FINE-TUNING THE MARINE CORPS' COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

Submitted by Jaime M. Ruvalcaba

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- ACE   Aviation Combat Element
- ACM   Air Contingency MAGTF
- ARG   Amphibious Ready Group
- BSSG   Brigade Service Support Group
- CAG   Civil Affairs Group
- CE   Command Element
- CMO   Civil Military Operations
- CSSE   Combat Service Support Element
- DOD   Department of Defense
- ESG   Expeditionary Strike Group
- EW   Electronic Warfare
- FSSG   Force Service Support Group
- GCE   Ground Combat Element
- IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency
- IED   Improvised Explosive Device
- JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JTF   Joint Task Force
- LGP   Local Governance Project
- MAGTF   Marine Air-Ground Task Force
- MAG   Marine Aircraft Group
- MARDIV   Marine Division
- MAW   Marine Aircraft Wing
- MCWP   Marine Corps Warfighting Publications
- MEB   Marine Expeditionary Brigade
- MEF   Marine Expeditionary Force
- MEU   Marine Expeditionary Unit
- MEU (SOC)   Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
- MPF   Maritime Pre-Position Force
- MPSRON   Maritime Pre-positioning Ships Squadron
- NCW   Network Centric Warfare
- OPSEC   Operations Security
- PDD   Presidential Decision Directive
- PME   Professional Military Education
- POG   Psychological Operations Group
- RTI   Research Triangle Institute
- SIO   Special Information Operations
- SOF   Special Operations Forces
- SOC   Special Operations Capable
- SOCEX   Special Operations Capable Evaluation Exercise
- SOCOM   U.S. Special Operations Command
- SPMAGTF   Special Purpose MAGTF
- TPD   Tactical Psychological Operations Detachment

Introduction-

The insurgency currently plaguing Iraq proves that this form of small wars continues to be ever present in the world's landscape. Moreover, based on historical precedence, there is a high probability that the United States will continue to involve itself in small wars, and specifically, in insurgencies throughout the world. Between 1800 and 1934, U.S. Marines staged 180 landings abroad.[1] Therefore, it is no surprise that in the early twentieth century, the United States Marine Corps came to be known as the State Department's troops for its continued role in small wars successfully dealing with numerous counterinsurgencies throughout the world. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States used its military power or paramilitary power on the average of once every 18 months.[2] More recently, in the 1990s, the Marines have been involved in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo (on average, every 24 months). Thus, if history serves as a future indication of U.S. involvement in world conflicts, specifically in small wars or counterinsurgencies, there is a high probability that the Marine Corps will be utilized in the future to attain the military and political objectives of the nation. The Marine Corps has proven throughout its history that it is the preferred U.S. military service to engage in small wars as well as an extremely capable military force in major theater wars because of its combat readiness and expeditionary capabilities.

Recently, major discussions in the Department of Defense regarding the transformation of the military services have focused on technology, specifically as it

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[1] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (New York: Basic Books, 2003), xiv.
[2] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, *U.S. Intervention: Low Intensity Thinking*, May 1990 (accessed 28 March, 2004); Available from http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1990/may90/may90barnett.html

relates to the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Numerous civilian defense experts and analysts have also been discussing the transformation of the military services and have been exploring ways of integrating the military instrument with the other instruments of national power.   However, an important issue that needs to be addressed is the type or scale of conflict that this transformation is seeking to address. While many discussions are focused on the technological transformation issues supporting major theater wars in all the services, the focus of this paper will be on fine-tuning the Marine Corp's role in counterinsurgency warfare, because as history has demonstrated, it is more probable that the Marine Corps will more often face these smaller conflicts as compared to a major theater war.

Section 1 will focus on analyzing the Marine Corps' role in crisis response, specifically as it relates to the crisis model developed by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing. It will entail an analysis the Marine Corps' readiness, expeditionary culture, integrated combined arms organizational structure, capabilities and joint/multinational adaptability. Lastly, it will demonstrate that the Marine Corps, through its highly adaptable and scaleable Marine Air Ground Task Force structure, has a major role to play in all phases of crises whether they be large or small.

After gaining an understanding of the capabilities of the Marine Corps and how it can support the various phases of crises, the discussion in section 2 will then be directed at analyzing the insurgency in Iraq using the detailed framework for analysis developed by Dr, Bard O'Neill. The analysis will examine the international system, domestic

context, goals, purpose, means utilized, and strategies to determine the type and nature of the Iraqi insurgency as well as determine the problems they pose to various actors. Thereafter, the analysis will be directed at the tactics and strategy the Marine Corps has developed to counter the Iraqi insurgency, primarily focusing on the Marine Corps' emphasis on Information Operations (IO) and Civil Affairs (CA). It will attempt to demonstrate that the Marine Corps is proceeding in an appropriate direction to address this insurgency.

After understanding the Marine Corps' counterinsurgency focus on IO and CA, a detailed analysis of these capabilities will be discussed in section 3 to demonstrate that these Marine Corps capabilities need to be enhanced in order to better address the current Iraqi insurgency as well as better prepare itself for similar and probable threats in the future. This section will also present cogent arguments for undertaking some transformations in the Marine Corps' Civil Affairs structure, the Psychological Operations (PsyOps) aspect of Information Operations, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. Lastly, section 4 will briefly present other alternatives in improving the Marine Corps' counterinsurgency capabilities by tying into the economic and humanitarian instruments of national power.

In 1990, Dr. Bard O'Neill stated, "insurgencies will likely continue to be prominent because there are no signs that the problems of national cohesion and economic development that give rise to these conflicts will be solved."[3] Therefore, and as historical examples have demonstrated, crises dealing with insurgency warfare will

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[3] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 10.

continue to exist and the United States Marine Corps will more than likely play a role in these existing and future threats as well as other small and large scale crises. It is with this understanding that this paper now tackles the goal of analyzing the Marine Corps' role in crisis phases and the insurgency in Iraq, and will demonstrate that the Marine Corps can improve its counterinsurgency capabilities by fine-tuning its structure and missions supporting Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

1 - USMC AND CRISIS RESPONSE

In the Marine Corps' recent publication M*arine Corps Concepts and Programs 2004,* Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael W. Hagee, states "Time and again, the Marine Corps has demonstrated the speed, flexibility, and adaptability that America demands from her Armed Forces during this dangerous and uncertain time."[4] Given the world's ever-changing threats, the Marine Corps' highest ranking officer continues to transform "America's 911" force to meet the challenges of most international crises. But just how adaptive is the Marine Corps in facing the wide spectrum of crises that can confront the US? What role(s) can it play in the pre-crisis, escalation, de-escalation, and post-crisis phases? How responsive is the Marine Corps? And lastly, has it adapted itself well to effectively counter the insurgency threat in Iraq?

In order to answer the questions posited, an analysis of the capabilities of the Marine Corps will be conducted to determine the various phases in which these capabilities support the crisis model defined by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing. However, prior to this examination, it is important to reach a common understanding of the definition of a crisis. Although there is no internationally accepted definition of a crisis, Snyder and Diesing define an international crisis as a "a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war." [5]

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[4] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "*Marine Concepts and Programs, 2004*", Quantico, Virginia, January 2004, ii.
[5] Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 6.

Furthermore, Richard Lebow, adds to this definition by defining a crisis as one which has the following seven characteristics and three operational criteria:

Crisis Characteristics-

- A perception of a threat to valued interests
- Heightened anxiety on the part of decision-makers
- Expectation of possible violence
- Belief that a far reaching or important decision is required
- Decision to be made is based on incomplete information and stressful situation
- Crisis is an acute rather than a chronic phenomenon
- Decision-making is different in regularly formulated foreign policy

Crisis Operational Criteria-

- Policy-makers perceive that the action or threatened action of another international actor seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country's bargaining reputation, or their own ability to remain in power.
- Policy-makers perceive that any action (capitulation aside) on their part to counter this threat will raise a significant prospect of war.
- Policy-makers perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints. [6]

With an understanding of a commonly understood definition of a crisis, the focus will now turn to examining the Marine Corps' readiness, expeditionary culture, integrated combined arms organizational structure, capabilities, and joint/multinational adaptability. The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate that the Marine Corps is a competent instrument in carrying out numerous military missions applicable to the Pre-Crisis, Crisis, and Post-Crisis phases of the Snyder-Diesing Crisis Model.

The chart in Figure 1.1 is a modified Snyder-Diesing crisis model used by Dr. Pfaltzgraff in his course *Crisis Management and Complex Emergencies* at Fletcher

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[6] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1981), 7-12.

School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. It depicts the prevention, deterrence,

diplomacy and preemption elements of the pre-crisis phase as well as the escalation, de-

escalation, and post-crisis phases. After examining the capabilities and structure of the

Marine Corps, this model will be utilized in the latter part of this section to depict how

the Marine Corps' capabilities can be used to support respective phases in a crisis.

Figure 1.1
Snyder – Diesing Crisis Model Adapted for *Crisis Management & Complex Emergencies*

Definition of a Crisis

1. Threat to highly valued interests or values
2. Turning point between Peace and War
3. Engages key decision makers who are party to crisis
4. Situation when time is finite
5. Characterized by Surprise
6. International politics in microcosm
7. Creation of <u>fait accompli</u> to which the other side responds.

CRISIS

WAR

Pre-Crisis

Post-Crisis

←——————— *TIME LINE IS FINITE* ———————→

Prevention
 Identifying **Sources** of Conflict
 Identifying **Causes** of Conflict

Deterrence
 Provide strategy/ capabilities to deter conflict
 Develop alliances & other international
 consensus

Diplomacy
 Link diplomacy and military capabilities

Preemption
 Preemptive prepositioning of forces
 Taking military action to remove threat before it
 removes you

Preception of need to respond
1. When one side threatens mil action against
 another
2. Direct military act

Escalation
 Deployment of force
 Threat of force
 Use of force
 Sanctioning
 Signaling intent
 Statements of Intent
 Formation of coalitions
 Diplomacy

DeEscalation
 3rd parties as mediators
 International organizations
 Threats of renewed escalation
 Diplomacy

 Peace Keeping
 Peace Enforcement
 Forward Posture
 Nation Building
 Economic Development
 Elections
 Democratic Political Systems
 Reassurance
 Use of nongovernment organizations
 Greater role for international
 organizations

A brief overview of the capabilities and structure of the Marine Corps now

follow.

