

Baghdad Without A Map

By Tony Horwitz

New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1991, 276 pp., \$19.95 cloth.

Reviewed by David Grann

Graham Greene liked to say (somewhat facetiously) that he wrote two types of books: serious novels and "entertainment." For those determined to classify books like species, Tony Horwitz's *Baghdad Without A Map* poses a problem. His recent account of roaming the Middle East for two years is part serious, part entertaining; it is also part travelogue, part political reporting, and part history. Measured by the standards of each category alone, the book is wanting. Horwitz is no Bruce Chatwin, a travel writer who possessed the pen and eye of a novelist; nor as a reporter does he concentrate enough on one place to understand its complexities, as does Thomas Friedman in *From Beirut To Jerusalem*. Historians and political scientists will find the book short on scholarship and analysis. But Horwitz is no pedant, either. And even when he falters, or the fragments of his stories fray, he has an enduring and rare quality to fall back on: a sense of humor.

When Tony Horwitz set out for the Middle East in 1988, he followed neither his dreams nor his instincts, but, as he says, "a habit of following my wife" (p.5). While he currently reports for *The Wall Street Journal*, he was formerly a stringer, one of "the double-A players of journalism" (p.6). His previous reporting experience included stints covering town meetings in Indiana and koala bears in Australia, which, he acknowledges, "hardly qualified me for a foreign correspondent's job writing about Abu Nidal or the finer points of OPEC negotiations" (p. 6). Two years later, after meandering through the region in search of stories, money for his travels, and a chance to play in the big leagues, Horwitz is an able observer of Middle Eastern riddles.

Horwitz moves in many directions. His adventures span the economic basket case of Sudan to the oil-rich emirates, the shell-shocked shores of Beirut to the fronts of the Iraq-Iran war, and the stones of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the streets of Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein looms in photos, calenders and portraits. It is a reporter's pinata: stories pour from every beaten nation.

Horwitz gives his travels the element of the quest: the reader moves from beautiful mosques and exotic bazaars closer to a forbidden horror, as Horwitz travels deeper into the crucible of conflicts that engulf the region. But Horwitz does not fulfill this Conradian journey. While the reader sees, hears, and smells the battles along with Horwitz, they cannot be fully understood. The reader is too often left wondering, why?

Comprehending the Middle East, of course, is not easy; the Arab-Israeli conflict has continued for years, defying the logic and understanding of most experts. But on other fronts Horwitz also does little to lift the shroud off the region. After finishing the book, the region remains a stereotype, a land of zealots, dictators, war, and perfidy. How is it possible that Miss Piggy can be banned in Saudi Arabia? How is it possible that the man who publicly condemned Salman Rushdie to death can be eulogized at his own funeral, as one English reporter says, "by the biggest bloody crowd ever in history" (p. 241)? Horwitz has compassion for most of the people he meets, but he seems at a loss to explain their political or religious institutions and traditions. He concedes this in the prologue. After encountering a woman who confesses her love for him without even knowing him, he says that

the mystery kept tugging, even after I left the Middle East. The margins were still filled with question marks. And some nights, when the rain raps hard against my window, I wander south to the Empty Quarter, to black masks and black eyes and red-henna toes, and wonder why it was she loved me (p.4).

Such passages reveal a romantic and distinctly Western voice, a voice that has the echo of travelling beatniks from Antigua to Agra. And it reflects that Horwitz is an outsider, particularly when reporting on Islam. For many Westerners, Islam is the single image of the stark, grey-bearded Ayatollah. It is a narrow view, grouping Persians, Arabs, Turks, Shi'is, and Sunnis together under one symbol, a symbol which has contributed to the fear that America's newest threat is Islamic fanaticism. Horwitz understands that the Middle East is not so simple a place. Indeed, Muslims are divided between modernists and fundamentalists and Saudi Arabia can be both a fundamentalist state and an ally of the United States. While Horwitz recognizes these distinctions, he rarely penetrates the black veils covering female faces, which cast the region in the darkest light.

But as much as Horwitz fails to belong to the places he visits or see them from an indigenous perspective, he excels at painting the local colors. His reporter's eye is sharp, his writing caustic, and no contradictions slip by him. When he enters Tehran to report on the Ayatollah's funeral, he watches a sea of people passing and chanting in Farsi. He stops a man to ask what they are saying.

"Death to America," says the man.

"Oh," says Horwitz.

"You are American?" he asks.

"Yes. A journalist."

"I must ask you something?" the man says. "Have you ever been to Disneyland?"

"As a kid, yes."

"My brother lives in California and has written me about Disneyland," he continues. "It has always been my dream to go there and

take my children on the tea-cup ride."

"And with that," writes Horwitz, "he rejoined the marchers, raised his fist and yelled 'Death to America!' again" (p.246).

The anecdote, like most throughout the book, illuminates with humor. There is the national ideology, religious and political, and the individual; that they clash should not be surprising.

Horwitz is sharpest when he first visits Baghdad, revealing with skill and untempered wit the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. Landing at the airport, Horwitz is greeted by one face—smiling, serious, and gallant, plastered on walls and billboards, even on an official's wrist watch. It is the face of Saddam Hussein, watching like "Big Brother" over a kingdom where literature, maps, and even the weather are classified for national security. Horwitz covers the Iran/Iraq war, not the Gulf War, but his account is prescient and harrowing. Iraq's political system has been transformed into a Stalinist apparatus, starring the world's latest mustachioed tyrant. Ever since Hussein rose to power, writes Horwitz, "Amnesty International's annual reports on Iraq have read like transcripts from the Spanish Inquisition: prisoners fed slow-acting poison, children tortured into ratting on their parents, teenagers returned dead to their families with fingernails extracted and eyes gouged out" (p. 113). Official Iraqi television and radio, of course, play another tune:

You are the perfume of Iraq, oh Saddam,
The water of the two rivers, oh Saddam,
The sword and the shield, oh Saddam (p. 117).

But bad poetry cannot remake reality. In the last decade, Saddam's sword and shield have repeatedly failed his people. In the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, which Hussein initiated and had predicted would be quick and glorious, thousands of Iraqis died. And while the war initially went well for Iraq, it took the use of poison gas to stave off defeat in the end. The country that Horwitz saw before the Gulf War was bleak and oppressive. But Horwitz notes that the one thing Hussein did for his country was spend much of the national income on ordinary Iraqis. That was before Allied bombs pounded Baghdad, however, and the country's export market was severed. Hussein's gamble on Kuwaiti oil wealth has left his country in tatters. And today, the sword and shield defend not Iraq, but one Iraqi.

When Horwitz is at his best, his humor cuts away the hypocrisy of Middle Eastern regimes: Colonel Qaddafi is Brother Leader, offering his people "little except sacks of Cuban sugar and cans of Bulgarian cooking oil" and *The Green Book* in which he explains "woman is female and man is male" (p. 157 and 146). Horwitz overwrites at times: too many taxis tear, too many signs are emblazoned. But his book is a highly readable introduction to a tumultuous region. Readers may not fully understand the Middle East when they finish, but they will certainly want to learn more—maybe even hop a plane to Arabia, with or without a map.

Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America

By Tina Rosenberg

New York, N.Y.: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991, 394 pp., with bibliography, \$25.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Mark Feierstein

By almost any standards, *Children of Cain* is an illuminating and edifying book. Tina Rosenberg introduces the historical and contemporary social factors that have spawned political violence in six Latin American countries and illustrates her thesis by interviewing people who have committed or who have been accomplices to violence. An enterprising and courageous journalist who spent five years reporting from Latin America, Rosenberg managed during her travels to befriend a member of the brutal *Sendero Luminoso* guerrillas in Peru and witness the planning of a murder in Colombia, to name just two of her most intriguing experiences. The interviews, personal observations, and political background in *Children of Cain* are well-organized, mutually supporting, and sustained by writing that is lively and cogent.

The book fails, however, to meet the ambitious expectations that Rosenberg creates in her introduction. She seeks to answer two questions: why people commit or participate in political violence and why certain societies foster violent behavior. Although Rosenberg capably introduces the reader to the political culture of six Latin American countries, her conclusions about the causes of violence are tentative and incomplete. Arriving at satisfactory answers would require the combined skills and research of a political scientist, an historian, a sociologist, a psychologist, an economist, and a criminologist. Surprisingly (and tellingly), the book ends without a concluding chapter to tie together the many elements contained in the six country-specific chapters.

Each chapter provides a thumbnail sketch of a country's history and current politics and the stories of people who have perpetrated or condoned violence. Rosenberg's selection of Colombia, Peru, Argentina, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chile for this study allows for an analysis of different types of political violence, ranging from the indiscriminate savagery of the Maoist *Sendero Luminoso* to the more restrained repression of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Violence thrives in Latin America, Rosenberg notes, in large part because political and economic relationships in most countries of the region are based on power rather than the rule of law. The Spaniards not only left a legacy of

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violence through their brutal conquest of the Indian civilizations but also instituted unbalanced social and economic structures that have been resistant to reform for more than five centuries. Moreover, countries such as Chile, once characterized by domestic stability, have also experienced periods of political violence. The cold war and the battle against leftist subversion, real and imagined, transformed democratic societies into violent communities capable of the most unspeakable cruelty.

Rosenberg's strength is her ability to portray perpetrators of violence as ordinary individuals rather than as pathological and irrational murderers and torturers. Her experiences, she says, confirmed the cliché that torturers are nice to their wives and children. She writes:

I would have preferred them to be monsters. Coming to understand that this is not the case was disturbing—for what it taught me about these people, and ultimately, about myself. I did not want to think that many of the violent are 'people like us': so civilized, so educated, so cultured, and because of that, so terrifying (p. 18).

In the end, she finds many of the hitmen, guerrillas, and torturers that she meets are "likeable" (p. 18).

Nevertheless, in explaining why and how civilized, educated, and cultured people become killers and torturers, Rosenberg fails to offer new insight. The brief personal profiles and the historical précis cannot capture the complexity and the interrelated nature of the many elements that have incited political violence in these six countries. Her explanations focus on a few variables, like military training and indoctrination (Argentina), an inaccessible and ineffective state (Peru), an aristocracy's refusal to accept economic and social reforms (El Salvador), an authoritarian political culture (Nicaragua), weak governmental institutions (Colombia), and cycles of societal denial and acceptance (Chile).

In order to comprehend why violence has flourished in some countries, it is also necessary to study states where violence has occurred on a lesser scale. Factors that *ex post facto* might appear to have produced or exacerbated violence in one country might also have existed in another country without having precipitated violence. Honduras, for example, has an authoritarian political history, wide income disparities, a relatively closed political system, and a military often disparaging of civilian rule. But Honduras has never suffered from the violence that has marked the three countries it borders: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Explaining the lower levels of violence in Honduras would allow for a more precise analysis of the causes of violence in Rosenberg's six case studies.

Too much space in *Children of Cain* is devoted to matters that do little to help the reader understand what causes political violence in Latin America. The chapter on Peru details a poor woman's inability to receive the most basic assistance from the government. This section illustrates the state's impotence and people's political alienation, but does not reveal why thousands would join one of the world's most violent movements in an attempt to raze society.

Furthermore, the section on Nicaragua is more a summary of ten years of Sandinista rule than an investigation into the roots of violence.

At times, the book aggravates the Latin American stereotypes held by many foreigners. In the chapter on El Salvador, Rosenberg promises to go beyond the many US press reports about the country that were often clichés of war and poverty. Such accounts, she writes, were factually true but failed to give "the truth about El Salvador" (p. 223). But she then proceeds to describe El Salvador in terms of war and poverty and devotes the bulk of the chapter to the views of reactionary members of the oligarchy. Absent are the views of more moderate Salvadorans, those who have made the recent peace accord possible. Rosenberg derides the term moderate as a "euphemism" and describes it pejoratively as "a big word at the US embassy" (p. 251).

