

**HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES TO EDUCATION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION**

ACHOLILAND, NORTHERN UGANDA



A THESIS
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
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PUBLICATIONS, EXHIBITS, PRESENTATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation studied the relationship between education and conflict in northern Uganda. The hypothesis driving this study was that examination of different approaches to education will shed light on the challenges and opportunities to promote peace and development. The author developed a framework of three different approaches to education in conflict or post-conflict societies: the humanitarian approach which prioritizes the imperative to protect the right to education, the development approach which either prioritizes economic development or human-centered development, and the conflict prevention approach.

This study defines the conflict prevention approach to education as one that recognizes the dual nature of education and seeks to harness the content and distribution of education to redress the impact of conflict and prevent future conflict. This approach is based on the notion that risk factors, examined through the analysis of conflict dynamics and local perceptions and priorities, should be integrated into education interventions.

The author conducted research between March of 2008 and July of 2009 in two districts in Acholiland, the area most affected by the war between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda. In order to inform an understanding of the potential goals of a conflict prevention approach, the author conducted a local perceptions study with 222 Acholi people who had either left displacement camps and returned to their rural homes or were still in camps. The author used semi-structured questionnaires designed to first learn about people's perspectives on the situation for

children and youth in Acholiland and then to learn about values and benefits associated with education. The author then studied other approaches to education by conducting interviews with selected samples from each of the following groups of stakeholders in the education field: donors, local and national government officials, teachers, and NGO representatives.

Although donors and the Government of Uganda state their commitment to promote peace and stability, education actors driven by humanitarian and development approaches fail to address grievances related to education and in some cases exacerbate conflict dynamics. Actors driven by the humanitarian approach improved access to education in camps and thus increased expectations that in many cases will be frustrated during the recovery period. The national government developed education policies with the aim of achieving economic growth by promoting science and technology. Local leaders are angry about these policies because they offer benefits to qualifying students but do not address the barriers that Acholi students face. Donors are driven by a human-centered approach which focuses on universal primary education and proscribes alignment behind national goals. Donors pursue these priorities rather than engage critically with the recovery plan for the north, despite the deficiencies of the plan and the potential consequences in terms of conflict dynamics.

DEDICATION

To my loving husband and baby girl.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Interest and Research Question: The author's interest in education and conflict in Acholiland began with her observation of the tremendous need for services for children and youth in the north,¹ the heavy emphasis that Acholi people displaced by the war placed on education,² and the forward-looking rhetoric regarding northern Uganda documented in the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP). The author developed the hypothesis that studying different approaches to education and their applications would inform an understanding of the challenges and opportunities for peace and development in northern Uganda. The central research question driving this study is the following: How do humanitarian and development approaches to education interact with the goals of a conflict prevention approach? The thesis of this dissertation is that although actors driven by humanitarian and development frameworks aim to mitigate the potential for conflict, their actions fall short of this goal and in some cases aggravate grievances and frustrations around education and enhance the potential for a return to conflict.

Theoretical Framework: Three approaches to education (and corresponding theoretical underpinnings and operational priorities) were determined through literature review. A humanitarian approach occurs during a crisis and seeks to protect

¹ The unmet needs of the most conflict-affected children and youth in northern Uganda is well documented by Dyan Mazurana and others through the Survey on War Affected Youth project: *The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda*, (Kampala, Uganda: UNICEF, 2006).

² This is well known and specifically documented by the Women's Commission: Women's Commission, *Learning in a War Zone: Education in Northern Uganda* (New York, 2005).

the right to education. This approach is founded in humanitarian law which governs during times of war and human rights law which protects the right to education through various conventions including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The priority of this approach is to provide access to educational activities in order to promote a safe environment and a degree of normalcy for children.

The development approach to education can have either an economic development focus or a human-centered focus. A development approach that focuses on economic development emphasizes the potential returns to investments in education. Although authors contributing to the literature on human capital formation and economists more broadly debate the most efficient way to invest in education in order to achieve public and private returns, an economic growth approach to development will always prioritize strategies aimed to maximize growth. A development approach may alternatively emphasize human-centered development, drawing on literature that explores the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and the role of development in promoting individuals' capabilities. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the operational manifestation of a human-centered approach to development. In education, international actors emphasize MDG #2; universal primary education.