__Readiness__

Every Marine and Marine unit is ready to task organize rapidly and deploy from the United States or while forward deployed to respond to and contain crises, or if necessary, to engage immediately in sustained operations.[7] Individual and unit flexibility is a trademark of every Marine and Marine unit. Early indoctrination instills in the Marine ethos that in addition to embodying the Corps' values of honor courage and commitment, Marines must always be ready to "adapt, improvise, and overcome" when faced with the numerous challenges encountered in a crisis situation, and to do so at a moment's notice. This high level of readiness and rapid ability to deploy quickly was evidenced by the rapid buildup of forces in the Central Command theater of operations in early 2003. The Marine Corps was able to deploy one half of its operating forces to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom within an eight-week period, demonstrating its strategic ability, tactical flexibility, and expeditionary posture.[8]

__Expeditionary Culture__

Marines are organized, structured and trained to deploy into diverse, austere, and chaotic environments on short notice to accomplish assigned missions using organic command and control, and logistics capabilities to operate independently of existing infrastructure. These unique capabilities provide Marine units the means to lead, enable joint, allied, or coalition operations and interagency coordination.[9]

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[7] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Concepts and Programs, 2004", Quantico, Virginia, January 2004, 4.
[8] Ibid., 108.
[9] Ibid., 5.

Forcible Entry from the Sea

Marine Corps units when combined with Navy units to form an Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) consisting of amphibious ready groups, submarines, and surface action groups with their inherent air defense, provide the nation with a primary capability to project and sustain power ashore in the face of armed opposition. Expeditionary Strike Groups reinforced, if required, by maritime prepositioning forces allow the United States global access to protect its interests and / or provide allied or coalition forces with a potent force.[10]

Joint/Multinational Adaptability

Whether first on scene, or part of or leading a joint or multinational task force, Marines instinctively understand the advantages of joint and combined operations. Their vast experience operating as combined-arms, multi-dimensional forces enhances their ability to readily integrate into, and operate as part of, a joint or multinational force. Units such as the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) provide commanders a liaison capability and foreign area expertise to plan, coordinate, employ, and conduct terminal control of fires in support of joint, allied, and coalition forces. This support can range from terminal-control firepower control teams up to division fire-support coordination centers. Moreover, the two largest Marine Air Ground Task Force units are capable of performing as a joint task force headquarters when augmented with appropriate command element personnel.[11]

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[10] Ibid., 54.
[11] Ibid., 243.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' principal organization for conducting missions across the spectrum of military operations. MAGTFs provide combatant commanders or joint task force commanders with *scalable*, versatile expeditionary forces able to respond to a broad range of crisis and conflict situations. Figure 1.2 is a visual depiction of some the scaleable capabilities that MAGTFs can provide national leaders. A single commander leads and coordinates this combined-arms team, from peacetime training through deployment.[12]

MAGTF Composition = Integrated Combined Arms Packages

MAGTFs are tasked-organized and specifically tailored by mission and for rapid deployment by air and/or sea. They range in scale depending on their mission and include four types: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)], and the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force.[13] However, no matter what their mission, scale, or mode of deployment, MAGTFs are balanced, combined arms force packages containing organic command, ground, aviation, and sustainment elements and are comprised of four elements. A description of these four elements follows:

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[12] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Concepts and Programs, 2002", Quantico, Virginia, January 2002, 17.
[13] Ibid., 18-20.

Command Element (CE). The CE contains the MAGTF headquarters and other units that provide intelligence, communications, and administrative support. As with all other elements of the MAGTF, CEs are scalable and task-organized to provide the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and joint interoperability necessary for effective planning and execution of operations.

Ground Combat Element (GCE).

The GCE is task organized to conduct ground operations to support the MAGTF mission. This element includes infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, armor, light armor, assault amphibian, engineer, and other forces as needed. The GCE can vary in size and composition. It can consist of a light, air-transportable battalion; a relatively heavy and mechanized unit that includes one or more Marine, Army, or allied divisions; or other type of Marine Corps ground combat unit that meets the demands of a particular mission.

Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The ACE conducts offensive and defensive air operations and is task organized to perform those functions of Marine aviation required to support the MAGTF mission. This element is formed around an aviation headquarters with appropriate air control agencies, combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The ACE can vary in size and composition from an aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings (MAWs).

Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The CSSE is task organized to provide the full range of combat service support functions and capabilities necessary to support the

continued readiness and sustainability of the MAGTF as a whole. It is formed around a combat service support headquarters and may vary in size and composition from a support detachment to one or more force service support groups (FSSGs). In summary, the CSSE, when combined with the ACE, GCE, and CE form potent combined arms forces defined as the MAGTF. The attention now turns to the size, or scalability, of the MAGTFs and capabilities of these units, proceeding from large to small.

Figure 1.2
Example of Scaleable Capabilities of MAGTFs

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

The MEF, which is commanded by a lieutenant general, is the principal Marine Corps warfighting organization, particularly during larger crises or contingencies. It can range in size from less than one to multiple divisions and aircraft wings, together with one or more FSSGs. It is equipped with 60 days of supplies and capable of both amphibious operations and sustained operations ashore in any geographic environment.

[14] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Concepts and Issues 98", Quantico, Virginia, January 1998, 13.

With appropriate augmentation, the MEF command element is capable of performing as a joint task force headquarters. MEFs are the primary "standing MAGTFs," existing in peacetime as well as wartime. The Marine Corps is currently organized with three standing MEFs, each with a Marine division (MARDIV), Marine Air Wing (MAW), and Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The MEFs remain the source from which all other Marine Corps capabilities emanate.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).

The MEB is the mid-sized MAGTF (ranging from 3,000 to 20,000 Marines) and is normally commanded by a brigadier general. The MEB provides transitional capability between the forward-deployed MEU and the MEF. It is comprised of a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), and a Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG). The command element of the MEB is embedded within the command element of its parent MEF; the Deputy MEF commander serves as the MEB commander. A MEB provides supported combatant commanders with scalable, warfighting capabilities across the spectrum of military operations. It is an expeditionary force capable of rapid deployment and employment via amphibious ships, strategic air/sealift, geographic or maritime propositioning force assets, or any combination thereof. It can conduct amphibious assault and self-sustained operations ashore in any geographic environment for 30 days. It can also serve as the forward echelon of a MEF or it can act as JTF headquarters when augmented with command element personnel.

## Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [(MEU(SOC)]

With a strength of about 2,200 personnel, the MEU(SOC) is normally built around a reinforced battalion, a composite aircraft squadron, and by a MEU Service Support Group. It is commanded by a colonel and is self-sustainable in any environment for 15 days. Forward-deployed MEU(SOC)s embarked aboard Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) operate continuously in the areas of responsibility of various unified combatant commanders. See Figure 1.3 for graphic representation of a MEU aboard an ARG. These units provide the President and the unified combatant commanders with forward-deployed units that can conduct a variety of quick reaction, sea-based, crisis response options in either a conventional amphibious/expeditionary role or in the execution of maritime special operations that can pave the way for follow on forces.[15]

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[15] Marine Expeditionary Unit, (accessed February 2, 2004); available from http://www.lilesnet.com/patriotic/OurMilitary/meu.htm

Figure 1.3

Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard an Amphibious Ready Group

A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has a strength of about 2,200 Marines and is made up of three combat elements -- command, ground and aviation. See how MEU is brought to battle by an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).

A mix of air muscle

The aviation combat element provides air support to Marine ground forces and is made up of a mix of helicopters and attack jets.

CH-46E Sea Knight
Principal assault and transport helicopter. Can carry up to 25 troops.

AV-8B Harrier
Marines' vertical take-off and landing aircraft, used for close air support.

AH-1W Super Cobra
Gunship used for attacking armored forces, reconnaissance, escort and fire support.

CH-53E Super Stallion
America's largest helicopter, used for heavy lift and assault. Can carry up to 55 troops.

Landing the troops

Troops and equipment assemble in helicopters and landing craft while still on the ships.

The landing craft, upon leaving the ships, assemble in circles along-side about 100 yards away.

Moving to shore in predeter mined waves, landing craft form a line about 200 yards in front of the ships.

Movement is planned so all landing craft in each wave reach land at the same time.

Initial wave of helicopters deliver lightly armed assault troops and is coordinated with ground landings.

Follow-on helicopters deliver heavy vehicles and other equipment.

Fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters protect the landing and provide air support to the troops.

After delivering their loads, landing craft return to the ships for more.

Ready to respond

An Amphibious Ready Group is composed of three or four ships, and transports a MEU and its equipment to the shore on landing craft.

Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
Can carry 840 to 930 troops; space for four helicopters and one landing craft.

Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD/LHA)
Can carry 1,685 to 1,710 troops; space for 41 to 46 helicopters and one to four landing craft.

Dock Landing Ship (LSD)
Can carry 450 troops; space for four landing craft and a helicopter landing area.

Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
Hovercraft that can carry troops or tanks and other vehicles at high speed.

Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
Used to ferry heavy vehicles, troops and cargo.

Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Personnel vehicle that can operate on land and in water; can carry 18 troops.

(CNN GFX/AP)

[16]

Prior to deployment, a MEU undergoes an intensive six-month training program focusing on its conventional and selected maritime special operations missions. The training culminates with a thorough evaluation and certification as "Special Operations Capable (SOC)". In addition to possessing conventional capabilities, MEU(SOC)s are augmented with selected detachments to provide enhanced capabilities. These special capabilities include:

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[16] Ibid.

- Amphibious operations

- Direct action

- Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel

- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

- Airfield/port seizure

- Non-combatant evacuations

- Humanitarian aid/disaster relief

- Supporting arms coordination.

Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF).

A SPMAGTF is task organized to accomplish a *specific* mission, operation, or regionally focused exercise. As such, SPMAGTFs can be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of expeditionary operations, ranging from crisis response to peacetime missions. Their duties cover the spectrum from non-combatant evacuation to disaster relief and humanitarian missions.

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF)

The Maritime Prepositioning Force is a strategic power projection capability that combines the lift capacity, flexibility and responsiveness of surface ships with the speed of strategic airlift. It is interoperable and flexible, capable of supporting any size MAGTF. Strategically positioned around the globe, MPFs provide unified combatant commanders with forward presence and rapid crisis response. MPF ships are organized into three Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRONs):

- MPSRON-1, based in the Mediterranean;

- MPSRON-2, based at Diego Garcia;

- MPSRON-3, based in Guam-Saipan area.

When needed, these ships move to a crisis region and offload either in port or in-stream. Offloaded equipment and supplies are then married up with Marines arriving at nearby airfields. The end result is a combat-ready Marine Air-Ground Task Force rapidly established ashore using minimal reception facilities.[17]

AIR CONTINGENCY MAGTF FORCES (ACMs)

ACMs are air-deployable forces available to the unified combatant commanders, whose lead elements can deploy within 18 hours of notification. The size of the GCE can range from a reinforced rifle company plus a battalion headquarters element, to a regimental-size force consisting of a regimental headquarters, two infantry battalions, a two-battery artillery battalion, a two-platoon reconnaissance company, a two-platoon engineer company, and appropriate aviation and combat service support elements. ACMs provide great versatility in that they can be used as part of the fly-in echelon of a MPF, as reinforcement for an amphibious force, or as the lead element of a MEF. The ACM will be task organized to meet the mission, the threat, and airlift availability.[18]

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[17] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Concepts and Programs, 2004", Quantico, Virginia, January 2004, 245.
[18] Ibid., 246.

