SYMBOLISM AND SUBSTANCE:  
HENRY KISSINGER AND THE YEAR OF  
EUROPE

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One of the most able and controversial statesmen of the century, Henry Kissinger was nonetheless unable to achieve Atlantic unity during his years as Secretary of State. His failures, though, stem not from a lack of concern towards Europe but more from a lack of understanding of how best to approach and secure NATO unity. In this article D. Brent Hardt explores Kissinger's views on alliance unity as exemplified in his Year of Europe with reference to his scholarly works. He reveals how Kissinger's work on nineteenth century European unity affected his views of twentieth-century Atlantic relations. Mr. Hardt discusses Kissinger's plan for unifying Europe and America as part of a deeply personal vision, one which ultimately failed because no other Western leader shared that vision. After examining Kissinger's grand design for alliance unity from both a European and an American perspective, Mr. Hardt points out the difficulty in translating a symbolic vision of unity into a substantive program for achieving that unity. The author concludes by assessing the prospects of a symbolic unity between the U.S. and Europe outlined by Kissinger both now and in the future.

I. SYMBOLISM AND THE PROBLEM OF ALLIANCE UNITY

On April 23, 1973, Henry Kissinger stepped up to the podium at the Associated Press annual luncheon and delivered a speech that committed the Nixon Administration to making 1973 the "Year of Europe." Having recently concluded the peace treaty with Vietnam, negotiated the SALT agreements with the Soviet Union, and initiated relations with the People's Republic of China, the Nixon Administration could claim considerable success in its dealings with adversaries. But this success had been achieved in part by neglecting relations with America's allies. Kissinger's speech signaled a shift in the center of gravity of American foreign policy toward alliance relationships.

After four years of frenetic diplomatic activity, Europe had finally reached the top of Kissinger's agenda. According to a Newsweek article

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on Kissinger, 1973 was "the season to consolidate gains made, to rekindle warm relations with old friends and to build into the apparatus of diplomacy the structure that will generate the preservation of the Nixon detente." The April 23 speech was to be the first step toward the realization of these goals.

In his speech, Kissinger called for meetings at the "highest level" to address all the political, military, and economic problems confronting the Atlantic Alliance. These meetings were to give rise to a "New Atlantic Charter" that would set long-term Alliance goals. This new document was to be signed by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at a grandiose summit meeting attended by President Nixon in the fall of 1973. According to Kissinger, the Charter would create "a new relationship" among the Atlantic nations and lay the foundation for a "new era of creativity in the West."

Kissinger's positive and creative emphasis is the most striking aspect of his Year of Europe speech. His simple call to action struck a long silent chord in the increasingly technical Atlantic dialogue:

Today the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspiration from its goals rather than its fears. The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh *act of creation*, equal to that undertaken by the post-war generation of leaders in Europe and America.

In essence, Kissinger posed a fundamental challenge to the nations of Europe: could a unity forged by a common post-war perception of the Soviet threat draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations?

The problem of Atlantic unity grew out of the origins and uneven nature of the NATO Alliance. Created when Europe was devastated by war and totally dependent on the United States for its security and economic well-being, the Alliance had functioned smoothly under American domination. But after fifteen years of U.S. tutelage, previously latent tensions began to surface: as Europe regained its economic vitality and initiated efforts toward economic integration, Americans began to fear the effect of an economically united Europe on the U.S. economy; as the United States and the Soviet Union took their first halting steps toward arms control in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, they provoked

3. Ibid., p. 103. (author's emphasis)
4. Ibid.
European fears of a Superpower condominium—a "super-Yalta" in the words of Charles de Gaulle; also, as Europe disengaged from its global role through decolonization, the Alliance was strained by diverging horizons—Europe increasingly looked inward while the United States assumed a global role. By the late sixties, these structural tensions had severely weakened the once-harmonious Alliance.

At the start of the first Nixon Administration, European leaders shared a dissatisfaction with the continued American dominance of the Atlantic dialogue. To redress this imbalance, they believed it was necessary to move Europe toward Federation. Jean Rey, President of the European Community in 1968, defined the European dilemma:

Europe ought to be united, but remains divided... Europe ought to be strong, but it still has no economic or monetary policy for this Continent... Europe has not yet attained its proper status, and it is still living too much in the settings and habits of yesterday when today, more than ever before, Community solutions ought to take precedence.5

During Nixon's first term, the European nations worked to resolve this dilemma while the United States worked to end the Vietnam War and to come to terms with the Soviet Union and China. But as each side pursued its own interests, the NATO nations lost their shared sense of direction.

It was this drift that Kissinger faced in 1973 as he turned his focus to Atlantic relations. Unresolved structural tensions in the Alliance expressed themselves as disagreements over trade and monetary policies, defense burden sharing, and Ostpolitik. These issues were made all the more intractable by an altered psychological climate in the West characterized by the rise of anti-Americanism growing out of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, Kissinger was undaunted; he had developed an American sense of optimism and believed that any problem could be solved by applying enough time and energy to it. After building an intricate structure of peace with America's adversaries, Kissinger believed he faced a much easier task in strengthening the NATO Alliance. Merely by "reinvigorating shared ideals and common purposes with our friends" Kissinger hoped to gain "the same sense of historical achievement" that he had gained in arduous negotiations with adversaries.6

Kissinger's optimism in the face of serious substantive differences among the Allies reflects his belief that these differences arose because of

6. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 103.
a lack of underlying political direction. To Kissinger, disagreements over issues were not the cause of Alliance disarray; rather they were the inevitable result of inattention to loftier symbolic themes that would lend the Alliance the appearance of unity.

Kissinger's call for a new Atlantic Charter seemed overly simplistic to many contemporary observers, leading them to believe that he was not really serious in seeking to strengthen the Alliance. But Kissinger struck a simple chord because he sought a symbolic unity through a symbolic diplomacy. "The major weakness of U.S. diplomacy," Kissinger once wrote, "has been the insufficient attention given to the symbolic aspect of foreign policy." A symbol is a tangible sign of something that is intangible. Unity in an alliance is an intangible concept; to give it meaning Kissinger needed a symbol. The new Atlantic Charter was to be that symbol.

