
Rethinking Sovereignty: The Politics of European Integration in Slovenia

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INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet bloc in 1989 gave rise to numerous new nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe. Many of these states sought to establish themselves as sovereign nation states for the first time in their history. This process of creating legitimate and sovereign nation-states has occurred simultaneously with efforts to integrate into transnational structures. The “return to Europe” was one of the powerful narratives in the independence movements of postcommunist states, epitomized by the 1990 Slovenian campaign slogan “Europe Now!” The return to Europe discourse called for the symbolic return of these states to their rightful cultural or civilizational spheres as well as their entry into the economic and political institutions of the European Union. European integration has now become an official and established political goal of all the governments of Central and Eastern European states. The state entities that were established in the name of ideals of national self-determination and political independence are now required, therefore, to give up part of their newly acquired “national sovereignty” to meet the economic, political and social requirements necessary to join European institutions.

Tensions have emerged because as these states have gained legal sovereignty in the international community, they have simultaneously experienced the erosion of the more substantial conception of sovereignty defined by “independence,” “autonomy” or “freedom of action.”¹ Though ruling governments have tried to balance demands from their constituencies to preserve national sovereignty with

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the demands of European accession mandates, the *perception* that they are subordinating sovereignty to Europe has contributed to a sense of powerlessness and cynicism among their constituents—what has been termed in the context of Western Europe as “Euroskepticism.”² This sense of powerlessness has contributed to the continued salience of ethnic nationalism as a defensive articulation of identity and (eroded) sovereignty in the face of Europeanization.³

The paper begins with a theoretical discussion of the changing notions of sovereignty in the era of Europeanization, and globalization more generally. The second part of this paper compares and analyzes the level of support for membership in the EU between Slovenia and other Central and Eastern European applicant countries and among respondents in Slovenia, including an analysis of the relationship between support for European integration and demographic variables (age, occupation, education) and partisanship, perceptions of who stands to lose and gain from membership in the EU, and reasons for supporting or opposing European membership, based on 1996 and 1997 Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer surveys. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of the sources and consequences of this dissent, arguing in the end for a more robust and democratic conception of sovereignty in Eastern and Central Europe.

RETHINKING SOVEREIGNTY

The concept of sovereignty has traditionally included both internal and external components: *internal* sovereignty defined as the supreme and absolute power and/or authority of the ruler over domestic decisions and *external* sovereignty defined as the recognition by the international community of the territorial boundaries and independence of a particular state. Or, as Biersteker and Weber define it: “a political entity’s externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its own affairs.”⁴ The external notion of sovereignty has been the primary focus of theories of international relations from realism to neoliberalism, invoked as something to be protected and defended in an anarchical or interdependent world. But the globalization of the world economy and the rise of the competitive state have called into question this traditional understanding of state sovereignty, blurring the longstanding distinction between foreign and domestic policy.⁵ No longer are crucial decisions made in national parliaments, but in transnational organizations like the World Bank, the IMF or the European Council. And no longer are the most competitive states no longer perceived to be those states that best regulate their national economies but rather those that best enforce the decisions made by transnational forces.

So, how might we rethink the notion of sovereignty in the era of globalization or Europeanization? First, we must differentiate between the constitutional or legal definition of sovereignty and a conception of sovereignty that

is defined by autonomy, meaning a state's capacity to articulate and achieve political goals independently.⁶ The real paradox regarding sovereignty is that globalization has strengthened the first form while eroding the second. The number of states that have been formally recognized as sovereign may have increased in today's global economy, but globalization has also simultaneously contributed to a loss of a sense of control over one's destiny in many national communities.⁷ Second, the question of whether globalization is indeed undermining the sovereign nation state is a contentious one in contemporary international relations/international political economy literature. Hyperglobalists declare that globalization is leading to the demise of the nation-state while global skeptics argue the nation-state remains central to the functioning of the contemporary political economy.⁸ But these analyses often fail to take into account that sovereignty is a historically determinate, variable, and *political* concept.⁹ Global capitalism has always relied on the territorially defined, constitutionally sovereign state and this new era is no different in this respect.¹⁰ What we are witnessing today is another transformation of both the function of the nation-state and the concept of sovereignty. We must assess, therefore, the variety of ways in which states are constantly forced to negotiate and renegotiate the nature of their nation-states and the concept of sovereignty today.¹¹ Third, the sovereignty of the state should be considered understood not as an objective condition, a thing that a state can possess, but as a social construction and a state of mind.¹² As Walker suggests, "As an account of history, as guide to political practices, as a formalization of deeply satisfying answers to questions about who we are, where we are, and where we should be going, the principle of state sovereignty still carries enormous political and moral weight."¹³ The erosion of state sovereignty or autonomy, therefore, does not necessarily entail a parallel erosion of the sovereign state as a source of collective identity.¹⁴

