
The State, Minorities, and Dilemmas of Development in Contemporary China

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Chinese economic modernization projects in ethnic minority regions have been roundly criticized as techniques of internal imperialism and quasi-colonial expansion. Since large-scale development projects often involve the deliberate relocation of large numbers of Han Chinese from the interior of the country to the ethno-religious periphery, these criticisms must be taken seriously. This is especially true where Han resettlement and modernization profoundly alter the socio-economic patterns and cultural practices of the minority residents of those regions. At the same time, we also need to consider Chinese development schemes in view of persistent poverty and underdevelopment in minority areas. As I will demonstrate, state officials are seriously concerned with increasing inequalities between minority and non-minority regions, and they have tried to incorporate at least some minority ethno-cultural institutions and practices within their developmental schemes.

My point in raising these issues is not to let the Chinese government off the hook regarding serious human rights abuses in Tibet, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. Nor is my goal to cast the state in a kinder, gentler light. Yet, an uninformed, distorted view of Chinese development policies is counterproductive. Western policymakers and international organizations need to recognize the complexity of the dilemmas and crises affecting the Chinese people, including ethnic and cultural minorities. Rather than simply walking away from controversial projects in the face of international pressure, organizations like the World Bank need to do a

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better job of publicizing the practical and beneficial effects of many of their programs. These include microcredit lending and relocation schemes for minority and Han Chinese alike. At the same time, these organizations need to pay closer attention to the manner in which their programs are implemented and the ways they may aggravate the marginalization of certain ethnic, religious, and cultural groups.

MINORITIES AND MODERNIZATION

The 2001 launch of a Chinese government project to construct a railroad between Qinghai Province and Lhasa, Tibet, has drawn fire from pro-Tibetan and human rights activists in Asia and around the world. Critics hold that the railway, which will be the world's highest, will exacerbate the degradation of Tibet's culture and strengthen the Chinese government's iron grip over the beleaguered region. The linking of the remote province by rail will, critics claim, accelerate the depletion of minerals, timber, and other resources from the province and facilitate the movement of military and People's Armed Police troops into the province. It is feared that more efficient transportation will also speed up the immigration of thousands of Han Chinese settlers from the interior of the country,

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whose dominance over the commercial and industrial economy of Lhasa aggravates the relative deprivation of Tibetan peasants and nomads. Tibetan rights activists agree with the Chinese government's claim that the railroad will more closely integrate Tibet with the rest of China, but they view this prospect with alarm, as a means for the fulfillment of China's colonizing ambitions.¹

In expressing these criticisms and fears, Tibetan and human rights activists highlight the deliberate efforts of the Chinese government to suppress the religious and cultural life of Tibetans. Much of

Tibet's traditional culture, and many of the Tibetan people's religious practices and institutions, have been lost or destroyed over five decades of Chinese control. A great deal of this is the result of outright repression. The contemporary Chinese government has acknowledged some of this cultural depredation, but generally blames it on the overzealous radicalism of the Maoist era, when religious and cultural institutions throughout the country were suppressed and destroyed. As groups like Amnesty International have shown, however, the current regime continues to restrict religious activities and arrest practitioners, especially monks and nuns, for allegedly using religion to "split the motherland."²

Opponents of the railway project also underscore the cultural and social depredations wrought by economic modernization—depredations that are more or less the unintended consequences of development. These depredations are not unique to the case of Tibetans or other Chinese ethnic and religious minorities; they are in fact the focus of international debate regarding globalization and its discontents. Nor are such consequences unique to present-day developing countries grappling with the challenge of integrating their economies and societies into the free-trade orthodoxy and regime of the global market. As Karl Polanyi pointed out half a century ago in *The Great Transformation*, an “avalanche of social dislocation” in the English countryside “...was the accompaniment of a vast movement of economic improvement” wrought by the Industrial Revolution.³ Economic modernization and socio-cultural destruction appear inextricable.