MAGTF CAPABILITIES

The naval character of MAGTFs enhances their global mobility, lethality, and staying power. Embarked aboard amphibious ships, forward-deployed MAGTFs provide U.S. civilian and military leaders with the ability to do the following:

- Move forces into crisis areas without revealing their exact destinations or intentions
- Provide continuous presence from secure sea bases in international waters
- Provide immediate national response in support of humanitarian and natural disaster relief operations
- Provide credible but non-provocative combat power over the horizon of a potential adversary, for rapid employment as the initial response to crisis
- Support diplomatic processes for peaceful crisis resolution before employing immediate response combat forces
- Project measured degrees of combat power ashore, at night and under adverse weather conditions if required
- Introduce additional forces sequentially into a theater of operations
- Operate independent of established airfields, basing agreements, and overflight rights
- Conduct combat operations ashore using inherent combat service support brought into the theater of operations
- Enable the introductions of follow-on MAGTF or joint and/or combined forces by securing staging areas ashore
- Operate in rural and urban environments and hostile nuclear, biological, and chemical situations
- Withdraw rapidly at the conclusion of operations or conduct stability operations to the affected areas
- Plan and commence execution of a mission within 6 to 48 hours of receiving a warning order.

Now that an understanding of the Marine Corps structure and capabilities has been presented, the capabilities have been applied to the Snyder- Diesing crisis model. Figure 1.4 depicts that Marine Corps capabilities can play an important role in every phase of this crisis model.

Figure 1.4
USMC Capabilities applied to Snyder-Diesing Crisis Model

Snyder - Diesing Model Depicting USMC Capabilities

CRISIS

WAR

Pre-Crisis

Post-Crisis

Time Line is Finite

Prevention
Identify conflict sources and causes
 through Intelligence capabilities
Deterrence
Conduct Information Operations
Move scaleable forces into crisis areas
Provide continuous presence from secure
 sea bases in international waters
Provide credible but non-provocative
 combat power over the horizon of crisis
Mobilize Reserve Forces
Diplomacy
Support diplomatic processes for peaceful
 crisis resolution (CMOC & Civil Affairs)
Link military operations to diplomacy
Preemption
Plan & execute mission within 6-48 hours
 of receiving a warning order
Project measured degree of combat power
 ashore at night & under adverse weather if
 required

Escalation
Enable the introduction of follow-on MAGTF
 or joint and/or combined forces by securing
 staging areas ashore
Introduce additional forces sequentially into
a theater of operations
Conduct combat operations ashore using
 inherent combat service support brought into
 the theater of operations
Operate in rural and urban environments and
 hostile nuclear, biological, and chemical
 situations
Operate independent of established airfields,
 basing agreements, and overflight rights
De-Escalation
Withdraw rapidly at conclusion of operations
 or conduct stability Ops to the affected areas
Act as liaison with international organizations
Provide a scalable force that can rapidly renew
 escalation or de-escalate if required
 (3-Block War)

Peace Keeping
Peace Enforcement
Stability Operations and/or reassurance to
 local population
Economic development through Civil Affairs
Local Security to international organizations
Forward Posture through Sea Basing concept
Intelligence gathering for continued
 monitoring of post crisis situation

One of the most important points to draw from the Marine Corps' structure and

capabilities is the value of it scalability, which was previously discussed. Richard Lebow

makes a powerful argument when he states, "recent experience gives no indication that

contemporary political leaders are any more effective than their predecessors in

regulating conflict and eschewing violence."[19] However, because U.S. political leaders

have access to the aforementioned <u>SCALEABLE</u> capabilities of the Marine Corps in

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[19] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1981), 17.

addition to the other instruments of national power, contemporary leaders now possess a broader range of options that they can utilize in their pursuit of escalation dominance. Although Lebow is correct that contemporary leaders have no advantage over predecessors in avoiding the violence associated with crisis, I argue that the Marine Corps' expeditionary and scalable capabilities provide leaders with a force that can be tailored to better attempt to *regulate* a crisis. These Marine Corps capabilities are undoubtedly a force multiplier to this nation by providing a rapidly deployable force capable of adapting to myriad threats and missions. It is with this understanding that the attention of this paper is now shifted to the mission that has historically been and is currently consuming the Marine Corps attention: counterinsurgency, and specifically the insurgent threat in Iraq.

2 - ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S INSURGENCY

As previously discussed, the Marine Corps has been engaged with numerous small wars involving insurgencies throughout its history, and it currently finds itself in a similar situation. Since no two insurgencies are alike, this section will focus on a thorough analysis of Iraq's insurgency. Thereafter, it will examine the tactical and strategic measures the Marine Corps has taken to counter this insurgent threat.

Insurgency Definition

Terms like insurgency, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and revolutionary war have not only been defined in various ways but have often been used interchangeably. The official Department of Defense definition of insurgency is stated in JCS Pub I-02 as, "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."[20]

A more complete definition is one provided by the pamphlet *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, published by the Central Intelligence Agency. This definition states: Insurgency is a <u>protracted political-military activity</u> directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity - including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activity - is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common

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[20] JP I-02, Department of Defense Dictionary and Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2003, 260.

denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country.[21] Several aspects of this definition are particularly important to note. First, it is a <u>protracted political-military activity</u> that includes guerrilla warfare and terrorism aimed at the weakening government control. Second, terrorism in this context is an auxiliary tactic that insurgents use as part of a broader strategy rather than an exclusive one.

To better understand the current insurgency in post-conflict Iraq, the framework for analysis described by Dr. Bard E. O'Neil in his book titled Insurgency and Terrorism will be utilized.[22] This broad framework analyzes insurgencies by examining the <u>international system</u>, <u>domestic context</u>, <u>goals</u>, <u>purpose</u>, <u>means utilized</u>, and <u>strategies</u>. From this analysis, the <u>nature of the insurgency</u>, <u>type</u>, (preservationist, pluralist, reformist, anarchist, secessionist, traditionalist, or egalitarian), the <u>problems they pose</u>, and the <u>requirements they place on respective parties </u>can be determined.

International System

The end of the Cold War has undoubtedly changed the international system. The international system is no longer a bipolar one that is divided between eastern and western blocs and led by two major powers. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the

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[21] Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,* Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. 2.

[22] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 12.

United States has now emerged as the world leader in military, economic and arguably, in political aspects. Additionally, the attacks on the World Trade Center, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania, have also dramatically changed the international system.

In the short term, just after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the international community unified against the newly perceived international threat by displaying an almost unconditional support for the United States in its efforts to bring the terrorist perpetrators to justice. Evidence supporting this was the adoption of United Nations' Security Council Resolution 1373, condemning the terrorist actions, and in effect, passing binding legislation.[23] One need only look at the clear and directive language that is found in paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 that stipulates that "all states shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorists acts, refrain from providing any form of support to terrorists, take necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorists acts, prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorists groups by effecting border controls, and establish a Committee of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of this resolution."[24] Furthermore, the United States took unprecedented unilateral action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for supporting the Al Qaeda terrorist group and invoked article 51 (self defense) of the UN Charter.[25] Although this sparked some debate, the international system acquiesced to this action. Even five weeks later when the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1378, it did not reprimand the US for this unilateral use of force and preemptive action. Instead, this resolution criticized the Taliban Regime for not taking

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[23] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1373*, 4385th Meeting., September 28, 2001, (accessed January 19, 2004); available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.
[24] Ibid
[25] United Nations, *Letter From the US Representative to the UN*, October 7, 2001, (accessed January 19, 2004); available from http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm.

any measures to stop its support to the Al Qaeda terrorists and it expressed its support for the new Afghanistan transitional administration supported by the United States. [26]

The (post September 11) support given to the US in the long term, however, is not as vast as it was in the immediate aftermath; especially in light of the international controversy leading to U.S. led coalition preemptive attacks on Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). Hereafter, it can be argued that the international community would no longer acquiesce to the preemptive actions of the United States: thus the actions of the only remaining superpower would no longer be unchallenged. It became clear that the international community, (through the UN) was not going to endorse the United States' desired combat operations under the aforementioned Article 51 (actions under self defense) of the UN Charter. Subsequently, the United States, understanding that it could not garner this international support for justification of preemptive self defense, pursued the approval of UN Security Council resolution (SC 1441) that focused on giving Iraq one last chance to comply with the previous Security Council resolutions in which it was found to be in "material breach."[27] This resolution outlined the following:

- Specifically recalled SC Resolution 678 (use of UN Charter Chapter VII enforcement action) and asserted that, failing compliance, SC Resolution 678 is reaffirmed.
- Asserted Iraq was in "material breach" of obligations under SC Resolution 687.
- Gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply with disarmament obligations.
- Ordered Iraq to provide UNMOVIC with unrestricted access to all sites, including Presidential sites.
- Granted UNMOVIC and IAEA sole discretion over removing, destroying weapons.[28]

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[26] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1378*, 4415th Meeting, November 14, 2001, (accessed January 19, 2004); available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.
[27] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1441,* 4644th Meeting, November 8, 2002. (accessed January 19, 2004); available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm.
[28] Ibid

Thus, it came to pass that the U.S. and U.K. engaged in operation Iraqi Freedom "under authorization of the United Nations" specified in Security Council Resolution 1441 and because of Iraq's continued "material breaches" of Security Council Resolution 687.[29] This action however did not come without harsh criticism: France Germany, and Russia expressed their concerns stating "There is no basis in the U.N. Charter for a regime change with military means."[30]

Although the scope of this paper is not focused on the international system, the examples above were discussed in detail to prove that the international system does not currently possess a standard lens through which it views the international threats. It can be argued that in the in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the U.S. received overwhelming support and it was able to provide a "standard universal" lens through which most nations viewed terrorists, as evidenced by the overwhelming support for Security Council Resolution 1373. However, as the U.S. and the U.K. expanded this threat to include Sadam Hussein's regime, the short-lived universal lens shattered and the international security environment is once again perceived quite differently throughout the world: a view substantiated by Helga Haftendorn in her article *The Security Puzzle*.[31] Subsequently, recent events have proven that even though the United States is the only major remaining superpower enjoying unmatched military and economic strength, its political influence will be affected and perhaps limited by the manner in which the rest of the international community perceives the international security setting.

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[29] United Nations, *Letter From the US Representative to the UN*, March 20, 2003, (accessed January 19, 2004); available from http://www.un.int/usa/s2003_351.pdf.

[30] Deutsche- Welle: "Russia, Germany, France Criticize United States On Iraq", 19 March 2003. (accessed 21 February 2004); available at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,7489_A_812501_1_A,00.html

[31] Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: The Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (March 1991): 3-17. In this article, Haftendorn argues that there is no universal security definition that applies to all situations. National and international security environments can be interpreted differently and are case specific.