Conflict Prevention Approach to Education: There is a growing consensus in education literature that a third approach should be considered. A conflict prevention approach to education recognizes the dual nature of education and seeks to harness the

potential of education content and distribution to redress the impact of conflict and to promote peace and stability rather than conflict. Literature related to the conflict-prevention approach to education prioritizes the need to understand the relationship between education and conflict by understanding and integrating context-specific factors into long-term processes, including: the impact of any past conflict on education; local priorities, perceptions and grievances; and conflict risks.

Education can affect conflict dynamics through a variety of mechanisms. Inequitable distribution of educational resources can create grievances and a sense of injustice that creates the potential for conflict, especially when inequality is associated with a particular group in society. Lack of quality educational opportunities may make youth more likely to join fighting forces for lack of better options or out of frustration. Pedagogy is also important: Authoritarian educational settings and the use of corporal punishment may produce students that do not know how to think critically or solve problems through non-violent means. The content of education can play a role in either inciting conflict or promoting peace, especially policies related to language of instruction and the instruction of courses such as history, social studies, and geography.

Local Context and Conflict Dynamics, Grievance in Acholi: Considering Acholi ethnicity and grievances in the wake of conflict and the impact of conflict on education sets the stage for understanding the goals of a potential conflict prevention approach. Grievances in Acholiland are especially tied to the dynamics that led the current president to take power and his persecution of the war with the Lord's Resistance Army

(LRA). The use of counter-insurgency tactics, especially the policy of forced displacement into camps where Acholi people were not protected from LRA attacks, were subject to abuse by the national military, and were not afforded the basic conditions for survival, left many Acholi people fundamentally suspicious of the Ugandan state. The north has historically received a lower level of development than central Uganda dating back to the colonial period, but the war marginalized the north to a new and tremendous degree. By the end of the war, 90% of Acholi people were in camps and the economy of the region was crushed by raiding, looting, and people's inability to continue their livelihood activities. The LRA raided schools in order to abduct children to fill their ranks. Because of abductions and the prevalence of other atrocities, children lived in a state of constant insecurity and fear. Although some basic education was provided in camps, the quality was abysmal and children's ability to learn was severely affected by the trauma of war.

Methodology: In order to study the goals of a potential conflict prevention approach, the author conducted a local perceptions study with 222 current or former internally displaced people (IDPs) in two districts in Acholiland (120 women and 102 men). At the time of research, between March of 2008 and July of 2009, the majority of people in Acholiland had left camps in order to return to their ancestral villages. For this reason, roughly two thirds of interviews were conducted in return sites (155) and just under a third of interviews were conducted in camps (67). Equal numbers of youth (ages 12-24) and non-youth (ages 25 or older) were interviewed. Research sites were in

heavily conflict-affected and resource-scarce areas.

The author utilized a semi-structured questionnaire. The first half of the questionnaire asked about general themes including; the situation in northern Uganda, plans for the future, and notions of peace. The second half of the questionnaire talked specifically about education, attempting to understand the benefit of education that people experienced in camps, the obstacles to education, and the way that being educated distinguishes people. At each parish where research was conducted, the author walked through the community, returning several days in a row at different times of the day in order to somewhat randomly select a representative sample of the people residing in the research site. Interview data was analyzed using a grounded theory approach to coding and memoing.

In order to understand the different approaches to education at play in northern Uganda, the author selectively sampled between ten and twelve actors from each of the following groups of stakeholders: donors, local leaders, national leaders, and NGO officials. 22 teachers in schools near the research sites were also interviewed. The author used a slightly modified version of the semi-structured questionnaire used in communities in order to understand stakeholders' perspectives and priorities in terms of education provision. Interview data was contextualized through policy and program analysis.

