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THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

Translated from the GREEK

By Mr. HAMPTON.

VOL. IV.

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THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the ELEVENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*Asdrubal, having entered Italy, is defeated by the Romans. His death and character.*

**A**SDRUBAL was in all respects dissatisfied with the state in which things appeared. But as it was now too late to take other measures, because the Romans were already formed, and beginning to advance towards him, he was constrained to draw up the Spaniards, and the Gauls that were with him, in order of battle. He placed the elephants, which were ten in number, in front; increased the depth of his files; and ranged his whole army upon a very narrow ground. He then

took his post in the centre of the line, behind the elephants; and moved to attack the left of the enemy: having before determined, that in this battle he would either conquer or die. Livius, leading on his troops with a slow and haughty pace, began the combat with great vigour. But Claudius, who commanded on the right, was unable to advance so as to surround the enemy; being utterly obstructed by those difficulties of the ground which have before been mentioned, and which had determined Asdrubal to make his whole attack upon the left. Anxious therefore, and not willing to remain inactive, he had recourse to the measure which the occasion itself suggested to him. For having drawn away his troops from the right, he led them round the field of battle; and, passing beyond the left of the Roman army, attacked the Carthaginians in flank behind the elephants. To this moment the success of the battle had remained doubtful. For both the Carthaginians and the Romans, well knowing that they had no hopes of safety but in victory, maintained the fight with equal bravery. The service also, which the elephants performed, had been the same to both. For these beasts, being in-  
closed

closed between the two armies, and wounded by the darts, spread no less disorder among the ranks of the Spaniards, than among those of the Romans. But when Claudius fell upon the enemy from behind, the engagement was no longer equal. The Spaniards, pressed at once both in front and rear, were almost all slaughtered in their ranks. Six of the elephants were killed, together with the men that conducted them : and four, which had forced their way through the disordered ranks, were afterwards taken, but without their leaders. Asdrubal, who had so often distinguished himself upon former occasions, displayed no less courage in this last action, and fell in the battle. It would be unjust not to pause awhile, and give the praise that is due to the character of this great commander.

It has already been mentioned, that he was the brother of Annibal ; and that the latter, when he began his march towards Italy, left to him the care of the affairs of Spain. The many engagements, which he sustained against the Romans in that country ; the various difficulties in which he was involved, by the jealousy of those commanders who were sent from time to time into Spain from Carthage ; how truly he shewed himself, upon all those occasions,

sions, to be the worthy son of Amilcar Barcas; and with what spirit and magnanimity he supported his misfortunes and defeats; these things have been all related in the former books. But his conduct, in the last scene of this contention, is that which especially deserves to be remarked, and is most worthy to be imitated.

The greatest part of Generals and of princes, when they are ready to engage in a decisive action, place continually before their eyes the honour and advantages that may result from victory; and consider only, how they may best improve each circumstance, and in what manner they shall use the fruits of their success; but never turn their view upon the consequences of a defeat; nor form for themselves any rule of action in the case of a misfortune. And yet the conduct, which the first of these situations may require, is sufficiently plain and obvious: but the second demands great foresight. Now, from hence it has happened, that commanders, through the want of this attention, and not having before determined in what manner they shall act upon such occasions, after the bravest efforts of their soldiers, have often been defeated with disgrace and shame; have dis-

dishonoured all their former actions ; and loaded the remainder of their lives with reproach and infamy. How many have been lost by this fatal negligence ; and how much one man is in this respect superior to another, may be learned with little pains. The history of past times is filled with such examples. But Asdrubal displayed a very different conduct. As long as any hope remained, of performing actions not unworthy of his former glory, he attended to nothing so much in every battle, as to the care of his own safety. But when fortune had taken from him every future prospect, and confined him to the last desperate extremity ; though he neglected nothing that might secure the victory, either in the disposition of his army, or in the time itself of the engagement ; yet he considered also with no less less attention, in what manner, in case that he should be defeated, he might submit with dignity to his adverse fortune, and not suffer any thing unworthy of his former actions. Let other commanders then be taught by this example ; as, on the one hand, not to frustrate the hopes of those who depend upon them, by throwing themselves unnecessarily into danger ; so, on other, never to add disgrace to their misfortunes, by cherishing an immoderate desire of life.

The Romans, as soon as they had gained the victory, pillaged the camp of the enemy. Finding many of the Gauls drunk, and sleeping upon their straw, they slaughtered them as victims without resistance. The prisoners were then collected together: and from this part of the booty more than three hundred talents were brought into the public treasury. Not fewer than ten thousand Gauls and Carthaginians fell in the engagement; and about two thousand of the Romans. Some of the Carthaginians that were of eminent rank were taken alive: the rest were destroyed in the action.

When the account of this great success arrived at Rome, so vehement was the desire that it might be true, that it was not at first believed. But when messengers after messengers not only confirmed the news of the victory, but reported also all the circumstances of the battle, the whole city was transported with extravagant joy. Every shrine was then adorned: and every temple filled with libations and with sacrifices. In a word, so flattering were the hopes, and so strong the confidence, which possessed all the people, that even Annibal, whom they had hitherto so greatly dreaded, seemed no longer to be in Italy.

## EXTRACT the SECOND.

*The Discourse of an Embassadour, exhorting the Ætolians to put an end to their war with Philip, and to be upon their guard against the designs of the Romans.*

“ WITH what earnestness, O Ætolians, king Ptolemy and the cities of Rhodes and Byzantium, of Chios and Mitylene, have endeavoured to persuade you to conclude a peace with Philip, let the facts themselves demonstrate. For this is neither the first, nor the second embassy that has been sent to you with that intention. Even from the moment when the war first began, we have never ceased to follow you; and have taken every occasion that was offered, to awaken in you an attention to your proper interests; being led to this measure, not only by the consideration of those evils, which the Macedonians and yourselves at this time suffer; but by the foresight of the ruin which will hereafter fall upon our own countries also, and indeed upon the whole of Greece. For as a fire, when it has once been kindled, is no longer con-

trouled by him who lighted it; but is directed in its course either by the winds that blow, or the combustion of the matter with which it is fed; and as it often turns most unaccountably the first efforts of its rage against the person himself who raised it into a flame; just so it happens in the case of war. Once kindled, it first consumes the authors of it; and from thence, spreading itself upon every side, devours without distinction every thing that it meets: acquiring still new strength; and being blown as it were into a flame by the folly of the neighbouring people. You now therefore see before you all the Greeks of Asia, and the people of all the isles, imploring you to put an end to a war, the effects of which they have too great reason to fear will extend hereafter to themselves. Embrace the sentiments which prudence dictates; attend at last to our intreaties; and give a favourable answer to our just demand. If the war indeed, in which you are now engaged, though attended like all other wars, with present disadvantage, had both been honourable in the first intention, and glorious also with respect to the events that have happened in it, this persevering obstinacy might perhaps be excused. But, if the motives that led you into it were  
most

most shameful; and if the conduct of it has been loaded with dishonour and reproach; how much does it now deserve your most serious consideration? For my part, I shall speak my sentiments without reserve: and you, if you are wise, will not be offended with this freedom. It is certainly much better, by censuring your conduct to preserve you before it be too late; than to sooth you with a flattering discourse, which in a short time would be followed by your own ruin, and by that of all the Greeks. Observe then the mistakes into which you have fallen. You pretend that you have taken arms against Philip, only to prevent the Greeks from falling under the absolute dominion of that prince. But the true design and tendency of your engagement is to destroy all Greece, and to bring it into a state of servitude. Your treaty with the Romans very plainly declares, that this is your only purpose. That treaty, which subsisted before in writing, and which now is carried into execution. While it was only written, it covered you with shame: and now, when it appears in the effects, your dishonour is become notorious to all mankind. The name then of Philip is only used, to cover your true intention. For this Prince can suffer nothing

thing from the war. His allies, the people of Peloponnesus, those of Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phocis, the Locrians, the Theſſalians, and the Epirots, have alone any thing to dread from the conditions of your treaty. These are they, against whom it is stipulated; “that the people and the spoil shall be allotted to the Romans, and the cities with the territory to the Ætolians.” If yourselves had taken any cities in open war, you neither would have set the places in flames, nor have exposed the free citizens to any injurious treatment. Such cruelty would have been judged too horrible, and worthy only of barbarians. Yet you have made a treaty, which delivers all the rest of the Greeks into the hands of a barbarous enemy, and exposes them to the most shameful outrage. The fatal tendency of this transaction was for some time unobserved; but that which has happened to the Oritæ, and to the miserable people of Ægina, has now shewn it in the clearest light. For fortune seems to have brought your imprudence into open view, like a machine upon the stage, to unravel the intricacy of your plot. Such was the commencement, and such to this time has been the event of the present war. And what, can it be expected, will

will be the end of it, if all things should succeed as you desire? Must it not be the beginning of the worst of evils, in which all Greece will be involved? For when the Romans shall have ended the war in Italy; and this, as Annibal is now shut up in a narrow corner of the Brutian district, must very shortly happen; it is manifest that they will then bring all their power into Greece: on pretence indeed of assisting the Ætolians against Philip; but, in reality, with a design to add this country to their other conquests. If, after they shall have become the masters of it, they treat the people with favour, the whole grace and honour of such indulgence will be their own. If on the contrary they are inclined to use severity, they alone will possess the spoils of those that are lost; and alone will exercise the rights of sovereignty over those that are preserved. In vain will you then obtest the Gods. The Gods will not be willing, nor will men be able, to lend you any assistance.

These then are the fatal consequences, which you ought to have foreseen from the beginning. Your honour might then have been preserved. But since the events that lie in the bosom of futurity too often escape the eye of human foresight, yet  
now

now at least be warned by those that have already happened, and turn yourselves to more prudent counsels. With regard to us, as we have omitted nothing that was fit for true friends either to speak or to act in the present conjuncture; so, with respect to the future likewise, we have declared our sentiments with a proper freedom. And we now conjure you with the greatest earnestness, not to envy both yourselves, and the rest of the people of Greece, the blessings of liberty and safety."

When this discourse was ended, and seemed to have made some impression upon the people, the embassadours from Philip came into the assembly; and, without entering into any particular discussion, said only, that they had received two orders from the king. The first, that they should conclude a peace, if the Ætolians would consent: and the other, that, if this proposal was rejected, they should immediately depart; having first called the Gods to witness, and the embassadours that were present, that the Ætolians, and not Philip, must be considered as the cause of all the evils which should fall hereafter upon Greece.

## EXTRACT the THIRD.

*The sentiments of Philopæmen concerning the brightness and neatness of arms. The character of this General. He gains a complete victory against Machanidas the tyrant of Sparta, in the battle of Mantinea.*

UPON this occasion it was said by Philopæmen: “that the brightness of arms very much contributed to strike an enemy with terror; and that great advantage also arose in action, from having the several parts of the armour well fitted to the body. That it was much to be wished, that men would transfer that attention to their armour, which they now bestowed upon their common dress; and become as negligent in the care of their dress, as they had hitherto been in that of their arms. That such a change would both be serviceable to their private fortunes, and be attended likewise with manifest advantage with respect to the public safety. If a man therefore, continued he, be preparing him-

himself for any military exercise, or for an expedition in the field, when he puts on his boots, let him be more careful in observing whether they are bright and well fitted to his legs, than in examining his shoes or sandals. When he takes his buckler, his breastplate, or his helmet, let him desire to see more splendour, and more costly ornaments, in these parts of his armour, than in his coat or mantle. For when men preferred mere shew and ostentation to things of real use, it was easy to foresee, what would be their conduct in the time of danger. In a word, he said, he wished that they would be persuaded, that an affected nicety in dress was worthy only of women, and those perhaps not extremely modest: but that a display of splendour and of costliness in arms denoted a man of courage; ambitious of acquiring honour; and determined to employ his utmost efforts in the defence of himself and of his country."

All the people that were present were so struck with this discourse, and with the good sense which it contained, that, as soon as the assembly was dismissed, they began to point out those that were elegantly dressed, and forced some of them to retire from the Forum. And afterwards, in all their military exercises and

expe-

expeditions, they were most particularly careful to bear in remembrance this advice. Such power is there even in a single exhortation, when delivered by a person of high authority, not only to deter men from bad habits, but to lead them into those that are the best. When the life especially of the speaker is known to correspond with his discourse, it is impossible not to give the fullest credit to his words. And such was the character of Philopœmen. Plain in his dress, and frugal in his table, he bestowed but a very slight attention upon the care of his body. In his conversation he was agreeably concise, and never gave any offence. In the whole course of his life, it was his greatest study, always to speak the truth. A few words therefore which he at any time spoke, and which seemed to fall from him without design, were sufficient to gain an entire credit with those who heard him. The example of his life rendered a long discourse unnecessary. With some short sentences, supported by this credit, and by the opinion which his actions had inspired, he often overthrew the long and plausible harangues of those who opposed him in the government. But let us now return to the history.

When

When the assembly was dissolved, the people all returned back to their several cities; greatly applauding the virtue of the speaker, and the discourse which they had heard: and were persuaded, that under the administration of such a governor the state could never suffer any loss. Philopœmen then went round to the several cities, and inspected every thing with the greatest diligence and care. He assembled the people together; formed them into troops; and instructed them in the military exercises. And when he had employed almost eight months in completing the necessary preparations, he drew together his army to Mantinea, to defend the liberty of all the people of Peloponnesus against the Spartan tyrant.

Machanidas, filled with confidence, and considering this measure as most favourable to his own desires, as soon as he heard that the Achæans were so near, assembled the Lacedæmonian forces at Tegea; harangued them as the occasion required; and early on the following day began his march towards Mantinea. Himself led the right wing of the phalanx. Upon either side of the van were the mercenaries, in two bodies, parallel each to the other: and behind these, a great number of carriages filled with catapults

tapults and darts. At the same time, Philopœmen also drew his army, in three divisions out of the city. The Illyrians, the troops that were armed with coats of mail, the foreign mercenaries, and the light-armed forces passed through the gate that led to the temple of Neptune. The phalanx through another gate that looked towards the west: and the cavalry of the city through a third that was near to the former. Upon a hill of considerable height, that stood before the city, and which commanded also the temple of Neptune and the road called Xenis, he posted first the light-armed forces; and next to them, on the side towards the south, the troops that were armed with mail, and also the Illyrians. Next to these, and upon the same right line, the phalanx, divided into separate cohorts with the usual distances between, was ranged along the border of a ditch, which beginning at the temple of Neptune, was continued through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, as far as to those mountains which are the boundary of the Elisphasian territory. Upon the right of the phalanx stood the Achæan cavalry, commanded by Aristænetus, a citizen

of Dyme. Upon the left was all the foreign cavalry, formed in close order, and without any intervals between the troops. At the head of these was Philopœmen.

When the time of engaging approached, and the enemy appeared in fight, this General, riding through the intervals of the phalanx, exhorted the troops to perform their duty, in few but very forcible words. But the greatest part of what he said was not even heard. For so strong was the affection which the whole army bore towards him, so great was their confidence, and such their ardour to engage, that the soldiers rather seemed to animate their General; and, with a kind of enthusiastick transport, called upon him to lead them against the enemy, and to be assured of victory. As often however as he had power to speak, he in general endeavoured to make them comprehend, that the object of the present contest was, on the part of the enemy, base and ignominious slavery; and, on their own part, glorious and immortal liberty.

Machanidas, as he at first advanced, made a shew of attacking the right of the enemy with his phalanx formed in the oblong square. But when he approached

proached nearer and had gained the distance that was proper for his purpose, turning suddenly the whole body to the right, he extended his front till the right of his line was equal to the left of the Achæans; and at the same time disposed his catapults along the whole front at proper distances. Philopœmen, perceiving that his intention was, by discharging stones, and wounding the cohorts as they stood, to throw the whole phalanx into disorder, allowed him not time to effect his purpose: but began the action vigorously with the Tarentines, who were posted near the temple of Neptune, upon a ground that was flat and level, and very proper for cavalry. Machanidas was then forced to send his own Tarentines also to oppose them. The charge was violent, and sustained on both sides with great courage. The light-armed forces came soon afterwards to support their respective bodies; so that all the mercenaries of both armies were in a short time engaged. And as the combatants fought man with man, and without regarding any order, the dispute was for a long time doubtful. Nor were the rest of the troops able to discern,

to which side the dust was driven; because both parties had changed their ground, and were removed far from the place in which the action was first begun. At last however, the mercenaries that belonged to the tyrant, who exceeded the others not only in numbers, but in the dexterity also which they had acquired in the use of their arms, prevailed

It was reasonable indeed that this should be the issue; the same which is almost always found to happen upon such occasions. For as much as the citizens who live under a democratical government display greater courage in action than the subjects of a tyrant, so much on the other hand are the mercenaries, which a tyrant retains in pay, superior to the foreign soldiers that serve in the armies of a democracy. The reason of this difference is, that the people, in the one case fight for liberty; and in the other, to be slaves: and that the zeal and courage of the mercenaries are rewarded, on the one side, with new advantages; and, on the other, tend only to their loss. For a democratical state, when it has once conquered those who attempt to subvert it, no longer employs mercenary troops,

troops, to guard its freedom. But a tyrant, in proportion as his successes are increased, has still greater need of such assistance. For, by accumulating injuries, he adds to the number of those whom he has reason to fear. The very safety therefore of every tyrant depends wholly upon the strength and the attachment of his foreign soldiers.

From these reasons then it happened, that the mercenaries of Machanidas, upon this occasion, maintained the action with so great force as well as courage, that not even the Illyrians, nor the heavy forces, which supported the Achæan mercenaries were able to stand against them; but fled in disorder to Mantinea, though that city was distant full seven stadia from the place of the action. This occasion afforded also a very clear and convincing proof of the truth of a thing which some have doubted: that the issue of battles is most frequently determined by skill on one side, and by the want of it on the other. A chief, it must be acknowledged displays no small ability, when, after having gained the advantage in the first part of a battle, he conducts the action to the end with the same success with which it was begun. But his capacity

will be seen in a much more exalted point of view, if, when he has been defeated in the beginning, he is still able to retain a presence of mind; to observe the errors which his adversary commits in the course of his success; and to turn those errors to his own advantage. For it has often happened, that some, when they have seemed to have the victory already in their hands, in a short time afterwards have suffered an entire defeat: and that others, who have failed in the beginning, by some sudden and dexterous effort have changed the whole fortune of the battle, and obtained an unexpected victory. The two Generals, who commanded in the present action, afford very eminent examples of both these cases.

For when the whole body of the Achæan mercenaries was in this manner routed, and the left wing of their army broken and compelled to fly; Machanidas, whose duty it was to remain in the place, to finish what he had begun, to surround the left of the enemy, and to charge their main body both in flank and front, attempted nothing of this kind; but, putting himself at the head of his victorious mercenaries, with  
an

an intemperate and childish valour pursued those that fled: as if their own fear alone, after they once were broken, would not have been sufficient to carry them even to the gates of the city. But the Achæan General, after he had employed all possible efforts to stop the flight of the troops, calling to the officers by name, and encouraging them to stand, when he perceived that they were forced to yield to the strength of the enemy, was not himself disheartened, nor quitted the action in despair: but, having posted himself on the wing of his phalanx, as soon as the enemy, by their pursuit of those that fled, had left the field clear where the action had passed, he turned to the left with his first cohorts, and ran in good order to take possession of the vacant ground. By this position, he both cut off the return of those that were engaged in the pursuit, and at the same time commanded the wing of the enemy. He exhorted the phalanx to fear nothing; and to remain in their place, till they should receive the signal to charge. At the same time he ordered Polybius the Megalopolitan, to collect together all the Illyrians and the mercenaries who had not fled with the

rest; to post them behind the wing of the phalanx; and to observe with the greatest care the return of the enemy from the pursuit.

The Lacedæmonian phalanx, elated by the first success, without waiting for the signal to engage, levelled their spears, and advanced towards the enemy. When they came to the bank of the ditch, whether because, as they were now so near, there was not time to change their purpose, or whether the ditch itself, being easy in the descent, and not having either wood or water in it, appeared contemptible, they continued their way through it without any hesitation. Philopœmen, perceiving that the moment was now come which he had long expected, ordered his phalanx also to level their spears, and to advance. The Achæans run together to the charge with loud and terrible cries. The Lacedæmonians, who had broken their ranks as they descended into the ditch, no sooner saw the enemy upon the bank above them, than they immediately began to fly. But great numbers of them were destroyed in the ditch: some by the Achæans; and some by their own men. Nor was this event to be ascribed

to chance, or even to the interposition of a lucky moment; but wholly to the ability of the commander. For Philopœmen had covered himself with the ditch in front, not with any intention, as some suspected, to avoid a battle; but because his great skill and judgment had enabled him to foresee, that, if Machanidas, not regarding the difficulty of the ditch, should lead his phalanx to the charge, the event must happen which now had happened: and, if the tyrant, on the other hand, stopped by this impediment, should change his purpose, and be forced to break the order of his battle, that his ignorance would be then confessed; and that he would leave to his enemies the honour of a victory, and carry away the shame of a defeat, even without having risked a general engagement. Such disgrace, the greatest indeed that can happen in war, has been the lot of many commanders: who, when they have formed their army, have been deterred from engaging with the enemy, either by the disadvantage of the ground, the superiority of numbers, or some other cause; and being forced to break again the order of their battle, have depended wholly upon the rear for victory, or for the opportunity at least of making their  
retreat

retreat with safety. With regard to Philopœmen, his foresight was proved true by the event: for the Lacedæmonians were completely routed.

When he found then that his phalanx had thus gained the victory, and that all things had succeeded most gloriously as he desired, he now turned his thoughts to the only remaining point, which was, to prevent the tyrant from escaping. Knowing him to be intercepted, together with his mercenaries between the city and the ditch, he stood expecting his return. Machanidas, at last coming back from his inconsiderate pursuit, and seeing the flight of his forces, was sensible of the mistake which he had committed, and at the same time perceived that all was lost. He ordered the mercenaries therefore that were near him to form themselves into a close body, and to force their way through the enemy, who were spread loosely over the field, and busied in pursuing the routed army. Some of his troops obeyed this order, and remained for some time with him; conceiving this to be the only expedient by which they might be able to escape. But when they came to the bridge that was upon the ditch, and found it guard-  
ed

ed by the Achæans, they immediately lost all hope; and all of them dispersed themselves, and sought their safety by different ways. Machanidas himself, laying aside all thoughts of attempting to escape by the bridge, rode along the bank of the ditch, and looked earnestly for some place in which he might pass it. Philopœmen soon discerned him by his purple habit, and by the trappings of his horse. Leaving therefore the care of the bridge to Aristænétus; with orders that he should spare none of the mercenaries, because they had always been the instruments of establishing tyranny in Sparta; and taking with him two of his intimate friends, Polyænus the Cyparissian and Simias, he passed to the other side of the ditch, and rode along the bank opposite to the tyrant, with design to stop him in his passage, and those who attended him. For he also was followed by two companions; Anaxidamus, and one of the mercenaries. Machanidas, having at last found a place that was easy of descent, spurred his horse, and drove him furiously through the ditch. But Philopœmen, in this very moment turning himself to meet him, happily wounded him with spear; and then, shifting the spear in his hand, struck

struck him again with lower part of it, and killed him. One of his companions, Anaxidamus, was at the same time killed by the two friends who attended Philopœmen; and the other sought his safety in flight. Simias then spoiled the bodies; and, having cut off the head of the tyrant, ran to shew it to those that were engaged in the pursuit: that the soldiers, perceiving that Machanidas was dead, might assume new confidence, and follow the flying enemy without any fear even to Tegea. This spectacle produced the effect that was desired; and raised so great ardour in the army, that they even gained possession of Tegea upon their first approach. On the following day, they incamped along the banks of the Eurotas, and were masters of all the open country. Thus the Achæans, who not long before had been unable to drive the enemy out of their own territory, had now all Laconia in their power, and ravaged it without resistance. They had lost but few of their men in the action but, on the side of the Lacedæmonians, four thousand were killed, and a greater number taken prisoners. All the baggage also, and the arms, fell into the hands of the Achæans.

## EXTRACT the FOURTH.

*Reflections on the great abilities of Annibal.  
The cause of his failing in his attempt to  
subdue the Romans.*

**I**T is impossible to contemplate the length of the time in which Annibal was employed in action; the general battles, as well as little combats, in which he was engaged; the sieges that were undertaken by him; the revolts of cities that had submitted to him; the difficult conjectures that often pressed him; and, in a word, the whole extent and greatness, both in design and execution, of his war against the Romans; and not to be struck with admiration of the skill, the courage, and the ability of this great commander. How wonderful is it, that, in a course of sixteen years, in which he maintained the war in the very heart of Italy, he should never once dismiss his army from the field; and yet be able, like a wise and prudent governour, to keep in subjection so great a multitude, and to confine

fine them within the bounds of their duty, so that they neither mutinied against him, nor broke into any sedition among themselves upon any occasion. Though his army was composed of people of various countries; of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, and Greeks; men who had different laws, different manners, a different language, and, in a word, nothing among them that was common; yet so dexterous was his management, that, notwithstanding this great diversity, he forced all of them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this too he effected in the midst of very various fortune. For sometimes he was carried in his course by the most favourable gales: and sometimes he was involved in storms. How high as well as just an opinion must these things convey to us of his ability in war. It may be affirmed with confidence, that, if he had first tried his strength in the other parts of the world, and had come last to attack the Romans, he could scarcely have failed in any part of his design. But now, as he began, with those with whom he should have ended, the people, that was the first object of his conquest, was the last also which he had the power to invade.

## EXTRACT the FIFTH.

*The defeat of Asdrubal, the son of Gesco,  
by Publius Scipio.*

**A**SDRUBAL, having drawn together his army from the several cities in which they had remained during the winter, came and incamped at the foot of a mountain, not far from a city that was called Elinga; and threw up an intrenchment round his camp. In his front was a large plain, very proper for a battle. The number of his forces was seventy thousand foot, and four thousand horse; together with thirty two elephants. At the same time Scipio sent away Marcus Junius, to receive from Colichas the troops which that Spaniard had raised; and which consisted of three thousand foot, and five hundred horse: while himself collected together the rest of the allies, as he advanced in his march towards the enemy. When he arrived near Castalo and Bæcula, he was met by Junius, with the forces which Colichas had sent. He was now  
involved

involved however in very great perplexity. On the one hand, the Roman forces alone, without the assistance of the allies, were too few to engage in a general battle. On the other, to place any dependance upon these allies, in so decisive an action, appeared to be extremely hazardous and full of danger. After much deliberation therefore, as the necessity pressed him closely on either side, he at last resolved, that he would employ the Spaniards in such a manner, that they should appear to the enemy to bear a part in the action, but that only the Roman legions should be engaged. Having thus determined, he began his march with all the army, which consisted of forty-five thousand foot, and three thousand horse: and when he came near to the Carthaginians, and was in sight, he incamped upon some hills that were opposite to the enemy. Mago, judging this to be a favourable time for attacking the Romans, before they had completed their incampment, took with him the greatest part of his own cavalry, together with the Numidians with Massinissa at their head, and advanced with speed towards the camp, not doubting but that he should find Scipio wholly unprepared

pared. But the Roman General, having foreseen that this might happen, had placed a body of cavalry, equal to that of the enemy in ambuscade at the foot of one of the hills. When these troops then suddenly appeared, the Carthaginians were so struck with surprize at the unexpected fight, that many of them as they turned themselves to fly, were thrown from their horses. The rest indeed stood firm, and maintained the fight with courage. But being closely pressed, and disordered chiefly by that dexterity with which the Romans were accustomed to quit their horses in the very time of action; and having lost also many of their men, they were forced to turn their backs after a short resistance. At first they retreated in good order. But when the Romans followed closely after them, they broke their ranks, and continued their flight in disorder even to their own camp. This success inspired the Romans with greater eagerness to engage; and, on the other hand, depressed the ardour of the Carthaginians. During some days that followed, they drew out their forces on both sides in the plain that was between the camps. And having tried

their strength in many little skirmishes between their cavalry and their light-armed troops, they at last resolved to engage in a general and decisive action.

Upon this occasion Scipio employed two stratagems. He had remarked, that Asdrubal always drew out his army at a late hour of the day; and that he placed the Africans in the centre, and the elephants before the Spaniards upon the wings. Himself, on the other hand, had been accustomed to bring his army into the field at his own time after the other, and to post the Romans, opposite to the Africans, in the centre, and the Spaniards on the wings. On the day then, in which he had determined to engage, he took in both these respects just the contrary method; and, by that change chiefly, procured to his troops the advantage which they gained against the enemy. For scarcely had the morning begun to appear, when he sent orders to the Tribunes and to all the army, that they should immediately take their repast, put on their armour, and march out of the camp. The soldiers, conceiving what would follow, obeyed the orders with alacrity. He then sent away the cavalry and the light-armed troops;

troops; commanding them to advance boldly towards the camp of the enemy, and to engage in skirmishing: and, the sun being now risen, he put himself at the head of the infantry, and began his march. And when he arrived near the middle of the plain, he then drew up the army in battle, but in an order contrary to that which he before had used. For he now placed the Spaniards in the centre, and the Romans upon the wings. The Carthaginians, surpris'd by the unexpected approach of the cavalry towards their camp, and perceiving that the rest of the army was drawn up in battle, and already in fight, had scarcely time sufficient to be armed. Asdrubal therefore, before the soldiers had taken any repast, was forced to send away in haste his cavalry and light-armed troops against the Roman cavalry; and to draw up his infantry in the usual order upon the plain, very near to the foot of the mountain.

