
TOWARD THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE ELITE PRESS

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Influential members of the American media, including Walter Lippmann, James Reston, and Joseph and Stewart Alsop, opened a creative dialogue with the Truman Administration, gently prodding the State Department into a dramatic revision of American foreign policy that led to the Marshall Plan. But the success of these prominent journalists was not limited to an effective campaign of public pressure. Elite columnists injected a stream of original ideas into the popular discourse, catalyzed debate within the foreign policy establishment, and transmitted the administration's appraisal of the international situation to the American public. Much of the credit for suggesting a European-initiated recovery plan and a consolidated European deficit properly resides with the U.S. media. While the importance of German recovery largely eluded the press corps, it readily adopted into its commentary the State Department's recommendation that the offer of American assistance include all of Europe. Through a fruitful alliance with the foreign policy establishment, prominent columnists made their influence felt in the formulation of the Marshall Plan.

The First Stirrings

As early as April 1946, journalists Joseph and Stewart Alsop championed a European union, a *leitmotif* of later Marshall Plan strategy. During this same period, Walt W. Rostow of the State Department's German and Austrian Division concluded that German reunification could not be achieved without the economic integration of Europe. Despite the enthusiastic support of Un-

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dersecretaries of State Dean Acheson and William Clayton, Rostow initially won few converts.

Among his most ardent defenders, however, was a vocal group of junior State Department officers, including Harold Van B. Cleveland, Charles P. Kindleberger and Benjamin Moore. Alarmed by the partition of Europe, they called for a comprehensive political settlement that would promote an integrated economic and political order. They argued that American aid, if extended to the Soviet bloc as well as Western Europe, would dissolve the Iron Curtain, allay Russian security concerns, and encourage the development of a multilateral system of world trade. While such a scheme promised to contain Germany, they maintained, it also recognized her importance to general European recovery. Administered under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, American relief could give rise to a unified, peaceful and prosperous Europe. Although these junior officials clearly hoped that integration might lead to a settlement with the Russians, leading policymakers came to view it as a means of stitching together the states of Western Europe into an anti-Soviet coalition. Partly in response to a series of articles by journalist James Reston, the junior officials began to compose a memorandum expressing their inchoate ideas. Although this document was not completed until June 1947, an annotated outline was widely circulated much earlier.¹

Planning in the War Department had begun to favor immigration. Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel advocated supranational control of the Ruhr Valley, Germany's industrial center. International supervision of this region, he believed, would smooth the integration of the German and French economies and perhaps give rise to a wider European union. While enterprising officers like Bonesteel pondered the future of Europe, domestic political events continued apace.²

The Dialogue Begins in Earnest

President Truman's March 12, 1947 address on aid to Greece and Turkey was warmly received by most of the press corps. Emerging as a dominant theme in much of the commentary, however, was the need for a more careful definition of American interests, including a study of the European question. Although the *Washington Post* hailed American assistance to the two eastern Mediterranean states as a boon to democracy, it cautioned against excessive optimism. Greece and Turkey were just a "starter" to the spread of American aid worldwide. Columnist Walter Lippmann asserted that the Truman administration should circumscribe American commitments by means of a "unified strategical conception" that channeled American "power, prestige, money, and expertness" where it was most urgently required. Journalist Marquis Childs suggested that the United States determine its capacity to help the world and then prioritize the demands placed upon it according to the severity of the needs. The *London Times* predicted that further efforts of the same kind might

be necessary. The *New York Times*, *U.S. News and World Report*, *Time* and *Newsweek* soon added their voices to the swelling chorus of praise for the Truman Doctrine, deepening public interest in a more extensive transformation of American foreign policy.³

Many commentators, including Lippmann, criticized Truman for his truculent language and anti-communist rhetoric. The President's speech, they argued, was likely to further embitter relations with the Soviet Union.⁴

Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace considered American assistance to Greece and Turkey to be the first step on the road to war with the USSR. In a radio address delivered on March 13, he endorsed a worldwide reconstruction program that included the Soviet bloc. Like Lippmann, Wallace condemned the President's dismissal of the United Nations as an ineffective means of promoting stability in the eastern Mediterranean.⁵

Henry A. Wallace deserves mention because of the unusual attention accorded him by the elite press. In a letter to the *London Times*, journalist Joseph Alsop and historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. assailed the former Vice President's pro-Soviet sympathies, arguing that Wallace was neither the heir of Franklin Roosevelt nor the standard-bearer of American progressivism. Earning sharp criticism even from the usually good-natured journalist James Reston, Wallace was to strain the patience of many in Congress and the State Department.⁶

Nevertheless, the President's detractors, including Wallace, offered the State Department several valuable lessons. An anti-Communist crusade was not likely to enjoy the broad support of the American public; consequently, future American assistance had to be directed not against the Soviet bloc but toward the states of Western Europe. Nor could the administration afford to discount the world's newest security organization.⁷ If the United Nations were to prove unable to oversee European reconstruction, responsibility for its failure would rest squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.⁸ Suggested in the study undertaken by Harold Van B. Cleveland, Benjamin Moore and others, these ideas quickly hardened into concrete policy recommendations in the columns of elite journalists and eventually in the seminal memorandum of the Policy Planning Staff.⁹

Even as Truman pledged his support for aid to Greece and Turkey, the administration began to consider additional measures. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson recommended a study of the European question by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in a memorandum of March 5. In the course of earlier discussions, the undersecretary recalled, officials had concluded that the Greek and Turkish debacle was "only part of a much larg-

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er problem" arising from the decline of British power and the economic weakness of Europe.¹⁰

Responding to Acheson's request, Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring authorized on March 17 the creation of an ad hoc committee of the SWNCC to explore policy options. The new body was to consider "aid... analogous to the Greek-Turkish program" for potential recipients of American relief in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Groping uncertainly for a new direction in American foreign policy, the State Department had yet to define

the scope and character of American assistance. But the right questions had been posed, and an answer of visionary proportions soon began to take shape.¹¹

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On March 19, journalists James Reston and Joseph Alsop predicted dramatic moves to implement the administration's new policy in the eastern Mediterranean. In a column published in the *Washington Post* the following day, Walter Lippmann called for a comprehensive political settlement establishing a European economic union. A fresh consideration of the German and Italian reparations problem indicated that only the American economy, relatively untouched by the recent war, could underwrite their indemnities and forestall a European collapse. Europe, including Germany, had to be viewed as an "economic unit."¹²

