

TERRORIST WARFARE: FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES

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In this article, Dr. Motley assesses terrorism as a form of warfare. He identifies the place which terrorism occupies on a spectrum of military conflict differentiated by risk, probability of occurrence, and level of intensity. Dr. Motley draws upon this model to outline a corresponding defensive role for U.S. armed forces — a role for which those forces must adapt. The probable increasing use of terrorist tactics to pursue military objectives in opposition to U.S. interests requires that the U.S. develop the necessary tactical skill and flexibility to meet this threat, he concludes.

I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is warfare “without territory, wages without armies as we know them. It is warfare that is not territorially limited . . . It is warfare without neutrals, and with few or no . . . innocent bystanders.”¹

Though practiced for centuries, terrorism has only recently become a substantial force in international politics. It is now a major U.S. national security concern. Recently described by the Department of Defense as “warfare on the cheap,” terrorism “permits small countries to attack U.S. interests in a manner which, if done openly, would constitute acts of war and justify a direct U.S. military response.”² According to one senior U.S. official: “Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant contest but we have no choice to play it.”³

For the United States, terrorism viewed as a form of warfare is a relatively new phenomenon — one which has received little doctrinal

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1. Brian Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet,” *Survival*, July-August 1975, p. 160.
2. *Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20 December 1983), p. 128.
3. Excerpts from a prepared text titled, “Terrorism and the Modern World” presented by Secretary of State George Shultz at the Park Avenue Synagogue in Manhattan. *The New York Times*, 26 October 1984, p. A12.

categorization or interpretation (neither "terror" nor "terrorism" is listed in the 1984 version of the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1). Used as instruments of war, however, terrorist acts conducted against the United States present formidable challenges. They must be countered by effective government action.

Based on the premise that terrorism is warfare on the cheap, U.S. policy makers should remember that military operations to counter terrorism must be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The strategic military objective of a nation at war must be to apply whatever degree of force is necessary to allow attainment of the political aim for which the war is being fought. But until a political purpose has been determined and defined by the President and Congress, strategic and tactical objectives cannot be clearly identified and developed. The strategic objectives, once developed, must constantly be subjected to rigorous analysis and review to insure that they continue to reflect accurately not only the ultimate political end desired, but also any political constraints imposed upon the application of military force.⁴

II. TERRORIST WARFARE: AN EFFECTIVE FORM OF COMBAT

Terrorism is a cheap method of conflict, requiring neither a high degree of sophistication nor extensive training. It is a low-cost strategy which, above all else, is a political act designed not necessarily to destroy the enemy but to demoralize him or to force him to overreact. Terrorists confronting the United States will never possess military superiority over the U.S. armed forces, nor do they have to possess it. Their strategy is one of limited aims, directed toward weakening and undermining the basic interests and values of the United States by inflicting many superficial wounds rather than a single mortal one. Contemporary terrorists have become experts at exploiting the media to publicize their cause and to spread the effect of their terror.

The October 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut is an excellent example of how terrorists seek to alter the political stance of an adversary. They were under no illusions regarding the U.S. ability to absorb such a military setback. Their intent, which proved successful, was to make the continued presence of U.S. forces politically unacceptable to the United States.

In years past, terrorism tended to be characteristic of the early stages of a conflict, and as the conflict expanded acts of terrorism diminished


4. Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 1982. Department of the Army, p. B-1.

substantially. Today, however, terrorist warfare has become an effective form of combat for many participants who see little need to escalate the fighting to more conventional military stages. Accordingly, it has become the prevalent means of armed conflict confronting the United States abroad. In terms of severity, it falls within the range of military operations conducted at the lower end of the conflict spectrum commonly referred to as low intensity conflict.⁵ Although direct Soviet-American military clashes would be unlikely to fall into the category of low intensity conflict, the Soviets and their proxies can be expected to continue to expand their "risk minimizing"⁶ strategy by maintaining their involvement in the internal affairs of Third World countries and supporting efforts to overthrow legitimate governments. Terrorist warfare will be an essential element of that strategy.

