

BOOK REVIEWS

The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy. Edited by W. Scott Thompson. San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1983, 319 pp., \$8.95.

Reviewed by JAMES STAVRIDIS

Archibald MacLeish, the poet and philosopher, once said that all that is required of us is to recognize the break between the centuries. He was referring, of course, not to the chronological juncture between the years, but to the moments in history when great changes are at hand. Such moments are hard to identify and thus difficult to exploit in an effective fashion. Much of the thrust of *The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy* is that the international system is poised today at such a "break between the centuries" in the role and function of the developing countries in the international arena. In this revised second edition (the first was published in 1978), editor W. Scott Thompson has gathered a selection of controversial and often convincing essays dealing with economic, political and military issues in both the developing world itself and in U.S.-Third World relations.

There are two major themes one senses throughout much of the work. The first is the great diversity of the Third World (an echo from the first edition) and the attendant danger of formulating overly simplistic strategies and approaches to such a varied group of countries. The second major theme seems to be the need for the North in general and the United States in particular to pursue a much more realistic and pragmatic approach in dealing with the developing countries. The first edition was written, as Thompson explains, "to some extent . . . as a critique of the Carter administration's idealistic designs for the Third World . . ."¹ The years since 1978 have not been kind to the "new age" called for by President Carter in the Third World; the second oil shock, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, proxy warfare on the African continent, unrest and conflict in Central America, continued war on several fronts in the Middle East, renewed genocide in Southeast Asia, and the Falkland Islands war have demonstrated the volatility and instability of the developing world. This

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1. W. Scott Thompson, ed., *The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy*, (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1983), p. 5.

newly published edition of *The Third World* continues to advocate the "new realism" as a practical approach for the United States to use in dealing with the less developed countries (LDCs), although it seems more balanced in tone and selection than the first edition.

The book is structured as a collection of essays, organized into five sections: Introduction, Social and Economic Realities, International Affairs, The Economic Problem and Conclusion. As the editor points out in the first essay, the principal purpose of the book is *not* to offer specific policy prescriptions (although several of the authors do make some broad recommendations for U.S. planners), but rather to "understand underlying premises."² Editor Thompson sets the tone for the entire work in his terse initial essay, "The Third World Revisited." He describes the events of 1978-1982 as offering the Third World the unattractive choice between "the draconian conditions of Soviet alliances" and "episodic commitments from the United States," and points out the need for the Third World to find a new political reality, and often a new political *ideology* as well. The search for that particular grail continues today, of course, as many of the Third World countries try to find a foothold on the slippery ground of the international arena. The increasingly pragmatic and less ideological approach taken by many developing countries seems to be an indication of this groping search for greater practicality in their international relations.

Turning to the economic and military "realities," Thompson points to a growing sense of failure of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the face of increasing Western opposition. He also emphasizes the dramatic importance of the military factor in considering Third World politics, where the guns, organization and discipline of the armed forces make them the frequent kingmaker in developing societies. Both of these concepts are further developed in later essays in the volume, but Thompson manages to foreshadow them fairly well in the opening selection.

In one of the most pragmatic selections in an extremely hard-nosed volume, Lord Max Beloff rejects all moralistic-idealistic thinking about the developing world. As he rather acidly puts it, "The Russians have realized that the Third World regimes want to know not who is going to be nicer to them, but who is going to come out on top."³ This is a fairly blunt opinion, but one not lacking in practical evidence, such as the continuing tendency for the Non-Aligned Movement to lean heavily toward the Soviet side on most issues, as seen in UN voting patterns. Indeed, one of the unquestioned leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement recently appeared on *Meet the Press* and echoed the same thoughts, while politely discussing the reasons why the Soviet Union had been "invited"

2. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

to send troops into Afghanistan.⁴ Lord Beloff's point is that the "ideological conflict" is really secondary to the more basic conflict between the Soviets and the United States over national interests and geostrategic position in the Third World. In this he may well be right, although his final thought, that all this may lead to the West's isolation and eventual ruin, sounds a bit premature and somewhat melodramatic.