Iraqi Domestic System: Background

It is equally important to understand the nature and dynamics of the Iraqi domestic setting and political system. While insightful analysis on Iraq's political and social dynamics in the pre-Saddam period exists, the closed nature of the former autocratic state makes it challenging to assess Saddam Hussein's former political system. Nonetheless, it is possible to make a number of observations. While the British and the Hashemite monarchy sought to undertake the building of the state, it was never fully realized. Saddam Hussein's autocratic regime, under the guise of the Ba'athist party purporting to represent the will of the people continued to make progress in building the Iraqi state in terms of the organizational and physical infrastructure of a modern, unitary state, until the 1990s. Iraq was able to develop formal administrative structures. These covered all aspects of society, from central to local government, from education through public works to the oil industry, which were staffed by relatively well-educated and competent technocrats. However, in terms of building a unified nation, whether in a monarchist, Arab nationalist, or revolutionary Ba'athist guise, it proceeded sporadically since the 1920s.[32] A recent and over-simplified observation is that Saddam's Sunni-led government, buttressed by the military and the intelligence services (*mukhabarat*), which were "bureaucracies of repression" for the Kurds and Shiites, contributed to Iraq's current day lack of national identity.[33]

Table 2.1 summarizes the political systems utilized by O'Neill. A simplified analysis reveals that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed characteristics of both the

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[32] RAND, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 2003 (accessed January 9, 2004); available from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/.
[33] Ibid., 186.

modernizing autocracy as well as the totalitarian system. These two political systems are in sharp contrast to the pluralistic system that the United States is attempting to emplace and in which the Iraqis have no previous experience with. Thus, it is evident that this transition to a new political system will not be timely and cannot be rushed given the lack of democratic experience. Steven Metz also supports this argument when he stated, "Moving from the psychology of totalitarianism to the psychology of an open society, with its foundations in political initiative, consensus building, and compromise, is a long and tortuous journey".[34]

Table 2.1
Political Systems: Sources of Support, Methods Control & Role of the Public. [35]

Political System	Sources of Support	Method of Control	Role of Public
Traditional Autocracy	Military, Landowners, Clergy provide support in exchange for socio-economic privileges.	Elites maintain tight control on "right to rule." Reinforce the importance of birthright, and personalism as key values to rule.	Expected to be apathetic and loyal. Opposition will be oppressed and controlled.
Modernizing Autocracy	Bureaucrats, Military, Landowners, and Clergy provide support in exchange for socio-economic privileges.	Birthright, personalism and religion also stressed as right to rule but emphasis placed on building "state power" to remain in hands of few elites. Hierarchical structure evolves with patrons dispensing favors for support.	Masses do not actively participate in political process. Some regulated private activity is permitted in widely state-owned enterprises.
Totalitarian	Tightly controlled vanguard party and societal groups.	Party claims to represent the popular will. Leaders use a complex bureaucracy, media and education system to carry out control of political, economic, and social aspects.	Expected to participate in vanguard party. Economic control may be in hands of public sector.
Pluralistic (Democracy)	Public acting through political parties.	Numerous political structures established within and outside of government. External groups act autonomously. Limits placed on powers of leaders. lace the political system in favor of individual freedom and liberty	Public actively participates in espousing values of freedom, liberty and compromise

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[34] Steven Metz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2003-2004): 27.
[35] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 13-16

Iraqi Domestic System: Present Day

No clean ending + developmental regression = challenging rebuilding.   The fact that the end of the conventional part of Operation Iraqi Freedom did not have a clean ending gave rise to cadres of Ba'ath loyalists as well as other opponents of the U.S. led coalition. In fact, it is now suspected that many of the insurgent threats now operating in Iraq are from other Arab countries like Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia fighting to end what is now clearly seen as an occupation.[36] Given this continued insurgent threat challenging Iraq's long transition to democracy, it is clear that the conventional military victory did not transpire to political victory or grand strategy victory as some leaders had expected. Anthony Cordesman, correctly points out that military victory was always a prelude to a much more important struggle: winning the peace.[37]

Unlike the formal surrenders of previous conventional wars like those of Germany and Japan which were instrumental in getting defeated armies to turn-in their arms and stop fighting, the war in Iraq did not (and has not yet to) produce a formal and open surrender from any senior official in the former regime. This lack of formal surrender has contributed to this "unclean" ending as former Saddam loyalists, unhappy that they have lost control, influence, and social status, continue to fight the American occupation. Although it is difficult to measure to what extent a formal surrender could have deterred the former regime loyalist from continuing to fight, it is arguable that even a small reduction of insurgent fighters (attained through a formal surrender) could have

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[36] Raymond Bonner, "Experts Warn Regional Groups Pose Growing Threat," *New York* Times, February 8, 2004, I1.
[37] Anthony Cordesman, *The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003) 122.

significantly improved the domestic setting by reducing the number of insurgents deeply committed at conducting terrorist acts. It is with this understanding that Ambassador Barbara Bodine stated, "We tried mightily to find some, any senior Iraqi officers who would surrender prior to April 9th."[38] Terrorist acts play a huge role in affecting the psyche of the masses and legitimacy of the government. Therefore, this notion of reducing the number of insurgents becomes even more significant when placed in the context of not only transforming a repressive autocratic government into a new democracy but also in attempting to rebuild the national infrastructure while simultaneously fighting an insurgency.

Dr. O'Neill addresses two fundamental challenges that confront nations in their transition to independence: lack of national integration and economic underdevelopment.[39] Societal divisions along one or more lines- racial, ethnic, linguistic, or religious and an absence of political tradition that transcends parochial loyalties are plaguing post conflict Iraq. Since the forceful removal of Saddam Hussein, the absence of the hard-line Ba'athist regime can no longer demand the citizens' loyalties through terror and intimidation. As rival groups now vie for their share of power, they foster inter-group antagonism and distrust, which may give rise to even more insurrections directed at the provisional government if it is dominated by rival groups, or perceived to be illegitimate. Retired Marine Corps General Zinni has even gone as far as stating that the United States must prepare itself for a possible civil war in Iraq.[40]

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[38] Barbara Bodine, U.S. State Department, *Response to Personal Email, March 21, 2004.*
[39] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 3.
[40] *A General's View*, (accessed 5 March, 2004); available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec03/zinni_09-30.html

Obstacles to economic development that have hampered or continue to hamper

Iraq include over one decade of sanctions, a long and costly war with Iran, reparations for

the invasion of Kuwait, corruption of government officials, poorly trained or inefficient

bureaucracies, the lack of adequate communications and transportation infrastructure, an

uncompetitive economic position, and a misuse of foreign assistance that was misdirected

in favor of its military establishment. According to a study conducted by Anthony

Cordesman, the Iraqi annual per capita income dropped from approximately $8,200 in

1978 to $1,435 in 1990, to $723 in 1991 and current figures now show $150 in 2003.[41]

One need not take a detailed analysis of the economic situation in Iraq to realize

that up until recently, it had not simply just failed in making economic progress but had

actually taken a huge economic decline. Therefore, the lack of a hard-line centralist

control of diverse and competing groups, the lack of the clean ending to post Iraqi war

hostilities, and the cluster of significant societal and economic factors have led to the

emergence of new dissatisfied groups and the rise to the insurgents and terrorists threats

that previously held a disdain towards the United States.

International – Domestic Interplay

As previously addressed, the terrorist attacks on the United States initially had a

unifying effect on the international community but the lack of broader international

support for Operation Iraqi Freedom is proof that in the long term, it had the opposite

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[41] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Military Balance in the Middle East* , (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic
and International Studies,1998) 12.

effect. At the domestic level, the lack of a clear ending coupled with the economic underdevelopment and lack of national integration eventually gave birth to the insurgent threat. David Reiff points out that when the administrator to the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer, announced the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, some 400,000 strong, and the lustration of 50,000 members of the Ba'ath Party, one U.S. official remarked, "That was the week we made 450,000 enemies on the ground in Iraq."[42] This statement is even more alarming when on realizes that these 450,000 newly minted "enemies" also have family members; so the number of disaffected Iraqis can easily exceed 1 million. <u>Thus, the current situation in Iraq, shaped by the international context of ambivalent support and the domestic context of dissatisfied groups is now a breeding ground for not only the local Iraqi insurgents, but also those international terrorists that desire to drive a wedge in the international community by attacking the U.S. in Iraq as well as those that align with it</u>. With this understanding the attention will now turn to analyzing the insurgency in Iraq by looking at the types of insurgents, their strategy, goals and means, as well as to determine the demands they place on different actors.

Types of Insurgencies

Dr. O'Neill identifies seven types of insurgencies. These are: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. Brief descriptors follow and are summarized in Table 2.2:

- *Anarchists* wish to eliminate the institutionalized political arrangements because they are viewed as illegitimate.

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[42] David Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess," *New York Times,* November 2, 2003.

- *Egalitarian* Insurgents seek to impose a new system of based on the ultimate value of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the society.

- *Traditionalist* insurgents also seek to displace the political system but they articulate primordial and sacred values rooted in ancestral ties and religion. And although they espouse some autonomy at the local level, widespread participation in national politics, especially by opposition groups is discouraged.

- *Pluralists* seek to establish a system in which the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise are emphasized and in which the political structures are differentiated and autonomous. Many groups use this rhetoric but their ultimate goals are anything but pluralistic.

- *Secessionists* renounce the political community of which they are a part of and seek to constitute a new and independent political community. Their focus can be regional, ethnic, racial, religious or a combination thereof but secessionist consider themselves nationalist in which their primary aim is independence.

- *Reformists* are the least ambitious type of insurgent. They seek more political social, and economic benefits for the population but do not reject the political community or system of authorities. Their primary concern is the allocation of material and political resources, which they consider discriminatory and illegitimate.

- *Preservationists* are quite different than the previously mentioned insurgent types as they seek to maintain the status quo because of the political, economic, and social privileges they receive from it. These groups seek to maintain the existing

political system by engaging in illegal acts of violence against non-ruling groups

and authorities that are trying to effect change. (e.g. death squads)

Table 2.2
Types of Insurgencies, their goals, and examples.

Type of insurgency	Goal	Example
Anarchist	Eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements; they perceive authority relationships as unnecessary and illegitimate	Foreign terrorist in Iraq – Ansar al Islam & Jaish Ansar al Islam
Egalitarian (socialist and communist	Impose a new system based on distribution of equality and centrally controlled structures to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community	Shining Path in Peru
Traditionalist	Displace the political system; the values they articulate are primordial and sacred ones rooted in ancestral ties and religion	Fawq in Iraq (Sadr's militia)
Pluralist	Displace the political system in favor of individual freedom and liberty	UNITA in Angola
Secessionist	Withdraw from the present political community and constitute a new and independent political community	Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka
Reformist	Gain autonomy and reallocate political and material resources within the present political system	Kurds in former Iraq
Preservationist	Maintain the existing political system by engaging in illegal acts against non ruling groups and authorities who desire change	Former Ba'athist

[43]

Recent data supports that the Iraqi insurgent threat is composed of dissatisfied

Iraqis of the former Ba'athist regime, international terrorists such as Ansar al Islam &

Jaish Ansar al Islam, and tribal militias (known as the Fawq).[44] Upon examination of

their goals and/or actions that support specific goals, these three main groups can be

classified as preservationists, anarchists, and traditionalists, respectively. It is important

to note that one must be cautious when attempting to classify the insurgents, as there exist

four challenges in analyzing an insurgency. These are:

- Their ability to transform their goals.

