Strategic Non-Violent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century

by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler

Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1994, 366 pp., with notes, bibliography and index, $55.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Reviewed by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Although the twentieth century has provided the setting for unprecedented levels of violent conflict in two World Wars and subsequently, it has also reaffirmed the enduring importance of means other than resort to violence to achieve political objectives. At the international level the lethality, range, and accuracy of nuclear weapons led to strategies based on deterring or preventing the outbreak of war. The nuclear deterrence strategy that shaped the East-West relationship was based on the assumption that the risk of devastation outweighed conceivable political gain. Contrasted with the military requirements for the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, the Soviet Union collapsed without armed conflict. Its territorial losses rank among the most significant military defeats suffered by great powers in previous generations, giving contemporary meaning to Sun Tsu's celebrated dictum about the best strategy being that which enables the victor to avoid actually employing violent means.

Deterrence strategy at the international level should not be equated with strategic non-violent conflict. Nevertheless, its effect may be similar to the extent that violence is avoided and political goals are achieved. Deterrence relies on the threat to employ violent means as a basis for preventing resort to military capabilities in armed combat. Strategic non-violent conflict implies a conscious choice neither to threaten nor actually employ violence. At the subnational level, this century has been witness to a substantial number of instances in which strategies of non-violence have been employed, with varying degrees of success or failure, in order to attain desired ends. The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe followed non-violent action on a massive scale, not only in the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s, one of the case studies examined in this volume, but also in the climactic weeks preceding the disintegration of Soviet-supported regimes. The Revolution of 1989 exemplified "people power"

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in action. For weeks, official policy on both sides of the Atlantic lagged behind the popular forces that overwhelmed regimes long thought to be largely immovable. It is at this level that Ackerman and Kruegler focus their research and analysis in a remarkable volume designed both to develop and refine a strategy for non-violent conflict and to test a series of propositions supporting such a strategy by reference to six twentieth-century case studies.

Central to their analytic framework is the assumption that, among the strategies available to them, actors in a conflictual situation, as a matter of choice, may choose a strategy based on non-violent methods in order to achieve vital objectives in a conflict. The stated goal of the authors is to set forth, with as broad a theoretical basis as possible, a more precise understanding of "how non-violent conflict actually works" (p. xx). Their central thesis is a proposition of "who wins based on who makes best use of the resources and options at hand" (p. xx). They therefore seek to discover which states will best exploit these resources and options. Appropriately, the authors reject the notion that non-violent strategies are necessarily the result of motives based on moral principles of goodness. Instead, they view non-violent strategies within the prism of consciously contrived purposeful action. In doing so, the announced goal of the authors is to "ask what happens when strategic concepts are introduced systematically into the arena of non-violent conflict" (p. 8). Just as there has been an extensive body of theory and strategy on the use of violence, there needs to be systematic investigation, analysis, and strategy development, they assert, in the important non-violent conflict setting.

In their systematic effort to describe strategic non-violent conflict as a process, the authors hypothesize that the quality of the strategy adopted by non-violent protagonists is important to the outcome of a non-violent struggle. Because strategy, defined as the organization of capabilities in relationship to posited goals, is essential in all fields of endeavor, it follows that the quality of strategic choice by practitioners of non-violent conflict should be the object of study, analysis, and operational refinement. As Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler point out, the strategist seeks to achieve objectives at minimal cost and risk at the expense of opponents who must be presumed to be engaging in a similar strategic process. This proposition applies in the discussion of violent conflict and in strategic non-violent conflict as well.

In undertaking their study of strategic non-violent conflict, the authors take steps to preempt the criticism that in the "fog of war" even the best strategy may become the victim of unforeseen events and rapidly changing circumstances. They concede that most mass non-violent conflicts are largely improvised. They are characterized by the absence of a clearly developed strategy. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask how such conflicts would have been changed in their outcome if a consciously developed non-violent strategy had been followed. To this question the authors seek answers by utilizing a model based on a series of principles of strategic non-violent conflict with which they compare and contrast six case studies, including the first Russian Revolution, 1904-1906; the German struggle against French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; the Indian independence movement, 1930-1931; the resistance to German occupation of

Denmark between 1940-1945; the civic strike of 1944 in El Salvador; and the struggle between Solidarity and the Polish Communist Party in 1980-1981. The cases were selected by reference to essentially four criteria: the conflict had to be of major importance for the parties fighting each other with large numbers of people mobilized or somehow affected; it had to be of adequate duration for certain dynamic processes to be present; the commitment of parties had to be sufficiently intense that they were prepared to inflict or sustain substantial damage; and last but not least, at least one of the parties had to be prepared to make use of non-violent methods.

Among the valuable contributions in this volume is the elucidation of a series of twelve principles of strategic non-violent conflict from the literature of military strategy and writings on non-violent action. Such principles are of interest because they represent a synthesis drawn from security-related literature. Their value is enhanced by the fact that the authors develop such principles as the basis for their comparative analysis of the six case studies. Appropriately, they recognize that principles such as those developed in this volume are more exploratory than definitive. They are of heuristic value as a conceptual framework against which to examine the behavior of actors in situations of strategic non-violent conflict. Such principles, subject to further development, can do little more than highlight the basic features of a strategy by which strategic non-violent conflict would be conducted. To the extent that such principles actually describe strategic non-violent conflict, we would have moved toward the development of a theory upon which to base a strategy that could be adopted for strategic non-violent conflict. As long as a gap between theory and practice remains, as the authors suggest is the case, the theory is in need of further refinement as a potential basis for understanding how practitioners of strategic non-violent conflict actually conduct (or should conduct) operations. By the same token, to the extent that a body of such principles exists and is therefore available to those who would employ them, the practitioners of strategic non-violent conflict would be strategically deficient in not making use of them.

As a basis for their analysis, the authors place the twelve principles into three categories: what they term principles of development, engagement, and conception, within which they proceed to categorize the many tasks and dimensions of strategic non-violent conflict. Principles of development are designed to address the basic question of how to "create the most advantageous environment for strategic non-violent conflict" (p. 23). Principles of engagement, the authors assert, pose the key question of how to interact with the opponent in such a way that "non-violent sanctions will have the maximum effect" (p. 23). Principles of conception are intended to help direct strategic thought to an understanding of the "relationship between remaining strategic options and the prospects for success" as the conflict unfolds. Such principles are sufficiently general in nature that, even without direct reference to the subject matter of the volume, they will be familiar to the student of military strategy and to an even broader constituency accustomed to thinking in strategic terms.

