

History and Memory in Chilean Unions:
Continuity and Contradiction from their Origins through Today

An Honors Thesis for the Department of International Relations

Emma Steiner

Tufts University, 2018

Acknowledgements

There are several people I would like to acknowledge and give thanks to for their role in this project. First, thank you to Professor Winn for sharing a wealth of knowledge on a very specific topic and guiding me through the complications of union politics. Professor Winn also encouraged me to take on this project and has guided me through research on this topic for two years. After I showed interest in the history of Chilean unionism he encouraged me to keep going and directed me towards opportunities such as Summer Scholars and the International Relations Research Fellowship that would help me to dive deeper into the research. Thus, he encouraged me to take on a project that has challenged me and helped me grow both academically, professionally, and emotionally. Thank you to Professor Cruz for her support, encouragement, and understanding. Professor Cruz has been a source of steady encouragement since my sophomore year when she suggested I take on a larger research project for her class Political Violence in State and Society. Professor Cruz has been empathetic and open and her support helped me through the inevitable self doubt and insecurity that comes with a project that suggests the subjectiveness of experience. Thank you to Anne Moore, Summer Scholars and the International Relations Research Scholars program for enabling me to dive deeper into my research and immerse myself in Chile. Thank you to Professor Eichenberg for his extremely helpful seminar for senior thesis writers. It helped me hit the ground running on this project. Thank you to Walter Roblero, Archive Director at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights (MMDH) for helping me sort through the incredible amount of resources at the Museum and for opening the archives to everyone for research. Thank you to my parents for being proud and excited for me at every stage in this process. Thank you to Buster.

Table of Contents

Title Page

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

1 - Introduction: Why Memory

2 - Literature Review: Unions and Memory in Research

3 - Methodology: Discourse Analysis and Memory Studies

4 - Memory as Resistance

5 - Union Origins: Development of Consciousness and Memory

6 - CUT: An Organization Formed with Memory

7 - *Unidad Popular*: The Height of Contradictions

8 - Military Dictatorship: Changing Goals and Struggles for Unity

9 - Conclusion: Continuity and Unionism Today

Endnotes

Bibliography

Unions, Challenges, and Memory

According to Luis Mecina, director of the NO+AFP movement in Chile, *el sindicalismo ya ha muerto*, unionism as we knew it, is dead. It is dead, according to him because the traditional collective values of unionization no longer exist, they have been overtaken by consumerism and individualism. However, Mecina, as the leader of No+AFP, a movement against privatized pensions in Chile, should know as well as anyone that the issues he refers to as the crux of the crisis are not new issues in the union movement. The same challenges and contradictions have been a fundamental part of Chilean unionism since its conception. On the other hand, Guillermo Oreggo, former director of the Cordon Industrial Vicuña Mackenna believes that the union movement is poised for transformative changes. What makes these two leaders approach the state of unionism so differently? How does their memory of the past affect their understanding of the present?

Throughout this analysis I hope to develop an understanding of union historical memory and how it informs today's current movement. How do these *dirigentes* remember a past they may or may not have been a part of and how does it shape their understanding of the labor movement today? Furthermore, I will interrogate the concept of unions in crisis, a subject which is frequently debated in union discourse but rarely clearly defined. What is the nature of this crisis? Why are unions talking about a crisis if unions are and have been weak for a long time?

I seek to develop an understanding of the fundamental challenges and contradictions within the union movement and how they have developed since their conception. Many struggles in the union movement have remained relatively consistent over time, through drastically different political moments. Other struggles are newer or more dependent on their political context. The point being, that though many union leaders of today fear a "death" of the movement, many of the struggles they are experiencing are not at all new to Chilean unionism. The "crisis" of unionism today is made up of several components and challenges, many of which are historical challenges in the Chilean union movement, and, to my understanding, are not drastic enough to lead to the death of the movement. I also suggest that understanding of strength and crisis in different historical periods are heavily influenced by the collective memory of the movement, rather than a more accurate historical understanding.

My project employs discourse analysis and analysis of historical memory in order to understand union mentality and memory throughout the history of the movement. Discourse analysis is a method that allowed me to understand how unions see themselves and their own history. Discourse analysis typically involves the analysis of writing and speech with the understanding that what we say or write is inherently attached to who we are and how we interact with the world.¹ Thus, discourse analysis of union discourse implies a revelation of the identity of unions: who leaders consider themselves and their union to be as compared to other unions, in the context of the working class, in the context of Chilean society as a whole, and finally in the context of a global working class.

Through this method I noticed two important trends in union discourse and memory. First, while many union leaders talk about a crisis of unionism, it is extremely unclear what that crisis entails. In the interviews I draw from, each leader defined the crisis differently, and some described the crisis in multiple, and contradictory ways. Definitions of the union crisis spanned from the very existence of the CUT to the existence of capitalism, and from institutional structures to social values to political corruption. Second, *dirigentes'* practice of recalling the past. Leaders invoke the past as an ideal model for strategy and values, and talk of the death of true *sindicalismo*. It appears to me that the strongest internal tension in unions is a tension between the past and the present. The collective values of the past versus the individual values of the present. The success of the past versus the stalled movement of the present. The militant strategies of the past versus the political negotiations of the present. Weakness in the union movement is not new or necessarily something that needs to be explained again. "Crisis" exists in the minds of the leaders who remember strength and a when labor organization had a powerful role in society. Thus, it is clear that the past is what informs their understanding of, criticism of, and frustration with the present.

This leads me to memory studies. Memory studies have risen in popularity recently and go along with a post-modern and constructionist understanding that who we are and what we understand to be reality is subjective. Memory studies seek to critically analyze individual memory, acknowledging that "memory can represent the imaginary as well as the actual" and that what one

remembers can have more to do with how one wants to remember the past or present their own identities.² However, this potential for imaginary memory does not discredit memory as an illegitimate method of historical research, far from it. Instead, it has become a tool for understanding individual identity in its larger context and rooting subjective perceptions of reality.³ I will further address the issues of discourse analysis and memory studies in my chapter on methodology.

To access discourse and memory this study makes extensive use of primary sources of discourse such as union publications, speeches, or interviews with *dirigentes*. Many of the sources I use are originally in Spanish, the translations recorded here are mine. The majority of the primary sources I accessed are from the *Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos*, Museum of Memory and Human Rights (MMDH) in Santiago, Chile. The Museum contains the the *Centro de Documentación*, Documentation Center (CEDOC) which makes resources about and from the dictatorship available for anyone who comes into the museum. It is there that I was able to access union discourse. However, even the Museum of Memory is not immune to the implicit individual and collective biases of memory. Winn and Stern criticize the museum for its silences and its static representation of trauma as having a beginning and end, this inherently excludes many of the people who were directly affected by the trauma of the dictatorship. Thus, my research remains within some of those limitations, which I will further discuss along with methodology.

In the next chapter I will discuss the methods and methodology of this project, namely discourse analysis and memory studies. In Chapter 3 I examine

the historical use of memory, the function of memory as resistance, and the role of unions as memory knots in Chilean society. In Chapter 4 I will discuss existing literature on historical union memory in Chile. Many sources elaborate the history of Chilean unionism and the contradictions that lie within it. My research tries to connect these contradictions and challenges through time and to incorporate an understanding of how union leaders experience and remember these challenges through the use of discourse. In Chapter 5 I discuss the development of worker consciousness in Chile and the contradictions that arise with the conception of the movement. I discuss how Recabarren serves as a symbol in union memory and what the reality of his role was at the time of his participation in the movement. In Chapter 6 I discuss the development of the original CUT and how it served as a symbol of ultimate unity and union power despite an actuality of weakness. In Chapter 7 I discuss the major contradictions that are revealed in the movement during the government of the *Unidad Popular*, the time when the labor movement was the strongest and the most influential. In Chapter 8 I discuss continuity and changes in discourse within a radically changed social context of the dictatorship. Lastly, in Chapter 9 I discuss examples of these same challenges in strikes during the 21st century and how all of this history can apply to an understanding of the union crisis today and the changed social identity of workers.

Discourse Analysis and Memory Studies

I began this project from a social constructionist position. As a journalist I am very aware of the way the words we write construct reality. Thus, in my studies of Chilean unions I began with the assumption that language is a product of our social world and that the way we speak reveals critical insight about who we are, what we believe, and where we are coming from. As I was investigating in the archives of union materials at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights I held this belief in mind and paid close attention to the language used by union leaders and in union publications. In doing so, I noticed two important and perhaps related trends in union language. First, consistent discussion about a crisis in today's union movement although the crisis is not clearly defined. These normative discussions place collective values of solidarity, unity, and action far above individual values such as consumerism, individualism, and ambition often associated with the rise of neoliberalism. Second, a tendency to recall the past and invoke continuity with the present. The past is idealized as a model for strategy and values as well as memorialized as a time of strength and power. By looking closely at union language I was able to understand key aspects of union culture such as collective values and a recollection of the past. In my research question I seek to dive deeper into understanding union memory of the past and the importance of this memory in today's movement. Thus discourse analysis and

memory studies are the methods best suited to my research question and my goals.

Discourse Analysis

In order to assess and understand memory in the union movement, I will employ critical discourse analysis as method. I understand discourse as a combination of language, words used, sentence structure, and method of communication. All of these factors help to construct meaning and can reveal ideology and world view. This is because words and the meanings they convey are not chosen at random, instead they are products of the social context in which they are produced, as Jørgensen and Phillips say. "Our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations, but rather, play an active role in creating and changing them" they write.⁴ In other words, discourse is both a reflection of an existing understanding of reality and something that creates or constructs understanding of reality. Memory is a key part of identity and worldview, thus, I believe that there is a reciprocal relationship between discourse and memory. Discourse is both created by the reality and memory that exists and in turn creates new memories and understandings of reality through the words and messages it employs.

Furthermore, this type of social constructionist understanding has already been adopted for studies of the Chilean Left. Specifically, Leiva, who introduces the idea of the socio-cultural matrix, and Hite, who elaborates cognitive

frameworks, bring attention to the socially constructed nature of ideology. Leiva describes his matrix as a way of understanding both reality and the "strategies to transform it," which perfectly describes my approach to union memory and union strategy.⁵

In this paper I will be analyzing the speeches, interviews, and publications of various union leaders and organizations and analyzing their words and the context in which they speak for meaning. Not the specific meaning of their words, but what we can understand about union leader memory and understanding of their own position through their words and their interpretation of reality. In this sense I will be using critical discourse analysis as method because I am seeking not only to understand the meaning of the words and their context but to place the words within a political context. James Paul Gee, in his book *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*, suggests that researchers who use critical discourse analysis as method seek to address or even intervene in political and social issues.⁶ While I do not seek to intervene into Chilean unionism I do hope to speak to the social phenomenon of memory within Chilean unionism and how it affects leaders understanding of a crisis today, whether or not that may be historically accurate.

In order to do so, I will be engaging deeply with the publicly available documents, interviews, and panels from the CEDOC at the MMDH. These publications include union bulletins, magazines magazines such as *Solidaridad*, and *El Coordinador*, and much scholarship on the issue. Finally, in order to be able to understand present memory I will analyze several panels and interviews

with union leaders conducted and mediated by researchers at the MMDH and the statements put forth on some union websites.

Memory Studies

Memory studies envisions a reciprocal relationship between past and present. In other words, memory is both a product of and a creator of the present. What we remember about the past is as much of a social construction as our own understanding of present reality; it is both informed by and an informer of our own identity and understanding of the present. Thus, the field of memory studies proposes to elaborate not only what people recall about the past but also the effects of those recollections on the present and their implications about social construction.

The field of memory studies holds three assumptions about memory, elaborated by Elizabeth Jelin in her book *State Repression and the Labors of Memory*. These three assumptions all stem from its social constructionist roots. These assumptions help analyze memory and give a sense of the importance and the insight of memory studies. First, and foundationally, memory is subjective, a product of experiences and identity. Second, and as a result of this subjectivity, memory is disputable. Memory itself often becomes an object of conflict. Jelin suggests that this characteristic should prompt us to pay attention to the role and the identity of those creating memory, and thus, what their intentions may be for creating that memory. "Who wants whom to remember what and why? Who

wants whom to forget what and why?" We must keep in mind power and understand who benefits when talking about memory. Third, memory, like any aspect of our social understanding, exists in historical contexts. In other words, we must "historicize" memory by analyzing it in its social context and the meaning ascribed to the past in said context.⁷

Importantly, the past that is focused on in memory studies includes not only an individual's immediate past, but also the historical or folkloric past of their nation, their religion, their race, or any other aspect of their identity. In fact, memory studies are often focused on the national level to determine how people of a nationality remember the history of their country. The idea that memory helps to consolidate a national identity was first put forth by Pierre Nora who lamented the decline of a *milieux de memoir* in France in favor of a less consolidated identity where memory only existed in specific *lieux de memoir*. Discourse analysis and memory studies are often applied to national identity or to studies of communication in mass media. They often attempt to portray conflicts in national identity or how the media shapes a country's understanding of its reality or memory of the past. Particularly common is examining memory after traumatic dictatorships, wars, or invasions. In Latin America, memory studies often document the struggles of reconciliation and reconstruction after violent dictatorships. According to Jelin, "memories and interpretations are also key elements in the processes of (re) construction of individual and collective identities in societies emerging from periods of violence and trauma."⁸ Memory studies of smaller social groups are more limited. However, looking into the

memory of smaller groups provides important insight into the identity and experiences of their members. This is what my research attempts to do.

In doing so, I am adopting the foundational theory of Maurice Halbwachs, who asserts, in *Collective Memory*, that memory exists only in collective contexts. There is a collective memory for every group that exists, almost an infinite amount of varying memories of similar histories, however memory can *only* exist in collectivities. In other words, memory of the past requires a reinforcing framework of a group which remembers the past similarly. In the introduction to his book, Halbwachs says "Our memories remain collective, however, and are recalled to us through others even though only we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned. In reality, we are never alone. Other men need not be physically present, since we always carry with us and in us a number of distinct persons."⁹ Here, Halbwachs describes the sensation of living in a socially constructed reality. Our thoughts and experiences are never purely our own. Instead, it is as if several other people were always accompanying us through life providing insight, judgement, criticism, making us feel embarrassed or proud or inadequate. These people are not necessarily people in our personal lives. They are the voices we have become accustomed to hearing that reflect social narratives. Because of this socially constructed nature of society, Halbwachs asserts that memories can only be collective, only remembered in the context of a group and an identity which guides social experience, like a posse of insight giving friends.

There is some debate in memory studies about whether memory is collective or individual, if an individual's memory can survive if it does not fit into a general story arch adopted by a collectivity. However, union memory tends to be collective because of the group, social, and even family nature of union membership. Furthermore, if we believe that memory, discourse, language is socially constructed we have to believe that memory is collective because the very way you understand your circumstances is dictated by a collective understanding of social values, for example, good vs bad, value of consumption, value of individualism, value of solidarity, etc.

Analyzing the MMDH

This is not a comprehensive study. I do not have access to or time to analyze every copy of all of these publications nor all of the documents published on union websites. I am intentionally not selecting a random sample of these publications, the goal of my research is not to see whether or how often memory is referenced. Instead I am seeking references to memory. My goal is to understand how memory has stayed continuous or changed over time and how it informs the present movement, and what it can tell us about the continuity of values and challenges in the movement. Because of the nature of memory, I cannot make sweeping statements, generalizations or assumptions. However, I can attempt to bring some further understanding.

Memory studies are often conducted through interviews and first hand interactions between the researcher and those individuals centered in the research. This method calls for analysis of the power relationships between the researcher and the interviewee or subjects of study. Interview relationships, though they may take on the appearance of friendship through the intimacy and personal nature of the narratives, are laden with power dynamics that have important implications for the results of the study. By choosing discourse analysis as method my research takes a unique path which poses several unique strengths and limitations. First, by using union publications which were published during the dictatorship, I tap into the memory and the mentality at that time specifically and am thus able to avoid the affects of hindsight which may skew memory. Second, I avoid the power dynamics of an interview which may prompt an interviewee to construct a specific narrative.

However, that does not mean that the publications are free of all biases or power dynamics. The publications I am looking at are published by large national level organizations with distinct agendas. They are often in competition with one another and they have clear goals of trying to unite the union movement and mobilize resistance actions. This lends the material to almost propaganda like discourse which is certainly an exaggeration of the experiences of workers' day to day. However, because my study is focused on the projections and the visions of national level leaders and movements, this should not constitute too much of a limitation. Finally, I will be looking at and using interviews conducted by other people, representatives of the MMDH, and at panels and interviews conducted in

the context of the MMDH. These interviews and panels are not free of the power dynamics of any interview. While I do not know much about the interviewers themselves, in order to analyze the power dynamics presented, I can analyze the MMDH, as an institution and what it represents. The Museum's self declared mission on their website says,

The Museum of Memory and Human Rights is a space designated to give visibility to the violations of human rights committed by the State of Chile between 1973 and 1990; to give dignity to the victims and their families; and to stimulate reflection and debate about the importance of respect and tolerance, so that these occurrences never again are repeated.¹⁰

This statement tells us several things about the museum's attitude towards memorialization and its goals and illuminates many silences upheld by the museum. First, the given time period is between 1973 and 1990, beginning with the coup and ending with the return to democracy. This time period, the 17 years of the dictatorship, eliminates all context, including the history of oppression of human rights prior to the dictatorship, the political context prior to the coup and the motivations for the coup, including United States support, as well as the oppressive aspects of the negotiated transition to democracy which has kept in place many oppressive and limiting policies, especially in regards to union organization. Second, there is a focus primarily on victims and on the importance of "tolerance" and human rights, *so that* these egregious violations do not happen again. This places the focus heavily on the violence carried out against victims, making this the focus of "never again." It does not leave much room for other forms of oppression or tolerance to be discussed. Furthermore, the goal is to

"stimulate reflection and debate" which implies that there is something to debate about in regards to respect, tolerance, and the acceptability of human rights violations, rather than even to stimulate memorialization, awareness, or to avoid forgetting the violence, its causes and consequences. This description places heavy focus on remembrance enclosed within a specific period of time and does not encourage a view of memory as dynamic, continuous, or complicated.

The analysis of the Museum and its motives given to us by Peter Winn and Steve Stern in their chapter about Chile in the book *No Hay Mañana sin Ayer: Batallas por la Memoria Historica en el Cono Sur*, confirms this understanding. Winn and Stern describe three key decisions made in the construction and curation of the museum which communicate similar ideas. First, the decisions to begin the museum at the point of the coup, with no more context than a quote about polarization (almost hidden near the bathrooms, as pointed out by Winn and Stern), avoids all contextualization of the causes of the coup or the prior history of Chile. Crucially, this lack of context leaves some room for the political right to justify the coup itself and condemn only the gross violations of human rights as the error of this authoritarian government. Second, the descriptions of what happened, in relation human rights violations are generally limited to the reports of official, government promoted, Truth Commissions, which present a very specific and limited view of the history. Third, just as the museum's permanent exhibit begins with the dictatorship, eschewing context, it ends with the return to democracy, choosing to avoid a discussion of the negotiated transition to

democracy, the consequences of that, and the legacies of the dictatorship. Winn and Stern write,

The periodization evades a political problem, but at the cost of the lack of historical interpretation, which can convert the coup and the violations of human rights into an inexplicable aberration - especially for new generations of Chileans who might have an imprecise understanding of this crucial period of recent history-. Also, it runs the risk of promoting a distinct type of forgetting, ignoring the continuities and ruptures between the two periods of Chilean democracy.¹¹

There is a danger in this lack of context, specifically, forgetting, and misunderstanding in future generations as the context of the coup and the dictatorship, and its legacies into the present become less and less clear.