Lippmann believed that American aid, administered under the aegis of European supranational institutions, would pave the way for the eventual economic integration of Europe. The old European state system would be replaced by a Europeanized version of American

federalism. Not content with simple economic recovery, Lippmann hoped to recast the European order in America's image.¹³

Walter Lippmann was not alone in viewing economic integration as the cure for Europe's ills. Walt Rostow, Harold Van B. Cleveland and others within the State Department had already suggested a European economic union; John Foster Dulles had mentioned a similar idea in a speech on January 18, 1947. Carried by the intellectual currents within the policy establishment and the press, these ideas later resurfaced in Lippmann's column, the memoranda of the Policy Planning Staff and the recommendations of Undersecretary of State Will Clayton.¹⁴

While Lippmann's article did not reveal any new information, his "constructive and influential" ideas, recalls one State Department officer, sparked creative debate within the government.¹⁵ Lippmann's articles of March 13 and 20 underscored the need for a comprehensive program of American aid to

Europe and heightened general expectations of a new direction in American foreign policy.

Across the Atlantic, the London *Times* observed that the Greek and Turkish aid program marked a significant shift in American foreign policy. The United States, forced by circumstances to provide more generous support to the states of Western Europe, might at last assume permanent foreign responsibilities. Liberality in meeting Europe's needs, one commentator maintained, would prove the most farsighted strategy for American economic interests as well as European.¹⁶

At the same time, Britain's domestic woes remained the focus of most columnists there. The prospect of additional U.S. support was, on balance, rarely mentioned. Instead, British journalists spoke of further austerity measures and liquidation of the Empire.

Herbert Hoover Enters the Debate

On March 23 former President Herbert Hoover released a report on economic conditions in Germany and Austria. Only one path, he concluded, was open to European recovery—production. The "whole economy of Europe" was intertwined with the German economy "through the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods." Consequently, the European economy could not be revitalized without the restoration of Germany.¹⁷

While media commentary on the topic of German revitalization was infrequent, leading citizens quickly assumed a role of the elite press—that of "retailer" of the State Department's ideas. In late January 1947, John Foster Dulles, the Republican "shadow" secretary of state, had drawn a conclusion similar to Hoover's in a speech delivered to the National Publishers' Association. Within the government, Charles Kindleberger, Charles Bonesteel of the War Department, and several others had come to grasp the importance of German recovery.

The former president's thesis, while clearly not original, exercised a profound influence upon the thinking of leading policymakers, particularly George Kennan, future director of the Policy Planning Staff. A week after the publication of the Hoover report the elite press resumed their offensive.¹⁸

In an article of March 30 entitled "France Isn't Lost to Reds Yet," columnist Joseph Alsop appealed for additional assistance to America's wartime ally. Economic recovery was the best means of restoring the health of French political life. Undue American thrift would "play directly into Communists' hands." Though Alsop viewed the International Bank as the most probable source of credit, he acknowledged that further bilateral loans might also be necessary.¹⁹

Alsop understood that post-war economic dislocation had produced social turmoil and political radicalism that threatened the democracies of Western Europe. Consequently, strategies that merely offered military and political support to the states of Europe were bound to fail. To loosen the grip of domestic Communist parties, he acknowledged, it was necessary to undermine the real basis of their strength—economic discontent.

Alsop's reasoning was hardly original; indeed, by July it had become quite commonplace. His article reflected the prevailing climate of opinion rather than opening new intellectual vistas to members of the State Department. But his column, like those of many other journalists, intensified the public's demand for an innovative foreign policy. "By the middle of May," claimed State Department official Joseph Jones, "the tide of public expectation" would become "so high that it was no longer a question of whether the United States would aid Europe but when and how the initiative would be taken."²⁰

The Dialogue Intensifies

Less than a week after the publication of the Alsop column, an article pregnant with future importance appeared in the *Washington Post*. Warning of an impending financial crisis in "Cassandra Speaking," Walter Lippmann proposed a peacetime Lend-Lease program and the full economic federation of Europe. None of Europe's leading countries—Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany—were recovering from the war or had any prospect of doing so with the means at their disposal. They had staved off the collapse of their currencies and standards of living not by successful production, but through the use of dwindling foreign reserves. Great Britain in particular would probably be forced to withdraw from Western Germany, leaving the United States face to face with the Soviets at the heart of a continent which "dreads more than anything else the prospect of being used as the arena of conflict between Russia and America." It was evident that "political and economic measures on a scale which no responsible statesman has as yet hinted at" would be necessary in the next year. "To prevent the crisis which will otherwise engulf Europe and spread chaos throughout the world, the measure will have to be very large—in Europe no less than an economic union, and over here no less than the equivalent to a peacetime revival of Lend-Lease."²¹

Lippmann, notes Joseph Jones, had not offered any new policy thinking. But he had informed both the American public and the entire State Department staff of his own estimate of an adequate remedy for European ills: peacetime Lend-Lease and European economic integration. Moreover, Lippmann's article was mentioned when Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson drafted his Mississippi Delta Council address.²²

Joseph Jones underscores Walter Lippmann's "highly significant role in the progress of policy thinking" during the fifteen week period when American policymakers formulated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Although officialdom chafed under the columnist's pointed criticisms, Lippmann encouraged debate within the State Department. His dialogue with the Administration, remarks Jones, loosed a torrent of creativity, encouraging top officers toward broader thought, enlarging the scope of what was regarded as possible, and arming lesser officials with a lever to prod their superiors on specific approaches.²³

The journalist's influence was also felt in Europe. Reaping hefty dividends

from his acquaintance with John Miller, London *Times* correspondent in Washington, Lippmann disseminated his ideas across the Atlantic. During the fifteen weeks, his name frequently appeared on the editorial page of Britain's most widely circulated newspaper. The "olympian voice" of Walter Lippmann, as one *Times* editorial writer characterized it, echoed loudly in articles such as "Lend-Lease in Peace."²⁴

At the same time, the gaze of the London *Times* was remarkably introverted during this period. Columns addressing Britain's bleak economy rarely called for additional American help or mentioned the more severe economic distress of the continent. On the whole, journalists offered the advice of hoping for the best, but planning for the worst. As an editorial in the *Times* later remarked, the debate over what came to be known as the Marshall Plan remained a thoroughly American affair.²⁵

The State Department Responds

Over the years, Walter Lippmann had established an intricate network of social and professional connections, consolidating ties with government officials, citizen leaders, and, of course, fellow journalists. Lippmann's intimates in the media included James Reston, Marquis Childs, John Miller and Joseph Harsch of NBC News. He was acquainted with the Alsops and with Arthur Krock of the *Washington Post*, whom he disliked.²⁶

Members of this exclusive group had several traits in common. They maintained a high level of interaction with one another and enjoyed access to information and individuals not commonly available to the popular press. On the day of his return from a foreign trip, for instance, Lippmann would invariably host a small dinner so that his friends in media could fill him in on events that took place during his absence. They also wielded considerable influence with both the American public and the foreign policy establishment.

