The Effects of Racism on Support for Torture in the United States

Post 9/11

An honors thesis for the Department of Political Science

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Why torture? American racism and the public sanctioning of torture for Arab and Middle Eastern terror suspects

Chapter One

Introduction

Purpose and Perspective

Imagine being forced to endure hours of standing in the most uncomfortable position possible and threatened with further suffering for moving, or being forced to lie down blind folded and having water poured over your face until you fell unconscious. Imagine being subjected to extreme hot and cold non-stop for days. This was a reality for many detainees and prisoners during the G.W. Bush Administration's "War on Terror". Though these acts are categorized by some as enhanced interrogation methods, to others they are essentially the same as more severe forms of physical abuse, not to be called anything but torture. The subject of torture as part of military intelligence operations continues to be the subject of heated debate today. While most of the Western world flatly rejects these methods as legitimate intelligence gathering tactics, a surprising number of Americans still support – as a matter of national security – torturing those suspected of belonging to terrorist organizations or having knowledge of future terror attacks. In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, almost half of the American public fully supported such interrogation methods. Forty-five percent of Americans were willing to have the US government torture terror suspects to gain information about future terrorist attacks on the US (*Gallup/CNN/USA Today* October 2001). In fact, as recently as June 2009, forty-six percent of Americans still believed that "There are cases to consider torture" (*ABC News/Washington Post* June 2009).

It is important to note that this approval comes with direct knowledge that the vast majority of terror suspects will be Arab or from the Middle East. While prejudice towards Arabs, Arab-Americans, and Middle Easterners is not a new phenomena in the United States, its visibility was certainly increased following 9/11. In the weeks following the attacks, there were 27 confirmed cases of passengers of Arab ethnicity being banned from airplane flights, and 520 reported violent actions directed towards individuals perceived to be of Arab ethnicity (American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 2001). Put bluntly, is seems likely that the substantial support for torture is related to the intense discrimination against Arabs and Middle Easterners in the wake of the attack.

The American belief system is fundamentally based on the protection of the rights of the individual from unlawful discrimination. This remains an opinion with constantly high support among Americans. Nonetheless, Americans still seem to support the violation of individual rights by supporting torture. The priority of civil liberties is embedded in both our Constitution and our governmental institutions. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the correlation between racism and public support for the use of torture and other violations of civil liberties against potential enemies following terrorist attacks or in times of War. I will address three questions relating to racism, punitive attitudes, and tolerance. Utilizing answers from these previous questions, I will address my final question: how does racism affect the willingness of Americans to sanction the use of torture and other civil liberties violations against suspected terrorists of Arab or Middle-Eastern descent?

America has a long history of wartime civil liberty abuses, many of which are deeply rooted in racial discrimination. Thus, this thesis speaks not only to the relevance of today's torture debate, but also to more general patterns of racial discrimination during times of national crisis.

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Most notable among these racially motivated national security tactics was Executive Order 9066, issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt after the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Under the guise of 'national security', the order led to the incarceration of 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, the majority of whom were either US citizens or held legal permanent resident status. Forced to leave their homes and jobs, those evacuated – mostly first and second generation Americans – were placed in concentration camps and forced to endure years of psychological and physical trauma. The experience of the interned Japanese and Japanese Americans during World War II is similar in many ways to the detainees of Guantanamo Bay and other US military prison facilities throughout the world. Like the 'enemy combatants' of the War on Terror, the Japanese were interned as a means of military necessity in order to protect against espionage and sabotage (PBS). Purely on the basis of race, these innocent Americans were subjected to countless civil liberties violations as part of a national security strategy. Simply because the interned were Japanese, the American public was willing to believe that they were synonymous with their international enemies. More importantly, the Japanese Internment during WWII was widely supported by the American public as an effective strategy to protect American lives from a foreign threat.

Understanding what motivates Americans to abandon their long-established belief in protecting rights and support government civil liberties violations, is important to address the broader questions of why free democratic societies engage in racially-motivated violence and discrimination against out-groups. The question of how race affects the public's willingness to sanction torture and other collective punishment is particularly relevant when considering future military interrogations after the War on Terror. Why do Western democracies, specifically the United States, engage in and justify these abuses as a legitimate technique? Do threat perceptions

based on race lead to future ethnic conflict, here and abroad? Most significant is the consideration that must be given at a time when our governmental institutions are also considering the prosecution of former Bush Administration officials for their part in promoting illegal acts of torture. Finally, it is necessary to confront the moral question of whether citizens, aware of the use of violence and civil rights violations, are accountable for their government's actions and their subsequent repercussions. In the proceeding section, I will define torture in the context of this thesis, summarizes the debates surrounding its use in the context of a larger national security agenda, and its supposed purpose in the eyes of the American citizenry.

The issues of punitive interrogation and treatment of an out-group, and how racism dictates conditions of individual support for the violation of civil liberties, have been largely addressed separately in the existing scholarship. In Chapter Three, I review the current state of the literature regarding racism and punitiveness, which will focus on explanations for why members of one group favor violence against out-groups of a different race. While there are many explanation as to why threat, such as that felt following 9/11, leads to negative feelings towards those associated with further security threats, the purpose of this review will be to determine the most appropriate explanation for what mechanisms transform racism into support for violence against a racial out-group.

Overview of the Torture Debate

Central to the purpose of this thesis is torture. In order to determine why Americans support the government's use of against terror suspects, the term 'torture', and its application must be defined. Article I of the 1984 United Nations' "Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" defines the term *torture* as: "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person

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for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity" (UN Doc. A/39/51 1984). This definition can be applied by the regulations laid out in the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Article Seventeen of Section One of the Convention states that "No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind" (75 UNTS 135).

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration authorized the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" in order to obtain information in the war on terror. While these techniques supposedly helped the US gain important intelligence to prevent future attacks and gain information on al Qaeda, both the country and the international community were shocked by the images of torture that began to emerge from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay as the war progressed. While both the Congress and the Courts were willing to offer greater powers to Bush officials, which in turn authorized military and intelligence offices to use torture as a interrogation technique, dissent was raised both at home and abroad.

As party to both the United Nations and the Geneva Convention, the US is under accord to follow the regulations laid out in both documents. However, the US government has come under fire from both the international and domestic community for straying from these Conventions. The controversial use of harsh interrogation techniques, that certainly constitute torture under the

definition laid out by the United Nations, by American military and intelligence officers in order to gain information from suspected terrorists clearly violate both the Conventions. The torture debate centered around the issue of whether the efforts to prevent future terror attacks against the US outweighed the severe civil rights and liberties violations faced by the victims of these interrogations. Despite the debate surrounding whether these interrogation techniques were considered torture, the issue of how racism factored into the debate remained largely unaddressed.

Although elite rhetoric within the US stressed the importance of not discriminating against Arabs and Middle Easterners, the actions of Congress and the Bush administration sent a different message to the public. The government sanctioning of torture in the form of interrogation techniques along with other civil-rights violating policies in the wake of 9/11, while perpetuating of a heightened threat of terrorism and radical Islam, allowed for the "construction of a juridically reinvented category of essentialized cultural difference" (Abrell, 2008). Additionally, legislation such as the US PATRIOT Act framed the discourse regarding the war on terror by characterizing those arrested under suspicion or with knowledge of terrorist activities as the enemy. Those categorized as enemy combatants were being held in US prisons across the world were denied the essential due process rights given to all those arrested in the US. This denial of rights, in the name of both winning the War on Terror and national security, only served to establish the guilt of these suspects in the eye of the public.

Furthermore fear of another attack by Arab or Middle Eastern terrorists allowed for the American public to not only favor these legislative measures, but to also sanction the use of torture as a means of intelligence gathering based on racial and cultural differences. Thus terror suspects were not only assumed guilty, but also assumed by the public to be either Arab or

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Middle Eastern. Because the public viewed torture as a method of extracting information from a guilty party, it was arguably *also* seen as a means for punishing terror suspects for their non-cooperation with US military and intelligence officials. To fully understand the concept of torture as punishment it is necessary to briefly explore how this aligns with America's already harsh penal policies and how they disproportionately affect minorities.

Tonry (2009) attributes America's harsh penal policies to four important historical and cultural factors. The first is the paranoid style of American politics, the second Manichean moralism, the third is constitutional structure allowing for short-term emotional policies to exact greater influence, and the fourth is the history of US race relations. Tonry points to the politics of the McCarthy era and during the war on drugs to exemplify the paranoid style of American politics in the face of real, or imagined, threats to the country (Tonry 2009). All these episodes led the American public to favor stricter punishments for those seen as contributing to these threats. Tonry points to the fact that this applies just the same to the war on terror. Similarly, the aftermath of 9/11 led to a clear promotion of Manichean moralism by the Bush administration, establishing the distinction between the US and the terrorist enemy as a battle between good and evil (Tonry 2009). Clearly the constitution allowed Bush to enforce the PATRIOT Act and use his executive power without disclosing the actions of the government to Congress or the public. Finally, the long-standing association of Arabs and Middle Easterners with terrorism has characterized the state of race relations between Arabs and white Americans. These factors, according to Tonry (2009), explain why Americans willingly sanctioned torture as the harshest form of punishment for terror suspects particularly those of Arab or Middle Eastern descent. With the essential connection between torture and punishment established, this thesis will fully explore the nature of racism in the US and its relationship to harsh criminal sentencing and

intolerance.

Literature Overview

<u>Racism</u>

I begin by reviewing the preexisting literature regarding *racism* in America. I examine the question of how racism, generally, affects American's political attitudes. Race has divided our nation since its foundation. Though acts of blatant racism are not as commonly visible today as they were during our prior history, its influence on public opinion should not be underestimated. It was not so long ago that American voters were being scared by the strongly influential "Willie Horton" ads of George H.W. Bush. More recently, Banaji, Cunningham, Greenwald, and Nosek's Implicit Association Test revealed that subjects matching words and images had strong subconscious racial biases with seventy-five percent of White participants demonstrating an anti-Black bias (Banaji, Greenwald & Nosek 2000). I look at competing theories of racism in order to form a solid definition of the term and identify variables that are link discrimination against a racial-out-group and particular policy preferences. I will focus on work related to how racism is expressed in relation to political attitudes according to the theories of *Stereotyping* (Devine 1989; Dovidio et al. 1997; Kawakami et al. 1998; Noseck et al 2000), *New Racism* (Kinder & Sears 1971)*,* and *Averse Racism* (Dovidio & Gaertener 1998; Nail, Decker & Harton 2003). Additionally, I will examine the motivation behind the expression or racism, focusing mainly on theories of *Group Dominance* (Bobo 1988; Frederico & Sidanius 2002; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar & Levin 2004). Drawing on these conclusions, I can more clearly identify which groups are most negatively affected by race, and are most likely to apply on these negative feelings to Arabs or Middle Easterners through support for torture.

<u>Support Severe Punishment</u>

Once the effects of racism on political attitudes been established from the aforementioned literature, the next part of the review will examine how racism leads to support for punitive policies in times of peace. The sharp racial divide among supporters of severe criminal sentencing is stark. I will focus on American support for the most severe form of criminal punishment: the death penalty. The role of racism in both the divide among death penalty supporters, as well as the unbalanced racial makeup of the prison and death row population, has been the topic of much scholarly exploration. Put simply, I will examine the question of why White Americans tend to favor the death penalty over any other racial group in the United States.

Many scholars argue that white racism is what leads to a disproportionate number of whites to support the death penalty as an appropriate form of punishment for convicted murders (Barkan and Cohn 1994; Cohen et al. 1991; Dambrum 2007; Gliser and Gilens 1997; Johnson 2008; Soss et al. 2003). I intend to show that it is in fact racism that drives white support for severe punishment independent of a national security crisis, by referencing past scholarship. These works will be important as a guide to the data analysis in this study, as I seek to determine those groups, which will predictably favor harsh treatment of criminals and suspects support the use of torture.

<u>Tolerance</u>

Finally, the central hypothesis of this thesis draws on theories of tolerance, which serve as a connection between racism and support for severe punishment. Understanding why Americans favor severe punishment is essential to understanding their willingness to impose it in times of international conflict; therefore the last question I will examine is why Americans demonstrate political tolerance for some groups and not others, particularly in their support for violating the

civil liberties of a particularly unpopular out-group. The basis of this question is to understand

why Americans would support the use of torture, a blatant violation of civil rights, on suspected

terrorists in the War on Terror. Political tolerance seems to move in waves according to the

salience of the threat a particular out-group poses to the American public (Davis 1995; Marcus,

Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood 1995; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams1978; Sullivan & Hendriks

2009). However, while the source of threat may change, the willingness to subvert the civil

liberties of some groups over others remains fundamentally rooted in prejudice against that

group (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood 1995). The concept of anxiety and fear are

essential to understanding how threat is related to tolerance. Anxiety and fear are shown to

increase intolerance, ethnocentrism and xenophobia, regardless of whether the threat is real and

widely acknowledged or a personally subjective perceived state (Huddy, Feldman, Taber &

Lahav 2005). In terms of racial discrimination, these emotions lead to greater feelings of

discrimination towards Arabs, support of stronger anti-immigration policies, intensified

intelligence monitoring of terror suspects, and support for retaliatory aggression against attackers

(Huddy 2005; Coryn, Beale & Myers 2004). I intend to explain the effects of this racial prejudice

on tolerance and how racism causes Americans to consider torture a legitimate tactic to achieve

national security.

Method

Drawing on these literatures, in Chapter Four I lay out my how the scholarship relates to my

own hypotheses regarding racism and the willingness of Americans to support national security

policies that involve severe violations of civil liberties, in particular torture. I hypothesize that

given the historically strong influence of racial prejudice - both conscious and unconscious - on

political attitudes, it follows that racism towards Arabs, Arab-Americans or those of Middle Eastern descent, will have a significant affect on support for torture in the context of a national security threat. This reaction should even be significant among those demographic groups not typically known to hold strong racial prejudices. To support my hypothesis, I draw on both past and present survey data regarding their support for illegal actions against perceived enemies during a security threat. By understanding what factors make racism more likely to influence political attitudes, I can test the strength of racial threat in sanctioning the use of torture.

First, I will examine data gathered from Gallup polls taken while America was engaged in active combat during WWII from 1941 to 1945. These polls ask about American willingness to employ illegal, and arguably criminal, tactics against both the Japanese and German enemy in order to bring an end the war. This data will provide a comparable basis of examining public sanctioning of physically harmful and illegal acts against an international enemy of another race during times of war and national security crisis. Examining the results of these surveys in relation to political tolerance, I will compare the WWII responses with public support for torture post—9/11. Analyzing these polls, will demonstrate the degree to which race affected a willingness to employ severe tactics on their enemy.

I use the same post 9/11 data, collected by the various organization from September 2003 through April 2009 to determine the specific effect of racism on support for the American government's use of torture. I will be looking at the affects of indirect and direct questioning as a means for measuring racism among respondents, and determine whether there is a correlation between racism and support for torture. Comparing the effect of racism for each case will demonstrate to what degree racism is responsible for support for torture in relation to each event. More specifically, I will analyze the survey responses by examining both questions indirectly

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and directly addressing racial bias as a means of questioning regarding racism. I break down this data according to the determined characteristics that predict which groups are more likely to allow racism to affect their support for rights violating policies. Using these results, it will be possible to determine the which Americans support racist or punitive policies, why these groups supported the use of torture despite no preexisting support for such civil liberties violations, and if this is a larger trend among the American people.

Results

Following the methods discussed in Chapter Four, multiple analyses were conducted on the responses to numerous questionnaires for both indirect and direct questions regarding racism. The results of this thesis show that a significant relationship exists between support for torture and the expression of racism. This relationship was most clear among respondents who answered indirect questions that identified Arabs or Middle Easterners as a threatening racial outgroup. The relationship between racism and support for torture was much less significant in its results for survey respondents who answered questions asking directly about their beliefs out racial outgroups. These results are consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, which demonstrated that self-reported racism is far less common than more subtle and subverted forms of discrimination against threatening racial outgroups. Overall, the results suggest that a the role of race in support for torture is a relationship deserving of far more investigation than previous studies have attempted. The full results and discussion of the indirect and direct questionning analyses will be given in Chapters Five and Six, respectively.

Implications of this Thesis

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The implications of the results of this thesis are both significant and far-reaching. Today, America's reputation as the defender of rights, freedom and democracy are being called into question by the world and its own citizens. Thus it is important to understand why such a significant portion of Americans so blatantly rejected their constitutional principles in favor of torture, potentially tainting their international reputation forever. Additionally, the question could provide relevant information for understanding other ethnic conflicts that take place in societies under the constant threat of terrorism or war, such as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By emphasizing more inclusive self-categorization following times of crisis, the collective response to clear violations of civil liberties can be for a collective rejection of immoral and unconstitutional policies.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

Understanding the Motivations and Expressions of Racism in America

There are a seemingly endless number of scholarly works that attempt to explain what drives racism in America. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to review all of these theories, but instead to determine those most relevant to support for withholding civil liberties from certain racial or ethnic groups. Although the literature reviewed refers to racism expressed by whites towards blacks, this long history has provided numerous insights into the influence of race on the formation of political attitudes. Thus, these theories of racism apply more broadly to racial conflicts beyond the scope of the black-white conflict. The scholarship addressed in this review is essential not only to define racism, but also to determine how racism influences support for torture and other national security initiative that violate civil liberties.

Race is defined as a socially constructed difference that produces subordinate and superordinate groups, and that the meaning is defined by its context (Cox 1948). According to Zuberi (2001) "Race expresses and symbolizes two aspects of social identity. It is the outward form of socially salient physical difference; it is also the flag of the population, the sign by which each racial group is distinguished from others, a visible mark of distinctiveness that is borne by everything that emanates from the race" (Zuberi 2001, xviii). This is the definition of race that will be employed in this thesis. The term '*racism*' is key to understanding the purpose of this thesis. I define racism as: the expression of prejudice or bias against another racial group, based

on a threatening perception or stereotype of the group. When race is salient, racism will be most influential in the formation of political attitudes in order for racial ingroups to justify and maintain dominance. This definition is based on the previously literature reviewed in the proceeding sections, in particular Dovidio and Gaertener's integrated model of new and averse racism and social dominance theory.   The utility of this definition arises from the fact that it encapsulates not only what motivates racism but also how it is expressed.

Since the Civil Rights Movement, blatant, or "old-fashioned racism" - such as support for Jim Crow laws – is not commonly expressed in American society. Some scholars attribute this to the fact that Americans are less prejudice than they once were, and that racism has just declined. While there is certainly plausibility to this view, racism continues to play a large role in policy debates across the country. Racism remains a salient issue in discussion of school busing, welfare, and affirmative action. The majority of the scholarship seems to agree that racial prejudice has not been expunged from American society or politics, yet it is clear that the expression of racism in American has clearly changed since the mid-twentieth century.

Stereotyping and Implicit Behavior

In order to understand this shift in the expression of racism, one must address how the affects of stereotyping and implicit behavior are related to the formation and assertion of political attitudes. Stereotypes are a kind of information shortcut involving simplified assumptions about individuals and the groups to which they belong. Rather than the explicit measures of attitude that operate in conscious modes, and are exemplified in traditional self-report measures, stereotyping occurs subconsciously and automatically (Dividio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson and Howard 1997). Automatic stereotype activation demonstrates that the stereotypes are not only over-learned, but spontaneously accessed in response to stimuli related to an out-group. For

instance, one might automatically associate the word 'welfare' with 'blacks' rather than 'whites', based on the negative stereotype that black Americans are more likely to be on welfare. Even though it is implicit, stereotyping is not any less consequential than deliberative behaviors in terms of people's perceptions and reactions to one another (DePaulo and Friedman 1997). Furthermore, Nosek, Cunningham, Banaji, and Greenwald (2000) found that seventy-five percent of White participants showed pro-white/anti-black preferences based on an application of their Implicit Association Test. The test required participants to pair sets of words in order to test their biases based on the amount of time each participant took to pair the sets. In Nosek et al. (2000), found that participants were far more likely to associate negative words with Blacks, and positive words with Whites. Devine (1989) asserts that the expression of stereotypes is conditional based on the processing environment and the individual's level of prejudice. He found evidence of similar levels of negative personal stereotype activation among whites who had self-reported as low prejudiced, as well as those who self-report as high-prejudiced, against blacks. These findings lead him to conclude that self-reported low prejudice individuals were actually subverting their actual levels of prejudice, which were reflected in their automatic stereotype activation.

However, contrary to Devine's findings, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that while individuals may not differ in the content of the stereotypes activated, this automatic activation is a consequence of stronger associations with categorical priming. In three experiments examining implicit and explicit racial attitudes, Kawakami, Dion, and Dividio (1998) replicated Devine's study, which specifically primed for negative stereotype activation against blacks. According to Devine, both high and low prejudice individuals should have similarly high rates of stereotype activation. Instead, when controlling for priming, high prejudiced individuals showed stereotype

activation not only faster but more frequently than the low prejudiced (Kawakami et al. 1998). These results suggest that stereotyping is only expressed explicitly by those who already hold a racial prejudice against a particular group.

Although stereotyping and implicit behaviors may influence certain expressions of racism, as can be seen in Kawakami et al. (1998), the fact is that neither can accurately predict for behavior. Simply because someone associates a certain group with negative stereotypes does not ensure that they will hold racist attitude or discriminate against members of that group. This association could likely be the result of an individual reacting to contextual priming (Dividio et al. 1997). If subconscious stereotyping was the underlying explanation for the racism affecting behavior, one would expect to see much higher levels of racial discrimination. This is especially true given the high frequency with which individuals refer to stereotypes for information shortcuts. However, Kawakami et al. (1998) clearly demonstrates that stereotyping is only a predictor of behavior among individuals who express strong racial prejudiced. To understand how stereotypes fit in the larger context of racism, it is necessary to explain why stereotypes are used and in what way they influence group behavior and political attitudes. Stereotypes appear to be a consequence, rather than a cause, of existing racist beliefs. For the purpose of the research in this thesis, the implications of these findings are that stereotyping is important to understanding the effects of priming on political attitudes, it does not necessarily determine behavior in and of itself. While stereotyping and implicit behavior demonstrate the prevalence of negative racial stereotypes, they do not necessarily predict how individuals will apply such stereotypes to their political decisions.

New Racism

Stereotyping and implicit behavior does not necessarily predict how attitudes will be expressed, thus how implicit behavior effects explicit behavior must still be established. To begin with, I look to the theory of *new racism*. The purpose of new racism is to account for the continuing prejudice towards racial out-groups and its clear effect on the formation of political attitudes, particularly why whites continue to resist policies that promote racial equality (Kinder and Sears 1981). The theory consists of two propositions. The first proposition, based on the thesis of *covert racism*, states that because racial prejudice is now regarded as socially un-desirable, individuals will favor disguised and indirect ways to express their racial prejudice (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick 1991). The second proposition draws from the theory of *symbolic racism* and states that with new racism, racial prejudice is expressed in non-racial terms, particularly as a violation of cherished values like individualism and equal opportunity (McConahay and Hough 1976). Ironically, it is a basis in traditional values that fuels new racism. The theory consists of a logically consistent view that blacks are no longer discriminated against; thus any disadvantages to blacks must come from their own lack of effort, any recent gains are undeserved, and special demands unwarranted (Tarman and Sears 2005).

Critics of new racism claim that its effects are only a correlative factor related to non-racial opinions in the discussion of race-related politics, which actually influence policy preference instead of race (Sniderman et al. 1991; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Moreover, new racism has also been shown to be highly correlated with old-fashioned racism, and thus may not represent a more subtle manifestation of personal attitudes, but a public expression significantly shaped by social desirability concerns (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Wiliams 1995). In defense of new racism, Tarman and Sears (2005) found that controlling for old-fashioned racism still

resulted in a substantial white prejudice towards blacks, and that symbolic racism was the

independent variable affecting the expression of prejudice. However, the most significant

objection is that the nature of the new racism thesis makes it particularly difficult to measure,

because it is based on the very idea that people will not openly express their true beliefs about

race. While new racism, provides an initial basis on which to explain the expression of racism in

today's world, its testability makes the theory somewhat weak. A more definitive criteria for

determining how racism is expressed and how it affects and shapes broader policy attitudes is

necessary.

Aversive Racism

To account for the fact that new racism doesn't provide an strong or sufficiently testable

hypothesis as to what actually motivates racism, I examine the opposing theory of aversive

racism. Aversive racism describes the form of racism that characterizes white Americans with

strong egalitarian values (Gaertener and Dovidio 1986). The theory is defined as 'aversive'

because aversive racists have a genuine desire to be unprejudiced, but have a distinct anxiety,

discomfort, or even disgust towards people of another race (Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003).

Rather than new racists, who hide their racist beliefs because it is socially undesirable, aversive

racists, sympathize with the victims of past injustices, support public policies that promote racial

equality, in theory identify with the liberal agenda, and consider themselves to be non-prejudiced

(Gaertener and Dovidio 1986). Yet, aversive racists unavoidably posses negative feelings

towards blacks. Because of their commitment to egalitarian values, these negative feelings are

subconscious. However, when a situation threatens to make these negative feelings conscious,

the aversive racist will strongly try to distance themselves from their internalized prejudice.

Thus aversive racists will amplify their positive attitudes towards blacks in order to reaffirm their

egalitarian convictions. When their negative feelings are not made salient, or the social cues against discrimination are absent, aversive racists will express their racist beliefs in more subtle and rational ways (Gaertener and Dovidio 1986). It is important to establish that these feelings are not hate, and negative feelings generally express themselves as avoidance rather than destructive behavior (Gaertener and Dovidio 1986).

Aversive racists will search out non-racial terms in order to explain their biases and negative reaction to racial out-groups rather than confront the issue of race directly. Gaertener and Dovidio's aversive racism model is supported by their findings of their experiment, which tested whether white liberals or white conservatives would be more likely to help a troubled motorist before and after the race of the motorist was revealed. They found that participants overwhelmingly indicated that they would be willing to help the motorist regardless of race. However, in line with aversive racism they found that liberals hung up on the black motorist far more frequently than on white motorists. The results illustrate the idea that when norms for appropriate behavior are well defined, whites will not discriminate against other racial groups, but when norms are ambiguous or conflicting both high and low prejudiced individuals demonstrate a clear racial bias (Gaertener and Dovidio 1986).

Aversive racism is certainly more testable than new racism, and seems to avoid the trap of merely demonstrating a relationship rather than a cause. The theory is particularly useful for the purposes of this thesis in order to analyze responses when participants are asked directly about racial prejudice versus times when racial norms are not made salient. While this is strong evidence in favor of aversive racism, it is important to note that this theory does not account for explicit acts of racism. Yet, this is not necessarily a challenge for this thesis because Americans are far more likely to verbalize their support for policies that violate the civil liberties of Arab or

Middle Easterners on the basis of maintaining national security. However, it is important to account for what motivates racism in those who do not hold strong egalitarian views. A stronger challenge to aversive racism comes from the fact that its focus on avoidance doesn't account for more overt forms of prejudice.

The Integrated Model of New and Aversive Racism

Utilizing the strengths of both new and aversive racism, Dovidio and Gaertener (1998) propose an integrated model of the two theories, which serves to explain the expression of both overt and subtle forms of racism. Specifically, they assert a link between political conservatism and new racism, and political liberalism and aversive racism. According to Divido and Gartener, conservatives haven't changed their views regarding racial minorities, despite changing national standards of prejudice. In general, conservative are more likely use new racism justifications for not supporting race-based policies in favor of racial minorities, or associated racial out-groups with negative symbols (Dovidio and Gaertener 1998; Nail, Decker and Harton 2003). On the other hand, liberals generally internalize non-prejudiced values and social norms. However, while liberals genuinely desire a more inclusive society and explicitly reject racism, they still unconsciously still harbor negative beliefs toward racial out-groups and will be more likely to experience aversive racism (Dovidio and Gaertener 1998; Nail, Decker and Harton 2003). Thus, the integrated model predicts that white, specifically European Americans, conservatives will favor whites based on race's salience and cues against discriminatory behavior. Conversely, white liberals will favor members of the racial out-group in an attempt to mask their true racist beliefs. However, if not being tested explicitly primed for about rejecting their racial biases white liberals will show greater levels of prejudice towards racial out-groups than conservatives. It is important to note that the model in no way links political affiliation with racism, but stresses

that certain political orientations are more likely to be associated with the expression of certain views towards racial out-groups.

