

ENLIGHTENED ENGAGEMENT: A FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

GARY HART

A foreign policy framework for the 21st century must seize the opportunity presented by the most significant change of the past 40 years — the great diffusion of military, political, and economic power. Our framework must help us reach our foreign policy goals in a world where other nations are maturing politically and economically at a rapid pace; where Soviet expansionism continues to be a threat, but where exclusive concern with the Soviets is both insufficient and dangerous; where we still have tremendous military, economic, political, and moral power, but where, increasingly, we can only exercise that power by engaging other nations — not commanding them.

What, then, is this new framework? It might best be called *a framework of enlightened engagement*.

Enlightened engagement requires that we find better ways to exercise our leadership in a world where we can rarely impose our will. Rather than resisting change, we need to *use* it to our advantage. We must use forces such as the diffusion of power, nationalism, and the force of a growing international economy — forces largely beyond our control — to fuel our leadership and help move the world toward our ideals rather than attempting to block those tides by standing in their path.

Our task now is to identify the strongest of these tides and propose how we might better use them to navigate toward our goals. There are four ways in particular.

MANAGING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

The clearest point for consensus in American foreign policy is the imperative of continued resistance to Soviet expansionism. Moscow's drive for hegemony is not likely to dissipate in our lifetime. It is deeply rooted in traditional Great Russian chauvinism, the Kremlin's interpretation of communism, empire-building urges of the Soviet military, and the xenophobic Soviet desire for "300 percent security" — for a world in which no one can threaten its security.

The question is not whether restraining Soviet imperialism should be an American goal; clearly, it should be and it is. But in a world where U.S.-Soviet military conflict could escalate to nuclear conflict, we have a responsibility to search for better means of limiting Soviet expansionism than direct confrontation. While our goals reflect a constancy of purpose, we need increasing flexibility and imagination in tactics. Military confrontation and bluster have proved no more effective than excessive efforts at conciliation.

Dramatic global changes since the emergence of containment in the 1940s and '50s suggest important ways we can improve our strategy with regard to the Soviets. Most important in this regard are the diffusion of power and the continuing rise of genuine nationalism.

Diffusion of power and nationalism have created a world in which the military efforts of a superpower are contained more by the resistance of those it is fighting — local powers — than by the actions of another superpower. The Afghans are not fighting the Soviet invasion because we are pressing them to do so. Nor does the effectiveness of their resistance depend primarily on us, as important as our aid is. We were defied in Southeast Asia by North Vietnam and its supporters in the South, not by the Soviet Union.

All this means that the goal of containment, while still necessary, can depend increasingly on local, rather than American, resistance to Soviet expansionism. We should still involve ourselves in resisting Soviet hegemony in some cases. But, given the mutual interest of the United States and the USSR in avoiding armed conflict with each other, fostering nationalism and the growing strength of minor powers will help us advance toward goals we share with indigenous populations.

This indirect approach to containment might best be summarized by a term borrowed from the Chinese: "Resisting hegemony while not seeking hegemony." In essence, we help others contain aggression directed against them, but play a secondary, supportive role so as not to turn local nationalism against us.

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Self-Interested Cooperation

But our foreign policy framework must also enable us to re-define the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in an age of declining superpower dominance. Despite the rise of nationalism, the international diffusion of power, and the development of a global economy, our relationship as hostile nuclear powers is still of the greatest importance to all humanity.

Enlightened engagement suggests a threefold approach for more skillfully managing relations with the Soviets. First, we and our allies should fortify our own conventional defenses so they are adequate to assure our security and become the principal — and most stable — bulwark of deterrence. These defense improvements must be largely in the form of military reform —

within our own military institutions and throughout NATO. Military reform is the best strategy for the United States and Europe to create a credible conventional deterrent that could reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons to defend Europe.

Second, we must engage the Soviets in a greatly expanded search for areas of mutual cooperation that work to our benefit. The most important of these, clearly, is arms control. A few points deserve emphasis.

