# INTERNATIONAL AID AND DEMOCRACY BUILDING PROCESS:

CAMBODIA

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

### **Submitted by Tooch Van**

April 2004

Under the advisement of Professors Peter Uvin and Sung-Yoon Lee

© 2004 Tooch Van

http://fletcher.tufts.edu



### TABLE OF CONTENTS

No.	Contents	Page
	Table of Contents Dedication Abbreviation	
I	ABSTRACT	7
II	CHAPTER ONE: Introduction	12
III	CHAPTER TWO: History of Cambodian Democracy	18
	<ul><li>A. Monarchy and Dictatorship</li><li>B. Republican Society and Corruption</li><li>C. Killing Field and Vietnamese Invasion</li><li>D. International Aid and Cambodia</li></ul>	20 21 22 23
IV	CHAPTER THREE: Democracy Building Process and International Aid community involvement	26
	A. A Starting point of Democracy Building Process B. UNTAC Operation Process ( <i>Legal Frame Work, Human Rights Component, Problems During Election, Cultural Different Issues, UNTACT Troubled by the Khmer Rough</i> ) C. Election Result and Political Atmosphere of Post election	26 27
V		31
V	CHAPTER FOUR: International Aid and Democracy	36
	A. Challenges of Building Democracy (Corruption Issues, Political and Military Struggles, Grenade Attack and Military Political Clashes, International Action towards Political and Military Crisis)	36
	B. Majors donors and their policies in building democracy (Japanese ODA, USAID, EC/EU, AusAID, UNDP, The World Bank, The ADB, The IMF)	43
	C. Analysis of International Aid Community (Weaknesses & Problems, Policy and NGO Impacts (a. NGO and Civil Society Growth Social Change,	48

b. <i>I</i>	Elections,	Reforms	and	Political	Institutions	Change,	С,	Economic
Gro	wth Chang	ge),						

VI	CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion	73
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	77
	NOTES	83

# Dedication

The International Aid and Democracy Building Process in Cambodia is dedicated to my genuine friends who have provided me with significant encouragement and support, without them I would never have come this far.

### ABBRECIATION AND DESCRIPTION

Abbreviation	Description
ADB	The Asian Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUSAID	Australian Service Agency for International Development
BFD	Buddhism for Development
CDC	Cambodia Development Council
CG	Consultative Groups
COMFREL	Committee for Free and Fair Elections
СКР	Cambodian People Party
CKP	Communist Party of Kampuchea
DKP	Democratic Kampuchean Party
EU	European Union
FUNCINPEC	United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and
	Cooperative Cambodia, which is known by the French acronym
GAO	United States General Accounting Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRI	International Republican Institute
KID	Khmer Institute of Democracy
KPNLF/BLDP	Khmer People Liberation Front/Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
LICHARDO	The Cambodian Leagues for the Promotion and Defense of Human
	Rights
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NICFEC	Neutral and Impartial Committee For Free and Fair Elections in
	Cambodia
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
SOC	States of Cambodia
SNC	Supreme National Council
TAF	The Asian Foundation
UCD	Union of Cambodian Democratic
UN	United Nations
UNTAC	United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia
UNESCO	United Nations Education Science Culture Organization
USAID	Unite States Agency for International Development

### **Abstract**

Historically, Cambodia has gone through many different regimes: A long monarchy, a constitutional monarchy, a dictatorship which included political executions, The Killing Fields, a communist regime, and finally a democracy have all been part of the governmental history in Cambodia. As a result, there exist varied opinions about Cambodia. Some (Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge) actually believed that a communist system is better for the people and the country. But this belief did not prevail long and no longer exists in Cambodia. It was really only predominant most recently, when Vietnamese communists invaded Cambodia in 1979 and tried to prove that the communist theory of Marxism and Leninism could improve Cambodia. But it did not work for Cambodia and the country system had been dysfunctional for more than a decade. Most recently, a democracy has been re-established. Democracy started in Cambodia in 1993 with the assistance of the international aid community and the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in terms of establishing a foundation of democratic principles. Cambodian citizens have embraced democracy and its accompanying concepts of freedom of speech, free press, freedom to choose the leaders and religious freedom.

The relationship between establishment of a democracy and the international aid community is fascinating because 45 percent of the annual Cambodian national budget comes from the international aid community. My research focuses on whether the international aid community assists to increase democratic development in Cambodia, and if it does, what are policy impacts of the international aid community?

My central argument is that although Cambodia's democratic journey still has a long road to travel, the international aid community has assisted Cambodia to lay down a concrete foundation for democracy building in several ways. Firstly, Non Governmental Organizational (NGO) movement has increased dramatically from only two in 1992 to 1100 NGOs in 2002. According to the Cambodian Cooperation of Committee (CCC), the largest of NGO Coalition in the country, at least 85-90 percent of these NGOs have had significant impacts on the community and on civil society growth. Less than 10% of Cambodian NGOs have involved political issues. Their work has been driven by the political parties because some political parties have been financed from their operation costs. But the majority of NGOs in Cambodia, especially Cambodian NGOs funded by international NGOs have worked directly with people at a grassroots level. primarily aim to serve common goals and work toward improved public good. They work locally, regionally, and nationally to enhance community infrastructure and social change. This is one of the most important vehicles in democracy building. For example, as change indicators the coalition NGOs have organized demonstrations and promoted alliances to demand change in important community issues, such as land ownership and use, forestry and fishery concerns and a peace movement.<sup>2</sup> There is compelling evidence from other countries around the world in which social change became a very powerful force, improving the democracy for all people. During the 1960s the civil rights movement of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. the history of the United States changed enormously. Also, one of the main reasons that the Soviet Union bloc had lost the Cold War in the 1980s was because their civil society groups stopped supporting the governmental policies.

Second, the major donors to Cambodia, Japanese ODA, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Australian Government-AUSAID, The European Union (EU)/European Commission (EC), United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have strong commitments to assist in the promotion of democracy and improvement of governance in Cambodia. The international aid community maintains strong political pressure to keep the Cambodian government on the right path of building democracy according to the Paris Peace Accord in 1991. For example, July 5<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> military and political forces clashed in 1997, which caused a big step backward in the democratic development process. The international aid community took action by applying strong pressure to Hun Sen's government, which ruled the country to allow the Union of Cambodian Democratic (UCD) and their resistant military groups at the Cambodian-Thai border to enter the country and compete in the national democratic election in 1998. Hun Sen complied with the international aid community's proposal. The second national democratic election was conducted by the National Election Commission (NED) in July 1998 and many people including international observers reported that the election was fairly free and fair.<sup>3</sup> Another major aspect is the international aid community has assisted the government to reform some major projects and many of these reforms including land management reform, military reform and public financial reform have shown significant progress.<sup>4</sup>

Third, resulting partially from the international aid's assistance, people gradually have learned how to assert their own rights and voice, to live in dignified and with healthy families and to practice democratic life. An indicator of this success can be seen

in the sheer number of people who participated in elections and other public forums such as demonstrations, debates and lobbying events. Currently, people have less fear to speak out than in prior times in Cambodia. They have taken the initiate to speak out against corrupt officials. This is something that has not happened in most of the past decade. For example, before 1994, there was no Cambodian term for "Domestic Violence" and the word "corruption" was discussed by people only in a quiet and secret forum and conservation. More recently individuals and many NGOs have worked to ameliorate the domestic violence incidents and bring the issues into the public eye<sup>5</sup>. Even the Prime Minister, Hun Sen and his senior Minister, Keat Chhon, have recognized the corrupt issues in society publicly.<sup>6</sup> People have dared to speak out against corruption; they have brought the issues into the mainstream of politics and society.<sup>7</sup> Also, people have had more access to the courts and public media than ever before. They have engaged more in a policy formation and have been willing to advocate more on issues that are important to them.

This thesis will include the following areas:

Charter 1: will explain why the international aid community is an important factor and what the relationship is between the international aid community and democracy building in Cambodia.

Chapter 2: will describe the history of a democratic birthing process in the country: how it is born, why it disappears, what the difficulties are in sustaining a democracy, how the international aid community assists in installing democracy.

Chapter 3: will demonstrate and explain the international aid community, especially the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) assists

Cambodians to replant seeds of democracy in Cambodia, it will also analyze the impacts of UNTAC bringing together all Cambodian factions to build peace and democracy in Cambodia.

Chapter 4: is the most crucial one of the thesis and contains the main argument. It will analyze the contribution, problems and impacts of the international aid community in building democracy in Cambodia. It will offer evidence of the impact of the international aid community's contributions have influenced peoples' lives and implemented social change. Policy makers have been guided within the government to adopt polices to benefit the poor and vulnerable people, all of which is a foundation of building democracy process.

Chapter 5: will synthesize the augments and make possible recommendations to be considered.

# **Chapter 1: Introduction**

Since the Soviet Union bloc collapsed bringing an end to the Cold War, major changes occurred for many countries including Cambodia. Democratic government has been established in most parts of the globe. Former United Sates (US) President Bill Clinton commented, "Democracy is on the march everywhere in the world." A democracy has become a popular concept and many people would like to learn how its process works in the real world. Cambodia and her people have proudly re-embraced a democracy since 1993 with the assistance from the international aid community and the United Nations.

The international aid community has played a crucial role in democracy building and in reconstruction of the country, after the more than 2 decades of destructive civil war. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) exerted strong pressure on Vietnam in order to have them withdraw from their invasion of Cambodia in 1987. This very successful political pressure liberated Cambodia. The international aid community has also assisted all Cambodian political factions to have the Paris Peace Accord in October 21, 1991, whereby all factions agreed to commit to instill peace and economic stability in the country and to build a quasi-democracy in Cambodia.

To achieve this challenging vision, the international aid community both bilateral and multilateral agencies have provided aid including, approximately 74% in grants and 26% in loans to Cambodia. More than 45% of the Cambodian national budget comes from aid for democracy building, reconstructing, and development in country. Statistically, most aid have provided to Cambodia in an overlapping sectors, there is still no breakdown available as to the specific percentage applied to democracy building or

good governance component, and how much of it has gone to a development and reconstructing one.

There is an argument against the international aid community assistance to Cambodia. Some critics have suggested that the international aid has only given more power to the elite and power brokers in the government to strengthen their power-base and alliances. It has been suggested this occurs because the high-ranking government officials handle all of the international aid. Due to most powerful people in the government handling international aid. It is presumed that they intentionally allocate the international aid for their personal gain and political interests and not for the benefit of vulnerable people in the country. It is even possible for those aid donors seek to promote democracy, but fail to understand the true dynamics of the society in Cambodia.

But this thesis does not believe that argument. The international aid community has its own flaws in a Cambodian context, such as lack of aid coordination, overspending resources on the expatriates and giving too many alternatives to the Cambodian government. As a result, the government does not perform its jobs in the long run.<sup>10</sup> Rather, the international aid community has had an impact on both democracy building and development in Cambodia. The international aid community has accountability for their own citizens and taxpayers when they donate funds. They must be responsible to their public and taxpayers at home and abroad. Although I know when I have met US citizens and told them about USAID funded projects throughout Cambodia, they have been quite frankly surprised that their tax dollars traveled so far from home. Most international donor agencies' financial and budget management must undergo review by certified auditing companies in order for them to stay keep operating. For example,

American NGOs that work to promote to a democracy and human rights development in Cambodia, and they funded by USAID, must have USAID auditors or American Institution of Certified Public Firms to ensure their financial and budget management compliance with the Office Of Management and Budget (OMB). Additionally every NGO funded by USAID must submit a proposal before receiving funding and must account for goals achieved before new funding is granted.

Also, the international aid community has disbursed their funding according to performance and progress of government work and NGO performance. The international aid community never has disbursed the same amount as they have pledged for Cambodia so far. For example, when violence broke out in Cambodia during a coup July 5-6, 1997, they suspended their funding to Cambodia. They were not satisfied with government performance and the government wielded military force to solve problems in country. They have suspended their funding in July 5-6 1997 event because, they have not satisfied with government performance and the government used military force to solve the problem in the country.

This thesis will demonstrate that the international aid community has successfully assisted in building a stronger democratic development process in Cambodia. Without the international aid community, Cambodia would likely have remained in civil strife or be ruled by a communist dictatorship. Yet, Cambodian people strive to build a process of democratic development, but they can't build it alone; they need the international aid community to assist them in the process.

The central argument of this thesis is that although Cambodian democratic development is still fragile, the international aid community has assisted to lay down a concrete foundation for building democracy process in Cambodia in several ways.

First, Non Governmental Organization (NGO) movement has increased dramatically from two in the country in 1992 to 1100 NGOs in 2002. According to, the Cambodian Cooperation of Committee (CCC) which is the largest of NGO Coalition in the country, the majority of NGOs (85-90%) have significantly impacted the community and civil society growth. Less than 10% of Cambodian NGOs are involved with political issues, their work has been driven by the political parties because some political parties have been financed their operation costs.<sup>12</sup> The majority of NGOs in Cambodia, especially Cambodian NGOs funded by international NGOs, have worked directly with people at grassroots levels. Their aims mainly serve common goals and public good and empower the people at a local level for a greater community improvement and social change. Some of the most important vehicles in building democracy. For example, as indicators the coalition NGOs have organized demonstrators and alliances to make demand on the issues are important for them and the community such as land use issues, forestry and fishery issues and peace movement.<sup>13</sup>

Second, the major donors for Cambodia, Japanese ODA, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Australian Government-AUSAID, The European Union (EU)/European Commission (EC), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have strong commitments in their assistance to promote democracy and improve good governance in Cambodia. The international aid

community creates strong political pressure to keep the Cambodian government on the right path of building democracy according to the Paris Peace Accord in 1991. For example, from July 5 to July 6 the military and political forces clashed violently in 1997, which resulted in a big step backward for democratic development process in Cambodia. The international aid community took action by putting strong pressure on the Hun Sen's government, to allow the Union of Cambodian Democratic (UCD) and their resistant military groups at the Cambodian-Thai border to enter the country and compete in the national democratic election in 1998. Hun Sen complied with the international aid community's proposal. The second national democratic election was conducted by the National Election Commission (NED) in July 1998 and to many people including international observers, assessed that the election was fairly free and fair. Another major aspect is the international aid community has assisted the government to reform some major projects and some of these reforms including land management reform, public financial reform and military reform have shown their progresses significantly.

