STATEMENT OF CERTIFICATION

The Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism (RPCM) certifies and approves this Southern Kordofan Conflict and Security Situation Analysis Report (March 2011) and is alone responsible for its content. The report reflects community perceptions of conflict and security in workshops undertaken across Southern Kordofan from May-June 2010 and does not reflect the opinion or beliefs of RPCM or any other institution.

Certified by:

Osman Gadim
Chairman, Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism

Signature: Date:

Southern Kordofan Conflict and Security
Situation Analysis Report
March 2011

1. Executive Summary and Recommendations

This is the first of two reports analyzing the data collected through community risk mapping workshops that were conducted in May-June 2010 by the Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism (RPCM), in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Southern Kordofan DDR Commission and UNDP Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC), and with the technical support of UNDP's Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) and Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP) projects. The report explores the main themes emerging from data on conflict and tension, personal safety and vulnerable populations, examining patterns across the state and providing insight into conflict dynamics in each locality.

Throughout the report, the recommendations specifically made by communities are recorded in separate boxes. This summary outlines some general recommendations identified by the RPCM as well as a list of specific recommendations for action by the Land Commission, the RPCM and the DDR Commission.

The community-level workshops from which all data for this report was provided revealed that the following issues where the main root causes of conflict in Southern Kordofan. If sustainable peace and peaceful co-existence is a priority for the state, these issues must immediately be addressed:

1. Disarmament of civilians, be they ex-Popular Defense Force (PDF) combatants, ex-SPLA combatants, criminal groups involved in banditry or armed civilians; following disarmament of ex-combatants, they must be reintegrated into civilian life;
2. Immediate formation of the State Land Commission to clarify land use and resolve outstanding disputes on land tenure (ownership);
3. Enhancement and enforcement of the rule of law and support for the Native Administration system to address disputes before they could break into wide-spread violent conflict;
4. Investment in infrastructure and basic services, with special consideration to water services to mitigate the sense of marginalization among citizens of the state;
5. Identification and re-opening of closed transhumance migration routes, coupled with timelines for movement across agricultural areas with consideration for cultivation and harvesting periods;
6. An acceptable set of rules should be created to guarantee the safe and peaceful movement of pastoralists to the southern parts of Sudan;
7. Contested state border issues must be addressed in a way that considers all stakeholders;
8. Increased effort to achieve social reform and a state of peaceful coexistence through reconciliation.

The Land Commission, once formed, will be in a strong position to deal with conflicts where communities report that land ownership is the main cause of tension. The following conflicts over land ownership all have medium risk of escalating:
- *Buram* in Daloka, Farandala, Angolo, Al Azraq, Al Abyad;

- Between Misseriya clans (Zuruk, Hamra, Ghazaya) along the northwest border between *Keilak*, *Lagawa* and *Al Salam* and the northeast border between *Keilak*, *Lagawa* and *Kadugli*;
- *Reif Asharqi* in Takota and Tkwana;
- *Al Salam* in Bania and Samoa villages;
- *Um Dorein* in Kululu and Hamra villiages, and Tangar and Krkerpimi;
- In Abassiya town.

Conflicts where land use and land ownership are jointly the main reported causes would benefit from a joint intervention of the Land Commission and the RPCM – especially where demarcation of nomadic routes is a key driver. The intensity of these conflicts varies; we have classified them into high, medium and low risk of escalating.

High risk:
- In *Abyei-Muglad* seasonal disputes over land ownership and boundaries (related to access to water) and conflicts over land use (related to access to pasture and water). These involve Misseriya and Rizegat along the Southern Kordofan – South Darfur border;
- Nuba Abujunuk and Misseriya in *Al Sunut* locality;
- Katla and Wali conflict.

Medium risk:
- Around the *Abassiya* mechanized farming scheme;
- Along nomadic corridors in *Buram* (in Tabania, Al Hamr, Fama, Daloka, Katcha, Taice and Shatt AlSofia);
- In *Reif Asharqi* along the migratory corridor (Abu Safifa, El Bardab, El Daba, El Koeik, El Rokb);
- Between Kawaleb and Lira tribes;
- Between Golfan and Darneala tribes;
- Between Alajang and Alnimanj.

Low risk:
- *Abu Jibeiha* locality general tension over land use;
- In *Keilak*, between Bagara nomads and Nuba farmers;
- Along the border between *Abassiya* and Northern Kordofan;
- In Ggoba and Um Kerasha (*Al Sunut* locality);
- In Al Farshaya (*Al Qoz* locality);
- Seasonal dispute over land use across *Dalami* locality;
- Between Dar-Bakhota, Hausa and Al Manadel.

A number of other conflicts, not related to land ownership, are reported and would benefit from intervention by the RPCM. The intensity of these conflicts varies; we have classified them into high, medium and low risk of escalating.

High risk:
- Conflict over borders with Unity and the *Abyei Area*;
- Conflict over water in Lake Al Abyad;
- Widespread conflict over water sources in *Habila* locality;
- In Babanosa conflicts over water sources along the marahil;

- In Babanosa and *Abyei-Muglad*, violent incidents of conflict between tribes and between political parties, which are not currently being addressed in a timely manner.

Medium risk:
- Conflict over land boundaries across the borders between *Rashad, Abu Jibeiha* and *Upper Nile*;
- In *Keilak* tension spreading from the border with Unity State involving Misseriya versus Dinka / Nuer/SPLA;
- Conflict over boundaries across the borders of Southern Kordofan and South Darfur state;
- Disputes over land use in the north of the locality *Lagawa;*
- Conflicts over land use between nomads and farmers are related to the lack of demarcated nomadic routes in *Kadugli* locality;
- Conflict over water between Nuba and Misseriya around Lagawa town;
- Conflict over water between Misseriya Humur and Misseriya Zurug in *Keilak*;
- Tribal tensions in *Rashad* at Abu Karsola;
- In *Dalami*, duplication of the native administration system is leading to instability in the Kawalib area;
- In *Al Salam* locality, reported political conflicts between affiliates of competitive political parties and presence of armed movements.

Low level
- Border demarcation along the border between *Heiban* and *Talodi*;
- Low level tribal conflicts over lands across the locality of *Heiban*;
- Low level tensions over water resources in *Abu Jibeiha* locality;
- Tensions between gold searchers and local communities in *Talodi*;
- In *Um Dorein*, tensions all along the marahil between sedentary communities mainly farmers and passing herdsmen seasonally;
- In *Um Dorein*, a seasonal conflict between citizens of Kenderma and Shanabla (camel herdsmen) over land use (tree cutting).