In an article of April 12 the columnist warned of strategic overstretch, again urging the United States to concentrate its resources and energies at the most vital points. The "vast and indeterminate responsibilities of the Truman Doctrine," he contended, threatened to dissipate American strength. While the prospect of European economic collapse was becoming more real, the administration had yet to submit even a "tentative general estimate" of the funds necessary for European reconstruction.²⁷

Though strategically important, Lippmann believed Greece and Turkey were geographically peripheral. European hegemony turned upon control of France, Italy, and, most importantly, Germany. In order to frustrate Soviet designs on Western and Central Europe, Lippmann maintained the United States needed to place economic aid in the service of a well-defined strategic objective. American financial assistance could be used to retool the European economy and consolidate the hold of democratic institutions on the states of Western Europe. European political and military strength, in turn, would forestall Soviet expansion.²⁸

Adopting this theme from the Truman administration, the elite press served as both the arbiter of popular opinion and as the State Department's intellec-

tual conduit to the American people. The same articles that circulated the views of policymakers also brought public pressure to bear on the government.

Deliberations within the foreign policy establishment maintained a brisk pace. On April 17 a State Department memorandum reported the preliminary findings of the SWNCC Ad Hoc Committee. Italy and possibly Hungary and

Austria required further American assistance. France's financial needs, however, could be met by "existing financial institutions, particularly the International Bank." Prior commitments would likely sustain other countries at least through 1948.²⁹

While the Committee underlined the need for additional American outlays, it scarcely espoused a dramatic revision of U.S. foreign policy. The scope of proposed American aid was clearly limited and the method of disbursement hardly innovative. At best, the administration had taken a very tentative step toward the Marshall Plan.

On the same day that the SWNCC memo began to circulate within the State Department, a prominent journalist continued his attempts to spark concerns about the future of Europe. Writing for the April 17 edition of the *New York Times*, James Reston chided Congress for permitting former Vice President Henry Wallace to derail intelligent foreign policy debate. The economic

chaos of Europe, generally conceded to be the real ally of Communism, had been thrust aside by partisan bickering. The journalist noted that Congressman Christian Herter, championing a "longer and wider view" of American foreign policy, had introduced legislation authorizing the creation of a Select Committee on Foreign Aid.³⁰

Reston lauded Herter's efforts to foster a broader view of foreign policy among legislators, betraying his own sympathy for a more comprehensive perspective on international affairs. Expenditures abroad, the journalist well knew, were generally handled on an *ad hoc* basis. Like Lippmann, he pressed the State Department to link aid disbursements to concrete foreign policy objectives. Staunchly defending a prominent theme of the later SWNCC report, Reston asserted that economic assistance was properly viewed as a single component of an overarching geopolitical strategy.³¹

While the media elite occasionally articulated a completely original suggestion, the current of ideas generally flowed both to and from the foreign policy establishment. This peculiar symbiosis afforded policymakers the opportunity to voice nascent ideas and gauge the climate of popular opinion, while members of the press acquired an exclusive scoop. The consummate insider,

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Reston frequently served as the administration's unofficial spokesman, conveying to the general public the State Department's estimate of international conditions. The final paragraph of Reston's April 17 article attests as much to this mediating role as to the status of policy planning. "Much more than has been appearing in the news," he remarked, "many officials in the United States government are concerned about the decline of Britain and Western Europe. Most of them are convinced that the loans already made to these countries will not see them through the reconstruction period."³²

Charles Kindleberger observes in his whimsical account of the period that, "In my book, Scotty [James] Reston gets a great deal of credit for initiating the Marshall Plan." Over frequent lunches with the journalist, Dean Acheson or George Kennan would allude to the Truman administration's latest attempts to address the European problem. On days following the meetings, articles by Reston appearing in the *New York Times* would outline the general thrust of policy planning. Members of the administration would then redouble their efforts. In this way, Kindleberger avers, Reston assumed the part of an unofficial liaison man within the State Department.³³

On April 17, Walter Lippmann argued in his column in the *Washington Post* that any offer of American aid had to be extended to all of Europe. The columnist also mentioned in passing the significance of German economic vitality. The "great error of previous policy," he declared, was to attempt to forge a "European settlement without the Europeans." It was crucial that the United States "proceed with the Russians if possible, without them if necessary—never excluding their allies from equal benefits and equality of position, yet refusing to wait and do nothing for ourselves *if they choose to exclude themselves*."³⁴

The United States, Lippmann averred, could not bear responsibility for the partition of the European continent; rather, culpability for a divided Europe had to reside with Moscow. Above all, American foreign policy could not become an ideological crusade. An economic plan intended to assemble the components of an anti-Soviet bloc was doomed to failure, for it would not enjoy the broad support of the American public. Nor was such a program likely to be popular with many Europeans.³⁵

It was imperative, Lippmann believed, that the United States ease Soviet anxieties, not deepen animosity. He hoped that the lure of generous financial support would persuade the Russians to permit Eastern Europeans to join the proposed economic union. The withdrawal of the Red Army would secure European independence and curtail European strife, ushering in a new era of international cooperation.³⁶

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Lippmann's vision was at once supremely crafty and hopelessly fanciful. The Soviet Union was unlikely to divest itself of its new satellites or loosen its grip on Eastern Germany, even if compensated by similar American withdrawals in the west. Marxist ideology, combined with the shift in the balance of forces following the war, clearly dictated the westward expansion of communism.