In the past, much of the U.S. military's strategy, doctrine, and force structure was based on a traditional model of potential conflict, which portrayed the different types of conflict as discrete incremental phases set along a continuum of probability and risk (Figure 1).⁷ But now, conflict is recognized as more complex and viewed in a more realistic manner. One useful way of looking at the spectrum of conflict involves envisioning multiple types of warfare occurring simultaneously or in a complementary fashion across the continuum of conflict and intensity (Figure 2). From this second model, three major inferences might be drawn. First, the United States must maintain the capability to deter strategic nuclear war. Second, the risks are great that conventional war could quickly escalate to nuclear war; therefore, the probability of deliberate conven-

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5. Low-intensity conflict is the range of activities and operations on the lower end of the conflict spectrum involving the use of U.S. combat forces to establish, regain, or maintain control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power. Other terms such as limited, small or minor wars, low-level violence, and limited contingencies are often used synonymously with low-intensity conflict. This operational definition is adapted from FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 1981, p. 14. Also, see Joint Chiefs Staff Publication 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 1 April 1984, p. 211, for a definition of limited war.
 6. I have borrowed this term from Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," *International Security* (Winter 1982/83): 143. He writes: "Although the Soviets are masters of opportunism, they have avoided indiscriminate muscle flexing. Instead, their tendency has been to talk tough as a matter of practice, yet to reserve actual intervention for cases where they have supreme interests at stake, a high probability of U.S. non-involvement, and a comfortable prospect of success with moderate investment of military capital." Ibid. See also Malcolm Mackintosh, "Perspectives of the World Scene 1983: A Soviet Assessment," especially p. 44 in Rusi and Brassey's *Defence Yearbook 1984*. Edited by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1984).
 7. The incremental and complementary models of potential conflict are discussed in detail in Lt. General Fred K. Mahaffey, "Structuring Force to Need," *Army*, 1984-85 Green Book, October 1984, pp. 205-206.

Figure 1. Incremental Phases Model of Potential Conflict




tional conflict occurring between the United States and the Soviet Union is low, primarily because it would prove very costly. Third, (a major premise of this article) the Services must focus renewed attention on the lower end of the conflict model by refining its military strategy, doctrine, and force structure to deal more effectively with terrorism, unconventional warfare, and other forms of low intensity conflict.

The political and military goals of a low intensity conflict environment are likely to require the U.S. to inject into conflict situations small, strategically-responsive, and flexible U.S. military units, organized to respond to a broader spectrum of combat operations. Under these circumstances, the utility of a large army, navy and air force will come under increasing question. Given the constraints of money, manpower, and the availability of sufficient airlift and sealift, U.S. military planners will be forced to focus more intently on "force integration,"⁸ — putting trained people and equipment, together with requisite support, into new unit structures throughout active and reserve military organizations.

8. This term is a modified version of comments expressed by General William R. Richardson, Commanding General, USA Training and Doctrine Command, "TRADOC: Army's Source of Well-Trained Soldiers," *Army*, 1983-84 Green Book, October 1983, p. 51.

Figure 2. Multiple, Simultaneously, Complementary Model of Potential Conflict



To date, U.S. military forces have been designed and structured primarily to engage in mid-to-high intensity conflict, which has posed the greatest danger to U.S. national interests. With the complexity and diversity that terrorist warfare poses, however, future U.S. military forces will have to take on a somewhat different character to offer greater balance and flexibility. Furthermore, realization of an improved power-projection capability by the Soviet Union, combined with its willingness to use surrogates to achieve its global aims, also raises the possibility that the United States will have to commit forces to fight in non-NATO areas and, in all probability, without allied assistance.⁹ This prospect is further