Finally, something that is not immediately clear from looking at the Museum's website is that the museum is a government project. The museum was built in 2006 by President Michelle Bachelet and is described by Winn and Stern as her "personal project." Part of the reason why the museum may have had to take a weaker stance on the context of the coup has to do with it being a governmentally funded project. Winn and Stern suggest that because the project was governmental it was vulnerable to changes in funding based on the political tendencies of future presidents. Thus, it had several right wing people on the board of its creation to prevent future, more conservative presidents from stripping it of its funding.¹² Furthermore, as a result of it being a governmental project, it was not curated in a way that centered the human rights organizations which had first advocated for its founding.¹³

Analyzing the CEDOC

In the basement of the Museum is the CEDOC. I accessed my resources there. The CEDOC describes its mission in the following way:

The Center for Documentation of the Museum of Memory is focused on the diffusion to and the access of the citizens of the historic information contained in the collections of documents, and the archives of texts, photography, iconography, speeches, audiovisual, and objects of the period 1973-1990.¹⁴

Having studied there, I can say that the resources at the CEDOC provide a much greater sense of context than their website suggests. Plenty of materials exist there that cover the prior and post periods of the dictatorship. This context was extremely important for the inspiration of and execution of my research.

Regardless, the interviews and the panels conducted by the CEDOC exist in the context of the Museum which lamentably avoids contextualizing or stably memorializing the occurrences of the time period which they seek to explain. This can have serious implications for the types of information provided by interviewees or panelists. While my research did not suggest to me that interviewees felt they had to hide their positions, which were often anti-*Concertación*, anti-Bachelet, and anti-neoliberalism, the status and prejudice of the Museum has heavy implications for the types of people that may be willing to engage with the museum and to share their memory. Many of the people engaged with the Museum are also people who are working on the national level, working closely with the government, or work for less radical organizations. Those at the

grass roots level or with more radical beliefs are less likely to engage with the museum. In fact, while I was researching at the museum I had a revealing conversation with a fellow researcher. He suggested that the Museum has a very specific story to tell about the return of democracy and the power and stance of unions and that if I were to talk to grass roots organizations I would get a very different picture of what was going on. Unfortunately, I did not have the contacts, time, or resources, to do this type of research. However, for future researchers, looking into the memory of grassroots labor organizations would be an important path to pursue.

Limitations of my method

One of the strengths, or potential weaknesses, (depending on how you understand the value of discourse analysis and recognition of subjectivity) of this method is its own self-consciousness. My writing is not exempt from social constructs and my own understanding of "reality." I encourage the reader to be aware of my word choice and sentence structure, the information I choose to include and the silences in this paper. For example, my research question in itself is a perfect example of discourse constructing reality. What my question is really trying to get at is the origin of union ideology, as well as several other questions including: how could unions be considered internally weak? What are the most important challenges of the present? Where did those challenges come from? Why are they important? I could have phrased my question that way or any

number of other ways. However, I decided to structure my question in a way that would invoke memory and discourse analysis because I wanted to say something about how the past is a constant influence on the present. This thus presents the "reality" that union identity and strategy is continuous, heavily based in the past. It would have been equally "real" to talk about a rupture in union strategy and identity, that it is significantly different since the end of the dictatorship. While I do talk about a rupture with past union identity, and its extreme import and influence as well, because of the words and structures I have chosen, the main point of my paper is to say that there is continuity with the past. While I am analyzing and describing the language used by union leaders and members I am using my own language and constructing my own understanding of reality. I would be a hypocrite if I presented this to you, the reader, as *the* reality.

Research as an Outsider

My understanding of union discourse is both limited and strengthened by my status as an outsider, in all senses of the word. The center of this research are people entirely different from myself. Latino, specifically Chilean, union members, typically from blue collar, unions, meaning they are doing physical labor, many men, since union culture is based in a sense of masculinity, people who are older than me, many of whom lived through the dictatorship, experienced torture, and repression. I am a young (22), white woman, born in Los Angeles, California. I have never done physical labor, and I have never experienced direct

oppression in terms of the limitation of my free speech or movement, or been targeted for my political beliefs. Furthermore, I am writing this paper within the social construct of academia. My analysis is informed by my education and my understanding of what social analysis should look like and based in the structure, and tradition of acceptable academic work. This constitutes a limitation; though I may seek to understand and empathize with the experiences of these union workers, my day to day, lived reality is so different that I could never claim to be an authority on union experience. This limits my ability to empathize with the experience and understand their experience of reality. The academic structure in which this research takes place have constructed my method of discourse analysis. However, as long as I and the reader recognize the subjectivity of all this, it is also a strength; because the memories I am studying do not construct my reality, I am perhaps abler to point to memory and its effects. Jorgensen and Phillips point out that the closer one is to a discourse, the more difficult it is to recognize the messages as "socially constructed meaning-systems that could have been different."¹⁵ Thus, they suggest that the analyst mentally distance themselves from the subject to try to see the socially constructed aspects of it. As someone whose reality is not constructed by the same experiences as union leaders and members, my background makes me abler to recognized socially constructed aspects of their reality. I also have a structure within which to study, a significant amount of previously executed research, access to the words and memories of union leaders and members, a platform upon which to share my work and a

structure of communication and analysis which is generally understood and accepted. These are all great privileges.

Consequences

Finally, Jørgensen and Phillips suggest that the analyst acknowledge the consequences their contribution to discourse may have. My analysis will identify what aspects of discourse are formed in memory and how that constructs reality, and particularly strategy in today's union movement. I hope that my research is not taken as a criticism of memory or as a suggestion that memory *not* influence the present. On the contrary, memory is an unavoidable and crucial source for the construction of the present. It carries identity, lessons, and ideology which form individuals as well as movements. My research only seeks to point to memory as a particularly strong influence in Chilean union identity and strategy construction. Attachment to memory for unions has been *both* an advantage and a disadvantage and a loss of memory in unions has also had significant consequences for *sindicalismo* as a movement. The "battle for memory" is one that takes place on many levels of society, and unions, though discursively focused on unity, are no exception.

Language

Last, but not least, the sources I am examining are in Spanish and the translations presented here are my own. Spanish is not my first language, and thus, that obviously presents certain challenges and limitations to my interpretations.

3

Memory as Resistance

It is important to contextualize this research within the historical uses of memory in Chile and for unions. This work is important and relevant because memory is still a battle in Chile, a battle between the memory of salvation, memory of rupture, locked box memory, traumatic memory, memory of resistance, and many more.¹⁶ In a country that experienced a dictatorship which purposely disappeared people and promoted forgetting, and in a democratic context in which memory is often considered an impediment to progress, memory is a strong method of resistance, and union leaders know that. Thus, we must give agency to union memory and recognize the precedent for the use of memory as a form of resistance and healing. In this sense, unions themselves are what Stern calls "memory knots," a part of Chilean society that screams memory and refuses to let go of the past.¹⁷

Historical Use of Memory in Chile

I want to contextualize and historicize the use of memory as a tool in and of itself. To do so, I would like to turn back to our fundamental assumptions about memory. To refresh, memory is collective, subjective, disputable, and subject to historicization. In other words, memory exists in group contexts, it is created based in experience and world view, and it changes based on historical

circumstances. These conditions of memory create what Stern calls emblematic memories, memories which come to represent the view point of a certain group of people. These emblematic memories can hold power, expanding or contracting to include or exclude more collectivities from its reach.¹⁸ Because they are designed to include groups of people, emblematic memories can become dominant, especially if they are remembered by the class, ethnicity, religion, gender, or other socially defined group in power. However, at any moment, there is never only one memory, because of the disputable and subjective nature of memory.¹⁹ Thus, there is likely to be an alternative collective memory, subjectively created and supported by an alternative group; a narrative or a memory that resists the dominant one. Jelin writes, "Normally, the dominant story will be the one told by the winners of historical conflicts and battles. Yet there will always be other stories, other memories, and alternative interpretations. These endure in spaces of resistance, in the private sphere, in the "catacombs" of history. There is an active political struggle not only over the meaning of what took place in the past but over the meaning of memory itself." Thus, memory itself can be a form of resistance, a way to speak truth to power and to cultivate consciousness.

In Chile specifically, we can see that a project of memory is a project of resistance. According to Brian Loveman and Elizabeth Lira in their article "Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and Impunity as Historical Themes: Chile, 1814-2006," Chilean precedent for dealing with trauma before the dictatorship was one of forgetting. Reparations would be made, and the topic would not be brought up again. This created a very stable and continuous form of government but also

allows violence and trauma to go un-denounced and forgotten by society.²⁰

Memory of trauma and even more so, the discussion of trauma, in these situations, is an act of resistance.

This would prove even more true during Pinochet's rule, a government which pursued depoliticization and *olvido* as policy, seeking to pacify its population by erasing those who it saw as a threat to the dominant memory of salvation it sought to create. Pinochet's government sought the dominant narrative of salvation, asserting that September 11, the date of the coup, a day of celebration of the restoration of order and of salvation and liberation from the degrading effects of Marxism. It played on class war, suggesting that Allende would upend all modern institutions and spread backward Marxist ideas to the population. The military government even went so far as to create false memories, such as the existence of Plan Z, a document forged by the CIA which intended to justify the military's violence on the basis of a false plan by Allende's government to carry out similar violence. Pinochet's government disappeared and tortured more than 100,000 people, in a brutal political act of forgetting and erasure.²¹ However, Pinochet's narrative of salvation and his policies around class war and the disappearance of people were laden with contradictions and weaknesses that only strengthened alternative memory.

Though its agenda was clearly classist, the military government also sought to eliminate the idea of class struggle from worker consciousness, creating policies intended to divide and weaken the labor movement and place the lower classes under complete control of a neoliberal system. This produced a strong

contradiction which only strengthened the memory, and the actuality, of class inequality. Union leaders especially, are quick to locate the coup's motivation in class politics. Furthermore, while the government literally took on a policy of erasure and forgetting through the disappearance of activists and workers who resisted the memory of salvation and who would have remained political opponents, refusing to let the idea of class war die, the method of disappearing people with important political relevancy, and depriving the population of information or justice, produced strong contradictions. Because the disappeared would not be able to be formally buried, memorialized, or even proclaimed dead, their memory was left in limbo; their disappearance also allowed government officials to forget or play dumb by avoiding having to indicate responsibility. They therefore avoided pointing out an anti-figure, someone who could represent their deaths through their life and their responsibility; they avoided the demand for justice. Thus, without concrete information, without responsibility, and without justice, memory becomes resistance or even a type of justice itself.

Stern and Winn say that memory became a form of resistance to the dictatorship in 1983. The economic crisis made the dictatorship vulnerable to criticism and deteriorating memory and activists were ready to challenge official memory, and to offer memory as a form of resistance. Stern and Winn write,

By then, "memory" had become a code word for a sacred struggle against a regime bent on "olvido" - a deliberate forgetting that involved the washing away of truth and the erasure from the collective memory of the people its agents had killed and disappeared. In this environment, memory was no longer confined to brave but beleaguered activists, relatives of victims, and persons of conscience determined to find and tell the truth. Memory turned into mass awakening and experience. Memory

meant human rights. It galvanized people to bring down the dictatorship and re-create a democracy. Memory was both a moral and political calling.²²

In other words, memory is not an unconscious phenomenon that amounts to resistance. In Chile, and especially for union leaders, remembering the strength of the past as well as the traumas of the past is an intentional resistance against Pinochet's practice of depoliticization and *olvido*. We must give unions agency in their memory and acknowledge memory as a conscious form of resistance, not simply a phenomenon for academic study. Furthermore, memory of the past allows for the creation of links between oppression of the past and oppression of the present. This is another way to resist *olvido* and hold institutions responsible for the perpetuation of oppression. Certainly, in Chile, the return of democracy did not necessarily mean the return of memory. Memory is still a battle in Chile.

Memory in the Union Movement Today

Memory is frequently used in the discourse of the movement today. Sergio Troncoso, Communist, Former President of the Confederation of Construction Workers, and current member of the Union of Construction Workers, Excavators, and Plumbers, began his contribution to the MMDH run panel called "Unionism today, problems and challenges," by recalling the sacrifices of workers

of the past, from the dictatorship, all the way back to the emblematic massacre at the Escuela Santa Maria in 1907. He says,

I want to, before passing to the subject of construction, perform a tribute to the thousands of martyrs since the year 1890 until today, the most emblematic being the massacre of the School of Santa Maria in 1907 and others that took place until the genocide of 73, where we had, as a union movement 452 comrades detained, disappeared, and political executions. Of these 452 comrades, 152 were workers and leaders from construction unions. To them, honor and glory, and to tell them, from their example, their sacrifice, their values, their militancy, their simplicity with which they fought from class based unionism continues to this day. They are the lights of today.²³

Because memory is still a battle, some, who want to focus on reconciliation and forward movement in democracy, advocate commonalities between people and seek to avoid conflict between the powerful tents of emblematic memory. Jelin writes,

"Other observers and actors, concerned primarily with the stability of democratic institutions, are less inclined to reopen the painful experiences of authoritarian repression. They emphasize the need to concentrate their efforts in building a better future, rather than continuously revisiting the past. Consequently, they promote policies of oblivion or "reconciliation."

²⁴

This is another form of *olvido*. The forgetting of the past in order to move forward into the present without conflict. Stern suggests that this is something called "locked box memory," an avoidance of some of the aspects, particularly the brutal human rights abuses, typically by the center right.²⁵ However, forgetting is

a political strategy that is used by the center left as well. Entreaties to move on, focus on the present, or the future, are coded phrases that encourage forgetting, often for the sake of political progress.

However, this leaves open the door for the unquestioned continuation of oppression of the past into the future. Union insistence on drawing links between their memories and the realities of oppression in the past to forms of oppression today is a way to resist and draw attention to undemocratic practices and human rights violations. On the other hand, while some remember the repression and torture of the past, it is distinctly a part of the past in their memory. Tracing the continuities of state repression and social inequalities is not a part of their understanding of the present. They are willing to remember the problems of the past but they cannot or will not connect it to their present. Thus, memory of continuity, memory of repression, memory of class war, memory of resistance, is still a form of resistance today. Not only for union leaders but for activists throughout the past centuries. For the union leaders who are the focus of this paper, their memory, their vision of past as alive and formative to the present is still a form of resistance today. Throughout this paper it is important to keep in mind that while union leader memory may be disputed, complicated, knotted, beneficial or detrimental to union progress, it is in itself a form of resistance and their commitment to memory has precedent and importance in a society that is constantly struggling with its memory of the past.

Memory knots on the social body²⁶

In union leader's insistence on recalling memory, not only of the past of union history but of the oppressive past of the country, they have become what Stern calls a "memory knot" in Chilean society. His terminology and description of these social knots is quite visceral. In the first book of his trilogy on memory in Chile, Stern invokes the sensation of a knot in your stomach, a "spasm that calls out for relief," and "breaks the 'normal' flow of everyday life and habit."²⁷ These knots in the social body demand attention, just as a knot in your stomach might, and interrupt a perhaps natural flow of forgetting with a spasm of memory. A memory knot, he says, can be human groups and leaders, specific events and dates, and specific physical sites that provoke memory. Thus, union leaders who recall the legacy of the dictatorship in today's democratic government and insist on the memory of their anarchist roots fit perfectly in this category. They not only are memory knots within Chilean society, they have also become memory knots in union groups themselves. Part of the discussion of the crisis is that union members, and workers as a whole do not hold the same consciousness of the past that the leaders do, and that the past is essential for understanding the present and fighting against systems of power.

Union Forgetting

However, despite this emphasis on memory, the resisting power of memory, and the insistence of union leaders to remember, union leaders also forget. And it is equally important to examine what they have forgotten as it is to examine what they remember.

As Cesar Toledo points out in the panel The Labor Plan and Reform, union leader memory has created emblematic moments out of the distant past, but forgets resistance of recent decades. Toledo says,

We talk about emblematic massacres, like the case which I have already mentioned, Santa Maria Iquique, but the mobilizations of the 90s and 2000s are not emblematic. I want to remind us of an example from the year [19]90 in a bicycle business that is located on [the street] North Amerigo Vespucio. A worker died from opposing a bus full of *carabineros* who had entered to break a strike. Or are we going to forget what happened with the lumber worker who confronted a *carabinero*...or are we going to remind ourselves too of the case of the contracted workers of CODELCO, workers who have died. It seems like today this has been lost, and I want to ask why? ²⁸

Resistance of the past, death of the past, such as the first major massacre which inspired Recabarren to organize workers, the massacre at Santa Maria Iquique, has become emblematic. They have become symbols for union resistance and are constantly recalled and remembered by union leaders. However, union leaders forget mobilizations, resistance, and worker death that happened only decades ago. Or if they have not forgotten, they do not call on them as emblematic

examples of worker experience. Why do people remember and make emblematic the far past but not the recent past? What types of memories become emblematic and what types are not incorporated into union leader narrative? Is there more looking into the past than there is engaging with the present? Toledo's statement raises important questions about forgetting. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this paper.

Unions and Memory in Research

In this chapter I will discuss some of the literature on memory, and specifically memory in Latin America, as well as literature which has discusses both historical and current day challenges or contradictions in the movement.

Literature on Memory

There are three authors who I would like to discuss in regards to the study of memory in Latin America: Elizabeth Jelin, who discusses the broader phenomenon of memory in Latin America, and authors Katherine Hite, and Steve Stern who both discuss memory in Chile specifically. The three writers, while they approach their studies extremely differently, and with very different purposes, can all be interpreted to present similar findings about memory. 1. Memory is understood in group contexts. 2. Memory is a powerful narrative that sticks with individuals throughout time. 3. Memory defines and is defined by identity.

State Repression and the Labor of Memory

Jelin's book is an analysis of memory based in the Latin American experience. However, her book has broader implications for the study of memory. Each of her chapters approach a different concept and question in memory. Jelin

discusses how memory manifests in the contemporary world, how to approach understanding where memory is coming from, how memory has become an object of political struggle, how history interacts with memory, and many other themes. Jelin suggests three main conclusions in this book, which I have discussed, earlier in the paper. Here, I will elaborate on these conclusions and their relationship to the three listed earlier in this chapter. Jelin's first central conclusion is that memory is subjective, a product of experiences and identity. Thus, we can conclude, that identity plays a large role in shaping memory, and vice versa. Then, because memories are created within social identity, memory is always "social framed" and understood and constructed within group settings.²⁹ Finally, because memory is a part of individual and group identity, as well as often the object of political and social struggle, memory can become firmly anchored in an individual, necessary to maintain a story they tell about themselves. Thus, periods of social crisis can challenge or threaten identity in a way that encourage the revision of memory to maintain identity.³⁰

When the Romance Ended: Leaders of the Chilean Left, 1968-1998

Hite does not seek to focus on memory, however, her conclusions are in line with the three I presented above. In her book Hite seeks to define the diffuse topic of political identity by dividing patterns of political thought into "cognitive frameworks." She does so by interviewing 100 leaders of the Chilean left and from their personal stories, identifying four "cognitive frameworks" which define

political identity and activism of individuals. The four frameworks she identifies are 1) political party loyalist, 2) personal loyalist, 3) political thinker, and 4) political entrepreneur. Party loyalists, she says, root their individual identity in the collective of the political party. Organization, discipline, and solidarity are primary values. Party loyalists idealize their own party, seeing it as the bringer of social change. Personal loyalists link their political identities to a specific leader. For example, in the context of the Chilean left, loyalty to Salvador Allende, the leader of the Popular Unity government, is the most common figure for personal loyalty. "Allendismo" becomes a political ideology which in turn defines identity. Personal loyalists, especially those loyal to Allende, face the challenge of justifying their identity after their figurehead is gone. Hite says that Allende loyalists rely on their memory of success and relevance in the past to justify their ideology through the present. Political thinkers prioritize ideas over parties or individuals and thus show greater ideological flexibility. Lastly, political entrepreneurs are far less idealistic than all the three previous categories and emphasize organizational strength and consensus over ideology.³¹ Thus, Hite groups political thought into four cognitive frameworks, which not only define an individuals approach to politics but also to memory.

