Art and Language. *Blurting*, 1973. Index cards with subject headings and cross-references annotated by Michael Corris. Detail. Courtesy Getty Research Institute Special Collections and Michael Corris.

PRAGMATICS

· choice (R1)
· ambiguity (R2)
· way of recognizing meaning ... B23
· of talking to each other ... C11

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The Inductive Turn in Conceptual Art: Pragmatics in the *0–9* Circle

JACOB STEWART-HALEVY

One day in 1970 the conceptual artist Adrian Piper, sporting a shirt streaked with sticky paint, walked into the Midtown Manhattan Macy's, ostensibly to shop for gloves and sunglasses. The following year, she returned to the department store and entered the bathroom, where she pulled out a comb from a purse filled with ketchup.[1] These "works" were part of her *Catalysis Series*, an intermittent project that involved wandering the city and engaging in all manner of situational improprieties. As outlandish as the routines may have seemed to passers-by, they would have resonated with an emerging field of dissident social-scientific inquiry: pragmatics. If Piper had walked through the same Macy's in the summer of 1963, she might well have passed the sociolinguist William Labov on her way from the accessories department to the bathroom. What was he doing there? Not exactly shopping for sunglasses either. He was busy conducting interviews with employees for an ethnography of postvocalic distribution. Discovering how sales clerks pronounced *r* sounds provided the groundwork for his influential 1966 study, "The Social Stratification of (r) in New York City Department Stores," an article that found its way into his foundational account of sociolinguistic patterns in 1972, shortly after Piper's performances.[2]

The remarkable aspect of Labov's article, and his work on New York City dialects that preceded it, was his revision of methods for gathering fragments of natural talk. Labov eschewed the questionnaire format and interviews with "knowledgeable" members of the community that sociologists had relied on for decades. Instead, he began to isolate a small number of phonological features of speech that seemed most pervasive in everyday usage. Like Labov, Piper and fellow artists associated with the journal *0–9*—Vito Acconci, Lee Lozano, David Antin, and Jackson Mac Low, among others—also began to question the use of surveys and other formal methods for data collection as they, too, began to focus on showing the constraints around conversation and other forms of social interaction.[3]

Artists affiliated with *0–9* constructed ethnographically based artworks that bear a rich and complicated relation to the contemporaneous tradition

of pragmatics, a branch of social science stemming from the microsociology of Erving Goffman, whose members include Goffman himself, as well as the ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel; the conversation analysts Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schlegoff, and Gail Jefferson; and sociolinguists, including Labov and Dell Hymes. Proponents of pragmatics and the *0–9* circle alike were trying to figure out and present how people conducted themselves and communicated with one another over the course of their everyday routines.

In the postwar period, a heterogeneous field of artists, critics, visual anthropologists, ethnomethodologists, social psychologists, and communications theorists maintained vested interests in defining the games and rules of social behavior.[4] Yet, in order to speak to one another, they often resorted to what we might call "behavioral images"—iconic indices of bodily movement, everyday habits, and interaction rituals that could be made accessible to members outside their particular communities of expertise.[5] In some cases, attempts by artists and critics to locate styles of comportment within artworks coincided with the creation of behavioral images across the social sciences. In the case of the *0–9* group's turn to induction, we witness how artists—rather than illustrating social scientific conclusions—pointed to ways of renovating established repertories of ethnographic research.

How did the efforts of these artists and social theorists come to coincide? The short answer: members of the art world—the British critic Lawrence Alloway, American artists Acconci and Martha Wilson, and the Art and Language Group, among numerous others loosely associated with conceptual art—read social theory.[6] Acconci, Piper's interlocutor, peppered his performance notes with phrases and diagrams from the social psychologist Kurt Lewin, the inventor of "field theory" who had tried to topologize tension in group dynamics among persons. Acconci made further use of the sociologist Edward Hall's proxemic and kinesic studies on social distance and body movement.[7] And, as the art historian Tom McDonough shows, Acconci even modeled the interpersonal dynamics of his performances directly on the interaction rituals described by Goffman.[8] Evidence in the other direction—of social theorists assimilating conceptual art into their thinking—is slim but may be found in the early work of the sociologist Howard Becker. Even before embarking on research in the early 1970s for his 1978 study of the art world, Becker could be found participating in the later 1960s San Francisco performances of avant-garde musician Steve Reich.[9]

Beyond these concrete instances of overlap, we witness deeper connections between pragmatics and conceptual art through their common recourse to inferential methods. By 1969, Piper and her cohort dissented with the orthodox strand of conceptual art in much the same way and for

Edward Hall. ***Chart Showing Interplay of the Distant and Immediate Receptors in Proxemic Perception*****, 1968.**

the same reasons that proponents of pragmatics broke from the central assumptions of social theory: Both camps turned to induction. They eschewed using data from official sources in order to glean information from the micro-interactional scenarios in the world around them. Subsequently, they constructed their work from these encounters.

In their turn toward induction, pragmatics researchers contested the sociologist Talcott Parsons's notion of a predetermined social order, which, in the early postwar period, had come to dominate social theory. Parsons had claimed that the norms of a culture govern social routine, behavior, and subjectivity. By contrast, students of pragmatics contended that constraints were rarely imposed on everyday activities from above but arose from token instances of their performance within the practices of a given community. Garfinkel, Sacks, and Goffman looked to find order generated by the common practices of the members they studied.

And, just as those in the pragmatics movement looked for order from below, Piper, Acconci, Lozano, and other conceptual artists looked to local ways of glossing their own behavior—particularly the social dynamics within their scene of artists, and among strangers who had little, if any, ties to Manhattan's postwar avant-gardes. For these artists, embedded methods of data collection and presentation served as alternatives to the kinds of interviews, reportage, statistical analysis, and bureaucratic styles found within the dominant strands of conceptual art at the time. Prior to the 1970s, conceptual artists had relied on serial procedures as a structuring device for executing their art. And when the artist Hans Haacke, the dealer and promoter Seth Siegelaub, and the curator Kynaston McShine and other prominent figures of the conceptual art movement did turn to artists and their audiences to glean information, they administered questionnaires or conducted expert interviews.[10] In contrast, like Labov, the members of the *0–9* circle found interviews, questionnaires, and a priori rules unconvincing ways of structuring their work. In their investigations, as in pragmatics, we witness a turn to models where social order can be observed, reported, and accounted for without professional expertise and where members'



methods and self-generated accounts provide a set of working premises for future induction.

Thus, we might account for the world of Piper and her affiliates at *0–9* as marked by an "ethnographic turn" in conceptual art. Material and anecdotal histories of their art and of the journal itself reveal affinities between the ways in which artists made recourse to rules in the later 1960s and early 1970s, and the methods employed at that time by ethnographers who reconsidered their roles in reporting pragmatic interaction. The various editions, publications, articles, events, and artworks around *0–9* are useful for thinking about this issue because they evidence an array of conceptual artists' voices and primary materials precisely at the moment when the movement's recourse to rules underwent a crisis: 1969.

1969: *0–9* and the Crisis of Rules in Conceptual Art

Sol LeWitt's "Sentences on Conceptual Art," first published in the fifth issue of *0–9* in January 1969, stands at the heart of this trouble regarding how and whether conceptual art might be rule governed.[11] When he penned "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art" (1967), the movement's arch-manifesto, LeWitt contended that the element separating conceptual from earlier "perceptual" or "expressionistic" art was the procedure under which it was executed. Whereas artists previously had decided which technical moves to pursue during the making process, conceptual artists formulated their ideas prior to making physical artworks, which then determined the steps through which the work would be produced. LeWitt made the point, however, that "conceptual art is not necessarily logical" and that "the logic of a piece or series of pieces is a device that is used at times, only to be ruined."[12] In the two-year gap between LeWitt's "Paragraphs" and "Sentences," however, New York artists and critics, including Joseph Kosuth, Christine Kozlov, and Lucy Lippard, alongside the British-based Art and Language group began to frame conceptual art in terms of designation rather than planned execution. Art was a rational, analytic idea, without any empirical, material correlate. Reasoning itself was a kind of art. And as they circulated their version of conceptual art through a series of journals, symposia, and exhibitions, their interpretation briefly, but with notable exceptions, achieved a kind of dominance.[13]

LeWitt's "Sentences" persistently reiterated the subtleties in his earlier position, beginning with the thesis that "conceptual artists are mystics rather than rationalists, who leap to conclusions that logic cannot reach," and that "illogical judgments lead to new experience."[14] Yet he also warned in his twenty-ninth sentence that "the [artistic] process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It should run its course."[15] Therefore,

"Sentences" occupied a contentious middle ground between a hard-line group of artists who were in the midst of consolidating their authority, eventually under the mantle of "Analytic Conceptual Art" and the numerous materially and empirically based latecomers, and marginal artists in the movement who challenged them.[16] If "Paragraphs" existed in an avant-garde position with regard to "perceptual" or "expressionistic" painters and sculptors of the midcentury who could not stick to set rules in executing their art, "Sentences" existed in a rearguard position to these later and only loosely affiliated conceptual artists who recognized LeWitt's arguments but posited rule-based actions only to tamper with them through negation, parody, error, and drift.[17]

The crisis over the arbitrariness of rules that nearly two decades prior had pushed John Cage from serial music to indeterminacy and had preoccupied a subsequent generation of Fluxus artists in the early 1960s had finally become a dilemma for conceptual art.[18] LeWitt could no longer ensure that "arbitrary or chance decisions would be kept to a minimum."[19] And insofar as the *0–9* circle drew heavily from aleatory musical, poetic, and choreographic precedents, their scene would be uniquely prepared to move from rule-governed, serial procedures to a rule-guided approach to conceptual art.[20] They would no longer follow rules they established before making a work but would begin to hold themselves accountable for their actions during and after their performances.