Third as a partial result of the international aid's assistance, people gradually learned how to develop their own rights and express their outcry by lifting their voices live in dignified and healthy families and to practice democratic life. An indicator of this success can be seen in the sheer number of people who participate in elections and other public forums such as demonstrations, debates and lobbying events. Currently, people have less fear to speak out. They have spoken out against the corruption officials, which did not happened 11 years ago in Cambodia. For example, before 1994, there was no Cambodian term of "Domestic Violence" and the word "corruption" was rarely openly discussed by people and if it was raised as an issue it was mentioned only in quiet, secret

forums or settings. Today citizens and many NGOs have worked to bring those issues out in the open and ameliorate issues such as the domestic violence and corruption publicly. Even the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, and his senior Minister, Keat Chhon has recognized the corrupt issues in society publicly. People have dared to speak out about corrupt practices and they have brought these issues into the mainstream of politics and society. Also, people have had more access to courts and public media than ever before. Cambodians have engaged more in policy formation and are willing to advocate more on issues that matter to them.

# **Chapter 2: History of Cambodian Democracy**

A democracy is commonly known as a western concept. It is derived from the root words "Demo" which means people and "Cracy" which means power. Thus, a democracy literally means a "power of the people". The meaning of the word is powerful and dynamic. Unfortunately, some Cambodians, especially the ones who live in the countryside, do not know what democracy means. Some government officials or politicians know the meaning of democracy, but they ignore what it might mean for the people and they frequently violate the principles of democracy, while they are in power. This chapter will describe the process of how a democracy was born in Cambodia, and will also explain some of challenges in establishing democracy in Cambodia.

Some Cambodians celebrate the arrival of democracy without knowing its meaning very well. However, they appreciated and embraced the change and the difference, and some knew democracy and its principles so well and were excited by the change. Long ago, the kingdom of Kampuchea was an absolute monarchy, which held all the power in the state. According to Dr. Lao, who is a Cambodian scholar who has been watching Cambodian politics for a long time, democracy was born in Cambodia in 1947, when the country transferred its first constitution from the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy. The implementing of the constitutional monarchy began with a positive and promising principle of genuine democracy and remained at that level until 1955.<sup>17</sup>

Where did the original democratic idea travel from, before it arrived in Cambodia? "The father of Cambodian democracy was Prince Yutevong, who died in 1947 at the age of thirty-four." He was a founder of the Democratic Party in Cambodia

and a person who was full of ideas, articulate, and very energized about this concept of democracy. Prince Yutevong was educated in France and he adopted democratic principles from the political left in France. He also strongly believed in a liberal ideology and parliamentary system, which, was rooted and understood by the left in France.<sup>19</sup>

France itself was divided on the issue of democracy. France was interested in colonizing Indochina, which consisted of Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos. The political right in France opposed a new Cambodian constitutional monarchy, while the political left's administration helped Prince Yutevong establish the constitution. The political right in France rejected the idea, which would have given a lot of power to the National Assembly. The Prince, however, fought to let the National Assembly members, who were elected by the people, exercises the maximum power on behalf of the people. Cambodia and her people enjoyed exercising their own rights and privileges at that time.

According to Herz, in December 1947 a national democratic election was held and "the Democratic members won fifty-four out of seventy-five seats" in the National Assembly. Prince Yutevong became the first Premier of Cambodia as elected by the people. Also, the Prince was the first person who managed to give parliament its own rights and power to challenge the King, who was used to exercise power in a 'top down approach.'<sup>22</sup>

Unfortunately, the democracy did not last very long due to the death of Prince Yutevong. At that time the royal family members who were in politics held strong political power and were against democratic principles. Democracy increasingly declined and its principles were gradually destroyed during that period. Some Democratic members received death threats. In 1950, the president of the National

Assembly, Mr. Ieu Koeus (pronounced Iu Kas) was assassinated. He was one of the most influential of the Democratic Party leaders. At the same time, freedom of speech became limited. Many outspoken journalists and politicians were violently abused. For example, there was a terrible tragedy involved a reporter named Mr. Nop Bophann, director of the Leftist Newspaper, the *Pracheachon* Newspaper<sup>23</sup>, who was shot to death in 1950.<sup>24</sup>

From that time forward, democratization continued to decrease sharply, as water flows down the bank of the river during a heavy rainstorm, into the bottom of the river. Prince Norodom Sihanouk's friend, Mr. Yem Sambaur, became the Prime Minister and, in 1950, he was involved a wide-ranging scandal of corruption. Sambaur didn't last too long. His government became chaotic, the political environment tumultuous, and students rose up and rioted against corrupt government officials. As Herz described, Yem Sambaur's power became shaky due to his involvement with a terrible corruption scandal. The city of Phnom Penh was in turmoil and many demonstrations took place during which several students were shot.<sup>25</sup>

#### Monarchy and Dictatorship

Prince Sihanouk became involved in politics to take a stand against democratic members. This was forbidden by the constitution of Cambodia at that time, but Prince Sihanouk exercised his autocratic power anyway. Herz wrote:

Cambodian democracy went completely into abeyance when the King<sup>26</sup> dissolved the second National Assembly in January 1953. During period of the 'crusade for Independence.'... The king had declared, when he took over full powers, that he would account for his stewardship within three years, and has sworn 'before all the Tevodas and the Most Real Power that I will allow myself to be arraigned to be judged in the public by the people at expiration of that period.' (Herz: 1958 p.107)

Prince Sihanouk succeeded in the crusade for Cambodian Independence from France. He quickly called the movement: a Sangkum Reatr Nyum (People's Socialist Community). According to Dr. Lao, "People's Socialist Community [was] the movement under the banner of 'guided democracy' subsumed all the political parties." Prince Sihanouk gained popularity from the people as Cambodians gave him credit for accomplishing independence from France. The country held a national election on September 11, 1955. As a result, the prince's party won 82% of the popular vote which all meant seats in the National Assembly. The Democratic Party won only 12% of the votes. <sup>28</sup>

Politically, Prince Sihanouk discouraged democratic members from participating in the government. He exercised a 'top down approach' by choosing the National Assembly members to participate in the National Assembly by himself. According to Herz, since Prince Sihanouk embodied the power and carried out a top down approach to control, nobody could challenge his leadership. He was a Prime Minister in charge of the government and controlled the Parliament. The Prince remained in his palatial retreat at Siem Reap Province, but all the important decisions of the country must be submitted to him. He was the man who controlled everything, and he was predominantly influenced by his parents: The King and Queen.<sup>29</sup>

### Republican Society and Corruption

An important event in history to be noted occurred was in the 1970s. Cambodian democracy reappeared when the political environment was chaotic. Prince Sirik Matak and his followers forced general Non Lon, Chief of the Armed forces, to stage a coup against Prince Sihanouk Norodom, while the Prince was abroad, for a long vacation in France. The coup was successful against the government of Prince Sihanouk. General

Lon Nol was heralded as Prime Minister and he embraced multiparty democratic principles in his government. The United States supported his control of Cambodia. Lon Nol ultimately became a dictator and his government was very corrupt.<sup>30</sup> His government would not last very long because people stopped supporting his policy and the country became chaotic again. This escalated to final collapse of his government.

### Killing Fields and Vietnamese Invasion

In 1975, Khmer Rouge defeated Lon Nol's government. Democracy disappeared completely during the Khmer Rouge period. Khmer Rouge leaders turned the country upside down by launching auto-genocide<sup>31</sup> between 1975 and late 1978. Pol Pot and his comrades killed 2-3 million people, the educated, the elite, the city people, Cambodians who spoke foreign languages, served as teachers, lawyers, doctors, monks, nurses, judges, anyone with soft hands, and those were wore eyeglasses. In 1979, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with Vietnamese troops seized power from the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge soldiers and leaders fled to the forest in the remote areas of the country. Vietnam installed the Heng Samrin's government or States of Cambodia (SOC) to run the government under the communist ideologies, which were then practiced, by Vietnam and Russia. Technically, Vietnamese troops were supposed to return to Vietnam after they helped to liberate Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge; but in fact they did not. Vietnam invaded Cambodia for ten years 1979-89, they installed a communist dictatorship regime in the country and extracted most of Cambodian resources and created policies to allow Vietnamese people to live on Cambodian land. All the state important decisions must be reviewed by Vietnam. No one could challenge Vietnamese policies; and if someone tried to oppose that person would be imprisoned.

### International aid community and Cambodia

During the Cold War, the bitter tension between the former Soviet Union bloc and United States increased sharply. In the 1980s the Soviets, who supported Vietnam's invasion in Cambodia, became less influential. The Soviets were more focused on tension with the United States. At the same time, the Phnom Penh Government (PRK), which had received "military support from Vietnamese regular forces and economic and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and other member of the socialist bloc," became very weak. 33

USAID and other western government donor's government began to support the Cambodian opposition factions at the Cambodian-Thai border. These political groups included, the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, which is known by the French acronym (FUNCINPEC), led by the Prince Norodom Sinhanouk and later by his son, Prince Norodom Rannarith, and the Khmer People Liberation Front/Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (KPNLF/BLDP) led by Former Prime Minister Son Sann. For example, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI) funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provided political training and some technical support to KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. Also, some FUNCINPEC and KPNLF senior party members were provided salaries by NDI and IRI. In the meantime, China continued to support the Democratic Kampuchean Party (DKP) led by Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot<sup>34</sup>.

It is interesting to note that all three factions fought against the Phnom Penh Government known as (PRK). PRK barely fought in the battle and they needed a lot of

military assistance from Vietnam, especially from their armed forces. At that time, western donor countries such as the United States and Canada established a political and economic embargo around Cambodia (Phnom Penh Government) and Vietnam. Vietnam could not maintain its presence in Cambodia any longer, because it was too expensive to stay. The Vietnamese government had to increase the armed forces sent to the Phnom Penh Government, in order to fight with the opposition factions at the border.<sup>35</sup>

ASEAN and the United Nations took a very firm stance by bringing political pressure to bear on Vietnam to withdraw their troops from Cambodia because the Vietnam invasion was not justified under the UN principles of sovereignty of the nation. As Mayall wrote:

Vietnam's invasion had violated the cardinal rule of the society of the states as enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council was constrained by Soviet Veto but the General Assembly passed recurrent adverse resolutions against Vietnam, calling for its military withdrawal. (Leifer and Berdal: 28-29: Cited in Mayall: 1996)

Therefore, Vietnamese government complied with ASEAN and international community's proposal. So Cambodia was liberated from Vietnam in 1987 and gained its sovereignty back. Since then Cambodia reopened its borders for access from and to the free and western world. The international aid community believed that Cambodia deserved to have peace, a liberal market, economic stability and a democracy. As a result, major donor countries including the US, France, Australia has created an innovative proposal to bring all Cambodia political factions together to sign the Paris Peace Agreement. According to William Shawcross, November 1987 was the first time for peace talks that began when Prince Sihanouk met with Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Phnom Penh Government. The negotiation between all four political parties began in 1989 in Jakarta, Indonesia.<sup>36</sup> These meetings also served as an "essential preamble to a

broader internationalization of the problem that would feature the direct participation of the ultimate power brokers of the Cambodia stalemate: China, the Soviet Union and the United States." From the Jackarta negotiation, there then came a peace agreement in Paris in 1991.

The Paris Peace Accord was a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflicts. An Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans put together a package based on the concept of creating an international independent body, which supervised and monitored Cambodia in transition. US Representative, Stephen Solarz, recommended this idea. As Shawcross wrote:

Senator Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister, then took the initiative, adopting an idea put forward by the U.S. Representative Stephen Solarz to create 'an international control mechanism' that would rule Cambodia temporarily. In February 1990 Australia produced its 'Red Book,' the first draft of a plan for an international peacekeeping operation in Cambodia that ultimately led to the Paris Peace Agreement of October 21, 1991. This was signed by nineteen nations including all the permanent members of the U.N Security Council and the ASEAN countries. (Shawcross: 1994)

Cambodian democracy emerged once again when all Cambodian political factions agreed to sign the Paris Peace Accord in October 1991. One of the most important components of the Accord was to request that the United Nations to designate the independent body called the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to organize and facilitate the first national democratic elections in 1993.

# **Chapter 3: Democracy Building Process and International Aid community involvement**

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) assisted in planting the roots of a democracy building process in 1993, after more than two decades of civil strife. Most Cambodians were ready to embrace a democracy in Cambodia, and they enthusiastically participated in the democracy building process. This chapter will explain the democracy building process and will demonstrate that the difficult process of international peacekeeping facilitated by the UN actually works. At the same time, this chapter will examine how the UN peacekeeping operation created opportunity for all Cambodian political factions to participate in the democracy building through the first national democratic election in 1993. Also, this chapter will depict the impact of the national election supported, facilitated and supervised by UNTAC.