9. Even though the "old truths" of the NATO Alliance are still valid — the Soviet Union is a threat; a collective response to that threat is needed; and nuclear forces remain the ultimate pillar of the NATO deterrent — NATO is eroding politically and militarily with dissension in the Alliance over a number of issues, the least of which is consensus on what constitutes an adequate military deterrence of the perceived Soviet threat. Three potential NATO crises are: (1) the possibility that Senator Nunn might revive his bill calling for the return home of up to 90,000 U.S. troops if the Europeans do not boost their defense spending (this proposal was narrowly defeated in June 1984, 55 to 41); (2) concern on exploiting new technology to strike Soviet follow-on forces, as has been discussed by NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington; and (3) the ever-present issue of whether to devote manpower and equipment to NATO's flanks in Norway and the Mediterranean or to concentrate forces in Central Europe. On the Nunn proposal, see *The Washington Post*, 21 June 1984, p. A1. As to Carrington's comments, see *The Washington Post*, 15 November 1984, p. A30.

heightened by the existence of widespread instability and conflict in Third World areas that contain the preponderance of the world's energy and strategic mineral resources. It is a strategic reality that U.S. forces possessing great flexibility will be required in the future to respond to low intensity conflict crises, not only to demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect vital interests, but also to prevent the escalation of minor crises and low intensity conflict into superpower confrontations.

III. THE CHARACTER OF TERRORIST WARFARE

Terrorist warfare is invariably waged with extreme ruthlessness and cruelty, and is clandestinely organized and undeclared. Moreover, it is inherently random, arbitrary, and indiscriminate in its effects on the innocent. Unlike conventional soldiers, who seek self-preservation in battle and whose survival in the mass is essential to success, the terrorist often achieves his purpose most effectively through his willingness to give up his life in the commission of his act. Terrorism differs from traditional warfare, which is most often institutionalized violence perpetrated by state upon state and therefore carries a badge of legitimacy. Terrorism is nonstate violence and is regarded as illegitimate violence. (This distinction can be found in the U.S. legal system, inasmuch as U.S. statutes do not identify terrorism as either a war crime or an act of war. Rather, acts of terrorism are punished under existing statutes dealing with murder, arson, bombings, extortion, air piracy, etc.¹⁰)

Terrorist warfare arouses more intense emotions and bitterness than conventional forms of war. This is due in part to the fact that a larger percentage of casualties are civilians, often women and children; and to the lack of applicable laws of war. Contemporary terrorism has proved to be an effective means of securing certain tactical objectives: as a form of propaganda it can capture enormous publicity for a cause; as an extremely powerful weapon of blackmail, terrorist operations can be used to obtain ransom payments, the release of jailed terrorists, and other concessions from authorities. A less obvious tactical benefit of terrorism is that it can be a means of inspiring and mobilizing sympathizers and encouraging emulation of terrorist acts.¹¹

Although unimpressive in firepower, terrorism provides a low-cost, low-risk means of conducting armed conflict. However, current U.S.

10. An excellent discussion of the distinction between terrorism and other forms of warfare, part of which I have reflected here, is Neil C. Livingston's, "Fighting Terrorism and Dirty Little Wars," especially p. 7, in *Air University Review*, March-April 1984.

11. For a more detailed treatment on the "tactical uses" of terrorism, see Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism — Global Links," especially pp. 217-219, in Rusi and Brassey's *Defence Yearbook 1984*.

military doctrine does not stress an understanding of terrorism as a method of low intensity conflict. Instead, it deals with terrorism in a conventional setting where combat power is measured in terms of troops, aircraft, and ships. In short, U.S. military doctrine assumes comparable conduct by the enemy; unfortunately, terrorists do not adhere to the traditional means of conventional warfare.

Whether employed by subnational groups or by nation states, contemporary terrorism has become a strategic tactic. Terrorists have introduced a new breed of violence that poses a new threat to the United States. Their tactics are well-suited to the emerging geopolitical context that will confront the United States in the remaining years of the twentieth century. The need for raw materials, strategic basing rights, and international political cooperation has made the United States dependent on other nations, thus increasing its vulnerability. In the future, terrorists are likely to take greater operational risks, that challenge all segments of American society. Accordingly, the United States political and military leadership must strengthen its awareness of the growing dangers of terrorism and must begin to develop joint strategies and capabilities to deal with this menace.