Dangling the bait of economic aid before the Soviets might have elicited a different response. Russia continued to stagger under the impact of World War II, and the economy of Eastern Europe lay in tatters. Clearly, the benefits of American relief would have been welcomed in Moscow. In the future, the Soviets were to dally with participation in the Marshall Plan, although For-

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Shattered by ideology and conflicting national interests, Allied solidarity, like European unity, was little more than a platitude by the spring of 1947. Nevertheless, Lippmann understood that Soviet, not American, actions had to formally consolidate the European spheres of influence. The idea traces its origins not to Lippmann's columns, however, but to those junior members of the State Department mentioned above. It later resurfaced in two memoranda issued by the Policy Planning Staff and in Secretary of State Marshall's Harvard Commencement Address.³⁷

Four days after the publication of Lippmann's article, the Truman administration took a crucial step toward the Marshall Plan. On April 21 the SWNCC Ad Hoc Committee detailed its fi-

nal conclusions in a seminal memorandum appealing for an "orderly and comprehensive program" of American aid. "Positive, forehanded, and preventative action" was required to stem the tide of political turmoil and economic dislocation. "Needs for assistance" would likely outstrip "currently estimated availabilities."³⁸

Ranking the likely requests for American relief, the Committee identified eight nations imperiled by instability. The integrity of Greece, Turkey, Iran, Italy, Korea, France, Austria and Hungary were seriously threatened; at lesser risk were Great Britain, the Benelux countries, Portugal, the Philippines, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The SWNCC highlighted the need to channel American resources where they were most urgently required by means of a carefully considered system of priorities. Repeating an idea advocated by both the elite press and the government, the study mandated that future economic assistance further America's strategic interests.³⁹

The European situation in particular, noted the framers of the memorandum, demanded an imaginative response that would promote "economic sta-

bility and the type of world trading system" that was the object of U.S. policy. Contemporary economic theory predicted that as each country strained to maximize its particular comparative advantage, production levels would rise and disparities in national income would gradually diminish. As a consequence of the expected boom, the United States would secure stable, open markets capable of absorbing her growing quantity of manufactures; overproduction would no longer threaten the American economy.⁴⁰

The origins of the Marshall Plan can be traced to the SWNCC Memo as well as to the columns of prominent journalists and the innovative suggestions of Harold Van B. Cleveland, Walt Rostow, Benjamin Moore and several other junior State Department officers. While the committee envisaged a coordinated program of American assistance, the German question had not received an adequate response. Nor had anyone above the assistant secretary level as yet given official sanction to the committee's findings.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the SWNCC Memorandum had revolutionary implications. Moving forward uncertainly, the committee took an intellectual step that was to influence the thinking of leading officials, including George Kennan.⁴²

Over the following weeks, the elite press renewed its plea for additional relief, deepening popular zeal for a further departure from traditional policy. Writing for the April 22 edition of the *Washington Post*, Walter Lippmann underscored the need to transform American opposition to Soviet expansion into an effective plan of action. The United States, agreed Joseph Alsop six days later, had to come to Europe's aid. These journalists recognized that efforts to redress a full-blown European crisis would have to be larger and even more dangerous.⁴³

The Dialogue Matures

George Marshall could not have agreed more. Exposure to the devastation wrought by World War II deeply affected the American secretary of state. Returning from the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference during the last week of April, Marshall spoke continually of the need to do something to save Europe. "The patient is sinking," he remarked in an address of April 28, "while the doctors deliberate. We cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay."⁴⁴

Lippmann elaborated on this theme in an article published on May 1 in the *Washington Post*. Occasioned by Marshall's return, Lippmann's column helped to shape the contours of thought in the State Department. In this remarkable article the journalist suggested two key features of the Marshall Plan: European initiative for a common plan of reconstruction and a consolidated European deficit.

Because the Russians had proven uncooperative, Lippman reasoned, unilateral American aid was in order. Piecemeal assistance, however, would be a mere palliative, and bilateral loans would also be unlikely to yield satisfacto-

ry results. The United States should "suggest to [the European countries] that they meet together, agree on a general European program of production and exchange, of imports to the outer world, and that they arrive at an estimate of the consolidated deficit for as much of Europe as can agree on a common plan." Not only would such a program relieve suffering, it would "serve as a premium and inducement to the unification of Europe" as well. If aid were "undertaken in the spirit of an anti-communist crusade," however, its chances of success were "negligible."⁴⁵

Were Lippmann's recommendations truly original, or was he merely acting as a "retailer" for the administration? Joseph Jones, aide to Assistant Secretary of State Benton, later wrote that the journalist's "proposal that the Euro-

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pean countries be asked to get together and agree upon a common recovery program and present us with a consolidated deficit was, so far as this writer can discover, original." Moreover, these ideas did not appear in any official document in *The Foreign Relations of the United States* until the Policy Planning Staff Memorandum of May 23, twenty-two days after Lippmann first suggested them in his column.⁴⁶

Could a member of the State Department have divulged his thoughts to the journalist privately? George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff, recalls that during this period Lippmann made a significant contribution to his thinking. Finally, strikingly similar language was used in the Staff Memorandum and the Lippmann article. The Policy Planning Staff report was to call for "a joint request from a group of friendly nations," concluding that "the formal initiative must come from Europe, and the Eu-

ropeans must bear the basic responsibility" for the program. This quotation bears very close resemblance to the *Washington Post* column both in form and content.⁴⁷

Each of these facts is highly suggestive in its own right. Considered as a whole they seem conclusive. Clearly, Walter Lippmann had articulated several of the basic ideas of the Marshall Plan, timing his suggestion to have the maximum psychological impact. Advocates of European union within the State Department suddenly found superiors more attentive and, significantly, their memoranda no longer relegated to the back of filing cabinets. Lippmann's article also helped to stir the forces of American popular opinion, creating a spirit of genuine urgency among the general public.⁴⁸ Most importantly, the columnist's ideas seem to have fired the imagination of the head of the new Policy Planning Staff.

