

ways denotes, and would in direct discourse be used to refer to, some particular object in the world may in indirect discourse be uttered in order to refer, by implication, to an instance of this use rather than to the object itself. And so failure to distinguish reference from denotation might have been one of the factors operative in persuading Frege to suppose that in indirect discourse an expression does not have its customary denotation but denotes its customary meaning, and in making him therefore claim that intersubstitutability of identically denoting terms does not fail for indirect discourse.⁴ Correspondingly, once reference is clearly distinguished from denotation, it becomes easier to acknowledge that intersubstitutability of identically denoting terms does indeed fail for indirect discourse.

In short, philosophical elucidation of the concept of reference, and therewith of intentional identity, is to be achieved by contrasting and comparing reference with denotation, rather than by trying to subsume an account of reference and intentional identity under a general theory of denoting or a semantics for quantification; and cross-referential expressions of ordinary language should perhaps be regarded as straightforwardly analyzable by cross-quantified variables only where denotation is concurrent and coextensive with reference.

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GEACH ON INTENTIONAL IDENTITY

PETER GEACH has concocted a sentence which, he claims, eludes the parsing techniques of Quine and forces us to take seriously the notion of *intentional identity*.^{*} Geach's example† takes us to Gotham, where a reporter is describing an outbreak of witch mania; the reporter says

- (3) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow

Geach claims that (3) is not ambiguous, and that the one proper sense it has resists analysis in terms of Quine's *opaque* and *transparent* constructions; but (3) seems to me to be patently ambiguous,

⁴ The paradoxes inherent in Frege's view are developed at length in *The Diversity of Meaning*, ch. VII, but I there used 'refer' in the sense in which I am here using 'denote'. The problem of semantical antinomies in connection with analyses of indirect discourse like (8), (9), and (10) is also discussed there.

^{*} "Intentional Identity," this JOURNAL, LXIV, 20 (Oct. 26, 1967): 627-632. Read at the APA Eastern Division Meetings, December 29, 1967.

[†] I shall use Geach's enumerations for his examples, and mark my own examples (A), (B), etc.

and all Geach need claim is that *one* of the acceptable, coherent senses of (3) is not amenable to Quine-style reconstruction. Let us look at the possibilities and see whether this is the case.

Geach points out first that there is no straightforward way of treating both halves of (3) opaquely, since 'she' or 'the same witch' in the second conjunct is bound to an antecedent, 'a witch', in the first, and the opacity barrier prohibits such syntactical liaisons. Geach then examines and discards two plausible and straightforward transparent constructions:

- (4) As regards some witch, Hob thinks she has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow

and

- (5) As regards somebody, Hob thinks that she is a witch and has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow

Both (4) and (5) commit the speaker to the existence of at least a suspected person (if not a witch), and Geach is interested in the case in which the reporter is a skeptic, but still wants to speak of the identity of the object of thought and wonderment. This leads us to possible opaque paraphrases of (3). Perhaps, Geach suggests, the 'she' in (3) is a "pronoun of laziness" so that the correct rendering is

- (18) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow

Geach has two objections to (18). One revolves around a peculiarity of the term 'wonder', and I will deal with it later; the other is that, although (18) might be what the reporter had in mind, it need not be, "for our reporter might be justified in asserting (3) if he had heard Hob say 'The witch has blighted Bob's mare' and heard Nob say 'Maybe the witch killed Cob's sow', even if Hob had not thought or said anything about Cob's sow nor Nob about Bob's mare" (630). I find this claim very puzzling. What could justify the reporter's use of 'same' if he has no inkling of cross reference in the depositions of Hob and Nob? The use of the definite article by both of them proves nothing, since each part of the village may have an imaginary witch of its own, called "the witch" by the locals. If Hob and Nob speak of "the Gotham witch" or "the skinny witch," then our reporter is on firm ground, but then we have another alternative opaque parsing of (3), which Geach suggests but wants to reject:

- (24) Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch that is *F* has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch that is *F* killed Cob's sow

(24) is also subject to the objection about "wonder," which I will postpone once more, since Geach has another objection to (24). He claims that although if (24) is true for some *F*, (3) will be true, the converse need not hold; there need be no shared definite description for it to be true of Hob and Nob that they are thinking of the same witch. No explicit argument is offered in support of this claim, and it is, I believe, unfounded precisely under the conditions established by the example. So long as we hold out the hope or conviction that the object or person or witch under discussion exists, questions of identity are substantive and serious, but as soon as we become skeptics like our reporter, and disavow transparent renderings of our discussion, questions of identity and diversity become idle if not outright meaningless. Suppose Tom says he doubts the existence of a solid gold round square; I cannot reply coherently that I doubt the existence of *another* solid gold round square—not Tom's at all. Or if Tom says he is imagining a polka-dotted elephant, I cannot wonder whether, when I duplicate his feat, I am imagining numerically the same polka-dotted elephant.