Central and Eastern Europe provide an ideal context in which to rethink sovereignty for a number of reasons. For one, in the past decade postcommunist states have been forced to balance the simultaneous demands of the creation of new and legitimate nation-states with the need to integrate into transnational institutions. Eastern Europe "continues to generate flurries of the older kind of nation-state legitimation alongside new evidence of transnationalism," Katherine Verdery explains. "Part of the turmoil of this region comes precisely from its hosting both sets of processes with such intensity."¹⁵ The different ways in which particular states have more or less successfully negotiated these tensions provides fertile cases for in-depth and comparative analyses. Second, Central and East European states have long been "penetrated societies," whereby external forces have played a decisive role in their domestic sphere—from the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman empires, and the Soviet or Yugoslav federations, to today's European Union.¹⁶ The erosion of distinctions between external and internal sovereignty,

and foreign and domestic policy in international relations today has a rich historical precedence in this region.

A third reason why Central and East Europe is a fruitful context to examine the changing concepts of sovereignty is that these states are grappling with a dilemma facing all states today: to live out and sustain the competing and often contradictory demands of the national and transnational. The stakes seem particularly high for small and peripheral states like Slovenia. Integration into European and global institutions risks Slovenia losing its unique identity and requires the erosion of its newly acquired sovereignty; but failing to integrate into transnational institutions threatens to leave Slovenia isolated on the periphery of Europe and the global political economy. Some argue that membership in the EU may in fact lead to the *expansion* of sovereignty for small states, however, since they can exert much more influence and achieve more of what they seek than if they were forced to compete on their own in the global economy.¹⁷ Within the EU, unlike the global economy at large, small states have to be taken seriously. But until these applicant countries are accepted as full members of the EU, European accession mandates have the opposite effect, leaving small states at the mercy of a democratically unaccountable accession process, an issue I return to in the last section. Finally, an exploration of sovereignty as consciousness or a state of mind is particularly fruitful in small states. As the Hungarian theorist István Bibó argues, sovereignty is considered most legitimate and culturally strongest in small nations with very little international influence and with a high degree of self-awareness and ethnic homogeneity.¹⁸ Small states' conception of sovereignty is more cultural than political, according to Bibó, and their agendas are more inward-looking than geared toward influencing the outside world.

SLOVENIA AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Since Slovenia seceded from the Yugoslav federation in 1991 after a short and relatively bloodless "Ten Day War," Slovenes have actively sought to establish themselves as a sovereign state for the first time in their history and simultaneously carry out the necessary economic and political prerequisites to be included in European and other multilateral institutions. Since 1993 when the member states of the European Council declared in Copenhagen that "the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union," the Slovenian government has sought to abide by the so-called "Copenhagen Criteria" for membership that included:¹⁹

- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
 - The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
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- The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

The convergence between their domestic policies and European mandates became more pressing after Slovenia and the European Union (EU) signed the Europe Agreement in June 1997, making Slovenia's application for full membership in the EU official. The Slovenian prime minister declared that not only was Slovenia willing to assume the obligations deriving from full membership in the EU, but was also "ready to accept certain limitations which the realizations of these obligations would bring for the sovereignty of the Slovene state."²⁰ In 1997, the office of the prime minister opened the Office of European Affairs, which was made responsible for adapting all Slovenian legislation to European accession mandates and for promoting European integration to the Slovenia public.