To Kissinger, unity was not something that occurred naturally as a result of substantive agreements. It was not an end result but a means of solving concrete problems. In Kissinger's mind, unity came first, substance second. "The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity," he warned in his speech, "we can no longer afford to pursue national or regional self-interest without a unifying framework." In an age of growing pluralism, Kissinger believed that symbolic diplomacy provided the key to maintaining Alliance unity.

This notion of unity through symbolism had deep theoretical roots in Kissinger's academic writings. The continuity between his scholarly thought and statesman's actions emerges clearly in regard to Europe. From the very beginning of his academic career, Kissinger was highly conscious of NATO's weaknesses and interested in devising means to overcome them. In examining the relationship between power and diplomacy, Kissinger was led to ask how a military alliance could be made into a more effective political force. "An alliance is effective," he observed, "only to the extent that it reflects a common purpose . . . the mere assembling of overwhelming power is meaningless if it cannot be brought to bear on the issues actually in dispute." In 1957 he proposed to bring about this common purpose by "an act of leadership" but failed to define what policies or acts constitute acts of leadership.

Kissinger had also recognized the role of symbolic diplomacy early in

8. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 105.
10. Ibid., p. 223.
his academic career. In a 1956 article he wrote that “Political proposals must be framed with a maximum of clarity and even simplicity, for their major utility is their symbolic content.”11 By 1957, the two threads that would form the Year of Europe — the need for unity and the role of symbolism — had emerged in Kissinger’s thinking, but they had not yet been woven together.

In 1961 writing in the Necessity for Choice, Kissinger continued to emphasize the need for unity. “Whatever aspect of the Atlantic Alliance is considered, the goal of Western policy must be to develop greater cohesion and a new sense of purpose,” he wrote.12 But now he began to integrate the two themes. “The courage, dynamism and convictions of the North Atlantic group of nations,” he wrote, “can become a symbol to the entire world of the vitality of an association of free peoples.”13 The persistent haggling over “details,” or substantive issues, indicated to Kissinger the inability of the Alliance to agree upon a program for the future. “Unless the North Atlantic group of nations develops a clearer purpose,” he remarked with characteristic pessimism, “it will be doomed.”14

Kissinger’s emphasis on Alliance unity as a symbol of strength reveals the strands of thought leading to the Year of Europe — a symbolic effort to unite North Atlantic perceptions. His 1961 proposal to address the problem of Alliance unity — “a conference of North Atlantic heads of state or foreign ministers” — was essentially the same scheme that he would present in 1973 as the Year of Europe.15 His agenda for this conference also resembled his later agenda: a recasting of NATO strategy and a definition of political and economic goals for a ten-year period.16

In The Troubled Partnership, written in 1965, Kissinger further developed his study of the role of symbolism in creating Atlantic unity. Because of the symbolic importance of American actions, Kissinger emphasized that the United States needed to act with unusual tact and steadiness:

Many of our Allies have been guilty of unilateral actions far more flagrant than ours. But when we act unilaterally, disarray in the Alliance is almost inevitable. Sudden, drastic, and above all, unilateral changes in United States strategic doc-

13. Ibid., p. 100. (author’s emphasis)
14. Ibid., p. 101. (author’s emphasis)
15. Ibid., pp. 166-67.
trine — whatever their merit — create a sense of impotence and are resisted as much for symbolic as for substantive reasons.\textsuperscript{17}

Kissinger singled out two cases where neglecting the symbolic aspect of foreign policy could be especially damaging to Alliance unity: diplomatic and military actions without adequate consultations and bilateral U.S.-Soviet dealings from which the Allies were excluded. Both he believed would lead to European pressures for autonomy. Ironically, after the military alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the U.S.-Soviet SALT agreements, these type of actions became a Kissinger trademark for which he was severely criticized in Europe. Had he remembered his own warnings, he could have prevented much of the discord that he eventually generated. The Europeans, Kissinger had recognized as a scholar, opposed such practices not "because they disagree with our view but because they are afraid of creating a precedent for unilateral change in other policies.\textsuperscript{18} By 1965, issues of substance had been subordinated to appearances in Kissinger's view of Atlantic relations.

Both of Kissinger's scholarly works devoted entirely to Europe, \textit{A World Restored} and \textit{The Troubled Partnership}, focus on the dilemmas confronting an alliance after the threat that had inspired its formation and generated its unity begins to recede. In 1973, Kissinger the statesman encountered the same dilemmas he had studied as an academic. In assessing the attempts of Castlereagh and Metternich to maintain the Concert of Europe from 1815 to 1822, Kissinger arrived at a pessimistic conclusion about the prospects of maintaining unity in the face of change. In facing new problems and different threats, he wrote, "the old unanimity could hardly be recaptured."\textsuperscript{19} As a statesman, however, Kissinger would strive to recapture the lost unanimity of the Atlantic Alliance. He believed that a symbolic diplomacy could transform the Alliance from a purely defensive conception into a creative force with positive goals:

A whole generation had grown up who knew nothing of the perils of the 1940's that had produced the Alliance . . . In America their formative experience was the nasty debate of the 1960's over Vietnam. In Europe it was the boredom of the welfare state. It had been a long time since the idealism and self-confidence of the Western tradition had found expression in a rededication to major positive tasks.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
People on both sides of the Atlantic needed to know what role the Alliance played in their lives. As Kissinger concluded in his memoirs, “the vitality of democracy in the modern period depends in large part on public confidence that the democratic world is master of its own future.” The Alliance had to prove to a skeptical public that it still controlled the fate of the West and that it had not become an antiquated edifice of a previous era. As economic difficulties and political differences eroded the morale and optimism of the Alliance, Kissinger noted that “an emphatic demonstration of an effective collective response seemed to me of profound political and moral importance.” In effect, Kissinger perceived the Year of Europe as a means to demonstrate — to symbolize — Alliance unity.

II. SUBSTANTIVE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE YEAR OF EUROPE

In formulating U.S. policy toward Europe, Kissinger wanted to address both concrete and intangible issues. Both needed to be solved, but not by the same means: intangible problems required symbolic diplomacy and concrete problems required detailed, substantive negotiations. Because of his longstanding aversion to bureaucracies, Kissinger shied away from the institutionalized channels of transatlantic cooperation like the GATT, OECD, or NATO high command. By avoiding them, Kissinger forfeited all hope of solving substantive problems. Nevertheless, he continued to believe that he could address both types of issues through his symbolic Year of Europe. Kissinger’s failure to resolve the tension between concrete and symbolic issues created an ambiguity in his approach that eventually doomed the Year of Europe.