Under the category of principles of development, for example, the strategist of non-violent conflict would be tasked with the formulation of functional

objectives as well as the creation of organizational strength, while securing access to critically important material resources, acquiring needed external assistance, and expanding the range of sanctions to be employed against an opposing group. The principles of engagement to which the authors refer include attacks designed to negate the opponent's strategy for consolidating control, combined with steps to minimize the impact of weapons of violence used by the enemy and actions to alienate opponents from their support base. All this must be accomplished while maintaining a discipline within which the strategic non-violent movement can operate most effectively. It is essential, they suggest, that offensive and defensive operations be adjusted to take account of the relative vulnerabilities of the protagonists and that there be sustained continuity in the non-violent strategy between sanctions adopted, mechanisms for strategic implementation, and the overall objectives on whose behalf the conflict is being waged.

In the real world, as the authors acknowledge, our ability to make use of clearly defined strategic principles is undermined by unanticipated events and other phenomena that may move the conflict out of human control. Even if it is possible to rely on a series of strategic principles, as the authors remind the reader, they may be neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily sequential.

Each of the chapters containing case studies in itself provides a detailed examination of a conflict in which one side employed non-violent means. The narrative is enhanced by the authors' utilization of other expertise upon which they called for assistance in drafting the various case studies. Each chapter contains an extended concluding section in which the case is analyzed by reference to the three sets of principles. Thus in the case of the first Russian revolution we learn that, among the reasons for the failure of non-violence, there was "no consensus in prioritizing sanctions or selecting those which maximized initiative or economy of force or which risked the least for the most gain" (p. 91). In the non-violent resistance to German occupation of the Ruhr, it is concluded that "the sanctions deployed did not show much ingenuity, or creative adaptation, nor did they begin to include the full range of possibilities" (p. 145). In the Indian independence movement case, the authors conclude that the "failure to appreciate the true relative power positions of the main parties, combined with a premature shift to conversion, or at least accommodation, as the preferred mechanism of closure, led the movement, at Gandhi's insistence, to demobilize its best sanctions" before the objective of independence was even significantly advanced (pp. 207-8). In the Denmark case during World War II, it is acknowledged that factors other than the use of non-violent sanctions contributed principally to liberation. However, it is suggested that "non-violent resistance achieved significant victories when it came to protecting Danish citizens from the rigors of occupation" (p. 241). In the civic strike of 1944 against the entrenched regime in El Salvador, it is concluded that if "the end of military rule and a permanent resumption of civilian democratic government were implicit goals, the campaign fell short and should be seen as neither a complete victory nor a defeat" (p. 274). Finally, Solidarity provides a rich basis for analyzing the strategic principles of non-violent conflict, with the movement

enjoying widespread civilian participation that provided "the widest possible set of options to attack or defend with" (p. 310).

Each of the case studies is evaluated by reference to the strategic principles developed by the authors and the conclusion is drawn that none of the twelve principles shows non-conformity in a majority of the cases. In other words, at least some of the principles are operative in all of the cases examined. Principles having utility in one case, the authors conclude, tended to help explain other cases as well. Yet they caution in the concluding chapter, as at the beginning of the volume, that each case was "sui generis and manifested substantial uncertainties from start to finish" (p. 335). The conflict followed a course in which the prospects for victory on the part of one side or the other were "highly volatile," with each campaign having "a different subset of principles that proved most important" (p. 335). By the same token, the willingness of one side to use violent measures was said to provide a "poor determinant for the fortunes of the non-violent protagonist" (p. 335). Instead, it is suggested that the ability of one party to utilize non-violent sanctions skillfully helped turn the tide in its direction. In sum, the authors contend that overall conformity to strategic principles such as those outlined as the basis for their analysis was more likely than not to enhance the prospects for success.

As the authors and many other analysts have pointed out, we are in the midst of a global paradigmatic transformation of historic proportions. This includes the contending and contrasting forces of technology diffusion, political fragmentation, and a broad spectrum of conflict encompassing the possible use of weapons of mass destruction as well as the utilization of non-violent strategies as described in this volume. To the extent that a politically fragmented world characterizes much of the global landscape of the years leading into the next century, it is probable that strategic non-violent conflict will be a dominant feature. At the same time, emphasis will be placed on the need to develop strategies designed to minimize the prospect that weapons of mass destruction will be used.

We are furthermore in the midst of what has been termed a military-technical revolution in which advanced technologies will dominate the battlefield in the case of major regional wars such as Desert Storm. Increasingly, strategic discussion is focused on the potential that may be afforded by a host of technologies providing for what is termed non-lethal warfare. For example, we may be able to use sophisticated sound waves based on acoustic beam-forming technology to locate, map, and seal off a labyrinth of tunnels clandestinely built over the years by North Korea under the demilitarized zone leading into South Korea. To the degree that high-tech wars are fought, a premium will be placed on the ability of one side to deprive its adversary of the advantages conferred by advanced technology, including access to timely battlefield information. Such technologies provide the basis for what increasingly is termed non-lethal warfare. This would include disabling complex weapons systems and rendering impossible the communications required to sustain the high tempo of military operations. Thus, non-violent combat assumes various forms in the emerging post-Cold War setting.

At the same time, we are reminded, in a politically fragmented world, especially at the substate level as we have already witnessed in this century, strategies that rely on relatively primitive technologies will continue to be developed and utilized as a basis for organizing action designed to achieve political objectives. Some strategies will be based on violence; others may be derived from the twentieth-century experience of non-violent action. It follows that conflict conducted by means other than resort to violence should be the object of continuing study and analysis. By their emphasis on this crucially important part of the conflict spectrum and, in particular, their balanced examination of strategic non-violent conflict, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler have set forth both a useful theoretical construct and a valuable set of tentative conclusions and thereby provided a rich research agenda for others to build upon and refine as part of a security studies literature for the post-Cold War era.

Economic Transformation the Mexican Way

by Pedro Aspe

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, 280 pp., with notes, appendix and index, $27.50 cloth.

Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela's Economic Reforms

by Moises Naim

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993, 180 pp., with notes, appendix, references and index, $24.95 cloth, $8.95 paper.

Reviewed by Merilee S. Grindle

One of the most serious challenges that has faced developing countries in the past decade is the daunting task of economic restructuring. Encouraging market-oriented domestic economies and outward-oriented development strategies implies for them a host of economically complex and politically difficult policy changes, such as improved exchange rate management, deregulation, liberalization of trade regimes, creation of new financial institutions, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and reform of state bureaucracies. None of these changes is easily accomplished and many of them are closely interlinked in terms of objectives, sequencing, and consequences. Not surprisingly, countries have varied widely in terms of how well and how fully they have been able to introduce and sustain coherent reform programs.

This combination of policy and strategy changes is the subject of two books by central participants in efforts to reshape the structure of national economies in Mexico and Venezuela. They were written by individuals with strong academic credentials — both have Ph.D.s from MIT — who also held high level positions in their governments during critical periods of economic policy reform. Pedro Aspe, an economist and minister of finance during the Salinas administration in Mexico, is the principal architect of that country's economic restructuring during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moises Naim, who holds a Ph.D. in management, was minister of industry under the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration in Venezuela, which introduced a major economic reform pro-

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gram in 1989, and subsequently became an executive director of the World Bank. The books are remarkable in that they combine scholarly analysis with insiders' perspectives on "what really happened." Both present useful and at times fascinating insights into the often troubled marriage of theory and practice in economic adjustment programs.