Communities also report insecurity related to armed communities, which the DDR Commission may be in a good position to address. These include:
- Communities in *Al Salam* locality report presence of armed movements;
- Communities in *Lagawa* and *Al Sunut* report that disarmament will make it less likely for conflicts to be associated with politics;
- In *Reif Asharqi*, community members report the unfairness of PDF leaders in dealing with listing the ex-combatants for DDR program;
- In *Kadugli*, communities report insecurity because disarmament has not been implemented in the following settlements: Murta, Algardood, Tilo, Mashayesh, Eklcoz neighborhood;
- Locations where arms proliferation is reported:
  - Along the Fayareen route: El Tabon, Abu Betekh, Gharig, El Foda, El Hereka, Nama, Tamama
  - Along the Awlat Kamel route: El Setat, Abyei, Dafra, Shage, Sofia, Tadama, Um Draas
  - Along the Awlat Aomran route: Beraka, Muglad, El Mirm, Marafeen, El Dabb, Higlig, Agok

- o Along the Misseriya Zurg routes: El Ko, El Ragefa, Mango El Daba, Umm Adara, Balala, Umm Khar
  - o Along the Misseriya Falayta routes: Abu Elkeri, Keilak, Kharasana, Marafeen
- Clusters of locations reporting armed communities:
  - o Western area of *Habila* and *Delling*, which was an area formerly controlled by the SPLA/M: Habila, Julud, Kagaria, Timan, Kalmay, Kaushee, Katla and Wali.
  - o North-west of Delling, where demobilized soldiers are reported to be still armed and involved in criminal activities: Al Sabie, El Fenda, El Karko, El Mandel, Klara, Slara, Tandia
  - o Along the Hawazma route, confrontation between farmers and nomads: El Kurgol, Hajer Gawad, El Ketan, El Nama, Delling
  - o Along the Murhal in *Buram*
  - o In *Reif Asharqi*, mostly as a result of crime driven by poverty: El Bardab, El Kweik, El Shaeer, Kega Damik, Kega Gero, Kega Loin, Kega Temero, Abu Safifa, El Tagato, Karkaria, Remala
  - o In *Abu Jubeiha*: Jebel Kaonaro, El-Rahmania and El-Tamar
  - o In *Rashad* locality only one location is reported as an armed community (Tandik village)
  - o In *Talodi* locality community members report the presence of arms in two locations; Leea and Um-khamira
  - o Only one case of arms in the hands of civilians is reported in *Heiban locality* (Karandal)

2. Introduction

2.1 Outline and purpose of the report

The main objectives of this report are to:
  (i)   provide a conflict oriented situational analysis **for the Reconciliation and Peaceful Co-existence Mechanism** (RPCM) to have a better understanding of the nature of conflicts and threats and the best methods to address them state-wide;
  (ii)   provide information to support effective **strategic planning by the State Government** based on realities and facts on the ground**;**
  (iii)   provide information **for organizations involved in the peace-building process** in the state to plan sound peace interventions accordingly.

The document as well will help establishment of a state **Early Warning System.**

This report is based on the outcomes of the community risk mapping workshops that were conducted in May-June 2010 by the RPCM, in collaboration with the Southern Kordofan DDR Commission and UNDP CSAC, and with the technical support of UNDP's Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project. **Section 3** outlines the methodology used for these workshops. The report also draws on other data sources collected through the Sudan Information Management Working Group.

Community risk mapping workshops set out to collect information on community perceptions of conflict, threat and risk. The information collected falls into six broad categories, namely conflict and tension, personal safety, vulnerable populations, economic threats and risks, critical lack of basic services, and environmental threats and risks. Given the wealth of information collected, this report focuses only on the first three categories, which are most directly related to conflict prevention. A second report, to be published shortly, will cover the remaining categories.

The report explores both geographic and thematic patterns emerging from the data collected. **Section 4** explores the main themes emerging from data on conflict and tension, personal safety and vulnerable populations. For each of these themes, the report sets out the nature of the issue, its causes and effects on the community, key locations affected by it, the timing of the issue, actors involved and any interventions known to address it. It is important to remember that the report is based on community perceptions, which are inherently subjective and contestable. Nonetheless, an understanding of these perceptions is essential to any state actor, particularly to anyone acting on issues of conflict prevention.

Section 5 looks at geographic patterns in the information provided by communities. It looks at the geographic relationship between indicators, namely the relationship between issues relating to land (conflict, access and degradation), between issues relating to water (conflict and availability) and between arms proliferation and conflict. There may be other patterns of interest to partners. The RPCM, with the technical support of UNDP CRMA, remains open to suggestions of what patterns to explore in the data.

2.2 General Background on Southern Kordofan State

Geography

The current boundaries of Southern Kordofan are a product of the CPA. The former Western Kordofan State was dissolved during the peace negotiations and divided between Northern and Southern Kordofan. The Southern part of Western Kordofan (Lagawa , Assalam, Abyei and Kielak localities) merged to Southern Kordofan state. The state is located in the centre of Sudan, north of the 01/01/1965 line that identifies the southern region of Sudan from the north as set by the British colonial administration. The state neighbors with Northern Kordofan state on the north, White Nile state on the North- East, Upper Nile state on the East and South East, Unity and Warap states on the South, Northern Bahr El-Ghazal on the South-West and Southern Darfur on the West. The capital city of the state is Kadugli. In 2009, the Government of the state, after approval from the State Legislative Assembly, established ten (10) new localities, adding to the nine (9) original localities of the state, to end up with nineteen (19) localities in the state.

Population

The population of Southern Kordofan is a reflection of the nation more broadly, since it is inhabited by many tribes and ethnic groups including Nuba, Misseriya, Hawazma, Fellata, Hausa, Bideriya, Bargo, Kawahla, Kinana, Barno, Dajo and some southern ethnic groups.

Political history

Southern Kordofan is one of the Three Areas in Sudan directly involved in the civil war. Consequently it was given a special consideration in the CPA and is subject to a unique protocol designed to address issues of stability in the state.

The social fabric of the state before the start of the previous civil war was a model for peaceful co-existence, tolerance and co-operation. Intermarriages between the different groups were normal and frequent. During the civil war, sharp political polarization based on ethnicity damaged the historical relations between the tribes, exacerbated by acute competition around resources and concerns over marginalization.

The political atmosphere prevailing in the state is characterized by the acute polarization based on ethnicity which constitutes a permanent threat to stability. The situation has improved due to progress in partnership between the two governing partners in the state (NCP and SPLA). Yet, a lot is still required to transform the consensus on the top governing level to the grass-root in the community in order to repair the damaged social fabric between the different ethnic groups/tribes and between sedentary settling farmers and the groups of migrating cattle-herders. The geopolitical location of the state (neighboring four southern states) has already created conflicts along contested borders, and will keep

threatening the stability of the state, especially if the Southern region fulfills its wish to separate as decided during the referendum in January 2011.

3. Data Collection Methodology

Data was collected through a series of community risk mapping (CRM) workshops. The RPCM led the process of CRM workshops, with technical support from CRMA, and in partnership with the state DDR Commission and UNDP DDR CSAC. A total of twenty workshops were run: one at the state level (held in Kadugli) and one in each locality capital. CRMA trained workshop facilitators, sent staff to accompany the process in the field and provided technical support throughout. The RPCM identified facilitators (from the RPCM and partners) and made all organizational arrangements for the workshops. Financial and logistical support was provided by UNDP CSAC and UNDP CRP.

Workshop facilitators

Each team consists of RPCM staff, a technical representative from UNDP, a technical representative from the Ministry of Social Development, Women and Child Affairs, and a representative from either the DDR Commission or UNDP DDR. Team members received intensive on the job training on the methodology and practice of CRM Workshop. Training for facilitators included:
- One day classroom training with four CRMA trainers, including practical exercises in participatory mapping and focus groups
- Four days intensive on the job training around the state-level workshop (including data entry training)
- Technical support and coaching throughout the weeks of locality workshops

Workshop methodology

All CRM workshops (locality and state level) run over two days and cover three key activities: (i) identification of ten critical threats, risks and conflicts affecting the community; (ii) mapping of ten critical issues; (iii) focus groups discussions (typically DDR, women and reconciliation). The CRM workshops follow the standard methodology set out in the CRMA Manual, with the addition of a fixed DDR focus group to accommodate the needs of DDR partners.