### A. A Starting point of Democracy Building Process

The comprehensive Paris Peace Agreement had many purposes, but one of the most important was to invite the United Nations to establish UNTAC, which began its peacekeeping operations in March 1992 in Cambodia. The UNTAC operation included military and police presence, civil administration, nationwide ceasefire supervision, human rights investigation and monitoring, and refugee repatriation and rehabilitation components<sup>38</sup> Also, the operation required that all four factions disarm, that a neutral political environment be established, and that there be control of the five important ministries: Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Information and Interior. Most critical,

UNTAC needed to organize and supervise a free and fair national democratic election for Cambodia and her people.<sup>39</sup>

The peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was the first and largest operation that the UN had launched. The UNTAC employed a 22,000 military and civilian staff to carry out the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Paris Peace Accord October 1991. UNTAC had spent in this effort almost 2 billion dollars for its total operation. It was a massive election supervision undertaking for a small country, which at the time had only 9.6 million people in 1993.<sup>40</sup>

### **B. UNTAC Operation Process**

According to the sovereignty of the country, Cambodia had to set up the Supreme National Council (SNC). SNC were representatives from the three main political parties, FUNCINPEC, BLDP and CPP. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who became the King in 1993, was the chairman of the SNC. SNCs' role and responsibilities were to make sure that UNTAC had all the necessary powers to organize and conduct the election according to the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991.<sup>41</sup>

### Legal Framework

UNTAC established the election law, which laid out the legal framework to make sure the election would be run freely and fairly. The law gave full authority to the election commission. Its members were UNTAC personnel. The rules and regulations were issued by the election commission and the safeguards were reflected in the election law. It was necessary for this process to be impartial to all political parties. All political parties, it was argued, must have an equal opportunity to conduct their campaigns. This was the most important part of the law because the people of Cambodia had not had a

chance to express their rights for quite some time. Cambodian people had been living under oppression and human rights abuses and violations of the auto-genocide of the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese's invasion for more than fifteen years by that time. This election was a significant chance for citizens to express their freedom of speech in choosing their leaders.<sup>43</sup> As a result, the election law was intended to give an equal opportunity to all political parties, so that the people could express their rights in a democratic fashion after more than two decades of civil war.

UNTAC developed an entire election administration, in which all principles were impartial, and were safeguarded for all Cambodian people. The election process included planning, organizing, and implementing the election. The tasks included: registration of voters, civil education, political party registration, rules of the campaign, polling, counting/consolidation of the result and announcement of the results. All of these would be done or supervised by the UNTAC personnel to ensure and maintain impartiality. There was great enthusiasm for the process as reflected in twenty different political parties registering with UNTAC. It is important to note that the Khmer Rouge did not register with UNTAC.

### **Human Rights Component**

UNTAC established a human rights component that worked with a few local human rights organizations to conduct training and education, and to monitor and investigate human rights abuses and violations in the country. According to Berdal and Leifer, UNTAC established its own human rights office in different provinces in Cambodia in order to ensure that the people understood and respected human rights. UNTAC also fielded human rights complaints. They monitored and investigated human

rights abuses at the grassroots level in order to help the people respect the law. UNTAC allocated civilian police to the process and 'its strength was 36,000 officers from more than 30 police forces world-wide.' 45

### **Problems During The Election**

There were a number of serious problems and a few failures that UNTAC faced in its mandate in organizing the elections in Cambodia. For example, the Democratic Kampuchean Party (DKP), one of the four parties who signed the Paris Peace Accord boycotted the election for two main reasons: First, they were not pleased with the way UNTAC handled the election management and authority distribution and they accused UNTAC of neglecting them. Second, they were not satisfied with the way the Cambodian People Party (CPP) transferred the power to the UNTAC. Because CPP did not completely turn over the five important ministries to UNTAC's control and supervision, this failed. It was in fact one of the requirements in the Paris Peace Accord in 1991. UNTAC exhibited weakness when it could not force CPP to hand over the power of those five ministries.<sup>46</sup> This was a lesson learned for the United Nations to consider in any further missions of this kind.

### **Cultural Difference Issue**

The issues were quite complex. Berdal and Leifer, stated that CPP ministry officials manipulated and obstructed the management systems of those ministries with regard to the UNTAC personnel. This work required a great deal of local knowledge and insight into the culture and local politics of the ministry staff in a sensitive fashion. This complicated issue made it impossible for UNTAC personnel to directly control the heart of the ministry. Most UNTAC personnel and experts were foreigners and they did not

speak the local language, 'Cambodian or Khmer language.' At the same time, it was hard to find Cambodian translators or interpreters who were qualified and understood the technical terms and complicated issues during that time.<sup>48</sup> Language was one of the main barriers standing in the way of UNTAC to achieve its objectives. As a result, UNTAC had to compromise with CPP on those five ministries. UNTAC personnel supervised some parts of the administrative areas, but the core administrative management of each ministry was still managed and supervised by the CPP officials. This absolutely prevented the UNTAC operation from controlling the entire civil administration.

### **UNTAC Troubled by Khmer Rouge**

The Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and continued committing violence around the country. They killed a few UNTAC personnel as well as people in rural areas. Frequently people were killed in isolated areas. For example, in April 1993, according to a UN report, attacks by Khmer Rouge caused the death of 110 Cambodians, including those of Vietnamese descent, and 179 were injured. This was a huge casualty incident crated by the Khmer Rouge.<sup>49</sup>

When these terrible killings occurred, many UNTAC officials and leaders wanted to deal with the Khmer Rouge violent presence by using UN military police forces to fight Khmer Rouge's soldiers. A French General attached to the UN, Michel Loridon, ended up resigning because he wanted to use force but the head of the UNTAC, Akashi, did not approve that approach. As the General commented, "he could have ended the Khmer Rouge threat with the loss of just 200 of his men." However, the Special Representative of the UN, Ysushi Akashi, who was head of the UNTAC operation in

Cambodia did not agree to allow UNTAC officials to use military offensive against the Khmer Rouge Soldiers. His Excellency Akashi tried to preserve the UN peacekeeping mandate and maintain a good reputation with the international aid community regarding the UN operation in Cambodia. His Excellency, Akashi pursued an ultimate goal in which a peaceful democratic election would be conducted. He commented during the conference on July 16 in New York that we have to conclude that our mission was 'firmness and flexibility' in achieving positive results at the end of the operation. <sup>51</sup>

### C. Election Result and Political Atmosphere of Post election

Although there were a number of problems that occurred UNTAC managed to run a fairly successful election process. The election was carved in a history book of Cambodia and the world. It was the biggest election that Cambodia had ever launched. Cambodian people were enthusiastic and came out and voted. The number of the voters were unprecedented:: 'More than 4 million Cambodians-representing 89.6 per cent of the registered voters, cast their ballots during five days with the multi-political parties in the election.' Moreover, UNTAC polling stations were numerous and widespread and easily accessed by voters, even in remote areas of the country. They made special efforts in fact to establish a mobile team to reach the voters to ensure those countryside dwellers has an opportunity to vote. In addition, UNTAC organized a variety of public meetings, conferences, and alliances to inform people about voter education.

Elections were held between 17-23 of May 1993. On the first day of the election there was heavy rain and thunder, and some local people thought that the Khmer Rouge had attacked Phnom Penh again, because they remembered April 1975 when the Khmer Rouge launched a final attack on Phnom Penh. UNTAC however was managing the

political environment and the national security in order to keep the peace throughout the process. People were very excited to have a chance to participate in the national democratic election again. There was a very long line of voters for each polling station. It was amazing to watch the enthusiasm of Cambodian people welcoming the arrival of democracy and hoping to see a change for the better. People woke up very early in the morning to be at the polling stations. They stood in the pouring rain to wait and cast their votes. They hoped that they were planting the seeds of democracy in Cambodian soil, and expecting a democracy to flourish.

UNTAC's Radio broadcasts. It turned out that the FUNCINPEC won the majority of voters over the CCP and other parties in the election process. Over 4 million of a total population of 9.6 million cases their ballots. Thereafter, the UN Security Council officially announced and legitimated the Cambodian democratic election as a free and fair election process.<sup>52</sup> The following was the official result:

The winning parties	Seats in Assembly		<b>Proportion of votes</b>		
FUNCINPEC	58		45.47%		
СРР	51		38.23%		
BLDP	10		3.81%		
Molinaka and Nakataorsou Khmer for Freedom			1.37%		

Sources: Cambodian Elections Results, UN DPI/1389-June 1993

With 58 of the 120 seats FUNCINPEC garnered the majority of the National Assembly. Legally and officially, FUNCINPEC could join with BLDP to take three-quarters of the

National Assembly seats and run the government. However, CPP leaders did not approve this request and claimed that UNTAC had manipulated the election result. CPP leaders, Prince Chakrapong, Deputy Prime Minister of Phnom Penh and Minister of Interior, Sin Son established 'autonomous zones' in a few provinces in the eastern part of Cambodia. Seeking control FUNCINPEC threatened to stage a 'coup' asserting they had the military ability and power to stage a coup if FUNCINPEC would not share power to run the new government. To avoid civil conflict, Hun Sen, and Chea Sim asked Sihanouk to negotiate with FUNCINPEC, to share the power with the CPP. If not it were threatened that CPP would stage a coup. Shawcross said " On 3 June both Chea Sim and Hun Sen went to the palace and asked Prince Sihanouk to assume absolute power. They warned of violence against FUNCINPEC." 53

That situation could have led to a serious crisis, which would have turned Cambodia into a bloody war zone again. King Norodom Sihanouk, who was head of the SNC called for all the important leaders, including Mr. Ysushi Akashi, head of UNTAC, Prince Norodom Rannarith, head of FUNCINPEC, and Hun Sen and Chea Sim head of the CPP, to join in discussions in order to create a compromise to share power.<sup>54</sup> The meeting harkened back to ancient times tradition when monarchs described above ruled and reigned in Cambodia. The arrangement of the meeting was run according to the old monarchy tradition.<sup>55</sup> As Shawcross stated:

Sihanouk announced at the 14 June meeting that was inviting members to meet 'en famille' at the palace with 'papa.' They met in the palace throne room the next day in a politico-religious atmosphere reminiscent of the old days of monarchy. Monks presided and incense burned on the altar. Sihanouk invoked the spirits (*tevodas*) to witness the gathering; he said members should leave behind bad feelings of the past and commit themselves to working peacefully. (Shawcross: 1994)

Sihanouk suggested a coalition government. The ultimate outcome of the meeting was a power-sharing scheme consisting of co-prime ministers running a coalition Prince Norodom Ranariddh of the FUNCINPEC party was the First Prime government. Minister and Mr. Hun Sen of the CPP party was the Second Prime Minister. The coalition government was based on 'the power sharing formula.' The division of power was "45 per cent FUNCINPEC, 45 per cent CPP, and 10 per cent BLDP- with the CPP obtaining twelve ministries, FUNCINPEC eleven, BLDP three and Moulinaka one. The Constituent Assembly then endorsed the provisional administration." This arrangement was not without complication. For example, if any Ministry was under the FUNCIPEC's supervision, a FUNCIPEC member would be a Minister and the two Co-Deputy Ministers, would be one each from the FUNCIPEC Party and the CPP Party. If any ministry were under the CPP's supervision, a CPP member would be a Minister and the two Co Deputy Ministers, would be one each from the CPP and the FUNCIPEC party. Because of their strategic importance the Ministries of Interior and Defense were exempted from that plan. Instead for the Ministries of Interior and Defense there were Co Ministers, one from FUNCIPEC and one from CPP. 57 Finally, all parties were satisfied with the result of the agreement. Though not a perfect nor completely democratic solution Cambodia was able to move forward because of this arrangement. It has been a point of criticism that the outcome of this election was more brokered by the King than an outcome of a free and fair election. However because UNTAC monitored this election thereby modeling free and fair election process there have now been three relatively free and fair elections in Cambodia.

Overall, UNTAC has assisted to bring peace and a basic democratic freedom to Cambodia. Its election's result was fair and acceptable to most Cambodian people. At least, the election has given Cambodian people the unique opportunity to participate in the democratic arena, to choose their own political freedom and to determine the political future of their country. UNTAC helped Cambodia put its country back together, after Cambodia had gone through more than two decades of civil strife. Also, UNTAC left Cambodia with a sense of pride and feeling of confidence in the seeds of democracy once again. After the UNTAC election and period, the number of NGOs that work in the area of human rights and democratic development and good governance has increased sharply. The success of the election legitimized the international community throughout the country, thereby making way for an influx of NGOs that would follow to work in the areas of human rights, democratic government and rule of law processes UNTAC in fact built the democratic foundation on which other NGOs would build in the future.

Another example of democracy during the post election time is the advent of critical media outlets. The number of media organizations have increased up to now around 200 organizations including those are both in favor of and critical of the government. These indicate that freedom of speech has improved dramatically also. The media was very different during the State of Cambodia (SOC). During that time there were only a few media sources and they were completely one sided and controlled by those who supported the government interests. Freedom of speech was very limited at that time.

## **Chapter IV: International Aid and Democracy**

Since the national democratic election in 1993 sponsored by the UN, international aid and the present of the international community in Cambodia have played quite an important role in building democracy and in promoting development of the country. Most Cambodians enthusiastically support and embrace the international aid. They believe that without the assistance of the international community and foreign aid partners in Cambodia, Cambodian democratic development would never have come this far. Without UNTAC the country would have been stuck in the Communist bloc and would have been suffering under Communist dictatorship. Additionally, the civil war would have continued devastating Cambodia and her people politically, socially, and economically.

This chapter will identify some challenges that the country faces in democracy building and will also analyze the international aid situation. It demonstrates the role international aid plays in democracy building. Finally, this chapter will describe the policies and the impacts of the international aid community in contributing to building democracy in Cambodia.