While the light troops were engaged in skirmishing, the Roman infantry remained for some time quiet in their place. But as the day was now advanced, and no great advantage was gained on either side, because the custom of these

troops was to retreat when they were pressed, and then returning again to renew the fight; Scipio called back his men from the engagement, and, having made them pass through the intervals of the cohorts, ranged first the light-armed, and next to them the cavalry, behind the infantry upon each of the wings. He then ordered the whole line to move with equal pace towards the enemy. But when he came to the distance of about a stadium from them, having directed the Spaniards in the centre to keep their ranks, and to advance still with the same pace; he ordered the infantry and cavalry of the right wing to turn to the right, and those of the left to the left. He then took from the right wing three of the foremost troops of cavalry, with the accustomed number of light-armed in front; and three maniples of infantry, which the Romans call a cohort; while Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius took in the same manner as many from the left: and then turning, Scipio with his division to the left, and the others to the right, they led on the troops in a direct line, and with great speed against the enemy: the rest of the wings making also the same movement, and

and following close in the same line. In this manner, as the wings were brought near to the enemy, while the Spaniards in the centre advanced with a slow pace, and were still at a great distance, Scipio accomplished what he had at first designed, and fell direct upon both the wings of the enemy with only the Roman forces. The movements which were made afterwards by the troops that followed, in order to fall into a right line with those that led, were contrary the one to the other, not only in the two wings, but in the cavalry also and the infantry of either wing. For, in the right wing, the cavalry and the light-armed forces, by turning to the right, fell into the line with those that were before, and attempted to gain the flank of the enemy; while the infantry wheeled to the left, and joined their leaders. In the left wing, the infantry turned to the right; and the cavalry and light-armed to the left. By these movements of the cavalry and light-armed forces, the troops changed their place, so that the right in either wing became the left. This change however Scipio considered as in itself of no great moment. His attention was fixed upon something more im-

portant; which was, to gain the flank of the enemy. And in this he judged right and reasonably. For though it is necessary indeed that a General should know the movements that may be made, it is of much greater moment to be able to apply those movements upon each occasion to their proper use.

As soon as the action was begun, the elephants, pierced by the darts of the cavalry and light-armed troops, and pressed closely on every side, were not less hurtful to their friends than to their enemies. For as they were driven from side to side in great disorder, they destroyed all without distinction that were within their reach. At the same time the infantry upon the wings of the Carthaginian army was vigorously attacked; while their centre, composed of the Africans, which were the choicest of their troops, remained inactive. For as they dared not, on the one hand, to leave their station and succour the wings, lest the Spaniards that were in the centre of the Roman army should advance to attack them; so neither were they able, on the other hand, to do any thing in their post against the Spaniards, because the  
latter

latter were still at too great a distance from them. Thus the action was maintained by the wings alone; and, as the whole stress of the battle lay upon them, was for some time maintained on both sides with equal bravery. But when the sun had now gained his greatest height, the Carthaginians, who had been brought hastily into the field, and before they had taken any repast, began to faint under the heat. The Romans, on the other hand, not only were superior in vigour and in spirit, but derived also another advantage from the prudence of their General, who had opposed the strongest part of his army to the weakest in that of the enemy. Asdrubal therefore, unable any longer to resist, at first retreated slowly, and in good order. But after a short time, his whole army, turning their backs together, ran in crowds to the foot of the mountain: and from thence, being still violently pressed, they fled in disorder into their camp. And indeed, if some deity had not interposed to save them, they must afterwards have been driven also out of their intrenchments. But suddenly the face of the heavens was changed; and the rain descended in such violent and continual torrents, that the Romans were scarcely able to return back again to their camp.

## EXTRACT the SIXTH.

*The manner in which Scipio suppressed and punished a sedition that had happened in the Roman army.*

**T**HOUGH Scipio had now gained a sufficient experience in affairs, he was thrown however by this revolt into a state of great irresolution and perplexity. Nor was this indeed without good reason. For as, in the case of the human body, the causes of external injuries, of those for example which arise from heat and cold, from fatigue or wounds, may either be guarded against before they happen, or afterwards be remedied without much difficulty; while the disorders on the other hand which are bred in the body itself, ulcers and diseases, are neither easily foreseen, nor easy to be cured; just so it happens with respect to governments and armies. When they are attacked by any enemy from without, if the necessary attention only be employed, it is no hard thing  
to

to take the measures that are requisite for their security and defence. But to appease the violence of intestine factions, to quell popular tumults and seditions, is a work of the greatest difficulty; and such as requires a very uncommon exertion both of address and prudence. There is one precaution however, which, in my judgment, would be greatly serviceable in the case of states and armies, as well as in human bodies: and that is, not to suffer in any of them a too long continuance in laziness and inactivity; especially when they enjoy the blessings of plenty and prosperous fortune.

Scipio then, who, besides that steady application to affairs which we before have mentioned, was very ready also and dexterous both in thought and action, contrived the following method for remedying the disorder that had happened. He called together the Tribunes, and told them, that the stipends that were demanded should be paid. And, that his promise might gain the greater credit, he directed that the taxes, which had been before imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army, should be levied publickly and with the greatest diligence: as if his only intention had



them, to meet them as they approached : and that each of them, taking five of the seditious leaders, and accosting them with a shew of friendship, should press them to take a lodging in their quarters, or at least to accept of the entertainment of a supper. Three days before, he had ordered the troops that were in the city to furnish themselves with provisions for a considerable time ; on pretence that they were to march, under the command of Marcus against Andobalis who had revolted. The seditious, being informed also of this order, were filled with still greater confidence. For they persuaded themselves, that, as the rest of the army would be removed, they should have all things in their own power, as soon as they should join the General.

When they were now ready to enter the city, Scipio sent orders to the other troops, that they should begin their march with all their baggage very early in the morning on the following day. But the Tribunes and the Prefects were at the same time secretly commanded, to send the baggage forwards as soon as they should come out of the city, but to keep the soldiers in arms near the gate ; to divide them afterwards into  
parties

parties at every gate; and to be careful that none of the seditious should come out of the city. The Tribunes, who had been appointed to receive the seditious leaders, met them as they arrived; and, having accosted them with much civility, carried them to their houses. The order given to them was, that they should immediately secure the persons of these men; and, when supper was ended, should bind them, and keep them safe: and that no person afterwards should be suffered to go out of the houses; except only a messenger from each to acquaint the General that the thing was done. This order was punctually observed and executed. On the morrow, when the day appeared, and the seditious had already begun to come in crowds towards the Forum, Scipio ordered the assembly to be called. As soon as the signal was made, the soldiers ran together, according to their custom; expecting eagerly to see again their General, and to hear what he would say to them on the present occasion. Scipio then sent orders to the Tribunes who were without the gates, that they should bring the troops in arms, and surround the assembly. At the same time he presented himself before

fore them; and in the instant, by his very first appearance, filled them with extreme confusion. For they had supposed him to be broken with disease; and they behold him vigorous and strong. His very aspect therefore, so different from all that they had conceived, struck them at once with surprize and terror. He then began his discourse to them in the following manner.

He could not, he said, but wonder, what motives, either of expectation or disgust, had led them into this revolt. That men usually rebelled against their country and their leaders, either because they were dissatisfied with the conduct of those who held the supreme command; or were displeased with the condition of affairs; or lastly perhaps, because they were ambitious of some greater fortune, and had filled their minds with aspiring hopes. Tell me then, continued he, to which of all these causes is your revolt to be ascribed? Is it with me that you are offended, because the payment of your stipends has been so long delayed? The fault however is not mine: for, during the whole time of my command, your stipends have been always fully paid. If it be Rome then  
that

that is in fault, and having neglected to discharge your former arrears, was it just that you should shew this resentment? taking arms against your country; and declaring yourselves the enemies of her who had bred and nourished you? How much better would it have been, to have made me the judge of your complaints; and to have intreated your friends to join together in obtaining for you the relief which you desired? When mercenary troops indeed, who have no other object but their pay, desert the service in which they are engaged, such a conduct, in certain circumstances, may perhaps be excused. But in men who fight for themselves, their wives, and children, this defection is a most unpardonable crime. It is no other indeed, than if a son, on pretence that his parent had defrauded him in settling an account, should go armed to take away the life of him, from whom himself had received his being. Or will you say then, that I have employed you in more painful duties, or exposed you more frequently to danger than the rest; and have given to others the advantages of the war, and the chief part of all the booty? You dare not say, that I have ever made this dis-

distinction: and, if you dare, you cannot shew the proof, To what part of my conduct then can you impute the cause of your revolt? Speak, for I wish to be informed. There is not one among you that is able to declare, not one among you that can even form to himself in thought, the least matter of offence against me. Nor is it again in the condition of affairs, that you can find any reasonable ground of discontent. For when were all things in a more prosperous state? At what time was Rome distinguished by so many victories? At what period were her soldiers flattered with a fairer prospect? But some of you perhaps are diffident of these appearances, and have fixed your hopes upon greater advantages, to be found among our enemies. And who are these enemies? Mandonius and Andobalis? Do not all of you then know, that, when they first joined our army, they broke their treaty with the Carthaginians: and that now again they have no less violated the most solemn oaths, by commencing new hostilities against us? How honourable is it for you to place a confidence in men like these; and to become, for their sakes, the enemies of your country.

You

You had surely never any hopes, that with such allies you could render yourselves the masters of Spain. Neither assisted by Andobalis, nor separately by yourselves, would you ever be able to stand in the field against our forces. What then was your design? Let me hear it only from yourselves. Is it the skill, the courage of those leaders, whom you have chosen to command you, that has filled you with this confidence? Or those rods and axes, which are carried in solemn state before them; and which it even is shameful for me now to mention? No, soldiers, these are not the causes: nor can you offer even the smallest matter of complaint, either against me, or against your country. I must endeavour then to justify your conduct, both to Rome and to myself; by those common principles, the truth of which is acknowledged by all mankind. The multitude is easily deceived; is impelled by the smallest force to every side; and, in a word, is susceptible upon all occasions of the same agitations as the sea. For as the latter, though in itself it is calm and stable, and carries no face of danger, is no sooner set in motion by some violent blast, than it resembles the winds them-

themselves which raise and ruffle it; in the same manner the multitude also assumes an aspect, conformable to the designs and temper of those leaders, by whose counsels it is swayed and agitated. From this consideration, all the officers of the army and myself have resolved to pardon your offence, and to engage our promise, that no remembrance of it ever shall remain. But to those who excited you to this revolt we are inexorable. The crime which they have committed, both against us, and against their country, shall be punished with the severity which it deserves."

As soon as he had ended this discourse, the troops that had surrounded the assembly in arms, upon a signal given, clashed their swords against their bucklers; and at the same time the seditious leaders were brought in, bound and naked. And while some of them were scourged, and some beheaded, the whole multitude was so struck with terror, both by the danger that incompassed them, and by the dismal spectacle that was before their eyes, that not one among them changed his countenance, or uttered a single word; but all of them stood fixed in silent astonishment and dread. The leaders, being thus put to death, were

dragged through the midst of the assembly. The General then, and all the officers, gave a solemn assurance to the rest, that their fault should never be remembered. The soldiers, approaching one by one, renewed their oath before the Tribunes; that they would be obedient to their chiefs, and not engage in any designs against their country. In this manner Scipio by his great prudence stifled a danger in its birth, which might have grown to be extremely formidable; and restored again his army to its former state.

## EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

*The revolt of Andobalis. Scipio marches against that prince; defeats him in an engagement; and finishes the war in Spain.*

SCIPIO, having called together without delay, and in the city of New Carthage, an assembly of all the troops, communicated to them the daring designs of Andobalis, and his perfidy towards them. Upon these topics he spoke so largely, that the minds of the soldiers were sharpened in the highest degree against that prince. Having then enumerated the many battles in which the Romans had been engaged, against the united forces of the Spaniards and the Carthaginians, with Carthaginian leaders also at their head; it would be absurd, he said, to think, when they had been always conquerors in those actions, that they could fail to obtain the victory against the Spaniards alone, commanded by Andobalis. That, upon this account, he would not have recourse to the assistance of any of the Spaniards, but would employ

ploy the Romans only in the present expedition: that from thence it might be known to all, that it was not by the strength of the Spanish forces, as some pretended, that the Romans had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain; but that the Roman spirit alone, and the Roman bravery, had conquered both the Carthaginians and the Spaniards. “Banish then, continued he, from among you all dissension: and, if ever you have engaged in any war with confidence, let me exhort you now to assume it. With regard to the success, myself, with the assistance of the gods, will take such measures as shall secure the victory.” This discourse inspired such ardour into all the army, that by their countenance they seemed as if they were already in fight of the enemy, and waiting only for the signal to engage. He then dismissed the assembly.

On the following day he began his march: and arriving in ten days upon the banks of the Iberus, he passed the river on the fourth day afterwards, and encamped near to the enemy, having before him a valley which separated the two camps. On the next day, having ordered Lælius to hold the cavalry in readiness  
and

and some Tribunes to prepare the light-armed forces for action, he drove some of the cattle that followed the army into the valley; and, when the Spaniards ran hastily to seize this prey, sent a part of the light-armed to attack them. The action was soon begun; and, as greater numbers advanced on either side to support the first, a sharp and general skirmishing ensued. But Lælius, who stood ready with his cavalry, perceiving the occasion to be favourable, fell suddenly upon the enemy; and, having cut off also their retreat at the foot of the mountain, destroyed a great part of the Spaniards who were dispersed through the valley. The barbarians, enraged by the loss which they had sustained, and dreading lest they should seem to be disheartened, and to have suffered an intire defeat, drew out all their army as soon as the morning appeared, and resolved to engage in a general battle. Scipio on his part was no less ready. But as he perceived that the Spaniards shewed so little skill and judgment, that they descended with all their forces into the valley, and ranged their infantry as well as their cavalry upon the plain, he waited for some time, that as great a number of them as

was possible might come down. For though he placed great confidence in his cavalry, he depended still more upon his infantry; because the latter, both from their bravery, and from the manner also in which they were armed, were far superior to the Spaniards, in close and set engagements. When he saw then, that as great a number had come down as he desired, he advanced in order of battle against that part of the Spanish army which was posted near to the foot of the mountain; and sent away four cohorts, drawn up in close order, to attack the infantry in the valley. At the same time Lælius, having led his cavalry along the hills that extended from the camp to the valley, fell upon the cavalry of the enemy in their rear, and kept them closely engaged. The Spanish infantry, being in this manner deprived of the assistance of the cavalry, by which they had expected to be supported, were unable to maintain the fight. The cavalry also laboured under no less disadvantage. Confined within a narrow ground, and disordered by the difficulties of their situation, they killed more of their own men than the Romans killed. For they were pressed in flank by their own infantry; by the  
Roman

Roman infantry in front ; and by the Roman cavalry in their rear. Such then was the course of this engagement. The Spaniards who had come down into the valley were almost all of them destroyed : and the rest that were drawn up near the foot of the hills sought their safety in flight. These were the light-armed troops, which composed about a third part of the army. Among these Andobalis found means to escape ; and fled to a certain fortified place. The war in Spain being thus intirely finished, Scipio returned back to Taraco full of joy : having atchieved for his country a glorious conquest, and secured to himself the honour of a splendid triumph. Being then desirous to be present at the election of Consuls, as soon as he had regulated all things in Spain, he committed the care of the army to Marcus and Syllanus, and sailed away with Lælius and the rest of his friends to Rome.

## EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

*Antiochus concludes a treaty with Euthydemus; and returns from his expedition into the upper provinces of Asia.*

**E**UTHYDEMUS, who was himself a native of Magnesia, endeavoured to justify his conduct, and said, that Antiochus had no reason for attempting to deprive him of his kingdom; since he never had rebelled against him, but had only obtained possession of Bactriana, by destroying the descendants of those who had before revolted. He insisted long upon this point; and intreated Teleas to mediate for him with Antiochus; that hostilities might cease, and that he might be allowed to retain the name of king. He urged, that such a reconciliation was even necessary for their common safety. That those wandering tribes, who were spread in great numbers along the borders of the province, were alike dangerous to them both; and that, if ever they should gain admittance into it, the whole country must inevitably fall into a state of barbarism.

barism. With these instructions he sent back Teleas to the king.

Antiochus, who had been long desirous of putting an end to the war, acknowledged the force of these reasons, and declared himself willing to accept the peace that was offered. And when Teleas had gone and returned again many times, Euthydemus at last sent his own son Demetrius to ratify the treaty. The king received him favourably; and judging by his appearance and his conversation, as well as by a certain air of majesty that was conspicuous in his person, that the young man was worthy of a kingdom, he promised to give him one of his daughters in marriage, and to suffer his father to retain the name of king. The rest of the treaty was expressed in writing, and the alliance confirmed by oaths.

After this transaction, Antiochus, having first distributed a large quantity of corn among his troops, and taken the elephants that belonged to Euthydemus, began his march with all his army. Passing mount Caucasus, he came into India, and renewed his alliance with Sophagenus the Indian king. In this place he obtained more elephants; so that his  
whole

whole number was now a hundred and fifty : and having furnished his army also with a new supply of corn, he again decamped ; but left Androstheneſes behind him, to receive the money which the king had engaged to pay. He then traversed the province of Arachofia ; and, having passed the river Erymanthus, and advanced through Drangiana into Carmania, as the winter now approached, he sent his troops into quarters. Such was the end of the expedition of Antiochus into the upper provinces of Asia : an expedition, which secured to him the obedience not only of those provinces, but of all the maritime cities, and all the princes likewise that were on this side of mount Taurus ; covered his own proper kingdom against invasion, and gave to all mankind the highest opinion both of his courage and his love of labour. For from this time, not the people of Asia only, but those also of Europe, considered him as a prince that was most worthy to reign.

THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the TWELFTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*The mistakes of Timæus in his accounts of Africk, and of Corsica. The manner of conducting herds of swine in Italy and in Greece.*

**A**FRICK is indeed a country of wonderful fertility. How blameable then is Timæus, who not only neglected to acquire a proper knowledge in these matters, but with a childish weakness, destitute of judgement, and trusting to the credit of ancient stories, which have been  
long

long ago exploded, represents this whole part of the world as a dry and barren sand, incapable of producing any fruits. Nor is this country less remarkable with respect to the animals with which it abounds. For not only horses and oxen, but sheep also and goats, are found in it in greater numbers, than any other part of the world perhaps can shew. Upon this account it is, that many of the inhabitants of this vast country, neglecting the cultivation of the lands, live upon the flesh of their cattle, and among their cattle. Every one also knows, that Africk breeds elephants, lions, and leopards, in great numbers, and of a surprising strength; together with buffaloes, which are extremely beautiful, and ostriches of an enormous size; and that none of these animals are found in any part of Europe. But Timæus is silent with respect to all these things; and seems indeed as if he had designed to give such a description of this country as should be most contrary to the truth.

The same want also of exactness and fidelity appears in his account of Corsica. Speaking of this island in his second book, he says; that the goats, the sheep, and the oxen, which are found in great

numbers upon it, are all of them wild, as well as the deer, the hares, the wolves, and other animals; and that the inhabitants hunt them with dogs, and pass their whole lives in that employment. Now it is certain, that there is not any such thing in the island as a wild goat or ox; nor even a hare, a wolf, or a deer, or any other animal that is wild; except only some foxes, some rabbits, and a sort of wild sheep. The rabbit, at a distance, appears to be a hare of a smaller size: but when taken, is found to be very different from the hare, both in figure and taste. This creature lives chiefly under the ground. It is true indeed that the animals in this island all appear to be wild: and the reason is this. As the island is rough and rocky, and covered also with woods, the shepherds are not able to follow their cattle into the places in which they are dispersed: but, when they have found a convenient pasture, and are desirous of bringing them together, they sound a trumpet. Upon this signal, the whole herd immediately run together, and follow the call of their own shepherd, never mistaking one for another. When strangers therefore come upon the island, and attempt to take any  
of

of the goats or oxen which they see feeding by themselves, the cattle, not used to be approached, immediately fly. And if the shepherd, perceiving what has happened, at the same time sounds his trumpet, they all run towards him with the greatest haste. From hence it is that they are supposed to be wild: and Timæus, having made only a slight and cursory inquiry, has fallen into the same mistake.

That the cattle should be thus obedient to the sound of a trumpet, is no very wonderful thing. In Italy, those who have the care of swine never inclose them in separate pastures, nor follow them behind, as the custom is among the Greeks; but go always before them, and from time to time sound a horn. The swine follow, and run together at the sound: and are so taught by habit to distinguish their own proper horn, that their exactness in this respect appears almost incredible to those who never heard of it before. As the consumption of these animals is very great in Italy, the herds that are raised to satisfy the demand are also very numerous; though fewer indeed than they were in ancient Italy, when the country was possessed by the  
Tyrre-

Tyrrhenians and the Gauls. At this time however, a thousand hogs, and sometimes a greater number, are reared from a single sow. In the morning they are turned out of their pens, in different troops, according to their breed and age. But when the herds meet together, it is not possible to keep them thus distinct; or to prevent them from being mingled one with another, either when they leave their pens, or as they feed in the pastures, or when they return back again at night. The horn therefore was invented, as a method of separating them without any difficulty. For as soon as the conductors go to different sides, and sound their horns, the herds separate themselves each from the rest; and run all of them with such alacrity to the sound of their own horn, that no violence is sufficient to stop them in their course. In Greece, on the contrary, when different herds meet together in the forests, he who has the most numerous herd, whenever he finds a proper opportunity, drives away the cattle of his neighbour, which are thus mingled with his own. Or some robber perhaps, who has waited in ambuscade, carries away a whole herd unperceived;

ceived; if the swine, as it often happens, have wandered too far from their conductor, in search of the acorns when they begin to fall. But this is sufficient upon this subject,

## EXTRACT the SECOND.

*The account given by Aristotle of the Locrians of Italy is confirmed by the customs and traditions which are found among that people.*

I HAVE often visited the Locrians, and have even performed for them some considerable service. It was through my request, that they were excused from attending the Roman armies into Spain; and from furnishing the succours which they were bound to send to the Romans by sea, in their war against the Illyrians. Upon these accounts, considering me as a person whose good offices had exempted them from much fatigue, as well as from great danger and expence, they have always treated me with singular respect and honour. I should certainly therefore be inclined, rather to speak favourably of this people, than otherwise. Yet I cannot hesitate to declare, that the account, which Aristotle has delivered to us concerning this colony, is nearer to

the truth, than that which is reported by Timæus. The Locrians themselves have indeed assured me, that their own traditions are more conformable to the account of Aristotle, than to that of Timæus. Of this they mention the following proofs.

The first is, that all nobility of ancestry among them is derived from women, and not from men. That those, for example, alone are noble, who draw their origin from the hundred families. That these families were noble among the Locrians, before they migrated: and were the same indeed, from which a hundred virgins were taken by lot, as the oracle had commanded, and were sent to Troy. That some women of these families came with the colony into Italy: and that those who have descended from them are still reputed noble, and are called the descendants of the hundred families.

Another instance is seen, in the appointment of the virgin called the Phialephorus. The account which the Locrians give of the institution is this. At the time when they drove the Sicilians out of this part of Italy, the latter had a custom of appointing a young man, who was chosen always from the noblest and

the most illustrious of their families, to lead the procession in their sacrifices. The Locrians, not having received any religious ceremonies from their own nation, adopted many of those that were used by the people with whom they were mixed, and among others this that is here mentioned. But they changed it in one circumstance. For, instead of a young man, they appointed a virgin to perform the office; because nobility among them was derived from women.

The same people affirm, that they never had any treaty with the Locrians of Greece, and that there was no account remaining among them of any such treaty: but that they know by constant tradition that they had a treaty with the Sicilians, which was executed in the following manner. When they came first into the country, and found that the Sicilians were struck with terror, and made no attempt to oppose their entrance, they concluded a convention with them in these words. “That they would live together as friends, and possess the country in common, as long as they should tread upon this earth, and carry the heads upon their shoulders.” But the Locrians, at the time of taking this oath, had put some earth within the soles of their

F 2

shoes,

shoes, and some heads of garlick, which appeared not in sight, upon their shoulders. And having afterwards shaken the earth out of their shoes, and thrown away the heads, they seized the first favourable opportunity, and in a short time drove the Sicilians out of the country.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

*An observation concerning truth and falsehood in History.*

**T**IMÆUS says, that, as a rule, which is perhaps defective either in length or breadth, is still a rule, and deserves to be so called, if it be only strait and even; and, if it wants this chief and most essential property, ought to be called any thing rather than a rule; in the same manner those written memoirs which record events, however faulty they may be in stile and disposition, and however defective in some necessary properties, yet, if the facts be true which are related, deserve to be called a History, and, if these be false, are utterly unworthy of that name. For my part, I am ready to acknowledge, that truth should be considered as the principal and most essential part in all such composition. I have even said in a former part of this work, that as an animal, when deprived of sight, becomes incapable of performing its natural and proper functions, so,

if we take away truth from History, what remains will be nothing but an useless tale. But there are two kinds of falsehood: one, which proceeds from ignorance; and the other from design. And as those writers may be excused, who offend against the truth through ignorance; so those on the contrary, who pervert it with design, ought never to be pardoned.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

*The malignity of Timæus censured.*

WHEN men of sense revenge an injury, they examine in the first place, what punishment it becomes them to inflict, and not what their enemies deserve to suffer. In the same manner also, when we throw reproaches upon others, we ought principally to consider, not what is fit for them to hear, but what is proper for us to speak. For if our own passion and resentment be the rule, we shall set no bounds to what we say; but must fall into the most unwarrantable excesses.

Upon this account it is, that I cannot allow any degree of credit to Timæus, in the things which he has reported against Demochares. His calumnies are indeed so gross, that they are neither to be admitted, nor excused. They shew too plainly, that the natural acrimony of his own temper has transported him beyond all the bounds of decency. Nor is the account which he has given of Agatho-

cles, how much soever that prince may have exceeded all other tyrants in impiety, in any degree more justifiable. For in the conclusion of his history he writes; that Agathocles from his earliest youth was a common prostitute, obedient to the call of the most debauched: that he was a jay and a buzzard; ready to act or to suffer, with all that offered, in the most infamous lust: and that, when he died, his wife, as she lamented over him, used these exclamations: “What have not I for you? What have not you for me?” In this instance again, not only the same spirit is discernible, which appeared in his censure of Demochares; but such an excess also of rancour, as is indeed astonishing. For, from the facts which Timæus himself has mentioned, it is evident that Agathocles was endowed by nature with very extraordinary talents. To leave the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and to come to Syracuse at the age of eighteen years; to follow his design with such success, as in a short time to become master of all Sicily; to render himself formidable and dangerous to Carthage; and lastly, to grow old in the sovereignty which he had gained, and to die with the title of king; are not these  
most

most signal proofs, that he was born with wonderful abilities, and possessed all the powers that are requisite for the administration of great affairs? The historian then, instead of confining himself to those actions which might serve to vilify Agathocles, and render him odious in the eyes of posterity, should have insisted likewise upon those parts of his conduct that were worthy of praise. For this is indeed the proper office of history. But Timæus, blinded by his own rancorous spirit, takes a malignant pleasure in recounting with exaggeration the defects of this prince, but passes hastily over all his shining qualities: and seems not to have known, that to suppress facts in history, is no less a kind of falsehood, than to report what never had existence.

## EXTRACT the FIFTH.

*A law of Zaleucus concerning the occupancy of a thing contested. A remarkable institution of the same lawgiver.*

**T**WO young men among the Locrians had a contest together concerning a slave. One of them had for a long time had him in his possession. The other, two days only before the suit, went into the country, took away the boy by force in the absence of his master, and carried him to his own house. The master, as soon as he was informed of what had happened, went to the house, and, getting his slave again into his hands, carried him before the judges, and contended, that, upon his giving sureties, the boy ought to remain with him, till the right should be determined. For the law of Zaleucus, he said, declared; that the thing contested should remain, during the suit, in the possession of him from whom it was taken. The other young man insisted on the other hand, that, by  
this

this very law, the boy ought to be left with him: because he was the person from whom he was taken; and that it was from his house that he was brought before the judges. The judges, conceiving that there was some difficulty in the case, went and referred it to the Cosmopolite: and this magistrate explained the law in the following manner. He said, that by the words, "from whom it was taken," was to be understood the person who had last held an undisturbed possession of the thing in dispute for a certain time: but that, if any one should come and take away a thing by force from another, and carry it to his own house, and the first possessor should come afterwards and take it from him again, the person, from whom it last was taken, was not the person intended by the law. The young man, against whom the judgment was given, was dissatisfied with this interpretation, and denied it to be the sense of the legislator. The Cosmopolite then demanded, whether any one would dispute with him concerning the intention of the law, in the manner which Zeleucus had prescribed. The manner was, that the two disputants should speak, each with a rope round his neck, in the presence

presence of a thousand persons: and that he, who should be judged to have contended for a wrong interpretation, should be strangled in sight of the assembly. The young man replied, that the condition was not equal. For the Cosmopolite, who was almost ninety years old, had only two or three years left to live: but that himself, in all appearance, had still the greatest part of his life before him. This facetious answer turned the whole matter into pleasantry: and the judges gave their sentence according to the opinion of the Cosmopolite.

## EXTRACT the SIXTH.

*The gross absurdities of Callisthenes, in his description of the battle between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.*

**I**N order to shew the truth of what I have affirmed, I shall examine only one single battle: a battle, which is very much celebrated; which happened at no very distant time; and, because this also is a circumstance of the greatest moment, a battle in which Callisthenes himself was present. I mean the battle which was fought between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia.