Participants are led in a group discussion to identify the ten critical threats, risks and conflicts affecting the community. Once consensus is reached, participants are randomly divided into three to four working groups and asked to brainstorm on the issues they have identified. They then map one issue after another by:
- Identifying exact locations where it occurs
- Describing the problem, the actors, its effects on the community, who is more affected, who is responsible of the problem, and the timing of the problem (permanent, seasonal or frequent)
- Agreeing on the likelihood and severity of the problem

Throughout these group discussions, facilitators move around the groups to help the process and answer the questions that might arise from the participants. Facilitators are also responsible for capturing this information in a standard spreadsheet and assigning an indicator from a pre-defined list to types of conflicts / threats / risks. A full list of the categories, indicators and sub-indicators is available from UNDP CRMA.

Focus group discussions select three issues to explore in more detail. Participants are asked to use mind-maps to identify the causes of the problem/issue, its implications, and then solicit the solutions they believe are suitable to solve the problem under consideration. Each group is then asked to present their work, the stage is then open for discussion from all participants to modify, suggest or add more solutions to the work of the group.

Workshop products

By the end of the workshop period, the RPCM and its partners produced:
- A comprehensive database of geo-referenced threats, risks and conflicts in Southern Kordofan as reported by communities; categorized, searchable and mapped.
- A field report for each locality, outlining (i) the ten critical threats, risks and conflicts identified by the community; (ii) a summary of three / four main issues arising in discussion as identified by facilitators; (iii) a summary of the key issues identified by focus groups (and the solutions they propose).

These products are the main inputs to this situation analysis report.

Workshop participants

Locality level workshops employ the same methodology as the State-level workshop, but with different participant target groups. The State Level Workshop included the Director Generals of the ten state ministries, locality commissioners and their executive directors, representatives of the Councils and other state-level Government bodies, representatives of UN agencies, and International and National Organizations.

In localities, participants were drawn from the locality administration, native administration and local civil society. Participants represented a balance of tribal affiliations, and must include representatives of youth, women and ex-combatants.

4. Thematic Areas

4.1 Conflict and Tension

Conflicts and tensions in Southern Kordofan often have several causes. In order to capture the main driving force of conflict/tensions in an area, community members were asked to identify the main cause

of conflict in each location. The indicator attributed to each entry reflects what communities identify as the main cause; other causes are reported as associated indicators or explained in the entry description. Therefore, the map below gives a picture of the overall drivers of conflict in the state, the rest of this section gives a more detailed description of what hides behind this picture.

Conflict and Tension

Processed by CRMA/UNDP for the Sudan
Information Management Working Group (IMWG)
For questions on updates and modifications,
please contact CRMA.sd@undp.org.

Northern Kordofan

White Nile

Southern Darfur

Unity

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

Warrab

Jonglei

	Conflict over land
	Tension over land
	Conflict over water
	Tension over water
	Tribal or group conflict
	Tribal or group tension
	Tension over oil / minerals

12

4.1.1 Conflict over land

As is evident from the map, issues around land are the predominant driver of conflict in the state. At the state-level workshop, the first critical issue mentioned was conflict over land. This was also the first issue mentioned by most locality workshops in the West (all except Al Fula) and a number of the workshops in the East. Under conflict over land, a number of sub-issues have been discussed, including conflict over land ownership, conflict over land use and conflict over boundaries. These three sub-issues are often inter-related, mixed with conflict over other natural resources (water) and made worse by local politics (tribal or group divisions). The same parties may be in dispute over more than one issue.

In *Abassiya* locality community members report numerous seasonal friction between farmers (both small scale and mechanized farming) and livestock herders based on land use (the area is an autumn resident for cattle June-October). Friction affects all groups: large farmers have seen crops destroyed resulting in decreased production; small farmers fear cultivating larger areas because they cannot insure security of crops and as a result are facing poverty; Bagara and other nomads have lost cattle. Community members believe that the state government is reluctant to put an end to the violations of herdsmen and apply the rule of law. However, they report that the current government is better at protecting farmers and herdsmen, providing, for example, mobile police units to protect farms during the harvest period. Friction takes place in a group of villages around the Abassiya mechanized farming scheme (Bared, El Debekaia, Farda, Tamda, Tajor, Tebsa) and along the border between Northern and Southern Kordofan (Gardood, Abu Doom, Fakaren, Tab El Zaraf). Communities in Abassiya town also report conflicts over the illegal distribution of their farm land nearer to the town as housing land ignoring the legal historical rights of the land lords, resulting in tension among the citizens of the town and frequent confrontation of citizens at the land distribution unit of the ministry of urban planning in the locality.

In *Abu Jibeiha* locality community members report low level tension over land use between farming and herders. Some clans are reportedly more involved in land conflicts, namely: Shiluk, Awlad Hameed, Al-Shanabla, Al-Hawazma, Awlad, Abujaed. Community members believe land conflicts are leading to delays in cultivation within the planting season, decrease in Arabic gum production, destroyed crops and loss of cattle. Community members also report on a conflict over land boundaries across the borders with *Rashad* and *Upper Nile* (related to rights to use of Hashab trees), with flashpoints in Gaded, Hababa, Rahmanaia, Seseban and Um Lobia.

Conflicts over land are very intense in *Abyei-Muglad* locality. Community members report on two different kinds of conflict. First, a conflict over borders with Unity and the Abyei Area, involving mainly the Misseriya (mostly Al Humar, sometimes also PDF) and Dinka (sometimes SPLA). The main reported causes are that some Misseriya do not accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) decision and the border has not been demarcated on the ground, leading to alleged incursions on both sides (including allegedly construction of SPLA bases in Misseriya land). This conflict is exacerbated by population

13

movements. The Dinka are moving north to resettle. Increased seasonal scarcity of pastures and water (exacerbated by expansion of the oil industry and the roads they construct blocking natural flood plains) has driven the Misseriya further south. The second kind of conflict in the locality is seasonal dispute over land ownership and boundaries (related to access to water) and conflicts over land use (related to access to pasture and water). These involve Misseriya and Rizegat along the Southern Kordofan – South Darfur border (with flashpoints in Meiram and El Khudur). The Misseriya claim that some villages in South Darfur (where Rizegat live) belong to Southern Kordofan, exacerbating the ongoing competition between the two tribes over water and grazing land. Community members report that the combination of these two kinds of disputes has resulted not only in loss of cattle and crops, but also in an unstable environment for grazing and farming, scarcity in pasture and water in areas that are too unsafe to be accessed and restrictions to travel given unsafe roads. Community members report fears that these disputes could escalate into war and claim that weak support to the native administration in the area makes timely negotiation harder.

Community members in *Buram* locality report conflicts over land ownership between local tribes (often associated with either SPLA or SAF/PDF), that are largely caused by inadequate legislation and dispute resolution mechanisms to settle issues of land ownership, particularly in Daloka, Farandala, Angolo, Al Azraq, Al Abyad. They also report conflicts between local farmers and Misseriya nomads, largely due to competition over land use and water resources along nomadic corridors (in Tabania, Al Hamr, Fama and Daloka) and sometimes exacerbated by tensions remaining from the war (Katcha, Taice and Shatt Al Sofia).

Community members in *Um Dorein* locality report two localized conflicts over land ownership, one localized conflict over land use and one widespread conflict over land use. Sporadic tensions around agricultural and resident land ownership in Kolulu and Hamra villiages, involving farmers from the different tribes (note that this tension is also reported in *Buram* locality as tension between Hamra and Daloka). The tensions have a negative effect on the social fabric, decrease production and provide an environment conducive to violence. In Al Qanazeea, community members report a dispute between the Tangar and Krkerpimi about the limits of territory between them. The community reports a seasonal conflict between citizens of Kenderma and Shanabla (camel herdsmen). Shanabla cut trees to make char-wood for sale; Kenderma citizens fear that might lead to desertification. Finally, community members report tensions all along the Murhal between sedentary communities mainly farmers and passing herdsmen seasonally in Aqab, Daluko, El Kanzaya, El Quanzyeea, El Kashaya, Kaya, Luqee, Al Atmor, Al Hamara, Al Ramala, Saraf Jamos and Om-Serdiba. The community stated that these tensions are unlikely to escalate into conflict. It seems that all communities are armed, so that there is an equilibrium in power where each group fears the other, making the outbreak of conflict unlikely; however insecurity high.