Many of the artists affiliated with *0–9* therefore moved from a Cagean project of constructing ever-looser or more-indeterminate parameters through which to execute their art toward using, for artistic purposes, the already existing norms that constrain social interaction. Conceptual artists began to consider how rules arose not from external, transcontextual sources but immanently from their situated practices—thus moving from "deductive structures" to inductive ones.[21] They began to focus not merely on the production of action, however indeterminate, instead relying on the process and settings, the presuppositions and tacit assumptions through which action becomes managed, accomplished, and recognized.

Hypothesis Situation #14: A Break with A Priori Structuring and Bureaucratese

Where can we locate the break? When did artists affiliated with *0–9* bring conceptual art's search for arbitrary motivation to its demise? When did they reconstrue their rules as immanent and performable within behavior itself rather than prior to it? In retrospect, a signal candidate may be Adrian Piper's little-known work *Hypothesis Situation #14 with Two Coexisting Space Conditions* (1969). Here, while moonlighting as an accountant at the

Cameo Employment Agency in the late 1960s in Manhattan, Piper decided to turn her office into a field site. She charts her own movement around the premises while taking pictures of her coworker Sandra Livingston, the receptionist.[22] In Piper's resulting documentation, eight sequential photographs place an hour of Livingston's day along a sheet of graph paper. The receptionist sits in an office chair, answers the phone, reads, greets applicants, walks to a back coatroom, and loosens and combs her hair. A two-column text accompanies the photo chart. The first column describes the surroundings of the agency; the second marks the hour-long duration of the performance through minute-long intervals. Because the columns are united by the same numeral, we can tell that at "number one," for instance, it is 10:02 in the morning, Livingston is seated, and Piper's camera faces the front room of the office toward the west-facing window.

Piper structured *Hypothesis Situation #14* through a set of binaries. In the first four photographs, Livingston performs tasks that require the affective labor of greeting applicants and answering the phone. These all occur in the threshold space of the front room. By contrast, the last photographs show the back closet used to store coats, a kind of private refuge away from the service area.[23] In private, Livingston untangles and then, as far as the photographs show, rebraids her hair, fixing her appearance. Thus, the binaries structuring the work are front room/back room, public/private, receptionist routines/self-appearance routines, and hair braided/hair loosened. If conceptual art approaches to office work at the moment had only articulated the first term in these binaries, Piper's photographs make visible the second set of terms, leading us to consider the relation of *Hypothesis #14* to the dominant strands of conceptual art.

LeWitt—Piper's downstairs neighbor at the time—had written in "Paragraphs" about how, in conceptual art, "all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair," like the work of "a clerk cataloguing the results of his premise."[24] Conceptual



artists made their art into "a perfunctory affair" in an effort to align their activities with the bureaucratic rigor and organization of office work.[25] When, in the accompanying text to *Hypothesis #14*, Piper describes Livingston's actions as a "random disarrangement"—a term that might describe hair fallen out of place—she seems to disentangle what would have been knotted signs by 1968: the monotony of office work and the repetitive procedures of conceptual art.

Piper uncouples the pair by resituating conceptual art's position within the service sector.[26] Whereas conceptual artists sought to align themselves with the upper echelons of service professions through the imitation of male-dominated, high-powered white-collar corporate and research jobs, Piper couched LeWitt's emphasis on preestablished serial order within the lower-tier "pink collar" office routines of receptionist and temporary work. This gesture might reflect Piper's own position at the margins of Seth Siegelaub's gallery, a central vehicle for the promotion and marketing of conceptual art at the time, where she served as the receptionist and administrative assistant without the opportunity to show her art.[27] Perhaps Livingston's "disarrangement" of the office setting even symbolically resolved her own institutional marginalization.

Beyond ad hominem issues, the way Piper paired the regimentation of formal front-room and informal back-room receptionist work by connecting them under a serial rubric raises the issue of the discourse of professionalism in pink-collar work. As Kathi Weeks points out, the accoutrements of professionalism—its look, attire, status markers, and styles—bind the "practices and identities of production with those of consumption."[28] They furnish the receptionist's desires and aspirations to identify with professional life even as she reaps none of its social and economic rewards. Piper's charting and quantification of the back-room activity as a time-based event, ulti-

HYPOTHESIS — Situation #14 with two co-existing space conditions (for Sandra Livingston)

bounded environment: details / conglomerate mass: details (variable) | minutes (variable)

Room 205
147 West 42 St.
N.Y.C. 10036
U.S.A.

AM
Tuesday
December 9
1969
A.D.

I. office: front room: W wall, window, doorway to hall, applicant
coat room: S, E, N walls, SE and NE corners, doorway, coat rack, file cabinet

II. Sandy: seated, reading, standing, answering phone, facing E and W, loosening hair, combing hair

1. office: front room: W wall, window Sandy: seated	1. 10:02
2. office: coat room: S wall, doorway, SE corner Sandy: standing, answering phone	2. 10:10
3. office: front room: W wall, doorway, window Sandy: seated, reading	3. 10:17
4. office: front room: W wall, window Sandy: seated, reading	4. 10:25
5. office: front room: W wall, doorway to hall, applicant Sandy: standing, facing W	5. 10:31
6. office: coat room: N wall, NE corner Sandy: standing, facing N, loosening hair	6. 10:45
7. office: coat room: E wall, coat rack, file cabinet Sandy: standing, facing N, combing hair	7. 10:47
8. office: coat room: N wall Sandy: standing, facing N	8. 10:58

Phases #1 and #2 exist simultaneously.
Phase #2 is a random disarrangement of Phase #1.

Opposite: Adrian Piper. *Hypothesis Situation #14*, 1969. Original typescript on paper, photo-diagram collage, silver gelatin print on baryta paper, black india ink on graph paper, vintage photo offset. Private collection, U.S.A. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin.

Right: Adrian Piper. *Hypothesis Situation #14*, 1969. Detail.

mately subsumable as wage labor, raised second-wave feminist issues around capital's extraction of surplus value from uncompensated peripheral workplace behavior, including the maintenance of appearances.[29] Piper made visible low-prestige labor in the service economy: symbolic recognition as the first step to material compensation.[30] We might call it an aesthetic of administrative assistance.

This reformist agenda is never made explicit. But *Hypothesis Situation #14* brings conceptual art's common reliance on serial gestures made from numerical, alphabetical, grammatical, or other abstract predetermined systems of order to its limit. Piper stakes the claim that behavioral routines result from the interactions among persons (herself, Livingston, and prospective temp applicants). The work therefore models a way of approaching work directly at odds with the Taylorist behavioral measurement of the workplace. Arguably, it even moves beyond the sociometric yardsticks and topological diagrams used by Acconci—via Hall—to measure physical distances as a way of gauging the social-psychological forces among persons. Instead, *Hypothesis #14* presents a situational model, one in which people were constantly devising new interactional, performative strategies through which to maintain and manage their proper distance, and others' impressions of them.

Whereas Piper's chart and accompanying text employ fixed temporal and spatial increments, Livingston's routine movements—the very ones that articulate her situated practices as a receptionist—undermine the order Piper tried to bring to the field site. As Piper notes, Livingston's section of the chart is a disarrangement of her section. In *Hypothesis #14*, the unraveling of temporal and spatial order reveals hidden dimensions of conceptual art's approach to service-sector work by proxy. The work laid bare conceptual art's latent aspirations to mimic disembodied clerk work and management styles found primarily at the upper echelons of administrations.

Hypothesis #14's claims to "disarrangement" may be generalized. By the turn of the 1970s, Piper, alongside her fellow performance-based conceptual artists had thoroughly abandoned the rule-governed method they had previously used to execute their art. Moving from prescription to description, they discovered order in their activities after the fact. At the same moment, a set of related developments occurred. These artists distanced themselves from a 1960s-era communalist belief in unmediated encounters and an everyday life unfettered by semiosis. Disillusioned by communalist models of sociability and collective effervescence, they tried to make art out of microsocial interaction rituals.[31] In particular, they turned to conversation analysis as the foundational site of interaction. As a result, some con-

sidered how social, economic, racial, gendered, and political principles constrained their everyday routines.

From Structural Functionalism to Conversation Analysis: An Overview of the Pragmatics Tradition

The move away from a priori rules toward an art of micro-interaction within the *0–9* circle was roughly congruent with the turn away from the structural functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons by pragmatics theorists such as Goffman, Garfinkel, Sacks, and Labov.[32] By studying actual face-to-face interactions, Goffman dramatically broke from Parson's model. He pointed to the way social order was not internalized from abstract principles nor produced by individuals out of psychological or rational motivation. Rather, order was generated through interactions among persons and, more precisely, through their mutual accountability—a concept he called "the interaction order."[33] Goffman outlined a set of "dramaturgical principles" where persons, often working in concert or "teams," engaged in the management of impressions through their facial expressions, acted in and out of character through role conformity and discrepancy, divided up space according to a front- and back-stage model, and used their furniture, clothing, and equipment as props. Goffman left no doubt that these face-maintaining activities were performances: "I have been using the term 'performance' to refer to all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers."[34]

For Goffman, these performances were meant to accomplish goals: to project self-worth, to conform or depart from standard decorum, or to deceive or cajole within the occasional dynamics of interaction or to repair some damaged interaction. Goffman pointed out how actors worked strategically through collusion, harbored and disclosed discrediting information, and repaired conversations through tact, each a collective effort meant to achieve pragmatic social effects.[35]

Garfinkel likewise found that the Parsons model lacked an adequate description of the process through which social action becomes produced and recognized. He called Parsonian subjects "judgmental dopes" for the way they were required to appeal to rational or emotional judgment every time they made a decision about how to act.[36] Garfinkel's solution, "ethnomethodology," discovered how participants come to a mutual understanding about both their roles in social routines and what these interactions are meant to accomplish. He argued that participants engaged one another in durable, methodical ways so their actions could be recognized to each other.