The second introductory essay in the volume is Allan E. Goodman's "Myth versus Reality in North-South Negotiations." In it, the author seeks to dispel what he terms the "myths" of the Third World:

1. LDC development prospects have been seriously hurt by the global economic disorders since 1973.

2. The LDCs have a clear view of the relief they want: a New International Economic Order.

3. The LDCs constitute a cohesive force that makes them influential in international affairs.

Goodman's contention, of course, is that these "myths" can be dispelled by looking at many practical factors often overlooked by developmental economists and international diplomats. For example, he contends that the serious factors in the developing world's economic problems have been bad governmental policies and corrupt performance rather than the operation of the international economic system *per se*.⁵ While alluding to some of the problems posed for the LDCs by the present international economic system, Goodman concludes that on balance there are positive aspects to the system from the developing world standpoint. He probably goes too far in glossing over terms of trade problems, trade barriers the LDCs face in entering developed markets, and other problems, but he does successfully shift the debate more toward the center from its accustomed position on the political and economic left. On the NIEO, he contents himself with pointing out its essentially political character and disregards it as a serious proposal for economic reform, a stand adopted by most of the other commentators in the volume. Finally, on the significance of the Group of 77 LDC negotiating group (G-77), Goodman believes that there is an emerging pragmatism on the part of many Third World countries that could be integrated into a more successful Third World policy on the part of the United States. In his conclusions the author points to the need for U.S. policies that "generate wealth" rather than redistribute it wholesale, and argues that U.S. policy should seek to encourage the emerging pragmatism in the Third World. This, of course, is more easily said than done, although the current economic recovery seems to bode well for some of Professor Goodman's ideas and suggestions. Overall, the first three

4. Indira Gandhi, interview on NBC News, *Meet the Press*, 1 October 1983.

5. W. Scott Thompson, ed., *The Third World*, p. 39.

essays are insightful and function well to introduce the general stance of the volume, which is to advocate "new realism" and pragmatism in dealing with the Third World.

The remaining essays in the volume continue these basic lines of thought. While space does not permit a thorough examination of each of the essays, several points concerning some of them are worth noting. Two of the most interesting pieces of work in the volume are the essays "Prospero's Island" (Dennis Austin) and "Third World Voting Patterns at the United Nations" (Kenneth L. Adelman and Marc F. Plattner). Austin, in an eloquent and literary essay, takes the position that the developing world is too complex and varied to simply be lumped together under one great "pseudo-doctrine" representing a simplistic North-South division. Adelman and Plattner take a close look at what U.S. foreign aid actually buys in terms of U.S. support on the issues. Answer: not much. Their brief, witty piece is the best dozen-page summary of the United States and the United Nations to emerge yet, and has direct relevance to the recent brief flap concerning U.S.-UN relations in the fall of 1983. Also noteworthy from the standpoint of controversy and refreshing writing are the twin economic essays by Tony Smith ("The Case of Dependency Theory") and Nathaniel Leff ("Beyond the New International Economic Order"). While neither article will win its author any new friends in the developing world, each has managed to deflate some of the rhetoric issuing from the other side of the debate. This is not to say that either argument is fully correct — each glosses lightly over many legitimate Third World problems and complaints, and gives little attention to the geopolitical and strategic complexities of U.S.-Third World relations. In both pieces, the emphasis remains on the concept of "realism" that is espoused consistently throughout the volume. As Leff comments:

U.S. policies toward developing countries have, in fact, taken a definite new turn. Broad economic and political commitments have been replaced by specific actions based on perceptions of mutual strategic interests in individual countries.⁶

Indeed, the overriding feature of *The Third World* is its essential unity of vision toward the developing countries. In one sense, this is a flaw in the work, in that it lacks any balancing viewpoints. Where is an essay by supporters of the NIEO? What of the Brandt Commission, the Cancun Summit, the Non-Aligned Movement? Are these not in some measure fundamental "premises" of U.S. policy in a Third World where many strongly believe in these positions? These views are ignored or glossed

6. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

over in the rush to support the "new realism" and a kind of instant "development realpolitik" that fits a bit too neatly with purely political views.

An additional omission in the work is the lack of any significant material dealing with the international debt crisis. Clearly, the major investments of U.S. banks and the Western financial system in the developing world *must* be a premise of U.S. policy — yet there is very little discussion of that issue. Finally, the moral dimension of the discussion is more or less ignored. One important "premise" in the entire North-South dialogue is that the vast majority of the world's people receive only a small share of the world's wealth. In a country like the United States, which stands for political equality and other rather fundamental principles of social justice, it seems that there should at least be some mention of the importance of simple fairness. This does not imply empty-headed idealism which leads nowhere, but rather some integration of idealism into the overall strategic equation that develops U.S. policy toward the Third World.