In *Economic Transformation the Mexican Way*, the published version of the Lionel Robbins lecture series, Pedro Aspe explains the thinking behind Mexico's extensive economic policy changes after 1982, with particular emphasis on the 1988-1993 period. His principal purpose is to explain what was done, why it was done, and what its consequences were for the Mexican economy. He emphasizes the lessons that policymakers learned from the design of the adjustment programs in a way that speaks to the interests of both practitioners and academics. In this regard, he explores how theory informed policy choices in Mexico and how practice sheds light on theory.

Aspe begins with a discussion of the links between stabilization and structural adjustment, arguing that stabilization measures must be accompanied by ongoing efforts to build and maintain social consensus and by the pursuit of structural change. In the Mexican case, a government-sponsored pact among major economic interests provided a political base for extensive policy change. Aspe explores monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies in order to explain their interrelationships in macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment. In assessing Mexico's financial and fiscal systems, he points to skewed income distribution and rigid institutions as factors that ultimately strangled Mexico's long-term growth prospects. Effective reform requires financial liberalization to be built on successful stabilization efforts, the development of financial markets, and the strengthening of state institutions for revenue collection and financial regulation.

Aspe goes on to argue that debt negotiations will produce satisfactory outcomes for the debtor country when negotiators have extensive technical expertise, an equally strong sense of national sovereignty, and a nonconfrontational strategy. He further suggests that trade liberalization is as much an issue of political negotiation and timing as it is of technical design. Turning to privatization, Aspe provides a list of steps that must be taken in order to ensure a transparent process for the transfer of ownership. In an insightful contribution, he refers to the importance of "privatizing the private sector" by reducing its dependence on state-provided benefits such as subsidies and tariffs.

The book concludes with an essay on the "new mechanism of transmission" between macroeconomic policy and microeconomic behavior. While the old mechanism of transition — state intervention to create the basis for a market economy — was an essential feature of Mexico's prior development strategy, he argues that a new role for the state is now required because the nature of the development task it faces has changed.

Aspe has written a clear and readable explanation of economic policy change in Mexico. He provides insight into the approach of the Salinas policy reformers and how their experience in dealing with the economic crisis under the de la Madrid administration helped form the basis for their strategy after 1988. He

confirms an accumulating body of evidence that the quality and coherence of the economic team is central to the success of restructuring. As an economist, Dr. Aspe has done a service in explaining the thinking behind Mexico's extensive policy changes. Recent events in Chiapas, however, indicate that he is being disingenuous when he asserts that the Mexican reforms were carried out within the context of democratic institutions or that they were designed with particular emphasis on their fairness to the working class and poor. A more forthright account would acknowledge that Mexico's political tradition remains authoritarian and its economic and social systems continue to be characterized by extensive inequity.

Paper Tigers and Minotaurs begins by observing that policy makers and politicians fear economic adjustment because of their perceptions that it unleashes monsters of opposition, conflict, and political instability. Naim argues that some of these monsters are nothing but paper tigers, while others are in fact vicious minotaurs which can thwart the reform process and undermine the legitimacy of political institutions. Unfortunately, he suggests, reformers are generally at a loss to distinguish one from the other and therefore are hindered in their ability to develop strategies for managing the politics of reform. His task is to explain how and why politicians and policy makers in Venezuela between 1989 and 1993 were surprised by both paper tigers and minotaurs. In 1989, the Pérez administration, newly installed and well-staffed by able but politically inexperienced technocrats, launched a major reform program. Why, Naim asks, did a reform program that was successfully implemented and that produced considerable economic growth in a short period of time, lead to riots and two coup attempts in one of Latin America's oldest democracies?

This case study suggests that knowledge about economic management of reform can far outstrip knowledge about the political management of reform. Naim holds the administration, and especially Pérez himself, accountable for failing to communicate effectively with the Venezuelan people about the reform measures, to build social consensus about the need for change, and to take the military seriously as a threat to political stability. Because public concerns about the performance of the economy and the changing role of government were not effectively addressed, frustrations accumulated and the inequalities of the economic and political systems increasingly focused on the long-standing corruption of public officials and on the questionable legitimacy of those who held office through a period of economic crisis and restructuring.

Naim describes the policy reforms and their consequences with a clear eye toward differentiating among the perspectives and expectations of policymakers and those of the economic interest groups and the general public. He demonstrates throughout the book that the extensively weakened Venezuelan state, because of decades of oil wealth and undisciplined government policies, was incapable of responding effectively to the reforms or their consequences. He explores this in terms of the virtual collapse of social sector ministries and the disorganized, demoralized, and ill-equipped police and military organizations that were paralyzed by the civic unrest resulting from the policy changes. Effective states are central to effective reform, he argues throughout the book.

Venezuela's tortured path to economic reform is eloquently presented and analyzed in this book. While it deals with the particulars of the Venezuelan case, including the availability of oil wealth and the impact of individual personalities on the reform process, its message is clear and of general import. Effective economic reform requires a political strategy and a set of effective government institutions. Politicians and policymakers have good reason to fear the beasts that lie in wait for reformers, but they can come better equipped to meet both paper tigers and minotaurs than did the Venezuelans in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Naim lends strong support to those who resist adjustment packages designed in the abstract or pushed upon countries by international financial institutions with little concern for local political contexts or for the particular skills and weaknesses of political leaders.

These two books offer cumulative insights by being read in tandem. Aspe is primarily concerned with explaining policy choices while Naim's focus is on what happened when policy measures were introduced and why. Both books provide the kind of insight and analysis that policy reformers and students of the political economy of policy change need as they consider these issues. Economists should welcome the healthy respect for the complex ways in which theory and practice interact. The value of the books is increased because of the scholar-practitioner divide that both accounts bridge. If readers must choose only one of the books to read, however, my vote would go to Moises Naim as the more provocative and forthright author of the process and pitfalls of reform.

We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young

by Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, USA (retired) and Joseph L. Galloway

New York: Random House, 1992, 412 pp., with appendix, notes, bibliography, index and photographs, $25.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Joseph E. Vorbach

The 1st Battalion of the U.S. Army's 7th Cavalry was inserted by helicopter into an area of Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley known as landing zone X-Ray on 14 November 1965. It spent the next two and one-half days fighting for its life. When the soldiers of this battalion were extracted from the combat zone, they carried with them the corpses of 79 of their comrades. An additional 121 were injured and the overall casualty rate was over 40 percent. On 17 November, at nearby landing zone Albany, a sister battalion was ambushed and suffered massive losses — one company went into battle with 108 men on the fit-for-duty list and emerged the day after battle with only 8. These two battles, and in a larger sense the entire Pleiku campaign of October and November 1965, represented in the words of the authors a ". . . sea change in the Vietnam War" (p. 199).