In *Keilak* locality community members report on three types of conflict related to land. First, tension spreading from the border with Unity State involving Misseriya versus Dinka/Nuer/SPLA. Tension is reportedly caused by a directive stipulating that herders may not cross into Unity State with guns incidents of cattle theft and the drying up of Keilak lake; this latter issue has resulted in water scarcity,

forcing nomads to migrate further south than in past seasons. Higlig and Khorasana are both flashpoints for this kind of tension. Second is a reported conflict over land ownership between Misseriya clans (Zuruk, Hamra, Ghazaya). The main causes are a disagreement over who has right to use land, leading to a dispute over who is entitled to compensations paid by oil companies, and complicated by a disagreement over the border between *Lagawa* and *Keilak* localities (and whether this border coincide with tribal borders). The main areas involved in this conflict are the northwest border between *Keilak, Lagawa* and *Al Salam* and the northeast border between *Keilak, Lagawa* and *Kadugli*. There is a strong element of tribal politics to this conflict, so that it was also reported as a 'tribal/group conflict' by community members. Third, community members report a small conflict over land use between Bagara herders and Nuba farmers. Nuba farmers claim migrating Bagara and nomads are encroaching on agricultural projects, Bagara claim Nuba are cultivating on transhumant migration and grazing corridors.

In *Reif Asharqi* locality, the community points out frictions between farmers and herdsmen along the migratory corridor (Abu Safifa, El Bardab, El Daba, El Koeik, El Rokb) taking place annually during the pass of nomads on their north and southward trips, resulting in insecurity and damage to crops. There are also conflicts over land ownership, resulting from a dispute between groups wanting to use land for agriculture or for residential construction in the settlements of Takota and Tkwana.

Communities in *Al Salam* locality identify two main conflicts: one over boundaries and another over land ownership. The conflict over boundaries is in a cluster across the boundaries of Southern Kordofan and South Darfur state (Fars, Safaha, Shaqada and Abu Tolo). The conflict is caused by disagreement on the demarcation of boundaries and the interaction of the administrative borders with perceived tribal borders. The conflict has significant impacts on the citizens of the area, including revenge raids, robbery of property and a prevailing sense of insecurity. The main actors in the conflict are Messeriya Humur (Ajaira and Falaita) and the Rizegat of Southern Darfur. The conflict over land ownership relates to the right of acquiring compensations paid by the oil companies, and takes place in Bania and Samoa villages between Messeriya clans.

In *Al-Sunut* locality the community reported conflicts related to land use as prevalent within the locality in a cluster across the nomad migratory corridor. The causes reported are the expansion of farm land onto pasture land or the encroachment of cattle in farms (depending on which side reports), as well as conflicts associated with land ownership (notably, Messeriya versus Abujunk Nuba). Community members also report a number of conflicts around limited water sources in the area, involving Messeriya, Nuba (Abujnuk Nuba and other Nuba clans), occurring seasonally during the seasonal migration across the corridor. The prolonged and violent conflict between Nuba Abujnuk and Messeriya is of particular concern, and is reported to have large impacts and a high potential to escalate, whereas conflicts in other locations (Ggoba, Um Kerasha) are described as being of lower intensity and having less potential to escalate.

Community members in *Al Qoz* locality report one seasonal conflict over land, mainly to do with access to water, in Al Farshaya.

In *Dalami*, community members report a localized conflict over land ownership and a wide-spread conflict over land use. There is a conflict over tribal borders and (consequently) land ownership between the Kawaleb and Lira tribes, involving also the Halafa, Ghebesh and Shawabna tribes. This conflict takes place in settlements in the south of the locality, spilling into *Habila* and *Heiban*. Both sides claim agricultural land has not been justly distributed. The conflict has resulted in insecurity in the area. Second, there is an ongoing seasonal dispute between farmers and herders that has reportedly resulted in reduced agricultural production. The northern part of the locality is covered by the Habila and Kortalla mechanized farming extension, which is crossed by a migratory route. This seasonal dispute spreads across the locality (with more incidents in the northern areas) and is exacerbated by increased desertification.

Community members in *Delling* report a number of localized conflicts both over land ownership (3) and land use (4). The most intense conflict is one over land ownership between the Katla and Wali tribes. Community members report that a lack of understanding between the two civil administration has resulted in lack of clarity over the border between the two, and hence what land can be used for farmland and for pasture. The dispute has resulted in insecurity in the area, including an increase in armed robbery and significant loss of life. There is also a related dispute over use of land for faming versus residential purposes in the area of Aleghabesh between Katla and Wali. Second, a dispute over land ownership between Golfan and Darneala tribes is triggered seasonally at times when water resources are scarce, and has at times led to murders. Third, a dispute over the border between Alajanj and Alnimanj has resulted in lack of security, largely because of the absence of civil administration to resolve the dispute. Conflicts over land use in the locality are seasonal (taking place between October and November), and are exacerbated by both the spread of weapons in the hands of farmers and herders and the expansion of agricultural land. Flashpoints for such conflicts are Kalandee, Almrahal, Kakra, Jahar, Julud and Elkook (where there is also tension between farmland and residential land).

The conflicts and tensions over land reported by community members from *Habila* locality are already covered in the descriptions provided my community members in *Delling* and *Dalami* (the two neighboring localities). Community members in *Habila* explicitly stated that the Land Commission could resolve the Golfan-Dabri conflict.

Community members in *Heiban* locality reported two types of conflict, but did not provide much detail. First, there is a problem with border demarcation along the border with *Talodi*. Second, there are reports of low level tribal conflicts over lands across the locality.

In *Lagawa*, community members report two conflicts over land, one in the north of the locality, the other in the south of the locality. Disputes over land use in the north of the locality (particularly El Arak, Karlanja and Nemr Shago) are related also to scarcity of water sources. Community members report that locality orders on land use are not being followed and that disputes are exacerbated by tribal tensions and the lack of communication between communities. Disputes in the south of the locality relate to compensation from oil companies as already described by community members in *Keilak* locality.

Community members in *Kadugli* locality report that conflicts over land use between nomads and farmers are related to the lack of demarcated livestock migration routes but also to the establishment of new localities. The community believes the Land Commission will play a strong role in resolving conflicts. Flashpoints take place along migratory routes, and particularly on the border with *Lagawa* and *Keilak* localities (where there is also a livestock migration route).

Conflict over land: Recommendations of communities

- Across the state: the government should demarcate migratory routes, identify times when pastoralists are allowed to enter an area and when they have to depart and provide more water sources for cattle to avoid use of water sources for humans

- Across the state: the powers of the native administration to resolve disputes (including judiciary powers) should be enhanced

- Across the state: legislation on land ownership is necessary, either done by the locality legislative council or by the native administration. The important role of the Land Commission was emphasized in Kadugli, Dalami, Delling and Habila.