In 1997, the European Council agreed to begin negotiations with the five Central and Eastern European States (CEES) best prepared for EU membership in March 1998, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia as well as Cyprus. At the same meeting, the Council also created an accession process for all potential CEESs, including an enhanced pre-accession strategy, accession negotiations, a so-called 'screening' of EU legislation and a review procedure. The accession negotiations focus on the terms under which candidate countries adopt, implement and enforce the *acquis communautaire*—over 80,000 pages of laws and regulations. All applicants must accept the total *acquis* before they enter negotiations, with no changes or exceptions. Applicants' progress is assessed in regular reports from the European Commission. In December 1999, the Council entered accession negotiations with Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Turkey and Malta.

These conditions of EU membership have had a significant influence on the internal policies of Slovenia due to the extensive requirements and because its performance is closely monitored by the Accession Commission. European integration is not only a foreign policy issue, but it plays a central role in almost every aspect of Slovenian domestic policy. European integration is almost unanimously supported by the parliamentary parties. But despite the convergence of domestic and foreign policy around the goal of European integration, it is interesting to note that the Office of European Affairs, itself, is divided between its office for external and internal affairs (where one is directed by the receptionist either to the office for external affairs to the right or the office for domestic affairs to the left). Among the tasks of the office for internal affairs is to carry out a public relations campaign and conduct monthly public opinion surveys on the level of support among the constituents for European integration. These efforts to influence and closely monitor public opinion suggest that public attitudes may function as a small, but significant, constraint on the state's action regarding European integration.

PUBLIC OPINION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Traditional functionalist and neofunctionalist theories of integration viewed the European integration project as an elite-driven phenomenon and therefore assumed that public opinion was inconsequential.²¹ But the contentious debates on Maastricht referenda in Denmark and France, as well as the rejection of accession referenda in Norway, made clear that constituents have the ability to constrain and possibly forestall states' European integration policies. One must acknowledge, however, that most people surveyed have fairly little systematic information about even the most basic aspects of the integration process. And for many of these countries, membership in the EU remains a distant and rather intangible goal. What Janssen asserts about Western European opinions towards European integration may be doubly true for Eastern European attitudes—that the issue of integration may be “too difficult, too abstract or not interesting enough for the average citizen to form a well thought-out attitude.”²² Respondents' proclivities to vote for or against membership in the European Union if it were held tomorrow, therefore, it is most likely not based on a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of European integration but rather is based on preliminary and general perceptions of the European Union. It remains to be seen whether the increase in information about the costs and benefits of European integration will lead to an increase or decrease in the support for European integration. But for now public opinion surveys offer a means of assessing some general attitudes towards European integration and identifying some potential cross cutting cleavages surrounding the issue.

In the following section, I examine public support for and opinions towards membership in the European Union among all applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as within Slovenia. Based on data from the 1996 and 1997 Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer surveys, I provide crosstabulations to assess the relationship of demographic variables (age, occupation and education) and partisanship to support for membership in the European Union as well as the perceived losers and winners from European integration.

TABLE I: "If there were to be a referendum held tomorrow on the question of membership in the European Union in 1996 and 1997 how would you vote, by country in rank order?" In percentages within each country.

Country	1996			1997		
	For	Against	Undecided	For	Against	Undecided
Romania ^(a)	82.4	2.4	6.9	75.1	5.3	9.8
Poland ^(a)	72.0	7.2	11.4	66.3	4.7	15.9
Slovakia ^(a)	47.8	7.9	25.1	62.5	7.6	15.1
Slovenia ^(a)	49.6	15.8	18.4	61.9	15.6	9.9
Hungary ^(a)	47.5	16.3	16.0	58.4	8.0	18.4
Bulgaria ^(a)	50.9	3.6	8.0	58.3	3.6	16.0
Czech Republic ^(a)	46.5	10.9	22.1	49.6	11.6	18.3
Lithuania ^(a)	36.1	7.8	23.4	40.8	12.2	24.8
Latvia ^(a)	36.1	11.3	29.0	40.4	11.6	30.0
Estonia ^(a)	30.6	15.1	35.1	36.1	13.1	34.7
Total Average	50.7	9.8	20.3	55.2	9.3	19.2

^(a) Countries accepted into the first round European Union accession talks, 1997.