Findings: Humanitarian and development approaches to education drive donors and government actors involved in education provision in northern Uganda. The goals

of humanitarian and development approaches to education and a conflict prevention approach are mutually supportive. Protecting the right to education sets the stage for development after conflict. Development promotes peace and peaceable conditions allow development to take hold. Yet in the case of northern Uganda, actors pursuing the humanitarian and development approach have inadvertently failed to address conflict dynamics and have in some cases exacerbated grievances that create the potential for a return to violent conflict. Humanitarian and development approaches have been fundamentally conservative in nature, aiming to alleviate suffering, reduce poverty, or promote growth, but not to interrupt the status quo. In contrast, the conflict-prevention agenda aims to challenge, disrupt, and transform the status quo that gave rise to conflict.

The humanitarian intervention was successful in increasing access to education in camps, but this was done without corresponding improvements to the structural environment that affects the provision of education. With increasing levels of access to education, current and former IDPs are more likely to put education at the center of their plans for their future and are more likely to expect education services in the future. Increasing expectations are not likely to be met during the recovery period due to the abrupt end of humanitarian aid and the slow and insufficient flow of recovery plans and funds. The resulting frustrated expectations increase the potential for grievances among Acholi youth and families.

The Government of Uganda is driven by an economic-growth focused

development approach which emphasizes the need for transformation through industrialization. This vision of growth extends to the education sector in the form of policies that emphasize science courses and high level technical skills. The policy of tuition remission for qualifying students at the secondary level has also been linked to this vision as a pipeline for tertiary education. These policies are non-inclusive in nature because they distribute benefits to students who can qualify based on exam results, but do not address the inequalities in the system in terms of access to quality education.

Throughout Uganda, the rural poor struggle to obtain a quality education and therefore are likely to be excluded from tuition remission programs that require qualifying exam results. However, in Acholiland, multiple exclusions overlap as a result of a war that devastated education systems, social institutions, and the economy in a sub-region that was previously underdeveloped and dependent on subsistence agriculture.

Local leaders are painfully aware of the dearth of real opportunities for Acholi learners and the way that growth-oriented education policies put Acholi youth even further behind students elsewhere in the country. Local leaders make invidious comparisons, pointing to Acholi's past accomplishments and innate ability to succeed if quality services are provided. Current and former IDPs place great emphasis on secondary education as the best way to gain entrance into the wage economy and have a better life. Local leaders' anger that Acholi students cannot compete at the national level for entrance into post-primary institutions forecasts the frustration that youth may

feel if and when their hopes for education are not fulfilled.

The human-centered development approach drives many of the donor agencies and has an important impact on Ugandan education priorities. This approach promotes human capabilities by addressing the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and is made operational through Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to end poverty by 2015. The strongest agenda item for education actors is MDG #2: universal primary education.

In Uganda, progress toward the MDGs has led to increased levels of donor funding and donor commitments to harmonize their activities and align around national goals. The principles of focusing on primary education and aligning around national goals convey from the national poverty reduction plan to the recovery plan for the north. As a result, some donors are disengaged from the situation in northern Uganda and do not question national plans for education, despite the clear inadequacies of the recovery plan as a tool to redress the impact of conflict.

Analysis of interviews with current and former IDPs provided insight into a local priority that is not incorporated into the development or recovery agenda. When asked about the situation in northern Uganda, more than half of respondents talked about the deterioration of social relationships as a result of war and camp life. Local leaders also talked about this theme and the way that camp life, for which they often hold the government accountable, destroyed Acholi culture and social institutions. Teachers noted social issues as the fundamental barrier to learning in their classrooms, often referring to cases of severe social disruption. Donors, however, never mentioned this

theme except to refer to traumatized children in generic terms. Education interventions and other recovery programs aiming to redress the impact of the conflict may consider this an important and overlooked local priority.

PART ONE: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS: EDUCATION AND CONFLICT IN ACHOLILAND

Given this dissertation's focus on education, conflict, and conflict-prevention, the experience of the Acholi people is of central concern as well as their relationship to the broader Ugandan state. Understanding pre-colonial, independence-era, and modern history through the lens of the Acholi experience sheds light on a long history of conflict. The focus of this section is on political, social and economic events and their overlays with the Acholi ethnic group. This analysis includes a discussion of the impact of the LRA war on education in Acholiland.