Not even as experienced and talented a journalist as Rosenberg can explain political violence satisfactorily without comparative analyses and a familiarity with the social sciences. *Children of Cain* is more appropriately viewed as an introduction to Latin American political culture and the experiences of a half-dozen countries than as a contribution to the extensive literature on political violence. But thanks to Rosenberg's careful and insightful observations and revealing quotes, *Children of Cain* does provide a depiction of daily life in Latin America that numbing statistics cannot convey. Rosenberg also has a novelist's flare that makes the some 400 pages seem about half as long, and her book is filled with creative metaphors. Among the most memorable are descriptions of the Sandinistas' special tribunals as "judicial steamrollers" (p. 292) and of *Sendero Luminoso* women marching in black high heels, black skirts, red blouses, and Mao caps as "flight attendants of the revolution" (p. 198).

Fortunately for Latin America, the judicial steamrollers have largely ground to a halt and *Sendero Luminoso* has been unable to hijack Peru's troubled democracy. Unfortunately, the democratic movement that swept Latin America in the late 1970s and 1980s and spread to other parts of the world has not yet eliminated political violence. As Rosenberg writes, political violence is not exclusive to Latin America or the developing world. The people in *Children of Cain* "can be found everywhere; *los violentos* are that way not because they are residents of Latin America, but because they are residents of this earth" (p. 20). All over the world, people still resort to violence to resolve political problems, and they remain children of Cain.

Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America

Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal

Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, 422 pp., with note on contributors and index, \$55.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Deirdre Murphy Savarese

Latin America's political landscape has changed drastically over the last decade. While authoritarian regimes controlled the majority of Latin American countries in 1980, today virtually all of the region's leaders were chosen through reasonably competitive elections, prompting scholars and politicians alike to proclaim the redemocratization of Latin America. The US government not only has heralded the resurgence of democracy in the region, but also has laid claim to a significant and active role in this political process. President Bush and other US leaders have stated that the promotion of democracy represents a principal objective of US foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, and the idea that the United States should and can export democracy remains essentially unchallenged in the Washington policy-making community (pp. vii-viii).

Yet, Abraham Lowenthal points out in his preface to *Exporting Democracy* this is not the first time that Latin America has experienced a widespread democratic opening. It is also not the first time that the US government has used influence in the region to promote its interpretation of democratic politics. Lowenthal identifies a "collective amnesia" (p. viii) which affects decision-makers and academics in their understanding of the long history of US involvement in Latin American affairs. *Exporting Democracy* aspires to trace in comparative detail the impact of US policies on the region's democratic prospects. Lowenthal recognizes the role of indirect US cultural and international influence on Latin America and acknowledges the impact of the frequent US tendency to retreat to benign neglect in regional relations. But more specifically, the essays which comprise this volume focus on the role of direct and active US efforts to promote hemispheric democracy.

Exporting Democracy is an important addition to two areas of considerable study and literature: Latin America's transition from authoritarianism to democracy and US-Latin American relations. This study emphasizes the impact of external policies on the region's most recent democratic development, an approach which stands in contrast to traditional approaches that focus on domestic forces as the important motivators of political change. Additionally, by emphasizing the US influence on the region's democratic prospects, this

work further distinguishes itself from the vast literature that limits Latin America's political and economic development to the dependency theory model.

Regarding the study of US-Latin American relations, this collection of essays provides not only a concise historical sketch of twentieth century intra-hemispheric relations, but also highlights several country-specific examples in an effort to distinguish the variety of sources and consequences of US policies throughout the region. The historical overview introduces the uninitiated reader to the long-term, complex relationship that the United States has maintained with its southern neighbors. Students of Latin American affairs will appreciate the authors' attempts to redraw this historical relationship in terms of active US intervention in the region. The divergence of US policies in the hemisphere and the special importance of geostrategic location, size, and the level of internal political and economic development are significant factors shaping the pattern of US-Latin American relations throughout the century. The chapters concerning specific countries work well to illustrate the notion of geostrategic importance. This approach reinforces the recognition of Latin America as a group of individual nations rather than as a monolithic political actor.

Lowenthal and the contributing authors have a unified perspective regarding the limited success that US government efforts have achieved in promoting democracy in Latin America. What has constrained the US ability to export democracy to Latin America clearly depends on the circumstances surrounding each situation, yet there are several general reasons which tend to characterize the US policy approach. First, willingness to opt for stability over democracy when its interests are threatened frequently has encouraged the United States to support authoritarian regimes, explicitly undermining the region's prospects for democracy. Second, the United States often operates under the ethnocentric presumption that its own version of democracy is universally applicable regardless of the depth of indigenous democratic movements. By ignoring each country's political history and institutions, the United States remains doomed to question why democracy does not take root automatically in Latin America. Finally, the inconsistent and unsustained application of US policy in the region, a reflection not only of competing global interests but also of US partisan politics, sows the seeds for its own demise by eroding the efficacy of many policy efforts.

Lowenthal foresees a continuation of this historical relationship into the 1990s. The United States will persist in subordinating its democratic goals in Latin America for the achievement of higher priority, national objectives. While this may be a valid assumption based on the historical pattern of regional interaction, *Exporting Democracy* does not address the most important event affecting the US-Latin American relationship in the 1990s: the end of the cold war—the driving force behind most of the hemisphere's interaction for the past fifty years. If US security and stability concerns have assumed primary importance in past dealings with Latin America, what will deter the United States from promoting democracy in Latin America in the future?

The book's authors might speculate that current US supremacy in the international economic spectrum is under attack and the United States will have to place this concern ahead of the pursuit of regional democracy. Yet today there reigns a virtually unanimous approach to economic policy throughout the region based on the principles of free markets, international trade, and reduced state involvement in the productive economic sectors. This consensus is perhaps best expressed in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, President Bush's three pillar economic plan for the hemisphere, which has many Latin American nations scrambling to establish free trade ties with each other and ultimately with the United States. In the 1990s, strengthened indigenous democratic movements have chosen civilian leaders who are pursuing free market policies with full US support, and at least for the moment, there is no contradiction in US policy. This is not to say that the United States has succeeded in exporting democracy. There exists, rather, a rare congruence among hemispheric interests which may allow the United States to place its economic and political objectives on equal footing.

Although *Exporting Democracy* strictly addresses Western Hemisphere relations, the implications for US policymaking in the rest of the world are significant. Despite the horrors of the Gulf war and the expectation that the Kuwaiti political balance would shift toward greater public participation in response to the allied victory, the thriving autocracy stands as the most recent and constant reminder that

[b]y its very nature, democracy must be achieved by each nation....It is an internal process, rooted in a country's history, institutions, and values; in the balance of its social and economic forces; and in the courage, commitment, and skill of its political leaders and of plain citizens (p. 402).

The pursuit of global democracy is not an ignoble goal; on the contrary, it is the highest expression of political freedom. Yet in order to be sustainable, democracy must be an expression of the will of the people, a collective decision from within to take charge of the political agenda. No standard model of democracy exists which can serve the interests of a variety of countries; in short, democracy is not an export commodity (p. 402).

In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: The Political Roots of American Economic Decline

By William S. Dietrich

University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991, xvi + 343 pp., with bibliography, appendixes, and index, \$25.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Lawrence Friedman

Japan fascinates America. But as Americans feel an unconscious need to find a new enemy in the post-cold war world, that fascination mixes with anxiety. The Japanese economic miracle increases the anxiety, and the desire for explanations: books theorizing about Japan's economic success and America's concurrent decline have virtually become a cottage industry.¹ Too often, however, authors posit their explanations in solely American terms, failing to consider the cultural and political differences which account for Japan's success. William S. Dietrich, rather than criticize Japanese institutions, attempts to incorporate Japanese methods into a prescription for the United States in his book, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: The Political Roots of American Economic Decline*.

Dietrich is an industrialist, as well as a Ph.D. in political science. His academic and management experiences offer him a unique perspective on the state of economic relations between Japan and the United States. Dietrich is not, however, a lawyer or an expert on Japan, and while *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun* is understandably a political analysis, his thesis is undermined by the failure to consider the details of Japanese industrial policy or the legal implications of his suggestions.

The thesis is, quite simply, that in order to remain competitive on an international level, the United States must fundamentally refigure its political structure to allow for "the comprehensive and system-wide use of industrial policy" as it exists in Japan (p.248). Dietrich explores this argument by briefly outlining the "American dilemma," with scores of facts and figures showing American economic descent and parallel Japanese ascent.² Next, he discusses Japan's industrial policy, noting the strength of the Japanese bureaucracy as well as its flexible attitude toward the free market. Then he traces the origins of the American traditions of antistatism and hyperindividualism, and the way in

1. See William J. Holstein, *Japanese Power Game* (1991); Robert Zielinski and Nigel Holloway, *Unequal Equities* (1991); Daniel Burstein, *Yen! Japan's Financial Empire and Its Threat to America* (1988); and Michael Crichton, *Rising Sun* (1992).

2. For example, "[w]ith regard to capital investment, average growth rates for the period 1960 to 1988 (as a percentage of gross national product) in France and Germany has been 25 percent higher than in the United States, and in Japan it is 73 percent higher," Dietrich, 7.

which these ideals undermine efforts toward a coherent economic policy. Finally, Dietrich discusses the industrial policy debate in America, concluding with a "call to arms." He advises that the United States consider fundamental changes, or risk becoming the neo-colony of a looming Japanese economic behemoth, with the US Federal Reserve Bank and Treasury Department "de facto colonial outposts of the Ministry of Finance" (p.265).

Dietrich is not the first to illustrate the substantial role Japan's government plays in managing economic growth. The country has been dubbed "Japan, Inc.," a monolithic, homogenous corporation devoted to economic success. This characterization fails to consider the realities of the Japanese infrastructure. Dietrich chooses to describe Japan as the quintessential "development state," and America as an "interventionist state." The development state, Dietrich explains, "has great respect for the powerful workings of the market but trusts the market far less than the interventionist state does" (p. 49). The United States, on the other hand, puts great faith in the unencumbered free market, intervening only occasionally and only when absolutely necessary.

The Japanese "development state" guides industrial policy with a strong central bureaucracy, embodied in agencies such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Japan's stable bureaucracy shares the national goals of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which has been in power for fifty years. National goals are placed at the forefront of decisionmaking; policy then guides the Japanese market based on a number of organizational principles:

the bureaucracy's administrative guidance of firms, the independent regulatory effects of industry-wide associations, and the large network of affiliated supplier companies attaching themselves to major Japanese firms (p. 70).

Dietrich notes that policy is effected through negotiation rather than by decree; business is involved in the policy-making process, and is thus more willing to accept the final outcomes.

Dietrich's short-hand assessment of the system makes Japanese industrial policy seem fairly simple, running as easily as the proverbial well-oiled machine. But his analysis begs the question of how things actually get done in Japan, how industrial policy works its magic at the micro-level.³ Dietrich avoids any explanation of administrative guidance, though it is a key to understanding how Japanese industrial policy functions.

Broadly defined, administrative guidance (*gyosei shido*) is a nonbinding technique that "seeks to conform the behavior of regulated parties to broad administrative goals."⁴ The informality of administrative guidance reflects the belief that conflict and friction among competing interests should be reduced

3. See Frank K. Upham, "The Man Who Would Import: A Cautionary Tale about Bucking the System in Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies* Vol. 17 (1991): 326.

4. Michael K. Young, "Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Dispute Resolution in Japan," *Columbia Law Review* Vol. 84 (1984): 926.

as much as possible; great efforts are made to build a consensus, and business is often asked to act in its best long-term interest. To this end, Dietrich refers to MITI's role as that of a "head coach" (p.177). But that description belies the power of administrative guidance. A more accurate term might be "umpire," which better captures MITI's ability to dictate the last word according to the needs of national policy.