Nail, Decker, and Harton (2003) tested Dovidio and Gaertener's integrated model by assessing white conservative and liberal's racial bias when confronted with a scenario modeled on the Rodney King case. They asked participants whether they would consider if a defendant, accused of beating a motorist, to be facing double jeopardy by his federal indictment after facing a state indictment. The race of the motorist and the officer was manipulated with each sample. Their experiments confirmed that conservatives were not affected by the race of victim except when it was white officer and black victim. For conservatives, in addition to race needing to be manipulated in order for them to demonstrate an explicit bias, a context in which to prime racism had to be manipulated that disturbed the established order in some way (Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003). On the other hand, liberals only favored blacks when one was the victim of a white officer, and they showed a lower double jeopardy rating with a black officer and white victim. However, when cues for non-discriminatory behavior were not present, liberals actually showed a higher level of racial bias than conservatives (Nail, Decker and Harton 2003).

While their results certainly provides support for Dovidio and Gaertener's integrated model, others suggest that cognitive changes to racial cues – or the expression of racial bias – "represent only attentional and orienting reflexes rather than prejudice or internal conflict" (Cacioppo and Sandman 1981; Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003, pg. 767; Petty and Cacioppo 1983). According to these objections, racial bias may actually be a momentary psychological response to being presented with a racial cue rather than an expression of racism. Additionally, the results of the model are highly speculative. Though there is a clear racial bias in individual's responses during each primed session, it is unclear beyond these primes whether racism is driving these biases.

These results are certainly promising for the affect of racism on decision-making and potentially

political attitudes, but more conclusive evidence of this phenomenon is needed.

Social Dominance Theory

    Theories of group dominance provide the missing elements of new racism, aversive racism

by integrating them into a model of group hierarchies. According to these theories of

dominance, racism is how individuals in the dominant group express their desire to maintain a

social position over groups lower in the social hierarchy (Bobo 1988; Frederico and Sidanius

2002; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar and Levin 2004).   In particular, social

dominance theory (SDT) aims to explain both the systematic group oppression and structural

inequality that result from racial prejudice and discrimination, by focusing on both individual

and structural factors related to racism (Sidanius et al. 2004). The theory relies on group-based

hierarchies, mainly concerned with gender and group systems based on "arbitrary sets", highly

flexible and situationally contingent social constructions of group membership – such as

racial/ethnic groups (Sidanius 1999). An individual's level of racism is determined by their

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), or the degree to which individuals desire and support

group-based hierarchy and the domination of "inferior" groups by "superior" groups. Higher

levels of SDO at the upper end of the social hierarchy contributes to the "will to group

dominance" (Sidanius 1993).

    Societies predisposed to form group-based social hierarchies, either achieved or ascribed,

will do so, formimg a *hegemonic group* at the top and at lease one *negative reference group* at

the bottom. The negative reference group influences how the hegemonic group will behave

towards all groups lower in the hierarchy. Racism is a measure to devalue those in other racial

or ethnic groups in order to maintain the social hierarchy. In essence, racism is a means to

control conflict within the social system (Sidanius 1993). Thus when those in the dominant group feel threatened by lower ranking racial groups, they will use new racism justifications in support of policies that negatively affect these lower ranking groups to express their societal control. As with domestic groups, social dominance should apply equally to the international arena. Internationally different groups become more important in the organization of the social hierarchy that is less prevalent in the domestic sphere. For instance, being categorized as an 'American' may be seen as dominant to any other nationality. However, racial and ethnic groups still remain highly significant even in an international setting. SDT demonstrates how and why new racism manifests itself, because it allows the dominant group to maintain the ascribed group hierarchy in a socially acceptable manner. It also explains that those who are more prejudiced towards minority out-groups, or those with higher SDO, will utilize information such as stereotypes to help understand their social surroundings.

One important characteristic of SDT that makes it particularly significant is the role of education in predicting the expression of racism through individual's political views. Frederico and Sidanius (2002) found that counter to the belief that higher education increases tolerance, instead higher education provided a means to covertly express racially driven social dominance in abstract political concepts like conservatism. Rather, it is political knowledge that lowers SDO (Frederico and Sidanius 2002). These findings provide important support to the argument that having a high level of SDO may outweigh the influence of education.

In support of SDT, Bobo (1988) stresses the role of threat to group interests, based in a notion of group position and a sense of superiority, as a precedent for racist attitudes. Similarly, Bobo and Fox (2003) and Zuberi (2001) assert the importance of social organization, and more fundamental bases and mechanisms of hierarchical differentiation that shape the ordering of

social relations and allocation of life experiences. Therefore racism is essential to maintaining

the social order. In summary, through its support of group and hierarchically based expression

of racism, SDT provides the cause factor missing from the new racism thesis, averse racism, and

even Gaertener and Dividio's integrated model. Those who view racial and ethnic minorities as

a threat to the social hierarchy will use new racism to justify their derogation of such out-groups.

This is particularly important because most American policies dealing with race are based on a

desire to assist the most disadvantaged in society. In the case of suspected terrorists, who will

certainly fall low on the group hierarchy, it is important to consider these aspects of racism as a

form of domination when considering the restriction of their civil liberties, especially when

doling out punishment to these groups. The importance of dominance is that it clearly explains

how racism is expressed and the motivations behind racial prejudice in a way that other theories

of racism cannot account.

The Relationship Between Support for Severe Criminal Sentencing and Racism

Before confronting the larger issue of torture following a terrorist attack, it is necessary to

examine why Americans support forms of severe punishment in times of peace and security. In

particular, I will examine how racism will influence support for the death penalty. Arguably

more extreme than torture, the death penalty is the most severe form of punishment for non-

compliance with the law. It serves as a relevant comparison for assessing support for severe

punishment in times of peace. As with racism, the literature on the relationship between punitive

attitudes and race is quite large. This thesis will focus on the most commonly accepted

explanations for why whites generally favor the death penalty, and whether this support is

influenced by racism. Soss, Langbein, and Metelko (2003) looked at racial attitudes, social group

differences, core values and political attitudes to explain the significantly high support for the death penalty among white Americans. Consistent with previous findings, their results suggested that the most important factor in connecting racism and support for the death penalty was social context (Glaser and Gilens 1997; Soss et al. 2003). The number of black residents in a community was most significant in explaining those who held anti-black prejudice (Soss et al. 2003). Soss et al. (2003) gives us not only a number of demographic and ideological factors that predict support for the death penalty among whites, but also provides support for the fact that contextual factors are very influential in terms of having racism increase this support. However, this study does not explain the actual effect of race on support for the death penalty.

This problem of determining causal support for racism and support for the death penalty is not limited to Soss et al. (2003), but to many of the scholars attempting to show that racism is more than a correlative to this support. Barkan and Cohn (1994) used data from the 1990 General Social Survey, to measure personal apathy towards Blacks in order to determine if support for the death penalty was motivated by racial prejudice. Their results only turned up a relationship between racial prejudice and support for the death penalty. A substantial finding was made by Cohen, Barkan, and Aveni (1991), who found that the punitive attitudes of whites towards criminals are a reflection of white prejudice towards stigmatized minorities, and that as the dominant group whites use punitive measures to control minorities. However, these results were not entirely conclusive in proving that racism was the actual cause of punitive attitudes beyond a strong relationship. While similar to studies on SDT in its underlying premise of group dominance, none of the studies on punitive attitudes and racism has provided direct evidence to support the hypothesis that racism is the source of these attitudes (Dambrum 2007).

Stack (2000) examined whether the relationship between racial bias and support for the death penalty was indirect and accounted for by levels of *personal authoritarianism*, a theory originally proposed by Adorno et al (1950) to explain fascist attitudes. Stack found that if authoritarianism was controlled for, the relationship between racial prejudice and support for the death penalty seems to disappear. However, the authoritarianism scale used by Stack has been criticized for strongly limited his results, due to his use of a very specific authoritarian scale, which also resulted in an internal consistency too low to explain as a unique cause (Dambrum 2007). Dambrum (2007) found high support for the *racial punitive bias hypothesis*, which suggests that people who are prejudiced toward out-groups and view them as engaging in criminal acts are also more likely to support death penalty. Dambrum asserted that his findings were in line with SDT, because when controlling for SDO the relationship between racial prejudice and support for the death penalty was substantially reduced. However, as with other past studies, all these results suggest a strong correlative relationship between racism and support for the death penalty.

A more conclusive study was conducted by Johnson (2008), who demonstrated that the racial gap in support for harsh criminal justice policies was linked to racial prejudice on the part of whites and perceived injustice on part of blacks. These results support the *conflict perspective theory* in criminology, which argues that the criminal justice system operates to protect the interests of the dominant group in society and control behavior of those who may challenge their power (Quinney, 1970; Turk 1969). The theory argues how white and black attitudes toward crime policies are associated with social structural location vis-à-vis the criminal justice system. Specifically, in terms of social structure and grouping, it is clear how this relates to SDT in its emphasis on maintaining the social hierarchy among whites and blacks. The conflict perspective

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shares the characteristics of domination and group hierarchy with SDT as important factors that determine how racism will influence behavior. Most significant in the data set examined by Johnson (2008) is that it was gathered from the 2001 Race, Crime and Public Opinion Study (RCPOS), conducted from August 7-20, 2001. This choice of data makes it a reliable measure of the influence of racial prejudice on support for the death penalty because of the use of racial primes within the survey. Additionally, the data also reflects public opinion just prior to the attacks of 9/11. White support for severe punishment based on race was a well-established fact prior to 9/11, although somewhat unsupported beyond a correlative basis. Johnson (2008) demonstrates the strength of this correlation prior to the attacks, and it is reasonable to assume that following 9/11 and the War on Terror, race remained an influential force for guiding American public opinion.

The most concrete evidence in support for racism as the driving force behind support for severe punishment comes from Unnever and Collin (2007), who investigated the divide between whites in blacks in their support for the death penalty. Unnever and Collin examined data from the 2000 National Election Study to determine if white racism fosters support for capital punishment. Their study examined racism through the lens symbolic racism and *racial resentment*. Racial resentment emerged as overt racial barriers were being dismantled following the Civil Rights Movement, without these impediments racist whites redirected their prejudice towards whether racial minorities would take advantage of this new color-blind society (Kinder and Sanders 1996). To measure racism, Unnever and Collin used a scale of symbolic racism to determine levels of white racism. They found that the strongest predictor of the degree to which Americans support the death penalty was their measure of white racism. The more a respondent agreed with the statements that blacks are "irresponsible" or "culturally deficient", the more

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likely they were to support executions for convicted murderers (Unnever and Collins 2007).

Though their research establishes a predictor, it does not explain why racism is related to support

for the death penalty, and that a more race-sensitive study is needed to properly address the why

racism is related to support for the death penalty. Yet, they argue that symbolic racism and racial

resentment are underlying reasons why Americans perceive black convicts as more deserving of

the death penalty than white convicts, as the death penalty serves as a "vessel that contains the

frustration and anger symbolic white racists have toward African Americans" (Unnever and

Collins 2007, pp. 1292). This argument is particularly convincing given the nature of racism as

described in SDT, and emphasizes the idea that white support for the death penalty is a means of

domination and reinforcing the social hierarchy.

Implications of Support for Severe Punishment

The results of these studies are helpful in determining how racism and support for severe

punishment will affect support for out-group violence. While the data on support for severe

punishment fails to decisively show racism as the causal variable in determining support for the

death penalty, it does establish an undeniably strong correlation between the two. Understanding

the causes of racism and how these influence support for punitive sanctions is an important step

to build on when determining if torture proponents hold a racial bias against the victims of

torture. Drawing from the literature, it is apparent that dominance and social hierarchy are

important variables in determining the degree to which race affects policy attitudes. However,

these theories all lack the important explanation of how these group variables will condition

respondents to a situation of extreme physical and symbolic threat to an in-group. In order to

examine this missing factor, it is necessary to explore the sources of group conflict and how

these feelings of racism and punitive attitudes play in the larger group response to external

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security threats. In particular, the hypothesis of this thesis draws mainly on three particular theories of tolerance.

Tolerance: A Historical Review and Berinsky (2009)

Individual-level Studies

References to 'tolerance' are specifically referring to *political tolerance*, an essential concept in understanding why Americans support the protection of right and liberties for particular out-groups within society. Political tolerance is the willingness to allow and protect the extension of civil liberties, such as free speech and a right to peaceably assemble, to groups considered threatening to the American belief structure. Core American beliefs include equal opportunity, the Protestant Work Ethic, and individualism (Tarman and Sears 2005).

The earliest studies of tolerance were social science based, and focused on studying support for civil liberties in the early to mid 1950s. These studies specifically examined American attitudes towards a number of the most loathed political groups of the time, mostly left-wing political groups. Significant, and sometimes successful, communist and socialist movements taking place around the world and the onset of the Cold War set the historical backdrop for the time. These movements were met with the predictable backlash and its associated repressive responses and reactions in America and the Western world (Sullivan and Henriks 2009). Stouffer (1955) was among the first American studies on support for civil liberties. Stouffer assessed Americans' tolerance for communists, socialists, and atheists, and found that there was very little tolerance for these groups at the time of his study. Most Americans were unwilling to extend procedural rights to these groups, such as the right to speak publicly and to hold full citizenship (Stouffer 1955). Overall, it seemed Americans were highly intolerant of these disliked groups.

Prothro and Grigg (1960) and McClosky (1964) both reinforced Stouffer's conclusions (Sullivan and Hendricks 2009). Most significantly, common among these studies was the fact that political elites were far more tolerant of disliked groups than the American public. This is significant because following 9/11, elite rhetoric stressed a high level of tolerance towards Arabs and Middle Easterners, but the wave of prejudice and violence towards Middle Easterners following the attacks speaks to the high level of intolerance among the American public. Thus making it more likely to support the denial of rights, or more specifically torture.

The next wave of tolerance studies, conducted in the 1970s, aimed to reassess the findings of the earlier studies in light of a more open political system (Sullivan and Hendriks 2009). In addition to much higher levels of education among the baby-boomer generation, left-wing ideals and groups no longer posed the same level of threat in the 1970s then they had twenty years prior. These studies aimed to see if post-Civil Rights Movement Americans were more tolerant. Davis (1975) utilized data from the National Opinion Research Center that replicated some of Stouffers tolerance measures from the 1950s. He found that base levels of tolerance had increased significantly since Stouffer's study. The political context and higher levels of education at the time, he argued, had produced a more congenial electorate, which favored full democratic participation even by unpopular groups. Nunn et al. (1978) replicated Stouffer (1955) and also found significant increases in tolerance towards communists, socialists, and atheists. However, these early tolerance studies failed to take into account the effect of threat over time on an individual's willingness to extend rights to disliked group.

General-Level Studies

Studies from the 1980s reexamined the underlying assumptions of tolerance utilized in past research. Sullivan et al. (1982) questioned whether the findings of increased support for the civil

liberties of left-wing groups between the 1950s and 70s demonstrated a more general

conceptualization and measurement of political tolerance. Most important was that Sullivan et al.

(1982) assessed whether tolerance towards certain political groups was fixed, or evolved

temporally within the political system. By allowing participants to identify their own disliked

target political group to determine if they would extend rights to this group, they found that once

the political spectrum was widened, Americas proved to much less tolerant than the previous

scholarship had indicated (Sullivan et al 1982; Sullivan and Hendriks 2009). This ability to

identify disliked groups also attenuated somewhat for stark contrasts in levels of tolerance

among the well educated and the poorly educated (Sullivan et al. 1982).

Earlier studies on support for civil liberties focused on individual level factors that appeared

to determine levels of political tolerance, such as education, trait-based variables, internalized

norms, and political context. However, they neglected the significant role of threat, in both a

political context and individual level trait, in the expression of political tolerance (Marcus et al.

1995). Marcus et al. (1995) stressed that the American public tends to react strongly against

groups that threaten American pluralist system. This threat leads to a large distinction between

tolerance judgments in the abstract and the concrete. Given the intense anxiety and fear that

affected many Americans following the attacks, particularly among those who believed future

attacks were inevitable, these emotions are essential to the question of how threat affects political

behavior. Racism and punitivness are clear responses to this heightened emotional state.

Anxiety and fear can lead people who are normally committed to democratic values to focus

and devote all of their attention to the contemporary threat rather than accessing their previously

held values when making important political decisions (Marcus et al. 1995). Huddy et al. (2005)

found that Americans who perceived a high threat of another terrorist attack were more likely to

negatively stereotype Arabs and support restrictive immigration and intensified surveillance policies directed at Arabs and Arab-Americans. They found that the effect of threat was also positively related with out-group vilification (Huddy et al. 2005). In addition to affecting prejudice, fear and anxiety have been shown to effect support for civil liberties among Americans. Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen (2004) found that increased fear of physical harm leads individuals to view members of a potentially threatening out-group as more violent and will thus favor reducing the civil liberties of the threatening out-group. Thus while Americans overwhelmingly support democratic principles and the protection of rights, when applying these ideas to specific groups who produce a real or imagined threat to the American public this support drops dramatically.

Marcus et al. (1995) stress the fact that individuals are mindful of contemporary information and pay careful attention to context in which an out-group poses a threat. They also assert that tolerance judgments are largely guided by an individual's *predispositions* and previously established beliefs, and Marcus et al. define predispositions as: "a subclass of antecedent considerations deeply rooted and stable individual characteristics, and result in generalized predilections to think, feel, and behave in certain ways" (Marcus et al. 1995, 19). Predispositions are distinguished from *standing decisions*, "antecedent considerations that are established attitudes and beliefs applied to specific domain in instance of civil liberties and political tolerance" (Marcus et al. 1995, 20). The former are generalized in their effect and are far less malleable, while the latter are more specific and circumscribed in their effect on tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995). The effects of predispositions are expressed indirectly through standing decisions.

In the post-9/11 period, Davis and Silver (2004) argued that following 9/11 the debate on civil liberties recast itself from a tradeoff between individual security and extending civil liberties to disliked groups, into an tradeoff between civil liberties for national security. Rather than a tradeoff between the individual and the disliked group, the latter is between citizen and government. While there was general support for restricting civil liberties for national security, Davis and Silver also found that over two-thirds of the American public favored the pro-liberty stance (Davis and Silver 2004). Their results suggest that following the attacks, although Americans were willing to accept greater civil liberty restrictions, support for protecting them was fairly strong. Similarly, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991) found that respondents' judgments about rights of particular groups are at least as reflective of "principled" support for general democratic norms as they are about affect toward those particular groups. This provides an overall picture of moderation on the issue of tolerance in the post-9/11 period (Berinsky 2009).

However, Davis and Silver (2004) examines American willingness to cede their *own* liberties for the sake of national security, rather than support withholding the civil liberties from a particular group: in this case Arab and Middle Eastern terror suspects facing torture. With this in mind, overall tolerance among Americans may actually be far less than Davis and Silver argued. Additionally, counter to these findings, Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) found that radical Muslims were among the top three hated groups by Amerians. Not only had this lead to a decreased trust in Arabs, but also high support for restricting the civil liberties of Muslim Americans even three years following the attack (Nisbet and Shanahan 2004). Based on the previously reviewed literature, it appears that an overall increase in tolerance in the post-9/11 period may not reflect increased tolerance of hated groups.

An important implication of this literature is that Americans appear to be no more tolerant today that they have been in the past. Rather express their intolerance towards groups that are currently perceived as most threatening in particular contexts where threat and group identity are salient. Also notable is the fact that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 did not create intolerance towards Arabs. Instead, 9/11 incited intolerance towards Arabs based on Americans' preconceived notions and suspicions of Arabs and Islamic fundamentalists (Davis 2007). General threat perception of the situation is important, but underlying beliefs about specific groups ensure that certain events will highlight the salience of that particular group's threat to the American public. Thus context is secondary to existing prejudice in determining levels of individual tolerance. This is particularly significant to this thesis because I argue that racism is the preexisting factor that formed the basis of intolerance to Arab and Middle Easterners following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It is this predisposition that made Americans so willing to support torture and the denial of civil liberties to these groups. In support of this argument, I compare survey responses from WWII and post-9/11 in order to show that despite the national security crisis facing Americans at both times, the predisposition of Americans in the post-9/11 era regarding Arabs made them more likely to support illegal acts against them.

Comparing American Tolerance in WWII and Post-9/11 in Berinsky (2009)

Prior to my own analysis of tolerance, it is important to address the results of a fairly similar study regarding support for civil liberties during WWII and post-9/11 conducted by Berinsky in 2009. This study is unique because it addresses the nature of tolerance in America during times of war. Berinsky argues that during war, societal groups only indirectly trigger responses to fear, and that threat –independent of different groups – can structure civil liberties judgments. He hypothesizes that controlling for factors plausibly associated with both levels of intolerance and

threat, would allow an individuals tolerance to be predicted as a function of the threat variable (Berinsky 2009). He found a strong relationship between threat and intolerance when more precise measures, such as the threat of nuclear war, were used. In the case of 9/11, Berinsky stresses that the role of fear was not unique in the wake of the attacks, but that the specific threat of future attacks was more likely to increase intolerance. Prior to 9/11, a significant majority of Americans believed that sacrifice civil liberties in order to curb terrorism would not be necessary (Berinsky 2009). However, in the immediate wake of the attacks, support for civil liberties dropped sharply, both in the abstract and concrete.

According to Berinsky, this shift in public attitude can be attributed to the increased salience of threat, a unified elite position in the immediate wake of the attack, or some combination of the two. He argued that trust, particularly in government, was positively related to intolerance. Additionally, Berinsky notes the distinct polarization along political party lines on the issue of civil liberties, even though prior to 9/11 Democrats and Republicans were somewhat equal in their support for civil liberties with Republicans slightly less supportive of restrictions. Berinsky also found a significant positive correlation between support for military action and the restriction of civil liberties (Berinsky 2009). He observed that following the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was actually a significant rise in support for civil liberties. This support, he argues reached a majority position by August 2003, and reached the support levels of late 1990s by 2004 (Berinsky 2009). Consistent with existing research, cross-sectional data analysis of Pew surveys indicated that despite increased support for civil liberties, the effects of threat persisted long after 9/11, particularly the effects of sociotropic threat and the threat of future attacks (Berinsky 2009). These results point to a desire expressed by the American public to use government force against the enemy in order to ensure their protection. Additionally, Berinsky

demonstrates that the post-9/11 period created a situation of persistent threat conducive to intolerance towards groups associated with this threat.

Berinsky found a similar pattern of domestic support for civil liberties among Americans during WWII. Berinsky analyzed data regarding public support for the rights of communists and fascists, two hated groups, in order to determine levels of political tolerance. While he acknowledges the lack of precise tolerance measures, his analysis provides the most comparable public opinion data to that available from the post-9/11 era. The data showed that prior to the War, communists were seen as seen as even greater threat to America than fascists. In response to a 1939 Gallup poll - asking which was greater danger to America, communists or Nazis living in America - thirty-three percent of Americans said communists were a greater threat as opposed to twenty-eight percent who believed the Nazis were (Berinsky 2009). These results point to the fact that in 1939 the US was uninvolved in the War, and that the Nazis couldn't be identified as the greatest threat to the Allies. Berinsky also notes that definition of radical groups were likely to change after the Nazis attacked Russia in 1941, making the communists our de facto allies, and then formal allies in 1942.

As a proxy measure for tolerance, Berinsky measured the relationship between attitudes towards radicals, whether Russia could be trusted as an ally, and support for free speech. Though support for free speech declined significantly until July 1942, when support for civil liberties seemed to recover even among those who didn't trust the Russians as allies, and actually exceeded baseline tolerance levels from 1938 (Berinsky 2009). The most interesting of his findings was that the negative relationship between support for the war and support for free speech, actually reversed by 1945. Years of fighting in the war seemed to ease the desire to restrict civil liberties and increased tolerance (Berinsky 2009). Additionally, the threat of future

attack seemed to have subsided as well. Partisanship didn't have the same polarizing effect during the War that it has today. Berinsky attributes this difference to the fact that partisan split in the 1940s was the result of differing levels of education, and that there was a general unification among Americans upon entering the War that seemed to come before support for political party.

With both WWII and the post-9/11 era, Berinsky found that the significant decrease in support for civil liberties among Americans was the result of a salient threat, and that as the threat decreased tolerance recovered quickly. These results suggest that perceptions of threat and attachments to political groups determine scope of restrictions citizens willing to their own civil liberties (Berinsky 2009). Significantly, during WWII the overall rise in tolerance coincided with the reduction in differences between those supportive of the states US war aims and the rest of the population (Berinsky 2009). This unity is clearly missing from the post-9/11 era, where the clear partisan split in support for the war was an important reflection tolerance levels. Polarization among the American public can be explained by both the strength of party affiliation and a lack of a defined war effort in the post-9/11 years.

While Berinsky (2009) provides an insightful overall explanation of the effects of war on support for civil liberties, his hypothesis faces a number of criticisms. Firstly, his focus is on general support for free speech as a proxy for tolerance is questionable. Testing tolerance requires examining an individual's willingness to extend rights to disliked and threatening groups rather than the general citizenry. The fact that he was looking at these issues separately is significant not only for interpreting the WWII data, but for the post-9/11 data as well. Essentially, his focus is general, rather than group-directed, tolerance. Without focusing on the rights of groups associated with a perceived threat, as was the case with Arab and Middle

Easterners following 9/11, is a significant disadvantage in exploring levels of tolerance during war time, which my thesis will address. Additionally, his assessment of the recovery in support for civil liberties is also subject to criticism.

While Americans overall support for civil liberties may have recovered significantly and levels of threat have decreased since the attacks, this fails to explain the significant support for torture against terror suspects. If the threat is gone and Americans are more protective of their rights, why do they support torture? As Berinsky notes, the effects of the terrorist threat remained with the American public, leading them to continue associating Arabs and Middle Easterners with terrorism long after 9/11. This effect was enhanced by the vague nature of both the War on Terror and the terrorist network American forces were attempting to combat. Even though Berinsky's findings are significant to the purpose of this thesis, they fail to explain why Americans continue to support torture, and the willingness to curb the civil liberties of outgroups that had previously threatened national security. The subsequent sections of this chapter will seek to account for the problems encountered by Berinsky (2009), and explain the effect of race on tolerance in both WWII and post-9/11 in order to properly assess the effects of race and tolerance on support for civil liberties during war times. Specifically I will examine support for using poison gas on the Germans and Japanese in order to end WWII, and whether the use of torture is justified to the American public.

Chapter Three

Support for Illegal Acts of National Security Then and Now

Implications of the Literature for American Support of Torture Post-9/11

Previous literature on the topics of racism, support for severe punishment, and tolerance, reveal some important implications for American support for torture, in particular why Americans are more likely to support the torture of Arab or Middle Eastern terrorism suspects. First, this thesis has focused on the importance of three groups of racism theories. Applying theories of stereotyping and implicit behavior, new and aversive racism, and social dominance theory, the way that racism plays into support for severe punishment can be more fully understood. Implicit behaviors and the frequent use of stereotyping demonstrate the potential for subconscious association of Arabs and Middle Easterners with terrorism based on the representation of Arabs in American media and culture over the past few decades. New and aversive racism explain the conscious aversion towards overt racism, and the use of more subtle forms of racism to express prejudice towards threatening racial outgroups. The primary significance of these first two theories is that racial prejudice today is far less overt in its expression than it has been in the past. Individuals who wish to demonstrate that they hold socially desirable beliefs about race will attempt to repress their implicit negative stereotype formation in favor of non-racial language in order to express their racism.

With the understanding that the expression of racism today is not as explicit as it once was, one needs to look at why racism continues to affect beliefs and political attitudes at all. SDT

provides this explanation by stating that racism is an attempt by the dominant societal ingroup to maintain its dominance over racial outgroups that potentially threaten its position at the top of the social hierarchy. Therefore, social dominance theory provides the framework for how both implicit behaviors and stereotypes, as well as more the more subtle forms of racism, affect political attitudes. From social dominance theory it is possible to understand the dynamic of supporting a racially biased violation of civil liberties on the basis of nonracial terms in order to both impose punishment and establish dominance over a threatening racial outgroup. Social dominance theory also demonstrates the relationship between racism and supporting the torture of Arab and Middle Eastern terrorist suspects. Supporting torture provides a means for demonstrating American dominance over the threat of Arab terrorists. 9/11 shook the security of Americans and in their minds upset the country's standing as the most powerful nation in the world.   Torturing terrorist suspects not only allows Americans to dominate the elusive enemy of 'terror', but also allows Americans to inflict punishment on a racial outgroup associated with a threat to the hierarchy.