This is the organizing thesis of *We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young*, but the sea change is of two forms: a crucial political turning point in the course of the war and a psychological sea change for all those involved in the conflict. Politically and militarily, the high American death toll, inflicted against the recently formed Airmobile cavalry (mobile warfare dependent upon troop movement by helicopter), served notice that the cost of involvement for the United States was going to be greater than had been expected in Washington and elsewhere. The political-military reality is reinforced by interviews conducted by the authors of this book with North Vietnamese soldiers. This battle marked the first time since Dien Bien Phu that they fought at division strength. Those interviewed contend that they intended to draw the Americans into battle in the Ia Drang Valley to learn all they could about the enemy and the viability of its helicopter assault technique on their terrain in order to shift the momentum of the war in their favor.

Implicit in the authors' notion of the Ia Drang battle as a "sea change" is the suggestion that none of the other significant events that proceeded it in the U.S.

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escalation were as important. Not until nearly 100 Americans died in one three day period did the magnitude of U.S. commitment crystallize for U.S. policy-makers. Certainly, major decisions preceded the Ia Drang battle, including: the Tonkin Gulf incidents and the subsequent Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August of 1964; the Viet Cong attack on the U.S. compound at Pleiku in February 1965; President Johnson's approval of General Westmoreland's request for additional Marine battalions in April 1965; and finally General Westmoreland's request for a force of 180,000 men by the end of 1965 (which came in June of that year). Arguably, these events made an event like the battle of the Ia Drang valley inevitable, but the authors' contention about where the tide changed in the chronology of events is more than credible.

One of the crucial results of this battle, as will be discussed further, was the soldiers' growing frustration with not being allowed to fight to win. Thus in addressing the politics that limited the effectiveness of the American fighting force in Vietnam, the authors bring to the surface again the tension that dominated the policy-strategy debate in the United States during and after the war. It is important that the authors address several of these issues in the book because, while the reason for the tension is not difficult to conceptualize, only the battlefield commander can relate the operational impact of policy decisions. In 1994, we need only look to Haiti and Somalia as examples of the difficulty of finding the proper policy-strategy mix; yet it is generally conceded that U.S. conduct of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 reflected an appreciation of the lessons learned in Vietnam — primarily that soldiers should never be placed in a situation where they cannot "fight to win."

The perspectives of the authors make them uniquely qualified to discuss these overriding issues and, more importantly, to humanize the conflict from the perspectives of the soldiers, their enemy, their leaders and their families. Lieutenant General Harold Moore, then a Lieutenant Colonel, was the commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Joe Galloway was a young combat reporter for United Press International and was deployed with Colonel Moore's battalion during the battle. Their account is a vivid, graphic and unashamedly emotive one that successfully conveys the intensity of battle and the thin line between life and death while simultaneously memorializing many brave sacrifices. The book expands well beyond the development of the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley as a transforming event in the Vietnam War. It is a revealing account of battlefield strategy and tactics employed by soldiers on both sides, and an evocative memorial to those who lost their lives. Each description of battle that recounts the death of an American soldier concludes with a mention of the full name, birthplace and age of the fallen soldier. Similarly, a complete listing of those Americans who lost their lives in the Pleiku Campaign of October and November 1965 is printed before the table of contents.

The battle diagrams provided in the introduction are useful in conceptualizing the arrangement of forces, but do little to help one appreciate the confusing conditions in which the battle ensued. It is the graphic descriptions of events provided by the authors and other survivors that leave a lasting impression on the reader. One senses the virtual blindness of marching through elephant grass,

canopy jungle and dry creek beds. It is suddenly not hard to understand how an entire platoon is cut off from the remainder of the Battalion, requiring a separate expedition to rescue its handful of survivors. One soldier's recollections provide a good example of the fear and confusion that prevailed:

> It was lonely as hell up there until a captain came over to me from my left rear and ordered me to, 'stay put. You are with such-and-such a company now!' I'll never forget that. I can't remember what company he said; hell, one company's as good as another. I don't know what the hell's happening. I'm out there by myself. I'm only a twenty year old kid. I don't know what's going on (p. 101).

The descriptions of death and injury are blunt and clear but not excessive in detail or tribute. Rather, the comments offered with respect to fallen comrades are one of the great strengths of the book — they are simple, heartfelt assessments from friends and comrades of sad, tragic facts. They serve to humble the reader and ground any glorification of war.

One is equally struck by the comradery and loyalty expressed by the soldiers who shared the horror of battle. As the ambushed 2nd Battalion arrived by truck at the rear area base at An Khe, Colonel Moore's Battalion greeted them with cheers. Colonel Moore relates:

> We cheered them as they passed. That little American flag that had flown at X-Ray now decorated one of the trucks. As they approached the clearing by brigade headquarters, the division band struck up the 7th Cavalry regimental march, "Garry Owen," and the division color guard dipped the 1st Cav colors in salute (p. 316).

A member of Colonel Moore's battalion recalled the faces of the dead on this occasion.

> They would not grow old with us. If I ever got the chance I would say to them: You were a ragtag bunch but Uncle Sam never sent better men into battle. I wasn't crying. It was the rain. Hell yes, it was only the rain (p. 316).

The book is a story of war, written by soldiers and perhaps understood best by soldiers, particularly Vietnam veterans. In this sense, it focuses primarily on the battle, the personalities, the bravery, the death, and the sorrow of loved ones. Moore and Galloway organize the book around the notion of the battle as a "sea change" within a chronological context, and so the story of the battle is told. There is however, the unstated concept of an "emotional sea change" for all those who survived the battle. Every chapter communicates the fact that the scars of war, physical and otherwise, do not go away. It is with this approach that the authors generally avoid in-depth discussion of the controversially political and diplomatic elements of the war.

Nevertheless, the lingering frustration of soldiers who were not allowed to "fight to win" emerges unmistakably in the prologue and the final "Aftermath" section of the book. A matter of particular frustration for Colonel Moore, as it undoubtedly was for all American commanders in Vietnam, was President Johnson's, "... refusal to declare a state of emergency and extend the active duty tours of draftees and reserve officers" (p. 25). The operational result of this policy was a reduction in training readiness. Any member of Moore's battalion with less than sixty days remaining on their enlistment as of 16 August 1965 (the date that the battalion was to deploy) was to be left in the United States. A second dominant frustration of the key players in the story of the Ia Drang Valley battle was the policy that prohibited the pursuit of the North Vietnamese into Cambodian territory. The diplomatic reasons for not doing this in 1965 are well known, nevertheless, this comment from Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard, Moore's division commander, expresses the frustration well:

> I was always taught as an officer that in a pursuit situation you continue to pursue until you either kill the enemy or he surrenders. I saw the Ia Drang as a definite pursuit situation and I wanted to keep after them. Not to follow them into Cambodia violated every principle of warfare (p. 341).