- Across the state: the government is responsible for settling disputes over boundaries and establishing the rule of law along state borders (emphasized particularly in Abyei-Muglad and Al Salam)

- Abassiya: provide and support mobile police resources (policemen, vehicles, telephones)

- Al Qoz: lower the cost of water to enhance access

- Al Salam, Keilak and Lagawa: the government should establish a clear plan for oil compensation rights acceptable to all

- In Um Dorein: the government should issue laws that regulate the cutting of trees and the protection of the environment

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Conflict over land

Legend:
- ▲ Conflict over land
- ▲ Tension over land
- ••••• Blocked livestock migration route
- ••••• Open livestock migration route
- ▨ Mechanized Farming Scheme (TRMA - WS - , 2007)

4.1.2 Conflict over water

Conflicts where communities report that the primary cause relates to land (section 4.1.1) are often exacerbated by conflict over scarce water resources. These conflicts are not covered in this section. Rather, this section covers disputes where the primary reported cause is conflict over water resources. Conflicts where competition over water sources is the primary reported cause are most common in the centre of the state, with communities in Habila locality reporting the largest number. High intensity conflicts over water are reported in Lake AlAbyad (Buram) and the marahil (Babanusa).

Communities in *Habila* locality report seasonal conflicts and disputes over water resources across the locality during the dry season. Community members report that the scarcity of ground water, limited water resources and inadequate maintenance of the available water sources leads to competition over water. Disputes are typically between settled communities, Hawazma herders and workers/landlords of the large mechanized farms. Disputes have led to displacement (in search of water sources) and to a negative impact on agricultural productivity. In the Dayri area, it has also led to loss of life as the settled community clashed with the Alretairet pastoralists. There is also a seasonal accumulation of citizens in the area around Habila town (where there are relatively more plentiful water sources), leading to friction between farmers and herdsmen. The ex-ministry of rural development and water resources recently constructed a haffir (not functioning well) and WFP has provided food for work to construct another one, but community members believe the gap still remains large.

Community members in *Buram* reported conflicts over water sources and pasture between settled communities and nomads along the nomadic routes. The main reported cause is competition over water near Lake Al Abyad. Nuba, Felatta and Dinka are all involved in this dispute. Community members believe the conflict is very likely to recur in the future and will impact a large number of people.

Communities in *Lagawa* locality reported seasonal conflicts over water during the dry season along the migratory corridors of nomads and their summer residency. At times, this has resulted in violent conflicts, loss of human lives, loss of livestock and a general atmosphere of insecurity. Conflicting parties are often Nuba against Misseriya. Most disputes are clustered around Lagawa town, with a flashpoint also reported in El Fugara.

Communities in *Abu Jibeiha* reported tensions around water as a result of the increase in number of cattle without providing the necessary water sources required. The tensions are not considered very severe by the community members.

In *Keilak*, communities report seasonal disputes over water resources from February to May between Messeriya Humur and Messeriya Zurug in the area from Mermer to Kokoduk. The reported cause is the lack of water sources, which leads to outbreaks of violence and the spread of insecurity in the area. Community members believe this conflict is likely to recur.

Communities in *Babanosa* report conflicts over water sources along the marahil (seasonal nomadic settlements). Community members report frequent violent clashes between farmers and nomads resulting in loss of live and livestock, which will likely recur.

Conflict over water: Recommendations of communities
- Buram, Habila and Abu Jubeiha: the State Government is responsible for providing sufficient sources of water to avoid scarcity and competition.
- Abu Jibeiha: the State Government should change the way traditional herding is carried out including demarcation of farming and grazing areas.

Conflict over water

4.1.3 Conflict over oil and mineral extraction

Communities in *Lagawa* and *Salam* report conflicts over compensation from oil companies, which were already covered in detail in section 4.1.1 (since they relate to a disagreement over ownership of the land over which compensation is received).

Communities in *Talodi* report the ongoing search for gold in the Om-Dehelib administrative unit and in Angarto as a threat to their communities. The huge number of gold searchers has resulted not only in tension, but also in rapid increase in prices of commodities and services in the area. It has also led to the removal of vegetation trees and erosion of the fertile layer of soil.

4.1.4 Tribal or group conflicts

Some communities report conflicts whose primary cause is hostility between two groups, and not competition over a particular resource. Although water and land are often also a cause, community members report here conflicts that have a strong political element (and whose solution must therefore go beyond provision of services).

Communities in *Abu Jibeiha* report the discriminative treatment of political parties to tribes and the acute political polarization as a major threat to communities in the locality. Political practices in the area have created tribal conflicts between the tribes who affiliate to competing political parties; this has in turn resulted in religious intolerance, and planted discord and a sense of injustice and discrimination among some groups.

In *Al Qoz* locality a tribal conflict was reported between Dar-Bakhota, Hausa and Al Manadel. Associated causes are the acute competition around limited farming and grazing land, lack of land use survey that identifies grazing and farming land and the claims of land tenure among the competing groups. The main reported location for this conflict is Farshaia. Southern Kordofan CSO NMIAD has intervened in resolving the conflict, the situation is currently calm and the relationship between the conflicting parties is stable and almost back to normal.

Communities in *Babanosa* report a cluster of conflicts along the western migratory corridor. They believe the lack of rule of law and reluctance to immediately resolve tribal conflicts is the main cause for minor conflicts to escalate into large conflicts. They also believe that the absence of the locality legislative council has weakened the ability of the civil administration to find solutions for the emerging conflicts between tribes. The conflicts between tribes are much aggravated by the proliferation of weapons in hands of civilians, as well as by the poor living conditions and high rates of illiteracy among citizens. There have been frequent violent clashes between citizens, armed robbery, a decrease of the living standards and spread of unsecured living environment.

Communities in *Rashad* locality reported presence of tribal conflicts in the locality between sedentary communities (Turjuc, Tagowi, Falata and Hawazma). Community members reported political tensions, largely due to political polarization based on ethnicity. This tribal tension compounds the competition between pastoralist and farmers around land use. Flashpoints are at Abu-Karshola and Helat El sharie, where security is perceived to have deteriorated and tension has resulted in the loss of crops and loss in human lives.

Community members in *Abyei-Muglad* report permanent violent confrontations between political parties, armed movements and retired government individuals of SAF, SPLA and PDF. These confrontations are a result of the struggle over power and political polarization based on ethnicity, resulting in the spread of hostility among communities, displacement and prevailing insecurity. Abu Jaber is reported as a flashpoint.

Communities in *Dalami* reported a duplication of the native administration system (some affiliated to NCP and others to SPLM). This duplication has resulted in spread of chaos among citizens and to lack of rule of law, including rules and customs and traditions of the tribe, in a number of settlements in Kawaleeb area. The political polarization is a source of conflicts and tension among citizens of the locality, resulting in fighting of a political nature, instability, insecurity and displacement.

In *Reif Asharqi*, community members report the unfairness of PDF leaders in dealing with listing the ex-combatants for DDR program. The community believes the government is responsible for resolving this issue.

Communities in *Salam* locality report political conflicts between affiliates of competitive political parties and presence of armed movements. The main reported causes are struggle over power, particularly over oil issues (revenues and employment). This conflict has resulted in violence, displacement, insecurity, torn social fabric and lack of development across the locality.

Community members in *Habila, Um Dorein, Al Sunut, Lagawa and Dilling* report that conflicts in the area are aggravated by political polarization between NCP and SPLM. This is particularly relevant to the cluster of conflicts along the *Al Sunut/Lagawa/Dilling* border (Tima-Tulushi and Katla-Wali conflicts), where reconciliation efforts are harder because of political affiliation.