Punitive attitudes and their link to social dominance are no better exemplified than in the national debate over the death penalty. Social dominance theory can be applied in order to explain substantial support for death penalty among whites, despite the obvious racial disparity among those executed. Although no one study definitively demonstrated racial prejudice to be the primary reason for white support for the death penalty, a strong connection between the two was clearly established. The results of these studies point to the fact that race plays an important, although still somewhat undefined, role in support for severe forms of punishment. The fact that blacks are far more likely to be convicted of the type of offenses yielding a capital punishment sentence cannot be overlooked in determining why white Americans generally favor the death

penalty. In essence, the fact that whites know that it is more likely that a black rather than a

white person will be facing the death penalty plays an important role in their political attitudes

towards this kind of severe punishment. Racial resentment and prejudice have been shown to be

quite clearly associated with the gap in support for the death penalty between whites and blacks.

There is an important connection between racism and support for severe punishment when it is

known that this punishment disproportionately affects a specific racial outgroup, considered a

threat to the hierarchy. The implication of these studies for this thesis is quite clear: if racism is

connected to support for the death penalty, then there should also be a similar connection

between racism and support for torture. Americans are more likely to favor the torture of Arab

and Middle Eastern terror suspects because they know that a racial outgroup will be on the

receiving end of this punishment. Supporting torture provides an outlet for their racism, in the

same way it does for supporting the death penalty, to maintain their security in the group

hierarchy.

It is this threat to the hierarchy that leads Americans to favor the rights and protections of

some groups over others. Thus, the literature on tolerance rounds out the explanations as to why

certain Americans consistently support torture in the post-9/11. Tolerance provides a context in

which to examine how racism and support for severe punishment affect political attitudes.

Intolerance is the ultimate expression of racism in the case of torturing Arab or Middle Eastern

terrorist suspects. As defined earlier, political tolerance determines to which groups the majority

of Americans choose to extend rights, and from which groups these rights will be denied. Threat

is an important factor in determining levels of tolerance, but as the literature indicates, threat

alone is not enough to explain support for the denial of civil liberties generally or to particular

groups. Rather, what the literature on tolerance suggests is that there is a more basic explanation

for why Americans support the denial of civil liberties to a particular group. The important

distinction between predispositions and standing decisions leads one to conclude that a strong

predisposition towards racism leads one to be more greatly affected by the standing decision. In

the case of Americans post 9/11, their standing decision is arguably that all Arabs are associated

with terrorists, which in turn leads to less tolerance towards these outgroups perceived to be

threatening. However, it is a predisposition towards racism among Americans that leads them to

actually favor torturing these suspects. This type of intolerance harkens back to the experience

of Japanese Americans interned during WWII, yet there are some striking differences between

the case of the Japanese and terrorist suspects held and tortured, which support both a

predisposition towards racism and the influence of standing decisions on political attitudes.

Tolerance of Threatening Racial Outgroups from WWII to Today

The current torture debate essentially centers around the issue of why Americans willingly

sanction torture as an intelligence gathering strategy in violation of international law.

Specifically, the debate deals with the more extreme form of civil liberties deprivation, in the

willingness of Americans to sanction illegal acts against threatening outgroups. I argue that

racism was not the primary motivation behind American support for the use of illegal acts

against the Japanese during WWII – the use of poison gas – based on the lack of a preexisting

association between the Japanese and a threat to the security of the social hierarchy. Therefore

despite any predisposition to racism, support for extreme punitive measures did not exist among

the most Americans, especially towards the end of the war. On the other hand, the predisposition

to racism coupled with a long-standing association between Arab and Middle Easterners as

terrorists, created a greater likelihood that a substantial portion of Americans would support

torture over an extended period of time.

While Berinsky (2009) argues that political tolerance is based on threat, a sub-hypothesis of this thesis is that racism is what drives tolerance for a particular group. Thus racism is the explanation for Americans' willingness to commit acts considered criminal even during times of war. In order to test whether it is racism or the general threat posed by a group labeled as the 'enemy' that leads Americans to sanction torture, I compare American opinion about the use of torture, and the use of poison gas against the Japanese during WWII. The tables below demonstrate American opinion regarding these two issues over time.

Table 3.1 American Opinion about the Use of Poison Gas Against Japanese and German Cities

	Against Japanese Cities (without missing data)	*Against Japanese Cities (with missing data)*	*Against German Cities (without missing data)*	*Against German Cities (with missing data)*
Approve	25.72	*23.46*	18.79	*17.16*
Disapprove	74.28	*67.76*	81.21	*74.19*

Table 3.1 shows the results of a September 1944 Gallup survey, one column with the original results and the other with results that have been appropriately weighted with the original missing data in order to present a more representative sample (italicized). Table 3.1 shows that despite a slightly stronger support for the use of poison gas on Japanese cities, there is overwhelming disapproval of the use of poison gas on both Japanese and German cities. One would expect if racism was the driving component in support for illegal actions in the case of WWII, that there would be much less disapproval for the use of poison gas against the Japanese. However, the lack of approval can be explained in a number of different ways, which will be addressed later in this section.

Table 3.2 displays data taken from six Gallup surveys conducted between December 1944 and June 1945. The questions asked in the surveys varied slightly, but all measured American

willingness to use poison gas on Japanese Soldiers either to protect American soldiers or to end

the War sooner[1]. Table 3.3 shows changes in Americans' willingness to justify the use of torture

on suspected terrorists from April 2004 through April 2009. The data was gathered from ten

surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, which consistently asked an identical

Table 3.2 American Opinion about the Use of Poison Gas Against the Japanese

	Yes (%)	No (%)
The Japs say that they will execute any American bomber pilots forced to land in Japan. If the Japs do this, should we use poison gas on Japanese cities? (Dec 1944)	43	47
To shorten the war in the Pacific, would you approve of using poison gas against Japanese soldiers? (Mar 1945)	30	65
Should American forces use poison gas against Japanese soldiers? (Mar 1945)	26	65
To shorten the war in the Pacific, would you approve of using poison gas against Japanese soldiers? (Mar 1945)	36	59
Should American forces use poison gas against Japanese soldiers? (Mar 1945)	31	63
If the heads of our Army said that lives of many US soldiers would be spared by using poison gas against the Japanese, would you favor its use? (Jun 1945)	40	49
Would you favor using poison gas against the Japanese to reduce the number of American soldiers who are killed and wounded? (Aug 1945)	40	51

Table 3.3 American Opinion On the Justification of Torture over Time (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press)

	Justified (%)	Unjustified (%)
July 8, 2004	42	54
March 17, 2005	45	51
October 12 2005	46	50
September 26, 2006	46	52
December 12, 2006	43	54
November 20, 2007	38	60
February 20, 2008	48	50
February 4, 2009	44	51
March 31, 2009	49	47
October 28, 2009	54	41

question to Americans about whether they considered tortured justifiable[2]. It is important to note

the distinction in the target of the illegal acts committed in Table 3.1 and 3.2. In Table 3.1 the

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[1] See Appendix for complete question wordings.
[2] See Appendix for complete question wordings.

target of the illegal act, poison gas, is potentially both enemy soldiers and civilians, whereas the target in Table 3.2 is a defined as just enemy soldiers. In Table 3.2, Americans are overwhelmingly unwilling to use poison gas against the Japanese in March of 1945. However, after applying a program to the data in order to re-weight it in line with appropriate census data from the time, gives us the December and June values, which while significantly closer still demonstrate a substantial difference in opinion. In Table 3.3 close to half of all respondents considered the use of torture against terror suspects at least sometimes justified. These figures are strikingly different. In order to explain the impact of this difference one must first consider the contextual differences between WWII and the War on Terror.

Differing Histories and Wars

Prior to WWII, the Japanese were not considered a hated outgroup by Americans. Italians, Germans, and Jews were disliked much more by Americans than the Japanese (Berinsky 2009). While racism was certainly more overtly expressed in 1940s America, the primary target of their prejudice was not the Japanese. Prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese posed little international, and certainly little domestic threat to the American public. Only after the attack were the Japanese associated with a security threat to Americans, who realized that mainland was not out of the reach of the enemy. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent success of the Japanese naval strategy, anti-Japanese hysteria was rampant, particularly among Americans living on the West Coast, who feared another attack on the American mainland. Both the media and political elites encouraged the perception that all Japanese posed a threat to the American public. Look no further than the December 22, 1941 issues of *Time Magazine*, in an article entitled "How to Tell Your Friends from the Japs". The article addressed the physical differences between the Chinese and the Japanese, and implicitly identifies all Japanese as

enemies. Nothing reinforced this message more than the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans in 1942.

It is also important to note that American support for the Chinese, racially the same as the Japanese, was consistent throughout the War. Americans considered the Chinese an ally because of their opposition efforts against Japanese forces early in the War. American propaganda films *Prelude to War* (Capra 1943) and *War Comes to America* (Capra 1945) depict the Chinese as our allies and as victims of the Japanese plot for the domination of the Pacific and Asia. There is no focus on their race in these films; however, the Japanese Emperor is described as "buck-toothed". This distinction among Americans clearly demonstrates that the threat of the Japanese during WWII was not a purely racial objection, but was based more on their prominent position in the American psyche as the enemy. There is a clear distinction made between the Chinese and the Japanese during WWII that is noticeably absent in the War on Terror. Americans have a more generalized view of their enemy, and cannot associate terrorism with any one particular nation. Similarly, when deciding to drop the atomic bomb, numerous sources cite the fact that Japan was the target of the atomic bombs simply as a matter of timing. As explained in Gerhard Weinberg's *A World at Arms*, Americans not only designed the atomic bomb in a race against the Germans, but also intended to use it on Germany as a means of ending the war (Weinberg 1994).

Compared to WWII, the use of poison gas had the added threat that it could potentially be unleashed on Americans, either at home or on the war front. This potential threat may have added to the lack of support for the use of poison gas on both the Japanese and the Germans regardless of race. It is interesting to note that in the first question in Table 3.2, which essentially asks if poison gas should be used against the Japanese in retaliation for killing

Americans, the responses are split almost half for and half against. This could be because the question triggers a punitive response against the Japanese for their crimes. Therefore it seems that when the issue of illegal acts is phrased as a matter of punishment, or revenge, the public is more likely to support such acts.

Thus the association of the Japanese with an international threat was a product of their attack and America entering the War. The relationship between Arabs and threat was far different for Americans. Immigrants from the Middle East were not numerous in the United States until the later half of the twentieth century. Additionally, since the 1970s and 80s, events like the Iranian Revolution, the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 874, the 1991 Gulf War, and the first bombing of the World Trade Center painted Arabs and Middle Easterners as radical terrorists in the minds of Americans. Both TV and film have served as a means to reinforce this image of the Arab terrorist (Qumsiyeh 1998). Qumsiyeh (1998) states that even prior to 9/11 Arabs and Muslims were generally categorized by the "3-Bs": bombers, belly dancers, or billionaires. The attacks of 9/11 only served to reinforce a predisposition to express racism and solidify the standing belief that Arabs and Middle Easterners are terrorists, despite elite rhetoric against this association post-9/11, and thus deepen prejudice towards these groups.

In addition to differences in predispositions regarding both the Japanese and Arabs prior to the attacks on America in 1941 and 2001, there are distinct differences in the wars that follow these attacks. These differences are important shaping public opinion regarding the enemy in each war. WWII was a legitimate war, in which Congress agreed to attack a specific enemy for a specific purpose. Its goals were concrete and real. Americans could identify with specific allies and enemies including the Japanese, the only Axis power to attack America. The presence of so many Japanese Americans on the West Coast also served to strengthen the immediate threat of

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another attack within the US. Additionally, WWII saw the entire country involved in the government-organized war effort. The War was a part of every citizen's life, both abroad and at home.

However, following 9/11 America's enemy was far more abstract. 9/11 gave us Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda as our primary enemies. Yet, the location of our enemy, and much about their organization, was largely unknown to both the American government and public, except that they were from the Middle East. The entire basis of defending the country against the threat of 'terrorism' was in and of itself a vague concept for most Americans to grasp. There was a complete reliance on the government to both identify and punish the perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11, and any future attacks against Americans. Most importantly, poison gas is easily conceptualized, and its effects were clearly visible to the American and global public following WWI. On the other hand, the concept of torture is far less concrete to imagine. Torture is a description of a techniques rather than an actual act. This distinction is necessary to understand why Americans would have been more likely to reject the use of poison gas as opposed to the use of torture. Furthermore, unlike in WWII, most Americans remained largely unaffected by, and uninvolved in, the war effort. Following the immediate aftermath of the attack, as the threat of another attack declined, so did interest in the War on Terror, yet the effects of such a strong threat still loomed large in the minds of the American public.

The Role of Threat

To further demonstrate the difference between the case of Japanese internment and the torture of Arab and Middle Eastern terrorist suspects, it is necessary to address the affects of threat on the American public's willingness to sanction illegal actions for the purpose of national security. If Americans only supported torturing Arab and Middle Eastern terror suspects based

on the heightened threat of a terrorist attack, then these suspects could be viewed in the same light as the Japanese during WWII – a willingness to commit illegal actions against this racial outgroup is the product of their role as a threat to US national security. In order to determine the relationship between the threat of terrorism and support for torture I compare data from the Pew Research Center.

Figure 3.4[3]

There appears to be no obvious relationship between considering torture justifiable and considering a terrorist attack even somewhat – let alone very – likely. In fact, when the perceived threat of a terrorist attack increases, public support for torture remains virtually the same. Moreover, as the threat of terrorism decreases, support for torture actually increases. While the threat of terrorism seems to decrease following a height between 2005 and mid-2006, support for torture remains virtually the same from July 2004 to October 2009. Since the threat

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[3] Thank you to Professor Richard Eichenberg for allowing me to use this graph as a part of my research. Both the percentage of Americans who consider torture justifiable – who answered either "sometimes" or "often" justifiable – and Americans who consider another terrorist attack "very" or "somewhat" likely are shown on the graph. The figure demonstrates the relationship between the question of torture and the threat of terrorism over time.

of another terrorist attack itself is very clearly not the driving force behind support for torture, there must be some other factor affecting support for torture.

Comparing Willingness to Sanction Illegal Acts Against the Enemy

How do these contextual differences explain the differences between Tables 3.2 and 3.3, particularly in light of figure 3.4? According to Berinsky, tolerance for a hated group during war should increase after the onset of the war. While the Gallup data only gives us American public opinion from the end of WWII, it seems logical to assume that this data would follow the same pattern as the freedom of speech data examined in Berinsky (2009). Shock should decay over time and support for civil liberties should prevail. So even after four years of complete engagement in WWII, over half of Americans rejected the use of criminal acts of warfare against the Japanese soldiers despite their very real threat to American lives during the War in the Pacific. Thus tolerance for the rights and liberties of the enemy seem to be respected, even while enduring total war. However, in the post-9/11 era almost half of Americans consistently consider torture justified. Even in 2009, with the perceived threat of another terrorist attack on America far less than in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the number of Americans who support torture is higher than ever. Why don't Americans follow the same pattern of increased tolerance when the threat of a disliked outgroup diminishes? Even if tolerance for threatening groups increased in the years following 9/11, a significant number of Americans still support torture. The threat to American lives does not seem to be the primary factor in determining support for illegal acts for national security. My hypothesis is that Americans remain divided not because of the threat of terrorism in and of itself, but because of a predisposition to racism that is constant in a large portion of the population. Moreover, the standing decision among many modern Americans that Arabs are associated with terrorists is strongly influential in their support for

torturing terror suspects, and thus race is an integral factor in support for torture. In and August

2006 poll conducted by *Time*, forty-seven percent of respondents favored the government

requiring US citizens of Arab descent to carry an federally issued identification card (*Time*

2006).

While the Japanese experience during WWII was surely in part because they were of a

different race, the fact that their threat was a post-war occurrence made race factor less into

political attitudes than in the case of Arabs post-9/11. In fact, as Americans were far more open

with their racial prejudice in the 1940s than today, one would expect to see much higher support

for illegal acts against a racial outgroup.   Yet, because the Japanese were considered a clearly

defined enemy in a clearly defined war, it was easier for Americans to associate them with the

other Axis enemies. Tolerance towards the rights of the Japanese to not be subjected to these

illegal acts was predicated on their dissociation with the threat of race and association with the

threat of an war-time enemy. The lack of a defined association of the Japanese with a particular

threat to Americans prior to Pearl Harbor made racism towards them less prevalent in deciding

whether to support the use of poison gas against Japanese soldiers.

Contrastingly, the vagueness of the enemy in the War on Terror forced Americans to rely on

their preexisting beliefs to determine their political attitudes. Americans had to use their

standing decisions about Arabs, formed by decades of prejudice, to transform the contextual

information provided by 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror in order to define their enemy.

Unlike the Japanese, Americans had a clear association that they could draw between Arabs and

terrorism from both experience and the media. Additionally, as Shildkraut (2002) points out,

elite rhetoric against ethnocentrism only increases its prevalence among the American public.

There was a distinct focus on the *social desirability* of maintaining a race-neutral discussion

against ethnocentrism, particularly with regards to the issue of ethnic profiling. Japanese American and other activists further publicized the issue of ethnic profiling by warning against the same profiling that led to the Japanese internment during WWII. Thus while it seemed socially undesirable to express racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners, Americans had already identified their attackers as belonging to these groups. Americans during WWII had no reference for this kind of thinking, and were therefore more upfront with the threat they associated with the Japanese. The hyperawareness of racism served to only promote it within the American public because of elite inability to separate race, and even religion, from the discourse on the War on Terror.

Moreover, following the WWI Armistice, in 1925 there was an international ban on the use of poison gas in wartime – this was brought on by the horrors witnessed in the First World War. On the other hand, terrorists and suspected terrorists had already been de-legitimized by elite rhetoric. Terror suspects were without an identity other than that they are 'Islamic fundamentalists', and most importantly Arab or Middle Eastern. The Bush Administration's labeling of these suspects as "enemy combatants" served to circumvent to application of the Geneva Convention on torture. This difference from the case of the Japanese in WWII only serves to strengthen the argument that race was particularly salient in the minds of Americans when considering the use of torture. Americans used their racism towards Arabs to define the treatment of terror suspects because they had little other information to rely on in the formation of their political attitudes but fear and prejudice. Because individuals assume that the subject of torture will be Arab, they are more willing to sanction the use of torture because they already associate Arabs with terrorism. They consider Arabs and Middle Easterners as deserving of this

punishment for the sake of American safety. Racism, as the source of intolerance, is what drives Americans to support illegal acts against a threatening racial outgroup.

Hypotheses for American Sanctioning of Torture and other Illegal Acts

Today the percentage of Americans who consider torture justifiable is just over half, with the average value over the past five years at about forty five percent. The trend is quite stable over time. This would lead one to assume that support for torture is based on a standing decision, an already established belief regarding torture and when it is justifiable. Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, the comparison of the Japanese and Arab War experiences, and the effect of the threat of terrorism, I hypothesize that the determinant factor in American support for torture in the War on Terror is racism. Based on the expression of racism through social dominance I assert that the support for torture is a punitive measure as a means of expressing racism through intolerance towards suspected terrorists, known to be of another race. The importance of their race stems from the fact that Arab and Middle Easterners are associated with disrupting the security of Americans, more specifically they disrupt the cultural and value system that keeps the hierarchy of dominant and subordinate groups in place. Based on these implications I also hypothesize that the expression of racism in the form of support for torture can be measured based on implicit and explicit activation of racial prejudice. In Chapter Four, I will review the methodologies that I will apply in order to test this central hypothesis.

Chapter Four

Methods for Determining the Impact of Racism on Support for Torture

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that racism determines an individual's level of support for the use of torture against Arab and Middle Eastern terror suspects. Before I can address this assertion, I first examine my research questions and sub-hypotheses that will provide the measures and support for my central hypothesis. These questions are, first, how does racism affect punitive attitudes? Second, how does racism affect tolerance, or the willingness to deprive certain groups of their rights? And finally, how does racism affect political attitudes? Additionally, these questions will identify important variables that could potentially confound the relationship between racism and support for torture, which must be controlled for.

Who Supports Severe Punishment?

In response to my first question, my first sub-hypothesis is that Americans who associate certain racial groups with crime are more likely to support the death penalty and other forms of severe punishment. This association stems from the fact that these Americans not only associate certain racial groups with receiving the punishment, but also believe that these groups are particularly deserving of punishment. It is a statistical fact that whites favor the death penalty significantly more than do any other racial group in America (Soss, Lanbein, & Metelko 2003). Paradoxically, black Americans far outnumber whites facing severe or capital punishment for their crimes. The association between white Americans and support for severe sentencing, in particular the death penalty, has been a well-documented fact (Barkan & Cohn 1994; Cohen, Barkan, & Aveni 1991; Johnson 2008; Soss et al 2003). Yet, it is also a well-documented fact that blacks are far less punitive in their attitudes toward sentencing than whites. Johnson (2008)

found that racial resentment was a significant predictor of punitive attitudes, and that racial prejudice contributed to the significant racial gap in punitive attitudes. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the implication of such research is that racism is a key factor in white support for the death penalty. These supporters know that it is more likely not only that blacks will be more likely to commit crimes that are punishable by death, but also that blacks are more likely to be executed than whites. This is a part of maintaining social dominance over a threatening racial minority.

The data gathered from previous studies show, generally, which demographic groups are more likely to support severe punishment and the death penalty. Identifying these groups is necessary in order to compare them to groups more likely to express racism, to be identified in the later analysis. This information is also available from numerous surveys taken over the years. In general white, conservative, men are most likely to favor the death penalty (Carroll 2004). This is important because it provides certain controls that will be applied to later correlations between racism and support for torture in order to rule out groups who are more likely to hold punitive attitudes.

Who Is Most Tolerant?

The answer to my second question and my second sub-hypothesis both focus on the issue of tolerance. As demonstrated in the previous literature, when determining the civil liberties of an unpopular racial out-group following a particular event that makes the threat of this group salient, racism can be expressed as intolerance toward these threatening out-groups. The salience of the threat determines the level of tolerance expressed by individuals (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood 1995; Sullivan & Hendriks 2009). Thus the target of intolerance rises

and falls over time depending on the level of threat associated with a particular group. Rather, tolerance levels change according the salience of a group's threat at a particular time. In essence, as the perceived threat of a group changes, so does the level of tolerance expressed towards the threatening group.

However, based on the comparison between support for torture and the individuals perceived threat of another terrorist attack examined in the previous chapter, there seems to be no relation between the two. As the threat of another terrorist attack increases, support for torture remains virtually unchanging and even increases as the threat of another terrorist attack increases in 2009. Additionally, the comparison between the use of poison gas on the Japanese and support for torture in the post-9/11 period also demonstrates that over time support for torture is fairly stable. These results provide an interesting answer to my second research question.

According to theories of tolerance, it is the threat in and of itself posed by the disliked group that leads to intolerance. However, the statistics in Chapter Three demonstrate that tolerance is inherently linked to beliefs regarding racism despite the race of the perceived aggressor. The strongest challenge to this thesis's hypothesis is the notion that individuals support the torture of their enemies simply because they are their enemies and they are fearful of future harm to themselves. By comparing percentages of support for illegal action during both times of war one can see that it is not the threat of the enemy that drives support for these actions but rather an underlying belief that these groups do not deserve tolerance. Thus my second sub-hypothesis is that racism affects tolerance when there is a predisposition among the individual towards racism, and that there is a standing decision that Arabs and Middle Easterners are associated with a terrorist threat. For those who support using torture against Arab and Middle Eastern terrorist suspects, I believe racism is the determinant for their intolerance.

Measuring Racism

The final, and most critical, sub-hypothesis of this thesis is that racism is the primary source of racial threat and strongly effects political attitudes, particularly when race is a salient issue. The measures I will use for determining racism will be *racial bias* and *prejudice*, and a *desire to maintain the group hierarchy*. Racial bias is the overt preference for members of one's own racial group over members of another (Nail, Harton, and Decker 2003). Prejudice is defined as animosity towards members of another racial group based on a real or imagined social, economic, or political threat (Kinder and Sears 1981). Finally, the desire to maintain the group hierarchy is an individual's desire to maintain his/her group's position of dominance over members of subverted groups within the social hierarchy (Sidanius 1993). This last measure is most appropriately expressed in the level of threat that a racial outgroup poses to the security of the dominant group. The purpose of establishing these measures is to apply them to the central hypothesis in order to determine if racism is the actual cause of support for torture. In order to establish these measures I have drawn on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter.

Nail, Harton, and Decker (2003) assessment of Dividio and Gaertener's integrated model of symbolic and aversive racism provides the necessary basis for using racial bias as measure of racism. Dovidio and Gaertener's integrated model poses a link between the two theories by addressing the affect of new racism on white conservatives and aversive racism on white liberals. The prediction of the integrated model was that both groups would express racism in the form of prejudice or racial bias in favor of whites. The results of the integrated models was that white conservatives expressed symbolic racism when race was salient or challenging established beliefs, and that white liberals will express an aversive bias when "cues against discriminatory behavior are strong and salient" (Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003, pp. 755). Applied generally,

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the integrated model demonstrates that both new and aversive racism result in the expression of racial bias depending on the salience of racism and the presence or absence of cues against discrimination.

Similarly, theories of group dominance provide the appropriate basis using racial prejudice and support for maintaining the group-based social hierarchy as further measures of racism. According to these theories of dominance, racism is the expression of the desire for the dominant group to maintain their social position over groups lower in the social hierarchy (Bobo 1988; Frederico and Sidanius 2002; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar and Levin 2004). In particular, social dominance theory aims to explain both the systematic group oppression and structural inequality that result from racial prejudice and discrimination, by focusing on both individual and structural factors related to racism (Sidanius et al. 2004). Prejudice is both overtly and subtly expressed when lower ranking groups challenge the dominance of high-ranking groups. Additionally, prejudice is accompanied by a desire for group dominance. According to SDT, an individual's desire to protect their interests within the dominant group is responsible for opposition to policies aimed at implementing racial equality, even if racism is less prevalent today (Bobo 1988; Frederico and Sidanius 2002). Like the integrated model, SDT provides measures that are both appropriate for measuring the expression of racism, but also are easily identifiable within the questionnaire responses.

Racism and Support for Torture

All of the aforementioned sub-hypotheses are necessary to establish the necessary measures and comparisons required to determine if racism is the main motivation among the American public for supporting torture. I will be examining surveys conducted by various polling

organizations from September 2003 to April 2009 (see Appendix for full question wording). I will apply the measures established in the previous section to the selected surveys in order to determine the degree of racism expressed in response by examining both *direct* and *indirect* questioning within the questionnaire.

In support for an *indirect line* of questioning, I look to numerous theories that point to the importance of indirect cues that make race salient in the minds of individuals when making race-related decisions (DePaulo & Friedman 1997; Devine 1989; Dividio et al. 1997; Nosek et al. 2000). Since the very natures of new racism, aversive racism, and SDT are such that individuals will be unwilling to self-report their bias, it seems obvious that the indirect expression of racism must be examined. In particular, these implicit reactions to indirect cues lead to the formation of negative stereotypes and prejudice against the particular racial out-group at which the cues are directed. I will model my analysis of indirect questioning on the findings of Dividio, et al. (1997), who emphasized the importance of implicit behavior, such as stereotyping. These behaviors occur subconsciously and automatically. This is in contrast to explicit measures of attitude, which operate in conscious modes of behavior, and are exemplified in traditional self-report measures of racism. However, Dividio et al. (1997) also emphasize a fundamental distinction between the beliefs of low and high prejudice individuals regarding race. They found that public aspects were the best predictors of policy preference. This is an important distinction in the scholarship regarding stereotyping as many studies, such as the Implicit Association Test (Nosek et al. 2000) and Lepore and Brown (1997), demonstrate that stereotype formation in and of itself, that is without a context that makes racial threat relevant, is not a strong enough predictor of behavior, even if they demonstrate the significant social acceptability of holding certain negative views regarding racial out-groups.