^(b) Countries accepted into the second round of European Union accession talks, 1999.

SOURCES: George Cunningham. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7: STATUS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1996 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Brussels, Belgium: GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research [producers], 1997. Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1998; Vantomme, Jacques, and Louis Hersom. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 8: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1997 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Brussels, Belgium: GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research/Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung [producers], 1998. Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1999.

Table 1 suggests that there is little correlation between how far along a country is in the accession negotiations and public support for European integration, with Romania showing the highest degree of support and Estonia the lowest. Table 1 illustrates that Slovenia is above average in both its support for (61.9 percent in 1997) and opposition to (15.3 percent) membership in the European Union, suggesting that strong cross cutting cleavages exist within Slovenian public opinion regarding the European integration. The following table illustrates the relationship between several demographic variables and support for European integration.

TABLE 2: Support of EU and demographic variables, 1997. (Percentages within each category).

	All Countries			Slovenia		
	For	Against	Undecided	For	Against	Undecided
AGE						
15 – 24	56.7	7.7	17.6	59.6	18.1	8.2
25 – 39	58.6	9.5	20.0	51.7	26.1	10.0
40 – 54	58.1	10.0	19.0	67.4	12.4	11.2
55 – 64	53.0	10.4	20.6	66.7	13.8	8.0
65+	45.0	8.7	18.4	66.5	5.2	11.3
OCCUPATION						
Civil Servant	62.1	10.9	17.8	59.0	17.9	12.8
State-Owned						
Enterprise	61.4	9.3	18.6	55.8	18.6	14.7
Private Business						
Owner	66.2	11.5	14.0	66.2	22.5	5.6
Private Business						
Employee	56.9	10.7	19.1	56.6	20.8	4.7
Agriculture	45.3	13.2	25.8	26.7	46.7	26.7
Laborer	44.6	5.4	32.4	81.8	9.1	4.5
Pensioner	49.2	8.7	19.3	65.3	9.0	11.3
Housewife	47.7	9.6	24.6	62.9	8.6	8.6
Students	56.9	7.1	15.4	65.8	17.1	6.8
Unemployed	52.7	6.9	21.5	59.2	21.1	5.3
EDUCATION						
Elementary						
Completed	40.9	8.9	21.7	53.2	15.2	12.8
Some Secondary						
School	55.5	9.2	18.4	39.9	17.2	8.9
Secondary School						
Completed	59.8	8.8	19.2	62.3	16.3	8.7
Higher Education	66.4	11.7	15.4	76.0	14.9	6.3
TYPE OF COMMUNITY						
Capital	56.7	11.1	19.0	73.2	13.2	6.8
Other Big City	60.4	7.9	17.7	60.5	15.0	10.0
Smaller (Provincial)	57.7	9.3	16.7	62.7	15.3	7.6
Village – Rural	49.2	9.4	22.0	55.6	17.8	13.6

SOURCE: Vantomme, Jacques, and Louis Hersom (1998).

According to Table 2, the most significant degree of opposition to EU membership in Slovenia is among those employed in the agricultural sector and those living in rural areas. The high degree of opposition to European membership among farmers (46.7 percent) and private business owners (22.5 percent) in Slovenia is understandable given the negative impact that increased competition from the EU would have on the relatively outdated agricultural and manufacturing production technologies used by most farms and small industries in the country. Education does not seem to be strongly correlated to opposition to EU membership in Slovenia, though those with a higher education were most likely to be in favor of EU membership. It is interesting to note, however, that among all applicant countries the largest percentage of those opposed to EU membership are those with a higher education (11.7 percent), suggesting that those who are likely to be better informed about the impact of European membership on domestic politics may be more likely to oppose it.

A number of studies that have sought to identify a correlation between Left/Right attitudes or party affiliations and support for European integration in Western Europe have been largely inconclusive.²³ However there appears to be a stronger correlation between partisanship and opposition to European membership in Central and East European countries.²⁴ Table 3 illustrates this relationship within Slovenia.

