RISKY BUSINESS:
ADVISING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES AND
THE NEED FOR SMART PARTNERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

In the post World War Two era, the United States has regularly supported advisory mission to organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise foreign security forces. Today the conventional military of the United States are continually called upon to train a wide variety of foreign security forces ranging from conventional military units to police forces. Examinations of the U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) campaigns since World War II illuminates the broader roles and missions that the Department of Defense, the Department of State and other U.S. government entities have placed in the support of host nation foreign security forces through training and equipping. Due to the sensitive politico-military nature of these campaigns, decision-making in and oversight of these campaigns usually resides with the President and senior policy makers of departments as well as the statutory members to the National Security Council.

This dissertation examines the policy and strategy of U.S. security force assistance campaigns within a host nation. The central question of this research is what factors best explain the success and failure of U.S. SFA campaigns in support of a host nation's security forces? This study provides generalizations about how the United States provides support to the organization, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising of a foreign security force. More specifically, it examines the U.S. historical experience to find evidence of a SFA campaign's strategic effectiveness and what variables pertinent to decision making at the national level explain that effectiveness. This dissertation closes with recommendations on the policy, strategy and implementation of security force assistance campaigns.

This study draws from an interdisciplinary body of literature to build a theoretical model known as smart partnership to describe past experience and prescribe future strategy development and implementation of support to security force assistance missions. This model is tested against three cases: U.S. SFA efforts in El Salvador from 1979-1989, U.S. SFA efforts in Kosovo from 1999-2009, and U.S. SFA efforts in Iraq from 2003-2011.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

“A mission few understand, nobody wants, and the one that everyone is doing.” – Conversation between Col. James Greer and Col. Sean Ryan at the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2007, on working with foreign security forces.


The central question of this research is why senior United States policy makers commit conventional United States forces to security force assistance (SFA) missions. Throughout our history, the United States military has constantly focused on organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising foreign security forces (FSFs). From the Philippine Constabulary at the end of the 19th century, to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. conventional forces continue to focus the majority of their deployed efforts on developing FSFs. While United States Special Forces are specially trained and organized to work with indigenous forces, the sheer size and complexity of rebuilding a Host Nation’s (HN) security forces has almost always required the assistance of conventional forces working in a role for which they traditionally receive little to no training. More importantly, there is little research on the type and amount of discourse at the senior policy maker level regarding the commitment of U.S. conventional forces to these advisory missions.

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This dissertation has two objectives: First, it seeks to determine whether generalizations can be made about how the United States provides support to an advisory mission consistent with its national security goals. Second, it pursues an exploration for why decision makers commit the United States to an SFA mission and whether SFA is an effective tool to achieve those specified strategic objectives.

This dissertation will accomplish these goals by examining the U.S. historical experience in three cases to find evidence of a campaign’s strategic effectiveness and determine what variables were pertinent to decision making at the national level. These cases include U.S. efforts in El Salvador (1980–1988), Kosovo (1999–2009), and Iraq (2003–2011). I will conduct process tracing in each case study followed by a structured, focused comparison among these three distinct cases to determine what elements are present when an administration decides to 1) initiate an SFA mission, 2) extend or continue a SFA mission and 3) terminate an SFA mission. For this dissertation, the dependent variable to be explained is the strategic effect of an SFA mission on the host nation security environment. From a U.S. perspective, a positive strategic effect is defined as the successful achievement of U.S. national security goals for a given SFA campaign. The independent variables are national interests, interagency collaboration, legitimacy, and civil-military interaction.

My hope is to add to the relatively limited literature regarding United States military advisory missions while attempting to find a better way for our senior policy makers to debate whether to commit our forces to such missions in the future.
I. Key Terms

Security Cooperation

The efforts of the United States to conduct SFA achieved varying results in our past. Over the past 130 years, United States military forces attempted to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise a variety of FSFs. Throughout this history, a loose doctrine related to security cooperation (SC) expanded to encompass the concept of SFA. SC comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to HNs.\(^2\)

*Joint doctrine note 1-13*, published 29 April 2013\(^3\), lists the multitude of DoD programs available to assist foreign nations. Included in the SC umbrella is SFA. The United States DoD defines SFA as:

Activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) and supporting institutions. I define Foreign Security Forces as all organizations and personnel under Host Nation (HN) control that have a mission of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well as external threats. SFA activities are primarily used to


assist an HN in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., supporting foreign internal defense [FID], counterterrorism, counterinsurgency [COIN], or stability operations).  

DoD policy states, “Security cooperation is an important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an integral element of the DoD mission. Security cooperation activities shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DoD activities. Security cooperation requirements shall be combined with other DoD requirements and implemented through standard DoD systems, facilities, and procedures.”

The DoD defines SC as “all interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN.” SC occurs across the spectrum of conflict and is not exclusively a peacetime activity. SC includes security assistance (SA) programs administered by the DOD as well as activities that enhance interoperability and the collective capability of combined forces (using Title 10 or exercise funding and authority). SC consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. It is “governed by various sections of Title 10 and specific public laws addressing DOD interactions with other nations.”

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7 Ibid.
United States Army Regulation 11-31, *Army security cooperation policy*, establishes the U.S. Department of the Army policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting, and execution of Army SC activities. It is the policy of the U.S. Army to conduct SC activities in compliance with higher-level guidance and in the execution of Army responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 22 that governs the transfer, exchange, conduct, and development of articles and services via a variety of USG programs. Army SC consists of official, cooperative, and noncombat interactions among any Army elements, active army, or reserve components. This includes any USG or nongovernment entity supporting the military and civilian joint and multinational organizations. Commanders distinguish SC from SFA based its emphasis in building relationships and capacities by using programmatic activities. Thus, SC may support or be supported by SFA.8

The concept of SC encompasses many different types of security activities, to include SFA. Within the USG, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) exists to manage the complexity of conducting SC around the globe. From its website, DSCA's mission is as follows: "DSCA is the Department’s lead agency for the execution of security cooperation programs. DSCA subject-matter expertise spans the gamut of security cooperation activities to include policy, financial, legal, legislative, programmatic, and weapons systems experts."9

The next area that we will look at in terms of the literature available on SFA also falls under SC: SA.

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Security Assistance

SA is defined by the United States DoD as a group of programs authorized by presidential memorandum “Policy regarding future commitments for foreign assistance,” 8 May 1956, as amended or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The DoD does not administer all SA programs. Those SA programs that are administered by the DoD are a subset of SC. Other USG departments such as the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and FBI are just a few of the other government agencies that conduct SA program.

SA traditionally focuses on providing the materials to assist the defense postures of key allies. In many ways, SA provides the critical equipment for FSFs and that associated training specific to that military equipment. The United States provided SA to allies such as Greece Turkey, Israel, and Egypt through a variety of SA programs. It involves “giving the tools” to strategic allies and partner nations through programs such as lend-lease or foreign assistance programs. The United States has been doing this for over 100 years and continues to do so today. The year 2015 (the year with the latest figures available at the time of this writing) saw the United States sell $46.6 billion in foreign military sales (FMS).  

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11 Hanlon, Q., Shultz, R.H. Prioritizing security sector reform: a new U.S. approach. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2016. This work is especially interesting. Building off of the work of Mark Sedra and other SSR authors, Hanlon and Shultz apply it to U.S. foreign policy and conclude with a draft of a proposed presidential policy directive for SSR.  
United States SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. SA is a specific subset of SC and may focus on external or internal threats.\textsuperscript{13}

A large manual, \textit{DOD 5105.38-M}, exists to describe the scope of U.S. SA programs in detail. These programs allow the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments. According to the \textit{Security assistance management manual} (SAMM; \textit{DOD 5105.38-M}), SA consists of the following:

Security Assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments. Security Assistance transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to the security and economic well-being of allied Governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the United States (U.S.). Security Assistance programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. They increase the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability. Security Assistance can be the delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign Governments; U.S. Service schools training international students; U.S. personnel advising other Governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities; U.S. personnel providing guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability; etc. When we assist other nations in meeting their defense requirements, we contribute to our own security.\textsuperscript{14}

At nearly 650 pages, the SAMM tries to cover all potential aspects of SA.

\textsuperscript{13} Department of the Army. \textit{Field manual 3-07.1. Security force assistance.}
\textsuperscript{14} Department of Defense. \textit{DOD 5105.38-M. Security assistance management manual.}
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

FID is “participation by civil and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”\(^{15}\) The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of internal defense and development (IDAD).\(^{16}\) IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat those threats. Clearly these different programs for dealing with foreign governments all have specific goals and limit the types of assistance offered. SFA not only tries to tie all these programs together, it also strives to fill in the gaps between them.

Security Force Assistance (SFA)

The United States DoD defines SFA as “activities that contribute to unified action by the … USG to support the development of capability and capacity of … FSFs and supporting institutions.”\(^{17}\)

SFA tasks range from rebuilding police forces to equipping and training all varieties of military forces within an HN. The United States has a long and varied record in terms of building accountable and effective security forces. Some of these efforts include training the security forces of the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In each instance, there are a wide variety of primary and secondary sources focusing on the tactical implementation of the


\(^{16}\) Ibid, 269.

advisor efforts in military doctrine, training manuals and military journal articles. Yet there is very little in terms of academic research on why decision makers at the strategic level eventually opt to use their conventional military forces in an SFA role. The 2015 National Security Strategy highlighted the importance of working with FSFs in the section titled “Building capacity to prevent conflict” as well as other sections of this document.18

The nature of today’s complex threat environment, spanning cyber warfare to the continued rise of non-state armed groups as well as the increased demand for security as populations move into littoral and urban areas, demands a functioning government with a security apparatus to protect its people. This, combined with the general war weariness of the American population as conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continue well into their second decade, contributes to the increased focus on an HN’s ability to build effective and accountable security forces without a major deployment of U.S. conventional forces.

Of note, the doctrinal term of SFA did not formally emerge until the first decade of the 21st century. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use the terms security force assistance (abbreviated SFA) and advisory missions interchangeably. While those United States forces, which worked with the Philippine Constabulary in the early 20th century and to rebuild the South Korean army, were called advisors, their mission fit clearly within the modern definition of SFA.

**Foreign Security Forces**

I define FSFs as all organizations and personnel under HN control that have a mission of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well as external threats. This would include the traditional branches of the military (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines), paramilitary forces (similar to the Italian Carabinieri), and the police forces (such as federal police, traffic police, and local police). Additionally, security branches that manage border crossings, ports of embarkation, and customs officials fall in to this definition as well.

**II. U.S. Experience in Advisory Missions**

Since the end of our Civil War, the United States military has continually worked by, with and through FSFs to develop the internal stability of an HN. From our constabulary efforts on the western plains working with cooperative Indian tribes, to the development of major forces such as the Philippine Constabulary, the USG has constantly used advisory missions as part of its national strategy. This section will provide a brief overview of some of those past operations to set the stage for the three main case studies of this dissertation.

**The Philippines**

From the start of the Spanish-American war, United States forces were placed into an unfamiliar role: a deployable force conducting operations outside of the continental
United States. Up until operations in Cuba and the Philippines, the U.S. military was a constabulary force. Its missions ranged from protecting the westward expansion of settlers against hostile Native American tribes to the reconstruction effort in the former confederate states.

The majority of sources with regards to the Philippine efforts emerged shortly after President Theodore Roosevelt declared the end of the insurgency in 1902. Brigadier General Henry Allen established the Philippine Constabulary and wrote the foundational Handbook: Philippine Constabulary, providing the operating principles for the constabulary in 1901. Allen served as the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary from 1901 to 1907, and as the aide of General Nelson Miles, the overall U.S. commander of the Philippines. The handbook and his letters highlight the importance the U.S. Army placed on using HN forces to pacify the Philippines. James Blount, a former army volunteer officer and later district judge in the Philippines wrote a valuable account of the Philippine Constabulary in the American occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912. Blount’s military experience provides a view of the capabilities of the indigenous forces. Additionally, his legal background provides insights into the legal issues and social struggles of arming the local population. Blount’s work, published in 1912, captures the struggles and benefits of America’s early attempts at SFA. Both Blount’s and Allen’s works are hard to find, and their location in only special collections results in an inability to disseminate their lessons learned across the U.S. military today.

In 1938, author Victor Hurley published *Jungle patrol*. His work reads more like a fiction novel but is based on interviews, diaries, and letters from dozens of Philippine Constabulary veterans and the insurgents they fought. Hurley’s book provides vivid accounts of the constabulary members working with advisors and is a useful read for current and future advisors in today’s SFA and COIN efforts. *The constabulary story*, written by the Public Information Office of the Philippine Constabulary in 1978, provides a thorough background and history of the founding, training, and operations of the constabulary.

More contemporary sources recently examined the U.S. Army’s experience in the Philippines. Historian Brian McAllister Linn revisited the constabulary role of the U.S. Army in his work *Guardians of the empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific 1902-1940*, published in 1997. Andrew Birtle’s *U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine 1860-1941* took on renewed importance as the U.S. military struggled with a rising insurgency in both Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. Birtle’s work devotes an entire chapter to the importance of the Philippine Constabulary and its development. In 2004, Edward Coffman analyzed a similar timeframe as Linn in *The regulars: The American army 1898-1941*. Coffman explores both the roles of the military during that time along with its culture, family life, and position in Philippine society.

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24 Birtle, 154.
Latin and South America, 1890–1932

Since the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States claimed, “The American continents … are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power.” However, up until the early 20th century, the United States did not have both the geo-political situation and balance of power to truly enforce that doctrine. At the turn of the century, with the buildup of the American military and a changing set of geo-political considerations, the United States found it had the capability actually to enforce that doctrine.

American military intervention in both Latin and South American started in earnest in 1890 with the deployment of conventional forces to Argentina to protect American interest. During this first foray into South America, the United States committed troops in a protection, combat, or advisory role 36 times from 1890 to 1939. These missions included the invasion of Cuba, a 20-year occupation of Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933, and a 19-year occupation of Haiti from 1913 to 1934.

While the First World War was fought on a conventional scale never before seen in the history of warfare, there were limited United States advisory missions ongoing. However, one of the most famous advisors/insurgents emerged from this period: T.E. Lawrence. To this day, both practitioners and policy makers involved in advisory efforts look to the words of Lawrence and how he worked with his Arab counterparts. As highlighted in an article by Mike Sullivan, what made Lawrence atypical was his lack of

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27 History of U.S. interventions in Latin America. Marc’s House of Knowledge. Retrieved from https://www.yachana.org/teaching/resources/interventions.html. This is an excellent website providing a snapshot of all U.S. military intervention in Latin and South America since 1890.
a military background and an incredibly extensive knowledge of the Arabian people through both study and on-the-ground experience.28 The British were highly involved in working with foreign militaries and irregular forces during the First World War and continued to do so throughout the 20th century.

After the First World War, America found itself in the position of not only having a marked expansion in global power projection through its newly expanded military forces, but also suffering relatively few casualties in comparison to the European powers that fought in the war. The result was the contraction of powers such as England and France from affairs in the Western Hemisphere and the expansion of America’s role in advisory missions. The outcome was an uptick not only in U.S. military involvement in Latin America but also an increase in the amount of advisory efforts undertaken to develop more effective HN police and military forces. The United States Marines Corps were instrumental in this effort due to their ability to deploy rapidly by sea. Based on both their advisory and counter insurgency efforts over this period, the Marine Corps developed the well-written, now-classic Small wars manual in 1940.29 The manual discusses the definition and strategy of fighting a “small war” and gets into the relationships with the State Department and the importance of civil-military relations within the HN. The following sentence can easily be applied to any advisory mission in

28 While outside the scope of this dissertation, read Mike Sullivan’s article in Military Review, “Leadership in counterinsurgency: a tale of two leaders”, which discusses the roles both T.E. Lawrence and General Sir Gerald Templer played in the Arab Insurgency during World War I and the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s, respectively. The article was retrieved from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/archives/english/militaryreview_20071031_art017.pdf.

present times, especially those ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet it was published in this manual in 1940: “The satisfactory solution of problems involving civil authorities and civil population requires that all ranks be familiar with the language, the geography, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in the country in which they are operating.”

Throughout years of deployments to more than a dozen Latin American nations during this period, the Marines not only understood what was needed to be successful advisors, they also captured these lessons in an enduring doctrinal manual.

**Korea, 1948–1952**

The experience of the United States military in the Second World War was again primarily conventional. However, there was little use of conventional U.S. military forces to work with HN forces during this time period. The next time we see the use of U.S. conventional forces was in the Republic of Korea (ROK). While previous advisor missions worked with a small number of forces in Latin and South America, the eventual advisory mission in Korea would rebuild a shattered army.

The government of the ROK came into existence on 15 August 1948, replacing the U.S. Army Military government in Korea. At this time, the United States created a provisional military advisory group (PMAG) to help improve the effectiveness of the ROK Army (ROKA). With its beginnings as a constabulary force, ROKA’s primary missions involved internal security and border defense. About a year after the founding

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30 Ibid, 41.
31 Abby Linnington’s dissertation “Unconventional warfare in U.S. foreign policy: U.S. support of insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Iraq from 1979-2001, found in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Ginn Library, does an solid job of exploring the rise of unconventional warfare during the Second World War and may be of interest to those researching unconventional warfare.
of the Korean Republic, the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) replaced the PMAG. KMAG was focused on assisting the ROK in developing its army, coast guard, and national police. This was no small task. By the summer of 1950, ROKA grew into a force of eight infantry divisions from essentially nothing. United States and Korea jointly funded the effort.\textsuperscript{32}

The invasion by the North Korean Army on 25 June 1950 caught the ROKA in the middle of its building program. ROKA resistance quickly collapsed, while KMAG, which at this point did not have a war-fighting mission, recalled its advisors. However, due to the fluid conditions of combat, a number of U.S. advisors remained with their Korean counterparts during the retreat. Once the shrinking perimeter stabilized around the port of Pusan, KMAG became a major subordinate command of the Eighth US Army (EUSA) with a secondary mission to maintain liaison between ROKA and EUSA.\textsuperscript{33} There was an immediate need to rebuild the battered ROKA forces and rapidly generate new forces to both maintain the Pusan perimeter and push back the North Korean forces. KMAG advisors immediately became the tip of the spear for these organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising efforts. However, as many KMAG advisors attested, they believed they were never the main effort of the war.\textsuperscript{34} The first pick of troops, and especially leaders, went to the U.S. combat divisions that were holding back the North Koreans and, later, the Chinese. As a result, KMAG was given short shrift in terms of


\textsuperscript{34} Ramsey, 11.
personnel, equipment, and priority of effort.\textsuperscript{35} T.R. Fehrenbach accurately captured this feeling amongst the advisors working for KMAG: “Traditionally, a nation instructing another should send its best men abroad, traditionally from Athens to the America of 1950, nations do not. There was little prestige, promotion or hope of your with serving with KMAG. The United States Army tended to forget these men. Most offices who could avoid KMAG duty did do, preferring to serve among their own troops, where food, companionship, and the chances of recognition were all considerably improved.”\textsuperscript{36} Even though the rebuilding of the South Korean military was necessary for the United States to disengage from Korea, that rebuilding effort was never a priority. Unfortunately, this trend continued in future advisory missions.

\textit{Vietnam, 1955–1973}

Vietnam would challenge the United States military with its longest, largest, and most complex advisory effort prior to Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States provided logistical support to the French in Indochina as early at 1950, and the Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V), came into existence in 1955. Initially limited by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to 342 personnel, it grew by an additional 350 personnel due to the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.\textsuperscript{37} MAAG-V worked with the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem from 1955 to 1960 to organize and train the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), which consisted of infantry

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\textsuperscript{35} Ramsey, 12.
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divisions, an airborne brigade, marines, armor battalions, a costal naval force, and a small air force. The RVNAF’s primary mission was the defense of the northern border against North Vietnamese invasion. This relatively small mission would greatly expand as the fight against both the North Vietnam forces and the Viet Cong continued.

The advisory efforts in Vietnam would rapidly dwarf the effort in Korea and last until 1973. Starting in 1961, MAAG-V advisors were permitted to accompany RVNAF battalion and companion units into combat to observe and advise. While advisors were forbidden from directly participating in combat and in operations near international borders, often the advisors had no say on when their units would make contact. As interest in Viet Nam continued to increase, so did the commitment of U.S. advisors. Advisors were assigned down to the lower level RVNAF units and in 1962, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was created with General Paul Harkins in command. Under MACV, MAAG-V had more than 3,500 personnel assigned to it with nearly 1,500 of them being advisors.

The challenge facing both the RVNAF and the U.S. advisors working with their counterparts was unique: Not only was there a valid threat from the conventional forces of North Vietnam, but the rising insurgency of the Viet Cong continued to increase in frequency and effectiveness. The continued U.S. military buildup subsumed MACV with troops reaching a maximum of 550,000 in 1968 to 1969. MACV became an American operational headquarters focused on fighting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and less on the insurgency within South Vietnam. The reliance on U.S. conventional

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39 Collins, 17.
40 Ibid, 21.
firepower and traditional maneuver warfare tactics resulted in a movement away from the importance of the advisory mission as American forces attempted to defeat both the NVA and VC.

Jonathan Caverley argues democracies such as the U.S. inevitably do a poor job of combating insurgencies because civilian officials “shift the burden of providing for the nation’s defense onto the rich by employing capital as a substitute for military labor. As a result, democracies fight insurgencies poorly because they rely on overwhelming firepower and technology rather than on more effective COIN strategy requiring large numbers of soldiers.”

James McAllister, however, disagrees with Caverley’s assessment. He argues, “The blood and treasure of the United States is not a viable substitute for local forces necessary to combat insurgencies. If there is one crucial lesson to take away from the history of the Vietnam War, it is to remember Westmoreland’s principle that the government of the United States is trying to assist in combatting an insurgency must ultimate provide security and the prospects of a better life for its people.”

The implementation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program under a civilian deputy to the MACV commander helped bring about a renewed focus both on COIN operations and the advisory mission. However, it wasn’t until after the Tet offensive and the implementation of the Nixon administration’s Vietnamization

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43 Ramsey, 30. After Tet, an additional 354 U.S. military advisor teams were created to work with local South Vietnamese security forces. By the end of 1968, the MACV advisory team had reached 11,596 personnel. Since they were nearly all senior noncommissioned officers and officers, this was the equivalent of another seven U.S. Army division on top of the 11 full divisions in the country.
policy that the U.S. military shifted its focus from conventional war fighting to advisory operation.

The policy of Vietnamization made it clear the U.S. military combat effort would decrease and the RVNAFs would need to expand their capacity and capabilities to meet the country’s security requirements. At this point, MACV division advisory teams converted to combat assistance teams (CATs), reduced the number of advisory slots at the RVNAF division level, and made a significant shift in the stated role of the advisor from advisory capacity to combat support coordination. However, at the battalion levels of the RVNAFs, there was an increase in the number of U.S. military advisor teams (MATs), again indicating a strong focus on improving the tactical performance of the South Vietnamese units and less concern over their operational and strategic performance.

By 1971, the continued concerns of the United States about the RVNAF capabilities to conduct major operations coupled with increasing domestic pressure in the United States to exit Vietnam resulted in both the withdrawal of U.S. combat units and a reduction in the number of advisors. During 1971, MATs were reduced from 487 to 66 teams, with the remainder eliminated by 1972. In a time where there needed to be an increased focus on advising the RVNAF forces as U.S. conventional forces drew down, there was instead a rapid decrease and planned exit of all American advisory teams at the tactical level.

The NVA's Eastern Offensive in March 1972 consisted of a conventional attack supported by artillery and armor. RVNAF forces, heavily supported by America air power

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and with U.S. advisors, fought for several months and were able to successfully halt the NVA offensive. A ceasefire went into effect on 28 January 1973, and all U.S. advisors were withdrawn within 60 days of it. Even though the 20-year advisory effort helped shape the RVNAF into a well-equipped force of 550,000 regulars and 525,000 territorials, weak leadership, corruption, an inability to sustain reforms, and a lack of support from their own people resulted in their collapse and eventual defeat in 1975 by conventional North Vietnam forces.

Iran

U.S. military involvement in Iran started before the end of the Second World War and continued until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The U.S. military mission was reorganized in 1950 as the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to train and assist the Iranian army in using the increased flow of U.S. military aid and equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that keeping the natural defensive barrier provided by the Zagros Mountains under allied control was essential to regional defense plans. The Americans then sought to adjust the Iranian military’s mission from internal to external security, leaving the former to the gendarmerie and national police. The shah welcomed the shift in U.S. policy to adjust the Iranian military’s mission to external security, which led to ever-growing quantities of more modern arms for the armed forces. Over the next few years, U.S. military planners concluded that the defense of the Middle East required effective military collaboration between Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran, which led to creation of the Baghdad Pact, or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955.
Muhammad Reza, in turn, used CENTO commitments as a new justification for expanding his military. The United States agreed to provide Iran with its first jet fighters and other modern equipment but tried to limit the deliveries based on Iran's ability to absorb the new arms.\textsuperscript{46}

From 1950 to 1972, Iran's various purchases of arms amounted to $1.5 billion. After the dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973, the value of arms transactions in the first year alone was twice that total. Between 1970 and 1977, the Iranian defense budget surged from just under $900 million to $9.4 billion, a staggering tenfold increase.\textsuperscript{47} Iran was posed to be the new "policeman of the Gulf" after the United States announced that it would not replace Great Britain in the region. Washington also described Iran as one of the "twin pillars in a regional security system, a fiction created because American reliance on Iran was viewed as a threat by the Arab states."\textsuperscript{48} The other twin was militarily weak Saudi Arabia, which the United States treated as an equal power to Iran to reassure the Arab world there would not be an Iranian hegemon.\textsuperscript{49}

The last American constraint on the shah's appetite for arms was loosened when National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger announced to a reluctant American bureaucracy in 1972 that purchasing decisions would be left primarily to the shah's government, giving Iran access to virtually any conventional American weapon system it


\textsuperscript{48} Ward, 194.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
wanted. This policy was reemphasized in 1974 when President Ford’s secretary of defense, James Schlesinger, stated that, because of Soviet nuclear parity with the United States, Western deterrence would be greatly strengthened by “regional military balances in critical areas of the world.” With these continued arms sales, the cadre of U.S. advisors continued to grow as well. Hired to equip and train the Iranian forces, these American advisors would reach their peak of approximately 40,000 advisors in the mid-1970s.

The Iranian military was based on the U.S. and British armed forces in both concept and organization. Organizations from the service staffs down to the squad level mimicked their Western counterparts. The U.S. MAAG missions worked with the Iranians to translate U.S. Army military manuals and regulations and provided a steady stream of advice and suggestions to the senior Iranian leadership. Their efforts gave a strong American cast to the Iranian tactics and administration, but emulating a western force structure proved much easier for the Iranians than adopting American leadership and management styles. In addition, the ground, air, and naval services went through almost constant reorganization following the 1953 coup, with numerous ups and downs in funding and growth. The regular addition of new weapon systems and evolving internal security operations and Cold War missions contributed to the turmoil. As Iran acquired more weapon systems following the oil boom, the Iranian forces increased in size from roughly 200,000 at the start of the decade to 410,000 by the late 1970s, making it the largest military in the Middle East. The two constants throughout this

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period were Muhammad Reza’s favored treatment of the upper echelons of his military establishment and his tight personal control over the armed forces.51

The almost total dependence on foreign know-how, technicians, and technical trainers required the presence of tens of thousands of foreign advisors, most of whom were U.S. civilians, who contributed to the growing rumbles of civil and military dissent amongst the Iranian people. The congressional assessments of the era noted that Iran might not be able to absorb and operate a large proportion of its sophisticated equipment even with the support of American technicians. The Iranians disproved these assessments during the war with Iraq, but the effort to manage and operate foreign equipment without advisors was time-consuming, difficult, and incomplete.52

United States military assistance to Iran between 1947 and 1969 exceeded U.S. $1.4 billion, mostly in the form of grant aid before 1965 and of foreign military sales (FMS) credits during the late 1960s. The financial assistance programs were terminated after 1969, when it was determined that Iran, by then an important oil exporter, could assume its own military costs. Thereafter, Iran paid cash for its arms purchases and covered the expenses of United States military personnel serving in the United States Army Mission Headquarters (ARMISH), MAAG, and technical assistance field team (TAFT) programs.53 Even so, in terms of personnel, the United States military mission in Iran in 1978 was the largest in the world. DoD personnel in Iran totaled over 1,500 in 1978, admittedly a small number compared with the 45,000 United States citizens,

51 Ward, 196. Iranian military figures derived from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military balance, various editions.
mostly military and civilian technicians and their dependents, living in Iran. Almost all of these individuals were evacuated by early 1979 as the ARMISH-MAAG program came to an abrupt end due to the Iranian revolution. Also cancelled was the International Military Education and Training program, under which over 11,000 Iranian military personnel had received specialized instruction in the United States at a variety of military schools.\textsuperscript{54}

In the Iranian case, it was the FMS driving the number and types of conventional force advisors the United States sent to Iran. The more complicated the equipment purchased by Iran was, the more advisors and maintainers were needed to ensure their new purchases worked. This included items such as the F-14 Tomcat fighter jet and the M60 tank. As a result, when the Islamic Revolution started, the United States advisors quickly departed Iran, and as a result, the majority of this high-tech equipment quickly broke down due to a lack of expertise to maintain it.

\textit{Post-Cold War and Post-9/11}

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has had no conventional military peer. Its overmatch capability on the conventional scale created a shift in how current and future enemies attempt to challenge United States military dominance. Today’s enemies fight a more asymmetric style of battle, mixing advanced technology with irregular warfare while integrating within a society. To prevent the spread of insurgencies and warfare, the United States assists legitimate foreign governments, supported by their constituents, to mitigate the fundamental root causes of modern

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
insurgencies. The development of an effective HN security force is fundamental to this effort. Although not a new concept, the military historically relegated SFA (building HN security forces) to a secondary role.

The end of the Cold War brought about a rise in non-state armed groups. A shift away from the Cold War, leftist communist-driven insurgency gave way to the “wars amongst the people.” Rupert Smith described a shift away from mechanized war with an army fighting an army to smaller wars among populations. As the binding forces of communism that kept the ethnic and religious tensions repressed in heterogeneous societies dissolved, the tensions and frustrations of hundreds of years of discontent rapidly exploded to the surface, resulting in a large increase in ethnically or religiously driven violence. The result was the need for the major powers of the world to intervene in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo to try to stem the massive casualties between warring civilian factions.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a change in the United States’ approach to how it interacted with foreign militaries. The invasion of nations such as Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in the need for a large-scale rebuilding of both nation’s security forces. As a result, we saw a major change in how SFA was conducted: with the large-scale use of conventional forces to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise a variety of security forces, ranging from local police to conventional military forces. Additionally, the new focus on the then-named Global War on Terror saw the wide usage of both special operations forces and conventional forces to partner with host nations where the rise of Al Qaeda either occurred or had the possibility of occurring. This resulted in a major

increase in SFA operations and the need to train large numbers of conventional forces on the intricacies of advising foreign security forces (FSFs).

This summary of past United States advisory missions highlights a few main points, which will be emphasized in this dissertation. First, advisory mission by United States conventional forces is not new. For over 100 years, the United States government committed conventional forces to advise, train, and equip a variety of FSFs. Second, there has been a wide range of assistance provided to FSFs across the history of U.S. advisory mission. This assistance ranges from supplying weapons to a foreign country to committing hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to advise and train a nation’s FSFs. Third, there is little evidence to support the claim there is a rigorous discourse at the strategic decision maker level regarding if, why, and how the United States should commit its forces to these advisory missions. It many instances, it appears to be only an afterthought once the advisory missions are already under way.

Fourth, as the conditions in the international milieu change, so does the United States’ approach to conducting these advisory missions. The bipolarity of the Cold War in many ways limited the forced the United States to downgrade any advisory mission to ensure there were ample resources to meet the Soviet conventional threat. Fifth and finally, there is dearth of academic literature on the strategic decision making regarding advisory missions, as we shall see in the upcoming literature review. One of the goals of this dissertation is to help bridge this gap.
III. Answering the Research Question

This study draws from an interdisciplinary body of literature to build a theoretical model to describe past experiences and prescribe future strategy development and implementation of SFA missions at the national level. The dissertation will look at the presence or absence of four independent variables as predictors of whether U.S. national security goals were successfully achieved: national interests, interagency collaboration, civil-military interaction, and legitimacy.

The theoretical framework is tested against three cases selected to maximize variation across the four independent variables. U.S. advisory efforts to El Salvador from 1979 to 1991 were strictly controlled by Congress; had a small, mandated force cap; underwent two different presidential administrations; and occurred during the Cold War. In Kosovo, the United States engaged in a peace enforcement operation in conjunction with NATO allies while attempting to establish the grounds for an independent and impartial Kosovo Armed Forces from 1999 to 2009. Again, this SFA mission occurred across two different presidential administrations, starting before 9/11 and continuing after 9/11. Third, efforts in Iraq were on a much larger scale than the other two case studies, began after a decisive military victory against Iraqi forces, and occurred while the United States and a few coalition allies occupied the country of Iraq. This case also occurred across two different presidential administrations, starting in 2003 with a definitive end point in December 2011.
IV. Organization of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the security studies and political systems and theory literature pertinent to the execution of SFA and literature on foreign policy decision-making.

Chapter 3 details the research question, structure of the qualitative study, and selected cases for comparison.

Chapter 4 introduces the international and U.S. domestic context prior to the start of U.S. interventions in the three selected case studies. This chapter will also look at the relevance of America’s security cooperation efforts regarding all three case studies.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe and explain the actions taken by the National Security Council members and advisers to initiate, continue, and end SFA missions in El Salvador, Kosovo, and Iraq, respectively.

Chapter 8 summarizes the case study findings, offers recommendations for future U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding the decision to commit U.S. conventional forces to SFA mission, and concludes with suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

In reviewing three case studies of United States involvement in SFA missions, I will demonstrate that the current existing academic theories fail to offer all the necessary insights to explain why U.S. senior policy makers continue to commit conventional forces to advisory missions. Each of the three existing theories I will describe, fails to take into account one or more of what I consider the logical factors that need to be considered by decision makers before committing conventional United States forces to an SFA mission. These four logical factors are national interests,56 legitimacy,57 civil-military relations,58 and interagency collaboration.59 In this dissertation, I take an approach that considers these four components when debating a potential SFA mission through the lens of smart partnership. I will discuss this concept further in my policy recommendations section at the end of the dissertation.

56 Donald Neuchterlein “Defining National Interests: An Analytic Framework,” America Recommitted Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991. pp. 13-33. Neucheterlein defines national interests as falling into survival (easy to recognize), vital (more time to decide how to respond but usually includes military power), major (considered important but not critical to well-being), and peripheral. The fundamental national interest of the U.S. is the defense and well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional system.

57 Gilley, B. (2009). The right to rule: How states win and lose legitimacy. New York: Columbia University Press. Bruce Gilley defines legitimacy as follows: “Legitimacy is the right to rule. It is an acceptance by citizens that the political institutions and leaders who wield sovereign power over them have gained that power and are using it in a way that is consistent with the rules, laws, ethics, norms, and values of the political community, and enjoy their explicit consent.”

58 Burk, J. (2002). “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces & Society, 29(1), 7-29. Burk describes civil-military relations as “[describing] the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority.” Theories of democratic civil-military relations.

59 Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb describe how such interagency collaboration worked in a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) by stating that a JIATF “is a model for whole-of-government problem-solving” that, by fostering “cross organizational collaboration,” seeks to overcome the “natural tendencies of many organizations to seek autonomy rather than collaboration.”
I. The Cases

While only a small amount of information exists on the formation of the Philippine Constabulary, there is a glaring dearth of references on the Operations, Plans, and Training Teams (OPATT) in El Salvador. The OPATT mission took the ill-trained El Salvadorian Armed Forces (ESAF), quadrupled their size, and increased overall professionalism. The majority of the references spring from either military or government sources. Former Ambassador Pickering provides a good assessment from his perspective in Manwaring and Prisk, *El Salvador at war: an oral history of conflict from the 1979 insurrection to the present*.\(^6\)\(^0\) Manwaring and Prisk’s work captures important lessons from participants and studies conducted by U.S. think tanks on lessons learned. Coming less than a decade after the end of the Vietnam War, the American public and Congress did not want to start another advisory effort that would possibly lead to a large conventional ground war.

Bacevich, Hallums, White, and Young highlight why the OPATT mission remained under tight constraints in their work *American military policy in small wars: the case of El Salvador*.\(^6\)\(^1\) This study, conducted by four senior Army officers attending different fellowships in the Boston area, is one of the most concise and accurate summaries of operations leading up to and during the advisory mission in El Salvador. Robert Ramsey does an excellent job compiling the experiences of the participants and capturing lessons learned in his Combat Studies Institute publication *Advising indigenous forces*:

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American advisors in Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador. The El Salvador chapter pulls a lot of its information from the two aforementioned sources but also consists of interviews with participants both at the advisory level and the OPATT level.

The OPATT mission utilized a large number of Special Forces personnel, possibly limiting the amount of works available on their mission with the ESAF. The RAND Corporation’s American counterinsurgency doctrine in El Salvador: the frustrations of reform and the illusions of nation building, written by Benjamin Schwarz, provides a useful timeline capturing the various evolutions the OPATT mission underwent. Finally, Cecil Bailey’s article “OPATT: the U.S. Army SF advisors in El Salvador,” found in Special Warfare Magazine, looks at the difficulties the OPATT members experienced due to the constraints placed on their mission by Congress. Both of these references found favor again in both the Special Forces and conventional forces as advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan started in earnest.

There is limited information on efforts to conduct security force assistance (SFA) with the forces in Kosovo. Unfortunately, many of the works focused only on the air campaign conducted by NATO forces. There was more focus on how effective or ineffective the air campaign was than on the reasons why the U.S. and NATO intervened in Kosovo and, more relevant to the research, why the SFA campaign to rebuild their security forces began in earnest.

However, one monograph published by Special Forces Major Michael A. Csicsila looked at how U.S. Special Forces focused their efforts on working with conventional

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Russian forces in Kosovo. In “Using BATs, CATs, and RATs to defeat transnational terrorists and controlling ungoverned space,” Csicsila documented his time working with the Russian Forces while he was first posted in Kosovo. Using what he terms battalion-level advisory teams (BATs), company level advisory teams (CATs), and regional-level advisory teams (RATs), Csicsila shared his methods with the conventional U.S. Forces in the Multi-National Brigade-East sector as a model for how to partner with the newly formed Kosovo Protection Corps and eventually the Kosovo Armed Forces.

One of the limited resources available about the decisions made leading up to the Kosovo war and intervention is General Wesley Clark’s book Waging modern war: Bosnia, Kosovo and the future of combat. While seen by many as a self-promoting book prior to a potential run for president, Clark’s work provides rare insights out of archival research into the mindset and decision making at the senior policy level to intervene in Kosovo.

The collection of essays written about two years after the Kosovo intervention edited by Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen has some data and information relevant to this dissertation. Especially relevant is the article by Alberto Coll entitled “Neglected trinity: Kosovo and the crisis in U.S. civil-military relations,” which looks at the challenges senior policy makers faced before and during the efforts to conduct an SFA campaign in Kosovo.

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The attempts to rebuild the Iraqi Army following the end of conventional operations in mid-2003 dominate the available literature today. Once again, American military forces attempted to relearn the advisory lessons of the past. Reports, newspaper articles, and a few books highlight the initial difficulties caused by some decisions of the Coalition Provincial Authority. However, books such as Tom Ricks’ *Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq* along with Gordon and Trainor’s *Cobra II: the inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq* are the initial cuts at the history of the early advisory efforts, albeit from a journalistic perspective. The Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth continues to capture lessons learned and recent advisor experience in its interview process and a series of occasional papers that are available online. Ramsey’s *Global war on terrorism: occasional paper 19, Advice for advisors: suggestions and observations from Lawrence to the present* culled recent articles from professional military journals written by former advisors. While it is too early to have firm histories of the initial efforts to rebuild the Iraqi Army, there exist numerous sources full with the experiences of recent advisors coming from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, Emma Sky, former advisor to the United States Forces Iraq Commander Ray Odierno, published one of the best works on the efforts to try to finalize the Iraqi SFA campaign from 2009 to 2011 in *Unraveling: high hopes and missed opportunities in Iraq*. This book provides solid insights at both the advisor and strategic levels as the decision to end the U.S. SFA mission in Iraq was debated and decided upon.

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Of note, the majority of the literature available on these three cases, other than primary source documentation, focuses more on the tactical level and how the advisor conducted his or her mission. Those who conducted the advisory mission wrote a large number of the works available on these cases. While such firsthand accounts are extremely valuable for gaining a better understanding for the needed preparation, challenges, and risks of conducting advisory missions, many of these accounts lack the perspective from the strategic decision-making level. A few of the works, such as the books by Ricks, Sky, and Gordon and Trainor, attempted to look at the higher level, incorporating some of the key decision makers in their study of the mission in Iraq. Yet, it will require more research into primary sources, including both document reviews archives and interviews with key decision makers, to paint a more accurate picture of why United States conventional forces were committed to each of these advisory missions. This dissertation will attempt to add to this body of literature. However, one of the problems is these accounts have to be anecdotal - I write this from Iraq where I am once again working with the Iraqi Security Forces in 2017.

II. International Security Studies and U.S. Foreign Policy

The U.S. prosecution of SFA encompasses several subfields within the greater literature on international security studies: Security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), and security sector reform (SSR). Also of critical value is historical study of the U.S. foreign policy experience with regards to each of these three topics. While often treated as interchangeable, there are important yet subtle differences between these fields that contribute to SFA.
Security Cooperation

According to Oindrila Roy, SC is defined as “collaboration among nation states where alliances must be looked upon as entities sui generis. The central idea of security cooperation is to depend on cooperation and collaboration with others for national security. In that case, the security of a nation state becomes dependent on the capability and cooperation extended by other states.”\(^\text{72}\) The very concept of SC points toward several puzzling dimensions from an international relations perspective. First, there is no guarantee that a nation’s friends today will not become tomorrow’s enemies. Next, SC does not come free of cost. The recipient nation must allow access to its land, materials, and population when bringing in another nation to assist in developing their security. Finally, SC involves giving up a nation’s self-help in exchange for cooperation from others.\(^\text{73}\) Therefore, we can start to see that there is a theoretical framework regarding SC already existing in international security studies literature.

Another theoretical avenue involving security cooperation is the concept of offshore balancing. John Mearsheimer initially described this concept in his work *The tragedy of great power politics.*\(^\text{74}\) Additionally, a recent article published on 13 June 2016, Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt again make their case as to why offshore balancing should be the grand strategy used by the United States. In their article, the authors state, “An April 2016 Pew poll found that 57 percent of Americans agree that the United States should ‘deal with their own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can.’”

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\(^{73}\) Ibid, 398.

can.” Mearsheimer and Walt state the United States’ grand strategy of liberal hegemony where the U.S. must use its power to “not only to solve global problems but also to promote a world order based on international institutions, representative governments, open markets, and respect for human rights” was a failure. Offshore balancing, however, they continue, would “forgo ambitious efforts to remake other societies and concentrate on what really matters: preserving U.S. Dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary.” It is the “intervening only when necessary” and “encouraging other countries to take the lead” where we have the intersection of the theoretical and the practical regarding SC and SFA. I will deal with this argument in the conclusion of my dissertation.

Security cooperation is the overarching umbrella of the other elements that are involved with foreign security forces. However, in Contending theories of international relations: a comprehensive survey, there is no mention of SC. Rather, it would fall under the security studies field, not as a direct subset of international relations. Listed in topics under security studies that sparked theoretical interests are “the prospects for security cooperation … and the role of military forces other than war, including peacekeeping.”

The Oxford handbook of political science also fails to list SC under its purview but does

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76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
comment on the field of security studies. Buzan states strategic studies as “embedded within the broader field of international relations …. Similar to that of a major organ within a body and as a subfield that specializes in the military aspects of international relations, strategic studies is, when compared to security studies, the much narrower subject.”