One common factor among all implicit behavior and belief tests is the methodological importance of priming for racism. Thus the use of indirect questions related to race within the survey will serve as a prime, which I believe makes race salient enough in the minds of respondents to affect their political attitudes. Given the importance of distinguishing racism from other potential correlative factors that might explain support for torture, I will use these indirect measures of racism to isolate those who demonstrate significant levels of racism from the rest of the participants in the survey. Indirect questioning provides the best chance of determining an indirect connection between racism and support for torture in cases where the survey does not directly ask about racism, since it taps into the respondent's implicit reactions to racial outgroups. Because no formal measures for racism are built into these surveys, I will have to rely on questions that use my established measures. I will use questions that make ethno-religious identity salient, have an absence of cues against discrimination, and generally challenge the social hierarchy (see Appendix for full questions wording). For example, ABC News/*Washington Post* (September 2003) asks "Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?" (ABC News/*Washington Post* 2003). These questions force respondents to consider whether they see Arabs, Middle Easterners, Muslims, and the religion of Islam itself in a positive or negative light. I believe that by answering negatively to these questions, respondents will be considering their negative feelings towards Arabs and Middle Easterners later in the survey – in particular when they are asked about their support for the torture of suspected terrorists.

Direct questioning regarding one's racial prejudice, bias or support for maintaining the social hierarchy provides obvious evidence as to a person's beliefs regarding those of a racial out-group. Relying on direct measures in the survey data – questions that directly ask about racism,

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racial bias, or racial prejudice – I will analyze the percentage of participants who support torture

with those who self-report racism. There are significant limitations to this method, because the

nature of racism's expression makes self-reporting somewhat unreliable. However, I hope that

comparing these results to those gathered by indirect questioning will overcome this problem.

Since direct questioning triggers an individual's desire to provide a "socially desirable" response,

there should be less of a correlation between racism and torture in these questions than compared

to indirection questioning, which relies on more subtle and thus more reliable measures of racism

(Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003).

Controls

I will be controlling for four factors that are highly correlated with the expression of racism:

level of education, ideology, census region, and where possible, living in an urban or rural

setting. All of these controls are taken from the previously reviewed literature. Level of

education is a long established factor competing with racism in the formation of political

attitudes. Prejudice and bias is often attributed to an individual's lack of education related to

acceptance (Davis and Silver 2004; Frederico and Sidanius 2002; Soss, Langbein and Metelko

2003). Thus I will control for the effects of low levels of education in order to rule out its

potential to confound the results of my analysis. Secondly, previous research has shown that

political ideology is strongly related to levels of expressed racism (Dovidio and Gaertener 1998;

Kinder and Sears 1981; Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003). Conservatives are often associated with

the nonracial explanations given in opposition to policies attempting to promote racial equality.

Therefore it is important to control for their responses as well. Finally I control for residence,

both in terms of census region and urban and rural setting, both of which have been shown to be

highly correlated with prejudice against groups with which they are unfamiliar (Davis and Silver 2004; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). Familiarity tends to increase tolerance for groups and lessen the expression of prejudice towards these groups. These controls are necessary in order to take into account and rule out their influence on support for torture and isolate the impact of racism.

Chapter Five

Indirect Questioning Results: the Effects of Indirect Questioning on the Relationship

Between Racism and Support for Torture

Overview of Indirect Questioning Applied to Survey Responses

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that racism determines an individual's level of support for the use of torture against Arab and Middle Eastern terrorism suspects. Chapter Four explained that today, the outward expression of racism is rare given the fact that these beliefs are considered 'socially undesirable' (Kinder and Sears 1981). However, this does not mean that the same feelings of racism have disappeared from the minds of Americans. These same feelings of antagonism towards racial outgroups have been suppressed in order for individuals to appear socially acceptable in a modern world that promotes diversity and acceptance. Chapter Two discussed multiple theories of racism seeking to explain new manifestations of old-fashioned racism in a post-Civil Rights Movement era. Many of these theories dealt with the role of implicit behavior and stereotype formation as a means for individuals to express racism within social boundaries.

Work done on implicit behavior and stereotyping reveals that racism is still a pervasive force in determining Americans' behavior in race-salient situations. Tests of implicit behavior attempt to bypass explicit measures of attitude that operates in conscious modes, and look to automatically activated stereotypes as a means of exploring attitudes regarding race (Dividio et al. 1997). Though these associations do not definitively determine behavior, their presence in more subconscious modes of thinking clearly affects the formation of political attitudes. The findings of Kawakami et al. (1998) demonstrate the importance of implicit behavior in understanding how racism affects negative associations. Their study of the formations of

negative stereotypes against blacks found that high prejudiced individuals showed faster and more frequent stereotype activation than low prejudiced individuals (Kawakami et al. 1998). Thus, people who hold prejudices are more likely to express them, especially when given the opportunity to do so in an environment where they feel their answer is not being judged as socially irresponsible. However, the fact remains that regardless of what people think about racial outgroups does not mean that they will voice these beliefs. That individuals are generally less likely to express racism outwardly complicates how racism can be measured.

Individuals are more likely to make associations based on the way information is presented to them. Keeping in mind the role of implicit associations, it became clear that the effect of racism on support for torture for survey responses had to be measured indirectly. As Dovidio and Gaertener (1988) demonstrated, indirect questioning is an effective way to evoke both new and averse racism in respondents. Using survey questions that indirectly refer to race and racism creates a response environment in which race is not only salient, but social cues against racism are absent. Moreover, already existing prejudices and negative association strengthens implicit behavior, particularly the effect of racism on attitude formation (Banaji et al. 2000). Testing implicit associations and negative stereotyping allows the suppressed forms of racism, new and averse racism, and exposes feelings of social dominance that motivate these discriminatory beliefs.

Applying these theories to American racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners, one can expect similar findings. The long-standing association between Arabs and terrorism presents a potential threat, real or imagined, to the dominant racial ingroup. Given the combined threat of race and physical violence, Arabs and Middle Easterners should face the same, or perhaps greater, implicit stereotyping and bias that white Americans display towards blacks. I predict not

only will existing racist beliefs cause respondents to express racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners, but also that when asked in absence of social cues against discrimination these patterns of discrimination should be all the more apparent.

This chapter presents the results of the analysis done on survey responses by cross-tabulating the responses to support for torture and indirect racism question in each survey. The cross-tab results will reveal if there is any relationship between support for torture and racism towards Arabs or Middle Easterners by looking at the relationship between support for torture and expressed racism among respondents. The questions reviewed in this chapter are meant to be indirect reminders of Arabs and terrorism in terms of their threat to the racial ingroup. In each case, respondents were asked indirect racism questions that did not explicitly mention anything about racism towards Arabs or Middle Easterners. However, the questions were worded in such a way as to make race salient in the minds of the respondent by referencing Islam and its potential for violence. The questions analyzed in this chapter also lack any social cues that would trigger the desire to provide a socially acceptable response, masking respondents' actual opinion of Arabs and Middle Easterners.

After doing an initial bivariate cross-tab between the indirect racism question and the torture question, I added four controls to each individual cross-tab. In Chapter Four I identified four control categories – census region, level of education, ideology, and type of community. The controls ensure that any significance found in the relationship between racism and torture is not biased by the responses of groups known to show old-fashioned racism despite any social cues against discrimination. These groups include Southerners, those with low levels of education, Conservatives, and those living in rural locations. If racism is really driving the relationship between racism and support for torture should still hold regardless of the controls. A strong

relationship after the application of the controls indicates that these external factors are not what is influencing the relationship between support for torture and expressed racism, but rather the expressed racism itself that is driving the relationship.

I hypothesize that even with the application of the controls the relationship between support for torture and indirectly expressed racism should not only remain strong, but should hold across all control categories. Furthermore, I predict that groups that are normally tolerant of racial outgroups will show a strong relationship between support for torture and indirectly expressed racism. This relationship should be even stronger than for notably racist groups for which the controls attempt to account. I review the results of analysis done on three surveys taken from September 2003 to March 2008, each of which contained a question asking the respondents opinion of torture, and one or more indirect racism question to demonstrate racism against Arabs and Middle Easterners.[4] The rest of this chapter presents the results of my analyses.

Support for Torture and Indirect Racism Questions

Table 5.1 presents the responses to both the torture question and to the indirect racism questions for each survey analyzed. Each row in the table gives the question number - which will be used to refer to the question throughout the chapter - the question asked, and the percentage of respondents who either supported or opposed the question, indicated by a "yes" or "no" (see Appendix for full question wording).

(Insert Table 5.1[5])

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[4] For all cross-tabs, both in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, I applied the *Pearson chi-square test* to determine statistical significance. For cross-tabs that had applied control variables, a cross-tabulation of responses was done controlling for census region, level of education reached, ideology, and urban or rural residential location (when data available). Significance is defined in this study by an asymptotic significance of p=<.100.

[5] All Tables are available at the end of the Chapter

The first survey, entitled "9/11 Anniversary", was conducted by ABC News/*Washington Post*. It was administered to a national adult sample of 1,004 respondents from September 4-7, 2003 via telephone. The sample was split for a number of questions, including the torture question and one of the indirect racism questions. Table 5.1 indicates if a question was administered to only half of the sample.

This was the only survey to refer to torture specifically as 'physical torture', and was the only survey to mention rendition as the means for subjecting terrorism suspects to torture. It is possible that this distinction was responsible for the substantial number of respondents who rejected torture in this survey. Respondents to the torture questions in the ABC News/*Washington Post* similarly reject the use of rendition and/or torture by the federal government against terrorist suspects to gain information. Additionally, the question lacks a range or response possibilities: in order for respondents to express degrees of support for torture. In essence, the respondent can either report that he/she supports or opposes torture, there is no in between. On the other hand, the sample was much more evenly divided on the question of respondents' opinion of Islam, and whether it encourages violence against non-Muslims. While the percentages indicate that in general respondents do not favor explicit torture, something causes a much deeper divide in their opinions of Islam.

Looking at Table 5.1, one can see a much closer split in responses for Q.7 than for Q.10. Both questions refer to the respondents' opinion of Islam, but Q.7 clearly evokes some underlying divisive factor about Islam. Perhaps this is a product of the fact that Q.7 is a general question about Islam, which allowed respondents to clearly express bias without social cues against discrimination. On the other hand, Q.10 was slightly more directed in its purpose because it asked respondents to describe their bias towards Islam. Admitting that one considers

Muslims more violent towards non-Muslims implies that one believes Muslims have a greater tendency towards acts such as terrorism against Westerners. This may be too strong for some people to admit, though conceding that Islam encourages violence is quite a similar statement. The results of the cross-tabs reflect this distinction between the two questions.

The second survey, conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International and sponsored by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Pres, was titled "Foreign Policy and Party Images". The survey was issued via telephone from July8-18, 2004 to a national adult sample of 2,009 respondents. All respondents who answered "often justified" or "sometimes justified" were counted as supporting torture. Only those who responded "never justified" were counted as opposing torture. Unlike the ABC News survey, the Princeton survey asks respondents if they consider the use of torture to be justified for the purpose of gaining information. The fact that respondents are given different degrees to express their support for torture likely led more respondents to admit their support than in the first survey. The more vague use of 'torture' leads to a much more even divide among respondents. In essence, the more indirect approach to torture also seems to lead more respondents to admit their support. More than ten percent of respondents support torture over those who opposed torture. There was a similar distribution in response to the whether respondent's believed Islam was more likely to encourage violence among its believers.

Unlike in the first survey, the indirect racism question for the Princeton study was asked after the torture question. An affirmative response to the indirect racism question exposes the fact that the individual considers Muslims to be more violent ethno-racial outgroup. By agreeing that Islam fosters violence among its believers their answer implies that not only are Muslims more violent that non-Muslims, but also indirectly links them with acts of violence such as terrorism. I

interpret the subtext of the question to be that if Muslims are more likely to commit violent acts, then one can in some way explain the link between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Interestingly, responses to the indirect question regarding the respondent's views on Islam are similar in distribution to the opinion of Islam given be respondents of the ABC News survey. The similarity was likely due to the closeness in wording of both indirect racism questions. A distribution in favor of indirectly expressed racism is an indirect means of addressing the activation of a negative stereotype of Arabs in the mind of respondents.

The final survey was issued by the Public Agenda Foundation between March 18 and April 1, 2008, and was entitled "Confidence in Foreign Policy". The 1,006 respondents were part of a national adult sample contacted via telephone. Unlike the first two surveys, the Public Agenda survey read only a single form of its questionnaire to all respondents. Table 5.1 shows that a fairly large number of respondents, thirty six percent, thought torture was not only justified but also necessary in the war on terror. Like with the previous survey, 'torture' is not explicitly defined as any particular act, and is left to the interpretation of the respondent. Note that answering in the affirmative ("yes") to Q.12b is actually in opposition to torture, while answering in the negative ("no") is in support for torture.

The distribution of responses to both the torture and indirect racism questions is quite different. A far greater number of respondents to the Public Agenda survey oppose the use of torture. While the majority of respondents did not believe torture was necessary to fight terrorism, a substantial number were in favor of its use. The openness of Q.12b allowed respondents to draw their own conclusions as to the potential perpetrators of terrorism without explicitly identifying their race as Arab. The divide in responses regarding Islam's promotion of violence was far closer. Table 5.1 shows that respondents were almost equally divided over

Q.26, whether Islam was more likely than other religions to promote violence among its believers.

Asking the respondent to label torture as "necessary" is a much stronger prompt than asking if torture is "justified". This is perhaps the clearest measure of support for torture because respondents who supported torture not only support its use, but also believe terrorist suspects must be tortured for their supposed knowledge in order to protect America. This is a clear revelation of a desire to establish dominance over a racial outgroup via violence, or in this case torture. Support for this question evokes a particularly punitive response, which is reflected in the low percent of responses in favor of torture. The ratio of respondents who oppose versus support torture is just under two to one. The cause of this split was specifically examined in the cross-tab between the indirect racism question and support for torture discussed later in the chapter.

Analysis of Individual Survey Cross-tabs

In order to determine if a relationship exists between the indirect racism questions and the torture question in each survey, it was necessary to make a comparison of just these variables. Before applying the controls to each of the individual cross-tabs, I did a bivariate analysis between the torture question and the indirect racism question for each survey. I applied the person chi-square test to determine significance, and the results can be seen in the table below.

(Insert Tables 5.2-5.7)

The tables for all bivariate cross-tabs without controls clearly demonstrate a strong relationship between expressed racism in response to the indirect torture question and support for torture. The chi-square values and significance are universally high across all other cross-tabs,

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though slightly lower for the cross-tab between Q.61c and Q.10 as seen in Table 5.4. These results were predicted by the central hypothesis of this thesis, and support the claim that increased feelings of racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners will increase the likelihood of support for torture. However, these results cannot be taken just at face value.

The distribution of respondents to the ABC News study, shown in Table 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, are vastly in opposition to torture regardless of their answer to the indirect racism questions. On the other hand, Table 5.6 and 5.7 show that a large proportion of respondents support for torture and expressed racism. Given these results, we can expect the ABC News study to likely weaken in significance when the controls are applied, whereas the Princeton and Public Agenda surveys should remain strongly significant despite controls. The established controls were applied in order to demonstrate that racism, rather than other competing factors, was responsible for the strong relationship between indirectly expressed racism and support for torture. The results of this new set of cross-tabs are discussed below.

ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

Table 5.8 through Table 5.22 report the results from four cross-tabs between each of the two indirect racism questions and each of the two torture questions in the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey. For each cross-tab, the table breaks down percentage of responses by the established control variables: census region, education, and ideology.

(Insert Table 5.8 and Table 5.22)

The results of the cross-tabs with the applied controls show that there is an overwhelming tendency towards the opposition of torture regardless of responses to either indirect racism question. While the distribution of respondents in who both express indirect racism and favor torture exceeds the proportion of respondents who support the use of torture and do not express

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racims, the overall leaning of all four cross-tabs remains towards opposition to torture. Applying the controls to the initiate bivariate cross-tabs caused the initially strong significant relationship between support for torture and indirectly expressed racism to drop off significantly. Therefore it seems that it was the remaining control groups that showed significance among the new set of cross-tabs with the applied controls that biased the initial significance of the first bivariate cross-tabs for the ABC News study. Apparently the indirect racism question did not achieved the desired effect of creating the salience of race in the minds of respondents, nor did it expose feelings of racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners. Rather, the results of all four of the cross-tabs in the ABC News study counter my hypothesis by demonstrating that the relationship between support for torture and does not hold in the presence of the specified controls. However, there are some notable areas of significance worth mentioning as secondary findings.

As Table 5.1 shows, there was greater opposition to Q.10 than to Q.7. Correspondingly, there were also much lower and less significant chi-square values for the cross-tab between both questions related to torture and Q.10. Q.7 provided a question to indirectly expose a respondent's racist views, in the complete absence of discriminatory cues prompted more tolerant groups to express discrimination against Arabs and Middle Easterners. However, the use of the word "generally" may have been a kind of cue against exposing negative beliefs towards an entire ethno-religious group. This may be why significance among cross-tabs with Q.7 showed far less significance once the controls were applied, except among certain groups known to express racism regardless of these cues. Q. 10 more clearly cues the connection between Islam and terrorism, which led to a greater reluctance to state one's belief that Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims. Even though the association between Muslims and terrorism was addressed indirectly, respondents were less likely to universally condemn Muslims as violent

against non-Muslims. Yet, as seen in the responses to Q.7, respondents did appear to think it was socially acceptable to express an unfavorable opinion of the religion in general. This explains the higher significance between torturing suspected terrorists and having a generally unfavorable opinion of Islam. This is also perhaps why groups such as Northeasterners showed the highest significance among those who had and unfavorable opinion of Islam and supported torture.

In all four cross-tabs for the ABC News study, there was the consistently high percentage of respondents living in the South who supported both the indirect racism questions and support the use of torture and rendition. The distribution of Southerners was also consistently in favor of torture across all cross-tabs with Q.61f. The controls isolated Southerners as more likely to express racism is the fact that across all the cross-tabs, as they were the only regional group to show a leaning in distribution in favor of both racism and support for torture. This is consistent with the use of the regional control, which predicted that groups such as Southerners who once exhibited old-fashioned racism consistently continue to hold racist beliefs even though they do not blatantly express racism.

Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004

The results of the cross tab between Q.77F2 – is torture justifiable, and Q.80F2 – does Islam encourage violence among its believers, are shown in Table 5.23 through Table 5.26. Again, the distribution of percentages is broken down across the established controls: census region, education, ideology, and community type. The analysis looks only at "Form 2" of the Princeton survey because only those who received this form of the questionnaire received the torture question. Note that the percentages shown in all the tables for the Princeton study will now total one hundred percent, but only respondents who answered that torture was "often" or "sometimes

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justified" were counted as supporting torture, and only those who responded with "never justified" were counted as opposing torture. Recall from Table 5.1, the majority of respondents supported both the use of torture and the indirect racism question.

<center>(Insert Table 5.23-5.26)</center>

What is most striking about the results of this cross-tab was the difference between the proportion of respondents who support torture and expressed racism, and who support torture and did not express racism. The percentage of respondents who expressed racism and support torture is far greater than those who did not express racism and support torture. It was also greater than the distribution of respondents who opposed torture for all responses to Q.80F2. By answering in the affirmative to Q.80F2, that Islam is more likely to encourage violence among its believers, respondents are stating that the violence produced by Islamic terrorists is a direct result of their ethno-religious identity.

Identifying Muslims as more likely to be violent because of their religion is an admission of an inherent association between Islam and the violent terrorist acts committed in its name. We know from previous research that when reminded of the threat of terrorist violence, Americans generally associate Arabs and Middle Easterners with terrorism and are shown to further vilify them as a threatening racial outgroup (Huddy et al. 2005). Thus torture is indirectly justified in one's answer to Q.77F2 because its will be used against a group to reduce the threat of a group that is prone to violence and poses a real, or imagined, threat to Americans. There seems to be a fundamental difference in support for torture based on one's opinion of Islam. This is consistent with the results of Table 5.6, which also showed the highest percentage distribution to be in favor of torture and expressed racism.

The difference in support for torture for those who opposed the indirect racism question was almost always between a ten to fifteen percent difference among those who believed Islam encouraged violence. This further demonstrates that though people are generally supportive of torture, those who support the indirect racism question are even more likely to support the use of torture against suspect terrorist. The results of the cross-tabs for the Princeton study with the applied controls are consistent both with my central hypothesis and with the literature. As the literature review in Chapter Two established, those who already hold racist beliefs are more likely to express them under the right conditions – with a lack of social cues against discrimination. A strong correlation exists between justifying torture and considering Islam violent, regardless of where the respondent lived, their level of education, their ideology, or their community type. Thus the controls had little effect on the results of the original bivariate cross-tab shown in Table 5.6.

This supports the use of indirect questioning in their integrated model and methods of testing implicit behavior discussed in Chapter Two by Dovidio and Gaertener (1998). Groups who frequently express racism, as well as those who are generally more tolerant, both show proportionately more respondents who expressed racism and support for torture. All groups who support torture seem to be strongly linked to the indirect expression of racism. This is not an expression of old-fashioned racism, but a less overt form of racism motivated by the symbolic, or realistic, security threat posed by Arabs and Middle Easterners to Americans. These results are consistent with SDT, in demonstrating that an obvious threat to the hierarchy, or safety of the dominant group, will lead to discrimination against a threatening racial outgroup. In this case favoring the torture of those considered a direct threat to the dominant group. It makes sense that almost all groups who feel their position threatened would favor the punishment of the

threatening outgroup, particularly if they are of another race. The fact that that the majority

within the response distribution favored torture and indirectly expressed racism, and that

significance remained across almost all categories, seems to support the central hypothesis of this

thesis.

Overall, there was an overwhelming support for torture among those who answered in the

affirmative to the indirect question, or stated that Islam promotes violence. In terms of secondary

findings, the cross-tab identified those living in the South, with some college education, who

identify as Very Liberal, and those living in suburban areas as the most highly in favor of torture

and supportive of the indirect racism question. Though these were the types of respondents with

the highest and most significant relationship, as the tables for this section clearly demonstrates,

other groups had similar response distributions. For example, the Northeast was equally

significant as the South. Also interesting was the fact that Conservatives showed the least

significance of all the ideological categories, while respondents who identified as Very Liberal,

Moderate, or Liberal all had equally high significance.   Moreover, Very Liberals had the highest

discrepancy in terms of the percentage of respondents who support versus oppose torture.

In fact, Conservatives were among the least likely respondents to show significance. This

seems to confirm the predictions made in the beginning of the chapter. When indirect questions

make race salient in the absence of social cues against discrimination, respondents usually

conscious of suppressing discrimination are more likely to express racism towards threatening

outgroups. Consistent with averse racism, groups that frequently express racism regardless of its

social undesirability prove to be more tolerant in the absence of social cues against

discrimination than groups that are socially conscious. Indirect questioning therefore exposes

underlying racism among groups who normally appear more tolerant.

The final cross-tab using indirect racism questions compared responses to Q.12b, can the terrorism be fought without torture, and Q.26, is Islam more likely to encourage violence, in the Public Agenda Forum survey. Table 5.1 shows that the majority of respondents clearly opposed the use of torture. On the other hand, the difference between those who believe Islam is more likely to encourage violence among its believers than those who did not was only one percentage point. The results of the cross-tab, shown in Table 5.27 through Table 5.29 reflect the large proportion of respondents who favored both the use of torture and believed Islam encouraged violence among its followers. Similar to the results of the Princeton survey, the results of the new cross-tabs for the Public Agenda survey show a distribution of responses that favors support for torture. In contrast, respondents who did not express racism vastly opposed torture. The data shows an obvious connection between expressing racism in one's answer to the indirect racism question and supporting the use of torture.

<center>(Insert Table 5.27-5.29)</center>

Respondents who consider torture necessary and indirectly express racism are indirectly expressing a discrimination against Arabs and Middle Easterners because of the implicit belief in their answer that they are a violent and threatening racial outgroup. The results of the new cross-tabs with applied controls are consistent with those of Table 5.7, which showed a very significant relationship between indirectly expressed racism and support for torture. Despite the application of controls to the original bivariate cross-tab, the results shown in Table 5.27, 5.28, and 5.29 show the strong relation between racism and torture across all groups of respondents regardless of the application of control variables. Clearly, support of the indirect racism question has a visible affect on support for torture, which is not present in respondents who have more tolerant

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views towards Islam in spite of potentially confounding external factors. One can only speculate that the source of this connection is racism, but there seems to be a strong potential given the results of the cross-tabs with the applied controls for the Public Agenda study.

Over a third of respondents to this survey not only supported the use of torture, but also considered it necessary to continue fighting terrorism. On the surface, this response implies that respondent who answer in the affirmative, believe the only way to end terrorism is to torture suspected terrorists. However, this response indirectly associates Arab and Middle Eastern with the threat of terrorism, and the necessity of the use of torture against their racial outgroup. One can deduce this association from the fact that the recent War on Terror was based mainly in the Middle East, and its suspects were almost entirely Arabs, which solidified the association between Arabs and Terrorism in the minds of Americans. Similar to responses to Q.80F2 in the Princeton study, answering in the affirmative to Q.26 implicitly links Arabs and Middle Easterners as more likely to be involved in terrorism. If Arabs and Middle Easterners are associated with Islam, and Islam is more likely to promote violence, then it follows from this logic that it is their ethno-religious identity that makes them more prone to commit acts of terrorism. Thus agreeing with both Q.12b and Q.26 implies that the respondent considers it necessary for the use of torture against Arabs and Middle Easterners because their religion makes it more likely to commit acts of terrorism.

Again, these connections can only be speculated because these questions were not specifically designed to measure the relationship between racism and punitiveness. Even so, it seems highly plausible given the literature reviewed in Chapter Two regarding SDT and implicit behavior that these associations would be present in the minds of respondents when giving their answers. The fact that all groups showed some significance is consistent with elements of the

theories of implicit behavior, new and averse racism, and SDT. Respondents appear to be making an implicitly association between Arabs and violence in their affirmative response to the indirect racism question. The lack of social cues prompts usually tolerant groups to express racism, and to a greater degree than groups who are known to frequently express racism regardless of the perception of the social acceptability of their answer in the eyes of the questioner. Most importantly, we see that the majority of respondents who identified Islam as encouraging violence, or a threat, also favored punitive action against suspected terrorist – a group they know to be mostly Muslim, Arab, or Middle Eastern. An established threat to the dominant racial ingroup leads to a response based on maintaining the social hierarchy. As established in Chapters Two and Three, we see that racism leads individuals to promote torture in order to punish or suppress Arabs in order to protect social dominance through the use of torture in the name of national security.

These assertions seem to be further supported by the fact that that each control variables shows significant p-values among all demographic breakdowns. These results support a strong and significant correlation between support for torture and racism. Respondents living in the South, who have either graduated high school or have had less education, and Conservatives, show the least significant relationships for the cross-tab. Whereas North Central, respondents with higher education, and Liberals had the highest significance. For the educational control variable, respondents with the lowest education actually had the lowest chi-square values though both were still statistically significant. As predicted, respondents with higher education were all shown to be highly significant. What was unexpected was the fact that significance seems to increases with higher levels of education. However this is consistent with SDT, greater education allows those with higher education to better conceal their racism in order to appeal to social

standards of tolerance. In an environment lacking no social cues against discrimination the racist beliefs of these groups are clearly exposed. Moreover, tolerant groups, when given the opportunity to express racism without social cues against discrimination, will do so with greater intensity than groups that frequently express racism – Southerners, the less educated, and Conservatives.

Discussion of the Effects of Indirect Questioning on Racism and Support for Torture

With the exception of the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey, all other surveys using indirect questions displayed a strong relationship between respondents who indirectly expressed racism and support for torture despite the applied controls. For the ABC News survey the lack of significance can, at least in part, be attributed to difficulties in distribution. Only half of the 1,004 respondents answered Q.10 and each question regarding support for torture. This is a stark contrast to the sample for the Pew survey, which also split its sample but started with a sample was almost exactly double the ABC News study's total sample population. Given the fact that so few respondents answered both Q.10 and the torture, it is not only unclear how representative each sample really is but also difficult to measure the relationship between racism and support for torture in this survey.