If Piper had walked into a Macy's in Los Angeles rather than one in New York, she might well have run into Garfinkel's rule-breaking students. Each semester, Garfinkel sent them to such locations to conduct "breaching experiments." For instance, he asked them to bargain with the sales staff for merchandise. Under Parsons's theory of fixed norms, the students "should have been fearful and shamed by the prospective assignment . . . and reciprocally, anxiety and anger should have been commonly reported for the sales persons."[37] But Garfinkel wanted to prove Parsons wrong. He hoped to show how Parsons's notion of a "one-price rule" was subject to negotiation. Even attempts or denials of negotiation, which had all sorts of compelling effects, could make the salespersons seem like narrow-minded conformists for adhering to the one-price rule too strictly. Or the student could seem like a fool for trying to bargain. Rules were never set, Garfinkel argued. People were always trying to test them or avoid testing them. They were using them for remedial purposes to repair damaged interactions, or to embarrass someone, or to normalize a state of affairs. The task of ethnomethodology was to discover a "practical ethics"—a "lay sociology" of and by a given group.[38] Philosophers and professional sociologists did not decide the "nature, production, and recognition of reasonable, realistic, and analyzable actions." In practice, the community's members did so.

Sacks and other conversation analysts took Goffman's work on the interaction order and Garfinkel's analysis of ethnomethods in a more precise direction by systematizing ways of gathering and analyzing fragments of natural talk. They relied especially upon recording devices and transcript analysis, and Sacks found that the transcripts exhibited a kind of procedural order. Participants relied on turn taking, they created "slots" for the divulging of information, and they defined positional variants and concerns in relation to themselves and others privy to the interaction. This order could be discerned not merely by experts but by the speakers who produced it as they "accomplished" their conversations. Sociolinguists also developed fine-grained methods for the isolation of speech variables. Labov, having invented an array of techniques for eliciting talk in informal settings, used them inductively to index social class, showing how speakers shifted

norms of use according to interactional contexts. He concluded that the cadences and pronunciation of spoken language, even as they eschewed standard diction, were highly structured by a given speech community.

The pragmatics paradigm therefore no longer considered the way abstract rules govern a social order. Rather, anywhere sociologists or laypersons approached social life, they were making use of—in Sacks's succinct phrase—"order at all points."[39] Participant observation was not a specialist activity but was imbricated ad hoc within interaction. In given social settings, subjects constantly moved between participant and observer roles, shifting what Goffman would call "footing," aligning themselves with positions that were only provisional and not necessarily their own.[40] The turn to induction momentarily purged externalized reflective judgment from artistic and research methods, but it also entailed the incompleteness of conclusive statements. As Goffman contended, apprentices at a job were participant observers, and so were their mentors.[41] Sacks and Garfinkel discovered that suicide hotline responders were participant observers, and so were the callers. In the same years social theory moved away from a model where a professionalized "self" dissected a primitivized "other," performance-based conceptual artists began to examine and revise the common practices by which they reported on everyday interaction in and out of the art world.

Opposite and right:
Harvey Sacks. *Harvey's Film of a Party*, 1973. Frame enlargements from 16 mm composite Kodak Ektachrome color print. Courtesy Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

Goffman in Perspective: Performativity ≠ Performance; Participation Framework ≠ Communal Participation

At first glance, the "dramaturgical principles" in Goffman's earliest book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956) might seem like they should translate especially well to performance-based conceptual art, alongside theatrical and other kinds of performance. Consider the feminist performance artist Martha Wilson's attempt to make this translation in a recent interview:

> Vito Acconci came to the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design (NSCAD) and told me to read *The Performance of Self in Everyday Life*—no! That's an interesting slip right there. It was Erving Goffman's *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,* which is about how we are performing for multiple audiences: our selves, our notion of history, as well as the people in the room. Performance is at play at all times, and that is fascinating to me.[42]

In order to connect Goffman's performance with performance art, scholars and artists including Wilson abandoned the sociologist's notion that occasions afford different pragmatic opportunities. Their aim was to make room for a model where subjects perform or enact models of "selfhood" or where group events produce communal models of participation that could model alternative visions of the public sphere.[43] While one might be sympathetic to descriptions of "self-fashioning" when applied to the way activist and rights movements of the 1960s tried to scale up forms of personhood through public, often mediated, performances, Goffman's approach to social interaction, as well as the pragmatics tradition that followed, took a different tack. For Goffman, the performance of the self is collectively and strategically managed not by bodies but by occasions. And these occasions do not bestow identities upon subjects. Instead, they allow people to accomplish a kind of goal, one that is often merely the tactful maintenance of sociability through conversation or like-minded communicative rituals. As Goffman stated, he hoped to forego what he perceived to be social theory's focus on "men" in order to focus on the dynamics of "moments."[44]

For Goffman, just as interaction rituals are not occasions for the performance of selfhood, participation frameworks are not occasions for modeling communal participation or alternative versions of the public sphere. "Copresence," "co-participation," and his later use of "participation frameworks" have nothing to do with the participatory collectivism of the later 1960s.[45] Goffman's "copresence" and counterculture copresence were quite different.[46] Goffman uses the term *copresence* throughout *Behavior in Public Places* to stipulate the absolute minimum conditions for sociability, employing it explicitly in contrast to "co-participation."[47] He writes, "copresence renders persons uniquely accessible, available, and subject to one another." But, he continues, "public order, in its face to face aspects, has to do with the normative regulation of this accessibility."[48] This thesis is borne out over the course of the book and in his work on public interaction throughout the early 1960s as he adopted a metaphorics of Cold War game theory chock full of "chance taking" and "uncovering" and "counter-uncovering"

maneuvers. Here, as in his earlier *Encounters* (1961) or his essay "Cooling Out the Mark" (1952), agents operate out of strategic calculations around the management of information that can be used to discredit opponents or lure naive "marks" (victims) into webs of deception. At best, Goffman imagines the interaction order among strangers to be based on "mutual trust" where "voluntary coordination of action is achieved."[49] In sum, Goffman is not merely unconcerned with issues of participation or participatory democracy. He considers the sociological study of these models obtuse and self-fulfilling, actively working against them through the study of minor anecdotes, participant observation, and microanalysis.

The Inductive Turn: From Individual Performances and Group Participation to Participant Observation

Distinctions between performance and performativity and communal participation and participant observation are crucial for comparative historical purposes. They were precisely the ones conceptual artists in the *0–9* circle made salient by the end of the 1960s as they relinquished the structured theatricality of happenings, expanded cinema, and other mass-mediated public spectacles. As Piper described in August 1970, "events and happening-type situations often share many of the same limitations of other discrete forms." The trouble was that "when an artificial series of actions are performed, the viewer perceives a similarly incomplete end product." And, she contended, when the viewer becomes another artist, "the potential impact of the work is diminished," while "the role of the viewer is incomplete (being temporarily superseded by the role of 'participating artist')."[50] A few months later, in October 1970, she described how these open works were especially problematic when they failed to address an audience outside the art world.

> I don't entirely reject events or happening-type performance situations, only the ones that are self-referential or denotative in the way I've tried to specify. I tried to indicate this by using the term "discrete form" to define that quality of separateness, isolation, that art objects have. . . . The more non-art-world contacts I have, the more I become painfully aware of my cultural alienation from the rest of the society.[51]

No matter how seemingly open-ended and embracing happenings and expanded cinema tendencies may have been, they were still "discrete," providing bounded, time-based experiences for members of the art world and the counterculture.[52] Piper was looking for an everyday life for everyone else. As an alternative, she, Acconci, and other artists affiliated with the *0–9* journal opted to work from induction, altering their everyday conduct with

strangers in ways oftentimes barely noticeable in order to make inferences about interactional norms. Their immediate public took only passing notice of them, and their art world public would encounter these works after the fact.

Toward the end of her work on the *Hypothesis Series* (1968–1970), Piper conducted her first real-time artwork in the public domain, *Streetwork Streettracks I–II* at *Street Works II* (1969). She circled for nearly two hours along the outer periphery of the sidewalk, around and around a single block. But her promenade took place a week before the scheduled event. She tape-recorded this initial walk, and a week later, on the evening of *Street Works II*, she walked on the inner periphery of the block for only one hour, playing back the tape recording of the previous week at double speed.[53]

On tape, we hear the artist tell friends on the street that she is in the process of recording them and that her two-part performance will "compress time and space." The work takes the temporal and spatial documentation of the photo charts and graphs of the *Hypothesis Series* and reorders them in real time by using the tape recorder's playback option. But in a departure from previous conceptual art that dealt with spatial displacement, her circular walking along inner and outer rings of the sidewalk figures the activity of the tape as it moves through the cassette, thereby creating an isomorphism between her performance and its recording.[54] By telling her friends she was recording them or by playing her street recording back to the street, Piper announced herself as a new kind of *flâneur*—one who, instead of responding to the live stimulation of the city, would receive, filter, and feed it back to an audience through her recording equipment.