Furthermore, Hite observes that these cognitive frameworks developed in early political experiences were not changed by the intervention of the traumatic military dictatorship. Though she had expected frameworks, and thus political identity and strategy, to exhibit a shift after the trauma of the dictatorship, she notes that people's cognitive frameworks presented a constant aspect of their

identity, surviving exile, torture, and the death or weakness of their party or personal political figure loyalties.³² Hite's final conclusion: "despite heart-wrenching experiences, the political identities of these highly political, sixties generation individuals - including their fundamental approaches to politics, to their immediate political communities, and to their understandings of their own images and roles in politics - have changed very little." I believe that this conclusion can thus be extended to memory, especially for those within the groups of political party loyalist or personal loyalist. These individuals hold in their memory of the morals as well as social value of their party or idolized individual, and significant historical changes do not shift their own memory.

Finally, Hite recognizes that sociological factors often contribute to the development of a cognitive framework, and therefore, relationship to memory. Factors such as class, education, membership in a political party, and generational ideas help to establish these cognitive frameworks at a very early age. Hite writes,

It involved early exposure to politics at the kitchen table, in the neighborhood, in the workplace, in school, and particularly for the 1960s generation, in the streets. For the men and women whose lives are the focus of this book, I found, the most salient indicators of political identity were the early experiences in national politics, experiences that seared their memories and defined their political priorities and relations to politics in a unique way.³³

It follows that these cognitive frameworks and an individual's approach to memory are tied to their identity.

Remembering Pinochet's Chile

Stern's book takes a similar approach to memory and identity. Stern divides up patterns of remembrance about the dictatorship in four ways, each of which he calls an "emblematic framework." These frameworks, he says helped individuals place their own experience within the experience of a collective. Memory of the individuals within each framework follow "recognizable patterns," which are characteristic to said framework.³⁴ Thus, Stern suggests a collective, group nature to memory. Stern characterizes the four groups by their approach and feelings about their memory of the dictatorship. These groups include memory as salvation, memory as rupture, memory as persecution and awakening, and memory as a closed box. Memory as salvation describes the understanding of the dictatorship as a "rescue mission" from the fear and loss that characterized leftist reform for these individuals.³⁵ An upper class woman who describes September 11th 1973 as the happiest day of her life is Stern's example for this category of memory. The woman felt that Chile's political shift to the left in the years before the dictatorship was upheaval, a threat to her livelihood, and for many in her socio-economic class meant confiscation of their property through the agricultural reforms. Memory as rupture describes an understanding of the dictatorship as a distinct break in the lives of these individuals, one which many of them will not recover from. He tells the story of an older woman from a *población* who lost both her sons during the dictatorship and who still today struggles to bring meaning to their loss and dwells in their memory.³⁶ Memory as

persecution and awakening also has to do with a serious mental shift caused by the dictatorship, but in this case a shift to awakening, a realization about the importance of family, social action, and political involvement. For the woman he uses as an example, the dictatorship and the trauma it caused gave her new purpose in fighting against these social systems and became an inspiration for action, to this day.³⁷ Finally, memory as a closed box, which Stern describes as "political aligned with the center right," avoids addressing their memory of the dictatorship, especially the aspect of human rights violations. Stern interprets this as a matter of taste and a will to avoid controversy stemming from the belief that it will not aid progress to dwell on the past. His examples include an army colonel and conservative historian.³⁸ His categorizations and examples of individuals belonging to each framework suggest that an individual's understanding of the dictatorship is long lasting, and unlikely to change. It is also clear that these categories align with social class, experience of persecution, and gender. Thus, the memories and adherence to certain frameworks is closely related to individual identity.

Historical Struggles

There is one piece I would like to discuss in relation to literature about the historical struggles, challenges, and contradictions in the labor movement. While there are many pieces that discuss the history of the labor movement, none are so explicit about the contradictions and historical challenges that arise within it as

Peter Winn's *Weavers of the Revolution*. *Weavers* reveals the internal disunity among the Yarur workers who were perceived to be a united group and explains how important the political moment of acceptance was in the Yarur worker's strength. The Yarur workers, having been severely repressed for expressing any dissatisfaction with the factory in the past were waiting on Allende's election as a crucial political moment to express their power and dissatisfaction.³⁹ In some ways, the political rise of the *Unidad Popular* was beneficial to the workers. They were able to create solidarity and organize more openly. However, at the time of the factory seizure, Allende's government was not supportive of this act of revolution from below. Allende was playing a calculated game of how radical a politician he could be and what steps to take when, and the seizure of the Yarur factory put his political calculations in danger.⁴⁰ There was a risk not only of appearing that the socialist revolution was out of Allende's control but also that other factories would catch on and begin a revolution from below. Overall, Winn's book provides a detailed and complicated account of the experiences of the Yarur workers and how their strength was affected by the political moment in which they organized as well as the contradictions and challenges that resided within their movement and its relationship to politics.

Challenges to Labor Today

Political Challenges

Challenges to the labor movement today are both internal and political. Many authors have reviewed the political inability or unwillingness of the *Concertación* and *Nueva Mayoria* governments to make any significant labor reform. These articles include Volker Frank's chapter in *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, "Politics without Policy: The Failure of Social Concentration in Democratic Chile, 1990-2000," and "The Elusive Goal in Democratic Chile: Reforming the Pinochet Labor Legislation," and Kurt Weyland's "Growth with Equity in Chile's New Democracy?" Frank and Weyland discuss the drastic political shift from dictatorship to the concept of social *concertación*, in which all parties attempted to come to an agreement, and the challenges that faced this new social dialogue while figures from the dictatorship still held political power and the neoliberal economic system was not in question. Frank suggests that, as a result, while labor was superficially included in the dialogue of social *concertación*, the political limitations to concrete change meant that they "reaped few if any benefits," in the years following the dictatorship.

Importantly, Frank makes clear that the goals, at least of the CUT, had changed significantly. He writes, "most workers and unionists were quite realistic and understood that the new democratic state would not favor the workers more than the capitalists. There hope was that in democracy, economic and political

elites would be willing to negotiate the creation of an industrial relations system that would facilitate workers attempts to move toward a balance of power and a level playing field."⁴¹ According to Frank, leaders were aware that the government would continue to prioritize economic growth over labor rights. The goal of the CUT was to participate in the reconstruction of democracy as a relevant social actor. Part of this participation in the first three months were the *Acuerdos Marco*, important landmarks of cooperation between the government, businesses and unions at the beginning of the transition which are now generally regarded as completely ineffective to strengthen the labor movement or promote labor reform.

Diego Barría Traverso, Eduardo Araya Moreno and Oscar Drouillas write specifically about the relationship between CUT and the Bachelet government in, "Removed from the Bargaining Table: The CUT during the Bachelet Administration." They conclude that the CUT was used as a social tool by the Bachelet administration. They would be included in reaching agreements when it suited the government but, unlike other governments of the *Concertación*, the CUT was not allowed direct involvement in policy discussions.⁴² However, their article makes clear that despite greater participation in earlier governments, the CUT never had enough power to be a source of pressure on the government. Alliance with labor, even before Bachelet, was mutually beneficial to both labor and the government. The government was able to appear more democratic and willing to engage in social dialogue, and have one consistent representative of the

labor movement, and the CUT appeared more powerful and influential than it actually was.⁴³

Internal Challenges - Memory

There is one extremely important piece about the internal challenges facing the movement, especially in regards to memory and attachment to the past. This is Francisco Leiva's "Flexible Workers, Gender, and Contending Strategies for confronting the Crisis of Labor in Chile." Leiva lays out what he calls the "old socio-cultural matrix," which defines not only memory, but perception of present reality. This matrix, he says is comparable to "framing processes" of social movement theorists (such as Hite and her cognitive frameworks) but he argues that a sociocultural matrix is far more encompassing. It defines a shared consciousness, he says which in turn defines practices and strategy, rituals, conflict, priorities, and trustworthiness. Thus, the socio-cultural matrix encompasses memory, current strategy, and ideas about the future. The matrix is old, Leiva says, because it is likely a left over mentality from the period between 1936 and 1973, a period of successful union action. Leiva marks five points in the center of sociocultural matrix during that time and questions their present day value. 1) "Masculinization of Chile's working-class culture," due to the large presence of miners and manufacturers in the labor movement of the time. The mental and often literal picture of the working class, and of working class masculinity was exemplified by the "images of the strong burly miner with his

helmet and drill;" 2) Androcentric thinking; an idea which goes hand in hand with a masculinization of the culture. The sociocultural matrix centers around men as the workers and left women on the peripheries. 3) On a plant level, a rigid understanding of the role of the union as an enforcer of the labor contract, primarily through the legal negotiating tool of collective bargaining; 4) On a government level, the role of the union to create the conditions for political, legal changes, and eventually the establishment of socialism; 5) On a national level, the role of the union to influence political parties "through the established part and electoral mechanisms, not through direct autonomous, social representation."⁴⁴

Leiva's assessment that union action is primarily focused on legal and legitimate action contradicts quite strongly with some of union discourse which emphasizes the legitimacy of union action regardless of legality as a method of self protection and a fight for human rights. It also contradicts the discursive assertion that union militancy is a dying factor, being taken over by legal negotiation and cooperation. If Leiva is correct, perhaps unions were never as militant as they remember and their current strategy and mentality is not all that different from the past. Perhaps the memory of union success is linked more closely to the responsiveness of the government in the 1936-1973 period, which Leiva identifies as the origin of the old sociocultural matrix, than its militancy. I hope that an examination of memory will reveal whether Leiva's assessment is correct, that unions have historically focused on legal actions, thus limiting them severely in the wake of Pinochet's labor code, despite the discursive and memory emphasis on militancy. Leiva's work provides a bridge for connecting union

memory to the present movement. Leiva's work addresses something important, which is that it is not necessarily the governments of the past or present to blame entirely for union weakness, although they have played a role in that, rather it is an internal issue which may be based in union leaders understanding of the past and constant comparison of the past to the present in a way that is neither accurate nor productive.

Internal Challenges - Consumerism

In his chapter of *Victims of the Chilean Miracle*, "Disciplined Workers and Avid Consumers: Neoliberal Policy and the Transformation of Work and Identity among Chilean Metalworkers," Joel Stillerman discusses the change in culture that a neoliberal economy has produced for workers and union leaders. Many factors produced this change, but particularly business emphasis on worker flexibility and a greater availability of consumer commodities and credit cards has eroded worker solidarity over time. Stillerman says that workers who enter into debt are more likely to engage in competitive working and overtime work in order to be able to pay off their debt more quickly.⁴⁵ This change in working culture and consumer culture points to a changing definition and solidarity to social class among workers. The shift has only garnered more internal tension between workers who engage in consumption of expensive consumer goods and competitive work and those who associate their working class identity with solidarity and group control of the work pace.⁴⁶

Union Origins: Development of Consciousness and Memory

This chapter seeks to establish an understanding of the development of worker consciousness and organization in Chile. Prior to national level organization and union discourse, there must be a development of a collective consciousness, an identity, a reason and a common denominator for grouping together and joining in a struggle. Furthermore, many of the issues that are today talked about as a crisis in the union movement are not new issues to the movement. This chapter will examine the history and memory of unions and their origins.

While Leiva's work suggests that the aspects of the old socio-cultural matrix are primarily drawn from the period between 1936 and 1973, the arrival of the government of the *Frente Popular* and the *golpe militar* which ended the government of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) when unions were the most successful, I would suggest that union memory goes much further back than that. Certainly, relevant union history is much older. To understand the use of memory in the union movement today it is important to understand the historical origins of union consciousness. As the movement for worker's rights grew there were constant efforts at unification of the movement under one umbrella organization and several contradictions began to arise which are visible throughout the history of Chilean unions, from conception through today. Unity became the ultimate goal in Chilean union organization. It was a mantra but also a value and a goal, a discursive rallying call and an ideological pillar for organization. Unity became

idealized and desired so much so that the issue of how to create it became an issue of contention and division. Organization's political alliances often created the most division and tension between unions. Unity is an ever present theme of union memory today. Some leaders lament the loss of unity and solidarity, saying that the plague of neoliberalism has fostered individualism and consumerism instead. Some leaders are frustrated by insistence on unity, saying that the fantasy of unity has impeded the reality of controversy and debate.⁴⁷ Regardless, the theme of unity is ever present and the reality of unity is ever elusive for the labor movement and even for the Chilean Left as a whole.

One of the issues which has always infringed upon unity for unions is the idea of legitimacy. There is a tension between the ability of the workers and the unions to be recognized by the government, and the potential for legislative change this creates, and the ability of the workers to organize themselves in a way that is most conducive to resistance. Governmental recognition, legality, legitimacy, comes hand in hand with governmental regulation and political norms, and feasibility, which tend to impede upon union organization, union resistance, and the relative success of union demands as much if not more than internal division. On the other hand, union resistance that is not politically legitimate is vulnerable to more violent repression and persecution. This chapter will also explore these rise of union consciousness and how these two contradictions and struggles which arise within the Chilean union movement between its birth and the arrival of the *Unidad Popular* unveil.

Development of Consciousness

In order for there to be collective memory, there must first be collective consciousness. In order for a group to remember a common history, regardless of the variations in that memory, there must be a reason for them to believe that they have a common history. There are two strata of theory about the creation of consciousness. The first says that consciousness, and therefore political beliefs, class identity, social goals, and work place complaints, are formed on the shop floor (or in the mine shaft or field). The existence or lack of machinery may have an affect, the way workers are treated by their supervisors, and how much interaction they have with the higher ups all play into the development of a worker consciousness. This theory, advanced by Charles Sable, favors the development of specific context based consciousness, of small, local level collective memory and consciousness over national or class level consciousness. Each group's consciousness depends upon their experience on the factory floor, or the mine shaft or the field, as the case may be.⁴⁸ A second theory says that collective memory is collective consciousness and the development of a collective memory is the development of a collective consciousness. The history of the development of worker consciousness in Chile illustrates that we must blend these two theories and accept them each as a part of the process of creating collective consciousness.

It is clear that early on, workers, through the fact of their labor and lack of sufficient compensation, were aware of the disparity and sought remuneration.

Letellier writes that salary level was both a symbolic and actual primary division and conflict between the working class and the bourgeois.⁴⁹ Furthermore, in 1890, prior to any real national level organization, a series of strikes set off across the country, beginning in July in Iquique and spreading from there throughout the year. The strikes were all within weeks of each other and exhibit several similar characteristics. According to Hernan Ramirez, all the striking workers presented similar and extremely precise demands and in several cities the strikes spanned several industries, reaching the level of being considered a general strikes.⁵⁰ These characteristics and instances suggest that there is some level of consciousness that develops simply from the condition of being a worker and recognizing shared struggles, across the country and across sectors.

On the other hand, for many years the worker resistance movement was inarticulate, unorganized, spontaneous, and material driven. This led to rebellions, violence, and strikes, but they were generally work place specific, unorganized, and immediately repressed. Furthermore, most initial resistance was focused on salary. It would take several years from the first complaints about salary until workers realized what they needed was an adjustment in their real wages and not in the sum of money itself.⁵¹ Workers did not generally focus on issues such as social benefits, workers rights, or political ideology without more formal organization to assist. One of the first general public protests was organized by the Democratic Party in 1888, shortly after its founding, to protest high prices of public transportation.⁵² Thus, in some ways some formal organization and social-structural imposition was required for a fuller

development of worker consciousness. This would suggest that historical memory and historical consciousness as well as formal organization is also required for the development of a fuller collective consciousness. As the movement progressed, ideology and the formation of consciousness increasingly incorporated a historical perspective. Memory of the foundation of the country in *latifundios*, as well as the consistent exploitation of colonizing and imperialist forces came to form a large part of worker consciousness as the movement went on. Thus, indicating that historical consciousness and memory are also necessary parts of the development of consciousness.

What is worker consciousness?

Importantly, the idea of worker consciousness has meant different things in different time periods, based on the historical, economic, political, and social contexts of the time. Worker consciousness does not take on the strong narrative of class struggle and anti-capitalism with which it is often associated (especially by the leader's of today's union movement) until the development of the Socialist Workers Party. As political context changes what it means to be a worker and to be a part of that consciousness shifts. After the development of the Socialist Party and prior to the *Frente Popular* government, worker consciousness was primarily centered around an embodiment of the class struggle, the worker versus capitalism in a fight for humanity and socialism. In this time the government was still developing and perhaps a system change to socialism was still a feasible goal.

After the rise of the *Frente Popular* and in the years of Leiva's "old-socio cultural matrix," from 1936-1973, when the left was strong in Chile, worker consciousness was focused on organization, unity, solidarity, action, and concrete reform in society through legislation. The government, now settled in capitalist democracy, provided legislation as the primary path for change, and the *Frente Popular* in particular leaned left in its goals and reforms. Thus, the labor movement saw its opportunity to legislate and legitimize social change in the eyes of the government and the watching modern world. During the dictatorship worker consciousness maintained its values of solidarity, action, and unity, but with the purpose shifted to be anti-dictatorship, pro-democracy, rather than pro-social change or anti-capitalist. Workers were risking their lives to even be associated with resistance to the government or the new neoliberal system. Resistance developed different strategies and different goals as a result and worker consciousness shifted away from legislative changes to resistance and survival. Finally, the *Concertación* and *Nueva Mayoria* governments after the return of democracy concretized, institutionalized, and socially normalized neoliberalism through both their discourse and legislation. The labor movement is now caught with a divided consciousness. All workers must split their consciousness between worker and consumer, two, perhaps contradictory, roles which have been made one in the same. Although some may be opposed to the consumerism of the day, at this point, survival is predicated on an ability to consume. What it means to have worker consciousness in neoliberalism is to be trapped in this contradiction.

In response, some seek dialogue with the government and a chance to participate in legislation once again and to create worker positive reform. Others, seeing the government, companies, and workers as having fundamentally and irreversibly opposed interests, seek a return to a more radical and autonomous unionism based in action and solidarity. However, no matter the period, worker consciousness is based in the political, economic, and social context of the present as well as an understanding of and mobilization of memory of oppression and worker experience in an earlier historical period.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge that the beginnings of development of worker consciousness is by no means the first understanding or consciousness of oppression in Chile. And the memory of constant oppression, not just of workers but of indigenous populations as well, is extremely important to the development of worker consciousness, illustrating how crucial historical memory is to the development of consciousness. However, I believe that it is important and necessary to distinguish consciousness of general oppression from the consciousness of the worker. The consciousness of the worker as oppressed and exploited, as a producer, as the source of profit, and therefore deserving of and strategically placed to demand basic rights through the use of strike is unique to and rises along side the cementing of the capitalist and imperialist political and economic system in Chile. Furthermore, as Leiva suggests, active members of labor unions today are disproportionately male and Chilean, as compared to the working population which is increasingly female and immigrant. Thus, worker consciousness exists at the crossroads of several different types of oppression and

often excludes the specific circumstances of many of its members. Worker consciousness is primarily focused on the needs of the Chilean male laborer and does not create room for other types of workers. On the other hand, even the most privileged of identity within the the working community is still fighting for a paid half hour lunch break after almost 100 years, making more specific reform for women or for immigrants seem incredibly unfeasible.