The substantive issues confronting the Alliance were perplexing. Because the United States no longer dominated the world as it once had, a reduction of America’s global commitments was necessary in the 1970s. This reduction of commitments, embodied in the Nixon Doctrine, had significant ramifications for U.S.-European relations. In a veiled reference to NATO, Kissinger wrote in Nixon’s 1970 State of the World message, “We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments rather than the other way around.” The objective of

21. Ibid., p. 934.
22. Ibid.
the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy was "in the first instance . . . to support our interests over the long run." The rejection of unqualified American support for Europe marked a major turning point in Atlantic relations. Previously the American commitment to Europe had been taken for granted; because the interests of the Alliance partners were assumed to be identical, acting in the European interest would ultimately be in the American interest. But the Vietnam War, strategic parity between the superpowers, and the rise of Europe as an economic competitor inescapably created a divergence of interests.

If the United States and the nations of Europe both pursued their self-interest, conflicts of interest would inevitably arise over economic, strategic, and military issues.

In the economic realm, Britain's entry into the Common Market raised the prospect of an enlarged trading bloc which could effectively limit American exports at a time of balance of payments deficits. Reports from the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture departments portrayed the enlarged Common Market as an economic monster that would dominate world trade. As European economic integration came to be pursued for its own sake, without any corresponding political unity, the United States faced the prospect of having to pay the economic costs of unity without reaping any corresponding political gains.

Trade differences in the early 1970's were accentuated by the perplexing problems of the international monetary system. Confidence in the dollar as the world's reserve currency eroded as high inflation rates and rising balance of payments deficits caused a wave of dollar selling. To counter overvaluation and its disastrous effects on American exports, Nixon dramatically suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, leading to a long-overdue adjustment of exchange rates. Europeans viewed Nixon's unilateralism as a declaration of economic warfare. "The other industrial nations resented being pressured into adaptations of their economic policies even though they knew very well that without pressure they would almost surely not have acted at all." Although multilateral efforts at reform of the system began after initial shock, the unilateral American manner of dealing with Europe in monetary relations ushered in an era of prolonged economic confrontation that had an unsettling effect on the Alliance as a whole.

In the realm of defense, the transatlantic debate centered on two
questions: the validity of the Flexible Response doctrine and the allocation of the defense burden, including the level of American forces to be stationed in Europe.

Flexible Response, which called for an enhanced NATO conventional posture, symbolized a growing reluctance by the United States to use its nuclear forces in Europe's defense. But the NATO conventional forces actually stationed in Western Europe were, in Kissinger's words, "too large to be a trip wire, too small to resist an all-out Soviet onslaught, the allied military establishment was an accidental array of forces in search of a mission."²⁶ European nations had little incentive to increase their conventional forces because they feared the destruction a conventional land war would bring to Europe and because no nation, including the United States, was willing to make the requisite economic sacrifices to improve the conventional effort. "We faced a nearly insoluble dilemma," Kissinger wrote. With no adequate conventional forces, strategic forces that were too risky, and a tactical nuclear war strategy full of uncertainties "we had in effect abdicated from the serious defense of Europe."²⁷ In May 1971, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield sought to force the European allies to take up a larger share of the defense burden by legislating a reduction in U.S. troop commitments. The proposal was ultimately defeated in the Senate, but to Kissinger, the very fact that such a proposal could gather support in Congress revealed a deep malaise in the Alliance.

The diplomatic realm gave rise to its own breed of Alliance tensions and uncertainties. After initially pressing Nixon and Kissinger to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets to ease Cold War tensions, European leaders recoiled in fear of a U.S.-Soviet condominium once the desired relaxation had occurred. Nixon and Kissinger in turn opposed separate approaches to the Soviets which would allow them to play Europe off against the United States. Willy Brandt claimed that Kissinger "would rather have taken personal charge of the delicate complex of East-West problems in its entirety."²⁸ American skepticism about Ostpolitik and European ambivalence over American intentions in U.S.-Soviet relations offered Kissinger further proof of the need for a new articulation of common principles.

By any standard, these issues created powerful incentives to pursue an initiative in European affairs. While the perception of a "crisis" in Atlantic relations was perhaps a bit overdrawn, it was not confined to

²⁶. Ibid., p. 83.
²⁷. Ibid., p. 391.
Kissinger alone. The sheer weight of unresolved issues hovered over the Alliance like the proverbial sword of Damocles. Any American statesman appraising the major issues in American foreign policy in 1973 would have been remiss not to focus his energies on Europe.

III. Symbolic Motivations for the Year of Europe

Concrete diplomatic realities provided forceful logic for the Year of Europe initiative, but intangibles of diplomacy were preeminent in Kissinger's view. "A purely pragmatic approach," he believed, "could not even solve the technical issues. Above all it would fail to inspire the generation that had grown up since the last great acts of creativity." The larger idealistic and symbolic motives behind the Year of Europe provide the keys to understanding its origins.

Kissinger's pessimistic historical perspective led him to liken the Atlantic nations to the Greek City-states; he prophesied a "Greek fate" for the Allies if they strove simply to manage the present and hope for the best. "The future must be shaped or it will impose itself as catastrophe," he argued. "That remains the key test of democratic statesmanship." Kissinger sought nothing less with his Year of Europe than to manage the future. He once wrote that statesmen are judged not only by their actions, but also by the tasks they set for themselves; he clearly hoped to be judged a great statesman, for his task was monumental. Statesmen required "the strength to contemplate chaos, there to find materiel for fresh creation." Kissinger perceived chaos in the Alliance in 1973 and sought to impose order. This personal vision was a driving force behind the Year of Europe.

The Year of Europe also reflected Kissinger's personal ambition. The Vietnam peace agreement signed in January 1973 was the third in a series of remarkable diplomatic achievements. The opening to China, the SALT treaty, and the end of the Vietnam War occurred in rapid succession, creating a powerful momentum in American foreign policy which Kissinger rode to new heights of personal popularity. His recent successes gave him a heady sense of accomplishment, emboldening him to foray into other areas. Indeed, his personal popularity had become so much a part of his effectiveness, that he began to search for a new initiative to maintain his image as a trouble-shooter and thereby, his popularity and effectiveness.