When used in the following paragraphs, "ethnicity" should be understood as the idea of shared group affinity and belonging based on the myth of common ancestry and a notion of distinctiveness.³ Following the constructivist approach to ethnicity which views ethnicity as constructed rather than absolute,⁴ the author aims to show the various ways in which history, war, and politics have laden ethnicity with meaning. Ethnicity is of concern because, in Rothchild's words, "as political memory interacts with the experiences of the past, new socially constructed identities emerge and become the basis of a consciousness that in some instances can prove very destructive."⁵ This has

³ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

⁴ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), vol. I, pp. 100–03.

⁵ Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*,

certainly been the case in Uganda.

Atkinson, an anthropologist who has been studying ethnicity in Uganda since the early 1970's, writes that identity politics have "been employed by every post-colonial administration to stoke ethnic and regional differences and tensions and in the process has helped produce a postcolonial Uganda that has not yet had a peaceful transition of power from one government to another."⁶ Atkinson later wrote about the importance of ethnicity to the Acholi people, "little has mattered more to Acholi, individually and collectively, than ethnic identity. For many thousands of men, women, and children, being identified as Acholi has literally meant, depending upon chronology and circumstance, life or death."⁷

The following paragraphs do not aim to reduce the complex challenges that Ugandans have confronted since colonial times to simple ethnic terms, but rather to show the overlay of ethnic identity with political, social and economic forces. Understanding these forces and their impact on the Acholi people helps to understand the real grievances and the suspicion that Acholi people have toward the Government of Uganda. This sets the stage for considering the impact of different approaches to education on grievances, and thereby, on the potential for violence.

Factors Shaping Identity: Colonial History, Socio-Economic Realities and Ethnic Identity

As noted by Gurr, historical processes such as colonization occur at the expense

Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1997.

⁶ Ronald Atkinson, *The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda*, revised edition," (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, forthcoming 2010), p. 2.

⁷ Atkinson (1994), 11.

of weaker and less fortunate peoples. The experience of exploitation that accompanied colonization in many countries often served to strengthen communal identities and contributed to a sense of collective injustice among those that experienced the greatest levels of depravity.⁸ Gurr refers to the existence of such depravity as, “the basic condition for civil strife of any kind.”⁹ With the understanding that colonial history had an important impact on levels of development as well as ethnic identity, we turn to accounts of the colonial process in Uganda.

In colonial Uganda, the British system of indirect rule favored the Baganda people in central Uganda for many reasons. First, Buganda was organized as a complex, hierarchical kingdom, the largest in East Africa, which in the British eyes indicated that the Baganda people were more advanced than peoples elsewhere in the protectorate. Second, the Baganda were willing to cooperate with the British (unlike Buganda’s neighboring, long-time rival kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitare). Third, the climate was more welcoming. These factors made the Central Region the focus of merchant, missionary, administrative, and educative activities.¹⁰

In contrast to the relative development in the Central Region, the Western, Eastern and especially the Northern Region remained undeveloped during the colonial period. The British viewed the Acholi people in the north as inferior and less useful to

⁸ Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).

⁹ Ted Robert Gurr, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” *American Political Review*, 62 (1968), 1105.

¹⁰ Tarsis Kabwegyere, *The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda* (Kampala: Fountain, 1995).

the colonial administration except as migrant laborers, peasant farmers of cotton and as members of the army and police. Because the smaller-scale Acholi political system of numerous politically independent chiefdoms could not be harnessed effectively for indirect rule, the colonialists integrated the Acholi through the Baganda council of chiefs system with a paramount chief as their cultural leader.¹¹

Although ethnic identities in northern Uganda pre-date the colonial period,¹² colonialization both entrenched and changed these identities. The creation of districts further reinforced ethnic identities under the colonial administration, as pre-colonial social structures were adapted and incorporated into a new administrative structure. Pre-colonial ethnic groups were typically localized within districts or other administrative boundaries for colonialists' convenience. Politics and both the competition for and delivery of infrastructural developments and services played out within these colonial structures and boundaries, leading people to identify in new ways with their colonially-defined areas, while the introduction of new actors increased the potential for competition and conflict. Missionaries' efforts to understand indigenous culture may have also played a role in entrenching feelings of distinctiveness and separateness between different ethnic groups. Missionaries developed written vernacular languages and written accounts of local/tribal histories and customs, creating new avenues for the expression of ethnic identity. They also fostered local educated

¹¹ Atkinson (1994), 12.