Another example of early collective consciousness are the gatherings on the 1st of May for international workers day. These gatherings began as early as

1892 in Valparaíso.⁵³ This image is of a gathering for the 1st of May, *primero de mayo*, in 1908 from the National Library of Chile.

Early History

Creator of Consciousness: Luis Emilio Recabarren

Recabarren is considered one of the founders of today's worker's consciousness. However, despite his image as the founder of worker consciousness, or perhaps because of his mythic character, Recabarren is often misremembered. It is important to examine the true history and opinions of Recabarren, first, because they illustrate the two central contradictions which have plagued Chilean unions since their beginning, and second, because it provides a sense of how far memory can take a subject from its reality. Recabarren, today, is understood as a founder of union values and consciousness and an unwavering proponent of union autonomy. However, his own writing and other's memories of him suggest that Recabarren, in his own time, represented opposing values. After the founding of the Socialist Worker's Party he represented disunity, bourgeois elitism, and the unwanted intervention of political parties in worker's movements. Furthermore, Recabarren is often used today as a figure to represent the value of unity and resistance, however Recabarren, in his time, was a figure of union division and of division of the Left as a whole. Thus, Recabarren strongly represents the ever present struggle for unity and the controversy over the alliance

of political parties with labor organizations, which are present from the beginning of labor unions in Chile through today.

Furthermore, because Recabarren was prone to publish his political and social opinions in worker's diaries his work is particularly relevant to discourse analysis and memory studies. Published work often holds a sense of legitimacy and authority that other works may not. However, even the fact of written publication can tell us something about his values. At the time in which Recabarren wrote, many workers were illiterate, thus his writings, and one can conclude his politics were not necessarily for the worker but for the politician. Finally, it is easy to submit his thought to an examination through memory studies because we can easily compare how he is remembered, how his image is used, and how he is written about after his death to his own writings and professed ideology.

Recabarren became a public figure, an emblem of memory, through consistent publishing in worker's publications and as a militant of *El Partido Democrático*. The Democratic Party, and its ultimate fracturing, is illustrative of the disunity of the Left. Founded in 1887, the Democratic Party in Chile is considered the first party to take class interests and worker interests into consideration.⁵⁴ Though it did not proclaim itself a party based in "class struggle" it declared that the party was founded "for the Chilean proletariat, because of their living conditions."⁵⁵ However, its class values were weak and its political position was too. Because of its small size and minimal resources, the Democratic Party was obliged to make value compromising alliances with large

political coalitions for even a chance to see its values represented in Parliament.⁵⁶ Still, it was the favored party of the left for a time and certainly of the working class. However, as Recabarren's own political and social consciousness developed he began to push the party towards stronger socialist values. In 1907 Recabarren left the Democratic Party and simultaneously proposed the incorporation of socialist ideals into it.⁵⁷ The party declined to change its name, or values, favoring tradition and minimal controversy over progress in an attempt to promote unity.⁵⁸ Even among workers, not only politicians and bourgeois, a shift to socialism would have proved controversial, as the ideology was not widely accepted at the time.⁵⁹ But the divisions and factions within the Democratic Party were impossible to avoid. In 1912 Recabarren created the Socialist Worker's Party, the *Partido Obrero Socialista* (POS), and breaks apart the party into factions.

From the name of the party, one can tell that there was no intention for this political party to be autonomous from worker organizations. Recabarren intended the party to be a center for the organization of workers and he sought to develop consciousness among workers that favored socialist values and prioritized the actualization of a socialist society.⁶⁰ The organization of workers through a political party, theoretically, would "arm" the workers with access to and knowledge of the same system used by their exploiters to help them conquer political power.⁶¹ In fact, not only was Recabarren in favor of collaboration between workers organizations and political organizations, he regarded those who

suggested the organizations remain separate as traitors to the workers, even if those against his methods were workers themselves.⁶²

Recabarren's ability to proclaim his love and support for the workers and still regard their organizations as "betray[ing]" the workers "entrap[ing] workers," "disarm[ing] the worker," lacking the ability, consciousness, or instinct to defend themselves, led him to be called a "political acrobat" and a "traitor of democracy" by his peers. Eduardo Gentoso, once an ally to Recabarren in the Democratic Party, and the principle editor of *La Locomotora*, a worker's diary for the Federation of Machine Workers and Stokers, said,

we do not understand...how an organization [the Socialist Worker's Party] which calls itself socialist, and which should work to embrace the unity of the working class, to organize and awaken the spirit of association between workers, concerns itself with dividing, discrediting, and dissolving organizations and association, which provide real and positive services for the well being and prosperity of its members.⁶³

Perhaps because of his contradicting goals his legacy in political memory changes over time. Massardo tracks the political legacy of Recabarren and how he is remembered in different periods of history in his book "The Formation of the Political Image of Recabarren." He describes the intention of the Socialist Party being to "liquidate [Recabarren's] political legacy."⁶⁴ In the minutes of a Conference in July of 1933, 11 years after the suicide of Recabarren, it is recorded that someone said,

The ideology of Recabarren is the inheritance that the party must quickly overcome. Recabarren is our own. But his liberal ideas with respect to patriotism, about the revolution, the edification of the party, etc., are, at the moment, a great obstacle to the completion of our mission...His democratic illusions, his faith in universal suffrage, his bourgeois patriotism, his understanding of the party as one of social reform,

structured as a federation of organizations for purely electoral goals, his ignorance and absolute failure to comprehend the workers revolution as a necessary phase in development, his abstract ideas of "social revolution" as a remote idea, and finally his explicit collaboration with the bourgeois, excused as "political realism," have impeded the party in its true goal of revolution.⁶⁵

At this time, so soon after his death, Recabarren was remembered as a traitor and a bourgeois poser. It was only after the creation of the *Frente Popular* when we see a "rehabilitation of Recabarrenism" in the discourse of the union movement and pieces that follow the lines of some of the discourse we hear today in which Recabarren is presented as the ancestor to the movement, pieces that describe the legacy of Recabarren. Massardo also says that once again, after the end of the *Frente Popular*, there was memorial silence about the legacy of Recabarren, perhaps for fear of political repression. However, these types of articles spring up again during Pinochet's dictatorship, articles in which Recabarren is lauded as a leader whose strategy will lead the workers through their resistance.

Recabarren, so often recalled to invoke resistance, unity, autonomy, and the power of the worker, in reality, has not always represented these values. The question is, why does Recabarren now represent such ubiquitous values, when, during his own life, he was largely regarded as arrogant, bourgeois, and patronizing to the workers.

In this sense, Recabarren himself becomes a manifestation of the social phenomenon that is memory, especially within the Chilean labor movement. His personal history is cloudy, a factor which only contributes to his mythic aura, and the histories we have of him rely mainly on the memories of those close to him at

one time or another. What we can mainly take as indications of who Recabarren was is what he wrote in various worker publications. Recabarren has now become a symbol. He is used by Sergio Troncoso to invoke the true values of unionism and by Ahumada to invoke the continuity of conservatism and political opportunism in the movement. Why would his image be used by these two leaders in such different ways?

Federacion Obrera de Chile (FOCH)

"The need to fight united would be a permanent preoccupation of the working class and its leaders since the beginnings of the struggle of the working class," writes Letellier.⁶⁶ Preoccupation is an appropriate word for the strategic reverence of and discursive obsession with unity in the labor movement. Unions continue to struggle for unity throughout their history despite the often disunifying consequences of that struggle.

The FOCH was the beginning of the existence of national level organizations fighting for concrete worker's rights. This meant moving from local consciousness to the creation of a national consciousness. The FOCH was founded in 1909, and though it was not the first attempt at a national umbrella organization to unite the workers it was the first that lasted more than a few months.⁶⁷ The FOCH begins to exhibit the contradictions of union consciousness even at its founding. This includes the back and forth relationship with political parties and struggles of unity.

The FOCH initiated the precedent of national organizations creating a list of principles or reasons for resistance (although local organizations held this practice long before). Declarations of Principles or Points of Struggle are excellent examples of the creation of collective consciousness because they define the ideals of a national movement. Discourse also opens space for internal disunity due to the clarification of the consciousness of different factions. By placing a definition on the ideology of a group it creates more opportunity for dissent. The first version of the Declaration of Principles for the *Gran Federation Obrera Chilena* marks the first discursive evidence of an incumbent dichotomy in the union movement in Chile to this day: cooperative with the government versus autonomous and militant. It classified itself as an organization with "its base in evolution and collaboration towards the social politics of the government."⁶⁸ Though this wording is rather confusing and ambivalent, it signifies a willingness of the FOCH to work collaboratively with the government, a principle that unions had not before manifested.

However, this was not the feeling of all of the workers and leaders who participated in the FOCH. There was a more radical part of the movement who eventually in 1924 took over. They changed the name to the *Federacion Obrera de Chile* and they changed the Declaration of Principles in order to reflect their more radical politics. The Declaration of Principles made by this version of the FOCH was part civilizing mission of workers, ("to definitively remove all the vices of the working class, like a taste for alcohol and gambling"), part worker's rights campaign ("for the diminution of working hours in order to diminish

unemployment and fatigue, and to give time for personal hygiene and social duties"), and part anti-capitalist, pro-worker's rule ("Upon the abolition of the capitalist system, the system will be replaced by the *Federation Obrera* which will take charge of the administration of industrial production and its consequences.")⁶⁹ This version of the FOCH was not looking to collaborate with the government. Its members saw collaboration with the government and politics as a imposition of bourgeois values on the workers. The bourgeois political parties could never truly have the well being of the workers at the center of their values. It took as its maxims "unity is strength," and "the emancipation of the workers must be the work of the workers themselves;" the later of which is taken directly from Marxist theory.⁷⁰ Still today these sentiments are repeated over and over. Unity, though it has always been elusive, is constantly invoked as the highest value of unionism and the most important and strengthening one. Furthermore, this mantra refers to the search for unity within the union movement and among the workers and implies unity against bourgeois government. Finally, "the emancipation of the workers must be the work of the workers themselves" once again reflects the movement's determination to push forward without the assistance of political party intervention.

Despite this determination the FOCH was not well positioned to achieve its goals without help. It was aware of its own weakness and powerlessness against the government to truly make the change it was seeking on its own and its discourse reflects that. The Declaration of Principles was careful to include phrases such as "once the FOCH is powerful...", and "these aspirations will be

sustained when the FOCH ...has sufficient strength to realize them..."⁷¹ And thus, despite its earlier decision to disassociate from participation with the government, in 1922 the FOCH allied itself with the Communist party. As a consequence, several anti-communist unions that had once allied with the FOCH dropped out and the FOCH base became a concentration of miners of nitrate and carbon.⁷² The FOCH and the Communist Party (PC) became so closely intertwined that many of the leaders of the FOCH were leaders of the PC at the same time.⁷³

In the history following the military coup in 1925 we can also see several strong contradictions play out within the union movement that are repeated to this day. In 1924 union legality and legitimacy, as well as unity, changed forever. Unions were given legal recognition, theoretically a victory of political legitimacy for workers. However, with legal status comes regulation, and unions were submitted to intense internal regulation, essentially eliminating their autonomy. This is the true beginning of a major internal contradiction within Chilean unions.⁷⁴ Unions seek both to undermine political structures and be recognized by them. From then on, the FOCH and all other union organizations take on the double task of both creating "*fuerza obrera*," in the words of Recabarren, and creating political will to reform the Constitution in favor of workers rights.⁷⁵

In 1927 Carlos Ibañez becomes president, taking over from the conservative Alessandri. Several unions were supportive of this change in government, imagining that the promises Ibanez made to end corruption and bring education reform would be seen through. To the contrary, the government of Ibañez violently repressed both the FOCH and the PC, severely weakening both

organizations. In this time the FOCH's intimate relationship with the PC was extremely damaging, not only because of the external repression they both faced, but also because of internal disunity. In 1927 the PC reoriented its internal structure to be more accommodating to the political discourse that was popular and legitimate at the time. As a result, the divisions regarding legitimacy versus autonomy within the FOCH deepened and eventually led to the disintegration of the FOCH.

With the 1931 *Codigo de Trabajo*, unions were legalized, but more importantly, they were legislated. Garces and Milos say that legislation was proposed to *enrielar*, lay down rails, for the movement, institutionalizing, regulating, and limiting their expression of needs and demands.⁷⁶ This legislation posed the same contradiction that all legalization of radical movements poses. It was both a formal recognition of the rights and demands of the workers but also an effective way for the state to cripple a movement by imposing rules of legality to limit the power of the workers. This is not only an attempt to limit the action power of the workers but also an attempt to limit the consciousness of the workers. A collective acceptance of government legitimacy limits the worker movement to acting and imagining within the boundaries of legality. Value is placed on compromise and dialogue as opposed to unified resistance and action. There then existed two types of unions: *legal*, and *libre*, legal unions and free unions.⁷⁷ Because legal unions had the political support of the government, and thus a mark of legitimacy, and government tolerance, it became more and more

difficult for free, autonomous unions to continue their movement. Free unions faced violent repression and political and social isolation.

We can see the fractioning of the union movement in the three separate national level organizations which arose at the time. First, the FOCH, which sought to resist capitalist exploitation. Second, the *Confederation Nacional de Sindicatos* (CNS) was composed of mainly legal and politically legitimate unions, but still declared class values. Third, the CGT was the most divergent of the organizations, it insisted on the use of direct and resistant action as the most successful way for workers to make their own change.⁷⁸ It favored direct counter action and opposed all political pacts. Furthermore, there were several unions that existed outside these three national organizations. All sought to represent the entire working class, all chose different strategies and ideologies. As a result, the relationship between the organizations was one of competition and infighting, dramatically increasing the destructive affects of the lack of unity. Illustrative of the tension and the contradictions inherent in union values, in 1935 a special Convention was held. At this Convention the conclusion was declared that unions could never be successful or free if they worked under the laws of the state. A vote was held and the two choices to decide the future of unionism. The first choice, to abandon legal unionism, and the second, to repudiate legal unionism. The second option won the majority and deciding what it meant to repudiate as opposed to abandon was put off till a later convention.⁷⁹ Thus, despite ideology and despite discourse, unions were unable to abandon the security of legal

unionism, electing ambiguous repudiation over decisive and unifying abandonment of government controlled unionism.

Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCH)

The CTCH rose to the center along with the new political coalition of the *Frente Popular*, the Popular Front. Just as there was intense division and debate among unions in regards to ideology and strategy, the Chilean Left has paralleled this conflict and division. In 1936 the left was able to reach unity through the creation of the *Frente Popular* which united the Socialist party, the Radical party, the Democratic party and the Communist party. This was a hugely important step in building unity in the left to counter the conservative actions of President Alessandri. This happened at the same time as a realization in the union movement that worker and union success was irrevocably tied to political support and the success of their supporting political parties. However, this dependence did not go one way, it was also crucial for the political parties to have the support of the unions and the workers in order to see success in elections, something which we see from then, through the election and government of Allende to today.⁸⁰ Thus, it was mutually beneficial for labor organizations and political parties to support each other. This is a pattern we can see throughout Chilean history.

With the creation of the *Frente Popular*, the union movement decided they needed another central organization to unify themselves, with, at very least, the strategic purpose of supporting the *Frente Popular*.⁸¹ Even through this decision

there was dissent and tension. The CGT, the most radical of the groups, favored the creation of a Union Alliance, which would be action based and would refuse to compromise with the idea of legal unionism or the demands of any government. However, in the end the CTCH was created, *Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile*. The CTCH displayed some typical values of Chilean unionism, including the countering of capitalism and the ultimate creation of a socialist nation. The CTCH promised to support both legal and free unions with the acknowledgement and acceptance that if any organization was going to unite the whole of the working class it would have to do so with acceptance of varying ideologies, not insistence on one type of strategy.⁸² As the CTCH incorporated itself into the *Frente Popular* it declared the following:

Our class can not be absent in a movement which proposes to reconquer for Chile the economic and political sovereignty, expel the imperialist companies that monopolize production and install an authentic popular democracy. These are the fundamental propositions of the *Frente Popular*...⁸³

This quote in a sense justifies the movements violation of its own principles by allying itself with a political/governmental organization. It also conveys the image that it is the responsibility of the labor movement to support a political movement which shares such similar goals. Furthermore, it gives the impression that that the *Frente Popular* relies on union support for success, and while this may be true, it excludes the acknowledgement that the labor movement also relies on the *Frente Popular* for success. The *Frente Popular*, on the other hand, had made no promises to fulfill the needs of the labor movement and the movement

itself even acknowledged that the *Frente Popular* did not plan to consider "the goals or ideal aspirations" of the labor movement. However, under the government of the *Frente Popular* the union movement began to make significantly more progress than it had in the past. It relied upon the support of the Leftist political parties and that they were in control of the government for its success. In 1939 the CTCH published in a newspaper, that since the arrival of the *Frente Popular* the union movement had "finally gained the right to organize, the freedom to convene, and freedom of speech and to put a barrier before the fascism which threatened us."⁸⁴

However, the CTCH's decision to ally itself with a governmental and political coalition had the expected moderating and pacifying effect. The CTCH proposed mainly moderate social reform, placing democracy above social reform and unity above class values.⁸⁵ Their alliance to the *Frente Popular* led to the loss of autonomy. However, the success of the CTCH during the time of the *Frente Popular* shows just how important the representation of leftist values in the government is in order for unions to make progress on their agenda.

CUT: An Organization Formed with Memory

Cooperation with and tension over alliances with political parties led to a crisis within and the ultimate fracturing of the CTCH. This chapter will illustrate the continuity of that very crisis in the successor organization, the CUT, despite its claim of unifying goals and ideologies. In some ways, the CUT represents the height of union strength and unity. However, its ultimate and overall weakness is representative of the struggles of the movement which have existed since its birth through today, though are still often referred to as a "crisis." In this way, the CUT serves as an emblematic point in memory when referring to union strength. This chapter will also discuss the CUT itself as a historical memory and as a creator of historical memory. The CUT is a particularly interesting organization to study in reference to historical memory because of the role its sister organization plays today in the government and labor organization of Chile.

Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) as Inheritance

The creation of the CUT in 1953 by Clotario Blest, another emblematic figure in the memory of the union movement, is the creation of an organization which will both inherit the contradictions and traditions of the labor movement and also create a new standard and ideal of labor action and involvement in society. Similar to the creation of other national level organizations in Chile, the

CUT rose out of the crisis of its ancestor and the subsequent clamor for unity in the movement. A year prior to the creation of the CUT the *Commission Nacional de Unidad Sindical*, National Commission of Union Unity, said

The existence of innumerable centers and unions which act separately, weakens the general fight of the workers for their re-vindication and general interests. This dispersion must not continue. The Chilean union movement finds itself in an upward push, given that the consequences of inflation and the results of antinational anti popular politics have fallen completely on the backs of the working masses in the country and the city.⁸⁶

The Commission criticizes the union movement for its dispersive quality, which it claims weakens the workers, and calls for ultimate unification in the face of inflation and anti-popular politics which target the workers. The organization that rises to fill that role, is the CUT. In this way, the CUT is an immediate inheritor of the value of unity and the contradictory struggle this implies.