### A. Challenges in building democracy

Even though Cambodians have happily embraced democratic development in Cambodia the progress has been slow. It has been two steps forward and one and a half steps back due to the power struggles in the state bureaucracy, corruption, despotism/cronyism and the general overall entrenchment of poverty, and due to lack of infrastructure. These present big challenges in the process of building democracy.

The state bureaucracy and power struggle among Cambodia leaders have caused a regression in building democracy. After the election in 1993, the coalition government was established, however, Cambodian leaders developed policies to maneuver around any real sense of coalition work. Rather political parties worked toward their own interests and never really cooperated in a team spirit fashion. It was not very long before the coalition government between First Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Rannariddh, FUNCINPEC and the Second Prime Minister; Hun Sen CPP, became unstable and shaky. The trouble began when the two Prime Ministers did work together to unseat Mr. Sam Rainsy. Sam Rainsy was a very outspoken Financial Minister who had railed against government corruption and who quite powerful due the fact that he managed the inflation, interest rates and exchange rates of Cambodia. He had helped to stabilize the Cambodian economy since before the war years. Rainsy was very popular in the eyes of the international aid and community. Both prime ministers were threatened by his popularity.

The firing of Sam Rainsy presented serious threats to the FUNCINPEC party, which led to trouble in its leadership. David Roberts said, "the sacking of the popular Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy in October 1994 exacerbated the problem between Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC. It also prompted the resignation of the Prince Sirivuth, another well-known figure of the party." Additionally, other senior FUNCINPEC members were unhappy with Prince Rannariddh, Hun Sen and CPP's policies. They believed FUNCINPEC and Prince Rannariddh were heavy influenced by Hun Sen and CPP. William Shawcross, is a long time political watchdog in Cambodian politics. He is considered one of the greatest scholars in international community press and media.

He had a conversation with one of the senior FUNCINPEC members, which is described below:

We have been swallowed and digested by the CPP. We were elected by the people to bring peace and development. Instead we have been pushed into adopting all the CPP's policies, including attacking the Khmer Rouge. Both CPP and the Khmer Rouge need the war. The CPP has stopped us from keeping any of our promises. Sometimes, I think that all aid should be stopped. There is no point in giving analgesics when surgery is required. (Shawcross: 1994, P.94)

# **Corruption Issues**

Politically charged events caused the coalition government to be dysfunctional which exacerbated corruption within the government. Many political scholars had predicted that the coalition government would be ultimately broken out.

Corruption occurs everywhere. Even government officials have recognized corruption as a disease of society. As stated in official government literature,

"[corruption] provokes irrational decision-making, disruptions the development of the private sector and undermines the environment for sustainable development. This issue is not where corruption should be fought but rather how and with what mean." Mr. Keat Chhon, Minister of Finance of Cambodia, estimates that Cambodia has lost up to 100 million dollars each year to the corrupt activities in illegal logging, rubber exportation and fishing 62. In his speech in 1997, the Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen said Cambodia has lost several million dollars because corrupt custom officers have taken away from the national tax revenue collection and put it in their own pockets. Corruption becomes the accepted norm in all business transactions. The Center for Social Development (CSD) reported that "more than 80 percent of Cambodians believe that bribery is the normal way of doing businesses in sectors such as education, health care, traffic and the judiciary." The least

that the Prime Minister has done is to recognize the problem and speak out against corrupt officials publicly.

In addition, most FUNCINPEC and CPP generals had Mercedes and several expensive residences or second houses while many people are still fighting for the basic needs for survival in the country. One problem is that almost everyone seems to work for the government. One example of corruption in the armed forces, is that the coalition government had an exorbitant number of generals and high-ranking officers, many of whom did not actually exist, but were listed on the military rolls. Since many of these officers were not officially registered, Cambodia as 'ghost soldier.<sup>65</sup>' Shawcross stated

There are now 2000 generals in the Cambodian army and 10,000 colonels. Many of these 'officers' are not even soldiers; they bought their stripes to be able to intimidate and extort more effectively. The nominal payroll of the entire army has now increased from 128,000 registered by the UNTAC's Operation Paymaster to close to 160,000 today-either or ten times the ideal size of the army. But many of these soldiers, as in the Lon Nol days, are 'phantoms.' Whose pay is going to the pocked of the officers. (Shawcross: 1994: p. 90 & 91.)

## **Political and Military Struggle**

Since there was little faith in the coalition government each party leader attempted to build a power base with their own interests at heart. It did not work well. These prime ministers could not be yoked together as a pair of good oxen and pull with joint effort for the ultimate success of Cambodia. This was much more like yoking an ox with a zebra – being of different size and motion and to yoke them together was an unequal yoking causing great discomfort to each and interfering with the effective work of both. In essence it failed. Between 1996 and 1997 the two co prime ministers seemed to be developing political policy in opposing directions. For example, in September 1996, Ranariddh secretly began to negotiate with Ieng Sary and three divisions of the rebel

forces that controlled the timber and gem mines in the Pailin area to defect to the Coalition Government Armed Forces. At the same time, Hun Sen secretly negotiated with Ieng Sary as well. "After strenuous bargaining between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. Hun Sen won over Ieng Sary, whose Khmer Rouge cohorts ultimately received a royal pardon."

As the Khmer Rouge became less and less of a threat to the stability of Cambodia and more and more key leaders defected to the Coalition Government Armed Forces, Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge chief got paranoid. He ordered the assassination of his deputy Son Sen and his entire family. Pol Pot's soldiers shot Son Sen and drove their cars over the bodies of his family members, crushing their skulls as a final insult.<sup>67</sup> The Khmer Rouge commander, Tak Monk, was furious with Pol Pot and ordered his troops to arrest Pol Pot. They tried him to the jungle near the border. But it was clearly a trial for show in a veiled attempt to appease the general Cambodian citizenry as well as the international aid After the trial Pol Pot was sentenced to house arrest in his village. community. Ultimately, Pol Pot allegedly died of malaria in his small hut at the Cambodian-Thai This was a big disappointment for Cambodians and the international aid border. community. It frustrated those who were concerned because tremendous effort had been made to bring Pol Pot and his senior leaders to international tribunal for their crimes against humanity. Efforts are still being pursued today to bring the rest of the Khmer Rouge rebels to trial for war crimes.

During this time, in Phnom Penh, there were tensions increased between Rannariddh and Hun Sen, due to the impending national election scheduled for 1998. FUNCIPEC was demanding that there be candidates from both parties at all district

levels. However, because most of district leaders were from CPP, CPP dismissed the demand and claimed that FUNCINPEC did not have enough candidates and did not provide a comprehensive list of candidates to the government. In light of escalating tensions, tension escalated Rannariddh and Hun Sen started increasing their bodyguards. Both prime ministers were creating their own private armies. Rannariddh smuggled in an arms shipment. Hun Sen increased the number of bodyguards. The tension became worse as the two Prime Ministers verbally threatened on national television to start a war. Once again the Cambodian were faced with fears that their country might be engulfed in bloodshed. Cambodians were worried that the country might face bloodshed again.

## **Grenade Attack and Military Political Clashed**

On March 30, 1997, Former Finance Minister Sam Rainsy and his supporters conducted a demonstration in front of the National Assembly to demand worker's rights and fair wages. Soldiers tossed out a few grenades at the protesters. The grenades exploded, killing 20 people, and wounding 100, including one American. Some of the soldiers blocked roadways leading to the National Assembly preventing access to ambulances and taxis to the areas where the wounded protestors lay on the ground. The Washington Post stated, "the FBI has pinned responsibility for the blasts, and the subsequent interference, on personal bodyguard forces employed by Hun Sen."<sup>69</sup>

In May, the bodyguards of FUNCINPEC and CPP had a battle on the street near Ranariddh's personal residence. Two rockets landed on Ho Sok's house. He was serving as the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Interior, member of FUNCINPEC. He was also a special security advisor to Rannariddh. The following month, another rocket landed at the residence of the US Ambassador Kenneth Quinn.

From July 5-6, 1997, the Second Prime Minister Hun Sen staged a final coup to overthrow the First Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Rannariddth, who was democratically elected by the people in the election of 1993. About 40 senior FUNCINPEC members including Ho Sok were killed and around 120 civilians were wounded. Prince Rannariddh and key party leaders of his were forced into exile. BLDP members and other opposition parties including the Sam Rainsy Party formed the Union of Cambodian Democratic (UCD) with their resistance military at the Cambodian-Thai border once again. UCD appealed to the United Nations, the United States and the international community for help in order get them back to the country, so they could run another democratic election in 1998.

## **International Community Action in Political and Military Crisis**

The international aid community condemned Hun Sen's government for using violence to overturn Prince Ranariddth and FUNCINPEC. The UN put a hold on the Hun Sen government and would not allow it to occupy Cambodian's seat at the United Nations Association South East Nations (ASEAN) had delayed the decision of whether or not to admit Cambodia's a member. Major donor groups include the United States Agency International for Development (USAID), Australian Government (AUSAID), European Union (EU), UNDP, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), suspended all aid and assistance to Cambodia. The investment groups left the country and some of them cancelled their new contracts with the government. The number of tourists visiting Cambodia decreased dramatically overnight. According to the European Commission (EC) the GDP growth has fallen from 7.4% to 2% decreasing in per capita income.<sup>70</sup>

The political and military forces clashes in July 1997 caused a huge step backward for the democratic building process and overall development in Cambodia. Most Cambodians were furious with their leaders who put their own ego and desires for power ahead of the national interests.

# B. Majors donors and their policies in building democracy Major Donor General Description

International aid donors are important players in building democracy, tackling challenges and enhancing overall development in Cambodia. Their policies and assistance are designed to promote democracy, rule of law and good governance in Cambodia. The country needs to rebuild its economic growth and a democracy after more than two decades of civil strife. The international aid community plays a major role in this effort. The major donors have provided assistance to develop economic growth and consistently worked with the government and its people to build democratic development. They include

Japanese ODA Assistance: Japan is the largest bilateral donor to Cambodia. It is in Japan's national interest to promote peace and stability in Asia. The Japanese view Cambodia as an important component of Asian stability and therefore are interested in facilitating economic growth in Cambodia thereby ensuring stability. Specific Japanese assistance to Cambodia include: 1) economic growth development and infrastructure reconstruction: 2) promotion and delivery of social services in the health, agriculture and education sectors 3) human resource development in Cambodia 4) According to the 1991 Paris Peace Accord implementation of a democratic policy and respect for human rights.<sup>71</sup> Japan wants Cambodia to compete evenly with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, and to that end Japan provides assistance in

Cambodian economic growth and development. Japan realizes that it would beneficial for Cambodia to qualify for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Japan's annual aid equals 25% of the total budget of the international aid community contributions. This assistance has been instrumental in initiating the Consultative Group (CG) Meetings. The CG is a group of donors who are interested in supporting a democracy building and development in Cambodia. Over the past decade Japan has provided "on the net disbursement basis, \$720 million including \$170 million through international organizations."

United States Agency for International Development (USAID): The aim of the United States of America is to promote the democracy, good governance and human rights improvement in Cambodia. Since the 1990s, USAID has assisted Cambodians in rebuilding their country and democratic society. A dramatic increase in the Non Governmental Organization in Cambodia has played a very important part in this effort.<sup>73</sup> The United States is the second largest bilateral donor to Cambodia. Since 1993 the USAID program has changed its focus from emergency relief assistance to long-term sustainable development and democracy building assistance. When the political and military violence erupted in July 1997, USAID suspended its funding and that reduced contributions to \$38 million grant which was only 2/3 of the annual budget allocated for Cambodian aid in development. 74 Up to now USAID has not provided any funding to political government process institutions or activities but has limited its funding to strategic areas such as "democracy and human rights, rural economic growth, health and population, primary education, war and mine victim assistance, environment and HIV/AIDS prevention."<sup>75</sup>

European Commission (EC) (France): The European Commission is the third largest bilateral donor for Cambodia. EC-Cambodia is interested in promoting social and economic development and in building democracy, rule of law and stable government. Since 1992, EC has provided assistance of more than US \$ 250 million in the areas of: community development (primary health care, education and environment protection, refugees resettlement), and democracy and human rights development including rule of law, good governance and human rights improvement. From 2002-2004, EC has committed US \$ 68.7 million assistance for the items listed above. In addition, EU has established its partnership with the ASEAN for a political, trade and economic cooperation and dialogue in order to maintain a "peace and stability in the region and its important economic weight have made ASEAN an essential partner for the European Union in Asia."

Australian Government (AusAID): AusAID works to promote Australia'S interests by building democracy, helping to reduce poverty and promoting a sustainable development in Cambodia. The program activities include: strengthening rule of law (judiciary reform, accountability and transparency in civil service, and strengthening law enforcement and court administration to ensure equitable access); and reducing imbalance of power (increasing productivity and annual incomes, strengthening the institutional and policy environment action on mine and agricultural products and their markets. AusAID has budgeted \$44 million for 2003-2006 in Cambodia. The Australian government's interests are: to promote development, stability and progress in Cambodia, to ensure Cambodia stability and prosperity, so that it can contribute to

"regional economic growth and assist in combating transnational crime, including terrorism, people smuggling narcotics and child sex tourism."<sup>81</sup>

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) follows up the philosophy of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)'s Declaration in September 2000 by working closely with the Royal Government of Cambodia to implement six practical fields including: democratic governance, poverty reduction, energy and environment and natural resource management, HIV/AIDS, crisis prevention and recovery of information and communication technology (ICT). The total budget for administrative costs of these programs in 2002 was approximately US \$687 million. The UNDP has a particular specialization in cooperating with the government to develop reform projects such as administrative reform, judiciary reform and public financial reform. In addition they are working with funding partners to provide election assistance in Cambodia. S4

The World Bank-Cambodia: The Bank cooperates with other developmental institutions including donors and NGOs in a partnership to assist the Royal Government of Cambodia to reduce poverty and to build sustainable development. According to the country strategy of the Bank, there are specific areas on which the Bank has focused "a) good governance including an efficient and accountable public administration and a credible legal and judicial framework that safeguards to basic human and property rights; b) greater access for the poor to basic social services and economic opportunities; and c) a policy environment that encourages private investment and entrepreneurship."<sup>85</sup>

Mainly, the Bank operates these objectives under the leadership of the Cambodian government. The Bank also has its own regular monitoring and evaluation process on a government performance. They disburse funding or loans according to a progress of a

government's performance. If they are not satisfied with a government's performance according to their guidelines, they will suspend funding or loans, this is especially true in the event they find event of any corrupt activities involved in the government operation.