Much of MITI's ability to use administrative guidance springs from its nonlegal nature, which often insulates the process from serious judicial review.⁵ Thus MITI can work closely with business and effectively ignore other interests, such as environmental or consumer concerns. In addition to the lack of judicial review, MITI may bring other pressures to bear on a business that chooses not to participate in the state-guided negotiation process. The example of Sato Taiji and his company, Lions Oil, is instructive: when Sato defied MITI's attempts to control his rogue oil imports through administrative guidance, MITI extorted his compliance. Sato learned that while the bureaucracy (much hailed by Dietrich) could achieve consensus through negotiation, it could also "bribe, threaten, and even butcher when necessary."⁶

Effective as administrative guidance is in Japan, it would not work in the United States. As Dietrich frequently points out, America lacks a strong central bureaucracy or any institutional mechanism for creating long-term economic policy. Nor does it possess a single ruling party and common national goals. Impressive political and judicial hurdles also stand in the way of the system's implementation: judicial review of agency action is not merely an expectation, but a requirement of the American political-judicial structure. The antistatist tradition notwithstanding, the US Constitution simply does not allow the type of government intervention tolerated in Japan; the framework of checks and balances exists to prevent, not promote, excessive government intrusion. Unlike Dietrich, few Americans would so casually endorse rewriting the Constitution to support a Japanese-style industrial policy.

Dietrich's analysis is not entirely without merit. To his credit, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun* avoids useless and offensive Japan bashing. Dietrich recognizes that the heart of US economic woes lies in America's inability to compete, rather than in Japanese trade barriers. His argument is correct on at least one point: the United States is hyperindividualistic, and antistatism, a tradition of Jeffersonian philosophy, has produced an implicit distrust of government by the American people.

What, then, is the United States to do? There are lessons to be learned from the Japanese. Administrative agencies in the United States have experimented with negotiated regulation, the American counterpart to administrative guidance (minus the coercion, but with judicial review intact).⁷ The success of these

5. See Jonathan Weinberg, "Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the United States," *Buffalo Law Review* Vol. 39 (1991): 637.

6. Upham, 343. Professor Upham's article provides an entertaining and enlightening account of Sato's battles with MITI.

7. See Lawrence Susskind and Gerard McMahon, "The Theory and Practice of Negotiated

efforts has been marked by a decrease in the amount of post-regulation litigation, and policy that is more acceptable to all of the competing business, labor, environmental, and consumer interests. Equally important, the process reflects traditional American pluralism. There are other lessons to be learned as well. Many commentators have noted that a good deal of Japan's success may be attributed to its firm foundations: the strong bureaucracy that Dietrich so admires is in part the result of a strong education system, and here the United States could do well to look at the Japanese example.⁸

Ultimately, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, although thought provoking, offers no panacea for American economic ills. Dietrich's suggestions are so broad as to be unworkable; America cannot adopt wholesale the Japanese system of industrial policy. But that does not mean the United States should close its eyes to alternatives, such as regulatory negotiation, that could function within the existing political environment. And it does not mean that Americans should look to Japan and blindly create a new enemy to blame for their own country's troubles.

Rulemaking," *Yale Journal on Regulation* Vol. 3 (1985):133.

8. See David Halberstam, *The Next Century* (New York, N.Y.: Avon Books, 1992).

Inventing Japan: The Making of a Postwar Civilization

By William Chapman

New York, N.Y.: Prentice Hall Press, 1991, 330 pp., with bibliography and index, \$22.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Thomas Cassidy

In the latest round of Japan bashing, journalists and analysts alike have employed a colorful set of metaphors to describe the Japanese. Their businessmen are called the new *samurai*, corporate loyalty is described as a displacement of emperor worship, and business cartels are seen as an extension of the nation's traditional clan organizations. But what may have started as catchy imagery has grown into a popular and accepted theory of Japanese society: all modern traits are nothing more than an extension of traditional culture. William Chapman's new book, *Inventing Japan: The Making of a Postwar Civilization*, attempts to counter this simplistic hypothesis.

Inventing Japan presents a vivid portrait of the Japanese people in the postwar years. Chapman's focus is political and economic, but he is able to draw on cultural examples from literature and film to illustrate shifts in popular attitudes. *Inventing Japan* follows a loose chronological order, concentrating on events that redirected or altered Japanese priorities. His interviews cover a broad spectrum of Japanese society, from prime ministers and powerful businessmen, to workers and students.

Chapman, a former Tokyo bureau chief for *The Washington Post*, neither reads nor speaks Japanese. But *Inventing Japan* is well researched and comprehensive. He judiciously alternates relevant statistical evidence with anecdotal accounts culled from the interviews he carried out during his twelve years in Japan.

Chapman states his unconventional thesis with conviction.

Virtually all of Japan's modern miracle can be explained by events that took place on that empty landscape left by war and occupation.... New institutions were developed and new relationships between them were constructed, not because of any cultural predisposition but because certain choices were made and certain understandings took root (p. 94).

Chapman takes a controversial stance in challenging the prevailing interpretation of the Japanese miracle as the result of Japan's cultural heritage. This theory is in vogue not only among Westerners, but also with the Japanese, who

strive to prove that their culture is unique and that modern Japan is derived exclusively from tradition. Television commentators and academics have gone to ludicrous extremes to identify distinctive features of Japanese culture and language. "Ironically, even the Japanese word to describe the country's supposedly 'unique' culture is borrowed from English, appearing in Japanese texts as *yuniiku*" (p. 246).

According to Chapman, the guiding values of postwar Japanese society were formed during the six years, seven months, and twenty-eight days in which the United States occupied Japan. Allied attacks had levelled not only factories, but also social institutions and relationships among people. Nearly universal poverty after the war erased many traditional class distinctions, and purges conducted by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) replaced many leaders. The new nation was built by many architects, and with more than one blueprint. The creative responsibilities were divided as follows: Washington contributed the substance, General MacArthur provided the style, and the Japanese negotiated to temper and reinterpret the design according to their own various goals. When all the bargaining was done, "old Japan was hardly recognizable" (p. 19).

This simple formula for nation building was complicated by inconsistencies in the ideological directives concocted in Washington. By 1948 American leaders were reversing their demands for an unarmed "Switzerland of the Pacific" and instead began seeking an Asian ally in the cold war. The United States initially encouraged the formation of strong independent labor unions as a necessary step in democratizing Japan, but later, fearing the spread of international communism, SCAP sanctioned a crackdown on union organizers. In contrast, MacArthur was motivated by a strong streak of old-fashioned American populism which manifested itself in his insistence on breaking up trusts, protecting small farmers, and promoting the rights of workers and women. His democratic ambition for Japan was, says Chapman, to create "a sort of Asian Nebraska" (p. 22). Added to these diverse and often contradictory visions were the goals of Japan's new leaders. The emerging politicians, having experienced the poverty and suffering of the war and the American occupation, made economic growth their top priority. This single desire has remained the dominant creed shaping postwar Japan.

Fortunately, the Japanese already had the skilled bureaucrats to pursue this goal. The men who had directed the war economy now formed the new Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which was to guide the nation on its quest for wealth. While the rest of the world engaged in the ideological debate between capitalism and socialism MITI created its own hybrid, a government-directed oligopoly dedicated to economic growth. The Japanese system, with central planning, fixed prices, and laws against competition, can hardly be called free market capitalism. Unconvinced by the major "isms" of western social ideology, the Japanese pursue "economism," the apotheosis of economic goals.

"Economism" is an exacting god requiring discipline and focus. Postwar Japan is a country ruled not by politicians, but by bureaucrats, such as those at

MITI, and by industry. The public is generally indifferent to politics, and laws discouraging meaningful campaigns promote political apathy. Moreover, the pervasive role of money in politics furthers the public detachment from political life. "If the measurements of corruption are frequency of scandals, the prominence of those involved, and the amounts of money changing hands, it would seem that Japan's politics is the world's most corrupt" (p. 155).

The extent of Japanese political apathy is often misunderstood in the United States. The recent Pearl Harbor anniversary highlighted American fears of resurgent Japanese nationalism. Chapman has little patience for this concern. The Japanese are "Ethnocentric, yes. Unthinkingly convinced of the superiority of their own culture, certainly. They are smug about their racial homogeneity ... But nationalists they are not" (pp. 232-233). Recent polls have shown that the number of young Japanese willing to serve their country is half that of other countries, and only 5.5 percent of all Japanese say they would sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of society's interest.

In fact, the 1980s witnessed a growing demand in Japan for the nation to make sacrifices to individual interests. The Japanese people have received few benefits from their incredible national wealth, and they are starting to ask why. Japanese consumers face artificially high prices for most goods, commute long hours to work, and enjoy amenities of life no better than those of their counterparts in Manila. In 1989, only one-third of Japanese lived in homes served by flush toilets and sewage systems. By the mid-1980s the middle class began to express resentment over living conditions and the lack of personal freedom. In 1990, MITI produced a proposal calling for "the improvement of the daily lives of citizens" (p. 302). So far Japan, geared toward economic growth, has been slow to achieve a more equitable distribution of national wealth. Nonetheless, this new emphasis on personal happiness and individual expression shows the inaccuracy of theories that sum up the Japanese as obedient, conformist creatures of tradition.

Throughout this readable and informed history, Chapman draws our attention to instances that refute the popular conception of contemporary Japanese culture as a natural extension of traditional Japanese patterns. The Japanese penchant for saving is a new phenomenon, brought about by specific government policies. The profound company loyalty, not seen in prewar Japan, was orchestrated by management. Lifetime work contracts came about as a compromise between labor and management during postwar labor shortages. Finally, and most persuasively, Chapman points out that the modern Japanese success story cannot be the product of some unique national heritage since it has been so successfully copied by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, nations with very different cultural backgrounds. Despite Chapman's impressive array of examples, it seems he may be overstating his claim. While much of modern Japan is a product of forces acting since the end of World War II, traditional culture has not been completely obliterated, and its effects must still be felt. Yes, Japanese "groupism" was intentionally orchestrated, but surely the success of this orchestration owes something to cultural traits.

If Chapman is guilty of pushing his thesis too far, he can perhaps be excused

because he is compensating for the simplification practiced by so many other critics of Japanese society. His argument against predictability and predestination serves as an antithesis to the prevalent cultural explanation. We now await a synthesis that will begin to distinguish the traditional from the modern in Japan.

Chapman's other accomplishment, however, is to break down the myth of a uniform, determinate Japan. It is all too easy for Americans to view the vast accomplishments of the Japanese since the war as the result of a single, focused will. Chapman clearly illustrates the complexities and contradictions in the forces that are shaping Japan. Far from being the monolithic "Japan Inc." of American myopia, Japan is diverse, changing, and sometimes uncertain in its ambitions. Forty years after the American occupation, the Japanese are still in the process of inventing Japan.

Japan's Unequal Trade

By Edward J. Lincoln

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990, 223 pp., including appendixes, endnotes, and index, \$28.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Noriatsu Matsui

Japan's Unequal Trade by Edward J. Lincoln examines Japan's strikingly different trade patterns and the American policy agenda for attaining access to Japanese markets. The author's view is clear: Japan's unusual trading pattern—a low level of manufactured imports and a relative absence of international two-way flow within particular industries—cannot be explained as the result of standard economic factors. Rather this pattern of trade is the outcome of institutions, policies, and behavior patterns in industry and government that have emerged from Japan's determined effort to catch up with the West. Furthermore, American trade policy toward Japan must take account of a new international phenomenon, the rapid appreciation of the yen since 1985. Now is not the time, according to Lincoln, for the United States to abandon a liberal trade principle in favor of managed trade. United States pressure and negotiation for more market opening and trade liberalization of Japan must be made firmly but carefully.

The main contributions of this work are two-fold. Lincoln, a bilingual economist, conducts thorough research on trade issues, drawing on United Nations trade data tapes for Japan, the United States, France, Germany, and South Korea, chiefly for the period from 1970 to 1987. He uses this information to illustrate Japan's unusual trade patterns, which analysts have been debating for some time, and to draw a number of important conclusions. In the process, Lincoln examines trade issues from both the US and Japanese point of view, providing a brief but good survey of trade theory, in particular, intra-industry trade theory.