George Kennan had been given two weeks in which to formulate a solution to Europe's difficulties, his only words of advice from the secretary of state a

terse "Avoid trivia." To help shoulder the burden of this enormous task, Kennan assembled a cast of characters including Carleton Savage, personal assistant to Cordell Hull; Ware Adams, a foreign service officer; Jacques Reinstein, an economist; Joseph Johnson, a State Department officer; and Colonel Charles Hatwell "Tick" Bonesteel III, a member of the War Department.⁴⁹ Acrimonious debate rocked the circle from the outset, driving Kennan to "an intellectual agony more intensive" than anything in his previous experience. On one occasion discussion grew so intense that, to recover his composure, Kennan left the room and walked, weeping, around the entire building. The Staff, hoping to weave together the disparate threads of foreign policy thought into a coherent whole, drew heavily upon the SWNCC study, State Department consultants, the elite press, Dean Acheson's Delta Council speech, and the ideas of Walt Rostow, Charles Kindleberger and other junior officers.

While the newest policymaking organ of the State Department began deliberation, the elite press continued to sound a familiar appeal.⁵⁰ In a series of articles appearing in the *Washington Post*, Stewart Alsop called for additional American credits to Great Britain. The erosion of the British economy, he argued, threatened attempts to contain Soviet power. A financial collapse would compel the British government to reduce its international commitments, divorce its foreign policy from that of the United States, and appease the Soviet Union. Thus deprived of its ally, an isolated America would remain the sole counterweight to Russian strength.⁵¹

Alsop's thesis voiced popular thought in the State Department and the elite press. Dean Acheson had remarked in his memorandum of March 5 that the Greek and Turkish debates highlighted the decline in Britain's geopolitical status. Lippmann had defended a similar idea in his column. Less than two weeks after the publication of Stewart Alsop's articles, the preliminary report of the Policy Planning Staff was to urge that the United States tie foreign aid to a "solution to Britain's difficulties."⁵²

During the same period, the Truman administration was far from silent. George Kennan maintained an arduous lecture schedule, stressing the importance of German recovery in an address delivered on May 6 to the War College. "The vigorous rehabilitation of the German economy," he advised, had to "be made the primary object of our policy." The revival of European prosperity hinged upon the successful reintegration of Germany into broader European patterns of trade and manufacture. Reemerging in the Policy Planning Staff Memorandum of May 23, the ideas of Herbert Hoover, John Foster Dulles, Charles Kindleberger and Charles Bonesteel had at last begun to crystallize

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into policy. The following day, another member of the State Department elaborated upon the administration's assessment of the European problem.⁵³

Walter Lippmann's articles, a contemporary later recalled, were influential in deliberations leading to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson's pivotal speech in Cleveland, Mississippi May 8. When asked by the President to take

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his place at a gathering of the Delta Council, Acheson good-naturedly accepted, suggesting "the disintegration of Europe" as a possible topic for his speech.⁵⁴

Painting in dark hues the developing crisis in Europe, Dean Acheson called for further emergency financing to bridge the growing "dollar gap"—the difference in the value of European imports and exports. He noted that European agricultural production had plummeted, financial reserves were evaporating at an alarming pace and manufacturing had all but ground to a halt. "Long-established business and trading connections" had dissolved during the war, shaking the system of world trade upon which American prosperity rested. In contrast, the United States had emerged from the war unscathed, commanding a disproportionate share of the world's industrial might. There could be "no doubt" about the principal source of funding for European reconstruction. Although re-

lief was America's "duty and privilege," national self-interest also demanded an innovative policy.⁵⁵

The Delta Council speech reflected the progress of the policy debate in the State Department. Dean Acheson peddled no panacea for the ills of European society, for the simple reason that the administration had yet to hammer out a concrete proposal. Hardly the midwife of the Marshall Plan, maintains Charles Kindleberger, the address made no reference to a "specific program" nor even suggested "who should draw one up." Instead, Acheson hoped to "shock the country into facing a growing crisis."⁵⁶

More importantly, the undersecretary's address revealed the motives that underlay the American quest for a new European order. Acheson's humanitarian appeals were clearly intended to touch the idealism of the American people. At the same time, American altruism was tempered by considerations of national security and economic well-being. Acheson maintained that the United States had to expand the global zone of free trade to include the Europeans, leveling the national barriers that had long plagued the world economy. Significantly, he failed to specifically address the Soviet menace in his speech, revealing the administration's new emphasis upon European economic vitality. Yet despite this omission, strategic concerns weighed heavily on his mind; the undersecretary had come to view a dynamic European economy

as the most effective weapon in the Western arsenal. Although Dean Acheson was eager to gauge the public temper through his speech rather than offer a remedy for Europe's economic problems, his call for further American aid to Europe was quickly answered.⁵⁷

Writing for the May 9 edition of the *New York Times*, James Reston identified a radical shift in the direction of American foreign policy. Citing Acheson's Delta Council speech as evidence, the journalist argued that the Truman administration had chosen to redirect its energies toward the "positive economic problems" of European reconstruction. Moreover, the columnist claimed that, "There is far more apprehension in high quarters about the possible economic collapse of the economy of Western Europe than has been acknowledged in the last few months. The private talk among our officials," he continued, "has been how the United States can help get industrial democratic Europe on its feet as a unit strong enough to trade with the United States and block Soviet expansion."⁵⁸

Highlighting his role as the State Department's intellectual pipeline to the American public, Reston's article conveyed the foreign policy establishment's analysis of the European problem to the American people. Top officials clearly used the journalist to make their case to the American public. Reston and other members of the elite press were, of course, paid in the coin of banner headlines for their trouble.

The Delta Council address, Joseph Alsop maintained, reflected a deepening awareness in Washington of the need for action. "The warning signals," Walter Lippmann agreed, "have been raised while there is still time to avert a collapse." But little time remained in which to "prepare the measures that the situation, outlined by Mr. Acheson, will unavoidably require."

While American columnists tried to enlist the aid of the public, British journalists were less intent on inflaming popular passions.⁵⁹ Capturing the introspective tone of the British press during the fifteen weeks, the London *Times's* response to the Acheson speech was subdued. "The long debate," commented an editorial, "to which Mr. Acheson's speech gives a new and urgent turn must remain an American affair." The British government and press were not about to agonize over a decision that could only be taken by the United States.