¹² Atkinson's work shows the extent to which the Acholi identity was developed prior to the colonial period, and argues that any attempt to understand ethnic relations in Uganda must take this into account. Atkinson (1994), 12.

elites who could express this identity.¹³

The combination of a changing awareness of group identity as a result of missionary influence and the drawing of district boundaries around ethnic groups led to the expression of political identity along ethnic lines. For example, in pre-colonial times, the Acholi were associated with one another through a decentralized system of sixty or more small, politically independent chiefdoms rather than a single leader.¹⁴ By the 1940s, competitive colonial politics led Acholi people to demand a head of District to whom all county chiefs should be responsible. This helped to foster an Acholi collective identity beyond their previous shared culture and language. They now shared the bonds of territory and an awareness of their identity as tied to a history of colonial subjugation.¹⁵

Parochialism was implicit in the emerging structures rather than a process of creating a national identity shared by all. Within the localized context, politics became exclusively tribal. Members of the same ethnic group competed for opportunities for representation, and then represented their groups' interests in competition with other ethnic groups.¹⁶ Mamdani finds that the Native Authorities that ruled over districts in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa according to their interpretation of customary law, exacerbated the "ethnic stranger" problem, whereby customary law could be used by

¹³ Kabwegyere.

¹⁴ Atkinson (1994).

¹⁵ Kabwegyere.

¹⁶ Kabwegyere.

local Africans against migrant workers.¹⁷ Groups which previously did not unite in order to compete for resources now identified themselves as a regionally and ethnically defined block.

The Baganda people enjoyed many benefits given their central location and role in the colonial system. Cotton and coffee gained importance starting in the early 1900s and Buganda enjoyed the greatest amount of labor migrants to develop this sector on commercial and private estates. Traders were discouraged from trading in the north under the notion that they would be unsuccessful. The difference between the economy in the Buganda province and elsewhere was stark. The revenue that was collected in Buganda in 1904 was more than twice that of all three other provinces combined. In 1905, there were eight trade depots in Buganda and none in the north. By 1920 there were 368 schools in central Uganda (Buganda) and only 44 in the west, 42 in the east, and too few in the north to record. The first secondary schools were not built in the north until the 1950s because colonialists argued that the north would not be receptive to education, and therefore resources should be concentrated elsewhere.¹⁸

In contrast to the analysis provided by Kabwegyere, which focuses on the way that the colonial system reinforced ethnic divisions through an uneven and exploitative process of subordinating indigenous populations, Mamdani argues that the ethnic composition of pre-colonial and colonial Uganda is over-emphasized. He considers it a

¹⁷ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 184.

¹⁸ In 1938, Warner noted the increasing resentment among against the education policy which was seen as unfairly taxing and distributing education resources in such a way as to favor the Baganda. He recommended that schools be built in all districts but this was not done. Kabwegyere.

mistake to assume that the history of a people “can best be explained by their racial origins.” In contrast, Mamdani places emphasis on human labor, the medium of interaction between humans and their environment. Mamdani explains the geographical factors that led to shifting cultivation and group differentiation in northern Uganda, as compared to feudal modes of production in the south that promoted the rise of mercantile profit and a highly organized political structure. As the slave trade ended, colonialists sought a collaborator class and found the Baganda well suited. They converted a group of Baganda into “landed gentry” or parasitic landlords. The Uganda Railway was completed in 1902, greatly aiding the subordination of the colonial economy to that of the metropole.¹⁹

Few writing today would argue that ethnicity is an unchanging fact and that ethnic differences alone are to blame for violent conflict.²⁰ Recent literature is likely to emphasize the way that ethnicity has been mobilized or constructed in order to further other aims. For instance, Young deemphasizes the role of identity as a cause of conflict, but finds that identity or ethnicity becomes the language through which struggles for political control are expressed.²¹ Mamdani argues that ethnicity is not “invented or imagined” but rather made through “social history,”²² and in the case of Uganda,

¹⁹ Mahmood Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999).

