

Atlanticism and Europeanism: Spanish Public Opinion on Security Policy in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

Atlanticism and Europeanism: Spanish Public Opinion on Security Policy

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This paper analyzes public opinion in Spain on NATO and on the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Spanish public opinion is analyzed within the context of Spanish interests and by comparison with public opinion in the other EU member states of France, Italy, Germany, the UK, and Poland. The public opinion analysis is based on the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends survey questions from the 2000s, often supplemented with analysis of other survey questions from earlier decades. I also make use of two multivariate regression models to determine influences on support for European-centric and Atlanticity-oriented security policy preferences.

Spain is a strong EU member, and as Spain is a democracy that must be mindful of citizens' opinions, public opinion in Spain will likely have bearing on future EU policy. In the 2000s, the Iraq War severely damaged Spanish opinion on both the US and NATO, and EU security policy became a concrete reality, setting the stage for greater support of EU security measures. However, I find that the majority of Spaniards still favor a strong EU-US security relationship. A significant portion of Spaniards, and Europeans, also support both the CFSP and CSDP. It seems that Spaniards want the EU to be a strong world leader, but within the context of the EU-US security relationship.

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Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: A General History of the CFSP and CSDP.....	3
Chapter 2: Changing Tides and Growing Atlanticism: Insights from Recent Scholarship.....	11
Chapter 3: Methodology: Measuring Support for European Security vs. NATO.....	24
Chapter 4: A Strong Atlantic Orientation in Europe.....	32
Chapter 5: Strong Support for European Security Policy.....	50
Chapter 6: Complements or Contradiction? Have attitudes towards NATO changed because of support for European defense?.....	62
Chapter 7: European Security, but not without NATO: A Multivariate Model.....	72
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Implications.....	86
Works cited.....	90

Introduction

The paper examines Spanish public opinion on security policy, a topic that has been neglected in the political science field. While Spain is perhaps not the most influential European Union member state, it is an important and prominent EU member. In recent years there have been Spanish EU Commission presidents, and Spain has participated in a variety of EU-led security and foreign policy missions. The EU is a democratic institution, and Schoen finds ample reason to believe that European Union “elites have a considerable incentive to respond to public opinion when making policy decisions.”¹ Furthermore, the security policy decision-making process in Spain is certainly sensitive to public opinion. One of the reasons that President Azar lost his election in 2004 was that he was a strong supporter of the Iraq War, whereas the Spanish public was strongly opposed to the war. His opponent, President Zapatero, won the election partially because his anti-Iraq War platform and promise to withdraw Spanish troops.² Thus, public opinion in Spain does affect Spanish security policy, and Spanish security preferences will likely factor into the EU decision-making process. In that light, it is surprising that Spanish public opinion on international security policy has scarcely been studied.

In this paper, I provide a comprehensive analysis of the state of Spanish public opinion on NATO and the CSDP/CFSP, and of both trends in public opinion and influences upon it. I use the German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trends surveys, administered in a variety of EU countries, as the basis for my analysis. No analysis of Spain is complete without comparison to other EU countries, and so I place my analysis in context by comparing Spanish public opinion to that in France, Italy, the UK, Germany, and Poland. I proceed by giving a brief background of

¹ Schoen, Harald. "Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence." *European Union Politics* 9.1 (2008): 23.

² Garcia, David. "Balancing between Bandwagoning and Appeasement: Spain's Foreign Policy Towards the US 2001-2011." *UNISCI Discussion Papers*.27 (2011): 69.

the evolution of the CFSP/CSDP to provide context for my analysis in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, I examine the current state of the literature on public opinion on the CFSP/CSDP and of Spanish's relationship with NATO and the CFSP/CSDP. I give an overview of my methodology in Chapter 3. In chapter 4, I examine overall Atlanticism in Spain and conclude that support for the EU-US security relationship via NATO is high. I analyze support for the CFSP/CSDP in Chapter 5, and find it to be very high as well. In Chapter 6, I conclude that the development of the CFSP/CSDP in the past decade has not led to a decline in support for NATO, and in Chapter 7 I examine various sociological influences on support for Atlanticism and for a more EU-centric security policy.

Finally, I conclude that despite dissatisfaction with American world leadership in the past decade and the CSDP/CFSP's development within that time, Europeans and Spaniards still want a strong EU-US security relationship. Europeans also support the CFSP/CSDP strongly, but only within the context of the EU's relationship with the US and with NATO. Spaniards seem to be slightly less Atlanticity oriented than average, but they still find NATO membership to be to Spanish and European advantage.

Chapter 1

A General History of the CFSP and CSDP

This chapter provides a brief overview of the milestones in the creation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), beginning in 1985 with the inception of the Schengen Zone through 2009 and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The history detailed here is by no means comprehensive, but serves to place the analysis of later chapters in context.

Key Dates

Year	Event	Description
1985	Schengen Zone created	Allows for free movement across borders of Schengen states
Begun 1992, implemented 1993	Treaty of Maastricht	Calls for a common defense policy
Begun 1997, implemented 1999	Treaty of Amsterdam	Codifies the Petersberg tasks and creates High Representative position
1998	Saint-Malo	Britain and France call for EU defense capabilities
Begun 2001, implemented 2003	Treaty of Nice	ESDP and Rapid Reaction Force created, WEU absorbed into the EU
Begun 2007, implemented 2009	Treaty of Lisbon	Creates the CSDP, streamlines EU foreign policy machine, creates mutual defense clause, calls for a common defense

The Schengen Zone begins to dissolve internal borders

The creation of the Schengen Zone is not commonly regarded as the start of the European defense project in the same manner that the Treaty of Maastricht or the summit at Saint-Malo are, but it is an important starting point. In 1985, the Schengen Zone was created, which eliminated internal borders between member states for the sake of travel. It was a natural extension of the economic integration of the European Union to begin removing the barriers to free trade within the EU and allow for the free movement of people across EU borders. In the Schengen Zone, member states are forced to rely on other states for border control, and thus for external security. At the time of its inception, the Schengen Zone included Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. By 1992, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy had been added to the Schengen Zone. With free movement between member states, a country like Luxembourg, completely surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany, has little control over the movement of people across its borders. The dissolution of internal borders was not immediately effective in practice. However, the symbolic surrendering of border control, one of the main tenants of a state's sovereignty, can be seen as the first step towards a collective security organization where member states rely on each other for protection and security. The Schengen Zone also increased member states' interests in each other's military capabilities and defense, as, for example, if France had weak external borders, then by extension so did Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany.

The Treaty of Maastricht sets the stage

The Treaty of Maastricht was formally signed in 1992, and represents the first organizational step towards collective security in the European Union. The treaty calls for "the

eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”³ There had been failed attempts to introduce defense policy into the EU in the past, such as the failed European Defense Community of the 1950’s, but the Treaty of Maastricht represents the first time that a collective security policy is specifically called for in an EU treaty. The treaty also recognized the importance of the Western European Union, a mutual defense organization of western European countries created during the Cold War, and the importance of the WEU as a part of NATO, not as separate from it.⁴ In the treaty, two instruments for handling security policy were spelled out: common positions for cooperation on a daily basis, and resolutions for joint actions that would allow member states to work together in concrete ways based on European Council decisions.⁵ These two instruments seemed clearer in theory than in application, however. While concrete progress was made with the Treaty of Maastricht, a true common foreign policy was still to come.

The Treaty of Amsterdam in the aftermath of the Balkans wars

When civil war broke out in the former Yugoslavian Republics in 1992, the weaknesses of the current common foreign policy became painfully apparent. The EU was unable to halt the bloodshed and depended heavily on NATO. Therefore, as planning for the Treaty of Amsterdam got underway, the shortcomings of the CFSP were fresh in Europeans’ minds. Art argues that it was the Balkans crisis that catalyzed the movement towards the CSFP and CSDP.⁶ However, two obstacles needed to be resolved: national governments needed to give up some sovereignty

³ Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010. 548.

⁴ Dinan, 549.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Art, Robert J. "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO." *Political Science Quarterly* 111.1 (1996): 33.

in the foreign policy field, and there needed to be a uniform interpretation of what the CFSP would do.⁷ To the common positions and joint actions developed at Maastricht, the Treaty of Maastricht added principles and guidelines to guide foreign policy and common strategies to clarify the EU's objectives. The treaty incorporated the Petersberg tasks, which called for the EU to have the ability to undertake autonomous peacekeeping missions. Finally, the treaty also called for the appointment of a High Representative, a sort of Secretary of State for EU foreign policy to advise the European Council. There was much discussion over whether to merge the WEU with the European Union, but no consensus was reached.⁸ For the time being, the military capabilities of the WEU remained separate from the European Union, but NATO praised the EU's effort to increase its security and defense capabilities through the CFSP.⁹

Saint-Malo: a British and French call for action

The British-French summit at Saint-Malo in 1998 marks the first real step towards the creation of the CSDP, or Common Security and Defense Policy. Britain, as a faithful member of NATO, had historically been against the development of an independent European collective defense. France, in contrast, had been a strong supporter of European security independence since the days of DeGaulle. The creation of a shared European currency, however, had created new incentives for Britain stay involved in EU integration, as it had opted out of the Eurozone.¹⁰ The declaration issued by the French and the British at Saint-Malo called for the EU to have the capabilities for autonomous action and military forces. While the declaration called for autonomous capabilities, it still framed the EU's security capabilities within the context of

⁷ Dinan, 551.

⁸ Dinan, 553.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Mathiopoulus, Margarita, and Istvan Gyarmati. "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense." *The Washington Quarterly* 22.4 (1999): 68.

NATO; Europe's defense capabilities were meant to complement the existing relationship with NATO, not compete with it. Although Europe's defense capacity was not conceived as independent from NATO and from the United States at Saint-Malo, the British support of a European defense had an important impact. Britain had the strongest defense capabilities of any European country, and for the UK to lend its support to the CFSP and to possible common defense as well meant that European security might become a concrete reality.

The Treaty of Nice gives the CFSP defense capabilities

The signing of the Treaty of Nice in 2001 capitalized on the momentum from the Saint-Malo declaration. Between the Saint-Malo declaration and the Treaty of Nice, violence in the Balkans had escalated, further emphasizing the need for the CFSP to expand military and defense capabilities. In the treaty, the Western European Union and its defense capabilities were finally absorbed into the EU itself. The treaty also formalized the decision made in Helsinki in 1999 to create an EU Rapid Reaction Force of up to 60,000 that could be deployed quickly and for up to 1 year on peacekeeping missions. The Common Security and Defense Policy, then called the European Security and Defense Policy, was formally introduced as a part of the European Union in the Nice Treaty as well. The CSDP would fall under the CSFP, and because of the WEU's incorporation into the EU and various other organizational shifts, a sizeable number of EU officials in Brussels began to "work exclusively on EU security and defense issues."¹¹ While the formalization of the CSDP represented a significant step forward for the EU in terms of creating independent security and defense capabilities, the EU's relationship with NATO was becoming less clearly defined. The EU had created the RRF, which would give it

¹¹ Dinan, 556.

the ability to act without the US, but had ceded some control of the RRF to NATO.¹² There was an EU unit stationed in the NATO headquarters in Brussels,¹³ and the Berlin Plus arrangements in 2002 gave the EU some access to NATO assets.¹⁴ However, in 2003 the EU conducted two peacekeeping missions, one in the Democratic Republic of Congo and one in the Balkans, both independently of NATO.¹⁵ The EU was beginning to develop security capabilities through the CSDP, but its relationship with NATO remained undefined.

The Lisbon Treaty refines the CFSP and CSDP

The Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007 and formally ratified in 2009, did not make the radical progress in terms of the CFSP or the CSDP that the Treaty of Nice did, but it did encourage the further development of both policies. In the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Lisbon Treaty created the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which combined the previously created High Representative position and the European Commission vice president into one position. This consolidation enabled the EU to conduct a more coherent foreign policy.¹⁶ The High Representative would head the European External Action Service, a foreign ministry and intelligence agency headquartered in Brussels. Also, while the majority of decisions related to the CFSP must be unanimous in the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty adds an exception for decisions that may have military implications and those in the area of defense. In those cases, unanimity gives way to qualified majority voting. As for the CSDP, the Lisbon Treaty officially renamed the ESDP the CSDP and emphasized the eventual creation of a common European defense. The treaty also expanded the

¹² Posen, Barry R. "ESDP and the Structure of World Power." *The International Spectator* 1 (2004): 15-16.

¹³ Dinan, 560.

¹⁴ Dinan, 558.

¹⁵ Dinan, 560.

¹⁶ Dinan, 561.

tasks that could be carried out under the CSDP framework to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilization. The Lisbon Treaty allows for permanent structured cooperation between member states in terms of defense under the European Defense Agency. Finally, for the first time, the treaty introduces a legally binding mutual defense clause in the EU. If one member state is attacked, the other member states are obligated to help, forming a collective security organization. Two exceptions are made, one for states that are traditionally neutral and one specifying that the clause does not affect NATO commitments.

Since 2009, progress has been slow

As a result of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009, the CSDP and the CFSP have begun to take on a more cohesive, coherent structure. The EU has appointed its first new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, and the EEAS is now fully operational. A variety of EU missions and operations have been created or extended; EULEX, the EU's mission in Kosovo, will now run until 2014, and Operation Atlanta has been successful at curbing piracy off the coast of Somalia. However, the CSDP's relationship with NATO still remains unclear, as became increasingly apparent during the 2011 civil war in Libya. France and the UK intervened in Libya, but under a NATO framework and not as part of the EU. The EU did approve a humanitarian intervention in Libya far into the civil war, but after discussion opted not to stage a military intervention. While the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the common frameworks of the CSDP and the CFSP, the civil war in Libya revealed that their effectiveness is still limited. Thus, while the EU has created the beginnings of a collective security organization in the CFSP, and the CSDP under it, whether the EU will develop to rival NATO or to be compatible with it,

as it largely is now, remains to be seen. In this thesis, I assess public opinion in the EU on whether EU citizens, specifically in Spain, see the CSDP and CFSP as a potential replacement for NATO or as a complement to NATO.