Nixon's memoirs support this analysis of Kissinger's motives and also

30. Ibid., p. 149; 746.
reveal that the Year of Europe was Kissinger's personal initiative. Nixon, who says almost nothing about Europe in his memoirs, essentially viewed Europe as a pacifier for Kissinger. In a February 3, 1973 diary entry Nixon wrote:

... I thought that Henry was having a letdown now because he realized that he had participated in the three great events of the postwar era — the Soviet, the China, the Vietnam — and that everything else would pale by significance. ... Henry needs to have another great goal. Haig feels strongly that it should be Europe. Henry I noticed had picked up this theme in my last talk with him.32

To maintain his momentum, Kissinger needed a great goal. But in focusing on Europe, Kissinger created a dilemma: SALT, China, and Vietnam had all been great events, but European relations were not an event but an ongoing challenge. Kissinger's problem was how to take an admittedly mundane relationship and make of it a great event; his solution was to try to turn the Year of Europe into an updated version of the Marshall Plan.

Kissinger recognized that the NATO Alliance had been created for a specific purpose — to counter the postwar Soviet threat to Europe. This purpose had defined the Alliance and given it a clear identity. But as this original purpose faded and a multitude of smaller, less-precise functions emerged, Kissinger believed that the Alliance had lost its sense of mission. To the generation that had never experienced the fears of the immediate post-war period, this massive military organization, far from appearing as the preserver of peace, often appeared as an obstacle to peaceful coexistence. The Year of Europe was intended to define the amorphous Alliance and give it a precise positive identity. To retain its vitality, Kissinger believed that NATO had to prove that it could do more than contain Communism.

Kissinger wanted to be 'present at the creation' of a new era in Atlantic relations. In modeling the Year of Europe after the Marshall Plan, however, he idealized the Plan and gave it a moral, psychological, and symbolic significance that it did not have in 1947. The Marshall Plan was originally conceived to deal with the immediate substantive problems of post-war reconstruction. It was not so much a vision of the future as a plan for the present.

Kissinger's nostalgia for the Marshall Plan and its Old Guard leaders

Acheson, McCloy, Monnet, and David Bruce reveals a powerful psychological motive behind the Year of Europe. Kissinger derived legitimacy from his association with the Old Guard. All of these leaders could claim major European accomplishments in their long and distinguished careers. Kissinger's recent achievements were significant, but in his own mind, he could never be considered a consummate statesman until he could point to a major European accomplishment. As one observer noted, Kissinger "wanted most of all — like the Great Generation of the Marshall Plan years — to leave a 'legacy,' not a 'tour de force'." In seeking this legacy, Kissinger imitated his predecessors too self-consciously.

1973 was not 1947; if Kissinger wanted to build a new order, it would primarily have to be a new ordering of American foreign policy because Europe had its own imperatives. The European imperative for unity, intensified by the enlargement of the European Community (EC) from six to nine, caused tensions with the United States. Kissinger hoped to diminish these tensions and prevent Europe from defining its identity in opposition to the United States through his symbolic effort to achieve Atlantic unity.

Kissinger's desire to engage in constructive diplomacy after the defensive diplomacy of Vietnam helps explain the timing of the Year of Europe. His frustration with Vietnam and his relief upon being delivered from its diplomatic tribulations, led him to seek a good dose of allied diplomacy. "It was oddly reassuring, even soothing," Kissinger wrote, "to be asked about a future no longer dominated by the nightmare of Indochina, to be invited in the midst of bitter divisions to speculate about a world of constructive ends."

As with all aspects of Nixon's second term, Watergate played an influential role in the Year of Europe. It was popular at the time to claim that the Year of Europe was simply a political ploy designed to divert attention from Nixon's internal weaknesses. Watergate, however, provided neither the origin nor the timing of the initiative, but did affect its lifespan. "Watergate made us more persistent than prudent," Kissinger wrote. "Nixon knew that the very critics who charged him with putting forward the Year of Europe as a diversion would allege that its failure was due to his domestic difficulties."

35. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 130.
36. Ibid., p. 162.
European reactions to the American initiative, the perverse logic of Watergate insisted that Kissinger persevere.

Having delivered his April 23 speech, Kissinger was launched down a path from which he could not depart. Having laid bare his views on Europe as a scholar, he now faced the momentous challenge of converting ideas into foreign policy. Kissinger's task was to take his terms "Atlantic unity," "Atlantic community" and "act of creativity" and give them concrete meaning.

IV. YEAR OF EUROPE: DIPLOMATIC REALITIES

The European reaction to Kissinger's Year of Europe speech was hardly the enthusiastic and grateful response he had hoped to evoke. Kissinger's original plan called for three to four months of high level consultations to draft the new Atlantic Charter, immediately followed by a grand summit attended by Nixon and all the European heads of state. It was to be a splendid triumph of symbolic diplomacy.

Unfortunately, nothing of the sort occurred. In fact, the Year of Europe became a diplomatic embarrassment to the United States; far from being a symbolic victory, it was a painful symbolic defeat. The course of events surrounding the effort to develop a common declaration of principles was a convoluted path which ultimately led nowhere. The diplomatic history of this initiative — the technical and procedural obstacles to agreement — can only be grasped in the context of a fundamental misunderstanding: the European allies never understood what Kissinger intended with the Year of Europe and the new Atlantic Charter. Responsibility for this misunderstanding rests entirely with Kissinger for he failed to convey to the Allies that what he sought was a symbolic statement of unity, not a comprehensive agreement on all outstanding problems.

In his speech, Kissinger had been exceedingly vague in discussing the new Charter, describing it only as a blueprint setting goals for the future "that builds on the past without becoming its prisoner, deals with the problems our success has created, and creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship . . . . This is what we mean by the Year of Europe."

From such a fuzzy definition the Year of Europe was interpreted as everything from "an opportunity Europe cannot afford to ignore" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) to "a diplomatic offensive which in appearance only is an offensive de charme" (La Nation). European leaders tended to be privately enthusiastic, publicly guarded, or simply confused.

37. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 104.
European uncertainty stemmed from the vagueness of the call for a Charter, which seemed to imply a somewhat perfunctory symbolic effort, and the specific, concrete nature of the sections of the speech that followed. Nixon's annual 'State of the World' message that came out a week after Kissinger's speech reinforced the impression that Kissinger wanted a concrete declaration indicating agreement on a broad range of complex problems. The Message declared, "The issues we face are not abstract, our aim is to examine concrete problems that impinge on the specific interests of the United States and to agree on a comprehensive way to resolve the issues." Highly complex and technical issues such as arms control, were hardly consistent with Kissinger's call for a document symbolizing a new era of transatlantic relations; as he had recognized earlier, symbolic documents must be framed with a maximum of clarity and simplicity.

Kissinger's emphasis on the comprehensive nature of his declaration aroused further anxieties in Europe. The French saw it as an attempt to blackmail Europe by taking advantage of American preponderence in defense to gain concessions in monetary and trade areas. Europeans preferred to separate the issues so that when they discussed matters of trade and finance, they could speak as relative equals. Additionally, the Europeans believed that if this agreement was to be both comprehensive and concrete, it would surely require more than three or four months to work out all the multifarious issues.

The European "ambivalence" to which Kissinger frequently alluded seems upon closer scrutiny to be an outgrowth of Kissinger's own ambivalence over the Year of Europe — at times he appeared to want symbolic agreement and at others he insisted on concrete agreement. Each approach required a vastly different form of diplomacy: a summit meeting to initial an agreement could serve symbolic ends, while concrete agreements would necessitate working through such institutions as the GATT, NATO, and IMF over a lengthy period of time. Initially, Kissinger's goal had been purely symbolic, but he found it difficult to express a symbolic goal as the aim of foreign policy and even more difficult to persevere in seeking it because concrete issues inevitably intruded. Issues must be addressed, positions must be taken. But as soon as Kissinger began to debate economic and strategic issues, the aura of philosophical unity he had hoped to create was lost.

That Kissinger actually sought symbolic unity is borne out by his references to the Declaration that finally emerged in mid-1974: "The

words of the Declaration were substantially what we had sought for a new Atlantic Charter. But an affirmation of unity requiring no concrete action that nevertheless takes fourteen months to negotiate is hardly a sign of moral rededication." Because Europe never knew that Kissinger wanted not concrete but symbolic actions, the Charter took over a year to work out; had his aims been clear at the outset, his original plan would have been more likely to succeed.

The Declaration of Principles signed in Ottawa on June 26, 1974 was not a charter of precise obligations. Essentially, the signatories reaffirmed their common destiny, their dedication to NATO, and their conviction that their common defense was indivisible. They pledged to make the contributions necessary to maintain that defense and promised to work to remove sources of economic conflict. The only significant points of interest were a reference to elemental problems of security and an avoidance of pressing economic issues. The declaration of principles, in sum, lacked the aura of inspiration and idealism that Kissinger had hoped to create. This failing was less a product of the actual content of the declaration than of the manner in which it was achieved. "What a year later became the Declaration of Atlantic Relations," Kissinger argued, "could have been drafted within three months of the offer. . . . Instead, our allies chose a procedure that was wounding, unworkable, and disruptive." Kissinger, like Metternich, understood the value of nuance: that the mode of accomplishment was as important as the fact of accomplishment, and sometimes even more so. In this case, the mode of reaching the Atlantic Declaration revealed more about the state of Atlantic relations than the Declaration itself.

The complex diplomatic course of events surrounding the Year of Europe becomes clearer in light of the misunderstanding over symbolic and concrete goals. The United States and Europe talked past each other instead of to each other. While Europe geared itself up for major confrontations over concrete issues and struggled to find the appropriate voice for conducting a transatlantic dialogue, Kissinger hoped for a quick diplomatic victory, and looked on incredulously as Europe procrastinated and equivocated.

The questions Europe faced in responding to Kissinger's initiative, however, were considerable. In what forum would the discussions with the United States take place? If they occurred within NATO they would arouse French opposition because the French did not want NATO to

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41. Ibid., p. 734.
gain political prestige — preferring to limit it to a military role. If discussions occurred under European Community auspices, they would bring American influence into the European forum France sought to dominate. Kissinger's proposal essentially called for a multilateral meeting where all members could both draw up larger principles and keep an eye on the interconnections between the specific negotiations. But precisely because it would be a large assembly, and no single voice would speak for Europe, the powerful voice of the United States would dominate the discussions. Bilateral discussions on the other hand would be impossible: the sheer number of discussions required would create confusion and misunderstanding. Finally, the accommodation of a wide variety of European viewpoints, particularly the acute sensitivities of the French would require careful treatment. These dilemmas, compounded by the initial misunderstanding, played themselves out in diplomacy surrounding the Year of Europe.

When Kissinger announced the Year of Europe initiative in May 1973, the major European partners found excuses to postpone a response: Germany claimed it had to wait until after Willy Brandt's forthcoming U.S. visit, Britain deferred to France, and France took no action on the grounds that Europe needed to work out a way to respond with one voice. During his May 1 visit to the United States, Brandt revealed the European impression that Kissinger sought to settle all concrete issues by insisting that failure to agree on one subject should not block progress in others. To Kissinger, who had not recognized the impression his speech had created, this argument "came close to turning our proposal into a platitude, for no one had ever questioned that controversial issues should be discussed individually." In his own mind, Kissinger had not questioned the role of the individual forums in solving concrete problems for he was concerned with symbolic issues. But other leaders, unable to divine his intentions, braced themselves for substantive clashes.

Travelling to London on May 10, Kissinger found the British reluctant to take the lead on any aspect of the Year of Europe. As a result, the French held the key to the success of the Year of Europe. Michel Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, held the key to French policy. The relationship between Kissinger and Jobert determined the form that the Year of Europe would take. Kissinger had not forgotten his criticism of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in The Troubled Partnership. He had not forgotten how they had alienated France by contesting French leadership in Europe and incited quarrels detrimental to both Europe.

42. "In the Same Boat," The Economist, June 9, 1973, p. 11.
43. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 156.
and the United States. Kissinger's desire to maintain consistency between his academic writings and statesman's actions prompted him to be acutely aware of French sensibilities. As a result, he dealt with France as Europe's representative. Jobert, who had certainly read *The Troubled Partnership*, recognized Kissinger's predilections and exploited them to reinforce France's image as the leading nation in Europe and its image of independence from the United States. Jobert, like President deGaulle, understood the role of symbolic diplomacy.