The authors move beyond this to a humanizing examination of their tenacious enemy. The North Vietnamese snipers tied themselves to the limbs of trees, they hid behind anthills, and with superior knowledge of the land, they achieved the element of surprise on more than one occasion. They suffered terrible losses yet were courageous and fearless. Dying North Vietnamese soldiers booby-trapped their bodies and weapons to deny the enemy any last satisfaction. Acknowledging that those who have not known war might not understand, the authors also offer their work as a tribute to these North Vietnamese soldiers: "This is our story and theirs. For we were soldiers once, and young" (p. xx). The reconciliation achieved by the authors, reflected in the above comment, is one that requires the passage of time, after the rhetoric has faded and the rebuilding has begun, when the only options are to carry a cross to your grave or seek a private peace. Undoubtedly, not all who fought with Moore and Galloway have come as far as they have, but this book could help some get there. Reconciliation on the individual level must be part of the process that leads to eventual normalization of relations between states and in this respect, without overstating the point, *We Were Soldiers Once... and Young* makes a contribution.

In this spirit of reconciliation and toward the goal of a full account of the battle, Moore and Galloway have attempted to corroborate their own battlefield impressions with those of certain key North Vietnamese military figures whom they interviewed during their research. Lieutenant General Nguyen Huu An was a lieutenant colonel and deputy commander during the Ia Drang battles. Senior General Chu Huy Man was a brigadier in 1965 and controlled the NVA and VC forces in the Ia Drang region. The comments of these two men that are

interspersed throughout the book help the reader to a broader understanding of the battle and a greater appreciation of the respect that the authors and other Americans developed for the tenacity of the North Vietnamese forces.

The book also offers insight, through General Moore's recollections, into the personal agonies of the more removed policymakers, including then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. It reveals a less technocratic side of the Secretary that was not publicly known until several years later. Moore was required to brief McNamara and other Pentagon officials on the battle at landing zone X-Ray when they "descended" on An Khe on 29 November 1965. Moore had steeled himself for the briefing in preparation for McNamara and his reputation as a "human computer, insensitive to people" (p. 319). Moore concluded his briefing and recalls that, "McNamara stood, stepped forward, and without a word extended his hand, looking into my eyes. He asked no questions, made no comments" (p. 319).

The final reflections, those of loved ones, are provided in a concluding chapter entitled "The Secretary of the Army regrets . . ." and are as powerful as the battlefield images provided in earlier chapters. The inclusion of the thoughts and recollections of wives, parents and children is consistent with the authors concept of a military unit as a family. This chapter provides the homefront perspective not only in the voices of widows left to raise children on their own, but in the voice of, among others, a twenty-seven-year-old woman who was seventeen months old when her father was killed in Vietnam. This woman recently met the man whose life her father had saved twenty-five years earlier in the jungles of Vietnam. In a statement that is perhaps indicative of the healing power of this book and others like it, she relates the encounter:

> I spent a lot of my childhood detesting the anonymous man that my Dad loaded onto that helicopter . . . I had always felt that my Dad traded his life for that man. It meant so much to me to be able to look that man in the eyes. I know now that if the roles had been reversed Ray Lefebvre would have done the same for my Dad (p. 330).

We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young is a book born of great personal emotion. It is the result of years of gathering information from Army records, phone calls, interviews, and a return to the battlefield that included meetings with the North Vietnamese commanders. The strength of the book lies in its collection of personal accounts of battlefield horror and heroism. While the authors are grateful to have their account published, one senses that they would have been happy to have concluded this account and tribute on their own for distribution to those to whom it would mean the most. On the other hand, in publishing the book, it is certainly their hope that soldiers and their sacrifices will not be forgotten and that lessons will be learned and remembered. The reader will quickly get past the jargon of the U.S. Army and appreciate the message.

In the wake of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, many, including President Bush in his State of the Union address on 29 January 1991, declared that the United States no longer suffered from a Vietnam syndrome. No Vietnam

veteran would deny that overcoming that syndrome was important to the nation's health. However, such a declaration does not erase the feeling among many veterans, like those of the Ia Drang Valley, that there story has not been fully told, nor have their contributions been fully saluted. In endeavoring to insure that what his soldiers did was recorded, Moore (with Galloway) has taken a small timeframe in the Vietnam war and given a ground up view from both sides of the battlefield. There is plenty there for the strategists and tacticians, but the real strength of *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young* lies not in the detail, but in the way the detail is revealed.

Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System

by James Fallows

New York: Pantheon, 1994, 456 pp., with notes and index, $25.00 cloth.

Reviewed by James Reed

James Fallows has produced the year's most celebrated book about the Asia-Pacific region, and it deserves to be read carefully, by all students of international relations, for that reason if for no other. Mr. Fallows is a celebrity journalist, with extensive Washington connections. In his acknowledgements he notes that among those whose comments on his manuscript "helped me greatly" are Richard Gephardt, Laura Tyson, Clyde Prestowitz, "and another person, who has asked that he not now be named. I hope to be able to thank him publicly in the future for his time and unselfish advice" (p. 455).

This may or may not refer to the President of the United States, although the former would make perfect sense given the close nexus between Fallows' work and the policy and thinking of the Clinton administration.

Fallows' title refers to what he sees as the rising sun of Japanese commercial expansion, extending out from the Japanese archipelago to the Korean peninsula, the China coast, Indochina, Mandalay, Singapore and Indonesia — largely at "our" expense. Like novelist Michael Crichton, whose intellectual assistance Fallows gratefully acknowledges, the journalist interprets this expansion as coming at the expense of the United States and insists that Japanese business constitutes a distinct threat to American prosperity and security. Moreover Japan's rise can be seen as part of an emerging "broad regional system" in Asia, "the New East Asian Economic and Political System" of the book's subtitle. This system can be viewed as a Greater Nippon, to be sure, but also and more fundamentally as a new way of doing capitalism, a new technique of organizing state and society, and a new pattern of cultural values. "I won't call this book a look straight into the sun," Fallows notes perhaps too modestly (p. 19). "But the Western world's reluctance to look at the Asian model directly, in all its brilliance and heat, is the main source of friction between Japan, plus those neighbors in Asia that it increasingly dominates, and the rest of the world" (p. 19).

Samuel P. Huntington and many other observers have argued similarly, though typically in briefer compass than Mr. Fallows's 450 pages. Given the

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affinity of their arguments, the omission of Huntington's famous essay on "The Clash of Civilizations" in the summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs* from this bibliography is stunning. Fallows uses computer industry publications and ephemera of fellow journalists extensively and prefers interviews to books, to the point where he will sometimes interview an author rather than master his work, as he does with the eminent political scientist Chalmers Johnson for example. In his quasi-historical chapters, he seems to rummage through the literature to find suitable "quotes" that will generate footnotes which will give his book the patina of learning. Almost invariably the standard works in a field are not cited, unless they are useful in sustaining the anti-Japanese polemic.