Chapter 2

Changing Tides and Growing Atlanticism: Insights from Recent Scholarship

Introduction

The European Union has begun to develop its own military and foreign policy capabilities, potentially separate from NATO, in a transatlantic orientation shift that could change the structure of collective security. In Europe, there has been growing speculation that the US has turned its focus away from Europe, towards Asia and the Middle East, and Europeans fear entanglement in wars that suit only American interests. As a result, the EU has strengthened its own collective security organization, the Common Security and Defense Policy, or CSDP, to perhaps rival NATO, and created a European foreign policy organization, the CFSP.

Spain, as a country with strong historical ties to the US and NATO, stands at a crossroads in the EU's re-orientation. While Spain may not be the most influential country in the EU, it is certainly a significant member state and will play an important role in determining the future dynamics of collective security for the west. As Spain is a democracy, with its EU representatives being democratically elected and EU referenda voted on, public opinion could have a dramatic effect on the future of the CSDP. For political scientists, the future of the CSDP has important ramifications both for the future of Europe's relationship with NATO and for collective security policy in the western world. In this chapter, I examine scholarship on the relationship between the CSDP and NATO, Spain's place in that relationship, and the effect of public opinion in Spain on the European Union's potential shift away from NATO to the CSDP.

An Introduction to the Existing Literature

The existing scholarly literature on the evolving relationship between the European Union and NATO is extensive. Literature that focuses on that relationship between the EU and NATO and takes into account public opinion is somewhat more limited, and literature that places Spain in the context of that relationship is even scarcer. Therefore, for the purposes of my thesis and this literature review, I focus on all three types of scholarly research in order to get a comprehensive perspective on the subject. The existing scholarly literature on the defense relationship between the European Union and NATO takes four approaches. The first, as exemplified by Posen, Smith, Art, Peters and Ojanen, examines the likelihood of a shift from reliance on NATO to the CSDP through the history and current reality of the EU's CSDP-NATO relationship. It focuses not on public opinion, but instead on the historical basis for the rise of the CSDP and potential theoretical explanations for an EU shift away from NATO. Although prospects for independent EU security seem bright to some, Art emphasizes that Europe still needs NATO; it does not yet have the capacity to act independently on security matters. Through an examination of history and theory, Posen, Smith, Art, Peters and Ojanen provide a relevant framework for what could shape Spanish public opinion on the relationship between the CSDP and NATO and what affect that opinion could have.

In the second approach, García and Guinea examine the specific history that Spain has with both the European Union and NATO in terms of defense and security to make conclusions about the future of Spain's relationship with both the EU and the US. The third approach analyzes what factors influence increased public support for the CSDP in contrast with NATO. Ray, Leonard, and Johnston examine the detrimental effects of the Iraq war on European's opinions of NATO, whereas Eichenberg argues that European citizens continue to want both NATO membership and CSDP growth. Finally, the fourth approach, seen in the work of Schoen

and Kentmen, examines public opinion at the individual level to scrutinize what specifically influences public support for EU leadership and the CSDP.

Historical and Theoretical Context for the CSDP-NATO Relationship

Through the Lens of History and Strategic Choice

Despite conflicts with the US and increasing independent aspirations, Peters and Art continue to see a security relationship characterized by the status quo dependence on NATO. Peters characterizes the US as “claiming stronger hegemonic leadership within the West, denying Europeans any voice in security affairs” in NATO, while the EU is striving “for significant input into Western policymaking and an autonomous EU capacity for decision making.”¹⁷ Peters concludes that while the conflict has not been resolved, the EU continues to buckle to American pressure and cede autonomy to NATO.¹⁸ While through 2004 and the early stages of the Iraq war, some EU members may have been comfortable surrendering authority to NATO, the historical argument does not hold true for the last eight years. According to Peters, mutual suspicion and ambiguity between the US and the EU have led the EU to become fearful of changing the status quo with NATO,¹⁹ and only increased cooperation and communication will lead to change. However, in recent years, the EU has begun to strengthen the CSDP and its own security integration, and not because of increased cooperation and communication with the United States, but in spite of them. While Peters’ historical argument certainly explains the lack of progress made in terms of CSDP development until 2004, it cannot explain the progress made since then.

¹⁷ Peters, Ingo. “CSDP as a Transatlantic Issue: Problems of Mutual Ambiguity.” *International Studies Review* 6.3 (2004): 382.

¹⁸ Peters, 396-397.

¹⁹ Peters, 382.

Art takes a different approach than Peters, but argues as well that the EU's development of its own military capabilities will not lead to a break with NATO or the United States. In examining the history of NATO in Europe, Art argues that the United States keeps the balance of power in Europe stable, and that in the absence of an American presence in Europe, a European state would have to become a hegemon, which would be unacceptable to the other European states.²⁰ Therefore, Europe cannot function without the United States in terms of security and defense, for as Art sees it, Europe would spiral into security competition.²¹ While competition may not lead to war, it would be disastrous for the fate of the European Union. Furthermore, Art argues that the EU did not, at the time his article was published, have the capabilities to function independently in terms of collective security. To prove this point, he uses the example of Bosnia, where the EU did not have the "collective will" to implement a successful peacekeeping mission without NATO's assistance.²² Art's examination of the historical record is very detailed, and while his argument is sound, it does not explain the amount of progress made in the European Union in the sixteen years since the article was written. Since then, Europe has developed and exercised security and defense capabilities, for example, curbing piracy off of the coast of Somalia, independently of NATO and the US. The CSDP and CFSP have evolved and integrated beyond what Art predicted in 1996.

In contrast with Art and Peters, Posen and Smith have a more optimistic perspective on the CSDP's future. Posen, writing eleven years later than Art, agreed that the CSDP could not function completely independently. Nonetheless, he attributes the formation of the CSDP to the EU's attempts to balance power against the United States and believes that "CSDP has provided Europe with a limited capability, and this capability seems likely to grow over the next decade."

²⁰ Art, 36.

²¹ Art, 8.

²² Art, 33.

Furthermore, he argues that “it seems likely to Europe will prove a less docile ally of the United States in a decade or two.”²³

Smith believes that the EU is already behaving as a legitimate, often independent international actor on the global stage and also argues that the EU’s failure in Bosnia has only prompted it to grow more serious about the CSDP. Smith examines the EU’s grand strategy and the EU’s past actions to conclude that in terms of the EU’s relationship with the US and NATO, “there is increasing evidence that the EU is able to not only set the global agenda, but to exert international policy entrepreneurship as well, even in areas where it faces overt American opposition.”²⁴ Furthermore, Smith argues that the EU can and has begun to act as a “security actor” both within and beyond Europe’s borders,²⁵ and may have more success with intervening in weak or failing states than the US or NATO because of its capacity for nation-building.²⁶ Thus Smith argues that the EU in recent years has developed capabilities independently from NATO and used those capabilities without NATO supervision, making the CSDP a strong actor even in the absence of NATO or American support.

International Relations Theory Predicts CSDP-CFSP Development

The theoretical approach, as seen in Ojanen, fares well in predicting the EU’s progress, perhaps because it has the advantage of being written after the beginning of the Iraq war. Ojanen examines two theoretical approaches to the study of whether the CSDP-NATO relationship will lead to further NATO-CSDP fusion or further separation: intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. The intergovernmentalist approach follows in the footsteps of Peters and Art,

²³ Posen, 2004, 17.

²⁴ Smith, Michael E. "A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU's Changing Global Role." *Journal of European Public Policy* 18.2 (2011): 149.

²⁵ Smith, 155.

²⁶ Smith, 159-162.

suggesting that NATO will continue to take the lead in collective security affairs and effectively absorb the CSDP.²⁷ In contrast, the neofunctionalist approach agrees with Smith, predicting that the EU will shift further away from NATO and toward increased EU integration in terms of security, defense, and foreign policy.²⁸ Ojanen concludes that the neofunctionalist approach is a more natural continuation of policies and practices the EU has implemented in the last two decades.²⁹ Neofunctionalist theory capitalizes on the positive spillover effect, positing that the benefits of integration in the economic sector will lead to integration in other sectors. As this is the exact path that the development of the EU has taken, neofunctionalism predicts that the EU's economic integration will eventually lead to collective security integration. Despite being six years old, the theoretical approach makes an accurate prediction of how the CSDP has evolved in the last six years.

Spain's shift away from the US and towards Europe

Guinea and García both argue that in its relationships with the US and the EU, Spain has viewed its own national interests as its chief concern. In terms of Spain's relationship with the United States and NATO, both García and Guinea agree that Spain has strong ties with the US because of both states' concern about terrorism.³⁰ Since 9/11, the United States has been fighting against terrorism on a global scale, and Spain, especially since 2004, has been fighting against terrorist organizations, specifically the ETA or Basque separatist movement, within Spain. Thus Spain was particularly willing to assist the US in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

²⁷ Ojanen, Hannah. "The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44.1 (2006): 70.

²⁸ Ojanen, 67.

²⁹ Ojanen, 72-73.

³⁰ Guinea, Mercedes. "Spain's Role in the European Common Foreign Policy: The Last Decade (2001-2011)." *UNISCI Discussion Papers*. 27 (2011): 46-47. García, 66.

at first.³¹ Guinea also argues that Spain has pursued a strong relationship with the US because it does not want to be dependent upon the Franco-German interests that so often drive the EU decision-making process.³² Spain seeks the flexibility of another security partner in the United States.

However, both Guinea and García believe that Spain has found the CSDP a better tool through which to further its national interests. Guinea posits that Spain has been extremely supportive of the CSDP partially as a way to create a stronger relationship with Latin America, by making Latin America an EU priority.³³ The CSDP gives Spain military capabilities and a global range that it would not have as an independent security actor.³⁴ Spain has participated militarily in 3 EU-led missions and operations, a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and a peacekeeping mission in Chad. This participation is a way for Spain to increase its standing as a global security actor. García also argues that Spain vacillates between using its relationship with the US to its own advantage and appeasing the US.³⁵ While under Bush the Spain-American relationship was characterized by appeasement, Spain has begun to view its relationship with the US more in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Partially because public opinion in Spain was strongly against the Iraq war³⁶ and partially to better pursue its national interests, Spain has decided that a strong relationship with the EU is more important than a strong relationship with the US and has made the EU a higher priority.³⁷ Thus García and Guinea both argue that while Spain has a strong relationship with the US because of both states' history with terrorism, Spain is acting to further its own national interests

³¹ García, 66.

³² Guinea, 42.

³³ Guinea, 36.

³⁴ Guinea, 39, 45.

³⁵ García, 65.

³⁶ García, 69.

³⁷ Guinea, 71.

and has decided that supporting the CSDP, and thus EU security capabilities, will have a more beneficial outcome than supporting NATO and the US.

Public Opinion Research Supports the EU's Transatlantic Shift

As previously noted, the public opinion-based literature takes two approaches, one examining factors that influence support for the CSDP versus NATO, and one examining factors that affect support for the CSDP in general. Both approaches rely heavily on Eurobarometer data, and neither approach has focused specifically on Spain. The articles discussed below examine EU member states more broadly.

Public Support for the CSDP has risen in contrast with support for NATO

There is not a great deal of literature focusing on what factors increase CSDP support and decrease NATO support, but the existing literature, mainly Ray, Leonard, and Johnston and Eichenberg concludes that while support for NATO has certainly declined somewhat in the twenty-first century, Europeans may not be ready to part with NATO entirely. Eichenberg examines support for NATO in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK through 20 separate Eurobarometer and USIA survey questions. The Eurobarometer methodology, with sample sizes of about 1,000 in each country and face-to-face interviews based on random sampling, is extremely sound, and France, Italy, Germany, and the UK represent a widely varied sample of countries in terms of historical support for NATO. Eichenberg and Ray et al both examine favorability for NATO in the EU from 1950's to the early 2000's, each concluding that through

2003 NATO favorability had remained relatively stable,³⁸ despite consistently high support for the CSDP since the EU's inception.³⁹ However, as Eichenberg's article was published before the Iraq War, it does not reflect what Ray et al would term the irreparable damage done to NATO and US standing in the EU since 2003.

Eichenberg posits that support for the CSDP grew as a result of "dissatisfaction with the perceived hard-line and unilateralist sentiment of US foreign and defense policy in the early 1980's."⁴⁰ Ray et al expand on this idea even further in their examination of how negative evaluations of the US have increased in Europe since 2003 on a variety of issues. While Eichenberg acknowledges fluctuation in terms of US and NATO support in Europe, Ray et al conclude that the downturn in support for the US within the EU has moved beyond mere fluctuation to a permanent decrease in support. Furthermore, Ray et al believe that an increase in their measure of anti-Americanism, which rates the US in the fight against terrorism, world peace, the fight against poverty, global economic growth, and protection of the environment, is strongly correlated with a decrease in the belief that NATO is essential to European security.⁴¹ Like Eichenberg, the data used by Ray et al is largely Eurobarometer data, and their regression models appear sound. Furthermore, Ray et al draw on Eichenberg's research in their conclusion that support for the CSDP was strong before the Iraq War, and the Iraq war exacerbated pre-existing unhappiness with American tendencies to unilateralism.⁴² While the research of Ray et al seems to confirm my beliefs that EU member states are beginning to see the CSDP as an alternative to NATO, it is limited by the fact that it is now six years old. Furthermore, in the past

³⁸ Eichenberg, Richard C. "Having it both Ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 67.4 (2003): 633, Ray, Leonard, and Gregory Johnston. "European Anti-Americanism and Choices for a European Defense Policy." *Political Science & Politics* 40.1 (2007): 85.

³⁹ Eichenberg, 2003, 630.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ray et al, 87.

⁴² Ray et al, 89.

six years, a series of events including the end of the Iraq War and Obama's election may prove that the CSDP's increased popularity at NATO's expense was merely a temporary phenomenon of the early Iraq War period.