*Tribal or group conflicts: Recommendations of communities*
- Abu Jibeiha: people believe the state government and political parties should intervene to rectify the political practice in the area, and should lead programs that unift citizens rather than programs that fragment them
- Lagawa, Al Sunut: disarmament will make it less likely for conflicts to be associated with politics
- Reif Asharqi, Abu Jihbeiha: the government should intervene to address reported unequal treatment of ex-combatants

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- Babanosa: the locality authorities should intervene as soon as an incident takes place to stop it from escalating
- Rashad: the government should intervene to resolve tribal tensions in Abu Karsola

Tribal or group conflicts

4.2 Personal safety

4.2.1 Armed communities

Community members report high levels of arms in the hands of civilians in Abyei-Muglad, Babanusa, Lagawa and Keilak in the West of the state, though no cases are reported in Al Fula. Arms in the hands of civilians are also reportedly fairly high in Delling, Habila and Reif Asharqi. Low levels of arms in the hands of civilians are reported in Abu Jibeiha, Habila, Talodi and Rashad. Community members report no armed communities in Dalami, Um Dorein and Buram, and only one case in Heiban – however, this may be an issue of perception, as explained below.

West: high arms proliferation, mainly along the nomadic routes

Community members in *Abyei-Muglad locality* report widespread proliferation among civilians, specifically in the hands of: paramilitary formations, Popular Defense Forces (PDF), members of armed movements and SPLA demobilized soldiers. Community members report that both major ethnic groups in the area (Arab and Dinka) hold weapons, and report that this intensive proliferation of weapons is the result both of the civil war and of a continued need for weapons for self and tribal defense. Arms proliferation has resulted in a number of counter-productive activities, including: criminal activities and banditry; large numbers of disabled persons, widows, and orphans; and the deterioration of the economic possibilities for people in the area. Community members believe that organizations working on the disarmament process lack commitment. The DDR program is operating in the locality, but people believe it is neither effective nor trustworthy.

Keilak locality community members also report very high levels of arms proliferation among civilians. Reported causes include weapons remaining in hands of civilians since the civil war, the presence of local residents that belong to the SPLA forces deployed in Unity State returning home in uniform and carrying weapons (often resulting in clashes with SAF / PDF), and people keeping weapons for self and tribal defense (due to perceived lack of rule of law). There is also a seasonal increase in arms among civilians when armed nomads (herdsman) pass through the locality on their way to Unity State at the beginning of the dry season and again on their way back at the beginning of the rainy season. Community members believe that the youth are the main actors, since they are the category of population who both use and fall victim of arms proliferation. Arms proliferation has resulted in a number of counter-productive activities, including: murder, loss of crops to farmers, loss of cattle to herdsmen, wide spread sense of insecurity, displacement and frequent banditry.

Community members in *Lagawa* locality report a number of locations where armed civilians are present. They attribute the proliferation of weapons to a number of reasons that include the presence of criminal groups (banditry), remnants of the war, the absence of rule of law (people keep weapons to protect themselves, their tribes and property) and the presence of paramilitary formations. Weapons are believed to be in the hands of criminal gangs, nomads, and demobilized individuals. The proliferation of weapons in the locality results in robbery of money and other properties, looting, and insecurity among

civilians. Community members also report a lack of commitment from organizations that are responsible for disarmament.

In all three localities, all locations identified by communities as having arms proliferation are along the nomadic routes, as follows:
- Along the Fayareen route: El Tabon, Abu Betekh, Gharig, El Foda, El Hereka, Nama, Tamama
- Along the Awlat Kamel route: El Setat, Abyei, Dafra, Shage, Sofia, Tadama, Um Draas
- Along the Awlat Aomran route: Beraka, Muglad, El Mirm, Marafeen, El Dabb, Higlig, Agok
- Along the Misseriya Zurg routes: El Ko, El Ragefa, Mango El Daba, Umm Adara, Balala, Umm Khar
- Along the Misseriya Falayta routes: Abu Elkeri, Keilak, Kharasana, Marafeen

Delling, Habila and Reif Asharqi: lack of rule of law

In *Delling* locality, the presence of weapons in the hands of civilians is attributed to lack of rule of law, (no police stations), the high rate of illiteracy among civilians, to lack of recognition of grievances, and to the lack of development programs in the area. The presence of weapons has resulted in social instability and disorder, and has delayed the voluntary return of IDPs to their home-lands in the area. The DDR program is the sole reported intervention addressing this issue.

Community members in *Reif Asharqi* locality attribute arms in the hands of civilians to prevalence of poverty among people, which drives them to crime. Most arms are reportedly in the hands of bandits, and traders are the main victims of armed crime. Armed gangs tend to exercise banditry along the only paved road to the capital of the state. The only program addressing this issue in the area is the DDR program.

In *Hablia* locality, the presence of weapons in the hands of civilians can be traced through a migratory route, since all the reported incidents were between cattle herders and sedentary small farming groups. Community members report that the causes for armament of civilians are: (i) the effects of the previous civil war (many weapons left in hands of civilians (ii) cattle herders holding guns to protect their cattle. The proliferation of weapons in the locality has resulted in insecurity, murders, robbery incidents, cattle invading small farms, loss of crops and loss of cattle. Youth are the most likely group to be armed. Other groups likely to hold arms include herdsmen (who invade small farms), small scale farmers and bandits.

In the three localities, four clusters of locations reporting armed communities can be identified:
- Western area of *Habila* and *Delling*, which was an area formerly controlled by the SPLA/M: Habila, Julud, Kagaria, Timan, Kalmay, Kaushee, Katla and Wali.
- North-west of Delling, where demobilized soldiers are reported to be still armed and involved in criminal activities: Al Sabie, El Fenda, El Karko, El Mandel, Klara, Slara, Tandia
- Along the Hawazma route, confrontation between farmers and nomads: El Kurgol, Hajer Gawad, El Ketan, El Nama, Delling
- In *Reif Asharqi*, mostly as a result of crime driven by poverty: El Bardab, El Kweik, El Shaeer, Kega Damik, Kega Gero, Kega Loin, Kega Temero, Abu Safifa, El Tagato, Karkaria, Remala

Abu Jubeiha, Rashad, Talodi: post-conflict arms retention

Community members in *Abu Jibeiha* locality report weapons in the hands of Abala (camels herders), Bagara (cattle herders) and ex-SPLA soldiers. Arms in the hands of civilians in the locality are reported in three locations: Jebel Kaonaro, El-Rahmania and El-Tamar. Arms are seriously affecting the safety of sedentary farming communities in the area and has resulted in instability, displacement and murders. Community members report that the government has not exerted sufficient efforts to disarm civilians. The DDR program is the only intervention dealing with arms, but community members believe that it is not effective and may be politically oriented.

In *Rashad* locality only one location is reported as an armed community (Tandik village), where reportedly the source of armament is un-demobilized SPLA and PDF. The DDR program is the only intervention in the area, but people have concerns around its effectiveness.

In *Talodi* locality community members report the presence of arms in two locations; Leea and Um-khamira. They attribute the presence of weapon in hands of civilians to remnants of war and presence of armed gangs. Sedentary communities who are subject to the frequent incidents of robberies are the most affected. The DDR program is the only intervention, but many community members believe that DDR is biased to PDF and is ignoring the SPLA affiliates.

In *Kadugli*, communities report insecurity because disarmament has not been implemented in the following settlements: Murta, Algardood, Tilo, Mashayesh, Eklcoz neighborhood

Dalami, Heiban, Um Dorein, Buram: SPLA/M former areas of control

Only one case of arms in the hands of civilians is reported in *Heiban* locality (Karandal). For Karandal, community members report that the civil war left many weapons in hands of civilians, which has resulted in lack of security and instability, and has negative impacts on their economy. No interventions to disarm civilians are reported. No cases of arms in the hands of civilians are reported in *Dalami, Um Dorein* and *Buram*. However, facilitators of workshops in these areas report that this may be the result of a particular community perception in these localities (particularly in the areas formerly controlled by the SPLA/M) that civilians are entitled to hold arms. Thus, community members do not report the presence of armed communities as a threat or a risk, or a trigger to conflict.