Lincoln's major factual findings can be summarized as follows: relative to other major industrial countries, Japan's manufactured imports (as a percentage of both GDP and GDP in manufacturing) have been low, the concentration of its exports in a few industries has been high, and the level of its intra-industry trade—imports and exports of similar products—has been both low and unchanging. This relative absence of intra-industry trade (IIT) in Japan, compared with the United States, France, and West Germany is a major theme of the book.

Noting the importance of two-way trade in products belonging to similar industrial classifications among industrialized countries, the author proposes

four general hypotheses about intra-industry trade: IIT increases as a nation's economy develops; IIT is higher between countries with similar market sizes; IIT rises when market barriers fall; and industry-wide characteristics (such as industries with differentiated products versus standardized products) affect IIT differently regardless of national locations.

Based on these assumptions, Lincoln then hypothesizes that Japan's levels of intra-industry trade, which should have been rising but have been consistently low since the 1960s, may be due to Japan's extensive trade with Asia and other developing countries and may strongly correlate with Japan's export concentration and levels of foreign direct investment. Study of Japanese IIT should focus on manufactured goods only, the author advises, noting that Japan has few raw materials and no common land borders. In addition, IIT in Japan is strongly affected by a peculiar industrial pattern skewed toward industries such as forest products. Lincoln also suggests that the dispersion of IIT in Japan may be higher than in other industrial countries, similar to that of South Korea, but in sharp contrast to distribution of the IIT index for the United States, France, and Germany.

Lincoln later explores Japan's need to change economic and trade structures in the face of rising imports, changing attitudes in the government and the private sector, and renewed relationships with Asian NICs (newly industrializing countries). He advises Americans to press for a liberal Japanese trade policy through lobbying, negotiation, and retaliation within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Unfortunately, there are some difficulties with Lincoln's analysis. First, the period covered by this study (1970-1987) should have been broadened to include part of the 1950s and 1960s. The period selected by the author is too short to observe clearly the changing trade patterns and industrial structure of Japan; 1970 is near the end of Japan's rapid economic growth period, and it is only in 1987 that the effects of permanent high-yen value started to appear after the Plaza Accord of September 1985.

The author's narrow time frame misses an important "turning point" in the Japanese economy that took place during the 1960s. According to a 1971 study by Ryoshin Minami, the Japanese economy changed from a labor surplus (or unlimited supply of labor) country to a labor shortage economy in the early 1960s. This ended the dual structure in wage differential and industrial structure, and consequently, marked the beginning of the end of the modernization process that began in 1868. As I have noted elsewhere,¹ 1985 may mark a third great transition after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the postwar reforms. If the Meiji Restoration was a "revolution within" a elite group, and the postwar reforms a "revolution from above," the current transition in Japan can be a "revolution from below." Should this be the case, the basic attitudes of government, industry, and people must change, and a greater opening of the economy

1. Noriatsu Matsui, "New Roles of Japan in the Global Political Economy," *Occasional Paper* Vol.2, No. 1 (Richmond, Ind.: Institute for Education on Japan, Earlham College, 1991). Also see Ryoshin Minami, *The Turning Point of the Japanese Economy* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Books Co., 1971).

must occur. Lincoln discusses attitudinal change, but it is important to set a broad enough time frame for the analysis, including some period before this "turning point", at least the 1950s and 1960s.

A wider time frame would also reveal drastic changes in export composition from 1950-1990. Statistics from others indicate that while light manufacturing exports (specifically textiles) declined, exports of chemical and heavy manufactured goods (especially machinery and equipment) increased dramatically over forty years. Major export items in the 1950s and 1960s were textiles, iron, and steel; since the 1970s, automobiles have become much more important, typically sharing about one quarter of machinery and equipment exports and about 18 percent of Japan's total exports during 1980s. The shift in relative importance from light manufactured goods to chemical and heavy manufactures occurred shortly after 1960. These shifts and trends indicate the importance of the late 1950s and early 1960s for an understanding of the structural changes in Japan's trade and industry, a time period which Lincoln does not include in his analysis.

A second problem faced by the author is the rapidly changing composition of Japan's imports of manufactured goods. Statistics show that manufactured imports in 1990 were almost four times those of 1980 in current dollar values. Dividing these values by the import price index shows that, in 1990, the real volume of Japan's imports was about six times that of 1980. Examining the quarterly data of the ratio of manufactured imports to total imports reveals a striking trend. Whereas the average ratio during the first half of 1980s was 27 percent, in the last half of the decade the average increased to 48 percent. Imports of heavy manufactures and chemical products increased its share of total imports from 16 percent in 1981 to 31 percent in 1990.

Third, the comparison between the import quantity index and the export quantity index poses an interesting challenge to Lincoln. According to various trade indices from 1980 to 1990, the import quantity index grew 75 percent by 1990 whereas export quantity grew by 63 percent. These figures cast doubt on the author, who relies on import shares of GDP, when he asks

How can a structural adjustment in which imports play a more important role be taking place if imports actually represent less of economic activity in Japan now than they did in the early and mid-1980s? (p.103).

The answer lies in the movement of import, export, and domestic prices, which changed drastically between 1980 and 1990. As mentioned in the second point above, Japan's import of manufactured goods in 1990 was six times that of 1980. In the same period, real GNP in yen grew only 1.52 times. Certainly, imports actually represent *more* economic activity in Japan during the 1980s.

Fourth and finally, comparing Japan's IIT index with only four countries (the United States, France, Germany, and South Korea) offers too narrow a picture to draw any conclusion. Why not compare Japan's IIT with OECD member countries such as Canada, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, or Switzerland? Why not compare them with those of the United

Nations ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific) region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan, and Indonesia? Such comparisons might offer interesting and illuminating future research.

Although Japan is undoubtedly an industrial country, not all sectors of its economy nor all aspects of its society developed or modernized at an equal pace. In 1965, Japan's per capita GNP was less than a quarter of the US GNP, generally less than a third of those of France, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and nearly half of those of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands, and Norway. It is interesting to note that Japan's IIT patterns are similar to South Korea's in the 1970s and early 1980s. Certainly, it would have been useful if the countries Lincoln compared with Japan's IIT index were greater in number and much more diverse.

Despite these criticisms, *Japan's Unequal Trade* is a worthwhile study given the author's detailed and painstaking analytical efforts to show that the low manufactured import, the high export concentration, and the low IIT of Japanese trade is successful, even though the Japanese economy is experiencing rapid change. Changing trade patterns commensurate with Japan's economic strengths are important, and this work is useful in understanding the fundamentally different trade patterns of Japan. It also helps to pinpoint the nature and location of specific microeconomic problems in Japanese trade policy. Trying to separate microeconomic factors from macroeconomic policy issues is sound and beneficial, for there have been many confused discussions on bilateral trade imbalance as a result of mixing up these two aspects of the issue.

John Dewey and American Democracy

By Robert Westbrook

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991, 570 pp., with bibliographical note and index, \$29.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Victor Bondi

Robert Westbrook has written an indispensable guide to the thought of John Dewey, creating an intellectual biography sure to set new standards for the genre. Westbrook's study is so rich in insight and perception that its use goes far beyond intellectual history. For those searching for a new basis for political action, few books will provide more stimulating and challenging proposals than those found in *John Dewey and American Democracy*.

The strength of this book lies in Westbrook's ability, as he says, to write a "Deweyian" study of John Dewey, one which reflects the intellectual methods by which Dewey constructed his distinctive worldview (p. xi). Dewey held catholic interests, ranging from psychology to poetry, art to archaeology. Dewey's prose is, moreover, notoriously dense and complex and the implications of his major philosophical concept, instrumentalism, are still being debated (p. xiii). In the course of a public career which lasted nearly seventy years, Dewey wrote penetrating essays on all these subjects—enough to fill more than thirty-seven volumes, the collection and re-publication of which was recently completed by Southern Illinois University Press.¹

Beyond the difficulties involved in mastering this theoretical material, Westbrook also faced the biographical challenge posed by Dewey's social activism, for he was no ivory-tower intellectual. While for the majority of his life, Dewey was a professor of philosophy at Columbia University, he also helped establish the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; his efforts toward educational reform contributed to the modernization of the American school. Furthermore, Dewey was a tireless organizer of movements for women's rights, racial equality, industrial justice, and international peace. Westbrook assembles his book by focusing on these activities. He seamlessly demonstrates how the interconnection of Dewey's activities with his intellectual concerns, and how social activism in turn restructured the substance of Dewey's thought. This fusion of Dewey's thought to his social activism is what makes Westbrook's work a "Deweyian" text. By

1. For an overview of the recent renaissance in Dewey studies, see Robert Westbrook, "Dewey Done," in *Intellectual History Newsletter* Vol. 13 (1991): 33-36.

employing Dewey's methodology to link intellectualism to activism, reflection to action, philosophy to democracy, Westbrook has written a book which is both a reflective history, and an engaged call for democratic action.

In his day, John Dewey took on the task of linking the ideals of the past to the realities of the present. Born in 1859, Dewey witnessed the turn-of-the-century transformation of the United States to an international force marked by an urban, multi-ethnic culture. As a young professor of philosophy, these transformations struck Dewey as incomplete, at least to the extent that modern, urban American society was still enthralled by pre-modern methods of thought, especially as expressed in such issues as union organization, women's suffrage, or race relations. In order to rectify this situation, Dewey, along with Harvard philosopher William James, developed a theory of knowledge which demolished the conceptual assumptions of pre-modern philosophy. In a series of powerful critiques of traditional thought, the most famous of which were Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920) and James's *Pragmatism* (1907), they asserted that wisdom was not found between the pages of books, or in blind obedience to inherited doctrine; wisdom was instead discovered in meeting the demands of everyday life, in the method by which one comes to understand and transform experience (pp. 117-149). Accordingly, one goal of their work was to attack the primacy of academic philosophy over common knowledge, especially as expressed in the abstract dualisms of classical metaphysics and epistemology. They sought to demonstrate that there was no simple distinction between subject and object, between mind and body, between theory and practice, or between good and evil. Their skepticism was directed toward exposing the futility of thinking in black-and-white terms. Another goal, however, was to rebuild ethics and morality in an age of contingency rather than absolutes, to develop a method of ascertaining truth and virtue in keeping with the realities of modern life. This did not mean that Dewey and James advocated the wholesale overthrow of inherited tradition. Instead, both favored the cultivation of methods by which the most valuable aspects of tradition were retained even as the more outdated dogmas of custom were abandoned.

At the level of political theory Dewey was preoccupied with the application of the method to traditional democratic theory, and with the reconstruction of Jeffersonianism. Political wisdom was not to be found in the "immutable" and "eternal" truths often worshiped, for example, in the Constitution, but in the capacity of the Constitution for amendment and in the mechanisms by which new laws were developed to meet the needs of current circumstances. Accordingly, Dewey sought to take the very foundations of democratic theory and to "amend" them to fit present needs. Traditional theory, for example, viewed society as a collection of self-sufficient individuals, whose rights and necessities were balanced against one another. Dewey, as the philosopher of the first generation of Americans who depended on store-bought food and clothing rather than home-made goods, argued that modern society was *interdependent*. Rights, responsibilities, and obligations were shared among the citizenry. Rather than simply abandon the traditional conception of the individual, Dewey argued that the fulfillment of individual's productive capacity in the

modern world was a social process, as Westbrook says, a matter of "conjoining self-realization and the social good" (p. 541). Where traditional democratic theory had espoused personal potential could be best realized by limiting the claims of government and society upon the individual, Dewey now asserted that government and society must actively promote the free development of the citizen, through education reform and laws to protect the worker and consumer. He also called for the removal of pre-modern impediments to individual growth, such as the Jim Crow laws. If the growth of society was dependent upon the genius and health of individuals then society had a stake in promoting its growth (pp. 223-227).