Current factors that increase CSDP support

The existing research that examines what factors specifically affect public support for the CSDP does not focus on how those factors can affect NATO support. However, research in this field has the advantage of being somewhat more recent than research on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP. Kentman and Schoen both analyze the effect of public opinion on the EU's influence on national economies and the effect of European-focused identities on support for the CSDP. Additionally, Schoen examines public opinion on whether Europeans feel that the CSDP will bring about more benefits than costs in terms of security, and Kentman looks at the effect of gender on CSDP support.

Both scholars rely heavily on Eurobarometer data, with Schoen using data from 2004⁴³ and Kentman using data from 2005,⁴⁴ with regression models and various control variables. While Schoen's models appear well designed, Kentman frequently cites unnamed previous studies as justification for her specific control variables, such as controlling for religiosity.⁴⁵ The lack of specificity in naming what preexisting research she examined to come up with her control variables may cast doubt on the reliability of her regression models. However, Schoen's findings on EU identity and economic performance are largely similar to Kentman's, and thus Kentman's findings on those issues will be discussed.

⁴³ Schoen, 11.

⁴⁴ Kentmen, Cigdem. "Bases of Support for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Gender, Attitudes Toward Economic Integration, and Attachment to Europe." *International Political Science Review* 31.3 (2010): 289

⁴⁵ Kentman, , 292.

In terms of examining the perceived effect of the EU on the member states' economies, Kentman and Schoen both agree that it has a positive effect on support for the CSDP, but disagree as to how much of an effect it has. Kentman argues that when respondents felt that their country's economy was more stable because of EU membership, their support for the CSDP was 10 percentage points higher than respondents who did not feel their economy was more stable because of EU membership.⁴⁶ Schoen, however, found that the perceived performance of EU institutions, such as the EU's economic institutions, elicited a more minor increase in support for the CSDP.⁴⁷ Schoen argues instead that the perceived effectiveness of the EU in terms of security and defense issues had the greatest effect on CSDP support.⁴⁸ Both Kentman and Schoen agree that the level to which the respondent feels an attachment to Europe and a sense of European identity instead of nationalist identity has a positive effect on support for the CSDP. Kentman argues that it increases support for the CSDP by between 4 and 8 percentage points,⁴⁹ while Schoen argues that it increases support only for the common foreign policy aspects of the CSDP, and not the CSDP as a whole.⁵⁰ Interestingly, neither Kentman⁵¹ nor Schoen⁵² find that gender has a statistically significant effect on support for the CFSP or CSDP. While their findings average a variety of EU countries, I believe that in Spain, a country that has so recently embraced democracy and gender equality, the support for the CFSP and the CSDP may be more sharply gendered.

The Need for Further Research

⁴⁶ Kentman, 293.

⁴⁷ Schoen, 20.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Kentman, 293.

⁵⁰ Schoen, 20-21.

⁵¹ Kentman, 293.

⁵² Schoen, 22.

The existing scholarly literature, therefore, leaves many questions to be answered in terms of public opinion in Spain on the CSDP-NATO relationship. The historical approach either cannot account for the amount of progress made in terms of the CSDP in the last eight years, or if it does, it does not place Spain and public opinion in the context of that progress. The theoretical approach makes accurate predictions for the evolution of the CSDP-NATO relationship, but does not examine public opinion or Spain specifically. In contrast, research that deals with public opinion, while slightly more recent, does not fully examine the effects of increased positive public opinion towards the CSDP on decreased support for NATO, and does not examine Spain in any depth. Eichenberg and Ray et al are limited in that since 2003 and 2006, significant steps have been taken in CSDP integration and development, which may have garnered increased public support for the CSDP and decreased support for NATO. Both Kentman and Schoen examine factors that influence CSDP support, but they fail to examine how those factors may affect NATO support. Furthermore, Kentman and Schoen only examine one year of data and cannot make strong predictions about trends in the CSDP-NATO relationship.

In summary, while agreeing on many points, the existing literature illuminates the need to further examination a number of hypotheses, specifically on public opinion and the changing nature of Spain's relationship with NATO and any shift towards the CSDP. Thus, existing research provides a solid beginning foundation for my thesis but does not adequately address Spain's context in the NATO-CSDP relationship in terms of public opinion. In the following chapters, I use public opinion data to more fully illustrate where the Spanish people stand in terms of the NATO-CSDP relationship and what influences Spanish opinion on the NATO-CSDP relationship. In order to understand the future of the CSDP-NATO relationship, the

factors that influence CSDP and NATO support must be identified, and I must also ascertain whether Spaniards consider the CSDP/CFSP a valid alternative to NATO.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Measuring Support for European Security vs. NATO

My research seeks to answer five questions on the nature of public opinion regarding the Common Security and Defense Policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and NATO in Spain and several other EU member states. I employ survey questions from the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends Survey, which is administered each year to a random sample of about 1000 people per country in the United States and a variety of European Union countries.⁵³ The countries I examined are Spain, which joined the survey in 2004, the United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, France, and Italy. I chose to compare Spain to these five other countries because an analysis of Spain in a vacuum without comparison to other countries in the European Union is inadequate to fully address my questions. Spanish support for NATO may be at 50%, for example, which seems high, but if the support for NATO in other European Union countries is at 80% on average, then Spain is relatively much less supportive.

Countries Examined

The United Kingdom proves a valuable comparison because of its strong ties, in terms of defense and security, to the US. The UK is a strong supporter of NATO and a more reluctant supporter of measures for increased EU integration. Germany, in contrast, has been one of the most ardent champions of increased EU integration over the last few decades, and thus provides an interesting counterpoint to the UK stance. Likewise, Italy has tended to follow in Germany's footsteps in being very supportive of EU integration on security matters. France also tends to

⁵³ Professor Eichenberg provided me with a complete dataset containing all years of the German Marshall Fund surveys. All but the most recent years of these data are also available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

favor EU integration, and has historically been opposed to strong reliance on NATO, preferring a more independent European approach to security. Poland is perhaps the most similar to Spain, being a fairly young democracy as well. Both Poland and Spain have been in the European Union and NATO for almost as long as they have been democracies, and both are on the margins of Western Europe. For that reason, Poland makes for an interesting comparison with Spain.

How positive are Spanish attitudes towards NATO?

The first question I address is how positive Spanish attitudes are towards NATO. I hypothesize that Spain is less supportive of NATO than the UK, more supportive of NATO than Germany, France, and Italy, and comparable in terms of support with Poland. To measure support for NATO, I use a measure of Atlanticism, or support for the US-led collective security organization focused across the Atlantic. I average answers to three questions to create the measure, all questions from the 2012 Transatlantic Trends survey. The first asks, “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?”⁵⁴ This question encompasses security in terms of both defense and foreign policy, and asks respondents to define the direction that the NATO-EU relationship should move in. The second question states, “Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?”⁵⁵ Support for NATO as essential to security clearly indicates support for NATO. The last question is question 1A, which asks, “How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat

⁵⁴ *Transatlantic Trends 2012, Transatlantic Trends*. The German Marshall Fund. 2013. 7 March 2013.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*

desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?”⁵⁶ This question measures whether respondents believe that the US should continue to be a world leader, and this indicates a preference for NATO as a symbol of American-led collective security. Thus the index of Atlanticism measures support for the US as a global leader, support for NATO as essential for security, and support for the EU-US relationship’s future direction. The combined responses to these three questions clearly measures support for NATO, both in terms of foreign policy and security and indicates a preference for US-led collective security rather than a framework in which European institutions have primacy

Coding

The index of Atlanticism ranges from zero to 3, with zero being no preference for Atlanticism and three being a strong preference for Atlanticism.⁵⁷ For each year of the survey, countries received a 1 if the majority responded that NATO was still essential to security, and a zero if the majority did not believe NATO was essential; countries received a 1 if the majority responded that it was very desirable or somewhat desirable that the US continue to be a world leader, and a zero if the majority felt it was very or somewhat undesirable; countries received a 1 if the majority responded that the relationship between the EU and the US should become closer or stay the same, as the EU-US relationship is already strong, and a 0 if the majority responded that the EU should take a more independent approach. A score of 3 indicates strong support for Atlanticism, a score of 2 indicates mild support for Atlanticism, a score of 1 indicates weak

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ For a study that employs the same questions in a slightly different way, see: Everts, Philip, and Pierangelo, Isernia. “Drifting Apart or Waltzing Together? Ideology, Atlanticism, and Support for Using Military Force in Transatlantic Relations.” Paper presented to the Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 2012. 1-26.

support for Atlanticism, and a 0 would imply no support for Atlanticism. I analyze this measure of support for Atlanticism in chapter 7.

How positive are Spanish attitudes towards the CSDP/CFSP?

The second research question, addressed in Chapter 5, is “How positive are Spanish attitudes towards the CSDP/CFSP?” I hypothesize that Spain attitudes towards the CSDP/CFSP have been increasingly positive in recent years, more positive than attitudes in the UK, slightly less positive than attitudes in France, Italy, and Germany, and comparable with attitudes in Poland. I examine support for the CSDP, the defense policy, and the CFSP, the foreign policy. In examining support for the CSDP and CFSP as a whole, I employ one question from the Transatlantic Trends survey. The question asks “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?”⁵⁸ To examine support for the CFSP more specifically, I looked at one question asked in repeated years. The question asks, “How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?”⁵⁹ Regrettably, there are no questions asked over a range of years on the Transatlantic Trends survey that measure support for an independent European defense force of any kind, but I do analyze one question asked in 2007, which asks respondents “Some say that in order for the European Union to assume a greater international role it needs to do certain things—To what extent do you agree with the following? The countries of the EU should combine their military forces into a single European army, even though [SURVEY

⁵⁸ Transatlantic Trends, 2012

⁵⁹ Transatlantic Trends, 2012

COUNTRY] may not always agree with EU decisions.”⁶⁰ Support for a EU-led military force that would have both autonomy from NATO and remove a degree of military sovereignty from member states is clearly support for a Common Security and Defense Policy. I also compare responses to this survey question with responses to a similar question asked in a survey by Louis Harris France in 2000. The 2000 version of the question asks, “Personally, are you in favor or opposed to...the creation of a common European army?”⁶¹

I examine support for both the CSDP and the CFSP because they represent different aspects of the movement towards European security integration. Support for the CSDP is support for increased EU integration on military and defense matters, whereas support for the CFSP is support for increased EU cooperation on external diplomacy and foreign policy. Both defense and foreign policy are essential components of security. The EU leadership survey question that I examine measures support for CFSP independently of support for CSDP, whereas the EU army question measures support for the CSDP independently. The partnership question asks respondents if they think that the EU should have greater security and diplomacy independence from the US. The EU leadership question asks the respondent to chose whether the EU should be a strong world leader. The world hegemonic power for the last few decades has been the United States; for the EU to be a strong world leader implies that it might rival the US in terms of world power and thus have autonomous foreign policy capabilities.

Analysis

⁶⁰ Transatlantic Trends, 2007, *Transatlantic Trends*. The German Marshall Fund. 2008. 7 March 2013.

⁶¹ Eichenberg, Richard C., *Public Opinion on European Defense Integration and NATO: Tables and Analysis*. Department of Political Science. Tufts University, 2004. Web.
<http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/eichenberg/POORCE.zip>. 7 Mar. 2013.

The first two questions have been asked on the Transatlantic Trends survey almost continuously since 2004 in the case of the partnership question and since 2002 in the case of the EU leadership question. The wide range of years means that I can analyze trends in CSDP/CFSP support in the EU. As the CSDP and the CFSP have evolved drastically since 2002 and 2004, I believe that examination of public opinion over this span of years will be particularly illuminating, given both the changes in the nature of European defense, the EU's relationship with NATO, and the EU's relationship with the United States. The last question, which addresses the issue of an autonomous EU military, clearly translates support for an EU military to support for the CSDP, and is a useful snapshot of public opinion in that regard.

Have Spanish attitudes towards NATO changed as a result of the CSDP/CFSP's growth and will they continue to do so?

Chapter 6 contains analysis of my third research question, namely if Spanish attitudes towards NATO have changed because of any growth in public support for the CSDP/CFSP, and if so, if will they continue to change in the future. I hypothesize that Spanish attitudes towards NATO have become less positive as a result of growing support for the CFSP/CSDP and will continue to decline in the future. I also predict that the growth of the CFSP/CSDP will have less of a negative effect on attitudes towards NATO in the UK and Poland than in Spain, and more of a negative effect on attitudes towards NATO in France, Italy, and Germany than in Spain. To examine this question, I analyze the question from the 2012 Transatlantic Trends survey that asks "Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should

the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?”⁶² This question asks respondents to choose between more EU autonomy in terms of both security and diplomacy, and more or similar reliance on NATO. I believe that as a result of the CFSP/CSDP’s growth, fewer Spaniards would feel the need to rely on NATO as strongly as was done in the past and therefore would be more in favor of increased EU autonomy. Therefore, this question is the single best measure of how the CFSP/CSDP’s growth has affected attitudes towards NATO.

Analysis

The question has been asked on the Transatlantic Trends survey since 2004, meaning that I can analyze responses over eight years. As both Europe’s relationship with NATO and the strength of the CSDP/CFSP have changed greatly since 2004, I believe that an analysis of these eight years will be very telling about the relationship between the growth of the CSDP/CFSP and attitudes towards NATO. I will be looking at the percentage of respondents in each country who believe that Europe should take a more independent approach from the US, which indicates decreased support for NATO.

What influences Spanish support for the CSDP/CFSP in contrast with support for NATO?

Finally, in addition to analyzing over-time trends in support, I seek to ascertain the individual-level correlates of support for Atlanticist and Europeanist orientations. In terms of influences on Spanish support for NATO and the CSDP/CFSP, I believe that there are a number of factors involved. In Chapter 7, I specify two OLS multivariate regression models, one analyzing influences on support for Atlanticism and the other support for EU-centric security policy. Each equation specifies independent variables including age, level of education, political ideology,

⁶² Transatlantic Trends, 2012

gender, and support for either American or European Union world leadership. My dependent variables are the Atlanticism index mentioned above and support for EU world leadership, as measured via the Transatlantic Trends question, “How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?”⁶³

Summary of Hypotheses and Methods

In summary, in the chapters to follow, I analyze three sets of research questions concerning Atlanticism, Europeanism, and the individual-level correlates of citizen opinions. My method includes a summary of over-time trends in levels of national support and in chapter 7, a regression analysis of individual opinions.