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[43] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 27.
[44] Tim Ripley, *JTIC Briefing: The Insurgency Threat in Southern Iraq,* Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, (accessed on 24 Feb 2004); available at http://jtic.janes.com/suscribe/jtic/doc_view/.

- Numerous insurgent groups may have different and mutually exclusive goals.

- They may mask their goals or convey misleading rhetoric.

- Goal ambiguity, as evidenced by two or more aims of which neither of them predominates. [45]

The latter challenge has indeed posed problems in analyzing some of the insurgents in Iraq. According to an article written by Patrick J. McDonnell and Sebastian Rotella, many of the suicide bombers in Iraq appear to be natives. This is in contrast to the statements from the DoD briefings, which state that suicide attacks are primarily the works of foreign jihadists like Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian connected to Ansar al Islam and affiliated with al-Qaeda. As evidence, they point to the definitive identification of an Iraqi suicide bomber that struck on December 9th 2003 as well as statements from LtCol Ken Devan, an intelligence officer for the Army's 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad that stated, "Overall, the facts say that the majority of folks we are fighting are Iraqis." [46] Yet despite this assessment, U.S. and Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated that Iraqis are unlikely to engage in such suicide missions because they do not have a history of violent religious extremism.

O'Neill also describes four strategies that can be employed by insurgents. These are: *conspiratorial, protracted war, military focus, and urban warfare strategies*.[47] These strategies vary as to the importance they place on the following variables: the

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[45] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 21.
[46] Patrick J. McDonnell and Sebastian Rotella, "Iraq Suicide Bombers Appear to be Natives," *The Seattle Times*, March 1, 2004.
[47] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 31.

environment, popular support, organization, cohesion, external support and the government response. A summary of each strategy follows:

- *Conspiratorial* Strategy: In this strategy a small group conspires to remove a ruling authority through limited but swift force. This strategy normally requires a well-organized group and does not necessarily rely on external support. This strategy is typical of coups led by military officers.

- *Protracted Popular War Strategy:* This strategy seeks to prolong the fight against the ruling government because insurgents realize the government has a conventional force advantage. They adapt asymmetric means to attack selected targets in order to discredit the government and cause disenfranchisement among the population. This strategy is the most widely used and is normally associated with Mao's guerrilla movement, which encompassed three stages: political organization and low-level violence which focused on recruitment and the infrastructure, guerrilla warfare, which encompassed violent military directed at the ruling government, and mobile conventional war, which encompassed large conventional attacks as well as psychological and political means to collapse the government. Mao also emphasized flexibility in these phases allowing leaders to revert to previous stages if necessary.

- *Military Focus Strategy:* This strategy gives primacy to military action and subordinates political action. It places little emphasis on the political aspect because it assumes that there is sufficient popular support or it will be a by-product of military victory. It focuses on catalyzing the insurgency through military efforts.

- *Urban Warfare Strategy:* This strategy employs terrorism as a key factor in destabilizing the society and its government. The purpose is to create havoc and insecurity, which will eventually produce a loss of confidence in the government. It employs tactics such as assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, armed propaganda, ambushes, and assaults on fixed targets in an effort to sabotage economic assets.

Table 2.3 is a simplified matrix of the three major insurgent threats in Iraq depicting the insurgency and type, strategy, means employed, and primary region(s) of operation. Although there are no distinct lines that clearly differentiate one insurgent group from another, it is important to note that each insurgency embraces a different strategy, and operates in specific regions. The insurgents do share the goal of expelling the coalition forces from Iraq, however, the Fawq are more willing to work with the Coalition in order to preserve or enhance their regional influence.[48]

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[48] Tim Ripley, *JTIC Briefing: The Insurgency Threat in Southern Iraq,* Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, (accessed on 24 Feb 2004); available at http//jtic.janes.com/suscribe/jtic/doc_view/.

Table 2.3

Types of Iraqi insurgents, their strategy, means, and regional location

Insurgency / Type	Strategy	Means	Region
Foreign Terrorist / Anarchist	**Urban Warfare Strategy**- transform political crisis into armed conflict by conducting terrorist acts that will force the government into military action. The purpose is to create havoc and insecurity, which will eventually produce a loss of confidence in the government.	Suicide Bombings,[49] Car bombings, Rocket attacks, Assassinations, Ambushes, Kidnappings Propaganda blaming the Coalition	Central and Northern Iraq
Ba'athist Regime / Preservationist	**Protracted popular war strategy** - prolong the fight against the transitioning government. Employ asymmetric means to attack selected targets to discredit the government and cause disenfranchisement among the population.	Bombings (IEDs), Car bombings, Rocket attacks, Mortar attacks, SAM at helos, Assassinations, Ambushes, Kidnappings, Propaganda blaming the Coalition, Infiltration.[50]	Baghdad, Tikrit, SW Basra, and other predominant Sunni cities
Tribal Militia (Fawq) / Traditionalist	To emplace a village or community based force supporting sacred primordial values rooted in ancestral ties and religion. Willing to work with coalition if position of influence is respected. (Flirting w/ **Military Strategy**)	Ambushes, Sniper fire, RPG fires, Car-jackings, Smuggling	Southern Iraq, Basra, Al Faw, Umm Qsar

[51]

Problems to Actors

The problems posed by the three insurgent groups are primarily of a security

nature to all the actors operating in Iraq but there are other problems that manifest

themselves differently and in differing intensities toward specific actors. For example,

the Coalition also faces the politicized challenges of dealing with the international

community and can see its influence fluctuate based the policies and means it employs in

countering the insurgency threats. Additionally, an NGO or a private organization can be

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[49] According to a March 1st 2004 Seattle Times article written by Patrick J. McDonnell and Sebastian Rotella, many of the suicide bombers in Iraq appear to be natives. This however is in contrast to the statements from the DoD briefings, which state that suicide attacks are primarily the works of foreign jihadists like Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian connected to Ansar al Islam and affiliated with al-Qaeda. U.S. and Iraqi officials have said repeatedly that Iraqis are unlikely to engage in such missions because they do not have a history of violent religious extremism.

[50] John Burns, "2 American Civilians Killed by Fake Iraqi Policemen*," New York Times*, March 11, 2004.

[51] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 49.

dissuaded from continuing its participation in the rebuilding because the monetary or

personal security costs are too high. See table 2.4

Table 2.4
Actors in Iraq, problems encountered, and requirements placed on actors.

Actor	*Problem Encountered by Insurgency*	*Requirements Placed on Actor*
US led Coalition	Security of local population, Security of Iraqi Governing Council, Security of NGOs and Private Groups Force protection, Credibility and Reputation, Ability to influence international community, Financial costs	Increase Forces – Seen negatively Increase force protection measures Impose restrictive measures Combat negative propaganda Increase expenditures
Iraqi Governing Council	Personal Security- High value targets Credibility- Seen as puppet Govt Inability to accommodate factionalized groups Groups can be politicized by attacks	Restrict personal mobility to secure areas Overcome factionalization Combat negative propaganda Provide reputable services/ policies amenable to public at large
Iraqi Security Forces	Personal Security- Seen as traitors Overwhelming task to secure local environment Limited Resources Limited Training Fear, leading to inaction	Combat negative propaganda through reputable security posture Patrol the streets enforcing law and order Improve training levels Earn trust of public through fair, just, and valiant law enforcement
NGOs and Private Sector	Personal Security- Seen as Collaborators Fear- Attacks will dissuade rebuilding efforts Costs for Security- An Additional 10%[52] Attacks on infrastructure increases project workload	Increase personal security measures Assess feasibility of continuing rebuilding efforts or relocating to more secure environment Spend more on security which means less money for projects

Now that a detailed analysis of the insurgency in Iraq has been presented, the attention

will shift back to the Marine Corps' capabilities. A special look will be taken at the

capabilities that pertain specifically to countering insurgencies as well as the *unique*

measures adapted by the Marine Corps to defeat the Iraqi insurgency.

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[52] Mary Pat Flaherty, "In Iraq, Contractors' Security Costs Rise," *Washington Post*, February 18, 2004, A01.

MAGTFs and Counterinsurgency

MAGTFs have the capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency operations to help stabilize and assist in foreign internal defense. MAGTFs can counter insurgent threats through a combination of selected combat, intelligence, psychological, and civic action operations designed to destroy the insurgent's grip on the people. The objective is to shift the popular support away from the insurgents and toward the legitimate government. MAGTFs can provide support through the local government to improve the environment and deny resources to the insurgents. Counterinsurgency operations may escalate to limited objective operations or eventually recede to the point that stability operations can be handed over to the local authorities to allow them to assume the responsibilities for internal security. The adaptability, flexibility, and scalability of a MAGTF present decision makers with a capable force to meet such a challenge. As was illustrated in Figure 1.2, MAGTFs can scale their operations in scope as well in size.

Unique Marine *Tactics* Adapted

In anticipation for its redeployment in the Iraqi theatre of operations, General Conway, Commanding General of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, took specific measures to prepare his forces to better meet the insurgency threat in Iraq.[53] These measures included Arabic language proficiency training, cultural awareness training, specific and detailed training on the limited use of force regarding rules of engagement and policing duties, intelligence gathering, building trust, and leadership scenario training focused on developing a "strategic corporal" – a corporal capable to making effective

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[53] Thomas Ricks, "Marines to Offer New Tactic in Iraq," *Washington Post*, January 7, 2004, A01.

decisions in a complex environment and under limited time. These measures are all part

of what the Small Wars Manual refers to as adapting to the specifics of the environment.

"The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people

encountered. National policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our

dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high moral plan. However, the military

strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be

adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.[54]

Unique Marine *Strategy* Adapted

"The enemy will try to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis. Do not allow the enemy that victory. With strong discipline, solid faith, unwavering alertness, and undiminished chivalry to the innocent, we will carry out this mission. Remember, I have added, "First, do no harm" to our passwords of "No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy." Keep your honor clean as we gain information about the enemy from the Iraqi people. Then, armed with that information and working in conjunction with fledging Iraqi Security Forces, we will move precisely against the enemy elements and crush them without harming the innocent."[55]

Major General Mattis, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, I MEF

The Marine Corps counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq is heavily influenced by the

tenets espoused in the Small Wars manual. General Conway's counterinsurgency strategy

focuses on three lines of operation: information operations, civil affairs, and stability &

security operations.[56]

- Information Operations- This encompasses the capitalizing of information

  mediums (television, radio, newspapers) to convey the message that the Marines

  are committed to stay in Iraq until the mission is completed, the American interest

  is not about oil but rather developing a stable government, encouraging Iraqis to

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[54] U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual,* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940. Reprinted 1990), 13.