Whenever we wish to disavow belief in the actual existence of any intentional objects, 'same' can at best mean "exactly similar in characteristics." Suppose tribe *A* believes in a moon god *X*, and tribe *B* believes in a moon god *Y*. How similar must the biographies and traits of *X* and *Y* be before we, as nonbelievers, will say the tribes believe in numerically the same moon god? Must the descriptions be identical, or can we set, by fiat (how else?) some laxer requirements? If we try to set laxer requirements, some strange puzzles will result. Are all the world's Santa Clauses and Father Christmases, black-skinned and white, in sleighs and on horses, really the same nonexistent man? What exotic fact would be affirmed by a man who asserted this, and how would we settle a dispute? Or suppose Tom and Mary believe in qualitatively identical anthropomorphic Gods, except that Tom thinks God has blue eyes and Mary thinks God's eyes are brown. Do they believe in the same God? If so, then either the God they believe in has contradictory characteristics (and neither of them, we can suppose, believes in a God with contradictory characteristics), or we shall have to tell one of them that he is wrong about the color of the eyes of the God he believes in!

I believe these examples show that, far from its being the case, as Geach contends, that *no* descriptions need be shared for us to speak of intentional identity, on the contrary, unless *all* descriptions are shared, the notion of the identity of intentionally inexistent objects dissolves into nonsense. If this is so, (24) looks to be the best opaque

paraphrase of (3)—with (18) as a plausible special case of (24). There is in fact a variation on (18), ignored by Geach, which is yet another plausible paraphrase of (3):

- (A) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow

Were (A) the gist of the report, we can imagine a ludicrous encounter that might arise between Hob and Nob. Nob says "I wonder if that witch you think blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow" and Hob replies "You imbecile—I didn't have any particular witch in mind, so how can you wonder that?" This should put an end to the particular wonder Nob was wondering, but yet he might have wondered it—(A) might have been true. If (A) were true under these circumstances, within its opaque second conjunct there would be a nondesignating definite description (there is no witch Hob thinks blighted Bob's mare—even if there are witches), but this would not affect the truth value of (A) precisely because of the opacity. The mistake Nob made that led to his silly—but perfectly possible—wonder was construing Hob's thoughts transparently, when Hob had no such construal in mind. A similar misunderstanding would arise if Hob said "I want a sloop" and Nob said "I wonder if the sloop you want has a leak in it." Such misunderstandings can arise, and we can report them when they do without falling into the very misunderstanding we are reporting, provided we keep both conjuncts opaque.

The conclusion reached so far is that Geach has failed to produce a coherent sense of (3) that resists capture in Quine's net. Either the reporter is a believer and had in mind (4) or (5), which are transparent, or he is a skeptic and had in mind (18) or (24) or (A), which are opaque. The opaque contexts of (18), (24), and (A) are self-contained, having no pronouns or other locutions requiring an antecedent outside the context. Still to be dealt with is Geach's interesting argument about how to construe "wonder" contexts. This argument can be made quite independently of the Hob-Nob example, and is, I think, the most serious challenge to Quine's scheme.

Geach's second objection to (18), which I have postponed until now, has to do with the expansion of its second conjunct. Geach accepts that

- (19) The witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow

is analyzable as

- (20) Just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and she killed Cob's sow

but thinks that, if we preface (19) with 'Nob wonders whether', the correct expansion is not

- (21) Nob wonders whether (the following is the case:) just one witch blighted Bob's mare and she killed Cob's sow

but

- (22) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow

The difficulty with (22) is that the problem of an antecedent outside an opaque context is reintroduced, so that (18) gets us nowhere. Or more precisely, as Geach fails to note, it gets us into an infinite regress. For if (22) is the correct analysis of the second conjunct of (18), the correct analysis of (22) is

- (B) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob assumes that just one witch is such that Nob assumes it to have blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the *latter* witch?) killed Cob's sow

and we can go on to analyze the "wonder" context of (B) into yet another combination of assuming and wondering, and so forth. Faced with the prospect of this regress, we may well turn back to (21) and see what Geach has against it as an expansion of the second conjunct of (18). Our first hint is that Nob doesn't *wonder* whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare—he *assumes* that, as (22) makes clear. But (21) does not say that Nob wonders whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare; it says Nob wonders whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare, *and* she killed Cob's sow. Geach acknowledges this by contrasting (21) with

- (23) Nob wonders whether just one witch blighted Bob's mare and (Nob wonders whether) she killed Cob's sow