⁶³ Transatlantic Trends, 2012

Chapter 4

A Strong Atlantic Orientation in Europe

Introduction

To measure support for NATO, I examined three separate survey questions asked variously from the 1960s through the Transatlantic Trends questions in 2004-2012 in Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Poland, and Spain. The first question asks, “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?”⁶⁴ This question, which essentially asks the respondent to choose between reliance on partnership with the US versus a more independent European approach, is revealing in terms of support for NATO. Those respondents who believe that the EU should take a more independent approach in terms of security presumably have a preference for the CFSP over security partnership with the US, whereas those who believe that the EU should rely as much or more on the US are showing a preference for NATO over the CFSP alone.

The second question I use to examine support for NATO poses the issue more directly: “Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say that it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?”⁶⁵ Those who believe that NATO is still essential support NATO, and those who believe that it is no longer essential do not support NATO specifically, are not supportive of collective security measures in general, or prefer more EU-centric security policy. However, this question is not the sole measure of

⁶⁴ *Transatlantic Trends*, 2012.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*

support for NATO in this paper because the belief that NATO is not essential does not necessarily indicate the belief that it is not important. Respondents may believe that NATO is not essential to security, but still prefer that their country remain in NATO for the sake of, for example, stronger relations with the United States. The final question I chose to examine is “How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?”⁶⁶ I believe that a significant portion of support for NATO stems from support for the United States as a world leader, as NATO is a symbol of American-led collective security.

To begin, I analyze the results to these questions separately. However, for the sake of simpler analysis and later regressions, I have also created an index measure of Atlanticism. The measure of Atlanticism, described in Chapter 3 above, combines the results of these three questions into an index, ranging from 0 to 3, of the strength of the public’s support for Atlanticism. Atlanticism in this case means a preference for American-led collective security as indicated by a close security partnership with the US, the belief that NATO is essential, and the preference for strong American global leadership.

Support for the EU-American security partnership

For the EU-American partnership question, I examined respondents who believed that the EU should have a security and diplomatic relationship that is as close as it is now or closer with the United States. As the EU-US security partnership is already fairly close, largely because of NATO, those who believe that the relationship should not change are exhibiting support for NATO. The partnership survey question was asked every year between 2004 and 2012 with the exceptions of 2007 and 2010.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

To add historical context to this data, I have also added responses to a USIA survey question asked during the 1990's to Table 1 and Figure 1. The question asks respondents, "One way some people have proposed to deal with post-Cold War security issues is to reduce the role of the US in NATO and strengthen the role of Western Europe. This would mean Europeans would have a much greater say on issue of Western security. However, Europe would have to spend more money on defense and assume more of the responsibility for the security of Western Europe. Which do you think would be the best for the security of Western Europe—keeping the same security relationship with the US or assuming more of the responsibility and control of our security?"⁶⁷ Much like the partnership question, the USIA question pits a security relationship with the US, namely in the form of NATO, against increased independence from the US and NATO. For that reason, this USIA question is a valuable pre-2004 benchmark for the partnership question.


⁶⁷ Eichenberg, 2004.

Table 1

Percentage of respondents who answered ‘as close’ or ‘closer’ when asked about the future of the EU-US security relationship (or ‘same relationship’ for the USIA question)

	Germany	Spain	France	Italy	UK	Poland
1994	38%		25%		44%	
1995	43		27		46	
1996	44		37	33	52	
1997	39		34	37	59	
1998	55		38		55	
1999	62		21		51	
2004	41	45	38	39	49	59
2005	42	49	33	33	49	62
2006	43	41	41	42	40	64
2008	46	46	43	47	47	72
2009	61	60	46	60	58	74
2011	58	56	56	62	60	70
2012	57	55	53	53	58	71
Average 1994-1999	49		30	35	52	
Average 2004-2008	43	45	38	40	46	64
Average 2009-2012	58	57	51	58	58	71
Average 2004-2012	49	50	44	47	51	67

Figure 1



Looking at the data for the 1990's, which was unfortunately unavailable for Spain, it seems that between 1994 and 2012, support for a closer relationship with the US grew somewhat in Germany and France, and stayed about the same in the UK, which makes sense given the UK's strong relationship with the US pre-1994. Beginning in 2004, I hypothesized that overall Atlanticism would be lower in Germany, Italy, and France than in Spain, higher in the UK than in Spain, and comparable to Spain in Poland. For support for US-EU partnership, my hypothesis holds partially true. Between 2004 and 2012, Spain averaged 50% support for a close EU-US relationship, slightly higher than France's 44% support, Italy's 47% support and Germany's 49% support. The UK and Poland both exhibit the highest average support, at 51% and 67% respectively. Support in Poland is somewhat surprisingly high, indicating a strong preference for US-led security policy, perhaps a result of Poland's experiences in World War II. Overall, support for EU-US partnership begins somewhere in the 50th percentile, and is more or less constant until 2008, when support increases between 3 points (France) and 16 points (Germany).

Between 2009 and 2012, there is a slight downward movement overall, with the exception of France. The bump in support for EU-US partnership comes at the same time as the beginning of Obama's first term. As the Iraq war was famously unpopular in Europe, Obama's election and the end of Bush's presidency likely bolstered Europeans' confidence in the EU-US partnership.⁶⁸ It is hard to tell, then, how much of the increase between 2008 and 2009 indicates increased support for partnership with the US, and therefore NATO, in contrast with support for partnership with Obama. Nonetheless, the data do tell us that support for partnership with the US appears to be higher in years after the 1990s, and support has increased since the acrimonious years of the Iraq War. Certainly partnership with the US has not become *less* popular since the 1990s.

Turning to Spain specifically, support for the EU-US security partnership has ranged between 41% and 60%, following more or less the average support for the six countries I examined. As support in Spain jumped 14% between 2008 and 2009, and the only significant change in the EU-US relationship between those two years was Obama's election, I believe that the increase in Spanish support is not necessarily indicative of increased support for EU-US partnership. Support for Obama's handling of international policies in 2009 in Spain was at 85%, which is extraordinarily high.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the small decline in support for the EU-US partnership between 2009 and 2012 seems to indicate that the initial euphoria over Obama's election has dissipated. I believe that support for security and diplomatic partnership between the EU and the US in Spain may have been artificially high in recent years as a result of Obama's election. Average support for a close EU-US relationship in Spain between 2004 and 2008 was at 45%, again the highest of all the EU countries surveyed with the exceptions of the

⁶⁸ Ray et al, 87.

⁶⁹ *Transatlantic Trends 2009. Transatlantic Trends*. The German Marshall Fund, 2010. Web. 7 Mar. 2013.

UK, where support was one percentage point higher, and Poland, where support was at 64%. Between 2009 and 2012, average support rose 12 percentage points in Spain to 57%. Support in Germany, the UK, and Italy was slightly higher, at 58% in each, much higher in Poland, and at 51% in France. Given that average support in Spain rose 12 percentage points between 2004-2008 and 2009-2012, it seems very likely that the change was due to the US presidential elections. As of now, however, more than half of Spain, and indeed more than half of each country surveyed, favors a strong EU-US security relationship, and in all cases, average support has been higher during Obama's presidency than Bush's. Clearly, the favorability of the American president has a strong influence on favorability of the EU-US relationship.

Without data for the 1990's, I can only hypothesize as to how the last decade in Spain fits into the context of the last twenty years. Given that Spain became a full-fledged democracy in 1978 and joined the European Union in 1981, it seems logical that as a young European democracy, Spain would be more preoccupied with economic and social reform and European integration than with matters of collective security. As the desire for a closer relationship with the US increased in Germany and France between the 1990's and the late 2010's, it seems plausible to assume that the same desire increased in Spain as well, meaning that support for a closer relationship with the US in Spain probably hovered around the 40th percentile through the 1990's. In light of that, it seems Spain has gotten slightly more Atlantic-oriented in recent years. However, I would argue that this shift is indicative of Spain's growth as an international actor that has been seeking out the allegiance of the current hegemon more than it is of a Spanish preference for a close security relationship with NATO or the US over a close security relationship with the EU. This view is supported by both realist theory, which assumes that Spain would be pursuing its best interests as an international actor, and also by Garcia, who

suggests that Spain defines its relationship with the US based on Spanish interests.⁷⁰ However, a final judgment must await examination of a number of additional opinion trends.

The belief that NATO is essential

The second question I examined asks respondents if they believe that NATO is still essential to their country's security. The question was asked in many years between and 2012, so we have a truly historical perspective on the question. Table 2 and figure 2 show the percentage of respondents who believe that NATO is still essential to their country's security. To put these figures into context, I have included results to an identical survey question asked in previous decades. The question come from USIA surveys and ask respondents, "Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country's security. Which view is closer to your own?"⁷¹ The wording in 1967 was slightly different, as it stated, "Some people say that the Soviet Union does not pose a serious military threat and that there is therefore not much need for NATO," before asking if NATO was essential. In 1973, "still important" replaced "still essential," but the wording was otherwise identical to other years.

⁷⁰ Garcia, 65.

⁷¹ Eichenberg, 2004.

Table 2

The percentage of respondents who answered the question, “Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say that it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?” with ‘essential.’

	Germany	Spain	France	Italy	UK	Poland
1967	67%		34%		59%	
1980	88		44	49	79	
1987	70		48	62	72	
1991	66	39	57	61	71	
1993	67	44	61	60	65	
1998	60	48	50	64	67	
2000	66	47	54	51	69	
2001	62	41	53	57	68	
2002	77		65	71	79	71
2004	71	62	63	66	76	61
2005	62	55	62	54	73	56
2006	57	50	62	55	67	56
2007	57	51	60	58	71	54
2008	62	63	64	57	73	61
2009	65	62	59	63	75	58
2010	57	60	64	58	70	58
2011	60	63	62	69	75	59
2012	61	56	63	57	76	53
Average 1967-2001	68	44	50	58	69	
Average 2002-2008	64	56	63	60	73	60
Average 2009-2012	61	60	62	62	74	57
Average 2002-2012	63	58	62	61	74	59

Source: USIA data from 1967-2001, Transatlantic Trends data from 2002-2012

Figure 2





Figure 3



Between 1967 and 2004, it appears that the belief in NATO as essential was more or less constant in Germany, Italy, the UK, and Spain, and rose slightly in France. Average belief in NATO as essential between 1991 and 2001 was lowest in Spain, where less than half of Spain finds NATO essential until 2004. I concluded in the previous section that support for a strong relationship with the US, as defined by NATO, would be in the 40th percentile. Given that support for NATO shown here is around the 40th percentile in the 1990's, that conclusion seems to hold true. Spain was less supportive of both NATO and a security relationship with the US than its EU peers. That lower level of support, however, may be more reflective of a preoccupation with domestic issues in the 1990's after Spain's recent democratization than it is of skepticism towards NATO at the time.

Looking at the years 2004 and beyond, I reasoned that support for NATO would be higher in Spain than in France, Germany, or Italy, lower in Spain than in the UK, and comparable between Spain and Poland. My hypothesis holds true for the relationships between Spain and the UK and between Spain and Poland. However, the percentage of respondents who believe that NATO is essential is very comparable between France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Poland. The only notable outlier is the UK, where respondents consistently find NATO to be more essential to security, and while support in the UK is higher, it is not a great disparity between the UK and Spain. Interestingly, unlike support for the EU-US partnership, there is not an increase in belief in NATO essential with Obama's election. There is an overall trend of decreasing belief in NATO as essential between 2002 and 2005, and belief in NATO as essential more or less stays constant between 2006 and 2012, with only mild evidence of an increase after Obama's election. I believe dissatisfaction with the Iraq war and the US was a negative influence on NATO support, and support began to level as the Iraq war drew to a close.

Spain joined the survey in 2003, and thus 2004 was the first year that the Transatlantic Trends question was asked in Spain. Between the spring of 2001 and 2004, support for NATO as essential jumps almost 20 percentage points, showing a marked increase from the 1990's to the early 2000s. I argue that the jump was due to the Spanish response to September 11. As previously noted, Spain has had experience with domestic terrorism, and I feel that the American war against terror likely resonated with Spaniards more than it would with other EU citizens.⁷² For that reason, Spain would have found a relationship with the US and NATO more appealing. The belief that NATO is essential in Spain hovers in the mid-to-low 50th percentile between 2004 and 2006, jumps up to the low 60th percentile in 2007, and vacillates around 60% between 2007 and 2012. In this regard, Spain seems to be comparable with the other EU countries surveyed, with slightly lower support than in France and Italy and comparable support with Germany and Poland. As the Iraq war became particularly unpopular in Spain, I believe that the decreased belief in NATO as essential between 2004 and 2006 may be artificially depressed as a reflection of dissatisfaction with the US and with the war.⁷³ As the war began to end, support increased slightly and then remained constant. About 60% of Spaniards said that NATO was essential to Spanish security. While 60% is more than the majority, I do not believe that this indicates that the majority of Spaniards would choose NATO over the CFSP/CSDP. Spaniards may believe that the two organizations are compatible, and not mutually exclusive; they may find both organizations essential to Spanish security, which I will discuss further in chapter 6.

Support for American Leadership

⁷² Guinea, 66.


⁷³ Garcia, 69.

The final question I examine in this section is “How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?” I examined the percentage of respondents who felt that American leadership in world affairs was somewhat or very desirable. This question was asked each year between 2002 and 2012, and again, Spain joined the survey in 2004.