TABLE 3: Partisanship and European Integration, Slovenia, 1997. In percentages (and n in parentheses) within each category.

	Number of Parliament Seats	Opinion of EU	
		For EU	Against EU
LEFT LEANING PARTIES			
United List of Social Democrats	9	73.3 (44)	16.7 (10)
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	25	73.4 (174)	9.7 (23)
Democratic Pensioners Party	5	92.9 (13)	7.1 (1)
Slovenian National Party	4	62.5 (10)	37.5 (6)
RIGHT LEANING PARTIES			
Social Democratic Party	16	71.0 (44)	11.3 (7)
Slovenian People's Party	19	62.9 (56)	19.1 (17)
Slovenian Christian Democrats	9	68.8 (33)	6.3 (3)

SOURCE: Vantomme, Jacques, and Louis Hersom (1998).

Though members of all parties, from those that lean towards the Left and those to the Right, show high levels of support for European integration, it appears that the highest percentages of those opposed to European integration are among the most ideologically extreme parties. 16.7 percent of those who identify

themselves as members of the United List of Social Democrats, the former Communist Party of Slovenia, are likely to vote against membership in the EU, despite the fact that United List supports European membership in its party platform. Even more significant is the 37.5 percent of Slovenian National Party voters who oppose European membership, suggesting that the most strident opposition to European integration is expressed in extreme nationalist parties. That nearly 20 percent of Slovenian People Party (SPP) voters oppose European membership, given that a coalition including these two parties assumed executive power in April 2000. Much of the support for the SPP, as well as the Slovenian National Party, is among those groups that are perceived to be most likely to lose out with increased ties between Slovenia and the EU—farmers, manual workers and those who are living on fixed-incomes, as illustrated in Table 4.

TABLE 4: Perceived Winners and Losers from European Integration, 1997. In response to the question “Do you think the following are likely to benefit or lose out as ties between [our country] and the European Union increase?”

	All Countries		Slovenia	
	Benefit	Lose Out	Benefit	Lose Out
State Enterprise	40.9	25.3	43.2	33.2
Farmers	33.	36.9	15.9	68.2
Private Business	58.1	12.3	60.4	17.0
Civil Servants	40.6	16.0	33.9	27.5
Manual Workers	34.1	26.9	31.5	39.5
Health and Social Services	49.8	12.6	44.7	23.2
Educational System	51.1	9.6	67.3	9.4
People Living on Low-Income	30.7	25.2	26.4	40.2
Armed Forces	55.5	6.7	58.4	9.4

SOURCE: Vantomme, Jacques, and Louis Hersom (1998).

The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys also contained an open-ended question regarding European union membership that asked, “What are the main reasons why you would vote for/against the EU?” The responses were grouped by the researchers into nine categories for those in favor of EU membership, including a “hard to answer why” response, and five categories for those against EU membership. Table 5 and Table 6 present the percentage of respondents who mentioned each reason.

Among those who responded that they would vote for membership in the EU if a referendum were to be held tomorrow, the percentage of cited reasons were as follows.

TABLE 5: Reasons for voting *for* European membership in Slovenia, 1996 and 1997.

%*	Reason
1996	
29	Economy will improve with open market
28	General progress thanks to EU help
13	We should integrate in Europe / join the EU
6	Open borders / world outlook broader
5	EU contributes to peace, human rights and democracy
5	EU will give us higher living standards
5	EU makes us strong
3	Economic / financial aid from the EU
2	General cooperation: science, technology, culture
5	Hard to answer why
1997	
29	Economy will improve with open market
27	General progress thanks to EU help
13	We should integrate in Europe / join the EU
8	EU contributes to peace, human rights and democracy
6	Open borders / world outlook broader
4	EU will give us higher living standards
4	EU makes us strong
1	Economic / financial aid from the EU
0	General cooperation: science, technology, culture
5	Hard to answer why

* Percentage among all reasons offered in favor of EU membership—each respondent gave up to three answers with probes (1996 n = 859; 1997 n = 823).