Literature more closely focused on security studies and the use of force gets closer to addressing the concept of SC. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, in their collection of essays titled *The use of force: military power and international politics*, do not have an essay that directly addresses advisory missions or SC. However, Paul Pillar’s essay on dealing with terrorists hints at its implications. Under the section titled “Help other governments to help with counter-terrorism,” Pillar writes:

> The needed cooperation often includes measures that are difficult or risky, and U.S. assistance and reassurance, should be furnished to make the other government willing and able to act. Training and other forms of practical assistance to police and security services enhance the ability of many foreign governments (especially in less developed countries) to help, and the United States should be generous in providing such assistance, through Antiterrorism Training Assistance courses and other departmental training programs.

The need to work with the police and other security services of a foreign nation falls squarely in the realm of SC.

In *Security studies: a reader*, edited by Christopher Hughes and Lai Yew Meng, Robert Jervis discusses SC from the standpoint of the prisoner’s dilemma. Based on his famous article “Cooperation under the security dilemma” published in *World Politics*

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82 Ibid, 507.
in 1978, Jervis discusses the problem that all nation-states face when dealing with an international system that lacks an overall authority. Jervis puts forth two essential arguments: First, the security dilemma is a key to understanding why in an international system of states with compatible goals, they may end up in competition and war. When a state increases its security, it decreases the security of another. Second, the magnitude of the security dilemma is influenced by whether defense or offense predominates and whether one can distinguish between offense and defense.

Jervis argues because there is no international sovereign, this not only permits war, but it also makes it difficult for states to be satisfied with the status quo. He states that nations find it hard to determine the goals and objectives of others. This is the main contributing factor to this security dilemma. Unless states believe they are willing to cooperate, they are going to believe the worst and not be inclined to cooperate. Jervis states in an international system where states do not always have a clear understanding of the intent and objectives of other states, it will lead them to policies in which they are less likely to cooperate and more likely to give attention to their security policies and capabilities.

States tend to be suspicious of other states and believe they may not cooperate. According to Jervis, the very nature of the international system feeds this security dilemma. While not specifically matching the above definition of SC, Jervis’ essay sets the stage for considerations as to when two nations would work together and what

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84 Jervis, R. (January 1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(2), 167-214. Jervis’ security dilemma is based on the “stag hunt” and “prisoner’s dilemma” where two actors do not truly know the intentions of the other, resulting in their taking steps to ensure their own security/survival/freedom.

85 Ibid.
conditions must exist to either raise or lower their perceived security dilemma.  

The majority of definitions for these types of activities are found in U.S. government publications. Doctrinal definitions are created to develop a common language so that those working in the government or military have a standard base of reference when working together. For the purpose of this dissertation, only United States government doctrinal publications will be used. My intent, however, for future research will be to look at how other nations define these concepts as well as how their governments approach the implementation of SFA.

**Security Sector Reform**

Arising with the end of the Cold War and a new focus on the concept of human security, SSR is a relatively new concept and one that deserves more attention. With the end of the Cold War between the United States and Russia, the world experienced a fundamental shift in what it had known in terms of security. In that bipolar world, all security revolved around the two superpowers.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the tenuous sinews that held artificial countries together began to come undone. Ethnic violence, always bubbling just beneath the surface of countries under the control of the Soviet Union, now leaped to the surface. The result was a fundamental shift in how warfare was viewed. Rupert Smith termed this “war amongst the people.”

No longer would wars be fought between two mechanized and recognized armies. Rather, the end of the Cold War brought forth

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86 Ibid.
this new type of violence, one for which a newly unipolar world had no immediate answer.

Additionally, at the start of the Cold War, there was a link between security and development within a nation. However, by the late 1960s, the two concepts of security and development were no longer linked, as the two were viewed as completely disconnected ideas.

The rise of ethnic violence in places such as Rwanda and the Balkans forced the international community to relook at how it viewed security and state sovereignty. The concept of human security and doctrine of Responsibility to Protect emerged during this period in the 1990s as a response to the new paradigm in security conditions. The start of international interventions by the United Nations, NATO, and other blocs of states, coupled with the high cost of human lives lost in these types of conflicts before intervention, resulted in the international community re-examining the linkages between security and development.

The traditional concept of security depended on the “emphasis on the stability of the state and its protection from external and internal threats through military power.”88 However, according to Querine Hanlon and Richard Shultz, this traditional definition of security was broadened “to accentuate the protection of the individual. This was termed human security. It was based on the proposition that the protection of the individuals, both in terms of physical safety and material welfare, is central to the establishment of security.”89

89 Ibid, 17.
Human security continues to be a major focus in the international relations field. The human security field brings together the concerns and practices that deal with the interconnection between freedom from fear and freedom from want. This concept covers a wide variety of issues and practices, but these all share some common themes: a desire to cross boundaries between fields of social change until now usually treated separately and an ultimate focus on the inclusive well-being of all people. Diana Chigas, Louis Aucoin, Mary Kaldor, Paul Heinbecker and Eileen Babbit are just a few of the professors who both teach and practice human security in the field.90

Tied to this emerging concept of human security is the importance of development assistance. Frances Stewart conducted the study “Development and security,” which highlighted the importance relationship by linking how developmental policies can enhance security. In her paper, Stewart finds that, “human security forms an important part of people’s wellbeing [sic] and is therefore an objective of development; that lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth and poverty and thereby on development; and that lack of development, or imbalanced development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of conflict.”91

Peter Albrecht, one of the leading practitioners and writers on SSR, stated that SSR emerged in the last half of the 1990s as a result of “a seismic shift in international thinking around the role that development agencies could play vis-à-vis specific defense

issues and security issues more broadly. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) took the lead in establishing the connection between development, security, and conflict. In March 1999, DFID drafted policy recommendations that set the conditions by which development assistance could be utilized to engage in SSR activities. The United Kingdom “emerged as the principle national-level advocate of SSR and broadening the understanding of security, development, and reform, modeling them into a conceptual framework,” according to Hanlon and Shultz. The British eventually went on to conduct a relatively successful SSR operation in Sierra Leone, one of the few success stories when looking at SSR.

This literature review of international security studies and foreign policy highlights a few main points. First, there are existing theories that postulate why one nation would intervene in the affairs of another nation. The specifics and rationale vary depending on the theory, but clearly these theories will impact any research into why the United States decided to commit its forces to advisory missions. Second, while there are academic writings and theories on SC, many do not analyze the decision making at the strategic level regarding why a nation opts to commit its forces to an advisory mission, why a nation opts to continue pouring national treasure into an advisory mission, and why that nation decides to end such missions. Third, the United States government and military doctrine writers have an extensive set of guidelines regarding different types of SC efforts. Part of this is a result of the need for oversight over such programs. Another reason for such detailed explanations comes from hard lessons learned in previous

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93 Hanlon & Shultz, 19.

94 Ibid.
conflicts such as Vietnam, where many believe the initial advisory efforts only helped
draw the United States deeper into that war. Fourth, there is a lack of both academic
and government literature on what strategic-level conditions must exist to ensure an
advisory mission has the best chance of success. While this dissertation will not offer a
clairvoyant approach to guarantee success in future advisory missions, it will look at
what conditions did or did not exist in the three case studies and how those affected the
outcome of each case.

III. Political Systems and Theory

The U.S. prosecution of SFA encompasses several subfields within the greater
literature on political systems and theory as well. However, while there are few political
theories that examine why one nation would want to commit its foreign security forces to
support another nation, there are many theories that look at how and why nations
intervene in the affairs of other nations. This may include why a nation’s armed forces
intervene politically — in a coup, for example, or why a nation decides to invade the
sovereignty of another nation. There are three theories that I believe are directly
applicable to how and why the United States decides to commit its forces to advisory
missions. These include the theories of logrolling, offensive realism, and balance of risk
theory. I will, however, argue that none of these three theories fully explain the United
States’ decision to support advisory mission. Nor have I found other theories with
greater explanatory power. Therefore, I believe this dissertation will make a contribution
to the current literature by advancing a new theory I will discuss at the end of this
dissertation.
The first political systems theory, which has a direct impact on whether or not the United States decides to commit its military to an advisory mission, is logrolling theory. This theory (Snyder, 1991; Miller, 1999) states that parochial groups (industrialists, financiers, traders, military, etc.) in society each have an economic or political interest in an expansionist foreign policy. Individually, none of them can influence state policy. Therefore, they engage in logrolling, where each group gets what it wants in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies its coalition partners desire. In the case of SFA, it is those domestic powers that advocate for a policy of committing U.S. forces to assist a host nation’s security force in for a variety of reasons that I will delve into as part of my dissertation. This theory explains economic motivations behind those supporting an advisory mission. However, it fails to take into consideration elements such as international politics and the security situation within a host nation.

Jack Snyder’s logrolling theory of imperialism improves on older theories by specifying the mechanism through which differing interests can translate into expansion of foreign policies.95 Snyder defines great power over expansion as aggressive military and diplomatic strategies provoking the formation of a hostile coalition or continue to the point where the costs exceed the benefits of the aggressive strategies. Snyder states, “Counter-productive aggressive policies are caused most directly by the idea that the state’s security can be safeguarded only through expansion.”96 Related to the next theory, Snyder puts forth a distinction between offensive realism and defensive realism.97 He claims logrolling is an example of defensive realism and is therefore not

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96 Ibid, 29.
97 Ibid, 11-12.
as “aggressive” as offensive realism. While each group’s material interest in specific foreign policies may not be identical, expansion or, in this case, deploying U.S. advisors, may benefit these select interest groups but not the state as a whole. As an example, the interests of many different groups both before and during the United States military advisor mission in El Salvador impacted the decision of President Carter and many in his cabinet.

Snyder, while focusing on imperial powers, places a great deal on the rhetoric used by imperialist coalitions to sell their agenda to the domestic audience. Snyder states that over time, “these groups and government elites often internalize their own rhetoric.” As a result, both groups, the imperialist partners and the senior officials, find themselves trapped in this rhetoric. Snyder continues, stating, “Insofar as the elite’s power and policies are based on society’s acceptance of imperial myths, its rule would be jeopardized by renouncing the myths when the side-effects become costly. To say in power and to keep central policy objectives intact, elites may have to accept some unintended consequences their imperial sales pitch.” One can easily substitute “imperial sales pitch” with “advisory mission sales pitch” and come out with a very similar result because both have unintended consequences rarely predicted at the start.

Snyder’s theory attributes intervention in the periphery to domestic politics. However, senior officials, not domestic interest groups, formulate and implement grand strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the influence of such domestic considerations in the deliberations of central decision makers. The theory suggests that leaders will be highly

98 Ibid, 64.
100 Ibid, 41.
101 Ibid, 42.
sensitive to the preferences of domestic interest groups.\textsuperscript{102} Jeffrey Taliaferro believes that in democratic states, leaders are less likely to intervene on the “periphery” (geographic areas where actual or likely conflict cannot directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland).\textsuperscript{103} He claims that when democratic leaders do intervene, they will be more inclined to adopt risk-averse strategies. However, in cartelized regimes, according to Taliaferro, leaders would be more inclined toward periphery intervention and more inclined to push risk-acceptant strategies.\textsuperscript{104} This will come into play when I examine his balance of risk theory.

Offensive realism (Layne, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001) claims that states seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals. Therefore, intervention in distant peripheries is a viable strategy that can weaken potential great power rivals and maximize relative power. John Mearsheimer argues, “States seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals.”\textsuperscript{105} Offensive realism holds that states or, more precisely, the leaders of those states, engage in calculated rather than reckless expansion. For offensive realists, the link between structural incentives and foreign policy behavior is relatively unproblematic. To understand why a state behaves

\textsuperscript{102} Taliaferro, 11.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 46.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
in a particular way, one must examine its relative capabilities and international
environment.  

In his book, *The tragedy of great power politics*, Mearsheimer argues that anarchy
compels great powers to strive to become a regional hegemon that will be the only
“great” power in that part of the world. He states, “Though a state would maximize its
security if it dominated the entire world, global hegemony is not feasible, except in the
unlikely event that a state achieves nuclear superiority over its rivals. The key limited
factor is the difficulty of projecting power across large bodies of water, which makes it
impossible for any great power to conquer and dominate regions separated from it by
oceans.”

Christopher Layne, on the other hand, points out a contradiction in Mearsheimer’s
theory. Layne states, “If by chance a rival emerges in some other part of the world, the
regional hegemon should still be safe in its own neighborhood, because geographical
distance and water confine regional hegemons to their regions, and stop them from
becoming global hegemons.” However, intervention in distant peripheries would
appear to be a viable strategy to weaken potential great powers and maximize relative
power. Mearsheimer even supports this view, stating, “Rival hegemons separated by an
ocean can still threaten one another by helping to upset the balance of power in each
other’s backyard. Specifically, a regional hegemon might someday face a local
challenge from an upstart state, which would surely have strong incentives to ally with

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106 Talliaferro, 12.
107 Mearsheimer. *The tragedy of great power politics*.
the distant hegemon to protect itself from attacks by the neighboring hegemon.\textsuperscript{109} In this case, the use of advisors can easily be perceived as a threat to surrounding countries. Efforts in El Salvador by the United States were seen as a threat by neighboring Central American countries. U.S. troops in Kosovo put Serbia on edge, as did the American efforts to rebuild Iraqi security forces, resulting in the upset of Iran.

Offensive realists claim that inserting U.S. conventional forces to train a host nation’s security forces can both weaken potential rivals and maximize the relative power of the United States. This theory is relevant as we continue to reevaluate the balance of power between nations and how non-state armed groups continue to flourish in the modern security environment. However, offensive realism fails to explore domestic considerations both within the United States and in the host nation receiving assistance through military advisors.

The third theory I will compare is the balance of risk theory.\textsuperscript{110} Rooted on prospect theory, the balance of risk theory argues that great powers pursues risky intervention strategies in the periphery to avert perceived losses.\textsuperscript{111} The necessity of avoiding losses in their state’s material power, status, or reputation weighs more heavily in the calculations of the leaders than in the prospect of gains in those commodities.\textsuperscript{112} Senior officials initiate risky diplomatic and/or military intervention strategies to avoid such losses in domestic, regional, and international politics. States continue to invest in and even escalate failing peripheral interventions to recoup past losses.\textsuperscript{113} This theory is extremely relevant especially when decision makers are deciding to extend or end an

\textsuperscript{109} Mearsheimer. \textit{The tragedy of great power politics}, 142.
\textsuperscript{110} Taliaferro. 14.
\textsuperscript{111} Taliaferro.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
advisory mission. Leaders must balance the cost in the state’s power or reputation against the continued commitment of blood and treasure to an advisory mission. These factors make Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory extremely useful. Additionally, Taliaferro looks at the rationale behind why great powers intervene in what he calls “the periphery.”

According to Taliaferro, “offensive realism explains great power intervention with reference to material capabilities and international opportunities. States strive to maximize relative power or influence, since only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival.” Unlike offensive realism, however, Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory is based on a mixing of defensive realism with the decision-making model based on prospect theory. Based on the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two Israeli psychologists, prospect theory states, “Most individuals tend to evaluate choices with respect to an expectation level and pay more attention to losses relative to comparable gains.” Individuals therefore tend to “overweigh certain outcomes relative to probable ones; value what they already possess over what they seek to acquire; and display risk-acceptant behavior to avoid (or recoup) losses, but risk-averse behavior to secure gains.”

As mentioned above, Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory looks at the rationale behind great power interventions in the periphery. In his book, Taliaferro states, “Great power interventions in peripheral regions are not unique to the cold war [sic].” He goes on to use Great Britain’s intervention in South Africa, Athens’ expedition to Sicily, and the

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115 Ibid, 11.
117 Ibid.
French experience in Indochina as examples of great powers intervening on the periphery. Taliaferro defines periphery as “geographic areas where actual or likely conflict cannot directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland. Whereas others draw a distinction between the periphery and core based solely on geographic distance, I have tried to incorporate the relative distribution of capabilities into the definition. A region is peripheral vis-à-vis a great power based on a combination of: 1) its geographical distance from the core, and 2) the inability of the peripheral state’s military forces to inflict damage on the great power’s homeland.” This concept of intervening in peripheral regions ties directly into the United States’ concept of both SC and SFA.

Taliaferro claims “great power intervention in the periphery can take several forms — diplomatic support or posturing, covert operations, arms sales, military advisors or direct use of force.” While United States arms sales to foreign nations falls under the SC blanket, specifically under SA, it is Taliaferro’s mention of the use of military advisors that makes this theory so relevant to this research.

My two arguments will show that these three most pertinent current theories (logrolling, offensive realism, and the balance of risk theory) lack full explanatory power to successfully predict if current and future SFA missions will meet the strategic goals of the United States. I will further demonstrate through process tracing three historical

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118 Ibid, 2. France in Algeria and the United States in Korea and Vietnam also fall into this category.
119 Taliaferro, 46. Taliaferro argues that while some would maintain the attacks on 9/11 by Al Qaeda, a transitional network of Islamic extremists whose leadership received safe haven in Afghanistan, invalidates the concept of a periphery. This is along with the fact that they did not use conventional military weapons. However, he argues the fact that the United States and its allies launched military operations into Afghanistan to deny that safe haven still validates the concept of periphery regions.
120 Ibid, 22.
case studies that a policy specifically based upon the components of smart partnership must be developed if SFA is to be used more effectively.

**IV. Foreign Policy Decision-making Theories**

The debate that United States senior policy makers conduct to commit its conventional forces to an SFA campaign clearly delves into many of the foreign policy decision-making theories. A variety of authors and theorists contributed to this field and continue to look for new models today. With theories ranging from the rational actor model (RAM) to game theory, there is a wide variety of foreign policy decision-making theories that impact the decision by senior United States policy makers to begin, continue, or end an SFA campaign.

Robert Putnam, in his article “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,” suggests a conceptual framework for understanding how diplomacy and domestic policies interact. The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Central decision-makers can ignore neither of the two games as long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.¹²¹

Putnam examines the views of previous authors on the subject of foreign policy decision making. He believes that Haas emphasized the impact of parties and interest groups on the process of European integration and that his notion of “spillover” recognized the feedback between domestic and international developments.\textsuperscript{122} Nye and Keohane emphasize interdependence and transnationalism, but the role of domestic factors has slipped more and more out of focus, particularly as the concept of international regimes came to dominate the subfield.\textsuperscript{123}

Putnam’s key points are the following: The nature of the “overlap” between domestic and international politics remained unclassified. More recent work on the domestic determinants of foreign policy has focused on “structural” factors, particularly state strength. The prediction of international outcomes is significantly improved by understanding internal bargaining, especially with respect to minimally acceptable compromises. Putnam breaks down the different types of agreements into two categories. A level I agreement results from bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement. A level II agreement results from separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. Putnam also looks at two types of defections. Voluntary defection refers to reneging by a rational egoist in the absence of enforceable contracts — the much-analyzed problem posed, for example, in the prisoner’s dilemma and other dilemma of collective action. Involuntary defection instead reflects the behavior of an agent who is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification. The most portentous development in the fields of comparative politics and international relations in recent years is the dawning recognition among

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\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
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practitioners in each field of the need to take into account entanglements between the two.\footnote{124}

Herbert Simon approaches the foreign policy decision-making dilemma from another angle. In his article “Human nature in politics: the dialogue of psychology with political science,” Simon looks at the nature of human reason and the implications of contemporary cognitive psychology for political science research that employs the concept of rational behavior. He focuses on the two main forms of theories of human rationality in social science, one having its center in cognitive psychology and the other in economics. Then he considers the implications for the balance in political science between rationalism and empiricism of adopting one or the other of these two paradigms of rationality.\footnote{125}

Simon emphasizes that the term \textit{rational} denotes behavior that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation and that there is a fundamental difference between substantive and procedural rationality. To deduce the substantively or objectively rational choice in a given situation, we need to know only the choosing organism’s goals and the objective characteristics of the situation. In psychology, behaviorism carefully avoids speaking about what goes on inside the head. It prefers to stick to the observable facts of stimuli and responses. Cognitive psychology has made great strides toward understanding how an information processing system like the human brain solves problems, makes decisions, remembers, and learns. If the situation involves uncertainties, the theory further assumes that the actor will choose the alternative for which the expected utility is the highest. The theory of objective rationality

assumes nothing about the actor’s goals. The utility function can take any form that defines a consistent ordering of preferences.\footnote{126}{Ibid.}

The gold standard of models when it comes of foreign policy decision making emerged from the Cuban Missile crisis. Graham Allison and his landmark work *The essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis* set the stage for all debate over foreign policy decision making since its publication in 1971.\footnote{127}{Allison, G.T. (1971). *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.} Allison developed three models based on the events that took not only America but the entire world to the brink of nuclear war. The first model, called the RAM, identifies the units of analysis as the state. Its concept is that states, as monolithic actors, tend to make rational foreign policy decisions. The rational behavior is appropriate to specific goals in the context of a given situation. This means key to this definition is the matching of desired ends with the appropriate means. The RAM is “the presumptive choice method for analysts and common folk alike in examining why national perform actions.”\footnote{128}{Ibid.} Allison uses bounded rationality on the concept of satisficing. There are a large number of variables no one can ever hope to fully understand. Therefore, it’s essential to focus on those variables that cannot be understood. Always challenging for any decision makers are cognitive limitations and the facts that the decision maker does not have due to imperfect information. Therefore, the decision makers need to focus on limited goals. Allison says dealing with levels of high uncertainty is the essence of crisis decision making.\footnote{129}{Ibid.}

His second model is known as the organizational behavior model. Unlike the RAM, this model uses the sub-state units as the unit of analysis, the “constellation of units”
that comprise the state. Foreign policy decisions are “outputs,” rather than deliberate choices resulting from numerous organizations within the state executing their respective functions. This model constrains rationality through relative effectiveness and the culture/parochialism of organizations. It tends to compound complexity, however, through increased interactions amongst the sub-state units. This model asks from what organizational contexts, pressures, and procedures did a certain decision emerge? The danger of this model is it may lead to increased parochialism as each organization tries to ensure its survival. These organizations are created for a purpose, and while they can contain leaders, the culture within that organization may grow strong enough to influence decisions to ensure its survival.130

The third model is called the governmental politics model and uses the intra-government institutions at the sub-state level as the unit of analysis. In this model, foreign policy decisions are the result of political bargaining among players. The results from this bargaining are critical decisions and actions. There exists the possibility of groupthink. Not everyone has the same interests when going into a decision-making process. An element of groupthink can take over, especially in smaller groups.131

In their 1992 article “Rethinking Allison’s models,” Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond believe the models should be further developed to highlight more fundamental factors in foreign policy making.132 The authors make five arguments about Allison’s work. First, while a key purpose of modeling is to focus the analysis to clarify the assumptions on which it will be based, it is often difficult to determine from Allison’s

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130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
models what the assumptions are. Second, the hypotheses drawn from a model should, ideally, be logically derived from the initial assumptions. Third, whatever the logical status of Allison’s propositions are, it is possible to demonstrate, on strictly logical grounds, that several key propositions in Model II are simply incorrect. Fourth, a well-crafted model must strike a balance between simplicity and complexity. Fifth, Allison’s Models I, II, and III are based on three bodies of literature (rational choice theory, organization theory, and bureaucratic politics) that only specialists in their fields know well, according to Bendor and Hammond, a critique with which I disagree.

Bendor and Hammond believe Allison misinterpreted parts of each of these three fields. In some cases the misinterpretations were quite substantial. They believe there is nothing in the history of rational action requiring an actor to have just one goal. *Essence of decision* argued for the use of formal reasoning. It also made the case for the development of alternative models to explain an important event, the derivation of testable propositions from the models and for the test of the propositions. However, there is an inevitable tension between attempting to explain a particular event (a historian task) and attempting to construct a model (a social scientist task). The challenge becomes balancing these two major tensions when analyzing a foreign policy decision.

Derek Clolla’s and James Goldgeier’s article “The scholarship of decision making: do we know how we decide?” found in the work *Foreign policy decision making revisited, the epic work of Richard Snyder, HW Bruck and Burton Sapain*, argues we still do not fully understand the essence of decisions. We are still a long way from adequately capturing the interplay between domestic politics and bureaucratic politics.
Moreover, the gap between what factors policy makers consider important to determine outcomes and what outside analysts believe is important is still too wide — in fact, it has probably only gotten wider in the four decades since Snyder, Bruck, and Sapain’s model first appeared.¹³³

No crisis epitomized this problem as much as the Cuban Missile Crisis, and scholars flocked to it. But as Snyder, Bruck, and Sapain pointed out in their original work, crises are likely atypical of the larger class of foreign policy problems where time is not urgent and the stakes at each moment do not seem high. Rather than having the ability to weigh fully the pros and cons of all available options to make the optimal choice, we can be pretty confident that individuals will settle on the first acceptable option rather than continuing the search for something more optimal. In many situations, the optimal choice is not an option. This is particularly true in situations, such as Camp David and Dayton, in which policy makers are working with complex, multiparty issues under intense pressure and tight deadlines and when the stakes for failure are high (i.e., return to bloodshed).

The lesson many Washington policy makers took from the events in Somalia — which Holbrooke describes as the “Vietmalia syndrome” and many called a quagmire — was that some situations were simply too tough, intractable, and dangerous for America to get involved and therefore U.S. interests did not warrant military intervention. Organizations rely on standard operating procedures to make decisions as routine as possible. It allows them to function but reduces flexibility in ways that can be downright frightening. Art’s argument is pretty clear-cut: For the really important decisions, it is the

president and his or her politics that matter most, not the bureaucracy’s.\textsuperscript{134} Those working in government understand that presidential politics are much more relevant for the daily business of officials on the National Security Council staff. Therefore, we see there is the importance of personal relationships and trust both within government and between governments. These are areas of decision-making analyses that most policy makers regard as indispensable but most scholars ignore. As a result, more emphasis needs to be placed on developing trust through personal relations, which can have a profound effect on policy outcomes. I often wonder how that has changed through the increase of video teleconferencing, Skype, and email.

Finally, another work dealing with how foreign policy decision making occurs comes from two Israelis psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Their work, “Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk,” published in 1970, critiques expected utility theory as a description model of decision making under risk and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people under estimate outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration.\textsuperscript{135}

Kahneman and Tversky argue that decision making under risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects or gambles. A prospect is acceptable if the utility resulting

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\item \textsuperscript{134} Glennon, Michael J. National Security and Double Government. 2015.
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from integrating the prospect with one’s assets exceeds the utility of those assets alone. In expected utility theory, the utilities of outcomes are weighed by their probabilities. Prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the choice process: an early phase of editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. As stated earlier, prospect theory is the basis on which Jeffrey Taliaferro developed his balance of risk theory, one of the main theories this dissertation upon which will build.

This literature review of foreign policy decision making highlights a few critical points relevant to this dissertation. First, for as long as governments have been making decisions regarding foreign policy, there have been attempts to try to model this behavior. A model, however, is only as good as the inputs that go into it and the effectiveness of how closely the model mirrors reality. As this brief literature review shows, there are numerous existing models, all with different approaches to determining how a government, specifically the United States government, makes important foreign policy decisions. Second, these foreign policy decision-making models focus on the key decision makers and the system in which they make their decisions. Third, these models tend to look at foreign policy decision making in general and do not focus on the specific decision, especially regarding the commitment of U.S. conventional forces to advisory mission. This is beneficial when trying to develop broad models, which have a much larger applicability, but they often become too broad to be completely useful. As a result, this dissertation will try to narrow down the criteria used to make foreign policy decisions when considering SFA missions. With these criteria, I hope to develop a more effective model to predict whether or not the United States government should commit its blood and treasure to an SFA mission.
Chapter 3 will address the research question, structure of the qualitative study, and selected cases for comparison.
CHAPTER 3: Methodology

The purpose of this study is to provide informed findings about how states decide to conduct, continue, and end security force assistance (SFA) missions using a “structured, focused comparison”\(^{136}\) of three distinct and separate cases. The comparative method is chosen to juxtapose three cases within a “single comprehensive analytical frame work” to examine the impact of the independent variables on the resulting outcome of each case.\(^{137}\) The method is “focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.”\(^{138}\)

The study of SFA is better suited to qualitative measurements rather than formulaic aggregate data analysis due to the mission’s complexity as well as the limited number of U.S. historical cases available. Alexander George argues, “Case studies can analyze qualitatively complex events and take into account numerous variables precisely because they do not require numerous cases or a restricted number of variables.”\(^ {139}\) This does, however, pose potential challenges by introducing the possibility of drawing faulty conclusions by using several unique cases. Arend Lijphart argues, “The problems of reliability and validity are smaller for the researcher who uses the comparative


\(^{137}\) George and Bennett, 67-72.

\(^{138}\) Ibid, 67.

\(^{139}\) Ibid, 45.
method. He can analyze his smaller number of cases more thoroughly, and is less
dependent on data that he cannot properly evaluate."140

This study will use George’s method for conducting a structured, focused
comparison: This includes specifying the research objective and variables, describing
the likely causal patterns, developing general questions to standardize the data
requirements, and selecting cases for comparison.141 Consistent with the heuristic case
study approach, the goal of this dissertation is to contribute to theory building on why
states decide to commit their troops to advisory missions.142 The final product will be a
conceptual framework to both describe past experiences of the United States’ efforts in
conducting SFA and prescribe future foreign policy decision making when the United
States considers conducting an SFA campaign. More broadly, this study contributes to
the field of security studies, public policy, and political systems and theory.

I. Research Objective

The central question of this research is what factors best explain why senior
policy makers decide to commit, continue, or end conventional United States forces to
SFA missions? This dissertation provides generalizations about how the United States
cconducts these missions to meet its national security goals. More specifically, this
dissertation examines the U.S. historical experience in three cases to find evidence of
the SFA campaigns’ effectiveness and determine what variables explain that

140 Lijphart, A. (July 1975). The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research. Comparative
Political Studies 8, 171.
141 George & Bennett, 67-88.
effectiveness. Finally, this study offers suggestions on the strategy and implementation of state support of an advisory mission.

To focus the scope of this research, the variables to be analyzed are those pertinent to decision making at the levels of the president, the National Security Council (NSC), and secretary. This paper concentrates analysis only on the actions taken by statutory members of the NSC and their designated advisors, including the assistant to the president on national security affairs, the director of central intelligence, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and relevant Cabinet members such as the secretary of state, to formulate the policy and implementation of an SFA campaign. This study will explore not the policy debate surrounding the choice to support a host nation (HN) foreign government but rather the decisions to start, continue, and end an SFA campaign.

II. Research Strategy

This section identifies the dependent and independent variables, describes the likely causal relationships between variables, and justifies the inclusion of each variable with supporting documentation.

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143 George & Bennett, 69. The authors assert that “case studies should employ variables of theoretical interest for the purposes of explanation. These should include variables that provide some leverage for policymakers to enable them to influence outcomes.”

A. Dependent Variable: Strategic Effect of an SFA Campaign

The dependent variable to be explained is the strategic effect of an SFA campaign on an HN’s security environment. From a U.S. perspective, a positive strategic effect is defined as the successful achievement of U.S. national security goals for a given SFA campaign. Strategic effect is best viewed along a continuum; its measurement is based upon the degree to which the SFA campaign meets stated or implied U.S. national security goals. Therefore, the variance in strategic effect ranges from the achievement of all stated or implied national security goals to the achievement of none of these goals. In the cases selected for comparison, the dependent variable is not held constant so as to better identify those conditions that may account for the difference in outcome.145

In his book *The future of strategy*, Professor Colin Gray defines strategy and strategic effect as follows: “Strategy enables a person, institution or state to connect its political purpose with the means that can reasonably be made available. Strategy enables a political community, or state, to use its (military) assets in the service of its policy wishes. It is the great enabler that allows tactical combat power to be translated into desirable consequences; this is called strategic effect.”146 However, Gray also argues that strategic effect is an inherently complex quality that “cannot be observed and measured directly.”147 He states the researcher “can recognize evidence of its

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145 George & Bennett, 79.
current condition and find material evidence of its recent and current presence.”\textsuperscript{148} Clausewitz states that the primacy of policy in war rests on the assumption that “policy knows the instrument it means to use and that only if statements look to certain military moves and actions to produce effect that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse.”\textsuperscript{149} In describing the outcome of a particular SFA campaign, the analysis does not aim to establish direct causality between the resulting securing environment and the SFA campaign.

This study seeks to consistently observe and compare several variables to the resulting outcome to determine their explanatory value in predicting the outcome. Evidence is gathered from primary and secondary source material to describe changes to the security environment leading up to, during, immediately following, and, where possible, up to five years after completion of the SFA campaign. This will include analyzing whether there has been a measureable change in the security situation of the HN, if the security forces are more accountable to their government, and to what extent the SFA campaign influenced the competency of the HN security forces.

At this point, I believe a possible outcome of this study will be a direct correlation between the existence of my independent variables (which are described in the following section) and the achievement of the United States’ strategic objectives regarding an HN.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
B. Independent Variables

Four variables are observed to test their explanatory values in predicting whether the following U.S. national security goals were achieved in three U.S. SFA campaigns: *national interests, legitimacy, civil-military relations, and interagency collaboration*. As detailed in the preceding review of the literature, several sources identify conditions or factors of success for styling phenomena related to why nations choose to intervene in other nations’ security affairs. For example, the literature on both military intervention and security studies offers numerous conditions for measuring success. Those conditions most useful for analyzing SFA missions fall within four broad categories: foreign policy decision making, institutional (or agency) decision making, tactical and operational mission execution, and environmental context.

To limit the scope of research, the four variables selected for this study fall within the category of foreign policy decision making. Primary and secondary sources are gathered on these above listed variables to describe and explain the actions taken by the president, applicable cabinet secretaries (primarily the Departments of Defense and State), the assistant to the president on national security affairs, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate and implement an SFA campaign.

The four independent variables are neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful outcome of an SFA campaign. Neither are these measures an exhaustive list of possible criteria for judging foreign policy decision making with respect to an SFA campaign. Rather, these four variables repeatedly arise as critical indicators of success.
of failure from theorists and operators writing on war and, more specifically, advisory missions.\textsuperscript{150}

These variables are not necessarily independent of each other, and as the selected cases will demonstrate, they are often interdependent. For instance, the tone set by a presidential administration with regards to its civil-military relations will often have an impact on the increase of or lack thereof interagency collaboration. How a U.S. government agency views the legitimacy of the HN government of a proposed SFA campaign can greatly affect the support generated and thereby impact the potential for interagency collaboration. If there is not a clear articulation of why committing U.S. conventional troops to an SFA mission is in our national interest, then it is less likely that the mission will be viewed with legitimacy both within U.S. governmental agencies and by the American public, thereby directly impacting civil-military relations. At this conceptual stage, however, these variables should not be considered formal hypotheses capable of rigorous testing. Instead, my intent is for them to serve as an initial framework to guide future study of U.S. policy making related to advisory missions and what I will later describe as “smart partnership.”

\textbf{Hypothesis 1:} Security force assistance is more likely to achieve national security objectives when those objectives are clearly defined and articulated in national security documents describing the national interests such as the National Military Strategy or National Security Strategy.

\textsuperscript{150} The development of this framework benefits from many of the authors who have worked on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Additionally, the ideas for these four variables emerged during a lecture at the Fletcher School with Emma Sky and Sarah Chayes on 23 Oct 2015. Sky and her excellent work \textit{The unraveling} played a major role in my thought process on this framework.
National Interests

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security goals when the senior policy leaders provide clearly defined campaign objectives that fall within national interests. Objectives that are clearly defined will 1) articulate the tasks to be accomplished, 2) state the desired end state and effects to be achieved, and 3) identify the lead and supporting U.S. government agencies for the campaign. Donald Nuechterlein defines national interests into four categories: survival (easy to recognize), vital (more time to decide how to respond but usually includes military power), major (considered important but not critical to well-being), and peripheral (some national interest involved but nation not greatly affected). The fundamental national interest of the U.S. is the defense and well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional system.\textsuperscript{151} Additionally, national interests must be viewed in light of an SFA mission falling within a larger, national strategy related to U.S. national interests such as El Salvador falling within the containment strategy used during the Cold War to battle the USSR. Another such example can be found in the Global War on Terror initiated by President Bush in 2001 and how this national strategy impacted both the Kosovo and Iraq cases.

Hypothesis 2: A security force assistance campaign is more likely to achieve national security goals when it is supported by effective interagency collaboration.

Interagency Collaboration

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when there is a greater political-military national security framework into which the campaign nests and is tied together through interagency collaboration. Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb describe how such interagency collaboration worked in a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) by stating that a JIATF, “a model for whole-of-government problem-solving,” by fostering “cross organizational collaboration,” seeks to overcome the “natural tendencies of many organizations to seek autonomy rather than collaboration.”152 Similar to a JIATF, a successful SFA mission requires interagency collaboration.

Variance in the interagency collaboration variable is measured by three possible outcomes: 1) an interagency collaborative process that is supportive of the SFA mission, 2) an interagency collaborative process that is not supportive of the SFA mission, and 3) no interagency collaborative process. Additionally, I define successful interagency collaboration as having the following characteristics: a definition of mutual relationships and goals, a jointly developed structure and shared responsibility, mutual authority and accountability for success, and sharing of resources and rewards.153


153 Harrison, B.M. Effective Strategies for Interagency Collaboration – Transition One Stop [PowerPoint slides].
**Hypothesis 3:** Security force assistance missions are more likely to achieve national security goals when campaign objectives are matched to a feasible and suitable strategy through effective civil-military interaction.

**Civil-military Interaction**

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when senior leaders develop and implement a strategy that is both feasible and suitable to the chosen means (military, intelligence, or otherwise) through an iterative civil-military discourse.\(^{154}\) This would include discursive dialogues between senior military and civilian leadership at the strategic level.\(^{155}\) A strategy is deemed feasible if objectives can be accomplished by the appropriate agency or agencies within the given time, space, and resource limitations. It is deemed suitable if the chosen objectives are uniquely matched to the capabilities of the SFA forces selected. In this case, the difference between civil-military interaction and interagency collaboration directly deals with the approach taken by the presidential administration to introduce, discuss, and have a relevant discourse on an SFA mission, whereas interagency collaboration, as defined above, focuses more on the process between different government agencies.

While not outside the scope of civil-military relations, the interagency collaboration will

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155 James Burk (2002) describes civil-military relations as "[describing] the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority." *Theories of democratic civil-military relations.* Armed Forces & Society 29(1), 7-29. My U.S. civil-military relations discussion and research are based on the foundational work of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Michael Desch, Jonathan Caverley, Michael Lind, Peter Feaver, and Eliot Cohen are some of the more recent authors who have advanced the writings on U.S. civil-military relations as well as looking at changes in these relations both during and after conflicts from Vietnam to ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
focus more on interactions between agencies and less on the civil-military discourse both at the senior policy maker level and with the American public.

**Hypothesis 4:** A security force assistance campaign is more likely to achieve national security goals when there is perceived legitimacy of the host nation government, both internally and externally.\(^{156}\)

**Legitimacy**

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when the national government of the host nation is deemed as legitimate in the eyes of their own population, the region, and the international community. There needs to be a view of legitimacy within: 1) the United States, 2) the HN with which the SFA campaign is taking place, 3) the regional organizations the HN belongs to, and 4) the international community. Peter Stillwell defined legitimacy as follows: “A government is legitimate if and only if the results of governmental output are compatible with the value pattern of the society.”\(^{157}\) Sarah Chayes sums it up nicely in her excellent work, *Thieves of state: why corruption threatens global security:* “Why would a farmer stick out his neck to keep Taliban out of his village if the government was just as bad?”\(^{158}\) Legitimacy is required at all levels, including the individual within the HN or the United States, as they consider why to try to help out their government with the views of regional and international organizations of both the U.S. SFA mission and the HN’s government. That being said,

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\(^{156}\) Chayes, S. (2015). *Thieves of state: why corruption threatens global security.* This work delves in detail into the impacts of legitimacy both internally and externally to a state. This will be an essential text as I focus on the perceived legitimacy of a host nation being considered for an SFA mission by the United States.


\(^{158}\) Chayes, 43.
three points regarding legitimacy need to be highlighted. First, the United States would never conduct SFA missions (or any other mission, for that matter) if it waited until those actions were deemed as legitimate by everyone from the individual to the world stage. Second, the more levels of legitimacy the United States has regarding an SFA campaign, I postulate the better chance it has to be successful. Third, I believe the most important level of legitimacy is that of how the HN views its government and security forces.

C. Questions for Analysis

To conduct controlled comparison, the following general questions examine the elements of study for each of my three case studies. The questions are not repeated within the text of each chapter. Topic headings introduce each element of the study in an effort to comparatively describe and explain the development and implementation of each SFA campaign and its strategic effect on the HN.

The first independent variable of this study is the national interests of the United States. What were the stated (or implied) objectives of the SFA campaign in question? Next, there needs to be a thorough examination of security documents or primary sources to try and identify the following: 1) Does the HN/SFA campaign fail within the national interests of the United States? 2) What is the SFA task to be performed in the HN? 3) What are the desired end date and effects to be achieved to accomplish the strategic objectives of the United States? 4) What are the timeline for completion or benchmarks for success? 5) How does success in this SFA campaign benefit U.S.
national interests? The final question for this variable asks, does the SFA campaign objectives seek a limited or comprehensive change in the status quo that furthers U.S. national interests?

The second independent variable for this dissertation focuses on interagency collaboration. First, is there a clear delineation between the lead and supporting agencies? Second, do a clear definition of success, mutual relationships between agencies, and end goals by each agency exist? Third, are there a jointly developed structure and shared success for collaboration between agencies to avoid “stovepiping”? Fourth, do mutual authority and accountability exist across all agencies? Fifth, and finally, do agencies share resources and rewards?

The third independent variable of this study is civil-military interaction. First, to what extent is there a healthy discourse between involved U.S. government agencies, the executive branch, and the American population? Second, are any of the current civil-military relations models (objective control, subjective control, principle-agent theory, unequal dialogue) being utilized during the debate over the proposed or ongoing SFA campaign? Third, what systems are in place, if any, to ensure a discourse between policy makers, agencies of government, and the U.S. population? Fourth, how do the different personalities of the senior policy decision makers impact the civil-military debate regarding the SFA case in question (the Rumsfeld effect)? Fifth, and finally, do the United States SFA efforts focus on building effective AND accountable HN security forces?

The fourth and final independent variable for this dissertation is legitimacy. The first question is to what extent did the U.S. government attempt to build the perception of
legitimacy within the U.S., within the HN, within regional organizations, and across international organizations? Second, how does/did the HN population view both their government and U.S. SFA efforts before, during, and after the advisory mission? Finally, what steps did senior U.S. policy makers take to garner popular support within both the U.S. military and public?

The dependent variable for this dissertation is the strategic effect of an SFA campaign. This will involve three questions. First, to what extent were stated (or implied) national security goals achieved during the SFA campaign, at the completion of the SFA campaign, and five years following the completion of the SFA campaign? Second, what systemic, regional, or local changes took place in the HN security environment? The third question is what were the costs to the United States in casualties, material resources, military, and political advantage? What were the costs to the HN?

D. Cases

In order to mitigate excessive differences and clearly define a consistent universe of cases, examples were chosen on the basis of five criteria: timeframe, purpose, method, HN, and key SFA actors.

The timeframe for this study is the post-United States NSC and structure establishment in 1947. Additionally, cases are selected to ensure there is time between the “end” of the selected advisory mission to see if that particular SFA effort had an
enduring effect. For example, the Iraq case study will cover 2003 to 2011, allowing five years to make an assessment of its success or failure.

The purpose of an SFA campaign is to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSFs) and supporting institutions. FSFs are all organizations and personnel under HN control that have a mission of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well as external threats. SFA activities are primarily used to assist an HN in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability.159

The method used in the SFA campaigns of this dissertation involves the use of the United States’ conventional forces to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise an HN’s security forces.

For this dissertation, the host nation is defined as the country which either has asked for or has been co-opted into using American conventional military forces to rebuild, organize, train, equip, or advise the HN’s security forces.

For the purpose of this study, SFA actors are defined as those United States conventional military forces given the mission to rebuild, organize, train, equip, or advise an HN’s security forces and are not part of the United States Army’s Special Forces. This includes how the United States conventional forces conducted SFA in places such as Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the early 1980s, the U.S. military once again undertook an SFA mission. The 12-year United States military assistance program in El Salvador evoked a variety of experiences and lessons learned. The mission continually evolved, as did the compositions and goals of the U.S. advisors. Billed as a foreign internal defense mission, operations in El Salvador resembled an SFA mission due to both the internal and external threats with which the El Salvadoran security forces had to contend.