There is also little attention paid to the idea that the nations of the world are becoming increasingly interdependent. This may be an idea with which some or all of the authors loudly disagree, but it seems that there are some realistic and pragmatic reasons for paying attention to the developing countries' demands and dreams. While most observers would agree with Henry Kissinger that the Western sense of guilt is a major well from which the developing countries attempt to draw concessions like so many buckets of water, there is at least something to be said for the argument that the LDCs have some cause for complaint with certain aspects of the current international system.

None of this invalidates the success of Thompson's collection of essays. Their avowed function is to outline some of the premises for U.S. policy in the Third World. They go about doing so in a hard-headed, no-nonsense, pragmatic and realistic way. The heart of the book is a subtle and seductive message — that if we can just get tough with the Third World we can win their hearts and minds more easily than with foreign aid or ineffective and vacillating support. The more important message is that U.S. economic power is our real strength in dealing with the developing world. We have so much more to offer than the Soviets — politically, militarily and, most importantly, economically. Freedom is our ultimate strength — not only in our free markets, but in our political and cultural systems. This is the message that must reach the Third World, and it is a message that contains not only realism, but some idealism as well.

In the final analysis, *The Third World* provides an important outlook on the debate over the U.S. role in North-South relations. It is far from

the final word, either philosophically or practically speaking, as the authors might be the first to admit. Its most important function is its role as a coldly reasoned, pragmatic answer to the occasionally overblown idealism of the Brandt report, the Non-Aligned Movement, the NIEO, the Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer and the more rhetorical sections of the new Law of the Sea Treaty. The volume does not purport to cover the entire range of premises for U.S. policy, and indeed pays little attention to such important issues as the debt crisis and the moral dimension of the debate. Yet it serves to shift the discussion toward the center, where it more properly belongs. It is not a book to be read in isolation — indeed, to do so would be similar to entering Wall Street armed with only the Horatio Alger novels as a guide. But *The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy* is a well-written, thought-provoking volume with a refreshingly guilt-free approach to the developing world. One leaves it with the sensation that such pragmatism might well be one key element in cutting through the Gordian Knot of U.S.-Third World relations.

The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. By Andrew Cockburn, New York: Random House, 1983, 338 pp., \$16.95.

Reviewed by LAWRENCE B. STOLLAR

Assessment of the absolute and relative capabilities of the Soviet armed forces has been an important part of the American defense debate of the past few years, and a growing body of literature has emerged on various aspects of the issue. With *The Threat*, British journalist Andrew Cockburn weighs into the discussion with one of the lengthier contributions to the genre, promising an inside look at the Soviet military machine that, according to the jacket description, "will be as unwelcome in Moscow as in the Pentagon."

It should be noted at the outset that *The Threat* is thoroughly journalistic in approach. On this basis it is possible to excuse some of the minor games that Cockburn plays with his sources. He invariably identifies as "hawkish" specialists such as Harriet and William Scott, who in his view exaggerate Soviet strength, while Fred Kaplan and James Fallows carry no labels at all. A work by a "defense scholar" that appears in the text to be a book turns out to be an unpublished B.A. thesis. The reader acquainted with the field does find himself wishing that Cockburn would be a bit more candid about the biases of his sources, if only for the benefit of readers lacking such familiarity.

The main body of *The Threat* is an ambitious survey of the Soviet armed forces from the bottom up, lively in tone and spiced with revealing anecdotes. The life of the raw recruit is taken up first. Drawing extensively upon recent research analyzing émigré testimony, Cockburn paints a grim picture of life in the ranks, a Hobbesian world marked by extreme material deprivation, physical brutality and a never-ending search for alcoholic escape. We meet the tank lieutenant who tried to smuggle vodka into camp in cans of salt fish and the air force mechanics who distributed alcohol intended for the braking system of a MiG fighter to their mates on the base, drink providing the only refuge from the eternal rounds of drill, beatings and political indoctrination lectures. (The latter do, however, offer the men a rare opportunity to get some sleep on the job.) Ethnic and racial hatred abounds, and Cockburn includes a selection of some of the choicer epithets used by Russian soldiers to describe their "Soviet brothers." It is little wonder that very few draftees are entrusted with live ammunition during their two year terms of service.

Why is any of this tolerated? Cockburn seeks the answer in his examination of the officer corps, whom he finds to be poorly educated, prone to drunkenness and ever-mindful of guarding the privileges that elevate most officers from their lower-class, rural origins. The Soviet principle of "unity of command" ensures that officers all the way up the line will be held personally responsible for incidents that take place in subordinate units, giving ranking generals and lowly lieutenants alike a powerful interest in covering up the deficiencies and misdeeds of those under their command. At the top, the intense competition for the personal and political favor essential to promotion rewards skill in bureaucratic maneuvering, not military talent or efficiency.