Not suprisingly, Dewey's reconceptualization of the individual's role in a modern democracy is similar to Marx's dictum that society should be organized from each according to their ability and to each according to their need. Although a strong critic of Marxist philosophy and a staunch opponent of Stalinism, Dewey shared Marx's aversion to the capitalist tendency to reduce all human values to an economic function, and he objected to the sacrifice of quality of life to the blind pursuit of profit. As Westbrook ably documents, Dewey became increasingly radical during the course of his life in response to the bureaucratic, inhumane imperatives of corporate capitalism and the culture of advertising. To Dewey, such forms of economic organization and information dissemination limited and reduced the individual's ability to govern personal life — an ability fundamental to a self-governing democracy. In Dewey's own words:

The mass usually become unaware that they have a claim to a development of their own powers. Their experience is so restricted that they are not conscious of restriction. It is part of the democratic conception that they as individuals are not the only sufferers, but that the whole social body is deprived of the potential resources that should be at its service (p. 434).

By the time he wrote what is perhaps his best political work, *Freedom and Culture* (1939), Dewey had refined his criticism of the capitalist order to a succinct democratic principle. Taking stock of the rhetoric of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and corporate America, with "justice" and "democracy" as their ostensible goals, Dewey argued that any political end must be commensurate with the means by which the end is achieved. No democracy could be achieved through the political means of the *Fuhrerprinzip* or the dictatorship of the proletariat, and no democracy could succeed if economic life is dominated by a system which concentrates power in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. Based on this principle, Dewey believed that those who argued that capitalism was necessary to secure American freedom were as mistaken as Lenin, who believed that the dictatorship of the proletariat was necessary to secure Soviet freedom. Authoritarian forms of organization are only effective in the pursuit of authoritarian goals; democratic ends presume democratic means.

Westbrook reveals Dewey's weakness as a political theorist: the substance of democratic means is maddeningly vague in Dewey's analysis. In part, this was because Dewey assumed that democracy, like any living idea, required constant adjustment and experimentation. In pursuit of democracy, some ideas would fail, and some would succeed—it was impossible to predict, in advance, the exact nature of these ideas. Yet one could always use the criteria of inherited moral and political values, the understanding of public opinion, and the skepticism codified in instrumentalism to criticize these ideas as they were presented. As a critic, Dewey was second to none. Westbrook skillfully combines Dewey's engagement with intellectual opponents such as Randolph Bourne, Walter Lippmann, Lewis Mumford, or Reinhold Niebuhr over the means and the ends of democracy. Westbrook is a reasonable and fair judge of these encounters, acknowledging the strong points of Dewey's adversaries, as well as Dewey's own intellectual failings. The author also demonstrates how the criticisms of Dewey's work were incorporated into his philosophy, and how these encounters transformed the substance of Dewey's thought (pp. 231-240, 300-318).

Westbrook himself is a perceptive critic of democracy today, and his account of Dewey is designed in part as a criticism of current democratic theory and practice. This aspect of *John Dewey and American Democracy* will perhaps be of greatest use to students of American foreign policy, for this book is largely a narrative of the development of both foreign and domestic policy as *elitist* doctrines at odds with democratic objectives. Westbrook relates how, in the 1920s and 1930s, intellectuals and statesmen other than Dewey abandoned their turn-of-the-century attempt to modernize American society and promote democracy, and began to conceive of democracy in traditional elite, economic, and "realist" terms (pp. 275-286). In foreign policy, this was a process of divorcing the means of American power abroad from the ends of American democracy at home; a process where, in fact, the elitist practice of foreign policy threatened the very inclusionary principle of American democracy.

At the end of the cold war, perhaps we have an opportune moment to reconsider the governing assumptions of realist theory. Westbrook undertakes such a reconsideration by carefully reconstructing Dewey's vision of a participatory democracy, and detailing its implications for domestic and foreign policy. No doubt, foreign policy in this century required a certain amount of professionalism and elitism. Thus, all the more reason that *John Dewey and American Democracy* should be required reading among students of foreign policy, for this book suggests methods by which the anti-democratic tendencies in foreign policy can be tempered and reapplied to the democratic project. At a time in which "democracy" has returned as, if nothing else, a tool in the rhetoric of foreign policy, a thoughtful reconsideration of the substance of that term, illustrated through the theory and practice of one of this century's greatest champions of democracy, is sorely needed. Robert Westbrook's excellent intellectual biography of John Dewey is more than adequate to this task.

October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan

By Gary Sick

New York, N.Y.: Times Books/Random House, 1991, 227 pp., with endnotes and index, \$23.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Warren Cohen

Historians frequently remind us that the study of the past is less a definitive chronicle of bygone eras than a vehicle to examine contemporary social and cultural values. Through this perspective, there appears in the late twentieth century a popular belief that the interruption of the natural course of history by sinister plots has inflicted unfair burdens upon the United States. Oliver Stone's "JFK" beams this message to an impressionable populace, but the phenomenon is rampant with new interpretations of Watergate and the deaths of Martin Luther King Jr., Zachary Taylor, and even Marilyn Monroe.

The latest historical "fact" exhumed in this process is the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis. Gary Sick, the National Security Council expert on the Middle East at the time, soberly reports in *October Surprise* of an alleged clandestine deal between the Iranian *mullahs* and Ronald Reagan's campaign operatives. In return for holding the fifty-two Americans until after the election, the Republicans promised to pay back Iran through surreptitious arms deliveries via Israel. The book's implicit message is that without the foul play, the Reagan-Bush era may never have occurred. If the allegations are true, the 1980 election would be, in Sick's words, the first "political coup" (p. 12) in American history.

The argument in *October Surprise* rests on the confession of Jamshid Hashemi, a jet-setting Iranian businessman. Hashemi, along with his arms-dealing brother Cyrus, offered to put the Carter administration in touch with members of Iran's revolutionary regime to discuss the hostage crisis. The Hashemis' credentials were solid, Sick reports, because the brothers had already arranged at least one contact between a still-classified US government official and a relative of the Ayatollah. In 1990, Jamshid told reporters that the Hashemis had also been approached by members of the Reagan campaign seeking the same access.

Sick makes a compelling *prima facie* case for the charges of a secret deal. Terrified that a pre-November hostage release would tip the election in Carter's favor, members of the Reagan campaign staff penetrated the deepest levels of the government to monitor Carter's handling of the crisis, "an achievement," in Sick's phrase, "that would have been the envy of the KGB" (p. 138). Some of the

more egregious examples of Reaganite scheming include: around-the-clock surveillance of US Air Force bases where Iranian weaponry purchased under the Shah was interned; knowledge of the transcripts of meetings of a handful of top government and military officials planning a never-executed second rescue; and the theft of Carter's foreign policy briefing book. These ethical breaches were so grave that both the FBI and a Senate subcommittee investigated the leaks of classified information after the end of the campaign.

For obvious political reasons, the Carter administration was desperately trying to negotiate the hostages' release. But the Iranians were searching for a solution as well, especially after Iraq invaded in late September. Carter's world-wide arms embargo prevented Iran from obtaining the weapons and spare parts necessary to defend itself. As the talks with Carter were reaching their climax, the Hashemis allegedly set up secret negotiations between Reagan campaign director William Casey and Khomeini officials. These contacts occurred in July and August in Madrid and concluded in Paris in October, Sick reports. At the same time these purported meetings ended, the Iranians abruptly cut off contact with the Carter administration and refused to discuss the hostages until after the election. Sick reasons that the Republicans came through with a more attractive offer, and so the hostages were ultimately not released until five minutes after Reagan was inaugurated. The moniker "October Surprise," coined and disseminated by the Reagan campaign through the press to ready the public for a possible pre-November hostage release, became a term best known for Casey's insidious deal.

Sick illustrates the alleged payoff for the hostage release as well. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin suggested that Carter allow Israel to resume weapon sales to Iran. Israel had furtive, but good relations with Iran before the revolution and wanted to continue the ties in order to counter what it perceived as Iraq's growing military threat. During the Carter embargo, a few Israeli shipments to Iran did circumvent US restrictions, but the weapons pipeline began to gush immediately after the inauguration, despite pronouncements that the new administration would never sell arms to Iran. In 1990, then Secretary of State Alexander Haig publicly admitted that some weapons arrived in Iran without his permission though Sick lists a variety of sources including State and Defense department officials and high-ranking Israelis who point the finger at Haig.

But it is a far leap to connect the antecedents and the aftermath to form a conclusive tale of treachery. Sick's meticulously documented evidence fails to convince readers of Casey's secret deals. By citing an anonymous underworld of gun smugglers, French and Israeli intelligence agents, and embittered Iranian exiles, Sick relies on hearsay testimony from people who were not present at the rumored meetings. For example, despite reporting that there were six Israelis, sixteen Iranians, and twelve Americans in attendance in Paris, Sick writes "none of the principals involved have ever spoken publicly about what happened" (p. 146). And two of the main characters at the crux of the scandal—William Casey and Cyrus Hashemi—died in the mid-1980s.

Sick unwittingly undermines his own case by citing "on-the-record" sources

with histories of contradictions. Oswald LeWinter, a self-described freelance intelligence operative, claimed that he helped clean up evidence of the Paris meetings. However, he also said that he received \$40,000 in 1988 to spread false stories about the "October Surprise" under an assumed name, a tale backed up by the journalists he fooled. Who can say if he is now telling the truth? Another example is the case of Iran's first President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, now living in exile. Bani-Sadr admits he was excluded from important decisions by Khomeini's religious inner circle, but claims he overheard secret murmurs of the deal. Yet Bani-Sadr also has a credibility gap. In addition to the "October Surprise" conspiracy, he is convinced that in 1980 National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski secretly teamed up with Saddam Hussein to plot the Iraqi invasion into Iran.

Aside from his questionable sources, Sick also neglects to analyze the story through other important viewpoints. In Sick's 1985 book *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran*, the hostage crisis is examined from the inner depths of the White House. Reagan, Casey, and the Hashemi brothers do not even merit an appearance in that book, but in *October Surprise* they become lead characters when Sick reconsiders the same events through the prism of the 1980 election. To peg the story accurately, Sick should revise his stance a third time from the most important angle—the Iranian perspective. The many contradictory and inconsistent signals the Carter administration received after the revolution are best explained by factions in Iran struggling for power. Clerics and politicians attempting to curry favor with potential allies were unlikely to breach Khomeini's inner circle by advocating a deal with the "Great Satan." Furthermore, it is a dubious proposition to believe that Iran would pass up a chance to procure critical ammunition from the Carter administration for a future promise of weapons from Casey. After the initial success of the Iraqi incursion, Iran was literally fighting for its life. If Iran had held the hostages until after the elections, there were no definite assurances that the Republicans would win and then keep their end of the bargain once elected. Reagan's oft-quoted belligerence toward Iran at the time suggests the opposite. And if there was a deal, why did Iran negotiate so frantically with the Carter administration *after* the election to reach an agreement days before Reagan was inaugurated?

Despite the inconsistencies and illogical interpretation of events, there remain many titillating details to give even the most skeptical reader pause. Jamshid Hashemi and six other corroborating sources were able to pinpoint separately, without consultation, the exact days during the campaign for which there is no conclusive evidence of Casey's whereabouts. A search of 100,000 pages of Reagan's 1980 campaign documents revealed no traces, such as hotel receipts or journal entries, exonerating Casey. Also, in October 1980, the FBI began surveillance of Cyrus Hashemi's offices because he was suspected of illegal arms sales, but in February 1981, the taping was terminated ahead of schedule by the new administration. The information from these tapings has still not been released despite many Freedom of Information Act requests from journalists. Then there are the inexplicable arms sales to Iran after the Reagan

administration took over, which some journalists have estimated to be worth several billion dollars. Sick makes a valid point when he claims that an "October Surprise" deal would serve as a precursor to the Iran-Contra affair between the same parties years later.