Our immediate goal must be much more than reduction in our nuclear arsenals — although that is still a crucial step. Our goal must be the prevention of *use* of nuclear weapons — by anyone, for any reason. In a time of Khaddafis and Chernobyls, the first step toward nuclear Armageddon is as likely to come from terrorists, technical accidents, or superpower miscalculation as from Soviet malice.

The goal of preventing the *use* of nuclear weapons requires several critical steps. Reductions in destabilizing, first-strike systems; non-proliferation, agreements; a freeze on weapons-grade fissionable material, including plutonium; jointly staffed crisis management centers; a major joint initiative to improve verification — a Manhattan Project on verification; and a comprehensive nuclear test ban, must all be central to our agenda. The most critical objective is to make the notion of nuclear war-fighting as unacceptable as possible for all nuclear powers.

As we pursue deep reductions in first-strike nuclear arsenals, we should make far greater use of asymmetrical agreements — asymmetrical, not in the benefit to each nation, but in the nature of the weapons exchanged. For example, to break the current stalemate each side should agree to verifiable limits on the systems the other side sees as most threatening. The Soviets must agree to substantial cuts in offensive forces, particularly their large ICBMs. We should agree to set limits on the testing and deployment of defensive systems.

Over the past 20 years, four administrations of both parties have vigorously pursued mutual, verifiable arms control agreements. Now an ideological faction opposed to all arms control has gained ascendancy and the administration has announced its intention to abandon voluntary compliance with the SALT II Treaty. Rather than punishing the Soviets, this disastrous decision makes the American people less secure, frightens our allies, and throws overboard an agreement that forced the Soviets to remove over a thousand nuclear missiles. Doctrinaire ideology will not advance America's self-interest — it is no substitute for the serious work of negotiating and verifying nuclear arms control agreements.

But arms control and crisis management are not the only areas in which we can engage in self-interested cooperation with the Soviets. Enlightened engagement requires that we be flexible in tactics. We must be prepared to alter our policies when warranted by Soviet behavior — such as invasion of

Afghanistan or repression of Solidarity in Poland. No fixed formula can determine our precise response to every Soviet action. There is a difference, however, between applying pressure on the Soviet Union in direct response to its adventurism — such as shoring up Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of its border country — and abrogating cooperative efforts that are in our own self-interest.

Those who advocate nullifying the achievements of nuclear arms control because they object to the Soviet regime somehow imagine that negotiating restraints on Soviet nuclear arsenals should be a reward for Soviet good behavior. This is not just nonsense, it is a serious threat to U.S. security interests. Cooperation in areas of clear self-interest — such as arms control — should not be used for short-term political objectives. We have more than adequate political and economic means to respond to Soviet misbehavior that do not require us to wound ourselves in the process.

Managing U.S.-Soviet Relations: Regional Applications

We have seen movements in Eastern Europe rising in protest to Soviet imperialist control and the incompetent management of their societies — most notably the struggle of Solidarity in Poland. Many Americans still hope satellite nationalist and popular movements will eventually help bring these states to independence from Soviet subjugation. Yet Soviet military domination must for now dim those hopes.

This kind of protest will likely increase in the future, particularly as the USSR makes more economic demands on these countries and has less to offer them in comparison to the West. While the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe is not likely to be overturned soon, the unreliable nature of the satellites will continue to keep the Soviet government off-guard.

Throughout the Third World, exploitation of instabilities is still the cutting edge of Soviet strategy for gaining influence. The greatest danger is the risk of local crisis escalating — perhaps by accident — to superpower confrontation. After a steady pattern of such confrontations in the Middle East in the 1970s — all mercifully stopping short of war — both powers learned critical object lessons about the hazards of Third World rivalry. We and the Soviets have had to recognize the dangers of heavily armed independent countries going to war in regional disputes over which we had relatively little control. Although we lack formal agreements, we and the Soviet Union must develop a far better understanding of “codes of conduct” to guide our actions in volatile areas of the world.

Ultimately, our decisive edge over the Soviet Union throughout the world is the strength and allure of our open society and economy. There is little the Soviet Union has to offer developing nations other than military equipment and raw commodities. For everything from tractors to trade credits to high

technology, from books to blue jeans, the developing world is turning West — toward us, and toward our allies. The rigidities of the Soviet bureaucracy, ideology, and economy often hobble its efforts beyond its own borders.