The idea that Chinese developmental plans for Tibet might be nefarious in aim and intent is not a new one. Nor is this the first time that such projects have come under

fire. In 2000, a World Bank-sponsored plan to relocate farmers in Qinghai Province from poor-quality, arid land to more fertile areas raised similar alarms. The project would have moved thousands of peasants—many of them members of the Hui minority—to lands historically inhabited by nomadic Tibetan herders. The relocation scheme was criticized as an insidious effort to occupy Tibetan territory and further constrain traditional rural economic practices that do not fit squarely within the developmental paradigm of post-Mao policy.⁴ Bowing to criticism, the World Bank pulled out of that project, leaving thousands of destitute peasants in the lurch. In February of this year, the Chinese government announced it would go ahead with the original relocation plan minus the Bank’s assistance.⁵

Rather than dismiss these projects as internal imperialism on the part of the Chinese government, it is important to examine them in light of China’s ongoing efforts to deal with rural poverty and underdevelopment, especially as they affect minority nationalities. While millions of Chinese peasants have seen their incomes and living standards rise considerably over nearly 25 years of reform, millions remain stuck in dire poverty, unaffected by the consistent and phenomenal growth China has experienced. Chinese officials have for some time been concerned with increasing inter-regional and inter-provincial disparities—a growing gap that has a disproportionate effect on China’s relatively small minority population. One of the quandaries facing the state is that these gaps in growth and income are not the unintended consequences of reform, but the result of a deliberate, calculated growth strategy.

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Recent developmental policies and projects targeted at minority areas indicate a move away from this strategy and a conscious effort on the part of officials to equalize the benefits of growth. This is not to suggest that the state is acting simply out of benevolence and in the interests of minorities. Increasing disparities and relative underdevelopment can spark protest, violence, and political unrest, and it is the state's own interest in security and stability that underpins these projects. The Tibet development project, along with many other schemes, must be viewed within this context.

In what follows, I first present an overview of contemporary minority policy and detail its departure (or lack thereof) from the policies of the Maoist era.

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Following that, I analyze what Mao himself might have called the contradictions of contemporary policies, and explain how the goals and methods of minority policies are at odds with many of the major economic policies of the same period. In elaborating these contradictions, I reveal that the contemporary Chinese leadership has demonstrated tolerance, and even active support, for the reestablishment and resurgence of many minority cultural practices and institutions. Rather than seeking to squelch non-Han, non-mainstream cultural practice and identity, officials have at times sought to integrate these into the project of economic development. State support is not, of course, unqualified, and where it imagines "splittist" threats to stability and security, the government is more than willing to clamp down.

CHINESE MINORITIES: AN OVERVIEW

Though often viewed as an ethno-cultural monolith, China is home to 54 official minority nationalities or *shaoshu minzu*. There are also dozens of other smaller groups, called "peoples," who have sought separate nationality status, but who are typically classed as subgroups of larger *minzu*. Minorities are concentrated throughout the south and west of the country, and areas with substantial minority populations comprise over half of China's total landmass, much of it sensitive border region. Chinese minorities are a diverse group. They include nationalities like the Koreans, who live in the more industrialized northeast and who have the highest literacy rates of any group (including Han) in the country. They also include swidden (e.g., slash-and-burn) cultivators like the Akha and Mosuo, who reside in the highlands of the southwestern province of Yunnan, which borders Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. As countless official documents state, together with the dominant Han these diverse groups constitute the Chinese nationality.

Comprising 100 million people, minorities make up only 8.2 percent of the total population of China, but they bear a disproportionate share of the burden of poverty. Rural poverty remains a persistent problem throughout the country despite two decades of growth. According to official statistics, between 1978 and 2000 the number of poor in the country declined from an estimated 250 million to 30 million, while the percentage of people in poverty (the rural poverty rate) also declined from 30 percent to three percent. The government has established the goal of lifting the remaining 30 million out of poverty over the next decade.⁶ The Chinese government defines rural poverty as subsisting on 300 Yuan (\$72) per year, about 20 cents per day.

The State Ethnic Affairs Committee estimates that minorities comprise roughly 40 percent of those living in poverty.⁷ A variety of historical and geographical factors have contributed to this situation. Historically, the border areas in which most minorities reside were peripheral regions, far from the more developed coastal centers of southern and eastern China. Many minority groups were themselves only weakly integrated into the culture, economy, and society of Imperial and post-Imperial China. To this day, minorities residing in remote areas of the west and southwest constitute a kind of periphery of the periphery. History and geography are not, however, the only contributing factors, for post-Mao economic policies have compounded the situation.