While the reviewer would like to proceed logically through the argument, pausing at appropriate points to evaluate the evidence, Fallows has rendered such a procedure all but impossible. His argument is so muddled that it would take an extended essay just to unravel it, let alone explore its contradictions. And it would take a book as long as *Looking at the Sun* to expose all the errors in the present volume. So we shall proceed by chapter to get some sense of the range and depth of this work.

In the Introduction, Fallows begins by stating a preference for history over economics — "History gives us different, more complicated lessons, which are more useful for understanding what is going on in Asia now" — then admits that "what I 'knew' about Asia, at the time I left the United States to live there, was what most educated Americans think they know" (p. 7). Since most educated Americans have not studied Asian history or American-East Asian relations, one may legitimately ask at the outset where Mr. Fallows got his grounding in those subjects and how he mastered their extensive literature. "The countries are far away, the languages are hard," (p. 19) he tells us, employing the simplistic level of discourse to which he frequently reverts.

In Chapter 1 ("The Mystery of the Chips") Fallows begins on firm ground, in the Silicon Valley, doing what he does best: business journalism. It is the best chapter in the book. "I was glad to be in California again," Fallows exudes: "I spent a March morning sitting on a bench in Cupertino, California, just feeling the spring sun and soft air" (p. 21). The delight in his own experience is typical of the author's research strategy, but the chapter is a generally competent and untendentious account of the rise and fall of the American semiconductor industry in the 1980s.

Fallows makes the sensible point that the American government, at the height of its laissez-faire approach, could have done something to assist the industry in its development. In this way, Fallows insinuates an argument for greater state intervention in the economy and some kind of industrial policy, and he perpetuates the tendency of a great deal of American writing about Asia to focus meditatively on the United States.

Chapters 2 through 5 deal ostensibly with Japan. They claim to be history, or some kind of analysis which is essentially historical, but they are in fact *ersatz* history — that is to say a fake history, calculated to prey on the presumed gullibility of the common reader. They are also breathtaking in their sweep: ambitious, overreaching, even reckless.

Chapter 2 ("The Drive to Catch Up") presents itself as a history of East Asia since 1592, when the warlord Hideyoshi, beginning Japan's career of aggression, set sail for Korea and created "a kind of dividing line for the modern history of East Asia, as the voyage of Columbus . . . is a dividing line for the history of North America" (p. 75). True, the coming of the European imperialists to Asia did in fact happen, but this was "a long time ago," and therefore basically irrelevant, whereas the rise of Japan is the theme to trace in "relevant history," in Fallows's phrase, since its effects are still with us today. The inability to see Western aggression clearly is among the book's principal blind spots. Fallows turns next to the Western missionary movement, noting blandly that "The proselytizing Catholics of that day were not believers in cultural relativism" (p. 79). The Meiji Restoration, despite the mendacious scholarship of Japanese historians bent on demonstrating that there were sometimes movements toward democracy and civil society, in fact led straight to Pearl Harbor. "Japanese citizens are not really citizens," Fallows explains. "They are mobilized, organized, and superbly well trained by the state and its institutions, but they have not really participated in its governance" (p. 101). While some readers may be tempted to contrast the closed, hierarchical, bureaucratic system of Tokyo with the wide-open, egalitarian, sympathetic republican virtue of Washington, D.C., it is vital to remember that this is *ersatz history* rather than the real thing.

Chapter 3 ("The American Years") continues this general history of Asia by focusing on the years of the American occupation of Japan. In his account of the occupation, Fallows traces the current difficulties in U.S.-Japan relations to the unwise policies of the immediate postwar years, particularly the Peace Constitution and the U.S.-Japanese alliance. He is particularly critical of what he terms America's "pol-mil mindset," the enduring tendency of policymakers to subordinate commercial considerations to America's overarching political and military interests in the region. These are indeed large topics with large literatures, and Fallows never tells us exactly what realistic policy options were in fact passed over in those bad old days. But he could have made his argument much more persuasively if he had mustered the discipline to study the occupation in its many complexities, with appropriate reference to the standard historical works on the subject.

Chapter 4 ("The Idea of Economic Success") is particularly egregious when judged by the standards of academia and of intellectual journalism. It begins as an *ersatz* history of ideas since the Enlightenment, stumbles through American history, and then turns into an outright attack on the economics profession and Japanologists, before the narrative settles down into conventional business journalism about corporate rivalries across the Pacific. Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Jefferson, Confucius, Edwin Reischauer, and Robert Reich are among those who undergo ritual slaughter in this extended intellectual rampage. With its zippy, staccato style, its affecting innocence and its free-floating resentments, the chapter is not easily categorized by genre. But the following may suggest the degree of nuance: "With the rise of Asian economies, some Asian leaders, notably Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore . . . have been saying that Rousseau's political philosophy is not necessarily the world's philosophy" (p. 181). Yet

characteristically, Fallows does not move beyond this to a discussion of such fine points as Rousseau's authoritarian concept of the "general will." Following this exercise in *Geistesgeschichte*, his attempt to explore the sophisticated history of ideas, Chapter 5 ("The Pan-Asian Age"), on Japanese commercial expansion, comes almost as a welcome return to business as usual.

In Chapters 6 ("Growth with Development") and 7 ("On the Sidelines") Fallows tours the countries of East and Southeast Asia, which he seems to enjoy principally because they are weak and they are not Japan. In his discussion of most of these countries, he seems transfixed by the Japanese presence and by the possibility that markets which might belong to the United States are instead dominated by the Asian giant.

In Chapter 8 ("Contenders") the tour continues on to South Korea which, inevitably, reminds the author of Japan and leads him to comment that "the two systems are pretty much the same." Finally, on page 401, Fallows arrives in China. Although he is never transformed as a result of his journey, he is forced in China to consider briefly that the entire architecture of his book may be ill-conceived, because at last he has found a country that is not just an emanation of Tokyo. China comes as a revelation, although the author is incorrect in his description of the American Concession in old Shanghai, which in fact never existed. Fallows tries to explain away the revised estimates on the size of China's economy — larger than Japan's and clearly not mired in recession. Since Fallows eschews the "pol-mil mindset," he never notices such conventional geopolitical concerns as the growth of the People's Liberation Army, and the prospective blue-water navy, with their obvious implications for the power balance in East and Southeast Asia. But the author's discovery of China represents a poignant moment, soon lost among banalities such as, "China's future role is the great wild-card variable in Asia's future, and to an extent the future of the world" (p. 401).