The Asian Development Bank-Cambodia: The ADB is one of the largest aid institutions in the country. The ADB collaborates closely with the Royal Government of Cambodia to reduce poverty, eliminate illiteracy and promote economic growth and good governance in Cambodia. According to the ADB Poverty Reduction Partnership Agreement, 38% of Cambodian people live below the poverty line Reduction Partnership and the Cambodian government have promised to lower by one half the proportion of population who live below the poverty line. From 1992-2002 ADB pledged \$664.4 million in loans. They have co-financed with other aid agencies to provide 97 technical support programs, which amounts to \$66.5 million in funding. Also, ADB has indicated "12 projects are proposed amounting to \$58 million, \$71 million, and \$110 million in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively."

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) This global funding organization works with the ADB and the World Bank to help the Royal Government of Cambodia to implement the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS). The IMF and the Government have created some reforms including macroeconomic structural reform (tax and customs administration strengthening and bank restructuring); and legal reform such as land law, Forestry Law, Investment Law and Judicial Reform including improving the court system and good governance. In 2003, the IMF Executive Board Directors have approved "a seventh disbursement of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) about US \$12 million, bringing total disbursement under IMF-supported program. Also, IMF


regularly consults with international and national NGOs to discuss policies, challenges and opportunities regarding implementations NPRS and IMF mandates.<sup>91</sup>

# C. Analysis of International Aid Community

Although these major donors have their own agenda and interests, their missions include the goals of building a sound democracy, promoting a stable economy, and advancing education in Cambodia. Their policies and missions have the power to influence Cambodian lives and the Cambodian government's politics. USAID, AusAIDS, EC (France), and the Japanese ODA have improved democracy, rule of law and good governance, and promoted success in the country. One of the best approaches for achieving their goals is providing funding to NGOs working both in urban and rural areas of Cambodia. These NGOs use that funding to work directly at the grassroots level to encourage the building of local democratic institutions and good governance, which are foundations of building democracy in Cambodia. Of course, there are not all the funding is going to directly to the grassroots level. Some NGOs still used most their funding for their staff including consultants and overhead costs and very a little funding to the program with their target groups. 92

Another factor is multilateral donors including the World Bank, the ADB, the IMF and UNDP have worked with the government and NGO community to reduce poverty, promote development as well as build democracy and good governance. Cambodia has suffered a long drawn out civil war and foreign invasion by Vietnam. The majority of Cambodians were vulnerable after the war, so international assistance was greatly appreciated and worthwhile. Currently, more than 45% of the Cambodian national budget is derived from the international aid community. As a result the

international aid community has a strong sphere of influence from, which to exert pressure on the Cambodian government to ensure that it upholds its commitments. The 1991 Paris Peace Accord mandates that Cambodia move forward in building of a democracy, establishing of rule of law practices, improving government operation and promoting economic prosperity in Cambodia. If the Cambodian government ignores the mandate, in all likelihood the international aid community could withhold some if not all of its funding which would have a devastating effect. Cambodia has already experienced a partial suspension of funding after the 1997 coup process. Leaders realize what a tremendous impact that would have on Cambodian citizens so this is a quite powerful tool used by the international aid community in extracting cooperation from the leadership in Cambodia.



Source: Cambodian Development Council

After political and military clashed within the government in 1997, a new coalition government formed in 1998. The international aid community has regained their confidence in the Cambodian government and her people, and they have expressed this confidence by increasing their assistance gradually. For example, the chart below

shows how international aid community contributions, have grown from 1999 to 2002 since the military and political clashed event 1997.

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002
ODA Distribution Million	\$399.71	\$466.81	\$471.84	\$635

Source: UNDP

## **DONORS PLEDGES AND DISBURSEMENTS(in million \$)**

Year	Pledge	Disbursement	% disbursement as %of pledge
1999(A)	526	399.71	76
2000(A)	603.3	466.81	77.3
2001(P)	610.71	471.84	77.3
Total 92-01*	5,002.72	3,683.01	73.3

A: Actual P: Provision

Source: Cambodian Development Council (CDC)

# 1. Weaknesses and Problems of the International Aid Community

The international aid community is not without weaknesses. Some of their challenges include aid coordination, policy orientation, late disbursements and improper resource distribution. Mismanagement of funds and lack of consistent policy implementation often clouds the message of democracy being promoted by funding organization. For example when an NGO promoting rule of law has written policy that expatriates are to stay in expensive, modern hotels while the host country staff stay at hotels which don't even have bathroom facilities, it leaves the impression to the impression that some people are more equal than others. These areas need to be strengthened or improved.

<sup>\*</sup> Excluding the year 1998, the CG meeting was not held.

Aid coordination has been a problem. Even though there have been some coordination initiatives and meetings have been established for this purpose of improving aid delivery there remain areas, which need improvement. For example, there has been a UNDP aid coordination meeting, the ADB and the United Nations Education Science Culture Organization (UNESCO) donor meeting on education, and the Cambodia Development Council (CDC), and the Consultative Groups meetings. However, there has still been a lack of coordinated funding, overlap in projects, and improper sector wide distribution of funding. The funding has not been properly distributed to the appropriate sectors and too much funding has stayed in the large cities, Phnom Penh and Battambang. For example, many donors have funded too many NGOs implementing their work in Phnom Penh and Battambang. What are the reasons? These donors and NGOs have had their programs mainly in cities due to many reasons, not the least of these being security threats and because traditionally NGOs run by expatriates and expatriates are most comfortable around other expatriates and don't want to go to provinces to do the work. The largest gathering of expatriates in Cambodia is in the major cities. It is rare to find expatriates who are comfortable working and living in the rural areas of Cambodia. Residents of Phnom Penh and Battambang tend to be more educated and sophisticated in the workings of the government and society. The advancement of democracy often seems to stop at the big city limits. Dr. Kao stated that this represents another challenge for Cambodians, because 86 percent of the population is located in the rural areas. While Phnom Penh's economy is quite well off, the rural people are often neglected. "The average monthly income is four times higher in Phnom Penh than the provinces. Spending on education is twice as high in the cities."<sup>93</sup>

This indicates that resource distribution has not been divided the proper way, as the gap of distribution of resources between the urban and rural is still a big one, and many people in rural areas still suffer and starve. The problem is that the international aid community has not coordinated well in their funding due to different agendas and political interests and comfort level of staffing.

Competition among donor agencies has been increasing greatly as the volume of aid to this small country has increased. Each donor wants to be a coordinating agency and charges for its administrative costs for those services. For example, currently the UNDP is acting as a coordinating agency and charges 15 percent in overhead costs which make other donors reluctant to participate with them. As Dr. McAndrew stated it is "aid market," full of conflicts of interests and competition. The organizations (donor agencies) want to pursue their own goals. Each has a different agenda and political interests. They also have quite different approaches to democracy building, how development should be done and in what order programs and sectors should be prioritized.<sup>94</sup> Often those receiving aid are put in the position of choosing between conflicting programs, funders and intervention. As a result there can be a high sense of territorialism among donors. As a result disagreements have arisen when some donor agencies political gain of their countries. An example is when French court reform programs are driven to teach judges and prosecutors their civil code system of law. The American, Australian and British court reform trainers come in wanting to train common law principles, which don't exist in Cambodia and the true approach should be one of teaching Cambodian law concepts and rules (which is a hybrid civil code system, with some common law overlays). The Cambodian court staff and Ministry of Justice are

caught in the crossfire – wanting the aid but not able to sort out the right approach to their cases under their law.

Aid is about politics. Each country maneuvers its aid differently depending on its foreign policy interests, and these are not necessarily the most important of priorities for Cambodia. For example, the United States foreign policy agenda is to build democracy. Most of the USAID funding is earmarked towards democracy building, human rights promotion and good governance strengthening. Japan's foreign policy interest is economic stability and peace in Asia. Most of Japan's ODA funding promotes economic growth and infrastructure development, and very little money goes towards democracy building and establishing rule of law.

Most of the donors have not disbursed the same amount of funding as they pledged, except for the Japanese Government. This has presented a challenge for the Cambodian government, other institutions and the NGO community to implement programs with less money than was budgeted based on donor pledges. If we examine the history of donor pledges and their disbursement statistics, they do not match. According to Dr. McAndrew, in 1992-1995 donors pledged US \$2.3 billion. However, donors disbursed only US\$ 1.3 billion including \$967 million (72%) from bilateral donors and US \$ 380 million (28%) from multilateral donors. As a result, the bilateral institution disbursement rate was 75% and multilateral donor disbursement rate was only 39%. 95

Table 1

Pledge and Disbursement of Major Donors for Democracy Building and Development (1992-1995), in thousand US\$

Majors Donors	Pledge	Disbursement	% of Disbursements
Multilateral			to Pledge
World Bank	28500	75,240	26.4
ADB	280,100	67,235	24
UNDP	169,000	92,088	54.3

European Union	122,346	92,979	76
IMF	120,000	52,750	44
Total	976,446	380,292	38.9*
Bilateral			
Japan ODA	321,400	395,854	123.2
USAID	244,800	154,685	63.2
AUSAID	81,259	57,087	70.3
EC/France	208,570	88,478	42.4
Total	856,029	696,104	73.7*

Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)/UNDP

\* Approximately of totaling the percentage

On the other hand, the disbursement rate of the entire international aid community has improved since 1998, because the international community has greater confidence in the Cambodian government. For example, the disbursements over the 1992-97 and 1999-2001 periods totaled nearly 3.7 billion dollars, which is approximately 73.3% of the pledges made by the donor community during these two periods. There was no donor meeting (CG) in 1998 due the political and military clashes within the government in 1997.

The international aid community has spent too much of their money on expatriates and consultants' salaries and fees. The Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), one of the most trusted and reliable research institutions in Cambodia, did research on the costs of personnel working with the NGOs, UN and bilateral and multilateral organizations. CDRI found that the costs of international experts could be as high as US \$170,000 annually, while the top executive NGO personnel get US \$60,000. The most expensive fees are international consultants and their costs including air fair, hotel reimbursement and living allowances... etc. For example, the per diem for UN personnel per-diem is up to US \$90 per day and the rate is even higher for some bilateral and multilateral institutions.<sup>97</sup>

Table 2: Personnel Costs: Average for two different kinds of projects (\$ p.a.)

Staff	Project implemented by NGO vs. UNV	Projects implemented by bilateral, multilateral, Companies and Govt	
Int'l exerts	\$ 43,800.00	\$ 127,381.000	
Int'l consultants		\$ 159,775.000	
Local experts	\$ 6,588.00	\$ 15,690.000	
Local consultants	5	\$ 24,250.000	

Source: CDRI Working Paper 15

Furthermore, democracy building for the long run and sustainable development are very challenging issues in Cambodia because most democracy building and development programs are still donor driven. Many NGOs and some other government institutions have developed their programs to satisfy donor criteria rather than to address the needs of the people at the community level and to address their own beliefs and principles. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, Cambodian scholar, stated, "Cambodians have become familiar with the culture of international development and know what [donors] want to hear." This is still a big issue in Cambodia; there are not many NGOs that are willing to fight for their own principles, because the funding is one of the aspects of their survival as an institution.

In addition, the international aid community has provided the Cambodian government too many alternatives. Donor agencies have provided funding and technical support to NGOs and think tank institutions to do development and democracy building work, which the government is supposed to do. Therefore, in the run long, the government becomes accustomed to not delivering those services to the people. For example, currently donor agencies have provided funding to the Cambodian Defender Project (CDP) and Legal Aid of Cambodia (LAC) to provide free legal services to the poor and ensure that the poor have access to the court and to a fair trial. But the international community and NGOs should be concerned that the government will become accustomed to not taking responsibility in providing services in those areas.

# 2. Policy Impacts and NGO Impacts by International Aid in Democracy Building

Despite the challenges and weaknesses the international aid community is currently facing, the international aid community has assisted Cambodia and her people to build democracy and has had a great positive impact in social, political, and economical areas.