CHINESE MINORITY POLICY DURING AND AFTER MAO

Under Mao, minorities were subject to extreme shifts in official attitudes, a rapid cycling that characterized Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies and politics in general. In the periods prior to and immediately following Liberation in 1949, the CCP made a point of tailoring the application of policies to minorities' "special characteristics," proceeding cautiously so as to win the hearts and minds of these linguistically, geographically, and culturally diverse peoples. This strategy enabled the CCP to work with and through pre-established minority elites.

Concern for special characteristics did not survive the radical leftism of the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. During these periods, the CCP practiced

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radical assimilationism, and those who had advocated respect for special characteristics were denounced as "local nationalists" and purged. The advent of a truly classless society, which Mao and his allies were aiming for, should have spelled the end of nationality and national divisions. Unfortunately for Chinese minorities,

this ideal was essentially a Han-centric one that left no room for alternative cultural identity or practice. This extremism was perhaps best summed up in a quip by Jiang Qing, Mao's wife and the leader of the Gang of Four, who once asked, "Why do we need minority nationalities anyway?"⁸

The Great Leap and Cultural Revolution had devastating consequences for minorities and for all Chinese. The policies and practices of the reform-era state have sought to ameliorate and make amends for Mao-era brutality and repression, which included, among other atrocities, a massacre of Hui Muslims in Yunnan Province. In trying to distance itself from its predecessor, the reform-era leadership initiated policies of tolerance and even active support for minority cultural institutions and practices. While heterodox, unofficial groups like Falun Gong continue to be suppressed, many minorities have been able to rebuild temples, mosques, and other institutions, often with state funds.

State support is not universal; as mentioned at the outset, where cultural practices are perceived as a threat to security and national unity, the state continues to suppress them and their practitioners. Unfortunately for groups like Tibetans in Tibet and Muslims in Xinjiang, the state often engages in a kind of pre-emptive suppression of religious and cultural activities that may be only tenuously and tangentially linked to anti-state protest. Still, it is accurate to say that the Chinese government has utilized more tolerant, minority-friendly policies to rebuild its legitimacy and win the support of minority peoples throughout the country.

It is thus ironic that other policies and policy objectives have perhaps undercut these goals. Most notable among these is Deng Xiaoping's coastal development strategy, which was itself a break with Maoist policy. Though the Maoist

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state ruthlessly suppressed traditional cultural practice, economic and fiscal policies under Mao Zedong actually served to alleviate some of the regional economic disparities that account for minorities' relative deprivation. Policies under Mao favored the interior at the expense of these better-off coastal regions. The poorest provinces were allowed to retain all their revenues while receiving subsidies from the central government—paid for with revenues from more developed provinces.⁹ The central state also channeled capital investment to the interior.

Such policies were motivated by national security concerns; the CCP's Third Front policy sought to geographically disperse the country's industrial capacity, especially that which had military implications.

In contrast, the leadership under Deng chose to, in the words of political

scientist Dali Yang, "favor growth at the expense of equity" to allocate limited resources to those areas that were already endowed in terms of human resources, industrial efficiency, infrastructure, and proximity to international markets.¹⁰ A kind of Smithian logic pervaded this strategy, as officials hoped that a rising tide of coastal development would eventually lift the boats of the poorer, less developed regions of the interior.¹¹ While this tactic worked to raise China's overall GNP and industrial output, it also exacerbated the coastal-interior gap. For instance, while per capita GDP in the coastal provinces was 1.74 times greater than that of the interior provinces in 1984, 10 years later it was 2.24 times greater, and the gap has continued to expand.¹² By the early 1990s, it was apparent that the desired boat-lifting effects of the coastal strategy had not transpired, and in some of the more remote areas of the interior, rural economies were sinking.

The causes of growing regional imbalance are many. For instance, the coastal provinces have received the lion's share of foreign investment. The gaps between coastal and interior regions are also related to differing rates of success in the township and village enterprises (TVE)

sector. TVEs are collective enterprises owned by villagers and managed by township and village government officials. They are one of the real success stories of the reform period, and their growth has helped to alleviate rural underemployment and raise peasant incomes. Yet, the benefits of TVE growth have accrued overwhelmingly to the east and southeastern seaboard. By the mid 1990s, the coastal provinces accounted for more than half of all employees and nearly three-quarters of all revenues in the rural enterprise sector.¹³ In the interior, where most minorities reside, TVEs tend to be small, inefficient, low-tech, one or two person affairs that are unable to achieve economies of scale. These problems exacerbate the relative underdevelopment of the interior provinces, since earnings from TVEs provide local governments with revenues for social services and basic economic construction.