In the account then which Callisthenes has given of this battle, he relates; that Alexander had already led his army thro' the passes which are called the Pylæ of Cilicia, when Darius, having advanced along the passes of the mountain Amanus, and being informed by the people of the country, that his enemy still continued his march forwards into Syria, resolved to follow him. That when he arrived near the passes of Cilicia, he encamped

camped along the river Pyramus: that the ground which he occupied contained a space of only fourteen stadia from the sea to the foot of the mountain: and that the river, falling down the craggy sides of the mountain, ran obliquely through this ground, and passing over the plain, between some hills that were rough and difficult of approach, discharged itself into the sea. After this description, he says; that, when Alexander returned back again with a design to engage, Darius and his officers drew up the whole phalanx in order of battle upon the very ground upon which they had encamped; and that they were covered in front by the river, which ran close to the camp: that they posted the cavalry near to the sea: next to these, in the same line, the mercenaries, along the bank of the river: and lastly the Peltastæ, adjoining to the foot of the mountain.

But it is not possible to conceive, that these troops could have been thus drawn up in order of battle between the phalanx and the river, if the river ran close to the camp: especially if we consider the numbers of which the several bodies were composed. For the cavalry, as Callisthenes himself affirms, amounted to  
thirty

thirty thousand; and the mercenaries to as great a number. Now it is easy to determine, what extent of ground this number of troops would require. The usual method of drawing up cavalry in the time of action is to range them eight in depth. It is necessary also to leave a certain space between each of the troops in front, that they may be able to perform their several motions. A single stadium then will contain eight hundred horse; ten stadia eight thousand; and four stadia, three thousand and two hundred. According to this computation, a body of eleven thousand and two hundred horse would have filled the whole extent of fourteen stadia. And if the whole thirty thousand were formed in order of battle, there must have been three such bodies, within a very small number at least, drawn up each behind the other. In what place then were the mercenaries ranged? Was it behind the cavalry? But Callisthenes says no such thing. On the contrary he affirms, that the mercenaries were engaged against the Macedonians in the very beginning of the action. It is manifest therefore, that one half of the ground that has been mentioned, the part that was on the side of the sea, was occupied

occupied by the cavalry; and the other half, which was next to the mountain, by the mercenaries. And from hence we may clearly judge, what must have been the depth of the cavalry; and, by consequence, how very distant the river must have been from the camp.

Afterwards he relates, that, when the enemy approached, Darius, who was in the centre of the line, called the mercenaries to him from one of the wings. But how was this possible? The very part in which the mercenaries were joined to the cavalry was itself the centre. If Darius then was among the mercenaries, how, or from whence, or to what place did he call them? He then adds also, that the cavalry upon the right wing advanced, and vigorously charged the Macedonians: that the latter received them with equal courage; and that the fight on both sides was maintained with the greatest bravery. But he forgets that there was a river between this cavalry and the Macedonians; and such a river too, as he had just before described.

Nor is this writer more exact in his account with respect to Alexander. He says, that this prince first carried with him into Asia forty thousand foot, and  
four

four thousand five hundred horse: and that, when he was ready to enter Cilicia, a new supply arrived from Macedon, of five thousand foot, and eight hundred horse. If we take then from these three thousand foot, and three hundred horse; which is the greatest number that can be allowed for occasional and absent services; there will remain forty-two thousand foot, and five thousand horse. With this army Alexander, as the historian writes, being informed, after he had advanced beyond the Pylæ, that Darius had entered Cilicia, and was at the distance of only a hundred stadia behind him, immediately returned, and directed his march back again through the passes: having the infantry in his van; behind these, the cavalry; and the baggage in the rear. As soon as he came into the open plain, he separated the army from the baggage, and formed the troops into a phalanx, by thirty-two in depth. At some distance afterwards, he ranged them by sixteen in depth: and at last, when he was come near to the enemy, by eight.

Now these absurdities are even greater than those that were before remarked. For when a body of troops marches by sixteen in depth, if we allow the usual

intervals of six feet between every rank, a stadium will contain only sixteen hundred men; ten stadia, sixteen thousand; and twenty stadia, thirty-two thousand. If Alexander therefore formed his phalanx by sixteen in depth, he must have filled a space of twenty stadia, and would still have wanted room for all his cavalry, and for ten thousand of his foot. Callisthenes then adds, that when this prince was at the distance of forty stadia from the enemy, he ordered the phalanx to advance in an extended front towards them. A greater absurdity than this is scarcely to be conceived. For where is the ground, especially in Cilicia, that will admit such a phalanx as is here described to advance in an extended front against an enemy: a ground, containing twenty stadia in depth, and forty in length? The impediments also, which would inevitably break the order of such a disposition, are too many to be recounted. Callisthenes himself has mentioned one, which is alone sufficient. For he says, that the torrents, which descended from the hills, had formed so many pits in the plain, that the greatest part of the Persians were lost in those cavities as they fled,

But

But Alexander, perhaps this writer might say, was willing to be ready to receive the enemy, in what part soever they should come to attack him. But nothing is more unfit for this purpose than the phalanx formed in an extended front, if this front be broken and disunited. And would it not also have been much more easy, to have ranged the several parts of this great body in the very order in which they followed each of them the other in the march: instead of forming the whole army in a single line, in which there must have been many vacancies, and leading it in an extended front to action, over a ground that was covered with bushes and broken cavities. He ought rather then to have formed a double, or a quadruple phalanx. One part following behind another. For if the ground would have admitted this order in the march, there would have been time sufficient to draw up the troops in the same order in battle: especially as he might have received notice from his scouts of the approach of the enemy, even while they were at a considerable distance from him.

Another fault in this description is, that the historian, while he represents the phalanx as advancing in an extended

front over a plain, forgets to make the cavalry march before; and places them upon the same line with the infantry. But the greatest of all his mistakes is this which follows. He says that Alexander, when he approached the enemy, drew up the phalanx eight in depth. The whole line therefore must have been equal in length to forty stadia. Or, let it be supposed, that the men stood so close together, as even to be wedged one within another. In that case, they must have covered at the least twenty stadia. And yet Callisthenes had before affirmed, that the whole length of the ground was less than fourteen stadia: that a part of it, which was nearest to the sea, was occupied by one half of the cavalry: that the other half was posted upon the right: and that between the whole line and the mountain there was left also a considerable distance; that the troops might not fall under a body of the enemy, which was posted upon the sides of the mountain. I know indeed, that, in order to oppose this body, he here forms a part of the line in the figure called the Forceps. Let us allow then ten thousand men; which is even a greater number than this purpose would require. In that case it is

evident,

evident, that there would remain, according to Callisthenes, eleven stadia only at the most, for the length of the whole line: and that thirty-two thousand men, contained in a space of this extent, how closely soever they were crowded, must necessarily have been formed by thirty in depth. And yet Callisthenes affirms, that at the time of the action they were ranged by eight. Mistakes like these cannot even be excused. For what credit is to be given to things that are impossible? When a writer lays down the exact measure of the ground, fixes the number of the men, ascertains the distance of one man from another, and gives afterwards an account which is wholly incompatible with all these circumstances; the falsehood is too glaring to be pardoned.

It would be tedious to examine all the errors into which this writer has fallen. One or two more however may just be mentioned. He says that Alexander took care to draw up his army in such a manner, that he might himself be engaged against Darius: and that Darius also had at first the same intention with respect to Alexander; but that he afterwards altered his design. But he neither mentions, how these princes knew, in what part of

their respective armies they severally intended to engage; nor to what other part Darius retired, after he had changed his purpose. How again was it possible for the phalanx to advance, in order of battle, up the bank of a river, which was broken and uneven, and covered also with bushes in almost every part? Such an absurdity can never be ascribed to Alexander; who is acknowledged to have been trained both in the study and the exercise of war from his earliest age. It must therefore be imputed to the historian himself; who, from a want of skill in matters of this kind, was unable to distinguish what was possible to be done from that which was impracticable. But this will be sufficient concerning Ephorus and Callisthenes.

## EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

*Topics for a discourse in praise of peace.*

**I**N the first place, he says, the assembly may be told, that men are wakened in the morning, in the time of war by trumpets, and, in the time of peace, by the crowing of cocks. And again; that Hercules, when he instituted the Olympick Games, as a remission after his toil, sufficiently declared this to be his meaning: that, whenever he had brought mischief upon any by making war, he was forced to it by necessity, and the commands of others; but that willingly he had never done harm to any person. To these arguments may be added the authority of the poet: who introduces Jupiter, expressing his displeasure against the god of war, in the following words:

Of all the gods that in Olympus dwell,  
Thou art to me most hateful: for in strife,  
In war, and battles, ever is thy joy †.

† Iliad. B. V. 890.

In another passage, the wisest of his heroes thus exclaims :

The man who stirs  
The bloody horrors of intestine war,  
No rights of kindred, or of family,  
No laws of justice knows †.

Of the same kind also are the sentiments of Euripides, expressed in the following lines :

Parent of wealth, celestial Peace,  
Thou fairest of the heavenly train, O why,  
Why this delay ? Wilt thou again  
These longing eyes ne'er visit ? How I fear,  
That age, insensible and cold,  
My trembling limbs will seize, e'er I shall  
hail

The moment of thy blest return,  
With the crown'd banquet, and the  
choral song\*.

Again, it may be urged ; that war resembles a disease, and peace a state of health. In one, the sick are recovered : but the other destroys those that are well. That in peace also, the old are buried by

† Iliad. B. I. 63.

\* Chorus from the Cresphontes.

the young, as the course of nature requires: but, in war, the young are buried by the old. And again; that, in the time of war, we are not safe within the walls of our cities; but that, in peace, there is full security, even to the farthest limits of the country. The other motives which he mentions are of a like kind with these.

## EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

*Men conversant in affairs are alone properly qualified for writing History.*

**T**HERE are two organs given to man by nature, through which all information, and all knowledge of things is derived, the hearing and the sight; and of these, the latter is by much the most conformable to truth. For the testimony of the eyes, as Heraclitus observes, is far more exact than that of the ears. But Timæus, in making his enquiries, had recourse to the easiest, though the least preferable, of these two methods; and never employed his eyes, but only his ears. And even still more; as the knowledge which is gained by hearing is also of two sorts; the one derived from reading books, and the other from interrogating other men; Timæus, as we have already shewn, took no pains to obtain the latter. What determined his choice in this respect, is not difficult to be discovered. The knowledge that is acquired by reading is gained without any danger,

ger; or any kind of toil. If a man will only fix his residence in the neighbourhood of a library, or in a city that abounds with written memoirs, he may make his researches with perfect ease; and, reposing himself with full tranquillity, may compare the accounts, and detect the errors of former writers. But the knowledge which is drawn from personal examination and enquiry, is attended with great fatigue and great expence. It is this however, which is the most important; and which gives indeed the chief value to History. Historians themselves are ready to acknowledge this truth. For thus Ephorus says; that if it was possible for the writers of history to be present at all transactions, such knowledge would be preferable to any other. To the same purpose is that passage of Theopompus: that the experience which is gained in battles renders a man a consummate General: that practice in pleading causes forms the perfect orator: and that the same observation is just with respect to the arts of navigation and of medicine. The poet also inculcates the same truth with still greater force. For designing to shew, in the person of Ulysses, what

what kind of qualities would render a man fit for the administration of affairs, he describes him in the following words:

Sing Muse the man, for various arts re-  
 nown'd,  
 Who wander'd long through many diffe-  
 rent climes.

And afterwards :

Oft through the deep with heartfelt an-  
 guish born,  
 To distant nations he his course essay'd,  
 Their cities visited, their manners knew.

And in another place he says; that he  
 had experienced

The rage of battles, and the boisterous  
 wave †.

Now such a man also is it, in my judge-  
 ment, that would alone be able to give a  
 proper figure to history. It was said by  
 Plato, that human affairs would then be  
 well administered, when philosophers  
 should be kings, or kings philosophers.

† Odyss. B. I. 1. and Iliad. B. XXIV. 8.

In the same manner I would say; that History would be well composed, if those who are engaged in great affairs would undertake to write it; not in a slight and negligent manner, like some of the present age; but regarding such a work as one of the noblest and most necessary of their duties, and pursuing it with unremitting application, as the chief business of their lives: or if those, on the other hand, who attempt to write, would think it necessary to be also conversant in the practice of affairs. Till this shall happen, there will be no end of mistakes in history. Now Timæus never used the least endeavours to acquire such practice: but confining his residence to a single place, in which also he was a stranger, he even industriously renounced an active life; was acquainted neither with politics, nor war; nor ever exposed himself to the fatigue of visiting distant countries, and of making personal inquiries. And yet this man has gained the reputation of being an excellent historian. I know not, for my own part, upon what such pretensions can be grounded: especially as he has himself acknowledged, that a good historian should possess the quali-

qualifications which have been here enumerated. For, in the Preface to his sixth book, he takes notice of an opinion which some persons had advanced; that the demonstrative kind of writing required greater genius, greater labour, and a greater stock of knowledge, than History. This notion, as he says, had before given offence to Ephorus: and, because that writer had not been able sufficiently to refute it, he endeavours to state, and to compare together, these two kinds of composition. \* \* \* \*

THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the THIRTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*Avarice compared to a dropsy. Deceit and artifice are too generally practised in publick affairs. The different conduct of the Achæans: and in some degree also of the Romans.*

**A**S in the case of those who are diseased with a dropsy, no application of liquors from without is sufficient to remove or allay the thirst, unless the internal disposition of the body be first changed by proper remedies; in the same manner also the desire of gain is never to

be satisfied, unless reason be employed to correct the vicious inclination in the mind.

There are many who employ that dark and treacherous policy which has now been mentioned: and yet no one will deny, that such a conduct is utterly unworthy of a king. But because arts like these are now common in the world, some men are willing to suppose, that the practice of them is become altogether necessary in the administration of public affairs. The Achæans however at all times were distinguished by different sentiments. So far were they from forming any secret designs against their friends, in order to enlarge their power; that they disdained even to subdue their enemies with the assistance of deceit. In their opinion, victory was neither honourable nor secure, unless it was obtained in open contest, and by the force of superior courage. Upon this account, they established it as a kind of law among them, never to use any concealed weapons, nor to throw darts at a distance: being persuaded, that an open and close engagement was the only fair method of combat. From the same reason it was, that they not only made a public declaration of war, but  
sent

sent notice also, each to the other, of their resolution to try the fortune of a battle, and of the place likewise in which they had determined to engage. In the present times, a General is supposed to be ignorant in his profession, if he discovers his intentions. Among the Romans alone, some slight traces of the ancient virtue still remain. For they make before hand a denunciation of war: they seldom form ambuscades: and they fight always man to man in close engagement. But in general artifice so much prevails, that it is now become the chief study of men to deceive each other, both in the administration of civil affairs, and in the conduct of war. And this it was which gave occasion to these reflections.

## EXTRACT the SECOND.

*The designs of Philip against the Rhodians.  
The character of Heraclides.*

PHILIP, being willing to give a proper subject to Heraclides for the exercise of his abilities, commanded him to contrive some method for disabling or destroying the Rhodian fleet; and at the same time sent some ambassadours to Crete, to excite the people of that island against the Rhodians, and prevail with them to join him in the war. Heraclides, whose nature was well adapted to any ill design, received this commission with joy: and, after some time employed in regulating his plan, sailed away to Rhodes. This Heraclides was originally from Tarentum; and was born of vulgar parents, who exercised some mechanical trade. He possessed all the qualities that are requisite to form a daring and licentious profligate. From his earliest age he abandoned himself to the most scandalous prostitution. He had a ready concep-  
tion,

tion, and a strong memory: was bold and terrible to his inferiors, but a base flatterer of those who were above him. He had first been forced to leave Tarentum, on account of a suspicion that was entertained against him, as if he had designed to betray the place to the Romans. Not that he at that time possessed any authority in the city: but being an architect, under the pretence of making some repairs in the walls, he had gotten into his hands the keys of the gate which led into the country. He then took refuge among the Romans; and, while he remained in their camp, entered again into a correspondence with Annibal, and sent letters to Tarentum. But being discovered, and dreading the consequences of his treason, he fled into Macedon; and, having insinuated himself into the confidence of Philip, gained afterwards so great a power over him, that he was almost the principal cause of the ruin of that mighty kingdom.

## EXTRACT the THIRD.

*The force of Truth.*

**F**OR my part I am persuaded, that there is not in nature a greater goddess, or any that has a stronger power over men, than Truth. For, though all unite in opposition to her, and though falsehood draws up a whole train of probabilities, and sets them in array against her, she triumphs, I know not how, single and unsupported, and forces her way into the heart. Sometimes her power is instantly discerned. Sometimes she is obscured for a while; but appears at last in perfect splendour, and surmounts by her own force alone the falsehood under which she has been oppressed.

## EXTRACT the FOURTH.

*The cruelty of Nabis the tyrant of Sparta.*

THE Lacedæmonian tyrant Nabis, though he had now for three years held the government, was deterred by the ill fortune of Machanides, who had so lately been defeated by the Achæans, from attempting any thing of importance; but employed himself in forming the design, and laying the foundations of a severe and lasting tyranny. With this view he seemed determined to destroy all that were now left in Sparta: driving into banishment the citizens that were most distinguished by their wealth or families; and distributing their possessions and their wives among the chief of those that were attached to his party, and among the mercenaries that were retained in his service. These were all of them assassins, house-breakers, nightly thieves, and robbers. For he spared no pains to collect together persons of this sort from every quarter: men whose crimes had forced them to

abandon their own countries. Of all these he was the declared protector and the sovereign: and, as he had formed them also into a guard for his person, it was manifest that he had determined to maintain his power by wickedness and violence. And indeed, not satisfied with driving the citizens into banishment, he resolved that they should find no safety even in the places to which they fled, nor any retreat secure. For some were destroyed upon the road by messengers whom he sent to overtake them; and others brought back again and killed. In the cities also in which they had fixed their abode, having hired by the means of unsuspected persons the houses that were adjoining to those in which any of the exiles lived, he sent thither some Cretans, who made holes in the walls, and, shooting arrows through the openings, killed some as they were standing, and others as they reposed themselves in their own houses. Thus the unhappy Lacedæmonians were in no time or place secure: and in this manner great numbers of them were destroyed.

He contrived also a machine, if it may be called indeed by such a name; an image of a woman, magnificently dressed,  
and

and formed in a most exact resemblance of his wife. And when his intention was to draw money from any of the citizens, he invited them to his house, and at first with much civility represented to them the danger with which their country was threatened from the Achæans; the number of mercenaries which he was forced to retain in pay for the sake of the common safety; and the great cost of maintaining the worship of the gods, as well as the other articles of public expence. If these arguments prevailed, it was sufficient for his purpose. But if all his solicitations were without effect, he then used to say: I want, it seems, the power of persuasion; but Apega, I believe, will be able to persuade you. Apega was the name of his wife. Upon these words, the image of the woman that has been mentioned immediately appeared. Nabis then, taking her by the hand, raised her from her seat: and folding afterwards his arms round the person whom he had been soliciting, brought him near by degrees to the body of the image, whose breasts, hands, and arms were stuck full with points of iron, concealed under the clothes; and then, pressing the back of the pretended woman

with his hands, by the means of some secret springs he fixed the man close to her breast, and soon forced him to promise all that he desired. But there were some also who perished in this torture, when they refused to comply with his demands.

T H E

THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the FOURTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*The conduct and exploits of Publius Scipio in Africk. He sets fire to the camps of Asdrubal and Syphax. The Carthaginians draw together a new army: and are defeated in a set engagement. They resolve to recall Annibal from Italy, and to continue the war.*

C H A P. I.

WHILE the consuls were employed in these affairs, Publius Scipio, who remained still in Africk, having received information during the winter that the  
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Carthaginians were getting ready a fleet, resolved to put his own fleet also in order, but not to relinquish his design of laying siege to Utica. He still encouraged also in himself the hope which he had conceived, that he should be able to bring back Syphax again to the Roman party. With this view, taking advantage of the neighbourhood of the two armies, he urged him by continual deputations; and was persuaded, that he should at last be able to draw him away from his alliance with the Carthaginians. For when he considered on the one hand, that it was the nature of the Numidians to pass soon from enjoyment to disgust; and, on the other, that they were no less ready to break through their engagements to the gods and men; he had scarcely any doubt, but that this prince was already fatiated, not only with his wife, for whose sake he had joined the Carthaginians, but in general also with his new allies. But while his mind was thus filled with different cares, and agitated by no less various hopes, unable as he was to contend openly in the field against the enemy whose numbers were far superior to his own, he took the occasion that was offered, to carry into execution an at-

tempt of a different kind, in the manner which we are now going to relate.

Some of the messengers, whom he had sent to Syphax, informed him at their return; that the tents in which the Carthaginians were lodged during the winter were framed of wood of every kind, and of the branches of trees, without any mixture of earth: that those of the Numidians, who were from the beginning in the army, were composed wholly of reeds: that the rest of the Numidians, who had been drawn lately from the cities, had framed their tents only with branches; and that, though some of them were lodged within the intrenchment, the greatest part remained without. Having considered therefore with himself, that, if he could set fire to the camps, it would be an action not less surprizing to the enemy than serviceable to his own designs, he began to take the measures that were necessary for that purpose. In the course of all the deputations, it had still been urged by Syphax, that the Carthaginians should retire from Italy, and the Romans also from Africk: and that both of them should retain possession of all that they then held between those two countries. To this time, Publius had

had utterly rejected these conditions. But his messengers were now instructed to suggest some little hope to Syphax, that it was not impossible but that his offer might be accepted. The Numidian, softened by this expectation, was more earnest to continue the intercourse that was begun; and suffered the messengers to go and to return, more frequently, and in greater numbers than before. Sometimes they even remained whole days, without being observed, in either camp. Upon these occasions, Publius always sent among his messengers some persons of experienced prudence, and some officers concealed under a vulgar dress, or disguised in the habit of slaves; that they might carefully observe the approaches and the entrances of both the camps. For there were two different camps: one occupied by Asdrubal, with thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse; and another, at the distance of ten stadia from the former, possessed by the Numidians, whose numbers amounted to ten thousand horse, and at this time to about fifty thousand foot. The latter, as it was easiest of approach, was the best suited also to the purpose of being set on fire; because the Numidians, as I have already said,

said, had framed their tents, not of wood nor of earth, but only of straw and reeds.

When the spring then was come, Scipio, having obtained all the information that was requisite for carrying into execution this design against the enemy, set all his ships a-float, and stored them with military machines, as if his purpose had been to attack Utica on the side of the sea. At the same time he sent away a body of two thousand foot, who took possession again of the hill which commanded the city; and began to fortify it, and to throw up an intrenchment round it with the greatest diligence. By this measure likewise he induced the enemy to believe, that he had nothing in view but the siege. But his true intention was, to leave these men as a body of reserve; that they might be ready, when the time of the expedition should come, to intercept the garrison of Utica, if they should sally out after the departure of the army, and attack the camp that was near, or attempt to invest the troops that would be left to guard it. While he was employed in these preparations, he sent also again to Syphax, desiring to be informed, whether he was satisfied with the terms that had been proposed; whether the

Carthaginians also were ready to receive them; or whether these last would not again pretend, that they wanted a longer time to deliberate upon them. He ordered the messengers also not to return, till they had received an answer to each of these demands. The Numidian had now no doubt, but that Scipio was sincere in his desire of peace: both because he had ordered the messengers not to return without an answer, and had seemed likewise more particularly careful to be assured of the consent of the Carthaginians. He sent therefore immediately to Asdrubal, informing him of all that had been done, and urging him to accept the peace that was offered: and himself in the mean while passed his time without any care or caution, and suffered the Numidians, who came from time to time to the army, to remain without the intrenchment. Publius on his part also affected the same shew of negligence; but in reality was still most intent upon the execution of his design.

As soon as Syphax had received notice from the Carthaginians that he might finish the treaty, he with great joy communicated the answer to the Roman deputies, who then returned back to their  
own

own camp, to inform their General what the king had done. But Scipio immediately sent them back again to acquaint him, that for his own part he was still firm and earnest in his desire of peace: but that his council were of a different opinion, and had resolved that the war should be continued. His design in sending this message was, that he might not be charged with any breach of faith, if he should commence hostilities while the conferences still subsisted for a treaty. This declaration being made, he thought that whatever he should attempt would be free from all reproach and blame.

As Syphax had already conceived the strongest hopes of peace, he was much grieved at this unexpected change, and went himself to Asdrubal to acquaint him with the resolution of the Romans. The two Generals, being thus filled with new disquietude, deliberated long together, concerning the measures that were now proper to be pursued. But both their apprehensions and their designs were very far distant from the truth. For they conceived not a thought of any danger threatening them, or of taking any precaution for their own security: but were intent only on the means of attempting something

thing against the enemy; and earnest to contrive some method of drawing them to a battle in the open country.

Before this time Scipio, both by his preparations, and by the orders which he gave, had induced the whole army to believe, that his intention was to take Utica by surprize. But now having assembled together the ablest of the Tribunes, and those that were most worthy of his confidence, he disclosed to them his design; commanded them to take their supper at the usual hour; and that, as soon as the trumpets should have all sounded, according to the custom, they should draw the legions out of the camp. For the Roman custom is, to sound all the trumpets of the army, immediately after supper, near the tent of the General; as the signal for placing in their respective posts the guards of the night. He then ordered the persons also to be called, who had been employed as spies to inspect the camps of the enemy; compared together and closely examined their accounts of the ways and entrances; and took the opinion of Massanissa concerning all that they reported, because he especially was well acquainted with the country. And when all his measures were

were adjusted, having left a sufficient body of troops to guard the camp, he began his march towards the enemy, who were at the distance of about sixty stadia from him, at the end of the first watch; and, arriving near them about the end of the third, he allotted one half of the Romans, and all the Numidians, to Lælius and Massaniffa, and ordered them to attack the camp of Syphax. He exhorted them to behave themselves like men of courage; to do nothing without due consideration; and to remember, that, in nightly expeditions, as much as the darkness was an impediment to action, so much should this disadvantage be compensated by valour and by prudence. Taking then the rest of the army, he advanced, but with a slow pace, towards the camp of Asdrubal. For his intention was, not to attempt any thing on his part, till Lælius should have first set fire to the Numidian camp.

This General then and Massaniffa, having divided their forces into two bodies, approached the camp of the enemy, and began the work. As the camp seemed framed, as I have said, for the very purpose of being set on fire, no sooner was the flame thrown by the foremost troops,

and had seized the first tents, than in a moment, because the tents were crowded close together, and the quantity of the matter also which fed the conflagration was extremely great, the evil was such as could admit no remedy. Lælius, keeping his troops together, remained in his post, and stood as a reserve: while Masaniſſa distributed his men among all the passages, through which he knew that the enemy would endeavour to save themselves from the flames. Not any of the Numidians, nor even Syphax himself, had the least suspicion of the truth: but supposed that the fire had happened by some accident. With this persuasion, either wakened from their sleep, or starting, full of liquor, from their nightly revels, they leaped hastily from their tents. Many of them were trampled down in the crowds that filled the passages of the camp. Many were intercepted as they fled, and perished in the fire. And the rest, who escaped the flames, fell all under the sword of the enemy; and were destroyed before they knew, either what they were doing, or what they suffered.

The Carthaginians, when they beheld from their camp the greatness of the fire, and the height to which the flames were raised,

raised, supposed also that the misfortune had happened by accident. While some of them therefore went in haste to carry assistance, the rest, running all out of their tents, stood without arms before the intrenchment, and viewed with astonishment the dreadful spectacle. Scipio, perceiving that all things had happened as he desired, fell upon those that were come out; killed one part, and, pursuing the rest, at the same time threw fire also upon their tents. In an instant, the same scene of conflagration and of slaughter appeared in the Carthaginian camp, as in that of the Numidians. Asdrubal used no endeavours to extinguish the flames. He now clearly perceived that the fire in the Numidian camp had not happened by accident, but from the bold attempt of the Romans. He began therefore only to consider, by what means he might escape with safety; though indeed he had but little hopes of being able to accomplish even that design. For the fire had spread itself with great rapidity, and incircled every part. All the passages also of the camp were filled with horses, with beasts of burthen, and with men: some of them half dead, and destroyed by the flames; and some driven from

their senses by astonishment and horror. Such disorder and confusion, which was sufficient to appall even the stoutest courage, seemed likewise to preclude every hope of safety. Syphax also and his officers were in the same condition. The two Generals however at last found means to escape, with a small body of horse. But the other thousands and ten thousands, of men, of horses, and of beasts of burthen, most miserably perished in the flames: or those among the men, who escaped the violence of the fire, were encountered by a foul and a dishonourable death. For they not only were without their arms; but some, even without their clothes, were cut down by the enemy naked as they fled. In a word, every place was filled with lamentable shrieks; with disordered cries; with frantick consternation; with confused and undistinguishable noise. With all these there was a devouring fire, and flames hurred to a tremendous height. Any one of these things alone would be sufficient to strike terror into the human heart: how much more all of them together? It is not possible indeed to shew any thing like the disaster; or to form any image of the greatness of it by any comparison. So  
 much

much do the most dreadful accidents that have hitherto been known fall below the horrors of this most astonishing scene. And in truth, though Scipio was distinguished by a course of many glorious actions, there is none, in my judgment, among all that he performed, so glorious, or so adventurous, as this exploit.