There is a new dynamic at work around the globe — an increasingly interdependent world economy — that offers new hope for political and economic progress. The “Four Tigers” of the Pacific Rim — Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea — did not achieve dazzling growth by depending on the military or economic hand-outs of either superpower. Those who have remained Soviet conscripts are still backwaters. We stand to benefit from this new dynamic. The Soviets do not. The irony of this approach would probably not be lost on Karl Marx. Enlightened engagement suggests that the bastions of capitalism adopt a strategy of letting the economic forces of history work to our advantage; time and the inherent unworkability of the Soviet system are on our side.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

The framework of enlightened engagement rests upon our ability to channel the forces of change to our benefit. The imperative of using forces of economic change extends far beyond our goal of containing the Soviet Union.

International economics has been the poor cousin of foreign policy for the past twenty years. The global economy can no longer be simply viewed as an arena for promoting American commercial interests. The international debt crisis threatens democratic forces abroad as directly as any political or military forces; protectionism strains our alliances as severely as any military deployment decision. Enlightened engagement requires that international economics become a primary foreign policy tool. For the rest of this century and beyond, international economics may well be our most important lever for strengthening our alliances, advancing the cause of human dignity, and supporting centrist forces abroad.

But effective international economic policy is also indispensable to building a consensus for enlightened internationalism at home. As long as American workers and voters see the international arena as the central cause of our economic woes, forces of isolationism will increase.

International Economics: Promoting Open Societies

We have seen how the strengths of our economy can be used to compete successfully with the Soviets in the Third World. But understanding and capitalizing upon global economic forces is also critical for our attempts to promote open societies. From Costa Rica to India to Colombia to Japan, economic growth and political freedom nourish each other. From the Weimar

Republic to Peronist Argentina, we have seen the political costs of economic failure.

Latin America provides a clear example of how we should use international economics to strengthen centrist forces. Today a tide of hope and democracy is sweeping that continent. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and others have all made giant strides toward free government. This is a praiseworthy end in and of itself. But it also immeasurably benefits hemispheric security.

At the same time, a monumental debt crisis threatens these fragile democracies. The success of our foreign policy toward these nations may stand or fall on our ability to address that crisis so our hemispheric partners can resume their economic progress and continue their political progress.

The debt distorts political relations with our neighbors by forcing unbalanced trade. As these countries struggle to meet their debt payments, they cut their imports of American crops, cars, and computers, and lower prices on goods they sell here to raise the dollars needed to make their debt payments. According to a recent study, nearly half of Latin American interest payments were generated by reducing purchases of U.S. products. Our declining trade balance with these countries has cost the jobs of nearly a million American workers — more, since 1981, than have been affected by trade with Japan.

There is a better course. Our government should act more like the champion of global growth and less like a collection agency for the overextended banks. If we help expand Latin American economies rather than squeeze them, we can increase American exports as we strengthen southern democracies and our own security. We must break the chokehold these debts have placed on the development of free economies and progressive, centrist governments. All involved parties must help pay for past mistakes.

The debtors themselves must ensure that relief is used to promote broad-based development — not to finance capital flight by elites. Debtor countries must also ensure their fiscal, monetary, tax, and regulatory policies encourage investment and growth. We must be flexible in designing such “conditionality” programs. Local political and economic realities must be taken into account. But we must also ensure that aid and debt relief is not undermined by irresponsible, shortsighted, or inefficient economic management in the developing countries.

The banks — domestic and international — must also do their share. Building 90-day solvency bridges that barely span the next crisis is no longer enough. Selected direct debt relief and — in some cases — corresponding writedowns, extended repayment schedules, interest rate relief, and new international lending mechanisms will be needed. The banks should know that full repayment of these loans is no longer tenable as a primary goal of U.S. policy.

The international scope of this crisis mandates an international solution. In particular, Japan's emerging and special role in the new world economy must

be recognized. As Japan occupies a position of greater wealth and prominence, it must accept new responsibilities — just as the United States accepted new responsibilities for the world's economy after World War II. The debt crisis — not just in Latin America, but in Africa and world-wide — offers a clear opportunity. Japan must make a substantial contribution to a multilateral development solution. It should increase its lending and direct investment in the developing world. Perhaps most important, both Japan and the European Economic Community must open their markets to developing country exports.