As illustrated in Table 5, the primary reason respondents gave for voting in favor of EU membership was that Slovenia's economy would likely improve with an open market (29 percent in both years), followed by the belief that EU membership would lead to general progress (28 and 27 percent respectively). Notably, security benefits (the "EU makes us strong"), open borders, financial aid and cooperation in science, technology and culture were less significant reasons for support of EU membership. These results suggest that the appeal of EU is largely driven by the perceived economic benefits of membership, rather than by potential political or cultural advantages. Despite the efforts by the EU to expand its mandate into political and cultural affairs, it appears the EU is still perceived by many citizens in Central and Eastern European states as primarily an economic regional entity.

Table 6 shows the reasons given for why respondents would vote against European membership, the most frequently cited reasons are as follows.

TABLE 6: Reasons for voting *against* European membership in Slovenia, 1996 and 1997.

***	Reason
1996	
55	Worsen economic crisis / too expensive/ no benefit
16	Loss of identity / independence
10	EU acts in its own interest
9	EU brings instability and disintegration
1	Hard to answer why
9	Other reason
1997	
54	Worsen economic crisis / too expensive/ no benefit
13	Loss of identity / independence
10	EU acts in its own interest
6	EU brings instability and disintegration
14	Hard to answer why
7	Other reason

* Percentage among all reasons offered in favor of EU membership—each respondent gave up to three answers with probes (1996 n = 227; 1997 n = 180).

Interestingly, while the primary reason offered *for* voting for European membership was the belief that free trade would improve Slovenia's economy, Table 6 shows that the primary reason cited for voting *against* EU membership was that it would worsen the economic crisis in Slovenia. The loss of identity and independence was only of secondary importance among those who would vote in opposition to Slovenia's entry into the EU. These results suggest that economic concerns are the primary concern among citizens of CEES in deciding whether or not to support EU membership.

In November 1997, the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center at the Faculty of Social Science conducted a survey entitled "The Attitude of Slovenians Toward European Integration and the Accession to the EU," which included 286 in-depth interviews with public opinion leaders from eleven leadership groups (university, government, local authorities, lawyers and judges, parties, media, economic advisors, religious communities, trade unions, non governmental organizations, and artists).²⁵ 93.7 percent believed that Slovenia would benefit from membership in the EU for the following reasons,

in rank order: i.) economic reasons (economic stability, wider market, increased competitiveness); ii.) the “Europeanization” of values and thinking;” iii.) security (protection against the Balkans, good neighborly relations with bordering EU member countries).

**COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN SLOVENIA**

Public opinion surveys are a useful way to assess the level of support for membership in the EU, perceptions of who stands to benefit and lose from European integration, and to identify existent or emerging cross-cutting cleavages (along occupation, education, partisanship or age) surrounding the issue of European integration. But opinions regarding membership in the EU are not formed simply by a rational assessment of its costs and benefits—they reflect larger ideological debates in these countries surrounding European integration. Many of these emerging debates concern important policy questions—namely the sale of land to foreigners, common agricultural policy, access to the benefits of structural funds, the free movement of capital and people, pension reform, protection of the environment and energy policy, and external border controls. But up until now European integration has largely been discussed in the abstract.²⁶ These internal ideological conflicts over questions of European integration and the maintenance of sovereignty might be interpreted more broadly as struggles over popular conventional wisdom, contests in which alternative conceptions of the world enter into conflict.²⁷ I argue that the issue of European integration illuminates a radical reorganization of political space taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, divided between what I term “integrationists” and “protectionists”—those who want to take advantage of European integration and those who oppose it, those who embrace a multicultural identity and those who want to protect national identity, those who welcome a transnational organization of space and those who want to preserve national territorial boundaries. These divisions cut across traditional party and ideological lines: for example, some traditional “Leftists” may support a protectionist “national Keynesian” agenda while others promote an integrationist agenda; meanwhile some on the “Right” might advocate a free market economy but want to protect national identity and national territory.