Furthermore, the goal of the CUT, like the declared goal of many of the organizations before it was anti-capitalist. CUT positioned itself as a political organization, invested not only in the rights of the workers but also in the functioning of the political system in which it existed. In its First Declaration of Principles in 1953, the CUT declared,

the *Central Unica de Trabajadores* considers the class struggle an integrated part of the general movement of classes, the proletariat, and the exploited masses, and in this sense, [the CUT] cannot remain neutral in the social struggle and should assume the role of leadership to which it corresponds. In consequence, [the CUT] declares...that unions are organizations of defense of the interests and goals of the workers within the capitalist system. However, at the same time, they are organizations of class struggle and have the express goal of their own economic emancipation, in other words, the socialist transformation of society, the abolition of classes, and the organization of human life according to the suppression of the oppressive state.⁸⁷

In this statement the CUT integrally links the role of the union in protecting workers to its political goal of creating a socialist state. These goals cannot be separated. However, the CUT also declared its independence from political parties and sectarianism.⁸⁸ Thus creating a rather confusing narrative about the alliances of the CUT and how it expected to pursue a socialist society. Over the next several years, when the National Congress of the CUT would convene to write the Declarations of Principles, the CUT maintained its anti-capitalist discourse, its class struggle discourse, and its conviction that unions were not just for the protection of the workers but a tool for social change and the emancipation of the workers. However, none of the following declarations of principles declared an explicitly socialist goal.

In an attempt to enhance unity and avoid some of the conflict of the past, the CUT declined to distinguish between legal and illegal strikes. In this way, the CUT tried to address the internal conflict regarding legitimacy and whether or not the union movement should adjust its own strategies and actions to the demands of a system that was not created to favor union strength.

By the 5th National Congress of the CUT in 1968 the CUT's platform had changed significantly. It no longer centered its struggle in the eradication of the "capitalist regime," instead it proposed extremely concrete, actionable demands, such as agrarian reform, nationalization of the country's natural resources, legal recognition, and changes to voting laws.⁸⁹

Strength or Memory

The formation of the CUT was a huge symbolic victory for the workers. It represented the ultimate unifying of the working class, a goal finally reached. On February 15th 1953, the day the CUT was created, people even wrote songs about this emblematic moment in union history, portraying it as the culmination of a continuous historical struggle. One of the songs, quoted in Monica Echeverría's *Antihistoria de un Luchador (Clotario Blest 1823-1990)* is itself a very strong example of union discourse and historical memory, and begins to place the newly created CUT within that context. The song goes,

From the 12th to the 15th of February

They made in the capital

A great union congress

Of blue and white collar workers

Our great proletariat

Following its ascending path

Always fighting bravely

They have surpassed challenges

Liberating a fighting will

Giving it back strong to slithers,

Traitors, and yellows

They united, simply and greatly

From the 12th to the 15th of February

If Recabarren were alive

How happy he would feel

After so much pleading

That the working class finally united

This 12th of February

The Center was born

Because of Clotario Blest

Heard throughout Chile

Was a simple discourse

Proclaimed in a strong voice

In the first assembly

In the coliseum theater

Inaugurating the tournament

THE WORKING CLASS IS FINALLY UNITED

For the existence of a word of

Work and equality

Respect and dignity

For the existence of love

Justice and comprehension

*Without distinction...*⁹⁰

The song marks the historic date, which it repeats several times, as a victory against all those who would have betrayed the working class. The song recalls the memorial struggle of Recabarren and his emblematic figure, and places a new emblematic figure, that of Clotario Blest, the founder of the CUT directly next to him. From then on, their images will often be associated and called upon for the purpose of invoking the need for unity, even though during their own times they 1) extremely polemic figures, and 2) had extremely different ideology.




Image of two emblematic figures with very different politics, Recabarren, left, and Blest, right, to encourage mobilization.

However, despite the celebration of unity, and the memory of strength, the creation of the CUT was not an automatic solution for the many internal contradictions and challenges for the labor movement. Particularly, the debate around the involvement of political parties in union organizing. Blest took a strong position against such political involvement.

Political and Social Context

Echevarria writes that during Ibañez' presidency "the political opposition in Chile was led by the CUT and Blest was the leader of the opposition. It was the era in which the CUT was the strongest."⁹¹ In part, because of its ability to unite many workers against a clearly oppressive political figure, contributed to the strength and mobilization power of the CUT. Furthermore, according to Garces and Milos, the country had recently arrived at an important point in its economic development. Industry had advanced, especially in the areas of productions of metals and chemicals through mining and exploitation of natural resources. Thus, a change and advancement in the most productive and lucrative industry in Chile and subsequently, an increase in wealth and political importance in the country leads to a larger gap in term of worker living conditions and income versus the living conditions and income of the capitalists or foreign powers which were invested in the natural resources of Chile. It also led to an increased need for laborers and increased importance of their labor and productivity. Thus, workers were simultaneously more needed, more powerful, and more exploited. This change of economic environment and development of industry also merits an opportunity for greater development of consciousness in regards to inequality and foreign exploitation of the natural and human resources of Chile. Furthermore, between 1946 and 1954 inflation reached almost 27.7% per year, causing extreme inequality and devaluation of the salaries of the working class. Finally, the political process, which often coincides with economic development, was

extremely repressive to labor organizations and free political expression.

Furthermore, in the early 50s the government began to play a larger interventionary role in the economy. Though its ancestors and the CUT had declared a theoretical avoidance of cooperation with the government, as the government and the economy became more and more intertwined, labor organizations, and particularly the CUT would see themselves obliged to cooperate more and more with the government.⁹² Thus, the development of the CUT coincides with a political and economic development which provided greater opportunity, through the development and strengthening of exploited worker consciousness, and greater need for the resistance of the working class.

However, despite engaging in consistent action, the CUT's social action was often more performative than it was successful. Every year between 1954 and 1970, they would hold at least one national work stoppage in protest of an economic or political issue. In some ways this is representative of a strength in the sense that the CUT was able to consistently mobilize a large base, something which the CUT during the time of the *Concertación* government could not do. Garces and Milos mark only three of those strikes as successful, in that they were able to create a reaction and action step from the government. Each of these strikes which were successful in promoting governmental action took place under a leftist government, suggesting that the mobilizations were largely performative more than they were effective at creating change, and that left leaning politics were conditional for a government reaction to mass mobilization of the workers.

Known Contradictions: Political involvement and legality

CUT was not invincible to the contradictions and the labor conflicts of the past and in 1957 these contradictions begin to break apart the CUT. The CUT divided itself in two around the issue of legality, and the division tended to be along party lines. Communists, Socialists, and Radicals believed that a legal and democratic approach to the struggles of the workers would be effective in the long run and sought to keep CUT and union actions within the boundaries of legality. In 1957 this meant that they wanted to rally the CUT around the election of Salvador Allende. On the other hand, Anarchists, some Socialists, and some Communists, who followed Trotsky's ideology, rejected legality, insisting that the need for social change was structural and could not be achieved by legitimizing that very structure through legal actions only. This group rejected the support of any candidate or the use of the resources of the CUT to rally around political issues. They insisted on direct action, in the form of general strikes.⁹³ The more anarchist faction soon broke off to form its own group, but the question of the effectiveness and importance of legality is not a question that has ever disappeared from the labor movement.

Blest who generally was willing to accept political negotiation and worked closely with the Communist and Socialist parties in the early years of the CUT, in 1959, under president Alessandri finds all efforts frustrated and seeks to return to a strategy of direct action and rejection of legality. However, the Communist and Socialist parties refuse to move away from their political strategies and power.

With the disintegration of unity, mobilization also weakened. Echevarria says that following the conflict at the beginning of 1959, no following mobilizations were achieved for the rest of the year.⁹⁴ It is this conflict which forces Blest to resign from his position as president of the CUT. This conflict has become emblematic in memory of the conflict and tension regarding the appropriateness and relevance of engagement with political parties. However, politics were impossible to avoid given that each elected member of the CUT came to the table with his own political background, which often strongly influenced his opinions on strategy and ultimate goal. By the time the government of the *Unidad Popular* came to power in Chile, Blest had resigned from his position as president and the CUT was much more guided by political parties, seeking political alliances over.

The nature of the power and the context of the development of the CUT changed as the government moved further and further to the left. Its strength became more and more tied to its relationship with and cooperation with the government, something that today's CUT is often criticized for. Especially during the government of the *Unidad Popular*, the goals of the government and the goals of the CUT aligned such that an alliance between the two was inevitable.

However, just as in the days of the CTCH, the benefits of a labor union-political alliance went both ways. The government and the political parties also had a strategic interest in protecting the rights of the labor movement to protest, strike, complain, and fight against them. The left claimed to be the representative of the working class, and it had to follow through with its discursive ideology, or risk losing the support of its base. This led to some conflict within the time of the

Unidad Popular, the ultimate manifestations of contradictions within the union movement and the Chilean left, which I will address in the next chapter. For these reasons, the CUT today is understood as one of the strongest labor organizations in Chile's history.

CUT and Memory

Despite its weakness and difficulties with unity CUT is a primary object of union memory because of its symbolic significance and the memory that surrounds it. The creation of the CUT in 1953 was a symbol of finally (if temporarily) achieved unity and a show of strength against the dictatorship of Ibañez. The memory of the strength of the CUT is primarily a memory of its in its *poder convocatorio*, or its ability to mobilize large populations. The CUT's consistent strikes each year which mobilized huge numbers of people came to be symbolic of what an active and mobilized labor movement looked like. The actual limited success of the strikes is not as frequently remembered. CUT's founder, Clotario Blest has become an emblematic figure in the movement both for his efforts towards unity and his rejection of the guidance and control of political parties in the movement. Blest is often invoked for his organizing power and commitment to values. Today, union leaders complain of a crisis or a lack of values, and a lack of a feeling of collectivity or solidarity. Thus, the image of Blest is often invoked to portray values idealized by labor leaders as values of "true" and strong unionism. Together with Recabarren, these figures symbolize a

memory of strength and a dedication to values that labor leaders often feel are lacking in today's movement. Their historical relevance and connection to disunity, and ultimate failure to unite the movement is not remembered, or at least not often invoked.

The CUT also occupies another space in memory today. The *Central Unitaria de Trabajadores* (CUT) is an influential organization that claims continuity and inheritance of this prior CUT. It also aspires to ultimate unity and acts as the mouthpiece for the workers to the government. It seeks to command *poder convocatorio*, with minimal success, and organize large scale protests. It proclaims much of the same ideology as its ancestor despite a dissonance between its proclaimed ideology and its actions. I will discuss the role of the new CUT further in Chapter 9.

***Unidad Popular* (UP): The Height of Contradictions**

For three years, the CUT existed in tandem with the government of the *Unidad Popular*. In this period some of the most important contradictions and divisions in the union movement and the left arose. Even though the *Unidad Popular* was the peak of strength in the Chilean Left and an emblematic example of unity and solidarity, the internal division we see in the labor movement at this time is a clear indication of the strength of the internal contradictions and divisions faced by the movement. Today, the UP is regarded by some labor leaders as the pinnacle of democracy and the strongest time in union history. In personal memories, union leaders recall the unity and the solidarity of the time when workers, *pobladores*, and even *delinquents*, worked together to ensure the election of Salvador Allende.⁹⁵ However, under the socialist democratic government of Salvador Allende, the union movement also exhibited the height of its contradictions. This was a government sympathetic to the goals of the movement, not only its labor oriented goals, but its ultimate goal of a socialist society, but which was too weak, even in the presidency, to implement the desired reforms quickly enough or radically enough to satisfy its base. The government, knowing it held a precarious political position, had to strike a balance between the reform desired by its base, in order to maintain its support, and the tradition demanded by its opposition and foreign powers. In this period of history, which is

remembered as the glory of the left, the divisions of the labor movement are perhaps the clearest.

Strength on the Left

By the time the government of the *Unidad Popular* reached office, the Chilean Left had been growing in strength for several years. Salvador Allende, a self-proclaimed socialist in search of a democratic revolution, had run for office several times, each time with increasing support from a diverse base on the left. The *Unidad Popular* was a coalition of several parties on the left, including the Socialist Party, Communist Party, Radical Party, Christian Left, and the MAPU. The Left had finally achieved some type of unity, knowing that only by joining into a coalition could they achieve power in office.

One month after arriving in office President Allende began to take action on his campaign promises. Many of his actions and declared goals aligned perfectly with the *bandera de lucha* and *Declaraciones de Principios* of the CUT. In the first month of his presidency, Allende signed an *acuerdo* with the CUT which declared the government's support to many of the CUT's goals. They included the following: 1) a determination of the politics regarding salary for the next year; 2) a declaration of the goal to fight against unemployment and ensure the stability of employment; 3) legal recognition of the CUT; 4) a declaration of the necessity to ensure the participation of the workers in the political determination of economic and social policy.⁹⁶

Despite the largely theoretical nature of this declaration, it was the first time that a government had taken the goals of the labor movement so seriously. Even more than that, the *Unidad Popular* also began to concretize the democratic road to socialism. Many of the steps taken with this goal in mind, were goals held by the labor movement, because they believed they would result in greater well being and measurable benefits to the workers. These changes included the nationalization of the copper mines, the nationalization of iron and nitrate mines, and the nationalization of the banks as well as several key companies. These industries were previously controlled almost completely by foreign enterprises which drained Chile of its natural and human resources and funneled the profits out of Chile. Other changes included the expansion of agrarian reform begun by Eduardo Frei in 1962 and the redistribution of income towards salaried workers.⁹⁷

Strength of the CUT

Another exhibition of the strength of the government and of the left was its power and motivation to actualize the goals it had campaigned on and which were key to its idea of social revolution. The CUT, at its 6th national congress, declared its support for these actions and for the government of the *Unidad Popular* in general and, for the first time, held direct national elections for the positions of the *Consejo Directivo Nacional*. This was important because in past years, and again since then, elections have been neither direct nor universal, limiting the democratic nature of the CUT and its ability to adequately represent

the workers it claims to. Another show of the power of the CUT during the government of Salvador Allende was the famous *Paro de Octubre* in 1972. In reaction to the reforms that were not favorable to the business owners, many owners declared a stoppage in order to create a lack of resources. However, the workers, along with the support of the CUT organized to keep the factories producing. The CUT led "massive mobilization of workers," students, farmers, and pueblo dwellers, to keep up factory operation and the production of necessary resources for the workers and the economic health of the country.⁹⁸ The popular reaction to the *Paro de Octubre* showed several examples of strength of the movement and the left at the time. It demonstrated the solidarity of various populations to support the government of Allende, not only workers but students, farmers, and pueblo dwellers, came together to counter the capitalist attack on Allende's success. It also demonstrated the power of the CUT as a national level organization to mobilize a wide base in favor of the government. "In these days the CUT showed on a practical level its capacity of leadership and the degree to which the workers recognized the CUT as its lead organization," writes Bongcam.⁹⁹

Strength in Memory

Perhaps even more importantly to this paper is the strength that the *Unidad Popular* had in the memory of union leaders. In memory, the *Unidad Popular* represents the height of democracy, the height of the strength of the left,

and the strongest demonstrations of solidarity. This was a time of strength not just for the left in government but also for activism and solidarity on a much smaller level. Nostalgia about this time is strong and comparisons of today with then are frequent. Discourse in general tends to focus on a lamentation of values lost and strategies no longer pursued. One of the strongest examples of the memory of strength and the idealization of the time is the discourse of Sergio Troncoso, President of the Union of Construction Workers, Excavators, and Plumbers. Troncoso refers to the *Unidad Popular* as the most democratic time in the history of Chile, the strongest time of the labor movement, and recalls the intense solidarity of the time between workers, pueblo dwellers, and students who all supported the government of Salvador Allende. Troncoso says, "They were years of much activity, much commitment, much happiness, the 2000 days of the popular government. Therefore, we are proud and we continue to think that the most democratic government that we have had in Chile is the government of Salvador Allende, and also Balmaceda...because these governments contained revolutionary measures." It was because of the level of popular action and commitment to support the government that Troncoso says he finds the government of Allende to be the most democratic of Chile. The workers were the most involved they ever have been. But Troncoso also says that the government of Jose Manuel Balmaceda in the late 1980s was one of the most democratic in history as well. The story of Balmaceda is eerily similar to that of Allende. He dedicated his presidency to expanding public resources and his government ended when Congress turned on him and he committed suicide. Balmaceda's history is

contested, some saying that he stepped over the line and began to legislate unconstitutionally and without the support of Congress, thus Troncoso's view of democracy has more to do with egalitarian goals of the government than a strict definition of practice.

Another example of strength in memory is shown in the use of statistics to reference the strength of the past, particularly in comparison to today. Miguel Ahumada uses a statistic to demonstrate the contrast between 1973 and today. He says, "The facts indicate that in the year 73, there were 1,051,000 workers affiliated with 6,600 organizations, which gives an average of 157 per organization, versus the facts from 2008, which is generous still for today, which give you an average of 86 workers [per organization]." ¹⁰⁰

Not only is the *Unidad Popular* remembered as a time of strength, it is also held as the standard for strength. Ahumada goes on to say "after the coup and the whole process that we lived through we barely reach half of what was a historic number. These numbers, then, in our opinion, are a clear reflection of a crisis in the union movement, which, in our opinion, is fatal." While Ahumada's opinion sounds extreme, referring to the statistics of unionization as an indication of the end of the movement, he is not the only one with this discourse. Luis Mecina, founder of the No+AFP movement, also refers to the death of unionism in his discourse, as something pending and unavoidable. In this sense, the numbers referenced by Ahumada represent a memory of union strength, a historic strength, during the government of the *Unidad Popular*.

Legacy of Strength

More than that the government of the Popular Unity and of Salvador Allende are points in memory that justify and encourage as well as provide precedent for the actions of the CUT today. At least in discourse, when the CUT of today recalls the government of the *Unidad Popular* it recalls its predecessor, its impulsor of values and its role model. On last year's anniversary of the military coup Barbara Figueroa, today's communist President of the CUT, said

In a year that contains a presidential debate, for the CUT, it does not matter who governs, because the aspiration of the Center is that once again a president of the workers enters the Moneda, and that the voice of the union world - which is the voice of the organized workers - once again can be relevant and transcendental, just as it has been in the past, and as, in its moment, it was recognized with nobility and bravery by President Allende... We do not only need more rights. We need, more than anything else, that our role is recognized and vindicated. We do not need paternalist governments nor candidates that think that they can represent our voice. We need representatives in political power who understand that, us, the organizations, are those who are called to do union politics and who are the declared defenders of the interests of the workers. And this, we must see recognized in laws, in legislation which creates a better balance but does not pretend to assume our own voice. Paternalistic ideas, this is not what democracy needs. What democracy needs is to recognize the role of the organizations of workers, and CUT, there is no room for doubt, plays a transcendental role in our country.¹⁰¹

Figueroa's commentary is telling and reveals many contradictions of memory and discourse as well as the role that the *Unidad Popular* and the government of Salvador Allende plays in the memory of Figueroa as the head of the CUT.