Jobert also understood Kissinger's personality better than any statesman that Kissinger encountered (with the possible exception of Chou-En-Lai) and he used this knowledge to gain an unusual personal ascendancy over Kissinger. Despite Jobert's countless political and personal attacks, Kissinger still wrote of Jobert, "strange as it may seem, I liked him enormously through all our conflicts, and a kind of friendship — tinged with exasperation — grew up between us. He was a cultured, charming man with whom it was a pleasure to exchange ideas."44 Kissinger forfeited his diplomatic discipline by allowing his personal friendship to influence his diplomatic approach to France.

Jobert combined his understanding of Kissinger with his own vision of Gaullism to thwart the Year of Europe initiative. By playing on Kissinger's sensitivity to French concerns, Jobert induced him to bypass the European Community, thereby insuring that France would shape the European consensus. Having kept the United States and the EC apart long enough to alienate the EC from the Year of Europe, Jobert then insisted that the United States deal only with the EC as a whole through its presiding Chairman and through Jobert as principal European spokesman. The irony of Kissinger's European diplomacy was that "an American initiative enabled Jobert to pursue the old Gaullist dream of building Europe on an anti-American basis."45 Kissinger had made a critical diplomatic error in allowing France to shape the European consensus: the responsibility for an American initiative was entrusted to the nation that had the least incentive to see it succeed. The lamb of the Year of Europe had been presented on a platter to the Gaullist wolves.

The success of Jobert's efforts to frustrate Kissinger became all too apparent at the European Community foreign ministers' conference in Copenhagen on July 23. Here it was decided that no member of the EC would be allowed to deal individually with the United States until a Community view emerged in a draft declaration. This draft, written without any consultation with the United States, was simply presented

44. Ibid., p. 164.
to the U.S. by the presiding Chairman of the EC who had no authority
to negotiate and could only report the American reaction to other Eu-
ropean leaders. "We had hoped to fashion a new commitment to shared
purposes, a new vision of a common future," Kissinger wrote. "Instead,
the proposed procedure for the Atlantic dialogue turned out to be more
rigid than even encounters with Soviet negotiators, who for all their
stiffness and inhibitions generally had more of a brief than simply to
listen."46 Even more ironic was that "the very leaders who found such
ingenious formulas for avoiding the American President were at the same
time pressing us to attend a collective summit with Leonid Brezhnev to
conclude the European Security Conference." At Copenhagen, the Year
of Europe essentially came to an end because, as Kissinger painfully
admitted, "No document symbolizing a new era could possibly emerge
from such a process."47

The failure of the Year of Europe rests on Kissinger's shoulders because
he allowed himself to be outmaneuvered and manipulated by Jobert.
Long after he should have realized Jobert's intentions, Kissinger contin-
ued to commit egregious diplomatic errors: he gave Jobert two American
drafts of the Declaration — allowing him to choose the one most to his
liking — and promised that he would not discuss them with the other
allies until France responded — again allowing Jobert to create the
impression that Kissinger was neglecting the EC.

In defense of his blunders, Kissinger wrote that Jobert "had a free run
at us because the possibility that the whole exercise might turn into a
confrontation had simply never crossed our minds."48 After SALT, China,
and Vietnam, Kissinger hoped to find a quick victory in allied diplomacy,
but diplomacy by its very nature is a contest of wills, even among allies.
This lesson from A World Restored Kissinger ignored with serious conse-
quences for the Year of Europe. Jobert, who wanted to thwart the Year
of Europe, exercised greater will than Kissinger, who failed to commit
himself firmly to either symbolic or concrete goals.

Jobert's motivations for defeating the Year of Europe were derived
from both international and domestic political ambitions. Internationally,
France sought to limit American influence in Europe; but the deciding
factor in Jobert's decision to pursue a confrontational path instead of
shaping a positive European consensus lay in French domestic politics.
Jobert was the rising star of French politics at the same time that
President Pompidou's physical decline became evident. In his memoirs,

46. Ibid., p. 701.
47. Ibid., p. 702.; Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 189-90.
Kissinger argues that "what finally drove Jobert into obsessive exaltation was the heretofore inconceivable idea that he might be the successor to his mortally ill President if he could capture the public imagination as a strident defender of French nationalism." Jobert's symbolic goal of appearing as a defender of French nationalism overpowered Kissinger's more ambiguous goals, leading to the defeat of the Year of Europe.

While Jobert's motivations were clearly his own, his ease in lining up the rest of Europe into his coalition of negation reflected both European uncertainty over Kissinger's motives and European preoccupation with European affairs. The procedural problems in which Europe enveloped the Year of Europe merely served to mask deeper differences of political direction.

In early 1973, Britain under the leadership of Edward Heath officially entered the European Community. For Heath, this act was the culmination of years of dedicated efforts to integrate Britain into Europe. Britain had historically been somewhat aloof from the Continent. Having made a formal commitment to align its fortunes with Europe, Britain still had to decide how it would establish its membership among the Continental nations. If Britain acted in close cooperation with the United States it would be accused of continuing the "special relationship" with the U.S. that had always set her apart. Heath, therefore, decided to end the special relationship. "He preferred a leading position in Europe," Kissinger wrote, "to an honored advisory role in Washington, and did not consider the two roles compatible."

Heath's priorities should have subdued Kissinger's enthusiasm for a European initiative because a strongly supportive Britain was crucial to the success of U.S. policy in Europe. Kissinger, who had written about the lack of European unity as a scholar, conducted his diplomacy with considerable indifference to the efforts of the NATO Allies to resolve their internal problems. Heath was not without an Atlantic vision; he wanted to "create a European entity to redress the balance in the Atlantic community as a whole." He conceived of an Alliance resting on two pillars in which "our present troubles are caused by the weakness of the European pillar." Like Kissinger, Heath was working for his personal vision of the Atlantic community. Kissinger failed either to reconcile Heath's vision with his own, or to offer Heath any convincing reasons why his American vision should take precedence.