²⁰ A useful description of the primordialist approach, the instrumentalist approach, and the ascriptive approach to ethnic studies is reviewed in the follow text: Ashley J. Tellis, Thomas S. Szayna, and James A. Winnefeld, *Anticipating Ethnic Conflict* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 1997). This text shows the extend to which writing has moved away from a primordialist approach to ethnicity.

²¹ Crawford Young, “Deciphering Disorder in Africa – Is Identity the Key?” *World Politics*, 54 (2002): 532-557.

²² Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

highlights the importance of divisions of labor and class issues that arise from economic realities.

Mamdani's argument that colonialists' decisions were based on economic motives and calculations about how best to manipulate local economies rather than any innate interest in ethnicity is convincing, given that colonialists risked their lives to gain wealth in Africa. But economic motives cannot explain all interactions. Missionaries, for instance, were driven by spiritual motives rather than coin. Regardless of whether the motives were economic, spiritual, or other, Young's theory still holds: the language of ethnicity has a prominent role the history of northern Uganda. The role of ethnicity can be explained in great part by examining the historical treatment of ethnic groups. As the colonial administration settled in Ugandan and pursued their economic interests through indirect rule they contributed to feelings of separateness and competition between groups that were ethnically distinct. In this way, identity became increasingly interwoven with socio-economic factors such that it was the overlap of these factors that becomes relevant, rather than either ethnicity or socio-economic factors alone.

Post-Independence Politics and Ethnic Dimensions of Conflict

Since independence, every transition of power in Uganda has been marked to some degree by regional, ethnic, and/or religious group politics. The independence movement leading to Milton Obote's leadership was no exception. Support for Obote's rise to power was based on the notion that Obote would redress economic inequalities in Uganda that fell along regional and ethnic lines. Obote was a northerner from the

Luo-speaking Lango ethnic group located just south of Acholi. He gained support for the Uganda People's Congress from many northerners, not just Langi people, because many hoped that he would promote development in the north (although it should be noted that Obote also cultivated and gained support outside northern Uganda). Obote's relationship with neighboring Acholi was somewhat strained because of the Catholic missionary presence in Acholi and their support of the opposing Democratic Party and because of the limited investment in Gulu District during his leadership. However, Obote did rely on the support of the large number of Acholi in the army, and the number and prominence of fellow Langi also increased. The increasingly Acholi and Langi face of the army gave pause to some who feared the increasingly ethnically-defined fighting force. The prominent position of Acholi in the army led many people to exaggerate Acholi links in general to Obote and his regime.²³

Although Obote came to power through an alliance with the Baganda Kabaka Yekka party, only a few years later he violently overthrew the Baganda king and rewrote the Constitution in 1967 to ban all of Uganda's kingdoms, including Buganda. This and other factors led to violent conflict between Obote and the Baganda people. Obote declared the country in a state of emergency which lasted until 1971. Dissent, corruption, Obote's alleged "move to the left," and conflict with the head of the army, Idi Amin, all contributed to Amin's take-over of the government in 1971.²⁴

Idi Amin ruled from 1971-1979. Because the Acholi people had been at the

²³ Atkinson (1994).

²⁴ Kabwegyere.

center of Obote's support in his army, they were the principal victims of Amin's regime.²⁵ Acholi professionals and prominent others became targets, although attacks on Ugandan citizens were not confined to the Acholi people. During Amin's rule, there was a breakdown of legal authority which undermined the viability of both public and private enterprises. Industrial investments made during the 60s incurred negative economic returns, as well as investments in tourism and agriculture.²⁶ Ultimately, Amin lost power due to these and other factors, including the failed attempt to annex a region of Tanzania.²⁷

Obote returned to the presidency in late 1980 leading a government typically referred to as "Obote II". Representatives of his party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), were declared winners in elections that many thought were rigged. Again, the most represented ethnic group in Obote's army was Acholi, who comprised 40% of the fighting force. The Langi people, who were similarly of Nilotic descent and came from the neighboring northern district Lango, were the second most represented ethnic group.²⁸

Yoweri Museveni opposed the UPC by leading a rebel group called the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) in a guerilla war based out of the Luwero Triangle in central Uganda. Because Obote had earned the hatred of many of the Baganda

²⁵ Atkinson. (1994)

²⁶ Heyneman, Stephan. *Education during a Period of Austerity: Uganda, 1971-1981*. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 27, No 3, (Oct., 1983), pp. 403-413.