Figueroa uses strong, almost religious language to describe the role of the CUT and the role of worker's organizations and her language implies that the CUT of today is the carrying on of the legacy of strength that was begun during the

Unidad Popular. She says that during the government of President Allende, worker's organizations and the voice of the workers were respected and considered relevant and even transcendental. She also suggests that in Chilean democracy today the CUT plays a "transcendental role," thus implying that the CUT is continuing the legacy of the labor movement during the Popular Unity. She says that this type of recognition, in which worker's organizations are listened to, given political relevancy and power, and recognized through legislation is what worker's organizations aspire to today. Despite the CUT maintaining discourse in favor of action whether legal or illegal, the final goal that Figueroa here suggests is legislation and political recognition. During the time of the government of the Popular Unity, the CUT and labor organizations were given political legitimacy and space in the development of the government and legislation. Thus, Figueroa continually suggests that the goal of the CUT and the worker's organizations is to reach a strength and relationship to the government similar to that which it possessed during the period of the Popular Unity. Figueroa goes so far as to say that this kind of recognition of the workers is not only what the worker's organizations need today but what democracy itself needs. This discourse of the workers playing a key role in the formation of democracy is one that workers have possessed and used since prior to Allende. The role of the workers as participants in democracy grew in strength during the dictatorship, reflecting a demand for human rights but also a nostalgia for when Chilean democracy did take into account the voice of the workers. In this quote Figueroa also suggests that to return to true democracy, such as that which existed during

Allende's government, the workers must be given more of a voice and larger political role.

Between Figueroa and Troncoso we can also understand something about how labor leaders understand democracy. As we will see, the discourse of leaders during the dictatorship focuses primarily on the return of democracy, because democracy was so crucial to the ability of workers to express their voices and fight for their rights. This discourse about the importance and the strength of democracy has stuck through to today, as we can see in the discourse of Figueroa and Troncoso, however they each define and remember good democracy to be a democracy in which the workers are central to reform and play a "transcendent" political role. During the government of the Popular Unity, workers and labor organizations were extremely active in the government and organized themselves outside of the traditional manners.

Revolution from Below

Finally, there was a unique surge of worker strength, what author Peter Winn calls, a revolution from below, which demonstrated the strength of the workers themselves during the government of the *Unidad Popular*. The arrival of the *Cordones Industriales* in 1972 in the city of Santiago also points to strength among the workers.¹⁰² After the *Paro de Octubre*, the workers organized to keep the factories functioning despite the administrative strike. The workers protected the factories with very basic weapons against company security, and ultimately,

formed their own organizations to support each other, the government, and production at their factories.¹⁰³ Salvador Misleh, former President of the Cordon Industrial de Macul, commented on the spontaneous nature of the *Cordones Industriales* in a panel at the MMDH titled "*Cordones Industriales* and the Power of the Workers." "It was very fast," he said. "In that time things happened very quickly.... Someone would arrive and say, 'Hey, this evening there will be a meeting at Rema to coordinate,' and everyone would be there that same evening. Everyone. So things really flew."¹⁰⁴ The rapid and spontaneous arrival of such active local organizations speaks to both the strength and the motivation of the workers at the time and also the political moment in which they surged. In no other political moment would it have been possible for the *Cordones Industriales* to 1) create the confidence and motivation for local mobilization across sectors; and 2) maintain such organizations in the face of repressive labor codes. Thus, the existence of the *Cordones* shows strength on the part of the workers and the power of the discourse of the government to mobilize its base population.

One important thing to note is that neither of these examples represent a surge in *union* strength. This is worker strength but not organized in the structure of the union. One thing that the *Unidad Popular* gave its base was the confidence and the safety to act outside legal boundaries or traditional boundaries. With a government that claimed to be an ally to the workers, these actions were taken as a manifestation of the power of the workers and were assumed to be supported by their *compañero presidente*. If Allende had repressed these movements he would have demonstrated himself a false ally, another populist seeking political power at

the expense of the workers. Thus, there was some confidence of the workers and the *pobladores* to act outside the conventional union structure.

Height of Contradictions

However, there exists in memory and in history the understanding that the government of the *Unidad Popular* meant significant contradictions for the left, for the union movement, and for consciousness. The story of the workers of Yarur, told in Winn's book, *Weavers of the Revolution*, and the example of the Cordones Industriales indicate the tension between the labor movement and the government and their mutual dependence. Winn writes that the workers at Yarur were waiting to protest the unlivable conditions in their factory, but from experience and memory knew that they had little chance of finding support outside their own members, and that even other factory workers could not necessarily be trusted to maintain a worker alliance against the factory owner. However, all were uncomfortable and impatient and sought to strike and demand better conditions. Winn writes,

Chile's workers might have been responsible for Allende's nomination and surging campaign, but he could claim credit, in turn, for enlarging and accelerating the workers' movement at the Yarur mill. The workers were convinced that their chances of "liberating the union" were bound up with Allende's electoral fortunes, but the Popular Unity's last minute surge was dependent upon worker support.¹⁰⁵

Yarur

After the election of Allende in 1970 the workers at Yarur began to exhibit greater strength, consciousness, and unity. In 1971, the white collar workers of Yarur formed a union for the first time in the history of the factor. The formation of a white collar union was more more difficult says Winn because of the class divisions and social implications. The white collar workers tended to think of themselves as a class above and the stigma of needing a union prevented them from organizing.¹⁰⁶ Already by 1971 Winn says the workers were gesturing towards a type of revolution of social norms in the factory. The white and blue-collar unions had begun to cooperate, and the blue collar unions had achieved “union democracy, collective bargaining, and increased real wages and benefits.”¹⁰⁷ Importantly, Winn suggests that the workers would not likely have decided on a factory take over on their own. Allende’s discourse of socialism and the government’s commitment to the nationalization of large companies, encouraged the workers to “liberate” the factory.¹⁰⁸

The worker’s take over of the Yarur factory is one example of this strength and revolution from below and indicates a change in worker understanding of their own power.¹⁰⁹ However, even though they got that understanding of themselves directly from the discourse of the government, that created tension between the workers and the government and brought to light the contradictions of a government seeking to create a socialist system on a slow and controlled path. While the workers were waiting for the election of Allende to feel safe and supported in carrying out their strike, the Allende government could not

politically support the take over and socialization of the factory as it went against the controlled image of their transition to socialism. Though Allende was truly committed to the transformation of Chilean society, he could not support the workers taking matters into their own hands. In the end, he met with the union leaders at Yarur and told them “Successful revolutionary processes are directed by a firm guiding hand, consciously, deliberately – not by chance...The masses cannot go beyond their leaders, because the leaders have an obligation to direct the processes and not to leave it to be directed by the masses.”¹¹⁰

Cordones Industriales

Memory differs regarding the independence and the political status of the *Cordones Industriales*. According to Franco, the *Cordones* were completely independent from political parties and from the CUT, in a way no other organization had been.¹¹¹ However, like labor organizations of the past, the *Cordones Industriales* were not immune to the power and influence of political parties. According to Misleh, the MIR was the primary political party involved in the Cordon Macul and according to Guillermo Orrego, former President of the Cordon Industrial de Vicuña Mackenna both the Communist and Socialist parties were deeply involved in supporting the *Cordones Industriales*. At the panel at the MMDH, he said, "The impression I have, which I have saved through memory, is that, at least in the Cordon Industrial Vacuña Mackena...the Communist party had a big presence...The MIR was also very important in our business and had a big

influence. There was an important group of comrades from the Revolutionary Workers Front, but the strongest in all of the *Cordones Industriales*, that I observed, was the Communist party and the Socialist party, these were the heaviest elements." Thus, even during this period of strength among the workers and of the Chilean left, even in the organizations that were most independent from an institutional environment, political parties held sway. Conflicts arose between the political parties and the *Cordones Industriales* as well. According to historian Ana Lopez Diaz, sectors of the Communist party actually opposed the existence of the *Cordones Industriales*, viewing them as parallel organizations to the CUT.¹¹² In other words, organizations which served the same purpose and catered to the same population as the CUT and thus created disunity by breaking up the worker into several different organizations. These sectors advocated for the merging of these organizations. Finally, there was tension between the *Cordones Industriales* and the government of the *Unidad Popular*. The *Cordones* rose independently from the government as organizations of self defense by the workers. Thus, the Cordones were always somewhat apart from the government and even in contradiction with the government. Misleh says,

Many wanted [the reform] to be faster, and in some ways [the *Cordones*] were defense mechanisms, but in general, [the *Cordones*] were autonomous from the government. The *Cordones* and the workers who were organized in this manner wanted things to move faster, or perhaps to be a bit more decisive. In this sense, there was always a conflict throughout all of the government of the *Unidad Popular* about how to advance, how to continue moving let's say, how to confront fascism, and how to confront, in the last few months, the coup, which was on its way. One knew that there were gestures toward a coup. This was a contradiction that was maintained during the whole government of the *Unidad Popular*, and the *Cordones* was a manifestation of that.¹¹³

Misleh remembers the *Cordones* as a dual force, a impulsor of faster reform and a defender of the workers. The *Cordones* sought faster and more decisive reform than the government of the *Unidad Popular* was willing to engage in and sought more concrete and more militant defense of the workers against business administrations than the *Unidad Popular* was willing or able to provide. Thus, even though the *Cordones* represented a surge of power and motivation in Allende's base, they also represented tension between the needs and the desires of the workers and the political capacity of a democratic government to deliver rapid reform and targeted defense of its base. Orrego recalls the the *Cordones* as a dual force in another sense. The *Cordones*, though they were worker organizations, they were not unions. Most members of the *Cordones* were separately members or leaders in unions. This explains, in part, the independence and action power of the *Cordones*. As organizations that were slightly separate from unions, without a particular history, memory, or precedent for how to organize or act, the *Cordones* were more militant, more willing to play with legality, and less beholden to political parties.

This very strength and willingness to play with legality and eschew the influence of political parties provides an interesting counter narrative to the strength of the government of the *Unidad Popular*. The discourse of Misleh and Orrego reflect Stern's conclusion that Allende struggled to control his revolutionary base, to his own disadvantage. Stern writes,

....Nonetheless, by 1973 Chile was a country governed by a president who could not keep his own revolutionary housing in order, let alone his opponents at bay. For better or worse, a revolution had been unleashed. With it came a rush of direct actions that redistributed property and power;

economic struggles and reorganization that generated serious scarcities, inflation, and production bottlenecks; and a certain theatre of violence oriented more to discursive performance and self deception than to serious organization and embodied in heated street confrontations, political speeches, and media reports. Eventually Allende lost control, and the country seemed on the brink of catastrophe.¹¹⁴

The *Cordones*, as well as the story of the Yarur workers, show this type of conflict during the time of the *Unidad Popular*. While Allende wanted to encourage his base to mobilize, the permanent contradiction and struggle about legality in a legal system that was specifically designed to undermine the organizing power of the workers prevented true collaboration between the government and its base. With a worker's government in power this contradiction came to its peak.

Finally, the government of the *Unidad Popular* faced intense political opposition. So much so that Misleh refers to it as still born. He says that based in the political opposition of the Chilean right and of the United States it was clear that the government of the *Unidad Popular* was targeted for a coup. However, at the time, the *Cordones* had faith in the government of the *Unidad Popular* and on the day of the coup they prepared themselves to fight in defense of their government. Both Misleh and Orrego described preparing the few things they had that could serve as weapons and waiting for Allende's government to bring them arms with which to fight. However, the arms never arrived.

Military Dictatorship: Changing Goals and Struggles for Unity

The arrival of the dictatorship in Chile meant immediate repression for unions and labor rights activists. Unions were completely stripped of their autonomy and self determination and *dirigentes* were exiled, arrested, and tortured. Pinochet's government demanded the complete depoliticization of society. Because of this extreme change in the nature of workers rights, worker consciousness also experienced a dramatic shift. Where as unions were once focused on anti-capitalism, the class struggle, or legal recognition, the focus of workers and unions became survival and the return of democracy. It was clear to the workers that a change in their circumstances could only come when their voices and their rights were not considered a threat and in opposition to the economic and political system. However, the discourse surrounding unity, the role of political parties, and the necessity of participation of the workers, available in union publications from the time, hardly changed at all, despite the significant shift in political context. The contradictions surrounding legislation of unions remain and begin to test union discourse regarding the importance of taking action whether or not the actions are officially legal. In this period, we see a practical challenge to union discourse surrounding legality, as many workers and organizations, are, understandably, unwilling to act in contradiction with legal norms because of the potential consequences.

Repression, Delegitimization

The arrival of the dictatorship was an abrupt shift in the political situation of the workers. The military junta that took over declared its intention to reverse nearly 50 years of leftist politics.¹¹⁵ The CUT was declared illegal 13 days after the coup in one of many Official Decreed Laws that would take aim at the labor movement.¹¹⁶ The law said that the organization had "transformed into an organization with political character, under the influence of tendencies foreign and strange to national sensibilities," in other words, communist.¹¹⁷ The junta suspended the pre-existing Labor Code of 1931 and began in 1978 to create a new Labor Code.¹¹⁸ The Labor Code, written by Jose Piñera Echenique, brother to Chile's current president Sebastian Piñera, was a series of Decrees, put into law over the next four years, designed to institutionalize the government's position on labor and quiet international human rights complaints about the lack of labor law in Chile. However, the new Labor Code was only one of many steps taken by the dictatorship to install and concretize the new economic system of neoliberalism.

According to Bongcam the four characteristics of the neoliberal government were "1) private initiative; 2) free market competition; 3) market openness to foreign investment; 4) the protector state." Importantly, the state is dedicated to protecting not the workers but the market, meaning that worker appeals to the state for human rights are often secondary to business appeals for efficiency. The new ideological system meant transferring as much control as possible to the hands of the business men, increasing efficiency as much as

possible and increasing profit as much as possible. This also meant both blatant and clever ways of depriving workers of their rights and benefits and weakening their class solidarity, and isolating them from one another.¹¹⁹

Unions were divided into four categories, only one of which could engage in collective negotiation, one of labor's most powerful tools outside of the strike. Union parallelism was encouraged in order to make each union weaker. In the past, if 55% of the workers in a company sought a union, a union was created and every member of the work force had to be a part of it. Thus, there was only one union and all members worked together within it to come to agreements. Decreed Law 2,756 made it so that no one could be obligated to participate in a union, and that a union could be formed with only 10% of the worker's approval, and that there could be multiple parallel unions. This was a clear attempt to encourage the disintegration and disunity of the movement and to weaken the force of negotiation.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the decrees eliminated union funding from their employers and prohibited union leaders from engaging in organizing during working hours. Any issue related to the power of the business owner to control and manage his own business was forbidden from negotiation. Unions could only negotiate for issues directly pertinent to economic remuneration or working conditions. A calendar was created for union negotiations which spread the negotiations throughout the year in order to prevent simultaneous negotiation, possible strikes, or coordination. Piñera decreed strict rules for going on strike legally, but the most damaging and weakening of the decrees limited the length of the strike to 59 days. On the 60th day any workers still striking were assumed to

have forfeited their jobs. During the strikes, employers were still allowed to hire strike breakers. Thus, a strike held almost no affect on a business owner in terms of production.¹²¹ On top of this, Pinochet and the military targeted labor leaders for detention, exile, and torture.

New Meaning to Unity, New Goals

The labor movement moved more and more towards the center as Christian democrats began to take on the rolls of the leftist leaders who had been detained or gone into hiding. Indeed, some political unity was achieved as the politics of the center and the left converged.¹²² The Group of Ten was created bringing leftist and center leaders together to speak out against the dictatorship and in favor of democracy. Winn writes "By 1978 they were calling for a restoration of democracy and a respect for human rights."¹²³ This discourse in favor of democracy and human rights, rather than focused on labor rights is consistent throughout the movement in this period. Because of the intense repression initially experienced, union publications do not begin until the mid to late 1970s after the movement begins to regenerate, despite continued repression. Thus, I am limited to the discourse that becomes available after that time. The discourse of the time makes two things about the change and continuity of union discourse very clear. First, a shift in the priority of labor goals towards the recreation of democracy. Second, a continued challenge to achieve unity and a continued discursive emphasis on it.

Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (CNS) - Unity and Democracy

One of the publications I examined is *El Coordinador*, the publication of the CNS. In Issue 35 on June 1987 in an article titled "We are decided," the CNS published the following:

They talk about immobility. They talk about a lack of unity facing a reality that is every day more adverse. They talk about egoism, indecisiveness, doubts, lack of leadership, of faults of someone else. They talk, they talk, the talk...and...what do they do?

The workers, the pueblo of Chile, has given more than enough proof of its determination for unity, need for peace, liberty, justice, and democracy. We have made this need into a constant struggle with massive and historical, peaceful mobilizations.....

...However, something is happening. Or rather, something is not happening. Because we are still here in dictatorship; still with misery of thousands of homes...; still living in injustice and threatened by violence...

...We are decided to retake social and peaceful mobilization to re-establish democracy and liberty in Chile, calling to all the parts of the nation to join in this action. We were the first to take clear steps towards this objective and today we are decided to do so as soon as possible.

For this, evidently, unity of all is necessary. But not U-N-I-T-Y, weakened by discourse, instead, real UNITY, that is urgently lived, generously practiced, and that is perceived as an imperative..¹²⁴

In this quote we can understand several things about the discourse of the CNS, a discourse that is extremely repetitive. First, we see a recognition of the prevalence of discourse over action. We see this in three parts of this particular quote. First, at the beginning, where it is suggested that an ambiguous "they" talk more about the desperateness of the situation than act on "their" declared principles. Second, in the middle of the quote, there is a recognition that despite apparent willingness and determination of the workers and the pueblo of Chile

change is not coming soon enough. Third, at the end of the quote we see a reference to the necessity of real, urgent, generous and imperative UNITY over theoretical unity. We can also understand the priority of democracy to the CNS. According to the discourse unity is pursued in an effort to recreate democracy, or in other articles, to get rid of Pinochet. It is clear that the goals of the labor movement have changed significantly. While they still seek unity in discourse the purpose of this unity is no longer the creation of a socialist society, agrarian reform, or even shorter work hours. These values are reiterated throughout the publication of *El Coordinador*. In almost every issue accessible in the MMDH, which is nearly one for every month between 1975 and 1986, at least one article discussed the need for unity in pursuit of democracy. Democracy is understood as the key to the respect of workers rights and a chance for the Chilean pueblo and Chilean workers to demonstrate their strength and ability to determine what is in their own best interest.

In other quotes, and other parts of the publication the conflict between ideologies and the difficulties of unity are revealed. For example, this quote in an issue from March 1986.

We can make this day arrive if we make the idea of unity a reality. After this, there is a whole future. A future of Liberty and Democracy, when you and I, we, with mutual respect, can discuss how to move Chile forward and the type of society that will guarantee us our rights and social and economic well being, taking care of our Democracy together.¹²⁵

"This day" refers to the arrival of democracy. However, what this quote makes clear is that the pursuit of democracy and unity was impeded partisan politics.

The quote suggests that discussions regarding the type of society that should be pursued, a question of partisan politics, have impeded the pursuit of change.