The following diagram illustrates what I see as some key tensions in three domains of the modern democratic nation-state: the political, economic and cultural, taking into account that these three domains are not immutable but inextricably related.²⁸

Domains	Key Tensions	
	Integrationist	Protectionist
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State enables capital • Take advantage of open European markets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State constrains capital • Protect against open European markets
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relative sovereignty • Multinational institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absolute sovereignty • Sovereign institutions
Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multicultural identity • Global 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National identity • Territorial

The modern European nation-state was once considered the ideal mechanism to bridge the gap between integrationist and protectionist demands, merging all ethnic or cultural groups around one national identity and creating an environment for national capital which would foster its allegiance to the territorial state and spur the reinvestment of profits into its home country.²⁹ Of course these tensions between integrationist and protectionist demands were never so easily resolved by the modern nation-state, but the important thing was that the majority of society believed in these resolutions. It is no wonder that the new states of Central and Eastern Europe modeled their societies after the modern European democratic nation-state, and, in the case of Slovenia, social democratic Scandinavian states in particular.³⁰ Slovenes resisted Western imposed “shock therapy” and pursued a middle approach instead, trying to mediate international competitive pressures through more active national governance.³¹ But the painful irony is that the European social democratic nation-state is being seriously challenged by the forces of globalization. Even the most strident and wealthiest proponents of such a model—e.g. Germany and the Scandinavian states—are finding it increasingly difficult to negotiate the competing demands of the national and transnational.

A stronger and more integrated European Union—in the economic, political and cultural domains—is considered by many to be one of the only means to protect the sovereignty and autonomy of European nation-states from the competitive demands of global capitalism. The European Union may actually serve to enhance, rather than diminish, the sovereign capabilities of its member states. The small states of Central and Eastern Europe might rightfully see European integration then as a means not only to protect but also enhance their (limited) newly acquired sovereignty. By joining the EU, small states like Slovenia would get the right to take part in crucial decisions on European matters, which it could not influence from its current position on the periphery of Europe and the global political economy. But until countries like Slovenia are granted full membership in the EU, European integration mandates may have the ironic effect of exacerbating this

tension between integrationism and protectionism in Central and East European States. For one, rather than allowing these newly emerging states to adjudicate between competing claims to the good, or consider different ways to organize their societies, the EU has collapsed these options into one, non-negotiable set of procedures. The debate over European integration is thereby reduced to either being for or against European integration, allowing no option to pick or choose which mandates they want to accept or reject (a possibility only allowed for member states). Second, until these states are granted official membership in the EU they are effectively excluded from participating in the decision-making processes that shape every realm of their societies. The EU is in no way democratically accountable, in other words, to the ten countries waiting to join. This glaring double standard—of a democratically unaccountable supranational institution mandating democratic accountability—is not lost on many critics of European integration in these states.

CONCLUSIONS

Defensive articulations of the particular—what I have termed “protectionist” for lack of a better term—can be both be a destructive and constructive force, fostering reactive and repressive intolerance or leading to positive social alternatives. The destructive and reactive variety has been much more prevalent in Eastern Europe until now. But I share Slavoj Žižek’s cautious optimism that by being forced to live out and sustain the competing and often contradictory demands of the national and transnational, postcommunist states are placed in a privileged position to invent creative ways out of this dilemma.³² But this requires that one take into account Rousseau’s paradox of the political: that the goal of creating a democratic state presupposes that the means are democratic. If these newly emergent democratic states cannot produce and sustain political, economic and social institutions with the legitimacy to make decisions over people’s lives, then political cynicism—or Euroskepticism—is a predictable reaction. ■

NOTES

¹ See David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford University Press, 1996); and Saksia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

² See George Kolankiewicz "Consensus and Competition in the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Affairs* 70 (1994): 478.

³ See Ulf Hedetoft, "The Nation-State Meets the World: National Identities in the Context of Transnationality and Cultural Globalization," *European Journal of Social Theory* 2, no. 1: 71-94. Saksia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁴ Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.

⁵ Joseph A. Camilleri, "Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World," in *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community*, eds. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1990), 33.

⁶ David Held and others, eds., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999) 52. Robert Jackson makes a similar distinction in his analysis of "quasi-states," between "positive sovereignty" (the ability of states to act in the international arena) and "negative sovereignty" (the freedom from the actions of others in that same arena). Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁷ Saksia Sassen, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: The New Press, 1998).