### A) NGOs, Civil Society Growth and Social Change

The international aid community has provided technical support and financial support to the NGOs that work to promote democracy building and to promote development in Cambodia. Civil society has grown quickly and their work has contributed to rebuilding the social structure of the country significantly. Through USAID's assistance, the Asia Foundation (TAF) has provided both technical support and financial support to around 50 NGOs that work in the areas of democracy building including rule of law establishment, elections assistance, human rights improvement, and press and media development. These NGOs play important roles in instilling democracy and educating the people about their rights and to assert their rights through appropriate channels. According to Professor Brown, the Cambodian Leagues for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) has established provincial offices in 20 provinces in Cambodia and has more than one hundred thousand members. LICADHO's aims are to provide human rights education and training, and to monitor and investigate human rights abuse cases.<sup>99</sup> Also, LICADHO established a good partnership with the government officials. One example is LICADHO's provincial child labor program, in which conducted a series of workshops at provincial, district, commune and village levels about child rights and labor issues. The participants included provincial and district authorities, parents and social affairs department

staff. Then LICADHO coordinated a monthly meeting, which was attended by previous participants to discuss child rights and child abuse cases, and to take immediate action concerning those issues in a collaborative way. LICADHO facilitated these meetings so that local stakeholders gathered at the table to discuss these issues. 100

The Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) worked closely with the ministries of education, interior and national defense, to provide a six-day training of trainer's event (TOT) course to its target group, especially to the Khmer Rouge defectors. The topics included human rights concepts, international law, and rule of law, market economics, democratic practice, Buddhism, and moral and ethical values.<sup>101</sup>

USAID and TAF provided funding to the Cambodian Defenders Project (CDP) and the Cambodian Court Training Project (CCTP) that worked directly with judges and prosecutors to improve the judicial system and court process in Cambodia. According to American Judge Juanita Rice, who worked in the provincial courts of Cambodia from 1995-97 in human rights trainings and court and defender trainings, the work has had an impact in Cambodian democracy building. Judge Rice wrote:

We trained around ethics of judicial offices, court - support staff and prosecutors on such concepts as pre trial detention and release as set forth in Cambodian law. Pre trial detainment times were shortened as a result. The Defenders program put in place trained defenders. Human rights programming, training and data compilation allowed for improved conditions in jails, more humane treatment of prisoners and review of pre trial detention information. (Rice: November 14, 2002)<sup>102</sup>

As this thesis asserts democratic development in Cambodia still has a long way to go, but it certainty has made some progress in its journey. For example, according to the USAID annual report 2002: the lawyer and public defenders have provided legal services to the poor access in 80% of courts countrywide (83 cases 1997, and 92 cases in 2002);

and the percentage of human rights abuse and investigation are solved 33% in 1997 and 40% in 2001-02.  $^{103}$ 

Indicator Description	Unit of	Source	
Measure			
Sustainable NGO funded by USAID	# of Sustainable		TAF and
Organization active in promoting	NGOs that advoca	_	NGO
HR, public policy and democracy, able	for increasing repo	ort	
to continue to function without external	HR and govt.		
administrative support	accountability		
HR abuses as they are defined by the Cambodian Constitution. Total # of investigations = statistics from USAID-funded NGOs	% of total # of HR complaints investigated which resolved		LICADHO
Court = 21, provincial, 1 supreme 1	Courts utilizing pul	olic	UNCHR

Source: USAID/Cambodia 2002.

TAF has contributed in press and media development. TAF has provided technical assistance and funding to media organizations that promote professional and ethical journalism and responsible press in Cambodia. These contributions have clearly helped: currently there are more 200 media organizations including newspapers, magazines and newsletters and more than 20 radio stations. These media organizations are both critical and supportive of the present government. More recently during the national democratic elections in 2003, Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the Voice Of America (VOA) have been broadcast in local station FM 105. Currently, the RFA and VOA still have their programs. FM 105 has reached a wide audience throughout the entire country. Many Cambodians enjoy listening to the VOA and RFA because those radio programs present balanced approach to news and a professional level of journalism not always present in other local Cambodian stations. In the mid 90's newspaper publishers were jailed and media officers were closed when they reported news that was unfavorable to the present leadership. Press and media have improved gradually. They have created more democratic forums in the country. Just 11 years ago, there were only one or two

newspapers and radio stations and they were primarily controlled by the government as to content of presentations.

Despite these improvements in the press and media generally, there is still a lot of work to be done. As an example, presently, all TV stations in Cambodia support the ruling party, the Cambodian People Party (CPP). It is significant that USAID and other donors like AUSAID and EC (France) continue supporting media and press development and promoting equal opportunity for political parties in the country. They provide professional trainings to the journalists to be more responsible about what they report and to have a genuine freed press concept in their professions.

Another important component is Pact Inc. Pact laid a foundation for civil society development in Cambodia. Since November 1991, Pact, with USAID's assistance, has promoted the capacity of Cambodian democratic institutions and local NGOs. It has provided grants to more than 60 local institutions and has offered technical assistance including technical support and financial management training. These 60 Cambodian NGOs and institutions, including professional associations of doctors, lawyers, teachers, nurses, and networking groups, have worked directly in community service, education programs, and business and entrepreneurial development. These institutions work directly in the community to help people find their own voice. They guide them in finding ways to create their own projects and select their leaders and to make decisions on their development plans in a democratic manner. So Pact and USAID have partnered to help people strengthen good local governments and local administrations. They have also provided them with the means and opportunity to practice democracy, which is a

fundamental component for ultimate democracy building. One example is worth examining. Buddhism for Development (BFD) a Cambodian NGO funded by Pact and USAID, has organized a yearly monk-leadership seminar. BFD has invited the head monks from 22 different provinces to attend the seminar. Every year, there are about 150-200 head monks who attend and learn about the principles of development, the concept of community building, the concept of democratic values and peace rehabilitation. After the seminar, the participants return to their communities and temples and educate their followers in strengthening communities and helping people to find their own voices within the community. The seminar has had a strong influence on people. The temple is the center of the community where people go to get advice on a variety of subjects. The monk is considered a both a spiritual and community leader.

These are some examples of NGOs funded by USAID and their significant work in the community to create dynamic and democratic communities. In addition there are hundreds of NGOs funded by EC (France) and AUSAID and other bilateral donors.

They have engaged in similar work serving the common good and have made important contributions to democracy building and development.

Cambodia has seen great changes in the past 11 years. People are now encouraged to exercise their rights and the masses have more freedom and express their freedom more frequently. They engage in civil disobedience, modeled by Ghandi and Dr. Martin Luther King, in the form of strikes, marches and demonstrations demanding rights and dignities from the government or private institutions. At last they are willing to advocate on the issues that are important to them.

According to Oxfam Great Britain's study of fisheries, fishing is an industry, which provides employment to over two million people and supplies. Additionally it provides over 75% of animal protein needs in the country. More than 20% of rural people depend on the fishing industry. When the government established concession contracts with private companies, commercializing fresh and natural water zones, a many local fishing communities were affected. They were not allowed to enter the concession areas, which threatened their livelihood. 104 In response, the NGOs established a fishery NGO network, which encouraged the community to voice their concerns. As a result, the communities combined their methods to place pressure on the government: They held demonstrations in front of the National Assembly. They wrote countless statements and letters to the Office of the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, as well as media and press organizations in order to raise public awareness of this injustice. 105 The NGOs and communities have brought the fisheries into the mainstream in order to enlarge the democratic atmosphere in the country. As Cristina Mansfield wrote "...discussion of disputes is common and civil society activists are becoming more confident about raising issues and identifying violators. Although people are still afraid, they are no longer silenced by the fear." <sup>106</sup>

The government now has recognized NGO and civil society effort. This is evidenced by the change of attitudes of government officials at the provincial and local levels. For example, in Kampong Thom Province, when NGOs started working in the community, the provincial and local authorities did not cooperate with the NGO activities. But significant NGOs have made a difference in local issues and the local authorities have now had an opportunity to work with them. As a result, the local

authorities have expressed willingness to cooperate with the NGO activities now. In Preach Vihear province, there are only few NGOs, the local authorities still have suspicion regarding NGOs activities. They have expressed their unwillingness to cooperate with the NGOs. On the other hand, in Battambang province, there are many NGOs. The provincial authorities and NGOs and communities have a good networking relationship and collaboration efforts in addressing issues in the province. However, there remains much room for improvement in the relationship between the NGOs and government. In the meantime it is very crucial that NGOs continue to approach the government in a diplomatic and constructive manner. 107 NGOs have been engaged in policy formulation process and legislation process as well. Most recently, NGOs have been invited to provide input and skills into the draft community fisheries sub-decree of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, the Department of Fisheries took into account all arguments from the NGOs and produced initial draft. There has been considerable collaboration between the NGO and the government policy makers. This process has not been easy or smooth but the results have normally been pleasing to both contingents. 108

These impacts would have not resulted if there had not been NGOs and international aid community intervention. Collaboration between NGOs and civilians is an effective vehicle for social change. It is possible for them to influence policy makers and state bureaucrats who are the key decision makers in the government. This is because history has taught us and experience has shown us that community groups have the power to make social change. There is compelling evidence of this from other countries: during the 1960s, the civil rights movement of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. changed the history of the United States enormously. Through civil disobedience,

education of the voters regarding their constitutional rights and organization of the common people democracy prevails. Also, one of the main reasons that the Soviet Union bloc lost the Cold War in the 1980s was because their civil society groups stopped supporting the policies of the government. Therefore, civil society groups are crucial to forcing social change and one of the foundations of building democracy.

Another significant impact is that the international aid community has contributed towards building human resources in Cambodia. The major donors like the Japanese government, US government and Australian government have provided scholarships to bright, young Cambodian students to study abroad in Japan, United States and Australia to complete higher education courses of study. This greatly impacts democracy development in the country. For example, through the Fulbright program the US government has provided scholarship to six to eight Cambodian students to study in the United States every year. The Japanese and Australian governments have provided scholarships to Cambodian government officials to study in their countries. One of the strict conditions to these students who are awarded the US Fulbright scholarship, is that they must return and serve the country. These students have learned and studied democratic values, critical and innovative skills from the US and have brought knowledge and democratic values back to Cambodia. They have worked and influenced the policies within the NGOs, think tank institutions and government institutions to improve the public and common good. They have become leaders in different forms and capacities: Some are managers of the research institutions and some serve in key positions to influence policies within in the institutions. Additionally, these students have formed their own groups including a Fulbright Student Association Alumni.

Australia Student Association Alumni, and Japanese Student Association Alumni. One of the objectives of these groups is to share and educate the students in different universities in Cambodia about democratic values and principles and liberal markets. The representative of these Alumni groups have given presentations and talks in different universities, seminars and conferences. These young students of this generation will bring a hope and optimism for democracy building in Cambodia. Although many countries have thousands of students educated in other countries and are still not living in a democratic society, Cambodian students taking advantage of scholarships from the democratic governments and organizations are not just returning with MBA and advanced business degrees, but instead are returning with degrees in International Relations, Peace Studies, Law and Diplomacy Specialties in information Distribution. Scholarship donors are able to control the types of students being educated as well as materials and courses of study in a manner, which fosters democratic process thinking.

# B) Elections, Reform Projects and Political Change

The international aid community has paid special attention to ensuring that Cambodia has a regular election. They have assisted the government with reform projects including administrative reforms, military reforms and judiciary reforms. Cambodia has had three democratic elections and to many people, including international observers and local observers they have been relatively free and fair. This is based on their reports filed with the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL), the Neutral and Impartial Committee For Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC). The international aid community mainly funds these two election committees and the election observers have concluded that, these elections can be considered at least 50-60% free and fair. 109

The result of the military violence between the two parties within the coalition FROM July 5-6, 1997, was a big step backward in the process of building democracy. However, the international aid community and the United Nations (UN) have assisted Cambodia to bring democracy building back on the right track and direction. Due to the fact that 45% of the Cambodian government funding has been derived from the international aid community, Hun Sen complied with their requests. Remember that the international aid community has put strong pressure on the Hun Sen government who ruled the country at that time to allow the Union of Cambodian Democratic (UCD) and their resistant military groups at the Cambodian-Thai border to return from exile and compete in the national democratic election in 1998. This was a result that Hun Sen was greatly influenced by their request. The members of the UCD re-entered the country safely.

The National Election Commission (NEC)<sup>110</sup> held the national democratic election on July 26, 1998 and the Cambodian people managed and supervised the election with the international community's observation and support only. This was one of a achievements of the basic steps of building democracy process, because Cambodians were able to manage their own election. Of course, there were some flaws including voter buying, some political intimidations and mismanagement in a voter registration in the election, which need to be improved, because Cambodians just have restarted to learn to exercise their rights in a democratic setting less than a decade after the war.

People were still eager to come and vote. The election's result in which CPP won the majority of votes. However, most international observers believed that the election was free and fair, as stated by Roberts:

	CPP	FUNCINPEC	Sam Rainsy	Others
Voters	2,030,802	1,554,374	699,653	617,654
No. Seats	NA 64	43	<i>15</i>	

To follow UNTAC's formula to form the government, CPP and FUNCINPEC have agreed to form a new coalition with only one Prime Minister, which is Mr. Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh as head of the National Assembly. Sam Rainsy remained an opposition party leader.

Also, the international aid community helped the Cambodian government and NEC hold local elections in February 2002, and a national election July 2003. Their assistance included both financial and technical support for election law establishment, voter education, election monitoring and observation. Additionally they assisted with election administration including election campaign and debate arrangements.