[55] Major General James N. Mattis, "*All-Hands Letter to 1st Marine Division*," received via email from Headquarters Marine Corps, March 26, 2004.

[56] James T. Conway, Lieutenant General, USMC, IMEF Commanding General: Lecture and interview, Tufts University, 11 Feb 2004.

step up and assume responsibility in their development, reassure minorities they

will be adequately represented, and request their assistance with local intelligence

to eradicate the insurgency threat posed to the population.

- Civil Affairs- This entails restoring basic services (food, water, and electricity) to

  the local community, repairing reopening local schools, repairing and revitalizing

  factories to tackle the unemployment problem to reduce the disenfranchised Iraqis

  that may otherwise seek to support the insurgency, and assist with governance to

  prepare for eventual sovereignty.

- Stability and Security Operations- This initially entails informing the Iraqis that

  the Marine Corps is a different force and conducts operations differently than the

  US Army. Thereafter, the Marines employ an early offensive against known

  terrorist sanctuaries while simultaneously rebuilding the local security forces with

  well-trained indigenous personnel.

Of importance is that the strategy is directed at the entire population employing a

dedicated appeal for basic respect for the culture in accordance with the guidance in the

Small Wars Manual as well as directing special attention to a *center of gravity,* identified

as approximately 45% of the local population that do not want the American presence in

Iraq. According to General Conway, the main measure of effectiveness in this

counterinsurgency strategy is the amount and quality of intelligence gained from the

population identified as the center of gravity.[57]

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[57]James T. Conway, Lieutenant General, USMC, IMEF Commanding General: Lecture and interview, Tufts University, 11 Feb 2004.

The tactics and strategy that the Marine Corps has adapted are a positive step in the right direction. The next section will now focus on how the Marine Corps can fine-tune its counterinsurgency capabilities to better engage the threats of the specific insurgency challenges encountered in Iraq as well as other possible future counterinsurgencies.

3 - FINE TUNING THE MAGTFs' COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY

Everybody … will seek a military solution to the insurgency problem, whereas by its very nature, the insurgency problem is military only in a secondary sense, and political, ideological, and administrative in a primary sense. Once we understand this, we will understand more of what is actually going on…[58]

Bernard Fall

Fredrick Kagan, in his critical work of the Bush administration titled *War and Aftermath*, states that although the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were militarily successful, the administration failed to achieve the political objective as it focused on simplifying war into a technical "targeting drill."[59] Furthermore, he is critical of the administration's use of Shock and Awe and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) in their application to the regime change mission in Iraq as well as the NCW focus in the DoD's transformation.[60] He cites that neither NCW nor "shock and awe" provided a reliable recipe for translating the destruction of the enemy's ability to continue to fight into the accomplishment of the *political* objectives of the conflict. Indeed his point that regime change is a complex mission is substantiated by historians' knowledge that the challenge

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[58] Bernard Fall, *The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (*accessed February 19, 2004; (available from http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/winter/art5-w98.htm#author.
[59] Ibid
[60] Shock and awe is described by Kagan as "Shutting the [enemy] country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese." NCW is described as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.

is not in destroying a sitting regime but rather *establishing* a new and legitimate one. Examples in Latin America, Africa, the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, and Napoleon's defeat in Spain all show the relative ease in overthrowing a government but also illustrate the chaos and complex challenges that follow. According to Kagan, "the true center of gravity in a war of regime change lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of the new one."[61] Thus, the most difficult task in effecting a regime change in another state is not simply defeating the opposition's armed forces but rather securing critical population centers and state infrastructure. The armed forces must be able to maintain order and prevent the development of humanitarian catastrophes likely to undermine the efforts to establish a stable new regime. And to this point, the human dimension or what is otherwise referred to as "troops on the ground" is the element that is most important in attaining the political objective of winning over the population to support the new establishment.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Kagan on what should be the primary focus of the DoD transformation is not the emphasis here. The important point to draw is that the human element is required to effect relationships of trust, rapport, and cooperation in order to win the support of the masses and defeat the insurgent threats.   It is this human element of Information Operations (IO), which includes civil-military operations (CMO), and Psychological Operations (PsyOps) as it relates to the stability and security operations that will be analyzed next.

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[61] Ibid

Information Operations Background

JCS Terminology: "Information Operations" are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own information and information systems.[62] Operations, according to JCS Pub 3-13, are divided between offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities. The offensive capabilities "include, but are not limited to, operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PsyOps), electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, and special information operations (SIO), and may include computer network attack." Defensive information operations include: "information assurance, OPSEC, physical security, counter deception, counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, EW, and SIO."[63] It is important to note that absent from those capabilities is civil-military operations. However, the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.4 includes Civil-military operations (CMO) as one of those capabilities under IO. Furthermore, whereas JP3-13 makes a cursory explanation of CMO (it is only mentioned twice), the MCWP devotes three pages to emphasize its importance in the IO campaign. Again, for the scope of this work, the focus shall be limited to information operations and PsyOps.

Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include

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[62] Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Policy on Information Operations-JCS PUB 3-13", October 1998, Pg. Vii.
[63] Ibid., Viii.

performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.[64]

Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs Forces, and Civil Affairs Activities

CA describes designated personnel and distinct units. It is neither a mission nor an objective, but the name of a particular force that helps the MAGTF commander to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. CA units in the Marine Corps are composed of the 3rd Civil Affairs Group and the 4th Civil Affairs Group consisting of only 103 and 128 Marines and sailors from the Reserve Component respectively.[65] These reserve forces bring expertise that is not normally available to the MAGTF. CA forces are organized and equipped specifically to support CMO and to conduct CA activities. CA activities embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, and involve the application of particular skills that are normally the responsibility of civil government. These activities include public administration, public health, economic development, and utilities.

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[64] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Operations", Quantico, Virginia, July 2003. 3-19
[65] Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Table of Organization 4997R and 4998R, Civil Affairs Groups", Quantico, Virginia, February 1999.

CMO build and use relationships with civilians and other groups to facilitate operational tasks across the full range of military operations. Any element of the MAGTF may participate in the planning and execution of CMO. Whether a Marine is an operational planner dealing with a member of a foreign government, a member of a team working with an international relief organization or a rifleman at a checkpoint talking with a local farmer, that Marine is conducting CMO. CA activities, however, are distinguishable from CMO to the extent that CA activities are characterized by the application of *functional specialties* in areas normally the responsibility of the local government or civil authority. In this respect, only CA forces help the MAGTF accomplish this.[66]

Fine-Tuning USMC Civil Affairs

With this understanding of Marine civil affairs as it relates to CMO, and with the prevalence of smaller wars like insurgencies over major theater conflicts one must ask if these forces are sufficient to address social-political aspects related to counterinsurgency operations? Should the CA force structure be increased? If so, by how much? Should these forces remain solely in the reserve component? Should these forces' missions be expanded?

The fact that the Marine Corps is evaluating options to create an active component CA structure to provide planning capabilities for operational and service headquarters is an indication that senior Marine leaders acknowledge the importance of

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[66] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Operations", Quantico, Virginia, July 2003. 3-19.

these forces in future conflicts. The goal is to increase active component integration with

Marine Reserve Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs).[67] However, the Marine Corps should go

beyond just increasing the CA structure to provide *planning capabilities* to that of

acquiring an active duty CAG for each MEF - a total of three CAGs equal to an

approximate force of 400 Marines. The justification for this argument follows:

- Insurgencies and other forms of LICs/SSCs will dominate over major theater

  conflicts. Most of the Securities studies literature supports this claim so it

  behooves military forces to prepare for the missions that will occupy our

  attention in the future. (It is important to note that from 1945-1999, seventy-

  three states, or over one third of the U.N.'s system, was engaged in a civil war

  or insurgency or ethnic war).[68]

- There is much truth to Kagan's hypothesis that troops on the ground will always

  be needed to secure the political objectives – especially in counterinsurgency

  warfare and regime change. Therefore, the transformation focus on technology

  and the DoD policy goal of reducing the force structure should be revisited to

  ensure CA personnel as well as those able to greatly influence the *political*

  objectives of military missions are increased.

- The force structure for the CA table of organization is woefully insufficient to

  handle the huge missions and political importance associated with

  counterinsurgencies and other forms of LICs. A current example is the

  extensive area that both Marine Corps civil affairs units are responsible for in

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[67] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Concepts and Programs, 2004", Quantico, Virginia, Jan 2004, 99.
[68] James Fearon and David Laitin: "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, no. 1, (2003): 75.

Iraq. General Conway equated I MEF's area of responsibility in present day

Iraq to the size of Wisconsin. <u>231 CA Marine Reservists (the personnel total of</u>

<u>both Tables of Organizations) will be spread quite thin to successfully cover</u>

<u>that vast area</u>.

- Conflict duration of LICs is normally a long period. A recent study conducted

  by James Fearon and David Laitin shows that the average Insurgency and Civil

  War between 1945-1999 lasted 6 years.[69] Thus, long periods of conflict pose

  problems with the activation limits of Reserve Component forces.

General Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as well as other service

chiefs recently rejected the idea of accepting an 8% manning increase to offset the current

deployment tempo challenges. One of the reasons General Hagee cited was that it would

take four to five years before the addition of more people on active duty yielded more

people who could deploy, and it isn't clear that that we would need them in four to five

years.[70] Three convincing reasons can be given to counter that assessment: firstly and as

stated above, there is a good chance that based on historical examples, the current

counterinsurgency threat we face in Iraq may last well beyond a couple of years.

Secondly, the Marine Corps can grow some new CA Marines from the current active

duty force structure (much like it developed its Special Forces in a matter of months) and

replace the vacancies they create from the additional force structure acquired. Lastly, the

value that additional civil affairs personnel bring to the fight in counterinsurgency

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Rick Maze, "More Troops? No Thanks," *Marine Corps Times*, February 6, 2004, 8.

operations is more than that of the regular Marine – CA Marines, much like Special

Forces are force multipliers!

PsyOps- Background

While CA personnel and forces advise commanders on the most effective

military efforts to support friendly or host nation civilian welfare, security, and

developmental programs, PsyOps maximize these efforts through information products

and programs. Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives,

objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,

groups, and individuals.[71] PsyOps publicize the existence or successes of CMO activities

to generate target population confidence in and positive perception of US and host

nations actions. PsyOps take on these forms at different levels:

- Strategic level - political or diplomatic positions, announcements or
  communiqués.
- Operational level – includes the distribution of leaflets, radio and television
  broadcasts, and other means of transmitting information that provides
  information intended to influence a selected group. It may be used to encourage
  enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, surrender or take any other action beneficial
  to friendly forces.

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[71] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "*Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Operations*", Quantico, Virginia, July 2003, 3-8.