Meanwhile, the American media maintained its dialogue with the administration.⁶⁰ In a May 11 column entitled "Europe's Broken Economy Challenges U. S.: More Aid Held Necessary to Block Communism," James Reston repeated a now familiar refrain. "Unless Europe is reconstructed at whatever cost," the journalist asserted, "Soviet communism cannot be stopped, American capitalism cannot employ its people...[and] an orderly, strong community of democratic states [cannot begin to coalesce]."⁶¹ Reston's article accentuated the

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bewildering jumble of motives behind the Marshall Plan, appealing in turn to strategic interests, economic concerns, and idealistic impulses. Once the administration began to take action, the press continued its role of public educator, untangling for the American populace the reasoning behind the State Department's pronouncements.

One such expositor of American diplomacy offered his advice to the foreign policy establishment in articles of May 13 and 17. Writing for the *Washington Post*, Walter Lippmann renewed his plea for a consolidated European deficit and the economic integration of Europe. He contended, moreover, that a German settlement was possible only within the framework of a broader

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European agreement.⁶² Lippmann's scheme was not dissimilar to that of Walt Rostow. Both men were convinced that German reunification could not be achieved in the near future without the unity of Europe. While Lippman continued his discussions with the Truman administration, George Kennan's strenuous efforts began to bear fruit. A study by Cleveland, Moore and Kindleberger foreshadowed the notion that the Soviet bloc could not be excluded from a U.S. offer of aid. The idea quickly reappeared in the columns

of the elite press, and was soon given clear definition by two Policy Planning Staff memoranda, which enabled it to harden into policy in Marshall's Commencement Address.⁶³

On May 16 the Policy Planning Staff issued a memorandum reporting its preliminary findings. Assimilating the thoughts of the SWNCC, the elite press, and individual policymakers like Walt Rostow and Harold Van B. Cleveland, the Staff called for a "master program" of American assistance "designed to encourage some form of political association of Western European states." America's messianic drive to reshape the European order had again reasserted itself. While the scheme of American aid had to rest on "guarantees which will preclude communist sabotage," it was also necessary to "leav[e] the road open for Czechoslovakia and other states within the Russian orbit." The Policy Planning Staff had adopted an idea often repeated by the elite press and a group of junior officers within the State Department: the offer of American support could not exclude the Soviet bloc.⁶⁴

Less than two weeks later, the Policy Planning Staff echoed this theme in a memorandum to Secretary of State George Marshall. The stigma of a divided Europe, it contended, had to rest solidly with the Russians. American efforts should be "directed not to the combating of Communism as such but to the restoration of the economic health and vigor of European society." The Policy Planning Staff averred that it was "neither fitting nor efficacious" for the United States to impose a plan unilaterally on Europe. Rather, "the formal initiative must come from Europe; and the Europeans must bear the basic responsibility" of administering the program. Moreover, the appeal for American support had to come "as a joint request from a group of friendly nations."

Collective action would promote a new European consciousness, freeing the states of Europe from the narrow chauvinism of the past.⁶⁵

Walter Lippmann, of course, had been the first to suggest a consolidated European deficit and a European-initiated recovery program. The notion of a "new" Europe, on the other hand, enjoys a history at once richer and complex. Walt Rostow had defended a European union as early as 1946. Cleveland, Moore, Bonesteel, Clayton and others soon joined the ranks of the faithful. By the spring of 1947, leading citizens and elite journalists rallied around the banner of European integration, lending support to advocates of European union within the State Department. Their agitation eventually won the attention of top officials. By late May, the Policy Planning Staff noted the importance of "forcing the Europeans to begin to think like Europeans."⁶⁶

The Policy Planning Staff Memorandum also argued that the rehabilitation of the German economy was a vital component in the recovery of Europe as a whole. While media commentary on this theme during the fifteen weeks was at best sporadic, citizen leaders such as John Foster Dulles and Herbert Hoover ably marketed the idea. The memorandum drew quite heavily upon the earlier work of Charles Kindleberger and particularly of Charles Bonesteel, now a member of the Policy Planning Staff.⁶⁷ Finally, the Policy Planning Staff report asserted that American aid should be administered through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, a proposal first submitted by Cleveland, Moore and Kindleberger and later repeated at least in part by Lippmann and Henry Wallace. Together with the Clayton Memorandum of May 27, the report of the Policy Planning Staff framed the basic proposal of the Marshall Plan.⁶⁸

In the past, Undersecretary of State Will Clayton had balked at the prospect of additional piecemeal assistance to Europe. Nothing less than the full economic federation of Europe and a comprehensive program of American assistance in its support could quell political and economic distress across the Atlantic. It was "obvious," he noted in his memorandum, that American policymakers had "grossly underestimated" the damage to the European economy inflicted by World War II. An estimated \$6-7 billion in new aid per year was required to restore European self-confidence and check the effects of material poverty. Like the findings of the Policy Planning Staff, the Clayton memorandum incorporated ideas earlier defended by the elite press and the foreign policy establishment.⁶⁹

Despite the progressive character of Clayton's views on European integration, he proved unwilling to yield the reigns of power. "The United States," he asserted, "must run this show." In stark contrast to George Kennan and

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Walter Lippmann, the Undersecretary was wary of a program that would force the United States to assume a sizable financial burden without having direct control of the funds. In spite of his imposing persona, Clayton lost the debate.⁷⁰

Denouement

Eight days later on June 5, Secretary of State George Marshall delivered his historic address to the crowd gathered for Harvard's commencement exercises. The world situation, he began, was grim indeed. Undermining the "entire fabric of the European economy," the recent war had left in its wake a swath of physical devastation and economic dislocation. European reconstruction would require "a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen."

Since Europe's need over the next three or four years for imports of food and other essential products would dramatically exceed her ability to pay, "she must have substantial additional help." The United States should "do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world." The alternative was economic, social and political turmoil.

American policy, he continued, was not directed "against any nation or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." Its purpose was the creation of "political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

It was evident that there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid....The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.⁷¹

The dialogue of the past two months had ripened into policy. Gently goaded by the elite press, the Truman administration had at last committed American strategic resources to the economic and political restructuring of Europe. Marshall's speech entrusted the diplomatic initiative to the Europeans, carefully leaving the door to Soviet participation ajar. Calling for a common recovery plan, the Secretary of State hoped that European cooperation would hasten economic integration and encourage European unity. Like many prominent journalists, the framers of the Marshall Plan were intent not simply upon the restoration of the European system, but upon its radical transformation. Like Lippmann, they also believed that American aid was necessary to address the imbalance in the European configuration of forces.