When the morning appeared, and the enemies were all either killed or dispersed in flight, he exhorted the Tribunes, and pursued without delay after those that had fled. Asdrubal, though he received notice of his approach, remained for some time in the city to which he had retired, trusting to the strength of the place. But when he perceived that the inhabitants were preparing to rise against him, not daring to wait the arrival of the Romans, he again continued his flight with the rest that had escaped. The number of these was five hundred horse, and about two thousand foot. The inhabitants were then quiet, and surrendered themselves to the Romans at discretion. Scipio spared the place; but gave two cities that were near to be plundered by the army, and then returned back again to his own camp.

## C H A P. II.

**T**HE Carthaginians were heavily affected by this great loss. The designs which they had formed were now entirely frustrated; and all their prospects fatally reversed. For they had flattered themselves with the hopes, that they should be able to invest the Romans, both by land and sea, upon the hill adjoining to Utica, which was the seat of their winter quarters; and had directed all their preparations to that purpose. But now they are not only forced, by a most strange and unexpected accident, to leave the enemy in possession of all the open country; but have reason also to fear, that their whole state would soon be exposed to the most imminent danger. Their consternation therefore and their apprehensions were extreme. As the condition however of affairs required that something should be determined with respect to future measures, the senate met together, but in great perplexity, and was distracted by confused and different sentiments. For some were of opinion,

pinion, that Annibal should be called home from Italy; as if the only hope that now remained was in that General, and in his army. Some again advised, that deputies should be sent to Publius to obtain a truce, and to enter into conferences for a treaty. But others exhorted the assembly to resume their courage; to raise new forces; and to send some messengers to Syphax, who had retired to Abba, a city at no great distance, and was employed in collecting together all those that had escaped from the late misfortune. And this was the opinion which at last prevailed. They ordered Asdrubal therefore to make new levies; and sent to Syphax, intreating him to assist them, and to remain firm to his first engagements; at the same time assuring him, that their General very soon would join him with another army.

Scipio was at this time intent on his first design of forming the siege of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax remained in his post, and that the Carthaginians were raising a new army, he collected together all his forces, and encamped before that city. At the same time having made also a distribution of the spoil, he sent merchants to purchase it; which

was done with very great advantage. For the soldiers, considering the late success as a certain assurance of the intire conquest of all the country, were ready to sell their shares of the booty at the smallest rates.

Syphax and his friends had at first resolved to continue their retreat, and to return back to their own country. But a body of four thousand Celtiberians, whom the Carthaginians had just now taken into their pay, having met this prince in the neighbourhood of Abba, he was so much encouraged by this additional strength, that he remained where he then was, and began to assume new confidence. And when his young wife also, the daughter, as we have said, of Asdrubal, joined all her power of intreaty, to prevail with him not to desert the Carthaginians in the present exigency, he at last suffered himself to be persuaded, and complied with all that she desired. The Carthaginians themselves had conceived likewise no small hopes from the arrival of these succours. Instead of four thousand, it was pretended that ten thousand Celtiberians were arrived: and that their courage, and the manner in which they were armed would render them invincible.

ble. This report, as it filled every mouth, and was spread universally among the people, inspired the troops especially with so great confidence, that they were impatient once more to take the field. At the end therefore of thirty days, they came and joined the Numidians and the Celtiberians, and incamped in the place that was called the Great Plains; forming all together an army of thirty thousand men.

As soon as it was known in the Roman camp, that the enemy had again taken the field, Publius resolved to advance towards them. Having given the necessary orders therefore to the fleet, and to the troops that were employed in the siege of Utica, he began his march with the rest of the army, disincumbered of all their baggage; and, arriving on the fifth day in the neighbourhood of the Great Plains, fixed his camp upon a hill, at the distance of thirty stadia from the enemy. On the next day, he descended into the plain, and formed his troops in order, placing his cavalry at the distance of seven stadia before the rest. In this situation both the armies remained during the two following days, and only made trial of their strength in little skirmishes. But on the

fourth

fourth day the Generals, agreeably to their design, drew out their forces on both sides, and ranged them in order of battle. The disposition that was made by Publius was simply the common disposition of the Romans. The Hastati were first placed in front; behind these the Principes; and lastly, the Triarii in the rear. Upon the right wing stood the Roman cavalry: the Numidians and Massanissa upon the left. On the side of Asdrubal and Syphax, the Celtiberians were drawn up in the centre, opposite to the Roman cohorts; the Numidians upon the left wing; and the Carthaginians upon the right. But the Numidians, even in the first onset, fled from the charge of the Roman cavalry; and the Carthaginians from that of Massanissa. So much was their courage broken by the late defeats. The Celtiberians alone stood firm, and maintained the fight with vigour: having but little reason to hope, either that they could escape by flight, as they were wholly unacquainted with the country; or that their lives would be spared, if they should fall into the power of the Romans. For as Scipio had committed no hostility against them in the course of the war in Spain, they seemed clearly

clearly to have violated the laws of good faith and justice, by taking arms in favour of the Carthaginians. When the wings however were broken, these troops were soon surrounded by the Principes and the Triarii, and were almost all of them destroyed in the place, after they had performed the greatest service for the Carthaginians, not only in the battle, but in securing also their retreat. For if the Romans had not been retarded by this obstacle, but had immediately pursued those that fled, scarcely any part of the army would have been able to escape. But while they were stopped by the brave resistance of these troops, Syphax, with his cavalry, found means to retreat to his own kingdom; and Asdrubal, with the rest that were saved, to Carthage.

The Roman General, as soon as he had given the necessary orders concerning the prisoners and the spoil, called together his Council, to deliberate on the measures that were next to be pursued. In this assembly it was determined, that Publius, with one part of the army, should go round to the several cities; and that Lælius and Massanissa, with the Numidians, and a part also of the Roman legions, should follow Syphax, and not  
allow

allow him time to stand, or to make any new preparations. These resolutions were immediately carried into execution. Among the cities, some were struck with terror, and surrendered themselves voluntarily to the Romans: and others, being invested by them upon their first approach, were immediately taken by storm. Through all the country indeed, so grievous were the distresses which the long continuance of the war had brought upon the people, and so heavy the tributes that were imposed, that all things were ready for a change.

In the city of Carthage, the minds of men, which had before been much disordered, were now filled with new and greater consternation. Their whole hopes indeed seemed at once to sink under this second blow, and to give place to voluntary despair. There were some however, among the firmest of the senators, who advised; that they should send a fleet to Utica, and endeavour to raise the siege of that city, by attacking the Roman fleet, which was wholly unprepared for an engagement; and that Annibal also should be recalled from Italy, and a trial be made of that resource without any farther delay. They insisted, that both these  
measures,

measures, as far as it could reasonably be judged, would be productive of very salutary consequences. But it was urged by others, that the times would not now bear any such remedy. That their present business was to fortify the city, and to put it into a condition to sustain a siege. That if the citizens would only agree in sentiments, chance itself would afford many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. At the same time they advised, that a consultation likewise should be held concerning peace; and that they should seriously consider, by what kind of treaty, and upon what conditions, they might be delivered from the present evils. After long and vehement debates, all these opinions were adopted by the senate. As soon therefore as the assembly was dissolved, the messengers that were to be dispatched to Annibal set sail for Italy: the commander of the naval forces went on board of the fleet: and the rest employed themselves in putting the city into a state proper for defence: and in holding constant deliberations together, concerning each particular measure that was fit to be pursued.

The Roman army, having marched through all the country, and not met  
with

with any resistance, was loaded with an immense booty. Publius therefore resolved to send away the greatest part of the spoil to be stored in his first camp; and, when he had thus lightened the army, to march and invest Tunis, and to encamp in the very sight of the Carthaginians; being persuaded, that by this boldness he should strike them most effectually with terror and dismay.

The Carthaginians, having completed in few days their naval forces, together with the necessary stores, were just now ready to sail out to sea, and to carry into execution the design that has been mentioned. On the arrival of Publius at Tunis, the garrison fled from the place, and relinquished it to the Romans. Tunis is situated at the distance of a hundred and twenty stadia from Carthage; and may be seen from almost every part of the city. It has already been mentioned, that both art and nature had concurred in making it a place of very uncommon strength. But scarcely had the Romans finished their encampment, when they discovered the Carthaginian fleet directing their course towards Utica. Publius therefore, being apprehensive that the consequences would be fatal to his own  
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fleet,

fleet, which neither expected such an attempt, nor was prepared against it, immediately decamped, and marched also towards Utica with the greatest haste. On his arrival, perceiving that his decked ships were well fitted indeed for the purpose of raising machines, and carrying them near the walls, and, in a word, for every other use that is requisite in a siege, but were in no respect prepared for an engagement upon the sea; considering also on the other hand, that the Carthaginians had employed the whole time of winter in preparing their fleet for this very design; he resolved not to engage in a naval action: but, having drawn up the decked ships close to the shore, he covered them with a line of the transport vessels, which were ranged by two and by three in depth. \* \* \* \*



THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the FIFTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*Scipio sends ambassadours to Carthage, to demand a restitution of some vessels which had been taken by the Carthaginians during the truce. The perfidious attempt of the Carthaginians against the Ambassadours. The war is renewed on both sides. The preparations of Annibal and Scipio. The interview between these two Generals. The battle of Zama.*

C H A P. I.

**P**UBLIUS was in no small degree disturbed by this perfidious action. Not only his own provisions were lost, but

the enemy also were at the same time furnished with a very plentiful supply. But the chief cause of his concern was, that the Carthaginians, in making this attempt, had been guilty of an open violation of the late solemn treaty. And that the war again was kindled. He sent therefore Lucius Servilius, Lucius Bæbius, and Lucius Fabius, ambassadours to Carthage, to complain of this transaction; and at the same time to acquaint the Carthaginians, that he had received letters from Rome, with an account that the treaty had been ratified by the Roman people. When the ambassadours arrived, and were introduced first into the senate, and afterwards into an assembly of the people, they discoursed on the whole state of affairs with very great boldness. They began with telling the Carthaginians; "that when the ambassadours who had been deputed by them to the Roman camp arrived at Tunis, and were admitted to appear before the council, they not only made libations to the Gods, and adored the earth, as the custom is among other men; but prostrated themselves also in an abject manner upon the ground, and kissed the feet of all the assembly. That afterwards, when they arose again, they  
made

made a voluntary confession of their guilt; and acknowledged, that they from the first had violated the treaties which subsisted between the Carthaginians and the Romans. That they were sensible therefore, that the latter might most reasonably inflict upon them every evil. That they implored them however, in the name of the common fortune of mankind, not to punish them with too great severity; but rather to suffer their inconsiderate folly to become a lasting monument of the Roman generosity and virtue." The ambassadors then added: "That Scipio and all the members of the council, who remembered this transaction, were now struck with surprize, and not able to conceive what confidence it was, that had induced the Carthaginians to forget all which they had at that time spoken, and to violate again their treaties and their oaths. That it seemed indeed most probable, that the return of Annibal, and of the army that was with him, had encouraged them in this bold design. That nothing however could be more absurd and senseless. For do not all men know,

bourhood of Lacinium, has been confined, and as it were besieged in that narrow space; and has now brought away his forces with the greatest difficulty. But if he had even returned with conquest, and was ready to engage us; victorious as we have been against you in two successive battles; you ought surely to entertain very doubtful expectations of success; and, while you flatter yourselves with the prospect of a victory, to take also into your consideration the possible chance of another defeat. And if the latter should be the event, what Gods will you then invoke; or what arguments will you employ in your distress, to draw the compassion of the conquerours towards you; when your perfidiousness and your rash attempt shall have rendered you alike unworthy of the protection of the Gods and of men?"

The ambassadours after this discourse retired. There were but few among the Carthaginians, who advised any adherence to the treaty: The greatest part, not only of those who directed the administration of the government, but of the rest also of the members of the council, beside that they were dissatisfied with the conditions which the Romans had imposed,

posed, were incensed also by the boldness of the ambassadors. Add to this, that they were unwilling to lose the vessels that had been taken, and the supplies with which they were stored. But the chief and most prevailing reason was, that they had conceived the greatest hopes, that with the assistance of Annibal they should now draw the victory to their side. The resolution therefore of the assembly was, that the ambassadors should be sent back without any answer. But the chief persons also in the government, having determined to leave no means untried that might serve to rekindle the war, concerted between themselves the following project. Pretending that some care at least should be taken, that the ambassadors might return back to their own camp with safety, they prepared two triremes to attend them. At the same time, they sent orders to Asdrubal, who commanded their fleet, that he should hold some vessels in readiness not far from the Roman camp: and, as soon as these triremes should have left the Romans, that he should bear down upon the vessel in which the ambassadors sailed, and sink it. For the Carthaginian fleet was at this time stationed along those parts of

the coast that were near to Utica. They then suffered the ambassadours to depart; having first ordered those that attended them in the triremes, that, as soon as they should have passed beyond the mouth of the river Macar, which was the place from whence the camp of the enemy might be discerned, they should there leave the Romans, and return. Agreeably to these instructions, the commanders of the triremes, when they arrived at the appointed place, saluted the Romans, and directed their course back again to Carthage. The ambassadours had no suspicion of any ill intention; and only were dissatisfied, because it seemed that the Carthaginians shewed some contempt towards them in leaving them so soon. But as they held on their course alone, they were suddenly attacked by three triremes, which had been prepared for the design. As these vessels however could not pierce with their beaks the Roman quinquereme, because the latter easily withdrew itself from the stroke; so neither were the men able to throw themselves on board, because the Romans resisted all their efforts with the greatest bravery. The Carthaginians therefore, shifting their ships from side to side, and  
con-

continuing the fight from every quarter, killed and wounded a great number of the Romans: till the latter, perceiving that some soldiers from their own camp, who had been foraging near to the coast, were drawn together upon the shore, and ready to assist them, drove their vessel close in to the land. The greatest part of the men that were on board had been killed in the action; but the ambassadours were most strangely and unexpectedly preserved. Thus was the war resumed with greater violence than before, and with a more implacable rage. For the Romans, incensed by this perfidious action, were now most earnest in their desire to bring the Carthaginians into an intire subjection. The Carthaginians on the other hand, being conscious of their guilt, resolved to attempt and suffer every thing, rather than fall into the power of the Romans. When such was the disposition on both sides, it was manifest, that the contest could only be decided by a battle. The minds of all men therefore, not in Italy alone and Africk, but in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia, were held in suspense, and distracted by an anxious expectation of the event.

As Annibal was at this time in great want of cavalry, he sent to a certain Numidian named Tychæus, whose territory was contiguous to that of Syphax, inviting him to seize the very moment of his safety, and to join him with his forces. For he could not but know, that if the Carthaginians should be superior in the war, he might still be able to hold possession of his kingdom: but, if the Romans on the other hand should remain the conquerours, the ambition of Massanissa would soon deprive him not only of his dominions but of his life. Tychæus was prevailed on by these reasons, and came and joined him, as he desired, with a body of two thousand horse.

Publius, having regulated all things that were necessary for the security of the fleet, left the command to Bæbius, and himself led the army round the country to reduce the cities: not suffering any to surrender upon terms of voluntary submission as before; but taking all of them by storm, and sending the inhabitants into slavery; that he might shew more strongly the resentment which he had conceived against the enemy on account of their late perfidy. He sent also continual messengers to Massanissa; to inform

form him of the manner in which the Carthaginians had broken the treaty; and urging him to draw together as large a body of forces as he was able to raise, and to join him with the greatest haste. For Massanissa, as we have already mentioned, as soon as the treaty was concluded, taking with him his own troops, together with ten companies of Roman infantry and cavalry, and some Roman deputies which he had obtained from Scipio, had gone from the camp, in order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but with the assistance of the Romans to add that of Syphax also to his own dominions. And this design he had now completely executed.

## C H A P. II.

**A**BOUT this time it happened, that the ambassadours, returning back from Rome, arrived at Utica, where the fleet of the Romans lay. Bæbius sent away immediately the Roman ambassadours to Publius: but detained those of Carthage; whose minds, dejected as they were upon other accounts, were now filled

filled with apprehensions of the greatest danger. For having heard of the late wicked attempt of the Carthaginians against the Roman ambassadours, they expected to suffer all the vengeance that was due to so base an action. When Publius was informed, that both the senate and people had readily confirmed the treaty, and were disposed also to concur with him in every measure, he was filled with no small joy. He then ordered Bæbius to dismiss the Carthaginian ambassadours with all civility. This resolution was, in my judgement, very wise and commendable. For as he knew that his country had always paid the most secret regard to the rights of ambassadours, he considered only what was fit for the Romans to do upon such an occasion, and not what the Carthaginians deserved to suffer. Suppressing therefore his own anger, and the resentment that was due to the late transaction, he endeavoured to maintain, as the Poet expresses it, “the glorious deeds of his progenitors:” and by this conduct he broke the spirit of all that were in Carthage, and even of Anibal himself; when they saw their own baseness opposed and conquered by such generous virtue.

The

The Carthaginians, impatient to behold their cities wasted and destroyed, sent some messengers to Annibal, intreating him not to admit any longer delay, but to advance towards the enemy, and to bring things to a decision by a battle. This General answered, that they should attend to their own business: that it belonged to him alone to chuse the time for repose, and the time for action. But, after some days, he began his march from Adrumetum, and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Zama; a city, which stood at the distance of about five days journey from Carthage towards the west. From this place he sent three spies, to examine into the situation and condition of the Roman camp. These men were discovered by the enemy, and were carried to the General. But so far was Publius from punishing them, as the custom is upon such occasions, that he ordered a Tribune to attend them, and to shew them distinctly every part of the camp. When this was done, he asked the men, whether the Tribune had faithfully executed his order. And when they answered, that he had; having furnished them with provisions, and some troops also to conduct them, he ordered them to

go back, and report to Annibal the exact account of all that had happened to them. The Carthaginian General, struck with the magnanimity and boldness of the action, conceived, I know not how, a desire to enter into a conference with Scipio; and sent a herald to acquaint him, that he should be glad to hold some discourse with him on the state of affairs alone. Publius, when he had received this message, told the herald, that he accepted the offer; and that he would send notice to Annibal of the time and the place in which they might meet. On the following day, Massanissa arrived at the camp, and brought with him six thousand foot, and about the same number of horse. Scipio received him with great favour; and congratulated him upon his success, in having prevailed upon all the subjects of Syphax to receive him as their prince. He then put the army in motion, and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Margarus; in a post which, beside other advantages, had water within the throw of a dart. From this place he sent notice to the Carthaginian General, that he was ready to engage into a conference with him. On receiving this message, Annibal also decamped; and,

approaching to the distance of no more than thirty stadia from the Romans, fixed his camp upon a hill, which, though in other respects well situated, was rather too far removed from water. And indeed the soldiers were upon this account exposed to very great hardship.

On the following day, the two Generals came out from their several camps with a small body of horsemen: and afterwards, leaving these, they advanced forwards, and approached each other, attended only by an interpreter. Annibal first saluted Scipio, and began in the following manner:

“ Well would it have been, if the Romans had never coveted any thing beyond the extent of Italy, nor the Carthaginians beyond that of Africk; but had both of them remained contented with the possession of those fair empires, which nature itself seems indeed to have circumscribed with separate bounds. But since we engaged in war against each other, first to acquire the sovereignty of Sicily, and afterwards that of Spain; since at last, like men infatuated by fortune, we advanced so far together in our preposterous course, as to bring even the safety of our own native seats into alter-  
nate

riate danger; that danger which you have so lately known, and to which we also at this moment are exposed; what now remains, but to endeavour, by ourselves, to deprecate the anger of the Gods, and find some means, if it be possible, of putting an end to this most obstinate contention. I for my part, who have seen in the course of a long experience the great inconsistency of fortune, with how slight a turn she effects on either side the greatest changes, and that she sports with us continually as with children, am most ready to consent to a peace. But much do I fear, that you, Publius, who still are in the flower of your age, whose designs both in Spain and Africk have all been attended with success, and who have never hitherto been driven back again in your course by any adverse blast, will be inclined to different sentiments, and not be moved by my persuasions, how worthy soever they may be of credit. Yet consider only and observe, at least in one example, the instability of human affairs. An example, not drawn from distant times, but which is present now to your eyes. In a word, view it in me who am before you. I am that Annibal, who after the battle of Cannæ was master of almost

the whole of Italy; and, having advanced not long afterwards in to the very neighbourhood of Rome, fixed my camp within forty stadia only of the city, and deliberated with myself in what manner I should dispose of you and of your country. Behold me now, returned back again to Africk, and holding a conference with you a Roman, concerning my own safety, and that of all the Carthaginians. Let this example incline you to embrace moderate sentiments; and to judge in this conjuncture, as it becomes a man to judge: that is, to choose always the greatest good, and the least of evils. And surely no man of sense would ever voluntarily meet the danger to which you are now exposed. For if you should gain the victory in the present battle, you will add but little either to the reputation of your country, or your own. But, if you should be conquered, the whole fame and glory of all your former actions will be for ever lost. What then is the purpose of this discourse? It is to inform you, that the countries which have been the objects of our wars, Sardinia, Sicily, and Spain, shall be yielded to the Romans: and that the Carthaginians at no future time shall attempt to recover by arms the possession  
of

of those territories. To the Romans likewise shall belong all the islands, which lie between Sicily and Africk. These conditions, while they leave Carthage in security, are at the same time, in my opinion, highly honourable, both to yourself and to all the Romans."

Here Annibal ended his discourse: and Scipio answered in the following words:

"It was well known, he said, that the Carthaginians, and not the Romans, were the cause both of the war of Sicily, and of that of Spain: that Annibal himself was most perfectly acquainted with this truth: and that the Gods also had born testimony to it, by turning the success to the side, not of those who had unjustly attacked, but of those who had taken arms in their own defence." He then added likewise; that no man was more strongly impressed than himself, with a just sense of the instability of fortune, and the uncertain course of human affairs. "But with respect, continued he, to the terms which you offer; if, before the Romans had come into Africk, you had retired from Italy, and proposed to us the same conditions of peace, you would not perhaps have been disappointed in your hopes. At this time, when  
you

you have been forced most reluctantly to abandon Italy, and we on the other hand have passed over into Africk, and have rendered ourselves the masters of all the open country, it is clear that the state of affairs is very considerably changed. But, beside this difference, there is something also of much greater moment. When your countrymen were defeated; and sued for peace; we refused not to accede to their request. A treaty was framed in writing; which, beside those concessions which you have now proposed, contained also the following articles. That the Carthaginians should restore without ransom all the Roman prisoners; should deliver up to us their decked ships; should pay a sum of five thousand talents; and, in the last place, that they should give hostages for the performance of all that was imposed. Such were the conditions, to which we on both sides gave consent. We then deputed jointly some ambassadors to Rome, to lay the treaty before the senate and the people: on our part intimating, that we approved of the conditions; the Carthaginians, on the other hand, requesting even with entreaty that they might be accepted. They were accordingly admitted by the senate, and

were ratified by the people. But no sooner had the Carthaginians obtained what they desired, than they annul at once the whole treaty by an action of the grossest perfidy. After such a conduct, what remains to be done? Put yourself in my place, and answer. Shall we release them now from all the heaviest of the conditions that were before imposed? This would indeed be an admirable method, by bestowing a reward upon their treachery, to teach them to deceive in future times the persons by whom they have been obliged. Or think you, if they could obtain their wish, that they would hold themselves indebted to us for the favour? They before obtained what with the most earnest supplication they desired. And yet no sooner had they conceived some faint hopes from your return, than they again disclosed their enmity, and renewed hostilities against us. If you had added therefore some conditions still more rigorous, the treaty might have been once more carried before the Roman people. But since you have detracted even from those that were admitted, the terms which you now propose cannot so much as be referred to their consideration. To what then tends

also my discourse? It is to acquaint you; that you either must submit yourselves and your country to us at discretion, or must conquer us in a battle." After these discourses, which left no hopes of an accommodation, the two Generals parted from each other, and retired.

On the following day, as soon as the dawn appeared, they drew out their forces on both sides, and prepared to engage: the Carthaginians, for their own safety and the possession of Africk; the Romans, for the sovereignty of the whole, and for universal empire. Is there any one that can forbear to pause at this part of the story, or remain unmoved by the relation? Never were there seen more warlike nations: never more able Generals, or more completely exercised in all the art and discipline of war: never was a greater prize proposed by fortune, than that which was now laid before the combatants. For it was not Africk alone, or Italy, that waited to reward the conquerors; but the entire dominion of the whole known world. And this indeed was not long afterwards the event. Scipio drew up his army in battle in the following manner. He placed in the first line the Hastati, leaving intervals be-

tween the cohorts. In the second, the Principes: but posted their cohorts, not, as the Roman custom was, opposite to the intervals, but behind the cohorts of the former line, and at a considerable distance from them, on account of the great number of elephants that were in the Carthaginian army. Last of all, in the third line, he drew up the Triarii. Upon the left wing he stationed Caius Lælius, with the cavalry of Italy; and Massanissa and the Numidians upon the right. The intervals of the first line he filled with companies of the light-armed troops: who was ordered to begin the action; and, if they should find themselves too violently pressed by the elephants, that the swiftest of them should retire through the strait intervals, to the rear of all the army; and the rest, if they should be intercepted on their way, direct their course to the right or left, along the open distances that were between the lines. When his disposition was thus completed, he went round to all the troops, and harangued them in few words, but such as the occasion seemed to require.

“ Remember, said he, your former victories; and shew now a courage worthy of yourselves and of your country.

Let

Let it be ever present to your view, that by gaining the victory in this battle, you not only will become the masters of all Africk, but secure to Rome the undisputed sovereignty of the rest of the world. If, on the other hand, you should be conquered, they who fall bravely in the action, will obtain an honour far more glorious than any rights of sepulture, the honour of dying for their country: while those that shall escape, must be condemned to pass the remainder of their lives in the extremity of disgrace and misery. For Africk will afford no place of safety; and, if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, what your condition must be, your own reason will easily instruct you to foresee. But may none of you ever know it by experience. When fortune then, continued he, has offered to us upon either side so noble a prize, universal empire or a glorious death, how lost must we be both to honour and to sense, if we should reject these the greatest of goods, and choose, through a desire of life, the most insupportable of evils. When you advance therefore against the enemy, carry that resolution with you into action, which is sure always to surmount the strongest resistance. Be de-

terminated either to conquer or to die. Retain not so much as a thought of life. With such sentiments, the victory cannot fail to be your own."

Such was the harangue of Scipio. Annibal, on his part, having placed the elephants, more than eighty in number, at the head of all the army, formed his first line of the mercenaries; who were a mixed multitude of Gauls, Ligurians, Balearics, and Maurusians, and amounted together to about twelve thousand men. Behind these were the Carthaginians and the subject Africans. The third line was composed of the troops which he had brought with him from Italy; and was placed at the distance of more than a stadium from the second line. The cavalry was posted upon the wings: that of the Numidian auxiliaries upon the left; and the Carthaginian cavalry upon the right. He ordered the officers who commanded the different bodies of the mercenaries, to exhort severally their own soldiers, and to encourage them to be assured of victory, since they were now joined by Annibal and his veteran forces. The leaders of the Carthaginians were instructed on the other hand, to lay before their view the fatal consequences

quences of a defeat ; and to enumerate all the evils, to which their wives and children would be exposed. And while these orders were obeyed, he himself going round to his own troops, addressed them with the greatest earnestness, and in words like these.

“ Remember, soldiers, that we have now born arms together during the course of seventeen years. Remember in how many battles we have been engaged against the Romans. Conquerours in them all, we have not left to the Romans even the smallest hope, that they ever should be able to defeat us. But beside the other innumerable actions in which we always obtained the victory, remember also, above all the rest, the battle of Trebia, which we sustained against the father of that very General who now commands the Roman army ; the battle of Thrasymene, against Flaminius ; and that of Cannæ, against Æmilius. The action, in which we are now ready to engage, is not to be compared with those great battles, with respect either to the number, or the courage of the troops. For turn now your eyes upon the forces of the enemy. Not only they are fewer ; they scarcely make even a diminutive part of

the numbers against which we were then engaged. Nor is the difference less with respect to courage. The former were troops whose strength was intire, and who had never been disheartened by any defeat. But these before us are either the children of the former, or the wretched remains of those very men whom we subdued in Italy, and who have so often fled before us. Lose not then, upon this occasion, the glory of your General, and your own. Preserve the name which you have acquired: and confirm the opinion which has hitherto prevailed, that you are never to be conquered."

When the Generals had thus on both sides harangued their troops, and the Numidian cavalry for some time had been engaged in skirmishing against each other, all things being now ready, Annibal ordered the elephants to be led against the enemy. But the noise of the horns and trumpets, sounding together on every side, so affrighted some of these beasts, that they turned back with violence against their own Numidians, and threw them into such disorder, that Massanissa dispersed without much difficulty that whole body of cavalry which was on the left of the Carthaginian army. The  
rest

rest of the elephants, encountering with the light-armed forces of the Romans in the space that was between the armies, suffered much in the conflict, and made great havock also among the enemy: till at last, having lost all courage, some of them took their way through the intervals of the Roman army, which afforded an open and safe passage for them, as Scipio wisely had foreseen; and the rest, directing their course to the right, were chased by darts from the cavalry, till they were driven quite out of the field. But as they occasioned likewise some disorder upon their own right wing in their flight, Lælius also seized that moment to fall upon the Carthaginian Cavalry: and having forced them to turn their backs, he followed closely after them; while Masfanissa on his side was pursuing the Numidian cavalry with no less ardour.