***Solidaridad* - Conflict in the struggle for unity**

Another source, the magazine *Solidaridad*, which was published and run by religious organizations in solidarity with the labor movement, provides a much broader sense of discourse in the movement. *Solidaridad* published its own articles, the declarations and statement of many union organizations, as well as interviews with specific *dirigentes* regarding their opinions and experiences. *Solidaridad* is perhaps the most informative of the publications at the time for several reasons. First, it began publishing earlier than *El Coordinador*. This, in part has to do with its relationship to the church. Because of its religious origins it was likely less regulated and less likely to face repression and targeted censorship. Second, because it is not published by a specific union organization but rather an outside organization in solidarity with workers, it provides discourse from a much broader range of sources. This is especially important because of the repetitiveness and similarity between the discourse published in *Solidaridad*, as well as *El Coordinador* and other publications. It shows that there is truly overlap and similarities across organizations and among *dirigentes* and reinforces the strength of the statements made in other magazines. With regards to statements on unity, the many articles show similar understanding of the situation to *El Coordinador*. In issue #66, Federico Mujica, President of the CEPCH is

quoted in an article about the situation of the workers. He says "we can find some coincidences [between organizations] with regard to basic things like the liberty of unions, union structure, collective negotiation, economic conditions, and social security...but it is important that the workers do not create false expectations: we cannot confuse coincidences with unity. Coincidence is a first step towards unity. Unity is not easy but neither is it impossible."¹²⁶ Mujica suggests the exact same message that *El Coordinador* does. Unity hasn't been reached yet.

We can see another similarity in the discourse, not only of other magazines but of the union movement as a whole since its beginning in issue #30, July 1979. William Thayer, the ex Minister of Labor under President Frei is quoted saying "political parties should always be at the margin of union life."¹²⁷ We see again the importance of the separation of unions from political influence which has been a principle of labor unions and a struggle in practice since their origins. In this same issue we also see a reiteration of the importance of worker participation in government and business in order to create a fair system. A quote from the Banking Federation representatives says "the new labor laws try to produce the disarticulation of the union movement, they incentivize individualism against the collective, they end the concept of participation or integration of the worker into the business, and they stimulate class war between workers and businesses."¹²⁸

Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) - Inheritance and legitimacy, a changing discourse for a changing political scene

By May 1988 things were changing in the political environment in Chile. After a major economic collapse and a renewal of social protest and one violent attempt on Pinochet's life a path out of the dictatorship was sought, in order to avoid an armed revolution.¹²⁹ In his 1980 Constitution, Pinochet included a plebiscite for 1988. In 1988 the people would vote "yes" or "no" to eight more years of rule by Pinochet. If the "no" won, presidential elections would be held the following year.¹³⁰ This was an opportunity for the return of democracy, though a slippery one. Political organizations and labor leaders were not convinced of its fairness and realized that it meant acknowledging the legitimacy of Pinochet's constitution.¹³¹ Troncoso says,

It was a very complicated moment with much internal discussion and argument...we spent every day in the street protesting and when we heard of this alternative of the plebiscite, and then they were going to make a calendar to end the dictatorship...it was because the Department of State in North America was afraid of a revolutionary end and so they sought a solution, but that created a contradiction. In the end we accepted and we acted as spokespeople, not for the party, but for our [labor] organizations, and we called for the people to vote "no."¹³²

In the same year, the CUT is created. Immediately, in the discourse of the CUT we can see continuity around union themes that have been important throughout history but also some very intense changes. We see the same discourse surrounding democracy in the newly created CUT's *Boletines Informativos*. "We have affirmed that democracy without the participation of the workers is incomplete," says the editorial on the first page of the August 1989 issue. Thus we see that the CUT holds the same values as the rest of the movement at this time by prioritizing democracy and worker participation over specific demands. However, perhaps after the political agreement to acknowledge

the legitimacy of the plebiscite we can understand this emphasis on democracy by a labor organization in a different light. Democracy is now a clear possibility, but it involves accepting a negotiated transition and the legitimacy of Pinochet's 1980 constitution. The CUT becomes a mouth piece for the return of democracy and their discourse begins to reflect what labor participation will look like in this new democracy.

Labor will now be, "rational," and make only "serious propositions," in this new democracy. In the August 1989 issue, with the transition already underway, Manuel Bustos, Christian Democratic President of the CUT, suggests that the union movement has changed significantly and has "demonstrated that we are capable of making serious propositions, more rational, and this has been noted by the government and businesses."¹³³ In this same issue, in an interview with Arturo Martinez, Socialist Vice President of the CUT at the time suggests that the union movement has "matured" and will not be engaging in massive strikes or "take advantage of liberty" in democracy.¹³⁴ Even more indicative of a value change within the CUT is a general rejection or de-emphasis of class values within the organization. The CUT went so far as to remove the discourse of class struggle from its Declaration of Principles.

Such discourse, which emphasizes a change and de-radicalization of the union movement, suggests a major change in the mentality of labor organizations. Especially of the CUT, whose nick-name sake (the *Central Unica de Trabajadores* or CUT) once suggested that strikes were the workers primary weapon, an inherent right of workers, and that cooperation with the government was a

contradiction to the values of labor. Of course, the CUT and the CUT are not the same organization, however, the *Central Unitaria* of 1988 did not choose its name without purpose.¹³⁵ Furthermore, and perhaps because of this radical change in ideology, the *Central Unitaria* of 1988 claims continuity with the *Central Unica* of 1953 in its discourse, at the time of the end of the dictatorship, and even today. In the same August 1989 issue mentioned above, an article says "The CUT is the legitimate inheritance of the struggle and the unified spirit of the Chilean workers. From the FOCH to the CUT, we are conscious of the problems and challenges that we must confront and we take these on with great perseverance and with the intention to develop our own strength, taking on the multi-faceted role that workers represent in society."¹³⁶ In this quote the CUT claims legitimacy in its work as a direct inheritor of the values and the challenges that the union movement has faced since its conception.

The goals of the CUT are strikingly different from its inheritance. However, the participation and importance of political parties within the two CUTs, Winn says, is consistent. It continues to be controlled and influenced by political parties. Through today, its political allegiance and motivation is one of the biggest complaints about the CUT.

Memory of the Dictatorship

In the interviews and panels at the MMDH the dictatorship is often remembered as a time of great strength and great resistance despite repression, a

time of fierce legality, as well as having "left a wound," on the labor movement and being the reason for most labor struggles of today.¹³⁷

Troncoso recalls massive instances of resistance on May 1st, International Workers day during the dictatorship and massive National Strikes which brought out thousands of people to protest against the dictatorship. He says that today, it is difficult to organize because the dictatorship left such a strong inheritance of individualism and consumerism among the workers. To illustrate this, Troncoso recalled an instance during the dictatorship in which he conferred with the workers he was representing about a negotiation with their company and the workers would not accept any agreement less than exactly what they demanded. They shouted at him "*hasta la ultima consecuencia*," until the last consequence, and declined the negotiation, even though the company had agreed to give them some of what they had wanted. There are historical examples as well that the will and consciousness of the workers was strong during the dictatorship. Winn tells the story of the 1978 union elections, which were called by the regime with 72 hours notice and barred all former union leaders from holding office again. He did so with the intention to weaken the labor movement and prevent leftist leaders from regaining control. However, according to Winn, the organization and the will of the workers was so strong that workers were able to now elect center-left leaders with similar politics who would not give in to the regime's or businesses bullying.¹³⁸ Furthermore, Winn writes, "although Pinochet used force, decrees, and the market to depoliticize Chile's labor movement in the 1970s, he did not succeed. On the contrary, organized labor recovered its militancy and would

emerge in the 1980s as the convener of a mass movement of social protests 83-85 convened by the miners union, even though the *poblaciones* took the lead that transcended its ranks and crossed political and class lines."¹³⁹ Unions are weak in the 1980s but they are seen as being strong, disjuncture between perceptions due to a lag effect seeing the centrality of labor on the left coming from the Allende period and because of that the unions retain a power to organize even if they are not as powerful anymore. Still, involvement in labor was dangerous and in terms of change, the labor movement was not able to affect much.

But it is the will of the workers that Troncoso remembers when he says that, today, when he tries to organize a group of workers, they want to organize but they are more concerned about their own personal debt or providing for their family than they are concerned about a collective struggle. Troncoso attributes this to the effects of the dictatorship and the neoliberal economy which have created a materialistic, individualist society that is more concerned with providing material goods for their families than with resisting unfair systems.¹⁴⁰

Similarly, the Madeco workers that Stillerman discusses are more prone to submitting to the competition and intense work conditions exacted by the bosses because of their desire, perceived need of, and need to pay off debt from, the consumer goods and habits which are increasingly available and increasingly normal among the working class. According to Stillerman, for a long time, workers had sustained a cultural and unspoken agreement about how much and how fast it was acceptable to work. This way, workers kept competition to a minimum and kept work levels sustainable. Individuals who did not accept these

cultural rules about work were distrusted, and criticized. However, the strategies of businesses and the increased cultural pressure and survival need to consume began to degrade these cultural rules. Though, Stillerman says, within the Madeco workers, individuals are still critical of falling sway to the individualist mentality of production, it is becoming harder and harder to sustain these cultural rules. Furthermore, consumption is becoming easier and more common due to credit cards, and with that, so is getting into debt. Stillerman writes "Union leaders have found that indebted workers feel compelled to work extensive overtime on a regular basis in order to satisfy credit payments. This makes them more beholden to employers, gives them less time to participate in union activities, and makes them less willing to threaten their good relations with the boss."¹⁴¹ This is not only a question of a changing worker mentality surrounding the collective struggle. It is a changing culture throughout Chile and a change in class identity and survival.

Then, with these examples, we may understand how memory makes the weakness of today appear even more pronounced.

Continuity and Unionism Today

The installation of the neoliberal system was the biggest and longest lasting change made by the dictatorship. While the government transitioned to democracy, elections were held, detention and torture were ended, the neoliberal economic system was and still is upheld. However, the institutionalization of neoliberalism was not a simple change to the economy. It is a change to how the government interacts with the economy, how the government interacts with businesses and workers, and how workers interact with businesses and each other. It is a change to all levels of society. But the crisis and weakness of unionism today are not only a product of the dictatorship or the neoliberal system. I have tried to show in this paper that union weakness, the specific challenges of political party involvement, struggle for unity, and inherent contradictions within the movement, are challenges that have been a part of the movement since its inception.

Double Identity

During the dictatorship the workers are often referred to as having had a double roll, as workers and as pueblo dwellers, workers, and generally the repressed lower class. This double identity increased solidarity, broadened the base of the movement, and gave workers twice the incentive to mobilize. Today,

workers also have a double identity. But it is not of worker and pueblo dweller, it is worker and consumer. The development of this consumer identity was not only the result of the installment of a neoliberal government and economy in Chile it was also the result of changing practices in companies and factories. A change in the workplace culture to accompany the political changes in the surrounding society. Strategies employed by companies to degrade working class culture involve the use of subcontractors, the increase in part-time positions over full time, the incorporation of advanced machinery that would isolate workers from one another. Emphasis in the work place was placed on efficiency and speed and bonuses were given for an individual worker's productivity, pushing workers to compete against one another to produce as much as possible rather than to work together. These company strategies not only made worker organization difficult but, along with an economic boom in the 1980s and 1990s, it began to degrade worker culture and solidarity.

All of the contradictions that I have discussed in this paper continue to exist in the Chilean union movement today. However, there is a new contradiction that has arisen with the institutionalization and cultural adoption of a neoliberal economy and society since the transition to democracy. There is a contradiction in worker identity between worker and consumer.

Changes in the Movement/The Continuation of Union Strength

However, this double identity of worker and consumer has not killed the movement as Mecina and Ahumada suggest it might. The movement continues to thrive and adapt, surge, and decline with the political moment. As Cesar Toledo suggests, the resistance of today is not as emblematic or as remembered as the resistance of the past, perhaps because it is not associated with the same venerated values or the same labor leaders are not involved in the struggles of more local movements.¹⁴² That is not to say that it does not exist. In their book *El Renacer de la Huelga Obrera en Chile*, Antonio Aravena and Daniel Nuñez elaborate three important strikes that have taken place in the last 12 years, which they refer to as the “rebirth” of the union movement. In the strategies and development of these strikes we can see many of the same contradictions, challenges, strategies, and strengths that the union movement has faced since its conception, particularly those of reliance on political parties, importance of unity, and competition with company unions.

Contracted workers CODELCO

In 2007 the contracted mine workers of CODELCO initiated a strike which would influence the resistance of several other groups of workers for the next few years. This strike both reflected the militant traditions of miners, going back at least a century, and marked a change in strategy for “modern” workers in

the post-Pinochet era, whose mobilizations have been severely restricted by the concepts of legality and legitimacy created by the Labor Code. Part of the success of the strike had to do with its size and geographical reach. According to *La Tercera* actions were taken in all divisions of CODLECO, not just one. A second aspect of its success was the varied intensity of the actions taken. In El Salvador workers took part in pacific *pancartas* and *batucada* while in El Teniente buses were burned and machines destroyed.¹⁴³

What took place in El Teniente during this strike was the most indicative of the clash of traditional militant culture and more pacific, legal strategies of negotiation. Union leaders had not planned for buses to be burned or machines to be destroyed, and after one worker took unilateral action to burn the buses, the *Confederacion de Trabajadores del Cobre* faced public censure. However, in their book *Renacer de la Huelga Obrera*, Arevena and Núñez interview various workers and present their views and their discourse regarding the violence. It is their words that best illustrates the tension between strategies. Cristian, a leader for SITECO described the rift that arose regarding strategy as a “contradiction” between the workers. Some workers denounced the use of violence as an ineffective way to promote the miner’s agenda. Others believed that the burning of the buses in El Teniente was key in communicating the level of frustration and anger that the workers were experienced to a national audience, who may not have otherwise understood the severity of the situation.¹⁴⁴ Thus, we see the continuation of contradiction and tension between workers regarding strategies for resistance.

Another factor that helped the strike gain national attention was the use of a strategy that was effective and important during the dictatorship, the support of the Church. *Dirigentes* sought public recognition from church leaders to draw the attention of the public and the government.¹⁴⁵ A fourth factor was that the protests and the marches were brought by the workers into the surrounding cities. They did not keep their marches isolated in the mountains but instead brought the fight to the cities where they could be seen by those who would otherwise not have paid attention, and supported in solidarity by their families and connections that lay outside the mines.¹⁴⁶ Students, family members, and other workers joined the marches. Aravena and Núñez say “in this act of solidarity one can see the appropriation of the experiences of struggle...”¹⁴⁷ This act of solidarity, though not controlled by the miners, more closely mirrored a culture of resistance and solidarity of the community from during and prior to the dictatorship, in which strikers were not fighting only for recognition and justice within their company or field but with a sense of injustice and class solidarity that was more widespread.

Finally, despite many union leaders believing that part of the moral crisis of unions post-dictatorship is their over allegiance to political parties, the strike at CODELCO successfully sought the support of political parties in order to increase the pressure on the mine executives. In the letter addressed to the president of CODELCO, which was delivered to him personally by the socialist representative Sergio Aguiló, brought forward an argument that also reflects the strategies and ideals of miners pre-Pinochet; the letter suggested that creating justice for the miners would help not only the individual workers and their families, but also the

economy of the country as a whole.¹⁴⁸ This idea, that justice for the miners, who are the most important workforce in the Chilean economy, will bring economic strength to the country as a whole is an idea that was used in an anti-imperialist discourse of the miners before and during Allende's nationalization of the mines. Though, in this case, there were no anti-imperial tones to the letter, especially in the neoliberal economy, the tradition and ideology supported in the letter takes on a similar strategy of connecting justice for the miners with the good of the country.

This did not stop CODELCO executives from trying to break up the strike and destroy worker's unity. According to Aravena and Núñez the president of CODELCO attempted to go behind the backs of the striking workers to negotiate with a faction of unionized workers who had not incorporated themselves into the strike. CODELCO and these workers negotiated an end to the conflict. However, because of the strength of solidarity of the striking workers this solution was not accepted and the workers were even further radicalized.¹⁴⁹

Though in this particular situation the company's favoring of unions who take on a consensus based strategy failed, the competition between combative and consensus based unions is part of the "moral crisis" of today's unionism in Chile. As Leiva describes in his article "Flexible Workers, Gender, and Contending Strategies for Confronting the Crisis of Labor in Chile" unionism can general be broken down into three distinct types, Partnership unionism, which he describes as "the counterpart to *Concertación* policies, seeking on the one hand to make workers feel as though they were participants in the system as well as potential

beneficiaries while on the other hand, ensuring that they do not demand immediate wage improvements that would endanger Chile's international competitiveness" a manifestation of the politics of consensus within unions, class conscious unionism, and grass roots unionism.¹⁵⁰ There is far more to discuss regarding these three types of unionism, such as the fact that there has to be a category of unionism at all which specifically recognizes itself as "class conscious." This indicates a major change in the makeup and mentality of unionism, since, at its conception, it was inseparable from the concept of class struggle. However, the important point, is that these types of unionism compete, and as Indrina Palacios-Vallardes shows in her study *Industrial Relations after Pinochet: Firm Level Unionism and Collective Bargaining Outcomes in Chile*, generally, if there is a union which uses the strategy of partnership to advance its agenda, that is the union that will be most successful, and ultimately, have the most members because of its general success, making militant, traditional, combative unionism almost "suicidal."¹⁵¹

Thus, the 2007 strike of contracted CODELCO workers was a manifestation of the identity crisis that unions are experiencing by combining both strategies that miners have used for centuries and challenges of the post-Pinochet era. This strike, its solidarity, success, and challenge to authority inspired and encouraged several other strikes in the next few years.

***Inter-empresa* negotiation Forestal Arauco**

The mobilization which took place in the multiple companies that constitute *Forestal Arauco* S.A. in 2007 shared many of the same strategies which led to success in the strike of CODELCO workers. Aravena and Núñez say that the unity created between many different unions of the sector, solidarity with the Church and political parties, and strong communication networks contributed to the success of this strike.¹⁵² Also, similar to the strike of CODELCO workers, part of what helped bring this strike to national attention was violence. In an ambiguous incident, Rodrigo Cisternas was killed by *carabineros*. This led to both greater worker solidarity and greater legitimacy of the strike in the eyes of the public.¹⁵³

The most important aspect of this strike was its attempt at *inter-empresa* negotiation, to arrive at all the same benefits for workers across companies. This was the principle challenge to post-Pinochet union organization and a return to the tradition of militant solidarity and unity among workers. *Bosques Arauco* was aware of this and in their negotiations they consistently left out workers from outside of the business, attempting to break up to unity and stop what would have been an extremely politically significant victory for workers, if *inter-empresa* negotiation were to be successful, since *inter-empresea* negotiation has been illegal since the creation of Pinochet's Labor Code. The workers were aware of the political significance of mounting an *inter-empresa* challenge.¹⁵⁴ The success of an *inter-empresa* negotiation, typically considered illegitimate, would have had

national political consequences, something that union struggles often lack in the age of neoliberalism. This further united the workers and created a strength and determination among them, to see the *inter-empresa* negotiation through, that allowed them to resist the attempts of *Bosques Arauco* to divide the struggle.¹⁵⁵ An iconic moment in this strike was the demonstration which took place on May 1st, International Workers Day. The workers use of this day to conduct a massive protest, with political, social, and Church support, led to increased visibility and solidarity with the movement.¹⁵⁶ It also reflects a long tradition since the early 1900's of workers protesting and making their conflicts visible on this day of international solidarity. In the end, 22 of the 23 demands put forward by the unions were accepted and signed into contract, not by the overarching *Forestal Arauco* but by each business on its own. Because each business signed separately, legally this could not be considered *inter-empresa* negotiation but in practice, the demands, striking, and results, were the same across companies, making the *inter-empresa* negotiation a veritable success.¹⁵⁷ This strike and its take on of *inter-empresa* negotiation, its strong unity and solidarity among workers, the Church, political parties, and the public, makes it an extremely important strike in the post-Pinochet era. It directly challenges many of the norms that have been established under his Labor Code and undermined the neoliberal system's and the individual businesses' attempts to divide the movement. At the same time, it successfully employed the more militant and traditional strategies of *sindicalismo*.