In Germany, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik had symbolically reversed and

49. Ibid., p. 166.
50. Ibid., p. 140.
transcended Germany's post-war policy by accepting the division of Germany. But Brandt's political advisor, Egon Bahr, sought to take Ostpolitik a step further by beginning the process of German reunification. Bahr believed that the recognition of strategic equality between the United States and the Soviet Union made it incumbent upon the Federal Republic to seek safety in a relaxation of tensions with the East, and that increased contacts between East and West would draw the East closer to the West. He therefore opposed the key aim of Kissinger's policy. "He would hear nothing of strengthening the political coordination within the Alliance because an Atlantic bloc would undermine the flexibility necessary for his own version of detente." Kissinger doubted the viability of Bahr's views, fearing both that West Germany would be drawn into the East and that the flexibility sought by Bahr would lead to "differential detente" in which the Soviets could set the democracies against each other and divide Europe from America. Kissinger launched the Year of Europe partly to counter these fears about Germany's policy. He hoped, arrogantly, that West Germany would abandon its political direction for his abstract notion of Atlantic unity. With the Year of Europe, Kissinger conducted a confrontational diplomacy under the guise of Atlantic partnership.

According to Willy Brandt, Kissinger always "stressed the importance of avoiding any impression that a nagging controversy had arisen between the EC and the U.S." Kissinger's concern reveals that symbolic diplomacy relied on appearances for success. Although differences of substance separated the two sides, Kissinger's Year of Europe sought to impose a facade of unity over these internal rifts. It failed because it "had been drained of its moral and psychological significance by a year of bickering." If his initiative could lose its meaning when Allies aired their differences, or "bickered," it was much too fragile an approach to deal with an Alliance of independent, strong-willed democracies.

Kissinger erred by embarking on a form of diplomacy that required the appearance of unity at a time when major issues of substance divided Europe and the United States. He refused to recognize the consequences of these differences. As Willy Brandt sensed, Kissinger "was reluctant to pay clear enough regard to the existence of the European Community and its slow and laborious evolution."

Kissinger weakened his initiative by failing to come to terms with the European unification movement which had come to express the

52. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 147.
53. Brandt, *People and Politics*, p. 313. (author's emphasis)
uneasiness that Western Europeans felt over their continued dependence on the United States. European unity remained, in Heath’s words, “the first order of business.” This overarching European imperative required symbolic acts of statesmanship; but not the same kind that Kissinger had hoped to elicit. Kissinger learned the hard way that the halcyon days of the Marshall Plan had ended. The Middle East War in October 1973 brought this fact home with a vengeance.

The Yom Kippur War disrupted the Year of Europe suddenly and reflected a crucial area of divergence between European and American interests. Europe, which imported almost eighty-percent of its oil from the Middle East, had to dissociate itself from the American effort to resupply Israel militarily. A cutback in oil from the Middle East would have caused mass unemployment and economic catastrophe in Europe. The United States was more concerned with the balance of power in the region, and felt it imperative to prop up Israel to demonstrate the American commitment to resist Soviet expansionism. These divergent concerns incited a vituperative debate that shattered any lingering hopes Kissinger might have had of achieving a show of symbolic unity.

The Yom Kippur War revealed that differences of substance sharply divided the Alliance. Implicit tensions had become open rifts. Europe objected when the United States placed its military forces on alert without prior consultation, and claimed that American actions in crisis belied assertions of concern for the Atlantic Alliance. The United States objected to the callous Allied dissociation which created a “sense of abandonment in a crisis.”

Sharp exchanges flew across the Atlantic, confirming the impression of Western disarray.

The Yom Kippur War shifted the Atlantic dialogue from a theoretical debate about the need for unity to a debate about real problems. In 1956, when the Suez crisis — initiated by unilateral French and British actions — shaped American thinking on Alliance unity, Kissinger had written, “This is not to say we must support our allies however arbitrary their behavior. Our coalition policy must strike a balance between identifying an alliance with the consensus of its members and the desire for freedom of action in situations where our views and those of our allies diverge.” Was the Yom Kippur War not a Suez in reverse? Kissinger recognized the historical parallel: Both events questioned the conduct of allies in an emergency when they disagree about causes or remedies.

“Should they use the occasion of their partner’s embarrassment to vindicate their own views? Or do they have an obligation

56. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 714.
57. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons, p. 211.
to subordinate their differences to the realization that the humiliation of the ally who, for better or worse, is most strategically placed to affect the outcome weakens the common defense and the achievement of joint purposes?"

In 1956, the United States insisted on its own view, creating lasting resentment in Europe. "Now the tables were turned," Kissinger wrote, "and Europe showed no greater wisdom than we had nearly two decades earlier." He failed to ask, however, whether the United States had shown any greater wisdom than had Britain and France in pursuing its goals so unilaterally.

To Kissinger, unilateral American actions were part of America's obligation to maintain the world balance of power. The allies, in Kissinger's view, had to be "prepared to let us act alone . . . our interests and those of our allies cannot be of the same order because the disparity of power and responsibility is too great." Here was the essence of the Kissingerian dilemma in Alliance diplomacy: he initiated the Year of Europe to evoke Alliance unity, but insisted that the interests of the two sides could not be the same. But what is unity except the manifestation of shared interest? If the Allies were to follow American policy even when their interests diverged, simply because it appears to American statesmen to promise the greatest long run benefits, the Alliance would no longer be a partnership but a new empire.

As a statesman, Kissinger lost his scholarly sympathy for European weaknesses. He had argued as a scholar that the United States should show "understanding and compassion for the problems of states whose margin of survival — military, political and economic — is far smaller than ours." When the Allies felt threatened, he continued, "we must be prepared to make concessions to what our allies consider their essential interests." In practice, however, the imperatives of the world balance of power proved too overpowering to Kissinger to allow any concessions to European interests.

Behind the Alliance split over the Middle East lurked the persistent problem of Atlantic unity versus European identity. The Alliance had reached a point where continuing confrontation might have brought on its demise. At this point, however, shared interests led the way back toward the path of cooperation. It was as if Siamese twins climbing in the mountains, bickering the whole way, suddenly reached a precipice. Each wanted to push the other off, but logic prevailed and they realized

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60. Ibid.
that their bond was inseparable. They peered over the precipice, became more aware of the necessity to work together, and walked back down much more amicably. In this way, a crisis achieved the understanding on shared interests in the Alliance that Kissinger had sought with the Year of Europe.

V. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLISM

The Middle East crisis revealed both the necessity and the inadequacy of the Year of Europe. The fundamental divergence of perspective it provoked revealed that the Atlantic Alliance "must do its utmost to prevent conflicting perceptions of fundamental interests from festering by being left unattended." But the Year of Europe also revealed that symbolic efforts to achieve the appearance of unity are not a substitute for working out a true consensus. A purely symbolic diplomacy is little more than an embellished set of platitudes. Symbolism without substance leads to a diplomacy of illusion; it can only play an essential role in diplomacy in conjunction with issues of substance. Kissinger's diplomacy succeeded only when he combined symbolism and substance.

Such a conjunction occurred during the Washington Energy Conference — an outgrowth of the Middle East War and the Oil Embargo. This initiative provides a useful counterpoint to the Year of Europe because it succeeded where the Year of Europe failed. The energy crisis and the Year of Europe both posed the question of "whether, and how, the industrial democracies could take charge of their common destiny." Like the Year of Europe, Kissinger posed the challenge in a major speech on Atlantic relations — this time to the Society of Pilgrims in London — in which he called for the creation of an Energy Action group to promote alternative sources and conservation, and to negotiate with producers.

The initial European reaction was again ambivalent, and again, Michel Jobert intended to spearhead the opposition. According to Kissinger, he "wanted no part in any grouping within which American influence might be decisive . . ." Few European nations agreed entirely with France's position, but few wanted to antagonize France either. But in 1974, as Jobert began to construct an elaborate procedural nightmare to enmesh Kissinger's scheme, Kissinger moved immediately to head him off by inviting the democracies individually to attend the Washington Energy Conference. "We would now see," Kissinger wrote, "whether we would

62. Ibid., p. 895.
63. Ibid., 898.
again be faced with the insistence that the European countries would speak to us only through a single instructed representative or whether the importance of the subject would produce a more natural pattern of consultation."\footnote{Ibid., p. 901. (author's emphasis)} When all the European nations except France accepted the invitation, Kissinger had his answer.

Unity is best achieved when concrete issues pose a challenge that requires cooperation to resolve. Confronted with a specific, instead of a theoretical, program, the European nations were obliged to take a position. As Joffert and the French offered no alternative proposal, the other European countries either had to agree to the American proposal or continue their disastrous "beggar thy neighbor" policies. This time Kissinger retained control over his initiative, worked around France, and achieved a considerable degree of success in inviting the democracies to meet a common challenge.

Unity generated by working on substantive problems can achieve symbolic ends, particularly in the moral and psychological realm of foreign policy. In a discussion with British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, Kissinger said that the energy issue was both "moral and political." "What we have here is an opportunity for a moral demonstration of what the West can do when it wants to get together..." To Kissinger, it was essential that the industrial democracies be perceived by their publics as mastering the new economic challenge. The Washington Conference, he believed, "would become a symbol of our decline or, with luck, a turning point."\footnote{Ibid., p. 902.} Kissinger's luck held and he achieved a symbolic and substantive unity among the Atlantic nations that began an improvement in relations continuing until he departed from office in 1977.

In comparing his two initiatives, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs:

No doubt the premise that the industrial democracies shared certain problems was at the base of both initiatives. But where the Year of Europe sought a moral rededication in order to face issues that had not yet arisen, the energy conference was designed to combat a clear and immediate danger.\footnote{Ibid., p. 905.}

The success of the energy conference, when juxtaposed with the failure of the Year of Europe reveals the flaw in Kissinger's basic premise that Allied nations can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations. In his nostalgia for the unity of the Marshall Plan era, Kissinger overlooked the clear and immediate dangers that had led to its creation: political
and economic chaos in Europe and a potential communist threat. Similarly, in calling for a new Atlantic Charter, he demonstrated his clouded historical perspective. The original Atlantic Charter of 1941 had signified a formal acceptance by the United States of responsibility for the defeat of Hitler and the establishment of a democratic peace. But even with goals of such magnitude, the immediate reaction to the Charter had been disappointing. The public in 1941 had expected an earth-shattering pronouncement from Roosevelt and Churchill but received only an eight point mixture of Wilson's Fourteen Points and Roosevelt's New Deal. Joint diplomatic statements rarely have that earth-shattering symbolic quality that Kissinger hoped to evoke with his new Atlantic Charter.

Kissinger had expected too much from symbolic diplomacy: in regard to Europe, Kissinger the statesman of realpolitik attempted to appear in the guise of Wilsonian ideologue. "Every great achievement was a dream before it became a reality," he wrote. "We thought we were tapping the idealistic tradition of the democracies when we put forward the Year of Europe." But there was something anomalous about the statesman who saw himself creating an American "geopolitical" tradition in foreign policy suddenly advocating an idealistic tradition. This anomaly was not lost on Europe where it generated suspicion of Kissinger's motives.

Still, the positive and constructive vision that Kissinger offered was a unique voice in the Atlantic dialogue. The fundamental questions he posed still lurk beneath the surface of Atlantic relations today. But as Kissinger had recognized earlier, statesmanship "involves not only a problem of conception but also of implementation, an appreciation of the attainable as much as a vision of the desirable." While the vision of Atlantic unity he presented was attractive, consensus among democracies is an inherently complex task in absence of immediate danger. The common interests that Kissinger talked about lacked the clarity, precision, urgency and compelling force that he tried to attribute to them.

The goals behind the initiative, Kissinger claimed, "lay largely in the psychological and moral realm" — to strengthen the psychological bond of Atlantic relations and to reinforce the American moral commitment to Europe. In defending his pursuit of these goals, he argued that "foreign policy is not an exercise in abstract logic; if it neglects psychological reality, it builds on sand." What Kissinger describes as "psychological realities" are the intangibles of trust and cooperation that infuse a strong alliance. But intangibles, by definition, are elusive qualities that cannot be set

69. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 136.; Ibid., p. 706. (author's emphasis)
down on paper. An initiative as rigid as the Year of Europe could not alter psychological realities; only by working together to solve real problems do nations gain that intangible sense of trust that Kissinger hoped to recreate with the Year of Europe. He recognized this in his memoirs when he wrote, "The close cooperation we had sought to achieve with formal declarations came about instead as a result of common necessity, practical arrangements and a restoration of mutual human confidence." Kissinger's abstract effort to achieve unity — an effort derived in part from his academic writings — revealed the gap between academic theory and diplomatic reality. The achievement of unity is not as simple as the desire for it.

70. Ibid., p. 934.