Yet by 1971, after completing her *Catalysis Series*, Piper was seeking ways of observing city life that neither resorted to technical reportage nor engaged in comical, outlandish behavior.[55] Accounting for her early efforts to make art on the street with passersby, she described how she was no longer "overly defining [her]self to viewers as artwork by performing any unusual or theatrical *actions* of any kind."[56] These actions, she wrote, "tend to define the situation in terms of the pre-established categories of 'guerilla theater,' 'event,' 'happening,' 'streetwork,' etc., making disorientation and catalysis more difficult." Those forms were already recognizable, classifiable, and understood as art. "More recently the work seems to be changing direction somewhat," she continued; "I'm not titling pieces anymore because I can't find anything descriptively adequate."[57]

These later untitled works have received scant attention because there is no documentation of them except for Piper's own diaristic recollections. Nevertheless, they are remarkable for the way they position "sociologists"

in relation to their subject par excellence: the stigmatized individual. In one untitled work, Piper talked to herself while walking on the street, making those who could hear her the object of her monologue. "Whatever I'm saying," she wrote, "may or may not be coherent." As she explained, she was still working with her "own set of rules that supplies inner consistency to my external actions"—that is, an extension of LeWitt's command to plan and execute the conceptual artwork in sequence. Meanwhile, "there is a public audience to which my actions appear meaningless or insane."[58] Hers was therefore not necessarily a progressive model of social-scientific fieldwork. At the same time, like much of Acconci's work around public masturbation and self-mutilation, Piper substituted the earlier poetic or liberatory valences around the "meaningless or insane" with rule breaking, stigma, schizophrenia, and the institutionalization of mental illness.[59]

Another artwork for which Piper has provided more textual detail extends her monologue piece by engaging another person in conversation. Piper describes how here she "attempt[ed] to draw as much of a person's life history, feelings, opinions, etc., out of simple random encounters, while simultaneously effacing [her] own personality."[60] Goffman classifies these attempts to glean more information from a stranger as "access rituals" taking place within "open regions" ("physically bounded places where 'any' two persons, acquainted or not, have a right to initiate face to face engagement for the purpose of extending face to face salutations").[61] In such rituals, one person leaves "slots" within turns for the interlocutor to offer personal information about him- or herself.[62] As Goffman points out, salutations among strangers almost always serve connotative—or socially prag-

Adrian Piper. *Catalysis IV*, 1970. Detail of performance documentation showing one of five silver-gelatin photographs (16 × 16 in. [40.6 × 40.6 cm] each). Photo: Rosemary Mayer. Collection of the Generali Foundation, Vienna. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin and Generali Foundation.

matic—rather than denotative purposes: "When A asks B how he is feeling, the questioning is not to be taken literally, a question is not being asked, a greeting is being extended."[63] Reporting on the success of her own extended greetings, Piper writes, "the longest and most complete personality situation I have encountered has been that of an elderly woman who travels back and forth on the Second Avenue bus."[64] The woman had "spent a lot of time at Bellevue" and because of severe arthritis often "lies down" when waiting for the bus. "She wears two left shoes, one of which has a high heel missing." Piper's description goes on to relate a bleak tale of the woman's estrangement from her "certified-public-accountant-son" and an isolated life traversing the city in circles via public transportation.

The woman's story of her estranged accountant child allegorizes Piper's abandonment of her early work within the "administrative logic" of conceptual art. The hellish circling of the city, block by block, belies a return of the repressed: a rude awakening to the lumpen precarity of wandering around the city by actual residents, concealed up to this point by the circular *flânerie* of the utopian *Street Works* events barely two years prior.

Conversation Analysis, Members' Methods, and the "Dialogue" Problem

Piper's untitled performance on the city bus where she drew another passenger into conversation might seem like an attempt to engage in a dialogue with a stranger. But there is a problem here. Like *performance* and *participation*, *dialogue* also became a synonym for the liberatory potential of group encounters. Although scholars have weighed in on the pitfalls and promises of relational aesthetics, participatory art, social engagement, and social practice art, little attention has been given to the structuring function of conversation. Even when allied with the Bakhtinian notion of the "dialogic," most discussions stay close to an everyday sense of "dialogue" as a symmetrical form of exchange among participants. However, Bakhtin and his circle were hardly concerned with ambiguity or the indeterminacy of communal dialogue as a good in itself.[65] Rather, they recognized that social forces always already condition the multiple meanings of utterances and that texts, artists, authors, and speakers use heteroglossic or polyvocal forms (artworks, texts, or otherwise) as a part of their repertoire of interested social interaction. Inherently "feel-good" and democratic qualities associated with a term like *dialogue*, which spans theories of communication and common sense, distort the way performance-based conceptual artists treated "conversation" as they inherited the pragmatics tradition of conversation analysis.

Long before *0–9* turned conclusively to conceptual art, its contributors tried to make art out of multiparty talk. In his instructions for *A Simultaneity*

for People (1961), the Fluxus poet Mac Low describes how "any person in a room may begin the action by making any vocal utterance. Other people in the room may make utterances or be silent at any time after the beginning." As his directions continue, it becomes clear that *simultaneity* merely describes ordinary conversation during a meeting or gathering. Already in 1955, Mac Low's *Methods for Reading*, published in 1968 in the fourth issue of *0–9*, scripted and indicated the lengths of pauses between utterances and ways of marking the simultaneity of overlapping speakers.[66] In the same issue, the musician Philip Corner, another member of the Cage coterie, described his method of isolating qualitative features from selected sound strips according to their class ("talk" was one of the classes listed). By finding associations among them according to the "smoothness or abruptness within this class," he could splice and overlay the sounds into a composition.[67]

In the next issue of the journal, the poet and organizer of *Street Works*, John Perreault, published his notes for his performance *Alternatives*; the notes state, "I am interested in psycholinguistics and 'The Cocktail Party Problem' (i.e. given several sources of information, how are we able to separate out one source from other sources)."[68] And, from 1969 to 1970, David Antin, who had been a linguistics graduate student at City College New York, made *The Conversationalist*. One of the few artists in the exhibition *Software* who eschewed the sender-receiver model of communication, Antin describes how he wanted to show how, in turn taking, speakers take up previous utterances as a way of aligning themselves toward the attitudes and expressions of other speakers in the conversation.[69]

In the sixth and final issue of the journal, Lee Lozano published her *Dialogue Piece* (begun in 1969). Inviting people to her loft to talk, she stated explicitly that "The purpose of this *piece* is to have dialogues, not to make a *piece*. No recordings or notes are made during dialogues, which existed solely for their own sake as joyous social occasions."[70] Yet, over the course of the following years, she kept a log of these conversations that both reported how she and various members of the art world accomplished a "dialogue" or "trialogue." She reviewed how invited members used avoidance



David Antin. *The Conversationalist*, 1970. Photo: Harry Shunk and Janos Kender.

tactics, displayed intimacy, or talked with discomfort. Using a wealth of slang and art-world jargon, she reported on "encounters" marked, in her words, by "exquisite," "terrific," "sluggish," "dense," and "long intense talk without too much tension." Oftentimes she described her conversations through a druggy psychoactive vocabulary where one conversant "empties out" or "douses" their information onto the other. We rarely are privy to what was said in these conversations, but seemingly her lay practices of reporting or accounting remained a central feature of the project.

This brief trajectory of the *0–9* circle's approach to conversation suggests a turn from the structuring of parameters in advance of, or during, an event by way of scripting and improvisation toward a new attentiveness to recording, reporting, and accounting for them during the moment of their occurrence or after the fact. Crucially, these studies were all aimed at the explanatory capacities of members—at what Garfinkel would describe as "ad hocing," "glossing," or "artful practices." As witnessed in Lozano's dialogue piece or the descriptions Piper offered of her projects, we see efforts at explanation throughout conceptual art as artists tried to define the parameters of their work at the moment they worked through them. For instance, Lozano's *Clarification Piece* (1969), reads "MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION

DIALOGUE PIECE (CONT. P.45A) 46A.

NOV. 20, 69 - FINALLY A GROUP DIALOGUE, GARY BOWER BRINGS KIDS FROM ART RESOURCES CENTER OF WHITNEY MUS, FOR A TERRIFIC EXPERIENCE FOR ME. ABOUT 18 KIDS. TALK MOSTLY TO A BOY* WHO'S GOING BACK TO HIS FARM IN MICH., SAID HE'S THE ONLY ONE WHO'S NOT STAYING IN N.Y.C. OF HIS GROUP. SAID MINE OF ALL THEIR SYMPOSIUMS SO FAR WAS MOST "DISORDERLY," THE LEAST "STRICT."
*BILL GOERS.

NOV. 28, 69 - DR & MRS. MILTON BRUTTEN FROM PHILADELPHIA. DR. BRUTTEN, A CHILD PSYCHOLOGIST, WANTED TO TALK ABOUT ART & I WANTED TO TALK ABT PSYCHOLOGY, WHICH SEEMS LIKE THE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO A GOOD DIALOGUE.

DEC 4, 69 - FRED GUTZEIT & I HAVE INSTANT GOOD SCORPIO COMMUNICATION.

DEC 5, 69 - AGNES DENES TELLS ME ABT DIALECTIC TRIANGULATION, HER DO-IT-YRSELF PHILOSOPHY.

DEC 5, 69 - ERIC, A STUDENT, COMES BY WITH KALTENBACH & THE DIALOGUE IS MOSTLY NON-VERBAL.

DEC 8, 69 - ED SHOSTAK, AN OLD FRIEND, GIVES A VERY GENEROUS & HIGH-INFO DIALOGUE WHICH I ENJOYED.