⁸ Examples of global skeptics include Kenai Omae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked World Economy* (New York: Harper Business, 1990); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Global skeptics include Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, "Globalization and the Future of the Nation State," *Economy and Society*, 24, No. 3 (August 1995): 408-442.

⁹ R.B.J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice," in *Contending Sovereignties: Refining Political Community*, eds. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder, CO: Lynn Reiner, 1990), 167.

¹⁰ Numerous theorists have suggested that rather than being in competition with each other, the state and multinational corporations are in a stable pattern of mutual accommodation. The primary responsibility of national economies is now to adapt domestic economies to the "exigencies of a global market." Robert Cox, "Critical Political Economy," in *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*, ed. Bjorn Hettne (London: Zed Books, 1995). See also Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History," *Alternatives* 16 (1991): 440.

¹¹ Biersteker and Weber, *State Sovereignty*, 11.

¹² See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History," *Alternatives* 16 (1991): 440.; Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Biersteker and Weber, *State Sovereignty*, 11-15.

¹³ R.B.J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice," in Walker and Mendlovitz, *Contending Sovereignties*, 167.

¹⁴ Øyvind Østerud, "Nationalism and the Transformation of Sovereignty," in *Small States Compared: Politics of Norway and Slovenia*, eds. Bojko Bucar and Stein Kuhnle (Bergen: Alma Mater Forlag, 1994).

¹⁵ Katherine Verdery "Nationalism, Postsocialism, and Space in Eastern Europe," *Social Research* 63 (Summer 1996): 91.

¹⁶ Atila Ágh, "Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States: Sovereignty-related Conflicts in the Context of Europeanization," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 32 (1999): 264.

¹⁷ K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp, eds., *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union* (London: Longman, 1998).

¹⁸ Istán Bibó, *Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination: Selected Writings*, ed. Károly Nagy, trans. András Boros-Kazai (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1991).

¹⁹ European Commission Directorate for Enlargement, Accession Criteria, at europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.html. Commission on Progress Towards Accession, Composite Paper, 13 October 1999.

²⁰ Republic of Slovenia Government Office for European Affairs, "Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia," (May 1997), www.sigov.si/svezlstrategy/.

²¹ Miles Hewstone, *Understanding Attitudes to the European Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 9-16.

²² Joseph Janssen, "Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization, and Public Support for European Integration," *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (1991): 443-468.

- ²³ See Paul Taggart, "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroskepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems," *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 363-388.
- ²⁴ Rachel Cichowski, "Western Dreams, Eastern Realities: Citizen Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2-5 September, 1999.
- ²⁵ Niko Tos, et. al., "Staliska slovencev o evropskem zdruzevanju in pridruzevanju EU," (Ljubljana: Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, 1997), 23.
- ²⁶ An exception was the debate in Slovenia between the "land-protectors" and the "land-sellers" when Slovenia was forced to abolish a constitutional prohibition of the purchase of land by foreigners in 1997 as a necessary precondition for the ratification of the Association Agreement with the EU. See Irena Brinar, "Slovenia: From Yugoslavia to the European Union," in *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. Karen Henderson (London: University College London Press, 1999), 252.
- ²⁷ See Mark Rupert, "Globalization and Contested Common Sense in the United States," in *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, eds. S. Gill and J. Mittelman (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- ²⁸ Jonathan Bach, "Globalization, Democracy and Modernity," in *Social Philosophy Today*, vol. 14, eds. Cheryl Hights and Hudson Yaeger (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, forthcoming).
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ See Irena Brinar and Stein Kuhnle, "Perspectives on European Integration in Smaller Democracies: Norway and Slovenia Compared," in Bucar and Kuhnle, *Small States Compared*.
- ³¹ Branka Liki-Brbori, "Globalization, Governance and the Political Economy of Transition," in *Scamble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction*, ed. Carl-Ulrik Schierup (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 171-199.
- ³² Slavoj Zizek, *The Spectre is Still Roaming Around* (Zagreb: Arkzin, 1998).