A military-industrial complex that encompasses a vast network of military and civilian enterprises, many of which are highly secret and isolated from the rest of the economy, provides the materiel for the officers and men of the Soviet armed forces. This separation, according to Cockburn, does not preclude the traditional defects of Soviet civilian industry from arising in the military sector: lack of innovation, poor quality control, falsification of production figures and the like. Even the construction of nuclear missiles proves to be subject to politically inspired meddling.

The remainder of *The Threat* is taken up by an examination of the various services of the Soviet armed forces and the weapons that they use. Here, again, the byword is politics in command; Cockburn sees the services as concerned first and foremost with the acquisition of prestigious weapons, in order that they not appear inferior to their American counterparts. Hence they have produced the MiG-25, an interceptor aircraft designed to shoot down nonexistent high-altitude bombers, the BMP-1, an armored fighting vehicle with its fuel tanks exposed in its rear doors, and a naval fleet more impressive on display than in combat. No branch of the armed services is immune to such criticism, and virtually no weapons system is worthy of Western respect or admiration. Cockburn holds several parallel side discussions, in which he repeatedly criticizes American weapons design and procurement, civil defense and nuclear war-fighting of any kind. Throughout these later chapters, he builds up his larger thesis, finally reaching a crescendo in the brief concluding section.

This thesis may be fairly reduced to the contention that the greatest danger to Western security is the willful threat inflation carried on by United States military bureaucrats in and out of uniform. Their deliberate exaggeration of Soviet military capabilities creates public and political support for a "war economy" on which "wide sections of the community" are "directly dependent." The war economy produces high-technology arms which, while not very useful on the battlefield, inevitably lead to efforts on the part of the Soviet military bureaucracy to duplicate the

American systems. The Soviet Union builds its own invariably inferior version of the U.S. weapon, which is consequently seized upon by American experts to justify a new round of expensive "modernization." And so, in Cockburn's view, the cycle continues, reinforcing militarism in both countries, a process which he sees as "ultimately leading to a dénouement more terrible and final than 1914."

Where does all of this leave the reader interested in an evaluation of Soviet military capacity and its implications for Western security and defense programs? Not very well off, in this reviewer's opinion. To be sure there are many insights in *The Threat* that might prove useful in demythologizing the Soviet army. If one's reading on this topic in recent years has consisted of glossy Department of Defense handouts, Capitol Hill testimony of the Service Chiefs and Richard Viguerie solicitations, *The Threat* can act as a much-needed palliative to the "Soviets are ten feet tall and coming this way" impression left by these sources. And there is no doubt that much critical examination of the American weapons procurement process is a necessity if anything approaching rationality in these decisions is to be achieved. Beyond these considerations, however, Cockburn's contribution to informed debate on the subject of the Soviet armed forces is a limited one, for in the end he, like the "militarists" he criticizes, falls victim to what might be termed the fallacies of optimal analysis.

He is quite correct in criticizing many military and civilian observers for assuming, as he puts it, that Murphy's Law does not operate in the Soviet Union. For analysts of this school, each new Soviet weapon is said to constitute a serious threat, every doctrinal adjustment becomes a rational preparation for impending conflict and all of the myriad elements that feed into an assessment of capability — strategy, doctrine, men and machines — are assumed to mesh together as an optimal political-military system. Not surprisingly, the conclusions drawn from such analysis suggest that Moscow can do just about anything it pleases in the world arena.

Cockburn intervenes to find, again correctly, that no part of the system performs perfectly and that the system as a whole functions at some level well below that described by the optimizers. From this, though, he jumps to the unwarranted conclusion that Moscow can do almost nothing at all. Lacking in both cases is a serious evaluation of what the Soviet armed forces, with all their defects, can do when the use of force is deemed necessary or desirable by Kremlin leaders. Those operational episodes that are brought up in *The Threat* are presented exclusively as examples of one failing or another of Soviet forces. (Most readers will be quite surprised, no doubt, to see the Afghan invasion cited in this context.) Not unexpectedly, operations such as the interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, successful by most standards, are not mentioned at all.