One example of this assistance was when in the national election in July 2003, with USAID's assistance, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) organized a series of multi-party candidate "debates and voter guides" in 12 out of 24 provinces. There were 23 political parties participating in the debates. It was the first time that the political parties were seated at the same table to present their platforms and debate their policies. Four of these debates were broadcast for the first time ever on national television. The debates themselves reached more than 25,000 voters, but when they were on the national television, they reached tens of thousands of voters. In this election there were improvements in the election process and much less violence occurred. It is important to note there still was vote buying, intimidation and errors of registration management. The opposition parties, FUNCINPEC (won 26 seats) and SRP (won 24 seats) formed the

Alliance of Democrats (AOD) and rejected the result of the election in negotiating with the major winner, CPP (73 seats) to establish a new coalition government. The international aid community and the King have been involved in the negotiation process. But the most striking result of this process was that there has been no violence and the negotiation process has been very peaceful. A key indicator of democratic process is peaceful transition of power. It was very different from post election in 1998, when there was violence between demonstrators against election results and government troops had some victims of killings. The results of these elections are shown in the table below

# **Elections for the National Assembly (NA)**

	Elections	No of Provinces and Municipalitie s	No of Political Parties Participating in the Elections	No Voters (% of estimated No of eligible voters)	No Seats
1	NA Election (23-28/5/93)	21	20	4,764,430 (108.7%)	120
2	NA Election (26/07/98)	23	39	5,395,595 (98.32%)	122
3	NA Election (27/07/03)	24	25 (Provisional)	6,341,834 (93.95%)	123

# **Election for the Commune Councils**

	Elections	No of Provinces and Municipalities	No of Political Parties Participating in the Elections	No of Voters (% of estimated number of eligible voters)	No of Seats
1	Election of Commune Councils (03/02/02)	24	08	5,190,307 (83.02%)	11,261

Source: National Election Commission (NEC)

In these elections, the percentage of registered voters who went to vote has been quite high compared to other democratic countries likes the United States and British Kingdom. It evidences that people are enthusiastic about to participating in the election, which is one of the successful components in democracy building process. However, the election in Cambodia still has some room to be improved such as stopping vote buying, preventing intimidation to the opposition party candidates and giving equal opportunity to the media to all political parties. But at least Cambodia has a regular democratic election in order to keep democratic building alive. An election is not the only factor in democracy building. That is why the international aid community has assisted Cambodia in other factors of society including a civil society building, reforming projects, and establishing rule of law and good governance.

The international aid community, especially multi-lateral institutions, the World Bank, UNDP, the ADB and the IMF have assisted the government in major reform projects, for example, financial public reform, land management reform and military reforms, administrative reform and judiciary reform. According to the GAO report June 2002, donors and government have made progress in three major reform projects including public finance reform, military and land management reform. Donors and government have reformed the major customs and tax administrations. They have set up a National Audit Authority, prevented smuggling activities, streamlined tax policies, and granted fewer tax exemptions. As a result, the government was able to increase its national revenues from 9 percent of gross domestic product in 1998 to 12.5 percent in 2001<sup>112</sup>. The World Bank provided financial and technical assistance to the government to implement military reform by lowering military spending. The bank provided \$18 million in loans to government to discharge 31,500 soldiers from 2000-02 and 80% of these discharged soldiers were disabled, chronically ill or elderly. In the event the government was able to reduce defense and security (national police) by 18% of total national expenses, this would permit the government to maneuver these expenditures to

other priority areas. In addition, the Australian government helped the Cambodian government to develop a *defending the kingdom of Cambodia* strategy. This is the first time ever that the corrupt practices of ghost soldiers (overstaffing) and skill enhancement has ever been addressed<sup>113</sup>. The ADB has assisted the government in drafting a new land law, which clarifies and differentiates state and private property and ownership. Both the World Bank and the ADB helped the Cambodian government to implement the new land law by drafting new regulations. Germany and Finland and the World Bank helped to launch a pilot land mapping and land titling program, through which about 60,000 plots of land were mapped and 2,000 land titles were drawn at no cost to the recipient in 2001.<sup>114</sup> These reforms that are progressive are important steps in democracy building. There are, however other challenging reforms down the road such as judiciary reform and anticorruption reform (transparency and accountability), which need to be tackled.

## C) Economic Growth Sector

Partially, the impact of the international aid community to Cambodia has been a peaceful and a stable political environment, which has allowed the country to promote its economic growth. In July 2002, Cambodia took over the rotating chairmanship of (ASEAN) from Brunei. Cambodia has hosted high profile representatives from the ASEAN countries and other influential and powerful world leaders. For example, in 2003 the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell came to the ASEAN meeting in Cambodia. This was very important for Cambodia to show the world that it is a stable and peaceful country in order to build a real market confidence for investors, which is crucial for Cambodian economic growth.

Another important factor is Cambodia being admitted to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which should encourage investment companies to come into the
Cambodia. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, "Cambodia's entry into the
WTO should boost investor confidence, and possibly attract renewed interest among
foreign investors looking for a low-cost manufacturing base."

In terms of economic growth, there are different positive trends supporting Cambodian economic development.

The real GDP growth will average approximately 5.5% in the next two years 2004-05, which increased slightly from 5% this year. Trade with Vietnam and Thailand has expanded. Also, the international aid community has had confidence in Cambodia and they are willing to invest in Cambodia. For example, the Japanese International CoOperation Agency has provided a loan package for construction of a special economic zone and international port in Sihanoukville. The Asian Development Bank has approved their new loan program to Cambodia.

There are more 200 garment manufactures in Cambodia, employing more than 250,000 workers. Cambodia's garment industry has played a very important role in bringing revenue to the country. Garments are on the top export products list.

According to the official data published by the Customs and Excise Department in the report by the Economist Intelligent Unit, the total revenues from the garment industry were US \$409 million in the second quarter which means that it increased more than 30% from year to year. The United States accounts for the bulk of Cambodia's exports, approximately 73% in 2003. Of these export products, 97% have been garment and textiles. In 2003, the US expanded its quota of 18% on garment exports, which demonstrates that they are happy doing business in Cambodia during this strong growth

period. The US imported Cambodian garments and textiles worth US \$716 million from January-July, which has increased every year more than 32% (based on a data from the US Census Bureau.)<sup>117</sup> Even though, Cambodian economic development has shown positive trends in its growth, the Economist Intelligence Unit has predicted if the current political deadlock is not soon resolved, inflation will increase and the current-deficit also will enlarge.<sup>118</sup> Currently, the international aid community and the King of Cambodia have tried to resolve down the most recent political dispute so that economic growth can still have a positive trend and a political stability remains. This is one of the most essential factors to build a real market confidence for investors.

Economic growth plays a very important role in people's standard of living when people have a better living, they will have an education. With economic growth comes improvement in people's standard of living. With a better standard of living people are able to invest in education. When people are educated they will make a better choice in choosing their political leaders. According to, the Judge Rice, states that a democracy in the United States was premised on the need for an educated electorate. Democracy struggles to flourish without an educated citizenry. Cambodia is 85% rural, with a 40% literacy rate. America provides free education for its children. The Founding Fathers saw this as a means to successful democratic process. It is interesting to note that the present Cambodian Constitution provides for free education for its children as well. If we drive around Phnom Penh and other big cities like Battambang and Siem Reap today, there is much new house construction, many new buildings have been built and increased in road and municipal infrastructure construction. Roads have been paved. Likewise, there have been the building and opening of many new universities. Universities have

been opened, are running and graduating students. These all indicate that the standard living of people who live in the cities is improved. With that improvement comes a better education and a more informed citizenry. With better education people become more skilled at selecting good representatives through the election process. Additionally, there have been many debates, advocated and lobbied concerning issues of development in the cities. The democratic development process still has a long way to go, such as ousting the current administration and ensuring a totally peaceful transition of power from one successful party or candidate to the other, it has nonetheless made progress. That is why it is vital to the future of Cambodia for the international aid community to continue to have a strong presence.

# **Chapter 5: Conclusion**

Democracy building in Cambodia still has a long way go, however, it has made progress and had some important impacts. The international aid community has partially contributed to this progress. A variety of factors indicate the success of international aid with respect to democracy building in Cambodia.

NGOs and civil society have developed a great deal, and the majority of them, approximately 90 percent, have contributed significantly to democracy building in different ways. Some have helped to build a stronger community and local democratic institutions while others have influenced government policy makers, encouraging them to adopt policies, which benefit the poor. For example, NGOs have provided inputs and skills into the draft community fisheries sub-decree of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, the Department of Fisheries took into account all arguments from the NGOs and produced a rational draft of sub-decree. There has been close collaboration between NGOs and government policy makers; while the process has not been easy, the outcomes have tended to please both sides. 120.

As a result of the international aid community's assistance, the Cambodian people have become more vocal about what matters to them. There are countless demonstrations, strikes, debates, public forum events, and increased lobbying activities. People speak out against the corrupt officials, moreover, the Prime Minister Hun Sen, has acknowledged the corruption issues within his own government. Furthermore, people have brought these issues into broader democratic discussion within mainstream society. Most recently, NGOs and communities have brought fishery issues, corruption issues and land issues to the forefront of discussion. Activists have more confidence in raising the

issues and identifying the violators; although people still have a certain level of fear when they speak out, at least they do not remain silent anymore.<sup>121</sup>

The international aid community has commitments to assist Cambodia and her people to build a genuine democracy and good governance in Cambodia, and to ensure the Cambodian government upholds its commitment to the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 through political pressure and their assistance and presence in Cambodia. Thus far, the international aid community has helped the government make progress on some major programs such land management reform, military reform and public financial reform. As a result, through assistance from the ADB, the World Bank, Germany, and Finland, the Cambodian government has drafted regulations to implement a new land law. As part of the implementation, the Cambodian government has launched a pilot land reform project which incorporates different components such as a mapping and land titling program; approximately 60,000 plots were mapped and 2,000 land titles were drawn at no cost to the recipients. 122

There have also been some successes in military reform. The Cambodian government was able to discharge 31,500 soldiers in three years 2000-02; 80% of these discharged soldiers were disabled, chronically ill or elderly. These and other changes in defense and security (national police) made it possible for the government to reduce 18% of total national expenses, of which allowed the government to maneuver these expenditures to other priority areas such as health, education and rural development. 123

These and other examples indicate that democracy building in Cambodia is making promising steps. Cambodia's quest for improved democracy is like a ship that has cruised out a long journey full of challenges, a journey that is not yet over. The path

to build a genuine democracy in a country that endured more than two decades of civil strife, where the rule of law was completely destroyed and the social fabric severely impoverished, has been full of obstacles. Political violence, corruption, and lack of resources have made Cambodia's journey particularly challenging. That is why, although democracy building in Cambodia still has a long way to go, the people of Cambodia, with the help of the international aid community, have at least begun the process of democratic development. These first steps of democratic development and the role of the international aid community in the democracy building process are vital in contributing to the ultimate goal of achieving true democracy in Cambodia. Overall, the process has made significant progress.

However, while the democracy building process in Cambodia has started, real genuine and liberal democracy in Cambodia is still a long ways away. The international aid community and the Cambodian government have challenging tasks ahead. With assistance from the international aid community, the government must commit to working on judiciary reform and anticorruption reform, which will bring a good governance (transparency and accountability) to Cambodian society. The government must also continue to strengthen the rule of law and firmly implement and enforce existing laws.

In order for international aid to assist Cambodia and her people in building democracy effectively, the nations and organizations in the international aid community involved in Cambodia need to improve their performances. They have to improve their aid coordination and ensure that their funding is distributed nationwide. Funding distribution should be properly and equally distributed in appropriate sectors and areas.

International aid resources should be focused on the needs of Cambodia, rather that the interests of contributing nations' and organizations' own foreign policies. The international aid community should ensure that the government work to provide services to the poor; furthermore, they must provide the Cambodian government with the tools to enable it to deal with this issue in the long run, without assistance. As a development proverb says, "it is better to teach a person how to fish rather than to give the person a fish."

The international aid community and the government must also work on education reform with a focus on human resource development. Scholarships and training opportunities must continue to be made available and expanded for students to work abroad and within the country. Providing educational opportunities to more people, particularly those in the younger generations, will result in a greater pool of future leaders who can make wise choices in the political arena. It is these future leaders that hold the key to bringing real democracy to Cambodia. The democratic reforms discussed in the previous chapters, if implemented and enforced, will allow people to make political and economic decisions independently, and their decisions will not have any coercive oppression or violent retribution attach to them. My vision is that the Kingdom of Cambodia will have a genuine democracy because Cambodians truly embrace a democracy.

# **Bibliography**

- Brown, Frederick Z. "The Future of NGO's in Cambodia." Washington Center, Asia Society September 23, 1997
- Ben Kiernan "The Cambodia Fractions in Democratic Process." [Khieu Kanaharith]

  Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, New Heaven, CT 1993.
- Doyle, Michael W. "Peace building in Cambodia: The Continuing Quest for Power and Legitimacy." Asian Society New York 1997
- Grant Curtis, "Cambodia Reborn?" Brookings Institution Press, 1998
- Lao, Mong Hay "Building Democracy in Cambodia: Problem and Prospects." The Asia Society, New York, 1997
- Liefer and Berdal "Cambodia." Contributed in James Mayall. "The New Interventionism

  1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and

  Somalia." Cambridge University Press 1996
- Martin. F. Herz. "A short History of Cambodia." Frederick. A. Praeger, New York City .

  1958
- McAndrew, John P "Aid Infusions, and Aid Illusion: Bilateral and Multilateral

  Emergency and Development Assistance in Cambodia, 1992-95" Cambodian

  Development Resource Institution January 1996.
- Mansfield, Cristina et... "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space."

  Pact/Cambodia. Inc.

Phnom Penh, May 2002

MRJ Vatikiotis, "Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the banyan Tree,

Routledge, 1996 Cited in David W. Roberts. "Political Transition in Cambodia:

1991-99. " 2001.