The Marshall Plan speech encapsulated many of the ideas bandied about in the dialogue between the media elite and the State Department. It is not entirely clear which concepts arose within the popular discourse and which were conceived by the Truman administration. The testimony of George Kennan and Joseph Jones, however, seems to affirm the originality of two of Walter Lippmann's suggestions: a European-initiated reconstruction plan and a consolidated European deficit. When combined with an analysis of both the chronological record and the language of primary sources, it becomes apparent that Lippmann brought fresh thinking to the debate.

In contrast, the idea of an offer of American aid to all of Europe arose within the foreign policy establishment. Outlined in the study by Cleveland, Moore and Kindleberger, this notion was quickly adopted by the media elite. An important corollary—Russian responsibility for a divided Europe—enjoyed a similar origin.

Prominent journalists were far less sensitive to the significance of German economic recovery. Nevertheless, it was the media that served as the intellectual nexus tying the administration to the general public. A stream of articles assiduously cultivated the support of the American people for a new direction in U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, well-known columnists triggered constructive debate within the State Department, driving influential officials to question the traditional foundations of American diplomacy.

The administration and the general public quickly discovered the elite press to be a persuasive interlocutor. As the brokers of powerful and occasionally original ideas, pre-eminent columnists sold their wares to citizen and policy-maker alike. Few episodes in the history of the United States so ably attest to the creative influence of the media as the genesis of the Marshall Plan. Etched indelibly on the new program were the thoughts and aspirations of America's foremost journalists.

Notes

1. For further info. on Junior Officers' Views and Differences Between Junior Officers/Leading Policymakers see Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 36, 45; For further info. on Reston's Impact see Charles Kindleberger and others, *Marshall Plan Days* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1987), 1.
2. For further info. on Bonesteel's Ideas see Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, 37.
3. For further info. on *The Washington Post*, Walter Lippmann, Marquis Childs, and Public Opinion see Joseph Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1955), 226; For further info. on *London Times* see "The American Giant," *The Times* (London), March 17, 1947; "Mr. Truman's Challenge," *The Times* (London), March 13, 1947, 5; "World Security," *The Times* (London), March 14, 1947, 5.
4. *The Fifteen Weeks*, 22.
5. Wallace Address, Reprinted in the *Washington Post*, March 20, 1947, 24; Lippmann: Walter Lippmann, "What Marshall Is Achieving," *Washington Post*, April 17, 1947, 11.
6. Joseph Alsop and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt and the Soviet Union," *The Times* (London), April 25, 1947, 5; James Reston, "Overall View of Europe Sought to Guide Congress," *The New York Times*, April 17, 1947, 12.

7. A Gallup survey published on April 13 indicated that 63 percent of Americans favored eventual U.N. supervision of Greek aid; George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll 1935-1971*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972), 639.
8. An important corollary soon to gain currency was the notion that the Soviets had to bear responsibility for a divided Europe. Consequently, offers of American aid had to embrace both Western and Eastern Europe. While this idea did not originate with the elite journalists, they quickly implanted it in the popular discourse. Of particular importance is Lippmann, "What Marshall Is Achieving," 11.
9. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Undersecretary (Acheson), memorandum, 23 May 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. 3 (Washington United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 223-230; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 335-343.
10. The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Secretary of War Patterson, memorandum, March 5, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 197.
11. Memorandum of the State Department Member (Hilldring), State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, March 17, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 198.
12. For more info. on Reston and Alsop see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 227; Lippmann: Walter Lippmann, "Not Backward But Forward," *Washington Post*, March 20, 1947, 15.
13. Effects of European Integration: Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, 39.
14. For more info. on Dulles see Will Lissner, "Dulles Urges German Pact Aiding Europe's Economy: Advocates Federal-State Structure, Joint Control of Industry by Western Bloc-Republican Leaders Back Plan," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1947, 1; For more info. on Ideas Resurface see Walter Lippmann, "Cassandra Speaking," *Washington Post*, April 5, 1947, 9; Walter Lippmann, "Marshall and Dulles," *Washington Post*, May 1, 1947, 13; Walter Lippmann, "The Two Blades of the Scissors," *Washington Post*, April 1, 1947, 9; Walter Lippmann, "What Marshall Is Achieving," 11; For more info. on Policy Planning Staff Memorandum see The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Undersecretary of State (Acheson), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 223-230; Kennan, *Memoirs*, 335-343; Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), 16 May 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 221; Clayton: Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), 230; Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, 42; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 242.
15. "Constructive and Influential Ideas" Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 230; Public Opinion: By early July the Marshall Plan would boast a very healthy approval rating of 57 percent. Only one in five Americans would oppose the policy. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 661. At the same time, public frustrations with existing methods of addressing the international situation would continue to mount. 50 percent of the American public expressed dissatisfaction with the U.N.'s performance in a Gallup Poll conducted in early April. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 640.
16. "The American Giant," *The Times* (London), 5; "Mr. Truman's Challenge," *The Times* (London), 5; "World Security," *The Times* (London), 5.
17. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 228.
18. While speaking at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, Dulles highlighted the importance of "integrating the industrial potential of Germany into the economic life of Western Europe." Commanding the support of Governor Thomas Dewey and Senator Arthur Vandenburg, the future Secretary of State also called for a German settlement that would "open the way for the economic unification of Europe;" Lissner, "Dulles Urges German Pact," 1; Effect on Kennan: Kennan, *Memoirs*, 343.
19. Joseph Alsop, "France Isn't Lost to Reds Yet," *Washington Post*, March 30, 1947, 5.
20. For more info. on Public Opinion see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 226.
21. Walter Lippmann, "Cassandra Speaking," 9.
22. Importance of Lippmann's Article: Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 229.
23. Ibid.