Additionally, it is necessary to mention the importance of question wording when determining the strength of the central hypothesis of this thesis. Questions that provided a more vague definition of torture, and allowed respondents to admit support without defining torture produced greater numbers of torture supporters. Offering greater degrees of support for torture means that respondents don't have to admit full support for a socially questionable opinion, as torture is clearly within violation of American principles of justice and morality. This was

probably more important to the results of the cross-tabs than was the wording of the indirect racism questions, which all displaced social cues against discrimination in similar ways. This is another possible reason that the significance for the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey was so much lower than the other questionnaires despite similar wording in the indirect racism questions. Whereas the indirect racism questions showed similar distribution to the other indirect racism questions, the responses to torture questions were overwhelmingly against torture. The fact that the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey asked if respondents favored 'physically torturing', in Q.61c and Q.61f seems to have made a substantial difference in determining significance when the controls were applied.

Question order is also one potentially confounding factor. It is possible that receiving the indirect racism questions prior to the torture question, as was the case with the ABC News study, triggered a social cue against discrimination that was lessened when the torture question was asked first. It is possible that punitiveness is actually the cause for racism, rather than the other way around. In essence, it is possible that once admitting their punitive beliefs, respondents were more inclined to also express indirect racism, but not the other way around.

Despite these possible confounding factors, one cannot ignore the overwhelming strength for the relationship between racism and torture in the Princeton and the Public Agenda Forum surveys, even with the controls applied to the original bivariate cross-tabs. The fact that the distribution of respondents favored both the use of torture and support for the indirect racism question in the Princeton and Public Agenda Forum surveys is strong support for my central hypothesis. Respondents were just more likely to favor than oppose torture if they agreed that Islam was more likely to promote violence among its believers. All of these results support the use of indirection questioning as a means to expose socially undesirable beliefs among groups

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thought to generally more tolerant. The lack of social cues against discrimination in the indirect racism question, and against punitiveness in the last two surveys was key to establishing a relationship. Despite the fact that respondents were from completely different samples and received completely different questions, a significant relationship across all three surveys was clear. This fact indicates that when asked indirectly about racism, even tolerant groups display punitive behavior towards threatening racial outgroups.

I argue that the common denominator between all these groups is the question of race. My claim is strengthened most by the clear difference shown in all tables between support for torture among respondents who express and do not express racism in their responses to the indirect racism questions. If race had nothing to do with determining support for torture, one would expect to see no difference in the percentage distributions and there should have been little to no significance across controls. However, this was quite the opposite of what I found. The indirect questions served to clearly identify the race of terrorist suspects as Arab or Middle Eastern. This made this association between Arabs and terrorism quite clear in the minds of respondents when determining their support for torture. The association between a racial outgroup and a threat to the dominant racial ingroup, determines whether a respondent supports the torture of members of this outgroup. Though the cross-tab can only provide the fact that there is a relationship between racism and torture, the fact that this relationship is significant across so many groups over a long period is a clear indication that the effect of indirect racism questions is to promote support for torture.

Table 5.1 Responses for Indirect Surveys

ABC News/Washington Post September 2003	*Yes (%)*	*No (%)*
Indirect Racism Questions:		
Q.7 Generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?	39	38
Q.10 Does mainstream Islam encourage violence against non-Muslims? (half sample)	34	46
Torture Questions:		
Q.61c Support the federal government physically torturing suspected terrorists for information? (half sample)	20	78
Q.61f Support federal government arranging for foreign security officials in other countries torture suspected terrorist for information? (half sample)	23	73
Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004		
Torture Question:		
Q.77F2 Can the use of torture against suspected to gain information be justified? (half sample)	43	32
Indirect Racism Question:		
Q.82F2 Is it your view that Islam is more likely to encourage violence among its believers? (half sample)	46	37
Public Agenda Foundation March 2008		
Torture Question:		
Q.12b Do you think that we can fight terrorism without using torture?	56	36
Indirect Racism Question:		
Q.26 Is Islam more likely than other religions to encourage violence among believers?	41	42

Table 5.2 Cross-tab Results for Q.61c and Q.7, ABC News/*Washington Post* Sept. 2003

		Q.7 Generally favorable opinion of Islam?			N	Chi-square	P
		Yes	No	Total			
Q.61c Support the federal government physically torturing suspected terrorists for information?	Support	6.59% (24)	14.01% (51)	20.60% (75)	36.3%	11.150	0.001
	Oppose	42.58% (155)	36.82% (134)	79.40% (289)			
Total		49.17% (179)	50.83% (185)	100% (364)	364		

Table 5.3 Cross-tab Results for Q.61f and Q.7, ABC News/*Washington Post* Sept. 2003

		Q.7 Generally favorable opinion of Islam?			N	Chi-square	P
		Yes	No	Total			
Q.61f Support federal government arranging for foreign security officials in other countries torture suspected terrorist for information?	Support	7.80% (29)	18.01% (67)	25.81% (96)	37.0%	11.150	0.001
	Oppose	43.82% (163)	30.37% (113)	74.19% (276)			
Total		51.62% (192)	48.38% (180)	100% (372)	372		

Table 5.4 Cross-tab Results for Q.61c and Q.10, ABC News/*Washington Post* Sept. 2003

		Q.10 Does mainstream Islam encourage violence against non-Muslims?			N	Chi-square	P
		Yes	No	Total			
Q.61c Support the federal government physically torturing suspected terrorists for information?	Support	13.98% (26)	8.60% (16)	22.58% (42)	18.6%	4.989	0.026
	Oppose	32.80% (61)	44.62% (83)	77.42% (144)			
Total		46.78% (87)	53.22% (99)	100% (186)	186		

Table 5.5 Cross-tab Results for Q.61f and Q.10, ABC News/*Washington Post* Sept. 2003

		Q.10 Does mainstream Islam encourage violence against non-Muslims?			N	Chi-square	P
		Yes	No	Total			
Q.61f Support federal government arranging for foreign security officials in other countries torture suspected terrorist for information?	Support	14.92% (27)	9.39% (17)	24.31% (44)	18.0%	11.950	0.001
	Oppose	24.31% (44)	51.38% (93)	75.69% (137)			
Total		39.23%(71)	60.77%(110)	100% (181)	181		

Table 5.6 Cross-tab Results for Q.77F2 and Q.88F2, Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004

		Q.82F2 Is it your view that Islam is more likely to encourage violence among its believers?			N	Chi-square	P
		Yes	No	Total			
Q.77F2 Can the use of torture against suspected to gain information be justified?	Support	26.36% (452)	15.107% (267)	41.93% (719)	41.9	61.485	0.000
	Oppose	14.11% (242)	18.60% (319)	32.71% (561)			
Total		40.47%(694)	34.17% (586)	74.64% (1280)	1715		

Table 5.7 Cross-tab Results for Q.12b and Q.26, Public Agenda Forum March 2008

		Q.26 Is Islam more likely than other religions to encourage violence among believers?			N	Chi-square	P
		Yes	Yes	Total			
Q.12b Do you think that we can fight terrorism without using torture?	Support	23.55% (186)	14.81% (117)	38.36% (303)	78.5%	32.129	0.000
	Oppose	25.06% (198)	36.58% (289)	61.64% (487)			
Total		48.61%(384)	51.39%(406)	100% (790)	790		

Table 5.8 Crosstab Results for Q.61c and Q.7 Controlling for Education, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

Q909. EDUCATION				Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
				Favorable	Unfavorable	
8th grade or less	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Oppose	Count		1	1
			% within Q.7		100.0%	100.0%
	Total		Count		1	1
			% within Q.7		100.0%	100.0%
Some high school	Q.61c	Support	Count	3	5	8
			% within Q.7	17.6%	22.7%	20.5%
		Oppose	Count	14	17	31
			% within Q.7	82.4%	77.3%	79.5%
	Total		Count	17	22	39
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated high school	Q.61c	Support	Count	12	22	34
			% within Q.7	22.2%	33.8%	28.6%
		Oppose	Count	42	43	85
			% within Q.7	77.8%	66.2%	71.4%
	Total		Count	54	65	119
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college	Q.61c	Support	Count	5	12	17
			% within Q.7	13.9%	24.0%	19.8%
		Oppose	Count	31	38	69
			% within Q.7	86.1%	76.0%	80.2%
	Total		Count	36	50	86
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated College	Q.61c	Support	Count	2	8	10
			% within Q.7	4.5%	27.6%	13.7%
		Oppose	Count	42	21	63
			% within Q.7	95.5%	72.4%	86.3%
	Total		Count	44	29	73
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate	Q.61c	Support	Count	2	3	5
			% within Q.7	8.7%	20.0%	13.2%
		Oppose	Count	21	12	33
			% within Q.7	91.3%	80.0%	86.8%
	Total		Count	23	15	38
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test

Q909. EDUCATION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
8th grade or less	Pearson Chi-Square			
	N of Valid Cases	1		
Some high school	Pearson Chi-Square	.152	1	.697
	N of Valid Cases	39		
Graduated high school	Pearson Chi-Square	1.953	1	.162
	N of Valid Cases	119		
Some college	Pearson Chi-Square	1.349	1	.245
	N of Valid Cases	86		
Graduated College	Pearson Chi-Square	7.849	1	.005
	N of Valid Cases	73		
Post-graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	1.015	1	.314
	N of Valid Cases	38		

Table 5.9 Crosstab Results for Q.61c and Q.7 Controlling for Ideology, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

Q908A. IDEOLOGY				Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
				Favorable	Unfavorable	
Liberal	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	4	5	9
			% within Q.7	10.8%	20.8%	14.8%
		Oppose	Count	33	19	52
			% within Q.7	89.2%	79.2%	85.2%
	Total		Count	37	24	61
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q.61c	Support	Count	11	22	33
			% within Q.7	12.8%	30.6%	20.9%
		Oppose	Count	75	50	125
			% within Q.7	87.2%	69.4%	79.1%
	Total		Count	86	72	158
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	Q.61c	Support	Count	9	22	31
			% within Q.7	19.1%	26.8%	24.0%
		Oppose	Count	38	60	98
			% within Q.7	80.9%	73.2%	76.0%
	Total		Count	47	82	129
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Q.61c	Support	Count	0	1	1
			% within Q.7	.0%	25.0%	12.5%
		Oppose	Count	4	3	7
			% within Q.7	100.0%	75.0%	87.5%

				Count	4	4	8
Total				% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q908A. IDEOLOGY		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	1.163	1	.281
	N of Valid Cases	61		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	7.485	1	.006
	N of Valid Cases	158		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	.965	1	.326
	N of Valid Cases	129		
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Pearson Chi-Square	1.143	1	.285
	N of Valid Cases	8		

Table 5.10 Crosstab Results for Q.61c and Q.7 Controlling for Census Region, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

CENSUS REGION					Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
					Favorable	Unfavorable	
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count		6	12	18
			% within Q.7		14.6%	38.7%	25.0%
		Oppose	Count		35	19	54
			% within Q.7		85.4%	61.3%	75.0%
	Total		Count		41	31	72
			% within Q.7		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Q.61c	Support	Count		6	12	18
			% within Q.7		17.6%	35.3%	26.5%
		Oppose	Count		28	22	50
			% within Q.7		82.4%	64.7%	73.5%
	Total		Count		34	34	68
			% within Q.7		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Q.61c	Support	Count		7	17	24
			% within Q.7		10.6%	21.3%	16.4%
		Oppose	Count		59	63	122
			% within Q.7		89.4%	78.8%	83.6%
	Total		Count		66	80	146
			% within Q.7		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West (CDiv 8,9)	Q.61c	Support	Count		5	10	15
			% within Q.7		13.2%	25.0%	19.2%
		Oppose	Count		33	30	63
			% within Q.7		86.8%	75.0%	80.8%
	Total		Count		38	40	78

CENSUS REGION				Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
				Favorable	Unfavorable	
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	6	12	18
			% within Q.7	14.6%	38.7%	25.0%
		Oppose	Count	35	19	54
			% within Q.7	85.4%	61.3%	75.0%
	Total		Count	41	31	72
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Q.61c	Support	Count	6	12	18
			% within Q.7	17.6%	35.3%	26.5%
		Oppose	Count	28	22	50
			% within Q.7	82.4%	64.7%	73.5%
	Total		Count	34	34	68
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Q.61c	Support	Count	7	17	24
			% within Q.7	10.6%	21.3%	16.4%
		Oppose	Count	59	63	122
			% within Q.7	89.4%	78.8%	83.6%
	Total		Count	66	80	146
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Q.61c	Support	Count	5	10	15
			% within Q.7	13.2%	25.0%	19.2%
		Oppose	Count	33	30	63
			% within Q.7	86.8%	75.0%	80.8%
			Count	38	40	78
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

CENSUS REGION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Pearson Chi-Square	5.457	1	.019
	N of Valid Cases	72		
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Pearson Chi-Square	2.720	1	.099
	N of Valid Cases	68		
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Pearson Chi-Square	2.983	1	.084
	N of Valid Cases	146		
West (CDiv 8,9)	Pearson Chi-Square	1.759	1	.185
	N of Valid Cases	78		

Table 5.11 Crosstab Results for Q.61f and Q.7 Controlling for Education, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

Q909. EDUCATION				Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
				Favorable	Unfavorable	
8th grade or less	Q.61f Support or oppose the federal government: Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	0	2	2
			% within Q.7	.0%	20.0%	14.3%
		Oppose	Count	4	8	12
			% within Q.7	100.0%	80.0%	85.7%
	Total		Count	4	10	14
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some high school	Q.61f	Support	Count	0	15	15
			% within Q.7	.0%	55.6%	34.1%
		Oppose	Count	17	12	29
			% within Q.7	100.0%	44.4%	65.9%
	Total		Count	17	27	44
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated high school	Q.61f	Support	Count	10	22	32
			% within Q.7	22.2%	44.0%	33.7%
		Oppose	Count	35	28	63
			% within Q.7	77.8%	56.0%	66.3%
	Total		Count	45	50	95
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college	Q.61f	Support	Count	5	16	21
			% within Q.7	10.6%	31.4%	21.4%
		Oppose	Count	42	35	77
			% within Q.7	89.4%	68.6%	78.6%
	Total		Count	47	51	98
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated College	Q.61f	Support	Count	6	9	15
			% within Q.7	12.2%	30.0%	19.0%
		Oppose	Count	43	21	64
			% within Q.7	87.8%	70.0%	81.0%
	Total		Count	49	30	79
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate	Q.61f	Support	Count	6	3	9
			% within Q.7	21.4%	27.3%	23.1%
		Oppose	Count	22	8	30
			% within Q.7	78.6%	72.7%	76.9%

			28	11	39
Total	Count		28	11	39
	% within Q.7		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q909. EDUCATION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
8th grade or less	Pearson Chi-Square	.933	1	.334
	N of Valid Cases	14		
Some high school	Pearson Chi-Square	14.330	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	44		
Graduated high school	Pearson Chi-Square	5.029	1	.025
	N of Valid Cases	95		
Some college	Pearson Chi-Square	6.245	1	.012
	N of Valid Cases	98		
Graduated College	Pearson Chi-Square	3.813	1	.051
	N of Valid Cases	79		
Post-graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	.152	1	.697
	N of Valid Cases	39		

Table 5.12 Crosstab Results for Q.61f and Q.7 Controlling for Ideology, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

Q908A. IDEOLOGY				Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
				Favorable	Unfavorable	
Liberal	Q.61f Support or oppose the federal government: Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	8	21	29
			% within Q.7	15.7%	48.8%	30.9%
		Oppose	Count	43	22	65
			% within Q.7	84.3%	51.2%	69.1%
	Total		Count	51	43	94
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q.61f	Support	Count	12	26	38
			% within Q.7	13.2%	42.6%	25.0%
		Oppose	Count	79	35	114
			% within Q.7	86.8%	57.4%	75.0%
	Total		Count	91	61	152
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	Q.61f	Support	Count	7	21	28
			% within Q.7	15.2%	29.6%	23.9%
		Oppose	Count	39	50	89
			% within Q.7	84.8%	70.4%	76.1%
	Total		Count	46	71	117
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Q.61f	Oppose	Count	1	3	4
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Total		Count	1	3	4
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q908A. IDEOLOGY		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	12.018	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	94		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	16.877	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	152		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	3.162[d]	1	.075
	N of Valid Cases	117		

Table 5.13 Crosstab Results for Q.61f and Q.7 Controlling for Census Region, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

CENSUS REGION				Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?		Total
				Favorable	Unfavorable	
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Q.61f Support or oppose the federal government: Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	6	10	16
			% within Q.7	15.8%	38.5%	25.0%
		Oppose	Count	32	16	48
			% within Q.7	84.2%	61.5%	75.0%
	Total		Count	38	26	64
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Q.61f	Support	Count	6	10	16
			% within Q.7	10.7%	22.7%	16.0%
		Oppose	Count	50	34	84
			% within Q.7	89.3%	77.3%	84.0%
	Total		Count	56	44	100
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Q.61f	Support	Count	12	44	56
			% within Q.7	21.4%	54.3%	40.9%
		Oppose	Count	44	37	81
			% within Q.7	78.6%	45.7%	59.1%
	Total		Count	56	81	137
			% within Q.7 Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

West (CDiv 8,9)	Q.61f	Support	Count	5	4	9
			% within Q.7	11.9%	13.3%	12.5%
		Oppose	Count	37	26	63
			% within Q.7	88.1%	86.7%	87.5%
	Total		Count	42	30	72
			% within Q.7	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

CENSUS REGION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Pearson Chi-Square	4.232	1	.040		
	N of Valid Cases	64				
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Pearson Chi-Square	2.646	1	.104		
	N of Valid Cases	100				
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Pearson Chi-Square	14.822	1	.000		
	N of Valid Cases	137				
West (CDiv 8,9)	Pearson Chi-Square	.033	1	.857		
	N of Valid Cases	72				

Table 5.14 Crosstab Results for Q.61c and Q.10 Controlling for Education, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

Q909. EDUCATION				Q.10 Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?		Total
				Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	
Some high school	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	1	0	1
			% within Q.10	12.5%	.0%	9.1%
		Oppose	Count	7	3	10
			% within Q.10	87.5%	100.0%	90.9%
	Total		Count	8	3	11
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated high school	Q.61c	Support	Count	12	7	19
			% within Q.10	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%
		Oppose	Count	24	14	38
			% within Q.10	66.7%	66.7%	66.7%
	Total		Count	36	21	57
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college	Q.61c	Support	Count	7	3	10
			% within Q.10	33.3%	9.7%	19.2%
		Oppose	Count	14	28	42
			% within Q.10	66.7%	90.3%	80.8%
	Total		Count	21	31	52

				Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated College	Q.61c	Support	Count	5	3	8
			% within Q.10	29.4%	12.5%	19.5%
		Oppose	Count	12	21	33
			% within Q.10	70.6%	87.5%	80.5%
	Total		Count	17	24	41
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate	Q.61c	Support	Count	1	3	4
			% within Q.10	20.0%	18.8%	19.0%
		Oppose	Count	4	13	17
			% within Q.10	80.0%	81.3%	81.0%
	Total		Count	5	16	21
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q909. EDUCATION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Some high school	Pearson Chi-Square	.413	1	.521
	N of Valid Cases	11		
Graduated high school	Pearson Chi-Square	.000c	1	1.000
	N of Valid Cases	57		
Some college	Pearson Chi-Square	4.510	1	.034
	N of Valid Cases	52		
Graduated College	Pearson Chi-Square	1.812	1	.178
	N of Valid Cases	41		
Post-graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	.004	1	.950
	N of Valid Cases	21		

Table 5.15 Crosstab Results for Q.61c and Q.10 Controlling for Ideology, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

				Q.10 Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?		
Q908A. IDEOLOGY				Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
Liberal	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	3	1	4
			% within Q.10	33.3%	4.8%	13.3%
		Oppose	Count	6	20	26
			% within Q.10	66.7%	95.2%	86.7%
	Total		Count	9	21	30
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q.61c	Support	Count	11	9	20
			% within Q.10	33.3%	17.3%	23.5%

					Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
		Oppose	Count		22	43	65
			% within Q.10		66.7%	82.7%	76.5%
	Total		Count		33	52	85
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	Q.61c	Support	Count		11	5	16
			% within Q.10		26.2%	26.3%	26.2%
		Oppose	Count		31	14	45
			% within Q.10		73.8%	73.7%	73.8%
	Total		Count		42	19	61
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Q.61c	Support	Count		1	0	1
			% within Q.10		25.0%	.0%	14.3%
		Oppose	Count		3	3	6
			% within Q.10		75.0%	100.0%	85.7%
	Total		Count		4	3	7
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q908A. IDEOLOGY		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	4.451	1	.035
	N of Valid Cases	30		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	2.882	1	.090
	N of Valid Cases	85		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	.000	1	.992
	N of Valid Cases	61		
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Pearson Chi-Square	.875	1	.350
	N of Valid Cases	7		

Table 5.16 Crosstab Results for Q.61c and Q.10 Controlling for Census Region, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

					Q.10 Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?		
CENSUS REGION					Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Q.61c Support or oppose the federal government: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count		6	1	7
			% within Q.10		31.6%	5.6%	18.9%
		Oppose	Count		13	17	30
			% within Q.10		68.4%	94.4%	81.1%
	Total		Count		19	18	37
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

					Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Q.61c	Support	Count		4	4	8
			% within Q.10		25.0%	16.7%	20.0%
		Oppose	Count		12	20	32
			% within Q.10		75.0%	83.3%	80.0%
	Total		Count		16	24	40
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Q.61c	Support	Count		7	7	14
			% within Q.10		26.9%	23.3%	25.0%
		Oppose	Count		19	23	42
			% within Q.10		73.1%	76.7%	75.0%
	Total		Count		26	30	56
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West (CDiv 8,9)	Q.61c	Support	Count		9	5	14
			% within Q.10		33.3%	17.9%	25.5%
		Oppose	Count		18	23	41
			% within Q.10		66.7%	82.1%	74.5%
	Total		Count		27	28	55
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

CENSUS REGION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Pearson Chi-Square	4.081	1	.043
	N of Valid Cases	37		
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Pearson Chi-Square	.417c	1	.519
	N of Valid Cases	40		
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Pearson Chi-Square	.096	1	.757
	N of Valid Cases	56		
West (CDiv 8,9)	Pearson Chi-Square	1.735	1	.188
	N of Valid Cases	55		

Table 1.7 Crosstab Results for Q.61f and Q.10 Controlling for Education, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

					Q.10 Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?		
Q909. EDUCATION					Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
8th grade or less	Q.61f Support or oppose the federal government: Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Oppose	Count		3	3	6
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

	Total		Count	3	3	6
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some high school	Q.61f	Support	Count	10	0	10
			% within Q.10	100.0%	.0%	76.9%
		Oppose	Count	0	3	3
			% within Q.10	.0%	100.0%	23.1%
	Total		Count	10	3	13
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated high school	Q.61f	Support	Count	12	7	19
			% within Q.10	44.4%	30.4%	38.0%
		Oppose	Count	15	16	31
			% within Q.10	55.6%	69.6%	62.0%
	Total		Count	27	23	50
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college	Q.61f	Support	Count	3	1	4
			% within Q.10	15.8%	3.0%	7.7%
		Oppose	Count	16	32	48
			% within Q.10	84.2%	97.0%	92.3%
	Total		Count	19	33	52
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated College	Q.61f	Support	Count	2	4	6
			% within Q.10	22.2%	13.8%	15.8%
		Oppose	Count	7	25	32
			% within Q.10	77.8%	86.2%	84.2%
	Total		Count	9	29	38
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate	Q.61f	Support	Count	1	5	6
			% within Q.10	50.0%	26.3%	28.6%
		Oppose	Count	1	14	15
			% within Q.10	50.0%	73.7%	71.4%
	Total		Count	2	19	21
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q909. EDUCATION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
8th grade or less	Pearson Chi-Square			
	N of Valid Cases	6		
Some high school	Pearson Chi-Square	13.000	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	13		
Graduated high school	Pearson Chi-Square	1.035	1	.309
	N of Valid Cases	50		
Some college	Pearson Chi-Square	2.764	1	.096
	N of Valid Cases	52		
Graduated College	Pearson Chi-Square	.367	1	.545

				N of Valid Cases	38		
Post-graduate				Pearson Chi-Square	.497	1	.481
				N of Valid Cases	21		

Table 5.18 Crosstab Results for Q.61f and Q.10 Controlling for Ideology, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

					Q.10 Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?		
Q908A. IDEOLOGY					Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	Total
Liberal	Q.61f Support or oppose the federal government: Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count		13	3	16
			% within Q.10		56.5%	12.5%	34.0%
		Oppose	Count		10	21	31
			% within Q.10		43.5%	87.5%	66.0%
	Total		Count		23	24	47
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q.61f	Support	Count		5	7	12
			% within Q.10		22.7%	15.2%	17.6%
		Oppose	Count		17	39	56
			% within Q.10		77.3%	84.8%	82.4%
	Total		Count		22	46	68
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	Q.61f	Support	Count		9	6	15
			% within Q.10		37.5%	15.8%	24.2%
		Oppose	Count		15	32	47
			% within Q.10		62.5%	84.2%	75.8%
	Total		Count		24	38	62
			% within Q.10		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Q.61f	Oppose	Count			2	2
			% within Q.10			100.0%	100.0%
	Total		Count			2	2
			% within Q.10			100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q908A. IDEOLOGY		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	10.137[a]	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	47		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	.578	1	.447
	N of Valid Cases	68		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	3.780	1	.052

	N of Valid Cases	62		

Table 5.19 Crosstab results for Q.61f and Q.10 Controlling for Census Region, ABC News/*Washington Post* September 2003

CENSUS REGION				Q.10 Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?		Total
				Encourages violence	Peaceful religion	
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Q.61f Support or oppose the federal government: Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them	Support	Count	3	3	6
			% within Q.10	37.5%	14.3%	20.7%
		Oppose	Count	5	18	23
			% within Q.10	62.5%	85.7%	79.3%
	Total		Count	8	21	29
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Q.61f	Support	Count	4	4	8
			% within Q.10	25.0%	12.9%	17.0%
		Oppose	Count	12	27	39
			% within Q.10	75.0%	87.1%	83.0%
	Total		Count	16	31	47
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Q.61f	Support	Count	19	6	25
			% within Q.10	51.4%	20.7%	37.9%
		Oppose	Count	18	23	41
			% within Q.10	48.6%	79.3%	62.1%
	Total		Count	37	29	66
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West (CDiv 8,9)	Q.61f	Support	Count	1	3	4
			% within Q.10	10.0%	10.3%	10.3%
		Oppose	Count	9	26	35
			% within Q.10	90.0%	89.7%	89.7%
	Total		Count	10	29	39
			% within Q.10	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

CENSUS REGION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Northeast (CDiv 1,2)	Pearson Chi-Square	1.903	1	.168
	N of Valid Cases	29		
Midwest (CDiv 3,4)	Pearson Chi-Square	1.093[c]	1	.296
	N of Valid Cases	47		

				Q82F2. Which statement comes closer to your own views about the Islamic religion even if neither is exactly right			
South (CDiv 5,6,7)	Pearson Chi-Square			6.495		1	.011
	N of Valid Cases			66			
West (CDiv 8,9)	Pearson Chi-Square			.001		1	.975
	N of Valid Cases			39			

Table 5.20 Crosstab Results for Q.77F2 and Q.82F2 Controlling for Education, Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004

EDUC. What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?				More likely to encourage violence among its believers	It does not encourage violence more than others	Neither	Total
None, or grade 1-8	Q77F2. Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Sometimes justified	Count	0	7		7
			% within Q82F2.	.0%	29.2%		21.2%
		Rarely justified	Count	0	7		7
			% within Q82F2.	.0%	29.2%		21.2%
		Never justified	Count	9	10		19
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	41.7%		57.6%
	Total		Count	9	24		33
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
High school incomplete	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	18	17	0	35
			% within Q82F2.	18.6%	32.1%	.0%	22.7%
		Sometimes justified	Count	31	3	0	34
			% within Q82F2.	32.0%	5.7%	.0%	22.1%
		Rarely justified	Count	23	7	0	30
			% within Q82F2.	23.7%	13.2%	.0%	19.5%
		Never justified	Count	25	26	4	55
			% within Q82F2.	25.8%	49.1%	100.0%	35.7%
	Total		Count	97	53	4	154
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
High school graduate	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	53	26	0	79
			% within Q82F2.	16.6%	12.1%	.0%	14.4%
		Sometimes justified	Count	100	59	10	169
			% within Q82F2.	31.3%	27.6%	58.8%	30.7%
		Rarely justified	Count	80	40	3	123
			% within Q82F2.	25.1%	18.7%	17.6%	22.4%
		Never justified	Count	86	89	4	179
			% within Q82F2.	27.0%	41.6%	23.5%	32.5%
	Total		Count	319	214	17	550

				% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Business, Technical, or vocational school AFTER high school	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	4	0	0	4
			% within Q82F2.	11.8%	.0%	.0%	9.1%
		Sometimes justified	Count	13	0	0	13
			% within Q82F2.	38.2%	.0%	.0%	29.5%
		Rarely justified	Count	5	0	0	5
			% within Q82F2.	14.7%	.0%	.0%	11.4%
		Never justified	Count	12	8	2	22
			% within Q82F2.	35.3%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%
	Total		Count	34	8	2	44
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college, no 4-year degree	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	40	18	0	58
			% within Q82F2.	16.0%	10.3%	.0%	13.5%
		Sometimes justified	Count	93	44	4	141
			% within Q82F2.	37.2%	25.3%	66.7%	32.8%
		Rarely justified	Count	65	38	2	105
			% within Q82F2.	26.0%	21.8%	33.3%	24.4%
		Never justified	Count	52	74	0	126
			% within Q82F2.	20.8%	42.5%	.0%	29.3%
	Total		Count	250	174	6	430
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
College graduate	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	18	26	2	46
			% within Q82F2.	12.9%	14.9%	25.0%	14.2%
		Sometimes justified	Count	48	43	3	94
			% within Q82F2.	34.3%	24.6%	37.5%	29.1%
		Rarely justified	Count	39	41	2	82
			% within Q82F2.	27.9%	23.4%	25.0%	25.4%
		Never justified	Count	35	65	1	101
			% within Q82F2.	25.0%	37.1%	12.5%	31.3%
	Total		Count	140	175	8	323
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate training or schooling after college	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	16	9	0	25
			% within Q82F2.	19.3%	9.8%	.0%	14.0%
		Sometimes justified	Count	19	15	2	36
			% within Q82F2.	22.9%	16.3%	50.0%	20.1%
		Rarely justified	Count	24	25	2	51
			% within Q82F2. Which statement comes closer to your own views about the Islamic religion even if neither is exactly right	28.9%	27.2%	50.0%	28.5%
		Never justified	Count	24	43	0	67
			% within Q82F2.	28.9%	46.7%	.0%	37.4%
	Total		Count	83	92	4	179

			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Don't know/Refused	Q77F2.	Sometimes justified	Count		1		1
			% within Q82F2.		33.3%		33.3%
		Never justified	Count		2		2
			% within Q82F2.		66.7%		66.7%
	Total		Count		3		3
			% within Q82F2.		100.0%		100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

EDUC. What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
None, or grade 1-8	Pearson Chi-Square	9.118	2	.010
	N of Valid Cases	33		
High school incomplete	Pearson Chi-Square	28.028	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	154		
High school graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	20.770	6	.002
	N of Valid Cases	550		
Business, Technical, or vocational school AFTER high school	Pearson Chi-Square	12.941	6	.044
	N of Valid Cases	44		
Some college, no 4-year degree	Pearson Chi-Square	29.062	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	430		
College graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	8.799	6	.185
	N of Valid Cases	323		
Post-graduate training or schooling after college	Pearson Chi-Square	12.092	6	.060
	N of Valid Cases	179		

Table 5.21 Crosstab Results for Q.77F2 and Q.82F2 Controlling for Ideology, Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004

				Q82F2. Which statement comes closer to your own views about the Islamic religion even if neither is exactly right			
IDEO. In general, would you describe your political views as...				More likely to encourage violence among its believers	It does not encourage violence more than others	Neither	Total
Very conservative	Q77F2. Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified	Count	21	9		30
			% within Q82F2.	27.3%	18.0%		23.6%
		Sometimes justified	Count	21	13		34
			% within Q82F2.	27.3%	26.0%		26.8%
		Rarely justified	Count	11	9		20
			% within Q82F2.	14.3%	18.0%		15.7%
		Never justified	Count	24	19		43
			% within Q82F2.	31.2%	38.0%		33.9%

	Total		Count	77	50		127
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
Conservative	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	38	36	2	76
			% within Q82F2.	11.9%	18.6%	8.3%	14.2%
		Sometimes justified	Count	119	54	7	180
			% within Q82F2.	37.3%	27.8%	29.2%	33.5%
		Rarely justified	Count	80	38	8	126
			% within Q82F2.	25.1%	19.6%	33.3%	23.5%
		Never justified	Count	82	66	7	155
			% within Q82F2.	25.7%	34.0%	29.2%	28.9%
	Total		Count	319	194	24	537
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	46	37	0	83
			% within Q82F2.	12.8%	13.6%	.0%	13.0%
		Sometimes justified	Count	132	63	5	200
			% within Q82F2.	36.8%	23.1%	62.5%	31.3%
		Rarely justified	Count	97	58	1	156
			% within Q82F2.	27.0%	21.2%	12.5%	24.4%
		Never justified	Count	84	115	2	201
			% within Q82F2.	23.4%	42.1%	25.0%	31.4%
	Total		Count	359	273	8	640
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Liberal	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	20	5	0	25
			% within Q82F2.	18.2%	3.7%	.0%	10.1%
		Sometimes justified	Count	19	35	1	55
			% within Q82F2.	17.3%	25.7%	50.0%	22.2%
		Rarely justified	Count	39	26	1	66
			% within Q82F2.	35.5%	19.1%	50.0%	26.6%
		Never justified	Count	32	70	0	102
			% within Q82F2.	29.1%	51.5%	.0%	41.1%
	Total		Count	110	136	2	248
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Very liberal	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	21	5	0	26
			% within Q82F2.	50.0%	8.2%	.0%	25.0%
		Sometimes justified	Count	9	6	0	15
			% within Q82F2.	21.4%	9.8%	.0%	14.4%
		Rarely justified	Count	3	15	0	18
			% within Q82F2.	7.1%	24.6%	.0%	17.3%
		Never justified	Count	9	35	1	45
			% within Q82F2.	21.4%	57.4%	100.0%	43.3%
	Total		Count	42	61	1	104
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test

104

IDEO. In general, would you describe your political views as...		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Very conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	1.805	3	.614
	N of Valid Cases	127		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	13.217	6	.040
	N of Valid Cases	537		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	32.961	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	640		
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	30.312	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	248		
Very liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	32.832	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	104		

Table 5.22 Crosstab Results for Q.77F2 and Q.82F2 Controlling for Census Region, Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004

				Q82F2. Which statement comes closer to your own views about the Islamic religion even if neither is exactly right			
Census region				More likely to encourage violence among its believers	It does not encourage violence more than others	Neither	Total
NORTHEAST	Q77F2. Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified	Count	44	17	0	61
			% within Q82F2.	23.8%	11.0%	.0%	17.9%
		Sometimes justified	Count	43	32	1	76
			% within Q82F2.	23.2%	20.6%	100.0%	22.3%
		Rarely justified	Count	58	37	0	95
			% within Q82F2.	31.4%	23.9%	.0%	27.9%
		Never justified	Count	40	69	0	109
			% within Q82F2.	21.6%	44.5%	.0%	32.0%
	Total		Count	185	155	1	341
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MIDWEST	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	27	32	0	59
			% within Q82F2.	12.0%	17.8%	.0%	14.3%
		Sometimes justified	Count	68	43	5	116
			% within Q82F2.	30.2%	23.9%	55.6%	28.0%
		Rarely justified	Count	64	36	1	101
			% within Q82F2.	28.4%	20.0%	11.1%	24.4%
		Never justified	Count	66	69	3	138
			% within Q82F2.	29.3%	38.3%	33.3%	33.3%
	Total		Count	225	180	9	414
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
SOUTH	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	51	23	2	76
			% within Q82F2.	15.2%	9.7%	10.0%	12.8%

				More likely to encourage violence among its believers	It does not encourage violence more than others	Neither	Total
		Sometimes justified	Count	133	58	7	198
			% within Q82F2.	39.6%	24.5%	35.0%	33.4%
		Rarely justified	Count	67	40	5	112
			% within Q82F2.	19.9%	16.9%	25.0%	18.9%
		Never justified	Count	85	116	6	207
			% within Q82F2.	25.3%	48.9%	30.0%	34.9%
	Total		Count	336	237	20	593
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
WEST	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	26	23	0	49
			% within Q82F2.	14.0%	13.3%	.0%	13.2%
		Sometimes justified	Count	60	40	5	105
			% within Q82F2.	32.3%	23.1%	45.5%	28.4%
		Rarely justified	Count	48	45	4	97
			% within Q82F2.	25.8%	26.0%	36.4%	26.2%
		Never justified	Count	52	65	2	119
			% within Q82F2.	28.0%	37.6%	18.2%	32.2%
	Total		Count	186	173	11	370
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test

Census region		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
NORTHEAST	Pearson Chi-Square	27.020	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	341		
MIDWEST	Pearson Chi-Square	13.593	6	.035
	N of Valid Cases	414		
SOUTH	Pearson Chi-Square	36.403	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	593		
WEST	Pearson Chi-Square	9.047	6	.171
	N of Valid Cases	370		

Table 5.23 Crosstab Results for Q.77F2 and Q.82F2 Controlling for Community Type, Princeton Survey Research Associates International July 2004

				Q82F2. Which statement comes closer to your own views about the Islamic religion even if neither is exactly right			
Community type - alpha				More likely to encourage violence among its believers	It does not encourage violence more than others	Neither	Total
Rural	Q77F2. Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often	Often justified	Count	36	29	0	65
			% within Q82F2.	13.9%	21.2%	.0%	15.8%
		Sometimes justified	Count	93	32	8	133
			% within Q82F2.	35.9%	23.4%	53.3%	32.4%

		Rarely justified	Count	69	20	2	91
			% within Q82F2.	26.6%	14.6%	13.3%	22.1%
		Never justified	Count	61	56	5	122
			% within Q82F2.	23.6%	40.9%	33.3%	29.7%
	Total		Count	259	137	15	411
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Suburban	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	73	40	2	115
			% within Q82F2.	15.6%	11.9%	13.3%	14.0%
		Sometimes justified	Count	160	76	3	239
			% within Q82F2.	34.1%	22.6%	20.0%	29.1%
		Rarely justified	Count	120	75	5	200
			% within Q82F2.	25.6%	22.3%	33.3%	24.4%
		Never justified	Count	116	145	5	266
			% within Q82F2.	24.7%	43.2%	33.3%	32.4%
	Total		Count	469	336	15	820
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Urban	Q77F2.	Often justified	Count	40	27	0	67
			% within Q82F2.	19.7%	10.0%	.0%	13.8%
		Sometimes justified	Count	50	64	7	121
			% within Q82F2.	24.6%	23.6%	70.0%	25.0%
		Rarely justified	Count	47	63	3	113
			% within Q82F2.	23.2%	23.2%	30.0%	23.3%
		Never justified	Count	66	117	0	183
			% within Q82F2.	32.5%	43.2%	.0%	37.8%
	Total		Count	203	271	10	484
			% within Q82F2.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test

Community type - alpha		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Rural	Pearson Chi-Square	27.476	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	411		
Suburban	Pearson Chi-Square	33.029	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	820		
Urban	Pearson Chi-Square	25.232	6	.000
	N of Valid Cases	484		

Table 5.24 Crosstab Results for Q.12b and Q.26 Controlling for Education, Public Agenda Forum May 2008

D7. What is the highest level of school you completed?	26. Which statement comes closer to your own views even if neither is exactly right?	Total

				The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encour...	The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more tha...	
Less than high school	12b. Do you think that... We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected terrorists?	Yes	Count	39	42	81
			% within 26.	76.5%	89.4%	82.7%
		No	Count	12	5	17
			% within 26.	23.5%	10.6%	17.3%
	Total		Count	51	47	98
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
High school graduate	12b.	Yes	Count	69	69	138
			% within 26.	52.3%	63.3%	57.3%
		No	Count	63	40	103
			% within 26.	47.7%	36.7%	42.7%
	Total		Count	132	109	241
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college or trade school, no degree	12b.	Yes	Count	26	55	81
			% within 26.	44.1%	66.3%	57.0%
		No	Count	33	28	61
			% within 26.	55.9%	33.7%	43.0%
	Total		Count	59	83	142
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Associates or 2-year degree	12b.	Yes	Count	12	23	35
			% within 26.	32.4%	63.9%	47.9%
		No	Count	25	13	38
			% within 26.	67.6%	36.1%	52.1%
	Total		Count	37	36	73
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Bachelor's or 4-year degree	12b.	Yes	Count	33	44	77
			% within 26.	47.1%	72.1%	58.8%
		No	Count	37	17	54
			% within 26.	52.9%	27.9%	41.2%
	Total		Count	70	61	131
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduate degree	12b.	Yes	Count	18	53	71
			% within 26.	54.5%	82.8%	73.2%
		No	Count	15	11	26
			% within 26.	45.5%	17.2%	26.8%
	Total		Count	33	64	97
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Don't know	12b.	No	Count	1		1
			% within 26.	100.0%		100.0%
	Total		Count	1		1
			% within 26.	100.0%		100.0%

Chi Square Test

D7. What is the highest level of school you completed?		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Less than high school	Pearson Chi-Square	2.835	1	.092
	N of Valid Cases	98		
High school graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	2.968	1	.085
	N of Valid Cases	241		
Some college or trade school, no degree	Pearson Chi-Square	6.934	1	.008
	N of Valid Cases	142		
Associates or 2-year degree	Pearson Chi-Square	7.234	1	.007
	N of Valid Cases	73		
Bachelor's or 4-year degree	Pearson Chi-Square	8.400	1	.004
	N of Valid Cases	131		
Graduate degree	Pearson Chi-Square	8.867	1	.003
	N of Valid Cases	97		
	N of Valid Cases	1		

Table 5.25 Crosstab Results for Q.12b and Q.26 Controlling for Ideology, Public Agenda Forum May 2008

Crosstab

D1a. In politics today, do you consider yourself a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?				26. Which statement comes closer to your own views even if neither is exactly right?		Total
				The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encour...	The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more tha...	
Liberal	12b. Do you think that... We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected terrorists?	Yes	Count	45	85	130
			% within 26.	56.3%	79.4%	69.5%
		No	Count	35	22	57
			% within 26.	43.8%	20.6%	30.5%
	Total		Count	80	107	187
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	12b.	Yes	Count	68	107	175
			% within 26.	51.9%	70.4%	61.8%
		No	Count	63	45	108
			% within 26.	48.1%	29.6%	38.2%
	Total		Count	131	152	283
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	12b.	Yes	Count	64	73	137
			% within 26.	44.8%	65.2%	53.7%
		No	Count	79	39	118
			% within 26.	55.2%	34.8%	46.3%
	Total		Count	143	112	255

				The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encour...	The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more tha...	Total
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Don't know	12b.	Yes	Count	9	18	27
			% within 26.	52.9%	72.0%	64.3%
		No	Count	8	7	15
			% within 26.	47.1%	28.0%	35.7%
	Total		Count	17	25	42
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

D1a. In politics today, do you consider yourself a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	11.616	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	187		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	10.189	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	283		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	10.538	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	255		

Table 5.24 Crosstab Results for Q.12b and Q.26 Controlling for Census Region, Public Agenda Forum May 2008

Crosstab

				26. Which statement comes closer to your own views even if neither is exactly right?		
CENSUS REGION				The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encour...	The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more tha...	Total
Northeast	12b. Do you think that... We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected terrorists?	Yes	Count	35	58	93
			% within 26.	52.2%	72.5%	63.3%
		No	Count	32	22	54
			% within 26.	47.8%	27.5%	36.7%
	Total		Count	67	80	147
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
North Central	12b. terrorists?	Yes	Count	52	77	129
			% within 26.	55.3%	81.1%	68.3%
		No	Count	42	18	60
			% within 26.	44.7%	18.9%	31.7%
	Total		Count	94	95	189
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South	12b.	Yes	Count	62	77	139
			% within 26.	44.9%	57.9%	51.3%
		No	Count	76	56	132
			% within 26.	55.1%	42.1%	48.7%

				138	133	271
	Total		Count	138	133	271
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West	12b.	Yes	Count	48	77	125
			% within 26.	57.1%	78.6%	68.7%
		No	Count	36	21	57
			% within 26.	42.9%	21.4%	31.3%
	Total		Count	84	98	182
			% within 26.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

CENSUS REGION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Northeast	Pearson Chi-Square	6.44[a]	1	.011
	N of Valid Cases	147		
North Central	Pearson Chi-Square	14.440	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	189		
South	Pearson Chi-Square	4.558	1	.033
	N of Valid Cases	271		
West	Pearson Chi-Square	9.656	1	.002
	N of Valid Cases	182		

Direct Questioning Results: Self-Reported Prejudice and Support for Torture

Overview of Direct Questioning Applied to Survey Responses

In this chapter I use a direct line of questioning to demonstrate the relationship between racism and support for torture. The decline of old-fashioned racism originally resulted in the widespread belief among scholars that racism had in fact decreased among the American public. Rather as Tarman and Sears (2005) found, controlling for old-fashioned or self-reported racism still produced substantial prejudice among respondents towards blacks. Their results demonstrate that although respondents are less likely to blatantly express racism, they still may hold racist beliefs in the style of old-fashioned racism. These individuals will express these beliefs non-racially because they realize overt expression of racism is socially undesirable. As the literature reviewed in Chapter Two demonstrates, asking respondent to express their own prejudices creates a cue to give a socially desirable answer, or to suppress their racism (Gaertener and Dovidio 1986; Nail, Decker, and Harton 2003). Respondents do not want to appear racist to the questioner because of the social pressure to appear tolerant (Tarman and Sears 2005). However, there are still certain groups that are known to consistently express racism, despite social cues against discrimination. Thus I predict that the cross-tabs with direct racism questions only produce significant results among demographic groups who are known to frequently express racist beliefs and allow these beliefs to affect political attitudes. These groups are the same as the controls described in Chapter Four – those living in the South or rural areas, with low levels of education, and identify their ideological beliefs as Conservative.

While direct questioning is the most obvious means of measuring racism, one must keep in mind the limitations of self-reported racism. One other important problem with direct

questioning is the fact that on most of today's surveys, questions that directly ask the respondent about their own racial prejudices are simply not asked often, if at all. Since the 1950s, one of the most common survey measures of racism has been opinion on interracial marriage between blacks and whites. However, the most recent mention of interracial marriage in the Roper Center Public Opinion Archives is a question asking whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: "The debate surrounding gay marriage now is similar to discrimination debates from the past like interracial marriage?"[6]. The archives show that the most recent mention of 'interracial marriage' to measure racism was in an ABC News/*Washington Post* survey taken in January of 1986. The measures for self-reported racism are particularly rare in the post 9/11 era, because measuring racism is seen as socially irrelevant in today's age. Yet, we know from the theories of racism discussed at length in Chapter Two that not only does racism still exist, it is also an important force in shaping political attitude. The questions analyzed in this chapter ask about racism in the most direct wording possible given the surveys available.

Given these limitations in questioning, in this chapter I expect that direct racism questions regarding either a respondent's general racism or racism towards Arabs or Middle Easterners may show some significance. However, when the controls are applied, I expect that these surveys will have considerably less significance than that seen in the cross-tabs for the indirect racism questions used to demonstrate racism in Chapter Five. Because the questions in Chapter Five were asking indirectly about racism, respondents were more willing to express racism in their answers. Nonetheless, there should still be significance among demographic groups that have been shown to express racism more frequently regardless of social cues against discrimination (Gaertener and Dovidio 1986). Recall from the Control section of Chapter Four

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[6] New Models National Brand Poll, Mar, 2004. Retrieved Mar-17-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

that the demographic groups more likely to express racism include respondents with less

education, those living in the South or rural areas, and those who identify their ideology as

Conservative. Therefore, one would expect that in response to these a direct question on racism

that these groups should have the greatest significance in the relationship between their

responses on racism and on torture. In the remainder of the chapter I analyze the results for three

surveys taken from March 2008 to April of 2009. Each of these surveys employs questions that

directly ask respondents their opinion of certain racial groups.

Support for Torture and Direct Racism Questions

Table 6.1 displays responses to the torture and direct racism questions for each survey

analyzed. Unlike the indirect questions, the distribution between the torture and direct racism

questions was quite different (See Appendix for full question wording).

(Insert Table 6.1[7])

The first survey analyzed is the same Public Agenda Foundation survey from March 2008

"Confidence in Foreign Policy", that was used in Chapter Five. Again, note that in Table 6.1

"yes" indicates opposition to torture, and "no" indicates support for torture. Table 6.1 shows that

while over a third of respondents support the use of torture, only eighteen percent of respondents

believe that the majority of Muslims support terrorism. This seems paradoxical considering the

much closer distribution seen in Table 5.1 for the indirect racism question, which asked whether

respondents though Islam was more likely to encourage violence among its believers. This study

best demonstrates the difference between indirect and direct racism questions on the levels of

racism expressed by respondents. By examining both types of questions in the same survey, it is

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[7] All Tables are available at the end of the chapter

possible to demonstrate the link between racism and support for torture is subverted when looking at the relationship between support for torture and directly expressed racism.

One would think that if almost half of respondents admitted that they believed Islam more likely to encourage violence, a large proportion would also believe that Muslims are more likely to be violent due to their beliefs. It follows that if respondents willingly generalize that Islam promotes violence among its believers then they also consider Muslims to be more violent that non-Muslims. Yet the response to Q.27 in Table 6.1 shows that this is not the case. This discrepancy is indicative of the problems faced by direct questioning. While one may generally be willing to indirectly express prejudice towards a specific racial outgroup, when asked to express the same opinion through direct questioning respondents have a heightened social awareness of how their prejudices will be perceived. Additionally, the theories of racism covered in Chapter Two all address the fact that most people will express racism through the use of non-racial terms in order to seem acceptable, but really hold the same old-fashioned racist beliefs. Thus, while respondents are unwilling to express racism in order to maintain an unbiased appearance to the questioner, groups who maintain old-fashioned racism will continue to express racist beliefs.

The second survey was conducted by ABC News/*Washington Post* from January 13 to 16, 2009 by means of landline telephones and cellular phones. The survey was entitled "Barack Obama/ Financial Crisis/ War on Terrorism/ Race Relations", and was given to a national adult sample of 1,069 respondents, with an oversample of African American respondents and cellular phone users. Looking at the straight percentage responses it appears that respondents are split both on their opinions of torture and their opinions of the treatment of blacks in their communities. These questions ask respondents directly about discrimination in their own

communities. One would expect the socially acceptable answer to be that blacks are equal in the community, because if not racism in the respondent's community would reflect badly upon him/her. The oversample of African American respondents, and the possible perception that they themselves are treated unfairly within their communities, could have biased the results in favor of the direct racism question. The use of a weight variable in the cross-tab has corrected for this potential bias, and the results should be of a nationally representative sample. Thus the relationship with support for torture should be strong in the chi-square test regardless of the oversample.

The third survey was entitled "April, 2009 – Barack Obama", and was conducted by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* between April 23 and 26 2009. The sample was a national adult sample contacted by landline telephones and cellular phones, with an oversample of cellular phone users. There was a slightly higher percentage of respondents who supported the use of torture as a valuable interrogation technique. This is also potentially the result of the fact that the survey did not did not use the word "torture". Q.39 was part of a larger question on the qualities of the Obamas' of qualities that had impressed the respondents. The "no" column has "not applicable" because the cross-tab counted those who did not select the promotion of racial diversity as an impressive element of the Obama family were counted as opposing it. That being said, there did not generally seem to be very much support for this particular aspect of their personal image.

Analysis of Individual Survey Cross-tabs

As with Chapter Five, a simple bivariate cross-tab of the torture question and direct racism question for each of the selected surveys was conducted in order to see if any relationship exists

between the two questions. The results of these cross-tabs are shown in Table 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.

<center>(Insert Tables 6.2-6.5)</center>

For the NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* the cross-tab results given in Table 6.5 show no statistical significance between the torture question and Q.39, asking if respondents were impressed by the Obamas' promotion of racial diversity and inclusiveness. Table 6.5 also seems to reflect the results of Table 6.1, which showed that while there was a pretty even divide among respondents in regards to their support for torture, there was little support for the Obamas' promotion of diversity and racial inclusiveness. The main issue facing this survey is the fact that Q.39 did not provide a chance for respondents to directly oppose racial diversity in their response. Rather, the cross-tab is broken down in terms non-racist responses as the respondents who favored the Obamas' promotion of diversity and racial inclusiveness, and racist responses as respondents who gave all other answers.

Looking at the difference between respondents who did and did not exposed racism in table 6.5, one can see that the proportion of respondents was overwhelmingly opposed to torture regardless of the respondent's answer to Q.39. The lack of any significant relationship demonstrates quite clearly that racism is not the obvious factor driving the overall support for torture in the case of the NBC News survey. This goes beyond the predictions of my earlier hypotheses in that there is no relationship between support for torture and expressing direct racism. I believe that the main reason this cross-tab showed no significance was the wording of the direct racism question. The fact that respondents were not asked about their opinion of the Obama's promotion of racial diversity independent of the other options to Q.39 meant that it is impossible to know whether respondents actually opposed this choice by not selecting it.

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Moreover, a not selecting racial inclusiveness in response to Q. 39 does not necessarily mean that the respondent answered with the intent of expressing feelings of racism. This limited the responses available for analysis within the cross-tab. Furthermore, not selecting the promotion of racial inclusiveness as an impressive element of the Obamas' personal image is not in and of itself an expression of racism. This survey failed to accurately ask respondents directly about their beliefs on racial outgroups, and thus failed to produce any significant results.

On the other hand, for the Public Agenda and ABC News surveys, the p-values for all bivarate cross-tabs were 0.000. As seen in Table 6.1, these questions address the issue of racism far more directly. These results were consistent with the prediction that there should be some significance for the surveys analyzed in this chapter. However, it is important to note that only the Public Agenda cross-tab showed any sort of leaning towards support for torture. Table 6.2 displays that a slightly more respondents favor torture having answered in the affirmative to the direct racism question. Table 6.3 and 6.4 show a major proportion of the respondent's in the ABC News survey oppose the use of torture in the ABC News survey. These results indicate that there will likely be a slightly stronger significance for the Public Agenda survey once the controls have been applied to all cross-tabs. Of the three surveys, this is the best measure of direct racism because Q.27 asks respondents point blank if they think most Muslims are terrorists and labels them as a violent racial outgroup. Yet, it is also important to note that only a small minority of about eighteen percent of respondents in the Public Agenda survey actually answered in the affirmative to the direct racism question. Among the respondents who answered in the affirmative to the indirect racism question however, there was a distinct leaning towards support for torture. The results of the bivariate cross-tabs for the Public Agenda and ABC News surveys with controls are shown below.

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For each individual cross-tab, the table presented gives the breakdown of responses to the torture question according to how the respondent answered the direct racism question. Each column is broken down by demographic groups determined by the control variable. For each survey the first column of the table gives the responses for those who demonstrated racism according to their answer, and the second column gives the responses of those who did not express racism in their answer.

Public Agenda Forum March 2008

Table 6.6 through Table 6.8 shows the results from the cross-tab between Q.12b – whether terrorism can be fought without torture, and Q.27 – if the majority of Muslims support terrorism. An affirmative response indicates a prejudice towards Muslims, and would be a direct expression of the standing decision that all Muslims or Arabs are associated with the threat of terrorism. However, as Table 6.1 shows, there is a huge disparity between the answers to these questions. This difference reflects the unwillingness of respondents to voice their racism openly, which was reflected in the results of the cross-tab.