In place of an investigation of the possible ways in which Soviet power might be used in pursuit of political ends, Cockburn assures us that the Soviet Union remains locked in a position of military inferiority since, "by every yardstick of military comparison, apart from nuclear weapons, the Soviets are still outnumbered by the combined forces of the United States, China, the European members of NATO, Sweden and Japan." (This is in addition, of course, to the numerous deficiencies in their forces which were described previously.) A skeptic might argue that a) nuclear weapons are an important part of the equation and b) comparing Soviet forces with the combined total capacities of the United States, an independent Communist state, a geographically bounded and oft-divided alliance, a neutral and a militarily limited regional power is not a very useful exercise. In reply, Cockburn offers the contention that continued growth in Soviet defense efforts will actually cause capabilities to diminish, as their propensity for mimicking expensive American high-technology weaponry leads them to deploy expanding numbers of highly complex systems. In Cockburn's words: "[t]he increased complexity of the new Soviet weapons will almost certainly ensure their diminished effectiveness as instruments of war."

In concluding his look at the Soviet military with a heavily stacked "net assessment" and a last questionable assertion of an inverse relationship between military spending and force effectiveness, Cockburn invites us not to take alternative views too seriously, lest we be deceived by the threat inflators and militarists. His dismissal of the possibility that the Soviet Union might pose any kind of significant challenge to Western interests and security leads him unfortunately close to the sort of ethnocentric perspectives disturbingly reminiscent of pre-World War II American attitudes toward another potential adversary. Then it was the Japanese army and navy that were comprised of near-sighted, undersized imitators; now it is the Soviet soldier portrayed as a drunken, underfed simpleton led by half-educated officers, saddled with universally ineffective equipment designed by the Soviet Union's own slavishly imitative industrial bureaucrats. One does not have to be expecting the Soviets to launch a Pearl Harbor attack of their own to appreciate the dangers inherent in this kind of thinking.

The Status of Gibraltar. By Howard S. Levie, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Replica Edition, 1983, 250 pp., \$22.00.

Reviewed by JOHN PETRIE

Professor Levie became interested in the Gibraltar question in the late 1960s and early 1970s when he found it was no longer possible to reach the Rock from Spain. The Spanish Government, then at the height of political and emotional reactivity in its most recent effort to recover the lost promontory, had sealed off all land, sea and air transportation to Gibraltar from Spain in what has been described as the "Sixteenth Siege." With his curiosity piqued Levie sought an opportunity to research the issues which underly this international dispute with his efforts culminating in publication of *The Status of Gibraltar*.

An attempt to categorize this book is difficult. Although it was originally written as an historical monograph, the complexity of the issue and the author's personal interests and talents have yielded something more. It could be equally well described as an analysis of the historical, diplomatic or legal status of Gibraltar. Significant aspects of the Spanish and British domestic attitudes towards Gibraltar and their influence on the respective governments are explored and the strategic role of the Rock is traced through recent history. Additionally, a factual and non-judgmental treatment of the actions of the UN General Assembly, which have probably only exacerbated the problem, is interwoven in the treatment of the last two decades.

The Status of Gibraltar is a concise analysis of a question whose resolution would have legal precedent value and strategic significance extending well beyond the immediate issues involved. Legally, the British response to Spain's insistent allegations of previous perfidy has to be understood as influencing the outcome of Guatemala-Belize, Venezuela-Guyana, Hong Kong, and the Falklands-Malvinas disputes. Strategically, the character of future naval operations in the Mediterranean may hang in the balance.

This superbly documented book allows the reader to travel quickly through time from the prehistory of the Rock to the Gibraltar of today, gathering along the way the essential data to analyze the current situation and to understand its implications for the future.

The essence of the current situation took form at the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession and the emergence of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). While the present dispute is complex, to say the least, it originates

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in part from the highly ambiguous provisions of Article X of that treaty which states:

The Catholic King (of Spain) does hereby . . . yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts there-unto belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right forever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever . . . the Catholic King wills, and takes it to be understood, that the above named propriety be yielded to Great Britain without any territorial jurisdiction, and without any open communication by land with the country round about.

That certainly seems to both grant and then take away the title to Gibraltar in the same breath and is today interpreted to do just that by some. It is incomprehensible, however, to assume that Great Britain, holding the upper hand militarily at the time, would consent to sign such an equivocal document. By analyzing the *travaux préparatoires* of the treaty Levie dispels the ambiguity and reveals the somewhat hidden meaning that nothing outside the walls of the fort to the north on the peninsula would come under British sovereignty. Over the years, however, the British have extended their control a short distance to the north and the current airport at Gibraltar is built entirely on territory not ceded by Spain. Additionally, each incursion was met by either diplomatic protest or a temporary agreement followed by protest when its temporary nature was ignored by the British.