- Tactical level - includes face-to-face contact and the use of loudspeakers or other means to deliver PsyOps messages to shape attitudes and influence behavior.[72]

Marine Corps' Current PsyOps Role

One may ask how the Marine Corps can conduct PsyOps if it does not have any dedicated units and must rely on the Army's 4th Psychological operations Group for external support. The reality is that the mere presence of Marine Corps forces may be a PsyOps activity in itself, bringing influence on a situation through a display of purpose.[73] The absence of a dedicated PsyOps unit has not restrained the Marine Corps from conducting PsyOps. MAGTFs have filled this void by acquiring their own organic *tactical* PsyOps capability. An example of this was the 24th MEU(SOC) experience with Task Force Tarawa in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to their Special Operations Capable Evaluation Exercise (SOCEX), and deployment, the 24th MEU(SOC) purchased several man-pack tactical broadcast systems (loud speakers) and used these extensively in Iraq.[74] Presently, the Marine Corps has no requirement to duplicate radio or television broadcast capabilities provided by theater level PsyOps assets in General Support.

The overwhelming success of PsyOps during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom highlighted the need for PsyOps support to the MAGTF. Concurrently, the worldwide demand for PsyOps forces has expanded. The increased demand on a finite number of USSOCOM PsyOps forces from the Army's only active

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[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Headquarters Marine Corps, Plans Policies and Operations: "*Information Operations Operational Advisory Group Working Group After Action Report",* October 21-24 2003.

duty Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) and two Army Reserve POGs reduces the availability of USSOCOM PsyOps forces to support to the Marine Corps.[75]

With this understanding of USMC PsyOps, it is important to examine the following PsyOps questions as they relate to the Marine Corps' counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq: Does the Marine Corps have a sufficient tactical PsyOps capability to address the psychological-political aspects related to counterinsurgency operations? Should the Marine Corps stand up a new PsyOps unit? If so, how large should this unit be? Should these forces be in the reserve or active duty component? Should their mission be at the tactical level, operational level, or both? What about the use of newly formed USMC Special Forces? Should they play a role in this PsyOps mission?

Fine-Tuning MAGTF PsyOps

There is evidence that supports the assertion that the Marine Corps PsyOps capabilities are insufficient and that the Marine Corps is moving in a direction to address this shortfall. A current Marine Corps PsyOps initiative was recently drafted in October 2003 to address such shortages. According to this initiative, it does not call on duplicating 4th POG's capabilities but rather it calls on the Marine Corps to continue to fully leverage theater level PsyOps support. This initiative is focused on providing the MAGTFs an organic *tactical* PsyOps capability to rapidly disseminate specific messages to target audiences during an operation in order to shape the battle space and protect the force. Its focus is the Tactical PsyOps Detachments (TPDs). The Marine Corps' Plans,

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[75] Ibid.

Policies, and Operations (PP&O) division has developed three courses of action to address the need of PsyOps support to a MAGTF. These include:

- Minimal Active Duty Force Structure - Two active duty PsyOps planners at each MEF, 3d & 4th CAG, with two Tactical PsyOps Detachments consisting of 18 PsyOps trained Marines.

- Tactical PsyOps Company at each MEF – Each company would consist of 5 Officers and 35 enlisted.

- Reserve and Active Duty Tactical PsyOps Detachments with a Reserve "reach-back" capability - Each MEF would have an Active Duty Tactical PsyOps Detachment with another reserve detachment in 3rd & 4th CAG that could be called-upon for reach-back support when needed.[76]

There has been a call to eliminate the third course of action in favor of a Marine Tactical PsyOps Company stationed at Ft Bragg with the Army's 4th POG. This Marine Tactical Company PsyOps Company would globally source all MEU/MAGTF for tactical PsyOp support.[77]

The Marine PsyOps initiative also addresses the capabilities that a new PsyOps unit should possess. The universal need statement expressed that the Marine Tactical PsyOps capability should not have a production capability. Mr. Borchini, a retired U.S. Army colonel and former Commanding Officer of 4th POG emphatically disagreed with the universal need statement and stated that any organic Marine Corps tactical PsyOps

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[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.

unit should possess some limited production capability for sound/voice, video, or print/handbills.[78]

After assessing the current insurgency threat in Iraq and understanding the possibility of Marines engaging in future similar conflicts, the Marine Corps should not only retain and implement the third course of action, but also implement the last course of action as well. Therefore, the Marine Corps should implement <u>the following:</u>

- <u>Activate three Active Duty Tactical PsyOps Detachments (one for each MEF), activate two Tactical Reserve PsyOps Detachments (in 3rd & 4th CAG) that can be tapped for "reach-back" capability when needed, and establish a Marine Tactical PsyOps Company stationed at Ft Bragg with the Army's 4th POG.</u>

Although this recommendation may seem too robust and critics may say it is"overkill" in PsyOps resources, the following five reasons justify this recommendation:

- Firstly, according to counterinsurgency and LIC experts, the main instruments utilized in these conflicts include political, psychological, economic, informational, and military means. Thus, a robust Marine PsyOps will support the political, psychological and informational instruments in addressing insurgency and other types of LIC threats without having to rely too much on the overstretched PsyOps forces of other services.[79]

- Secondly, it is important to heed the advice of the French military strategist General Andre Beaufre regarding counterinsurgencies and LICs:

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[78] Ibid.
[79] Richard Shultz, "Doctrine and Forces for Low-Intensity Conflict," in *The United States Army: challenges and Missions for the 1990s*, ed. Robert Pfaltzgraff and Richard Shultz, (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1991), 115.

Counterinsurgency strategy must be indirect and political in scope. He emphasized the use of a total strategy in the *indirect* mode when dealing with insurgent threats. Direct strategy is the conventional use of force and indirect strategy is that in which force recedes and psychological factors advance in importance. "While both approaches seek to break the will of the enemy, the indirect method attempts to do so primarily by non-military methods, in other words, by methods that the military plays an auxiliary role. The "psychological effect" and "exterior political maneuver… outside the area of conflict" are among the most important of these nonmilitary methods.[80]

- Thirdly, activating PsyOps detachments in the active and reserve components will provide an abundant pool of resources that can be utilized without having to overextend the reserves beyond their two-year call up. As mentioned earlier, conflicts like counterinsurgencies and LICs tend to be long in duration. Providing sufficient PsyOps assets will permit the rotation of units supporting these long duration conflicts.

- Fourthly, establishment of a PsyOps Company co-located with the Army's 4th POG can focus primarily on supporting the newly established USMC Special Forces detachment while the other MEF and reserve PsyOps detachments can focus their support on the Marine conventional forces. This co-location of Army and Marine PsyOps forces will also have a positive effect in that there will be greater integration of doctrine, forces, and assistance within these services - An integration that has been strongly espoused by insurgency and LIC experts.[81]

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[80] Ibid., 120.
[81] Ibid., 115.

Additionally, the PsyOps Company stationed at Fort Bragg can benefit from the

expertise of 4th POG and also serve as the unit overseeing PsyOps standardization

throughout the Marine Corps to ensure all units are training to the same PsyOps

standard. In this sense, the PsyOps Company can play a similar role to that of

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS-1), standardizing

aviation tactics throughout the Marine Corps.

- Lastly, just like the effect of increasing the Civil Affairs force structure,

  establishing dedicated tactical PsyOps units will serve as force multipliers.

Cost of Additional Civil Affairs and PsyOps Personnel

Some critics may oppose increasing the Marine Corps Civil Affairs and PsyOps

manpower because they argue that manpower is too costly as compared to the less

expensive and technology-oriented transformation associated with NCW.   However, the

following example will show that increasing the Marine Corps manpower will not be that

expensive because the operational costs of the Marine Corps are relatively low when

compared to the other services.

According to the DoD budget of 2004, the total discretionary budget for all the

services was $379.9 billion.[82] The Marine Corps received approximately $19 billion of

this total obligation allocation (TOA).[83]   This equates to the historical amounts of 4 to

5% that the Marines have traditionally received. See figure 3.1. The Marine Corps

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[82] Department of Defense, *Fiscal 2004Department of Defense Budget Release, February 3, 2003 (accessed April 6, 2004) available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/b02032003_bt044-03.html*
[83] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Marine Concepts and Programs, 2004", Quantico, Virginia, January 2004, 222.

allocation for manpower in 2004 was $9.596 billion for a force of 177,779.[84]   This cost is

approximately $53,977 for every Marine per year. Thus, if we multiply the 620

additional CA and PsyOps Marines recommended in this paper by the cost of each

Marine per year, the cost of this new CA and PsyOps capability comes out to just under

$33.5 million: an amount dwarfed by the $379.9 billion and roughly equivalent to the

cost of two AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters. Therefore, it could be argued that those

that believe technology should be the focus of transformation might well be overlooking

the valuable psychological and political influence that CA and PsyOps personnel bring to

the complex environment of counterinsurgency operations. Because the Marine Corps'

share of the DoD budget is comparatively small, and it leads the DoD in converting every

dollar into credible combat power, it should not hesitate to increase its CA and PsyOps

capabilities.[85]

Figure 3.1: DOD FY01 TOA SHARES[86]

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
[84] Ibid., 223.
[85] US Marine Corps Combat Development Command: "Concepts and Issues 2001", Quantico, Virginia, January 2001, 167.
[86] Ibid.

Fine-Tuning Marine Special Forces Missions

The Marine Corps recently established its Special Operations Forces Detachment

after General Jones, former Marine Commandant and Air Force Gen. Charles R. Holland,

former Commander of Forces, SOCOM, signed a memorandum pledging greater

cooperation between SOCOM and the Marine Corps.[87] This Special Operations

Detachment consists of 95 Marines and has been assigned the following missions:

- Special Reconnaissance
- Direct Action
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Other Missions as Required
- Coalition Support (Not really a SOF mission)

In comparison with the existing Special Forces in SOCOM, absent from the Marine

Corps' missions are:

- Combating Terrorism
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Theater Search and Rescue
- Unconventional Warfare[88]

The Marines began testing the new experimental Special Forces unit in June

2002, completed their evaluation in March 2004, and are expected to deploy in April

2004 in support of real world operations.[89] According to Major Tom Dolan, the Fires

Liaison Officer, for Marine Special Operations Detachment-1, the Marine Special Forces

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[87] United States Marine Corps, Special Operations Command Detachment 1: "Official Unit Brief," February 2004.
[88] CRS Report for Congress: "*Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress*", October 15, 2001. 2.
[89] Major Tom Dolan, Fires Officer, USMC Special Forces SOCOM Detachment 1: Telephone Interview on 23 January 2004.

have outperformed many of the other services' special forces in the extensive training and evaluation exercises over the last year.[90] He attributes this to the following:

- Marine Special Forces were recruited from the best personnel in Infantry, Intelligence, and Force Reconnaissance units.