And now the heavy-armed forces on both sides advanced to action with a slow and steady pace: those troops alone excepted, which had returned with Annibal from Italy; and which remained still in the station in which they at first were placed. As soon as they were near, the Romans, shouting all together, according to their custom, and rattling their swords

against their bucklers, threw themselves upon the enemy. On the other side, the Carthaginian mercenaries advanced to the charge with confused and undistinguishable cries. For as they had been drawn together, as we have said, from different countries, there was not among them, as the poet expresses it,

One voice, one language found :  
But sounds discordant as their various  
tribes \*.

In this first onset, as the combatants were so closely joined, that they were unable to make use of their spears, or even of their swords, and maintained the action hand to hand, and man to man; the mercenaries, by their boldness and dexterity, obtained at first the advantage, and wounded many of the Romans. But the latter, assisted by the excellence of their disposition and the nature of their arms, pressed forward, and still gained ground; being supported also by the rest of their own army, who followed and encouraged them from behind. The mercenaries on the other hand were neither followed nor

\* Iliad. IV. 437.

supported. For the Carthaginians that were behind them came not near to assist them in the action, but stood like men who had lost all courage. At last therefore the strangers turned their backs: and, thinking themselves manifestly to have been deserted by their own friends, they fell, as they retired, upon the Carthaginians that were behind, and killed them. The latter however fell not, without a brave and vigorous defence. For being thus unexpectedly attacked, and compelled to fight both with their own mercenaries and with the Romans, they exerted their utmost efforts, and engaging with a frantick and disordered rage, made a promiscuous slaughter of friends and enemies. Amidst this confusion, the Hastati also were so pressed that they were forced to break their ranks. But the leaders of the Principes, perceiving the disorder, brought up their troops close behind to support them: so that, in the end, the greatest part of the Carthaginians and the mercenaries were destroyed in the place; partly by themselves, and partly by the Hastati. Annibal would not suffer the rest that escaped to be received into the third line towards which they fled; but ordered the foremost ranks  
to

to point their spears against them as they approached. They were forced therefore to retire along the wings into the open plain,

As the whole ground, that was between the forces which now remained, was covered with blood, and slaughter, and dead bodies, the Roman General was in no small degree perplexed; being apprehensive that this obstacle would prevent him from obtaining a complete and perfect victory. For it seemed to be no easy thing, to lead on the troops, without breaking their ranks, over bleeding and slippery carcases, thrown one upon another; and over arms, which were scattered in confusion, and preposterously intermingled with the heaps of the dead. Having ordered the wounded however to be carried into the rear of the army, he called back the Hastati from the pursuit, and drew them up in order as they returned, in the forepart of the ground upon which the action had passed; and the opposite to the centre of the enemy. He then commanded the Principes and the Triarii to close their ranks; to form a wing on either side; and to advance over the dead. And when these troops, having surmounted all the intermediate obstacles,

cles, were come into the same line with the Hastati, the action was then begun on both sides with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As the numbers were nearly equal; as the sentiments, the courage, and the arms on both sides were the same; the battle remained for a long time doubtful. For so obstinate was the contention, that the men all fell in the place in which they fought. But Lælius and Massaniſſa, returning back from the pursuit of the routed cavalry, arrived most providentially in the very moment in which their assistance was chiefly wanted, and fell upon the rear of Annibal. The greatest part therefore of his troops were now slaughtered in their ranks. And, among those that fled, a very small number only were able to escape; as they were followed closely by the cavalry through an open country. Above fifteen hundred of the Romans fell in the action. But, on the side of the Carthaginians, more than twenty thousand were killed; and almost an equal number taken prisoners. Such was the battle between Annibal and Scipio: the battle which gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world.

When the action was ended, Publius, after he had for some time pursued those  
that

that fled, and pillaged the camp of the Carthaginians, returned back to his own camp. Annibal, with a small number of horsemen, continued his retreat without stopping, and arrived safe at Adrumetum: having performed, upon this occasion, all that was possible to be done by a brave and experienced General. For first, he entered into a conference with his enemy; and endeavoured by himself alone to terminate the dispute. Nor was this any dishonour to his former victories: but shewed only, that he was diffident of fortune: and willing to secure himself against the strange and unexpected accidents which happen in war. In the battle afterwards, so well had he disposed things for the action, that no General, using even the same arms, and the same order of battle as the Romans, could have engaged them with greater advantage. The order of the Romans in battle is very difficult to be broken; because the whole army in general, as well as each particular body, is ready always to present a front to their enemies, on which side soever they appear. For the cohorts by a single movement turn themselves together, as the occasion requires, towards the side from whence the attack is made,

Add

Add to this, that their arms also are well contrived, both for protection and offence: their bucklers being large in size; and their swords strong, and not easily injured by the stroke. Upon these accounts, they are very terrible in action, and are not to be conquered without great difficulty. But Annibal opposed to each of these advantages the most effectual obstacles that it was possible for reason to contrive. He had collected together a great number of elephants, and stationed them in the front of his army; that they might disturb the order of the enemy, and disperse their ranks. By posting the mercenaries in the first line, and the Carthaginians afterwards in a line behind them, he hoped to disable the Romans by fatigue, before the battle should be brought to the last decision; and render their swords useless by continual slaughter. As he had thus placed the Carthaginians also between two lines, he compelled them to stand; and, as the poet has said,

Forced them by strong necessity to fight,  
However loth\*.

\* Iliad. IV. 30.

In the last place, he drew up the bravest and the firmest of his troops at a distance from the rest : that, observing from afar the progress of the action, and possessing their whole strength as well as their courage intire, they might seize the most favourable moment, and fall with vigour upon the enemy. If therefore, when he had thus employed all possible precautions to secure the victory, he was now for the first time conquered, he may very well be pardoned. For fortune sometimes counteracts the designs of valiant men. Sometimes again, according to the proverb,

A brave man by a braver is subdued.

And this indeed it was, which must be allowed to have happened upon the present occasion.

## EXTRACT the SECOND.

*The Carthaginians in the most abject manner sue for peace. The conditions upon which it is granted by Scipio. The sentiments of Annibal, and his behaviour in the senate of Carthage upon this occasion.*

WHEN men, in lamenting the wretchedness of their fortunes, exceed in their actions all the customary forms of grief, if their behaviour seems to be the effect of genuine passion, and to arise only from the greatness of their calamities, we are all ready to be moved by the strangeness of the sight, and can neither see nor hear them without commiserating their condition. But if these appearances are feigned, and assumed only with an intention to deceive, instead of compassion, they excite indignation and disgust. And this was now what happened; with respect to the Carthaginian ambassadours. Publius told them in few words; “ That, with regard to themselves, they had clearly no pretensions to be treated with gentleness or favour:

since, by their own acknowledgement, they had at first begun the war against the Romans, by attacking Saguntum in contempt of treaties; and now lately again had violated the articles of a convention, which they had ratified in writing, and bound themselves by oaths to observe. That the Romans, however, as well upon their own account, as in consideration also of the common condition and fortune of humanity, had resolved to display towards them upon this occasion a generous clemency. That such indeed it must appear to themselves to be, if they would view all circumstances in a proper light. For, since fortune, having first precluded them, by the means of their own perfidious conduct, from every claim to mercy or to pardon, had now thrown them wholly into the power of their enemies; no hardships which they should be forced to suffer, no conditions which should be imposed, no concessions which should be exacted from them, could be considered as rigorous or severe: but rather it must appear to be a matter of astonishment, if any article of favour should be yielded to them." After this discourse he recited first the conditions of indulgence which he was willing to grant;

grant; and afterwards those of rigour, to which they were required to submit. The terms which he proposed to them were these:

“That they should retain all the cities which they held in Africk, before the beginning of the last war which they had made against the Romans; and all the lands likewise which they had anciently possessed, together with the cattle, the men, and the goods that were upon them. That from the present day all hostilities against them should cease. That they should be governed by their own laws and customs; and not receive any garrison from the Romans.” Such were the articles of favour: the others, of a contrary kind, were these:

“That the Carthaginians should restore all that they had taken unjustly from the Romans, during the continuance of the truce. That they should send back all the prisoners and deserters, that had at any time fallen into their hands. That they should deliver up all their long vessels, ten triremes only excepted; and likewise their elephants. That they should not make war at any time upon any state out of Africk: nor upon any in Africk, without the consent of the Romans.

mans. That they should restore to king Massianiffa the houses, lands, and cities, and every thing besides, that had belonged to him, or to his ancestors, within the limits which should hereafter be declared. That they should furnish the Roman army with corn sufficient for three months; and pay also the stipends of the troops, till an answer should be received from Rome, confirming the conditions of the treaty. That they should pay ten thousand talents of silver, in the course of fifty years; bringing two hundred Euboic talents every year. That, as a security for their fidelity, they should give a hundred hostages: which should be chosen by the Roman General out of all their youth, between the age of fourteen and of thirty years."

As soon as Publius had finished the recital of these articles, the ambassadours returned back in haste to Carthage, and reported the terms that were proposed. Upon this occasion, when one of the senators was going to object to the conditions, and had begun to speak, Annibal, it is said, stepped forwards, and taking hold of the man, dragged him down from his seat. And, when the rest of the senate appeared to be much displeas-

at an action so injurious to the customs of that assembly, he again stood up, and said, " That he might well be excused, if his ignorance had led him to offend against any of their established forms. That they knew, that he had left his country when he was only nine years old; and had now returned to it again at the age of more than forty-five. He intreated them therefore, not so much to consider, whether he had violated any custom, as whether he had been moved by a real concern for the distressed condition of his country. That what he had felt upon that account was indeed the true cause of his offence. For that it appeared to him to be a most astonishing thing, and altogether preposterous, that any Carthaginian, not ignorant of all which their state in general, as well as particular men, had designed against the Romans, should not be ready to worship his good fortune, when, having fallen into their power, he now found himself treated by them with so great clemency. That if the Carthaginians had been asked but a few days before, what their country must expect to suffer, if they should be conquered by the Romans, they would not have been able to make any answer: so great, so exces-

five were the calamities which were then in prospect. He begged therefore, that they would not now bring the conditions into any debate, but admit them with unanimous consent : offering sacrifices at the same time to the gods ; and joining all together in their prayers, that the treaty might be ratified by the Roman people." This advice appeared to be so sensible, and so well suited to the present exigency, that the senate resolved to consent to a peace upon the terms which have been mentioned ; and immediately sent away some ambassadors to conclude the treaty.

## EXTRACT the THIRD.

*The unjust designs of Philip and Antiochus against young Ptolemy: with a reflection on the manner in which those princes afterwards were punished.*

**I**T is strange to consider, that, as long as Ptolemy lived, Philip and Antiochus were ready always to support him, though he wanted not their assistance: and yet no sooner was he dead, and had left an infant son, than these princes, whose duty it was, according to the laws of nature, to maintain the child in the possession of his kingdom, combined together to share his dominions between themselves, and to destroy the helpless orphan. Nor did they even endeavour, like other tyrants, to cover the shame of this proceeding, so much as with the slightest pretext: but prosecuted their design with such barefaced and brutal violence, as made the saying very applicable to them, which is commonly used concerning fishes; that the destruction of the small, though they are all of them of

the same kind, is the life and nourishment of the great. We need only to turn our eyes indeed upon the treaty that was made between the two kings upon this occasion: and we shall behold, as in a glass, the strongest picture of their avowed impiety, their savage inhumanity, and their ambition extended beyond all bounds. If any one however should be disposed to censure fortune, and indeed with good shew of reason, for admitting such injustice in the course of human affairs; he will judge perhaps more favourably, when he considers, that afterwards she punished both these princes in the manner which their actions merited, and exposed them as a memorable warning, to deter all those who in future times might be inclined to follow their example. For while they were practising all the arts of treachery against each other, and tearing away by pieces the dominions of the infant king; this deity, having raised up the Romans against them, inflicted upon them, with the most exact measure of justice, those very evils which they had unjustly meditated against others. Subdued, each of them in his turn, they were at first compelled to submit to the imposition of a  
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tribute, and to receive orders from the Romans. And in the end, before any long time had elapsed, the dominions of Ptolemy were established again in full security: while, on the other hand, the kingdom and the successors of Philip were intirely subverted and destroyed; and those of Antiochus very nearly also involved in the same calamities.

## EXTRACT the FOURTH.

*The Cianians, a people of Bithynia, are conquered and carried into slavery by Philip. Reflections on the cause of their misfortune, and the conduct of the king.*

THESE great calamities indeed, in which the Cianians were involved, ought not to be ascribed so much to fortune, or even to the unjust designs of others against them, as to their own want of wisdom, and the wrong administration of their government. For as they raised continually the very worst men into the posts of honour, and punished all those that opposed their measures, for the sake only of enriching themselves with the spoils of the plundered fortunes, they threw themselves, as it may be said, with their own free consent, into all that wretchedness which is the necessary result of such a conduct. Examples of this kind are frequent and notorious: and yet men, I know not how, never cease to fall into the same imprudence. They  
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seem not to entertain even the smallest diffidence upon such occasions; but are worse in this respect than animals that are destitute of reason. For these, not only if they have extricated themselves before with difficulty from any trap or snare, but even if they have seen any other animal in danger, are not easily led to the like again, but suspect the very place, and distrust every thing that is before their eyes. But men are strangers to all this caution. Though they have heard that many have been lost by the ill conduct that has now been mentioned; though they see others perishing through the same imprudence; allure them only with the prospect of enriching themselves with the spoils of others, they catch greedily at the bait, which they are assured has been in all times fatal to those who have tasted it, and pursue those very measures which are acknowledged to have been pernicious to every government.

Philip, when he had so well succeeded in this design, and rendered himself master of the city, was elated with no small joy. He thought that he had performed an honourable and a glorious action. For he had brought the speediest succour to his son-in-law in his distress: he had struck

struck a terror into all those that were inclined to oppose him: and had gained, as he supposed, by the fairest means, a very great booty in prisoners and in money. But the circumstances that were opposite to these he never once considered, though they were indeed sufficiently notorious. For first, he had assisted his son-in-law, not when he was unjustly attacked, but when he had himself made war upon his neighbours in direct breach of treaties. In the next place, by involving a Grecian city, without any just cause, in the most dreadful calamities of war, he confirmed the opinion which before was entertained concerning his inhuman treatment of his allies: and taught all posterity to consider him, upon both these accounts, as a man who paid no regard to the most sacred obligations. Thirdly, this action was a very gross insult upon the ambassadours, who had come to him from the cities, in order to rescue the Citanians from their danger. For while they were encouraged to remain, and were soothed by him with daily conferences, they were forced to be spectators of those very evils, which they had wished most earnestly not to see. Add to all this, that the Rhodians now held him in  
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so great abhorrence, that they would not so much as suffer the name of Philip to be any more mentioned among them. Indeed chance itself conspired to raise against him this aversion. For when his ambassadour, in a studied discourse which he addressed to the people in the theatre at Rhodes, was endeavouring to display the great generosity of his master; who, though he had at this time the city of the Cicians almost wholly in his power, was willing, as he said, to yield it as a favour to the Rhodians, and to refute by such indulgence the calumnies of those that opposed his interests, as well as to give also a most signal proof of his affection towards their state; it happened that a certain man arrived from the fleet, and related in what manner the Cicians had been carried into slavery, and the whole cruelty that had been exercised upon the occasion. These news, being reported to the assembly by the first magistrate, at the very time when the ambassadour was delivering his harangue, struck all the people with such astonishment, that they were scarcely able to believe that Philip could be guilty of so black a perfidy. And yet this prince, when by his treacherous conduct he had been false rather

to himself than the Cianians, was so destitute of judgment, as well as lost to all sense of duty, that, instead of feeling remorse and shame, he on the contrary boasted of the action, as if it had been a glorious and a great exploit. From this time therefore, the Rhodians regarded him as an enemy; and resolved to hold themselves in readiness to begin hostilities against him. Nor was the resentment less, which the Ætoli-ans conceived against him upon the same account. For he had just before composed his differences with that people. And yet, in the very moment almost when he was extending his hands towards them, when not even any pretence could be urged to cover such a conduct, of the three cities, Chalcedon, Lyfimachia, and Cianus, which had lately been received into a confederacy with them, he forced the two former to separate themselves from the alliance, and carried the inhabitants of the latter into slavery, though an Ætolian governour at that very time commanded in the place. With respect to Prusias, though he was pleased that his design had been attended with success, yet was he on the other hand no less

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Ex. IV. of POLYBIUS. 175

dissatisfied, when he found that all the advantages of the conquest were possessed by another, and that nothing remained for himself but the bare ground of a ruined city. He was forced however to bear what he had no power to remedy.

## EXTRACT the FIFTH.

*The lamentable destruction of Agathocles, the guardian of young Ptolemy, together with all his family, in a popular insurrection at Alexandria. His conduct and character. Some observations on the manner of relating tragical events in History.*

## C H A P. I.

**A**GATHOCLES, having ordered the Macedonians first to be assembled, appeared before them, bringing with him the young king, and attended by his sister Agathoclea. For some time he pretended, that his tears flowed so fast that he was not able to speak. But when he had often wiped his face with his mantle, and seemed to have stopped the violent course of his grief, lifting up the child, “Receive, said he, O Macedonians, this young prince, whom his father, when he was dying, delivered indeed into the arms of my sister, but intrusted to your fidelity. The affection of my sister can now  
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but little avail. His preservation depends upon you alone: in your hands rests all his fortune. It was notorious long ago to all men of judgment, that Tlepolemus was forming designs too high for his condition. He has now fixed the day, and even the hour, in which he has determined to assume the royal diadem. I ask not, continued he, that you should give credit to me alone; but to those who have seen the truth, and who are just now come from being witnesses of the transaction." With these words, he introduced to them Critolaus, who declared, that he had seen the altars ready, and the victims which the people had prepared for the celebration of the ceremony. But the Macedonians were so far from being moved with compassion towards him from this discourse, that they did not even attend to what he said: but began to sneer and to whisper together; and insulted him with so much scorn, that he scarcely knew in what manner he at last withdrew himself from the assembly. He then called together, in their proper assemblies, the other bodies of the soldiery: and was received with the same ill treatment by them all.

During the time of this confusion, many of the troops arrived continually from the armies that were in the upper provinces; and began to urge their kindred and their friends, to apply some remedy to the disorders of the state, and not suffer themselves any longer to be insulted by such unworthy governours. The people were the more easily engaged in this design, and began to fear that even the least delay might be attended with dangerous consequences, because Tlepolemus was master of the port of Alexandria, and had it in his power to stop all the provisions that should be coming to the city. Agathocles also himself helped greatly at this very time to provoke the rage of the multitude, as well as to incense Tlepolemus. For, as if he had been willing that the whole city should know that a difference subsisted between this General and himself, he took Danae, who was the step-mother of the former, from the temple of Ceres, and, having dragged her through the streets with her face uncovered, threw her into prison. This action so exasperated the minds of all men, that they no longer communicated their discontent in private confidence, and with secrecy, as before: but fixed

fixed up writings in the night in every part of the city; and in the day-time assembled together in parties, and declared aloud their detestation of the government.

Agathocles, perceiving this disposition of the people, began now to apprehend some fatal consequences. Sometimes he resolved that he would endeavour to escape by flight. But as he had been so imprudent as not to have made any of the necessary preparations for such a purpose, he was forced to desist from that design. Sometimes again, he was beginning to form associations of his friends; and seemed determined to make at least one desperate attempt: to destroy one part of his enemies; to seize the rest; and afterwards avowedly to usurp the tyranny. While he remained in this state of suspense, one of his guards, whose name was Mœragenes, was accused of betraying all his secrets to Tlepolemus, through the means of a correspondence with Adæus, the governour of Bubaste. Agathocles immediately gave orders to his secretary Nicostratus, that he should take this man, and force him by every kind of torture to declare the truth. He was seized accordingly; and, being conducted by Ni-

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costratus

costratus into a remote apartment of the palace, was at first interrogated, as he stood, concerning the facts with which he was charged: and when he refused to confess any thing, he was stripped. The guards, some of them were preparing the instruments of torture, and others, with rods in their hands, were taking off his clothes; when a servant came running into the apartment, and, having whispered something to Nicostratus, in his ear, retired again with the greatest haste. Nicostratus immediately followed him; speaking not a word, but smiting continually his thigh. The situation in which Mœragenes now found himself was very singular and strange. The rods were already raised to strike him, and the instruments of torture lay ready at his feet; when the attendants, upon this departure of Nicostratus, stood motionless, and, looking one upon another, expected his return. After some time, as he came not back, they all gradually withdrew themselves from the apartment. Mœragenes, being thus left alone, passed through the palace unobserved, and came, naked as he was, into a tent of the Macedonians that was near. It happened that the soldiers were assembled together to take their

their dinner. He related to them all that had been done, and the surprising circumstances of his escape. Though the story appeared to be almost incredible, yet when they saw that he was still naked, they could not doubt of the truth. Taking occasion therefore from this accident, he began now with tears to intreat the Macedonians, not only to afford protection to himself, but to take the measures also that were necessary for the preservation of the king, or rather indeed for their own safety. For the destruction of them all was imminent and certain; unless they would seize the moment, when the hatred of the people against Agathocles, and their desire of vengeance, were at the greatest height. And this, he said, was now that moment: and nothing was wanting, but that some persons should begin the enterprize. The soldiers were raised into fury by this discourse; and consented to all that was proposed. They went first into the tents of the other Macedonians; and afterwards into those of the rest of the army. For they were all contiguous one to the other, and stood together on the same side of the city. As the disposition to revolt had long been general, and waited only

to be called into action, no sooner was this spirit set in motion, than it spread every way like a raging flame: so that, before four hours had passed, all orders and ranks of men, both in the camp and in the city were united in the same design. An accident also at this time happened, which tended greatly to facilitate the success of the undertaking. Some spies were brought to Agathocles, together with a letter which had been written by Tlepolemus to the army. The purport of the letter was, that Tlepolemus was preparing to join the army: and the spies declared, that he was now ready to come. On receiving these news, Agathocles seemed to be bereaved at once of all his understanding. For, instead of preparing himself for action, or taking any of the measures which such an exigency required, he calmly retired to his repast, and indulged himself in all the pleasures of his table in the usual manner.

But Oenanthe, oppressed with grief, went into the temple of Ceres and Proserpine, which was now opened for the celebration of an annual sacrifice. At her first entrance, she fell upon her knees, and supplicated the protection of the Goddesses with the most soothing prayers. She

She then fate down near the altar, and was quiet. Many of the women who were present beheld her grief and her dejection with a secret pleasure, and said nothing. The relations only of Polycrates, and some others of rank, not knowing the cause of her disorder, came near to her, and were beginning to comfort her. But Oenante cried out with a loud voice; "Approach me not, wild beasts as you are; I know you very well; you are enemies to our interests, and are praying the Goddeses to inflict upon us the worst of evils: but I hope on the contrary, that they will force yourselves to feed upon your own children." With these words, she ordered her attendants to drive them from her, and even to strike those that should refuse to retire. The women therefore all left the temple; lifting up their hands to heaven, and imploring the Gods, that Oenante herself might feel those curses which she had imprecated upon others. And as the men already had determined to revolt, this resentment of their wives, being now spread through every house, added new strength to the rage with which they were before inflamed.

As soon as night was come, in the whole city nothing was to be seen but tumult, lighted torches, and people running to and fro in every part. For some assembled themselves together in the Stadium with loud cries : some animated the rest : and some, running every way in disorder, sought for houses and secret places in which they might lie concealed. All the open spaces that were near to the palace, the square, the stadium, and the court that was round the theatre of Bacchus, were now filled with an innumerable multitude of people of every kind ; when Agathocles, who had not long left his table, was awakened from sleep, full of wine, and informed of what had happened. Immediately collecting all his kindred, Philo only excepted, he went to the king ; and, after some few words of lamentation, took him by the hand, and carried him up into the gallery that was between the Mæander and the Palæstra, and which led to the entrance of the theatre. He fastened behind him the two first doors, and passed on to the third, with only two or three guards, the king, and his own family. The doors were framed in the manner of an open lattice ; and were fastened with double bars.

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The numbers of the people that were drawn together from all parts of the city were now so great, that not only the open places, but the steps also and the roofs of the houses were covered with them. A confused noise and clamour was heard, from the voices of women and children mingled with those of the men. For such is the custom at Alexandria, as well as at Carthage, that, in tumults of this kind, the children are no less active than the men. When the day fully appeared, amidst the many undistinguishable cries, it was heard however above all the rest that they called for the king. The Macedonians therefore, now first advancing together in a body from their tents, took possession of the gate of the palace, which was the place of the royal audience. And, after some little time, being informed to what part the king had retired, they went round to the place, forced open the first doors of the gallery, and, as they approached the second, demanded the child with loud cries. Agathocles, perceiving that the danger was so near, intreated the guards to go, and to declare to the Macedonians; “that he was ready to lay down the guardianship of the king, and all his other power: to divest himself of all his  
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his honours; and even to abandon all that he possessed. That he desired only that his life might be spared; and that small allowance yielded to him, which would be necessary for his support. That when he should have thus gone back again to his first condition, it would no longer be in his power, whatever might be his will, to do harm to any person." But the guards all refused to be employed in this service; till at last it was undertaken by Aristomenes: the same who held afterwards the chief administration of the government. This man was an Acarnanian by birth; and having, as he advanced in life, obtained the supreme direction of affairs in Ægypt, he governed with a very high reputation both the king and kingdom; and demonstrated indeed no less ability in maintaining himself in that exalted station, than he had shewn before in flattering Agathocles during the time of his prosperity. For he was the first, who at a banquet had presented to Agathocles alone of all the guests a golden crown: an honour, never accustomed to be paid to any but kings. He had the courage also to be the first, who wore a portrait of Agathocles in a ring. And when he had a daughter born, he gave her

her the name of Agathoclea. But this may be sufficient to mark his character.

This man then, having received the orders before mentioned, went out thro' a little wicket, and came to the Macedonians. He had scarcely spoken a few words, and begun to declare the intentions of Agathocles, when the soldiers attempted in the instant to strike their darts through his body. But some persons, having covered him with their hands, and appeased that first fury, ordered him immediately to return, and to tell Agathocles, that he should either bring out the king, or not dare to come out himself. When they had thus dismissed him, they advanced against the second door of the gallery, and forced it open. Agathocles, perceiving both by the answer that was brought, and by this new violence, with what rage the Macedonians were inflamed, extended now his hands through the lattice of the farthest door. Agathoclea likewise shewed her breasts, which she said had suckled the king. With the most suppliant words that could be uttered, they begged that at least their lives might be spared. But when neither their prayers nor their intreaties any thing  
availed,

availed, they at last sent out the child, together with the guards.

The Macedonians, when they had received the king, set him immediately upon a horse, and conducted him to the Stadium. As soon as he appeared, the people broke together into the loudest shouts of acclamation and applause. They stopped the horse, took down the king, and conducted him to the seat in which their kings were accustomed to be seen. But the joy which the multitude shewed was still mingled with grief. For while they rejoiced that they had gotten the king into their possession, they were grieved on the other hand, that the guilty persons were not taken, and brought to suffer a just punishment. They demanded therefore with continual clamour, that the authors of all the evils should be delivered up to the public vengeance. As the day was now far advanced, and the people still wanted the objects upon which they might vent their rage, Sofibius, who was the son of Sofibius, and was at this time one of the royal guards, had recourse to an expedient, the best indeed that could be devised, with respect both to the king and the public peace. Perceiving that the commotion was not  
likely

likely to be appeased, and that the young prince also was uneasy at seeing himself surrounded by persons unknown, and terrified by the noise of a rude multitude, he went and asked him, whether he consented that those who had been guilty of crimes against his mother and himself should be delivered up to the people. And when he answered, that he consented; Sosibius ordered some of the guards to declare this resolution to the people, and at the same time carried the king to his own house which was near, to give him some refreshment. As soon as the intentions of the king were known, the whole place again resounded with shouts of approbation and of joy.

During this time Agathocles and Agathoclea had retired severally to their own apartments. Some of the soldiers from their own voluntary motion, and others urged by the people, soon went in search of them. But the first beginning of the slaughter that ensued was occasioned by the following accident. One of the parasites and servants of Agathocles, whose name was Philo, came drunk into the Stadium; and, seeing what was the disposition of the people, told those who stood near him, that, as soon as Agathocles

thocles should appear, they would change their sentiments, as they had done before. Upon hearing these words, some began to revile him, and others pushed him: and, when he attempted to defend himself, they tore his clothes; and some struck the points of their spears into his body. He was then dragged along, still breathing, and with many insults, thro' the midst of the multitude. As the people had now tasted of blood, they were impatient to see the others brought out. In a short time afterwards, Agathocles came first, loaded with chains. As soon as he appeared, some persons ran towards him, and instantly killed him. In this they performed the office, not of enemies, but of friends: for they saved him from the more dreadful death which his crimes deserved. After Agathocles, Nico was brought out; then Agathoclea naked, with her sisters; and afterwards all the rest of their kindred. Last of all, Oenanthe also was torn from the temple, and was brought naked on horseback into the Stadium. All these were now abandoned to the fury of the multitude. Some bit them with their teeth; some pierced them through with weapons; and some tore out their eyes. And as each of them  
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fell, they were divided limb from limb till they were all torn into pieces. For the anger of the Ægyptians always is attended with most terrible cruelty. At the same time likewise, the young women who had been educated with Arsinoë, being informed that Philammon had come three days before to Alexandria from Cyrene, with a design to kill the queen, ran to his house: and, having forced their entrance, they murdered him with clubs and stones; strangled his son who was an infant; and then dragged his wife naked into the streets, and killed her. In this dismal manner perished Agathocles, Agathoclea, and all their kindred.