It was in light of these persistent and even growing disparities that the CCP leadership began considering ways of accelerating the economic development of the interior. The central government has indicated that it will increase the proportion of state investment going to the interior, and it has initiated a number of large-scale, multi-year economic and infrastructure construction projects, such as the Tibetan development plan discussed earlier. In 1995, the government also launched the National Project of Compulsory Education in Poor Areas, aimed at

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improving literacy and education levels in the poorest provinces.¹⁴ More recently, in October 2001, the State Council issued a 20,000-word white paper on poverty reduction in rural areas that specifically addresses the problems faced by minority nationalities.¹⁵

Provincial and local officials have also sought to capitalize on resurgent minority culture and harness it to the project of economic growth, especially TVE expansion. Many party and state officials now see minority tradition as less an impediment to economic modernization than as a means through which this modernization can be achieved. In doing so, they are buttressed by a growing sub-genre in Chinese academia—the study of nationality economics.

NATIONALITY ECONOMICS: THE CASE OF YUNNAN PROVINCE

Although this essay began with a discussion about Tibet, the case of Yunnan Province best illustrates this trend and the impact of development more generally on minority nationalities. Home to 25 of China's 54 official minority nationalities (including Tibetans), approximately one-third of Yunnan's population of 41 million are classed as *shaoshu minzu*.¹⁶ In many ways, the main issues concerning minority nationalities in Yunnan are the same ones that concern the province as a whole: poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy, and a growing AIDS problem.¹⁷

The issue of regional disparities is starkly illustrated by the case of Yunnan. In 1980, per capita net rural income in the province was about one-fifth lower than the national average; in 1997, the provincial figure lagged the national average by over one-third.¹⁸ A growing income gap between urban and rural dwellers within the province also worries Yunnan officials. While Yunnan ranks fifth from the bottom among all provinces in terms of net rural incomes, recently it was ranked eighth from the top in terms of urban dwellers' salaries.¹⁹ Compounding this economic backwardness are low education and literacy levels. A quarter of the population over age 15 is illiterate, while the national illiteracy rate for those over age 15 is 16 percent.²⁰

Provincial officials have tried a variety of measures to improve Yunnan's overall social and economic situation. In addition to the compulsory education program, they have initiated a number of anti-poverty programs in conjunction with the World Bank. These include a Grameen Bank-style microcredit program, through which poor households receive small loans to purchase farm inputs and materials for starting household enterprises. Joint provincial and World Bank programs have also helped farmers in unproductive areas relocate to higher quality farmland—exactly the sort of program that the Bank planned, and then abandoned, for Qinghai.

Recognizing the role of TVEs in overall Chinese economic growth, officials have sought to expand this sector throughout Yunnan's hinterlands. TVEs have

been established in a wide variety of industries, including horticulture, cement, cigarette processing, canning and fruit drink processing, transportation, restaurants, and building materials. This is another example of officials in minority areas finding ways to join their local cultural "factor endowments" to TVE expansion.

The attempt to link minority culture and economic development is typically and most obviously seen in the rise of the tourism industry in underdeveloped and more remote minority regions. At times, this reaches absurd proportions. In December 2001, the State Council approved a provincial government proposal to rename Zhongdian County, a Tibetan autonomous county in northwest Yunnan, "Shangri-la." The decision was approved after several years of allegedly careful searching by the Yunnan Government for the region that best matched the landscape depicted in James Hilton's 1933 novel of the same name. It is part of an effort to enhance the county's Himalayan mystique and cash in on a Yunnan tourism boom that has mostly bypassed this remote county.²¹

The packaging of ersatz minority culture as a commodity for Chinese as well as foreign tourist consumption has been thoroughly analyzed and criticized by Western scholars.²² Many Chinese

minorities are themselves critical of what they see as a bastardization of identity-based practice and institutions. One Dai intellectual in Xishuangbanna (an autonomous prefecture that borders Myanmar and Laos) lambasted the stilted, stereotyped, and sexualized renderings of Dai-ness that permeate the capital of Jinghong and draw hundreds of thousands of tourists annually. For instance, many village officials in the prefecture have established collective enterprises, which are essentially fake villages (adjacent to the real ones) where tourists can experience Dai life in action. Still, such renderings help make possible the revenue, and to some extent the institutional space, that allows more grassroots cultural expression to flourish. Thai, Chinese, and other Asian tourists who come for the dancing make considerable donations to Xishuangbanna's temples, including the Number One Temple where this same intellectual teaches Dai literacy classes to adults, including women, who previously had little or no opportunity to learn the written form of their language.