In Washington, Sick's charges have ignited a partisan battle. The story has been branded baseless by Republicans (White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater called Sick "the Kitty Kelley of foreign policy"). Columbia Pictures has optioned the movie rights for a reported \$500,000.

On the other side of the debate, Sick's accounts have found a voice with outraged Democrats. Eight former hostages, President Carter, former hostage negotiator Warren Christopher, and even Presidents Bush and Reagan have supported a Congressional inquiry. While Republicans have blocked a move in the Senate, the House approved the formation of a bipartisan task force that will spend between \$1.2 and \$2.5 million to probe the charges. But any evidence Congress discovers supporting or denying the theory will be secondary to the ultimate judgment of the American people, who will confront past and present demons again.

The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity

By James G. Kellas

New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1991, 188 pp., with appendixes, bibliography, and index, \$45.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

With the end of the cold war and the bipolar perspective of looking at the world, multinational ideological states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have split asunder. This schism has opened the way for national and ethnic conflicts to enter the global landscape with virulence and violence. Nationalism and ethnicity are permeating the body politic of the international environment at a pace and resonance not seen since before the first World War.

James G. Kellas' *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* is timely and welcome reading for students of international relations. Professor of politics at the University of Glasgow, Kellas has written an introductory primer on these issues. He begins with key definitions of the subject matter. Nationalism is seen as an attempt to build on a people's awareness of a nation in order to derive a set of attitudes and a plan of action. Ethnicity is defined as the state of being ethnic or belonging to a group where its membership shares certain inborn attitudes. In systematic fashion, Kellas proceeds to analyze the prominent studies in the field and to provide factual information on nationalist movements around the globe. He concludes with a theoretical framework for the study of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity.

The book propounds the idea that "human nature (insofar as can be defined) plays some part in explaining why ethnicity and nationalism have been so pervasive and powerful in human history" (p. 8). The author brings together two differing theories of ethnicity: the sociobiology perspective which supports the idea of "kin selection," and the neurophysiology speculation which argues that "human behaviour is the result of 'culture' and 'learning' rather than biology" (p. 11). In addition, Kellas introduces elements of social psychology, the study of deliberate behavior such as individual and group "rational self-interest." Sociobiology, neurophysiology, and social psychology thus merge to form the building-blocks of any theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity.

It is from this explanation of human nature and political behavior that ideas and ideologies enter the realm of nationalism and ethnicity. "Nationalism is an ideology which builds on the idea of the nation and makes it the basis for action" (p. 21). Such action may or may not be political. Kellas uses the example of sports

as a manifestation of the most popular form of nationalistic behavior, "where masses of people become highly emotional in support of their national team" (p. 21).

The biggest debate among scholars of nationalism occurs within the context of ideas and ideologies. The question these writers grapple with is how nationalism developed as an ideology. Kellas is especially adept at introducing the principal theorists in the field and their differing interpretations on the ideological development of nationalism. Unlike the Greeks and the Jews, who can trace their respective nations to the ancient world, most other nations have more recent origins. While Anthony Smith has concluded that nations have ethnic origins, Ernest Gellner believes that "the condition for the emergence of the national principle and nationalist movements was the stage of development reached by some states in Europe" (p. 32). Kellas also discusses the works of a number of other writers in order to demonstrate the vast literature and disparity of opinion that exists on the topic. The problem here is that, to a certain extent, all these writers are right in their conclusions. For example, while the Scottish "Declaration of Arbroath" of 1320 claiming an independent Scotland supports Smith's *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, the emergence of British and French nationalism validates Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*.

Also discussed is the current approach to the politics of nationalism and ethnicity within existing political entities or states. Clearly, different types of nationalism exist: ethnic nationalism of groups such as the Kurds, Latvians, and Tamils, based mainly on common descent; social nationalism, defined by commercial ties and culture rather than common descent; and the official nationalism of a state. Multiethnic states like the United States adopt official nationalism and use it to maintain cohesion, while in other states, where one ethnic group controls the state, "nationalism is expressed as official nationalism or patriotism" (p. 55). For example, the ruling National Party in South Africa is the party of the white Afrikaners, and the ruling United National Party in Sri Lanka is the party of the Sinhalese.

Developed and developing states are replete with examples of the various kinds of nationalism and the problems that these create for governments. Kellas provides good summaries of the various nationalist parties or contemporary movements which have had considerable political impact. Kellas examines the Catalan and Basque movements in Spain; the nationalist problems of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, now seething due to the disintegration of the federal structure of republics constituted along "nationalist" lines; the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka; the Biafran issue in Nigeria; the African National Congress and its demands in South Africa; and the clash of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism in Israel.

Although these case studies provide the reader with a cursory look at the plethora of contemporary nationalist movements, Kellas focuses more on how these states can create national cohesion, given that most states are multiethnic and multinational. Yet the problem with an all-encompassing nationalism is that it can lead to a form which is highly intolerant of national minorities, such as Nazism or Facism. Political scientists have been attempting since the late

1960s to visualize a democracy "devised to cope with the problems of extreme 'cultural pluralism'" (pp. 135-136). It is within this context that the term "consociational democracy," which stresses constitutional reform for altering nationalist political behavior, has evolved. The consociationalist approach, of course, does not lack its detractors, especially Donald Horowitz who suggests policy aims with regard to ethnic groups should include "fragmentation, moderation, coalition, fluidity and proportionality" (p. 144).

Kellas suggests that

[a]n integrated or general theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity must be the aim of all students of the subject. Without such a theory, it is impossible to make a claim that understanding has been advanced beyond the level of the description and partial analysis of apparently unrelated case studies (p. 159).

His theory attempts to integrate the existing literature on the subject as well as the various constitutional state models that exist in order to bring some cohesion to the subject. Here, Kellas fails on two counts. First, his theory suggests no definite conclusion nor is it original since it depends on incorporating the theories of others. Second, if the intention was to introduce an "integrated theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity," why does the book read like a primer on the topic? But despite its failure to offer a comprehensive theory, the book provides an excellent overview of the issues of nationalism and ethnicity. For this reason, it is useful reading for American students of politics, who have largely ignored this topic, emphasizing instead the study of the world through bifurcated lenses that saw only East and West.

The Samson Option

By Seymour M. Hersh

New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1991, 354 pp., including endnotes and index, \$23.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Scott Berrie

A keen combination of sensationalism, mind-boggling speculation, libel suits, and the author's solid reputation as a top-notch investigative reporter make *The Samson Option* by Seymour M. Hersh a commercial dream-come-true for any publishing house. *The Samson Option* has become an international best seller, causing a stir in the world media. But if the existence of the Israeli bomb is yesterday's news, then why are book stores selling the book faster than they can stock the shelves? The answer is found in Hersh's outrageous allegations, scathing descriptions of Israeli leaders, and critical assessment that American foreign policy over the last forty years has been, at best, hypocritical.

A former correspondent with *The New York Times* and a Pulitzer Prize winner, Hersh has compiled an informative history of Israeli nuclear weapons development at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Based on research and interviews he gives an exciting narration of the dynamic history of the Israeli nuclear program. Hersh's depiction of the players involved, such as his reference to Ernst David Bergmann as the "scientific father of the Israeli bomb," is endearing and compelling. He moves on to describe the "French Connection" and how, through the 1950s and 1960s, the French government sent hundreds of scientists and engineers to help the Israelis design and build their nuclear compound. Hersh adds that the scale of French assistance was far greater than had been thought by American analysts who studied the matter.

But Hersh's historical account quickly turns sour with his derogatory evaluations and critical commentary. References to Ben Gurion as the "Mafia don" (p.33) of the Mapai Party discredit his analysis by revealing a hostility toward the Israeli political elite. Hersh goes on to implicate Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in the transfer of intelligence information to the Soviets.

Some of the most important Pollard documents were retyped and sanitized by Israeli intelligence officials and then made available to the Soviet Union as a gesture of Israeli goodwill at the specific instructions of Yitzhak Shamir, a longtime advocate of closer Israeli-Soviet ties (p. 286).

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Even a staunch critic of Shamir knows of his almost fanatical conservatism; his greatest political aspiration is to leave the government exactly the way he found it. For Shamir to take the kind of political risk involved in intelligence transfer to the Soviets would have been equal to shooting himself in the foot and simply out of character.

Hersh's allegations concerning Jewish allegiance to the United States government versus allegiance to Israel are disturbing. The chapter titled "Dual Loyalty" describes Lewis Strauss, ex-chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, as a conservative, thoroughly assimilated Jew whose sense of guilt over his inability to stop the Nazi Holocaust affected his objectivity when dealing with Israeli nuclear development. Hersh provides weak evidence to prove his vilification. He simply states that "Strauss chose not to talk about the Israeli nuclear program because, as a Jew with deep feelings about the Holocaust, he approved of it" (p. 83). Like this assertion, most of Hersh's findings are based not on solid evidence or documentation, but on recent interviews about events which took place more than thirty years ago.

The most electrifying charge by Hersh is that Israel targeted the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that Israel's intention was to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. But the argument makes little sense. In the event of a nuclear war the Soviet's first strike capabilities would have been aimed at destroying American and NATO nuclear forces in the United States and Europe in order to minimize US "second strike" capability. The Soviets would not have wasted time targeting Israel, risking retaliation from Israel's nuclear weapons as well. Moreover, in order to deter Soviet targeting of Israel in a "first strike," Israel would have had to conspicuously avoid targeting the Soviets or pursue a "second strike" policy based upon nuclear submarines with long-range missile capabilities. Yet, Israel has never purchased or manufactured these prohibitively expensive submarines.

Hersh's theories of Israeli nuclear targeting are further discredited by his reliance upon the uncorroborated testimony of Ari Ben-Menashe. Ben-Menashe's testimony has fueled the most explosive and damaging allegations in *The Samson Option*. Hersh describes him as an Israeli agent and a trusted adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Ben-Menashe claims involvement in the Mossad's 1986 kidnapping of renegade Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu and responsibility for having leaked the story of the Iran-Contra scandal. Ben-Menashe's most politically explosive assertion is that he saw George Bush enter a Paris hotel room in October 1980 for a secret meeting with representatives of the Iranian government. But his claims do not completely check out. According to investigative reporter Steven Emerson¹, Ben-Menashe was nothing more than a low-level, poorly-paid translator for the Israel Defense Forces. Both *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines confirmed that, according to their investigations, Ben-Menashe fabricated his stories. He was caught lying to Seymour Hersh and Gary Sick, who also used Ben-Menashe as a major source

1. Author of *Terrorism* and a contributor to *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *US News and World Report*.

for his book *October Surprise*. Hersh himself admitted in an interview with Israeli newspaper *Yediot Ahronot* that Ben-Menashe had fabricated the story he had told Sick about George Bush in Paris in 1980, and that "some parts of what [Ben-Menashe] says are illogical."² Hersh then inexplicably told the interviewer that Ben-Menashe was referred to on one page only in the book when, in fact, he was quoted on seventeen pages and virtually all of the book's subsequent media attention was spurred on by claims in those pages.

The Samson Option suggests that US complicity in Israel's development of nuclear weapons was a hypocritical policy maintained by almost every administration from Dwight Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan. "America's policy toward the Israeli arsenal, was not just one of benign neglect; it was a conscious policy of ignoring reality." Hersh notes that President Kennedy repeatedly pressed Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion for assurances that Israel was not developing nuclear weapons. After Kennedy finally won the opportunity to inspect Dimona, the Israelis built a false control room and other fake sites and managed to convince the inspector year after year that Dimona was for academic research only. The Israelis began production in the weapons plant in 1968, Hersh argues, after President Johnson stopped the American inspections and decided that he was no longer interested in pressing Israel on this issue. According to Hersh, the Nixon administration was generally sympathetic to Israeli development of nuclear weapons because Henry Kissinger believed in it. Yet these allegations appear in the book as unsubstantiated postulations.