The United States must take the initiative in coordinating solutions. We should convene a series of negotiations, undertaken on a country by country basis, that bring together debtors, lenders, and international lending agencies. Ten year capital plans must be developed, based on realistic economic and political assumptions, that offer blueprints for growth. The entire portfolio of private and public debt — not just this quarter's or this country's crisis loans — should be put on the table.

International lending agencies should help alleviate stress on both the countries and banks after these long term agreements are established. Any new funds necessary to provide a combination of interest rate relief, guarantees, purchases, or debt-for-equity swap programs should come from a consortium of international lenders.

Encouraging open societies will require more from economic policy than solving the debt crisis. We must promote broad-based and balanced development throughout the developing world. Our aid policies should promote education, health, and other investments in "human capital." We must show a greater appreciation for the importance of small-scale farmers and appropriate technologies.

International Economics: Strengthening our Alliances

But in addition to providing effective competition to the Soviets in the Third World and to promoting centrist forces and open societies, economic policy is a critical tool for strengthening our alliances. Economic relationships should, by rights, promote and strengthen alliances. Yet we face a world in which trade seems to be poisoning our most important friendships — with Japan, with Europe, with Canada, and with the developing world. At a time when the language of conflict dominates discussions of international trade, all pressures are for less trade — not more.

If our alliances and friendships are to survive the next few decades, we must remember this protectionism is isolationism — no less dangerous to our people or our alliances or our collective security than the isolation of the 1930s. The economic pain many of our people feel because of trade is real, as are the flaws in the world's trading system. But we must address these flaws directly, not

paper them over with political demagoguery or trade restrictions that would suffocate prosperity and alliance.

We need policies that address the root causes of protectionist sentiment. First, we must repair an obsolete and dangerously unstable system of international finance and macroeconomic cooperation. Second, we must increase and spread the benefits of trade to American workers by easing the costs of adjustment and promoting productivity growth and competitiveness.

Uncoordinated and irresponsible macroeconomic policies have caused the persistent and unprecedented trade imbalances of the eighties. U.S. federal deficits have been larger than the entire economies of all but a handful of countries. Our deficits produced high interest rates and an overvalued dollar that taxes U.S. exports and subsidizes foreign imports. Explosive swings in the dollar have whipsawed international prices by more than 50 percent over a period of mere months. These and other financial and macroeconomic factors rob our firms and workers from the chance to compete on the basis of their relative productivity.

Understanding the financial and macroeconomic grounding of the trade crisis is no new insight. There is near unanimity among economists (a minor miracle in its own right) that unfair trade practices abroad account for less than 20 percent of our trade deficit. Yet year after year, politicians incite resentment against our allies rather than identify and tackle the real causes of our trade woes. This tactic is not populism; it is demagoguery, and it represents one of the greatest isolationist threats to the security of the West in the coming decades. The politics of blame threatens to accomplish what the Soviets never could — the rending of the Western alliance.

The United States must take a lead role in overcoming these trade imbalances — first, by reducing our federal deficit. Increased revenues, decreased spending, and military restraint — not Gramm-Rudman or budget projections grounded in fantasy — represent the clear path.

As we reduce the budget deficits, we must simultaneously encourage fiscal changes by our trading partners. Japan must also reduce its chronic trade imbalances. West Germany and other countries with strong international positions must accept greater responsibility for world growth.

We can only achieve greater coordination on fiscal and monetary policies in the context of evolutions in the flexible exchange rate system. A new Bretton Woods conference — not a continuing series of high-publicity low-content economic summits — is necessary. “Target zones” or some similar form of more explicit management of exchange rates must be developed. The effort of the leading industrialized nations — the so called “G-5” — to bring down the value of the dollar deserves praise. But this intervention came far too late. A “target zone” system would help force cooperation by leading to a set of long term institutions and mechanisms that prevent realignment from coming too late again. Such an effort will require more from our allies as well

as from ourselves. The diffusion of economic power must be matched by a new allocation of responsibility.