Table 3

The percentage of respondents who answered the question, “How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?” with very or somewhat desirable.						
	Germany	Spain	France	Italy	UK	Poland
2002	69%		49%	64%	71%	69%
2003	46		28	46	57	59
2004	37	18	24	41	57	43
2005	39	22	28	37	55	47
2006	43	19	31	35	50	45
2007	38	18	30	37	53	46
2008	39	18	29	40	50	41
2009	62	42	52	55	67	49
2010	60	42	48	55	73	51
2011	61	36	49	58	69	59
2012	60	39	57	49	65	45
Average 2002-2012	50	28	39	47	61	50
Average 2002-2008	44	19	31	43	56	50
Average 2009-2012	61	40	52	54	69	51

Figure 3



As before, I predicted that Spaniards would find US leadership less favorable than the British, more favorable than the Germans, French, and Italians, and as favorable as the Polish. It is clear in figure 3 that Spaniards found US leadership the least desirable of all six countries. The British found it the most desirable, followed by the Germans and the Polish, then the French and the Italians, and finally the Spanish. Support for US leadership overall dropped dramatically between 2002 and 2004, leveled between 2004 and 2008, increased sharply between 2008 and 2009, and then remained more or less constant between 2009 and 2012. The 2009 bump is again likely a reflection of US President Bush being replaced with President Obama. It seems logical that the American president's popularity would influence support for American leadership abroad. As a result, I believe that the jump from 2008 to 2009 is more representative of support for Obama than support for US leadership, and NATO supremacy, as a whole.

Support in Spain for American leadership is interestingly somewhat lower than support in the other five EU countries. While Spain was initially very supportive of the Iraq war, I believe that a similar drop in support for American leadership would have occurred in Spain between

2002 and 2004.⁷⁴ Spanish support of both the Iraq war and American leadership fell rather quickly once Spanish troops were deployed, and so Spain withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2004, largely due to tension between the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and President Bush. Obama has been very popular in Spain, and I believe that the increased support in Spain for US leadership between 2009 and 2012 may be artificially high for that reason. Even with Obama's popularity in Europe and the devastating effects of the Eurozone crisis in Spain, Spanish support for US leadership hovers at forty percent. The majority of Spaniards do not find American leadership desirable, and therefore, they prefer the leadership of another actor, either independently of the US or as a partner to the US. That actor may be Spain, but it may also be the European Union. In either case, Spaniards currently do not favor American leadership in international affairs, and they are less supportive of American leadership than France, Italy, Germany, Poland, and the UK. As France has traditionally been very supportive of independence from the US in terms of security in the past, I believe that Spain's lower level of support here is particularly noteworthy.

Atlanticism in Europe

While I examined each of the three questions individually above, for the sake of simplicity in further analysis, I constructed an index of Atlanticism following the work of Isernia and Everts.⁷⁵ The index combines the three questions discussed above, and ranges from zero, meaning no support for Atlanticism, to three, meaning high support for it. If a respondent found NATO essential, the respondent received one point; if the respondent found US leadership

⁷⁴ Garcia, 66.

⁷⁵ Everts, Philip, and Pierangelo, Isernia. "Drifting Apart or Waltzing Together? Ideology, Atlanticism, and Support for Using Military Force in Transatlantic Relations." Paper presented to the Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 2012. 13-14.

desirable, she received one point; if the respondent felt that the EU-US security relationship should stay close or grow closer, the respondent received one point. As discussed in my methodology section, I believe that this index is a valid indicator of overall Atlanticism in a country, as it captures three central ideas of Atlanticism. It includes support for NATO as essential, support for American leadership, and support for a strong EU-US security relationship, all of which are important components of an Atlantic security orientation.

Figure 4




Figure 4 shows the average Atlanticism score respondents received in a country for each year. I believed that Atlanticism would be highest in the UK, then in Spain and Poland, and lowest in France, Italy, and Germany. In fact, Atlanticism is highest in both the UK and in Poland, and fairly comparable in the remaining countries, with Spain being slightly lower. The trends in US favorability and support for the EU-US security relationship that became clear above are visible here to a much-reduced degree. Average Atlanticism is more or less constant

between 2004 and 2008, moves up slightly between 2008 and 2009, and then is fairly constant through 2012. The effect of Obama's election in late 2008 seems to have been a slightly positive influence on overall Atlanticism, but not to as large a degree as it was for US favorability. Overall, while there is some variation between 2004 and 2012 and between countries overall, the results are fairly comparable between countries, ranging from just over 1 at the lowest in Spain to just under 2 at the highest in the UK. In general, average Atlanticism in most countries hovers just above 1.5, meaning that respondents lean Atlanticist overall.

It seems that Spain is slightly lower in terms of Atlanticism with the other countries surveyed, but overall Spain is fairly comparable to the other countries surveyed. There is a slight upward shift between Bush's presidency and Obama's presidency, but average Atlanticism in Spain is largely between just above 1 and just above 1.5, whereas in other countries it stays closer to 1.5. As to whether Spain has gotten more or less Atlanticity-oriented in the last decade, I believe that there has been little change, and if anything Spain has gotten more Atlanticist overall. Support for the EU-US security relationship does not seem to have changed much in Spain since the 1990's, US favorability likely has not changed dramatically since the 1990's, and it seems that Spanish support of NATO has risen slightly in the past decade. Therefore Spain's average Atlanticism would likely be higher this decade than in the previous one.

Conclusion

The six countries surveyed here are all fairly comparable in terms of the strength of their Atlanticism, and there seems to have been little change in the last decade but for a slight bump in Atlanticism following Obama's election. The majority of Spaniards, and indeed the majority of

Europeans, find NATO essential to security. While US favorability and support for the EU-US security relationship have fluctuated, likely due to the Iraq War and Obama's election, more than half of Spaniards and Europeans favor a close EU-US security relationship. About half of Europeans favor the US as a strong world leader, although support in Spain is somewhat lower, nearer to the 40th percentile than the 50th. Perhaps this combination of lower favorability of American leadership and high support for NATO and the EU-US security relationship in Spain indicates a belief that while NATO is important to Spaniards, American leadership is less consistently popular. That gap may indicate support for stronger European leadership in the context of the EU-US relationship. Clearly, Atlanticism and support for NATO are high in all states surveyed. However, given that favorability of American leadership has fluctuated widely in recent years, Europeans may feel that the EU's growth in the EU-US security relationship is necessary due to skepticism about American leadership of NATO.

Chapter 5

Strong Support for European Security Policy

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine three survey questions to analyze support for the CSDP and the CFSP. Measuring support for the CSDP/CFSP as a whole and for the CSDP and CFSP individually over time is difficult. There are few survey questions used repeatedly that ask respondents to evaluate their support for EU-led collective security. Instead, there are more frequently two types of questions: questions asked over a span of years that measure support for EU-collective security independence in an indirect way, and more specific questions asked only once. I combine results from both types of questions to form a more complete picture of CSDP/CFSP support.

The first question I examine was asked once, on the 2007 Transatlantic Trends survey, and asks respondents “Some say that in order for the European Union to assume a greater international role it needs to do certain things—To what extent do you agree with the following? The countries of the EU should combine their military forces into a single European army, even though [SURVEY COUNTRY] may not always agree with EU decisions.”⁷⁶ I examined respondents who either somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that a EU army should be formed, and that part of its formation should involve a transfer of partial military sovereignty from member states to the EU. A defining aspect of a country’s sovereignty is control over its military capabilities. Therefore, the creation of a EU army with soldiers from each member state, much in the style of NATO’s military forces, shows support for EU-led collective security, or the CSDP, where control over military forces is ceded to the EU as an institution. I compared

⁷⁶ *Transatlantic Trends*, 2007.

responses to this question with responses from a question from a 2000 Louis Harris France survey, which asked respondents “Personally, are you in favor or opposed to...the creation of a common European army?”⁷⁷

The second question I examined asked, “How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?”⁷⁸ The question was asked each year between 2002 and 2012, with the exception of 2003. I examined respondents who answered that it was either very or somewhat desirable that the EU exerts strong leadership in world affairs. Strong leadership in world affairs implies strong leadership in terms of foreign policy and diplomacy and thus implies support for the CFSP. The third question asked, “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?”⁷⁹ I examined respondents who answered that the EU should take a more independent approach between 2005 and 2012, with the exceptions of 2007 and 2010, when the survey question was not asked. Support for EU diplomacy and security independence from the US translates as support for the EU’s own security and diplomacy institutions, the CFSP and the CSDP. In terms of overall CSDP/CFSP support, I hypothesized that Spanish attitudes towards the CSDP/CFSP became more positive in recent years and are more positive than attitudes in the UK, slightly less positive than attitudes in France, Italy, and Germany, and comparable with attitudes in Poland.

Support for EU military independence


⁷⁷ Eichenberg, 2004.

⁷⁸ *Transatlantic Trends*, 2012.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

EU security independence has many separate aspects, and yet it comprises a small fraction of survey questions. In order to provide some context for support for EU defense autonomy, I examine a question in the 2007 survey that asked respondents if they supported the creation of an autonomous NATO-style EU army. The wording of the 2007 question is slightly different from the wording of the question asked in 2000, as the 2007 question specifically asks about the ceding of military sovereignty to the EU. However, I believe that the responses to both questions can be analyzed together, as the general concept underlying both versions is the same. For the 2000 iteration of the question, data for Poland was not available. To place 2007 in the trends of support for the CFSP/CSDP and for NATO that we see in other chapters, in 2007 support for American-led collective security was at a low point. Dissatisfaction with both President Bush and the Iraq war had soured opinions on NATO in Europe.

Figure 1



In each country, with the unsurprising exception of the UK, more than half of the respondents favored the creation of a European Union army. I predicted that support would be highest in France, Italy, and Germany, then in Spain and Poland, and lowest in the UK. In reality, support was highest in France and Italy, then in Spain, followed by Germany and Poland, and then lowest in the UK. To compare with the results of the 2000 survey, in 2007 support grew only in Spain, shrank somewhat in Germany, France, and Italy, and was roughly equivalent in the UK. The differences in support between 2000 and 2007, however, are not large, and could certainly be due to sampling error. I believe that support for a common EU army in 2000 makes for a valuable comparison because it is just before the Iraq war, but at a point in time where the EU-US security relationship was already becoming strained and when the EU was beginning to develop security capabilities. Furthermore, while support shifted a bit between 2000 and 2007, support for a common EU army was in the majority both years in every country but the UK. In 2007, almost 60% of Spain favored the creation of a EU army. Interesting, Spain supported the Iraq war and had a strong relationship with the US in the early 2000s, and yet support for a EU army was still above 50%. With the Iraq war's official end in 2011 and Obama's high popularity in Europe, support for a EU army may be somewhat lower now that anti-Americanism is decreasing in the EU. However, the CSDP has developed since 2007, and has certainly become more of a concrete reality since 2000; EU-led missions in Somalia, Kosovo, South Sudan, and other countries have since taken place. It would therefore not be surprising were support for a EU-led army to have grown as the CSDP has developed. Regardless, it seems that there is, or was as of 2007, a basis of support for the CSDP; Eichenberg also finds a similar level of support for the CSDP in the EU from the 1950's to the early 2000's.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Eichenberg, 2003, 633.

Support for the CSDP in Spain is not a recent phenomenon, either. A popular Eurobarometer question asks “Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [nationality] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the [national] government, and which should be decided jointly within the EU...security and defense.”⁸¹ Support in Spain, while not particularly high when compared to Germany or France, ranges from 38% to 57% in support for EU-level decision-making between 1989 and 2001, which is higher than support for national-level decision-making in the majority of years. In summary, support for the CSDP and for specific elements of the CSDP, namely a common EU army, has been strong since at least the late 1980’s.

The EU as a global leader


Support for the CFSP has been very strong since at least the late 1980’s as well. A Eurobarometer question asked over many years specifically examines CFSP support: “Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [nationality] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the [national] government, and which should be decided jointly within the EU...foreign policy towards countries outside the EU.”⁸² In Spain, support for EU-level foreign policy from 1989 to 2001 has ranged from 58% in 1989 to 77% in 2001. Support in Germany, France, and Italy has consistently been higher, while support in the UK has unsurprisingly been somewhat lower.

⁸¹ Eichenberg, 2004.

⁸² Ibid.

Looking at the last decade specifically, I predicted that support for EU world leadership would be highest in France, Italy, and Germany, then in Spain and Poland, and finally lowest in the UK. For the most part, my hypothesis was correct, as seen in Figure 2. The one exception is France, where support for EU leadership was comparable to that of support in Spain. While support for EU leadership varies between the six countries I examine by as much as 25 percentage points, what is surprising is that overall, there have been no significant trends in public opinion on EU leadership. EU world leadership implies EU leadership on both autonomous foreign policy and autonomous diplomacy; being a world leader does not necessarily imply military strength. Therefore, support for the EU as a world leader implies some measure of support for the CFSP as well, since for the EU to be a world leader it would have to have some form of autonomous and unified foreign policy.

Figure 2



Support for the EU as a world leader has dropped about 20 percentage points in the UK over the last ten years, but in France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Poland, support has been more

or less stable. Interestingly, it does not seem that support for the CFSP has grown since 2002. However, support for the CFSP, as seen through support for EU leadership, has been markedly high since the early 2000s, and even since 1989. For most countries represented, somewhere between 70% and 90% of respondents found EU leadership either somewhat desirable or very desirable. Even in the UK, where EU leadership seems the least popular, more than half of respondents still favored EU leadership. Also interesting is the high level of support for European world leadership in Poland, which exhibited a strong preference for US-led security policy. These figures are consistent with measures of support for EU-led collective security dating as far back as the EU's inception.⁸³ Support for the CFSP has grown since the 1980's and 1990's in Germany, Spain, and surprisingly, the UK, has remained constant in Italy and dropped slightly in France. Overall, one thing is clear: the CFSP has been popular for decades, and in some cases, has gotten even more popular in recent years.