Mercifully, Chapters 9 ("The Impact of the Asian System") and 10 ("Looking at the Sun") bring this epic travelogue to its appropriate anticlimax as Fallows attempts to draw conclusions from his extensive experience for Washington policymakers. He has alerted his fellow citizens to a massive challenge, to which a massive response logically might be necessary. But because of the general inability of the American government to resolve problems on a large scale, Fallows's policy prescriptions are aimed at temporary relief, a modest combination of worker training, managed trade, and discussions of industrial policy. This returns us, by means of a somewhat circuitous route, to a focus on the Clinton administration and its role in Asia and the Pacific.

To an extent still not adequately understood by those outside of Washington, American foreign policy, especially in the post-Cold War period, is largely a function of domestic politics and public opinion. The Washington journalist plays a pivotal role here. "This is not supposed to be an ideological age, but the ideas we use to explain events are very, very powerful," (p. 45) Fallows observes. The identification of "ideas" and ideology is characteristic of the author's approach and is later made explicit when Fallows explains that "the realm" he really cares about is not the intellectual community but "the realm of politicians,

newspaper editorialists, TV talk shows, and the other forms of punditry that define reasonable and unreasonable ideas" (p. 192). The author is thus self-consciously attempting to influence domestic politics and public opinion from within the Washington establishment. Will he succeed?

Fallows seems already to have succeeded brilliantly by his own yardstick. In its first two years, the Clinton administration has largely conducted itself in the Asia-Pacific region in line with Fallows' prescriptions. Looking at the sun, the Clinton policymakers have shed the old "pol-mil mindset" for one that straightforwardly replaces politics with economics, and that caters to domestic interest groups. There is great enthusiasm for the Pacific century of American commercial and industrial prosperity back home, as was demonstrated in the description of the 1993 APEC conference in Seattle as really being about "jobs, jobs, jobs." Still blinded by the Japanese commercial prowess of the 1980s, the Clinton administration has fixated on trade rivalry with Japan and has employed an ad hoc approach to such putatively lesser matters as the political future of the Korean peninsula, the dramatic emergence of China, the arms race in Southeast Asia, and the building of multilateral institutions. The President, like Mr. Fallows, has no deep or abiding interest in such "pol-mil" issues and, in this context, it matters little whether Clinton read this book in manuscript. The essential point is the elective affinity between *Looking at the Sun* and the fundamental values and assumptions of the Clinton administration in its approach to Asia and the Pacific.

The book therefore deserves to be read critically for what it aspires to be: the functional equivalent, under modern American conditions, of a state paper, an authoritative exposition of current American policy. As such, it ought to send a shiver down the spine of every foreign office in Asia.

Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements

by Lawrence E. Susskind

New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 201 pp., with appendices, notes, bibliography, and index, $45.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Reviewed by Andrew M. Deutz

To date, the international community has concluded nearly 900 treaties which principally address environmental issues or which contain significant provisions directly pertaining to them. The 1992 Rio Conference marked the signing of two major conventions and the adoption of the extensive Agenda 21, together with the Rio Declaration and a declaration on forest principles. Follow-up negotiations on the implementation of the former two treaties have continued in preparation for the first Conferences of the Parties, and the Desertification Convention was adopted in June 1994. Developments at the regional level have kept pace with global negotiations, to the point where some commentators have noted the new phenomenon of "treaty congestion," manifesting a need for a more efficient and manageable treaty-making process.

Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements by Lawrence E. Susskind is an attempt to address this issue. Despite the apparent quantitative success in environmental treaty negotiation, Susskind contends that "the procedures we currently use to formulate global environmental agreements were not designed to handle the unique demands of environmental problem solving. . . . A new consensus-building process is required, and the institutional arrangements on which we have relied must be changed" (pp. 6-7). Susskind is primarily concerned with how the mechanics and procedures of the multilateral negotiating process can be modified "so that internal and external pressures on national negotiating committees can be addressed effectively" (p. 5). He emphasizes the process of environmental negotiations, rather than the substance, and his orientation is toward settling disputes or reaching agreements, rather than on evaluating the ecological or political effectiveness of whatever agreements may be reached. Regrettably, while acknowledging in the opening chapter that national delegations to environmental negotiations are often composed of representatives of multiple government ministries and that national negotiating positions themselves are often the result of interministerial consultations and negotiations, the implications are not substantively taken up

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in the course of the discussion. The work could benefit from the application of Susskind's knowledge of negotiation theory to the intra-governmental level as well.

In his critique of the existing multilateral treaty making system, Susskind is particularly critical of the convention-protocol approach to contemporary environmental treaty making, as exemplified by the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol. He criticizes this process as often long and drawn out, but he does not make the case convincingly. To support his argument, he cites the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which took ten years to run the process from initial issue articulation to political mobilization to convention adoption, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which also took nearly a decade to negotiate. Yet in the grander scheme of multilateral treaty drafting, a ten year process from initial concern to signed treaty is not especially long when compared, for example, to the latest round of GATT negotiations. Indeed, recent negotiations indicate that the international community is getting better at negotiating complex environmental treaties quickly. The Climate Change and Biodiversity conventions, as well as the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, with its four detailed annexes, each took less than two years to negotiate, as did the regionally-based U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) agreements on industrial accidents and volatile organic compounds.

In addition, it is an oversimplification to assume that all environmental treaties fit the convention-protocol approach. UNCLOS does not fit this mold; it is comprehensive and definitive in scope, attempting to codify existing law rather than address an environmental concern new to the international agenda. Nevertheless, Susskind is dismayed by the ad hoc nature of the convention-protocol approach to treaty making, and argues for "a formal negotiating system spelling out the rights of each country to help set agendas and the obligations of secretariats to achieve a certain minimum threshold of support from U.N. Members before environmental treaties can be considered" (p. 33).

In one of his stronger chapters, Susskind takes up the issue of the role of science in environmental treaty making. He contends that science has traditionally played a fairly small role in the negotiating process, though this role has increased in addressing the issues of acid rain, ozone depletion, and biodiversity. The role of science in the Climate Convention was perhaps more mixed; science was clearly a driving force in articulating the issue, but the scope of the political and economic interests at stake led to what Susskind calls "adversary science," i.e., the deliberate politicization of scientific methods and findings. This phenomenon was rife during the climate negotiations and threatens to undermine the credibility of the scientific community as a whole. In the case of the climate convention, the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) allayed this danger somewhat by establishing a credible forum for the development of an international consensus on the science of climate change. Another development to increase the role of scientific assessment that Susskind points to is the institutionalized review of scientific evidence on the adequacy of political commitments undertaken by countries, originating in the

Montreal Protocol and repeated in the Climate Change Convention, and to a lesser extent the Biodiversity and Desertification Conventions. In this context, it should also be noted that all four instruments establish expert panels or subsidiary bodies for scientific and technical advice.