- Kao Kim Hourn. "Cambodian and International Community: The Road Ahead." Asian Society Organization, NYC, 1997
- Kato Toshiyasu et ..... "Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in Aid-Dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia." CDRI, Working Paper 15 August 2000, P54
- Roberts, David W "Political Transitional in Cambodia 1991-99." St. Martin's Press, Scholarly and Reference Division. New York, 2001
- R. Jeffrey smith "leader's bodyguards blamed for assault that killed 20, injured American." Washington Post, June 29, 1997
- Rice Juanita. "Responding to the Survey." Personal Email. November 14, 2003.
- William Shawcross. "Cambodian's New Deal." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994
- "Asia: Cambodia" National Democratic Institute (NDI) Report Worldwide, July 2003.
- "Australia-Cambodia. Development Cooperation Strategy. 2003-2006." Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Cambodia, June 2003.
- "Building Democracy in Cambodia." USAID/Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 2002.
- "Cambodia: Annual Report: 2002" UNDP Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 2002.
- "Cambodia -Country assistance strategy:" Document, East Asia and Pacific Regional
  Office, February 7, 2000
- "Cambodia: Governance Reform Program Progressing, but Key Efforts Are Lagging."

  GAO-02-569, June 2002

- "Cambodian Development Report 2001." Cambodian Development Council, Phnom Penh 2001
- "Cambodian Election." UN Chronicle, September 1993
- "Cambodia- Politics and Government Election Monitoring" The Economist (US), June 19, 1993
- "Country Report: Cambodia: Economic Growth" The Economist Intelligent Unit:

  November 1 2002
- "Cambodia: Recent Developments:" International Monetary Fund May 2003
- "The EC-Cambodia: Country Strategy Paper. 2000-2003." IP/02/732-Brussels, 17 May 2002.
- "14 EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting: Conclusions:" IP/02/732-Brussels, January 2003.
- "IMF Resident Office in Cambodia Initiates Roundtables with National and International NGO" International Monetary Fund, Phnom Penh June 2003
- "Japan's ODA to Cambodia." The Japan Embassy December 9, 2002
- "Poverty Reduction Partnership Agreement." ADB Country Strategy and Program Update, Phnom Penh, 2004-2006,
- "National Survey on Public Attitudes towards Corruption." The Center for Social Development, Phnom Penh 1995.
- "USAID Cambodia: Introduction." http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001. Nov. 17. 2000.
- "US\$ 239 Million in Loans Earmarked for Cambodia in the Three Year." ADB News Release, August 29, 2003.

#### Abstract

<sup>1</sup> Ms. Theavy S. Khouch. "Cambodian NGO Status in Cambodia." Personal Conversation, July 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Learn more details in chapter 4 in the Analysis of International Aid Community.

### Chapter 1:

- <sup>8</sup> MRJ Vatikiotis, "Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the banyan Tree, Routledge, 1996, p. 82. Cited in David W. Roberts. "Political Transition in Cambodia: 1991-99" 2001.
- Cambodian Development Council's source
- <sup>10</sup> Learn more on Chapter 4: The weakness of the international aid community.
- <sup>11</sup> Learn more on Analysis of international aid community section in Chapter 4
- <sup>12</sup> Ms. Theavy S. Khouch. "Cambodian NGO Status in Cambodia." *Personal Conversation*, July 2003. <sup>13</sup> Learn more details in chapter 4 in the Analysis of International Aid Community.
- <sup>14</sup> Learn more details in chapter 4 in the Analysis of International Aid Community.
- <sup>15</sup> More details in chapter in the challenges of building democracy.
- <sup>16</sup> Cristina Mansfield and Kurt MacLeod. "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space." Pact/Cambodia. Inc. May 2002

#### **Notes Chapter 2:**

- <sup>17</sup> Dr. Lao Mong Hay "Building Democracy in Cambodia: Problem and Prospects." *The Asia Society*
- <sup>18</sup> Martin. F. Herz. "A short History of Cambodia." Frederick. A. Praeger, NY. 1958 P. 98.
- 19 Ibid: .
- <sup>20</sup> A National Assembly was used in Cambodia, where is the United States it's congress or the house.
- <sup>21</sup> Herz "The Agony of Democracy." Page 99. <sup>22</sup> Herz "The Agony of Democracy." Page 100.
- <sup>23</sup> It means the People Newspaper.
- <sup>24</sup> Ben Kiernan "The Cambodia Fractions in Democratic Process." [Khieu Kanaharith] *Yale University* Southeast Asia Studies, New Heaven, CT 1993. <sup>25</sup> Herz "The Agony of Democracy." P. 104
- <sup>26</sup> He means the Prince Sihanouk
- <sup>27</sup> Cambodian terms of Angle or God (meant Buddha.) Cambodians are Buddhists, they consider Angle as a God and God for them it means Buddha, and it is literally corrected concept.
- <sup>28</sup> Dr. Lao Mong Hay "Building Democracy in Cambodia: Problem and Prospects." P. 1
- <sup>29</sup> Herz: 114.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid 144
- <sup>31</sup> It meant the genocide was committed on their own people, example, Khmer Rouge soldiers were Khmer, they committed the genocide on Khmer people, which was 1.7 million out of 7 million were died and killed by the regime.
- <sup>32</sup> Grant Curtis, "Cambodia Reborn?" *Brookings Institution Press*, 1998 P. 5 & 6.
- <sup>34</sup> William Shawcross. "Cambodian's New Deal." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, p.10 <sup>35</sup> Ibid: P 9 & P. 10
- <sup>36</sup> William Shawcross. "Cambodian's New Deal." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, p.10 & P 15
  <sup>37</sup> Ibid: P 15

## **Chapter 3 Notes:**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Learn more details in chapter 4 in the Analysis of International Aid Community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> More data in chapter 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Cristina Mansfield and Kurt MacLeod. "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space." Pact/Cambodia. Inc. May 2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> More details in chapter in the challenges of building democracy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Cristina Mansfield and Kurt MacLeod. "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space." Pact/Cambodia. Inc. May 2002

<sup>39</sup> Shawcross. "Cambodia's New Deal." P.39

- <sup>40</sup> Liefer and Berdal "Cambodia." Contributed in James Mayall. "The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia." Cambridge University Press 1996 P. 25
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid: 12
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid: 38&40
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid: 40&45
- 44 "Cambodian Election." UN Chronicle, Sept 1993. P. 3 & P. 10.
- 45 Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, "Cambodia." P.38
- <sup>46</sup> Five ministries included: Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Information, and Finance.

<sup>47</sup> Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, "Cambodia." P.44 & P.45 & P. 50

- <sup>48</sup> The reason of difficult in finding the translator was that in the 1990s, there were not enough Cambodian people who could speak English and French. The country was blocked or banned to the Western Languages French or English during Communist regime Vietnam Invasion 1980s: If individuals who tried to learn English or French; they would arrested by the government officials or soldiers. For elders who could speak French, either died during the Khmer Rouge or worked for CPP governmental ministries. People who fled to the Cambodian-Thai border had a chance to learn English or French, but they were not so effective, because they could not get along well with the people who lived in the country in terms of dealing with the politics. Also, some of them, their English or French was not good enough.
- <sup>49</sup> "Cambodia- Politics and Government Election Monitoring" The Economist (US), June 19, 1993. P. 2 & 5.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid: P 12.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid: P 15
- <sup>52</sup> "Cambodian Election." UN Chronicle, Sept 1993. P. 10 & P.15
- 53 Shawcross. "Cambodia's New Deal." P. 25 & P. 27
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid P. 28
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid P. 29
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid P. 29& 35.
- <sup>57</sup> The reason was that that, these two ministries hold all military and police powers, which were very important for Cambodian situation at that time. By the way, a Cambodian Ministry is equivalent to an American Department. A minister is equivalent to a secretary rank in the United States.

## Notes: Chapter 4

- <sup>58</sup> David W. Roberts." Political Transitional in Cambodia 1991-99." *St. Martin's Press, Scholarly and Reference Division*. New York, 2001 P.156.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid: P 158
- <sup>60</sup> William Shawcross. "Cambodian's New Deal." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, P 92 & 93.
- 61 "Poverty Reduction Partnership Agreement." ADB Country Strategy and Program Update 2004-2006, 62 Thid
- <sup>63</sup> The Associated Press Report, October 17, 1997
- <sup>64</sup> "National Survey on Public Attitudes towards Corruption." The Center for Social Development, 1995.
- <sup>65</sup> The soldiers just have their names in the government payroll, but they just want their armed officer's status to run the business and their salaries given to their bosses or supervisors, to manipulate or to uncover for their tricks. Whenever the donors come to monitor their offices, their supervisors will call them to be represented those days.
- <sup>66</sup> Michael W. Doyle. "Peace building in Cambodia: The Continuing Quest for Power and Legitimacy." Asian Society NY 1997, p. 2.

67 Ibid P. 4 & 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Based on Shawcorss, the figure of refugees was 370,000 that UNTAC need to bring from the Cambodian Thai's border camps.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid P 10.

- <sup>69</sup> R. Jeffrey smith "leader's bodyguards blamed for assault that killed 20, injured American." Washington Post, June 29, 1997; page 20
- <sup>70</sup> "The EC-Cambodia: Country Strategy Paper. 2000-2003." *IP/02/732-Brussels*, 17 May 2002.
- <sup>71</sup> "Japan's ODA to Cambodia." *The Japan Embassy* December 9, 2002. P.2

<sup>72</sup> Ibid: P 7& 8.

73 "USAID Cambodia: Introduction." http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001. Nov. 17. 2000.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid P: 4&5

<sup>75</sup> Ibid P: 2

<sup>76</sup> "The EC-Cambodia: Country Strategy Paper. 2000-2003." *IP/02/732-Brussels*, 17 May 2002. P. 2

<sup>77</sup> Ibid P· 1

- <sup>78</sup> "14 EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting: Conclusions: *IP/02/732-Brussels*, January 2003.
- <sup>79</sup> "Australia-Cambodia. Development Cooperation Strategy. 2003-2006." Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program. *The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)*, Canberra, June 2003. P. 2

80 Ibid: P 1

81 Ibid: P3

82 "Cambodia: Annual Report: 2002" UNDP Cambodia. P 10.

83 Ibid: P8

- 84 Ibid: P 14 & P 16
- <sup>85</sup> "Cambodia Country assistance strategy:" *Document, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office,* February 7, 2000
- <sup>86</sup> "Poverty Reduction Partnership Agreement." ADB Country Strategy and Program Update 2004-2006, Cambodia, July 2003
- <sup>87</sup> These projects include agriculture, education, health economic and environment, which are under the framework of Rural Economics development, Private Sector Enterprise Development and Human Resource Development objectives.
- <sup>88</sup> "US\$ 239 Million in Loans Earmarked for Cambodia in the Three Year." *ADB News Release*, August 29, 2003, p. 1
- <sup>89</sup> Cambodia: Recent Developments: *International Monetary Fund* May 2003 P. 1

<sup>90</sup> Ibid: 3

<sup>91</sup> "IMF Resident Office in Cambodia Initiates Roundtables with National and International NGO" *International Monetary Fund* June 2003

<sup>92</sup> More details in the NGO impact.

Organization, NYC, 1997. Page 5.

- <sup>93</sup> Kao Kim Hourn. "Cambodian and International Community: The Road Ahead." *Asian Society Organization*, NYC, 1997. Page 5.
- <sup>94</sup> John P. McAndrew. "Aid Infusions, and Aid Illusion: Bilateral and Multilateral Emergency and Development Assistance in Cambodia, 1992-95" *Cambodian Development Resource Institution*\_ January 1996. P. 12 & 15

95 Ibid: P 8& 10

- <sup>96</sup> "Cambodian Development Report 2001." CDC, 2001
- <sup>97</sup> Martin Godfrey, Toshiyasu Kato..et "Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in Aid-Dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia." *CDRI, Working Paper 15* August 2000, P54 <sup>98</sup> Kao Kim Hourn. "*Cambodian and International Community: The Road Ahead.*" *Asian Society*
- <sup>99</sup> Frederick Z. Brown. "The Future of NGO's in Cambodia." Washington Center, *Asia Society* September 23, 1997, p. 3

```
<sup>100</sup> Cristina Mansfield and Kurt MacLeod. "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space." May
2002. P 28
```

<sup>101</sup> (Brown: 1997): P. 3

Juanita Rice. "Responding to the Survey." Personal Email. November 14, 2003.

103 "Building Democracy in Cambodia." USAID/Cambodia 2002.

- <sup>104</sup> Cristina Mansfield et... "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space." Pact. Inc, May 2002 P.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid: P 48.
- 106 Ibid: P 51
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid: P 31
- <sup>108</sup> Ibid: P 30
- <sup>109</sup> "The Cambodian Election Report" *The Committee For Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL)*, May 01.
- <sup>110</sup> Many people had complaint that the NEC was on political bias for CPP. Because many NEC members were arranged their posts by CPP. This complaint was by David W. Roberts. "Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99: Power, elitism, and democracy." St. Martins' Press, Scholarly and Reference Division. New York, 2001. P. 180
- <sup>111</sup> Asia: Cambodia" NDI Report Worldwide, July 2003.
- "Cambodia: Governance Reform Program Progressing, but Key Efforts Are Lagging." (GAO-02-569, June 2002 p.13)
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid: P 16-20.
- <sup>114</sup> Ibid: P 18
- 115 "Country Report: Cambodia: Economic Growth" *The Economist Intelligent Unit*: November 1 2002
- <sup>116</sup> Ibid: P 3
- <sup>117</sup> Ibid: 2
- <sup>118</sup> Ibid: 1&3
- <sup>119</sup> Juanita Rice. "Personal Conversation." Personal Email. April 1 2004.

## **Notes: Chapter 5**

- <sup>120</sup> Cristina Mansfield, "Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space." Pact/Cambodia, May 2002.
- 122 "Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, but the Key Efforts Are Lagging." GAO, June 2002. P 17.
- <sup>123</sup> Ibid P. 16