Although there are no simplistic solutions to the battle against terrorism, the U.S. military must continue to prepare to cope with this form of warfare. This preparation will compete with other Service priorities and programs for scarce resource allocation¹² and will require appropriate strategy, doctrine, equipment, and training to deal with the gross manifestations of terrorism. (A discussion of the "force-strategy mismatch" is beyond the scope of this article. The issue is, however, an essential consideration that the Services must consider regarding antiterrorist operations.) Terrorism as a form of low intensity conflict requires serious consideration by military planners concerning the proper role of the U.S. armed forces in responding to terrorist warfare. Currently, the Department of Defense is equipped to handle only a limited number of terrorist situations.

12. For a detailed discussion of questions on the Reagan Administration's priorities in military spending since 1981 and the U.S. armed forces' readiness to go to war, see "Military Priorities Hit by Critics of Readiness," *The Washington Post*, 30 July 1983, p. A1, and "U.S. Gambles on Peacetime Military," *The Washington Post*, 19 August 1984, p. A1. Appearing before a special Congressional panel to track improvements in U.S. special operations forces (SOF), Noel C. Koch, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, DoD, noted that funding for special operations is once again on the rise, reversing the stagnation that set in after Vietnam. Mr. Koch cautioned that the pace of change is "agonizingly slow" and warned that SOF strategy being developed by the top military commanders is "still largely directed to actions in a conventional environment." *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1984, pp. 15 and 18.

The wars that the United States has fought in the past sought to achieve territorial or political goals inseparable from the disruption of the opponent's internal power structure, and which were waged according to Clausewitzian theory as refined into U.S. military doctrine. The nature of terrorist warfare, as is the case in most forms of unconventional warfare, is frustrating to the American cultural experience.¹³ Following a formal U.S. declaration of war, terrorist operations will assume minimal significance in the overall battle plan. The U.S. military's problems¹⁴ in dealing with terrorism arise during peacetime or during the gray period between pre-crisis and crisis when demoralizing and destabilizing acts of terror occur.

In coping with terrorist warfare, a major lesson from the Vietnam conflict¹⁵ that will remain uppermost in the minds of U.S. policy-makers for years to come is that the American public is unwilling to sacrifice the blood of its men and women over a prolonged period of time in pursuit of uncertain or unpopular goals. In order to make the supreme sacrifice of life for foreign policy goals, Americans require from their national leaders a detailed understanding of the threat, an articulation of well-defined objectives, and a clear conception of how such objectives will be achieved.

The military approach to countering terrorism will involve two kinds of warfare: First, a political and psychological war to secure the popular consent and support that must form the basis of any effective modern democratic government, and second, an offensive military war to destroy, disrupt, contain, and reduce terrorist organizations. For U.S. policymakers to be able to pursue such an approach entails major problems.¹⁶

13. Two excellent sources dealing with this point are Sam C. Sarkesian's *America's Forgotten Wars*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), and Donald Vought, "American Culture and American Arms: The Case of Vietnam," in *Lessons from an Unconventional War*, ed. Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Elsford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 158-190.

14. For a succinct discussion of the military problems and challenges posed by the threat of terrorism as a form of low-intensity conflict, see Robert H. Kupperman, et al., "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Military in the 1990s," in *Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000*, ed. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1984), pp. 200-203.

15. One of the more current critiques of America's military strengths and successes, as well as its weaknesses and failures, in Vietnam is General Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984). General Palmer contends that America's most serious error was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by U.S. civilian leaders. Lacking clear objectives, the U.S. armed forces failed to develop an appropriate strategy, thus relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi.

16. The controversy sparked by Secretary Shultz's October 26, 1984 speech highlights this point very vividly. (See note 3) One major issue is when should the United States utilize its vast

However, judging by the concerns expressed recently by high-ranking U.S. officials and the patterns of international terrorist incidents, anti-terrorist operations¹⁷ are certain to assume a more integral role in U.S. national security planning, policies, and programs.

IV. SUMMARY

Given the totality of missions presently assigned to the U.S. armed services — maintaining the capability to deter strategic nuclear war, to engage in conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, and to react to a multitude of low-intensity conflicts ranging from antiterrorist operations to fighting more conventional wars — the U.S. military planner is presented with challenges more diverse in scope than those of the early post-Vietnam years. Today, U.S. military forces require greater balance and flexibility and must be tailored to meet specific needs since multiple types of conflict can and may occur at any level of intensity. Anti-terrorist operations, by necessity, will assume an increasing role in U.S. military strategy.