24. Lippmann's Trans-Atlantic Tie: Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 462; Lippmann mentioned by name in the London Times: "Lend-Lease in Peace," *The Times* (London), May 7, 1947, 5; "The Truman Doctrine," *The Times* (London), March 27, 1947, 5; "United Europe," *The Times* (London), May 15, 1947; "Olympian voice of Walter Lippmann": "Lend Lease in Peace," *The Times* (London), 5.
25. For more info. on Marshall Plan Debate see "America Looks Ahead," *The Times* (London), May 9, 1947, 5.
26. Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century*, 462.
27. Walter Lippmann, "Doubts of an Old Friend," *Washington Post*, April 12, 1947, 9.
28. For more info. on Greece and Turkey see Lippmann, "The Two Blades of the Scissors," 9; Lippmann's Strategy: "Doubts of an Old Friend," 9.
29. C. Tyler Wood to Undersecretary Acheson, memorandum, April 17, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 203.
30. James Reston, "Overall View of Europe Sought to Guide Congress," *The New York Times*, April 17, 1947, 12.
31. Reston, *Ibid.*; SWNCC Report of the Special "Ad Hoc" Committee of the State War-Navy Coordinating Committee, April 21, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 205-218.
32. "Officials Concerned" Reston, "Overall View of Europe Sought to Guide Congress," 12.
33. Kindleberger and others, *Marshall Plan Days*, 27.
34. Lippmann, "What Marshall Is Achieving," 11. (Emphasis Added) Public opinion supported Lippmann's position. A Gallup survey of July 31 revealed that 82 percent of Americans favored a move without the Russians if necessary; Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 663.
35. Ideological Crusade: In a memorandum of May 28 to Secretary of State Marshall, Dean Acheson struck a similar note, contending that "The great immediate problem is not an ideological one, but a material one." Acheson Memorandum to Marshall, May 28, 1947 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 233; Gallup data suggests that the American public overwhelmingly supported cooperation with the Russians whenever possible; Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 649.
36. For more info. on Lippmann's Strategy see Lippmann, "What Marshall Is Achieving," 11.
37. For more info. on Policy Planning Staff Memoranda see Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning staff (Kennan), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 220-222; The director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Undersecretary of State (Acheson), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 223-230; Marshall Address: George Marshall, "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery," Address at Commencement Exercises at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, in *U. S. Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 16, no. 415 (June 5, 1947), 1160.
38. Report of the Special "Ad Hoc" Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 210.
39. *Ibid.*, 206.
40. "Economic Stability" *Ibid.*, 210; Economic Theory: Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 58.
41. Contrary to a popular myth, the Marshall Plan arose among junior officers, then began to claim adherents among high level officials; Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, 35.
42. Influence of SWNCC Memorandum on Kennan: Kennan, *Memoirs*, 329.
43. Public Opinion: Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 226; Lippmann: Walter Lippmann, "Resuming the Discussion," *Washington Post*, April 22, 1947, 9; Alsop: Joseph Alsop, "Welcome Home, Mr. Marshall," *Washington Post*, April 28, 1947, 9.
44. Effects of WWII on Marshall and "Patient Sinking" see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 227.
45. Walter Lippmann, "Marshall and Dulles," 13.

46. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 232.
47. Lippmann's Impact on Kennan see Ibid; Policy Planning Staff Memorandum quoted in Kennan, *Memoirs*, 335-343.
48. A Gallup survey conducted in July revealed that "foreign policy/helping Europe" ranked a close second behind inflation as the leading concern of most Americans. 22 percent viewed the international situation as the United States' "most important problem," while 24 percent suggested "high prices." In a similar study published in January, foreign policy trailed labor unrest as the nation's most pressing difficulty by nearly twenty points; Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 666.
49. Given his earlier work, it seems likely that Bonesteel impressed upon the Policy Planning Staff the urgency of German economic recovery, one of the group's most important contributions to the Marshall Plan.
50. Policy Planning Staff's Members, Deliberations, Goals, and Sources: Kennan, *Memoirs*, 328-329.
51. Stewart Alsop, "Can We Do the Job? The British Partnership," *Washington Post*, May 12, 1947, 9; Stewart Alsop, "The Gap," *Washington Post*, May 5, 1947, 9; Stewart Alsop, "Henry Wallace and the Great Debate," *Washington Post*, May 2, 1947, 23.
52. Lippmann, "Cassandra Speaking," 9; Policy Planning Staff Memorandum: The Director of the Policy Planning Staff, memorandum, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 221.
53. For more info. on Arduous Lecture Schedule see Kennan, *Memoirs*, 329; War College Speech see Kennan, *Memoirs*, 329-33; German Recovery in Policy Planning Staff Memorandum see Kennan, *Memoirs*, 343.
54. For more info. on Lippmann's articles see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 229; Acheson Asked to Address the Delta Council: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 227-228; Hadley Arkes, *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 49.
55. Delta Council address quoted in Arkes, *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest*, 49-50.
56. For more info. on Kindleberger and others see, *Marshall Plan Days*, 27; "Shock the Country," Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 227.
57. Gauge the public temper see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 227.
58. James Reston, "Administration Now Shifts Its Emphasis on Foreign Aid: Economic Reconstruction of Western Europe Now Held Best Bar to Soviet Expansion," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1947, Section 4, 3.
59. For more info. on Joseph Alsop see Joseph Alsop, "The Chickens Come Home to Roost," *Washington Post*, May 9, 1947, 21; Lippmann: Walter Lippmann, "On Borrowed Time," *Washington Post*, May 10, 1947, 9.
60. "America Looks Ahead," *The Times* (London), May 9, 1947, 5.
61. James Reston, "Europe's Broken Economy Challenges U. S.: More Aid Held Necessary to Block Communism," *The New York Times*, May 11, 1947, Section 4, p. 5.
62. Walter Lippmann, "The Voice of America," *Washington Post*, May 13, 1947, 9; Walter Lippmann, "U. S. Reasons for European Union," *Washington Post*, May 17, 1947, 9.
63. Quoted in Kennan, *Memoirs*, 336.
64. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Undersecretary of State (Acheson), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 221.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 337.
67. Emphasis on German Recovery Ibid., 343.
68. Staff Recommends U.N. Supervision: Ibid., 338-340; Cleveland, Moore, Kindleberger: Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, 36; Wallace: *Washington Post*, March 20, 1947, 24; Lippmann: Lippmann, "What Marshall Is Achieving," 11.
69. For more info. on Economic Federation of Europe see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 242; Clayton Memorandum: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 230-231; Hogan, *The Marshall*

Plan, 42-43; Memorandum by the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, May 27, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 230-232.

70. Quoted in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 230.

71. Marshall, "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery," 1160.





Communist demonstration, Moscow. November 1996. Photo by Ivan Sigal.