DDR: a statewide concern

In general across the state, DDR has emerged as an important area of concern to communities in both the East and the West of the state (with the exception of *Abassiya*, where the topic was of lesser interest). Discussions were particularly heated in *Babanusa* (where a number of participants expressed anger with the slow implementation of DDR), in *Abu Jibeiha* (where participants reported concerns about unequal implementation of DDR for SPLA versus SAF), and in *Talodi* and *Al Fula* (where

participants had many questions about the DDR process). In Lagawa, discussion on DDR was very general, and demonstrated that there is a need for further public information on the process. In *Keilak*, there was a heated discussion about reported disputes when SPLA soldiers deployed in the South come home to *Keilak* to visit their relatives, carrying guns and uniforms.

Armed communities: Recommendations of communities
- Abu Jibeiha: a local DDR committee should be re-organized and reformed, and the process should include all armed civilians without bias.
- Abyei-Muglad: the DDR Program should be properly implemented, and demobilized citizens should be absorbed in to development programs.
- Keilak and Habila: the government should increase rule of law activities and demobilize armed individuals.
- Delling: the government should exercise the rule of law, provide police stations, and lead developmental programs in the area.
- Reif Asharqi: the government should exercise the rule of law, disarm and arrest members of criminal gangs.

Presence of SALW

4.2.2 Criminal activities and rule of law deficits

Across the state, community members make clear the link between criminal activities and rule of law deficits is clear from the data. The table below summarizes this relationship; the rest of this section provides a summary of the situation in each locality. It is also noteworthy that in the Abyei Area, Abyei Muglad, Babanusa, Rashad and Talodi crime / personal insecurity is reportedly related to the presence of paramilitary / military forces.

Locality	Criminal activity (including banditry)	Law enforcement shortfalls	Justice shortfalls	Civil / native admin shortfalls
Abassiya			X	X
Abu Jubeiha	X		X	X
Talodi			X	X
Rashad	X	X	X	
Dalami	X		X	
Heiban			X	X
Al Qoz		X		
Habila	X		X	X
Reif Asharqi	X		X	
Delling				X
Al Sunut	X			X
Lagawa	X	X	X	X
Babanusa	X			X
Abyei Area	X			
Abyei Muglad	X			

Communities in *Abu Jibeiha* report presence of banditry in the area of Al Rahmania. Banditry activities have resulted in intimidated citizens in the area and locality, loss of property and threat to life. Community members believe the government is reluctant to exercise the rule of law. Communities in the locality also report a weak civil administration system that is incapable of performing its responsibilities within the community. Reported causes are politicization of the system, lack of necessary financial resources, and lack of laws on native administration, which leaves the native leaders without authority. This in return has resulted in lack of trust between the native leaders and community and dissatisfaction among tribes.

In *Abassiya* locality, community members report that the government civil administration in the locality is weak and has failed even to provide civil administration salaries on time. The commissioner has failed to form the locality legislative council, so decisions affecting peoples' lives are taken by a limited number of members within the commissioner's political party. The native administration and civil society organizations have a limited role in the community due to lack of resources and limited capacity and powers. Community members report that these rule of law weaknesses have resulted in unbalanced development, conflicts and torn social fabric.

Communities in *Abyei-Muglad* locality report presence of large scale banditry in the locality, they reported that SPLA invades the Messeriya land on the north as well as presence of troops violating SPLA commands. They believe the main reason is the lack of clear identified north south borders according to the borders lines of 1956, and the reluctance of the government to implement the 2005 CPA. Community members report that armed robbery is not only driven by economic motivations, but also by politics. The entire locality is affected (nomads are reportedly affected to a greater extent), with flashpoints in Abuajbar, Bahr Al Arab, Khashkash, Al Fars and Mankor.

Communities in *Al Qoz* locality report shortfalls in the number of police forces in many residential locations in the locality. The lack of appropriate and sufficient transportation means for the available police forces compound the shortfalls. There is also a very weak native administration system that cannot offer adequate help for the limited police force. This means crimes are often left unresolved and tradesmen are subject to frequent robbery.

In *Al Sunut* locality, community members report insufficient police forces in the locality, lack of police stations, and lack of transportation means for the limited number of police forces. This has resulted in instability, armed robbery and displacement due to the lack of security. Most reports of crime and insufficient rule of law are around the *Abu Junuk - Al Sunut* area.

Communities in *Babanosa* report armed robbery on the borders with South Darfur, in El Tboon and El Gantoor. Reported causes include the overlapping borders and ethnic issues. The community reports the presence of paramilitary forces and armed movements. Communities also report the absence of the locality legislative council and marginalization of the native administration system, which leaves all the powers to the executive body.

In *Dalami* locality, community members report that insecurity is driven by the presence of arms in the hands of civilians, which mean tribal conflicts can turn violent. Community members report lack of sufficient policemen in the locality to manage this violence. Furthermore, the duality of native administration leaves the community in a state of instability with respect to conflicts.

Communities in *Dilling* report that the native administration in the locality is weak, duplicated and receives poor salaries, so that they lack motivation to effectively shoulder their responsibilities and duties. This lack of effective native administration, combined with the presence of small arms in hands of civilians, create insecurity and instability.

In *Habila* locality, community members report a weak native administration system that is undermined by the state government, its leaders receiving poor salaries and lacking training opportunities. This weakness results in escalation of small conflicts into violent conflicts. Of particular concern to the community are Julud, Tiemen and Tima (all were previously under SPLM control).

Communities in *Heiban* locality report lack of courts in the locality and lack of judicial powers authorized to the native administration, which makes it hard for the native administration to manage relations between nomads and sedentary communities.

Communities in *Lagawa* locality report that the civil administration of the locality is weak, incapable of enforcing the rule of law and has failed to comply with native administration in the locality. Communities further report prevalence of banditry and armed robbery.

Communities in *Rashad* report that the presence of SPLA in Ombartbo is a source of insecurity and instability. They further report that the civil administration in the locality is weak.

In *Reif Alsharqi*, community members report incidents of armed robbery as well as a weak native administration system in the locality. Tradesmen are most likely to suffer from armed robbery.

Communities in *Talodi* locality report frequent armed robbery (in Al Bida and Om Safafir), and attribute that to the presence of small arms in hands of civilians and to the presence of the SPLA. Community members further report the lack of judiciary system in the locality and the very poor environment in the few native administration courts available in the locality. The police force in the locality is reportedly not enough and lacks appropriate means of movement and communication.

Criminal activities and rule of law deficits: Recommendations of communities
- Abu Jibeiha, Al Sunut, Delling: the government should empower the native administration system by allocating appropriate funding and modifying the laws to offer more power to native leaders
- Abassiya: international organizations should intervene in the locality to build capacity and to empower the community.
- Al Qoz, Talodi: government should provide more police forces and should equip them with the necessary movement and communication resources so that they could address the conflicts before they could escalate.
- Babanusa, Talodi: the government should disarm people and get rid of armament movements
- Talodi: the government should build courts

Crime and Rule of Law

Legend:
- Large scale banditry
- Criminal activity
- Law Enforcement shortfalls
- Non-functioning judiciary
- Limited access to justice
- Weak civil administration
- Lack of Access to Legislative Issues

4.2.3 Mines and UXO

This section is by no means an objective assessment of places where there are minefields and un-exploded ordinances. Rather, we have recorded instances where the community believes mines and UXOs are a severe threat to the community. This only came up in two localities: Heiban and Um Dorein.