DEC 12, 69 - GARY BOWER RETN'S FOR A 7-HR DIALOGUE THIS TIME. I THANK HIM FOR LETTING ME GET OUT SO MANY IDEAS.

DEC 13, 69 - LEFTY (SEBASTIAN) ADLER & I WERE JUST GETTING INTO A DIALOGUE WHEN BOB STANLEY WHO BROUGHT HIM DRAGS HIM AWAY.

DEC 18, 69 - DINE AT ED & CINDY FELDMAN'S WHERE THE MOST EXQUISITE DIALOGUE TAKES PLACE.

BETWEEN A PIECE AS AN ACT OR SERIES (SET) OF ACTS IN TIME, & THE WRITE-UP OF A PIECE WHICH OCCURS ONLY WHEN THERE IS OCCASION TO SHOW THE WRITE-UP (EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY IN THE FORM USUALLY OF LETTERS TO INDIVIDUALS)." Despite the stated intentions of the piece, Lozano goes on to riddle her "clarification" with footnotes and addendums that draw out the various addressees, problems, and expectations involved in "writing up" a clarification in the art world. For instance, in the footnotes at the bottom of the drawing, she writes that the "clear distinction" should be made not in general but "to Marcia Tucker," the curator who had just championed "process art" in similar terms.[71] She goes on to claim, "all write ups are drawings," but tacks on the addenda that sometimes these pieces may be called "investigations" or "experiments" within the right circles. She limits her clarification to maintain the naive purity of her early work, "which will remain undisclosed" to give it added cachet. And the drawings will be either infinitely reproducible or one of a kind, except when they are neither, as when a few carbon copies or Xerox copies are allowed. Through her mock efforts to govern her work through preestablished rules, Lozano "respecified"—


LEE LOZANO 60 GRAND ST. N.Y.C. 10013

(QUOTE) - BLOW YR NOSE TO BREATHE CLEARLY. BLOW YR MIND TO THINK CLEARLY.

CLARIFICATION PIECE (JULY 28, 69)

MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION‡ BETWEEN A PIECE AS AN ACT OR SERIES (SET) OF ACTS IN TIME, & THE WRITE-UP* OF A PIECE WHICH OCCURS ONLY WHEN THERE IS OCCASION TO SHOW THE WRITE-UP (EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY IN THE FORM USUALLY OF LETTERS TO INDIVIDUALS).

FIRST WRITE-UP OF A PIECE: DRAWING* FOR LUCY'S PEACE SHOW (FEB 28, 69).

SOME EARLY PIECES† EITHER WRITTEN UP LATER OR NOT YET WRITTEN UP:

THE JAN 1, 68 TO DEC 31, 69 OR 70 PIECE: INFO FOR THIS PIECE WAS BEGUN TO BE COLLECTED ON JAN 1, 68.

INVESTMENT PIECE (JAN 15, 69). INITIATED AS A PIECE & DESCRIBED VERBALLY AS A PIECE FROM DATE OF INVESTMENT (JAN 15, 69) TO DATE OF WRITE-UP (FOR DWAN LANGUAGE III SHOW, MAY 19, 69).

PILE YOUR READING MATERIAL PIECE (BEGUN AS INTEREST IN ALREADY EXISTING ACCRETION INCREASED, ABT EARLY 68). DESCRIBED VERBALLY AS A PIECE DURING 68.

TV PIECE (APRIL 13, 68 TO JULY 9, 68).

NIGHT SKY SHOW PIECE (APR 11, 68). DESCRIBED VERBALLY AS A PIECE TO BE IMAGINED, 68 & 69.

ETC.

‡ TO MARCIA TUCKER AFTER DIALOGUE JULY 28, 69.
* ALL WRITE-UPS OF PIECES ARE DRAWINGS, ← PLEASE NOTE!
† SOMETIMES CALLED INVESTIGATIONS, OR EXPERIMENTS.
SUBJECT TO REMAIN UNDISCLOSED UNTIL COMPLETION.
THIS IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A ONE-OF-A-KIND° (HAND) PRINTED (PIECE OF) MATTER & PRINTED MATTER, WHICH IS REPRODUCED MATTER.
° I GOTTA ALLOW A FEW CARBON COPIES, OR ZEROX COPIES.

Opposite: Lee Lozano. *Dialogue Piece (Part 1 of 7)*, 1969. Ink on notebook paper. © The Estate of Lee Lozano and Wadsworth Atheneum Museum of Art, Hartford, CT. Courtesy Hauser & Wirth.

Right: Lee Lozano. *Clarification Piece*, 1969. Carbon with colored pen. © The Estate of Lee Lozano. Courtesy Hauser & Wirth.

to use the language of ethnomethodology—the clarity of concept and execution as an accomplishment of the market, curators, and herself. "Clarification" arises only in completely muddled fashion according to the practices of the art world rather than from some transcontextual source. The use of slang, qualifiers, and cross references in Lozano's drawings marks a turn away from the metasemantic frameworks conceptual artists were using (e.g., LeWitt's predetermined execution, Kosuth's *Tautologies*) toward metapragmatics; that is, from a discussion of the syntax or structure of the artwork toward an awareness of its functions and constraints in the art world.

In similar fashion, although with less biting sarcasm, Piper tried to analyze the ways she accounted for her artistic activities. In *Phillip Zohn Catalysis*, for instance, she recorded, memorized, and subsequently recited her part of a lengthy telephone conversation. Over the course of the initial conversation she explained her current artworks in the midst of other events in her everyday life. Playing the recording back and reciting her earlier report to her friend Zohn provided a way of analyzing her report—that is, how she was making sense of her art in conversation with other people. But Piper also tried to figure out how "members' methods" of glossing worked in natural talk among strangers so that she might be able to borrow them to report on her own artworks or derive new works from them. In a journal entry from 1973, she describes a scene witnessed in Washington Square.

> Wednesday I was sitting at the park with Robert and his sister Susan. A very tall black man came down the path from University Place. He wore a grimy blue pea-coat, black knickers, and knee-length leather boots. He looked very seedy. His hair was twisted into a thousand little 2"-long braids, which stuck straight out all over his head, giving a pincushion effect. He had an untrimmed beard, his eyes were bloodshot. He walked w/a swagger & smiled broadly. He was talking to himself in a loud singsong voice. Another, seedier looking man sitting on a bench asked him as he passed whether he could spare a few cents. Perhaps the second man was nearsighted. The first stopped, laughed, and said very loudly,
>
> "How can you take some cents from a man who got no sense? Huh? You know what I mean? Right? You can' take nothin from a crazy man, you know? Cause no cents is nonsense, so it's all the same to me, you dig?"
>
> He then continued down the path, walking slowly, occasionally stopping in front of bench occupants, continually repeating, "No cents is nonsense, right brother? Amean lahk you can' take nothin from a crazy man, you dig, you dig? If he's crazy, don' matter what you do. You CAN' take nothin from ME man, you know whata mean?"

> I was really dumbfounded. He had done it—achieved a near perfect balance of behavior and self-consciousness. His knowledge, articulated in vociferous language, gave him almost total control. I thought of the piece I'd done about a year and a half ago where I moved slowly down the street holding a continual, semi-coherent monologue and making any passerby the object of my talking without altering the subject matter or style of my delivery. My piece suffered by comparison. This man's performance seemed poetic; divinely inspired, in contrast to my own dry, overintellectualized effort. It seems that the tension he achieved had a lot to do with the degree to which he could both EXPRESS his state of mind and also self-consciously acknowledge it.[72]

Piper was "dumbfounded" because the witnessed "performance" resolved a nagging issue in her art. Until then, she had applied a set of parameters for her performances beforehand and tested them out on the street, recording and reporting her results to friends or, infrequently, to gallery and museum audiences. But her attempts to structure interaction in this manner had fallen on the deaf ears of strangers on the street and art-world audiences alike. As she writes in the passage, her art was "dry" and "overintellectualized." Here, however, she discovered that in routine interaction members drew on the resources of their language during their conversations to characterize the social setting at hand. And even the most materially resource-poor vagrant seemed to be able to do this with a certain amount of ordinary creativity, punning on "no cents" and "nonsense" to draw attention to the dark humor of another vagrant asking him for money.

Through capitals and respellings, Piper even seems to have tried her hand at the sorts of innovative transcription methods developed for conversation analysis by Sacks and Jefferson at the same moment.[73] Furthermore—and this is why the story serves as a kind of self-styled origin myth for her later treatment of race relations in pragmatic interaction—because the vagrant had access to the indexicality and reflexivity of language, he could use the membership categorization device, "crazy," as a way of framing his interaction. He was a self-proclaimed "crazy man." He did not, however, apply the category of "crazy man" abstractly as a stereotype. Instead, he used it to point out the absurdity of being panhandled. Although this particular employment of a membership categorization device is somewhat humorous, Piper would discover a litany of more sinister uses in the coming decades.[74]

Order at All Points?

The elective affinities between conceptual art at the turn of the 1970s and concurrent developments in social theory revolved around their shifting

reliance on ethnographic formats for participant observation and inferential approaches to rule-governed interaction. But for all their affinities, what separated their efforts?

One answer lies in the dilemma of professionalization. Mainstream sociologists regarded pragmatics as dissident, even referring to it as "countercultural," for the way it challenged paternalistic models of participant observation and speculative, "armchair" theorizing.[75] By contrast, conceptual artists used a repertoire of invented ethnographic research methods to break ties with the counterculture, to eschew their status as dissidents, and to align with intellectuals, a turn we might read as a symptom of the neo-avant-garde's assimilation within the academy. A second area of divergence concerns creativity. Pragmatics dealt with creativity through ethnopoetics, folkloric investigations into the emergence of prosody and aesthetic form in the everyday rituals of nonartists. Meanwhile, even as they sought ways of addressing everyday life, conceptual artists overlooked the issue of everyday creativity because of a binary that structured their field at the time between noncreative conceptual art and creative expressionism.