In fall 1981, U.S. Southern Command sent a seven-man strategic assistance team led by Brigadier General Fred Woerner to work with the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) General Staff. Woerner’s mission was twofold: to guide the military leadership in developing a national military strategy to defeat the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and to provide an assessment of the ESAF’s capabilities to the U.S. government. The requirements developed by the ESAF General Staff and Woerner consisted of expanding the ESAF by 10 battalions, modernizing equipment, and improving the training, command, control, and communications systems across the force.

The guiding principle established by the initial US Military Group was KISSS: “Keep it simple, sustainable, small, and Salvadorian.” Woerner reported that such an effort required both an expensive and a long-term American commitment. Failure to do so, Woerner reported, “would result in unabated terror from the right, and continued tolerance of institutional violence could dangerously erode popular support to the point

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160 Ramsey, Robert D. *Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present*. Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, KS. 2006
where in the Armed Forces would be viewed not as the protector of society, but as an army of occupation.”

After mostly (although not exclusively) using Special Forces teams to work with selected ESAF battalions, in 1984 the decision was made to attach more conventional advisory teams to each of the six ESAF brigade headquarters to assist in staff work and planning. Each team consisted of a lieutenant colonel team chief, a captain as a training officer, and a military intelligence officer, each of whom came from the U.S. conventional force. Known as an operational planning and assistance training team (OPATT), these three-man groups specifically avoided the title of advisors, per the guidance issued by Congress.

In addition to the congressionally mandated 55-man force cap on the El Salvadorian mission, Congress specifically banned the trainers from participating in combat operations with their respective ESAF units. This decision resulted in a multitude of problems for the U.S. trainers. Trainers indicated U.S. forces would simply stay on bases and conduct training. Advisors would accompany their partner units through both training and combat operations. Regardless of the term OPATT, the U.S. soldiers continued to refer to themselves as advisors: “The word ‘advisor’ is more accurate and is a direct translation of the Spanish ‘Aesor,’ which is what we were called by our Salvadoran colleagues.” The bond created between the U.S. soldier and his El Salvadorian counterpart continued to grow despite the numerous congressional attempt to limit the types of interaction the two had at the tactical level.

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161 Ibid.
162 Ibid, 88.
The El Salvador mission provides a glimpse into the political debates over how and why the United States commits its conventional forces to advisory missions. In this case, coming only five years after the fall of South Vietnam, there was a natural political and military hesitancy to once again commit U.S. forces into another country, especially one caught up in a civil war. The Cold War was still at its height, and I analyze how the different administrations of both Presidents Carter and Reagan viewed the risks and rewards of committing U.S. conventional forces to help rebuild ESAF.

Additionally, this is a relatively small-scale example of SFA. The numbers of American troops committed to the organizing and training of the ESAF, while often exceeding the congressionally mandated force cap, never came close to the size of future SFA missions in both Kosovo and Iraq. This case study affords the opportunity to look at the impact on the size and scope of an SFA mission with regards to how senior policy makers decide to commit U.S. troops to this type of mission. The interaction with Congress regarding the mandated force cap is part of both the interagency collaboration and civil-military aspects of this dissertation.

**Kosovo 1999–2009**

Studies regarding the intervention of NATO in Kosovo tend to focus on the air campaign that eventually led to the Serbian withdrawal from the province. There has been relatively little discussion or literature on the efforts to rebuild the security forces of Kosovo by U.S. forces starting in 1999. However, almost immediately after deploying ground forces into the southern part of Kosovo, United States conventional forces
began to rebuild and train the local Kosovo Police Force, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), and, in 2008, the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF). These three forces all originated from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the mixed group of fighters who battled the Serbians.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999. It ended the war and established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, known as UNMIK, as the executive, judicial, and legislative authority for Kosovo. UNMIK’s responsibility included “establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.” Additionally, UNMIK was also given responsibility for establishing provisional system of self-government and “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”

After the withdrawal of Serbian forces on 20 June 1999, some 50,000 peacekeeping troops were deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a “peace support operation” for Kosovo and the region. These troops, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), were drawn from NATO member countries, NATO partner countries, and non-NATO countries, such as Russia. KFOR served as a steward of the KLA’s

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165 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Article 9 C, 10 June 1999.
167 By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39,000 troops. NATO reduced KFOR troop levels to 26,000 by June 2003 and to 17,500 by the end of that year.
transformation into the KPC. However, it fell upon NATO, including troops from the United States, to rebuild the KLA into the KPC. The creation of the KPC was out of necessity: the KLA was a large, armed group that did not want to demobilize. Therefore, the KPC was created to reintegrate this large, armed organization into a security force for the emerging nation of Kosovo.

Almost immediately upon arriving as NATO Multi-National Brigade East built around a U.S. Infantry Division Headquarters (1st Infantry Division), United States conventional forces began both peace enforcement operations as well as conducting SFA missions to reestablish local security forces. While NATO was tasked to ensure a safe and security environment and deter renewed threats, the development of an effective and accountable KPC was the long-term way out of Kosovo for NATO and the United States forces.

In September 1999, UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 transformed the KLA into the KPC. The KPC consisted of 5,000 members, including 2,000 reservists. Its members had a military uniform with a military look, but according to Resolution 1244, the KPC was unarmed and had no military security missions or training. Its initial function was primarily for civil emergencies with the KPC being divided into six regional protection zones, each with a regional commander.168 The KPC was the foundation for the eventual development of the KAF in 2008. This particular workaround was a way of dealing essentially with an armed militia, the KLA, and legitimizing them into what would become the KAF. This brought its own unique challenges and benefits that will be explored further in the chapter on Kosovo.

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This particular case study occurred during the administrations of both Presidents Clinton and Bush. The start of the SFA mission was prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, yet the advisory mission continued well into the Global War on Terror period, indicating that the success of this SFA mission kept its importance even after the commitment of the majority of U.S. conventional forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. There are very interesting civil-military challenges involved with the Kosovo campaign, ranging from the perceived distrust between the military and President Clinton to the role played by Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark in the initial entry of NATO troops into Kosovo.

While the amount of troops and time on the ground greatly exceed those in the El Salvador case study, the size and scope of this SFA mission again does not come close to recent efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike in the El Salvador case study, operations in Kosovo did not take place in a Cold War setting and continued after the attacks of 9/11. This provides the opportunity to see how policy debate regarding the deployment of conventional troops in an SFA role was affected, or not affected, by the lack of both a Cold War enemy and a national security policy of containment.

Finally, the Kosovo case study provides unique insights into the question of legitimacy of an emerging nation. As Kosovo struggled to establish itself as an independent nation, and not a province of Serbia, questions of both internal and external legitimacy came into play. This provided unique challenges to U.S. foreign policy decision makers and to the troops committed to work with Kosovo forces during this SFA campaign.
Iraq 2003–2011

The decision by the Coalition Provincial Authority to disband the Iraqi Armed Forces remains one of the most contentious topics of the Iraq war. Some argue Paul Bremer’s decision was a necessary step toward reconciliation. Others say it stripped Iraq of one of its only organized and integrated organizations, resulting in a sudden pool of trained fighters for a rising insurgency. Regardless of the debate, the need to build trained and professional security forces in Iraq became painfully obvious to those in the Green Zone of Baghdad in mid-2003. The initial attempts to build a new Iraqi Army (NIA) resulted in the formation of advisory support teams (ASTs). These advisor teams opened a new chapter in the U.S. military’s history of SFA, one still under study today as refinements to the advisor missions continue while conducting combat operations again in Iraq. One lesson is clear: The lack of clearly defined national security goals hindered the initial efforts to reestablish the Iraqi Army. Even today, a gap exists between tactics, techniques, and procedures used by current advisors as U.S. Forces once again conduct SFA in Iraq and a national debate over the security goals as we try to counter the Islamic State.

The Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team headquarters developed a two-phase training technique in early 2004 for building NIA units. Iraqi officers with previous experience in Saddam’s army went to training in Jordan. The civilian contractor company Vinnell Corporation received the contract to conduct the training of the Iraqi

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169 Ricks. Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq.
Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) program. Once trained, the officers and NCOs combined to form the cadre of a NIA Battalion. This cadre, with American advisor assistance, formed the nucleus of a battalion, taking 700 to 800 recruits and conducting basic training to form a cohesive battalion. The lynchpins for this effort were the ASTs.

The formation of the early ASTs in 2004 would start nearly seven years of different attempts by coalition and U.S. forces to rebuild Iraqi security forces. Unlike the previous two selected cases, Iraq proved a massive challenge from a size and scope perspective. The disbanding of Iraqi security forces put the onus of rebuilding every type of security force, ranging from heavy armored division to border police on the occupying coalition forces, all while fighting growing insurgencies of different types and what would turn into a civil war between the Sunni and Shia sects, on the United States. This put a tremendous burden on the fledgling Iraqi security forces and their partnered U.S. units. The size and scope of this SFA mission ensured U.S. conventional forces would conduct the preponderance of training for the majority of the ISF.

The invasion in 2003 toppled the longstanding government of Saddam Hussein and, as a result, added to the burden the rebuilding of an Iraqi government viewed as legitimate by Iraqis, the region, and the international community. Unlike the previous two case studies, this presented another unique challenge to the foreign policy decision makers, especially regarding the key decisions to continue and eventually end the SFA mission in Iraq.

This case will range from the years of 2003 to 2011, when the last official withdrawal of American troops occurred. The rise of the Islamic State and the current situation in

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Iraq will only be looked at through the lens of whether the SFA mission that ended in 2011 could be judged as successful or not. The “coalition of the willing” rapidly became the “coalition of the one,” with only the United States remaining executing both an active combat role and SFA mission. The three key decision points of the dissertation, the decision to implement an SFA mission, the decision to extend an SFA mission, and the decision to end an SFA mission, fit well in the given timeframe of this case study.

**E. Limitations of This Study**

Using a comparative case study method has the advantage of testing the causal mechanisms and testing the logic of my argument. It will afford the opportunity to see whether or not the main actor (the United States) is behaving in the ways suggested by the theories I have chosen to analyze, which include offensive realism, logrolling, and balance of risk. I will get to test the story behind the correlation between variables.

However, there are downsides to using this method. First, there exists the strong possibility of having a biased case selection. There is always the danger that my subjective biases and commitments to certain theoretical propositions led me to select cases that over confirm my favorite hypotheses. Additionally, the fact that I have personally served in both Kosovo and Iraq may bias my case selection. I believe I have accounted for any potential biased case selection by 1) selecting a broad span of cases that vary across both temporal and geographical domains and 2) focusing on the strategic decision making and not on the much lower tactical level, where my limited experience has occurred.
Comparative case studies may also result in an omitted variable bias. Since this clearly is a “small-n” study focusing on only three cases, not selecting the correct variables may bias my results. However, not all omitted variables result in biased estimates of causal effects. In order to result in bias, the omitted variable must exert a causal influence on both the explanatory variables of interest and the dependent variable. With my selection of these four independent variables, I believe I am capturing the critical elements, which cut across not only these three case studies, but also other such instances where the United States has or will commit its troops to conduct SFA missions. These “small-n” cases are essential in such an analysis as there are not a large number of U.S. cases to study post 1947.

The next chapter provides an overview of the history and context of United States security cooperation leading up to SFA efforts in El Salvador, Kosovo, and Iraq.
Chapter 4: The Road to United States Security Force Assistance

I. Introduction

The fall of Saigon in 1975 to the North Vietnamese Army brought closure to the final chapter on the United States' involvement in Vietnam. Across both the U.S. population and in the military, there was a sense of closure. The military, decimated from years of combat in Vietnam and a continued Cold War threat in Europe, was starting to rebuild its shattered ranks of its noncommissioned and junior officers. Emerging military leadership began to refocus on what they saw as the United States' military's core mission: defeating the Soviet Union on the plains of Eastern Europe.

The doctrine writers of the time were correspondingly affected. The Vietnam era, in addition to depleting its numbers and physical resources, left the Army in a doctrinal vacuum. The Army, along with the other branches of the Armed Forces, had become so obsessed with a war that it had fought for so long in Vietnam that it neglected the challenges still facing it in Central Europe and elsewhere in the world. Officer training along with military and doctrinal theory were, over the years, distorted by the exigencies of the Vietnam War. The post-Vietnam era also bore ill omens for the future in the form of steadily declining defense budgets, and it looked as though the anticipated force improvements would not be soon coming. Indeed, the air of pessimism that this state of affairs engendered was great. The low point may have been reached when murmurs surfaced proposing that “... the Army in Europe posture primarily to facilitate its evacuation in the event of war.”

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At the same time, the United States Army was revamping its doctrine, training, and even the very structure of its units. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan along with the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua came during a time of great turmoil in the international political system and the U.S. domestic situation. Taking advantage of the United States preoccupation with Vietnam, the Soviet Union moved away from détente, pursuing rapid arms growth and increased commitments to Marxist-inspired movements in the Third World. Adding to the turmoil was the revivalism of Islamic movements, highlighted by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. An increase of attacks on American diplomats and embassies around the world was a harbinger of the growing Islamic anger rising to the surface of the international environment. Senior U.S. decision makers launched a number of covert programs to support political opposition groups and armed insurgents to combat the growing communist expansion.

These foreign policy challenges arose during a turbulent time in the domestic situation of the United States as well. Confidence in the presidency was in decline from the social turmoil created by the Vietnam War. Watergate shook the public confidence in the office of the president, rising oil prices controlled by less-than-friendly Middle Eastern countries placed increase stress on a struggling economy, and the rise of international terrorism targeting Americans dominated the front pages of U.S. newspapers of the era.

II. The International System

In the 1970s, the East-West superpower competition dominated the international relations sphere. The international system was dominated by the two nuclear-armed

172 Linnington, 66.
super powers, the USSR and the United States. U.S. foreign policy was specifically
guided by the withdrawal from Vietnam along with a public (and Congress) not willing to
commit United States conventional forces abroad in any overseas interventions.

President Nixon’s visits to Moscow and Beijing helped maintain America’s prestige in
the eyes of the international arena despite the loss of Vietnam and the continued
drawdown of U.S. forces around the world. The rise of détente with the Soviet Union
enabled both superpowers to increase their own economic cooperation and limit the
strategic arms advantages of their competition through a renewed mutual strategy of
containment. This overarching strategy of containment will come into play when
looking at the rationale for U.S. involvement in El Salvador in the next chapter.

The downfall of the Nixon presidency and the loss of South Vietnam dealt a hammer
blow to American credibility in the eyes of the world. This greatly limited the U.S. foreign
policy momentum gained from the opening of relations with China and the continued
negotiations with the USSR. American influence was on the decline, and it impacted
numerous countries around the world. Thailand turned toward Vietnam. Laos and
Cambodia received no American assistance to combat a communist takeover of both
countries. The United States and Europe were still under an oil embargo due to the U.S.’
open support of Israel in the 1973 war, resulting in not only a windfall of oil profits to the
Soviet Union but also increasing tension amongst NATO allies. A U.S. journalist
traveling with Secretary of State Kissinger in the Middle East in March 1975 described a
“sense of almost fatalistic gloom” with “an appraisal of the overall world situation that

Publishers.
174 Linnington, 71.
was the most pessimistic [the reporter] had heard in some time.” Kissinger believed because the United States had failed to prevent the “great communist conspiracy to take over Asia that Moscow drew the conclusion which the advocates of the Domino theory so feared — the historical correlation of forces had shifted in its [Moscow’s] favor.” This would result in a continued commitment of the United States to try to intervene in Third World nations under threat from the USSR.

With this perceived rise of the USSR at the expense of the Western world, populations across both the United States and Europe elected leaders committed to challenging Soviet expansionism, returning to conservative economic policies, and refocusing on the importance of human rights. While détente had brought some sense of stability to the East-West relationship, it failed to halt Soviet support into Third World conflicts or prevent their strategic arms exports. By the time the USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Cuban military assistance helped oust the relatively “U.S.-friendly” Samoza regime in Nicaragua, Moscow signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the military junta in Ethiopia, new Soviet-friendly regimes emerged in South and North Yemen, and Marxist political parties and resistance forces emerged in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It was in this turbulent and new international environment that the United States military tried to define its role in future conflicts.

Each of the three selected case studies occurred during very different international contexts. The El Salvador case study began during the height of the Cold War and while the United States was struggling to regain its standing in the international community. U.S. troops were reluctantly committed to El Salvador under President Carter, but the effort would increase under President Reagan. Additionally, President Reagan would bring a return to a hardline, Cold War rhetoric with the Soviet Union, increasing the tensions between the two superpowers.

The intervention in Kosovo has a large NATO component to it. Occurring after the end of the Cold War, the international context shifted from a standoff between the two large superpowers to an increase in the number of ethnically driven conflicts within the crumbling remains of the Soviet Union. As Rupert Smith discussed in his work, this “war amongst the people” was a fundamental shift in how war was and would continue to be fought. The shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world brought with it great turmoil and would find the United States committing more of its military to different hot spots around the globe, including Panama (1989–1990), Iraq (1990–1991), Northern Iraq (1991–2003), Somalia (1993), and Bosnia (1995–present). The intervention in Kosovo began under President Clinton but would continue under President Bush, even after the dramatic attacks of 11 September 2001 on United States soil. Much of the literature on the Kosovo intervention focuses on the air campaign, which many argue compelled the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo. However, while the air campaign lasted 78 days and ran longer than most analysts believed it would take, the true work started once NATO, U.S., and Russian troops entered Kosovo in June 1999 and continues up until this day.

179 Smith, 22.
There are hundreds of books and journal articles analyzing why the United States decided to invade Iraq. From the attacks of 11 September 2001 to the unfinished business of the first Gulf War, many believed a showdown with Saddam Hussein and his forces was inevitable. Again, much has been written about the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent downfall of the regime. However, other than looking at the now famous “surge” of additional forces, little academic literature exists in terms of the why the decision was made to rebuild Iraqi security forces. Again, this case study looks at a campaign across two different presidential administrations (Bush and Obama) in a post-Cold War setting. Unique to this case study, however, is that it occurred entirely in a post-9/11 setting and occurred on a much greater scale in terms of size than either the El Salvador or Kosovo case study.

III. The U.S. Domestic Context

While the United States faced a host of domestic challenges leading up to its intervention in El Salvador, none loomed larger than the conflict in Vietnam. Public hostility to the war, the controversial draft, and the continued rise in defense spending had a major effect on domestic and foreign policy decision making well into the 1980s. It wasn’t until the successful conclusion of the first Gulf War in 1991 that many experts said the United States military had “exorcised the ghosts of Vietnam.” However, experiences in Vietnam would set the immediate tone not only for the intervention in El Salvador, but in all subsequent U.S. interventions all the way up through today. Strong congressional oversight, concerns about unclear mission objectives, and an American

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public wary of another quagmire for its troops to get bogged down in are just some of the residue passed on from Vietnam to more recent SFA missions.

President Nixon’s accomplishments in foreign affairs were overshadowed by his inability to recognize the limits of his power in the domestic sphere. The growing “credibility gap” between President Johnson and the American public over the Vietnam War, which came to a head during the Tet offensive, continued under President Nixon and his administration. The U.S. military campaigns in Laos and Cambodia only added more distance between the American public and the presidency to this credibility gap. However, it would be the Watergate scandal coupled with the eventual defeat of the South Vietnamese forces in 1975 that would prove disastrous for the credibility of the executive branch. After a reelection victory, the allegations of misconduct and the president’s involvement in the Watergate scandal would force Nixon to resign on 8 August 1974.  

The presidential administrations following Nixon would not only have to work to rebuild the trust of the American people, they would have increased congressional scrutiny on all their actions, especially those dealing with the potential commitment of U.S. troops to a foreign engagement. With the scars of Vietnam still fresh in the collective mind of representatives and the American public, Congress would work hard to ensure the United States could not stumble into another Vietnam scenario again. Just as concerning as a large-scale deployment of conventional military forces was the use of a limited number of advisors — since that is how the United States started down the path to its involvement in Vietnam.

Congressional Oversight

The decline in status of the presidency along with the vocal public outcry over the Vietnam War led Congress to curb the power of the executive branch, ushering in a significant structural change to the American foreign policy process. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, which required congressional approval for military interventions lasting longer than sixty days.\textsuperscript{182} In December 1974, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was passed.\textsuperscript{183} This amendment addressed the question of Central Intelligence Agency covert actions and prohibited the use of appropriated funds for their conduct unless and until the president “found” that each such operation is important to the national security and submitted this finding to the appropriate Congressional committees — a total of six committees. (This grew to eight committees after the House and Senate intelligence committees were established.\textsuperscript{184}) These steps were deemed necessary in the eyes of Congress to prevent another Vietnam from happening and to keep the executive branch in check. President Ford’s administration was buffeted by numerous perceived failures, from the immediate pardoning of President Nixon to the fall of Saigon in 1975 to the failure to deliver a settlement on nuclear arms with the Soviet Union.


It was not until President Carter was elected with the highest public approval ratings since President Johnson and with a two-thirds Democrat majority in Congress that a sense of optimism returned to the office of the Presidency. President Carter quickly supported the modernization of the United States’ nuclear arsenal, reconfirmed the U.S.’ commitment to NATO, and created the Rapid Deployment Force, a precursor to what would eventually become U.S. Central Command. Carter still operated under the overarching U.S. strategy of containment. However, the continued aggressive maneuvers of both the Soviet Union and many of its proxies working to destabilize areas such as Central America, the Middle East, and Africa forced President Carter into having to decide to on whether to commit conventional U.S. troops to an advisory role, something Congress had been working against since 1974.
IV. United States Security Cooperation Programs

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

The Foreign Assistance Act is a United States Act of Congress that reorganized the structure of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs, separated military from non-military aid, and created a new agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to administer those non-military, economic assistance programs. On 3 November 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the act and issued Executive Order 10973, detailing the reorganization. The agency unified already existing U.S. aid efforts, combining the economic and technical assistance operations of the International Cooperation Administration, the loan activities of the Development Loan Fund, the local currency functions of the Export-Import Bank, and the agricultural surplus distribution activities of the Food for Peace program of the Department of Agriculture. While separate from traditional Department of Defense activities, these important functions assigned to USAID would play a larger role in the three case studies to be discussed.

This act states that no assistance will be provided to a government that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people

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in such country.”\textsuperscript{187} This statement would bring human rights and the concept of responsibility to protect the people of a nation into the discussion of whether the United States should commit troops to support governments, even those fighting against communist aggression. This was a substantial change from the more realist view that dominated U.S. foreign policy up until this point. This ties into the early literature mentioned regarding the emerging field of human security. The protection of human rights is a major consideration when deciding on which security forces the United States can work with.

This act was amended in 2004 specific to the treatment of orphans and other vulnerable children. This amendment allows the president to provide aid to the peoples of other countries to look after children in cases of HIV/AIDS and to set up schools and other programs for the advancement of child treatment.\textsuperscript{188}

\textbf{Security Cooperation}

To counter these growing threats, the U.S. government developed a wide variety of foreign assistance programs to assist other governments. These programs provide a variety of specific assistance to assist a foreign government’s security forces. Security cooperation (SC) is “all Department of Defense (DoD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests which develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and


multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a Host Nation (HN).”¹⁸⁹ Security assistance (SA) is “a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies or objectives.”¹⁹⁰ In the history of U.S. SC, covered earlier in this dissertation, the United States sold a huge amount of weapons, ammunition, and supplies to countries like Iran under the SA program. In the Iranian case, U.S. contractors, often in large numbers, followed these weapons sales to teach the HN’s military how to use and maintain the expensive equipment. Similar actions occurred during the Iraqi case study. In 2010, the United States sold highly sophisticated M1 Abrams main battle tanks to the Iraqis, resulting in a large contractor presence to try to teach the Iraqi Army about the maintenance and operation of these tanks, an effort that continues even to this day.¹⁹¹

According to U.S. law, SC occurs only during peacetime and is limited to DoD agencies only. Another component is foreign internal defense (FID), defined as “participation by civil and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.”¹⁹² The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN’s

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¹⁹⁰ Joint publication 1-02, 476.
¹⁹² Joint publication 1-02, 212.
program of internal defense and development (IDAD).\footnote{Ibid, 269.} IDAD ideally is a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug trade, terrorist, or other type of threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. Clearly, these different programs for dealing with foreign governments all have specific goals and limit the types of assistance offered. Security force assistance (SFA) not only tries to tie all these programs together, it also strives to fill in the gaps between them.

These U.S. government programs seek to assist friendly governments at the strategic level. The programs provide financial assistance, equipment, education, and training to build the capabilities of a nation to defend itself from both internal and external threats. At the tactical level, U.S. trainers assist with the development of a security force’s capabilities. The rapport-building skill of our Special Forces combined with an in-depth knowledge of a peer’s cultural background may translate to successes at the lowest levels. The real difficulty occurs, however, when trying to develop the level between the strategic programs and the tactical actions. It is at the operational level where both the U.S. military and government struggle to understand the intricacies of an SFA mission.

**The Role of United States Special Forces in Advisory Missions**

While there continues to be confusion between the terms *special operations forces* and *Special Forces*, this dissertation needs to initially discuss the original mission of the United States Special Forces and why most SFA missions now require conventional forces. Special operations forces refers to highly trained units across the United States
military, ranging from the Army’s Ranger battalions and Special Forces to the Navy SEALs and Marine Force Recon. Only the role of the United States Special Forces, however, will be discussed in this next part of the dissertation since their mission is directly tied to SFA.

The primary mission of the U.S. Army Special Forces is to train and lead unconventional warfare (UW) forces, or a clandestine guerrilla force in an occupied nation. The five primary missions of the U.S. Special Forces are direct action, counter terrorism, special reconnaissance, FID, and UW. These last two missions, FID and UW, both involve training and advising either a foreign security force (as in an FID mission) or UW, which is to train, equip, advise, and assist forces in enemy-held or enemy-controlled territory. While FID efforts concentrate on HN security forces, UW deals more with raising and assisting a guerrilla force such as the Montagnards in Vietnam or working with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in late 2001. The focus of the Special Forces conducting UW is to train and equip these guerrilla forces to conduct ambushes and raids and disrupt the daily operations of an occupied force. U.S. Special Forces receive years of specialized training, ranging from becoming fluent in multiple languages to cultural immersion training to better understand the people they will work with. Additionally, each Special Forces group (approximately regimental size) has a specific geographic area on which they focus. This allows members of the Special Forces teams to make numerous trips to the same area, to build relations and specialize in the culture of that region. However, due to the specialized selection process and training, U.S. Special Forces make up only a small fraction of the much

\[194\] Ibid.
larger, conventional army and therefore can only be deployed on a small scale or work with only a limited number of foreign troops.

While these well-trained Special Forces troops have the capability to train foreign security forces, they often lack the capacity, especially over a sustained period of time or when dealing with a large rebuilding mission. In the El Salvador case, Congress placed a 55-man limit on the amount of United States advisors that could be in a country at any one time. Initially, as we will look at in greater detail in the next chapter, the advisory efforts in El Salvador were manned with highly trained and qualified Special Forces soldiers. However, as the mission continued, the pool of available Special Forces qualified personnel began to run low, and the U.S. military was forced to use conventional troops to conduct the advisory missions. In Kosovo, Special Forces were used to conduct 1) direct action raids against high-value targets and 2) serve as liaisons with Russian forces working adjacent to the American sector of responsibility. As a result, the burden of training the fledgling Kosovo security forces fell on the conventional United States forces. Finally, in Iraq starting in 2003, the sheer number of security forces requiring training and advising greatly overwhelmed the number of Special Forces available. While Special Forces conducted training with both Iraqi special operations forces and Iraqi Police Special Weapons and Tactics teams, they rarely worked with any of the Iraqi conventional forces, especially with regards to training and advising these forces. Again, that burden fell on the U.S. conventional military.
A Shift to Security Force Assistance

On 28 February 2007, a message sent out to all Army activities stated, “The U.S. Army’s Transition Team (TTS) mission is the Army’s top priority and is the way to achieve a more secure region in the primary theaters of operation — Iraq and Afghanistan — in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).” ¹⁹⁶ Five years after the attacks of September 11, the United States Army finally labeled SFA missions as its top priority. However, a majority of the conventional military still lacked a thorough understanding of the mission, requirements, scope, size, and goals of these transition teams. SFA works “by, with, and through” HN security forces. The bottom line of SFA is to build capability in other people, their organizations, and their institutions to ensure a standalone HN security force — legitimate, trusted, capable, and supported by the people of their nation. SFA missions build up the internal structures necessary to maintain stability within a nation. They additionally counter the rising tide of the enemy’s use of asymmetric warfare. The most successful military troops at countering an insurgency are the indigenous security forces of the nation in peril. They better understand the politics, cultural nuisances, languages, tribal structures, and power brokers of their own country. By strengthening an HN’s security forces, the United States gains a stable global partner.

SFA seeks to overcome the limitations found in the majority of the U.S. government programs designed to provide assistance to foreign governments. Some of the obvious restrictions of the previously discussed programs involve their usefulness in wartime.

SA and SC are valuable programs during the shaping phase of a campaign but run into legal and logistical restrictions once hostilities commence. Most FID programs, while applicable in a combat environment, focus on an HN’s internal threats only. Today’s insurgent rarely emerges from, remains in, and draws support from only one country. The transnational nature of non-state armed groups today make the usefulness of FID highly limited. While FID does provide valuable aid and training to an HN, it lacks the capability to deal with both internal and external threats simultaneously. Additionally, FID normally focuses only on the HN’s military programs, leaving vital security forces such as police, border guards, and customs officials out of the training. Without a holistic approach to countering both internal and external threats, FID often is of limited value. FID, in essence, creates an exploitable gap for non-state armed groups to take advantage of.

The deficiencies of current U.S. government SC programs also include the selected training audience. SC goes against all the current trends and experience from previous operations that call for an interagency approach to problems within an HN. When it comes to examples such as Iraq and Afghanistan, nearly all experts and leaders agree that a military (i.e., DoD) solution alone is not going to bring about resolution. Instead, the U.S. government needs to utilize all of its available resources to assist the HN, including agencies such as the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, USAID, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others to effectively develop nation-building capabilities. Additionally, the majority of the current U.S. nation-building programs only focus their assistance on an HN’s military. While military-to-military contacts are normally the fastest to establish, SFA highlights the importance of training
with all types of HN security forces to include police, paramilitary organizations, border police, customs officials, and their respective supporting infrastructures. This requires a broad range of expertise and interagency collaboration by U.S. government agencies to ensure no elements of the HN security forces are being neglected and therefore can be more easily exploited by enemies to the state.

SFA missions include a variety of tasks. These include: 1) force generation (organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise); 2) advise host nations forces as part of FID (stability, offense, secure); 3) assist employment of HN forces in support of campaigns and major operations; 4) advise the HN forces faced with an external threat (offense, defense, stability); 5) provide traditional SA through foreign military sales, international military education and training, and mobile training teams; 6) develop sustaining capabilities for HN forces; 7) develop legislative and legal authorities of HN; 8) integrate foreign security forces (FSFs) into the broader interagency of the HN; and 9) enhance the professionalism of FSFs as the legitimate forces of a partner nation.197

The goals of SFA missions are to develop foreign security forces that are competent, capable, committed, and confident, also referred to as the four Cs. HN forces must be competent across all levels from the individual to ministry levels and across all functions, including combat operations to logistics. Capable forces are appropriately sized to accomplish any potential mission and sustainable over time within the HN’s resource capabilities. HN forces must be committed to the security of their people, the survival of their state, the preservation of human rights, and the peaceful transition of power within the state. Finally, HN forces must be confident in themselves, their

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government must show confidence in their security forces, the people must trust in the professionalism of their security forces, and the international community must believe HN security forces are an agent for positive change. When an SFA mission develops forces that meet the requirements of the 4Cs, that mission is considered a success by the author.  

This chapter demonstrated the varying programs the United States government has at its disposal to assist other nations in developing accountable and competent security forces. This chapter also highlighted some of the inherent weaknesses in the individual SC programs and elaborated on why many of these programs have restrictions placed on them by Congress. SFA is a tool that attempts to bridge many of the gaps created by the other very specific SC programs. By helping an HN develop security forces that have the capability to deal with both internal and external threats, the United States hopes to develop a long-term, stable partner in that particular region.

The next three chapters will analyze the cases of El Salvador, Kosovo, and Iraq, looking to see why United States senior decision makers opted to begin, extend, and end these unique SFA campaigns with conventional forces.

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198 Ibid, 16.

I. Introduction

“It was a tragedy that there was no respectable body of doctrine to be drawn on, that we were thrown back into pragmatism. We had no respectable organizational approach to deal with this.”199 — U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering

The above quotation from Ambassador Pickering highlights an enduring theme through the numerous advisor missions conducted by the U.S. military. In the early 1980s, the U.S. military once again undertook a security force assistance (SFA) mission without the necessary SFA doctrine for general-purpose forces. The 12-year United States military assistance program in El Salvador resulted in a variety of experiences and lessons learned. Too often, however, lessons learned from advisory missions are not captured and translated into enduring doctrine for future generations to utilize. Rather, these SFA missions are treated as aberrations detracting from the important mission of conventional war fighting. Ambassador Pickering’s above comment captured the essence of the SFA mission in El Salvador. The U.S. military wasted too much time relearning lessons of the past, thereby detracting from the efficiency of another SFA mission.

As this chapter will demonstrate, the United States set out with strategic objectives regarding its SFA campaign in El Salvador. The eventual decision by different presidential administrations to initiate, sustain, and end an SFA campaign will be

analyzed through process tracing. By looking at the four independent variables (national interests, interagency collaboration, civil-military interaction, and legitimacy), this chapter will make the determination whether the course of action chosen by the United States achieved its stated strategic objectives by sending conventional forces as advisors to train and assist the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) or missed the mark.

After the 1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran leftist movement formed into a single movement, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The FMLN launched an armed rebellion in 1980 and conducted conventional offensive operations in 1981 in an attempt to seize power. While the FMLN’s actions failed to garner the popular uprising they hoped for, their operations highlighted numerous weaknesses in the ESAF.

The ESAF had minimal doctrine, training, and experience in counterinsurgency warfare. The majority of the military defended fixed sites across the country from insurgent attack, forfeiting any offensive advantage they had. In 1981, the ESAF was untrained, poorly equipped, and notorious for its record of human rights abuses. The ESAF conducted brutal, repressive campaigns in an attempt to maintain internal stability and utilized “death squads” to eliminate political rivals. These techniques violated one of the most important principles of counterinsurgency warfare: Maintain the support of the population.

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200 Bailey, C. (Dec 2004). OPATT: The U.S. Army SF advisors in El Salvador. Special Warfare, 20. Bailey’s work provides significant insight to those initial United States Special Forces soldiers who conducted the initial assessment of the ESAF and ran some of the early OPATTs.

The ESAF consisted of a small officer corps and essentially peasant soldiers.\textsuperscript{202} The officers gradated in “waves” and continued to advance up the ranks with the same group of officers, creating a very insular and clique atmosphere amongst peers. Similar to many Latin American militaries of the time, the ESAF had no concept of a noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. The officers were in charge of all aspects of the soldier’s day. The 11,000-man Army lacked training, modern equipment, and effective leadership. As the FMLN continued to demonstrate its prowess on the battlefield, the ESAF recognized it needed assistance to defeat the increasingly effective insurgency.\textsuperscript{203}

After the FMLN launched a major offensive against the ESAF, the United States restored military aid to El Salvador on 14 January 1981.\textsuperscript{204} In addition to military aid, the U.S. sent a Special Forces Mobile Training Team (MTT) to train an immediate reaction battalion for the ESAF. In March 1981, Congress authorized a “training” mission within El Salvador, capped at 55 United States military personnel on the ground. Coming only six years after the fall of Saigon and South Vietnam to North Vietnam, Congress and a good portion of the American public remained skeptical about any sort of advisory mission with the potential to pull America into another conventional war. With the influx of Cuban advisors and the buildup of forces in Nicaragua, Congress would eventually agree El Salvador required assistance. However, unlike the experience in Vietnam, this


\textsuperscript{204} Ramsey. Advising indigenous forces, 84.
time there were numerous restrictions placed on the advisors, starting with the number allowed in the country by the State Department. Of note, the State Department would remain the U.S. government (USG) agency in charge of the overall advisory efforts. This will be discussed in greater detail later. Concurrently, a fight over the financing and deployment of U.S. military advisors to El Salvador raged in the Senate to ensure that the U.S avoided another open-ended commitment that had the potential to turn into another “Vietnam-esque” conflict.205

II. The Rationale for U.S. Support to the Government of El Salvador

As discussed early in Chapter 2, the international system at the start of the El Salvador SFA campaign was one of a Cold War setting. The United States and Soviet Union were the sole superpowers. The final downfall of Saigon and resignation of President Nixon put the United States on a shaky footing in the international arena. Sensing an opportunity, the Soviet Union moved to fill the gap left by a United States in contraction.

At this time, the United States strategy of containment was still the driving force behind American foreign policy. George Kennan initially brought up the idea of a containment strategy in 1947. Kennan’s ideas, which became the basis of the Truman administration’s foreign policy, first came to public attention in 1947 in the form of an anonymous contribution to the journal Foreign Affairs, the so-called X Article. In this article, Kennan wrote, ”The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet

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205 Miller, J. (1981). U.S. Green Berets to aid El Salvador. The New York Times. March 14, 1981. A1. This truly started the involvement of the United States “boots on the ground.” However, the Special Forces soldiers are not the focus on this case study. Rather, the decision to eventually commit conventional soldiers to the advisory mission is the main focus.
Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies.” To that end, he called for countering “Soviet pressure against
the free institutions of the Western world” through the “adroit and vigilant application of
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,
corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” Such a policy, Kennan
predicted, would “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either
the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”206 From Kennan’s article, the
United States policy of containment was born. The result would be nearly 50 years of a
concerted strategy to continuously counter any growth of communism in nations and
regions around the globe and would eventually lead the United States to places such as
Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.

In a conversation between President Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, assistant to
the president for national security affairs, in the White House on 11 May 1979,
Brzezinski expressed his concerns regarding the continuing expansion of the Soviet
Union in Central America: “We became interested in Nicaragua and are interested in all
of Central America because we know that the internal revolutionary tensions, if not
properly managed, can lead to external revolutionary involvement by Castro, for
example and also through the Cubans by the Soviets. We hope that the problem of
Nicaragua does not spread elsewhere.”207 This concern about the continuing influence
of the Soviet Union in places such as Central America represented a direct threat to the
United States policy of containment. Facing both an insurgent threat from the FMLN and

207 President Carter Library Document. NSA 7 Box 33, National Security Affairs, Memcons:
Other U.S. officials in this meeting included Viron P. Vaky, assistant secretary of state for inter-American
affairs, and Robert A. Pastor, staff member, National Security Council.
the outside threat of a communist-supported Nicaragua, the U.S. government felt compelled to intervene in some capacity in El Salvador but was unsure as to how to best proceed. The debates over United States policy in El Salvador would span three presidential administrations and cover over 12 years.

With the combined rising of the USSR’s influence among communist states, especially in Latin and South American, coupled with the perceived decline of American influence following the fall of South Vietnam, it was imperative to many that the United States do what it could to counter these expansive maneuvers by the Soviets and their proxies. As a result, the debate within the Carter administration would demonstrate the influence or lack thereof from three well-established international relations theories on why the United States should or should not intervene in El Salvador.

III. Existing Theories

This section will discuss how the three theories selected for this dissertation (logrolling, offensive realism, and balance of risk theory) could or could not explain the eventual decision of the United States to support El Salvador with conventional forces in an advisory role. Each of the following sections will review the respective theory and then provide evidence to support or deny the supposition of the theories with regards to the SFA campaign in El Salvador.

A. Logrolling

The first political systems theory that has a direct impact on whether the United States decides to commit its military to an advisory mission is logrolling theory. Logrolling theory (Snyder, 1991; Miller, 1999) states that parochial groups (industrialists, financiers, traders, military, etc.) in society each have some economic or political
interest in an expansionist foreign policy. Individually, none of them can influence state policy. Therefore, they engage in logrolling, where “each group gets what it wants in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies its coalition partners desire.”208 In the case of SFA, it is those domestic powers that advocate for a policy of committing U.S. forces to assist a host nation’s (HN) security forces for a variety of reasons that I will delve into as part of my dissertation. This theory also explains economic motivations behind those supporting an advisory mission. However, it fails to take into consideration key elements such as international politics and the security situation within an HN.

Jack Snyder's logrolling theory of imperialism improves on older theories by specifying the mechanism through which differing interests can translate into expansion of foreign policies.209 Snyder defines great power over expansion as aggressive military and diplomatic strategies provoking the formation of a hostile coalition or continuing to the point where the costs exceed the benefits of the aggressive strategies. Snyder states, “Counter-productive aggressive policies are caused most directly by the idea that the state’s security can be safeguarded only through expansion.”210 Related to the next theory, Snyder came up with a distinction between offensive realism and defensive realism.211 He claims logrolling is an example of defensive realism and therefore not as “aggressive” as offensive realism.212 While each group’s material interest in specific foreign policies may not be identical, expansion, or in this dissertation’s case, deploying U.S. advisors, there are benefits to each group involved in logrolling, even if there is not

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208 Snyder, 30.
210 Ibid, 29.
211 Ibid, 11-12.
212 Ibid, 64.
a benefit to society or the state as a whole.\textsuperscript{213} As an example, the interests of many
different groups both before and during the United States military advisor mission in El
Salvador would impact the decision of President Carter and many in his cabinet on how
to best proceed in El Salvador.

First and foremost, my research shows there was an incredible amount of concern
regarding the human rights situation in El Salvador and how this would impact potential
United States support for the government. All parties involved, including rebels on the
left, government troops as well as right-wing, government-supported militias were all
implicated in multiple human rights violations. This concern was raised to the Carter
administration through numerous channels from direct letters to the president to sending
messages of concern through President Carter’s wife, Rosalynn. One example of this is
a letter written by Georgetown University’s president, Father Healy, expressing his
concerns to Mrs. Carter about the human rights situation in El Salvador. Written in 1977,
it is clear indicator of the types of pressure different domestic groups placed on the
administration, in this case, not to intervene in El Salvador. In response to Father
Healy’s concerns, a letter was sent back which from NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski stating,
“As your comments reflect, El Salvador has indeed been experiencing a series of crises
during the past several months, including terrorist actions by both leftists and rights [sic]
groups. The rightist terrorist threat to kill all Jesuits remaining in El Salvador after July
21 was part of this series of crisscrossing assaults from both extremes …. A special
emissary from the Department of State went to El Salvador on July 11 (1977) and

\textsuperscript{213} Taliaferro, 8.
addressed this matter directly with the President of El Salvador.” Human rights concerns kept coming to the forefront from a variety of these domestic groups, but despite these concerns, other agencies such as the DoD and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lobbied the president for more involvement, not less, despite the continued human rights concerns.

There was a large push by the Catholic leadership in the United States to try to protect its ministers and aid workers in El Salvador from both the guerrillas on the left and the government forces on the right. Toward the end of President Carter’s term, he received a letter from Bishop Tom Kelley, the general secretary of the U.S. Catholic Conference and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and Archbishop James Hickey of Washington asking for a “permanent suspension of U.S. military aid to El Salvador.” In a memorandum from the vice president to the president, Vice President Mondale stated, “They would be speaking not only on behalf of the U.S. Catholic hierarchy, but for the Catholic Church in El Salvador. They are greatly concerned that the Reagan administration will lift the temporary suspension of military aid, which they feel will allow continued persecution of the church in El Salvador.” These are clear indicators of domestic groups, in this case the Catholic leadership in the United States, trying to impose their will on U.S. foreign policy under President Carter.