Increasing support for EU security and diplomacy independence

The third Transatlantic Trends question that I examine asks respondents to choose the future of the EU-US security and diplomatic partnership. Asked over a wide span of years, it asks respondents if the EU-US security and diplomacy relationship should become closer, remain about the same, or if the EU should become more independent. The partnership question is examined in later chapters of my thesis in various other ways; here it is particularly instructive because it is designed to measure European support for the general concept of the CFSP/CSDP because "independence" cannot be achieved without them.

EU collective security has two key aspects, the defensive or military, and the foreign policy. The CFSP cannot survive without the CSDP, and vice versa. Again, I believed that

⁸³ Eichenberg, 2003, 630.

France, Italy, and Germany would be most supportive of the CFSP/CSDP, followed by Spain and Poland, with the UK being least supportive. I examined the percentage of respondents who felt the EU should be more independent, as the EU-US relationship is already relatively close, and so support for that relationship to stay the same is essentially support for a close relationship.

To put the figures below in context, I also examined a USIA survey question asked in the 1990's. The question asks respondents, "One way some people have proposed to deal with post-Cold War security issues is to reduce the role of the US in NATO and strengthen the role of Western Europe. This would mean Europeans would have a much greater say on issues of Western security. However, Europe would have to spend more money on defense and assume more of the responsibility for the security of Western Europe. Which do you think would be the best for the security of Western Europe—keeping the same security relationship with the US or assuming more of the responsibility and control of our security?"⁸⁴

The results of this question are shown in Figure 3 below. The dynamic proposed, asking respondents to choose the future of the EU-US security relationship, is very similar to the dynamic of the Transatlantic Trends partnership question. In 1996, 70% of Spanish respondents felt the EU should take more responsibility for its own security. That number fell to 48% in 1997 and rose to 50% in 1998. In each year, the percentage that chose more EU independence was higher than the percentage that felt the EU-US security relationship should stay the same. Similar percentages were observed in France, Germany, and Italy, with less support for independence in the UK.

⁸⁴ Eichenberg, 2004.

Figure 3




Figure 4




Table 1

Percentage of respondents who responded to “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?” with “take a more independent approach.”

	Germany	Spain	France	Italy	UK	Poland
2004	58%	54%	61%	60%	50%	40%
2005	57	51	66	66	50	38
2006	56	58	58	57	59	35
2008	54	53	56	53	52	37
2009	38	39	53	39	41	25
2011	41	43	44	37	40	29
2012	42	44	46	46	41	28
Average 2004-2012	49	49	55	51	48	33

Support for EU security independence has generally been strong, if not in the majority. The drop in support in the mid-1990’s seems to confirm Art’s hypothesis that the Balkans crisis undermined confidence in EU security policy as it stood.⁸⁵ Support in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK has been relatively comparable, with support being between 10 and 20 percentage points lower in Poland, which again seems to prefer US-led security policy. Support for EU independence began relatively high, averaging between 50% and 60% for most countries in 2004. Between 2004 and 2008 support did not vary much, and then between 2008 and 2009 there was a somewhat sharp downturn in support for EU independence. Since 2009, support for independence has begun to edge upwards, perhaps back towards pre-2009 levels. The plateau between 2004 and 2008 is likely caused by the Iraq war. On the one hand, Europe was largely dissatisfied with the US’s role in the Iraq war, and on the other hand, Europe was still largely reliant on the US and NATO in terms of military capabilities, especially in the face of a Middle

⁸⁵ Art, 33.

Eastern threat. The drop between 2008 and 2009 was likely caused by Obama's election as American president. Given Obama's popularity in Europe, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is logical that support for the EU's independence from the US would drop with Obama's election. However, a year into Obama's presidency, support for EU independence began to rise back towards pre-2008 levels. Moving into Obama's second term and the US's continued presence in the Middle East, combined with the EU's growing security capabilities, it seems possible that support for EU security independence will remain at its current level or continue to grow. Support for a more independent Europe was relatively high even in the late 1990's, when a more independent EU was not as plausible as it is today. As support is already in the 40th percentile, it does not seem implausible that in a few years perhaps more than half of Europe will support EU security and diplomacy independence, as it did before the Iraq war and before Obama's terms in office.

Implications for Spanish and European support for the CSDP & CFSP

Support for the CFSP, as measured through support for EU-leadership, is very high. Likewise, support for the CSDP, as seen through support in 2000 and in 2007 for a EU-led army, is also relatively high. Support for both policies combined is somewhat lower; while more than the majority of Europeans supported these measures of the CFSP and the CSDP individually, less than half currently support the CFSP/CSDP as a whole. Looking at Spain specifically, it seems surprisingly comparable to the more traditionally pro-EU countries of France, Italy, and Germany, and with good reason. Spain as an individual actor on the world stage has very little real power, both in terms of defensive capabilities and in crafting forceful foreign policy. It does not seem like a stretch of the imagination to conclude that Spain's citizens are aware of this, and

that they are also aware that Spain serves to better its own interests through membership in NATO and the CFSP/CSDP.

While membership in both American and European-led collective security is not mutually exclusive, it is quickly becoming more and more apparent that American, and thus NATO, security priorities have shifted away from Europe. Garcia argues that Spain's relationship with the US is characterized by alternating bandwagoning and appeasement to suit Spain's interests.⁸⁶ Given the drift of American attention to Asia and the Middle East, it seems that at the moment, EU-led collective security has more to offer Spain than NATO membership does. Likewise, further EU integration in the security and foreign policy realm is logical, given the current level of EU integration in other fields. In recent years, Spain has participated in three separate EU peacekeeping missions, including one to curb piracy off the coast of Somalia, a mission with both foreign policy and defensive underpinnings. Spain is getting more involved with and more invested in EU-led collective security. Furthermore, almost half of Spaniards believe that the EU should take a more independent approach to security and diplomacy from the US, and that number seems likely to rise, as it has been high in the past. Given the combination of high support for EU world leadership, ongoing support for an EU-led army, and support for EU security and diplomacy independence, not just in Spain, but in all six EU countries examined for recent decades, support for the CSDP and the CFSP seems robust.

⁸⁶ Garcia, 65.

Chapter 6:

Complements or Contradiction?

Have attitudes towards NATO changed because of support for European Defense?

Introduction:

The third question I examine is whether Spanish attitudes towards NATO have changed because of the growth of support for the CSDP/CFSPs. Do Europeans see the CSDP/CFSP and NATO as complementary and desirable, or has the CSDP/CFSP's growth leached support away from NATO? To answer that question, I re-examined one Transatlantic Trends survey question asked each year between 2004 and 2012, with the exceptions of 2007 and 2010. The question asks, "Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?"⁸⁷ I examined respondents in Spain, France, Germany, the UK, Poland, and Italy who answered that the EU should take a more independent approach from the US. I believe that as the CSDP/CFSP has evolved over time, it may have drawn support away from NATO in Europe. Furthermore, I believe that the shift in support will manifest itself in the belief that the EU should be more independent from the United States in terms of both foreign policy and security, as support for EU security and diplomacy independence implies support for the EU's security and diplomacy organizations. Finally, I examine whether Europeans see EU-concentric collective security and NATO as competitive or complementary.

Reviewing the evidence: changing tides in Europe

⁸⁷ *Transatlantic Trends*, 2012.

I believed that the CFDP/CSDP's growth in the last decade would have a positive effect on the number of Spaniards who believe that the EU should take a more independent security approach from the US. I also hypothesized that there would be less of a positive effect in Poland and the UK than in Spain on the percentage of citizens who believe the EU should be more independent, and that there would be more of a positive effect in France, Germany, and Italy than in Spain. Overall, I believed that Spain would be average in terms of support for EU independence, with the UK and Poland having less support for EU independence and France, Italy, and Germany having more support. The data reveals that I was partially correct; Spain seems to be in the middle of the six countries in terms of support for EU independence, with France being more supportive and Poland being much less supportive. The UK, Germany, and Italy, however, are comparable with Spain in terms of support. Poland aside, support for EU independence does not differ drastically between the other five countries. The trends in support, however, are much more revealing.

To put the data from the 2004-2012 Transatlantic Trends in context, I have included a USIA survey question asked between 1994 and 1999. The question is similar in pitting a strong security relationship with the US against the EU having more independence and autonomy in terms of security. Specifically, the question asks, "One way some people have proposed to deal with post-Cold War security issues is to reduce the role of the US in NATO and strengthen the role of Western Europe. This would mean Europeans would have a much greater say on issue of Western security. However, Europe would have to spend more money on defense and assume more of the responsibility for the security of Western Europe. Which do you think would be the best for the security of Western Europe—keeping the same security relationship with the US or


assuming more of the responsibility and control of our security?”⁸⁸ I examined respondents who felt that the EU should take more responsibility over its security.

Table 1

Percentage of respondents who responded to “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?” with “take a more independent approach,” or with “more responsibility” to the USIA question.						
	Germany	Spain	France	Italy	UK	Poland
1994	55%		71%		48%	
1995	54		70		51	
1996	52	70	57	60	41	
1997	42	48	63	56	25	
1998	31	50	55		30	
1999	58		77		31	
2004	58	54	61	60	50	40
2005	57	51	66	66	50	38
2006	56	58	58	57	59	35
2008	54	53	56	53	52	37
2009	38	39	53	39	41	25
2011	41	43	44	37	40	29
2012	42	44	46	46	41	28
Average 1994-2012	49	51	60	53	43	33
Average 1994-1999	49	56	66	58	37	
Average 2004-2008	56	54	60	59	53	38
Average 2009-2012	40	42	48	40	41	27
Source: USIA data from 1994-1999, Transatlantic Trends data from 2004-2012						

⁸⁸ Eichenberg, 2004.

Figure 1




In the 1990's, support for greater EU security independence is fairly high in Germany, France, and Italy, where it is generally above the majority. Predictably, support is slightly lower in the UK, and for the three years Spain was surveyed, it was above the majority twice and only slightly below the majority once. Coming into the 2000s, it seems that a fair number of Europeans wanted a more independent, autonomous Europe.

Turning to the 2000s, as is apparent in both Table 1 and Figure 1, there is a general downward trend in support for independence between 2004 and 2009, and then a very slight upward movement in support for independence between 2009 and 2012, with a sharp drop between 2008 and 2009 for most countries. Support is lowest in Poland, highlighting again that despite expected similarities between Spain and Poland, Poles are much less supportive of EU-led security policy than Spaniards. Turning to Spain specifically, support for independence

hovers in the 50th percentile from 2004 to 2008, drops from 54% in 2008 to 39% in 2009, and then slowly rises to the mid 40th percentile by 2012, as seen in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2



In the chapter four, NATO support appeared heavily influenced by the popularity of the current American president. The American president's popularity does not seem to have as strong of an effect on support for EU independence, although it does have some influence. Support for EU independence in the 2000s is highest in the middle of Bush's second term as US president and in the middle of the Iraq war. Given the Iraq war's unpopularity in Europe,⁸⁹ and particularly in Spain in its later years, an increased desire for EU security independence at this time does not come as a surprise. The sharp drop in support for EU independence in 2009 coincides with Obama's election, as he won the presidential race in late 2008. It seems logical to

⁸⁹ Ray, et al, 87.

conclude, with Obama's consistent popularity in Europe,⁹⁰ that his presence in the Oval Office would leave Europeans more hesitant to shy away from NATO's protective embrace. However, since 2009, support for European independence has started to creep upwards again in Spain, mirroring the decrease in strong Atlanticism in Spain since 2009 as well.

Implications for NATO & The CSDP/CFSP

Currently, support for EU independence from the US in terms of security and diplomacy is at just under 45% in Spain, and in the 40th percentile for France, Italy, Germany, and the UK, while somewhat lower in Poland. Poland's deviation from the other five countries may be due to the recent opening of an American air base in the country, which would only strengthen Poland's ties to NATO. Taking Poland out of consideration, as it is one of the lesser influential EU member states, and examining the general trend in Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Spain, it seems clear that support for EU independence is just under 50%. Support for EU independence has been weaker in this decade than the last, and it is impossible to ascertain whether the slight upward trend since 2009 is indicative of a substantive change in attitudes or merely a result of short-term fluctuations.

Currently, support for more EU security autonomy is not in the majority, but it is robust, as became clear in the previous chapter. Looking back to chapter four, support for NATO is generally in the majority, and seems stable. Support for EU security autonomy and Atlanticism both seem to have been affected by the Iraq war and Obama's election in inverse ways. However, it is clear looking back on the first decade of the 21st century that while support for EU security autonomy is strong, Atlanticism and support for NATO are stronger. The Transatlantic Trends survey question pits EU-centric and US-led collective security against each other, but

⁹⁰ Transatlantic Trends ,2009.

it does not seem that Europeans feel a need to choose. The CSDP and CFSP have developed greatly in the last decade, but there does not seem to be a drastic change in support for both policies, which have been fairly popular conceptually for decades.⁹¹ With support for EU-centric and US-led collective security both fairly high, albeit with US-led security more popular in Europe, it raises the question as to whether Europeans are choosing one or the other, or if the same Europeans are choosing both EU-led and US-led collective security.

Table 2: Cross-tabulation of NATO “essential” and Desirability of EU world leadership

	EU world leadership is...					
	Very undesirable	Somewhat undesirable	Neither	Somewhat desirable	Very desirable	Total
NATO not essential	46	44	44	36	34	37
NATO is essential	54	56	56	64	66	63
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi-squared	309.5684—p < 0.01					

The cross tabulation in Table 2 compares support for EU world leadership and the belief in NATO as essential. Given the robust chi-squared value, it clear that there is a relationship between the two variables, namely that support for EU world leadership is not independent of the belief that NATO is essential. Furthermore, the relationship is positive, that is, of respondents in table 2 who found EU leadership highly desirable, the majority also found NATO to be essential. The same goes for respondents who found EU leadership somewhat desirable. Interestingly, respondents who were less supportive of EU world leadership tended also to find NATO less essential. The results for Spain specifically are similar, but even more dramatic, with respondents who favor EU leadership strongly favoring NATO and vice versa.

⁹¹ Eichenberg, 2003, 633.

