on any other country. Other faults could have been avoided. For instance, the book never frees itself from the conviction that it has a message; it would have more impact if its narrative voice were more dispassionate. Arkin and Fieldhouse also show a propensity to fill in details with a degree of speculation; many of the book's most interesting facts and conclusions are free of citation.

The weaknesses of *Nuclear Battlefields* are far outweighed by its strengths, however. It is a good one-volume summary of the military posture of the nuclear powers. By concentrating on the less "sexy" parts of this display — the warning, assessment and communications networks — the authors bring home the fact that many of us are in the front line. Above all, its sobering appendices, describing the nature and location of nuclear-related installations worldwide are an invaluable real estate guide for where not to buy property if one is planning to lay down a family seat.

After this harrowing read, it is a relief to turn to something which seems to be lighter. *How to End the Nuclear Nightmare*, by Stuart Speiser, is a book driven by deep concern about the possibility of nuclear war, but from a less technically informed point of view than that of Arkin and Fieldhouse's work. With the "solid" background in politics, economics and strategy provided by a career as a personal injury lawyer, he has analyzed the current domestic and international situation. But Speiser's work, although concerned with the possibilities of nuclear war, does not present the reader with a coherent analysis of the problems surrounding nuclear weapons.

For example, we are assured that the only difference between the U.S. and the USSR is ideological, based on different property relationships obtaining in the different countries. The author's solution to this problem is to initiate a massive redistribution of ownership within the U.S., while retaining the capitalist mode of production, by a program he delights in referring to as "SuperStock." This refers to the cessation of prevailing methods of cash generation in the U.S. corporate economy (stock and bond issue, other debt, and retained earnings) and its replacement with the issue of government-guaranteed equity in private companies to the deserving poor.

"SuperStock" leads to the end of domestic injustice, the author concludes. This produces a sounder basis for democracy, and an erosion of the difference between the two superpowers that would lead to a confluence of interests. Very soon there would be no reason left to go to war, for "if we socialized American capitalism through Superstock, the main source of ideological contention between the U.S. and the USSR — ownership of the means of production — would be eradicated. What, then, would there be left to fight over?"⁷ What indeed? Speiser is not unaware of the savage reality of statesmanship, however: "suppose, for example," he states, "that despite signing the treaty, the USSR deployed nuclear missiles in Latin America or otherwise caused the Marxist forces there to threaten our security or that of our allies. We would, of course, then have to invoke the Monroe Doctrine and remove those threats."⁸

It is clear the Speiser does not have the expertise to write a book on nuclear war; he neither knows nor seems to concern himself with the realities of international relations. But the purpose of reviewing this book is not to decry its technical ignorance, but to highlight the fact that if one hopes to reduce the chance of nuclear war, one must argue from knowledge of detail, not utopian hope. Unless one is searching for light relief through rather simplistic conclusions, there is no reason to turn to this book. Although it is clear that the author cares deeply about his subject, any abiding impression left with the reader is the narrowness of education that goes into the training of a personal injury lawyer.

The difference between the subtitles of the two books provide a summary of the differences between them. The certainty of the autodidact and the "passionate intensity of the worst" inform Speiser's *You Know the Problem: Here is the Solution*. Arkin and Fieldhouse's *Global Links in the Arms Race*, on the other hand, show how much one must know before commenting sensibly on weapons buildup, and that knowledge does not necessarily dispel fear.

7. Stuart Speiser, *How to End the Nuclear Nightmare: You Know the Problem, Here is the Solution* (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: North River Press, 1984), p. 164.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