A similar effort to prevent the United States from providing military aid to El Salvador came from the Catholic Church within El Salvador. Archbishop Romero, the leader of

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214 Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Dr. Brezezinski, 7/6/1977 — White House central files — First Lady’s social office file — subject file. Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject: letter from Father Healy, Box 3, CO 37 countries, Costa Rica, 1 July 78–20 Jan 81 through CO 70, countries Indonesia.
215 Memo, National Security Council to Mr. Peter Tarnoff, 10/24/1979 — Office of Staff Secretary handwriting file presidential files. Memorandum — Extra-Governmental Efforts in Central America and the Caribbean, 29 Dec 80–17 Jan 81, Box 187, Jimmy Carter Library.
216 Ibid.
the Catholic Church in San Salvador, sent an open letter to President Carter on 19 February 1980 asking the United States to not send military aid. His letter stated, “The present Junta government and above all the armed forces and security forces unfortunately have not demonstrated their capacity to resolve, in political and structural practice, the grave national problems. In general, they have only reverted to repressive violence producing a total of deaths and injuries much greater than in the recent military regimes whose systematic violation of human rights was denounced by the international committee on Human Rights.” Additionally, the letter also stated, “For this reason as well as my obligation as a Salvadoran and as Archbishop of the Archdiocese of San Salvador to see that faith and justice reign in my country, I ask you, if you really want to defend human rights, to prohibit the giving of this military aid to the Salvadoran government, and to guarantee that your government will not intervene directly or indirectly with military, economic, diplomatic or other pressures to determine the destiny of the Salvadoran people.”

If logrolling theory were to hold true in this case, the combined weight of the various groups, including Catholic leadership, trying to limit U.S. intervention in El Salvador, would result in the prevention of advisors entering El Salvador. While there was a temporary suspension of non-lethal military aid during the Carter administration, world events would overrule the potential logrolling strength of these domestic groups and result in the expansion of both U.S. military aide and the entrance of advisor.

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218 Ibid.
Not all groups had the same interests, but there was enough lobbying to prevent United States military action in El Salvador, including many in Congress still wary from the recent Vietnam experience. However, despite the numerous domestic groups actively logrolling to prevent a further expansion of U.S. military aid to El Salvador, the situation there would drastically change in early 1981. The leftist guerillas launched a series of successful attacks on the ESAF and the government of El Salvador. Messages of panic started to come from Americans stationed in El Salvador. As a result, the new conditions on the ground that directly threatened the American strategy of containment quickly overruled the strong, combined efforts of these domestic groups in favor of not intervening in El Salvador. As mentioned earlier, one of the weaknesses in my opinion of logrolling theory is that it often does not take into account the international situation. In this case, the change in the situation on the ground in El Salvador posed a direct threat to the U.S. strategy of containment, rapidly overwhelming the concerns many had over the numerous human rights violations by all players. Therefore, the political theory of logrolling does not account for the United States decision to commit U.S advisors to El Salvador. The forces promoting logrolling were not strong enough to force either action or inaction.

**B. Offensive Realism**

As a reminder, offensive realism (Layne, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001) claims that states seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more
power at the expense of rivals. Therefore intervention in distant peripheries is a viable strategy that can weaken potential great power rivals and maximize relative power. John Mearsheimer argues, "States seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals." Rather than being in favor of a reckless expansion, offensive realism holds that states or, more precisely, leaders of those states engage in calculated expansion. For offensive realists, the link between structural incentives and foreign policy behavior is relatively unproblematic. To understand why a state behaves in a particular way, one must examine its relative capabilities and its international environment.

From an offensive realist perspective, the El Salvador case must be looked at from the overarching environment of the Cold War. The bipolar relationship between the United States and the USSR was the driving factor of United States foreign policy during both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Two events during the lead-up to the commitment of U.S. advisors to El Salvador are especially relevant from the offensive realist point of view.

First, the Iranian hostage crisis dominated the attention of America and the Carter administration. On 4 November 1979, a mob of young Islamic revolutionists overran the United States Embassy in Tehran, taking more than 60 Americans hostage. Historian Gaddis Smith stated, "From the moment the hostages were seized until they were released minutes after Ronald Reagan took the oath of office as President 444 days later, the crisis absorbed more concentrated effort by American officials and had more

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219 Mearsheimer. Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War, 5-56.
220 Taliaferro, 12.
extensive coverage on television and in the press than any other event since World War II.”

This was not, however, a spontaneous event. As described earlier in this dissertation, American support for the shah went back to the CIA-supported coup of 1953 that put the shah in power in the oil-rich country of Iran. The continued support for the shah with both American equipment and trainers increased the level of hostility between the Western-leaning shah and the Islamic fundamentalists. As that gap continued to grow, the power of the Islamic hardliners expanded and boiled over when the shah was out of the country receiving medical treatment back in the United States. Ironically, as the senior policy makers debated whether or not to let the shah into the United States, Vice President Mondale recalls that President Carter “went around the room, and most of us said, 'Let him in.' And then he said, 'And if [the Iranians] take our employees in our embassy hostage, then what would be your advice?' And the room just fell dead. No one had an answer to that. Turns out, we never did.” Unfortunately, President Carter's unanswered question would soon become reality.

Not only was this a direct challenge to the status of the United States as a superpower, it greatly worried many in the administration that the Iranian actions would embolden others to challenge the United States. The USSR entered Afghanistan in December 1979 to assist the newly established pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Rapidly nearly 100,000 Soviet soldiers seized control of major highways and cities. While the Soviets would wage a brutal and bloody fight against the Islamic Mujahedeen rebels, continued support from both the United States and other Islamic nations, combined with


\[\text{Ibid.}\]
a war weariness in the Soviet Union reminiscent of the United States in Vietnam, would lead to the Soviet withdrawal starting in 1988 and ending in February 1989.\textsuperscript{223} In a speech given by President Carter on 3 January 1980, he clearly stated the concerns and goals of the United States regarding the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan:

> It has been, and will remain, the policy of the United States to demonstrate, in concert with others, that armed aggression across international boundaries and other outrages against international law cannot be committed without serious consequences to the violators. It has been and will remain, the policy of the United States to help other countries in their efforts to maintain their independence and to strengthen themselves against aggression.\textsuperscript{224}

Additionally, President Carter stated, “Moreover, this naked Soviet aggression has ominous implications for other nations beyond Afghanistan. It endangers the security and independence of Pakistan, Iran and other nearby countries. It threatens the stability of a vital — and volatile — region of the world. It says to the world that no free country, if it is small and weak, is safe from Soviet attempts to extend its influence.”\textsuperscript{225}

Offensive realists view power as a zero-sum game. As one side gains power, the other side loses power. During the Cold War, from an offensive realist’s perspective, any moves by the USSR that strengthened its overall position to be a regional hegemon took away from the overall strength of the United States. In the case of El Salvador, the continued destabilization of Central American countries by both leftists and communist proxies were seen as an accumulation of power by the USSR at the expense of the United States. With the recent losses of prestige, ranging from the fall of Saigon in 1975 to the Arab oil embargo and the Iranian hostage crisis, key members of the Carter


\textsuperscript{224} Speech draft by President Carter. (3 Jan 80). Press Office. Speech on USSR invasion of Afghanistan by USSR, Office of Staff Secretary, handwriting file, presidential files, 80, Box 145, Jimmy Carter library.

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
administration felt the United States could not afford to lose any more power with the fall of El Salvador. The concern was expressed in a 16 January 1981 diplomatic cable from Ambassador White to the U.S. Secretary of State regarding the amount of aid and equipment leftist guerrillas in El Salvador received from communist sources to include the USSR. Ambassador White stated, “In my opinion, the rationale for the renewal of military assistance and the provision of ammunition rests 99 percent on the introduction of sophisticated new weapons of communist manufacture which have entered into El Salvador from Nicaragua. We know this to be the case and we must present this case to the world. Otherwise it appears we are just propping up another regime that cannot survive without our support. This is not the case in El Salvador. So long as the guerrillas were enjoying only modest support from outside sources, the GOES (Government of El Salvador) had no problem in containing the threat.”

Ambassador White continued, saying, “The problem is the nature of the threat has changed in scale and nature and we have to make that clear. But to give any credence at all to the alleged inability of this government to control the internal leftist threat is to play into the hands of the communists.”

While an initial view of offensive realism would support the claim that the United States decided to intervene in El Salvador to gain more power against the USSR, other events, such as the United States’ concern about the human rights situation in El Salvador, work against the offensive realist argument. Early in his administration,
President Carter’s National Security Advisor (NSA), Zbigniew Brzezinski, requested the following in a confidential memorandum:

A short paper be prepared on the human rights situation in El Salvador, and particularly the terrorist campaign against Jesuit priests and the Catholic church. Also, please provide recommendations on how and whether the President should address himself to this issue, and include a draft of a letter for this signature to President Romero of El Salvador.228

Human rights, especially with regards to offenses against Catholic missionaries in El Salvador, committed by both sides, were a main concern and point of contention against the argument for military aide. In an offensive realist world, neither human rights the pressures of United States domestic politics would be a concern. Therefore, in the case of El Salvador, offensive realism falls short in explaining why the United States eventually would commit its troops to an advisory mission.

C. Balance of Risk Theory

The third theory I will compare is the balance of risk theory (Taliaferro, 2004). This theory is extremely relevant especially when decision makers are deciding to extend or end an advisory mission. Leaders must balance the cost in the state’s power or reputation against the continued commitment of blood and treasure to an advisory mission. These factors make Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory extremely useful. Additionally, Taliaferro looks at the rationale behind why great powers intervene in what

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he calls “the periphery.” There will be more to follow on the definition and importance of the periphery later.

According to Taliaferro, “offensive realism explains great power intervention with reference to material capabilities and international opportunities. States strive to maximize relative power or influence, since only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival.” Unlike offensive realism, however, Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory is rooted in a mixing of defensive realism with the decision-making model based on prospect theory. Stemming from the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two Israeli psychologists, prospect theory states, “Most individuals tend to evaluate choices with respect to an expectation level and pay more attention to losses relative to comparable gains.” Individuals therefore tend to “overweigh certain outcomes relative to probable ones; value what they already possess over what they seek to acquire; and display risk-acceptant behavior to avoid (or recoup) losses, but risk-averse behavior to secure gains.”

Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory looks at the rationale behind great power interventions in the periphery. In his book, Taliaferro states, “great power interventions in peripheral regions is not unique to the cold war [sic].” He goes on to use Great Britain’s intervention in South Africa, Athens’ expedition to Sicily, and the French experience in Indochina as examples of great powers intervening on the periphery. Taliaferro defines the periphery as:

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230 Ibid, 11.
231 Kahneman & Tversky. Choice, values and frames.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid, 2. France in Algeria and the United States in Korea and Vietnam also fall into this category.
Geographic areas where actual or likely conflict cannot directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland. Whereas others draw a distinction between the periphery and core based solely on geographic distance, I have tried to incorporate the relative distribution of capabilities into the definition. A region is peripheral vis-à-vis a great power based on a combination of: 1) its geographical distance from the core, and 2) the inability of the peripheral state’s military forces to inflict damage on the great power’s homeland. 234

This concept of intervening in peripheral regions ties directly into the United States’ concept of both security cooperation and SFA.

El Salvador clearly falls within Taliaferro’s definition of the United States’ periphery. First, the geographic area of El Salvador cannot directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland such as the United States. Located in Central America, the conflict within El Salvador, although a challenge to the interests of the United States, did not pose a direct threat to the security of the United States homeland. The efforts of communist guerrillas and right-wing forces in El Salvador did not pose any threat to the homeland of the United States, and they had no capacity to develop such a reach. Therefore, within the definition of balance of risk theory, El Salvador is classified as being in the periphery of the United States.

Taliaferro argues that great powers pursue risky intervention strategies in the periphery to avert perceived losses. These losses are not just material, according to Taliaferro’s definition stated above. His argument also includes perceived losses in a state’s reputation in domestic, regional, and international politics. To avoid these perceived losses, according to the balance of risk theory, the United States would have to continue to invest in and even escalate failing peripheral interventions to recoup

234 Taliaferro, 46. Taliaferro argues that while some would maintain the Al-Qaida attacks on 9/11, a transitional network of Islamic extremists whose leadership received safe haven in Afghanistan, along with the fact that they did not use conventional military weapons, invalidates the concept of a periphery. However, he argues the fact that the United States and its allies launched military operations into Afghanistan to deny that safe haven still validates the concept of periphery regions.
those past losses. As this section will demonstrate, balance of risk theory does not accurately reflect why the United States decided to continue its advisory mission and end its mission in El Salvador.

As the decision to intervene militarily in El Salvador was debated, there was a strong effort by Congress to ensure this commitment of United States advisors would not spiral out of control and grow to an effort similar to that in Vietnam. Congress and the American public were both extremely leery of an open-ended advisory commitment coming less than five years after the fall of Saigon. These scars were still fresh in the minds of the American public and Congress.

In 1980, the first series of Operations, Plans and Training Teams (OPATTs) entered El Salvador to conduct an assessment of the HN’s military and to help identify areas the United States could better assist in. In their initial report through Southern Command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the OPATT recommended, “We should open up FY 81 FMS (foreign military sales) loans; we should provide mobility (helicopters, in particular); we should get MTTs or their equivalents in country with Brigades or Corps/Sector areas. Time is running out.” In this case the OPATT was recommending that the United States let the fiscal year 1981 FMS loans be released to the El Salvadorian armed forces. Additionally, they called for proving ESAF with helicopters to increase their mobility and, most important, the need for MTTs into the country to help rebuild the ESAF. However, it wouldn’t be until a renewed rebel offensive put the GOES into a crisis that President Carter finally acted.

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In late 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie provided potential options for President Carter with regards to providing military assistance to the government of El Salvador. In a memorandum dated 12 January 1981, the options provided to President Carter included:

Four Options: 1) Go ahead only with the FY 81 FMS deliveries of non-lethal equipment and International Military Education and Training (IMET) 2) Go ahead with the FMS and IMET and deliver to helicopters and hold back on the other four, 3) go ahead with the FMS, continue IMETs and deliver all six of the helicopters, 4) Go ahead with the FMS, continue IMETs, deliver all 6 helicopters and furnish some of the lethal equipment and additional supplies requested by the Salvadoran military on a grant basis with funding under the Section 506 emergency drawdown authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. We recommend you approve Option 2.236

In this case, the Secretary of State was firmly against providing lethal aid to the ESAF and recommended holding back four of the six requested helicopters from the government of El Salvador. On 14 January, however, it became clearer that more was needed to support the government of El Salvador in the face of a powerful rebel offensive.

Up until the late 1980s, the United States only provided non-lethal aid to the GOES. However, a renewed offensive by leftist guerrillas in early January 1981 galvanized the Carter administration into action. In a memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter dated 14 January 1981, the NSA stated:

The situation in El Salvador has become militarily more critical. In the last several days, the government has lost significant amounts of ammunition (an arsenal in Santa Ana has been blown up), and our MILGROUP believes that the government may have as little as one week’s supply left. If you approve lethal

assistance, DoD informs us that we could send it there in three days, perhaps
less if we use stocks in Panama. It is clear that the Cubans and Nicaraguans are
in this for a long struggle, and moving to lethal assistance will not deprive the
next administration (incoming President Reagan) of any leverage.\textsuperscript{237}

The same memorandum also stated that Secretary of State Muskie was against
providing lethal aid: “You should know that Secretary Muskie is very strongly opposed to
crossing the threshold of lethal assistance. You are familiar with his arguments, and you
may wish to discuss this matter with him further.”\textsuperscript{238} The NSA was not only
acknowledging the concerns of the Secretary of State, but encouraging the president to
explain to the secretary in more detail why this aid was deemed necessary.

The White House Press Secretary released a statement on 17 January 1981 that
captured the concerns of the Carter administration: “On January 10, Marxist guerrillas
launched a major offensive in El Salvador. Evidence emerging from this offensive and
intelligence reports confirmed that the guerrillas have obtained from abroad a
substantial quantity of lethal weapons, including grenades, recoilless rifles and
mortars.”\textsuperscript{239} As a result of this renewed offensive, the statement continued, “The U.S. is
therefore providing $5 million in equipment, and services, including some urgently-
needed arms and ammunition, under Section 506A of the Foreign Assistance Act. The
GOES is in control of the country despite repeated outbreaks of terrorism and scattered


\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.

guerrilla attacks.”240 Included in this request was a detailed list of arms and ammunition to be sent to El Salvador.

From the very start of the military advisor mission to El Salvador, there was a good deal of ensuring that the risks to both the mission and the U.S. soldiers committed to the mission were minimized. I would argue offensive realism does a better job explaining why the United States opted to intervene militarily in El Salvador than logrolling. From the hesitation of the Carter administration to put “boots on the ground” or to committing the United States to lethal aid, this slow and deliberate debate helped keep risk to a minimum. Congress placed a force cap of 55 men on the eventual advisor mission. Although the actual numbers of U.S. advisors on the ground in El Salvador would fluctuate around the 55-man cap, it rarely exceeded that number except during the transition of personnel. Additionally, the mission to El Salvador was, in many ways, successful. The El Salvadoran Armed Forces would triple in size during the time the United States advisors worked with them, and the leftist guerrillas would eventually be defeated, signing a peace treaty with the government. Therefore, we do not see any evidence that the balance of risk theory applies in this case.

240 Ibid.
IV. Smart Partnership in El Salvador

The previous theories do not accurately account for the reasons why the United States decided to commit its conventional forces into El Salvador in an advisory role. Each theory focuses on only one or two aspects of why a power such as the United States would opt to assist a nation such as El Salvador with rebuilding its military. However, I believe these previous theories fell short in their explanatory role and are not the best way to predict if the United States will be successful in meeting its strategic objectives for future SFA missions. This next section will look at the components of smart partnership, testing each variable to see if it provides better explanatory power in the El Salvador case.

A. National Interests

The first variable of my theory on smart partnership is the national interests of the United States. This includes looking into the stated or implied objectives of the SFA campaign, what was identified in national security documents or primary sources, and seeing whether the SFA campaign objectives sought a limited or comprehensive change in the status quo that furthered U.S. national interests. This next section of the dissertation will look into what evidence supports whether the SFA mission in El Salvador was in the national interest of the United States.

The Carter administration demonstrated varying degrees of why it felt it was necessary to intervene in El Salvador. While the administration had taken an interest and monitored events in El Salvador since taking office in 1977, it wasn’t until it was
nearly the end of its term when events spurred the Carter administration to take the next step by committing U.S. advisors to assist the government of El Salvador. Brzezinski stated to President Carter in a memorandum dated 14 January 1981, only six days before the inauguration of President Reagan:

Let me say, however, that in my view it would be extremely damaging not only to our national interests but to the historical record of this administration to leave office unwilling to take the hard decision to provide lethal assistance to an essentially middle of the road government, beleaguered by revolutionaries almost openly assisted by the Cubans via Nicaragua.\(^{241}\)

While acknowledging that the need to provide lethal assistance to support El Salvador fell within the national interests of the United States, it also provides an interesting look into how an outgoing administration worried about how it will be perceived by the “historical record.”

Another indicator of how the Carter administration viewed the problems in El Salvador as falling within the U.S. national interests was captured during a meeting between Brzezinski and the foreign minister of Guatemala. The NSA stated:

We became interested in Nicaragua and are interested in all of Central America because we know that the internal revolutionary tensions, if not properly managed, can lead to external revolutionary involvement by Castro, for example and also through the Cubans by the Soviets. We hope that the problem of Nicaragua does not spread elsewhere.\(^{242}\)

Again, the overarching United States strategy of containment comes into play. To have a communist regime in Nicaragua and the potential of further regimes spreading

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posed a direct threat to the national interests of the United States. This directly fell in line with the prevalent U.S. belief in the domino theory: if one country fell to communism, others would soon follow.

**The Reagan Administration**

The embrace of El Salvador’s junta was not an inescapable priority for Congress or the public. The Reagan administration chose to make it so. Yes, El Salvador was nearby, but the purely military case was hard to make. The administration effectively made El Salvador the global symbol of America leading the West, stopping or even rolling back communist totalitarians.

Since the Iron Curtain descended, the right-most elements of the Republican Party had denounced the actions of presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman and their administrations as sellouts to the Soviet Union and communism. To many, the subsequent gains of the communists in China, Cuba, and most recently Vietnam showed communism advancing inexorably. They saw an obvious line from Yalta to San Salvador. The foreign policy team, headed by NSA Richard V. Allen, considered Carter’s foreign policy a failure on its face and intended to change things quickly. Secretary of State Al Haig spoke of “drawing a line in the sand” and “going to the source” (i.e., Cuba).

The following excerpts from talking points sent by National Security Council (NSC) staffers Alfonso Sapia-Bosch and Oliver North to NSA William P. Clark paint a clear

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picture of the overall view of the Reagan administration on 13 April 1983.\footnote{President Reagan library. Executive secretariat, NSC: country file, Latin America, El Salvador Box 30. Executive secretariat, NSC: country file, Latin America, El Salvador Box 30. Folder number: El Salvador Vol. IV 1/1/83-10/31/83 (2). Memorandum between Sapia-Bosch and North to NSA William Clark, 13 April 1983.} The points were intended for Clark to use in his effort to persuade U.S. Representative Edward P. Boland (democrat from Massachusetts) to revise pending legislation so as to permit funding for the Nicaraguan contras:

We have not added to instability in the region. The Nicaraguans began their activities shortly after assuming power in July 1979. Had the U.S. not become involved, we would have already lost El Salvador; Honduras would be on the way; and Guatemala would be next. If we withdraw our support from the Contras now, we stand to destroy the credibility we have been rebuilding since Vietnam. Not only will we be accused of standing in the way of freedom, liberty, and democracy, but the Soviets and the Cubans will have new opportunities to step up their involvement in the area. This fact will not be missed on [sic] those in the Mideast and NATO, who are watching this situation closely as a measure of U.S. resolve and commitment.\footnote{Ibid.}

On 17 February 1981, four weeks to the day after the administration took office, Secretary of State Alexander Haig briefed the ambassadors of the NATO countries plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Spain. The below text is from his briefing to the ambassadors and clearly indicates how the new presidential administration viewed the El Salvador problem as firmly within the national interests of the United States:

The policy implications are already clear: First, the U.S.G. [United States Government] supports and will continue to support the present Government in El Salvador. We intend to work with that Government with the objective of achieving social justice and stability in that strife-torn country. Second, the U.S.G. is convinced that neither stability nor social justice in El Salvador is possible as long as Communist subversion continues. Third, we will not remain passive in the face of this Communist challenge, a systematic, well-financed, sophisticated effort to impose a Communist regime in Central America.

This effort involves close coordination by Moscow, satellite capitals and Havana, with the cooperation of Hanoi and Managua. It is a repetition of the pattern we have already seen in Angola and Ethiopia, and, I may add, elsewhere.
It is a threat, in our view, not just to the United States but to the West at large. We have not yet decided on the precise steps we will take to deal with the situation; we will, however, in some way have to deal with the immediate source of the problem — and that is Cuba.

Off the record, I wish to assure you we do not intend to have another Vietnam and engage ourselves in another bloody conflict where the source rests outside the target area. We believe in all sincerity we have no alternative but to act to prevent forces hostile to the U.S. and the West from overthrowing a government on our doorstep, particularly when that government offers the best hope of progress toward moderate democracy.246

This above statement clearly lays out the view the Reagan administration had on El Salvador. Not only was it within the national interests, but it fell within the larger landscape of the Cold War and contained the spread of communism. More importantly, the statements by Haig indicated the United States campaign was seeking a change in the status quo by preventing both the continued pouring of military equipment to leftist rebels in and around El Salvador and the status quo of the continued spread of Soviet influence through communism.

Donald Nuechterlein defines national interests as falling into four categories: survival (easy to recognize), vital (more time to decide how to respond but usually includes military power), major (considered important but not critical to well-being), and peripheral (some national interest involved but nation not greatly affected). The fundamental national interest of the U.S. is the defense and well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional system.247 In the case of El Salvador, when considered in the greater context of containment, I would 1) agree El Salvador was within the national interests of the United States and 2) it could be classified as a vital

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interest under Nuechterlein’s definitions. While not a direct threat to the survival of the United States, the communist aggression in El Salvador, in the overall context of containment, was a threat to the United States, and military power would be needed to counter the threat. As mentioned earlier, the domino theory weighed heavily on the minds of senior decision makers, and therefore fit within the national interests at this time.

President Reagan published the first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 1987. In that first NSS, two paragraphs are key indicators of how both the conflict in El Salvador and the importance of using armed forces in low intensity conflicts were to that administration. The first statements are found under the section of “Regional Policies” under “Western Hemisphere”:

Aggressive Marxist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua have made the Western Hemisphere, once considered indisputably secure for the United States, an area of strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union. The fragility of social and political arrangements in Latin America and the presence of these two Soviet client states, with their support for guerrilla movements in other Latin nations and their ties to international terrorism, promise continued instability and conflict in the region. This situation is compounded by continuing economic and debt-servicing problems, the ongoing problem of the drug trade and the growing political strength of the drug traffickers who — often in collusion with local guerrilla groups — have begun to pose serious challenges for the reborn Latin democracies.

U.S. national security policy for the Western Hemisphere seeks to address these problems within the broader framework of the promotion of democracy, fostering economic development, strengthening dialogue and diplomacy within and among area countries, and contributing to defensive capabilities that allow progress without debilitating external interference. Many of the current challenges for the United States fall outside of the formal collective security arrangements created in previous decades. Our national security requires an emphasis on political and economic support for the hemisphere's democracies and diplomatic initiatives to strengthen alliances.248

Further in the document, under the section “Intelligence Support of National Security” and in the paragraph titled “Military Instruments of Low Intensity Conflict,” the administration lays out the importance of supporting contingency operations and supporting security assistance programs:

The fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict directed against our friends and allies is that military institutions in threatened states must become able to provide security for their citizens and governments. U.S. Low Intensity Conflict policy, therefore, recognizes that indirect-rather than direct applications of U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national goals. The principal military instrument in Low Intensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance.

The primary role for U.S. armed forces in Low Intensity Conflict is to support and facilitate the security assistance program. The military services must also stand ready to provide more direct forms of military assistance when called upon. Usually, this assistance will consist of technical training and logistical support. The services and the Unified Commands must also be prepared for the effective execution of contingency and peacekeeping operations when such operations are required to protect national interests. U.S. combat forces will be introduced into Low Intensity Conflict situations only as a last resort and when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.249

As seen in the above examples of national documents, stated objectives, discussions within the NSC, and key strategic decision makers, national interests were at stake and greatly considered when the decision to commit U.S. advisors to El Salvador was finally made.

B. Interagency Collaboration

The second independent variable of smart partnership is interagency collaboration. This variable looks to identify whether there is a clear delineation between the lead and

supporting agencies. It also looks into whether a clear definition of success, mutual relationships, and goals exist. Third, interagency collaboration includes any jointly developed structures and shared successes for collaboration. Fourth, it asks if mutual authority and accountability exists across all involved agencies. Finally, it questions if those agencies share resources and rewards equally. It is my evaluation that in the El Salvador SFA campaign, the United States demonstrated effective interagency collaboration.

Any advisory mission is a complex endeavor. From a USG agency perspective, this is no different. The two “big dogs” of the USG play the largest roles in any SFA campaign. Those two main agencies are the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). Any military component of the SFA campaign will belong to the DoD. Additionally, the DoD traditionally has the largest budget over any other government agency. In 1981, the DoD budget was approximately $322 billion. In comparison, the DoS budget was approximately $4.9 billion.250 This trend continues through the current SFA operations in 2017: The DoD had a much larger amount of funding and resources to accomplish an SFA campaign.

However, the DoS should and often does have primacy in any advisory or SFA campaign. In the early days of the El Salvador campaign, the Carter administration asked for, received many, and listened to the reports coming from its ambassador in El Salvador, Ambassador Robert E. White. Appointed by the Carter administration in 1980, White was sent with the hopes of helping the U.S.-backed government find a reformist middle ground and prevent a full-scale revolution. However, White would become a

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controversial and outspoken critic of the actions being carried about by the American-trained military units (trained at U.S. Army bases back in the United States such as Fort Benning, GA) and right-wing death squads, including assassinations and massacres. He was against the resumption of military aid to El Salvador, and his views were greatly respected by the Carter administration, a clear indicator of the primacy of the DoS early in the El Salvador case.

In a memorandum that listed proposed non-lethal aid for the government of El Salvador, there was a mention of the possibility of sending military MTTs to help assist the ESAF. Attached to this memorandum was a handwritten note from NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski to Deputy NSA David Aaron. The note dated 14 March 1980 stated, “These are approved but NOT as a substitute for the MTTs. A decision on the teams will wait until we have heard from White. (You better make your call!)” As the DoS senior representative on the ground in San Salvador, Ambassador White’s cables were well respected, as was his expertise on the rapidly changing situation in El Salvador.

White provided a daily play-by-play of the political infighting of the El Salvador junta and the increasing violence the country continued to experience. In a diplomatic cable sent on 14 November 1980, White expressed his concerns about the increasing violence in the country, specifically the Salvadoran armed forces and from the extremist groups on both sides. “Killings from both the extreme right and left are increasing in scale and enormity. Meanwhile, the participation of the Salvadoran Security Forces in

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rightist massacres is becoming increasingly notorious,” he wrote. White then pleaded for the USG to define its position on El Salvador:

It is essential for the USG to define its position. The Junta is surviving, improvements can be seen across the broad spectrum, the Honduras peace treaty has fortified the government's position considerably, and foreign loans are being offered for the first time in a year, the harvest is progressing well. In short the junta has a great deal going for it and still presents the best opportunity to defeat the far left by holding to a steadily moderate course between extremes of right and left.

Of equal importance in not only the above cable, but in nearly all of the cables from Ambassador White, were the other key U.S. agencies included in the cables for situational awareness. The included agencies ranged from the CIA, numerous DoD entities, the White House, and other key government agencies. The back and forth between the DoS (and the secretary of state directly) and Ambassador White indicated the high amount of ongoing discourse regarding United States policy in El Salvador. In a cable sent from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Ambassador White, Christopher specifically mentioned the evolving United States policy regarding El Salvador and some of the assistance options on the table if the government of El Salvador tried to better manage the situation:

You may state that U.S. policy on El Salvador is under review and attitudes and intentions of key military and civilians are desired in Washington. In addition to helicopters you may state the economic assistance including support in IFIS [sic] and continued military assistance are part of the review. You should state that should these programs be discontinued it would be very hard to restart them given likely pressures from the public and congress, unless of course there was a great change in the human rights situation.

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254 Ibid.

In addition, Christopher emphasized the importance of developing the situation before the different agencies of the USG would take action, “However, until we have more information we do not want to take actions which have grave risk of polarizing situation even more and denying us possible moderating influence … before embarking on track that risks isolating and divisions we need to have clearer idea of possible alternative strategy.” The interface between the DoS and DoD is a clear indicator that interagency collaboration was both present and in the forefront regarding El Salvador.

In a follow-up cable from Deputy Secretary Christopher, he indicated that courses of action for El Salvador were discussed in a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the NSC. The SCC dealt with the coordination and implementation of foreign policy related to specific issues such as arms control, intelligence, and crisis management; Brzezinski chaired the SCC. The cable from Christopher to White stated the following: “Rogers and Bowdler briefed SCC and President. Message you are to convey is that if he and the Christian democratic colleagues reach agreement with the military leadership along the lines of the PDC program outlined to us in our meeting last Saturday evening, we will resume our economic and military assistance.” Even more important in this note was the first mention of limiting the number of advisors around 50: “4c) Sending of three MTT's (Timing to be discussed with GOES) to help train

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Salvadoran forces at Brigade HQs and other small MTTs as appropriate. Total military presence would not exceed fifty.” Developed in an interagency committee of the NSC under the direction of the NSA, this initial course of action for U.S. advisors in El Salvador came directly from interagency collaboration. The structure was developed jointly in the SCC and shared across the involved agencies — a remarkable example of interagency collaboration.

C. Civil-military Interaction

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when senior leaders develop and implement a strategy that is both feasible and suitable to the chosen means (military, intelligence, or otherwise) through an iterative civil-military discourse. This would include discursive dialogues between senior military and civilian leadership at the strategic level. A strategy is deemed feasible if objectives can be accomplished by the appropriate agency or agencies within the given time, space, and resource limitations. A strategy is deemed suitable if the chosen objectives are uniquely matched to the capabilities of the SFA forces selected. In this case, the difference between civil-military interaction and interagency collaboration directly deals

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258 Ibid.
260 James Burk describes civil-military relations as “… the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority.” (2002). Theories of democratic civil-military relations. Armed Forces & Society. 29(1): 7-29. U.S. civil-military relations discussion and research are based on the foundational work of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Authors such as Michael Desch, Jonathan Caverley, Michael Lind, Peter Feaver, and Eliot Cohen are some of the more recent authors who have advanced the writings on U.S. civil-military relations and examined changes in civil-military relations both during and after conflicts from Vietnam to ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
with the approach taken by the presidential administration to introduce, discuss, and have a relevant discourse on an SFA mission, whereas interagency collaboration, as defined above, focuses more on the process occurring between different government agencies.

There are some key aspects of each case study that will be looked at to analyze the level of civil-military interaction. First, there needs to be a close look at the extent of a healthy discourse involving USG agencies, the executive branch, and the American population. Next, this section will look to see if any well-known civil-military relations models such as Huntington’s objective control, Feaver’s principle-agent theory, or Cohen’s unequal dialogue were being utilized during the debate over the SFA campaign. Third, are systems in place to ensure a discourse between senior policy makers, agencies of the USG, and the U.S. population? Fourth, how do the personalities of senior policy decision makers impact the state of civil-military interaction? Finally, do the SFA efforts of the United States focus on building effective and accountable HN security forces?

First, the El Salvador SFA campaign was shaped by the previous experiences of the United States in Vietnam. The debate over providing both lethal aid and the eventual deployment of U.S. troops to assist the government of El Salvador began in earnest only two years after the fall of Saigon. The hard-learned lessons of Vietnam included the dangers of committing U.S. ground forces in an advisory role to a conflict and the potential for what may start as small advisory mission turning into a conflict costing tens of thousands of American lives and creating a huge rift in American society. Therefore,
the El Salvador case demonstrates a great deal of restraint and discourse at the civil-military level, even though there was discordant discourse occurring at the same time.

Early in his administration, President Carter sent out instructions to the heads of executive departments and agencies. In his message, President Carter clearly laid out his expectations of the primacy of the civilian leadership over any military activities within foreign countries, specifically mentioning any units engaged in security assistance:

As Commander In Chief I have authority over United States military forces. Apart from forces under the command of a U.S. area military commander and Department of Defense personnel seconded to international organizations, you shall assume responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all Defense Department personnel within your country of accreditation. This includes, for example, responsibility for Defense Attaché Offices, units engaged in security assistance and other military components attached to your mission, as well as other activities by Defense personnel which may have an impact on the conduct of our diplomatic relations within the country of your assignment.\(^\text{261}\)

This statement clearly indicated President Carter’s position on the primacy of civilian control over the military and, more importantly, the DoS having primacy over military matters (those which fall outside an active conflict under control of a U.S. military commander) involving security assistance and therefore advisory or SFA matters. This is no surprise coming only two years after the fall of Saigon. However, seeing the responsibilities laid out clearly by the president reinforces the importance place on civil control of the military, especially as security assistance missions continue to increase due to the expansion of Soviet influence and communist insurgencies.

From the start of his administration, President Carter and his national security staff had a close eye on El Salvador and the possible policy implications. In a request from

Christine Dodson, the White House staff secretary to Peter Tarnoff, executive secretary for the DoS, the Carter administration, concerned by the continued complaints raised by Catholic Church leadership, asked for more information on the situation in El Salvador: “Please provide by COB July 7 1977, a short paper on the human rights situation in El Salvador, and particularly the terrorist campaign against Jesuit priests and the Catholic church. Also, please provide recommendations on how and whether the President should address himself to this issue, and include a draft of a letter for this signature to President Romero of El Salvador.”\(^{262}\) As seen in the earlier discussion on logrolling, we see evidence of how domestic concerns by groups such as the American Catholic Church influenced actions by the presidential administration. More importantly, in regards to civil-military interaction, is the White House asking for the DoS to 1) delve into the allegations and 2) provide recommendations on how the civilian leadership of the United States should address this concern with the civilian leadership of the government of El Salvador. The implications point towards effective discourse across the different agencies of the U.S. government, something not often seen in other cases.

The cables from both Ambassador White under President Carter and Ambassador Pickering under President Reagan provide an insightful view into the discourse occurring between the civilian and military senior leadership on what to do regarding El Salvador. In a rather scathing cable, Ambassador White criticized what he saw as a rush to send military assistance to the GOES and urged caution:

> Given all the complications, what is the crashing hurry to renew military assistance? There is no danger that the armed left can overthrow this

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government over the next six months. In my view, the renewal of military aid at this point would be a major blunder that would risk losing the great opportunity we have now to convince the military and the forces of the left that their differences can be settled through peaceful negotiations.263

But eventually with the change in administrations, the caution and concerns expressed by Ambassador White did not fit with the way President Reagan wanted to approach El Salvador, and he was quickly replaced.

A story in the New York Times published on 2 February 1981 captures not only the removal of Ambassador White, but also the shift in how the Reagan administration approached El Salvador compared to the Carter administration. The new secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig, “ordered an interdepartmental review of United States policy toward El Salvador, which is now under way, but the decision to remove Mr. White was reportedly made before the completion of the review. State Department sources said Mr. White, who has been in a Foreign Service officer for 25 years, had not been offered a new assignment.” According to the Times, there was an internal conflict within Carter on the approach to El Salvador. “Under the Carter Administration, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency consistently advocated increased shipments of combat equipment to El Salvador and more training for its armed forces.”

The Times continued, stating:

Mr. White resisted additional United States military aid to El Salvador that was not linked to social legislation, such as the redistribution of land from large estates to peasants. With his efforts, El Salvador received $90 million in economic aid from the United States last year and small amounts of military aid. El Salvador is scheduled to get $10 million in military aid this year. Mr. White also sought to end the killings of political dissidents by right wing “death squads” that

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are part of the security forces. He emphasized the need for popular support for the Government if it was to prevail against the guerrillas.264

With the new administration came an interdepartmental review of how the Reagan White House would implement its policy toward El Salvador. “The group conducting the interdepartmental review on El Salvador is led by James Cheek, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, who was closely involved in the Carter administration’s policy. Also participating are representatives of the Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council and other offices of the State Department. A report to Mr. Haig is expected next week.”265 This story highlights two key points: First, there was friction between the different agencies under President Carter as to how to best proceed in El Salvador with the DoS urging caution and the DoD and CIA advocating for increased shipment of combat equipment and training. This discordant discourse, while not always beneficial, is part of that interagency collaboration. Second, the Reagan administration would try to avoid this infighting by bringing all involved agencies under the president’s view of how to handle El Salvador and then move the policy forward.

Secretary Haig sent a message to President of El Salvador Duarte making him aware of the relief of Ambassador White: “I have called Ambassador White back for consultation and do not expect him to return. I know you share the view that at times his actions have been too much in the public eye. We shall be sending a senior experienced officer to be temporary charge at this critical time and a new ambassador

264 Ibid.
with a different style as soon as possible.”

Again this serves as an example of clear primacy of the civilian policy portion of the USG: The dialogue not only occurred within the involved U.S. agencies, but with the HN leadership as well. It is also significant that a new president would so quickly share a policy change with the head of El Salvador before gaining depth and experience with the leadership.

A cable sent from Frederic L. Chapin, the interim chargé d’affaires in the American Embassy in El Salvador who was sent to fill in for the now relieved Ambassador White, laid out the concerns, challenges, and opportunities available to the new administration in El Salvador. Additionally, Chapin generated a six-page cable providing an assessment of the situation on the ground upon his arrival. In it, Chapin discussed the policy implications for the new administration:

This telegram raised the policy implications of seeking to broaden the government of El Salvador, its advantages and disadvantages, and the importance of such a broadening for the prospect of meaningful national elections at a reasonable future date. Charge seeks to open a dialogue with Washington on this central issue with respect to U.S. policy toward El Salvador.

Chapin continued, stating, “The time is fast approaching, it has not already arrived, when the USG must decide whether it really wishes to push hard for a broadening of the Salvadoran JRG and/or Cabinet.” Finally, he closed with his purpose for sending the detailed cable: “The primary purpose of this message is, however, to provoke thought.

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267 President Reagan library. Executive secretariat, NSC: country file, Latin America. Executive secretariat, NSC: country file, Latin America, El Salvador Box 30. Box 57. Folder name: El Salvador (1), 1/20/81-5/31/81. Cable from American Embassy, San Salvador, Chapin to SECSTATE. Subject: Broadening the Salvadoran government-a quandary. 17 April 81. Author note: The box numbering system is confusing. The label on this box states it is part of the NSC: country file, Latin America, El Salvador Box 30, but then goes on to say it is Box 57. I have photos of the actual box and label stored in my files.

268 Ibid.
and discussions on our policy where we should be heading.” This mention of an “open dialogue” is evident from the cables sent under both presidential administrations and points toward a healthy discourse on the matter of El Salvador policy. A healthy discourse does not necessarily mean agreement. Rather, the debates between the different actors helped to shape the next policy steps.

When the leftist rebels launched a strong offensive in late February 1981, the United States reassessed its position. Alexander Haig set a memorandum to President Reagan requesting immediate assistance for the government of El Salvador, “requesting immediate additional assistance to finance import of food, agricultural chemicals, and industrial materials. Otherwise we cannot be sure the current government will survive.” Echoing a whole-of-government approach, Haig also stated, “Early announcement of this package would also help our military package for El Salvador. A number of congressmen sensitive to pressure by the churches and rights groups — or uncertain about our judgment of the El Salvador situation — will find it easier to support a program with a larger economic element.” Again, these quotes provide strong examples of a whole-of-government approach coupled with an effective interagency discourse to develop a complete package to assist the GOES.

After an NSC meeting in February 1981, a memorandum was sent to NSA Richard Allen from Robert Schweitzer (NSC Defense Group Director) and Roger Fontaine (NSC Director of Latin American Affairs) that expressed the importance of getting U.S. troops on the ground in El Salvador. “Presence of even a few small US training teams will have

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269 Ibid, 6.
271 Ibid.
an uplifting psychological and morale effect. The moral significance of external support is the greatest single hope for any reversal.”

Additionally, Schweitzer and Fontaine argued for supporting the entrance of U.S. mobile training teams into El Salvador: “We have had a game plan, which the El Salvadoran have wanted very much for over a year. Our Ambassador urges it; OSD (Office of Secretary of Defense) was once aboard. Now we are starting to vacillate and in a way characteristic of the last administration.”

When the decision was finally made to deploy U.S. advisors to El Salvador, there were clear indicators that the U.S. ambassador would be in charge of these teams, ensuring both civilian control over the military and the need to train effective and accountable ESAF units:

Deploy a single five-man Operational Planning Assistance Team (OPAT) and three five-man Small Unit Training Teams (SUT) for a total of 20 additional personnel as requested by the Government of El Salvador and approved by our Ambassador with support of his entire country team. Teams may be deployed to garrisons outside of San Salvador as the Ambassador (Chief of Mission) may direct.

Additionally, in what will be covered in greater detail in the following section regarding legitimacy, attempts were made to ensure this deployment of U.S. troops was both well-coordinated with other agencies and fell within all necessary congressional

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273 Ibid.

oversights: “Integrate CIA and DOD plans and programs. Consult informally with Congress; War Powers Resolution does not apply to present circumstances.”

Under President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz created an interagency group that included representatives from the DoS, DoD, CIA, and NSA with the group reporting to the secretary of state:

The Interagency Group (IG) shall be headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and include representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The President’s Special Envoy for Central America shall also participate. The Interagency Group shall report to the Secretary of State.

Included was President Reagan’s Special Envoy for Central America, who helped create a holistic approach ensuring that any actions focused on El Salvador were integrated with efforts in surrounding Central American countries.