Table 3

NATO essential =1	Direction of the EU-US Security Relationship			
	More independent	As close	Closer	Total
NATO not essential	45	30	29	37
NATO essential	55	70	71	63
Total	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi-squared	899.85— $p < 0.01$			

The cross tabulation in Table 3 compares opinions on the future direction of the EU-US security relationship with support for NATO as essential. On average, European respondents who felt that the EU should take a more independent approach from the US found NATO to be essential. Given the robust chi-squared value, it seems that more desired independence does lead to lower support for NATO, but even among those who want independence, the majority still finds NATO to be essential. However, only 48% of Spaniards who wanted the EU to take a more independent approach found NATO to be essential, compared to 52% of respondents did not believe NATO was essential. Similar, if less dramatic results occurred in Poland as well. Interestingly, Spaniards who want an independent EU seem to be slightly less Atlantically-oriented, albeit by a small margin. Further cross tabulations reveal that Europeans and Spaniards who favor a strong EU on the international stage and further EU security autonomy also tend to favor the US as a world leader and NATO as essential.⁹² To summarize my findings, it seems

⁹² Tabulations for support for a common European army and support for US world leadership also provided a robust chi-squared value. Europeans overall who support a common EU army are split between approval and disapproval of the US as a world leader, whereas Spaniards who support a common EU army tend to disapprove of US world

that as of now, support for EU security autonomy and support for NATO are linked, and that those who favor a strong EU also favor a strong US.

Conclusion and Future Implications for the EU

Between 2004 and 2008, there was a downward trend in support for European security and diplomacy independence from the United States. From 2008 to 2009, support dropped somewhat, and between 2009 and 2012 it increased slightly. Support was comparable in Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Spain, and lower in Poland, although the overall trends in Poland matched those of the other five countries. The 2004-2008 decline in support for European independence matches the 2004-2008 increases in Atlanticism, and the 2009-2012 increases in support for European independence also matches the 2009-2012 decrease in Atlanticism. While support for EU security independence has fluctuated in the past decade, it currently seems firmly ensconced in the fortieth percentile, robust but below the majority. At the same time, support for the CFSP/CSDP, as seen in the previous chapter, has similar levels of support, while NATO enjoys majority support. Thus, it seems clear that while the CFSP and CSDP are popular, their growth in the past decade has not stolen support away from NATO and the US. Indeed, Europeans, and particularly Spaniards, who want a stronger EU also find NATO to be essential.

Across the six states surveyed, the common theme is that Europeans support common European security, but not at the expense of NATO. Spaniards seem to be slightly more

leadership. Tabulations for support for US world leadership and support for EU world leadership resulted in a chi-squared value of 0. Spaniards who favored EU world leadership were somewhat split between favoring and disapproving of US world leadership, but leaned towards disapproving of it, whereas Europeans as a whole who supported EU world leadership were more evenly split between approving and disapproving of US world leadership. Finally, a cross tabulation between support for a common EU army and belief in NATO as essential reveals that in each country, Europeans who support an EU army also tend to find NATO essential. However, the chi-squared values for this relationship are relatively low, ranging from 2-16, and so the relationship between these two variables may not be statistically significant.

polarized, with those respondents who want a strong EU and a common EU army tending to be less enthusiastic about American world leadership. However, on the whole, Spaniards and Europeans want it both ways—a strong EU and a strong NATO. As previously noted, Spain tends to formulate security preferences based on what suits national interests.⁹³ Supporting NATO and the CSDP/CFSP seems to be another example of pursuing national interests, as Spain is well served by both a strong relationship with the US and the EU. It seems that Spaniards may be a little less enthusiastic about NATO and the US than the other EU countries on average, and may find that a strong relationship with the EU suits its interests somewhat more, as discussed in the literature review.⁹⁴ Regardless, it seems that Spaniards and Europeans are refusing to choose between the CSDP/CFSP and NATO when they can have both.

⁹³ Garcia, 65.

⁹⁴ Guinea, 36.

Chapter 7

European Security, but not without NATO A Multivariate Model

Introducing the variables

Many factors contribute to support for Atlanticism in Europe, but certain variables seem to play a larger role in defining support for Atlanticism and support for a more EU-centric security, especially in Spain. In this chapter, I use two multivariate regression models to determine the influence of these independent variables on my dependent variables, Atlanticism and ‘Europeanism,’ or a Eurocentric security focus. The dependent variable that I use to analyze support for US-led security is the index of Atlanticism discussed in chapter four, which combines support for a security and diplomacy partnership with the US with support for NATO and support for US leadership. The dependent variable I use to measure support for Europeanism is support of EU leadership, specifically the Transatlantic Trends question that asks, “How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?”⁹⁵

I test a combination of independent variables for their influence on the two dependent variables, starting with political ideology.⁹⁶ The US is often seen as a particularly militant nation, and there is fear in Europe on the Left that NATO membership will lead to European entanglement in America’s wars. In addition, the European Left tends to be more supportive of the EU in general, and of EU-focused collective security, whereas European conservatives are more supportive of American-led collective security. The second independent variable is gender.

⁹⁵ Transatlantic Trends, 2012.

⁹⁶ Political ideology is determined by the following Transatlantic Trends question, which produces a seven point scale; In politics, sometimes people talk of ‘left’ and ‘right.’ Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 7, where ‘1’ means the extreme left and ‘7’ means the extreme right?”

Traditionally, women are been less supportive of both war and of the use of force.⁹⁷ Given the link between gender and political ideology on issues of security, gender should have an effect on how Atlantically-oriented Europeans are. Thus women may be less supportive of strong ties with NATO and American-led security, instead preferring EU-led security, or not perhaps favoring security policy at all.

Age is the third independent variable. Statistically, younger generations tend to be more liberal than older generations. Furthermore, the older generations in Europe grew up during the Cold War era or earlier, when NATO was a dominant and protective actor in the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. In contrast, the younger generations have matured in a world where NATO seems less relevant. For that reason, I expect age to have an influence on support for Atlanticism, which is the more traditional and conservative route, and on support for Europeanism, which tends to be more associated with the European Left. Likewise, age at completion of education is another independent variable. Individuals with college diplomas or other advanced degrees tend to be more liberal than those without, thus respondents with more advanced degrees may be more liberal, and more Europe-focused than Atlantic-focused. The final independent variables are support for American world leadership and support for European world leadership.⁹⁸ When examining influences on Atlanticism, I expect strong support for EU world leadership to weaken Atlanticism. When examining influences on support for EU-focused security, I expect strong support for American world leadership to be a negative influence.

⁹⁷ Eichenberg, Richard C. "Women, War, and World Order: Gender Difference in Security Attitudes in Europe and the United States, 2002-2011." Paper presented to the Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, Tufts University, April, 2012.. Also available at: <http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/eichenberg/womenWarWorld2012.pdf>

⁹⁸ Support for EU world leadership comes from the Transatlantic Trends question that asks, "How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?" The question that examines support for American world leadership is identical, save for replacing 'European Union' with 'United States.'

Turning to Spain specifically, the scholarly literature, particularly Garcia and Guinea, suggests that in the past Spain has turned either towards Europe or across the Atlantic to the US based on what suits Spanish interests best in terms of world leadership.⁹⁹ In that case, it seems that Spanish Atlanticism would be heavily influenced by support for American world leadership and support of EU world leadership. If respondents felt that Spain served to gain more international standing through a close relationship with a strong EU, they would favor strong EU leadership. However, that may not be a negative influence on Atlanticism in Spain. If support for strong EU leadership is positively correlated with high Atlanticism, Spaniards may feel that both a strong EU and a strong EU-US relationship are in Spain's best interests.

Likewise, while Kentmen and Schoen found that gender did not have a strong effect on support for the CSDP and CFSP, I feel that in Spain it will have a stronger effect.¹⁰⁰ As Spain is a relatively recent democracy, gender equality is a much more recent phenomenon there than in the other EU countries included here. With women becoming more involved in politics in Spain with each passing decade, the ideological manifestations of the gender gap may be getting sharper, as women tend to become more liberal than men as nations develop.¹⁰¹ Additionally, I expect age to have a stronger effect in Spain than in other countries. The older generations in Spain grew up under Franco's conservative regime, saw NATO's inception, and saw Spain come into maturity as an international actor in a world where the US was the sole hegemon during the Cold War. For those reasons, the older generations may be more conservative and thus be more in favor of traditional Atlanticism instead of increasing EU independence. However, I feel that

⁹⁹ Garcia, 63-72. Guinea, 35.62.

¹⁰⁰ Kentmen, 293. Schoen, 22.

¹⁰¹ Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective." *International Political Science Review* 21.4 (2000): 442-443. .

level of education may be less influential in Spain than in other countries, as there is not a large ideological gap in Spain between respondents with disparate levels of education.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Based on Transatlantic Trends data, Spaniards who do not go to high school are slightly more conservative than those who complete high school or college, and those who complete college are slightly more liberal overall, but the disparities are small.

Table 1. Multivariate regression analysis of Atlanticism

Independent variables	Spain	Germany	France	Italy	UK	Poland
Political ideology	0.15**** (0.01)	0.11**** (0.01)	0.14**** (0.01)	0.21**** (0.01)	0.08**** (0.01)	0.08**** (0.01)
Gender	-0.12**** (0.03)	-0.04* (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.17**** (0.04)
Age at completion of education	-0.004* (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.007*** (0.00)	-0.006*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.01)
Age	0.005**** (0.00)	0.003**** (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.004**** (0.00)	0.005**** (0.00)	0.002** (0.00)
EU leadership	0.23**** (0.01)	0.24**** (0.02)	0.19**** (0.01)	0.14**** (0.02)	0.15**** (0.01)	0.21**** (0.02)
Pseudo R²	.12	.07	0.09	.11	0.06	0.07
*p<0.20; **p<0.10; ***p<0.05; ****p<0.01						

Regression model results for Atlanticism

Similarities between states

The coefficients are OLS regression coefficients, with standard error in parentheses and the corresponding p-value marked with an asterisk.

Political Ideology

For each of the six countries, more conservative respondents displayed significantly stronger Atlanticism. The effect was strongest in Italy, then in France and Spain, and weakest in the United Kingdom, but was statistically significant in every state. As predicted, political conservatism is associated with a strong preference for Atlanticism and a close security relationship with the United States, whereas liberalism is more associated with a preference for Europeanism. Ideology seems to have the strongest effects in Italy and Spain, given the higher coefficients, whereas the effects of political ideology are smaller in Poland and the UK.

Interestingly, the UK and Poland are slightly more centrist overall than the other countries surveyed here, which tend to lean more center-left. The weaker effect of political ideology then may be due to the fact that both countries as a whole skew more conservative.

Age

In each state, older respondents tended to exhibit stronger Atlanticism. These results were statistically significant in Spain, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Age seems to have a much weaker effect overall on Atlanticism than political ideology, but its effects were strongest in the United Kingdom and in Spain. I predicted that age would have the strongest influence in Spain, as it does. The older generations in Spain grew up under Franco's conservative regime, and saw Spain become an international actor under the umbrella of NATO. Thus, the older generations are much more likely not only to be politically conservative, but also to favor NATO membership more strongly than the younger generations. Likewise, the older generations in the United Kingdom grew up in a world where the United States was the hegemonic power and Britain had a strong relationship with the US through NATO, and thus would be more Atlanticity inclined than younger generations as well. Age may be less influential in Italy, France, and Germany because all of these countries have been democratic international actors since World War II.

EU Leadership

Surprisingly, respondents who favor strong EU world leadership tend also to display strong Atlanticism in each of the countries examined at a statistically significant level. In fact,

support for EU world leadership is the single strongest influence on Atlanticism overall.¹⁰³ I did not expect the desire for the EU to be a world leader to be such a strong positive influence on Atlanticism in every country. Indeed, I expected the opposite, namely that the two are competitive or mutually exclusive.

This seems to corroborate what Eichenberg wrote in 2003, Europeans still seem to ‘want it both ways.’¹⁰⁴ Many Europeans want the European Union to be a strong world leader, but those Europeans want that strength to be in the context of a close EU-US security relationship, as opposed to increased EU autonomy. Art supports this view as well, arguing that Europe has insufficient capabilities to pursue security independently and that in the absence of NATO’s presence in Europe, a European hegemon would emerge, with the EU states spiraling into security competition.¹⁰⁵ In that way, Europeans may want the EU to be a strong world leader, but still under the protective wing of NATO’s stabilizing influence. The relationship between the desire for EU world leadership and Atlanticism is everywhere strong, but it is strongest in Germany and Spain. Given García’s analysis of Spain as defining its relationship with the US based on what suits Spanish interests,¹⁰⁶ it seems that Spaniards who want a strong Europe have decided that a strong Europe will be best realized in the context of the EU-US relationship. However, that does not mean that Spaniards do not think that the nature of the EU-US relationship should remain static. They may want the EU-US relationship to remain strong, but for the EU to win more autonomy in the context of that relationship.

Age at completion of education

¹⁰³ Italy is the one exception; political ideology is a slightly stronger influence than support for EU world leadership.

¹⁰⁴ Eichenberg, 2003, 638.

¹⁰⁵ Art, 36.

¹⁰⁶ García, 69.

The age at which respondents completed their education is a negative influence on Atlanticism in every country but Poland, where the results are not statistically significant. The results are also not statistically significant in Spain or Germany, although higher education is a negative influence on Atlanticism in both countries. Spaniards' political ideology does not vary significantly between those with and without higher education degrees. As political ideology is a strong influence on Atlanticism in Spain, a lack of variation in political ideology between levels of education shows that higher education is not a strong influence on Spaniard's Atlanticism. Interestingly, higher education is a significant negative influence on Atlanticism in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, although not a strong negative influence. In Germany, Italy, and the UK, the intellectuals are more anti-Atlantic than those without higher education degrees. Germany, Italy, and the UK are also display more ideological polarization between those with advanced degrees and those without than Spain does.¹⁰⁷ Given that in general individuals with advanced degrees tend to be more liberal, it seems logical that respondents with more advanced degrees would be less inclined towards Atlanticism than those without. Age at completion of education seems to have the strongest influence on Atlanticism in countries like Germany, Italy, and the UK, where there is the greatest ideological striation between education levels; in countries like Spain, where ideology is more similar between education levels, age at completion of education is not a significant influence on Atlanticism.