As another mechanism to combat adversary science, Susskind proposes the negotiation of contingent agreements, i.e., multiple protocols that would be negotiated at the same time as the framework agreement, which would come into force if certain criteria were met. Certainly, the negotiation of several additional components would increase the difficulty of the initial round of negotiations and could reduce the debate regarding precise scientific assessments, but this may prove a means of postponing the politicization of the scientific debate. By initially reducing the need for scientific consensus and agreeing on an array of contingent response measures, the inevitable question of whether or not the various triggering thresholds have been met may itself become a critical political issue, since the scientific assertion of fact would directly entail legal commitments. Getting around this problem would require the establishment of a scientific review panel similar to the IPCC that could establish a momentum of credibility over time and authoritatively pronounce on an international scientific consensus.

While the international community has gotten better, at least in quantitative terms, at negotiating environmental treaties, effective implementation is often still lacking. In his discussion of the potential for enhancing the enforcement of international environmental agreements, Susskind draws on the experience of various human rights mechanisms of the United Nations. He suggests that governments sign a protocol equivalent to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to create a body, equivalent to the Human Rights Committee, to which individuals could submit complaints against governments for environmental treaty violations. This approach would necessitate casting environmental issues in terms of individual rights, but here Susskind offers no ideas for the legal instrument which would articulate these rights and to which an optional protocol could be attached. One could potentially foresee such an instrument as an outgrowth of the 1994 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment which was presented by the report of the Human Rights Sub-Commission Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, Madame Fatma Zohra Ksentini. However, such an approach seems a long way off, particularly if viewed in light of the length of time that was required to institute human rights mechanisms from the adoption of a General Assembly Declaration in 1948, to the adoption of the two treaty instruments in 1966, to their entry into force in 1976, to the establishment of specific committees for monitoring and enforcement of each in 1976 and 1987 respectively.

Susskind also explores the possibility of creating both public and confidential review procedures for alleged environmental treaty violations modeled on the Resolutions 1235 and 1503 Procedures of the Human Rights Commission. He argues for the creation of an environmental violations committee. Structurally, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) would seem the logical

body to oversee this function, but curiously, Susskind does not mention it in this context. Granted the CSD has a relatively weak mandate, essentially to review the implementation of Agenda 21, but it does have the authority to review information regarding the implementation of international environmental conventions and to receive information from governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental sources. To carry Susskind's analogy to the Human Rights Commission further, and to give a potential boost to what so far has proven to be a lackluster institution, specific environmental treaty review processes could be developed and the CSD's mandate augmented to give it the authority to establish working groups and special rapporteurs.

To complement these institutional processes to enhance the enforcement of environmental agreements, Susskind advocates the creation of a "'Green Amnesty International'; the league of nongovernmental organizations whose stated objectives would be to work for prompt and fair resolution of environmental treaty violations under internationally recognized norms" (p. 114). This organization would have an international secretariat, national offices, and be open to individual membership. At this juncture, Susskind demonstrates a striking unfamiliarity with the work of the existing environmental NGO community. Several existing international NGOs fit his description: Greenpeace has four million members and operates in twenty-nine countries, the World Wide Fund for Nature also has four million members and operates through twenty-three national organizations and four affiliate organizations, and Friends of the Earth International has one million members and fifty-two constituent organizations. Alongside these groups, several regional and global networks of NGOs have been organized over the last five years to address specific issues and negotiating processes. As one example, NGOs established the Climate Action Network (CAN) in 1989 to facilitate cooperation and information exchange among NGOs working on climate issues worldwide. The network has since expanded to incorporate over 160 NGOs drawn from forty-seven countries. By combining advocacy and scientific expertise with global coordination, CAN was and continues to be a effective force in the negotiations to draft and now to implement the Climate Change Convention. Without a doubt, this sector plays a key role in the negotiation and enforcement of international environmental agreements, and Susskind's analysis could benefit from an examination of both the interactions within the NGO community and their substantive influence in negotiating and enforcement processes.

In the concluding chapter, Susskind presents two sets of proposals for improving the environmental treaty making process. The first is an elaboration of ten recommendations of the Salzburg Initiative, derived from a series of seminars held from 1989 to 1991. The suggestions are useful, straightforward applications of negotiation theory to the environmental treaty-making process, and various elements can be seen in the negotiating history of the Rio treaties. In addition, Susskind points to the need for the creation of an international academy for environmental diplomacy. To this end, it should be noted that the United Nations University (UNU), Dartmouth College, and the Woods Hole Research Center have established an Institute on International Environmental Govern-

ance as a joint program, with a view towards evolution into a UNU Research and Training Center.

In an attempt at greater innovation, Susskind proposes a new, three-stage environmental treaty-making process. Stage I would aim, in six months, to establish a consensus on the science of the problem and to adopt a statement of principles to elicit an international response. Stage II would consist of the negotiation of a general framework convention together with multiple, contingent protocols, over a two-year period. Stage III would review the results of Stage II and strengthen elements of the framework convention and protocols as necessary. Commencing and concluding each stage would require explicit support from particular majorities of the U.N. General Assembly or parties to the agreement, and the timetable for each stage would be strictly circumscribed. Susskind contends that the greatest advantage of this system would be its enhanced predictability: the schedule would be known, the voting structure would clarify the status of the negotiations, the elements included in each treaty would be consistent, and the criteria for measuring adequate progress would not vary.

As proposed, this three stage structure is not all that different from the current convention-protocol approach as exemplified by the Climate Change Convention. The official impetus for these the negotiations came in the form of a General Assembly resolution establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC). After fifteen months of negotiations, a framework convention was opened for signature at Rio which elaborated principles, weak commitments, a financial mechanism, and an institutional review process. Less than two years later, the convention entered into force. In September 1994, the Alliance of Small Island States submitted a formal protocol proposal to the INC Secretariat for consideration for adoption at the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) in Berlin in March 1995. It proposes firm targets and timetables for the reduction of carbon dioxide and a formal process to negotiate future reductions of other greenhouse gases. Although the proposal is unlikely to be adopted by COP1, we can expect instead to see the launching of a formal process leading to a protocol by a subsequent Conference of the Parties. This particular process is structurally similar to Susskind's proposed three stage approach.

It is likely that international environmental agreements will increasingly need to adopt new approaches, obligations and procedural innovations to confront the challenges that lie ahead. Arguing retrospectively, it is difficult to imagine that negotiators trying to respond to the threat of ozone depletion in 1985 or climate change in 1991 would have felt comfortable operating within a rigid structure imposed on them from the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. Establishing an arbitrary structure specifically designed to generate structurally consistent treaties on strict schedules, as Susskind suggests, would unnecessarily limit the flexibility and capacity for innovation of the negotiators.

In short, *Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements* is useful for its application of negotiation theory to the field of international

environmental treaty-making. It may prove of interest to those seeking an introduction to the field, but the description of the negotiation process should be complemented by a more rigorous analysis of the environmental and legal substance under consideration.

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