Levie concludes:

The negotiating history leaves no doubt whatsoever that Great Britain had and has not the slightest legal basis for claiming that the cession of Gibraltar included any land on the isthmus north of the Rock itself, as they have done almost since the Treaty of Utrecht became effective . . . (p. 82)

He goes on to conclude that they have no legal claim to this territory on any basis. While Levie contends that "after Utrecht the Military Governors of Gibraltar succeeded in obtaining *de facto* what the diplomats had been unable to obtain *de jure*" (p. 82), he goes on to assess that a valid title formed by prescription could not be argued successfully. Despite protest, Spain has failed, for the same exceptionally long period of time, to recover effectively the territory in question.

The British Government was prepared in September of 1966 to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice but in December of that year Spain refused to submit. Great Britain most likely would have argued that they held title by prescription. Spain may have recognized this and therefore refused to submit to the Court's jurisdiction; or, perhaps the larger issue of British sovereignty over the Rock itself was recognized as unassailable. In either case the effective exercise of sovereign rights by Great Britain continues today, though not without Spain's protest.

There is little question of the desires of the indigenous population. In a plebiscite held in 1967 Gibraltarians voted a one-sided decision (12,138 to 44) to retain their association with Great Britain. Furthermore, a panel of observers assigned by the Commonwealth Secretary General reached the unanimous conclusion that "the actual conduct of the referendum fully conformed with the requirements of free expression of choice through the medium of the secret ballot." (p. 113) Unfortunately for the future of self-determination the UN General Assembly rejected the plebiscite (G.A. Res. 2353, UN Doc. A/6716 (19 December 1967)).

Spain might do better to encourage the plebiscite route. The British have pledged themselves to respect the desires of the populace, and the Treaty of Utrecht calls for the British not to transfer sovereignty to anyone without first offering Gibraltar to Spain. This would seem to require the route to independence to travel through a period of association with Spain. Spanish treatment of Gibraltar to date has not encouraged this and unquestionably accounts for the lopsided results in the 1967 polling. The Spanish need only encourage a simple majority in a future plebiscite and they would achieve what force and diplomacy have failed to do for over two and a half centuries.

A proposal to permit the flying of the Spanish flag with those of Great Britain and Gibraltar was violently opposed by Gibraltarians in 1968. This may have been the best action which could have been taken if Great Britain intends to retain sovereignty on the Rock. A similar move by President Eisenhower, over the objections of Congress, in the Panama Canal Zone was the first step towards the loss of sovereign rights in that area. The strategic similarities of the territories in question are also striking.

Levie, fully comprehending that the dispute over Gibraltar defies simple solution, closes his analysis with a proposal for Spanish sovereignty in Gibraltar with a lease-back provision. The intent of the proposal is apparently to assuage Spanish pride while meeting the strategic and political needs of Great Britain. However, the British have retained control of Gibraltar in recent years based on the legal strength of their rights granted by Spain in the Treaty of Utrecht. The proposed solution would be a renunciation

of those rights. With the support Spain has garnered in the General Assembly any long-term lease-back provision would likely result in a very short-term arrangement.

Additionally, with Spain's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) it would be difficult to contend that there is any justification for the British guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean when Spain could do it equally well from its own territory as a NATO ally. Of course the commitment of Spain to NATO could not diplomatically be questioned but the enthusiasm of the Gonzalez government thus far is not especially convincing.

The strategic control of the gateway to the Mediterranean also appears to have been the Spanish motivation in submitting proposed amendments to the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS III) regarding transit passage through straits. These amendments, which failed, would have given Spain a great deal more latitude in enforcing pollution regulations over transiting ships. UNCLOS III is already giving the equivalent of belligerent rights of visit and search to coastal states to enforce pollution regulations.

Although this action on the part of Spain to enhance its position vis-à-vis the Straits of Gibraltar occurred after the completion of Levie's manuscript, and therefore cannot be viewed as an oversight in his research and analysis, it certainly raises questions about the feasibility of his proposed solution of Britain surrendering sovereignty over Gibraltar to Spain.

Overall, *The Status of Gibraltar* is of immense value to the international lawyer, diplomatic historian, geopolitical strategist or scholar whose purview includes the questions surrounding the past, present or future of Gibraltar.