## C H A P. II.

I AM not ignorant indeed, with what pains some writers, in order to strike their readers with astonishment, have heightened this transaction into a most portentous story; and loaded it with a detail of studied observation, exceeding even the relation itself in length. Some of them, ascribing every thing that happened to the sole influence of fortune, attempt to paint in the strongest colours the inconstancy of that Goddess, and to shew how difficult it is for men to secure themselves against her power. Others again, when they have represented all the circumstances to be indeed astonishing, endeavour afterwards to assign some probable causes of so wonderful an event. For my own part, I have resolved not to undertake the task of making any such reflections. For I cannot discover that Agathocles was distinguished either by his military skill and courage; or that he possessed in any considerable degree that happy dexterity in the administration of civil affairs which might deserve to be imitated;

imitated; or lastly, that he ever excelled in that talent of courtly intrigue, that refined and crafty policy, by the means of which Sosibius and many other ministers preserved through their lives a supreme influence over those princes who successively intrusted them with the management of their affairs. He was indeed in all respects the very reverse of these. For it was only the incapacity and weakness of Philopator, which first raised him, with the astonishment of all men, into high authority. And when afterwards he had the fairest opportunity, upon the death of that prince, to maintain himself in his exalted station, he in a short time threw away, by the mere want of spirit and ability, both his power and his life. The story of a man like this needs no enlargement; nor affords any room for such reflections as might be drawn from the fortunes of that other Agathocles and Dyonysius, the two tyrants of Sicily; and of some besides, who acquired a name by their ability and great exploits. The latter of the two here mentioned derived his origin from the very lowest of the people. The former left the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, as Timæus has said of him in

the way of reproach, and came young to Syracuse. And yet each of them, in his time, raised himself to be the tyrant of that renowned and opulent city. Afterwards, they became the sovereigns of all Sicily; and were masters likewise of many of the parts of Italy. Agathocles also formed still greater designs. For he even invaded Africk: and at last died in the full possession of all his honours. And from hence, it is said, when Publius Scipio, the first conquerour of Carthage, was asked what persons he judged to have been the most distinguished by their skill in government, and their wisdom in conducting the boldest enterprizes, he answered, Dionysius and Agathocles. These then are the men, from whose actions an Historian may take a fair occasion to stop his readers with reflections; to remind them of the power of fortune; to remark the course of human affairs; and, in a word, to inculcate many useful lessons. But others, like the Agathocles, whose fate we have described, are very unfit to be made the subjects of such discourse. Upon this account, I have related without any enlargement the bare circumstances of his fall. But there was also in-

deed another reason, which determined me with no less weight, to reject all amplification in the recital of this story. Those changes of fortune, which are dreadful and astonishing, should be exhibited in a single view, and so far only as that they may be barely known. To keep them afterwards in sight, and to exaggerate them in a long description, not only is attended with no advantage, but must even be painful to those to whom they are shewn. In every thing that is offered to the eyes or ears, the design should always be, to convey either some utility, or some pleasure. All History especially should be directed constantly to these two ends. But an exaggerated description of astonishing accidents is certainly neither useful nor pleasing. It cannot be useful, since no one would wish to imitate what is contrary to reason: nor pleasing, because none can be delighted either with the sight or the relation of such events as are repugnant both to nature and to the common apprehensions of men. We may desire indeed once, and for the first time only, to see or to hear of such disasters; for the sake of being assured, that some things may happen which we conceived

to be impossible. But when we have this assurance, any lengthened repetition, forced upon us, only fills us with disgust. An historian therefore should be contented barely to relate, what may serve for imitation, or may be heard with pleasure. An enlarged description of calamity, which exceeds those bounds, may be proper indeed for Tragedy, but not for History. Some indulgence however may be allowed perhaps to those historians, who, because they neither have considered the works of nature, nor are acquainted with the general course of things in the world, are ready to regard the events which themselves have seen, or which they have greedily received from others, as the greatest and most wonderful that have happened in any age. Misled by this persuasion, and not sensible of the mistake into which they have fallen, they set themselves to relate with large exaggeration transactions, which have not even the praise of novelty, since they have before been recounted by others, and from which their readers also never can derive either advantage or delight.

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THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SIXTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*The naval engagement between Attalus and Philip, near the island of Chios.*

**P**HILIP was now filled with great perplexity, and began to be extremely anxious with respect to the event. His progress in the siege had in no degree answered his expectation: and the enemy also were lying at anchor near him, with a greater number of decked ships than his own. As there was therefore no room left for choice, he suddenly sailed away with all his fleet. This motion occasioned no small surprize in Attalus; who expected

pected that the king would still have continued the work of his mines against the city. But Philip had persuaded himself, that, by getting first out to sea, he should be secure from being overtaken by the enemy; and, directing his course along the coast, might be able to arrive safe at Samos. He was however very greatly disappointed in his hopes. For Attalus and Theophiliscus no sooner saw that he was getting out to sea, than they resolved immediately to follow him. Their fleet was not formed in order: for they had expected, as we have said, that Philip would still have persisted in the siege. They exerted however their whole skill in rowing; and, when they had overtaken the enemy, Attalus attacked the right, which was also the van of their fleet, and Theophiliscus the left. Philip, finding himself thus intercepted in his course, gave the signal to his ships upon the right; commanding them to turn their prows towards the enemy, and to engage with vigour: and himself with some boats retired to the little islands that were in the middle of the strait, designing to observe from thence the progress of the battle. His fleet consisted of fifty-three decked ships; besides open vessels, such

such as boats and long gallies, which were in number one hundred and fifty. Some others were left at Samos, which he had not been able to get ready. On the side of his enemies were sixty-five decked ships, including those sent by the Byzantines; and, beside these, nine biremes, and three triremes.

The vessel in which Attalus sailed began the combat: and the nearest of the ships on both sides, without waiting for any signal, immediately engaged each with the other as they approached, Attalus, having attacked an octireme, laid open the side by a fortunate stroke below the surface of the water; so that the vessel sunk at last to the bottom, though the men upon the deck maintained the fight for some time with the greatest bravery. Another vessel that belonged to Philip, carrying ten banks of oars, and which was the first ship in the fleet, was lost by a very strange accident. A bireme, having fallen under the prow of this large ship, was struck by the latter with so great violence, that all the art of the pilot was not able to draw out the beak, which was fixed fast in the middle of the hulk of the little vessel, just below the uppermost bank of the oars. At this very time two

quinqueremes came up ; and striking their beaks into both the sides of the large ship, which was so fixed in its position by the little vessel that was suspended from it that it was not able to move, sunk it to the bottom, together with all that were on board. Among these was Democrates, the chief commander of the fleet. About the same time likewise, Dionysidorus and Dinocrates, two brothers and commanders on the side of Attalus, were engaged, with circumstances not less singular, the one with a septireme, and the other with an octireme of the enemy. Dinocrates, who attacked the latter, having raised the prow of his vessel, received a stroke in the part that was above the water, and at the same time struck his own beak so deep into the lower part of the octireme, that he was not able to draw it back, tho' he many times attempted it by lightening his stern. In this situation, he was so closely attacked by the Macedonians, that he found himself in the greatest danger. But Attalus, perceiving what had happened, bore down upon the octireme ; and by the violence of the shock separated the two vessels, and set Dinocrates free. The Macedonians were all killed after a brave resistance ; and the vessel remained

mained in the power of the conquerours. Dionysidorus on his part, bearing down upon the septireme, missed his stroke; and, as he fell against the enemy, lost all the banks of his oars upon the right side of his vessel, and all the battlements of his deck. The Macedonians attack him on every side with loud shouts and cries. The vessel was soon sunk, together with all that were on board. Dionysidorus alone, and two others, saved themselves by swimming to a bireme that was near. Among the rest of the ships that were engaged, the contest was more equal. The advantage which Philip had in the number of his small vessels was balanced by the strength of the decked ships on the side of Attalus. And, tho' the hopes of success were the most promising on the side of Attalus, the vigour of the Macedonians in the right of the fleet rendered the victory at this time doubtful.

The Rhodians, when they first sailed out to sea, were at a very great distance behind the enemy, as we before have mentioned. But as they far exceeded them in the swiftness of their course, they soon reached the rear of the Macedonian fleet; and began to attack the vessels

sels in stern, as they were sailing from them, and to break their banks. The Macedonians were then forced to turn, and assist the ships that were thus attacked. And when the rest of the Rhodian vessels were come up, and had joined Theophiliscus, the whole fleets on both sides turned their prows, the one against the other, and amidst the sound of trumpets, and the noise of animating cries, engaged in set battle with the greatest ardour. The action however would have been determined in a very short time, and with little difficulty, if the Macedonians had not intermingled some small vessels among their decked ships, and by that measure frustrated in various manners the efforts of the Rhodian fleet. For no sooner was the order of battle broken by the first shock, and the ships mingled together in confusion, than these small vessels, falling in among the rest, either stopped them in their course, or prevented them from turning, and employing with advantage their proper strength; and, by obstructing sometimes the working of the oars, sometimes by attacking the prow, and sometimes again the stern of the larger ships, rendered the skill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers alike

alike unserviceable. When any of the ships were engaged beak with beak, the Rhodians indeed displayed their superior art. For setting their own vessels low upon the prow, while they received the stroke of the enemy above the water, they at the same time struck the adverse ships below it, and made such breaches as were irreparable. It was but seldom however that they availed themselves of this advantage. Deterred by the vigour which the Macedonians shewed, in maintaining the fight hand to hand against them from their decks, they in general declined the danger of a close engagement: and chose rather to run through the fleet of the enemy, and to break the oars; and then, returning again, to direct their strokes against the stern of the vessels, or against the sides, as they were turning themselves obliquely from them; and either pierced them with their beaks, or carried away some part that was necessary for the working of the ship. By this method they destroyed a very great number of vessels in the Macedonian fleet.

There were three Rhodian quinqueremes, that were distinguished in a very remarkable manner in this engagement. One of these was the vessel in which Theophiliscus

philiscus failed, who was the commander of the fleet. Philostratus was captain in the second. The third had Nicostratus on board, and was commanded by Autolychus. The last of these ships had struck one that belonged to the enemy with so great violence, that the beak was left sticking in the vessel. The ship that was struck soon sunk with all the men: and the other, while the water flowed in fast at the prow, was surrounded on every side by the enemy. Autolychus defended himself for some time with the greatest courage: till, being covered with wounds, he at last fell with his arms into the sea. The rest that were on board maintained the fight with no less bravery, till they were all likewise killed. At this time Theophiliscus advanced towards them. Not being able to save the vessel, which was already filled with water, he struck two ships of the enemy, and forced out all that were on board. But being soon surrounded by a very great number both of light and heavy vessels, he lost the greatest part of his men after a brave resistance. And having himself also received three wounds, and being pressed by the most imminent danger, he at last with great difficulty saved his ship through the  
assistance

assistance of Philostratus, who had the courage to take his place in the action. Being then joined by some other vessels, he returned once more to fight: and, tho' the strength of his body was much weakened by his wounds, yet such was the vigour of his mind, that he distinguished himself by more glorious efforts, and by a courage more astonishing than before.

In this battle there were properly two actions, at a great distance one from the other. For the right of the fleet of Philip, which was attacked by Attalus, having kept their course close along the shore, as they had at first designed, was not far distant from the continent of Asia: while his left, which had turned to support the ships in the rear, had approached the island Chios, and was engaged with the Rhodian fleet. The success of Attalus against the right had been almost complete; and this prince, as he pursued his victory, was now come near to those little islands, where Philip was stationed, expecting the event of the battle; when he perceived, that one of his own quinqueremes, which had advanced too far beyond the rest, was struck by a Macedonian vessel, and was ready to sink. He  
hastened

hastened therefore with two quadriremes to save this ship. And when the enemy, as he approached, declined the combat, and retired towards the land, he pursued with the greatest eagerness, and was earnest to render himself master of the Macedonian vessel. Philip, perceiving that the king was so far separated from the rest of his fleet, took four quinqueremes, three biremes, and some boats that were near, and stood ready to intercept him in his return. Attalus, finding his return cut off, and being filled with the greatest apprehensions for his safety, was at last forced to run his ship close in to the land, and escaped safe to Erythræ, with the rest that were on board; while the vessel, and all the royal furniture, fell into the hands of Philip. An artifice indeed, which he had employed upon this occasion, very greatly facilitated his escape. He had ordered his most splendid furniture to be brought out, and placed upon the deck of the ship. When the Macedonians therefore first entered from their boats, and saw many rich goblets, a vest of purple, and all the utensils which accompany the regal pomp; instead of following the pursuit, they set themselves to pillage what was before them, and by that delay  
gave

gave full time to the king, to continue his flight with safety to Erythræ.

Though Philip had been by much the greatest sufferer in the whole of the engagement, yet so much was he elated with this success, that he sailed back again into the open sea, and began with great diligence to draw together his ships, and to encourage his men, as if he had now clearly obtained the victory. And indeed when his enemies on the other side perceived, that he was followed by the royal vessel bound fast to his own, they were all ready to believe that Attalus had perished. Dionysidorus among the rest was filled with that persuasion. He made the signal therefore for bringing together the ships of his own fleet: and, having soon collected them into a body, he sailed away to the ports of Asia without any danger. At the same time also, the Macedonian ships that were engaged against the Rhodians, having for a long time suffered greatly in the action, withdrew themselves separately from the fight, under the pretence of carrying assistance to some other part of the fleet. The Rhodians, when they had bound fast to the stern of their own ships one part of the vessels which they had taken, and broken the  
the

the rest into pieces, directed their course to Chios. In the engagement against Attalus, Philip had lost one vessel of ten banks of oars, one of nine, one of seven, and one of six; together with ten other decked ships, three biremes, and twenty-five boats. These vessels were all destroyed, together with the men that were on board. In the engagement against the Rhodians, ten of his decked ships were destroyed, and forty boats: two quadriremes were also taken, and seven boats, with all their men. On the side of Attalus, one breme and two quinqueremes were sunk; and the royal vessel was taken. Two quinqueremes of the Rhodians were destroyed, and some triremes; but none of their vessels taken. No more than sixty men were killed on the side of the Rhodians; and about seventy in the fleet of Attalus. But on the side of Philip, three thousand of the Macedonian soldiers, and six thousand of the naval forces lost their lives. Two thousand also of the Macedonians and their allies were taken prisoners. Among these, seven hundred were Egyptians. Such was the end of the naval battle near the island of Chios.

When

When the action was finished, Philip assumed to himself, upon two accounts, the honour of the victory. The first was, that he had forced Attalus to run his vessel in to the land, and had made himself master of the ship: and the other, because he had cast anchor, after the engagement, near the promontory Argennum, and taken his station in the very midst of the wrecks of the fleets. On the next day likewise, he endeavoured by his actions to support the same pretension. With this design, and in order to persuade men still more strongly that he remained the conquerour, he collected together the wrecks of all the ships, and took up the bodies of his own men that were to be distinguished among the dead. But it very soon appeared, that this was not his own opinion. For while he was employed in this very work, Dionysidorus and the Rhodians, having joined their fleets together, came sailing towards the place where he was, and stood for some time before him in order of battle. And when he declined the engagement, they returned unmolested back to Chios.

In reality, this prince had never at any time before suffered so great a loss in a single action, either by land or sea.

He felt himself very deeply affected with the misfortune; and was forced to abate much of his former ardour. He endeavoured indeed, by every method, to conceal his sentiments from others: but the very face of things alone rendered even this attempt impracticable. For, beside other circumstances, the objects that presented themselves on every side, after the engagement, struck all with horror who beheld them. So great had been the slaughter, that the whole strait at the time was covered with blood; and was filled with dead bodies, with arms, and wrecks of the ships. And for many days afterwards, these objects were seen mingled together, and thrown in heaps upon the shores. So dreadful a spectacle not only struck Philip with confusion, but filled all the Macedonians with extreme dismay. Theophiliscus, who survived only one day after the battle, wrote an account of the action to his country; appointed Cleonæus in his own stead commander of the fleet; and then died of his wounds: having merited immortal honour, not only by his courage in the engagement, but on account of the resolution also which he had shewn in conducting the whole design. For unless his  
spirit

spirit had determined him to be thus early in attacking Philip, so universally was that prince at this time dreaded, that the present opportunity would have been wholly lost. But he not only resolved to begin the war against him, but obliged his country also to seize the favourable moment: and forced Attalus likewise, not to waste his time in preparations, but to enter immediately into action, and to try the fortune of a battle without any delay. It was not without good reason therefore, that the Rhodians after his death decreed such honours to his memory, as were most proper to encourage, not those alone who were then alive, but the men also of future times, to render upon great occasions the most effectual service to their country.

## EXTRACT the SECOND.

*The reason why men often abandon their designs.*

WHAT was it then which forced him to stop at once in the midst of this pursuit? It was nothing indeed but the mere nature of things. For we often see, that men, while they contemplate objects at a distance, and attend only to the great advantages that would follow from success, engage eagerly in designs which are impossible to be accomplished. The violence of their desires precludes altogether the exercise of their reason. But when the time of execution is come, and the difficulties which appear upon a nearer view are found to be absolutely unsurmountable, their thoughts are suddenly bewildered and perplexed; their understanding becomes confused; and the attempt is then abandoned with the same precipitation with which it had before been undertaken.

EXTRACT the THIRD.

*Philip renders himself master of Prinassus by a stratagem.*

**A**FTER some attacks, which the strength of this little city rendered fruitless; Philip desisted from the attempt; and, leading his army through the country, destroyed the citadels, and plundered the villages that were near. He then went and encamped before Prinassus: and having in a short time finished his blinds, and completed the other preparations that were necessary for a siege, he began to undermine the wall of the city. But when he found that the rockiness of the soil rendered this work altogether impracticable, he had recourse to the following stratagem. He ordered the soldiers to make a great noise under ground in the day-time, as if they were employed in digging the mines, and in the night to bring earth from distant parts, and to lay it along the mouths of the pits that were opened; that the besieged, on seeing a large quantity of earth, might be

struck with apprehensions of their danger. At first however, the inhabitants displayed a great shew of bravery, and seemed determined to maintain themselves in their post. But when Philip informed them by a message, that the wall was undermined to the length of four hundred feet; and that he left it to their choice, whether they would now retire with safety, or, remaining till he should set fire to the props, be then all destroyed amidst the ruins of the place; they gave an entire credit to his account, and delivered up the city.

EXTRACT the FOURTH.

*The situation of Iassus. The judgment of the author concerning wonderful stories.*

**I**ASSUS in Asia is situated upon the gulph, which is terminated on one side by the temple of Neptune in the Milesian territory, and on the other by the city of Mindus; and which by many is called the Bargylietic gulph, from the cities of the same name which are spread round the innermost parts of it. The inhabitants of Iassus boast that they were originally a colony from Argos: but that afterwards their ancestors, when they had suffered a great loss in the Carian war, received a new colony of Milesians, which was brought to them by the son of Neleus, the first founder of Miletus. The city contains ten stadia in circumference. There is a report which is firmly credited among the inhabitants of the Bargylian cities; that no snow or rain ever falls upon the statue of the Cindyan Diana, though it stands in the open air.

The people of Iassus affirm the same thing also concerning their statue of Vesta: and both these stories are related as facts by some historians. For my own part, I know not how it is, that I am still forced in the course of my work to take some notice of such traditions, which are scarcely to be heard with patience. It is certainly a proof of a most childish folly, to relate things, which, when they are brought to be examined, appear to be not only improbable, but even not possible. When a writer affirms, for example, that certain bodies, though placed in the light of the sun, project no shade, what is it but a plain indication of a distempered brain? And yet Theopompus has declared that this happens to those who are admitted into the temple of Jupiter in Arcadia. Of the same kind are the stories that have now been mentioned. I must confess indeed, that, when things of this sort tend only to preserve in vulgar minds a reverential awe of the divinity, writers may sometimes be excused, if they employ their pains in recounting miracles, and in framing legendary tales. But nothing which exceeds that point should be allowed. It is not easy perhaps to fix in every

every instance the exact bounds of this indulgence; yet neither is it absolutely impossible. My opinion is, that ignorance and falsehood may be admitted in a small degree; and, when they are carried farther, that they ought to be exploded,

## EXTRACT the FIFTH.

*Scipio returns to Rome. His Triumph.  
The death of Syphax.*

NOT long after this time Publius Scipio returned back to Rome from Africk. As the greatness of his actions had raised in men a very high and general expectation, he was surrounded by vast crouds upon his entrance, and received by the people with the greatest marks of favour. Nor was this only reasonable, but an act also of necessary duty. For they who not long before had not so much as dared to hope, that Annibal ever could be driven out of Italy, or the danger be removed from their own persons and their families, now saw themselves not only freed from the apprehension of any present evils, but established also in a lasting and firm security, by the intire conquest of their enemies. Upon this occasion therefore, they set no bounds to their joy. On the day likewise in which he entered the city in triumph, as the objects that

7

were

were viewed in the procession represented most clearly to the senses of the people the dangers from which they had escaped, they stood as in an ecstasy of passion, pouring out thanks to the Gods, and acknowledgements to the author of so great a deliverance. Among the rest of the prisoners Syphax also, the Massælyian king, was led along a captive in the procession: and after some time he died in prison. When the solemnity of the triumph was finished, there was afterwards in Rome, during many days, a continual succession of games and spectacles; the expence of which was defrayed by Scipio, with a generosity which was worthy of him.

## EXTRACT the SIXTH.

*The prudent conduct of Philip after his defeat.*

THERE are many men indeed, who may be observed to begin an action well, and even to redouble their ardour as they advance, till they have made a very considerable progress: but to conduct an enterprize completely to the end, and, even when fortune obstructs them in their course, to supply by prudence whatever may have been defective in alacrity and vigour, is the portion only of a few. In this view, as the inaction of Atalus and the Rhodians, after their late victory may justly be censured; so, on the other hand, the magnanimity and the royal spirit, with which Philip persisted still in his designs, deserves not less to be applauded. Let it be remarked however, that it is not my meaning to apply this commendation to the general character and conduct of this prince; but that I am speaking only of the attention which  
he

he exerted upon the present occasion. Without this distinction, I might be charged perhaps with inconsistency; in having not long before applauded Attalus and the Rhodians, and censured Philip, and delivering now a contrary judgment. But for this very purpose it was, that I observed expressly in the beginning of my work, that an Historian often is obliged to applaud and to condemn the same persons, as different occasions may require. For the revolutions of affairs, and sudden accidents as they arise, are frequently seen to change the intentions of men from good to bad, or from bad to good. And even without the impression of external circumstances, the natural inconstancy of the human mind sometimes determines men to a right course of action, and sometimes to that which is altogether wrong. The force of one or other of these causes was now clearly visible in Philip. For though this prince suffered no small concern from his late defeat, and was apt, almost at all times, to be hurried along by violence and passion, yet upon this occasion he accommodated himself with a most astonishing prudence to the exigency of the times. By this conduct he was again enabled to  
resume

resume the war against the Rhodians and king Attalus; and in the end accomplished all that he proposed. Such an instance of his prudence deserved not to pass altogether without remark. For some men, like bad racers, abandon their designs, when they are arrived even almost at the end of their course: while others, on the contrary, obtain a victory against their rivals, by exerting in that very moment more strenuous efforts than before.

EXTRACT the SEVENTH.

*The situation of Sestus and Abydus. The siege of this last city: and the desperate resolution of the citizens.*

**I**T would be needless to enter into a long description of the situation of Sestus and Abydus, or to enumerate the conveniences which they possess. For these cities are so singularly placed, that there is scarcely any one, unless among the most vulgar of mankind, who has not acquired some knowledge of them. But it will not be unuseful upon the present occasion, to turn the attention of the reader to a general view of their position. And indeed whoever will compare and lay together what I am going to say, may obtain from thence a juster notion of these two cities, than even from an examination of the ground upon which they stand.

As it is not possible then to sail from the Ocean, or, as it is called by others, from the Atlantick, into our sea, without passing through the strait of the Pillars

lars of Hercules; so neither is there any way of sailing from our sea into the Propontis and the Pontus, unless through the passage that lies between Sestus and Abydus. In one respect indeed, these straits are very differently formed. For that of the Pillars of Hercules is much larger than the Hellespont, and contains sixty stadia in breadth; whereas the other, between Sestus and Abydus, has no more than two. But in making this difference, Fortune seems to have acted not altogether without design. One reason of it, as far as we are able to conjecture, seems to be, that the exterior ocean is by many degrees larger than our sea. To this we may add, that the strait of Abydus is better adapted, upon this account, to the necessities of those who live upon it. For as both sides of it are covered with inhabitants, the narrowness of the passage serves as a kind of gate for their mutual intercourse. For this purpose, they sometimes throw a bridge over the strait, and pass from one side to the other on foot. At other times, vessels are seen sailing continually upon it. But the strait of the Pillars of Hercules is very rarely used, and only by a few. For the people that live on both sides, in the extreme borders

ders of Africk and of Europe, have but little communication one with another, and scarcely any knowledge of the exterior sea. The city Abydus is inclosed also on either side by the promontories of Europe; and has a harbour, which affords a safe shelter to the ships that are stationed in it against every wind. But without the entrance of the harbour, it is not possible for any vessel ever to cast anchor, on account of the rapidity and violence with which the waters are carried through the strait.

This was the city, to which Philip was now laying siege both by land and by sea. On the side of the latter, he had blocked the place closely by piles planted crossways: and, by land, had carried an entrenchment round the walls. The greatness of the preparations that were made, the variety of the works that were contrived, the skill and artifice that were employed in carrying into execution every usual method either of attack or of defence; these, however memorable, are not the things that are most worthy of admiration upon the present occasion. But the generous resolution and the extravagant spirit, which appeared in the besieged, were so singular and astonishing, that this

siege, upon that account alone, deserves more than any other to be transmitted to posterity in lasting characters. At first, reposing an intire confidence in their own strength, they sustained all the attacks of Philip with the greatest firmness: disabling the machines that were advanced against the city from the sea, by stones thrown from their Balistæ; or destroying them by fire; so that the Macedonians were scarcely able to withdraw even their ships from the danger. On the side of the land likewise, they repulsed the king in his approaches with so great vigour and success, that for some time they seemed to hope, that they should force him to desist from his attempt. But when they saw the outer wall of the city fall down; and that the Macedonians had brought their mines very near also to the wall which had been raised within the other, to supply the place of that which had fallen; they then sent Iphiades and Pantacnotus to treat with Philip, and offered to surrender the city to him upon these conditions: that the troops which they had received from Attalus and the Rhodians should be dismissed with an assurance of safety; and the free citizens be allowed to depart to what places soever they

they should choofe, with the garments that were upon their bodies. But Philip ordered the deputies to go back again and tell the befieged, that they either muft furrender at difcretion, or continue to defend themfelves with courage.

The Abydenians, when they had received this answer; met together in council, and, with minds agitated by defpair, deliberated on the meafures which they now fhould take. They refolved firft, that the flaves fhould be made free; that they might affift without referve in the defence of the city. In the next place, that all the women of the city fhould be affembled together in the temple of Diana; and all the children, with their nurfes, in the Gymnafium. That all their gold and filver likewise fhould be laid together in the Forum: and, in the fame manner, all their valuable veftments, in the Rhodian quadrireme, and in the trireme of the Cyziceniens. Thefe things, being thus decreed, were carried into execution with one confent. They then called together another affembly: and, having chofen fifty of the oldeft men, who were judged to be moft worthy of fuch a truft, and who had ftrength fufficient alfo to accomplifh all that was propofed,

they made them swear in the presence of all the citizens, that, as soon as the enemy should become masters of the inner wall, they would kill the women and the children; set fire to the two vessels; and throw the gold and the silver into the sea. After this, the priests being called, all the rest of the citizens were engaged likewise by a solemn oath, that they would either conquer, or die fighting in the defence of their country. And to conclude the whole, having slain some victims in sacrifice, they obliged the priests and priestesses to pronounce upon the burning entrails, dire execrations against those who should neglect to perform what they had sworn. When all was finished, they no longer endeavoured to countermine the enemy; but resolved only, that, as soon as the wall should fall, they would exert their utmost efforts upon the breach, and continue fighting till they should all expire.

And now may it not be said, that both the desperate resolution of the Phocæans, which has before been mentioned, and the magnanimous spirit also of the Acarnanians, were surpassed by the daring courage which the Abydenians shewed upon this occasion? For when the Phocæans

cæans entered into a like determination with respect to their families, they had still some hopes of saving themselves by a victory; having an opportunity of engaging the Theſſalians in a ſet battle. The Acarnanians likewiſe had in their power the ſame reſource. For when they only expected an invaſion from the Ætolians, they paſſed in their council a ſimilar decree. We have before given a particular account of theſe tranſactions. But the Abydenians, already enclod on every ſide, and having no means of ſafety remaining in their power, choſe rather to periſh, every man, together with their wives and children; than to live with the certain expectation of ſeeing their children and their wives fall into the hands of their enemies. The conduct therefore of Fortune, with regard to this laſt people, may well be charged with ſome injuſtice. She compaſſionated the diſtreſſes of the others, retrieved their affairs by a victory, and reſtated them in ſafety when they had almoſt loſt all hope. To the Abydenians alone ſhe ſhewed no favour. The men all loſt their lives; the city was taken; and the children with their mothers came alive into the power of the enemy. For as ſoon as the inner wall fell down, the

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citizens,

citizens, in observance of their oaths, all mounted the breach, and opposed the entrance of the enemy with so great fury, that Philip, though he sent continually, even till night came on, fresh troops to the assault, was at last forced to desist, and began to apprehend that the whole design was irrecoverably lost. For the foremost of the Abydenians not only advanced with a frantick kind of desperation over the dead bodies of the enemy; nor were contented to employ their spears and their swords alone with a most astonishing force; but, when their weapons were rendered useles, or were torn by violence out of their hands, grasping the Macedonians close, they threw some of them with their armour upon the ground; broke the spears of others; and, catching the fragments from them, turned the points against their faces, and against the other parts of their bodies that were uncovered; and by these means threw them into extreme consternation and dismay. But when the night had put an end to the combat, the greatest part of the citizens being left dead upon the breach, and the rest disabled by fatigue and wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus, having assembled together a small number of the oldest men,

men, prevailed with them to abandon that most glorious and most admirable determination which they so lately had embraced, and to consider only their own present safety. They resolved therefore to save the women and the children alive; and, as soon as the day should appear, that they would send the priests and priestesses, dressed in their holy habits, to implore the mercy of Philip, and to deliver the city to him.