The discussion then moved to deciding at which level the U.S. advisors needed to go. An argument was made to have advisory teams at the ESAF Brigade level. “A US presence at brigade locations will also have an important discipline effect on the Salvadoran troops. The presence of even a few small US training teams (augmented by other nations) will have an uplifting psychological and morale effect.” It is important to point out that early in the discussion on the implementation of sending United States forces to serve as advisors in El Salvador, there was consideration of developing not only effective troops who could defeat the communist insurgency in El Salvador, but

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275 Ibid.
also troops who were accountable, especially after so many years of human rights violations. The prevailing view was U.S. advisors would have an “important discipline effect on the Salvadoran troops,” a clear indicator that any human rights violations by the ESAF would be seen and reported by these U.S. advisors, and, therefore, this would help keep the ESAF troops accountable not only to their own government, but also to established human rights protocols.

The El Salvador case provides interesting insights into which, if any, current civil-military relations models the interaction between the civilian leadership and the decision to send in military advisors falls under. First, it is clear that this was not a Huntingtonian example of civil-military interaction. The civilian leadership of the United States government clearly was in charge of the decision to implement the advisory effort and ensured the DoS in El Salvador was in charge. Objective control of the military does not apply here. As for Feaver’s principle-agent theory, the military was eager to commit more of its resources and manpower to this mission and had to be reined in by congressional checks and balances. There is little evidence of any “working or shirking” by the U.S. military with regards to the El Salvador advisory mission. If anything, we see the opposite: The military wanted to be more involved in the mission. Finally, there are clear traits of Cohen’s unequal dialogue theory. Under both presidential administrations, it is clear that orders came down from the president and they were dutifully carried out by all involved agencies. There was an unequal dialogue where the military and other agencies such as the CIA wanted more lethal aid and more advisors to go into El Salvador, but the civilian leadership, in a true unequal dialogue under Cohen’s definition, won every debate.
Throughout all aspects of the El Salvador advisory case we see positive examples of civil-military interaction. There is a level of discourse not seen, or perhaps not captured, in the other two cases of this dissertation. From memorandum of NSC meetings to press statements from the White House to the cables exchanged by DoS personnel, the historical record supports positive civil-military interaction in the example of El Salvador.

D. Legitimacy

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when the national government of the HN is deemed legitimate in the eyes of their own population, the region, and the international community. There needs to be a view of legitimacy within 1) the United States, 2) the HN with which the SFA campaign is taking place, and 3) the regional organizations to which the HN belongs. Peter Stillwell defined legitimacy as “only if the results of governmental output are compatible with the value pattern of the society.”

278 Legitimacy is required at all levels, from the individual within the HN to the United States, as they consider why to try to help their government according to the views of regional and international organizations of both the U.S. SFA mission and the HN’s government.

Legitimacy has multiple components. For the purpose of this dissertation, legitimacy in each case will be looked at in three ways, First, to what extent did the United States government attempt to build the perception of legitimacy with the U.S., within the HN, and within regional organizations? Second, how did the HN population view both their government and security forces before, during, and after the advisory mission? Third

and finally, what steps did senior U.S. policy makers take to garner popular support with the U.S. military and public for the SFA campaign in question? In the case of El Salvador, we see a solid effort to develop legitimacy in both the United States and within El Salvador, all while occurring under the umbrella of the Cold War.

The concern over numerous violations of human rights in El Salvador was one of the main driving factors behind decisions made by the Carter administration. Atrocities were committed by left-wing guerrillas, right-wing death squads, and elements of the El Salvadoran armed forces. The result was a maelstrom of human rights violations, all of them hard to prove and even harder to determine who was responsible for the violence. As a result, the Carter administration treaded carefully regarding El Salvador to ensure it did not lose legitimacy in the eyes of the U.S. domestic audience.

President Carter asked then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to prepare a letter for the archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero. In the letter dated March 11, 1980, Vance tried to alleviate the concerns of the archbishop, who was against any renewed military aid to his own government:

We understand your concerns about the dangers of providing military assistance, given the unfortunate role which some elements of the security forces occasionally have played in the past. As we consider any requests for such assistance, I can assure you that whatever military assistance may be provided will be directed at helping the government defend and carry forward its announced program of reform and development. We are not as concerned as you that any assistance we provide not be used in a repressive manner. Therefore, any equipment and training which we might provide would be designed to enhance the professionalism of the Armed Forces that they can fulfill their essential role of maintaining order with a minimum of lethal force.279

Unfortunately, Archbishop Romero would be gunned down two weeks later by pro-government forces.

Ambassador White was another proponent to ensure the United States maintained the moral high ground when it came to El Salvador. In a cable to the secretary of state, White expressed his concerns about needing what he called “more ammunition” to help get the United States policy to ensure human rights, and therefore the legitimacy of the United States efforts, remained at the forefront:

Thus I need more ammunition if our policy is to have any chance of success. Concretely, I need authorization to say that unless prompt and satisfactory action is taken a) military assistance will be suspended and b) the military training teams will depart. In addition, I need a joint statement out of Washington of intent to carry on the broad lines of the present policy beyond January 20, specifically including the reaffirmation of the emphasis on human rights. If the last requirement is impossible to obtain, then we have one more tool available: $20 million dollars of ESF (Emergency Security Funds).280

Ambassador White was insistent on forcing the GOES to identify and weed out those mid-level officers who were responsible for the killings. “At a minimum we must achieve the expulsion from the armed forces of the middle level officers who are responsible for the killings and a rededication of the officer corps to professionalism and a code of conduct,” he stated.281 Human rights violations were clearly a continuing concern to ensure that the advisory mission and, more importantly, the GOES had a perception of legitimacy both with its own people and in the region.

Early in the Reagan administration, experts analyzed the lessons learned from the American experience in Vietnam as they could be applied to El Salvador. The result

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281 Ibid.
was a well-thought-out understanding of the challenges facing any potential deployment of U.S. advisors into the conflict. Out of the 10 lessons learned that were summarized in the report, two stand out both for El Salvador and for the other cases this dissertation will address. First, the report stated, “This kind of conflict is mainly political in nature.”

Right away, the lessons learned from Vietnam were in the forefront and evidence that a purely military approach to the problem of El Salvador would not be the answer. Next, understanding the political issues in El Salvador was going to be more important than any standalone military action. The fourth lesson learned is also telling: “Pure force of arms is not going to be decisive.” Again, a holistic approach involving the whole of the United States government would be required to assist in the El Salvador case, not just the military instrument of power.

Congress was kept appraised of the continued military operations in El Salvador, and under the War Powers Resolution, it insisted on and received regular updates from the White House. A discussion between Paul Bremer and Richard Allen opens up some insight into the concerns regarding how to handle the War Powers Resolution:

On the basis of present evidence regarding the circumstances of the proposed deployments of US military personnel in El Salvador, the Office of the Legal Advisor believes that a report to Congress under the War Powers Resolution is not required at this time. In any event, if a decision is taken to deploy such MTTs, it would be prudent to consult with Congress before the deployment occurs. The situation in El Salvador is unlike any other in which a War Powers report has been filed. Each previous case has involved a rescue operation which was over within days after the introduction of US forces.

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From the very start of the military advisory mission in El Salvador, the White House initiated and continued continuous updates providing reports to Congress every 60 days for the duration of the mission. This not only alleviated fears of the effort expanding from advisory missions to full-fledged conflict but was also instrumental in keeping the American public informed of the ongoing efforts in El Salvador. As a result, the American public had a much better understanding of the ongoing operations by American conventional advisors than they did during the Vietnam efforts.

V. Campaign Objectives and Conclusions

The main question for each of these case studies is whether the United States met its campaign objectives in each respective SFA mission. In the case of El Salvador, the answer is a firm yes. This portion of the case study will look at how the U.S. SFA campaign ended, what the results were at that time, and how the HN, in this case El Salvador, looked five years after the end of the SFA mission.

Early in 1985, the FMLN acknowledged the ESAF’s improved combat effectiveness by reverting to small-scale guerrilla operations. No longer provided a large, fixed target, the ESAF resisted the need to revert to small unit operations. In 1986, the ESAF launched its “United for Reconstruction” civic action plan and Operation PHOENIX to destroy the insurgents near the Guazapa volcano. Neither was particularly successful by 1987. Even at its peak strength of 56,000, the ESAF “was still not big enough to defeat the guerrilla and implement an essentially social-economic-psychological operations program at the same time.”284

A stalemate between the ESAF and the FMLN ensued from 1987 to 1990. In August 1987, President Jose Napoleon Duarte signed the Central American Peace Plan and then followed up with a broad amnesty program to try to entice the rebels to give up the fight. Off-and-on attempts at negotiations and an upsurge in human rights abuses characterized this period. These prompted visits and threats from the U.S. secretary of state in 1988 and Vice President Dan Quayle in 1989. In frustration over the lack of progress in reaching a settlement, on 11 November 1989 the FMLN launched attacks in the cities. Despite almost a decade of work, the surprise attack exposed failures of the ESAF intelligence in predicting the attack, the ESAF ineffectiveness in responding to the FMLN attacks, and the continued abuse of human rights by ESAF units.285 In 1990, the United Nations became involved in trying to reach a settlement between GOES and FMLN. That same year, an assistant secretary of defense delivered a “scathing lecture” to the ESAF leadership on the deaths of Jesuit priests, and the U.S. Congress cut funds to the GOES by 40 percent. A helicopter crashed with three U.S. trainers aboard in 1991. One died in the crash; the rebels executed the two survivors.286 On 17 January 1992, the Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed between GOES and the FMLN. On 1 February, a nine-month cease-fire took effect, and by summer 1993, no United States military advisors remained in El Salvador. On 15 December, a ceremony commemorated the ending of the civil war and brought the chapter of conventional U.S. advisors in El Salvador to a close.

285 Ramsey, 103.
In the end, ESAF had averted defeat, but success against the insurgency had proved elusive. The ESAF had “probably become Central America’s most formidable military force, [and] with much pride they argue[d] that if Nicaragua ever started a war, the Salvadorians could finish it…. [That] may be accurate … but also irrelevant” since it could not defeat the FMLN, its actual threat.287 Despite the U.S. advisors’ attempts to change the ESAF, its “incongruous approach … to organizing and equipping the Salvadoran armed forces in a general conventional manner ... complicated the task of persuading them to adapt relevant tactics and force structure to the counterinsurgency.”288 It proved impossible to professionalize the ESAF to American expectations.

Without U.S. training, equipment, or advice, the ESAF would have failed and the country would have either fallen to the leftist guerillas or into a failed state as civil war engulfed the population. The United States effort in El Salvador was a long, financially costly affair, but the initial aim of preventing a FMLN victory was met. The creation of an ESAF that was organized and capable of conducting small-unit counterinsurgency operations among the populace proved elusive — both because of the ESAF resistance and the American approach that organized, equipped, and trained ESAF for what it knew best: conventional operations. However, the goal of professionalizing the ESAF — of changing its internal values, customs, and traditions to those resembling a modern professional military — did not happen.289 But the United States’ strategic objectives of preventing another Latin American country from falling to the communists, especially in regards to the Cold War, were achieved. However, progress towards a democracy

287 Manwaring & Prisk. A strategic view, 16.
288 Ibid. 17.
289 Ramsey, 104.
within El Salvador was hardly made. This raises the question, should the U.S. have sacrificed its democratic and human rights ideals to prevent a communist takeover in El Salvador?

I. Introduction

Studies regarding the intervention of NATO in Kosovo tend to focus on the air campaign that eventually led to Serbian withdrawal from the province. There has been relatively little discussion or literature on the efforts to rebuild the security forces of Kosovo by U.S. and NATO forces starting in 1999. However, almost immediately after deploying ground forces into the southern part of Kosovo, United States conventional forces began to rebuild and train local Kosovo police force and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) leading to, in 2008, the birth of the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF).290

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999. It ended the NATO air campaign against Serbia and established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, known as UNMIK, as the executive, judicial, and legislative authority for Kosovo.291 UNMIK’s responsibility included “establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.”292 Additionally, UNMIK was given

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292 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Article 9 C, 10 June 1999.
responsibility for establishing a provisional system of self-government and “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”

After the withdrawal of Serbian forces on 20 June 1999, some 50,000 peacekeeping troops were deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a “peace support operation” for Kosovo and the region. These troops, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), were drawn from NATO member countries, NATO partner countries, and non-NATO countries, such as Russia. KFOR served as a steward of the KLA’s transformation into the KPC. It would fall upon NATO, including troops from the United States, to rebuild the KLA into the KPC and eventually the KAF.

Almost immediately upon arriving as NATO Multi-National Brigade East built around a U.S. infantry division headquarters (1st Infantry Division), United States conventional forces began peace enforcement operations and started conducting security force assistance (SFA) missions to reestablish local security forces. While NATO was tasked to ensure a safe and secure environment as well as deter renewed threats, the development of an effective and accountable KPC was the long-term way out of Kosovo for NATO and the United States forces.

In September 1999, Regulation Number 1999/8 transformed the KLA into the KPC. This was important as a legitimate government could not afford to have an uncontrolled militia in its midst. The KPC consisted of 5,000 members, including 2,000 reserves. Its members had a military uniform with a military look, but according to Resolution 1244, the KPC were unarmed and had no military security missions or training. The corps’

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294 By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39,000 troops. NATO reduced KFOR troop levels to 26,000 by June 2003 and to 17,500 by the end of that year.
initial function was primarily for civil emergencies, with the KPC divided into six regional protection zones, each with a regional commander.\textsuperscript{295} It is important to note that the agreement indicated that with the final resolution of Kosovo’s political status, Kosovo would develop its security forces with a mission similar to that of the U.S. National Guard.\textsuperscript{296} The political status of international state acceptance of Kosovo was a long and deliberate process that involved members of the United Nations. In order to demilitarize the KLA, an interim solution was proposed and implemented. To meet the UN requirements, a civilian organization, the KPC, was created. The KPC’s mandate was to provide disaster response services, perform search and rescue missions, provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, and assist demining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities, something desperately needed after years of ethnic violence and war.\textsuperscript{297}

Kosovo’s final status resolution went through a number of developmental phases. In 2005, the UN assigned a Norwegian diplomat, Kai Eide, to conduct a study of the resolution of final Kosovo status negotiations.\textsuperscript{298} Eide submitted his report at the end of 2005, indicating that conditions for final Kosovo status negotiations had been achieved. The UNSC endorsed Eide’s recommendation and authorized the start of the status negotiation process. This report was important for Kosovo because there was a long debate whether the status of the country should be negotiated in the first place, and it

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gave the opportunity for Kosovo to be independent. The UN special envoy, former
Finland President Marti Ahtisaari, led the negotiation process between Kosovo and
Serbia. Discussions began in early 2006 and continued until end of 2007. Although the
negotiating parties did not reach an agreement, Ahtisaari drafted a final status proposal,
known as the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
(Comprehensive Proposal), in which he suggested “supervised independence” for
Kosovo. While this proposal was not approved by the UNSC, Kosovo, in coordination
and support from the U.S. and European Union, on 17 February 2008 declared its
independence and called itself the Republic of Kosovo. Since 17 February 2008, 115
countries have recognized the Republic of Kosovo.

The Republic of Kosovo (hereafter Kosovo) embraced Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive
Proposal in its entirety and implemented all of its recommendations. One of the
recommendations was the establishment of a new multi-ethnic, professional Kosovo
Security Force (KSF). However, the KSF was to be developed with certain limitations
and restrictions. Limitations and restrictions imposed by the Comprehensive Proposal
focus on the KSF’s end strength, mission, and equipment. Article 5 of Annex VII of the
Comprehensive Proposal states that the KSF shall “consist of no more than 2,500
active members and 800 reserve members … lightly armed… [I]nitially the KSF shall be
primarily responsible for crisis response, explosive ordinance disposal, and civil
protection.” Additionally, Article 5 of Annex VIII stated that “[c]hanges to the limits set
forth in Article 5.2 of this Annex are to be determined by the International Military

300 Ibid, 54.
Presence (IMP), in coordination with the International Civilian Representative (ICR). A full review of these limits shall be conducted no earlier than 5 years from the date this Settlement enters into force."\textsuperscript{301} NATO agreed to assist in the dissolution of the KPC and establishment of the KSF and a civilian structure responsible to supervise the KSF, the Ministry for the KSF. The KPC ceased to be operational and stood down on 20 January 2009, and the KSF stand-up began on 21 January 2009.\textsuperscript{302}

Since January 2009, KSF has been developed, trained, and guided by NATO KFOR. The core mission of the KSF is to conduct crisis response operations in Kosovo and abroad and civil protection operations within Kosovo and to assist the civil authorities in response to natural disasters and other emergencies. Primary tasks of KSF include search and rescue operations; explosive ordnance disposal; inspection, decontamination, and destruction of hazardous materials; firefighting; and humanitarian assistance tasks.\textsuperscript{303}

Since 2009 and until the end of 2014, the KSF has conducted numerous missions in assistance to civil authority within Kosovo. These missions have been mainly related to demining, search and rescue, and hazardous materials operations. Although the KSF is the third-line responder in Kosovo for civil emergencies (police and emergency services being first and second), because of the lack of capabilities and skills in these institutions, the KSF was often first on the scene. Extensive engagement in demining

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid.
and other emergency response within Kosovo gave an opportunity for the KSF to gain experience and enhance its professionalism in civil emergency missions.304

In March 2012, one year before the five-year limitation imposed by the Comprehensive Proposal for the review of future missions, organization, and structure of the KSF, the government of Kosovo initiated a Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR). The main SSSR objectives were: To define strategic objectives of Kosovo and security and defense policies of the Republic of Kosovo; to define the strategic security environment and possible security risks and threats; to analyze the current capacities of internal security institutions; to define the capacities that internal security institutions need in the future; to make recommendations for developing necessary capacities and the dissolution of those not required (needed), based on SSSR capabilities analysis to provide guidance for a new national security strategy of Kosovo, to provide recommendations for necessary legislative changes and to establish security institutions based on SSSR recommendations and based on the National Security Strategy305

Chapter 7 of the SSSR gives a recommendation for the transformation of the KSF into the KAF. According to the SSSR, the KAF would:

Take on, over time, primary responsibility for homeland defense; and gradually transfer capabilities for responding to civil emergencies to the Emergency Management Agency. Additionally, it was determined that the Kosovo Armed Forces will continue to participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations; assist civilian authorities to respond to natural disasters and emergencies, including readiness for a regional or an international response; conduct explosive ordinance disposal; and assist civilian authorities in civil protection operations tasks.306

304 Berat, 4.
306 Ibid, 30.
In addition, the SSSR recommended that core tasks of the KAF should be defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity, supporting civilian authorities and communities, and participating in international and peace support operations. Furthermore, the SSSR recommended that the future KAF would be comprised of no more than 5,000 active personnel and no fewer than 3,000 reserve personnel developed to NATO standards of interoperability. Moreover, the SSSR recommended that the KAF have a clear goal of participation in appropriate international operations as part of a national strategy to build a closer relationship with NATO and ultimately NATO membership.

II. American Involvement in Kosovo

The history of ethnic conflict in Kosovo goes as far back as the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 between the army led by the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the invading army of the Ottoman Empire under the command of Sultan Murad Hüdavendigâr. The importance of this battle was always in the mind of the Kosovars, and still it today. For the purpose of this dissertation, however, we will start in the mid-1990s to set the stage for the eventual NATO intervention and U.S. advisory efforts. In the mid-1990s, after the civil war in former Yugoslavia, Albanian separatists decided to try again, this time more violently. Separatists started attacks on Serbians, other non-Albanians, and police, army, and government institutions, including Albanians who were loyal to Serbia. The conflict culminated in 1998, when the United States threatened Serbia for the first time with intervention due to ethnic cleansing of Albanians and continued police
brutality. After dozens of attacks by the KLA, Serbian armed forces, pro-Serbian militias, and paramilitary groups, along with continuous news coverage of attacks on civilians, the international community decided to act.

The conflict in Kosovo marked a fundamental, post-Cold War change in international actors. First, the change in the roles of international actors in this system in transition was made evident in several respects. The realignment of relative state power was felt within the walls of Chateau Rambouillet, as the parties tried to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the strife in Kosovo. According to Marc Weller, this attempt at a Kosovo resolution was intended to prevent the emergence of a unipolar system dominated by the United States. Russia openly attempted to frustrate the concept of a settlement on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and enforced by NATO. Should that turn out to be impossible, Russia at least sought to preserve a controlling role for itself in the further administration of the crisis.310

Second, the struggle for influence among the states of the Contact Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], which furnishes a further layer of institutional authority and still acts principally under the consensus principle, despite its membership of over 50; and, finally, the UNSC, where Russia enjoys veto powers) was also reflected in this additional aspect of the changing role of international actors — namely, the functions and authority of the relevant international organizations or mechanisms themselves. The previous episodes in the Yugoslav crisis had demonstrated that the much vaunted new “European security architecture” was more

myth than reality. The attempt to achieve a settlement for Kosovo once again reopened
the struggle for pre-eminence between the OSCE, which Russia considers to be the
principal focus of authority in relation to peace and security in Europe; the European
Union and its as-yet-struggling attempts to establish a security identity; and the United
States and United Kingdom, with their aim of preserving the dominant role of NATO.311

A third and final aspect of the change in the roles of international actors concerns
the position of non-state actors. Obviously, the representation of ethnic groups and the
majority population of Kosovo posed a difficulty. The questionable legitimacy of
purported representatives of the minority groups in Kosovo included in the FRY
delegation highlighted one aspect of this problem. The extraordinary influence of a few
individual members of the delegation of Kosovo and the relationship between the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the elected government of Kosovo raised other
questions. Most startling to the Contact Group, and especially the United States, must
have been the inability of the states assembled in force at Rambouillet to exercise
decisive influence over such groups on whose assent the entire project depended.312

The international response to the crisis in former Yugoslavia was conditioned on the
perceived need to retain three essential principles of the international community’s
situational order, which had come under considerable tension with the end of the Cold
War. These included the principles of territorial unity, non-intervention, and non-use of
force.

The first principle at issue concerns the rationale of the legal entitlement to
statehood. Governments acting in the international arena for their own benefit created

311 Ibid, 212.
312 Ibid, 213.
the classical international legal system. It comes as no great surprise that all existing
governments share an interest in perpetuating the existence within the current
boundaries of the respective states they claim to represent. This is achieved through the
doctrine of territorial unity.\(^{313}\)

It was partially in order to prevent a further extension of self-determination claims
that the governments involved in the international administration of the collapse of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), acting through the EU, the OSCE,
NATO, and the UNSC, insisted on the maintenance of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
state within its former SFRY boundaries. Hence, in Dayton it was accepted that the
mainly Serb entity of Srpska would administer itself with a high degree of autonomy, but
within the continued territorial unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{314}\)

Oddly enough, a wider assertion of the right to self-determination had been made by
Yugoslavia. It claimed that the mainly Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia, Bosnia, and
Herzegovina should be entitled to secede and constitute themselves as independent
states. The Badinter Commission, established to advise the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia on issues of recognition, statehood, and succession, rejected
this argument. While self-determination also applied to Serbs and others who now found
themselves minorities in new states, this was a different kind. It was not an entitlement
to statehood; instead, self-determination in this context was reduced in content to
human and minority rights and to autonomous structures of governance in areas where
Serbs constituted a local majority.\(^{315}\)

\(^{313}\) Ibid.

\(^{314}\) Ibid, 215.

The governments and international organizations involved in responding to this claim took a restrictive view of constitutional self-determination and did not accept a right to statehood for Kosovo. Instead, they insisted that its human rights should be respected and meaningful self-administration should be restored. The referendum of September 1991 in which the population of Kosovo overwhelmingly declared itself in favor of independence and the declaration independence that followed was ignored. This approach also dominated the talks at Rambouillet.\footnote{Weller, 216.}

The second issue addressed the principles of what the United Nations would eventually develop into the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. At the forefront of the debate were the conflicting beliefs of sovereignty/non-interference versus human rights.\footnote{Ibid.} Even while the SFRY was still in existence, Serbia had unilaterally abolished the status of Kosovo as a federal-type entity.\footnote{These developments are chronicled in Helsinki Watch, Belgrade, Kosovo, Law and Politics (1998), e.g. E.CN.4, i992/Si/9,28 August i993, para 32;A/48/92, 26 Feb i993, paras i53-i71, E/CN.4/I994/i994/47, i Nov i993, paras i88-2o5;A.49.64I, 4 Nov i994, paras i82-5; E/CN.4/i996/63, i4 March i996, paras i i-80; E/CN.4/i998/9, io Sept i997, passim;A/53/322, ii September i998, paras 82-96.} In terms of SFRY federal law, this was unlawful and null and void. But in practice it meant the total subordination of all aspects of life in Kosovo under Serb law, which was administered in an overtly discriminatory way. The literal disenfranchisement of ethnic Albanians in what they considered their own country, their removal from public functions, and the increasingly vigorous suppression of human rights were reported upon extensively, including by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, over some six years.\footnote{E/CN.4/i996/63, i4 March i996, paras i i-80; E/CN.4/i998/9, io Sept i997, passim;A/53/322, ii September i998, paras 82-96.} These reports had triggered formal and consistent condemnation of the FRY by the UN Commission on Human Rights, its sub-commission, the UN General Assembly, and...
other bodies. However, no significant action was taken to act upon these urgent and dramatic findings. Indeed, following the signing of the Dayton accords in 1995, sanctions against the FRY were progressively lifted and tentative attempts were made to integrate Belgrade once more into the community of states.

The third issue falls along similar lines regarding the non-use of force and humanitarian action. A third area of tension relates to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Up to 1990, it was widely accepted that there existed no exception to the prohibition on the use of force, which permitted forcible humanitarian action in the absence of the consent of the government and/or effective authorities of the target state. Since 1990, there have been about 15 instances of forcible humanitarian action. However, most of these were conducted within the framework of Chapter VII mandates granted by the UNSC. Some more adventurous activities undertaken by regional arrangements had at least obtained a retroactive blessing from the UNSC. The administration of forcible humanitarian action without some justificatory link to the UNSC was a more difficult issue. True, forcible action had been taken by a self-selected coalition of the willing in relation to northern and southern Iraq without a formal Chapter VII mandate. The decision to violate the UN charter, however, was made with the rule of law in mind. This action was initiated when Iraq had just suffered a significant military defeat by the international coalition and was internationally entirely isolated. The FRY, on the other hand, retained a measure of international support and had not been subjected to a direct military defeat. Moreover, states sympathetic to Belgrade’s point of view noted that while it had been possible to dissuade the Kurds from declaring

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320 See e.g. UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution I993/7, 23 Feb 1993; Resolution I994/76, 9 March 1994; Resolution i998/79, 22 April i998, paras I6-29; General Assembly Resolution 49/204, 23 Dec I994; Resolution 50/I90, 22 Dec i995; Resolution 5i/Iii, i2 Dec i996; Resolution 52/I39, 1 Dec I997, etc.
independence under the protection of the aerial exclusion zone maintained by the coalition, Kosovo had already declared itself independent.\textsuperscript{321}

The threat and possible use of force by NATO caused tension with Russia and also China, another permanent member of the UNSC that had been effectively circumvented. It also posed a practical dilemma. If NATO was willing to enforce the withdrawal of FRY military forces and special police forces from Kosovo, it was unlikely that the small Serb minority would be able to maintain its stranglehold on the administration of all public functions in the territory. Instead, Kosovo authorities would establish themselves ever more firmly and would ultimately obtain effective control over the territory. Kosovo would then be effectively independent, and this status would have been achieved under NATO protection. To overcome this problem, the threat of the use of force was coupled with a demand that the parties agree upon a settlement for self-governance in Kosovo. This demand, of course, had previously gone unheeded for some seven years.\textsuperscript{322}

By the end of 1998, more than 300,000 Kosovars had already fled their homes, the various ceasefire agreements were systematically being flouted, and negotiations were stalled. Two rounds of internationally brokered talks in Rambouillet, France, in February and in Paris in March 1999 failed to break the deadlock and exhausted diplomatic avenues. At the time, autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY, guaranteed by the presence of a NATO-led force, could have been ensured. Accepted by the Albanian delegation, the proposal was rejected by Belgrade.\textsuperscript{323}

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\textsuperscript{321} Weller, 217.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid, 218.
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The situation in Kosovo flared up again at the beginning of 1999, following a number of acts of provocation on both sides and the use of excessive force by the Serbian military and police. This included the massacre of 40 unarmed civilians in the village of Račak on 15 January 1999. Renewed international efforts to give new political impetus to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict resulted in the convening of negotiations between the parties to the conflict in London and Paris under international mediation. These negotiations failed, however, and in March 1999, Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity of their operations, moving extra troops and tanks into the region in a clear breach of previous agreements reached. Tens of thousands of people began to flee their homes in the face of this systematic offensive. A final unsuccessful attempt was made by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to persuade President Milosevic to reverse his policies. With all diplomatic avenues having been exhausted, NATO launched an air campaign against the Milosevic regime on 24 March 1999.\textsuperscript{324}

Despite strains, the NATO alliance held together during 78 days of air strikes in which more than 38,000 sorties — 10,484 of them strike sorties — were flown without a single Allied fatality. After first targeting the Serbian air defenses, NATO gradually escalated the campaign using the most advanced, precision-guided systems and avoiding civilian casualties to the greatest extent possible. Target selection was reviewed at multiple levels of command to ensure that it complied with international law, was militarily justified, and minimized the risk to civilian lives and property.\textsuperscript{325}

\textsuperscript{324} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.
Following diplomatic efforts by Russia and the European Union on 3 June 1999, a Military Technical Agreement was agreed to between NATO and the governments of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia on 9 June. On the following day, after confirmation that the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo had begun, NATO announced the suspension of the air campaign. On 10 June, UNSCR 1244 welcomed the FRY’s acceptance of the principles for a political solution, including an immediate end to violence and rapid withdrawal of its military, police, and paramilitary forces and the deployment of an effective international civil and security presence, with substantial NATO participation.326

Troops from multiple nations entered Kosovo at the end of the air campaign to try to stabilize the war torn province. These troops included NATO member countries, including the United States, and non-NATO members such as Russia. The United States would commit its active-duty units to the Kosovo mission through July 2003 and then would begin to rely on its reserve and National Guard units due to increasing commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of what was now called the Global War on Terror. Ironically, once the mission in Iraq ended in 2011, active-duty U.S. Army units once again deployed to Kosovo in 2013, nearly 10 years after relying on the National Guard and reserve troops to train the Kosovo security forces.327

III. Existing Theories

This section will discuss whether the three theories selected for this study (logrolling, offensive realism, and balance of risk theory) can explain the eventual decision of the

326 Ibid.
United States to support Kosovo. Each of the following sections will review the respective theory and then provide evidence to support or deny its supposition.

**A. Logrolling**

As a reminder, the first political systems theory that has a direct impact on whether the United States decides to commit its military to an advisory mission is logrolling theory. This theory states that parochial groups (industrialists, financiers, traders, military, etc.) in society each have some economic or political interest in an expansionist foreign policy. Individually, none of them can influence state policy. Therefore, they engage in logrolling, where each group gains what it wants in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies desired by its coalition partners. In the case of SFA, it is those domestic powers that advocate for a policy of committing U.S. forces to assist a host nation (HN)’s security forces for a variety of reasons that I will delve into as part of this dissertation. This theory explains the economic motivations behind those supporting an advisory mission. However, it fails to take into consideration elements such as international politics and the security situation within an HN.

The Kosovo case had many different domestic factions with interests in both intervening militarily and/or not intervening. This section will look at these interests, whether they were able to influence the senior United States decision makers, and, if so, to what extent. Coming so close after the Bosnia mission, the potential military intervention in Kosovo caused great debate across many spheres of American life. A
New York Times article by Judith Miller captured this intense debate between those for and against military intervention in Kosovo:

The American involvement in Kosovo has started the most furious debate since the end of the Cold War over what constitutes United States strategic interests. “Not since the Persian Gulf War in 1991 have foreign policy analysts filled the nation’s airwaves, newspapers and policy journals with such passion. “The Kosovo crisis has sharpened and intensified what was a largely theoretical debate within think tanks and seminar rooms,” said John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “The $64,000 question is what areas of the world and causes are worth Americans fighting and dying for?”

This article continues by providing a vivid description of the intense debate between those who prefer a modern form of isolationism versus those who see intervention as a necessity for American foreign policy:

At one end of the spectrum are the “Fortress America” advocates. Think of Patrick J. Buchanan, the television pundit and repeat presidential candidate, who asserted the United States should not get caught up in other countries’ messes, whether they’re military, economic or political. Richard N. Haass, who served in President George Bush’s National Security Council, says the Fortress America contingent has the advantage of being straightforward, relatively consistent and minimalist. “Neo-isolationists believe that the purpose of foreign policy is to have as little of it as possible,” he explained. While tragic, this camp argues, the brutal effort to drive Albanian Muslims from Kosovo is not an American problem. At the opposite end are the “interventionists” or “hegemonists.” Philip D. Zelikow, another Bush Administration veteran, however, prefers to call this camp “expansive idealists.” They can be either liberal or conservative. The interventionists have found common intellectual ground in the idea that the United States is the only superpower left standing and simply cannot avoid getting involved. The United States has an obligation to do whatever it takes to create a world where it dominates, the thinking goes. In this view, the United States has a “window of opportunity to shape the world in its image,” Fareed Zakaria, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and a skeptic of this approach, explains.


329 Ibid.
These arguments assert the need for some sort of “grand strategy” and the concerns of even those known as realists over possible open-ended commitments to Kosovo and other conflicts as demonstrated in the following quote:

Yet as Kosovo illustrates, defining an American grand strategy or the country’s national interest is not necessarily straightforward even if one has a clear notion of how the world should be organized. Regardless of whether Kosovo is worth fighting for, by getting involved, the United States has created a strategic interest there even if one didn’t exist before. “Once America stakes its credibility on an issue, it automatically becomes strategic,” Mr. Zakaria says. Even those “realists” who disapproved of American involvement in the war against Yugoslavia concede that having made the commitment, the United States must pursue victory with all possible means, including ground troops. Of course not all self-described realists agree. Henry A. Kissinger, who presided over the Vietnam War, which cost 50,000 American lives, argues against “the proliferation of open-ended American commitments involving the deployment of U.S. forces.” He draws the line on sending American ground troops to Kosovo; the Europeans should provide the soldiers. Until there is more of a consensus over how the United States should respond in this changing world, it may be that the United States grand strategy can best be described as muddling through.330

While the debate between the interventionists and those against intervention occurred in the newspapers and academia, a majority of Americans supported intervention in Kosovo based on humanitarian concerns. A Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey published on 27 May 1999 interviewed approximately 1,200 Americans. In its survey, PIPA found the following:

Support for involvement in Kosovo is primarily derived from humanitarian concerns and the belief that genocide is occurring. A strong majority feels the imperative to respond to genocide overrides the prohibition against intervening in the internal affairs of a country. An overwhelming majority is uncomfortable about intervening in Kosovo without a UN Security Council resolution, but most favor proceeding nonetheless. However, if a ground intervention did not have NATO approval, only a very small minority would favor proceeding with an ad hoc coalition of allies.331

330 Ibid.
Unlike the El Salvador case study, there is very little evidence of domestic groups trying to influence public policy on the United States intervention or non-intervention in Kosovo. In this particular case study, there is little support that logrolling effectively explains why the United States decided to intervene militarily in Kosovo and eventually opted to commit ground forces to advise the Kosovo military.

B. Offensive Realism

As a reminder, offensive realism claims that states seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals. Therefore, intervention in distant peripheries is a viable strategy that can weaken potential great power rivals and maximize relative power. John Mearsheimer argues, “States seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals.”\(^\text{332}\) Rather than a reckless expansion, states or, more precisely, leaders of those states will engage in calculated expansion, according to offensive realism. For offensive realists, the link between structural incentives and foreign policy behavior is relatively unproblematic. To understand why a state behaves

\(^{332}\) Mearsheimer. Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War, 5-56.
in a particular way, one must examine its relative capabilities and international environment.³³³

As mentioned in the above section on logrolling, Mearsheimer, the main proponent of offensive realism, was quoted regarding the potential Kosovo intervention, “The $64,000 question is what areas of the world and causes are worth Americans fighting and dying for?”³³⁴ In the case of offensive realism, if the cost of soldiers’ lives brings about more power to the state and/or a weakening of their adversaries, then it is worth it. In this particular New York Times article, Mearsheimer advocates for “offshore balancing,” or having the majority of the troops required for Kosovo come from NATO countries. This provides the benefits of strengthening the overall position of the United States, but without having to float the larger bill in both troop deployment costs and lives lost. Rather, NATO, in Mearsheimer’s argument, would send most of the troops and therefore bear most of the burden. In some ways, Mearsheimer’s offshore balance approach appeared to be correct in my view. During the initial deployment of troops to Kosovo, nearly 50,000 foreign troops entered Kosovo with the United States only providing 7,000 troops.³³⁵ The largest contributors were the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Additionally, Russia sent in a force of 4,000 paratroopers and settled in the eastern portion of Kosovo, which was predominantly Serbian.

A report completed by Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre captured the confusion and difficulties the Clinton administration was experiencing with this new dynamic of warfare: “We are seeing the collapse of the old static, bipolar era in which

³³³ Taliaferro, 12.
³³⁴ Miller.
the world was divided unevenly into relatively static blocs, the East and the West. That has now collapsed into a very confusing post-Cold War dynamic. This shift from the static, bipolar Cold War paradigm to Rupert Smith’s “war amongst the people” directly challenged the notion of offensive realism. No longer were two great powers competing against one another in a zero-sum, realist-driven game of politics and war. Rather, the shift to conflicts in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo, which were driven by ethnic and religious differences, upended the conventional offensive realist outlook. Rather than looking to gain power at the cost of a rival, the debate regarding the commitment of U.S. troops to Kosovo centered on humanitarian issues and the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO. After visiting the Balkans, U.S. Representative Frank Wolf had the following comments regarding the possible commitment of U.S. troops to Kosovo:

If there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it could be necessary to commit U.S. troops to the Kosovo peace effort. I make this recommendation with reluctance, but without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The US is both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is involved, we must be a part of the effort or it will fail. NATO's 50th anniversary is later this spring and there will be a large celebration in the U.S., Kosovo will be a big test for this important alliance.

So with the threat of intervening in Kosovo, the focus moved from the absolute, zero-sum game of the Cold War and seeking power to a renewed look at what the role of the

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United States needed to be in a post-Cold War world. This was a new dynamic for both the political leadership of the United States and the academics who studied international politics.

In the case of Kosovo, there is the first post-Cold War application of force by the United States, which does not fit within the parameters of offensive realism. While there is some support for offshore balancing, the change in the international milieu from that of a bipolar, Cold War system to essentially a unipolar system with a shift to wars amongst the people contributes to my findings that offensive realism does not effectively explain why U.S. troops eventually trained the KAF.

C. Balance of Risk Theory

As a reminder, the balance of risk theory states leaders must balance the cost in the state’s power or reputation against the continued commitment of blood and treasure to an advisory mission. These factors make Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory extremely useful. Additionally, Taliaferro looks at the rationale behind why great powers intervene in what he calls “the periphery.”

While the balance of risk theory doesn’t provide any sort of explanation as to why the United States committed its troops initially to rebuild the KAF, it does have merit when considering why the United States opted to keep training these Kosovo forces. When President Bush toured Kosovo and Camp Bondsteel in July 2001, he was there to reassure NATO allies that despite the change in administrations, the United States would still honor its commitment to the Kosovo mission:

The address to soldiers was intended not only to boost morale, but also to reassure nervous allies that the administration did not intend to pull its military presence out of the region. “We came in together and we will leave together,” Bush told cheering troops of the Multinational Brigade East, a camp under U.S. command about 20 miles from the capital of Pristina. Bush also declined to give a timetable for withdrawal, saying, “There’s still a lot of work to do.”

However, the attacks of 9/11 two months after this visit would reshape the focus of the Bush administration and United States military.

The attacks radically altered both the foreign policy of the United States and the focus of the United States military. Before 9/11, Kosovo and Bosnia were the two major missions involving the United States Army. However, after 9/11, the focus rapidly shifted to Afghanistan first and then Iraq in late 2002. This shift allows us to assess how accurate the balance of risk theory applied with regards to continuing efforts in Kosovo.

By 2003, the level and intensity of violence in Kosovo had declined to such a point that the NATO forces throughout the province were able to reduce their total force structure. There was a 20 percent drop in KFOR personnel in 2001 and another 20 percent drop in 2002. In Multi-National Brigade East (MNB East), a more mobile force of 4,000 personnel provided a safe and secure environment in the U.S. area that once demanded more than 7,000 Americans plus another 2,000 soldiers from Russia, Poland, Ukraine, and Greece. This drawdown of forces reduced or eliminated some security details. When a routine KFOR escort of Serbian shoppers traveling on public transportation was terminated in one municipality, no one noticed. In June 2003, the Russian peacekeepers were withdrawn from Kosovo. Another indication of the reduced threat level in 2003 was the elimination of Kevlar helmets and flak vests for routine

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patrols in selected areas of MNB East, a clear indication of a reduced risk to the KFOR soldiers operating there.\textsuperscript{340}  

The reduction of forces and lowered level of violence in the province posed new operational challenges. To ensure that U.S. personnel did not lose their war-fighting skills while conducting this peace enforcement and SFA mission, more time was devoted to training, which included creating and utilizing firing ranges in Kosovo. In fact, gunfire heard in or near an American encampment after 2002 was more likely to be part of a military training exercise than a hostile activity. During the latter half of 2002 and continuing into 2003, U.S. troops patrolled Kosovar neighborhoods with allied forces at least one week out of every month. Task Force Falcon characterized such joint patrols as constituting a multinational laboratory and a valuable learning experience for its personnel. Joint patrols also altered the operational tempo and helped prevent soldiers from becoming complacent in their peace enforcement mission.\textsuperscript{341}  

The last active-duty brigade that was deployed to Kosovo (prior to 2013) ended its tour in July 2003. At this time, the United States was significantly engaged in combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The result was the transfer of the Kosovo mission from the active-duty military to the United States National Guard. Starting in July 2003, National Guard units assumed the mission in Kosovo, which included peacekeeping, and the continued building of the KAF.\textsuperscript{342}  

Since deploying its troops into Kosovo in 1999, the United States committed a large amount of troops and money toward the NATO mission of providing a safe and secure

environment for the people of Kosovo. Efforts to create an independent, effective, and accountable security force in Kosovo began almost immediately within the United States sector. In 2003, United States troops began to flow into Iraq in large numbers. The United States at this point could have taken this opportunity to leave the Kosovo mission. NATO troops were picking up other duties that the United States could no longer complete due to the deployments to Iraq. In Germany, for example, U.S. Army troops started guarding their own bases immediately after the attacks of 9/11, moving away from private contracted guards. In January 2003, German troops began to take over the base defense mission, employing German soldiers and marines at all the United States military points based in Germany. This freed up United States troops to focus on training and eventually deploying to combat.\textsuperscript{343}

While the United States lost a few soldiers during the Kosovo mission, its international reputation, status, and military primacy were not affected. There was no degradation of the United States’ ability to respond to both Afghanistan and Iraq. If anything, the fact that the United States was able to seamlessly transition the Kosovo mission from its active-duty troops to its National Guard is a clear indicator that the United States was not subject to the conditions espoused by the balance of risk theory. Rather, it appeared the United States was able to minimize the amount of effort it was putting into the Kosovo mission while simultaneously remaining on track to achieve its mission. In this particular case study, the balance of risk theory does not effectively explain why the United States continued to work with the Kosovo forces, especially after the events of 9/11. National guard units took over for the active duty units and

continued to train the Kosovo security forces at all levels: from tactical to strategic. SSR was and continues to be a key part of this development at partners such as NATO, the EU and the United States work to further develop those necessary systems to ensure the Kosovo security forces are both effective and accountable to their population.

IV. Smart Partnership in Kosovo

For a variety of reasons listed above, none of the three well-known international relations theories explained why the United States committed its conventional military forces to conduct SFA in Kosovo. I therefore propose the concept of smart partnership as a better way to explain why or why not the United States commits its military to SFA missions and use as a predictor for future success or failures in such missions. The next section will look at the four variables of smart partnership and see how they align with the Kosovo SFA campaign.