As with new inventions, change results in jarring dislocations.

Protectionism purports to prevent the pain of trade. Positive adjustment and productivity policies will allow us instead to reap its benefits.

We need to increase the scope and effectiveness of Trade Adjustment Assistance — not eliminate it as this administration has consistently proposed. We need new and effective job training programs. Firms that demonstrate a willingness to make the long term investments necessary to modernize should be able to receive financial and technical assistance.

Most important, we need to promote flexibility and competitiveness before the winds of change become destructive. Competitiveness will not materialize out of thin air. No “invisible hand” builds the roads, the schools, and the research laboratories necessary to move our economy into the 21st century. We need an explicit and ambitious set of investments in our future. We must invest more in specific, targeted programs even in a period of severe budgetary restraint.

While we resist protectionism domestically, we must insist it not grow abroad. We must strengthen trade rules at home and demand that they be enforced. We should establish clear definitions of what constitutes unfair practices that include consideration of other countries’ trade in services, high technology, agriculture, and failure to combat counterfeiters and pirates of intellectual property. Once we determine that a country is engaging in unfair trade practices sanctions should be automatic. The President should not be able to suspend sanctions except in cases of certifiable national security threats.

We must reaffirm and expand the GATT process. International trade rules must be modernized in a new “Growth Round” of multilateral trade talks. Extending and modernizing GATT must be accompanied by strengthening its procedures for dispute settlement.

Sensible trade policy will strengthen our alliances in endless ways. By developing methods of international coordination and domestic investment, we can promote positive competition — competition that enriches all and encourages economic peace.

STRONGER ALLIANCES BASED ON EQUALITY

Some argue that America’s alliances have outlived their usefulness; that we must increasingly act unilaterally, because our alliances stand in the way of decisive, self-interested actions. In fact, in an age of diffuse economic and military power, our alliances will be more vital for our security and prosperity — not less. If our alliances are not working adequately — and in some cases they are not — our challenge is not to abandon them, but to reform, modernize, and improve them.

Stronger Alliances: NATO

NATO is and must remain key to deterring war in Europe. The establishment of the NATO alliance is a crowning achievement of the post-war era. Alleviating the strains within this 16-country partnership must be a central concern of a new foreign policy framework.

But the importance of NATO must not preclude reforms where needed. As suggested earlier, the *absence* of such reform is most to blame for current tensions in that alliance. If we continue to resist change within NATO, it may soon look like the Holy Roman Empire in its last days, with everyone wondering what still holds it together.

Our fundamental goal for NATO is to improve its ability to achieve its most basic objective — preventing war. Many of the strains in the Alliance arise from the realization among all NATO partners that nuclear conflict, either initiated at the strategic level or in Europe, is not acceptable. At the same time, the only solution to this threat — sufficient conventional forces to preclude nuclear escalation — is resisted by many countries. The continued failure to field an effective conventional deterrent — conventional forces which provide for the common security and inspire confidence among both NATO governments and publics — is the key vulnerability of the Alliance.

To improve NATO's deterrent, we need to alter dramatically its fragile "forward defense" cordon. Today, NATO's forces are deployed in a manner that resembles the French Maginot Line of the 1930s. The cordon defense is a continuing reason for our low nuclear threshold in Europe and our inability to lessen our dependence on nuclear deterrence at the tactical and strategic levels.

The lack of adequate operational reserves represents NATO's key weakness. Today there are only two divisions in operational reserve: too few to wage an effective counterattack against a major Warsaw Pact breakthrough or to support a successful NATO counter-thrust. Quite simply, NATO does not have enough ground combat units, and no injection of technology or commitments to raise defense budgets by arbitrary percentages can make up for that deficiency.

The only realistic solution is to reform NATO's defenses, just as we need to reform our own military structure.¹ In particular, one key to the creation of a more adequate conventional deterrent is greatly increased European use of its military reserve systems. We must also take steps to increase the combat capability of our ground forces in Germany, and we might consider increasing the number of U.S. divisions in Europe within current troop levels.