- Marines bring much more experience to the Marine Special Forces Detachment. The average age of a Marine Special Forces member is 33 compared to that of 24, the average age of a Navy Seal at Naval Special Warfare Command. Although the Army, Air Force, and Navy Special Forces undergo their specific service's Special Forces training courses, the Marines still outperformed many of the other services' Special Forces because of their vast experience training with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and overall years of active duty training.

The Marines are expected to field three more Special Operations Detachments in the future and given their outstanding record to date, it could be argued that some of the new detachments could be ideal in undertaking some of the other Special Forces missions like combating terrorism, civil affairs, and psychological operations in order to assist with combating the terrorist and insurgency threats that are currently plaguing and will continue to plague the international community. The following justification supports this argument:

- Advantage in Targeting and the Use of Force- At the highest levels of conflict, targeting is a relatively easy proposition. The single integrated plan, for strategic retaliatory strikes in the event of nuclear war, for example, is a precise

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[90] Ibid.

document. However, part of the problem of credible deterrence in counterinsurgency and LIC is that of targeting. Targeting the enemy forces in counterinsurgency warfare is not clean nor easily accomplished through technology. The adversary is elusive and often indistinguishable from the population. It is often questionable, therefore, whether the United States can effectively undertake conventional military operations that are relevant to the circumstances. In many cases, in fact, the use of force may exacerbate the situation.[91] The special expertise that Marines bring from their Force Reconnaissance experiences can contribute greatly to this targeting in unconventional warfare.

- <u>Marine Special Forces can reduce the burden on overextended SOCOM SOFs</u> - SOFs have expertise in language, culture, force structure, and missions. These skills in PsyOps, civil affairs, and their ability to act as "warrior diplomats" cannot be duplicated in conventional US military forces.[92] Broadening the Marine SOF mission will expand the options available to decision makers confronting crises and conflicts below the threshold of conventional war and will also relieve some of the deployment pressures that SOFs from other services are experiencing.

- <u>Eliminate the mismatch of long-term requirements and availability of most-needed forces</u>. According to James Locher, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the SOF structure,

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[91] James Locher, "Special Operations Forces," in *The United States Army: challenges and Missions for the 1990s*, ed. Robert Pfaltzgraff and Richard Shultz, (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1991), 137.
[92] H. Allen Holmes, "Special Operations Forces as a Strategic Asset in the 21st Century" in *Roles and Missions of SOF in the Aftermath of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., and W. Bradley Stock, (Publisher and date unknown), 161.

roles, and missions must be rationalized.[93] 75% of PsyOps and 97% of Civil

Affairs are in Reserve Component. By active duty Marine SOFs assuming these

missions, it will reduce the mismatch.

- Improve the national *HUMINT* capability. SOF community knows too well that

    the national *technical* means of intelligence collection does not suffice.[94]

    Marine SOF engaged in these missions will contribute to the HUMINT

    capabilities.

It is no secret that many Marines oppose the Marine Corps' involvement with

Special Operations Command. They argue that the inherent capabilities of the MAGTFs

are sufficient to face the conventional and unconventional threats. Although it was

shown in section 1 that Marine MAGTFs do possess *most* of the capabilities required to

address the aforementioned threats, they do not posses them all. By assuming these new

capabilities, the Marine Corps will be better prepared to face these asymmetric threats.

The synergies of both SOF and MAGTFS can better meet the dynamic challenges of

insurgency warfare. The Marine Corps has already proven that it can generate qualitative

Marine Special Forces fairly quickly by recruiting from the existing and experienced non-

commissioned officers. The Marine Corps should therefore continue this approach to

capitalize on its strengths. There is no sense engaging in a fight with one hand tied

behind our back.

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[93] James Locher, "Special Operations Forces," in *The United States Army: challenges and Missions for the 1990s*, ed. Robert Pfaltzgraff and Richard Shultz, (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1991), 140.
[94] Ibid., 139

4 - TYING IN WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

"We need to train our officers and leaders for a different kind of mission out there. I don't need someone who is only good at killing and breaking, I need somebody that has the breadth of education experience and intellect to take on all the rest of these missions that he or she is going to be saddled with when the shooting stops or when it subsides to some level."[95]

General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Retired

As previously stated before, insurgency threats require a political-military approach that capitalizes on the political, psychological, informational and economic instruments of national power. As such, the next focus will be on linking the Marine Corps with the sources of economic power that can also have a psychological effect on the populace: the link with the NGO community. Additionally, this section will also briefly examine an alternative to increasing the Marine's CA capability by exploring the civilianization of CA roles and missions to the private sector.

The NGO Link

It is no surprise that most Marine Corps Officers know very little about Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Aside from the select few officers that have attained first hand real-world experience dealing with NGOs, the only formal instruction about NGOs that Marine Officers receive is from the limited curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. This curriculum entails only a 1.5-hour lecture, a 2-hour seminar, and three reading assignments totaling 21 pages.[96]   Even more

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[95] "How Do We Overhaul the Nation's Defense to Win the Next War?" (accessed January 23, 2004); available from http://www.mca-usniforum.org/

[96] USMC Command & Staff Course Syllabus, *Military Interaction with Non-Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations,* 21 May 2002, Pg. 87.

confounding is that even fewer hours of instruction are devoted to the other government agencies: There is a 3-hour lecture and one-hour seminar devoted to the topic of *Agencies*.[97] Major Jason Climer, in his thesis titled "*The NGO Liaison Officer Course: Effective Integration of Civil-Military Operations*, clearly argues that little interagency cooperation exists, especially when it deals with the military and NGOs.[98] As a solution, he proposes establishing an NGO Liaison Officer Course program of instruction for the entry, career, and intermediate levels associated with the ranks of 2nd Lieutenant, Captain and Major, respectively. This author agrees with this insightful recommendation but would take it a step further by recommending that the career and intermediate level schools (e.g. the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Warfare School and Command & Staff College) allow a handful of NGO representatives to attend these schools as visiting students that participate in an abbreviated curriculum applicable to civil military operations. This will provide an interactive exchange between representatives of these two organizations in an academic environment. In addition with complying with the intent of improving interagency cooperation outlined in PDD-56, it would also capitalize on an issue recognized as one of the most valuable benefits of attending a resident PME school: learning from fellow student peers and building the network of "connections" that become critically important in future service operations. Thus, this academic environment provides a forum where these diverse groups study a curriculum of mutual interests; it increases the understanding of their institutions, and builds networks that can be called upon during future civil-military operations.

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[97] USMC Command & Staff Course Syllabus, *Agencies,* 21 May 2002, 337.
[98] Major Jason Climer, "The NGO Liaison Officer Course: Effective Integration of Civil-Military Operations" GMAP Thesis, Tufts University, 2003, 5.

A Civil Affairs Alternative

An alternative to increasing the size of the Marine Corps' CA force structure is to work with the State Department to increase the "civilianization" of the civil affairs missions. A current example of this is the local governance contracting of Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq. Under this contract, RTI is responsible for implementing the Iraq Local Governance Project (LGP) in Iraq's 18 national governorates.

The LGP is a capacity-building project that aims to improve the quality of governance in Iraq's governorates, cities, and towns in order to bring concrete improvements to the quality of life of Iraqi citizens. In close cooperation with Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) personnel and military civil affairs officers, LGP representatives work in the field to build the capacities of both government institutions and civil society organizations while fostering democratic dialogue on policy issues and partnerships for their implementation.

This project has been successful. Within 2 weeks of signing the USAID contract, RTI deployed an advance team to Iraq to lay the logistical and technical foundation for the project. Since then, RTI has set up offices in 17 of the 18 total governorates, deployed over 200 professional staff from 33 countries and hired approximately 800 Iraqis. In fulfilling the USAID contract, RTI has been making progress in:

- Increased access to basic services.

- More transparent and participatory public policy making and local governance.

- More effective local services.

- More effective advocacy and participation of civil society organizations in local government.[99]

Another beneficial point regarding the civilianization of civil affairs projects is that companies such as RTI are required to provide their own force protection. This means they do not encumber or bog down the military forces with a security force requirements and more importantly, they are able to maintain a sense of "neutrality" by not being associated with the military forces, which may lead to enhanced credibility with the local populace.

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[99] RTI: "RTI in the Field", RTI Home Page (accessed 26 March 2004); available from http://www.rti.org/index.cfm

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Marine Corps provides the nation a military force capable of responding to various types of crises. The Marine Corp's inherent MAGTF structure, capable of supporting a rapidly deployable and expeditionary force ranging in size from an ACM to MEF, can greatly enhance this nation's crisis response capabilities. These capabilities provide myriad options to national leaders desiring to use the military instrument to attain national objectives. Applying those Marine specific capabilities to the Snyder Diesing Model demonstrated their possible applicability to phases of a crisis and respective utility in each phase. The Marine Corps has played an instrumental role in addressing crises of the past and historical examples as well as the current international setting demonstrate that it will continue to be engaged in future crises.

An analysis of the current international and domestic Iraqi settings, historical precedents, as well as the specific insurgent threat in Iraq all indicate that this or other similar threats will continue to exist in the future. As such, the findings in this paper indicate that the Marine Corps can greatly improve its counterinsurgency capabilities by fine-tuning its CA, PsyOps, and SOF structure and missions. Increasing the CA units and manpower, creating a PsyOps company and detachments, and expanding the missions of the newly established Marine SOFs to include PsyOps, Civil Affairs, and Combating Terrorism will undoubtedly posture the Marine Corps to better face future crises involving insurgencies and other similar forms of LICs reliant on political and psychological instruments.

Opponents of these recommendations may cite that the Marine Corps will not need these extra capabilities because, as they say, "by the time these forces are fielded, the current Iraqi crisis may well be over." Another reason cited may be that the cost of these additional CA and PsyOps is difficult to justify as it goes against the Network Centric Warfare concept of reducing our reliance on manpower in favor of less expensive and (arguably) more reliable technological force.

The Marine Corps' extensive involvement in small wars throughout its history as well as its current involvement in Iraq and possible involvement in Haiti clearly validate the need to fine-tune these Marine Corps capabilities that are lacking and have been proven as "force multipliers" in attaining the critically important *political* objectives associated with insurgency warfare. The associated costs of this fine-tuning process should not be a deterrent. The Marine Corps accounts for only about 4 to 5% of the entire DoD budget yet provides a major role in managing this nation's crises through its expeditionary and scalable MAGTF capabilities. The roughly $33.5 million needed to add an additional 620 capable CA and PsyOps Marines should be considered a small price to pay for exponentially increasing the Marine Corps counterinsurgency capabilities. As previously stated, why should the Marine Corps engage in a fight or assist in establishing security in nations with one hand tied behind its back? Max Boot is correct when he quotes the Roman writer Vegetius's advice in reference to the United States' preparations for future small wars that include counterinsurgencies: "*Qui desiderat pacem, preparet bellum*." (Let him who desires peace, prepare for war).[100]

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[100] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 351.

Thus, the Marine Corps should fine-tune its counterinsurgency capabilities to better

prepare for these types of small wars – the current international setting and history tell us

that these small wars will recur.

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