A third question concerns the practice we might call "ethnographic conceptualism," a rejoinder to a long discussion among artists, art historians, and social theorists about the art-ethnography nexus.[76] Ethnomethodologists were searching for the norms and assumptions that undergirded—and were in turn generated by—routine interaction. They placed their emphases on new methods for gathering and interpreting data. Conceptual artists never made these goals explicit and instead seemed content merely to call attention to situations where a social order might emerge. They produced conversations, and even conversational transcripts, but they were loath to analyze them in any systematic way. In this light, their artistic methods thus seem amateur by comparison. But the artists also raise the possibility of a kind of productive negligence in research.[77] For instance, Piper and Lozano found means of engaging social dynamics that were less predictable than Garfinkel's breaching experiments. Lozano asked unassuming guests at her loft to take money from a kitchen jar as if it were candy; Piper imagined clever rebuttals to an argument her friend might make, and then, while in line at the post office, would drift into these scenes, taking up the facial expressions and gesticulations of the projected situation. Although this is far from the kind of surrealist juxtaposition James Clifford once pointed to as a way of innovating ethnographic methods, the casual nature of their investigations expanded the range of situations and repertoire of research, leading to truths about interaction unanticipated by ethnomethodology.[78]

The vestiges of Piper's early performances appear obliquely in her later writing as a moral philosopher. She marshals the open-ended investigations

of the *Street Works* and *Catalysis* projects as thought experiments. To separate dogmatists from solipsists in a discussion about how people deceive themselves through "pseudorationality," she employs the following philosophical example:

> Suppose, then, that you are in New York, making your way down West Broadway, where anything may happen, and you suddenly encounter—what? It is large, mottled gray, prickly, shapeless . . . you have at the disposal of your current perspective certain concepts . . . but it is not immediately evident which one would suffice in these circumstances.[79]

Here, Piper returns to the breaching experiments she conducted at the start of the 1970s in order to point out the failures of dogmatists to consider experiences that do not fit into their rigid concepts of norms and rules. Nevertheless, by the time she settled into a career as a professional philosopher, having finished her doctoral work with the political philosopher John Rawls, she hewed closely to just the kinds of social theory models from which her earlier work seemed to break away. For instance, she argued in 1985, "Conscious behavior is *norm-governed* if it is caused by a disposition, normatively instilled in the process of socialization."[80] The uptake of Piper's "ethnographic conceptualism" in her philosophical thought experiments and subsequent renunciation of these projects leads to the question of the legacy of this significant break in method shared by artists and social scientists.

The turn to induction was short lived. By the mid-1970s, social theorists became preoccupied with models of parallaxic reflexivity wherein critical distance and a reified sense of the roles of participant and observer were perpetually monitored for their attentiveness to difference, moral turpitude, and overidentification.[81] Meanwhile, artists lost interest in communicative pragmatics altogether. Questions of interactional performativity gave way to fetishizing documents and detritus left over from individual performances. Artists began to act out social roles, identities, and reifications of the body. While some issued overt critiques of the art institution and the postmodern culture industry, others turned to the expressive potential of the mediums and the market success this return to order entailed. Despite the seemingly divergent political and aesthetic drives behind each of these approaches that followed, they marked a collective move away from the inductive methods I have outlined toward a renewed reliance on the allegorical potential of symbolic form.

The current emphasis on a priori categories of identity and notions of scripted performance return us to the fixed systems of an earlier, Taylorizing approach to social life. Even as Piper received the Golden Lion

at the 2015 Venice Biennial, her reputation may be ultimately damaged by the occlusion of her earlier practice by those who want to make her art into a token of a social type. The art of induction is compelling for just the opposite reason, because it refuses discrete action, goal-oriented intervention, and rational choice. Instead of telling us what we already know by explicating a priori premises, the method infers order as it emerges experientially and provisionally in interaction. It therefore lies closer to inconspicuous forms of biopolitical governance, closer to the reflexive monitoring of comportment as it becomes habituated into social life. Attuned to these developments, the art of induction—in the words of Charles Sanders Peirce—is a kind of "ampliative" reasoning, breaching the fixation of belief.[82]

Notes

1. Piper specifies that the 1970 section of the series was titled *Catalysis III* and that the second performance at Macy's in 1971 is untitled. She discusses both iterations in Adrian Piper, "Talking to Myself: The Ongoing Autobiography of an Art Object" (1970–1973), in *Out of Order, Out of Sight*, vol. 1, *Selected Writings in Meta-Art, 1968–1992* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 46.

2. William Labov, *The Social Stratification of English in New York City* (Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1966); and William Labov, *Sociolinguistic Patterns* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972).

3. In 2006, as part of their "Lost Literature" series, Ugly Duckling Presse republished the entire *0–9* journal along with its supplemental issues. The republication coincided with a renewed interest in the figures associated with the journal, witnessed in Gwen Allen's anecdotal history of *0–9* and its material culture in her work on conceptual-art magazines. Gwen Allen, "Art on and off the Page: *0–9*, 1967–1969," in *Artists' Magazines: An Alternative Space for Art* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 69–90. Liz Kotz gives an account of *0–9*'s important place in spanning minimalism, concrete poetry, and performance art in her study of the various uses of language in the art of the 1960s. Liz Kotz, "Poetry from Object to Action," in *Words to Be Looked At: Language in 1960s Art* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 135–74. Craig Dworkin has used the *0–9* group to advance a notion of "Conceptual Writing," a new form of "nonexpressive" speculative writing. See Craig Dworkin, introduction to *Language to Cover a Page: The Early Writings of Vito Acconci* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith, eds., *Against Expression: An Anthology of Conceptual Writing* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011); and Craig Dworkin, *No Medium* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).

4. Paul Erickson, Judy L. Klein, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, Thomas Sturm, and Michael D. Gordin, "Enlightenment Reason, Cold War Rationality, and the Rule of Rules," in *How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 27–50.

5. Recently scholars have begun to show how these images became available for interpretation and misreading as they traversed disciplinary boundaries. See Fred Turner, *The Democratic Surround* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); and Seth Barry Watter, "Scrutinizing: Film and the Microanalysis of Behavior," *Grey Room*, no. 66 (Winter 2017): 32–69.

6. Alloway's archive contains photocopied essays by Edward T. Hall on proxemics (Getty Research Institute Special Collections Archives, Lawrence Alloway Papers, Box 14, Folder 14). Vito Acconci's notebooks provide evidence that he read Hall and Lewin (Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York, Vito Acconci Notebooks from 1969–1970). Further commentary on this association may be found in Vito Acconci, "Early Work: Moving My Body into Place," *Avalanche* 6 (1972): 7; and Kate Linker, *Vito Acconci* (New York, 1994), 30–34. For a contrasting reading of Acconci's assimilation of Hall and Goffman in the wake of happenings, see Tom McDonough, "The Crimes of the Flâneur," *October* 102 (Fall 2002): 101–22. Martha Wilson discusses Goffman's influence on a generation of performance artists in the 1970s in Martha Wilson, *Martha Wilson Sourcebook* (New York: Independent Curators International, 2011), 44. Michael Corris has collected documentation relating to Art and Language's investigations into conversational pragmatics and the use of language in the art

world. Getty Research Institute Special Collections Archives, Michael Corris Papers of the Art and Language New York Group, 1965–2002, Box 1, Folder 37.

7. Proxemics, Hall's 1960s research into the effects of personal distance on behavior, became a useful source for conceptual artists as they sought to frame their own location. In *The Hidden Dimension* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), Hall drew charts according to "intimate," "personal," "social-consultive," and "public" domains, a series of concentric circles radiating out from the individual, each affording different kinds of conduct, which conceptual artists borrowed from both implicitly and explicitly. Acconci, for instance, used both Lewin's topological diagrams and an uncredited photograph from Hall's example of "perfect contact behavior": "Male Walruses sleeping among Rocks on Round Island." Acconci's *Proximity Piece* (1970), realized at the exhibition *Software* at the Jewish Museum in the fall of 1970, drew on proxemics theory most directly. Acconci stood at measured distances from museum-going strangers, crowding their "personal space," as Hall had termed it. Although Goffman discusses personal space in many of his works throughout the 1950s and 1960s, he would not write of how "a gallery goer can expect that when he is close to a picture, other patrons will make some effort to walk around his line of vision" until 1971. Erving Goffman, *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 35.

8. McDonough, 113–17. Acconci's work does not exactly deal with the way coparticipation is mediated through interaction. Rather, it treats the way interaction is mediated by actual, physical bodies; that is, bodies considered as media themselves. He transposes Goffman's treatment of "civil inattention" (the privacy strangers bestow upon each other) to his analyses of shadowing and "lurk-lines," glancing, "corporeal excreta," and "implosive" breathing. I would characterize Acconci as being more broadly interested in what Goffman describes as the fluidity between "anonymous" (stranger) and "anchored" (personal) relations, and in the role of the body in mediating the two.

9. David W. Bernstein, *The San Francisco Tape Music Center: 1960s Counterculture and the Avant-garde* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008), 187.