Modern conflict, real or potential is serious and complex. Thus, one must ask: is the U.S. national security community truly attuned to the changing spectrum of conflict that it is likely to experience during the

military power to counter challenges posed by international terrorists. Mr. Shultz argues for the importance of using armed strength as an instrument to combat global terrorism. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, however, warns of the limits of military power and the need for extreme prudence in utilizing it. For a succinct discussion of these two contrasting views, see *U.S. News and World Report*, 24 December 1984, pp. 20-21.

17. If terrorism is to be treated as a form of warfare, there is a critical distinction that must be understood regarding anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist operations. Anti-terrorist operations denote an offensive strategy employing a range of options to prevent terrorist acts from occurring. Conversely, counter-terrorist operations are retaliatory measures, primarily the use of force after the fact, and thus are more accurately termed a reactive strategy. Though the current U.S. program is described as anti-terrorist, in reality it is counter-terrorist and makes no allowance for decisive preventive offensive action. Although National Security Decision Directive 138 provides the framework for offensive action against terrorist acts (*The Washington Post*, 16 April 1984, p. A19) and Secretary Shultz has pushed for U.S. military retaliation, indications are that such action has been deemed impractical, inasmuch as such strikes "would damage America's real interests." *U.S. News and World Report*, 26 November 1984, p. 23. The latter source also reported that not only did the White House drop the idea of U.S. military retaliation, but "gently chided Shultz for getting carried away in bringing it up." At the time this article was written, the Defense and State Departments had refused to comment on a story appearing in the November 27, 1984 issue (p. A1) of *The Washington Post* that the United States had undertaken detailed preparations to launch an anti-terrorist retaliatory bombing strike in Lebanon from the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower before Thanksgiving. Also, Secretary of Defense Weinberger's November 28, 1984 speech, "The Uses of Military Power" (see note 22), regarding the employment of military force contrasts sharply with Mr. Shultz's position on retaliating against terrorists.

remainder of the twentieth century, or does the traditional preoccupation with conventional warfare (World War II fought with advanced technology systems) still prevail? For many years, Europe¹⁸ has been the central focus of U.S. foreign policy, and, while a radical change in this orientation seems unlikely, a certain de-emphasis seems both inevitable and desirable. Armed conflict in Europe appears less likely than in almost any other part of the world — a situation that is not expected to change in the near future. On the other hand, threats to U.S. interests at lower levels of conflict have assumed greater importance. During the past two decades, with regard to both internal wars and conflict between nations, tensions in the Third World have been on the rise. During the period from 1945 to 1977, there were no fewer than 56 conflicts involving a significant part of at least one state; in 1983, some 40 to 45 nations were at war in one form or another.¹⁹ Major conflicts in 1984 described as “little clashes” that can explode into “greater ones” include: Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Chad, Western Sahara, Angola, and the Philippines.²⁰ In the years ahead, it is likely that the United States will become increasingly preoccupied with low intensity conflict, especially terrorist warfare. By necessity, the United States will be forced to direct some of its attention away from Europe and its traditional fixation with conventional warfare.

Anti-terrorist missions are only one of many missions that U.S. forces must be prepared to accomplish within the low intensity conflict environment, but they appear to be the most prevalent form of warfare that the United States will confront over the next decade. In attempting to cope with such violence, military planning may lack the detailed intelligence normally associated with military operations, but certainly the urgency of the mission will require the creation of well-trained military units which are prepared for rapid deployment and capable of carrying out tactics that emphasize surgical precision. The maintenance of such operational readiness will require adequate resource allocation from all of