A. National Interests

The first variable of my theory of smart partnership involves the national interests of the United States. This includes looking into the stated or implied objectives of the SFA campaign, what was identified in national security documents or primary sources, and whether the SFA campaign objectives sought a limited or comprehensive change in the status quo that furthered U.S. national interests. This next section of the dissertation will look into what evidence supports or denies that the SFA mission in Kosovo was in the national interest of the United States.
When President Clinton took office, he asked for a review on peacekeeping operations. He determined that peacekeeping operations are an important tool of foreign policy in the new, post-Cold War world. The following quote from a press release from NSA Anthony Lake to Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, the director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated the new emphasis placed on these types of missions by President Clinton:

The central conclusion of this study is that properly conceived and well-executed, peacekeeping can be a very important and useful tool of American foreign policy. Our purpose is to use peacekeeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in the past. So we have to make distinctions. And the reality is that we cannot often solve other people's problems; we can never build their nation for them. So we must be selective, as I have just said and we must also me more effective. Two sets of question: Does the mission advance American interests? Is there a threat to international peace and security? Does it have a very clear mandate? Does it have clear objectives? And are the forces and the funds actually available for such an operation?

With the shift away from the bipolar world of the Cold War, the United States had look at other options when it came to dealing with violence in different parts of the world. This new peacekeeping doctrine required the civilian leadership to see if such missions were within the national interests of the United States. It also addressed other important questions regarding threats, objectives, and end states of such missions.

As with the conflict in Bosnia, there was great concern at the level of the United States senior policy decision makers that the ethnic violence could spread across the Balkans and affect Europe. This concern, combined with the rise of the 24-hour cycle of continuous news coverage, brought the plight of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to the

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forefront. No longer was this a decision about gaining more power over a Cold War rival; the decision was about saving lives and stopping another humanitarian catastrophe.

Once an agreement had been reached with Serbia, Mark Tavlarides, the National Security Council’s director of legislative affairs, sent an email that highlighted President Clinton’s thoughts on the importance of intervening in Kosovo to the national interests to the United States and its NATO commitment:

Our involvement in Kosovo has entered a new phase as we work to bring short-term security and long-term stability to this troubled region. I have decided to commit 7,000 troops to the largely European Kosovo Force (KFOR) that will keep the peace now in Kosovo. With KFOR’s rapid entry into Kosovo, under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement, the process of bringing the refugees home to Kosovo in safety and self-government is underway. Already, the United Nations and relief agencies are channeling vital humanitarian supplies to the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians driven from their homes by Belgrade’s brutal repression.

We will also be a driving force in the international community’s longer term effort to promote democracy and stability in this region. We are working closely with the EU on a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Our European partners must provide most of the resources for this project, but it is in America's interest to do our part as well in order to guarantee a democratic future for the region and better lives for those who live in it.345

The above statements highlight two key points about the mindset of the Clinton administration and how Kosovo fit within the national interests of the United States. First, there was a shift in how the United States viewed its national interests. It was no longer about containing the Soviet Union or ensuring we maintained an edge in the nuclear arms race. Rather, our national interests expanded into the new field of human

security. This emerging concept would eventually become the United Nations’ R2P doctrine. R2P emerged from the rise of ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. First explained in a December 2001 report, the concept of R2P was approved by all members of the United Nations in 2005.346

The second important point is how both its NATO allies and the world perceived the United States in its interaction regarding Kosovo. The statement mentions how even a relatively small commitment of United States troops (7,000 out of a total of 50,000) was vitally important to both NATO and the perceived chance of mission success. In another email to Congress from Miriam Sapiro, special assistant and counselor to the president for southeast European stabilization and reconstruction, the administration highlighted the importance of having the United States participate in the Kosovo mission:

I want to stress that the President has not made any decisions about US participation in the force. In fact, SACEUR has not yet requested force contributions from NATO nations. Nonetheless, if an International Political Agreement is reached, we feel it is important to have US contingent in KFOR, both for US credibility as the leader of NATO and as an indication to both the Kosovars and the Serbs that NATO means business. As was the case in IFOR, our allies have all indicated to us that without a US commitment, they will not participate. So US presence is vitally important to the success of this mission and the security of the IPA. Our thinking is that if we provide a Brigade sized force to KFOR, together with some plus-ups to the ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corp—a NATO quick response force), this will suffice. We are still working the numbers but believe our total contribution will be fewer than 4,000. We anticipate that forces would begin to flow as soon as the agreement is set so that they can be pre-positioned in nearby Macedonia to move into Kosovo at entry-into-force.347

In the Kosovo case, national interests were clearly considered before intervening and during the transition from using active-duty units to National Guard units to train the KAF. I would argue, however, that the view of what constituted national interests for the United States changed at the end of the Cold War. No longer were we locked in a zero-sum game with the Soviet Union. There was a shift from a realist perspective of foreign affairs to one involving much more of a focus on human rights and stopping the spread of ethnically or religiously fueled violence, an idealist perspective. While the views of what constituted national interests may have changed, the fact that the United States was prepared to commit its conventional forces to support those national interests did not change.

B. Interagency Collaboration

The second component needed for smart partnership is interagency collaboration. This variable seeks to identify if there is a clear delineation between the lead and supporting agencies. Interagency collaboration includes any jointly developed structures and shared successes for collaboration. Agencies must share mutual authority and ensure accountability exists across all involved agencies. Finally, this variable questions whether those agencies share resources and rewards equally. It is my evaluation that in the Kosovo SFA campaign, the United States demonstrated effective interagency collaboration.

The Kosovo case study is an anomaly since it involved both members of NATO and the former Cold War enemy, Russia. This added many complexities not seen in other
SFA case studies. Yet, there are strong indicators demonstrating the effective use of interagency collaboration within the United States.

In many ways, the Rambouillet Conference helped set the stage not only for an effective civil-military discussion on the use of United States conventional forces in Kosovo, but also regarding interagency collaboration. The public meetings helped a variety of U.S. agencies prepare for the eventual deployment of both military forces and government agency personnel into Kosovo.

One such example is a letter written by Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott expressing his concerns over the possible intervention of the United States into Kosovo:

> We are clearly at a critical juncture in the Kosovo crisis and have an opportunity in Rambouillet to establish a peace process that can end the bloodshed. I also share your interest in ensuring that any NATO force in Kosovo have a clear and achievable mission. For this reason, we need to consult closely in the coming weeks as these talks unfold and NATO makes plans for a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR).³⁴⁸

The concerns about having a clear and achievable mission echo issues from past wars (e.g., Vietnam) and peacekeeping operations such as Somalia and Bosnia. The conference at Rambouillet allowed those in NATO and the United States government to openly discuss the way forward and provide input to those negotiators representing their interests.

Lott then continued, “As NATO develops the plan for KFOR, we will insist that its mission and tasks are clearly defined and that the force operate under NATO chain of command, headed by SACEUR, General Wes Clark, USA. No one outside of the NATO

chain of command will be able to task this force." This statement is a clear reference ensuring there would be no outside agencies in control of United States forces by the United Nations. Even under NATO command, there would be United States commanders and chains of command in place so that no U.S. soldiers conducting their mission would fall under potential legal prosecution by other nations. This was and continues to be of great concern anytime the United States military is deployed in any capacity involving an alliance or outside agencies such as the United Nations or by the host nation’s authorities.

Finally, Lott concluded with the following:

The missions and tasks of the force, as well as benchmarks for the end-state of the operation, will be outlined in the Operations Plan currently under development by NATO military authorities and General Clark. Following approval of the military plan, NATO military authorities will seek force contributions from all NATO nations. We will consult with you and others in Congress as plans for the US force contribution are developed, as we have done on all aspects of our Kosovo policy. We expect our European allies to provide the vast majority of the forces required for the operation.

The key line in this passage, "we will consult with you and others in Congress," is a solid indicator of the establishment of the necessary framework for effective interagency collaboration regarding the initial deployment of troops into Kosovo and what the objectives were for those troops.

In many ways, the Clinton administration's focus on peacekeeping operations had already set the framework for effective interagency collaboration seen during the Kosovo mission. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), issued by President Clinton on 5 May 1994, entitled, “U.S. policy on reforming multilateral peace operations,” set the stage for what would eventually become both the Bosnian and

349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
Kosovo mission. In section VII of PDD 25, President Clinton explained how his administration would ensure better interagency collaboration:

To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and ongoing peace operations. Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues. Specifically, the Administration will:

- Regularize recently initiated periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
- Continue recently initiated monthly staff briefings on the UN’s upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peace operations.
- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in UN operations.
- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely basis.
- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace operations.
- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.351

It is worth highlighting key passages in section VII. First, President Clinton appealed to both Congress and the American people, stating that any military operation lacking the support of both would be doomed to fail. He emphasized how the lack of communication when dealing with previous peacekeeping missions was no longer useful in the new paradigm of a post-Cold War security environment, a hat tip to the evolving nature of conflict. Increasing the communications between the executive

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branch (and its corresponding agencies) with Congress was of value to all involved in
the potential or ongoing peacekeeping mission. This would be put to the test during the
later 1995 deployment of U.S. peacekeepers to Bosnia and once again during the
Kosovo campaign.

In his report to Congress in 2004, President Bush also highlighted the continuing
importance of the U.S. participation in the Kosovo mission despite the increased
demands of combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Issued in a press release
on November 2004, President Bush remained committed to supporting the Kosovo
mission but also to continuing effective interagency collaboration:

As noted in previous reports regarding U.S. contributions in support of
peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo, the U.N. Security Council authorized Member
States to establish KFOR in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10,
1999. The mission of KFOR is to provide an international security presence in
order to deter renewed hostilities; verify, and, if necessary, enforce the terms of
the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (which is now Serbia and Montenegro); enforce the terms of the
Undertaking on Demilitarization and Transformation of the former Kosovo
Liberation Army; provide day-to-day operational direction to the Kosovo
Protection Corps; and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the
work of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Currently, there are 23 NATO nations contributing to KFOR. Eleven non-
NATO contributing countries also participate by providing military personnel and
other support personnel to KFOR. The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo is
about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, or approximately 10 percent of KFOR's total
strength of approximately 18,000 personnel. In addition, U.S. military personnel
occasionally operate from Macedonia, Albania, and Greece in support of KFOR
operations.

The U.S. forces have been assigned to a sector principally centered around
Gnjilane in the eastern region of Kosovo. For U.S. KFOR forces, as for KFOR
generally, maintaining a safe and secure environment remains the primary
military task. The KFOR operates under NATO command and control and rules
of engagement. The KFOR coordinates with and supports UNMIK at most levels;
provides a security presence in towns, villages, and the countryside; and
organizes checkpoints and patrols in key areas to provide security, protect
minorities, resolve disputes, and help instill in the community a feeling of
confidence.
In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the UNMIK continues to transfer additional competencies to the Kosovar Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, which includes the President, Prime Minister, multiple ministries, and the Kosovo Assembly. The UNMIK retains ultimate authority in some sensitive areas such as police, justice, and ethnic minority affairs.

NATO continues formally to review KFOR’s mission at 6-month intervals. These reviews provide a basis for assessing current force levels, future requirements, force structure, force reductions, and the eventual withdrawal of KFOR. NATO has adopted the Joint Operations Area plan to regionalize and rationalize its force structure in the Balkans. The UNMIK international police and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) have full responsibility for public safety and policing throughout Kosovo except in the area of Mitrovica, where the KFOR and UNMIK share this responsibility due to security concerns. The UNMIK international police and KPS also have begun to assume responsibility for guarding patrimonial sites and established border-crossing checkpoints. The KFOR often augments security in particularly sensitive areas or in response to particular threats.352

President Bush, despite the overwhelming commitment of U.S. forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, still continued to cultivate the interagency collaboration started under the Clinton administration. While not perfect, the use of interagency collaboration was much better than what we would see in larger SFA missions such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

C. Civil-military Interaction

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when senior leaders develop and implement a strategy that is both feasible and suitable to the chosen means (military, intelligence, or otherwise) through an iterative civil-military discourse. This would include discursive dialogues between senior military and civilian

leadership at the strategic level. A strategy is deemed feasible if objectives can be accomplished by the appropriate agency or agencies within the given time, space, and resource limitations. It is deemed suitable if the chosen objectives are uniquely matched to the capabilities of the SFA forces selected. In this case, the difference between civil-military interaction and interagency collaboration deals directly with the approach taken by the presidential administration to introduce, discuss, and have a relevant discourse on an SFA mission. Interagency collaboration, as defined above, focuses more on the process occurring between different government agencies.

This section will look to see whether any well-known civil-military relations models such as Huntington’s objective control, Feaver’s principle-agent theory, or Cohen’s unequal dialogue were utilized during the debate over the SFA campaign. During the Kosovo SFA campaign, there were numerous examples of effective civil-military interaction specifically utilizing Peter Feaver’s principle-agent theory. Unlike the successful civil-military interaction seen during the El Salvador SFA campaign, the Kosovo campaign, especially during the lead-up and first two years, suffered from poor civil-military interaction between President Clinton and his senior military leaders.

The Kosovo SFA campaign must be viewed from the lens of the Clinton presidency and how its relationship with the military started out strained. Peter Feaver’s work “Armed servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations” helped frame the challenges facing United States civil-military relations during this period leading up and into the Kosovo SFA campaign.353

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Feaver took a new approach to how civil-military relations occurs in the United States. Deviating from the well-known model of objective/subjective control of Samuel Huntington, Feaver’s model treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior as well as other factors.

His model challenges Samuel Huntington’s professionalism-based model of civil-military relations and provides a different way of making sense of the U.S.’ Cold War and post–Cold War experience — especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military vigorously disagreed over whether to deploy the military and how to deploy military force. These episodes, according to agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, both now and in the future.354

Feaver’s theory discusses how the United States military will “work or shirk” based on if they agree with the orders given by their civilian authority. Feaver defines these terms in the following way: “Working is doing things the way civilians want, and shirking is doing things the way those in the military want. Shirking, in my use, has an explicit civil-military context. Shirking is part of a broader range of deviant behavior in which a

354 Ibid, 58.
soldier might engage.” Feaver continues, stating, “At the extreme end of shirking is the traditional civil-military concern of a coup. At the extreme end of working is some ideal-type military that does everything the civilian has contracted with it do, viciously and without subversion.”

The Clinton administration implemented policy decisions that were unpopular with the United States military. First, there was a general view that the new president was a “draft dodger” and had not served in the United States military. President Clinton was the first president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to have no military service prior to assuming office. This was a major shift from what the Pentagon had been used to regarding its commander in chief since the end of World War II and President Roosevelt’s presidency.

Additionally, President Clinton implemented changes to military policies, such as the implementation of the controversial “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, which allowed homosexuals to serve in the military and prevented the military from trying to root them out. This was a major shift in the policy of the United States armed forces and put the military at odds with the White House. According to the New York Times:

After six months of turmoil, President Bill Clinton announced a new policy Monday that will tolerate homosexuals in the military only if they remain silent and chaste, but will halt aggressive efforts to root them out.

The White House calls the complicated rule don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue. Under the old policy, homosexuals were officially barred from the U.S. military, and sodomy was a violation of the code of military conduct. During the 1980s, the military spent $500 million to investigate and remove some 17,000 homosexuals from its ranks.

Under the new policy, the ban against homosexual conduct remains. A person can be a homosexual as long as he or she does not act like a homosexual or tell too many people. Recruits would not be asked if they are

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355 Ibid, 60.
homosexuals, nor would anyone on active duty be officially asked. If asked, no answer would be required.357

It is hard to imagine today that this decision would split the military and executive branch as strongly as it did. However, any time there is a major policy change in a large, bureaucratic organization such as the military, there will be disagreement and friction.

This decision by President Clinton, however, resulted in senior military officers and officials claiming combat units would lose cohesion and not be ready to fight wars. The "Don't ask, don't tell" policy was a major shakeup of the United States military and added to the mistrust between the military and the White House that is accurately captured by Feaver in his research.

A key player involved in this increased friction in civil-military interaction was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. Powell’s now famous interview in 1992 where he openly disagreed with committing U.S. forces to open-ended peacekeeping or nation-building missions in many ways set the tone of distrust between the Clinton administration and the military. Powell, a Vietnam veteran, was publicly against the use of U.S. forces in nation building or missions with limited objectives. Powell stated, “As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they me tell me 'surgical,' I head for the bunker.”358 Normally calm and collected, the general spoke angrily as he complained about the impetuousness of civilians whom he said had been too quick to place American forces in jeopardy unwisely for ill-defined missions:


These are the same folks who have stuck us into problems before that we have lived to regret. I have some memories of us being put into situations like that which did not turn out quite the way that the people who put us in thought — i.e., Lebanon, if you want a more recent real experience, where a bunch of marines were put in there as a symbol, as a sign. Except those poor young folks did not know exactly what their mission was. They did not know really what they were doing there. It was very confusing. Two hundred and forty-one of them died as a result.\(^{359}\)

The so-called Powell Doctrine would once again come to the forefront during the discussion on whether to intervene militarily in Kosovo. Eric Schmitt wrote in April 1999:

> “Suddenly, General Powell's principles are looking a lot more attractive. ‘This only affirms the Powell Doctrine’ said Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican, who joined the growing chorus of those clamoring to send ground troops into Kosovo. ‘This is more reminiscent of the gradual escalation and bombing pauses that characterized the Vietnam War.’

> Even General Powell broke his usually self-imposed silence on continuing military operations … offering remarks that carried a distinctly I-told-you-so ring.

> ‘The challenge of just using air power is that you leave it in the hands of your adversary to decide when he’s been punished enough,’ General Powell told reporters before a speech in Blacksburg, Va. ‘So the initiative will remain with President Milosevic.’\(^{360}\)

It was more than retired high-ranking military leaders who pushed back on the potential use of U.S. conventional forces in Kosovo. Feaver describes one particular debate that involved the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

> The debate played out in particular vigorous bureaucratic wrangling that just skirted shirking. In January 1999, the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) met and decided to recommend against military involvement in Kosovo for two reasons, first, because any involvement in Kosovo would be detrimental to “military readiness,” throwing in doubt the ability of U.S. forces to fulfill the obligations of the national military strategy; and second, because the Kosovo issue was not in the “national interest” anyway.\(^{361}\)

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359 Ibid.
361 Feaver, 274.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s comment on the impact to military readiness showed that the issue was well within their purview. However, their statement about what was and wasn’t in the national interests is an example of borderline shirking according to Feaver and his principle-agency theory. While not truly within Feaver’s definition of shirking, the actions of the Chiefs impinged on political and geopolitical decision making, normally in the purview of elected officials. Feaver stated, “The second reason is not a judgment the military is competent to make; civilian principals are the ones who decide what is and is not in the national interest, and the chiefs stepped beyond the bounds of their proper role in arrogating that judgment for themselves.”

Once President Clinton made the decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo, Feaver claimed his administration wanted to “do it on the cheap,” continuing, “This meant highly restricted bombing of Serbian targets, necessitating an extraordinary degree of civilian intrusive monitoring of military operations, the third major civil-military issue of concern here. Air Force General Charles Walk said the rules of engagement were ‘as strict as any I’ve seen during 27 years in the military.’”

Another such example of the challenging civil-military relations involving the Kosovo campaign is found in the Washington Post story published 5 April 1999 by Bradley Graham. In this article, the Joint Chiefs were quoted as disagreeing with the decision to intervene militarily and only agreeing to “go along” with intervention out of respect for civil-military relations. Feaver states:

362 Ibid.
362 Ibid, 276.
Far from showing a respect for civilian control, however, the very existence of the article indicated just how far little fear of punishment the senior military officers actually had — they were willing to undermine the current policy with leaks calculated to embarrass and handicap the commander in chief while the operation was still unfolding; the unnamed military officers evidently assessed the likelihood of punishment correctly, for there is no record of the Clinton administration making any response to these subversive leaks.365

The transition to the Bush administration brought civil-military relations back toward a more “normal” state with the arrival of a Republican administration. However, Feaver didn’t believe the change to a Republican administration had as big of an impact on the civil-military relations of the United States as others did:

Moreover, the debate over Iraq has followed a very familiar civil-military script. Above all, there is no evidence that September 11 repealed the basic working of agency theory. Civil-military relations in the United States continued to reflect the strategic interaction of civilian principals and military agents, each playing out a role, pursing preferences, and responding to the costs of monitoring and expectations of punishment. The new war on terrorism altered the stakes but did not otherwise constitute a fundamental change in the logic of how civilians and the military interact to provide for the common defense.366

Unlike the El Salvador case study, when the decision was made to involve United States forces in the eventual SFA mission in Kosovo, civil-military relations were severely strained. These relationships were already strained before the debate over Kosovo occurred, partially due to the background of President Clinton (having never served in the Armed Forces), his policies (“Don’t ask, don’t tell” and his emphasis on peacekeeping) and the shift from a relatively stable Cold War security environment to a new, unfamiliar role of limited conflict. Feaver’s principal-agent theory does an effective job of explaining why the dissent of the senior military leaders was not only public but unprecedented in its persistence. Weighed down by a variety of scandals to include an

365 Ibid, 278.
366 Feaver, 292.
impeachment proceeding, President Clinton never had the political muscle to reprimand or reel in the senior military leaders who disagreed with him, resulting in troubled civil-military interactions during the start of the Kosovo SFA campaign.

D. Legitimacy

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when the national government of the HN is deemed as legitimate in the eyes of its own population, the region, and the international community. There needs to be a view of legitimacy within the United States, the HN with which the SFA campaign is taking place, and within the regional organizations to which the HN belongs. Peter Stillwell defined legitimacy as: “… A government is legitimate if and only if the results of governmental output are compatible with the value pattern of the society.”367 Legitimacy is required at all levels, from the individual within the HN and the United States as they consider why to try to help out their government with the views of regional and international organizations of both the U.S. SFA mission and the HN’s government.

Legitimacy has multiple components. For the purpose of the Kosovo SFA campaign, legitimacy will be looked at in three ways. First, to what extent did the United States government attempt to build the perception of legitimacy within the U.S., the HN (Kosovo), and regional organizations? Second, how did the HN’s population view both their government and security forces before, during, and after the advisory mission? Third and finally, what steps did senior U.S. policy makers take to garner popular

367 Stillman.
support with the U.S. military and public? In the case of Kosovo, we see a very challenging environment that spanned not only the United States and Kosovo but also NATO, the European Union, and Russia.

In the lead-up to the Kosovo intervention, there was a variety of concerns regarding the legal ability of the president to commit United States military forces to act. Stemming from the interventions in both Somalia and Bosnia, members of Congress sought to limit the ability of the president to commit troops to Kosovo. However, in one response to Congressman Ben Gilman, the White House clearly outlined its stance on why the president had the legitimacy to commit U.S. forces without congressional approval into Kosovo:

There is clearly no need for a declaration of war for the President to order the US military actions in question. H.J. Res 44 purports to declare a state of war pursuant to Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution and section 5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution. Section 5 (b) call for the President to terminate, absent a declaration of war, or enactment of specific statutory authorization for such use, any use of US armed forces within 60 days after a report was submitted or required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) of the resolution. A section 4 (a)(1) report related to the introduction of US armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.368

As with any administration, the Clinton White House referenced how other previous presidents, including Republicans, had executed similar deployments of American military forces without having to declare war:

This administration, like previous administrations, takes the view that the President has broad authority as Commander in Chief, and under this authority to conduct foreign relations, to authorize the use of force in the national interest. In

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addition there is ample constitutional precedent for the type of action the President is currently undertaking, which, in addition to earlier cases, includes air strikes in Bosnia in 1995.369

This statement clearly indicated that the White House and President Clinton believed they had legitimacy when it came to the commitment of U.S. forces into Kosovo and to keeping them in Kosovo to conduct their SFA mission.

In an update to Congress in June 1999, President Clinton explained what the role of United States troops would be when deployed to Kosovo. This was a critical update to let a divided Congress know where the troops were going, what they would be doing, and, most importantly, why this deployment was a legitimate use of the United States military:

Last week the President announced our commitment of 7,000 troops [sic] to KFOR. On the weekend, he transmitted a Roberts report informing you that he has directed these forces to begin deploying to Kosovo, once it was clear that Milosevic had met our conditions. The MEU is off Thessaloniki, waiting for orders to offload and head north. Forces in Germany are also preparing to deploy. The 7,000 US troops will constitute less than 15 percent of the force. -The civil presence will set up an interim administration, administering Kosovo until provisional local institutions can be put in place, and establishing an international police force until local police can be trained.370

Critical to the start of the U.S. SFA mission in Kosovo was the establishment of the KPC. Initially created in late 1999, the KPC would become the foundation for the KAF. Ensuring that this force was viewed as legitimate by both the people in Kosovo and the communities outside was critical to the success of the SFA mission. A report submitted from President Clinton to the speaker of the house and senate president in December

369 Ibid.
1999 clearly laid out the role of United States forces in Kosovo at this time and, more importantly, discussed the establishment of the KPC and its legitimacy to serve as the internal security force:

In Kosovo, the U.S. forces are assigned to a sector principally centered around Urosevac in the eastern portion of Kosovo. For US KFOR forces, as for KFOR generally, maintaining public security is a key task, and US forces conduct security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside throughout their sector. Approximately one-half of KFOR’s total available personnel is directly committed to protection tasks including protection of ethnic minorities.

The KLA agreed on June 21, 1999 to a ceasefire, to withdraw from the zones of conflict in Kosovo, and to demilitarize itself. On September 20, 1999, KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson accepted the KLA’s certification that the KLA had completed its demilitarization in accordance with the June 21st agreement. The UNMIK thereafter established a civil emergency service entity known as the Kosovo Protection Corps that is intended to provide civic assistance in emergencies and other forms of humanitarian assistance. The UNMIK is in the process of considering applications from former KLA personnel for service in this corps. In addition, KFOR is providing assistance in the areas of demining, humanitarian relief, international civil police training, and the maintenance of civil works resources. Until UNMIK is able to field a full complement of civil police, public security remains principally a KFOR responsibility.\(^{371}\)

This report clearly emphasizes the importance of ensuring the legitimacy not only of the United States mission in Kosovo but of UNMIK and how former KLA personnel would be integrated into the new KPC. An internal security force created of purely former KLA fighters or of only Albanian descent would not best represent Kosovo and would add to the already simmering tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbians. UNMIK was initially in charge of ensuring that a balanced KPC was created, and the various participating NATO countries in Kosovo, including the United States, began to train and equip the KPC for service.

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Another important and relatively new addition to this international mission was the close coordination and integration of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the post-Cold War environment, NGOs suddenly took on a much larger and more important role in humanitarian crises such as Bosnia in Kosovo. Including NGOs in the planning and execution of these missions was of critical importance. Not only did NGO involvement add to the legitimacy of a mission such as Kosovo, these specialized organizations also brought important capabilities that a blunt instrument such as the military may not have. These services ranged from medical care to services for newborn infants and their mothers.

In a meeting held by the White House, the Clinton administration brought in numerous NGOs to the planning sessions to help ensure the legitimacy of the Kosovo intervention. In one such meeting, representatives of the following NGOs were present: American Red Cross, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Doctors of the World, InterAction, International Catholic Migration Conference, International Medical corps, International Orthodox Christians Charity, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps International, Oxfam America, Relief International, Save the Children, and World Vision.\(^{372}\) Within these NGOs were numerous specialized capabilities that the United States military simply did not have. Of particular importance were those involved in relief operations and Orthodox charities since the affected Serbian populations in Kosovo were primarily Orthodox Christians.

The longer the mission in Kosovo took to develop, the more legitimacy it gained. Once the initial arguments over the need to deploy United States troops to Kosovo were no longer relevant, the development of the United Nation’s mission in Kosovo, NATO, and the economic participation of the European Union all helped to increase the perceived legitimacy of the mission in Kosovo. By working with these different organizations, the countries surrounding Kosovo viewed their efforts as legitimate. The Clinton administration was able to provide supporting evidence to Congress and the American people of why it was imperative for the United States to participate in the Kosovo mission. The slow but eventual success of developing effective and accountable security forces in Kosovo is a testament to the efforts to promote legitimacy there and an example of a successful element of smart partnership.

V. Campaign Objectives and Conclusions

The main question for each of these case studies is whether the United States met its campaign objectives in each respective SFA mission. In the case of Kosovo, the answer is yes. This portion of the case study will look at how the U.S. SFA campaign ended, what the results were at that time, and how the HN, in this case Kosovo, looked five years after the end of the SFA mission.

As a reminder, UNMIK’s responsibility included “establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.”373 Additionally, UNMIK was also given responsibility for establishing provisional system of self-government and “facilitating a political

373 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Article 9 C, 10 June 1999.
process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.” In terms of these objectives, the NATO and United States forces involved in the SFA campaign met all of them.

One caveat is that the United States continues to provide military forces in Kosovo to this day. They work with the KAF to continue to develop their capabilities, professionalism, and accountability to the civilian government of Kosovo. While the Kosovo SFA mission has never officially ended, there was a significant reduction in the number of American troops committed to the missions starting in 2009, and therefore this case shall evaluate the success or failure of the Kosovo SFA mission using 2009 as its “end” point since this is also when the KAF officially activated.

Today, the KAF (also known as KSF) are a small but well developed security force within Kosovo. It is a new, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly armed, and uniformed security force that is subject to democratic, civilian control. Its mission is to conduct crisis response operations in Kosovo and abroad, undertake civil protection operations within Kosovo, and assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. Such duties include search and rescue operations, explosive ordnance disposal (demining and UXO removal), the control and clearance of hazardous materials, firefighting, and other humanitarian assistance tasks.

The mission statement taken from the Ministry for the KSF’s website is telling. It states, “The Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) is responsible for exercising civilian control over the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), including management and administration. It comprises a mixture of civilian and KSF personnel and is accountable,

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through the Prime Minister, to the Kosovo Assembly. Emerging from its KPC roots, the KAF has a unique mission of not only providing security from both internal and external threats but also being heavily integrated into operations to which the United States military refers as Defense Support to Civilian Authorities. The role the KAF has in consequence management is vital to protecting the multiethnic population of Kosovo. Through working with its United States and NATO partners, the KAF places critical focus on remaining subject to the democratic, civilian control of its forces.

The KAF has its own Department of Civilian Military Cooperation in Ministry, which works with the different municipalities within Kosovo. This includes the planning, resourcing, and construction of projects to better the lives of the population of that area, and it is integrated into all aspects of the KAF’s mission statement and resourcing. In many ways, the KAF has emerged as a successful partner with both the Kosovo government and the Kosovo people in what I consider an effective hybrid role of both active-duty and National Guard force.

The shift from a Cold War environment to one of a unipolar United States brought with it the decreased threat of nuclear war, but as this case demonstrated, an increase in ethnic or religiously driven conflict and “wars amongst the people”. The result was the need to re-evaluate if deploying United States forces fell within the national interests. In the case of Kosovo, both Presidents Clinton and Bush successfully made the case that Kosovo was in the United States national interest from both a humanitarian perspective as well as a stability perspective. The fact that President Bush and the National Security

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376 Ibid.
Council continued to commit military resources to the Kosovo SFA campaign after the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq sent a clear message: Kosovo was well within the national interests of the United States.

The Kosovo case also demonstrated a successful interagency collaboration across all involved government agencies of the United States. Adding to the complexity was the need to work within and through NATO, especially with regards to the air campaign. UNMIK was another component with which the United States needed to work closely to ensure unity of effort, and the United States military was successful in its collaboration.

The one area of smart partnership where the United States struggled regarding the Kosovo SFA mission was civil-military interaction. The troubles experienced by the Clinton administration, combined with the distrust the military and for the president based on a variety of reasons, created a strained environment. In many ways, this was the first time in decades where the military openly criticized its commander in chief in the media and caused academics (and future practitioners) such as Peter Feaver to reevaluate the gold standard of United States civil-military relations theory, Huntington’s objective control of the military theory. Public statements disagreeing with policies such as the unpopular “Don’t ask, don’t tell” to the increased commitment of United States forces to peace enforcement/peacekeeping operations put senior military leaders at odds with the senior civilian leadership.

Despite these troubles and friction, the professionalism and systems in place ensured there remained one person in charge of the military: the president of the United States. While the strained civil-military relations continue to be a major topic of
discussion today, the campaign objectives set out for Kosovo by President Clinton were successfully met.

President Clinton was able to shape the Kosovo mission within the framework of being a legitimate mission of the United States. Intervention in Kosovo, much like Bosnia, took place in an unfamiliar world setting where the Cold War was no longer the dominant milieu. Rather, these increased ethnic and religiously driven conflicts, coupled with an increased ability for new agencies to broadcast the plight of refugees to the world continuously, resulted in a shift to viewing humanitarian concerns as being within the national interest. The result, despite debates on all levels of senior United States policy makers, was the perceived legitimacy of the United States’ role in Kosovo both within and outside of the country.

I. Introduction

There are a number of reasons why the Army was largely unsuccessful in preparing ISF [Iraqi security forces] for the fight it now faces. One may be that the training we offered was centered on how to operate as the U.S., not Iraqi, Army. Another may be that when the Iraqi showed any tactical ability, it was more to impress the American noncommissioned officer standing behind him than to defend against an opposing tribe or political belief. A third is that the American soldier’s planning doctrine is too Western and incongruent with Eastern methods. Fourth, despite our best efforts over the years, courage and effective, trustworthy leadership may not be trainable. Overall, no matter how culturally savvy we were back in the OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) days, the training and partnering we conducted never truly translated. The military decision-making process and patrolling may have been explained in Arabic, but never fully modified from the original Western school of thought for Iraqis to fully absorb. — Major Brad Hardy, Iraqi police advisor

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Watching events unfold in Iraq since 2014 puts into question the entire United States advisory effort in Iraq. After an investment of billions of dollars and thousands of lives, the training effort seems to have failed in Iraq as ISIS forces rapidly seized portions of the country and Iraqi security forces (ISF) collapsed in 2014.

This begs the question: What happened? Who failed, the Iraqis or our efforts to train ISF? More importantly, what does this indicate with regards to the eventual departure of U.S. and NATO combat troops in Afghanistan? And of greater concern, how can the United States assist our other partner nations in developing competent and accountable security forces?

The decision by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) to disband the Iraqi armed forces remains one of the most contentious topics of the Iraq war. Some argue Paul Bremer’s decision was a necessary step toward reconciliation. Others say it stripped Iraq of one of its only organized and integrated organizations, resulting in a sudden pool of trained fighters for a rising insurgency. Regardless of the debate, the need to build trained and professional security forces in Iraq became painfully obvious to those in the Green Zone of Baghdad in 2003. The initial attempts to build a New Iraqi Army (NIA) resulted in the formation of United States Advisory Support Teams (ASTs). These advisor teams opened a new chapter in the U.S. military’s history of security force assistance (SFA), one still under study today as refinements to the advisor missions continue while conducting combat operations again in Iraq. One lesson is clear: The lack of clearly defined national security goals hindered the initial efforts to reestablish the Iraqi Army. Even today, a gap exists between tactics, techniques, and procedures used by current advisors and the national security goals as U.S. forces once again conduct SFA in Iraq.

The Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team (CMATT) headquarters developed a two-phase training technique in early 2004 for building NIA units. Iraqi officers with previous experience in Saddam’s army went to training in Jordan. Vinnell Corporation received the contract to conduct the training of the Iraqi Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) program. Once trained, the officers and NCOs combined to form the cadre of an NIA battalion. This cadre, with American advisor assistance, formed the nucleus of a

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379 Ricks, Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq.
380 Conversation between the author and LTG (Ret.) George A. Crocker, program manager, New Iraqi Army training project, Kirkush, Iraq, 24 June 2004.
battalion, taking 700 to 800 recruits and conducting basic training to form a cohesive battalion. The lynchpin for this effort was the ASTs.

The formation of the early ASTs in 2004 would start nearly seven years of various attempts by coalition and U.S. forces to rebuild ISF. Unlike the previous two SFA cases, Iraq proved a massive challenge from a size and scope perspective. The disbanding of ISF put the onus of rebuilding every type of security force, ranging from heavy armored division to border police, on the occupying coalition forces, all while they were fighting growing insurgencies of different types and an emerging Sunni-Shia sectarian war within Iraq. This put a tremendous burden on the fledgling ISF and their partnered U.S. units. The size and scope of this SFA mission ensured U.S. conventional forces would conduct the preponderance of training for the majority of the ISF.

The invasion in 2003 toppled the longstanding government of Saddam Hussein and, as a result, added to the burden the rebuilding of an Iraqi government viewed as legitimate by Iraqis, the region, and the international community. Unlike the previous two case studies, this presented another unique challenge to the foreign policy decision makers, especially regarding key decisions to continue and eventually end the SFA mission in Iraq in 2011.

This case will range from the years of 2003 to 2011, when the last official withdrawal of American troops occurred. The rise of the Islamic State and the current situation in Iraq will be looked at through the lens only as to whether the SFA mission that ended in 2011 could be judged as successful. The “coalition of the willing” rapidly became the “coalition of the one” with only the United States remaining in both an active combat role and an SFA role by 2009. The three key decision points of the dissertation, the decision
to implement an SFA mission, the decision to extend an SFA mission, and the decision to end an SFA mission, fit well in the given timeframe of this Iraqi case study.

This case study will show support for Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory. Additionally, it will raise issues regarding challenges of interagency collaboration for such a massive-scale SFA campaign, the difficulty in civil-military relations this SFA campaign created, and whether the United States efforts in Iraq were viewed as legitimate.

II. The Rationale for U.S. Support to Rebuild the Iraqi Security Forces

Secretary of State Colin Powell was quoted in Plan of attack, a book in which he was a key source who cautioned President Bush before the war that he would “own” Iraq, with all its problems, after military victory. "Privately," wrote Bob Woodward, “Powell and [Richard] Armitage called this the Pottery Barn rule: You break it, you own it."381 In many ways, the words of Powell would ring true when it came to the need not only to rebuild the ISF, but to do so on a massive scale not seen in the history of United States SFA campaigns.

The efforts in Iraq for this SFA case study can be broken down into three parts: direct rule (June 2003 to June 2004), the surge (January to December 2007), and the drawdown (May 2008 to September 2010).382 These three stages represent the major advisory efforts of the United States conventional military during the operations in Iraq. Additionally, these three stages help focus our attention on the how and why of U.S. SFA efforts. Of note, the author participated in all three of these phases albeit at the tactical level as a military advisor to a variety of Iraq security forces.

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382 Sky.

To this day, debate exists over whether or not the United States was justified in launching its attack on Iraq in 2003. Spurious reports of a burgeoning Iraqi chemical weapons program, expatriate Iraqis desiring revenge on Saddam Hussein, and a lingering series of United States military operations against Iraq since the end of the 1991 war were all contributing factors to the final decision to launch a ground invasion of Iraq in 2003. The invasion culminated with the seizure of Baghdad, the now famed “thunder run” by the 3rd Infantry Division as well as the symbolic toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdos Square, Baghdad, which became one of the lingering images of the invasion.\(^{383}\) Unfortunately, once coalition forces arrived in Baghdad, the real challenges began.

On 22 March 2003, President Bush addressed the American people, explaining why he was committing United States forces to combat in Iraq. The president almost immediately stated that the reason for the United States going to war in Iraq was due to the threat of weapons of mass destruction:

American and coalition forces have begun a concerted campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In this war, our coalition is broad, more than 40 countries from across the globe. Our cause is just, the security of the nations we serve and the peace of the world. And our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.\(^{384}\)

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Almost immediately after the capture of Baghdad, confusion reigned supreme. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) set up the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) under the leadership of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner. But within days of his organization’s haphazard arrival in Iraq, the presidential administration changed its mind on the initial plan to hand over power to a transitional Iraqi government and hold elections within 90 days. Instead, the White House appointed Ambassador Paul Bremer on 11 May 2003 to head up the new CPA, thereby subsuming OHRA.385

Bremer did not believe there were credible Iraqi leaders to assume power, and therefore he decided that the CPA had to directly administer the country for an unspecified period. America was going to rebuild Iraq as it had rebuilt Germany and Japan after the Second World War. Bremer and the CPA dissolved the Baath Party and disbanded all ISF. The results would be catastrophic. The first directive, which disbanded Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, also prohibited most members from playing any further role in Iraqi public life. The second dissolved the entire Iraqi national security apparatus, which included the army.386

For a nation of 25 million people in 2003, the sudden dissolution of the entire security apparatus was devastating. Not only did the entire army now suddenly become disenfranchised, resulting in out-of-work men with training in weapons, the Iraqi police and borders forces ceased to function. As a result of these two CPA orders, the United

385 Sky, 11.
States military would have to embark on a massive SFA campaign to rebuild ISF nearly from scratch.

In remarks given at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy held in the United States Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC. On 6 November 2003, President Bush spoke about the importance of building democracy in Iraq, a theme not seen at the start of the war. Additionally, there was no longer a discussion of weapons of mass destruction with Iraq, the casus belli for invading Iraq in March 2003:

In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are also working together to build a democracy — and after three decades of tyranny, this work is not easy. The former dictator ruled by terror and treachery, and left deeply ingrained habits of fear and distrust. Remnants of his regime, joined by foreign terrorists, continue their battle against order and against civilization. Our coalition is responding to recent attacks with precision raids, guided by intelligence provided by the Iraqis, themselves. And we’re working closely with Iraqi citizens as they prepare a constitution, as they move toward free elections and take increasing responsibility for their own affairs. As in the defense of Greece in 1947, and later in the Berlin Airlift, the strength and will of free peoples are now being tested before a watching world. And we will meet this test.

Securing democracy in Iraq is the work of many hands. American and coalition forces are sacrificing for the peace of Iraq and for the security of free nations. Aid workers from many countries are facing danger to help the Iraqi people. The National Endowment for Democracy is promoting women’s rights, and training Iraqi journalists, and teaching the skills of political participation. Iraqis, themselves — police and borders guards and local officials -- are joining in the work and they are sharing in the sacrifice.

This is a massive and difficult undertaking — it is worth our effort, it is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes. The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed — and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran — that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the
heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.  

On a shoestring and with little to no training on how to rebuild a nation’s security force, the United States military established the CMATT. The effort to build the police and other security forces such as border guards fell under the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Neither organization was in existence prior to March 2003, nor were they initially manned to accomplish their tasks.

The initial United States plan was to build a professional Iraqi army consisting of nine light infantry battalions, a small aviation element, and a small coastal defense force during the first year of occupation with a budget of $170 million. U.S. defense contractor Vinnell along with multiple sub-contractors was contracted to accomplish this mission under the command of United States Army Major General Paul Eaton. The initial plan was to build whole Iraqi battalions, one at a time at Kirkush, a former Iraqi Army training facility, 70 miles east of Baghdad. Vinnell was to bring the training teams, provide security, and train the battalions with CMATT’s oversight and support. The plan for the needed infrastructure and logistics to support such an army would be contracted to local Iraqi companies or U.S. contractors who would then sub-contract work to Iraqis.