<center>(Insert Table 6.6-6.8)</center>

The results of this survey are consistent with established expectations. Significance, while high in the initial bivariate cross-tab between the torture and direct racism question, falls off substantially when the controls were applied. The overwhelming majority of respondents seem to oppose both the direct racism question and torture. This mirrors the results of Table 6.2, which showed only a slight leaning towards those who favored torture and expressed racism over those who opposed torture. As predicted, the direct racism question produced far less of a relationship between the torture and directly expressed racism. Among some of the control variables that

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remained significant, the proportion of respondents who supported torture was greater among those who opposed torture for all those who expressed racism in their answer.

Respondents living in the South, and with less than a high school education, had the highest chi-square values and significance among control variables. Comparing support for torture among respondents who expressed racism and those that did not, one can see that it is with these variables where the greatest discrepancies in response distribution occur. Both those living in the South who expressed racism overwhelmingly supported torture as opposed to those who did not express racism. The results support the expectation described earlier in the chapter: groups who continue to have old-fashioned racist beliefs will be more likely to express them. Therefore the relationship between racism and torture should be, and is, strongest among these groups, as seen in the new tables with applied controls for the Public Agenda study. The only curious finding was that Conservatives did not show a significant relationship between support for torture and racism, whereas there was a significant relationship for Liberals and Moderates. It is possible that the results are due to the fact that though Liberals and Moderates are do not frequently express racism towards blacks, this may not be the case for Arabs and Middle Easterners. Perhaps something about the threat of this racial outgroup increases punitivenss among these groups.

ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

Results from Table 6.1 show that respondents generally oppose torture, and consider blacks in their community as treated equally. Yet, Table 6.3 showed high significance for the relationship between support for torture and directly expressed racism. Table 6.9 through Table 6.11 give the results for the cross-tab between Q.35 and Q.39 with the applied controls. Table 6.12 through Table 6.14 give the results for cross-tabs done between Q.35 and Q.41c with the

applied controls. The results of both all the cross-tabs reflect the results of Table 6.1, rather than Table 6.3, as there is little significance across most of the control variables. After the controls were applied one can see that there is a weak relationship between support for torture and directly expressed racism.

<p align="center">(Insert Table 6.9 through 6.14)</p>

The results of the cross-tab between Q.35 and Q.39 were far less significance across all control categories, while the results of the cross-tab between Q.35 and Q.41c produced mixed significance. On the whole, the results clearly point to a weak connection between support for torture and directly expressed racism. There is a slight leaning in favor of torture for some of the groups that showed significance. The results for the South and Midwest were much stronger in their cross-tab, and thus it seems much more significant in terms of their importance to the relationship between racism and torture. Similarly, while Liberals showed a weak significance in the first cross-tab for this survey, Conservatives showed substantially more significance in the second cross-tab than wither of the other ideologies in the control variable.

The potential for significance in the cross-tab between the torture question and the direct racism questions are troubled by the fact that if a respondent answered 'blacks experience racial discrimination' (Q.39) or 'blacks do not receive equal treatment as white from the police' (Q.41c), it does not necessarily mean that they answered this way based on feelings of racism. One could have answered in the affirmative to either question because they have seen or experience racial discrimination in their own communities. However, the degree to which these questions demonstrate the potential of new and averse racism is quite high.

The surprising finding counter to my predictions is that those with higher education had the strongest relationship between racism and support for torture. Although this appears to counter

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the idea that those who most frequently express racism should do so when asked about their beliefs directly, it is possible that the results of the education variable in the tables for both the cross-tabs with the applied controls are a product of the a problem mentioned earlier. It is possible that those who expressed racism in their responses did so not out of racism. Instead, as mentioned in Chapter Two, it is possible that the racist responses are driven by blacks who perceive injustice associated with the social structural locations (Johnson 2008). This may explain why even those who identify as Liberal, and have a higher education, still do not think blacks are treated equally, or experience discrimination, within their communities.

This is supported by the fact that across all education variables for both surveys the distribution in support for torture remains quite similar between those who expressed racism and those who did not. Moreover, there is a higher percentage among significant groups in the education variable that favored support for torture. The results seem to imply that it is not expressed racism that is driving significance, but some other factor. The one exception is the difference in cross-tab with Q.39 among respondents with some high school education, which is again consistent with the prediction that those with a lower education will be more likely to let race affect their political attitudes. While this is only speculation, it does seem to explain the difference in results between this survey and the Public Agenda results.

Discussion: Direct Questioning and the Relationship between Racism and Support for Torture

Overall the use of direct questioning to measure racism among survey respondents proved more difficult than expected. The first and best example of the affect of racism on support for torture was from the Public Agenda Foundation survey. Compared to the results of the cross-tab for the indirect racism question asking if the respondent thinks Islam promotes violence, and the

torture question, the cross-tabs in this chapter showed much less significance. Both Tables 6.2

and 6.7 showed a slight leaning in favor of torture when respondents answered in the affirmative

to the direct racism question. Though this was only among a small overall percentage of

respondents, there is still some evidence that considering Arabs and Middle Easterners terrorists

is linked directly with support for torture. Again, it is necessary to consider the possibility that

question ordering influenced these results. It is possible that in fact one's support for torture

leads them to express the belief that the majority of Muslims support terrorism.

    The lack of significance was due mostly to the wording of the questions in the surveys

themselves. Both the ABC News and NBC News studies suffered from the problem that the

direct racism questions in each study did not necessarily reflect racism against a racial outgroup.

This is likely what resulted in no significance in the cross-tab for the NBC News survey.

Additionally, the fact that the Public Agenda study asked directly about the respondent's feelings

towards Muslims rather than blacks, as in the ABC News survey, likely had a strong effect on

the projected significance of the relationship between racism and support for torture. By making

both race and threat of terrorism salient in the minds of respondents, the question was activating

an implicit association not seen in the other studies between race and threat to the ingroup. The

question simultaneously cues the respondent that to answer "yes" to the direct racism would be

equivalent to a blatant generalization about an ethno-religious group. The Despite the inevitable

drawbacks of using surveys not specifically designed to ask respondents to self-report racism, the

results of this method were mostly consistent with both the literature and my central hypothesis.

    However, as predicted this pattern of support only held for the groups known to express

racism regardless of social cues. The use of the controls on the cross-tabs direct questioning

helped to highlight groups that are known to express racism more frequently despite social cues

against prejudice. This was clearly reflected in the results of the Public Agenda and ABC News surveys. These results show that there seems to be a strong relationship between racism and support for torture among respondents from the South, rural areas, with less education, and who identify as Conservative. As stated in the beginning of the chapter, these results further support the theories of racism discussed in Chapter Two. These theories predict the aforementioned groups will express racism regardless of social cues against discrimination and intolerance as a result of continued, but subverted, feelings of old fashioned racism expressed. The consistency of the results across categories seems to show that with the exception of these groups, some factor other than race appears to be driving support for torture. This is the complete opposite of the results for the indirect questions in Chapter Five, for which we see almost all significant groups had a higher percentage of respondents who supported torture and the indirect racism question.

More importantly, one must ask why these results were so different from results in Chapter Five using the method of indirect questioning to measure racism. In fact, the results of direct questioning support the use of the indirect method. Where the direct method produced few connections, the indirect method produced far more and across all categories of all the control variables. This occurred despite the differences in questions and the time in which the surveys were issued. Consistent with the racism theory reviewed in Chapter Two, these results indicates that when asked directly about their racism, respondents will not self-report racism, and thus the relationship between racism and torture appears insignificant.

When race is made salient and social cues against racism are absent through the use of indirect questioning, the significance of relationship between racism and support for torture becomes quite apparent. In essence, when given the opportunity to express racism, it seems as though even tolerant groups will indirectly show discrimination towards Arabs and Middle

Easterners. Additionally, as the Public Agenda survey shows, people will not only express these

beliefs when asked indirectly, but are conscious to suppress these same feelings of racism when

confronted directly about their opinions of threatening racial outgroups. Looking at the results of

Chapter Five, it is apparent that feelings of racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners exists in

the minds of respondents, and that these feelings are strongly related to their expressed support

for torture. However, comparing these results to those in Chapter Six, it appears that only when

respondents are asked about racist beliefs indirectly, in a context without cues against

discrimination, will they actually express their discrimination. The results of all cross-tabs

demonstrate that there is something particular to American's opinion of Arabs and Middle

Easterners that makes them more supportive of torture. While this is not definitive proof that

racism is the cause for support for torture, it is evidence that the relationship between the two

warrants further investigation.

Table 6.1 Responses from Direct Surveys

Public Agenda Foundation March 2008	Yes (%)	No (%)
Torture Question:		
Q.12b Do you think that we can fight terrorism without using torture?	56	36
Direct Racism Question:		
Q.27 Do you think the majority of Muslims support terrorism?	18	73
ABC News/Washington Post January 2009		
Torture Question:		
Q.35 Do you think there are cases in which the US should consider torturing terrorism suspects?	40	58
Direct Racism Questions:		
Q.39 Do blacks in your community experience racial discrimination?	40	51
Q.41c Do blacks in your community receive equal treatment as whites from police?	54	40
NBC News/Wall Street Journal April 2009		
Torture Question:		
Q.36b Has the use of harsh interrogation techniques helped to extract valuable information?	46	42
Direct Racism Question:		
Q.39 Has the Obamas' promotion of racial diversity and inclusiveness impressed you?	13	n/a

Table 6.2 Cross-tab Results for Q.12b and Q.27 in Public Agenda Forum March 2008

		Q.27 Do you think the majority of Muslims support terrorism?			N	Chi-square	P
		Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Total (%)			
Q.12b Do you think that we can fight terrorism without using torture?	Yes	9.55	9.08	18.63	85.4	13.688	0.000
	No	28.87	52.50	81.27			
Total		39.42	61.58	100	859		

Table 6.3 Cross-tab Results for Q.35 and Q.39 in ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

		Q.35 Do you think there are cases in which the US should consider torturing terrorism suspects?			N	Chi-square	P
		Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Total (%)			
Q.39 Do blacks in your community experience racial discrimination?	Yes	12.40	26.73	39.13	96.3	28.442	0.000
	No	23.27	25.39				
Total		35.67	52.11	87.78	1040		

Table 6.4 Cross-tab Results for Q.35 and Q.41c in ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

		Q.35 Do you think there are cases in which the US should consider torturing terrorism suspects?			N	Chi-square	P
		Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Total (%)			
Q.41c Do blacks in your community receive equal treatment as whites from police?	Yes	27.06	30.02	57.08	87.6	21.980	0.000
	No	13.85	29.07	42.92			
Total		40.91	59.09	100	946		

Table 6.5 Cross-tab Results for Q.12b and Q.27 in Public Agenda Forum March 2008

		Q.36b Has the use of harsh interrogation techniques helped to extract valuable information?			N	Chi-square	P
		Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Total (%)			
Q.39 Has the Obamas' promotion of racial diversity and inclusiveness impressed you?	Yes	5.54	7.03	12.57	93.4	3.944	.139
	No	43.82	37.53	81.35			
Total		49.36	44.56	93.92	939		

Table 6.6 Crosstab Results for Q.12b and Q.27 Controlling for Education, Public Agenda Forum May 2008

D7. What is the highest level of school you completed?				27. What is your impression - Do you think the majority of Muslims support terrorism or do you think a small minority of Muslims support terrorism?		Total
				The majority of Muslims support terrorism	A small minority of Muslims support terrorism	
Less than high school	12b. Do you think that... We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected terrorists?	Yes	Count	16	71	87
			% within 27.	45.7%	83.5%	72.5%
		No	Count	19	14	33
			% within 27.	54.3%	16.5%	27.5%
	Total		Count	35	85	120
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
High school graduate	12b.	Yes	Count	28	129	157
			% within 27.	49.1%	61.7%	59.0%
		No	Count	29	80	109
			% within 27.	50.9%	38.3%	41.0%
	Total		Count	57	209	266
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college or trade school, no degree	12b.	Yes	Count	11	79	90
			% within 27.	50.0%	57.2%	56.3%
		No	Count	11	59	70
			% within 27.	50.0%	42.8%	43.8%
	Total		Count	22	138	160
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Associates or 2-year degree	12b.	Yes	Count	2	37	39
			% within 27.	20.0%	54.4%	50.0%
		No	Count	8	31	39
			% within 27.	80.0%	45.6%	50.0%
	Total		Count	10	68	78
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Bachelor's or 4-year degree	12b.	Yes	Count	14	66	80
			% within 27.	63.6%	60.6%	61.1%

					The majority of Muslims support terrorism	A small minority of Muslims support terrorism	Total
	No		Count		8	43	51
			% within 27.		36.4%	39.4%	38.9%
	Total		Count		22	109	131
			% within 27.		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduate degree	12b.	Yes	Count		7	67	74
			% within 27.		53.8%	77.9%	74.7%
		No	Count		6	19	25
			% within 27.		46.2%	22.1%	25.3%
	Total		Count		13	86	99
			% within 27.		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Don't know	12b.	No	Count		1		1
			% within 27.		100.0%		100.0%
	Total		Count		1		1
			% within 27.		100.0%		100.0%

Chi Square Test

D7. What is the highest level of school you completed?		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Less than high school	Pearson Chi-Square	17.781	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	120		
High school graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	2.940	1	.086
	N of Valid Cases	266		
Some college or trade school, no degree	Pearson Chi-Square	.405	1	.525
	N of Valid Cases	160		
Associates or 2-year degree	Pearson Chi-Square	4.129	1	.042
	N of Valid Cases	78		
Bachelor's or 4-year degree	Pearson Chi-Square	.073	1	.787
	N of Valid Cases	131		
Graduate degree	Pearson Chi-Square	3.464	1	.063
	N of Valid Cases	99		

Table 6.7 Crosstab Results for Q.12b and Q.27 Controlling for Ideology, Public Agenda Forum May 2008

				27. What is your impression - Do you think the majority of Muslims support terrorism or do you think a small minority of Muslims support terrorism?		
D1a. In politics today, do you consider yourself a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?				The majority of Muslims support terrorism	A small minority of Muslims support terrorism	Total
Liberal	12b. Do you think that... We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected terrorists?	Yes	Count	18	124	142
			% within 27.	45.0%	72.9%	67.6%
		No	Count	22	46	68
			% within 27.	55.0%	27.1%	32.4%
	Total		Count	40	170	210

				The majority of Muslims support terrorism	A small minority of Muslims support terrorism	Total
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	12b.	Yes	Count	28	157	185
			% within 27.	51.9%	64.1%	61.9%
		No	Count	26	88	114
			% within 27.	48.1%	35.9%	38.1%
	Total		Count	54	245	299
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	12b.	Yes	Count	27	121	148
			% within 27.	47.4%	57.3%	55.2%
		No	Count	30	90	120
			% within 27.	52.6%	42.7%	44.8%
	Total		Count	57	211	268
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Don't know	12b.	Yes	Count	4	33	37
			% within 27.	66.7%	66.0%	66.1%
		No	Count	2	17	19
			% within 27.	33.3%	34.0%	33.9%
	Total		Count	6	50	56
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

D1a. In politics today, do you consider yourself a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	11.546	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	210		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	2.805	1	.094
	N of Valid Cases	299		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	1.807	1	.179
	N of Valid Cases	268		

Table 6.8 Crosstab Results for Q.12b and Q.27 Controlling for Census Region, Public Agenda Forum May 2008

Crosstab

				27. What is your impression - Do you think the majority of Muslims support terrorism or do you think a small minority of Muslims support terrorism?		
				The majority of Muslims support terrorism	A small minority of Muslims support terrorism	Total
CENSUS REGION						
Northeast	12b. Do you think that... We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected	Yes	Count	19	79	98
			% within 27.	63.3%	60.8%	61.3%
		No	Count	11	51	62

			% within 27.	36.7%	39.2%	38.8%
	Total		Count	30	130	160
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
North Central	12b.	Yes	Count	21	114	135
			% within 27.	60.0%	70.8%	68.9%
		No	Count	14	47	61
			% within 27.	40.0%	29.2%	31.1%
	Total		Count	35	161	196
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South	12b.	Yes	Count	21	145	166
			% within 27.	30.9%	59.4%	53.2%
		No	Count	47	99	146
			% within 27.	69.1%	40.6%	46.8%
	Total		Count	68	244	312
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West	12b.	Yes	Count	16	113	129
			% within 27.	59.3%	68.9%	67.5%
		No	Count	11	51	62
			% within 27.	40.7%	31.1%	32.5%
	Total		Count	27	164	191
			% within 27.	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

CENSUS REGION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Northeast	Pearson Chi-Square	.068	1	.795
	N of Valid Cases	160		
North Central	Pearson Chi-Square	1.567	1	.211
	N of Valid Cases	196		
South	Pearson Chi-Square	17.403	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	312		
West	Pearson Chi-Square	.983	1	.321
	N of Valid Cases	191		

Table 6.9 Crosstab Results for Q.35 and Q.39 Controlling for Education, ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

				Q.39 Do you think blacks who live in your community experience racial discrimination, or not?						
Q909. EDUCATION				Yes, OFTEN	Yes, occasionally	Yes, rarely	No, does not happen	(VOL) No blacks in community	DK/No opinion	Total
8th grade or less	Q.35 Obama has said that under his administration the United	Support not using torture	Count	6	0	2	2	2		12
			% within Q.39	100.0%	.0%	40.0%	33.3%	100.0%		57.1%
		There are cases	Count	0	2	3	4	0		9

			% within Q.39	.0%	100.0%	60.0%	66.7%	.0%		42.9%
	Total		Count	6	2	5	6	2		21
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
Some high school	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	11	20	5	39	5		80
			% within Q.39	68.8%	71.4%	100.0%	58.2%	62.5%		64.5%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	5	8	0	28	3		44
			% within Q.39	31.3%	28.6%	.0%	41.8%	37.5%		35.5%
	Total		Count	16	28	5	67	8		124
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
Graduated high school	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	33	47	13	93	7	2	195
			% within Q.39	73.3%	73.4%	59.1%	55.7%	70.0%	50.0%	62.5%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	12	17	9	74	3	2	117
			% within Q.39	26.7%	26.6%	40.9%	44.3%	30.0%	50.0%	37.5%
	Total		Count	45	64	22	167	10	4	312
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	22	33	10	56	2	4	127
			% within Q.39	59.5%	54.1%	50.0%	45.5%	25.0%	80.0%	50.0%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	15	28	10	67	6	1	127
			% within Q.39	40.5%	45.9%	50.0%	54.5%	75.0%	20.0%	50.0%
	Total		Count	37	61	20	123	8	5	254
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated College	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	25	32	6	44	2	1	110
			% within Q.39	78.1%	72.7%	35.3%	50.6%	66.7%	50.0%	59.5%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	7	12	11	43	1	1	75
			% within Q.39	21.9%	27.3%	64.7%	49.4%	33.3%	50.0%	40.5%
	Total		Count	32	44	17	87	3	2	185
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	14	27	5	27	2	3	78
			% within Q.39	87.5%	58.7%	71.4%	51.9%	100.0%	60.0%	60.9%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	2	19	2	25	0	2	50
			% within Q.39	12.5%	41.3%	28.6%	48.1%	.0%	40.0%	39.1%
	Total		Count	16	46	7	52	2	5	128

| | % within Q.39 | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Chi-Square Test

Q909. EDUCATION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
8th grade or less	Pearson Chi-Square	10.656	4	.031
	N of Valid Cases	21		
Some high school	Pearson Chi-Square	4.638	4	.326
	N of Valid Cases	124		
Graduated high school	Pearson Chi-Square	9.442	5	.093
	N of Valid Cases	312		
Some college	Pearson Chi-Square	6.518	5	.259
	N of Valid Cases	254		
Graduated College	Pearson Chi-Square	14.945	5	.011
	N of Valid Cases	185		
Post-graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	8.222	5	.144
	N of Valid Cases	128		

Table 6.10 Crosstab Results for Q.35 and Q.39 Controlling for Ideology, ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

				Q.39 Do you think blacks who live in your community experience racial discrimination, or not?						
Q908A. IDEOLOGY				Yes, OFTEN	Yes, occasionally	Yes, rarely	No, does not happen	(VOL) No blacks in community	DK/No opinion	Total
Liberal	Q.35 Obama has said that under his administration the United States will not use torture as part of the U.S. campaign against terrorism, no matter what the circumstance. Do you support this position not to use torture, or do you think there are cases in w	Support not using torture	Count	40	53	15	66	5	3	182
			% within Q.39	83.3%	79.1%	88.2%	66.0%	50.0%	50.0%	73.4%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	8	14	2	34	5	3	66
			% within Q.39	16.7%	20.9%	11.8%	34.0%	50.0%	50.0%	26.6%
	Total		Count	48	67	17	100	10	6	248
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q.35	Support not	Count	48	74	15	108	5	5	255

				Yes, OFTEN	Yes, occasionally	Yes, rarely	No, does not happen	No blacks in community	DK/No opinion	Total
			% within Q.39	67.6%	66.1%	50.0%	51.2%	50.0%	71.4%	57.8%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	23	38	15	103	5	2	186
			% within Q.39	32.4%	33.9%	50.0%	48.8%	50.0%	28.6%	42.2%
	Total		Count	71	112	30	211	10	7	441
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	21	30	10	84	8	1	154
			% within Q.39	67.7%	46.9%	34.5%	46.4%	66.7%	50.0%	48.3%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	10	34	19	97	4	1	165
			% within Q.39	32.3%	53.1%	65.5%	53.6%	33.3%	50.0%	51.7%
	Total		Count	31	64	29	181	12	2	319
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	1			0	1		2
			% within Q.39	100.0%			.0%	100.0%		40.0%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	0			3	0		3
			% within Q.39	.0%			100.0%	.0%		60.0%
	Total		Count	1			3	1		5
			% within Q.39	100.0%			100.0%	100.0%		100.0%

Chi-Square Test

Q908A. IDEOLOGY		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	12.747	5	.026
	N of Valid Cases	248		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	11.258	5	.046
	N of Valid Cases	441		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	8.845	5	.115
	N of Valid Cases	319		
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Pearson Chi-Square	5.000	2	.082
	N of Valid Cases	5		

Table 6.11 Crosstab Results for Q.35 and Q.39 Controlling for Census Region, ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

				Q.39 Do you think blacks who live in your community experience racial discrimination, or not?						
CENSUS DIVISION				Yes, OFTEN	Yes, occasionally	Yes, rarely	No, does not happen	(VOL) No blacks in community	DK/No opinion	Total
New	Q.35 Obama	Support not	Count	4	6	3	16			29

			% within Q.39	50.0%	85.7%	100.0%	48.5%			56.9%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	4	1	0	17			22
			% within Q.39	50.0%	14.3%	.0%	51.5%			43.1%
	Total		Count	8	7	3	33			51
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
Middle Atlantic	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	12	17	6	34	3	4	76
			% within Q.39	80.0%	63.0%	54.5%	50.0%	60.0%	66.7%	57.6%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	3	10	5	34	2	2	56
			% within Q.39	20.0%	37.0%	45.5%	50.0%	40.0%	33.3%	42.4%
	Total		Count	15	27	11	68	5	6	132
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
East North Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	18	36	4	34	2	2	96
			% within Q.39	64.3%	67.9%	57.1%	47.2%	28.6%	50.0%	56.1%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	10	17	3	38	5	2	75
			% within Q.39	35.7%	32.1%	42.9%	52.8%	71.4%	50.0%	43.9%
	Total		Count	28	53	7	72	7	4	171
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West North Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	7	11	2	16	2	1	39
			% within Q.39	100.0%	73.3%	33.3%	57.1%	66.7%	50.0%	63.9%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	0	4	4	12	1	1	22
			% within Q.39	.0%	26.7%	66.7%	42.9%	33.3%	50.0%	36.1%
	Total		Count	7	15	6	28	3	2	61
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South Atlantic	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	24	22	10	54		1	111
			% within Q.39	75.0%	57.9%	52.6%	50.5%		100.0%	56.3%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	8	16	9	53		0	86
			% within Q.39	25.0%	42.1%	47.4%	49.5%		.0%	43.7%
	Total		Count	32	38	19	107		1	197
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
East South Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	6	7	2	15	0	0	30
			% within Q.39	66.7%	53.8%	25.0%	51.7%	.0%	.0%	48.4%
		There are cases	Count	3	6	6	14	2	1	32

			% within Q.39	33.3%	46.2%	75.0%	48.3%	100.0%	100.0%	51.6%
	Total		Count	9	13	8	29	2	1	62
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West South Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	16	12	4	29	6	1	68
			% within Q.39	76.2%	50.0%	66.7%	46.8%	85.7%	100.0%	56.2%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	5	12	2	33	1	0	53
			% within Q.39	23.8%	50.0%	33.3%	53.2%	14.3%	.0%	43.8%
	Total		Count	21	24	6	62	7	1	121
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mountain	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	9	18	4	21	3	1	56
			% within Q.39	100.0%	75.0%	66.7%	65.6%	60.0%	100.0%	72.7%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	0	6	2	11	2	0	21
			% within Q.39	.0%	25.0%	33.3%	34.4%	40.0%	.0%	27.3%
	Total		Count	9	24	6	32	5	1	77
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Pacific	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	21	33	5	46	3	1	109
			% within Q.39	72.4%	67.3%	45.5%	60.5%	75.0%	50.0%	63.7%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	8	16	6	30	1	1	62
			% within Q.39	27.6%	32.7%	54.5%	39.5%	25.0%	50.0%	36.3%
	Total		Count	29	49	11	76	4	2	171
			% within Q.39	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test

CENSUS DIVISION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
New England	Pearson Chi-Square	5.749	3	.124
	N of Valid Cases	51		
Middle Atlantic	Pearson Chi-Square	5.263	5	.385
	N of Valid Cases	132		
East North Central	Pearson Chi-Square	8.294	5	.141
	N of Valid Cases	171		
West North Central	Pearson Chi-Square	7.698	5	.174
	N of Valid Cases	61		
South Atlantic	Pearson Chi-Square	6.949	4	.139
	N of Valid Cases	197		
East South Central	Pearson Chi-Square	6.053	5	.301

	N of Valid Cases		62		
West South Central	Pearson Chi-Square		9.545	5	.089
	N of Valid Cases		121		
Mountain	Pearson Chi-Square		5.146	5	.398
	N of Valid Cases		77		
Pacific	Pearson Chi-Square		3.534	5	.618
	N of Valid Cases		171		

Table 6.12 Crosstab Results for Q.35 and Q.41c Controlling for Education, ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

Q909. EDUCATION				Q.41c Do you think that blacks who live in your community DO or DO NOT receive equal treatment as whites from the police?		
				Yes, they do	No, they do not	Total
8th grade or less	Q.35 Obama has said that under his administration the United States will not use torture as part of the U.S. campaign against terrorism, no matter what the circumstance. Do you support this position not to use torture, or do you think there are cases in w	Support not using torture	Count	4	4	8
			% within Q.41c	44.4%	66.7%	53.3%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	5	2	7
			% within Q.41c	55.6%	33.3%	46.7%
	Total		Count	9	6	15
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some high school	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	39	34	73
			% within Q.41c	61.9%	66.7%	64.0%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	24	17	41
			% within Q.41c	38.1%	33.3%	36.0%
	Total		Count	63	51	114
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated high school	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	104	73	177
			% within Q.41c	62.7%	62.4%	62.5%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	62	44	106
			% within Q.41c	37.3%	37.6%	37.5%
	Total		Count	166	117	283
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Some college	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	60	58	118
			% within Q.41c	42.6%	61.1%	50.0%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	81	37	118
			% within Q.41c	57.4%	38.9%	50.0%
	Total		Count	141	95	236

				100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

				Yes, they do	No, they do not	Total
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Graduated College	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	42	60	102
			% within Q.41c	47.2%	75.0%	60.4%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	47	20	67
			% within Q.41c	52.8%	25.0%	39.6%
	Total		Count	89	80	169
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Post-graduate	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	33	40	73
			% within Q.41c	48.5%	80.0%	61.9%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	35	10	45
			% within Q.41c	51.5%	20.0%	38.1%
	Total		Count	68	50	118
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q909. EDUCATION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
8th grade or less	Pearson Chi-Square	.714	1	.398
	N of Valid Cases	15		
Some high school	Pearson Chi-Square	.278	1	.598
	N of Valid Cases	114		
Graduated high school	Pearson Chi-Square	.002	1	.965
	N of Valid Cases	283		
Some college	Pearson Chi-Square	7.770	1	.005
	N of Valid Cases	236		
Graduated College	Pearson Chi-Square	13.616	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	169		
Post-graduate	Pearson Chi-Square	12.096	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	118		