10. Uses of surveys in conceptual art include the preparations for *Information* (1970) an international exhibition of conceptual art at MoMA where McShine, the curator, asked each participating artist to fill out a questionnaire about the meaning of information. As part of *Information*, Haacke made *MoMA Poll* (1970), which asked visitors to respond to a posted question about Governor Nelson Rockefeller's passive support for the American invasion of mainland Southeast Asia by dropping a ballot in one of two Plexiglas boxes. Subsequently in 1972, Haacke asked visitors to Documenta 5 to fill out sociological surveys about themselves. At the same moment, Siegelaub and the lawyer Robert Projansky wrote the *Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement*, meant to protect and standardize the exchange of artworks. They solicited responses about its utility from a variety of conceptual artists via survey.

11. Alexander Alberro, "Reconsidering Conceptual Art, 1966–1977," in *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), xvi–xxvii.

12. Sol LeWitt, "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art," *Artforum* 5, no. 10 (Summer 1967): 80. Rosalind Krauss's poststructuralist reading of LeWitt revises earlier interpretations of his work and of postminimal and conceptual art in general that described LeWitt and his peers' work as purely rational or the manifestation of thought itself. Rosalind Krauss, "Sense and

Sensibility: Reflections on Post 60's Sculpture," *Artforum* 12, no. 3 (November 1973): 43–53; and Rosalind Krauss, "LeWitt in Progress," *October* 6 (Autumn 1978): 46–60.

13. Joseph Kosuth, "Art after Philosophy," *Studio International* 178 (1969): 915–17, reprinted in *Joseph Kosuth, Art after Philosophy and After: Collected Writings, 1966–1990*, ed. Gabrielle Guercio (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Lucy Lippard and James Chandler, "The Dematerialization of Art," *Art International* 12 (February 1968): 120; and Joseph Kosuth, Frederick Barthelme, and Donald Karshan, eds., *Conceptual Art and Conceptual Aspects* (New York: New York Cultural Center, 1970). For a detailed history of Art and Language, see Robert Bailey, *Art and Language International: Conceptual Art between Art Worlds* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).

14. Sol LeWitt, "Sentences on Conceptual Art," *0–9*, no. 5 (1969): 3.

15. LeWitt, "Sentences on Conceptual Art," 5.

16. The critic Ursula Meyer coined the phrase "analytic conceptual art" to describe Kosuth and Art and Language in her early anthology of the movement. Ursula Meyer, "Introduction," in *Conceptual Art*, ed. Ursula Meyer (New York: Dutton, 1972), xviii.

17. For immediate evidence of this kind of tampering, witness the works of Rosemary Mayer, Dan Graham, or Robert Smithson in these *0–9* issues. For instance, in Graham's *Discrete Scheme without Memory* (1969), which appeared in the fourth issue of the journal, something seems amiss, and we quickly realize that he has introduced errors into serialized processes. Building on Jasper Johns's stenciled number paintings, Graham enumerates the integers 0 through 9 according to their order. But instead of repeating the sequence in linear fashion, he provides a set of every possible pair of numbers from 0 through 9. The "discrete scheme" takes the shape of a triangle where each new integer provides one more combinatory possibility than the one above it. The scheme is "without memory," though, because it has forgotten something: On the right side of the third line from the top of the triangle, Graham has placed a "1" where a "2" should go, creating a repetitive stutter that leaves one of the number pairs, "2" over "2," missing. This might seem like a careless error on the artist's part, but when we look at a contemporaneous number scheme he drew up and eventually self-published in *End Moments*, we witness a similar error on the second line, right side where a "0" appears where a "1" should be.

18. By the fourth issue of *0–9* (June 1968), OuLiPo, Fluxus, and concrete poetry appear alongside the serial progressions of Graham and LeWitt, marking the first appearance of conceptual art in the journal, which abruptly became its primary focus for the remainder of its run. Both Julia Robinson and Branden Joseph trace a history from Fluxus to conceptual art, unacknowledged by conceptual artists themselves. Robinson uses the event scores of George Brecht as a through-line, and Joseph discusses Fluxus as a precursor to conceptual art both through the musical avant-garde's adoption of visual and linguistic notation, what he terms "the social turn," and in the "concept art" of Henry Flynt. Julia Robinson, "From Abstraction to Model: George Brecht's Events and the Conceptual Turn in Art of the 1960s," *October*, no. 127 (Winter 2009): 77–108; and Branden Joseph, *Beyond the Dream Syndicate: Tony Conrad and the Arts after Cage* (New York: Zone Books, 2008).

19. LeWitt, "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art," 80.

20. When Morton Feldman, Mac Low, Simone Forti, Dick Higgins, and Philip Corner (among other Fluxus-affiliated artists) contributed to *0–9*, their work was forced to conform to the format of the journal, where their chance operations inevitably functioned at a textual

remove. In the second issue, folkloric transcriptions of Andamanese and Semang songs replace the earlier reliance on "Moksha" or Zen, just as translations of Raymond Queneau's *Exercises in Style*—which tell the story of a bus ride altercation in ninety-nine ways—replaces the score. The shifts from borrowing from the I-Ching toward printing a catalogue of indigenous folk music from "experimental translations under a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research" or from performing spontaneously in the midst of a happening toward Queneau's reporting an event in distinct styles ("notationally," "metaphorically," "precisely," according to a word game) seem significant. The journal presents the live event at a temporal or geographic distance, as a proposal or document. This has the effect of both canonizing the Fluxus artists and providing a lineage for new forms of concrete poetry, performance, and, ultimately, conceptual art that for the most part did not rely on the auratic immediacy of the closed concert.

21. Michael Fried uses the phrase "deductive structures" to characterize the work of color field painters whose initial decisions (i.e., the size of the brush) determine the parsing of the canvas (i.e., into quadrant or chevron compositions). Michael Fried, "Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella" (1965), reprinted in Michael Fried, *Art and Objecthood* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 252.

22. John Bowles, *Adrian Piper: Race, Gender, and Embodiment* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011) 108.

23. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Kabyle House or the World Reversed" (1963), in *The Logic of Practice* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 271–83.

24. LeWitt, "Paragraphs," 80.

25. Benjamin Buchloh, "Conceptual Art 1962–1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the Critique of Institutions," *October* 55 (Winter 1990): 105–43.

26. The use of the temporary office in *Hypothesis #14* may be productively contrasted with feminist artists who brought the routines of domestic household labor to bear on the procedures of conceptual art. See Helen Molesworth, "House Work and Art Work," *October* 92 (Spring 2000): 71–97; and "Artist Project: Mierle Laderman Ukeles Maintenance Art Activity (1973) with Responses from Miwon Kwon and Helen Molesworth," *Documents* 10 (Fall 1997): 5–30.

27. Adrian Piper, "Personal Chronology," *Adrian Piper: A Retrospective*, ed. Maurice Berger (College Park, MD: Fine Arts Gallery, University of Maryland, 1999), 188. Rosemary Mayer quotes Piper on the gendered dimension of clerical work: "The satisfaction of the job is nothing, but the satisfaction in being an attractive sex object is paramount because there are so many young people there and most of the women have jobs like receptionists, file clerks, secretaries." Rosemary Mayer, "Performance and Experience," *Arts* 47 (March 1973): 34.

28. Kathi Weeks*, The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 74.

29. Goffman describes how "in many business offices, for example, one can find half-shielded washstands where a secretary can look into a mirror to apply make-up, comb her hair . . . being able to indulge in a degree of auto-involvement not elsewhere permitted." Erving Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 66.

30. Consider the radical refusal of recognition and subsumption proposed by the feminist-Marxists writing in the midst of the Wages for Housework campaign: "We say that women must overthrow the relation of domestic-work-time to non-domestic-time." Mariarosa Dalla

Costa and Selma James, *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community* (London: Falling Wall Press, 1972), 38.

31. "Collective effervescence" is the transgressive, creative, liberating force of religious rituals, which leads individuals to feel as though they are inextricably bound to a collective group. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. K.E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995). In his writings throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the anthropologist Victor Turner transposed Durkheim's model to counterculture happenings, be-ins, and psychotropic experience. Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 138.

32. David Silverman, *Harvey Sacks: Social Science and Conversation Analysis* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998); John Heritage, *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1984); and John Heritage, "Goffman, Garfinkel and Conversation Analysis," in *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, ed. M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, and S. Yates (London: Sage, 1984), 47–56.

33. Goffman offers his most succinct account of "the interaction order," a concept developed over the course of his career, in Erving Goffman, "The Interaction Order: American Sociological Association, 1982 Presidential Address," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 1 (February 1983): 1–17.

34. Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), 32.

35. This position may be contrasted with the use of "performativity" in "Ordinary Language Philosophy." J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice deduced the meaning of utterances in context through invented examples at the same time Goffman was using data culled from the world of hearsay, novels, press clippings, and ethnographic fieldwork.

36. Harold Garfinkel, "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," in *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

37. Garfinkel, "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," 69.

38. Garfinkel, "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," 74.

39. Harvey Sacks, *Lectures on Conversation, Vol. 1*, ed. Gail Jefferson (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 484.

40. Erving Goffman, "Footing," in *Forms of Talk* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 124–59.

41. "What for the professional is literally work is for the apprentice, an opportunity to practice. And of course there is also participant-observation at least done with prior self-disclosure." Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 75.

42. Martha Wilson, "First Lady of Performance Art: Martha Wilson with Jarrett Earnest," *Brooklyn Rail*, 5 November 2014, 35.

43. For the art historian Amelia Jones, Goffman "links together the theoretical exploration of the self and the performative bodies of body art" because he "provides a notion of the self as an embodied performance." Amelia Jones, *Body Art: Performing the Subject* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 39.

44. Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 3.

45. Carrie Lambert-Beatty writes, "Certainly, Judson Dance Theater emerged at a cultural

moment when ideas about direct communication and unmediated interaction were brought into focus and invested with significance in a new way across a range of disciplines and contexts—as in 1963's *Behavior in Public Places*, in which sociologist Erving Goffman had to delineate as a special object of study the phenomenon of situated, embodied communication, in which people were 'copresent' in time and space. Likewise, what Goffman called copresence, was, at the same moment, undergirding the social vision of the emerging New Left, whose emphasis on participatory democracy as an antidote to the 'remote control economy' and the 'structural separation of people from power' animated the 1962 Port Huron Statement of Students for a Democratic Society." Carrie Lambert-Beatty, *Being Watched: Yvonne Rainer and the 1960s* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008), 29.

46. Goffman's fury over and subsequent withdrawal from speaking at a conference with Stokely Carmichael do not exactly corroborate the claim that Goffman's "copresence" and counterculture copresence were similar concepts. Nor does the sociologist's answer to his Berkeley students at the height of the free speech movement. When the students asked, "Where do you stand?" He claimed he would feel sympathy for the Students for a Democratic Society only "when they [the national guard] start shooting students from the steps of Sproul Hall." Gary Marx, "Role Models and Role Distance: Remembrances of Erving Goffman," in *Erving Goffman*, ed. Gary Fine and Gregory Smith (London: Sage, 2000), 68.

47. Goffman writes, for instance, "Unfocused interaction has to do with the management of sheer and mere copresence" and "There are communication arrangements that seem to lie halfway between mere copresence and full scale co-participation." Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, 24, 102.

48. Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, 22.

49. Goffman, *Relations in Public*, 17.

50. Adrian Piper, "Talking to Myself," 34.

51. Piper, "Talking to Myself," 41.

52. Scholarship on the relation between the way happenings mediated between the avant-gardes and the counterculture include Bernstein, *The San Francisco Tape Music Center*; Sally Banes, *Greenwich Village 1963: Avant-Garde Performance and the Effervescent Body* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993); and Geoffrey Hendricks, ed., *Critical Mass: Happenings, Fluxus, Performance, Intermedia and Rutgers University 1958–1972* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).

53. The resulting documentation took the form of the artwork *Streetwork Streettracks I–II* (1969; 01:43:28). When the work is installed in exhibitions, it is played back at the originally recorded speed. John Bowles reports that the noises and voices sound mostly incomprehensible when the recording is played at double speed. Bowles, *Piper*, 278.

54. Piper wrote at this moment of trying to "make the medium an intrinsic part of the piece, as in Michael Snow's movies, or Bernadette Mayer's space filling poetry." Piper, *Out of Order*, 37.

55. In 1963, David Antin, a poet-artist later affiliated with *0–9*, translated from the French Marcel Prettre's popular scientific text *Catalysis and Catalysts*. In the work, Prettre notes a more expansive usage of the term: "*to catalyze* is used in areas very remote from chemical kinetics to express the effects of an acceleratory action or intervention capable of overcoming passive resistances." He describes how "everything living on our planet . . . have become tributaries of catalysis" and that understanding the phenomenon would be crucial to dis-

covering a solution to nuclear catastrophe and "uncertain tomorrows." Marcel Prettre, *Catalysis and Catalysts*, trans. David Antin (New York: Dover, 1963), 3–4, 83. In contrast, Piper introduces the term *catalysis* through Aristotelian metaphysics: "all arts . . . are potencies; they are originative sources of change in another thing, or in the artists [*sic*] himself considered as other." Piper, *Out of Order*, 32.

56. Piper, *Out of Order*, 49; emphasis in original.

57. Piper, *Out of Order*, 49.

58. Piper, *Out of Order*, 49.

59. Goffman glosses these types of behavior in his fieldwork-heavy texts *Asylums* and *Stigma*, which take place in the sociological subfield of social deviance. Erving Goffman, *Asylums* (New York: Anchor Books, 1961); Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1963). For LeWitt's valorization of the irrational, see "Sentences," 3–5.

60. Piper, *Out of Order*, 46.

61. Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, 132.

62. Goffman borrows the "slots" metaphor from Sacks, who was his student in the mid-1960s. Sacks had earlier discussed "pick up devices" and "slots" during turn taking. "Pick-ups" are ways of entering a conversation, and "slots" are procedural rules for speaking at given moments in a conversation. Harvey Sacks, *Lectures on Conversation*, 130–31, 308–9.

63. Goffman, *Relations in Public*, 81.

64. Piper, *Out of Order*, 46.

65. Mikhail Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres," in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 60–102.

66. Jackson Mac Low, "Methods for Reading *Biblical Poems*," *0–9*, no. 4 (June 1968): 65–77.

67. Mac Low, "Methods for Reading *Biblical Poems*"; and Corner, "*Three Works*," *0–9*, no. 4 (June 1968): 65–77, 109–14.

68. Perreault uses capital and lower case letters to indicate words spoken by different sections of his Central Park audience. John Perreault, "Alternatives," *0–9*, no. 5 (January 1969): 91.

69. Antin further describes his work in terms of turn taking: "Conversation is an improvisation on a limited number of words partly determined by the person you're talking to and partly by the weather. If somebody said that to me I'd have a strong tendency to answer with some of the same words, even if I intended to disagree or change the subject, e.g., 'Yes, but I can ignore the weather.' or 'No, it's not the weather at all . . .' and so on." David Antin, cited in *Software, Information Technology: Its New Meaning for Art*, ed. Jack Burnham (New York: Jewish Museum, 1970), 43. Antin's audience was supposed to build a story stochastically, recording themselves, playing back their recording, and then listening to the others.

70. Lee Lozano, "Dialogue Piece," *0–9*, no. 6 (July 1969): 10.

71. "For some artists in this exhibition . . . meaning can be found in an expressed intention." Marcia Tucker, "Anti-illusion: Procedures/Materials," in *Anti-illusion: Procedures/ Materials*, exh. cat. (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art), 44.

72. Piper, "Preparatory Notes for the Mythic Being," in *Out of Order*, 92.

73. Gail Jefferson, "Glossary of Transcript Symbols with an Introduction," in *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation*, ed. Gene Lerner (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2004), 13–23. Earlier attempts to approximate these kinds of transcripts can be found in the

Fluxus event scores collected in *An Anthology of Chance Operations, Concept Art, Anti-art, Indeterminacy, Plans of Action, Diagrams, Music, Dance Constructions, Improvisation, Meaningless Work, Natural Disasters, Compositions, Mathematics, Essays, Poetry* (New York: La Monte Young and Jackson Mac Low, 1963) and in the "performance parameters" for Mac Low's "Young Turtle Asymmetries" (1967) where the artist instructs that "the durations of silences, instrumental tones, and prolonged phonemes are at least those of single words or word strings that might be printed in equivalent spaces, as they would be spoken aloud by the individual reader." By calibrating phonemes and word strings at the moment of utterance to the listeners, the parameters of the performance would be "partially determinate" (Mac Low's words), rather than completely indeterminate in the manner of Cage. Mac Low's performance of orality navigated between the expectations of the audience and the dispositions of the performer as a way of imitating natural discourse. Jackson Mac Low, *Representative Works: 1938–1985* (New York: Roof, 1986), 206.

74. Paradigmatic examples include *The Mythic Being* (1973), *My Calling (Card)* (1986), and *Cornered* (1988).

75. Referring to the opinions of sociologists John Goldthorpe, Ernest Gellner, and Lewis Coser, John Heritage writes, "Dominant sociological figures of the 1970s lined up to dismiss CA (conversation analysis) as dustbowl empiricism, or 'do it yourself linguistics,' or a 're-enchantment industry' fit only for the counter-cultural hippies of southern California. Under these circumstances CA was all but extinguished as a field of sociological analysis." John Heritage, "Conversation Analysis as Social Theory," in *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*, ed. Bryan Turner (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2008), 300.

76. For an abbreviated history of this discussion, see Michel Leiris, "The Discovery of African Art in the West," in *African Art* (New York: Golden Press, 1968); James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Surrealism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 4 (October 1981): 539–64; Joseph Kosuth, "The Artist as Anthropologist," in *Art after Philosophy and After*, ed. Gabriele Guercio (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Hal Foster, "The Artist as Ethnographer," in *The Return of the Real* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 171–204; and Alfred Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1998).

77. Recent work in literary studies looks at these negligent modes of inquiry as an alternative history of the Enlightenment. Pierre Saint Amand, *The Pursuit of Laziness: An Idle Interpretation of the Enlightenment*, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); and David Carroll Simon, "Andrew Marvell and the Epistemology of Carelessness," *English Literary History* 82 (Summer 2015): 553–88.

78. "Collage brings to the work (here the ethnographic text) elements that continually proclaim their foreignness to the context of presentation. . . . The procedures of (a) cutting out and (b) assemblage are, of course, basic to any semiotic message; here they are the message. The cuts and sutures of the research process are left visible; there is no smoothing over or blending of the work's raw 'data' into a homogeneous representation." Clifford, 563.

79. Adrian Piper, "Pseudorationality," in *Perspectives on Self-Deception*, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Amélie Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 301. A broader transdisciplinary discussion of this later phase in Piper's career might draw out cross-connections to Harvard philosophers on rule; for example, Rawlsian political philosophy and Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979).

80. Adrian Piper, "Two Conceptions of the Self," *Philosophical Studies* 48 (February

1985): 182; emphasis in original.

81. James Clifford and George Marcus, eds., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).

82. Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 28–45.