The title *The Samson Option* comes from the Biblical story of Samson who had been, as Hersh describes, "captured by the Philistines after a bloody fight and put on display, with his eyes torn out, for public entertainment in Dagon's Temple in Gaza" (p.137). In a last-ditch effort to end his torment, Samson asks God for the strength to pull down the pillars of the temple, killing himself and his captors. Hersh's allusion here to Israel's "Masada complex," the inclination to pursue murderous, suicidal policies is old hat. The Samson analogy better describes the world's fascination with putting Israel on display rather than Israel's "never again" military doctrine.

The Samson Option when avoiding sensationalism and burdensome footnotes, which should be published separately or incorporated into the main text, is an informative and entertaining book. It retells the familiar history of Israel's nuclear weapons program with spice and is replete with anecdotes aimed at a public with a seemingly never-ending appetite for revelations into the Israeli defense establishment. Yet, for the discerning reader *The Samson Option* fails to fulfill the standards of accuracy and authoritative insight by which academicians, journalists, and the well informed judge the quality of the information they read.

2. *Yediot Ahronot*, 29 November 1991, American edition, 12-13.

Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Quebec

By Allen Buchanan

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991, 174 pp., including bibliography and index, \$ 14.95 paper.

Reviewed by George Crowder

Few phenomena of international relations are more dramatic and far-reaching in their consequences than secession. Recent events in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union come readily to mind, and much of the political culture of the United States may be attributed to the outcome of two great secession crises. Yet the question, "Is there a right to secession?" has been virtually ignored by political philosophers. Allen Buchanan sets out to remedy this neglect in his stimulating and well-argued study, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Quebec*.

Buchanan is properly aware of a difficulty that confronts him from the outset, namely the apparent diversity of moral perspectives. He places his theoretical and ideological cards on the table, declaring that his presuppositions are pluralistic—he believes that moral considerations cannot be harmonized within a single system, but are irreducibly multiple—and liberal. Yet, the author denies that his assumptions are individualistic in the crude metaphysical sense which posits that only individuals are real. His liberalism is individualistic in a different way. He adopts the normative axiom that "what matters most, morally speaking, are individuals" (p. 8). It follows that Buchanan takes as basic a standard liberal concern for civil and political rights, and for justice.

From that perspective, he sets out on a challenging journey through a maze of pro and con arguments about secession. That the path he takes is tortuous and often fails to arrive at any very definite terminus is no fault of Buchanan's—his discussion is generally well-organized and clear. Complexity is inherent in the subject matter. Whether we should say in a particular instance that there is a right of secession depends on how we weigh the relevant considerations among a complex set. No simple formula is available for all cases.

For some there is scarcely any reason why peoples or cultural groups should not be permitted to secede from existing states if they so choose. Such easy permissiveness is ruled out by the consideration that secession necessarily involves a claim to territory, one of the scarcest and most disputed resources.

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To secede is to set up a new state on territory formerly, and perhaps still, claimed by an existing state. But within that territory there may be and there usually are people who do not wish to be members of the seceding entity. The existing state may also have legitimate interests within the territory that would be threatened by severance. In addition, there may be a question about the extent to which the breakaway group can establish a "viable" state. Buchanan cites with approval Ernest Gellner's observation that there is room on the planet for only a finite number of genuinely "independent or autonomous political units," a number greatly exceeded by the sum of those groups that might aspire to nationhood (p. 49).

Gellner's observation is cited by Buchanan as a powerful argument against one of the most common putative justifications for secession, the notion of self-determination of peoples, or the "normative principle of nationalism" (p. 48). Although the United Nations declares that "all peoples have the right to self-determination," Gellner (and Buchanan) would reply that "not all nationalisms can be satisfied, at any rate not at the same time" (pp. 48, 49). There is, moreover, the conceptual difficulty of determining whether a particular group is to be counted as a "people." The conventional boundary-markers, common language and culture, are often far from clear.

Buchanan suggests that the idea of self-determination is in itself empty of moral force. It is often no more than a place-holder for some other, submerged set of arguments such as the claim, in Quebec for example, that secession is necessary in order to preserve a threatened culture. The "cultural preservation" argument should, he argues, be admitted as conclusive only on a number of conditions: the culture in question must really be threatened; less drastic ways of preserving it must be unavailable; it must meet minimum standards of decency (the Nazi culture had no right to preserve itself); it must not be seeking independence in order to establish an illiberal state (that will remove cultural choice from future generations) and it must have a valid and exclusive entitlement to the territory it claims (p. 153).

Despite all this, the general tendency of Buchanan's discussion is to defend a right to secession, even if this is a limited right. He argues that the best pro-secession cases rest on claims of justice. Secession is most likely to be legitimate when the seceding group has been the victim of some kind of injustice perpetrated by the state it wants to leave. The injustice may take the form of a denial of the civil and political rights of individuals or groups, or the denial of distributive justice. Or, better still for the purpose of establishing a right to secede, the injustice may consist in the past illegitimate annexation of the seceding group's territory. In each of these cases the relevant injustice must be systematic and prolonged, such that secession is the only way the injury can be remedied. Several actual cases appear to satisfy Buchanan's conditions here. The American Revolution is presented as an example of how economic injustice can found a right to secede; the Baltic republics provide the paradigm case of "unjust incorporation" (p. 67).

Through all these arguments and qualifications, Buchanan's discussion is both subtle and forceful, and on the whole persuasive within the limits he sets

himself. Inevitably with a subject of such complexity, the details will raise many questions for political philosophers. Among these considerations are two large issues, both concerned more with the scope and limits of Buchanan's inquiry than with its internal components.

First, it must be noticed that Buchanan starts with the presupposition that it is secession that needs to be justified, not the claims of existing states. A theory of secession that began from the opposite view would surely be less restrictive. And why should we not start from the opposite view? Buchanan's approach seems to place considerable weight on Gellner's argument about the impracticality of satisfying every potential nationalist movement. But although that appears to be a forceful pragmatic point, is it sufficient to defeat the ideal of self-determination as a principle? Even if we recognized a great many groups as possessing a right to secede, it would not follow that every such group would choose to exercise its right. Moreover, Gellner's point is rather vague. What does the limited "room" for new states mean — physical territory or something else? What is it for a state to be "viable?" Is a viable state for example, economically self-sufficient and able to defend itself with its own military resources? Scarcely any contemporary state would be counted as viable on those terms. If, on the other hand, something less is required, then where is the line to be drawn? Perhaps it is not so obvious after all that unity should be the norm rather than fragmentation.

The second large issue concerns the avowedly liberal and "individualist" orientation of Buchanan's views. This is clearly a powerful determining factor throughout, especially evident in his marked preference for arguments from justice, and in his general resistance to arguments based on conceptions of nation or culture. Of course, the author's openness forestalls any complaint that he has smuggled in this bias through the back door. But even those who are inclined (as I am) to share his frank alignment with the liberal point of view might have reservations about the way liberal assumptions are allowed, largely unchallenged,¹ to determine the course of Buchanan's discussion.

One consequence of this is that we are never shown how the very important political arguments from nationalism and from culture might look from the perspective of those who make them, and so we never see the full force they possess for those concerned. An example of this limitation is provided by Buchanan's claim that cultures have value so far as they contribute to the lives of individuals, and that what is most important is that the individual be attached to *some* culture, not any culture in particular (pp. 53, 54). This is no doubt appropriate from the perspective of liberal individualism, but clearly would not satisfy those members of religious and other traditional communities who believe that their own culture possesses eternal value independent of its benefits to any particular individual. Such beliefs are likely to imply a much stronger argument for rights of cultural self-preservation than any allowed by Buchanan.

Buchanan's neglect of what may be called the "hard communitarian" per-

1. Buchanan does criticize certain aspects of the standard liberal outlook, but these criticisms do not affect the points made here.

spective has a further consequence. His declared intention is to provide not merely philosophical analysis but also practical guidance (p. xii). But unless his intention is merely to clarify the normative commitments of liberals in this field (to be sure, no mean task in itself), his standpoint is again significantly limiting. For what makes many secession cases difficult (e.g. Quebec, again) is precisely the confrontation between individualist and communitarian values that Buchanan settles in favor of the former from the outset.² That is no recipe for practical guidance if such guidance implies a basis for agreement among the contending parties. Buchanan's discussion should win the admiration of liberals, but many significant groups beyond the liberal pale will not find it so congenial.

A more complete theory of secession might therefore attempt to exhibit nonliberal arguments alongside liberal ones, and look for possible meeting points between these. Such an attempt may, of course, be doomed to disappointment, revealing no more than another aspect of that fixed point of contemporary political discourse, the apparently unbridgeable gap between the individualist and hard communitarian points of view. That may be so, but it would be interesting to pursue the matter further. Allen Buchanan might have gone further in that direction, but there is no doubt that he has given such a project a more than useful start.

2. Another kind of hard case for which a purely liberal account is of limited help is where a conflict arises between two non-liberal communities.

Three Blind Mice: How the TV Networks Lost Their Way

By Ken Auletta

New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1991, 642 pp., with appendixes, bibliography, endnotes, and index, \$25.00 cloth.

Reviewed by John Ellis

Three *Blind Mice* by Ken Auletta is a fascinating account of the decline of American network television following what some call the “home entertainment” revolution. Auletta recounts, in extraordinary detail, the desperate scramble of corporate executives to “fix” CBS, NBC, and ABC during the latter half of the 1980s. The result is a solid book about an industry apparently destined to make the movie *Network* seem understated.

Television is the most powerful advertising tool known to marketing. It sells goods and services to a mass audience more effectively and efficiently than print, radio, direct mail, or any other communications vehicle. The men who built network television understood from the beginning that advertising was and is the primary function of television. By delivering revenue, it enables everything else.

Television, of course, also entertains and informs its audiences. It covers sports so well that it is often better to watch a game on the tube than to see it in the arena. It provides virtually everyone with a favorite show, be it a soap opera, a sitcom, a PBS special, or “Saturday Night Live.” From the Kennedy assassination to the Gulf war, television news has served as America’s principle source of news and information.

In other words, television is a central part of our national culture; a shared source of entertainment, sports, and news for Americans from New York City, to Juneau, Alaska. Television gives all Americans something in common—a community that for some is as important as their own hometown.

From the early 1950s through the late 1970s, television was dominated by three major networks—CBS, NBC, and ABC. The Big Three virtually “owned” the airwaves during the astonishing post-World War II economic expansion. These were the glory days when unit costs of advertising rate cards always went up, news operations ever expanded, market share was 90 percent on a bad day, and cash flowed from their owned and operated affiliates. It was impossible, really, to make a mistake. The “competition” was allegedly fierce between the Big Three, but in reality, no matter how many mistakes management made, the three major networks made money hand over fist. Home entertainment, aside

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from the occasional cocktail or dinner party or game of charades, meant network television.

Technology changed all that. First came what my grandfather used to call "the clicker"—the remote control device that allowed viewers to change channels and *mute the audio during commercials*, an evil little twist in a business that depended on advertising for its revenue. Then came the video cassette recorder, which allowed consumers to videotape favorite programs for viewing at their convenience. Worse, it allowed them to *fast forward through the advertising*. And worse still, it allowed consumers to rent movies and watch them at home, which meant fewer viewers of network television and *diminished advertising revenue*. Next came video games, all those Nintendo gadgets hooked up to the TV set denying American children the right to see network cartoon shows and children's advertising. The last straw was when cable television arrived for good in the 1980s, penetrating two-thirds of the market, competing for advertising dollars every inch of the way. The "home entertainment" revolution leaves the future of network television very much in doubt. Along with cable programming, there now exists a fourth network, Fox Broadcasting, which has made dramatic inroads among younger viewers. The Big Three network market share has fallen to 60 percent on a good day, and marketers who once spent 60 percent of their budgets on advertising and 40 percent of their budgets on promotion now do the reverse. Advertising no longer provides enough revenue for network television to cover costs and turn a profit.