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18. Many argue that the obligations of Alliance members entail more than burden-sharing. They also entail risk-sharing, inside and outside Europe. Though the “old truth” — the Soviet Union is a threat; a collective response to that threat is needed; and nuclear forces remain the ultimate pillar of the NATO deterrent — are valid, it is time members of NATO recognize that they must accommodate themselves to a changing strategic environment encompassing “new realities” and threats within the Third World. This particular theme is well-treated in Alan Ned Sabrosky, “NATO: Old Truths, New Realities,” *The Retired Officer*, December 1984, pp. 19-21.
 19. John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., eds., *American Defense Policy*, Fourth Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 154; Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, Commanding General, U.S. Army, 1st Special Operations Command, “Special Forces: To Help Others Help Themselves,” *Army* October 1983; 1983-1984 Green Book, p. 248.
 20. For a brief discussion of these “hot spots” see *U.S. News and World Report*, 31 December 1984, p. 29.

the military services, strong leadership, joint exercises, and the best equipment available. The implementation of U.S. anti-terrorist missions will also pose a severe test to joint command, control, and communication functions.

The performance of the U.S. military since the end of World War II has led some to question the Services' overall readiness and their ability to defeat an enemy in the event of war. Critics of the U.S. military have claimed that the Pentagon cannot devise successful military policies — Korea, Vietnam, the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission, and the Beirut tragedy are cited as examples of American postwar military malaise. Even the recent Grenada operation has received its share of criticism.²¹

V. CONCLUSION

Terrorist warfare presents many unprecedented challenges for the United States. The military, as the ultimate curator of U.S. interests, will play an increasingly large role in combatting this phenomenon. Unfortunately, within the U.S. national security community, terrorism is a phenomenon for which there is neither a consensus nor a common language. It flourishes in various forms in different countries and at different times as a result of a combination of factors. What terrorists will do next; when, where and how they will strike remains an uncertainty. But the harsh reality is that there will be new victims and new attacks and that the United States will be a major target.

U.S. policymakers face difficult and demanding decisions in the war against terrorism. These decisions will have to be made without vacillation or apology, because war is death and destruction — characteristics which the American public has come to associate with contemporary terrorism. Terrorist warfare may well prove to be bloody and costly; there will be no easy victories. As the United States has learned through bitter

21. See, for example, Arthur T. Hadley, "Inside America's Broken War Machine," *The New Republic*, 7 May 1984; Jeffrey Record, "It's Full of Bureaucrats Instead of Warriors," *The Washington Post*, 29 January 1984; Report on Grenada to Congressional Military Reform Caucus by Bill Lind on April 5, 1984, reprinted in press release of Representative Jim Courter (R-NJ). While claiming that most things went pretty well when U.S. forces invaded Grenada, senior military officers acknowledged that problem areas did exist, e.g., the lack of "decent" maps and trouble with communication between Army and Marine forces on different parts of the island. According to Congressman Jim Courter, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, "The mission was accomplished but it was a good deal less than the totally successful operation they claimed. It took some luck and an overwhelming force ratio, and we lost more equipment than we should have." *The Washington Post*, 26 January 1984, p. A21. For a detailed assessment of the Grenada operation, see James Berry Motley, "Grenada: Low-Intensity Conflict and the Use of U.S. Military Power," *World Affairs*, Winter 1983-84, pp. 221-238.

first-hand experience, war remains a serious business.²² Successful pursuit of anti-terrorist warfare will require clearly defined and well-articulated objectives, a strong political commitment and national resolve, the courage of conviction in making difficult decisions, imagination, detailed planning, timely and effective implementation of a well-thought-out strategy, and military men and women prepared to risk their lives to combat terrorism.

22. In a November 28, 1984 speech entitled "The Uses of Military Power," Secretary of Defense Weinberger outlined a set of six tests, drawing on the lessons of Korea and Vietnam, that he said the United States would apply when deciding whether to send military forces into combat abroad. They are: (1) deem the act "vital to our national interests;" (2) commit forces only as a "last resort;" (3) be prepared to fight "wholeheartedly with the clear intention of winning;" (4) have "clearly defined political and military objectives" and the means to achieve them; (5) have "reasonable assurance" of support by Congress and the public; and (6) be ready to continually reassess and "adjust if necessary" the need to continue a military operation. *The New York Times*, 29 November 1984, pp. A1 and A4.