The use of Iraqi firms and limiting of who could fill what contract was a restrictive policy meant to support the Iraqi economy, and it became a major hindrance to the efforts of CMATT. The use of contractors for training was the decision of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as it allowed tasks to be accomplished without tapping into

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additional U.S. military manpower. Policy mistakes that adversely affected the building of Iraqi security infrastructure included: 1) using only contractors for training the Iraq army, 2) disbanding the Iraqi Army, 3) lacking a unity of effort between security missions, and 4) withholding funds from CMATT.\textsuperscript{389}

The building of security forces evolved through several different iterations. This included increasing resources allocated to CMATT to include the training of 1,500 Iraqi officers in Jordan, the deployment of Army Reserve Institutional Training Divisions, and the ever-expanding use of military ASTs. These ASTs were a combination of National Guard soldiers, active-duty observer controllers from the Army's combat training centers, and marine reservists.\textsuperscript{390}

There were some local Iraqi forces still available in spite of the disbanding of the Iraqi Army. National Guard units, known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Force (ICDF), were rapidly recruited, trained, and used by coalition units in the field. There was no common standard for training or equipping for these National Guard–type units. They were ethnically homogeneous and helped fill the lack of manpower of the coalition. The Kurds in the north were already organized in the well-respected Peshmerga (Kurdish Army). This was a militia army that had fought alongside U.S. Special Forces and the 173rd Airborne brigade during the war in northern Iraq. The Iraqi police and army units had, for the most, part dissolved. The ICDF and Peshmerga filled the short-term need for troops with about 41,000 trained by coalition forces by the end of 2003.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{390} Sullivan, M.D. (July-Aug 2005). From the ashes: rebuilding the Iraqi Army. \textit{Armor Magazine}: 44-47.
\textsuperscript{391} CMATT Command Brief, Taji, Iraq. 24 Sept 2004.
The immediate goal of CMATT was to build an Iraqi army composed of three divisions of three brigades each and a small aviation element and coastal defense force by September 2004.\textsuperscript{392} These brigades were to be light infantry with some wheeled vehicles for increased mobility. The original missions assigned to these new Iraqi battalions were to conduct tactical road march, attack, defend, conduct movement to contact, and conduct cordon and search, the most basic of infantry unit missions. In reality these units would operate across the spectrum of conflict in very complex terrain, at times against their own population. Brigade staffs, division staffs, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense were being formed along with the simultaneous development of their own training base capability. Once the Iraqi leadership was established and shown how to properly train new recruits under the watchful eyes of coalition advisors, CMATT let them train their own personnel. This infantry-based army would allow the Iraqis to build a military force that suited the need of their nation based on the decisions of the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{393}

In June 2004 CMATT and CPATT were combined under the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I). Coalition units then integrated Iraqi forces within their brigades, augmented heavily by additional U.S. advisors from the conventional force. Lieutenant General Petraeus took over as the first commander of MNSTC-I.\textsuperscript{394} During this phase of the SFA campaign, there was little to no evidence of discussions at the senior policy decision maker level regarding how to conduct the SFA in Iraq or even

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{392} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{393} David, T.C. Building the Iraqi Army: teaching a nation to fish. (United States Army Command and General Staff College master’s thesis. AY 04-05).
\end{itemize}
if SFA should occur. Rather, evidence shows the U.S. military (DoD) was left in charge of how to best develop and implement the SFA campaign on an unprecedented scale.

B. The Surge (January–December 2007)

In many ways, the efforts of the United States military from June 2004 to July 2007 were “more of the same.” A larger number of United States troops were committed to both combat and training roles in Iraq. However, there continued to be minimal strategic guidance from the president and senior policy makers. Instead, the military was forced to do its best while a full-fledged sectarian war emerged in Iraq.

On 10 January 2007, President Bush again addressed the nation. After discussing the continued deteriorating circumstances in Iraq, he then described his future plans for Iraq, a tactic that would eventually be known as “the surge,” or the dramatic increase in the number of U.S. forces in Iraq and a major shift in their role:

Tonight in Iraq, the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that will determine the direction of the global war on terror — and our safety here at home. The new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course in Iraq, and help us succeed in the fight against terror. When I addressed you just over a year ago, nearly 12 million Iraqis had cast their ballots for a unified and democratic nation. The elections of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections would bring the Iraqis together, and that as we trained Iraqi security forces we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops.\(^{395}\)

After describing what had occurred two years before with the first Iraqi elections, President Bush then went on to discuss the increased level of violence between Shia and Sunni Iraqis:

But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq — particularly in Baghdad — overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq's elections posed for their cause, and they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam — the Golden Mosque of Samarra — in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq's Shia population to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.396

This admission by the president that the strategy used by Al Qaeda in Iraq worked was something rarely seen in previous SFA missions. The president acknowledged the failure of the past years of effort by the United States in its attempts to both stabilize Iraq and build a competent Iraqi security force to protect the Iraqi people. He continued, “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people — and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.”397

President Bush admitted the responsibility for the failed efforts in Iraq laid with him; he then discussed the need to change the current strategy (or lack thereof) in Iraq. This truly was the first time that clear evidence existed of the national security team and senior policy decision makers directly being involved in how to best implement the SFA campaign in Iraq:

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396 Ibid.
397 Ibid.
It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted members of Congress from both parties, our allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefitted from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.  

While the early counterinsurgency strategy had limited success, President Bush publicly discussed the importance of establishing security in Iraq, especially in the capitol, Baghdad. The strategy of building ISF while United States troops commuted to work had proven ineffective. At this point, President Bush and senior policy makers decided to change the strategy in Iraq, with security being the main focus.

“The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis. Only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it,” President Bush stated.

He then laid out the rationale for the surge. He stated that there were not enough troops (from both the United States and Iraq) to secure the neighborhoods once insurgents were cleared out of them — not enough to “hold” those neighborhoods, allowing the insurgents to move back in once the U.S./Iraqi troops left. Second, there were too many restrictions placed on the U.S. troops. Living on heavily fortified bases, known as forward operating bases, the U.S. troops commuted to and from where they

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398 Ibid.  
399 Ibid.
operated, often risking attacks by deadly roadside bombs as they traveled. In what was an attempt to minimize the danger to troops, the commuting to and from their Iraqi partners actually exposed them to even more danger. President Bush continued:

Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.\textsuperscript{400}

The commitment of the surge included an additional five U.S. brigades, bringing an approximate increase of 20,000 troops into Iraq. President Bush highlighted that their focus would be on Baghdad and increasing the security alongside their Iraqi counterparts:

This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them — five brigades — will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.\textsuperscript{401}

President Bush then described the new strategy of “clear, hold, and build.” Whereas past operations may have cleared Baghdad neighborhoods of insurgents, there were not enough troops, or the tactics were wrong, resulting in the coalition troops departing and insurgents reoccupying the neighborhoods. In this new strategy, with more troops and less restrictive rules of engagement, the coalition troops would clear the neighborhoods but then remain there to hold

\textsuperscript{400} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{401} Ibid.
them while other agencies would build those neighborhoods back up to keep the insurgents from returning, President Bush stated: Many listening tonight will ask why this effort will succeed when previous operations to secure Baghdad did not. Well, here are the differences: In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we'll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared.402

President Bush and his policy team warned the American public that this new strategy would not bring about an immediate end to the growing violence. Rather, it would take time, something about which the American public had been increasingly frustrated. By reducing the level of violence, especially in Baghdad, senior U.S. policy makers hoped this would open the door to reconciliation from some of the previous sectarian violence tearing at the fabric of Iraqi society, as President Bush said:

This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq's Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace — and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible.403

In what I consider to be the most important part of his speech, President Bush explained to the American public the United States was now in a different kind of war, one that would not have a definitive ending, such as a Victory in Iraq Day. He explained that this new type of war, war amongst the people in Rupert Smith's parlance, would

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402 Ibid.
403 Ibid.
require different sacrifices from past, more conventional wars. He then discussed the interagency collaboration that brought about the decision to surge more U.S. troops to Baghdad and acknowledged there were many who disagreed with this strategy. However, the president and his team saw this strategy as the best way to break the cycle of violence in Iraq, assist the Iraqi government in building security forces to protect its population, and, in the end, bring the United States troops home from Iraq:

Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and grandfathers achieved. There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship. But victory in Iraq will bring something new in the Arab world — a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people. A democratic Iraq will not be perfect. But it will be a country that fights terrorists instead of harboring them — and it will help bring a future of peace and security for our children and our grandchildren.

This new approach comes after consultations with Congress about the different courses we could take in Iraq. Many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States, and therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq's borders and hunting down al Qaeda. Their solution is to scale back America's efforts in Baghdad — or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. We carefully considered these proposals. And we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear the country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale. Such a scenario would result in our troops being forced to stay in Iraq even longer, and confront an enemy that is even more lethal. If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.

In the days ahead, my national security team will fully brief Congress on our new strategy. If members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable people have different views, and they will voice their criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to scrutiny. And all involved have a responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed.404

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404 Ibid.
In many ways, the surge was a success. While initially American casualties increased due to units moving into and staying in areas held by insurgents, the “clear, hold, and build” strategy started to bear results. The additional troops and new tactics allowed both U.S. and Iraqi troops to gain footholds in some of the most troubled neighborhoods, planting themselves firmly between the warring factions or the insurgents and the people. Within months, coalition casualties began to drop as more insurgents were taken off the battlefield, miles of concrete walls separated neighborhoods, and more ISF came online to provide a much-needed boost in local security presence.

Some will argue that the surge’s success was due to the now famous Anbar Awakening, where Sunni Arab tribes, tired of the extremist brand of Islam brought by the mostly foreigners in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), began to fight back. These Sunni tribes would soon seek out the help of the Americans to fight AQI together. This was a major development for the United States forces, and the timing worked out nearly perfectly with the surge. Having coopted many of the Sunnis whom they were previously fighting, the coalition now had more Sunnis on their side in the fight against AQI. The combination of this awakening during this time period combined with the surge gave the time the Iraqis needed to hold and build the neighborhoods in Baghdad.

C. Drawdown (May 2008–September 2010)

The success of the Sunni awakening and surge of U.S. troops bought the time Iraq needed to stabilize itself and put more trained security forces into the fight. With the
American public and Congress growing weary of continued American casualties and gigantic expenses, President Bush looked for a way to leave Iraq. On 17 November 2008, the Strategic Framework for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, known as the Strategic Framework Agreement, was signed. The agreement let Iraqis and the world know the United States would depart Iraq by the end of 2011. The agreement looked to normalize the U.S.-Iraqi relationship with strong economic, diplomatic, cultural, and security cooperation.

The Strategic Framework Agreement set the stage for the eventual drawdown of United States troops in Iraq. ISF would now take the lead, and the Americans would support their efforts. Unilateral American combat operations were no longer allowed: The Americans needed to have Iraqi partners with them if they were conducting any sort of combat operation.

In his radio address on 6 December 2008, President Bush discussed the importance of both the Strategic Framework Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement signed between Iraq and the United States. President Bush described how the Iraqis would now assume the lead for security operations in all major Iraqi population centers: U.S. combat forces would move out of Iraqi cities and step back while their Iraqi counterparts took charge. He also acknowledged what many believed: The surge had worked. The extra expenditure in American blood and treasure had bought precious time for the Iraqis to stabilize their battered country. Finally, he discussed the plan to bring all U.S. troops home by the end of 2011, a pledge that President Obama would carry out:

This withdrawal will take place in two stages: The first stage will occur next year, when Iraqi forces assume the lead for security operations in all major population centers, while U.S. combat forces move out of Iraqi cities and move into an overwatch role. After this transition has occurred, the drawdown of American forces will continue to the second stage, with all U.S. forces returning home from Iraq by the end of 2011.

As we enter this new phase in America’s relations with Iraq, we have an opportunity to adopt a new perspective here at home. There were legitimate differences of opinion about the initial decision to remove Saddam Hussein and the subsequent conduct of the war. But now the surge and the courage of brave Iraqis have turned the situation around. And Americans should be able to agree that it is in our Nation’s strategic and moral interests to support the free and democratic Iraq that is emerging in the heart of the Middle East.

The American people have sacrificed a great deal to reach this moment. The battle in Iraq has required a large amount of time and a large amount of money. Our men and women in uniform have carried out difficult and dangerous missions and endured long separations from friends and family. And thousands of our finest citizens have given their lives to make our country safer and bring us to this new day. The war in Iraq is not yet over — but thanks to these agreements and the courage of our men and women in Iraq, it is decisively on its way to being won.\textsuperscript{406}

While most American troops never really “moved out of the cities,” they did turn over the lead in nearly all conventional operations to the Iraqis. No longer did the American troops “own battle space.” Rather, Iraqi units were now considered “ground holding units” — not the Americans. This was a fundamental shift in the physical organization of the Iraqi battlefield, but even more importantly, in the mentality of the American troops in Iraq. They no longer had the legal authority to conduct independent operations, and any Iraqi detained now required a signed warrant by an Iraqi judge. The rule of law was starting to take shape in Iraq.\textsuperscript{407}


\textsuperscript{407} Morea, M. (2010). \textit{Shoulder to shoulder: achieving peace through partnership.} The Raider Brigade in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Transition to Operation New Dawn. Fort Steward, GA.
As combat operations shifted from the American to ISF, so too did types of SFA conducted by the American conventional forces. There was now a much larger emphasis on the advise portion of SFA. The organize, train, equip, and rebuild phases, for the most part, were greatly reduced. Instead, the American forces moved into a much larger advisory role starting in 2009 until the end of 2010. In this role, American units lived with their Iraqi counterparts, sharing the risks and directly receiving the benefits. This was a major shift from previous methods used by the Americans: living on large, secure Forward Operations Bases (FOBs), commuting to work with the ISF, then commuting back to the FOB at night.

For the Iraqis, having the Americans with them brought the key combat specialties which their fledgling security forces did not have access to, ranging from air power to medical evacuation to the use of highly sophisticated forensic labs to investigate improvised explosive devices. For the Americans, the benefits included receiving much better intelligence through the Iraqi networks, a decreased amount of United States ground troops conducting combat operations, and the ability to closely monitor the performance of their Iraqi partners in both combat operations and adherence to proper humanitarian conduct.  

In 2010, only one United States brigade remained in Baghdad and Baghdad Province. This brigade, designated as an Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB), partnered with four Iraqi Army Divisions, two Federal Police Divisions, and all the police forces in the province. It was a massive undertaking considering the AAB was only built around a heavy brigade combat team augmented with 48 additional field grade officers. It did

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408 Ibid.
409 Ibid, 134.
not have any major additional troop numbers or experts in advisory missions.

Fortunately, this brigade had served as the Consequence Management Response
Force (CMRF) in 2009. As the CMRF, this brigade underwent extensive training to
support U.S. Northern Command in the event of any natural disaster, chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive event in the United States. This
was the first time an active-duty brigade was on call to support any sort of contingencies
within the United States. The result was a fundamental shift in how the brigade viewed
itself and how it learned to work with local agencies. Rather than having the more
common mentality of the Army brigade being the “biggest and baddest on the block,”
the brigade rapidly learned to leave their ego at the door, realizing they would be
working for civilian officials at the local, municipal, county, state, or regional level to
support. The brigade would not be in the lead — they would be in support of the civilian
agency needing assistance. This proved invaluable to conducting SFA in Iraq.

The first AAB entered Iraq with the mentality that the Iraqis were in charge — that is,
the Iraqis were the supported unit, and the brigade was supporting them. Rather than
focusing on targeting enemy fighters as past U.S. units did, the AAB shifted its targeting
approach, focusing on the status of the partnership with each of its Iraqi units.
Relationships became pacing items, as important as a tank or weapons system to the
commanders, and were tracked as such in weekly briefings.

The result was an increase in confidence of the AAB’s partnered Iraqi commanders.
They began to act like American commanders, took more responsibility for the success
of their respective areas of operation, and took better care of their soldiers. Soon,

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410 Ibid, 22.
411 Ibid, 11.
412 Ibid, 88.
outlying American units were unable to pass through the Iraqi Army sectors without prior
coordination — something American units expect of one another but until this time the
Iraqis had not been capable of enforcing. That was no longer the case. Rather than
getting frustrated with their Iraqi partners, however, the American brigade commander
and his units saw this as a major step forward: Their Iraqi partners were embracing the
fact that they were responsible for their sector and acted as such.413

By the end of 2010, Iraqi units were conducting unilateral operations with minimal
American support. Some operations where American support was needed involved a
single American vehicle with a four-man crew from the AAB accompanying Iraqi
operations. This liaison unit was there strictly to assist the Iraqi leadership should they
need additional American assets still not organic to the ISF.414 But this shift
demonstrated the ISF had made major improvements since 2008. As the first AAB
departed Iraq in December 2010, most were optimistic that their efforts to assist the
Iraqis had made a difference and the ISF was on track to be successful. Unfortunately,
the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 2011 proved this hope was false.
Immediately the Iraqi Prime Minster, Nouri al-Maliki, would move to put trusted family
members in key positions both in the ISF and Iraqi government. Corruption and ethnic
prosecution against Sunnis returned to a fever pitch as morale amongst the rank and
file members of the ISF plummeted. When ISIS entered Iraq in 2014, the hollowed out
ISF would implode resulting in American intervention in 2015 to prevent the wholesale
fall of Iraq to ISIS.

413 Ibid, 13.
414 Ibid, 76.
III. Existing Theories

This section will discuss how the three theories selected for this dissertation (logrolling, offensive realism, and balance of risk theory) could or could not explain the eventual decision of the United States to commit conventional forces in an advisory role to rebuild ISF. Each of the following sections will review the respective theory and then provide evidence to support or deny the supposition of the theories with regards to the SFA campaign in Iraq.

A. Logrolling

As a refresher, the first political systems theory, which has a direct impact on whether or not the United States decides to commit its military to an advisory mission, is logrolling. Logrolling theory states that parochial groups (industrialists, financiers, traders, military, etc.) in society each have some economic or political interest in an expansionist foreign policy. Individually, none of them can influence state policy. Therefore, they engage in logrolling, where each group gets what it wants in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies its coalition partners desire. In the case of SFA, it is those domestic powers that advocate for a policy of committing U.S. forces to assist a host nation (HN)’s security force in for a variety of reasons. This theory explains economic motivations behind those supporting an advisory mission. However, it fails to take into consideration elements such as international politics and the security situation within an HN.
The Iraq SFA case must be viewed after the events of 9/11 and President Bush’s belief in the need to preempt future attacks. In his speech at the West Point graduation in 2002, President Bush explained how America now faced new threats that required a new response:

In defending the peace we face a threat with no precedent. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger the American people and our nation. The attacks of September the 11th required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men. All of the chaos and suffering they caused came at much less than the cost of a single tank. The dangers have not passed. This government and the American people are on watch. We are ready. Because we know that terrorists have more money and more men and more plans.415

President Bush acknowledged that these new threats consisted of a “perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.”416 The advancements in chemical as well as biological weapons was of great concern for a world where failing states allowed non-state armed groups to not only get established, but to flourish. Additionally, there was continued concern over countries such as Pakistan or members of the former Soviet Union losing control of a nuclear weapon to one of these armed groups. These non-state armed groups were such that “even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.”417

President Bush argued that the deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, had no effect against “shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” He also argued that the long-time strategy of containment was not

416 Ibid.
417 Ibid.
possible as unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction could deliver those
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.

Unlike as in the decades of the Cold War, President Bush argued that the war on
terror would not be won by remaining on the defensive. Rather, America needed to take
the offense and “disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”418
He also acknowledged that the way domestic agencies collected intelligence needed to
change with this emerging threat. Finally, the United States military had to be ready to
“strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world.”419 It was in this speech that
the idea of preemption emerged as way for Americans to “to defend our liberty and to
defend our lives.”420

In this new type of threat environment, logrolling loses some of its effectiveness as a
predicting theory. Rather than having the time to debate and gather domestic entities
with similar interests to drive foreign policy action, Bush’s new doctrine of preemption
would cut out many of those previous characteristics found in the theory of logrolling.
While the debate before the invasion of Iraq reached a global scale, with dozens of
countries, many close allies of the United States, coming out against any military action
against Iraq, there is little evidence of small, domestic interest groups unifying to push
the United States into the ground invasion of Iraq.

I argue that the decision to invade Iraq was a combination of simmering tension
since the of the Gulf War in 1991, an extreme distrust of Saddam Hussein, and the
belief that he was harboring weapons of mass destruction, rather than the collusion of
United States domestic interests groups in favor of invading Iraq. There is no evidence

418 Ibid.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
to support logrolling occurred with regards to the SFA mission in Iraq. Therefore, logrolling is not a good predictor for why the United States opted to commit its conventional forces to rebuild ISF.

B. Offensive Realism

Offensive realism claims states seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power positions. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals.

Similar to the previous example involving log rolling, offensive realism requires an analysis of the objectives of the SFA campaign in Iraq. While the Iraqi leadership and military were clearly the enemy of the United States in the initial portion of the Iraqi war and invasion, once Saddam Hussein and his cronies were out of power, the United States worked with the Iraqis to rebuild and restore a functioning government. The hoped-for end state was a democratic Iraq to serve as a model for other Arab states looking to transition from authoritarian rule.

Once the United States fully committed to the rebuilding of ISF, offensive realism needs to explain how this would help the United States accumulate more power at the expense of its rivals. While AQI, an offshoot of Al Qaeda, certainly was a rival, there is little evidence to show that operations in Iraq helped the United States accumulate more power. If anything, the events in Iraq caused the United States to lose power both in the regional and international stages.
Regional powers such as Iran also posed a challenge to the amount of influence and power the United States would have in the region. Despite overwhelming evidence of Iranian meddling in Iraq, including providing the deadly explosively formed penetrator versions of improvised explosive devices to insurgents as well as using members of its Quds force to train Shia militias on how to better attack United States forces, America did not take any overt actions to dissuade Iran from its courses of action.421

According to offensive realism, the United States would have to take action against Iran to ensure it maximized its power against this regional rival competing for influence in Iraq. However, as the case demonstrates, the United States did not take overt action against Iraq, which is evidence that offensive realism does not accurately explain why the Iraq SFA mission occurred. The increasing financial burdens hurting the U.S. economy, the American loss of confidence in the rationale for invading Iraq in the first place and other factors all support why offensive realism does not effectively explain why the United States invaded Iraq.

C. Balance of Risk Theory

The third theory I will compare is the balance of risk theory. Rooted on Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, balance of risk theory argues that great powers pursue risky intervention strategies in the periphery to avert perceived losses.422 The necessity of avoiding losses in their state’s material power, status, or reputation weighs more


422 Taliaferro, 14.
heavily in the calculations of the leaders than the prospect of gains in those commodities.\textsuperscript{423} Senior officials initiate risky diplomatic and/or military intervention strategies to avoid such losses in a state’s material power, status, or reputation in domestic, regional, and international politics. States continue to invest in and even escalate failing peripheral interventions to recoup past losses.\textsuperscript{424} This theory is extremely relevant especially when decision makers are deciding to extend or end an advisory mission. Leaders must balance the cost in the state’s power or reputation against the continued commitment of blood and treasure to an advisory mission. These factors make Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory extremely useful. Additionally, Taliaferro looks at the rationale behind why great powers intervene in what he calls “the periphery.”\textsuperscript{425} In the case of Iraq, the balance of risk theory has positive explanatory power, especially when considering why the decision was made to conduct the surge of troops to Baghdad in 2007.

In 2006, the situation in Iraq was at one of its lowest points. A sectarian civil war was ranging across Iraq. Over 800 American soldiers were killed in 2006 in Iraq,\textsuperscript{426} one of the highest totals in the years American troops were in the country. Attacks on both American troops and Iraqi civilians were at an all-time high. Dead Iraqi civilians showing horrendous signs of torture were appearing every morning across Baghdad and other parts of Iraq, victims of the sectarian violence. For example, on 3 November 2006,
nearly 60 tortured bodies were found in Baghdad in 24 hours.\textsuperscript{427} The level of horror and violence had reached its peak.

Without a doubt, Iraq falls within Taliaferro’s definition of being on the periphery of the United States. As a reminder, Taliaferro defines the periphery as “geographic areas where actual or likely conflict cannot directly threaten the security of a great power’s homeland.”\textsuperscript{428} Whereas others draw a distinction between the periphery and core based solely on geographic distance, Taliaferro tries to incorporate the relative distribution of capabilities into his definition. A region is peripheral vis-à-vis a great power based on a combination of: “1) its geographical distance from the core and 2) the inability of the peripheral state’s military forces to inflict damage on the great power’s homeland.”\textsuperscript{429} This concept of intervening in peripheral regions ties directly into the United States concept of both security cooperation and SFA.

While it can be argued in a globalized world with transnational terror groups, perhaps there is no periphery anymore. But according to Taliaferro’s definition, Iraq’s military forces did not have the ability to inflict damage on the homeland of the United States directly. While Al Qaeda had clearly demonstrated its ability to do so at the start of the ground war in 2003, Al Qaeda was not in Iraq in major numbers and was not able to reach the United States homeland from Iraq.

In his book \textit{The gamble: David Petraeus and the American military adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008}, Thomas Ricks describes a meeting between Secretary of Defense


\textsuperscript{428} Taliaferro, 46.

\textsuperscript{429} Ibid. Taliaferro argues that while some would maintain the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaida, a transitional network of Islamic extremists whose leadership received safe haven in Afghanistan, along with the fact that they did not use conventional military weapons, invalidates the concept of a periphery. However, he argues the fact that the United States and its allies launched military operations into Afghanistan to deny that safe haven still validates the concept of periphery regions.
Rumsfeld and former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Jack Keane on 19 September 2006. Keane’s grim message was, “We are edging toward strategic failure. Despite capturing Saddam Hussein, killing his two sons, holding three elections, writing a constitution, installing a permanent government, beginning to develop a capable ISF, killing Zarqawi — the level of violence has increased every year in the contested areas. Security and stability are worse today than it had been since the insurgency started. It threatens the survival of the government and the success of our mission.”430

It would take General Raymond Odierno going around his immediate commander, General George Casey, and speaking directly with the White House to plead his case. “Ironically it was only after Odierno stepped outside that structure, rejecting the views of his superiors and lobbying the White House on his own, that policy formulation began to work effectively, producing a workable strategy.”431 With the amount of United States blood and treasure already invested in Iraq (America had suffered over 3,000 killed in action by this point), the options for the United States were limited: 1) Double down and invest more resources to try and turn what looked like certain defeat into a victory, 2) stay the current course, which would certainly lead to defeat, or 3) cut and run by pulling out all the American troops to Iraq, a clear defeat. Any defeat in this case would send a signal to the enemies of America that it did not have the stamina to stay through a tough, bloody fight, and its aversion to casualties, similar to Mogadishu in 1993, was its Achilles heel.

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431 Ibid, 92.
Balance of risk theory argues that great powers pursue risky intervention strategies in the periphery to avert perceived losses.\textsuperscript{432} The necessity of avoiding losses in their state’s material power, status, or reputation weighs more heavily on the calculations of the leaders than the prospect of gains in those commodities.\textsuperscript{433} States continue to invest in, and even escalate, failing peripheral interventions to recoup past losses.

In the case of the Iraq SFA campaign, the president decided to initiate a risky strategy: the dramatic increase of combat troops to buy more time for the struggling ISF to stabilize their nation. This strategy was the surge and was intended to ensure the past losses of soldiers and treasure were not in vain, while averting any perceived losses in the status of the United States. While many were arguing the efforts in Iraq were failing — and I agree with those who believed this in 2006 — the United States not only continued to invest in its efforts in Iraq, but it escalated what was easily viewed as a failing peripheral intervention. In the case of the surge, balance of risk theory does the best job out of the three described theories to explain why the United States greatly increased its commitment on what certainly looked like a failing intervention on the periphery.

While the balance of risk theory does a better job of explaining why the United States surged its forces in 2007 to Iraq, it does not accurately predict what happened at the end of 2011: All United States forces withdrew from Iraq, with the eventual result being the rise of ISIS and collapse of the Iraqi military in 2014. Therefore, Taliaferro’s balance of risk theory shows much better predictive power than logrolling or offensive realism in the Iraqi case study, especially with regards to the decision to the surge.

\textsuperscript{432} Taliaferro, 14.
\textsuperscript{433} Ibid.
However, balance of risk theory did not do a good job of predicting why the United States first intervened in Iraqi in 2003 or why it opted to end its commitment in 2011.

IV. Smart Partnership in Iraq

The previous theories do not accurately nor fully account for the reasons why the United States decided to commit its conventional forces into Iraq in an advisory role. Each theory focused on only one or two aspects of why a power such as the United States would opt to assist a nation such as Iraq rebuild its military. However, I believe these previous theories fell short in their explanatory role and are not the best way to predict if the United States will be successful in meeting its strategic objectives for future SFA missions. This next section will look at the components of smart partnership, testing each variable to see if it provides better explanatory power in the Iraqi case.

The Iraq SFA campaign highlights the challenges of conducting such a large advisory effort without the key elements of smart partnership present. In this case study, the national interests for getting involved in and continuing in Iraq changed. This shift in the casus belli would impact the other variables of smart partnership in a negative way. Interagency collaboration remained a challenge from the early planning of the Iraqi campaign through the majority of the SFA effort. There was a short period where a combination of systems and key personalities resulted in an improvement in interagency collaboration, but for the majority of the Iraqi SFA campaign, interagency collaboration struggled. Civil-military interaction ebbed and flowed depending on how the American public perceived the challenges or successes of the SFA campaign. Additionally, the Iraqi case experienced a shift in the type of civil-military interaction demonstrated by President Bush and his administration, a shift from a “Huntingtonian” model to an Eliot
Cohen unequal dialogue mode. Finally, the views of legitimacy from within Iraq, within
the United States, and by the regional partners waxed and waned depending on the
success of failure of the security situation in Iraq. Additionally, the United States SFA
mission was constantly hindered by a mix of corruption and sectarian violence within the
country of Iraq.

A. National Interests

The first variable of smart partnership involves the national interests of the United
States. This includes looking into the stated or implied objectives of the SFA campaign,
what was identified in national security documents or primary sources, and whether the
SFA campaign objectives sought a limited or comprehensive change in the status quo
that furthered U.S. national interests. This next section will look into what evidence
supports or denies that the SFA mission in Iraq was in the national interest of the United
States.

Was invading Iraq and then rebuilding it in the national interest of the United States?
Hindsight now points to no. However, when viewed in context of the situation in 2003, it
appears that invading Iraq fit well within both the national interest of the United States
and under the new Bush doctrine of preemption, or at least it fit well in the eyes of
fervent supporters of President Bush, not to most foreign policy elite thinkers.

After the attacks of 9/11, the United States was on edge. America had just suffered
the worst attack on its soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941. The desire to root out and
destroy the perpetrators of these attacks led the United States into Afghanistan in
October 2001. As intelligence resources continued to untangle the web of Al Qaeda, they found out that it wasn’t just in Afghanistan; it had contacts and groups in numerous countries. There was a concern that Al Qaeda was in Iraq and could use that rogue nation as a base to try and launch another attack. It is important to acknowledge this was not a universal concern, but rather, varied thinking on the part of some who supported the decision to invade Iraq.

There also was the lingering feeling that Iraq was unfinished business from the first President Bush. While the 100-hour ground war in 1991 quickly defeated the Iraqi conventional forces and liberated Kuwait, it did not bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein. He rapidly crushed Kurdish and Shia uprisings and ruled the country with an even stronger iron fist until 2003. Despite sanctions, no-fly zones over two-thirds of his country and continued efforts by the United States to remove him from power, Saddam remained.434

At the time before the invasion, the United States and many of its allies believed that Iraq not only had weapons of mass destruction, but also had the capability to deploy them. Identified as one of the three countries in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech at the 2002 State of the Union address, Iraq was put on notice that the United States would not allow them to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Additionally, President Bush stated Iraq was “supporting terrorists.” He then added, “This is a regime which has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its

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own citizens.” If this wasn’t enough to convince the American public and Congress to consider military action against Iraq in the post-9/11 world, Secretary of State Colin Powell provided an impassioned brief to the United Nations making the final case as to why it was in the national interest of the United States to remove Saddam Hussein from power, by military means if necessary.

The lack of finding any significant amount of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq took away from the argument that it was in America’s interest to invade Iraq. However, once in Iraq and having dissolved its old regime, the United States could not walk away without creating even more friction and chaos in the Middle East. Instead, the United States opted to try and construct a democratic nation in a region where none had ever existed before. Driven by the post-9/11 ideals of President Bush, creating a democratic Iraq ruled by its own people was viewed as being in the national interest of the United States. As a result, U.S. conventional troops were involved in an SFA campaign from 2003 to 2011 and a new one that began in 2014 after ISIS exposed critical weaknesses in ISF. An article in the *Washington Post* from 6 November 2003, captured this sentiment well:

President Bush today portrayed the war in Iraq as the latest front in the “global democratic revolution” led by the United States. The revolution under former president Ronald Reagan freed the people of Soviet-dominated Europe, he declared, and is destined now to liberate the Middle East as well. In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) described as a major policy address by the White House, Bush avoided issues such as preemptive attack, weapons of mass destruction and “gathering” dangers to the United States. Rather, he put the war in a broader context of the “2,500-year old story of

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democracy,” in the same tradition as the “military and moral” American commitments to restoring democracy to post-War Germany, to protecting Greece from Communism during the Cold War and combating communist domination in Latin America, Europe and Asia, including, he said explicitly, Vietnam.437

In November 2005, the White House and National Security Council published The national strategy for victory in Iraq. For the first time since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, a national strategy document listed both the challenges and goals of the United States efforts in Iraq. Regarding national interests, this strategy stated:

Victory in Iraq is a Vital U.S. Interest. Iraq is the central front in the global war on terror. Failure in Iraq will embolden terrorists and expand their reach; success in Iraq will deal them a decisive and crippling blow. The fate of the greater Middle East — which will have a profound and lasting impact on American security – hangs in the balance.438 This strategy would then go on to describe how the strategy for victory included, “Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.”439

The Bush administration made a clear and compelling argument that invading Iraq in 2003 was well within U.S. national interests, especially in light of the 11 September 2001 attacks. As the rationale for going to war, after weapons of mass destruction were not found, the administration, now committed to rebuilding a shattered nation in the heart of the Middle East, changed its rationale as to why the Iraq SFA campaign was in the national interest of the United States. Despite the different reasons stated, the fact remains that the administration never wavered from this argument that a stable and secure Iraq was always within America’s national interest and fell with the policies of a

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439 Ibid, 2.
post-9/11 America, although there was not wide agreement on this point both within the United States and amongst our allies.

B. Interagency Collaboration

The second component needed for smart partnership is interagency collaboration. This variable looks to identify if there is a clear delineation between the lead and supporting agencies, there is clear definition of success, and mutual relationships and goals exist. Interagency collaboration includes any jointly developed structures and shared successes for collaboration. It also asks if mutual authority and accountability exists across all involved agencies. Finally, it asks if those agencies share resources and rewards equally.

It is my evaluation that in the Iraq SFA campaign, especially at the start, the United States demonstrated poor interagency collaboration. An example that highlights this ineffective interagency collaboration involves the _DoD Directive Number 3000.05, Military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations_, issued 23 November 2005, and the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44).441

After the initial confusion regarding who would have responsibility for post-war Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense set up OHRA under the leadership of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner. But within days of his haphazard arrival in Iraq, the White House changed their mind on the initial plan to hand over power to a transitional Iraqi

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440 Department of Defense directive number 3000.05, Military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
government and hold elections within 90 days. Instead, the White House appointed Paul Bremer on 11 May 2003 to head up the new CPA, thereby subsuming OHRA.442

However, as the United States SFA campaign began to emerge and the Iraqi theater matured, confusion still reigned over what U.S. government agency had primacy when it came to the stability, security, transition, and reconstruction of Iraq and specifically their security forces. DoD Directive 3000.05 spelled out the role of the U.S. military with regards to stabilization operations. However, it came out over two years after Iraq had been invaded and conventional U.S. military forces had been fighting and advising. It stated:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:

Rebuilding indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.443

442 Sky, 11.
443 Department of Defense Directive number 3000.05.
Since no other agency in the United States government had the budget, manpower, or reach as the DoD, many of the tasks leaders in the military assumed would be handled by civilian agencies had to be undertaken by military troops, a mission for which they were not trained nor one many believed they needed to be doing. However, this directive focused on the key tasks DoD forces would have to do, regardless of whom they believed should be accomplishing this mission.

Shortly after the DoD issued its guidance on military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction, President Bush issued NPSD 44. NSPD 44 clearly stated the State Department was the lead agency for United States government efforts regarding stabilization and reconstruction activities. It emphasized the need for coordinated efforts across U.S. government entities, but in reality, the funding and manpower never shifted to allow the State Department to achieve this. NSPD 44 stated:

Need for Coordinated U.S. Efforts. To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response (sic) to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Coordination. The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships
among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.\footnote{NSPD 44, 2.}

NSPD 44 placed the State Department as the supported agency, meaning the DoD, along with all other United States government agencies, would be supporting that department when it came to reconstruction and stabilization efforts. While the directive was clear on paper, the amount of personnel and funding was telling a different story in Iraq. The State Department could not compete with the DoD from a personnel and budgeting standpoint. In Iraq, U.S. conventional forces were not only conducting security missions, but also the reestablishment of essential services and stabilization projects that NSPD-44 assigned to the State Department.

Despite the differences in resources, the combination of Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus in Iraq began to show the advantages of having two leaders with a common vision and who worked well together. Ricks describes the relationship in his book, \textit{The gamble}: “Crocker and Petraeus would become close partners in 2007, creating almost the reverse of dysfunctional relationship that had existed between the first permanent post invasion U.S. envoy, Ambassador Bremer, and his military counterpart, General Sanchez. They were determined to get along, to achieve the ‘unity of effort’ whose lack had so plagued the American effort. Where Bremer had been a control freak, Crocker could be self-effacing. Where Sanchez dove into minutiae, Petraeus strove constantly to keep his head above water, to focus on the big picture.”\footnote{\textit{The gamble: General David Petraeus and the American military adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008.} Ricks.}\footnote{Ricks. \textit{The gamble: General David Petraeus and the American military adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008.}} The two agreed on the way forward in Iraq and would come to symbolize what an effective relationship between the ambassador and military commander on the
ground looks like. Unfortunately, there was no blueprint for this success – just the fortuitous chemistry of two professionals who worked well together.

As the security situation in Iraq stabilized, the relationship between the U.S. conventional forces and interagency partners such as Department of State improved as well. The relationship between the American units and their provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) provide excellent examples of how a strategic document such as NSPD 44 played out on the ground in Iraq. In 2007, the State Department–run Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghdad went where the United States military and “ground owning commander” wanted them to go. This was partially driven by the security situation as well as the belief the U.S. military was in charge of reconstruction efforts. These PRTs were critical in getting civil-military experts, such as with the Department of State or USAID, out of the FOBs and into the field.

However, by 2010, the PRTs had the flexibility to go where it saw the greatest need based on feedback from both the Iraqi government and the American military. Rather than being told where to go, the PRTs, equipped with a mixed security escort of Iraqi and American military, now had the lead on projects and created their own schedule of where to go and when. The ground-owning commander was now the Iraqi general whose unit was responsible for a sector, and the American commander was supporting his Iraqi partner. It was a small but fundamental shift in both attitude and how the U.S. military was trying to “work itself out of a job.”

In many ways, interagency collaboration evolved as the Iraqi SFA campaign did. At the start, the post-campaign planning was a disaster. Initial efforts to coordinate the SFA mission stumbled over numerous interagency roadblocks, concerns over funding,
and confusion as to what agency had the lead. NSPD 44, the focus on unity of effort combined with a close working relationship between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and the improved security situation due to the surge of U.S. forces into Iraq all contributed to an improved interagency collaborative process. The challenge for future SFA missions, however, is to start with the positive interagency collaboration seen in Iraq in 2010, at the beginning instead of the end of an SFA campaign. Additionally, for future research, it would be worth devising ways to institutionalize the process as much as possible so not to be as dependent on personalities.

**C. Civil-military Interaction**

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when senior leaders develop and implement a strategy that is both feasible and suitable to the chosen means (military, intelligence, or otherwise) through an iterative civil-military discourse. This includes discursive dialogues between senior military and civilian leadership at the strategic level. A strategy is deemed feasible if objectives can be accomplished by the appropriate agency or agencies within the given time, space, and resource limitations. A strategy is deemed suitable if the chosen objectives are uniquely matched to the capabilities of the SFA forces selected. In this case, the difference between civil-military interaction and interagency collaboration directly deals with the approach taken by the presidential administration to introduce, discuss, and have a relevant discourse on an SFA mission, whereas interagency collaboration, as defined
above, focuses more on the processes occurring between different government agencies.

This section investigates whether any well-known civil-military relations models such as Huntington’s objective control, Feaver’s principle-agent theory, or Cohen’s unequal dialogue were being utilized during the Iraqi SFA campaign. In many ways, the Iraqi SFA campaign operated under two very different theories: Huntington’s objective control and Cohen’s unequal dialogue. As this section will demonstrate, there was a shift in civil-military interaction as the situation in Iraq changed. This points to the need to continually reevaluate the current situation in a SFA campaign and adjust civil-military interaction as needed to suit the facts on the ground. This raises the question for future research whether a civil-military interaction at the senior policy maker level requires a sliding scale: The amount of guidance from the civilian leader depends on the complexity of the given mission.

The debate over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was well-established and played out in the 2016 presidential election as candidates argued over who was and wasn’t in support of the invasion. A March 2003 Pew poll showed that approximately 72 percent of Americans said they were in favor of using military force in Iraq. This number, however, dropped to 38 percent by February 2008. Simultaneously, the perception of how the war was going changed. In March 2003, 88 percent of Americans surveyed by Pew said the war was going very/fairly well. By February 2008, this number was at 48 percent, rebounding from a low below 40 percent in 2007.447 This view of Americans would play out through congressional support for the war and influence the debate over

aspects such as the surge and when to shift the military mission in Iraq from leading combat operations to supporting Iraqi operations.

At the start of the war, President Bush mirrored the same attitude his father had regarding the 1991 Gulf War. In his address announcing the start of the air war on 16 January 1991, President H.W. Bush stated, “Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I’ve told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I’m hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.”

Echoing the much-often repeated belief that the American effort in Vietnam failed due to the interference of politicians, both presidents, father and son, would take a hands-off approach to how they would run their respective wars with Iraq.

President George W. Bush took a very similar approach at the start of the Iraqi campaign. From 2003 to 2006, there is little evidence of the president directly getting involved in the strategy of how the American military waged its SFA campaign in Iraq. Rather, exercising what Huntington called “objective control of the military,” President Bush provided objectives to the military and let the generals figure out how to best achieve those goals. At the start of the war in 2003, his stated objectives were as follows: “We’re hunting down the terrorists. We’re helping Iraqis build a free nation that

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is an ally in the war on terror. We’re advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability, and laying the foundation of peace for our children and grandchildren.”\textsuperscript{449} However, by the time \textit{The national strategy for victory in Iraq} was published in November 2005, the definition of the mission changed:

Victory in Iraq is defined in Stages. Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces. Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential. Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{450}

This evolution from what was called a “clear mission” into a staged approach to victory matched the increase in complexity of the mission. All three stages of this modified definition of victory involved the rebuilding of ISF, highlighting the importance of the SFA campaign. President Bush’s subjective control of the military approach was about to change.

In his book, \textit{Surge: my journey with General David Petraeus and the remaking of the Iraq War}, Peter Mansoor lays out the shift in the civil-military approach of President Bush:

The new strategy for reversing Iraq’s death spiral, subsequently known as the surge, was the result of collective and individual deliberation on what went wrong in Iraq and how to fix it. Groups working for the National Security Council, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all wrestled in the fall of 2006 with the deteriorating situation in Iraq and what do about it. A congressionally appointed Iraq Study Group also examined the state of affairs in the country and provided its own recommendations to the administration by the end of the year.


\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
These groups were all important in deliberating the change in strategy that would change the course of the war. Individuals also made a huge difference. Retired General Jack Keane, working as a member of a team assembled by the American Enterprise Institute, gained entree to the Oval Office and advised President Bush to reinforce the effort in Iraq to forestall defeat and achieve victory.

Most important, the president refused to give in to his many critics, who were all too quick to declare the war lost. Swimming against every political tide in the United States and the world, Bush decided to send tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq and to alter the priorities of U.S. forces there in accordance with a new counterinsurgency doctrine published in December 2006. His leadership and personal involvement in the details of strategic decision-making, regrettably lacking in the early years of the war, made the critical difference when it mattered most in 2007 and 2008.451

There are numerous key points in the above passage. Mansoor mentions that President Bush’s personal involvement “in the details of strategic decision making, regrettably lacking in the early years of the war, made the critical difference.”452 Rather than displaying a lack of strategic decision making, President Bush followed a more traditional, Huntingtonian approach as to how best provide guidance to the military. He defined the political objectives of the Iraq mission and gave his senior military leadership room to operate. Unfortunately, it would take too long before the president realized not only were the objectives not being achieved but the United States was rapidly approaching a strategic defeat in Iraq, before he altered his approach to civil-military relations.

452 Ibid.
We know that in 2002, President Bush read Eliot Cohen’s book, *Supreme command: soldiers, statesmen and leadership in wartime*. In this book, Cohen looks at the relationship between wartime civilian leaders and their lead generals. From his study, Cohen comes to the conclusion that “war is too important to be left to the generals” and develops what is now known as the unequal dialogue.