In short, competition for the "home entertainment" market is now wide open *within* the television business itself, to say nothing of the entertainment, telecommunications, and computer sectors that loom on the horizon, angling for control of what we used to call "the idiot box." Competition for America's home entertainment and information systems will grow only more intense as technology continues its relentless advance.

Ken Auletta's *Three Blind Mice* is an examination of the three major television networks from 1984-1991, seven years of upheaval in the aftershocks of the "home entertainment" revolution. The glory days of network dominance are over. New management has arrived: the Big Three have been acquired by Larry Tisch (CBS), General Electric (NBC), and Capitol Cities (ABC). Walter Cronkite and the Huntley-Brinkley Report are gone, replaced by newscasts of strikingly different temperament, form and content. Production, broadcast rights, labor, and talent costs are draining network profits. The outlook for network television is grim and getting grimmer.

Auletta was granted extraordinary access to the men (TV remains a white male bastion) who run the three major networks and those who carry out their orders. He made the most of it. *Three Blind Mice* is a thorough and fair account of the internal machinations of three networks struggling to find a winning formula in the new world of multiple home entertainment choices. I worked at NBC News for five of the years the author describes and his portrayal of the upheaval there is deadly accurate. "He even got the people right, even the people he *likes*," a friend who used to work at NBC News told me recently.

The book, however, is about nothing more than that. Readers interested in

how television affects our lives, how television news diminishes our politics, how television sports corrupt college and professional athletics, and how children's television pollutes our airwaves should look elsewhere. *Three Blind Mice* is written in a style similar to *Barbarians at the Gate*, the superb recounting of the RJ Reynolds takeover. Auletta introduces the characters, describes their thinking and actions in wonderful detail, then quickly summarizes what it all might mean for network television down the road.

The result is well worth reading—more for its raw material than any deep, special insight. Auletta does not have grand pretensions, as David Halberstam did in his study of “big media,” *The Powers That Be*. *Three Blind Mice* is about a very good reporter who took a front row seat at the network takeovers and their aftermath and wrote it all down.

Auletta gave his subjects every opportunity to describe what strategies they will pursue to survive and eventually flourish in the battle for advertising and other streams of revenue. What is most revealing in *Three Blind Mice* is that with the exception of Capitol Cities (ABC), the men who run networks seem to have no clue as to where they might find the future revenue streams that will enhance the advertising revenue and allow the networks to flourish. Both CBS's Larry Tisch and General Electric's Jack Welsh are obviously frustrated by the network television business, and by their inability to change the network culture. One or both will likely unload their respective networks (at a substantial profit) and move on to other things. The days of CBS and NBC are clearly numbered. What a departure from fifteen short years ago when they “owned” the airwaves. Auletta helps us understand what happened in the interim.

Triumphs and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People

By Ramón Eduardo Ruiz

New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., 512 pp., with index and bibliographical essay, \$29.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Edward Hoyt

The quincentenary of Columbus' discovery of the New World is a milestone from which to examine the history of the Americas and their constituent nations. It is now important for Americans (meaning the inhabitants of the Americas, not just the United States) to contemplate their future, especially since the forces of integration slowly uniting Europe are perhaps at work on this side of the Atlantic as well, albeit at a different pace. A better understanding of the American past is crucial, for it would help present and future Americans to create new institutions for a broader, more integrated continental economy. While the current negotiations for a free-trade zone stretching from Yukon to the Yucatán may not be completed by Columbus Day of 1992, many in the United States, Canada, and Mexico believe it is only a matter of time before a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) becomes a reality. And as political, economic, and demographic forces create a more unified and interdependent North America, citizens of the United States will find their southern neighbor a subject of even greater interest.

Ramón Eduardo Ruiz has produced a book on Mexico that attempts to meet the demand for a comprehensive history of the country from the days of Montezuma to the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Unfortunately, he and his publishers have delivered a draft, not a finished product. As such, the book may prove useful to the newcomer looking for a sweeping introduction to the history of Mexico, but it will not satisfy specialists given its lack of academic rigor and critical apparatus. In addition, the simplicity of the book does not facilitate readability, for Ruiz's style may also disappoint many readers.

From the outset, Ruiz makes sure the reader understands that his treatment of Mexican history reflects his ideological tendencies (p.11). However, Ruiz often fails to deliver convincing explanations for some of the events he describes. Often this is because he passes over issues too rapidly, which may be inevitable in a book of this scope. Less forgivably, this also happens because he fails to situate events in their proper international context. His treatment of the

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recent debt crisis is particularly weak as a result. Most importantly, however, Ruiz's book neglects topical questions that will be asked as the world marks the half millenium since Columbus' voyage, and witnesses the end of the cold war.

Ruiz raises more interesting questions than he solves regarding Mexico's view of the quincentenary of Columbus' voyage. The conquistador Hernán Cortés, along with 600 Spaniards and an army of 80,000 Indians, laid seige and eventually sacked the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán, a city of many millions, less than thirty years after the discovery of the New World (p. 50-53). Ruiz presents a balanced portrait of the Aztecs and the other indigenous civilizations that dominated Mesoamerica until 1521, portraying their grandeur and their intellectual and artistic achievements as well as their savagery. He is less balanced in his treatment of the Spaniards, their motives and aspirations, and the racist "pigmentocracy" they installed to administer their colonial holdings (p. 119). Yet, by the end of the story, Ruiz does not give the indigenous people of Mexico more than a passing reference. Beyond noting the poverty, isolation, and ignorance of the native peoples in his final chapter, this 500-year narrative lacks closure or any reflection on the meaning of Columbus' arrival for present-day Mexicans of all races (p.468).

What is interesting is that Mexico, like many other Latin American nations, has perhaps finally come to terms with Spain after almost two centuries of vilifying its former colonial master. As Mexico begins to recover from its "lost decade," it has figured prominently in the reversal of anti-Spanish sentiment born of nationalist and revolutionary fervor. The first Ibero-American summit in history drew every Latin American leader to Guadalajara, Mexico, in July, 1991; another summit is scheduled for July, 1992, in Madrid. Spanish officials say Mexico played a pivotal role in the relatively rapid Latin American reconciliation with Spain.¹

The reasons for Mexico's reconciliation may have something to do with the manifest failures of the various "revolutionary" governments, which have, as Ruiz shows, often wound up reversing the efforts of their predecessors. Further, Mexico's debt crisis of the 1970s and the painful period of adjustment that followed was not an isolated event in Mexican history, though it was arguably one of the most damaging. But as Mexico's leaders propel their country into the world marketplace, and embrace liberal economic policies more rigorously than any have done since the Great Rebellion of 1910, the country looks to its European cousin with renewed interest for markets and ties to the European Community. Simultaneously, Spaniards—who are enjoying an economic renaissance of their own—look to Mexico for markets and investment opportunities.

Unfortunately, the glimmerings of a "Mexican miracle" were not yet bright enough to attract the attention of the author as he finished the book. Perhaps for this reason, he does not take time to assess the outcome of Mexico's long struggle for a coherent economic strategy. In his view, the Salinas administra-

1. See Alan Riding, "500 Years Later, Latin America Can Forgive Spain," *The New York Times*, 13 February 1992, A4; and "In Defence of Columbus," *Economist*, 21 December 1991, 73-77.

tion has returned Mexico to the *laissez-faire* economic and trade policies that cemented Mexico's economic dependence on the United States and Europe in the late 19th century during the long period of stable economic growth under the autocratic Porfirio Díaz. As such, the recent developments represent a step backwards from the populist, reformist, and economically interventionist policies of the most revolutionary Mexican administration since 1917, that of Lázaro Cárdenas (1935-1940). Ruiz repeatedly charges that liberal economic policies from Díaz's time onward have made Mexico an economic province of the United States; he quotes a contemporary critic of the NAFTA saying that it is tantamount to a "deal to give away the store" (p.466). The unfettered capitalism of the Porfiriato, Ruiz contends, resulted in a concentration of landholding, monopoly market structures, excessive foreign ownership of Mexican industry and infrastructure, and increasing US economic and political domination (p.276-280).

With the exception of the Cárdenas era, Ruiz contends, Mexican administrations have been dominated by the interests of foreign and domestic capital, with only hollow allegiance to the reformist ideals of the Constitution of 1917, which pledged land reform, labor rights, and accessible public education, among other things (pp. 335-337). Mexican politics before and after the Constitution, it seems, have been marked by the struggle between the forces of privilege, both land and capital, and the disenfranchised masses. By and large, the legacy of the Great Rebellion of 1910 against the excesses of the Porfiriato is that of a partial revolution. To quote one historian of the time, the rebels "wanted revolution, but not too much" (p. 338).

Ruiz's critique of Mexican capitalism is essentially that of the *dependencia* school, although he makes no reference to it as such. While there is much to be said for the *dependencia* insight, Ruiz disregards the shortcomings of its application to the Mexican case, especially in light of the success of the "four little dragons" in East Asia. While capital flight played a major role in the economic crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, one cannot overlook the long-term problems associated with a huge wasteful public sector, heavy tariff protection for domestic industry, and prolonged fiscal imbalance—legacies of Mexico's more autonomous, protectionist development programs.

Ruiz describes the symptoms of Mexico's principal economic problem, but never really names it: inconsistency and incoherence. The insistence of the middle and upper classes on low rates of taxation alongside tariff protection and subsidized credit was at least partially responsible for the gradual exhaustion of Mexico's economic growth in the 1970s; the country's problem seems to be as much one of contradictory policy hemmed in by conflicting political demands as it is one of economic organization.² The Salinas government seems finally to be curbing the excesses of corruption, patronage, and fiscal mismanagement. While the price has certainly been high for Mexico's long-suffering poor, the lesson has not been lost on the middle and upper classes. Part of the

2. See John Sheahan, *Patterns of Economic Development in Latin America*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 296-308.

Salinas strategy in pursuing radical economic reform and free trade with Mexico's northern neighbors is to "tell Mexico's once inefficient industries and the outside world that there really is no going back."³

In the end, it is clear that Ruiz is no economist. Since Mexico's economic woes have dominated the country's attention for the last ten years, this failing certainly weakens the last chapter of the book. Two statements of questionable validity are enough to raise some doubts about Ruiz's economic analysis. First, he asserts that the end of the war in Vietnam, and not the 1973 oil price shock, was responsible for the recession in the United States that helped dampen growth in Mexico in the mid-1970s. Second, he asserts that an oil glut in the early 1980s and collapsing oil prices were responsible for a global recession that contributed to Mexico's debt crisis. In the first instance, it seems that the oil shock deserves at least equal mention with the end of the war in Southeast Asia as a cause for the US recession. In the second, Ruiz fails to put Mexico's crisis into the context of the whole cycle of oil price rises in 1973 and 1979, leading to petrodollar recycling by money-center banks and ill-considered borrowing by cash-strapped developing nations. These practices, in turn, boomeranged with devastating consequences when commodity prices declined and interest rates soared as the industrial world confronted a combination of economic stagnation and high inflation.

Still, *Triumph and Tragedy* does present other episodes in Mexican history with clarity and probing insights. One example is Ruiz's treatment of the war with the United States which ended with Mexico ceding much of what is now the US Southwest. He notes that the United States was divided politically over the war, which was clearly the result of provocation by President Polk. Abraham Lincoln decried the slaughter, saying that "the blood of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to Heaven against [Polk]" (p.214). Whatever its deficiencies in terms of theoretical focus or convincing economic argument, *Triumph and Tragedy* paints Mexican history with a broad brush, giving the reader much material, however unformed, with which to work. However, the reader will find that Ruiz's sometimes annoying, often clichéd style—ridden with stock phrases such as "all was not sweetness and light" (p.123)—diminishes the power and scope of his narrative.

3. "Free Market Mexico," *Economist*, 14 December 1991, 20.