Not all efforts to tie traditional culture to economic development concern the tourism industry. For instance, in 1984 in the Bai minority region of Dali, officials in one large township established a collective enterprise to produce and market a local ethnic specialty, batik cloth. That firm grew considerably and is now

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a multimillion-yuan enterprise employing over one-third of the residents of the village. Shortly after reforms were launched in Tonghai County, which has a sizable Hui Muslim population, township officials tapped into a traditional expertise in metallurgy and established a successful steel door and window-frame factory.²³

In another Hui area, the Weishan Hui and Yi Autonomous County, officials and entrepreneurs have capitalized on cultural preferences and Islamic dietary restrictions in expanding the TVE sector. In the early 1990s, officials set

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up a *qingzhen* (i.e., *halal*) beef drying and packaging plant in the Hui village of Huihuideng. Dried beef is a Yunnan and, particularly, a Hui specialty; the fact that the enterprise produces and packages *qingzhen* beef means that it can take advantage of Muslim as well as non-Muslim markets in China and abroad. "Huihuideng" has become something of a regional brand name for *halal* beef products.²⁴ The Weishan Hui are also famous for their cultivation of tea, and county officials have been promoting tea production in the more mountain-

ous parts of the township. These officially sponsored efforts to capitalize on minority culture are only part of the larger project to develop the economies of minority regions. Still, they underscore the government's interest in equalizing the pace and benefits of growth.

THE RAILWAY TO ASSIMILATION?

Problems of poverty and underdevelopment continue to plague vast areas of China's interior. Many of those most affected are ethnic and religious minorities who reside mainly in the least developed western provinces and comprise a disproportionate number of China's poor. Tackling poverty and underdevelopment and reducing the gap between these provinces and the industrialized coastal regions have become top priorities for the central and provincial governments. Large-scale infrastructure and development projects, such as the railroad being built to Tibet, reflect these priorities. In searching for ways to accelerate the development of rural minority regions, officials have tried to utilize—rather than to quash—a variety of cultural practices, traditions, and institutions.

As stated at the outset, underlining the state's concern with poverty and underdevelopment, and its efforts to link minority culture to the project of economic growth, is not to suggest that we ignore serious human rights abuses in Tibet, Xinjiang, and other regions. Still, Western policy-makers and international

organizations ought to appreciate the intricate socio-economic problems facing Chinese ethnic and religious minorities and acknowledge efforts by state officials to preserve minority cultural practices while tackling these problems.

The criticisms of Tibetan activists expose continuing human rights violations and religious repression in Tibetan regions. They also highlight the often unintended but problematic erosion of cultural tradition that economic development entails. Such criticisms are a necessary corrective to unqualified enthusiasm for China's market-oriented reforms. At the same time, we should recognize that the promotion and preservation of minority cultural identity and practice are not incompatible with economic growth—if state officials are committed to that task.

At the start of this essay I cited *The Great Transformation*. In that work, Polanyi debunks liberal notions of the self-regulating market by demonstrating the role of deliberate state action both in creating market economies and in alleviating the ravages of the market system—what Polanyi called a “satanic mill.”²⁵ China's own efforts to implement a market system have worked to raise living standards for millions of rural and urban Chinese throughout the country. One question that we must ask, however, is to what degree the contemporary state seeks to mitigate the market's negative effects, and the effects of development more broadly, on fragile and marginal populations such as minority nationalities.

There is a kind of policy schizophrenia with regard to minorities. A problem minorities may face is that the state's vow to preserving minority cultural institutions may depend on their compatibility with the development agenda. Other indicators suggest that the CCP remains committed to the homogenization-via-modernization of Chinese society and culture in ways that echo the Han-centric Maoist era. For the reform-era state, market-based economic development will, it is hoped, be able to achieve that which Maoist socialism was not quite able to create: a truly integrated nation-state and an integrated culture of the Chinese nationality. Whether that integrative ideal allows space for minority identity and practice remains to be seen. ■

NOTES

1 See “A Railroad to Progress or Just Another Chain to China?: After 50 years of Chinese Rule, Tibetans Remain Skeptical of Plans to End Their Poverty and Isolation,” *The Guardian*, February 9, 2002; also, Erik Eckholm, “China Wins the Wallets of Tibetans, but Hearts Are Still Slow to Follow,” *The New York Times*, December 1, 2001.