1. For details of military reform strategy, see Gary W. Hart and William S. Lind, *America Can Win* (Bethesda, Md.: Adler and Adler, 1986).

But the foundations of common security are as much psychological as material. An inherent fallibility of the Alliance is the continued and corrosive notion of the United States as dominant partner — even as the other partners have grown to positions of relative equality. The myth of American domination of NATO undermines the sense of self-determination which all countries require to develop public support for their defense. And it encourages unnecessary political frictions by suggesting U.S. *diktat* as the reason for unpopular actions, such as modernization of intermediate range nuclear forces stationed in Europe or increases in defense budgets.

To adapt NATO to changing times we must return to NATO's original goal: a Europe primarily responsible for its own defense. That was quite explicitly NATO's original purpose.

We must evolve from an alliance that reflects European dependency on the United States to one based on equal partnership. To that end, we should begin negotiating with our NATO allies, to consider ways we might restructure military burdens in Europe in the coming decades. For example, at some time in the 21st century, the United States might assume more of the air and sea defenses and Europe, more of the burden of land defense — an allocation that would better reflect our comparative strengths.

I stress: any move to alter NATO doctrine and forces must be evolutionary, and undertaken in full concert with our allies. But we must also make it clear we are not the Romans. We do not intend to stay in Germany for 300 years, or until we are driven out.

NATO *is* an enduring achievement of our postwar foreign policy. But for many, even the smallest detail in the traditional structure of our Alliance is considered sacrosanct. Anyone who suggests that it be changed or reformed is labeled irresponsible, isolationist, or a heretic. The domestic political cost that accompanies reform proposals has become so high that the debate over how we can strengthen the Alliance is forever put off to another day.

Recognizing NATO as a real partnership, rather than an aggregation of subservient states, can only result in a stronger, reinvigorated Alliance. But it also imposes some restraint on the United States. We must not attempt to alter NATO policies unilaterally.

The most recent and damaging example of *droit de seigneur* exhibited by American leadership has been the President's Strategic Defense Initiative. With a suddenness and rhetorical enthusiasm born of a purely domestic impulse, the administration has attempted to recreate NATO doctrine in its own image.

The Strategic Defense Initiative has inspired real fears among NATO governments and publics. Rightly or wrongly, it has fostered the perception among some that the United States desires strategic superiority; that we are seeking to sunder our commitment to NATO's defense; that we have little

interest in arms control; and that we ultimately intend to prosecute U.S.-Soviet differences on NATO soil.

Fueled by the U.S. failure to achieve progress in arms control, these fears have inflicted incalculable damage on NATO cohesion. The recent U.S. decision to abandon the limits of the SALT II Treaty — in spite of European entreaties — has further poisoned the atmosphere. Even as the quixotic promise of the SDI recedes, the political task of rebuilding consensus for Western nuclear policies will be formidable. Unilateral and dramatic shifts in strategy are not the way to treat equal partners or achieve common security.

Stronger Alliances: The Developing World

The idea of independent states acting collectively on the basis of mutual interests should also guide our policies toward the industrializing, centrist countries of the developing world. The notion of the United States and the USSR carving out spheres of influence, based on compliant client states, has been discredited and should have been discarded years ago. From Egypt's expulsion of the Soviets in the early 1970s, and our "loss" of Iran in the late 1970s, we have seen repeated examples of how the world has evolved far beyond the concept of client states — in military, economic, or political relations.

The advent of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 marked a watershed in U.S. relations with the Third World. Its declared objectives — to promote military self-reliance among friendly countries in place of dependence on U.S. interventionary forces — was, in theory, an appropriate response to important historic trends. The doctrine responded to nationalism in the developing world and acknowledged the declining utility of traditional instruments of American power, such as U.S. troop presence, base rights, and formal security alliances.

In practice, however, the Nixon Doctrine exported military technologies wholly inappropriate to the security needs of the recipients. In Iran, South Korea, and elsewhere in the Third World, by exporting excessively complex and sophisticated weaponry, we fostered dependence even as we claimed to do the opposite.

In the developing world, alliances and friendships based on equality mean we must provide these friendly states with realistic and effective means of self-defense. We can start by extending the principles of military reform to Third World recipients — providing affordable, rugged, and effective defense equipment suitable to their regional security requirements.