“Huelga larga del salmon”

The “*Huelga larga del salmon*,” according to Aravena and Núñez, marks the end of this wave of particularly successful and militant strikes. However, this strike is still symbolically important in that it represents some of the largest challenges to *sindicalismo* post-Pinochet. First of all, Aravena and Núñez say the principle reason that the strike failed was due to the surrounding political context of the time.¹⁵⁸ A challenge that has thwarted union resistance since its conception. While in this situation, the government did denounce the behavior of the businesses, the level of actual intervention or political support given to unions was meager. This furthers the idea that union success is dependent on political support and a friendly political environment and is unable to resist successfully on its own.

This strike, like the negotiation with *Forestal Arauco* also emphasizes the importance of *inter-empresa* negotiation in post-Pinochet politics. The companies of *Aguas Claras* attempted to negotiate together but the executives “were willing to pay high economic costs to avoid the ‘domino effect’ that accepting collective negotiation could have had,” write Aravena and Núñez. Business executives even went so far as to say that the unions working together were a “violent,” “mobilized minority” and that the government appeared to be complacent with their actions.¹⁵⁹ They denounced all types of violence and said that accepting negotiations under conditions of violence would be a bad precedent to set for the country.¹⁶⁰ This attitude completely delegitimizes both the strategies of

mobilization and combativeness which have characterized Chilean unions since their beginning, and the negotiating points of the striking workers, by writing them off as a violent minority acting without legality or legitimacy. Ultimately, the resistance of *Aguas Claras* forced the unions to abandon their strategy of pushing legal boundaries and try to find a way to negotiate with the business.¹⁶¹ However, the appearance of a group of workers within the business that was willing to negotiate a *convenio colectivo* with the business also weakened the force of the unions extra-legal battle. *Aguas Claras* was much more willing to negotiate a looser *convenio* with these workers than negotiate with the more traditionally militant unions. Similar to the situation of the workers of CODELCO, the appearance of “partnership unionism” has dramatically weakened those unions which chose more traditional, combative strategies. Despite great unity on the part of the mobilized workers and an extremely long strike, in the end the workers accepted the same offer the business had given at the beginning of the strike.¹⁶² This offer included an increase “bonus for production” one factor that is a major part of the new neoliberal economy. A bonus for production encourages individualism, competition, and overworking in order to make more money. This mentality is part of what breaks down traditional union solidarity and strategy.

The “*huelga larga del salmon*” attempted to take advantage of the political precedent of the workers of CODELCO and *Forestal Arauco* but were unable to have the same success by pushing for *inter-empresa* negotiation. The “*huelga larga*” is an example of how government influence, neoliberal mentality

of business and workers, and an increase in individualism are all making union mobilization more difficult.

Conclusion

My conclusion is two-fold. First, that union memory over emphasizes union strength in the past, which contributes to a “crisis” mentality because it dramatizes a contrast between strength in the past and weakness in the present. Second, the *dirigentes* describe as being elements of a crisis are actually continuous throughout the labor movement since its conception and have been causes of weakness throughout union history. As I have said before in this paper, memory is a powerful tool of resistance, a strong former of identity, and a motivation for current behaviors. Memory of the dictatorship in the union movement is a memory of strength, resistance, and admiration. It is also a memory of repression, violence, fear, and rupture. However, the dictatorship's role in the union "crisis" of today should not be accepted as the only reason for union weakness. It is an unavoidable factor, in the struggles of the union movement today, both legislatively, and emotionally. However, what I have tried to demonstrate with this paper, is that many of the issues that are experienced as a "crisis" of unionism today are not new issues to the movement. They are not "fatal" as Mecina says, and they never have been. The issues of declining worker participation, and particularly lack of unity, and involvement of political parties are not new issues. These issues have posed challenges and sparked debates in

the union movement since their conception over a century ago and unions have always persisted, adapted, expanded, and contracted in accordance with the political moment.

The role of memory in union leaders often allows them to imagine both a serious change in the strength of the movement and also to invoke continuity throughout the entire history of the movement. Memory enhances strength in some areas of history, such as the period of the *Unidad Popular*, which makes the weakness of today feel even more pronounced. On the other hand, memory of the dictatorship often helps to justify the weakness of today, even if the affects of the dictatorship are not the only factor. Memory is often a tool, one that allows for emblematic figures to play powerful roles in history and can encourage mobilization of the masses. Memory resists oppression and draws connections between the oppression of today and oppression of the past.

-
1. Phillips, Nelson, and Cynthia Hardy. *Discourse Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, California, 2017, 2.
 2. Katherine Hite. *When the Romance Ended: Leaders of the Chilean Left, 1968-1998*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, xx-xxi.
 3. Alessandro Portelli. *The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory and Meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
 4. Marianne Jørgensen, and Louise J Phillips. "I the Field of Discourse Analysis." In *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 20. SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011.
 5. Fernando Leiva. "Chile's Labor Movement 1990-2012: Ensnared in the Past and Absent from the Struggles to Democratize Society?" *University at Albany (SUNY)*, n.d, 16.
 6. James Paul Gee. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014, 8.
 7. Jelin, Elizabeth, Judy Rein, and Marcial Godoy-Anativia. *State Repression and the Labor of Memory*. University of Minnesota Press, 2003, xv.
 8. Jelin, Rein, and Godoy-Anativia. *State Repression and the Labor of Memory*, xvii-xviii.

-
9. Maurice Halbwachs. *The Collective Memory*. Harper Colophon Books, n.d, 23.
 10. A. (n.d.). Sobre el Museo. Retrieved from <https://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/sobre-el-museo/>. Translation mine.
 11. Steve J Stern, Peter Winn, Federico Lorenz, and Aldo Marchesi. *No Hay Manana Sin Ayer: Batallas Por La Memorial En El Cono Sur*. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2016, 275.
 12. Stern, Winn, Lorenz, and Marchesi. *No Hay Manana Sin Ayer*, 276.
 13. Ibid., 275.
 14. Centro de Documentación. Retrieved from <https://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/centro-de-documentacion/>. Translation mine.
 15. Jørgensen, and Phillips. "I the Field of Discourse Analysis," 20.
 16. Steve J Stern. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004, 120.
 17. Stern. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*, 120.
 18. Stern. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*, 106.
 19. Jelin, Rein, and Godoy-Anativia. *State Repression and the Labor of Memory*, xvii.
 - ²⁰ Brian Loveman, and Elizabeth Lira. "Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and Impunity as Historical Themes: Chile, 1814-2006." *Radical History Review*, December 2007.
 21. Stern, *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*, xxi.
 22. Stern, Winn, Lorenz, and Marchesi. *No Hay Manana Sin Ayer*, 5.
 - ²³ Sergio Troncoso. "Unionism Today, Problems and Challenges." presented at the Conversatorios, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, June 28, 2017. Translation Mine.
 24. Jelin, Rein, and Godoy-Anativia. *State Repression and the Labor of Memory*, xvii
 - ²⁵ Stern, *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*, 80
 26. Ibid., 120-121.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Cesar Toledo. "From the Labor Plan and to Labor Reform." presented at the Conversatorios, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, June 7, 2017. Translation Mine.
 29. Jelin, Rein, and Godoy-Anativia, *State Repression and the Labor of Memory*, 12.
 30. Ibid., 17.
 31. Katherine Hite, *When the Romance Ended: Leaders of the Chilean Left, 1968-1998* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 20-22.
 32. Ibid.
 33. Ibid., xv
 34. Stern, *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*, xxviii
 35. Ibid., 1.
 36. Ibid., 39.
 37. Ibid., 60
 38. Ibid., 87.
 39. Winn, *Weavers of the Revolution*, 98
 40. Ibid., 187.
 41. Volker K. Frank. "Politics without Policy: The Failure of Social Concertacion in Democratic Chile, 1990-2000." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d, 71.

-
42. Diego Barría Traverso, Eduardo Araya Moreno, and Oscar Drouillas. "Removed from the Bargaining Table: The CUT during the Bachelet Administration." *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 4 (July 2012): 85–101.
43. Ibid., 90.
44. Fernando Leiva, "Flexible Workers, Gender, and Contending Strategies for Confronting the Crisis of Labor in Chile," *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 4 (2012): 107-109.
45. Joel Stillerman. "Disciplined Workers and Avid Consumers: Neoliberal Policy and the Transformation of Work and Identity Among Chilean Metalworkers." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d., 181.
46. Ibid., 185.
47. Miguel Ahumada. "Unionism Today, Problems and Challenges." presented at the Conversatorios, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, June 28, 2017. Translation Mine.
48. Charles F. Sabel. *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry*. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
49. Fernando Ortiz Letelier. *El Movimiento Obrero En Chile (1891-1919)*. Madrid, Spain: LOM Ediciones, 1985, 85.
50. Letelier. *El Movimiento Obrero En Chile*, 121
51. Ibid., 85.
52. Ibid., 114.
53. Ibid., 127.
54. Julio Pinto. *Luis Emilio Recabarren: Una Biografía Historica*. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2013, 63.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 48.
57. Ibid., 69.
58. Ibid., 71.
59. Ibid., 109.
60. Ibid., 122.
61. Ibid., 69, 123.
62. Ibid., 134.
63. Ibid., 136.
64. Jaime Massardo. *La Formacion del Imaginario Politico de Luis Emilio Recabarren*. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2008, 53.
65. Ibid., 53.
66. Letelier. *El Movimiento Obrero En Chile*, 123
67. Carlos Bongcam. *Sindicalismo Chileno: Hechos y Documents 1973-1983*. Circulo de Estudios Latinoamericanos (CELA), 1984., 12
68. Mario Garces, and Pedro Milos. *FOCH, CTCH, CUT: Las Centrales Unitarias En La Historia Del Sindicalismo Chileno*. Santiago, Chile: Educacion y Comunicaciones Ltd. (ECO), 1988. 23
69. Bongcam, *Sindicalismo Chileno*, 12
70. Ibid., 13.
71. Garces, and Milos. *FOCH, CTCH, CUT*, 25 and Bongcam, *Sindicalismo Chileno*, 12.
72. Garces, and Milos. *FOCH, CTCH, CUT*, 33

-
73. Ibid., 43.
74. Bongcam, *Sindicalismo Chileno*, 13.
75. Garces, and Milos. *FOCH, CTCH, CUT*, 42.
76. Ibid., 49.
77. Ibid., 50.
78. Ibid., 71.
79. Ibid., 55.
80. Ibid., 67.
81. Ibid., 71.
82. Ibid., 73.
83. Ibid., 78.
84. Ibid., 79.
85. Ibid., 81.
86. Ibid., 99.
87. Bongcam, *Sindicalismo Chileno*, p. 16
88. Ibid., 15.
89. Ibid., 18.
90. Antihistoria 187
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., 109.
93. Ibid., 217
94. Ibid., 232.
95. Sergio Troncoso. Testimonios Audiovisuales. Interview with Walter Roblero, Archives Director. Museum of Memory and Human Rights. 2015.
96. Bongcam, *Sindicalismo Chileno*, 18.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 19.
99. Ibid., 20.
100. Miguel Ahumada. "Unionism Today: Problems and Challenges." presented at the Conversatorios, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, June 28, 2017. Translation Mine.
101. CUT rinde homenaje al Presidente Salvador Allende resaltando su legado en el marco de las elecciones Presidenciales 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.cutchile.cl/2017/09/11/cut-rinde-homenaje-al-presidente-salvador-allende-resaltando-su-legado-en-el-marco-de-las-elecciones-presidenciales-2017/>
102. Veronica Franco. "Cordones Industriales and The Power of the Workers" presented at the Conversatorios, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, June 14, 2017. Translation Mine.
103. Salvador Misleh. "Cordones Industriales and The Power of the Workers."
104. Ibid.
105. Peter Winn. *Weavers of the Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986, 100.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 120.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 134.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 135.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 136.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., 186,

-
111. Veronica Franco. "Cordones Industriales and The Power of the Workers."
112. Ana Lopez. "Cordones Industriales and The Power of the Workers."
113. Salvador Misleh. "Cordones Industriales and The Power of the Workers."
114. Stern. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*, 26.
115. Peter Winn. "The Pinochet Era." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d, 14.
116. Bongcam, *Sindicalismo Chileno*, 80.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid., 85.
119. Ibid., 77.
120. Ibid., 87.
121. Ibid., 89.
122. Winn. "The Pinochet Era," 24.
123. Ibid.
124. "Estamos Decididos." *El Coordinador*, June 1987, 11.
125. "Hacer de La Unidad Un Hecho." *El Coordinador*, March 1986, 1.
126. "Trabajadores: Camino Hacia La Unidad." *Solidaridad*, n.d, 17.
127. "Es Necesaria La Unidad." *Separata Solidaridad*, July 1979, 17.
128. Ibid., 18.
129. Winn, "The Pinochet Era," 45.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Troncoso interview with Roblero. Testimonios Audiovisuales.
133. "La CUT debe ser una instancia de servicio." *Informativo Central Unitaria de Trabajadores*, August 1989, 3.
134. "Tenemos Un Sindicalismo Reducido y Las CUT Zonales Se Politizaron." *Informativo Central Unitaria de Trabajadores*, August 1989, 5.
135. Winn, "The Pinochet Era," 53.
136. "Primer Aniversario: Realidades y Desafios." *Informativo Central Unitaria de Trabajadores*, August 1989, 1.
137. Eugenio Sieralta. "Unionism Today: Problems and Challenges."
138. Winn, "The Pinochet Era," 67
139. Ibid., 37.
140. Troncoso interview with Roblero. Testimonios Audiovisuales.
141. Joel Stillerman. "Disciplined Workers and Avid Consumers: Neoliberal Policy and the Transformation of Work and Identity Among Chilean Metalworkers." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d, 181.
- ¹⁴² Toledo. "From the Labor Plan and to Labor Reform." presented at the Conversatorios.
- ¹⁴³ Antonio Aravena, and Daniel Núñez, eds. *El Renacer de La Huelga Obrera en Chile: El Movimiento Sindical en La Primera Década del Siglo XXI*. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz, n.d, 60.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 62.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 63.

-
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 64.
¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 67.
¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 65.
¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 69.
¹⁵⁰ Leiva, “Flexible Workers, Gender, and Contending Strategies,” 114.
¹⁵¹ Indira Palacios Valladares. “From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in Contemporary Chile.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010): 84.
¹⁵² Aravena and Nuñez, *El Renacer de la Huelga Obrera*, 117.
¹⁵³ Ibid., 126.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 128.
¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 133.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid.
¹⁵⁸ Ibid.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 95.
¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 97.
¹⁶¹ Ibid., 106.
¹⁶² Ibid., 108.

Bibliography

- Alessandro Portelli. *The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory and Meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Antonio Aravena. “El Conflicto Laboral En Chile. Perspectivas de Analisis y Tendencias Emergentes.” In *El Renacer de La Huelga Obrera: El Movimiento Sindical En La Primera Década Del Siglo XXI*, 9–36. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz, 2009.
- Antonio Aravena, and Daniel Núñez, eds. *El Renacer de La Huelga Obrera en Chile: El Movimiento Sindical en La Primera Década del Siglo XXI*. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz, n.d.

-
- Carlos Bongcam. *Sindicalismo Chileno: Hechos y Documents 1973-1983*. Circulo de Estudios Latinoamericanos (CELA), 1984.
- Cesar Toledo. "From the Labor Plan and to Labor Reform." presented at the Conversatorios, Museum of Memory and Human Rights, June 7, 2017.
- Charles F. Sabel. *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry*. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Diego Barría Traverso, Eduardo Araya Moreno, and Oscar Drouillas. "Removed from the Bargaining Table: The CUT during the Bachelet Administration." *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 4 (July 2012): 85–101.
- "Es Necesaria La Unidad." *Separata Solidaridad*, July 1979.
- "Estamos Decididos." *El Coordinador*, June 1987.
- Fernando Leiva. "Chile's Labor Movement 1990-2012: Ensnared in the Past and Absent from the Struggles to Democratize Society?" *University at Albany (SUNY)*, n.d.
- . "Flexible Workers, Gender, and Contending Strategies for Confronting the Crisis of Labor in Chile." *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 4 (2012): 102–28.
- Fernando Ortiz Letelier. *El Movimiento Obrero En Chile (1891-1919)*. Madrid, Spain: LOM Ediciones, 1985.
- "Hacer de La Unidad Un Hecho." *El Coordinador*, March 1986.
- Indira Palacios Valladares. "From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in Contemporary Chile." *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010): 73–102.
- Jaime Massardo. *La formacion del imaginario politico de Luis Emilio Recabarren*. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2008.
- James Paul Gee. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.
- Joel Stillerman. "Disciplined Workers and Avid Consumers: Neoliberal Policy and the Transformation of Work and Identity Among Chilean Metalworkers." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d.
- Julio Pinto. *Luis Emilio Recabarren: Una Biografia Historica*. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2013.
- Katherine Hite. *When the Romance Ended: Leaders of the Chilean Left, 1968-1998*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Marianne Jørgensen, and Louise J Phillips. "I the Field of Discourse Analysis." In *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 1–23. SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011.
- Mario Garces, and Pedro Milos. *FOCH, CTCH, CUT: Las Centrales Unitarias En La Historia Del Sindicalismo Chileno*. Santiago, Chile: Educacion y Comunicaciones Ltd. (ECO), 1988.
- Maurice Halbwachs. *The Collective Memory*. Harper Colophon Books, n.d.
- Peter Winn. "'No Miracle for Us': The Textile Industry in the Pinochet Era, 1973-1998." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d.
- . "The Pinochet Era." In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d.
- , ed. *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004.

-
- . *Weavers of the Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Phillips, Nelson, and Cynthia Hardy. *Discourse Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, California, 2017.
<https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412983921>.
- “Primer Aniversario: Realidades y Desafíos.” *Informativo Central Unitaria de Trabajadores*, August 1989.
- Sergio Troncoso. Testimonios Audiovisuales, May 11, 2015. Museum of Memory and Human Rights.
- Steve J Stern. *Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London 1998*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Steve J Stern, and Peter Winn. “El Torturoso Camino Chileno a La Memorialización.” In *No Hay Mañana Sin Ayer: Batallas Por La Memoria Historica En El Cono Sur*, 277. Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2014.
- Steve J Stern, Peter Winn, Federico Lorenz, and Aldo Marchesi. *No Hay Manana Sin Ayer: Batallas Por La Memorial En El Cono Sur*. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2016.
- “Tenemos Un Sindicalismo Reducido y Las CUT Zonales Se Politizaron.” *Informativo Central Unitaria de Trabajadores*, August 1989.
- Thomas Miller Klubock. “Class, Community, and Neoliberalism in Chile: Copper Workers and the Labor Movement During the Military Dictatorship and the Restoration of Democracy.” In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d.
- “Trabajadores: Camino Hacia La Unidad.” *Solidaridad*, n.d.
- Volker K. Frank. “Elusive Goal in Democratic Chile: Reforming the Pinochet Labor Legislation.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002).
- . “Politics without Policy: The Failure of Social Concertacion in Democratic Chile, 1990-2000.” In *Victims of The Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, n.d.