At the very time of this transaction, Attalus, having heard that the Abydenians were besieged, sailed through the Ægean sea to Tenedos: and Marcus Æmilius, who was the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, came to Abydus. For the ambassadors that were sent from Rome, having received also at Rhodes the notice of this siege, and because they had orders likewise to obtain an interview with Philip, stopped their journey to the other kings, and sent Æmilius to Abydus to confer personally with that prince. The Roman, being admitted into his presence, declared to him the orders of the senate: “ that he should not make war upon any of the people of Greece, nor invade any of the dominions that belonged to Ptolemy; and that he should engage to make

an equitable compensation for the losses which Attalus and the Rhodians had unjustly sustained. That, if he would comply with these conditions, he might still remain in peace: if otherwise, that the Romans would declare war against him." The king endeavoured to convince the ambassadour, that the Rhodians had first attacked him. But Æmilius, interrupting him; "And what, said he, did the Athenians? what, the Cicians? what, at this moment, the unhappy Abydenians? did either of these first attack you?" Philip, after some hesitation, told him; that for three reasons he would excuse the haughtiness of this address. First, because he was a young man, not yet experienced in affairs: in the next place, because he was the handsomest man of his age; which indeed was true: and, lastly, because he was a Roman. He then added, that it was his earnest wish, that the Romans would still confine themselves within the bounds of their treaties, and lay aside all thoughts of war. But if they determine otherwise, we shall then, continued he, invoke the assistance of the gods, and defend ourselves against them with our utmost strength. After this discourse they severally retired. The king  
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then took possession of the city; and without any difficulty seized all the treasure, which the Abydenians had before collected, and laid together in heaps. But how great was his astonishment, when he saw the numbers of the persons that destroyed themselves, together with their wives and children, with the most eager fury. Some stabbed, some strangled themselves; some plunged themselves alive into wells; and others threw themselves headlong down from the roofs of the houses. Filled with grief at this dismal sight, he ordered proclamation to be made, that he would allow three days to those who should choose to hang, or otherwise destroy themselves. But the Abydenians had before determined their own fate, and adhered inflexibly to their first purpose. They considered themselves as guilty of a kind of treason against those brave citizens, who had perished in the defence of their country: nor would any among them submit to live, except those whose hands were tied, or who were restrained by some other kind of force. The rest, with their whole families, without any delay, embraced a voluntary death.

## EXTRACT the EIGHTH.

*The expedition of Philopœmen against Nabis.*

PHILOPOEMEN, having first computed the respective distances of all the Achæan cities, and considered also, which of them lay along the same roads in going towards Tegea, wrote letters to them all, and sent them in different parcels, to the cities that were at the greatest distance from that place: the parcels being so composed, that each of these cities, together with the letter addressed to itself, received those likewise that were written to the rest of the cities which stood upon the same road. The first letter was addressed to the chief magistrate of the city, and contained the following words: “As soon as you have received this letter, assemble together in the Forum all the men of military age with their arms. Let them be furnished with provisions, and with money for five days: and, when they are formed into a body, conduct them to the next city. On your arrival there, deliver the letter that is addressed also to the  
chief

chief magistrate of that city ; and let the contents of it in like manner be obeyed." This second letter contained the same orders as the former ; and was different only in the name of the next city to which the troops were to be conducted. The same method was observed through all the cities : and the result of this management was, that, as no one was able to conjecture what was the design and object of the expedition, so neither had the troops themselves any farther knowledge of their march, than that they were going to the next city ; but remaining still in a state of doubt and ignorance, joined themselves each to the others, and continued to advance. As the first and most distant cities were not all situated at an equal distance from Tegea, care had been also taken, that the letters should not be delivered to them all at once ; but at different times, proportioned to their respective distances. And from hence it happened, that, when neither the Tegeans, nor the troops themselves, had conceived any expectation of such an accident, the Achæans all arrived at Tegea in the same moment in arms, and entered the city together by all the different gates. The design of Philopœmen was, to elude by  
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this contrivance the observation of those spies and gatherers of news, which Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, had dispersed through the country.

Having thus formed his project, on the day on which the Achæans were expected to arrive, he sent away a select body of troops from Tegea; with orders, that they should conceal themselves during the night in the neighbourhood of Sela-fia, and early on the following day make incursions into the Lacedæmonian territory. That, if the Spartan mercenaries should be drawn together to oppose them, they should then retreat towards Scotita; and in all other things obey the orders of Didascalondas of Crete, to whom he had communicated his whole design. This measure being carried into execution, he directed the Achæans to take their supper at an early hour, and then led them out of Tegea. Having continued his march all night with the greatest haste, he arrived at break of day, and took his post secretly in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which lies between Tegea and Sparta. The Spartan mercenaries that were stationed in Pellene, having received notice in the morning from their scouts, that some troops of the enemy were making  
incur-

Ex. VIII. of P O L Y B I U S. 237

incursions in the country, immediately sallied out, and attacked them with their accustomed vigour. The Achæans observed their orders and retreated. The mercenaries pursued with the greatest eagerness: till, being at last arrived at the place where the rest of the Achæans lay concealed, they were suddenly surrounded by them, and were all either killed or taken prisoners.

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THE  
GENERAL HISTORY  
OF  
POLYBIUS.

BOOK the SEVENTEENTH.

EXTRACT the FIRST.

*Conferences between Philip, Flaminius, and the deputies of the allies. They all send ambassadors to Rome. The Roman senate resolves that the war shall be continued against Philip.*

CHAP. I.

WHEN the day appointed for the conference was come, Philip sailed from Demetrias in an armed sloop, accompanied with five boats, and came into the Malian gulph. He was attended by his  
two

two secretaries, Apollodorus and Demosthenes, both Macedonians; by Brachylus of Bœotia; and by Cyeliadas an Achæan, who had been forced to fly out of Peloponnesus, for the reasons that have before been mentioned. On the other side, with Titus Flaminius, came the king Amynder; Dionysodorus, on the part of Attalus; and deputies also from the other states and cities. On the part of the Achæans appeared Aristænetus and Xenophon: for the Rhodians, Acesimbrotus, their chief naval commander: and, in the name of the Ætoliens, Phæneas, their Prætor, with many others that were employed in the administration of the government. When they were all come near together upon the coast of Nicæa, Flaminius steered his vessel close in to the land, and went and stood upon the shore. But Philip, though he also approached the land, stood aloof at some little distance from it: and, when the former called to him to come on shore, he answered from his ship that he would not do it. The other asked him, who it was that he feared? I fear no one, said Philip, except the Gods: but I have just reason to be distrustful of many that are here present, especially of the Ætoliens. Fla-  
minius

minius was surpris'd, and said, that the opportunity was the same, and the danger equal to all. The danger is by no means equal, replied Philip; for if Phæneas were to be killed, the Ætolians might find many other Prætors; but, if the same thing should happen to me, the Macedonians would at this time be left without a king. This beginning gave no small offence to all that were present. He was desired however by the Roman General to speak what he had to say upon the subject of their meeting. Philip answered, that it belonged not to him to speak, but to the Roman. That for his own part therefore he only desired Flaminius to declare, upon what conditions he might be suffered to remain in peace. The conditions, replied Flaminius, are clear and simple. I order you to relinquish every part of Greece: to send back all the prisoners and deserters to their respective countries: to restore to the Romans the places which you have conquered in Illyria since the treaty of Epirus; and to Ptolemy all the cities which you have taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator. Then turning himself towards the other deputies, he bade them declare the orders which they had re-

ceived from their several states. Dionysodorus began the first; and demanded in the name of Attalus, that Philip should deliver to that prince all the ships and men which he had taken in the engagement near the island of Chios; and restore also, in the same condition as before, the Nicephorium and the temple of Venus, which he had plundered and destroyed. Next to him, Acesimbrotus on the part of the Rhodians required, that the king should restore the district of Peræa, which he had taken from them; withdraw his garrisons from Iassus, and the cities of Bargylia and Euromea; allow the Perinthians to be united as before in the same common government as the Byzantines; and, in the last place, that he should deliver up Sestus and Abydus, together with all the ports and places of traffick which he possessed in Asia. After the Rhodians, the Achæans demanded likewise the restitution of Argos and of Corinth. Last of all, the Ætolians insisted also, as the Romans had done, that Philip should relinquish every part of Greece; and to this they added, that he should restore unhurt the cities which had been before associated with them in their government.

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These demands were made by Phæneas the Ætolian Prætor. But there was a certain Alexander, surnamed the Ifian, who was considered among the Ætolians as a very able speaker, and well versed also in affairs. This man then began to speak. "It was not, he said, to be expected, that Philip would now employ any greater sincerity in making peace, than he had at any time shewn spirit in making war. That in conferences and negotiations, his endeavour was always to lay snares; to watch for some advantage; and to act even upon such occasions a hostile part. That his manner of making war was alike contrary to justice, and void of courage. That he never dared to look his enemies in the face, but fled always before them: pillaging and burning the cities in his flight; and depriving the conquerors by this dishonourable method of the just fruits of their victory. How different, continued he, was the conduct of the former kings of Macedon? They engaged continually in set battles in the open field; and scarcely at any time destroyed or overthrew the cities. Such was the manner in which Alexander maintained his war in Asia against Darius, and atchieved the conquest of that

mighty empire. The same was the conduct of his Generals who came after him, when they contended together for the same Asia against Antigonus. The same was that of all the succeeding princes to the time of Pyrrhus. Eager always to encounter with their enemies in the field, they employed every effort to determine their disputes by arms: but spared the cities, that the conquerours might possess them, and gain subjects by whom they might be honoured. And indeed, to relinquish the war itself, and only to destroy those things for the sake of which it is made; what is it but the work of the very strongest madness? Yet this is the manner in which Philip acts. For since the time of his retreat, which was made with so great haste through the passes of Epirus, he has destroyed in Thessaly, among the people who are his allies and friends, more cities than their enemies have at any time destroyed." Many other things were urged by him in support of the same charge. And he then concluded his discourse, with demanding of Philip; for what reason, when Lyfimachia was confederated with the Ætolians, and governed by an Ætolian Prætor, he had driven out that magistrate, and placed a Mace-

Macedonian garrison in the city? Upon what pretences, even while himself was allied by treaty with the Ætolians, he had carried the Cianians into slavery, who were associated also with the Ætolian state? And lastly, by what shew of right he now held possession of Echinus, of the Pthian Thebes, of Pharfalus and of Larissa?

As soon as he had ended, Philip approached nearer to the land; and, standing forwards in his ship, “This is in truth, said he, an harangue very worthy of an Ætolian, a declamation proper only for the stage. For who does not know, that no man ever willingly occasions the destruction of his allies: but that in certain conjunctures the leaders of armies are forced to take many measures that are repugnant to their inclinations.” He was still speaking, when Phæneas, who was very near-sighted, roughly interrupted him, and told him that he was wandering from the subject; for that he ought either to conquer in the field, or to receive the law from the conquerours. “Without doubt, replied Philip, turning himself quick towards him; even a blind man can see that.” For this prince had a strong propensity to raillery: and even

at this time, when his affairs were in no very proper condition for jesting, he was not able to restrain his natural inclination. Afterwards, addressing his discourse again to Alexander; “ You demand of me, said he, for what reason I possessed myself of Lyfimachia? It was to prevent the Thracians from taking advantage of your negligence to destroy that city: the very thing which happened afterwards; when the war forced me to withdraw the troops, which I had placed there, not as a garrison, but as a defence only against those invaders. Nor was it I that made war upon the Cianians. But when Prusias had declared war against them, I assisted him indeed in conquering their city. If there was any crime in this proceeding, to yourselves alone the guilt must be imputed. For how often have we demanded of you, both myself and all the states of Greece, an abrogation of the law, which allows you to take spoils from the spoils? But you have always answered, that you would sooner separate Ætolia from Ætolia, than relinquish that law.” Flaminius was astonished, not being able to conceive the meaning of these words. Philip therefore explained it by informing him, that it was the custom of this  
people

people not only to pillage the lands of those with whom they were at war ; but that when any other persons, even those that were the allies and friends of the Ætoli-ans, were engaged in war against each other ; the latter held it to be lawful for them to join their arms, though without any public decree, both to the one and the other of the contending parties, and to ravage the lands of both. That upon such occasions they knew not any difference between enmity and friendship : for that their neighbours, all equally without distinction, whenever any contention arose among them, were sure to have the Ætoli-ans for their enemies ? “ With what shew of justice then, continued he, do they now urge it as a crime, that, when I was indeed in friendship with the Ætoli-ans, but at the same time was allied to Prusias, I scrupled not to attack the Ci-ani-ans, in support of my ally ? But that which is most insufferable is, that these men now assume to themselves an equality with the Romans ; and, like them, command the Macedonians to relinquish the whole of Greece. This language, haughty indeed as it is, may be born however from the Romans ; but from the Ætoli-ans it is intolerable. And tell

me, I pray you, what is this Greece, from which I am commanded to retire? By what limits is it to be circumscribed? For a great part even of the Ætolians are not Greeks. The countries of the Agræans, the Apodotæ, the Amphilocheians; these are no parts of Greece. May I be allowed to retain possession of these?" Flaminius smiled at this pleasantry. "But enough has been said, continued Philip, upon the subject of the Ætolians. With regard to Attalus and the Rhodians, it would be thought more reasonable by any equitable judge, that they should restore to me the ships and the men which they have taken from me, than that I should restore their ships to them. But, if such be your pleasure Alexander, I will restore the district of Peræa to the Rhodians, and to Attalus those of his ships and men which are still preserved. The Nicephorium and the Temple of Venus, since they already are destroyed, it is not in my power, unless by one way only, to restore. I will send some plants to the place, and some gardeners also, who shall cultivate the ground, and make the trees grow that have been cut down." Flaminius laughed again at this droll conceit: and Philip, passing next to the Achæans, enume-

enumerated all the acts of kindness which they had received from Antigonus, and from himself. He then recounted also the many and great honours which this people had conferred upon the kings of Macedon. And having, in the last place, recited the decree, by which they had renounced the friendship of the Macedonians, and embraced the party of the Romans, he from thence took occasion to inveigh largely against their ingratitude and their breach of faith. In conclusion he said, that he was willing however to restore Argos to them; but that with respect to Corinth, he would deliberate concerning it with Flaminius.

Having in this manner finished his discourse to all the rest, he now addressed himself, as he expressly declared, to Flaminius and the Romans: and desired to be informed, what places and what cities of Greece he was commanded to relinquish; those only which he had conquered, or the others also which had been transmitted to him from his ancestors. As Flaminius made no answer, Aristænetus immediately rose up to speak on the part of the Achæans, and Phæneas for the Ætolians. But the day being now almost closed prevented any farther debate.

Philip

Philip then requested, that he might receive all together in writing the conditions upon which peace might be obtained. He was left, he said, alone, without a single person, by whom he might be advised: and that he wished to retire, and to consider with his best attention the concessions that were exacted from him. Flaminius had heard with pleasure the railleries which this prince had mingled with his discourse: and not being willing that it should be said, that he had nothing to reply, he now rallied Philip in his turn. “You do well indeed, said he, to complain that you are left alone: how can it be otherwise; when you have put all those to death, who might at this time have assisted you with the best advice?” The king forced a kind of reluctant smile, and made no reply. The demands of the several states were then given to him in writing, and were the same that have been mentioned. After this the assembly separated; having appointed a second meeting in the same place on the following day.

On the next day then Flaminius came again to the place. All the rest also were present, Philip only excepted, who did not appear. But when the day was so far advanced,

advanced, that there remained but little expectation of his coming, he at last arrived just in the evening, attended by the same persons as before. The conditions, he said, were so perplexing, and so full of difficulty, that he had wasted the whole day in the consideration of them. But the others believed, that his design in coming so late was, that the Ætolians and Achæans might not have time sufficient to accuse him. For he had observed, when he retired from the former conference, that they were both ready to enter into farther altercation, and to renew their complaints against him. And this indeed appeared to be the truth, when now, upon his first approach, he desired to be allowed a separate conference with Flaminius; that, instead of skirmishing any more together with words, some end might at last be put to their disputes. As he urged this request with repeated earnestness, Flaminius, when he had first asked the opinion of the rest, and received their consent for him to hear what the king would offer, took with him the Tribune Claudius, and, having directed the other deputies to retire to a little distance from the shore, ordered Philip to come upon the land. The king accordingly

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left his ship, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes; joined Flaminius; and conferred with him for a very considerable time. What passed on both sides upon this occasion, it is not easy for me to say. But Flaminius, after Philip had departed from him, informed the rest; that the king was ready to surrender to the Ætolians Pharsalus and Larissa, but not Thebes; and to the Rhodians the district of Peræa, but not the cities of Iassus and Bargylia: that he would restore to the Achæans both Argos and Corinth: would deliver to the Romans all the places in Illyria, and all the prisoners: and to Atalus, the ships which he had taken from him in the late engagement, together with the men likewise that were at this time in his hands. These offers were rejected at once by all the assembly. They demanded that Philip should first consent to the condition which they all required; that of relinquishing the whole of Greece. Unless this was done, the concessions which he was disposed to make to particular states would be vain and ineffectual. Philip, perceiving that the contest was likely to be vehement, and being apprehensive that he should again be forced to hear himself accused, desired that the  
assembly

assembly might be deferred to the morrow: that the day was already closed: and that he would either bring himself to yield to the conditions that were exacted from him, or prevail with the others to accept the terms which he had offered. Flaminius consented to this request, and appointed the shore near Thronium for the place of the third conference.

On the following day they all met together at an early hour. Philip, having first in a short discourse, intreated all that were present, and Flaminius above the rest, not to obstruct the conclusion of the peace, when it was manifest that the greatest part were inclined to consent to some accommodation, said that he wished indeed, if it was possible, that all their differences might be adjusted among themselves. But, if this was not to be accomplished, he then desired, that he might be allowed to send ambassadours to Rome. That he either would engage the senate to yield to him the matters in dispute; or would submit to every thing which they should otherwise enjoin. The deputies all at once rejected this proposal, and cried out that the war must be continued. But Flaminius said, that he very well knew that Philip never would perform

perform the conditions that were demanded of him. That their compliance however with this request would bring no injury to their affairs. That the conditions themselves, as they had been now proposed, could not otherwise be ratified, than by the authority of the senate: and that the present time was the most commodious for informing themselves of the inclinations of that assembly. For as the armies would not be able to attempt any thing during the winter, by employing that season of inaction in sending deputies to Rome, they would advance, and not retard, the end which they all desired. As it appeared from this discourse, that Flaminius himself was not unwilling to refer the matter to the senate, the rest readily concurred in this design, and consented that Philip should send some ambassadors to Rome. At the same time it was determined, that ambassadors should be deputed likewise from the other states, to lay their pretensions before the senate, and support their accusations against the king.

## C H A P. II,

**F**LAMINIUS, having in this manner brought the conferences to an end most favourable to his own intentions, and the same which he had from the first designed, applied himself now to finish what remained of the work; and, while he took such measures as were necessary for his own security, was careful not to leave any handle of advantage to Philip. Granting therefore to him a truce for two months, he commanded him to send his ambassadours to Rome within that time, and immediately to withdraw his garrisons from Phocis and from Locris: at the same time taking also every other precaution that was requisite, to prevent the allies from receiving any injury from the Macedonians during the continuance of the truce. He gave these orders in writing to Philip: and then made haste to finish what more particularly regarded his own design. He first engaged Amynder to go immediately to Rome: well knowing

knowing that this prince, who was of a flexible and pliant disposition, would easily be directed by his friends in the city; and that the title also of king would raise the public expectation, and give splendour to the negotiation. He then deputed thither, on his own part, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of his wife; Quintus Fulvius; and Appius Claudius, whose surname was Nero. On the part of the Ætolians were sent Alexander the Isian, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicæarchus of Trichonium, Polimarchus of Arfinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, and Nicomachus of Acarnania. The exiles that had been driven from Thyreum, and had taken refuge in Ambracia, sent also in their name Theodotus of Pheræ; who, after his banishment from Thessaly, had fixed his residence in Stratus. The Achæans deputed Xenophon of Ægium; king Attalus, only Alexander: and the Athenians, Cephisodorus.

When these Ambassadors arrived at Rome, the senate had not finally determined the allotment of the provinces to the magistrates of the year; but were making it the subject of their deliberation, whether both the Consuls should be sent into Gaul, or one of them be charg-  
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ed with the war against the king of Macedon. But after some time, when the friends of Flaminius were at last assured that both consuls would remain in Italy, on account of the apprehension of a Gallic war; the deputies were then introduced into the senate, and declaimed with great acrimony against Philip. Their discourses were in general the same which they had made in the late conferences with the king. But the opinion which they chiefly laboured to impress upon the senate was, that as long as Philip should hold Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias in subjection, the Greeks could never entertain so much as a thought of being free. That this was acknowledged by Philip himself, who used to call these places the fetters of Greece: and that no declaration ever was more true. For, while a royal garrison remained in Corinth, the people of Peloponnesus would be afraid to move. That the Locrians, the Bœotians, and the Phocæans, must in the same manner lose all courage, if the king should retain possession of Chalcis, and the other parts Eubœa. And lastly, if the Macedonians were allowed to hold Demetrias, that the Theffalians and Magnesian could never hope to obtain even the

smallest portion of freedom. That the offer therefore that was made by Philip, to relinquish any other places, was merely an empty shew, contrived only to elude the present danger: for, if he still should be permitted to remain master of those three cities, he would be able to bring the Greeks again into subjection, at any time that he should choose. Upon this account, they requested of the senate, either that the king might be forced to make an immediate cession of those places; or otherwise, that things might remain in their present state, and the war be continued with vigour against him. That the war indeed was at this time very nearly finished: since the Macedonians had been already twice defeated; and that their supplies by land were all exhausted. To these reasons they in the end added also their intreaties; and implored the senate, not to disappoint the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor to deprive themselves of the honour of a glorious name.

When these and other things of the same kind had been urged by the deputies from the several states, the ambassadours of Philip were ready also to make a long harangue, but were stopped in the very  
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beginning of it. Being asked if they would relinquish Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they answered, that they had received no instructions concerning those places. They were loaded therefore with reproaches from every side, and were forced to be silent. It was then decreed, that both the Consuls should be sent into Gaul, as we before have mentioned; and that the war should be continued against Philip, and Flaminius be intrusted with the affairs of Greece. And thus all things happened as Flaminius had desired. Nor was his success upon this occasion scarcely in any degree to be ascribed to chance, but chiefly to his own foresight and prudent management. For there was not in all Rome a man more dexterous, or that shewed greater wisdom and ability, either in the conduct of public affairs, or in the advancement of his own particular interests. And yet he was at this time very young: not more than thirty years old. He was the first also of the Romans that led an army into Greece.

## EXTRACT the SECOND.

*A reflection on the depravity of mankind.*

**I**T seems that men, who in the practice of craft and subtlety exceed all other animals, may with good reason be acknowledged to be more depraved than they. For other animals are subservient only to the appetites of the body, and by them are led to do wrong. But men, who have also sentiments to guide them, are guilty of ill conduct, not less through the abuse of their acquired reason, than from the force of their natural desires.

## EXTRACT the THIRD.

*The difference between the Roman Palifade and that of the Greeks. The motions of the Macedonian and Roman armies. The battle of Cynoscephalæ, between Philip and Flaminius. The Macedonian Phalanx compared with the arms and order of battle of the Romans.*

## C H A P. I.

**F**LAMINIUS had not yet been able to discover, in what place the Macedonians were encamped. But being assured that they had entered Theffaly, he ordered all his soldiers to cut pales for the entrenchment, and to carry them with them, that they might be ready for use whenever occasion should require. This is a labour, which in the discipline of the Grecian armies is considered as impracticable: but the Romans perform it without much difficulty. For the Greeks, in their marches, scarcely can support the

toil of carrying their own bodies. But the Romaps, when they have slung their shields by the leathern braces behind their shoulders, take their Javelins in their hands, and are able at the same time to carry the pales. What renders the task indeed the easier is, that these pales are very different from those that are used by the Greeks. For the Greeks esteem those to be the best, which have many, and very large branches all around the trunk. But the Romans choose those that have only two or three branches, or four at the most; and those also, upon one side of the trunk, and not springing alternately from both. By this method, the carriage of them is rendered altogether easy: for three or four of them may be laid close together, and be carried by a single soldier. In this way also, they are much better contrived than the other, for the security of the camp. The pales used by the Greeks are easily torn out of the ground. For, as they are planted singly, and each of them standing as it were alone, with many great branches spreading from the trunk, if two or three soldiers apply their strength to the branches, the trunk is soon drawn from the ground, and leaves a very spacious opening: and the  
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the adjoining pales also are at the same time loosened; because their branches are too short to be interwoven each with the other. But it is otherwise in the method of the Romans. Among them, the branches are so twisted together, that it is not easy to distinguish, what branches belong to the stems in the several pales, or what stems to the branches. Add to this, that the texture of them is so close, as to leave no room for a hand to pass; and that the points also of all the branches are very carefully sharpened. And even when it is possible to lay hold on any part, it is still extremely difficult to draw out any of the pales: not only because they are very firmly fixed in the ground; but because the force also, which is applied to any single branch, must at the same time draw along many other branches, which are inseparably twisted with it. Nor is it scarcely ever practicable for two or three men to lay hold on the same pale together. And if a single pale, or if two, by the efforts of continual shaking should at last be removed from their place, the opening that is made is so small that it is scarcely to be discerned. As these pales then have in three respects a very great advantage over the others;

in being found almost in any place; in being carried with ease; and in forming, when they are used, a rampart the most stable and secure; it is manifest, at least in my judgement, that there is not any part of the Roman discipline, which so well deserves to be approved and imitated.

Flaminius then, having ordered the soldiers, as we have mentioned, to cut and carry the pales with them, that they might be ready for use, advanced slowly with all the army. When he arrived at the distance of about fifty stadia from the city of Pheræ, he there encamped: and, early on the following day, he sent out a body of his men, to discover, if it was possible, in what place the enemy lay, and what were their designs. Philip on the other hand, having been informed that the Romans remained still in the neighbourhood of Thebes, decamped from Larissa at this very time with all his army, and, directing his march also towards Pheræ, arrived before the day was closed at the distance of thirty stadia from the city. In this place, he ordered the troops to take their refreshment and repose: and, on the following day, having sent forwards his advanced guard, before  
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it was light, to take possession of the hills that were above the city, as soon as the day appeared, he began to draw out all his forces from the camp. The troops that were sent forwards from both the armies had almost met together, as they advanced, on the top of the hills. But perceiving the approach of each other through the dawn, when there was now but a very moderate distance between them, they immediately halted, and sent some to inform the Generals of what had happened, and to receive their orders. The Generals on both sides resolved to remain quiet in their respective camps; and recalled the troops that had advanced. On the next day, they sent away again on both sides about three hundred of their cavalry and light-armed troops to make discoveries. Among those that went from the Roman camp, were two troops of Ætolians, selected for this service by Flaminius, on account of their knowledge of the country. The two bodies met together on the road that leads from Pheræ to Larissa, and the engagement was begun with vigour. But so strenuous were the efforts of Eupolemus, who headed the Ætolians, and so well did he animate the troops of Italy to support

support the charge, that the Macedonians suffered very greatly in the action. When the skirmish however had continued for a considerable time, both parties returned back again to their several camps.