Communities in *Heiban* report presence of land mines and UXOs in: Afab, Aldebi, Al Shawaia, Tandri, Abul, Al Azarq, Al Kook, Aworo, Heiban, Kelkada, Mendi, Nakma, and Tembera. Communities in *Um Dorein* report presence of land mines and UXOS especially on the top of mountains in: Leloba, Um Dorein and Om Serdiba. Community members in both localities report frequent explosion incidents that kill or injure either humans, means of transportation or animals. Unsafe movement from one place to another within the area has resulted in some social frictions. Furthermore, lands covered by land mines cannot be used in agriculture or animal grazing.

> *Mines and UXO: Recommendations of communities*
> - Some organizations are working on demining, yet the communities believe more is required before the entire area cleared from land mines, and that the government should be more proactive.

4.3 Vulnerable populations

4.3.1   Gender issues

Information on gender issues can be difficult to capture in participatory mapping workshops for two reasons. First, there is some reluctance to raise certain issues in a public forum. Second, many of the issues are difficult to map because they relate to wide-spread attitudes (so the map below should be viewed with caution). A women's focus group was run at each workshop to enhance information collected on gender.

Across the state community members report three main issues affecting women:

First, FGM and early marriage are wide-spread. These harmful practices are associated with divorce, dissolution of households, homeless children and increased crime (due to a lack of employment opportunities for divorced women). In some localities, there are also reportedly high rates of domestic violence, often related to alcohol abuse (Buram, Talodi).

Second, there are high levels of illiteracy among women, which often results in unemployment of women. Community members often attribute the high rate of illiteracy among women to traditions that are intolerant of education for women, the limited or inappropriate educational facilities, the limited

availability of teaching staff and text books, and lack of food for education. The resulting high rate of unemployment means that women who are alone are very poor.

Third, the provision of maternal health is poor in general. A related problem is limited education on healthy practices to raise children (often linked to illiteracy). This is particularly a problem for women from nomadic tribes.

Gender issues: Recommendations of communities
- Provide dedicated education facilities to combat illiteracy among women.
- Provide food for education to motivate inclusion of girls in education.
- Run awareness raising campaigns against early marriage

Processed by CRMA/UNDP for the Sudan Information Management Working Group (IMWG). For questions on updates and modifications, please contact: CRMA.sd@undp.org.

U N D P

Northern Kordofan

White Nile

El Hamadi
Dibebad
Al Qoz
El Abasia   El Abassiya
Delling
Delling   Habila   Dalami   Rashad
Salara   Rashad
El Fula   Kurgol   Habila   Dalami
El Salam   Lagawa   Habila
Lagawa   Abu Jibaih
Babanusa   Reif Asharqi   Heiban
Babanusa   Haiban
El Muglad   Kadugli   Kauda
Kadugli   Abu Jibaih
Umm Dorain   Um Durein
Keilak   Kdlak
Al Boram   Talodi
Boram
Keilak   Talodi
Abyei
Meiram
Southern Darfur   Upper Nile
Abyei Area
Abyei
Agok   Unity
Northern Bahr El Ghazal   Jonglei
Warrab

0 12.5 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

Projection & layout: Cylindrical ASSUM

▲ High women's illiteracy
▲ Socio-Cultural Practices
▲ Lack of livelihood opportunities for women

4.3.2 Youth and children's issues

As with gender issues, youth issues are not easily captured on a map. A number of localities held focus groups on youth issues. Two key issues emerged in these discussions: homeless children and illiteracy leading to unemployment.

The problem of homeless children is reported as a concern by communities in *Dilling*, *Al Salam* (especially in Al Fula), *Um Dorein* and *Abyei-Muglad*. Community members report that children become homeless not just because of the effects of the civil war and widespread poverty, but also as a result of early marriages. This is more of a problem for sedentary than for nomadic communities.

Illiteracy resulting in unemployment is reported as a concern by communities in *Um Durein, Abassiya, Talodi* (particularly in Aliri), *Abu Jebeiha, Heiban* and *Rashad*. Community members report that the use of children as part of the labor force and the lack of pre-school education result in inadequate education, which often leads to limited job opportunities for youth. Unemployed youth are also widely reported to feel marginalized, making them prone to take up violent activities and alcohol use. Some localities also report that youth migrate to big cities and out of the state in search of jobs. Again, this problem is more acute for sedentary communities.

4.3.3 Returnees

Most of the localities reporting problems with displacement are those that directly experienced the war. Often, displacement away from these localities as a result of the war has continued in times of peace because these areas also have the worst infrastructure and less job opportunities.

Communities in *Lagawa* (especially Um Mashturaya and Um Khir) and in *Talodi* report displacement caused by the previous civil war in the region. Sedentary and nomadic communities are reportedly equally affected.

Communities in *Abyei-Muglad* locality report displacement attributed to the atmosphere of insecurity caused by the previous civil war, the lack of basic services (mainly water and health services), and the environmental pollution caused by the extraction of oil. Main affected areas include Abu Jabir, the western, eastern and middle migratory corridor of Messeriya, Damblolia, Al Aged, El Aza, El Debab, El Odam, El Mirm, El Mogadema, Al Mugld, Al Steeb, Nama, Tendama, and Om Drees.

In *Al Qoz* and *Dilling* localities, community members report displacement of people and delay of voluntary repatriation because of lack of infrastructure (electricity and bridges), lack of basic services and lack of proper planning by the government.

Communities in *Habila* report continued migration of people from the locality towards cities and towns far from the locality searching for job opportunities and better services. Al Jebal Elsita, Al Kurgel, Habila and Hajar Jawad are particularly affected by such migration.

As the recipient of most IDPs, *Kadugli* town reports heavy pressure on its basic services.

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Returnees: Recommendations of communities
- Habila: government should re-consider its policy in distribution of basic services to ensure balanced development

</div>

Displaced communities and returnees

5. Geographic relationship between themes

Many relationships between the indicators gathered could be explored. These three seemed of greatest interest. Please note that the patterns identified below have not been tested using statistical methods.

5.2.1 Land: conflict, degradation and access

The map shows that conflict over land is almost always accompanied by one or more related indicators: land degradation, land pollution or problems of access to land. Land degradation is the most common factor associated with conflict over land. Most conflicts that are not associated with one of these indicators relate to land ownership or boundaries (rather than land use). This explains why the related indicators do not appear in *Abyei-Muglad* and the *Abyei Area* (where conflicts are mostly about ownership and/or boundaries) and in *Habila* (where conflicts are reportedly mainly about land ownership).

5.2.2 Water: conflict and availability

Water: availability and conflict

The map shows that places where communities report limited availability of water are not the same places as communities report water as the main driver of conflict. This might indicate that where access to water drives conflict, it's not lack of resources that is problematic, but rather how these resources are managed. On the other hand, there is significant overlap between places where land is reported as the main driver of conflict and places where limited availability of water is reported, suggesting that acess to water and land are often intertwined.

5.2.3 Arms proliferation and conflict

Arms: presence of arms and conflict

Not many conclusions can be drawn from this map: there is no clear relationship between reports of presence of SALW in the hands of civilians and reports of conflict. On the other hand, the map below shows a fairly clear relationship between reports of presence of SALW and reports of widespread criminal activities (with the exception of a cluster around *Al Sunut – Abu Junuk*, where the reports of crime probably have more to do with the conflict between the two communities).

Arms: presence of arms and crime