But relationships based on equality also require that diplomatic and military arrangements strengthen the hands of our friends and allies in their own region. There is no better or more important example than the Middle East.

In the last half decade, American diplomacy has ignored too many of the Middle East's internal realities and, as a result, helped perpetuate a costly

stalemate. Our common interests with both Israel and the moderate Arab states — preserving Gulf security and opposing the Islamic fundamentalist revolution, for example — are extremely important.

We should support certain Arab nations in these efforts, Egypt being the foremost. But we must not reward countries that try to block peace or that support intransigence, terrorism, and anti-American radicalism. We have the right and duty to use our leverage, including overt arms sales, to seek to influence their policies just as we do in other parts of the world.

Here, as elsewhere, if we are to base our relations on equality, we cannot expect to simply rearrange things to our liking. Attempts to do so can backfire in the face of local nationalism. What we can do — and what the Camp David process did well — is try to construct a framework within which the local powers can take positive, mutually beneficial actions on their own initiative, reflecting their own independence. We should be actively doing this in the Middle East today. We are not, and because we are not, we have helped to perpetuate an unstable and dangerous status quo.

To strengthen our alliance with moderate forces in the region, we should reward leaders who show flexibility in their positions — leaders, like the late President Sadat, who are willing to accept the prerequisites of regional stability — most notably, recognizing Israel's right to exist. Our commitment to the survival and security of a free and independent Israel must never be in doubt.

ENCOURAGING MORE OPEN SOCIETIES AND CENTRIST FORCES

The fourth and final focus of our framework must be encouraging the centrist forces which are the best resistance to Soviet expansionism, the strongest guarantor of human rights, and the most powerful fuel for world economic growth.

Encouraging centrist forces implies engagement — political, economic, and sometimes military. We take pride in many past engagements — the Marshall Plan; our help to famine-stricken Africa; our diplomatic assistance in launching the Camp David peace process; or our actions in assisting the transition of power from Ferdinand Marcos to Corazon Aquino in the Philippines. Yet the notion of intervention often grates on the American prejudice against meddling in the affairs of other countries. In part, the public perceives intervention as too expensive — as in the case of foreign aid. Such perceptions have been exacerbated by incidents of the government over-stepping public definitions of ethical behavior — the CIA's involvement in sponsoring assassinations and coups, for example.

But the American public will support engagements for which our leaders have made a compelling case. We must think clearly about how and when intervention is justified and effective, and we must actively rebuild public consensus for an enlightened internationalism.

Open Societies: Economic Engagement

The first type of engagement should be economic: The demands of Third World countries have moved from ideological nationalism to practical agendas for economic emancipation. The bankruptcy of the Soviet model as an example for Third World development can be the West's strongest weapon. But this will require a change in orientation of our own policy.

For example, our policies toward the nations of Africa have focused too much on external threats to their security, and too little on the more immediate *internal* crises they face.

We must marshal the energies of public and private development efforts. Our goal must be to promote economic and agricultural self-sufficiency; to improve the yields of local farms; to control the most devastating diseases and famine; to create the infrastructure for subsistence; and to speed the development of a healthy African private sector.

A very practical step to assist Africa and lesser developed economies elsewhere would involve employing our intelligence satellites on their behalf: to predict crop development; to monitor agricultural practices; to search for minerals, gas, oil, fish and other resources; and to assist in humanitarian relief efforts.

But our practical efforts to assist African nations in their development must be accompanied by moral solidarity as well. Unless we take action within our power to end the murderous reign of apartheid in South Africa, many of our positive efforts throughout the African continent may be eclipsed.

Economic sanctions have rarely succeeded in achieving our foreign goals. South Africa is a living and compelling exception. Our purpose in applying sanctions is well-defined: speeding the overdue transition to majority rule and disassociating ourselves from the repressive white minority regime. Ideally, this action should not be unilateral; for greater effectiveness, it should have the full support of our allies.

Open Societies: Political and Diplomatic Engagement

Much engagement by the United States will be diplomatic and political. The restoration of democracy in the Philippines demonstrates the effectiveness of these means, however late our own efforts may have been.