Differences between states

Gender

In Spain and Poland, and in the UK and Germany, where results are not statistically significant, women are less Atlanticity-inclined than men. In France and Italy, women are more

¹⁰⁷ Transatlantic Trends, 2012

Atlantically inclined than men at a significant level. The obvious similarity between Spain and Poland, and what stands in stark contrast to Italy and France, is that Spain and Poland are fairly recent democracies, Spain becoming a democracy in 1976 and Poland in 1989. France and Italy, however, have been democracies since at least the end of World War II. While women were allowed to vote in Communist Poland, only female heads of households were allowed to vote in Franco's Spain, and gender equality was far from encouraged in either country. The issue of Atlanticism and security is more gender-influenced in Spain, Italy, France, and Poland than in Germany or the UK. As to why women in Spain and Poland are more anti-Atlantic and women in France and Italy are more pro-Atlantic, the answer rests on speculation. A likely explanation is that Spain and Poland have weaker economies, and women are opposed to the idea of collective security and thus increased defense spending, in general, as it may bleed money from the domestic social programs that women traditionally support.

Table 2

Multivariate regression analysis of Europeanism

Independent variables	Spain	Germany	France	Italy	UK	Poland
Political ideology	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.014* (0.01)	-0.07**** (0.01)	-0.12**** (0.01)	-0.05**** (0.01)
Gender	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.15**** (0.03)	-0.09**** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Age at completion of education	0.02**** (0.00)	0.006**** (0.00)	0.03**** (0.00)	0.02**** (0.00)	0.02**** (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
Age	0.01**** (0.01)	0.001 (0.00)	0.002*** (0.00)	0.004**** (0.00)	-0.005**** (0.00)	-0.003**** (0.01)
US leadership	0.25**** (0.09)	0.22**** (0.07)	0.31**** (0.01)	0.16**** (0.01)	0.32**** (0.01)	0.23**** (0.13)
Pseudo R²	.10	.09	0.14	.06	0.13	0.08
*p<0.20; **p<0.10; ***p<0.05; ****p<0.01						

Regression model results for Europeanism

The coefficients are OLS regression coefficients, with standard error in parentheses and the corresponding p-value marked with an asterisk.

Similarities between states

Political ideology

Political ideology has a negative effect on Europeanism in every country but France, where the results are not statistically significant, but the impact of ideology is not as consistently strong as was the case with Atlanticism. Europeans on the Left are more supportive of European-focused security. Left-leaning ideology has the strongest positive effect on Europeanism in the UK, and mild effects in Germany and Poland. As seen in the results for Atlanticism, the Left tends to be less supportive of Atlanticism, and thus more supportive of Europeanism. Interestingly, the results are also not statistically significant in Spain, in contrast with the results for Atlanticism, which were statistically significant. Conservatism seems to have a negative effect on Europeanism, but not at a significant level; political ideology has a stronger effect on Spaniards' support for Atlanticism than it does for Europeanism. If Spaniards are going to approve or disapprove of Europeanism, it will not be due to political ideology; however, in most EU countries, those on the Left do tend to support for Europeanism, whereas conservatism indicates a more Atlanticity oriented mindset, as seen in Table 1.

Age at completion of education

Respondents with higher levels of education tend to be more supportive of Europeanism, with the exception of Poland, where results were not statistically significant. Higher levels of

education had a negative effect on support for Atlanticism, as discussed earlier, and seem to have the opposite effect on support for Europeanism. The positive effects of higher education are strongest in Spain and France. Given that higher education had no influence on Spaniards' support of Atlanticism, it is interesting to note that it has a mild positive effect on how supportive Spaniards are of Europeanism. In each EU country surveyed where the results were significant, intellectuals tended to be more positive about Europeanism and more negative about Atlanticism; as intellectuals tend to be more liberal overall, this trend is not surprising.

US leadership

Support for the United States as a world leader has a positive effect on support for Europeanism in each EU country surveyed and is both strong and significant in all of them. The effects of support for the US as a world leader on Europeanism were strongest in France, the UK, and Spain. As seen in Table 1, support for the EU as a world leader also had a strong positive effect on Atlanticism. Respondents who feel that the US should be world leader also favor more EU global leadership, and respondents who feel that the EU should be a world leader favor US-led collective security. Furthermore, a cross tabulation of support for a common European Union army reveals that Europeans who support American world leadership are more supportive of a EU army than respondents who do not support American world leadership.¹⁰⁸ Given that supporting a EU army implies support for at least parts of the CSDP, those who favor American leadership seem to favor the CSDP more than strongly those who do not. Europeans who want

¹⁰⁸ This cross tabulation compares responses to the following Transatlantic Trends questions, "How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?" and "Some say that in order for the European Union to assume a greater international role it needs to do certain things- To what extent do you agree with the following? The countries of the EU should combine their military forces into a single European army, even though [SURVEY COUNTRY] may not always agree with EU decisions."

strong world leadership still favor ‘having it both ways’ in terms of collective security and feel that the US being a strong world leader is beneficial for more EU security independence.

Differences between states

Gender

In all countries where gender was a statistically significant variable, women were less supportive of Europeanism, and in all countries where gender was not statistically significant, women were more supportive of Europeanism. Women were strongly less supportive of Europeanism in France, and mildly less supportive of Europeanism in Spain and Italy. As I predicted, gender had a negative influence on Atlanticism in Spain, where the ideological gender gap is wider. It is interesting to note that gender had a significant negative influence on both Europeanism and Atlanticism in Spain. Women in Spain are less supportive of collective security measures overall than women in the other EU countries surveyed. It is hard to identify exactly why, but it may be due to the fact that women tend to prioritize welfare issues over defense issues.¹⁰⁹ As the Spanish economy is in such a fragile state, Spanish women may be reluctant to devote Spanish money and attention to collective security policy over issues of social welfare.

Age

In Spain, Italy, Germany, and France, older generations were more supportive of Europeanism, although results were not significant in Germany and France, whereas in the UK and Poland, older generations were significantly less supportive of Europeanism. Older generations in the UK may be less supportive of Europeanism because in they grew up in a

¹⁰⁹ Eichenberg, 2012, 5.

world where the US was the world hegemon, and the UK had a strong security relationship with the US. As seen in table 1, older respondents in the UK were also more supportive of Atlanticism. In Poland, older generations may be less supportive of Europeanism because of the legacy of World War II. In Italy and in Spain, older respondents supported both Atlanticism and Europeanism more. Older Italians and Spaniards seem to want both a strong EU and a strong US, and do not find the two mutually exclusive. Given that older Spaniards came of age in world dominated by NATO and under Franco's regime, simultaneous support for a strong EU, and thus a stronger Spain, and for a strong EU-US relationship is logical. Spaniards are seeking to strengthen Spain through both avenues, Atlanticism and Europeanism.

Conclusions

While the six nation states examined in this chapter exhibit a variety of similarities in terms of support for Atlanticism and Europeanism, their differences are equally numerous. In each state, the Right was more likely to support Atlanticism, and generally the Left was more likely to support Europeanism. Older respondents were more supportive of Atlanticism overall, but older Spaniards, Germans, and Italians, and French were more supportive of Europeanism, whereas older Poles and English were less supportive of Europeanism than their younger cohorts. The desire for the EU to be a strong world leader was a significant, positive influence on Atlanticism in each state, and the desire for the US to be a strong world leader was likewise a significant and positive influence on Europeanism in each state. Where results were statistically significant, gender was a negative influence on support for Europeanism, with women being less supportive than men. The same holds for Spain and Poland in terms of support for Atlanticism, although women tended to be more supportive of Atlanticism in France and Italy. Finally, a

higher age at completion of education was a positive influence on support for Europeanism, and a negative influence on support for Atlanticism.

Overall, it seems that relative support for Europeanism and Atlanticism rests for the most part on gender, political ideology, and the desire for the US or the EU to be a world leader. There are common themes in each state, with women being less supportive of security measures in general, the Left being more in favor of Europeanism and conservatives in favor of Atlanticism, and respondents who favor the EU as a world leader supporting Atlanticism, and vice versa. While the six states examined here do differ on certain variables, mainly age and age at completion of education, these variables were not as influential on support for Atlanticism or Europeanism even when statistically significant. In general, it seems that Europeans who support collective security measures and a strong EU also support a strong EU-US relationship. Turning to Spain specifically, I believe that as the ideological gender gap manifests more strongly and if the country continues to move in a liberal direction politically, Spaniards may be more supportive of an independent EU in the future. However, at the moment it seems that Spaniards, and most Europeans examined here, see the EU's future security as closely tied to the United States.

Chapter 8

Conclusions and Future Implications

The EU's expanding security and foreign policy capabilities, combined with the negative effects of the Iraq war on public opinion and changes in Spanish security interests, have set the stage for Spaniards to turn away from Atlanticism and take a more Europeanist approach. However, an analysis of public opinion paints another picture, namely that Spaniards, and Europeans at large, are still very attached to the US and to NATO. Europeans support EU security policy, but within the context of the EU-US security relationship and not separate from it.

The CFSP and CSDP are very popular in the EU and in Spain, and this is not a new phenomenon. As discussed previously, support for the policies has been high for decades, and while the policies have been more concretely realized in the last ten years than ever before, support does not seem to have grown. Likewise, NATO and Atlanticism are very popular in Europe, with the majority of respondents in each of the six countries examined finding NATO to be essential. It does not seem that the growth of the CFSP and CSDP has leached support away from NATO. In fact, most Europeans who support the CFSP/CSDP want the US to be a strong world leader and support NATO, despite fluctuations in the favorability of American leadership in the EU.

The multivariate regression models in the previous chapter make clear that political ideology, gender, and preferences on world leadership are the strongest influences on Atlanticism and Europeanism. Europeans on the Left tend to be more supportive of Europeanism, whereas conservative Europeans favor Atlanticism. Women are less inclined to

support security policy in general, and the desire for the US to be a strong world leader is a positive influence on Europeanism, whereas the desire for the EU to be a strong world leader is a positive influence on Atlanticism.

Reflections on Spain

I expected Spain to be more of an outlier in terms of relative support for the CFSP/CSDP and NATO when compared with France, Italy, Germany, and the UK, and more comparable with Poland, given that Spain and Poland are both recent democracies. However, Spanish public opinion on security policy fell closer to public opinion in France and Germany than it did to Poland. In fact, overall Spanish public opinion on security policy was fairly average in the EU context, with a few interesting deviations. It is difficult to determine whether the six states I surveyed were fairly comparable because their individual idiosyncrasies added up to similar results, or because despite differences in culture, history, and domestic politics, as realist theory dictates, similar states with similar capabilities in similar scenarios will have comparable preferences. I expected results in Spain to be much more similar to results in Poland than in France or Germany, which was not the case. Despite similar histories of both being recent democracies, Poland and Spain seem to have different security preferences. American world leadership was much less popular in Spain than it was in Poland, and thus Atlanticism was much higher in Poland than in Spain. It seems likely that Poland is more supportive of American leadership given Poland's history in Europe. Distrust of other European countries, particularly Germany and Italy, two key EU member states, given Poland's experiences in World War II, may lead Poland to seek the alliance of the US more than that of the EU in terms of security preferences. Ironically, it seems that the legacy of World War II and Franco's regime had a

different effect in Spain, as Spaniards seem to be supportive of both American world leadership and EU world leadership. Given that Spaniards had average support for Europeanism and slightly lower support for Atlanticism, it seems that Spain more be one of the EU's stronger supports of the CFSP/CSDP.

Implications for NATO and the CSDP/CFSP

Whatever concerns Europeans may have about entanglement in American wars or the US' shifting focus to Asia, Europeans are still very supportive of NATO. Ray argued that decreased US favorability in Europe would damage Europeans' belief in NATO as essential, and that does not seem to be the case.¹¹⁰ American favorability has not been high, but Europeans seem to be currently more supportive of NATO than of the CSDP/CFSP. This seems to undermine Posen and Smith's arguments as well, for they both posited that as the CSDP/CFSP developed, it would become more popular than NATO in the EU.¹¹¹ However, Europeans are still very supportive of European security measures, and support for NATO does not indicate a preference for NATO alone. Europeans seem to favor the CSDP/CFSP and NATO in tandem, indicating that perhaps not much has changed since Eichenberg reached the same conclusion in 2003.¹¹² Peters and Art also reached that conclusion, with Art arguing that despite the CSDP/CFSP's growth, Europeans would not leave NATO for fear of losing stability and Peters asserting that the EU would continue to cede autonomy to NATO.¹¹³ It seems that support for EU security policy has not grown much since the Balkan's crisis, and that in the past decade there has been a souring towards security policy in general. Kentman and Schoen both found

¹¹⁰ Ray et al, 87.

¹¹¹ Posen, 2004, 17, Smith, 149.

¹¹² Eichenberg, 2003, 638.

¹¹³ Peters, 396-397, Art, 33.

that when respondents felt that EU membership was not a positive effect on their own country's economy, respondents were less supportive of security policies.¹¹⁴ Given the current economic climate in the EU, it is not surprising that Europeans are less supportive of security policy.

However, this paper finds that there is strong support for European Union security policy, despite its relative lack of growth since the CSDP/CFSP's inception. The EU is a democracy, and EU elites seem to have incentives to listen to public opinion during decision-making.¹¹⁵ Likewise, national leaders certainly have incentives to listen to domestic public opinion on security policy for the sake of re-election, and thus domestic public opinion may play a significant role in EU decision-making. Therefore, it seems likely that the support Spaniards and Europeans have for the CFSP/CSDP may be translated into in the future into stronger EU security policies and capabilities, albeit within the context of the EU-US security relationship.

¹¹⁴ Kentman, 289, Schoen, 1 1.

¹¹⁵ Schoen, 23.

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