Whereas (23) tells by conjunction of two wonders, so to speak, (21) tells of one compound wonder. Geach admits that objections to (23) do not carry over to (21); so we must look elsewhere for Geach's dislike of (21). He says it is not easy to be sure of the matter, but he just does think (22) is the right sort of analysis rather than (21). I have to disagree. I am ready to accept (21) as an analysis of the second conjunct of (18) as I am to accept (20) as an analysis of (19), but—and I think this is the source of Geach's misgivings—I doubt whether Nob, the naive rustic, would be happy with either. That is, perhaps Geach dislikes (21) because he feels Nob would disavow it; but Nob's likely disavowal should count against his logical acumen, not against our analysis, for Nob is just as apt to balk at (20) as a paraphrase of (19). To

my ear, (21) captures the wonder expressed in the second conjunct of (18) as well as (20) captures the sense of (19), and it does have the tremendous advantage over (22) of not generating an infinite regress. Moreover, if we accept (21) as our model for dealing with "wonder" contexts, we can deal with a further problem; for if (22) is not acceptable as an analysis of the second conjunct of (18), it is still a perfectly good sentence which might arise for other reasons, and it does contain that troubling cross reference outside an opaque context. Now we have a way of dealing with it, however. (22) can be analyzed as

- (C) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether (the following is the case:) just one witch is such that Nob assumes it to have blighted Bob's mare, and she killed Cob's sow

This sentence is rather unusual, and needs a careful analysis. The first phrase, 'Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare', must be treated as opaque, since the *speaker* of (C) need not believe in witches. Also, everything following 'Nob wonders whether' is in an opaque context sealed off from the rest of the sentence, but *within* the second opaque context everything is transparent. This means that 'assumes' is used the first time in the sentence to herald an opaque context and the second time in a purely transparent context (within an opaque context). This is not inconsistent in any way, for we have seen that Nob cannot coherently wonder his wonder about the *same* witch unless *he* is willing to accept a transparent rendering of his assumption. Unless he is willing to talk about *the* witch he assumed to have blighted Bob's mare (a witch *he* believes in), we will not be able to make sense of his wondering whether the same witch killed Cob's sow. This transparent occurrence of 'witch' does not, of course, commit the speaker of (C) to the existence of witches, for it is embedded within the second opaque context.

This analysis can be generalized to handle other cases of supposed intentional identity. For example,

- (D) Tom thinks there is a bogey man in his bedroom and wishes he would go away

can become

- (E) Tom thinks there is a bogey man in his bedroom, and Tom wishes the bogey man Tom thinks is in his bedroom would go away

and although the expansion of (E) is extremely awkward—

- (F) Tom thinks there is a bogey man in his bedroom, and Tom wishes that (it were true that) just one bogey man is such that Tom thinks him to be in his bedroom, and he goes (has gone) away

—that seems to be its only shortcoming. This method of handling cross references from within intentional contexts works well in all cases in which the intentional contexts are contexts of explicit “propositional attitude,” but it runs into a snag where this is not the case. Consider

(G) Tom thinks there is a bogey man in his bedroom and fears him

This goes easily enough into

(H) Tom thinks there is a bogey man in his bedroom, and Tom fears the bogey man he thinks is in his bedroom

but the definite description in (H) cannot be expanded away in the style of (20) without dropping the opacity barrier. The elimination of definite descriptions requires a propositional context, and if we use ‘Tom fears . . .’ as such a context, we lose the opacity we need.

(I) Tom thinks there is a bogey man in his bedroom, and just one bogey man is such that Tom thinks he is in his bedroom, and Tom fears him

will not do at all, since it commits us to the existence of a bogey man.

This impasse suggests three possible escapes. We can admit in the end that Geach has a strong case for intentional identity (but then how will he make sense of the moon gods, the different Santa Clauses, etc?); we can decide that definite descriptions are not eliminable after all; or we can argue that all nonpropositional intentional contexts such as ‘fears . . .’ and ‘searches for . . .’ are paraphrasable (at least roughly) into contexts of propositional attitude and handled like (C) and (F). Thus ‘fears . . .’ would always be eliminated in favor of ‘fears that . . . will harm him’ or something of the sort. No doubt Quine would favor the last alternative, which is, I believe, plausible for extralogical as well as logical reasons, but I shall not attempt to support this claim here.

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BOOK REVIEWS

In Defence of Free Will, with Other Philosophical Essays. C. A. CAMPBELL. New York: Humanities Press, 1967. 277 p. \$7.50.

Anyone with a taste for close and resolutely rational pursuit of a philosophical theme must enjoy reading Professor Campbell, though he will by no means necessarily agree with him. The present volume