2 “Religious Repression in China,” Amnesty International Report ASA 17/069/1996 (July 1, 1996), <<http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA170691996>> (accessed April 27, 2002).

3 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), 40.

4 “World Bank Rejects China's Proposal to Resettle Farmers,” *The New York Times*, July 8, 2000.

5 “China Pushing Ahead with Controversial Resettlement of Farmers to Tibetan Lands,” *The Associated Press*, January 22, 2002.

6 “China Initiating New Anti-Poverty Method,” *Xinhua*, November 16, 2001. It should be noted that the Chinese government estimates poverty somewhat differently than the World Bank does. The Bank defines poverty as an income below one U.S. dollar a day.

7 *1999 Yunnan Yearbook* (Kunming: Yunnan Yearbook Press, 1999), 6-7.

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- 8 Quoted in Dru Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1991), 138.
- 9 Dali Yang, *Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions of China* (London: Routledge, 1997), 20-23.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 19.
- 11 See Ezra Vogel, *One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Vogel's is an account of rapid growth in this southeastern coastal province that borders Hong Kong. For accounts of how the coastal development strategy has contributed to widening regional disparities and center-provincial political struggles, see Dali Yang, *Beyond Beijing* and Yang and Houkai Wei, "Rising Sectionalism in China?" *Journal of International Affairs* 49 (2) (Winter 1996): 456-476.
- 12 Masahisa Fujita and Dapeng Hu, "Regional Disparity in China 1985-1994: The Effects of Globalization and Economic Liberalization," *Annals of Regional Science* 31 (1) (2001): 4.
- 13 Loraine A. West and Christine P.W. Wong, "Fiscal Decentralisation and Growing Regional Disparities in Rural China" in *Growth Without Miracles: Readings on the Chinese Economy in the Era of Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 331-346.
- 14 "China issues White Paper on Poverty Reduction in Rural Areas," *Xinhua*, October 15, 2001.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 Population censuses are conducted every 10 years in China; the figure of 41 million is a 1998 estimate. State Statistical Bureau, ed., *China Statistical Yearbook, 1998* (Beijing: China Statistical Information & Consultancy, 1998), 139.
- 17 "China: Overcoming Rural Poverty," Joint Report of the Leading Group for Poverty Reduction, UNDP, and the World Bank, No. 21105-CHA (October 18, 2000): 4.
- 18 *1999 Yunnan Yearbook*, 7.
- 19 According to World Bank estimates, nearly a quarter of Yunnan's population in 1996 was classed as poor (i.e., living on less than one U.S. dollar per day), while the entire population of 7.7 million comprised 15.3 percent of rural poor in the entire country, the largest share of any province. "China: Overcoming Rural Poverty," 4.
- 20 *1999 Yunnan Yearbook*, 7. Also, *1998 Education Statistics Yearbook* (Beijing: China Educational Press, 1999), 380, and State Statistical Bureau, ed., *1998 China Statistical Yearbook*, 122.
- 21 It is not clear if it will be called "Shangri-la" or "Shangri-la County." Before finalizing the decision, county officials entered into an agreement with the Hong Kong based Shangri-la Hotel Corp. stating that each entity could continue to use the name. Since other regions of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Tibet (as well as Himalayan regions outside of China) have laid claim to the name, the Zhongdian decision may spark controversy from resentful local officials elsewhere. See "Lost and Found," *The Sun Herald*, January 20, 2002.
- 22 See, for instance, Louisa Schein, "Gender and Internal Orientalism in China," *Modern China* 23 (1) (January 1997): 69-98. Also, Dru Gladney, "Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/ Minority Identities," *Journal of Asian Studies* 53 (1) (1994).
- 23 Gao Fayuan, ed., *Yunnan Huizu Xiangqing Diaocha* (Research on rural Hui communities in Yunnan) (Kunming: Yunnan Nationalities Press, 1992), 192.
- 24 *1999 Yearbook of Dali Prefecture*, 304-05.
- 25 Polanyi, 73.
-