In his interview with the West Point Center for Oral History, Cohen describes his theory of unequal dialogue:

> The theory is well, what civilian leaders ought to do is be very clear about what the objectives are. They ought to provide the resources. Pick the senior commanders. Set some left and right limits, and then get out of the way. And the problem with that is, you know, when I looked at people like Lincoln or Churchill, that’s not the way they behaved. And the argument of the book instead was that what is desirable is what I call an “unequal dialogue,” where the civilian and military leaders are going back and forth, which is a dialogue.

> It is unequal, because the civilians are ultimately responsible and ultimately in charge. And that sometimes the civilians will have to go quite deeply into details not all the time, but sometimes. And that you know, when you need to be involved in the detail is a matter of judgment, and that’s part of what it is to be a statesman.

As Mansoor points out, President Bush became more personally involved in the decision making in what would eventually lead to the surge. This falls in line with Cohen’s theory: that the military and the civilian leaders need to have a dialogue, but in the end, the civilian leadership’s guidance must be followed.

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Mansoor also addressed the impact of a think tank, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and the role retired General Jack Keane played in influencing President Bush. An article in the *Washington Post* by Bob Woodward captures some of the influence Keane had in 2006 within the Bush White House: “Retired Army Gen. Jack Keane came to the White House on Thursday, Sept. 13, 2007, to deliver a strong and sober message. The military chain of command, he told Vice President Cheney, wasn't on the same page as the current U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus. The tension threatened to undermine Petraeus's chances of continued success, Keane said.”⁴⁵⁶

Even today, there is a great deal of debate over the role retired senior military leaders should take once they leave the service. Many advocate the opinion of retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Martin Dempsey that retired senior officers should “stay off of the political battlefield.”⁴⁵⁷ Keane, however, felt it was his duty to get more involved to prevent the Army and the United States military from suffering what was rapidly becoming a defeat in Iraq. His influence carried great weight with both the leadership of the Army and President Bush. As a result, Keane was able to greatly influence not only the decision on the surge, but also important decisions such as placing General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq mission in 2007.

AEI is one of many think tanks in Washington, DC. The AEI website states its current mission as follows: “The American Enterprise Institute is a public policy think tank dedicated to defending human dignity, expanding human potential, and building a freer and safer world. The work of our scholars and staff advances ideas rooted in our

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belief in democracy, free enterprise, American strength and global leadership, solidarity with those at the periphery of our society, and a pluralistic, entrepreneurial culture.” In the case of the Iraq SFA campaign, AEI was one of numerous think tanks that developed its own opinion and proposed various ways forward for the Bush administration to stave off defeat in Iraq. Its ability to influence policy at the highest level is what many of the current think tanks in the United States hope to do. In the Iraqi SFA case, AEI was successful in influencing the president toward its preferred course of action, a surge of American troops to buy more time for the Iraqi SFA mission.

The Iraq SFA campaign demonstrates a variety of civil-military interaction and challenges. Unlike the other two case studies, this case demonstrates a clear shift from one dominant theory of civil-military relations to another. Additionally, we see the impact of think tanks and super-empowered individuals such as retired General Jack Keane on the most senior policy decision maker in the United States. Many civilian actors can have a role in influencing the senior policy makers and ultimately the president. As a result, ensuring civil-military relations are clear and understood, may help with this decision making in future SFA cases.

D. Legitimacy

An SFA campaign is hypothesized to achieve national security objectives when the national government of the HN is deemed as legitimate in the eyes of its own population, the region, and the international community. There needs to be a view of legitimacy within: 1) the United States, 2) the HN with which the SFA campaign is taking

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place, and 3) the regional organizations to which the HN belongs. Peter Stillwell defined legitimacy as follows: “A government is legitimate if and only if the results of governmental output are compatible with the value pattern of the society.” Legitimacy is required at all levels, from the individual within the HN and/or the United States as they consider why to try to help out their government with regards to the views of regional and international organizations of both the U.S. SFA mission and the HN’s government.

Legitimacy has multiple components. For the purpose of the Iraq SFA campaign, legitimacy will be looked at in three ways, First, to what extent did the United States government attempt to build the perception of legitimacy with the U.S., within the HN (Iraq), and within regional organizations? Second, how did the HN population view both its government and security forces before, during, and after the advisory mission? Third and finally, what steps did senior U.S. policy makers take to garner popular support with the U.S. military and public? In the case of Iraq, we see a rapidly changing environment both within and outside of Iraq as the SFA mission progressed. The result is a constant shifting of the views of those affected directly and indirectly by American efforts to create effective and accountable ISF during this campaign.

In his book, *Running the world: the inside story of the National Security Council and the architects of American power*, David Rothkopf describes the Bush administration’s foreign policy as being akin to a four-quarter football game:

I believe people will ultimately look at the foreign policy of this administration as having four quarters, like a football game. The first was focused on September 11 and the instant coalition that was offered to us by the world to support our efforts in responding to the terrorist threat. The second came as we made the decision to enter Iraq and do so in a way that undercut must of our international

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459 Stillman.
support. The third has been spent, during the past year, with Condi’s (Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) leadership, rebuilding those international coalitions. But the fourth will be about Iran.\textsuperscript{460}

In Iraq, there was an initial majority of the population who were supportive of the American invasion. Shias and Kurds, who for decades were oppressed by Hussein and the minority Sunnis, were clearly in favor of the American military operations. However, as stability never materialized and the post-war Iraq quickly tumbled toward sectarian civil war, support for the new coalition government and its efforts rapidly dissipated. Iraqi complaints ranged from the inability of the coalition to provide power to Baghdad to the continued rise of sectarian violence. In a poll conducted in September 2007, “According to this poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC and NHK to assess the effects of the U.S. military’s surge strategy, 70 percent of Iraqis believe the strategy has made Iraq’s security situation worse. The poll finds 47 percent of Iraqis want U.S.-led forces to leave Iraq immediately and 34 percent want the troops to leave when the security situation improves. The results of the survey indicate the surge has hampered conditions for political dialogue, reconstruction and economic development and has not improved security. The findings come as U.S. commander General David Petraeus prepares to deliver his own assessment of the ‘surge’ strategy to Congress.”\textsuperscript{461}

In a survey of Iraqi public opinion by the International Republican Institute from 23 to 30 October 2010, nearly 60 percent of Iraqis stated things were headed in the wrong direction.\textsuperscript{462} This was nearly a 20 percent increase in dissatisfied respondents from


December 2009. Ironically, as the security situation seemed to be improving due to an increase in both the number and effectiveness of ISF, the Iraqi public expected to see a corresponding increase in jobs, essential services, and health care, something that the fledgling Iraqi government was unable to provide. This highlights an important point regarding legitimacy. Even though the SFA mission may have been achieving success, such as an increased number of effective ISF by October 2010, the public expected to see other simultaneous improvements to come with that successful SFA campaign, especially when the United States was involved.

From a regional perspective, there was little argument from most countries neighboring Iraq that the removal of Hussein was welcome. However, once the situation in Iraq started to rapidly deteriorate and it became clear that a permanent U.S presence in Iraq was needed to try to bring about stability, those nations rapidly changed their views. While Iran had the most to gain in a post-Saddam Iraq, neighboring countries such as Turkey, Syria, and Kuwait were concerned about the instability within Iraq. Turkey, always concerned with the Kurdish population in and across from its borders, was not in favor of an even greater autonomous Kurdistan, something that happened as the central Iraqi government struggled to exist, let alone control its own population. For Kuwait, the continued traffic of American military units put more pressure on both its internal and external politics. Syria rapidly became a staging point for extremists looking to fight the Americans, putting even more pressure on an already splintered political landscape. Jordan had to deal with not only being known as a close American ally, but

having to bear the burden of Abu Musad al-Zarqawi’s rise, the leader of a break-away faction of Al Qaeda in Iraq and who many consider the founder of today’s ISIS.  

Within the United States, the relationship between how Americans viewed the legitimacy of the Iraqi SFA mission varied based on whether the mission was going well. In November 2005, Representative John Murtha (D-PA) called for the United States to withdraw all troops from Iraq:

In another sign of rising discontent in Congress over the war in Iraq, perhaps the House’s most influential Democrat on military issues called today for the immediate withdrawal of all American forces from that nation. ‘The U.S. cannot accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. It is time to bring them home,’ said Rep. John Murtha of Pennsylvania, a former Marine intelligence officer in Vietnam and the senior Democrat on the House appropriations subcommittee that oversees military spending.

One could argue the American public is fickle: When it sees success, it supports the mission. Yet, this is the value of having public opinion directly tied to how congressional leaders should act. As Americans watched the number of American casualties continue to climb, coupled with the downward spiral in the security situation within Iraq, they began to express their frustrations publicly and through their representatives. The result was a wide variance in how much of the American public viewed the Iraqi SFA campaign’s legitimacy.

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V. Campaign Objectives and Conclusions

The main question for each of these case studies is whether the United States met its campaign objectives in each respective SFA mission. This portion of the case study will look at how the U.S. SFA campaign ended, what the results were at that time, and how the ISF looked five years after the end of the SFA mission.

I classify this case study as a failure. After the switch from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn on 1 September 2010, the continued drawdown of American forces in Iraq resulted in more autonomy being passed to the ISF. From a tactical perspective, the majority of the major army and federal police units were both capable and accountable to the Iraqi government. Having worked personally with six of the 18 total divisions in Iraq in 2010, I saw how much progress they had made since I first started building the NIA in 2004. They were tactically competent and professional in their approach and respected the rule of law. Even though the amount of U.S. advisors had been reduced, the fact that there was still a link to American enablers allowed the ISF to still perform well.\textsuperscript{465} This changed in 2011.

In this year, the date for the final withdrawal of all American forces from Iraq drew near. The few remaining American units in Iraq were told to “clean up the battlefield” and shifted from conducting SFA to trying to capture as many of the known terrorist suspects as possible before withdrawing from Iraq. Suddenly, the advisors and the American enablers were gone. American forward operating bases turned over to the ISF were rapidly plundered for anything of value. Air conditioners, copper wiring, and

\textsuperscript{465} This is based on the author’s experience serving as the operations officer for 5-7 Cavalry in 2009 to 2010 and the operations officer for 1-3 Advise and Assist Brigade through December 2010. These are also captured in the brigade’s after action review by Maj. Gary Morea.
furniture were looted within days of the base being handed back to the Iraqis. It was a
disturbing sign.\(^{466}\)

At the end of 2011, the last American troops not associated with the normal security
cooperation mission in Iraq exited the country. In attempt to normalize relations with
Iraq, the U.S. Embassy managed security cooperation and was in charge of small
numbers of U.S. trainers at a variety of Iraqi military bases. From the start of 2012 to
June 2014, the Iraqi military regressed to its old sectarian ways as the prime minster
coup-proofed his security forces. Senior Iraqi leaders who were trained by the
Americans and gained experience from years of fighting side by side with U.S. troops
were quietly removed and replaced with family members loyal to Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki. The corruption that American advisors had worked so hard to remove from the
security forces rapidly returned under the new, less-than-competent leadership. The
welfare of the security forces began to suffer, as did the logical support for these units.
When ISIS entered Iraq in 2014, the whole rotten house collapsed on itself.

*New York Times* author C.J. Chivers chronicled the collapse of the ISF in the face of
ISIS in June 2014. The ISF adopted a technique used by the Americans to provide
logistics during their time in Iraq: They relied on contractors. However, when the fight
with ISIS started, these contractors were unwilling to risk their lives and livelihood by
entering into a combat zone with supplies:

Several officers said the system the Interior Ministry had devised to supply its
forces was suited for peacetime, and predictably failed in war. They said it relied
on contracts with businesses that would deliver supplies to the troops’ main

\(^{466}\) The looting of the bases and the shift from SFA to “cleaning up the battlefield” was witnessed
personally by the author in April, August, and September 2011 as the 3rd Infantry Division prepared to
take over the Security Cooperation mission in Iraq in early 2012 prior to President Obama agreeing to
remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.
garrisons. But as the border-police convoys headed for territory under militant influence or control, the vendors would not follow.467

As a result, Iraqi units suffered from a lack of food, water, and ammunition. Without these essentials for combat in searing desert conditions, the brigade was forced to withdraw.

Another unit in the 4th Iraqi Division suffered from the inept leadership of a Maliki family member placed in command of the division. A member of the same tribe as the prime minister, General Maliki had formerly served in Amara as a senior officer in Iraq’s security forces. He left in disgrace in 2008 after being accused of providing government weapons to the Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia that opposed Western and Iraqi troops. He was granted a new command after receiving help from Sheikh Salam al-Maliki, a member of Parliament and a leader in the same Bani Malik tribe as the prime minister, who escorted General Maliki in the capital to lobby for a job. An official familiar with brigade’s preparations said General Maliki lacked the skills or character to lead. As ISIS advanced, the officer said, the general had been more interested in arranging patriotic ceremonies for television than in organizing his units for battle or ensuring they had food, water, and fuel.468

As a result of these failures, American conventional troops are once again in Iraq conducting an SFA mission. While there are still the normal security cooperation activities occurring through the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, nearly 5,000 conventional troops are in Iraq working closely with the ISF to improve their performance.

468 Ibid.
Stabilizing Iraq was always in the national interest of the United States. Even when the coalition of the willing was down to the coalition of the one (the United States), a stable Iraq with a competent security force to serve as a model for other Middle Eastern countries was needed. Then and now, it is still in the national interest of the United States to build a competent ISF.

This case study demonstrates how difficult interagency collaboration is in a complex SFA environment such as Iraq. From the initial planning of post-war Iraq to the continued feuds over who was in charge of the Iraqi reconstruction mission, there was a disconnected interagency process, where stovepiped communications and unity of command outweighed the more important unity of effort. This case also demonstrated the importance of having the right personalities working together at the senior level as we saw with the Ambassador Crocker-General Petraeus team who achieved that unity of effort, but it did not continue past their time in Iraq.

Civil-military interaction was also shaky across the entire Iraq SFA campaign. Support for the war continued to decline as the number of American casualties increased, along with the daily violence in Iraq. Even when the violence was lowered by the surge, Sunni awakening, and hard-fought gains of both Iraqi and American troops, it wasn't enough to bring about the needed Iraqi government reforms to ensure that the people of Iraq's needs were being met. The result was war weariness by both the American and Iraqi public, which virtually ensured the Iraqi SFA campaign would fail.

After working with coalition and American units, many of the ISF gained crucial legitimacy with the population they are supposed to protect. Incidents of ethnic violence (Sunni versus Shia) decreased in most of the army and federal police units. A few
smaller, specialized units still had (and have) a reputation as being sectarian in their conduct, but by 2010, the majority of the ISF were viewed as both competent and accountable by both the Iraqi population and U.S. advisors. Unfortunately, the Iraqi government lacked the legitimacy needed to ensure these SFA gains remained.

The parliamentary elections in March 2010 resulted in a win for Ayad Allawi over Prime Minister Malaki. However, since it wasn’t a decisive win, Malaki was able to delay and eventually ignore the results of the elections with the complicit support of the United States. The United States failed to take action against Maliki, letting him remain in power and set the stage to create a divisive, despotic, and sectarian government that would eventually rip the country apart and devastate American interests.\textsuperscript{469} This failure to enforce the election results cost both the Iraqi and the United States governments legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis, Americans, and the world.

All of these factors combined resulted in a failed SFA campaign in Iraq. The fact that United States troops are back in a combat advisory capacity in Iraq reinforces this fact. The question now is, are we doing more of the same, or is there a different approach being used to ensure we do not, once again, waste the lifeblood and treasure of America? How can smart partnership ensure we are not doing more of the same? I will review a summary and recommendations in the next chapter.

Chapter 8: The Need for Smart Partnership

I. Key Findings

This dissertation has shown that there are key elements that need to be present for the United States to execute an effective security force assistance (SFA) mission. These key elements, which are national interests, interagency collaboration, civil-military relations, and legitimacy, are the foundation of smart partnership. This chapter will present key findings and lessons from three cases where the United States committed its conventional military to SFA missions with varied results. In the cases where the elements of smart partnership were all present, the United States achieved its strategic objectives. Where elements of these components were weak or missing, the United States did not achieve its objectives.

National interests must be viewed through the lens of the American grand strategy during that period of history. The desired end state of a potential advisory mission should be debated thoroughly to ensure that the mission is within the United States’ national interests. Aligning the national interests with the core democratic principles of the United States helps steer an SFA mission toward success but doesn’t guarantee it. Senior policy makers must reframe national interests as they relate to SFA campaigns and, if necessary, make changes in their direction.

Successful interagency collaboration depends on procedures and personalities. The systems and procedures must be in place to ensure that shared intelligence, burden, and rewards for an SFA campaign are successful. The right personalities must also be in place to facilitate unity of effort versus unity of command. In an ideal situation, the two happen simultaneously (such as the Crocker-Petraeus team in Iraq). However, having
the right procedures in place to facilitate interagency collaboration may make it possible to overcome personalities that are dysfunctional to the organizations. Having these procedures in place help ensure that even poorly meshing personalities cannot upend a SFA campaign.

Civil-military relations matter. An unequal dialogue is a traditional American approach to civil-military interaction. But that dialogue must occur, and both sides must at least listen. A civil discourse must not turn into two sides talking past one another. Rather, each side much at least listen to and consider other options before blindly pushing their own. This happened in the Iraqi SFA case and led to the eventual failure of the mission.

Legitimacy is easy to measure, yet hard to achieve. Successful SFA campaigns were those that were viewed as legitimate by the host nation (HN) population, the United States people/Congress, and the regional partners around that HN. A lack of legitimacy at any of these levels makes achieving success in an SFA campaign that much tougher. Similarly to national interests, there must be a continuous reassessment of how these three areas of legitimacy are trending, and adjustments should be made as necessary.

Conventional forces are not optimal for SFA missions. They lack the training and proper manning for the mission. However, even for a mission as small as El Salvador, Special Forces were not capable of continually manning the SFA mission, which forced the United States to rely on its conventional forces. If the United States continues to conduct SFA missions, it must make the commitment in manpower, money, training, and long-term stability of specially trained conventional forces focused on conducting
advisory missions. Failure to do so now almost guarantees “more ad hockery” in future SFA missions.\textsuperscript{470}

**II. Summary of the Three SFA Cases**

The three SFA case studies described here, while cutting across different time periods and locations, all have key factors in common that predicated success or failure. Those with more elements of smart partnership were more successful. Those that struggled with one or more components of smart partnership tended to not be as successful or to fail. While three case studies are an incredibly small sample size, it is worth relooking at why smart partnership worked or did not work to help guide future SFA missions.

Here we will summarize the treatment of each factor by different United States administrations and how each factor impacted the achievement of the nation’s strategic objectives during the SFA campaign. Identifying and better utilizing these fundamentals can help future SFA planning and execution.

\textsuperscript{470} Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaking at Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare Conference, sponsored by the Marine Corps Training and Education Command and the United States Naval Academy, 29 Oct–1 Nov 2007, written 20 April 2007.
Any venture that is not within the national interests of the United States is a waste of time, resources, and lives. Any time the United States deems it necessary to put its military into harm’s way, the cause must be in the national interest of the United States. In all three cases, ensuring that the SFA campaign succeeded fell within the fully articulated national interest of the United States in that given period. The mission in El Salvador fell under the U.S. grand strategy of containment. After a contraction in the international stage following the collapse of South Vietnam and the Watergate affair, the United States needed to counter renewed Soviet influence and pressure on smaller nations. Ensuring that both the government of El Salvador and its security forces not only survived but became competent and accountable was well within the grand strategy of containment.

The Kosovo campaign occurred during a fundamental shift in the international milieu and after the Cold War. With the rise of ethnic- and religious-driven conflicts once the Cold War came to an end, the Clinton administration and the United Nations both looked at ways to better conduct peacekeeping operations and stem the bloody “wars amongst the people” from spreading. The result was the intervention in internal conflicts, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, to try to prevent the continued genocide of ethnic groups and stabilize Eastern Europe. This clearly fell within the national interests of the United States and was one of the first shifts in how America viewed its interests after the Cold War.
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States undertook a strategy of preemption, arguing that strategies of the Cold War, such as containment, were no longer appropriate for a post-Cold War world where organizations such as Al Qaeda could murder 3,000 Americans on U.S. soil. The result was a shift in how the United States conducted foreign policy, and it resulted in the eventual invasion/occupation of Iraq. The result of a failed SFA campaign to build capable and accountable Iraqi security forces (ISF) led to greater instability in the Middle East. However, at the time of the Iraqi invasion in 2003, the concerns over weapons of mass destruction and continued violations of both human rights and international agreements by Saddam Hussein resulted in the United States viewing intervention into Iraq as being within its national interest. Despite protests against intervention in Iraq from both within the United States and other allied nations, the U.S. government moved forward with both political and military steps resulting in the eventual intervention in Iraq.

Those cases where the strategic objectives of the SFA campaign fell within the national interests of the United States had a larger impact on the effectiveness of the advisory mission. Aligning the strategic objectives with the national interests brought more elements of the United States government to bear on the SFA campaign, providing more resources and guidance for the conventional forces conducting the advisory mission.

**Interagency Collaboration**

All three case studies provide both positive and negative examples of interagency collaboration. Vital to ensuring there is unity of effort in an SFA campaign, interagency
collaboration involves the available systems in place to ensure collaboration, such as the National Security Council (NSC), and the interaction of key leaders in each element of that interagency field.

The El Salvador SFA campaign underwent a significant change between the two different administrations. Whereas the Carter administration worried more about human rights concerns, the Reagan administration took a harder stance toward the Soviet Union and approached El Salvador from a realist perspective. The result was clearer guidance from the president and the NSC for those conducting the SFA campaign on how to proceed in El Salvador. The result of this positive interagency collaboration was a more effective campaign by the conventional United States military working in El Salvador and the eventual, successful achievement of the stated strategic goals of the United States.

The Kosovo SFA campaign had the added complication of working within an alliance (NATO) and with a former Cold War enemy (Russia). However, despite these challenges, there was positive interagency collaboration across United States government agencies, NATO, and the European Union. The prior studies conducted by the United States military and Clinton administration on peacekeeping operations also helped shape the interagency collaboration by already having established systems in place to work together through the planning process for the SFA campaign. This effective interagency collaboration, not only across the United States government but between NATO partners and the European Union, brought much more resources to the Kosovo SFA mission than if the United States acted alone. However, while the initial
outcome of the SFA efforts in Kosovo appears to be successful, there is still an ongoing
effort to further develop the security forces of Kosovo today.

The Iraq case suffered from a serious lack of interagency collaboration, partially due
to the systems (or lack thereof) in place and partially because of the personalities of the
senior policy makers involved. There is little doubt characters such as Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld or Secretary of State Rice greatly influenced the interagency debate
and had to overcome personal challenges to try to move their organizations forward to
better collaboration. As a result of this ineffective interagency collaboration, the
conventional forces thrust into the SFA campaign in Iraq lacked a basic understanding
of the environment they were in, the history of the people they were now responsible
for, and a failure to understand the logistical challenging facing any attempt to achieve a
successful SFA campaign in Iraq.

Overall, those SFA campaigns, which had stronger interagency collaboration, were
more effective in achieving the strategic objectives of the United States. The impact on
effectiveness of better interagency collaboration brought more resources from the whole
of the United States government to bear on the ongoing SFA campaign. This provided
more effective resourcing, reach-back capability, and depth of understanding for the
conventional military undertaking the advisory mission.

Civil-military Interaction

Again, all three cases provide a variety of examples of both positive and negative
civil-military interactions. Any successful SFA campaign will require effective civil-
military interaction. Difficulties in civil military interaction put a successful SFA campaign at risk, and therefore this interaction must remain positive throughout the entire length of the campaign.

While there was different focus between the two different presidential administrations that conducted the El Salvador SFA campaign, both ensured the direction for that campaign came from the president and his advisors. The evidence found in archival research through diplomatic cables and memorandums clearly shows each administration issued direct guidance and all the agencies ranging from the Department of State (DoS) to the Department of Defense (DoD) followed it. Even though the number of advisors was much smaller than the other two cases, the civil-military guidance was clear as was the result in El Salvador: a successful SFA campaign.

The Clinton presidency suffered from troubled civil-military interaction from the moment it entered office, and it never really escaped from under that cloud. The result was a military that both doubted and sometimes openly challenged the president on his decisions. This contentious environment increased the friction between the senior policy makers and those having to execute the SFA campaign in Kosovo. The result was delayed decisions, a feeling of mistrust between the two, and a lack of clear guidance on the end state for the Kosovo SFA campaign. This greatly impacted the effectiveness of the Kosovo SFA campaign. The lack of trust between the military and the chief executive brought about public disagreement over the best way to achieve the nation’s strategic objectives in Kosovo. Additionally, this lack of civil-military interaction cast doubts within the minds of those conventional forces on the ground in Kosovo over the
perceived importance of their mission and how it fit into the strategic objectives of the United States.

While support for the military intervention in Iraq was highest at the start of the effort, public opinion and civil-military interaction wavered with the lack of success there. The revolt of the generals, during which retired generals who served in Iraq openly critiqued and called for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, was just one example of the troubled civil-military interaction of this case.\(^{471}\) The public rapidly grew war weary of American casualties, continued costs, and the lack of progress with regards to the level of violence in Iraq. It would take a bold and risky move by President Bush to commit to the surge, a tactic about which General Petraeus said, “Mr. President, this isn’t double-down. This is all-in.”\(^{472}\) This risky move, against the public opinion and advice of most of those in Congress, traded American lives for precious time buying space for the growth of ISF. It was a gamble that paid off in the short term.

Unfortunately, the lack of a renewed Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq in 2011 brought about the withdrawal of American combat troops and resulted in the collapse of much of the Iraqi forces in 2014 against ISIS. The result of this ineffective civil-military interaction brought into question the strategic objectives of the United States in Iraq. For the conventional forces on the ground, there was confusion over the end state of their SFA campaign. The ineffective civil-military interaction also brought unrest within American society over the goals of the SFA campaign and the increasingly high costs in blood and treasure to achieve these shifting goals.


Legitimacy

The question of legitimacy occurs at several levels in an SFA campaign. First, the HN security forces and government must be viewed as legitimate. Second, the regional partners must view the SFA mission as legitimate. Third, the United States public must view the mission as legitimate or risk losing popular support and ending before gains can be consolidated. Each of the three case studies demonstrates the importance of legitimacy to the concept of smart partnership.

The El Salvador SFA case holds its claim to legitimacy based on two factors: the intense scrutiny placed on the atrocities committed by all involved El Salvadoran parties and the fact that it was viewed within the Cold War environment. The numerous atrocities committed by both the right- and left-wing parties fighting in El Salvador placed a much greater interest on human rights than did previous conflicts the United States had been involved in. Coming so closely on the heels of the failed Vietnam effort, congressional leaders and the American public were extremely wary regarding the commitment of American troops to another foreign mission. The result was much greater scrutiny on ensuring those El Salvadoran forces trained, understood, and acted according to proper human rights standards. While not always easy, there was a substantial shift with the El Salvadoran security forces toward embracing the rule of law and international human rights standards. Each administration effectively described how the SFA campaign fit within its overall views of the global milieu. As a result, there was a positive impact on effectiveness of the SFA campaign in El Salvador.

In Kosovo, the question of Kosovo’s future as an independent nation or a province of Serbia still hangs over the achievements of NATO and the United States thus far. There
was much debate over whether or not intervening militarily in Kosovo was legitimate, especially from the United States point of view. However, the Clinton administration’s efforts on preventing another Rwanda or Bosnia greatly added to the legitimacy of the Kosovo mission. Within the changing, post-Cold War landscape, the importance of preventing more ethnically driven genocides increased the legitimacy of the Kosovo SFA campaign. This legitimacy expanded the effectiveness of the Kosovo SFA campaign in two main ways: First, it ensured the advisory efforts were multinational in scope, avoiding a mission led solely by the U.S. Second, the legitimacy involved with the mission ensured key regional organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union were involved as well. This is an example of reciprocal legitimacy. The enterprise had to be conceived as legitimate in order to secure the cooperation and support of EU and UN. Their support increased the perception internationally of legitimacy.

The debate over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 continues to this day. What was not in doubt, however, was the need to rebuild effective and accountable security forces that would not be the tools of continued sectarian violence in Iraq. The legitimacy of the United States’ SFA mission wavered as it teetered on the brink of failure. However, as American troops departed in 2011, there was sense of success. ISF along with the government seemed to be on the right path to stability. Unfortunately, a combination of underdeveloped systems in the ISF, sectarian leadership by the prime minister, and reverting reversion back to a system of putting trusted tribal and family members in positions of power instead of those competent officers resulted in the collapse of ISF in the face of ISIS in 2014. This lack of legitimacy both within the United States and by
other nations around the globe inhibited the effectiveness of the Iraq SFA campaign. The “coalition of the willing” rapidly became the “coalition of the one” as nations pulled their support from the Iraqi SFA campaign. Without a sense of legitimacy, the United States shouldered most of the costs in blood and treasure and sustained a blow to its reputation on the global stage.
III. Recommendations for Smart Partnership

This section will make five recommendations on how to better implement smart partnership into the current security cooperation programs of the United States.

1. Implement Smart Partnership

First, smart partnership needs to be implemented before any future SFA missions involving the conventional forces of the United States occur and when deciding to either extend or end these missions. As these case studies have shown, when all elements of smart partnership (national interests, interagency collaboration, civil-military interaction, and legitimacy) are not present in a positive manner, the SFA campaign will more than likely fail to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States.

United States senior policy makers need to evaluate a potential SFA campaign by looking at the key components of smart partnership. If any of these four components are missing or trending negative, the SFA mission should be reconsidered. If conducting an SFA campaign to improve the capabilities of an HN's security forces is not within the national interest of the United States, then there is no need to commit U.S. conventional forces to such a mission. This begs the question of if such a mission is not in the national interests, then why consider it at all? Too often there is little to no discussion about what the potential issues are for failure or success of a military operation. In the case of SFA, this needs to be viewed from the point of view of national interests. What does the United States risk to gain or lose if the SFA mission succeeds or fails?
Previous SFA campaigns provide policy makers with both positive and negative examples of interagency collaboration. This is critical during both the initial planning for an SFA campaign and in-progress reviews of how the campaign is faring. The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) used by U.S. Southern Command or the reorganization of Task Force 714 in Iraq both provide excellent examples of positive interagency collaboration.\(^{473}\) There are no simple SFA missions. All future efforts will require a consensus of government as well as non-government agencies to be involved to positively influence an HN’s security force. Ensuring the systems are in place for positive interagency collaboration is critical to making certain these systems survive the departure of effective leaders or the arrival of less-than-effective ones.

Positive civil-military interaction ensures there is a dialogue between senior policy makers and senior military leadership regarding the national security objectives of an SFA campaign. Such a discourse is vital to not only receiving guidance on the desired strategic end state, but also ensuring that the United States Congress and therefore the American public are brought into the discussion about the use of military power. While there are many instruments of national power available to the United States to assist an HN’s security force, conducting SFA with the United States military is one of the best ways to ensure that those security forces become more accountable and capable. Positive civil-military interaction ensures the discussions are taking place, but it does not ensure the mission’s eventual success. According to Eliot Cohen’s unequal dialogue, the president needs to have an open discussion with his senior military leaders and policy makers about courses of action. However, in the end of the unequal dialogue, the president gets the final say and the military executes those policies.

Of the four components of smart partnership, legitimacy is the easiest to measure through polling data yet is the hardest to achieve and maintain. Conducting SFA to improve the security forces of a government viewed as illegitimate by its people is a wasted effort and one that reduces the legitimacy of the United States in the eyes of both the indigenous population and regional organizations. Similarly, if an HN government does not improve its legitimacy standing in the eyes of its population and neighbors during a U.S.-led SFA campaign, then the United States may have reason to discontinue the SFA mission. Without legitimacy within the United States by the people or Congress, an SFA campaign will most likely end before the HN troops are ready to stand on their own, as we saw in the Iraq case study in 2014.

2. Update Current United States Security Cooperation Programs

The next recommendation is that the United States needs to update its current security cooperation programs to include SFA functions. Pursuant to Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017, the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq submitted its activities report to Congress covering the period from 1 October 2016 to 31 March 2017. During that time, some of the sharpest fighting by ISF supported by American advisors occurred, especially in the city of Mosul.

Split into two distinct efforts, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) and the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) are focused on two different yet overlapping efforts to help the ISF. CJTF-OIR’s mission focused on the

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military defeat of ISIS, while OSC-I’s security cooperation mission will continue after the defeat of ISIS. CJTF-OIR uses Iraqi Train and Equip Funds (ITEF) to respond to immediate requirements for training, small weapons, and ammunition requirements for the ISF. OSC-I does not have authority to use ITEF, but rather foreign military sales and foreign military financing to facilitate long-term security cooperation and security assistance efforts.⁴⁷⁵

While the CJTF-OIF works by, with, and through the Iraqis to defeat ISIS, OSC-I focuses on the ISF of tomorrow. Working in close consultation with international allies and partners to help the government of Iraq develop transition plans for ISF, there is a large gap in what OSC-I can accomplish to help the Iraqi security situation.

The current OSC-I plans focus on guiding the recovery of Iraqi forces and equipment from combat operations. Next, it is focused on resetting ISF to accomplish the most critical missions to ensure Iraq’s stability: counterterrorism, border security, and critical infrastructure protection. While the focus of the United States has been to provide specific material solutions to address capability gaps for the ISF, the future of Iraqi security depends on improving sustainment of key capabilities, integrating these capabilities into coherent systems, and developing the ISF professionally.⁴⁷⁶

The main problem is when OSC-I mentions the ISF, it is only able to focus on the parts of the security forces that do not include the Ministry of the Interior. This means OSC-I is focused only on those forces under the Ministry of Defense, such as the Army, Navy, and Counterterrorism Services (CTS). Key security forces under the MoI include the Federal Police, Border Guards, and Energy Police, who protect the vital Iraqi oil

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, executive summary.
⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.
infrastructure. In Iraq, the United States security cooperation mission cannot conduct institution-building activities with these critical security forces, thereby creating an exploitable seam. However, SFA focuses on both internal and external threats facing an HN and, if implemented, would allow the Iraq Office of Security Cooperation to work with all security forces vital to Iraqi security.

Updating authorities in the Office of Security Cooperation, such as the one in Iraq, to work with critical members of all HN security forces is vital to future success. Implementing this portion of SFA will greatly reduce exploitable gaps in the professionalism of these Iraqi security organizations and develop a reliable partnership performing these vital national security missions for Iraq.

3. Increase Funding and Personnel within the United States Department of State

Third, there needs to be an increase in funding and personnel within the United States DoS. While SFA primarily uses the military instrument of national power, having a stronger, better-resourced DoS plays a vital role in any SFA mission. As seen in the El Salvador and Iraqi case studies, having an ambassador in overall charge of the SFA mission provides better results.

That ambassador and his or her staff have a better feel for the politics and mood of an HN, especially in a relatively stable environment such as El Salvador in the 1980s. Ambassador Crocker was able to work closely with his partner, General Petraeus, to form an effective partnership that resulted in successes during a highly troubled time in Iraq. However, as the Iraqi case demonstrated, once these two personalities departed

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477 Ibid.
Iraq, progress slowed significantly, and the gains made were essentially lost once the United States departed Iraq in the end of 2011. The budget and manpower of the DoS dwarf those of its much larger cousin, the DoS. With this in mind, however, more attention needs to be paid to conducting SFA missions in peacetime or pre-conflict situations to try to prevent a situation deteriorating to the point where the United States is conducting both combat operations and SFA simultaneously.

4. Move Toward Security Sector Reform

The next recommendation is that the United States government needs to move toward conducting SSR, a more comprehensive approach to building capable and accountable foreign security forces. The rise of ethnic violence in places such as Rwanda and the Balkans forced the international community to relook at how it viewed security and state sovereignty. The concept of human security and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged during this time period in the 1990s as a response to the new paradigm in security conditions. The start of international interventions by the United Nations, NATO, and other blocs of states, coupled with the high cost of human lives lost in these types of conflicts before intervention, resulted in the international community reexamining the linkages between security and development.

The traditional concept of security depended on the “emphasis on the stability of the state and its protection from external and internal threats through military power.” However, according to Hanlon and Shultz, this traditional definition of security was

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478 Hanlon and Shultz, 16.
broadened “to accentuate the protection of the individual. This was termed human security. It was based on the proposition that the protection of the individuals, both in terms of physical safety and material welfare, is central to the establishment of security.”

Tied to this emerging concept of human security was the importance of development assistance. Frances Stewart conducted a study, Development and security, that highlighted the importance relationship by linking how developmental policies can enhance security. In her paper, Stewart finds “that human security forms an important part of people’s well-being and is therefore an objective of development; that lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth and poverty and thereby on development; and that lack of development, or imbalanced development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of conflict.”

Peter Albrecht, one of the leading practitioners and writers on SSR, stated that it emerged in the last half of the 1990s as a result of “a seismic shift in international thinking around the role that development agencies could play vis-à-vis specific defense issues and security issues more broadly.” The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) took the lead in establishing the connection between development, security, and conflict. In March 1999, DFID drafted policy recommendations that set the conditions by which development assistance could be

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479 Hanlon & Shultz, 17.
utilized to engage in SSR activities.\textsuperscript{482} The United Kingdom “emerged as the principle national-level advocate of SSR and [broadened] the understanding of security, development and reform, modeling them into a conceptual framework,”\textsuperscript{483} according to Hanlon and Shultz. The British eventually went on to conduct a relatively successful SSR operation in Sierra Leone, one of the few success stories when looking at SFA or the new concept of SSR.

5. Reconsider Personnel Policies of Conventional United States Military Units with Advisory Missions

Finally, the United States Army needs to reassess its personnel policies in conventional forces with SFA missions. The Army recently created regionally aligned brigades (RABs), military units focused on a specific position of the world. In October 2012 at the annual Association of the United States Army Dinner, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Odierno stated that the Army would leverage its capabilities by “organizing our missions around highly trained squads and platoons — the foundation of our company, battalion and brigade combat teams — for specific mission sets and regional conditions.”

This “regional alignment of forces” will not only offer combatant commanders access to the full range of capabilities resident in the Army today, it will “provide maximum flexibility and agility to national security decision-makers.”\textsuperscript{484}

\textsuperscript{482} Hanlon & Shultz, 19.
\textsuperscript{483} Ibid.
With the end of combat operations in Iraq in 2011 and the continued drawdown of combat forces in Afghanistan, the Army reconsidered how it conducted its business. The shift to regionally aligned forces marks a significant change, not only in how the Army prepares its conventional forces for deployments, but how it sees the world. The Army’s fiscal year 2013 Strategic Planning Guidance made it clear that:

The future force will provide regionally aligned, missioned tailored forces scalable in size from squad to corps. Its personnel are to be empowered by technology and training to execute operations under the concept of mission command, underpinned by trust flexibility and proficiency. The operating force will, thus, comprise forces both regionally aligned in support of combatant command and those maintaining a global orientation for specific contingency missions.485

The ability to tailor its forces to regional areas is an important step in bettering the capabilities of the U.S. Army to work with HN security forces. However, it is the author’s opinion that while it is a good first step, it does not go far enough to effectively partner with foreign security forces.

The cornerstone of the regionally aligned forces will be the RABs. These organizations, with approximately 4,000 soldiers of all ranks and skill sets, are the cornerstone of the modular Army. However, with the Army’s current personal and manning system, nearly 95 percent of these personnel leave their units every three years. Part of the Army Force Generation cycle is the constant building, training, deployment, redeployment, disbandment, and rebuilding of Army brigades. As a result, the RABs in the current personnel system will be focused on a region only in name. Every three years, a new group of soldiers will rotate into the brigade, learn the bare minimum of cultural nuances and languages, and then move to a different brigade, post,

485 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013, 6.
or country after three years. As a result, there is a complete disruption in the concept of not only building rapport, but also, more importantly, maintaining rapport as advisors through relationships with their HN counterparts.

As much as I would like to see the wholesale change of the Army’s personnel system, I do not see it occurring anytime soon. Rather, I recommend a different solution to augment the movement to regionally aligned forces: the implementation of conventional Advise and Assist Teams, which truly have a regional focus for the duration of their time in the service.

This concept is based on the successful use of Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs), also known as Security Force Assistance Brigades. First implemented in Iraq in 2009, this structure became the mainstay for U.S. Army units in Iraqi through Operation New Dawn and into Afghanistan as well. The AAB concept took a standard combat brigade and added 48 additional field grade officers with a specific focus of advising their partner units. These 48 field grade officers, with ranks from majors (mid-grade officers with 12 to 16 years of service) to colonels (senior officers with more than 22 years of service) and attached them with smaller tactical units to support their advising mission. These units provided the combat power, manpower, logistical support, and partner capability for the advisory teams. The advisors focused on developing their partners at the brigade staff level and above.

Different units had varying success with their advisors. Those who integrated their 48 field grades into their pre-deployment training to include a focused SFA rotation at a Combat Training Center such at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, CA, tended to have better success. However, some teams were limited by those selected for the
advisory mission. Advisors ranged from Special Forces qualified officers with years of advisory training and experience to officers who had worked in the Reserve Officer Training Corps for the past 13 years and never deployed. The AAB concept has merit but needs to be adjusted based on lessons learned from the past seven years of using this system and adapted to an unstable world.

IV. Suggestions for Future Research

The events of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in the collaboration between the DoS, the DoS, and the broader international community in the conduct of SFA. U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq offer new opportunities for studying SFA as a precursor to and subordinate campaign within the currently global war on terrorism. The U.S. SFA campaigns in El Salvador, Kosovo, and Iraq provide unique insights on the conduct of working with HN security forces executed by a U.S. conventional force presence than more traditionally by Special Forces “A” teams.

Other nations, including close allies of the United States, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, have conducted missions similar to United States SFA. The United Kingdom conducted an effective SSR campaign in Sierra Leone after stabilizing the country from both internal and external threats. The studies so far conducted on SSR in Sierra Leone are limited, and there is a greater opportunity to look further into how a relatively small mix of conventional and special United Kingdom forces were able to conduct their version of SFA in Sierra Leone.

Similarly, the Australians conducted a mission much like SFA in East Timor. With its smaller military, the Australians were able to contain the violence in East Timor and became the primary trainer of the Timor Leste Defence Force. This mission was
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and greatly strained Australia’s logistics system. However, the use of its conventional military to train the fledgling military of Timor Leste can be judged as a success and worth further study.

Regime changes stemming from the Arab Spring are also opportunities to analyze conflicts in from the perspective of civil-military relations in countries that do not have a tradition of a democratically elected government controlling its military. Along these same lines, what is the relationship between a successful SFA campaign and the HN’s security forces improved adherence to international humanitarian standard?

As the United States enters a period of budget stringency and withdraws large numbers of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. conventional forces remain deployed worldwide. Further study is needed to determine the extent to which operations over the last decade have regenerated or exhausted the institutional capabilities within the DoD, and DoS for SFA. It will be important to harness and sustain the breadth of the U.S. advisor experiences during upcoming personnel reductions to ensure the military does not have to relearn these hard won lessons.

Finally, while conventional units conducting SFA are capable of operating with smaller footprints, a robust U.S. military framework of basing and logistics networks that will likely be reduced in the years ahead buttresses their operations. Policy and defense leaders must ensure they account for other agencies’ and departments’ reliance on defense frameworks so that they may deliver a wide spectrum of capabilities in ongoing and future SFA campaigns.
V. Conclusions

Smart partnership is more than just a pithy phrase. After investing thousands of lives, billions of dollars, and over a decade of effort into places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear the United States does not have an effective doctrine or approach to SFA to achieve national objectives. The British experience in Sierra Leone, captured in the concept of SSR, has the potential to serve as a better guidepost for the way forward for U.S. SFA. We will continue to experience fragile environments and seek to prevent the expansion of failed states along with ungoverned territory. We have seen what emerges from these dangerous situations.

Today’s fragile environment features a host of post-conflict, post-authoritarian states and transitioning and new democracies that have at least one thing in common: Their security sectors are dysfunctional. The need for a more comprehensive SSR policy and organization will be paramount as we continue to move deeper into the twenty-first century and face the increased pace of globalization and littoralization. Smart partnership is a start as to how we can better employ U.S. advisors to work with foreign security forces to ensure they are able to better protect their population. However, smart partnership should be a waypoint on the path to the eventual new U.S. approach to building partner capacity of SSR through SSR.

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