Table 6.13 Crosstab Results for Q.35 and Q.41c Controlling for Ideology, ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

				Q.41c Do you think that blacks who live in your community DO or DO NOT receive equal treatment as whites from the police?		
Q908A. IDEOLOGY				Yes, they do	No, they do not	Total
Liberal	Q.35 Obama has said that under his administration the United States will not	Support not using torture	Count	68	99	167
			% within Q.41c	66.7%	81.1%	74.6%
		There are cases to	Count	34	23	57

				Yes, they do	No, they do not	Total
			% within Q.41c	33.3%	18.9%	25.4%
	Total		Count	102	122	224
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Moderate	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	134	101	235
			% within Q.41c	54.0%	63.1%	57.6%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	114	59	173
			% within Q.41c	46.0%	36.9%	42.4%
	Total		Count	248	160	408
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Conservative	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	73	65	138
			% within Q.41c	41.2%	59.1%	48.1%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	104	45	149
			% within Q.41c	58.8%	40.9%	51.9%
	Total		Count	177	110	287
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(VOL) Don't think in those terms	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count		1	1
			% within Q.41c		50.0%	50.0%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count		1	1
			% within Q.41c		50.0%	50.0%
	Total		Count		2	2
			% within Q.41c		100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

Q908A. IDEOLOGY		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Liberal	Pearson Chi-Square	6.141	1	.013
	N of Valid Cases	224		
Moderate	Pearson Chi-Square	3.292	1	.070
	N of Valid Cases	408		
Conservative	Pearson Chi-Square	8.657	1	.003
	N of Valid Cases	287		
	N of Valid Cases	2		

Table 6.14 Crosstab Results for Q.35 and Q.41c Controlling for Census Region, ABC News/*Washington Post* January 2009

				Q.41c Do you think that blacks who live in your community DO or DO NOT receive equal treatment as whites from the police?		
CENSUS DIVISION				Yes, they do	No, they do not	Total
New England	Q.35 Obama has said that under his administration the United States will not	Support not using torture	Count	18	9	27
			% within Q.41c	56.3%	56.3%	56.3%
		There are cases to	Count	14	7	21

			% within Q.41c	43.8%	43.8%	43.8%
	Total		Count	32	16	48
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Middle Atlantic	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	35	34	69
			% within Q.41c	53.0%	64.2%	58.0%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	31	19	50
			% within Q.41c	47.0%	35.8%	42.0%
	Total		Count	66	53	119
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
East North Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	47	45	92
			% within Q.41c	51.1%	71.4%	59.4%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	45	18	63
			% within Q.41c	48.9%	28.6%	40.6%
	Total		Count	92	63	155
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West North Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	18	17	35
			% within Q.41c	54.5%	81.0%	64.8%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	15	4	19
			% within Q.41c	45.5%	19.0%	35.2%
	Total		Count	33	21	54
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South Atlantic	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	49	57	106
			% within Q.41c	48.0%	64.0%	55.5%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	53	32	85
			% within Q.41c	52.0%	36.0%	44.5%
	Total		Count	102	89	191
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
East South Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	12	15	27
			% within Q.41c	42.9%	71.4%	55.1%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	16	6	22
			% within Q.41c	57.1%	28.6%	44.9%
	Total		Count	28	21	49
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West South Central	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	25	28	53
			% within Q.41c	41.7%	65.1%	51.5%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	35	15	50
			% within Q.41c	58.3%	34.9%	48.5%
	Total		Count	60	43	103
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mountain	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	27	22	49
			% within Q.41c	65.9%	88.0%	74.2%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	14	3	17
			% within Q.41c	34.1%	12.0%	25.8%
	Total		Count	41	25	66

				100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Pacific	Q.35	Support not using torture	Count	54	47	101
			% within Q.41c	62.1%	63.5%	62.7%
		There are cases to consider torture	Count	33	27	60
			% within Q.41c	37.9%	36.5%	37.3%
	Total		Count	87	74	161
			% within Q.41c	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square Test

CENSUS DIVISION		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
New England	Pearson Chi-Square	.000	1	1.000
	N of Valid Cases	48		
Middle Atlantic	Pearson Chi-Square	1.492	1	.222
	N of Valid Cases	119		
East North Central	Pearson Chi-Square	6.414	1	.011
	N of Valid Cases	155		
West North Central	Pearson Chi-Square	3.924	1	.048
	N of Valid Cases	54		
South Atlantic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.930	1	.026
	N of Valid Cases	191		
East South Central	Pearson Chi-Square	3.960	1	.047
	N of Valid Cases	49		
West South Central	Pearson Chi-Square	5.514	1	.019
	N of Valid Cases	103		
Mountain	Pearson Chi-Square	3.983	1	.046
	N of Valid Cases	66		
Pacific	Pearson Chi-Square	.036	1	.850
	N of Valid Cases	161		

Chapter Seven

Overview of the Findings

The purpose of this thesis has been to show that feelings of racism towards Arabs and Middle

Easterners cause Americans to support the use of torture against terrorism suspects. As the

results of this study demonstrate, the degree to which this relationship can be observed and

measured is strongly affected by the evolution of intergroup relations and how individuals are

asked to express their opinion of potentially threatening racial outgroups.

Comparing the Japanese experience in WWII to discrimination against Arabs and Middle

Easterners following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 provides a historical context to the torture

question. While the Japanese did not face a standing history of discrimination within the U.S.

prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Arabs and Middle Easterners have long been associated with

a religious fanaticism that drives them to terrorism. Both groups produced a perceived security

threat in the wake of the respective attacks on the U.S., but only Japanese and Japanese

Americans faced internment. Both a greater acceptance of blatant racism and the imminent

international security threat posed by the Japanese were the roots of this obvious civil liberties

violation. However, this does not mean that Arabs and Middle Easterners did not face

discrimination following the attacks of 9/11. In addition to facing more blatant racism from the

public, the government enacted security efforts aimed to indirectly target Arabs and Middle

Easterners through racial profiling under the guise of homeland security. Thus, racism faced by Arabs in the U.S. post-9/11 was a more subtle form of racism, which still aimed to subvert the potential threat of Arabs to the American population.

For Americans the perceived threat of terrorism itself was not shown to be correlated with support for torture. This pattern in public behavior emerged despite a significant relationship between negatively stereotyping Arabs/Muslims as more likely than other groups to be violent towards non-believers and support for torture. The results of Chapter Four are somewhat inconsistent with those of Davis and Silver (2004) and Huddy et al. (2005), which attributed increased threat to one's sense of security to the decreased support for the protection of civil liberties. The lack of a correlation between perceived threat of terrorism and support for torture clearly shows that torture is not supported as merely a means to ensure national security in times of crisis. Rather, since support for torture seems to be relatively unvarying,it is not the threat of terrorism itself that drives support for torture. Rather, Americans are influenced by other factors that explain this political phenomenon.

The American public remains almost equally divided on the issue of torturing for information, as well as in their opinion of Arabs - particularly their opinion of Islam. Given this relatively similar split in support for torture and the expression of racism against Arabs, the fact that the results showed a high correlation between the two was not surprising. What was surprising was how the relationship between the independent and dependent variables differed based on how racism questions were posed to respondents. In the absence of social cues against discrimination, indirect questions regarding one's racist beliefs were much more strongly connected with support for torture than were responses to direct questions regarding racism. The strong relationship between support for racism and the indirect expression of racism existed

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across almost all regional, education, and ideological demographics. On the other hand, when individuals were asked directly about racism, the relationship dramatically drops off. The only groups to show any significance were those demographics expected by the literature to demonstrate any correlation in their opinion of torture and their opinion of racial outgroups. The stark distinction between the indirect and direct questioning serves to further support the idea put forth in the theories of racism reviewed in Chapter Two. Racism is just as pervasive among Americans as it was in the mid-twentieth century, and continues to exist and shape behavior even though it is expressed in more subtle forms.

Future Implications for the Relationship between Racism and Support for Torture

The findings of this thesis raise important questions about the motivations behind public support for particularly punitive government antiterrorism and national security policies. In recent years the torture debate has gained attention for both its value as an interrogation technique and as a violation of human and civil rights. Though it appears that both the military and Federal government did not want to expose the use of these methods to the American public in the early years of the war on terror, following the media frenzy surrounding the prisoner abuses and harsh interrogation at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay made this impossible. Arabs were clearly associated with being the victims of torture and abuse at the hands of the U.S. military and intelligence officers. Additionally, the constant use of terror alerts and the association between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism by the Bush Administration made the separation between Arabs, the Middle East, and terrorism even more difficult in the minds of the American public (Abrell 2008). These factors, combined with the standing decision that terrorists are identified as being of Arab or Middle Eastern origin, is likely the explanation as to why the

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relationship between an individual's negative opinion of Islam and their support for torture was so strong.

The results of the cross-tabs conducted, particularly in Chapter Five, suggest that the connection between one's negative beliefs towards a racial outgroup is significantly related to their support for the use of punitive measures against this group in order to establish physical and psychological dominance. For the indirect questions, the high significance across all control categories serves to demonstrate that racist beliefs towards Arabs is implicit, that is individual's make negative associations automatically and subconsciously. What is more important is that unlike the findings of Banaji et al. (2000), the findings of the indirect questioning portion of this thesis supports the fact that the implicit negative associations ascribed to Arabs and Middle Easterners – specifically Muslims – affect behavior and the formation of political attitudes.

Governments facing the challenge of implementing harsh and targeted security policies against targeted groups do not need the support of the public at large in order to successfully implement its policies. However, public support is certainly necessary for both the questions of accountability and legality. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that support for indirectly targeted national security policies is quite strong among sections of the population who hold racist beliefs towards Arabs and Middle Easterners. Post-9/11 surveys show that almost half the population holds an unfavorable opinion of Islam and its followers. Thus the most important implication of this thesis's findings is that so long as this close association exists, it appears as though tolerance for Arabs and Middle Easterners suspected of terrorism both within the U.S. and abroad will be low. In essence, the results point to the fact that as long as a significant number of Americans continue to hold racist beliefs regarding Arabs, either subtle or overt, the

public will continue to support the use of punitive and discriminatory policies under the guise of national security.

Contributions to Existing Scholarship

This thesis provides important insight into both the fields of study related to racism and the formation of punitive attitudes, in addition to the future of public support for antiterrorism efforts at home and abroad. Modern sensibilities no longer allow the outward expression of racism (Kinder & Sears 1971), a system of implicit association with negative stereotypes has evolved to compensate for long-standing racism towards Arabs. These implicit beliefs have been shown to greatly the formation of political attitudes (Devine 1989; Dovidio et al. 1997; Kawakami et al. 1998; Noseck et al 2000). Moreover, racism motivates Americans to favor punitive measures in response to the threat posed by certain racial outgroups (Bobo 1988; Frederico & Sidanius 2002; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar & Levin 2004). Though past theories of racism in the U.S. have focused mostly on the black-white discourse, the post-9/11 era has changed both the expression and target of American racism. Globalization has brought Americans into contact with a whole new set of potentially threatening outgroups.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror identified Arabs and Middle Easterners with American fears through their clearly association with not only the potential threat of terrorism within the U.S., but also with the threat of terrorism abroad. One can see that patterns of racism that have evolved to include Arabs and Middle Easterners, and that similar non-racial means to express racism have formed as well. Support for torture is the product of a new type of security threat that, for most of the American public, is posed exclusively by Arabs and Middle Easterners who constitute the ranks of Islamic fundamentalist terror groups. What is

special about American racism towards Arabs and Middle Easterners is their perceived participation in global terrorism, and the military involvement in the Middle East.

Moreover, the violent nature of the terrorism seems to have evoked more violent reactions to its potential perpetrators. Similar to the evidence that white support for the death penalty is based on the expectation that those receiving the punishment will be mostly black prisoners, the results of this thesis give further evidence that punitive attitudes are at least partially a product of racism. That there is a definite and strong relationship between expressed racism and favoring punitive policies for suspected terrorists demonstrates the strong potential that not only does race affect the formation of punitive attitudes, but also larger support for security measures directed against specific racial outgroups.

The effects of racism in the case of Arabs and Middle Eastern terrorism suspect goes beyond the phenomena of prejudice, bias, and subversion by the dominant racial ingroup within America. The continued use of these policies has also had substantial repercussions for America's role as the moral standard for liberal democracies. The responsibilities of both governments and citizens to protect rights is fundamentally challenged by the continued use and support of torture, no matter who it is used against. The role of racism in public support for torture has even greater implications for the perception of the U.S. The use of torture certainly hurts American credibility abroad as the defender of rights and democracy, but is even more damaging to our relationship with Moderate Muslims and those living in the Middle East. Additionally, racism also has the potential for the future implementation more overt racially targeted national security policies.

Extending the Study

That the conclusions of this thesis are drawn specifically from American public opinion about a mostly foreign racial outgroup makes it somewhat difficult to generalize these findings about racism and punitive attitudes outside the U.S. Differing histories of inter-group conflict make predictions regarding the effects of racism difficult to predict. Moreover, given that the cross-tabs only revealed strength of the relationship between racism and support for torture exists – and if the relationship existed at all – I do not know if some of the relationships between the two are positive or negative. This is particularly important for the direct questioning cross-tabs, which could have benefited from the use of regressions in order to reveal if some of the unexpected results were actually a negative relationship. Though the indirect results were strong enough to show a positive relationship between support for torture and negative feelings towards Islam.

Further testing of the central hypothesis has the potential to fully explicate the results. Questionnaires not designed specifically to test both racism and punitive make the results difficult to confirm. The established racism measures discussed in the literature are required to determine whether racism is the causal variable in determining support for torture. Despite limitations to the methods of this thesis, the results demonstrate the strong potential that the central hypothesis of this thesis is at least in part correct. While racism may not be the only factor driving support for torture, it is certainly an important influence on the formation of punitive attitudes. There are undoubtedly numerous factors influencing American support for torture, and controlling for these variables in order to isolate racism has proved to be particularly difficult.

This thesis has revealed significant new evidence in favor of not only the relationship between racism and punitive attitudes, but specifically how racism towards Arabs and Middle

Easterners affects public support for torture against terrorist suspects. There is clear evidence that the relationship between a negative opinion of Islam and their support for torture is significantly and strongly correlated. This stands in stark contrast with the modern expectation that racism no longer exists, or plays a strong role in punitiveness. Though the use of torture creates a substantial moral dilemma for the U.S., the continued opposition to torture among large sections of the American public counters the potentially damaging effects of racism on political attitudes. The continued resistance of Americans to violate the civil liberties of racial outgroups in spite of the potential threat that they pose will continue to shift the balance of public opinion in favor of tolerance. In this sense, the desire among almost all Americans to promote the protection of rights remains alive and well, and those in favor of protecting civil liberties will continue to do so regardless of race, color, or creed.

Appendix

Questions for Chapter Three by Date

Gallup Poll # 1944-0329: World War II/Presidential Election/Country of Birth [USAIPO1944-0329] (September 22-27, 1944)
Gallup Poll, Sep, 1944. Retrieved Apr-29-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.2A. If it means an earlier end to the war in the Pacific, would you approve or disapprove of the allies using poison gas against Japanese cities?

  666 1. Approve
2135 2. Disapprove
 166 3. No Opinion
  21 0. No Code or No Data

Q.2B. If it would shorten the war in Europe, would you approve or disapprove of using poison gas against German cities?

 463 1. Approve
2342 2. Disapprove
 160 3. No Opinion
  23 0. No Code or No Data

Questions for Table 3.2

Gallup Poll # 1944-0337: World War II/Social Security/Italy and Greece's New Governments/Presidential Election [USAIPO1944-0337] (December 14-20, 1944)
Gallup Poll, Dec, 1944. Retrieved Apr-29-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q2. The Japs say they will execute any American bomber pilots forced to land in Japan. If the Japs do this, should we use poison gas against Japanese cities?

1. Yes
2. No
3. No Opinion

Gallup Poll # 1945-0347: Starvation in War Effected Countries/Taxes/Peace Terms [USAIPO1945-0347] (March 17-23, 1945)
Gallup Poll (AIPO), Mar, 1945. Retrieved Apr-29-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html
Q.9 (Form K) If it would shorten the war in the Pacific, would you approve or disapprove of using poison gas against the Japanese?

1. Approve
2. Disapprove
3. No Opinion

Q.9 (Form T) Do you think the American armed forces should use poison gas against Japanese soldiers?

1. Yes
2. No
3. No Opinion

Gallup Poll # 1945-0343: Aftermath of War/Employment [USAIPO1945-0343] (March 22-28, 1945)
Gallup Poll (AIPO), Mar, 1945. Retrieved Apr-29-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.2 (Form K) If it would shorten the war in the Pacific, would you approve of disapprove of using poison gas against Japanese soldiers?

1. Approve
2. Disapprove
3. No Opinion

Q.2a (Form T) Do you think the American Armed Forces should use poison gas against the Japanese?

1. Yes
2. No
3. No Opinion

Gallup Poll # 349 [USAIPO1945-0349] (June 14-20, 1945)
Gallup Poll (AIPO), Jun, 1945. Retrieved Apr-29-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.3a (Form K) Would you favor or oppose using poison gas against the Japanese if doing so would resduce the number of American soldiers who are killed and wounded?

1. Favor
2. Oppose
3. No Opinion

Q.3a (Form T) If the heads of our Army said that lives of many of our soldiers would be spared by using poison gas against the Japanese, would you favor or oppose using poison gas?

1. Favor
2. Oppose
3. No Opinion

Pew Research Center Poll: Foreign Policy and Party Images [USPEW2004-07FP] (July 8-18, 2004)
Pew Research Center for the People , Jul, 2004. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.77F2 Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{new}*

 1 Often justified
 2 Sometimes justified
 3 Rarely justified
 4 Never justified
 9 Don't know/Refused

Pew Research Center Poll: Typology Callback [USPEW2005-TYPOCB] (March 17-27, 2005)
Pew Research Center for the People , Mar, 2005. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.14 Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{7-04}*

 1 Often justified
 2 Sometimes justified
 3 Rarely justified
 4 Never justified
 9 Don't know/Refused

Pew Research Center/The Council on Foreign Relations Poll: America's Place in the World IV [USPEW2005-APW] (October 12-24, 2005)
Pew Research Center for the People , Oct, 2005. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.36F2 Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{late 3-05; E}*

1 Often justified
2 Sometimes justified
3 Rarely justified
4 Never justified
9 Don't know/Refused

Pew Research Center Poll: Early October 2006 Turnout Survey [USPEW2006-TURNOUT] (September 21-October 4, 2006)
Pew Research Center for the People , Sep, 2006. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.51   Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{10-05 APW}*

1 Often justified
2 Sometimes justified
3 Rarely justified
4 Never justified
9 Don't know/Refused

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Update Survey[USPSRA.032207.R28] (December 12-January 9, 2007)
Pew Research Center for the People , Dec, 2006. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

(Full data set unavailable)
Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?

Pew Research Center Poll # 2007-11PRIM: November 2007 Caucus and Primary Scene-setter Survey [USPEW2007-11PRIM] (November 7-26, 2007)
Pew Research Center for the People , Nov, 2007. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.45   Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{1-07}*
{QID:x050327-14 NATIONAL TREND ONLY}

1 Often justified
2 Sometimes justified

3   Rarely justified
4   Never justified
9   Don't know/Refused

Pew Research Center Poll # 2008-02POL: February 2008 Political Survey--2008 Presidential Election [USPEW2008-02POL] (February 20-24, 2008)
Pew Research Center for the People , Feb, 2008. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.73F1Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{11-07}*
{QID:x050327-14 or QID:x050327-14 NATIONAL TREND ONLY}

1   Often justified
2   Sometimes justified
3   Rarely justified
4   Never justified
9   Don't know/Refused **(VOL.)**

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Political & Economic Survey (February 4-8, 2009) [USPSRA.09FEB04.R48F1]
Pew Research Center for the People , Feb, 2009. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

(Full data set unavailable)
Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?

Pew Research Center: April 2009 Values Survey [USPEW2009-VALUES] (March 31-April 6, 2009 and April 14-21, 2009) [USSRBI.120309P.R70F2]
Pew Research Center for the People , Mar, 2009. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.B25F1 Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{2-09, Values 07}* {QID:x050327-14}

1   Often justified
2   Sometimes justified
3   Rarely justified
4   Never justified
9   Don't know/Refused **(VOL.)**

Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Council on Foreign Relations merica's Place in the World Survey (October 28- November 8, 2009)
Pew Research Center for the People , Oct, 2009. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

(Full data set unavailable)
Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?

Questions for Chapter Five and Chapter Six by Date

ABC News Poll # 2003-931: 9/11 Anniversary [USABC2003-931] (September 4-7, 2003)
ABC News Poll, Sep, 2003. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

7. Would you say you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of Islam?

   1   Favorable
   2   Unfavorable
   8   DK/No opinion

SAME HALF SAMPLE AS Q8
10. Do you think mainstream Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, or is it a peaceful religion?

   1   Encourages violence
   2   Peaceful religion
   8   DK/No opinion

61. Please tell me if you support or oppose the federal government doing each of the following. The first is (READ ITEM).

How about (NEXT ITEM)? **(IF NEEDED: Do you support or oppose the federal government (ITEM)?**

HALF SAMPLE
a. Holding suspected terrorists without trial at the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
b. Allowing FBI agents to monitor public places like libraries, places of worship and Internet chat rooms as part of a general investigation of terrorism, even if it's not related to a specific crime
c. Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them

HALF SAMPLE
d. Holding U.S. citizens who are accused of terrorism for special military trials, rather than turning them over to the non-military court system
e. Allowing terrorism investigators to tap into telephone calls and e-mail messages with just a search warrant, rather than a court order
f. Arranging to have foreign security officials in other countries physically torture people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them

    1   Support
    2   Oppose
    8   DK/No opinion

Pew Research Center Poll: Foreign Policy and Party Images [USPEW2004-07FP] (July 8-18, 2004)
Pew Research Center for the People , Jul, 2004. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Q.77F2   Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? *{new}*

    1   Often justified
    2   Sometimes justified
    3   Rarely justified
    4   Never justified
    9   Don't know/Refused

Public Agenda Foundation Poll: Confidence in Foreign Policy Index--Volume 6 [USPAF2008-CFPI6] (March 18-April 1, 2008)
Public Agenda Confidence in US Foreign Policy Index Poll, Mar, 2008. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

(SAME Question as Spring 07 ASK EACH RESPONDENT A RANDOMIZED LIST OF 5 OUT OF 10 ITEMS)
(INSERT "think" FOR ITEMS a, b, AND d; INSERT "believe" FOR ITEM c)
    12.   Do you (think/believe) that (INSERT)?

    1   Yes
    2   No
    8   (DO NOT READ) Don't know
    9   (DO NOT READ) Refused

a. Improved communication and dialogue with the Muslim world will reduce hatred of the U.S.
b. We can fight terrorism without sometimes using torture against suspected terrorists
c. When more countries become democratic there will be less conflict and violence in the world
d. If there is less poverty in the world there will be less terrorism

Q.82F2   Which statement comes closer to your own views even if neither is exactly right.
        [READ, IN ORDER] *{7-03; 3-02}*

1   The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage violence among its believers
2   The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than others
3   Neither **(VOL.)**
9   Don't know **(VOL.)**

(SAME – ITEM f2 IS NEW)
ROTATE Q26 & Q27
(ROTATE 1&2)
26.   Which statement comes closer to your own views even if neither is exactly right?
      (READ LIST. ENTER ONE ONLY)

1   The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage violence among its believers
2   The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than others
8   (DO NOT READ) Don't know
9   (DO NOT READ) Refused

27.   What is your impression – Do you think the majority of Muslims support terrorism or do you think a small minority of Muslims support terrorism?
      (READ LIST. ENTER ONE ONLY)

1   The majority of Muslims support terrorism
2   A small minority of Muslims support terrorism
8   (DO NOT READ) Don't know
9   (DO NOT READ) Refused

ABC News/Washington Post Poll: January Monthly--Barack Obama/Financial Crisis/War on Terrorism/Race Relations [USABCWASH2009-1085] (January 13-16, 2009)
ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Jan, 2009. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html
35. Obama has said that under his administration the United States will not use torture as part of the U.S. campaign against terrorism, no matter what the circumstance. Do you support this position not to use torture, or do you think there are cases in which the United States should consider torture against terrorism suspects?

1 Support not using torture
2 There are cases to consider torture
8 DK/No opinion
9 NA/Refused

39. Do you think blacks who live in your community experience racial discrimination, or not?

IF YES: Do you think it happens often, occasionally, or rarely?

1 Yes, OFTEN
2 Yes, occasionally
3 Yes, rarely
4 No, does not happen
5 (VOL) No blacks in community
8 DK/No opinion
9 NA/Refused

DO NOT ASK IF NO BLACKS IN COMMUNITY (Q39=5)
41. Do you think that blacks who live in your community DO or DO NOT [ITEM]?

How about [NEXT ITEM]? **IF NEEDED:** Do you think that blacks who live in your community DO or DO NOT [NEXT ITEM]?

SCRAMBLE ITEMS
a. have as good a chance as whites to get housing they can afford?
b. have as good a chance as whites to get a job for which they're qualified?
c. receive equal treatment as whites from the police?
d. receive equal treatment as whites when they visit local businesses, such as stores, restaurants or banks?

1 Yes, they do
2 No, they do not
8 DK/No opinion
9 NA/Refused

NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll: April, 2009--Barack Obama [USNBCWSJ2009-6094] (April 23-26, 2009)
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Apr, 2009. Retrieved Apr-30-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

q36b (104) Q.36b. Which statement better represents your view?
   Measurement Level: Ordinal
   Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
   Print Format: F4
   Write Format: F4

Missing Values: -100

Value   Label

1   Statement A/Helped by extracting valuable information
2   Statement B/Hurt by undermining moral authority
3   Both (VOL)
4   Not sure

q39_1 (113)
q39_264:The kind of parents Barack and Michelle Obama have been to their children:Q.39. Let me read you a number of pers
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

Value   Label

0   No
1   Yes

q39_2 (114)
q39_264:The kind of first lady Michelle Obama has been, reaching out to both the young and the elderly:Q.39. Let me read
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

Value   Label

0   No
1   Yes

q39_3 (115)
q39_264:Their new dog, Bo:Q.39. Let me read you a number of personal elements that Americans have learned about Barack O
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

Value   Label

0   No
        1   Yes
q39_4 (116)
      q39_264:The way Michelle Obama's mother has moved to the White House to
      help the children:Q.39. Let me read you a number
    Measurement Level: Ordinal
    Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
    Print Format: F4
    Write Format: F4
    Missing Values: -100

        Value   Label

        0   No
        1   Yes

q39_5 (117)
      q39_264:The willingness of the Obamas to volunteer and help promote
      civic service:Q.39. Let me read you a number of pers
    Measurement Level: Ordinal
    Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
    Print Format: F4
    Write Format: F4
    Missing Values: -100

        Value   Label

        0   No
        1   Yes

q39_6 (118)
      q39_264:Their promotion of racial diversity and inclusiveness:Q.39. Let
      me read you a number of personal elements that A
    Measurement Level: Ordinal
    Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
    Print Format: F4
    Write Format: F4
    Missing Values: -100

        Value   Label

        0   No
        1   Yes

q39_7 (119)

q39_264:Too much emphasis on style and personality:Q.39. Let me read you
a number of personal elements that Americans ha
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

       Value   Label

         0   No
         1   Yes

q39_8 (120)
    q39_264:All (VOL):Q.39. Let me read you a number of personal elements
    that Americans have learned about Barack Obama and
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

       Value   Label

         0   No
         1   Yes

q39_9 (121)
    q39_264:None (VOL):Q.39. Let me read you a number of personal elements
    that Americans have learned about Barack Obama an
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right
Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

       Value   Label

         0   No
         1   Yes

q39_10 (122)
    q39_264:Not sure:Q.39. Let me read you a number of personal elements
    that Americans have learned about Barack Obama and
Measurement Level: Ordinal
Column Width: 8 Alignment: Right

Print Format: F4
Write Format: F4
Missing Values: -100

        Value   Label

            0   No
            1   Yes

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