On the following day, the two Generals, being alike dissatisfied with the ground in the neighbourhood of Pheræ, which was covered every where with plantations, gardens, and fences, resolved both of them to change their camp. Philip therefore, having put his troops in motion, directed his march towards Scotussa: with design to draw from thence a plentiful supply of all provisions, and afterwards to encamp in some place more commodious for his army. At the same time Flaminius, suspecting that this was his intention, began his march also towards the same place with the greatest haste; that he might be able to arrive before the king, and destroy the provisions through the country. Between the two armies was a chain of lofty hills, which intercepted the view of each from the other: so that the Romans saw not the course in which the Macedonians directed their march, nor the Macedonians that of the Romans. At the end of the day,  
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the former arrived near Eretria in Pthiotis, and the latter upon the banks of the river Onchestus, and remained there for the night; not knowing in either army, in what place the other had halted. On the next day they continued their march forwards, and severally encamped; Philip, near the place called Melambium in the district of Scotuffa; and Flaminius in the neighbourhood of Thetidium in Pharfalia; but were still alike unacquainted, each of them with the situation of the other. On the third day, at early dawn, came on violent storms of rain accompanied with thunder; and the whole earth was covered with so black a sky, that the soldiers were scarcely able to see a step before them, Philip, however, being earnest to accomplish his design, resolved to continue his march with all the army. But when he had advanced but a little way forwards, he found himself so incommoded by the darkness, that he again halted, and encamped; but sent away a body of troops, to take their post upon the top of the hills that were between the two armies. Flaminius remained still in his camp near Thetidium: but being solicitous to know in what place the enemy lay, he sent away ten  
troops

troops of cavalry, together with a thousand of the light-armed infantry, to make discoveries; commanding them to direct their course with caution through the country. As this party advanced, they were betrayed by the darkness, and fell, without perceiving them, among the Macedonians who had taken their station upon the top of the hills. The two bodies, being alike surpris'd, stood a while in suspense: but after a short time they began to engage together in action, and sent notice to their respective Generals of what had happened. As the engagement became more warm, the Romans were so unequally press'd by the Macedonians, that they were forced to send and request succours from the camp. Flaminius therefore sent away to their assistance Archidamus and Eupolemus, both of them Ætolians, and two Roman Tribunes, at the head of two thousand foot and five hundred horse. On the arrival of these forces, the face of the action soon was changed. The Romans, encouraged by this new strength, continued the fight with double ardour. The Macedonians on the other hand, though they defended themselves with the greatest bravery, yet being now press'd in their turn, and

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incumbered with their heavy armour, were forced to retreat back again to the summit of the hills, and from thence sent and desired assistance also from their king. Philip, who, for the reasons already mentioned, had formed no expectation of engaging upon this day in a general battle, had sent out a great part of his troops to forage. But being now informed of what had happened, and as the darkness also was beginning to be dispersed, he ordered Heraclides of Gyrtone, who led the Theffalian cavalry, Leon who commanded that of Macedon, and Athenagoras who was at the head of all the mercenaries except those of Thrace, to go and support the combatants. The Macedonians, reinforced by so considerable a strength, attacked the Romans with new vigour; drove them down back again from the summit of the hills; and would have totally dispersed them; if the resistance chiefly of the Ætolian cavalry, who maintained the fight with an astonishing impetuosity and courage, had not prevented the disorder from being complete. For as much as the infantry of this country, on account both of their arms and of the manner in which they are ranged in the field, falls below that of the rest of  
Greece

Greece in all general battles; so much on the other hand is their cavalry superior to all other, when they engage in separate actions, or man against man. At this time therefore they opposed with such success the efforts of the enemy, that the Romans were not driven quite into the plain; but turned their faces again, and stopped their flight at a little distance from it. Flaminius, perceiving not only that the cavalry and the light-armed forces were in this manner routed, but that their flight had spread a consternation also through the rest of the troops, drew his whole army out of the intrenchments, and ranged them in order of battle near the foot of the hills.

While the Romans were thus driven back, messenger after messenger, leaving the detachment upon the hills, came running to Philip, and cried aloud: "The enemies, O king, are flying; lose not the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us. The day is now your own: the very moment of victory is in your hands." These vehement cries forced the king out to engage; though he altogether was dissatisfied with the nature of the ground. For the hills, of which we are speaking, are called Cynoccephalæ

scephalæ, from the resemblance which they bear to the head of a dog: being parted, round the summit, into ragged cliffs, and stretched upwards to a considerable height. Philip therefore, who well knew that such a ground would be very disadvantageous to his troops, had not made from the beginning any disposition for a general battle. But being now so urged and animated by the excessive confidence of those who brought the news of this first success, he at last gave orders to lead the whole army out of the intrenchments.

Flaminius also, having drawn up all his forces, as we have mentioned, in order of battle, and being now ready to support the detachment that was engaged upon the hills, at the same time went through all the ranks to encourage his men. The words which he employed were few, but very forcible, and such as the troops might perfectly understand. “ Are not these, said he to the soldiers; as if the enemy had stood close before their eyes; are not these the Macedonians, whom you attacked upon the heights of Eordæa, advancing openly up the sides of the hills under the conduct of Sulpi-  
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from their post? Are not these the Macedonians, who, when they had taken possession of the passes of Epirus, which were thought impossible to be forced, were by your courage routed and dispersed; and, throwing away their arms, continued their flight even to their own country? And can you have any thing now to fear in engaging the same enemy without any disadvantage? Does the remembrance of those successes offer any thing dreadful to your view? Ought it not rather, on the contrary, to inspire you with the strongest confidence? Rouse up then your courage, and advance boldly to the fight. For I am well assured, that, with the assistance of the gods, the present action will soon be terminated in the same glorious manner as the past." When he had ended this harangue, he ordered the right wing of his army to remain still in their post, with the elephants before them; and moved slowly with the left wing and the light-armed forces towards the enemy. The Romans that were first engaged upon the hills, perceiving themselves to be now supported by the legions, returned back again, and renewed the fight with vigour.

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At the same time Philip, when he had drawn up the greatest part of his army in order of battle before the entrenchments, putting himself at the head of the Pelastæ and the right of the Phalanx, made haste to ascend the hills; and ordered Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to follow him without delay with the rest of the forces. As soon as the foremost of the troops had reached the summit, he began to form the right of his line, upon the ground near to the top, which was now open and deserted. For the detachment from the Macedonian army, that was first engaged, had driven down the Romans to the lowest part of the hills. But while the king was still forming his right, the mercenaries that were in that detachment came running towards him in disorder, being driven back again by the Romans in their turn. For the latter, as soon as they were followed by the legionary troops, which were brought up, as we have said, to support them, were so strengthened by that new weight, that they pressed heavily upon their enemies, and destroyed great numbers of them. Philip therefore, who, at his first arrival upon the hills, had beheld with pleasure that the place of the

action was at no great distance from the Roman camp, now seeing his troops forced back again, and flying towards him for support, was compelled by this accident to advance, and engage in a general action; though the greatest part of his phalanx was still in march, and had not yet reached the summit of the hills. Having received then the troops that were forced back, he collected them all together, and placed them, both infantry and cavalry, upon his right wing; and gave orders to the Peltastæ and the soldiers of the phalanx, to double their files and close their ranks upon the right. When this was done, and the Romans now were near, he commanded the phalanx to level their spears and advance; and the light-armed forces to extend themselves, and attack the enemy in their flank.

Flaminius also, having received into the intervals of his army the troops that had been engaged, at the same time advanced against the enemy. The first shock, which was on both sides violent, was attended likewise with a very great and unusual noise. For both bodies shouted at once together. The cries also of the rest that were at a distance were  
joined

joined to those of the combatants; and filled all around with astonishment and horror. The right wing however of Philip had from the first onset very clearly the advantage. The higher ground from which they fought, the weight of their disposition, and the nature of their arms, well situated to the present action, all joined to give them a manifest superiority over the Romans. But with regard to the rest of the Macedonian army, the troops that were next in the line to the right stood at a distance from the enemy; and those of the left wing were not yet arrived, having but just now begun to appear upon the tops of the hills. When Flaminius therefore perceived, that his troops were not able to maintain their ground against the phalanx, that great numbers were already killed, and the rest beginning to retreat; he went in haste, and joined the right wing of his army, which was now his only resource; and, having remarked the division and disorder of the Macedonians; that the next in the line to the troops that were engaged remained inactive at a distance; that some were just coming down from the tops of the hills; and others standing upon the summit; he placed the elephants at the

head of this wing, and advanced against these several bodies. The Macedonians, not having any leader from whom they might receive the command, and being unable to form themselves into a phalanx, both on account of the inequality of the ground, and because, as they were advancing towards that part of their army that was engaged, they were still rather in the order of a march, than in any order of battle, waited not to be attacked by the Romans, but were broken at once by the elephants, and immediately dispersed. The Romans pursued them with the greatest part of their forces, and slaughtered them as they fled. But one of the Tribunes, at the head of no more than twenty companies, took at this time a measure which the occasion suggested to him, and which was chiefly the cause that rendered the victory complete. Observing that Philip had advanced far beyond the rest of his army; and that he continued to press the left wing of the Romans with a weight which they were wholly unable to sustain; he quitted the right, where the success was clear and uncontested, and making a circuit to one side, fell in behind the combatants, and charged the Macedonians in their rear

Now such is the disposition of the phalanx, that the soldiers never can turn, or engage singly man with man. The Tribune therefore went on, killing those that were before him, till the Macedonians, having no power to defend themselves, threw away their arms, and were forced to seek their safety in flight. For the Romans also, who had before begun to retreat, now turned again, and charged them at the same time in front. When Philip, who from his first success, had flattered himself, as we have said, with the expectation of a perfect victory, now saw his troops throwing away their arms, and the enemy attacking them in their rear, he retired, with a small body of infantry and cavalry, to a little distance from the place of the action, and surveyed the whole state of the battle. And when he perceived, that the Romans, who were pursuing his left wing likewise, had almost reached the summit of the hills, he collected together as many of the Thracians and the Macedonians as the time would allow, and resolved to leave the field. Flaminius, as he arrived upon the tops of the hills, saw some troops of the left wing of the Macedonian army, which were just now also ascending to

the summit from the opposite side. He was preparing to attack them, but stopped when he observed that they held their spears erect. This is the custom of the Macedonians, when they either surrender themselves, or pass over to the side of the enemy. The Roman General therefore, as soon as he was informed of the intention of this signal, held back his troops from advancing, and determined to spare the men who had not courage to resist him. But, in the instant when he was forming this resolution, some of his foremost ranks rushed down upon them, and killed a great part of them, while a very small number only threw away their arms, and escaped by flight.

The battle being now ended, and the Romans victorious in every part, Philip directed his flight towards Tempe. Having rested the first evening in the place that is called the Tower of Alexander, he arrived on the next day at Gonni, which is situated in the entrance of the valley of Tempe. In this place he halted, in order to receive all those that had escaped after the action. The Romans, having for some time pursued the fugitives, began some of them to strip the dead, and some to bring together their prisoners.

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But the greatest part ran to pillage the camp of the enemy. On their arrival there, they found that the Ætolians had already pillaged it. Supposing themselves therefore to have been defrauded of their just rights, they vented bitter complaints against that people, and even loaded their own General with reproaches. “You expose us, said they, to the dangers of the war: but the booty you allot to others.” They returned back however to their camp, and there passed the night: and on the following day, having collected together the prisoners and the rest of the spoil, they continued their march towards Larissa. The Romans lost in this action about seven hundred men. On the side of the Macedonians, eight thousand were killed; and not fewer than five thousand taken prisoners. Such was the end of the battle of Cynoscephalæ in Thessaly, between king Philip and the Romans.

## C H A P. II.

HAVING left an assurance with my readers, in the sixth book of this work, that I would choose some proper time to compare together the arms and the orders of battle of the Macedonians, and the Romans, and to shew in what respects they severally have the advantage, or are inferior each to the other, I shall here take the occasion which the action now described has offered, and shall endeavour to discharge my promise. For as the order of battle of the Macedonian armies was found, in the experience of former ages, to be superior to that of the Asiatics and the Greeks, and the Roman order of battle in the same manner surpassed that of the Africans and all the western parts of Europe; and as, in later times, these two several orders have been often set in opposition each to the other; it must be useful as well as curious, to trace out the difference that is between them, and to explain the advantages that turned the victory to the side of the Romans in these engagements. From such a view, instead  
of

of having recourse to chance, and blindly applauding, like men of superficial understanding, the good fortune of the conquerours, we shall be able to remark with certainty the true causes of their success, and to ground our admiration upon the principles of sound sense and reason.

With regard to the battles that were fought by Annibal, and the victories which he obtained against the Romans, there is no need upon this occasion to enter into a long discussion of them. For it was not his arms, or his order of battle, which rendered that General superior to the Romans; but his dexterity alone, and his admirable skill. In the accounts that were given by us of those engagements, we have very clearly shewn that this was the cause of his success. And this remark is still more strongly confirmed, in the first place, by the final issue of the war. For as soon as the Romans had obtained a General, whose ability was equal to that of Annibal, they immediately became the conquerours. Add to this, that Annibal himself rejected the armour which he first had used; and having furnished the African troops with the arms that were taken  
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from the Romans in the first battle, used afterwards no other. In the same manner also Pyrrhus employed, not only the arms, but the troops of Italy; and ranged in alternate order a company of those troops, and a cohort disposed in the manner of the phalanx, in all his battles with the Romans. And yet, even with the advantage of this precaution, he was never able to obtain any clear or decisive victory against them. It was necessary to premise these observations for the sake of preventing any objection that might be made to the truth of what we shall hereafter say. Let us now return to the comparison that was proposed.

It is easy then to demonstrate by many reasons, that while the phalanx retains its proper form and full power of action, no force is able to stand against it in front, or support the violence of its attack. When the ranks are closed in order to engage, each soldier, as he stands with his arms, occupies a space of three feet. The spears, in their most ancient form, contained seventeen cubits in length. But, for the sake of rendering them more commodious in action, they have since been reduced to fourteen. Of these, four cu-

the soldier grasps in his hands, and the lower end of the spear behind, which serves as a counterpoise to the part that is extended before him : and the length of this last part from the body of the soldier, when the spear is pushed forwards with both hands against the enemy, is by consequence ten cubits. From hence it follows, that when the phalanx is closed in its proper form, and every soldier pressed within the necessary distance with respect to the man that is before him and upon his side, the spears of the fifth rank are extended to the length of two cubits, and those of the second, third, and fourth to a still greater length, beyond the foremost rank. The manner in which the men are crowded together in this method is marked by Homer in the following lines :

Shield stuck to shield, to helmet helmet  
 join'd,  
 And man to man ; and at each nod that  
 bow'd  
 High waving on their heads the glitter-  
 ing cones,  
 Rattled the hair-crown'd casques: so thick  
 they stood\*.

\* Iliad. XIII. 131.

This description is not less exact than beautiful. It is manifest then, that five several spears, differing each from the other in the length of two cubits, are extended before every man in the foremost rank. And when it is considered likewise, that the phalanx is formed by sixteen in depth, it will be easy to conceive, what must be the weight and violence of the intire body, and how great the force of its attack. In the ranks indeed that are behind the fifth, the spears cannot reach so far as to be employed against the enemy. In these ranks therefore, the soldiers, instead of extending their spears forwards, rest them upon the shoulders of the men that are before them, with their points slanting upwards; and in this manner they form a kind of rampart which covers their heads, and secures them against those darts, which may be carried in their flight beyond the first ranks, and fall upon those that are behind. But when the whole body advances to charge the enemy, even these hindmost ranks are of no small use and moment. For as they press continually upon those that are before them, they add by their weight alone great force to the attack, and deprive also the foremost ranks

ranks of the power of drawing themselves backwards or retreating. Such then is the disposition of the phalanx, with regard both to the whole and the several parts. Let us now consider the arms, and the order of battle, of the Romans; that we may see by the comparison in what respects they are different from those of the Macedonians.

To each of the Roman soldiers, as he stands in arms, is allotted the same space likewise of three feet. But as every soldier in the time of action is constantly in motion; being forced to shift his shield continually, that he may cover any part of his body against which a stroke is aimed; and to vary the position of his sword, so as either to push, or to make a falling stroke; there must also be a distance of three feet, the least that can be allowed for performing these motions with advantage, between each soldier and the man that stands next to him, both upon his side and behind him. In charging therefore against the phalanx, every single Roman, as he has two Macedonians opposite to him, has also ten spears, which he is forced to encounter. But it is not possible for a single man to cut down these spears with his sword, before they can  
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take their effect against him. Nor is it easy on the other hand to force his way through them. For the men that are behind add no weight to the pressure, nor any strength to the swords, of those that are in the foremost rank. It will be easy therefore to conceive, that, while the phalanx retains its own proper position and strength, no troops, as I before observed, can ever support the attack of it in front. To what cause then is it to be ascribed, that the Roman armies are victorious; and those defeated that employ the phalanx? The cause is this. In war, the times and the places of action are various and indefinite. But there is only one time and place, one fixed and determinate manner of action, that is suited to the phalanx. In the case then of a general action, if an enemy be forced to encounter with the phalanx in the very time and place which the latter requires, it is probable in the highest degree, from the reasons that have been mentioned, that the phalanx always must obtain the victory. But if it be possible to avoid an engagement in such circumstances; and indeed it is easy to do it; there is then nothing to be dreaded from this order of battle. It is a well known and an acknowledged

known truth, that the phalanx requires a ground that is plain and naked, and free likewise from obstacles of every kind; such as trenches, breaks, obliquities, the brows of hills, or the channels of rivers; and that any of these are sufficient to impede it, and to dissolve the order in which it is formed. On the other hand again, it must as readily be allowed, that, if it be not altogether impossible, it is at least extremely rare, to find a ground containing twenty stadia, or more, in its extent, and free from all these obstacles. But let it however be supposed, that such a ground may perhaps be found. If the enemy, instead of coming down upon it, should lead their army through the country, plundering the cities, and ravaging the lands, of what use then will be the phalanx? As long as it remains in this convenient post, it not only has no power to succour its friends, but cannot even preserve itself from ruin. For the troops that are masters of the whole country without resistance will easily cut off from it all supplies. And if, on the other hand, it should relinquish its own proper ground, and endeavour to engage in action, the advantage is then so great  
against

against it, that it soon becomes an easy prey to the enemy.

But farther; let it be supposed that the enemy will come down into this plain. Yet, if he brings not his whole army at once to receive the attack of the phalanx; or if, in the instant of the charge, he withdraws himself a little from the action; it is easy to determine what will be the consequence, from the present practice of the Romans. For we now draw not our discourse from bare reasoning only, but from facts which have lately happened. When the Romans attack the phalanx in front, they never employ all their forces, so as to make their line equal to that of the enemy; but lead on a part only of their troops, and keep the rest of the army in reserve. Now, whether the troops of the phalanx break the line that is opposed to them, or whether themselves are broken, the order peculiar to the phalanx is alike dissolved. For if they pursue the fugitives, or if, on the other hand, they retreat and are pursued, in either case they are separated from the rest of their own body. And thus there is left some interval or space, which the reserve of the Roman army takes care to seize,

seize, and then charges the remaining part of the phalanx, not in front, but in flank, or in the rear. As it is easy then to avoid the times and circumstances that are advantageous to the phalanx; and as those, on the contrary, that are disadvantageous to it can never be avoided; it is certain that this difference alone must carry with it a decisive weight in the time of action.

To this it may be added, that the troops of the phalanx also are, like others, forced to march, and to incamp, in every kind of place: to be the first to seize the advantageous posts; to invest an enemy, or be invested; and to engage also in sudden actions, without knowing that an enemy was near. These things all happen in war: and either tend greatly to promote, or sometimes wholly determine the victory. But, at all such times, the Macedonian order of battle either cannot be employed, or is employed in a manner that is altogether useless. For the troops of the phalanx lose all their strength, when they engage in separate companies, or man with man. The Roman order, on the contrary, is never attended, even upon such occasions, with any disadvantage. Among the Romans,

every single soldier, when he is once armed and ready for service, is alike fitted to engage in any time and place, or upon any appearance of the enemy: and preserves always the same power, and the same capacity of action, whether he engages with the whole of the army, or only with a part; whether in separate companies, or singly man against man. As the parts therefore, in the Roman order of battle, are so much better contrived for use, than those in the other; so the success also in action must, in the same proportion, be greater in the one than the other. If I have been long in examining this subject, it was because many of the Greeks, at the time when the Macedonians were defeated, regarded that event as a thing surpassing all belief: and because many others also may hereafter wish to know, from what reasons, and in what particular respects, the order of phalanx is excelled by the arms and the order of battle of the Romans. I now return from my digression.

Philip, when he had done all that was possible in the battle, and had suffered an entire defeat, collected together as many of the troops as were able to escape, and directed his retreat through  
Tempe

Tempe towards Macedon : but first sent away one of his guards to Larissa, in the very night that followed the action, with orders to destroy and burn all the royal papers. This attention which he shewed, even in the very moment of his distress, not to leave so necessary a duty unperformed, was indeed highly worthy of a king. For he knew that if these papers should fall into the hands of the Romans, they would afford many pretences that might be employed against himself and his friends. There are others perhaps to be found, who have not born the power of prosperous fortune like men ; but have stood firm under the pressure of adversity, and supported themselves by their caution and prudence. But this was very peculiarly the character of Philip : as it will be seen in the following parts of this work. For as we gave a distinct account of the happy disposition and virtuous tendency of this prince in the beginning of his reign ; and shewed afterwards, from what causes, and in what time and manner he changed his conduct, and pursued a different course of action ; it will be no less our duty also to shew, in what manner he returned again to a better mind, and by what wise management,

when his misfortunes had inspired him with different sentiments, he adjusted all his measures to that necessity, which the times, in which he found himself, imposed. The Roman General, when he had made the necessary disposition of the prisoners and the rest of the spoil, continued his march with the army towards Larissa.

## EXTRACT the FOURTH.

*Men who are most practised in deceit, are often deceived through want of caution.*

**I**T is manifest then from this example, that, though we are all so liable to be deceived, both by the same arts and the same instruments also of fraud, yet we are never sufficiently upon our guard against them. For this very artifice has been practised upon many occasions, and by many persons. It is not strange perhaps, that mankind in general should so often fall into the snare. But that those men, who are as we may say the very source of all deceit, should be themselves deceived, may reasonably be thought astonishing. But indeed this only happens to them, because they do not recollect upon such occasions the wise admonition of Epicharmus. “Be sober, and distrustful : these are the nerves of the mind.”

## EXTRACT the FIFTH.

*The conference at Lyfimachia between Antiochus and the Roman deputies.*

ABOUT this time, with the rest of the ten Roman deputies, came Publius Lentulus from Bargylia, and Lucius Terentius and Publius Vilius from Thaffus: and within a few days afterwards, notice of their arrival having been immediately conveyed to the king, they all assembled together at Lyfimachia. Hegesianax also and Lyfias, who had been deputed from Antiochus to Flaminius, were at the same time present. In the private interviews that passed between the Romans and the king, nothing was to be seen but frankness and civility. But when they were afterwards all assembled together, and brought their business into debate, the aspect of things was not so friendly. For Lucius Cornelius, as he desired the king to deliver up those cities in Asia, which he had torn from the dominions

minions of Ptolemy, at the same time pressed him also in the most peremptory terms to relinquish those that had belonged to Philip: since nothing, as he said, could be more absurd, than that, when the Romans had maintained a war against that prince, Antiochus should come afterwards and carry away the spoils. He exhorted him likewise not to assume any power over the cities that were free: and then added; that, upon the whole, he could not but wonder, what design had induced him to pass into Europe with so powerful a fleet and army. That, if the thing were to be well considered, no other motive could indeed be assigned for such an expedition, but an intention to make war upon the Romans.

The king replied to this discourse: “ That he knew not upon what grounds of reason his possession of the cities of Asia was now contested; and that the Romans, of all others, had certainly no right to bring his title into dispute. That he wished that they would abstain from meddling with the affairs of Asia; as much as he was careful, not to meddle at any time with those of Italy. That his design in passing into Europe was to recover the Chersonesus, and the cities of

Thrace, which were properly a part of his own dominions. That those places had belonged originally to Lyfimachus : and, when that prince was attacked and vanquished by Seleucus, they had passed, with the rest of his kingdom, to the conquerour, by the just rights of war. That in succeeding times, while the attention of his ancestors was drawn away to other objects, Ptolemy had first usurped some parts of the dominions that were so acquired, and Philip afterwards the rest. That he did not therefore now possess them, as taking an advantage from the misfortunes of Philip ; but only as improving an opportunity which was fair to himself, and favourable for the recovery of his own proper right. That in bringing back the inhabitants of Lyfimachia, when they had been driven out by the Thracians, and restoring the city to its former state, he had done no injury to the Romans, nor shewed any intention to attack them ; but designed only to make the place a seat of residence for his son Seleucus. That, with respect to the cities of Asia that were free, it was fit that they should owe their liberty to his grace and favour, and not to the command of the Romans. And lastly, with  
regard

regard also to Ptolemy, that he should be ready without the interposition of others, to adjust all disputes in the manner which himself should desire: for he had resolved, not only to live in friendship, but even to contract likewise an affinity with that prince."

It was then proposed by Lucius, that the Lampfacenians and Smyrnæans should be called in, and heard; and this accordingly was done. On the part of the former appeared Parmenio and Pythodorus; and on that of the latter, Cœranus. But as they were beginning to harangue with great boldness and freedom, Antiochus, being uneasy that he should in this manner seem to give an account of his conduct before the Romans, stopped Parmenio from proceeding in his discourse, and said; that it was not the Romans, but the Rhodians, that were the proper judges of the matter in dispute. Upon this, the conference was immediately broken up; and the parties all retired, being alike dissatisfied with each other.

## EXTRACT the SIXTH.

*The death of Scopas the Ætolian at Alexandria.*

**T**HOUGH there are many indeed who would wish to draw glory from hazardous actions, there are but few who have the courage to undertake them. And yet Scopas had advantages far greater than Cleomenes, if he had been willing to try the fortune of some bold and desperate attempt. For the latter had been unexpectedly prevented by his enemies; and had no hope left, except in the assistance of his domesticks and his friends. He resolved however to make trial of that hope, and chose rather to die with honour, than to survive with disgrace. But Scopas on the contrary, though he had a strong force ready to support him, and though the infancy of the king rendered the opportunity also highly favourable, was prevented merely through his own irresolution and delay. For Aristomenes,

menes, having received notice that he had assembled his friends together at his house, and was holding a consultation with them, sent some of the guards, to require him to attend the royal council. On receiving this message, Scopas was struck with such confusion, that he had neither courage to carry any thing into execution, nor resolution to obey the orders of the king. This was senseless in the highest degree. Aristomenes therefore, being informed of his folly, surrounded the house with some troops and elephants, and at the same time sent Ptolemy the son of Eumenes with a body of young soldiers, to conduct him to the council, if he was willing to come, or otherwise to bring him by force. When Ptolemy entered the house, and told him, that the king commanded his attendance, Scopas seemed not at first to pay any regard to what he said; but, fixing his eyes stedfastly upon him, for some time continued to survey him with a threatening air, as if he had been astonished at his boldness. The other, coming nearer, roughly seized him by his mantle: and Scopas then called upon his friends to help him. But as many of the soldiers were now come in, and some person also informed him that  
the

the house was surrounded by troops, he was forced to yield to the necessity, and followed Ptolemy, together with his friends. As soon as he appeared before the council, the charge against him, having been opened in few words by the king, was then continued by Polycrates, who had lately arrived at Cyprus, and afterwards by Aristomenes. The chief heads of the accusation were the facts which have before been mentioned. To these only were added, the secret meetings which he had held with his friends, and his refusal to obey the orders of the king. Upon these facts he was condemned, not only by the council, but by the ambassadors also that were present. For Aristomenes had called together upon this occasion, besides many other illustrious men from Greece, the ambassadors likewise that had been sent by the Ætolians to negotiate a peace. Among these was Dorimachus the son of Nicostratus. When the accusers had ended, Scopas attempted indeed to say something in his own defence: but the guilt of his actions was so manifest, that what he urged made no impression. He was conveyed therefore to prison with his friends: and in the following night, by the orders

ders of Aristomenes, ended his life by poison, together with his friends. But Dicæarchus, by the same orders, after he had first been tortured, was whipped to death with rods: and thus suffered the punishment that was both suitable to his crimes, and due likewise to the common vengeance of all Greece. For this was the same Dicæarchus, who, when Philip had resolved, in contempt of treaties, to invade the Cyclade islands and the cities of the Hellespont, was appointed by that prince the commander of all his fleet, and chief leader of the whole expedition. Employed in a design so manifestly impious, he was so far from being shocked at the injustice of his undertaking, that he endeavoured, by an action of the most abandoned profligacy, to strike both the Gods and men with horror. For, when he had brought his fleet to anchor, he erected two altars, one to Impiety, and the other to Injustice; offered sacrifices upon them; and adored those vices, as if they had been divinities. It seems therefore, that both the Gods and men concurred to inflict upon him a most proper punishment. For it was reasonable that a man, whose life had been so contrary to nature, should die also a death that was un-

unnatural. The rest of the Ætolians, who were willing to return to their own country, were dismissed by the king, and allowed to carry with them all their goods. With regard to Scopas, that passion for acquiring wealth, in which he was known during his life to surpass all other men, appeared still more conspicuously after his death, from the great quantity of money and of valuable goods that was found in his house. His custom was, to employ the debauched and profligate as the ministers of his rapine: and, with the help of such associates, he forced his way into the strongest places through all the kingdom, and ransacked them in search of treasure.

When this disorder was so happily composed, the ministers of the court resolved to celebrate the Anacleteria, or proclamation of the king. For though this prince had not yet arrived at the customary age, it was thought that, if he should now seem to take the supreme authority into his own hands, the affairs of the kingdom would acquire a more settled form, and might be again brought back into a better train. The preparations upon this occasion were very sumptuous; and the ceremony performed with

a magnificence that was worthy of such a sovereign. It was supposed that Polycrates was the person, by whose means chiefly this measure was carried into execution. This Polycrates, under the reign of the father of the present prince, tho' he was then very young, had rendered himself, both by his services and his fidelity, one of the most distinguished persons of the court. Nor was the credit less, which he had acquired in the present reign. For having been intrusted with the government of Cyprus, and the care of collecting the revenues of that country, in most difficult and unsettled times, he not only had preserved the island for the infant king, but amassed likewise a very large treasure; and now brought it with him to Alexandria, after he had first resigned his government to Ptolemy of Megalopolis. On account of this important service, he was received with great applause, and became afterwards very powerful. And yet this man, as he advanced in age, started aside from this honourable course, and plunged himself into a life of vice and profligacy. The same dishonour is said also to have attended the old age of Ptolemy the son of Agesander.

When

When we arrive at the proper time, we shall take care to give some account of the scandalous actions which they committed, after they had raised themselves into power.

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