South Korea provides one of the best examples of how we should use political and diplomatic engagement. In this case, our mutual security interests are clear, recognizable and rooted in the histories of both nations.

Unfortunately, political progress has not kept pace of the industrial progress that has made South Korea one of the economic miracles of the post-war world.

The opposition New Korea Democratic Party — a democratic political force which fully appreciates the nature of the external threats to South Korea —

makes no unreasonable demand by insisting that the next Korean presidential elections fully reflect the will of the Korean electorate. Responsible opposition leaders — and there are many — share our concern that internal instability not provide a pretext for external subversion or aggression. Such leaders also recognize that security and prosperity are reinforced, not weakened, by democracy.

We have the ability and influence to encourage the moderate and pragmatic elements that exist in both the New Korea Democratic Party and the Democratic Justice Party. By strengthening and identifying with such elements now, rather than when it is too late; by using diplomacy and trade as incentives for internal accord (rather than using heavy-handed pressure which conjures up images of patron-client relationships) — by taking such steps, we can exercise true leadership.

Open Societies: Military Engagement

Diplomatic, political and economic efforts — these are the means of choice for our intervention on behalf of open societies and centrist forces. But the United States also has awesome military strength, and it is a formidable task to decide where, and under what circumstances we should use that force. In providing for our common security and prosperity, and in defense of certain vital interests of the United States, at times we will be called on to use American military power.

But direct applications of military power will be increasingly less effective in the face of continued diffusion of power around the world. Today, the resurgence of radical religious fundamentalism has a far more destabilizing effect on the Third World than do communist-inspired insurgencies.

There is no military solution — in the traditional sense — to terrorism. Together with our allies, we must use our intelligence assets to *infiltrate* terrorist groups, *identify* their leaders and sources of support, and *interdict* their plans and operations by covert and para-military means. Terrorist groups must be isolated, denied financial and military resources, and effectively frustrated until they wither and disappear.

In more traditional national and regional conflicts, the use of American military force is not an instrument of choice, but one of last resort: the culmination of failure to resolve crises by other means.

The complexity and diversity of the global environment defies mechanistic prescriptions of when and how to use force. But some principles do exist:

- First and foremost, American military forces must obviously be used to protect our security interests and those of our allies;
- Second, we must clearly define what we are trying to accomplish — what are our political and military objectives. We must insist on tangible, obtainable political goals stated in concrete terms;

- Third, the American people must support the use of their army (or other forces) in any sustained military operation and be fully cognizant of proposed levels of military force and potential costs — including of human lives;
- Fourth, we should commit our forces only after diplomatic, political, and other means have been exhausted and local forces are determined to be insufficient to resolve the conflict;
- Fifth, we must be clear on how we intend to achieve our objective and what strategies, tactics and doctrine we mean to employ;
- Sixth, we must have agreement on the command structure of any military engagement and insist that the role of civilians who make policy not overlap the uniformed commanders tasked with carrying it out;
- Seventh, the proposed operation and our thinking about it must pass the test of simplicity — the plan of operation must be achievable in its execution.

CONCLUSION

More skillfully managing U.S.-Soviet relations; expanding our use of international economics; strengthening our alliances; encouraging open societies — these four areas of enlightened engagement illustrate the tremendous opportunities awaiting America in this era of global change.

Enlightened engagement is a rejection of isolationism; and it is a rejection of traditional, bipolar containment. It is a recognition of a fundamental new truth — that the diffusion of political, military, and economic power is an opportunity for America. Grasping this reality will vastly increase — not decrease — America's influence and America's role in the world.

Engaging our economic partners in a search for stronger rules of finance and trade increases America's prosperity. Engaging developing nations in their march toward self-determination will increase America's security. Engaging the world in a cooperative fight against terrorism will increase America's safety. Engaging our allies in military reform will increase our collective confidence. Engaging the Soviets in serious arms control negotiations will increase the likelihood we will reach the 21st century — and the 22nd.

Let us seize this moment. Let us navigate the currents of change and reach a new world beyond. Let America's age of opportunity begin.