²⁷ Kabwegyere.

²⁸ Atkinson (2010).

people when he abolished the kingdom in 1967, the Luwero Triangle, which was populated mainly by Baganda, was fertile ground for Museveni's to launch an attack on Obote's second regime.²⁹ The long guerilla war and counter-insurgency response was brutal, with atrocities committed on both sides and widespread destruction in Luwero.

Museveni manipulated ethnicity in a somewhat sophisticated manner, downplaying ethnicity and thereby undermining local power structures and also playing up ethnic ties with the local population to create a unified front against a common ethnic enemy. Museveni "de-ethnicised" local politics by implementing a hierarchy of Resistance Councils to govern the local area. These democratic and multi-ethnic groups undermined the political power of the local Baganda chiefs and re-aligned loyalty to the NRM. Meanwhile, Museveni and his leadership emphasized the importance of a common Bantu ancestry among those from central and western Uganda and promulgated the notion of an enemy that was not Bantu, but rather Nilotic (the ancestry of the many of the people in northern Uganda), and generally referred to as Bacholi or Abaacholi (the Bantu words for Acholi). This instrumentalist characterization of the army served Museveni's purposes but obscured some aspects of reality: the third most represented ethnic group in the army was Banyakore (Museveni's own ethnic group).³⁰ Museveni's guerilla forces gained strength between 1981 and 1986 and eventually held territory in a third of the country.³¹

²⁹ Atkinson (2010), p. 4.

³⁰ Atkinson (2010), p. 4.

³¹ Kabwegyere.

By casting Obote's army as Acholi, as alien, and as responsible for abuses in past and present, Museveni created an effective narrative of distinctive ethnicity that promoted unity among his forces. Eventually the NRM narrative about the Acholi army spread as a characterization of northern people in general. Obote's policies fed into the later strategy, given his heavy recruitment of Acholi and Langi populations from the north. His rapidly recruited and less than professional army committed human rights abuses that fueled the hatred of the NRM supporters in Luwero and West Nile.³²

In Obote's army, Acholi soldiers bore much of the brunt of war and they were also singled out by NRA/M supporters as responsible for the army's actions. Yet it was Obote and his leadership circle that had decision-making power, not the Acholi soldiers. In frustration, a group of Acholi officers overthrew Obote in 1985. One of the leaders of the coup, Tito Okello, ruled as President from 1985-1986. Okello unsuccessfully tried to broker a peace agreement and hold Museveni to the terms, but Museveni overpowered him and took the presidency.³³ Museveni ousted Okello and large numbers of Acholi from the army and the civil service. These Acholi returned to the North, embittered by the turn of events, and fearful of marginalization and reprisals in retribution for the violence in Luwero.³⁴

The War in the North

Ethnic politics date all the way back to the colonial period in Uganda, but the

³² Atkinson (2010), p. 4.

³³ Kabwegyere.

³⁴ Sverker Finnstrom, *Living with Bad Surroundings* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

particular pattern of ethnic stereotyping and ethnicised politics linked most directly to the war in northern Uganda have their roots in the NRA/M war described above. Atkinson writes that many Acholi felt that, “while the war raged, Uganda became... essentially two separate countries: a mostly peaceful and relatively prosperous south, with a growing economy that has won Museveni much praise from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other donors (especially the U.S.), and the war-torn, impoverished, isolated north.”³⁵ Reviewing the phases of the war between the LRA and the Government of Uganda sheds further light on ethnic politics, as well as the tactics that led to tremendous escalation of violence and abuse suffered by the Acholi people and others in northern Uganda.

When Museveni took the presidency in 1986, he deployed NRA troops to northern Uganda, expecting a widespread rebellion. Obote’s former troops did not, however, have widespread support and were not prepared to wage an insurgency. They rather hid their weapons and then re-grouped in Sudan as the Ugandan People’s Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/M). But the NRA/M had planned a counter-insurgency and implemented it regardless. Fueled by the justification of the past abuses of Obote’s army in Luwero, the NRA committed human rights abuses on civilians and remaining soldier. Ironically, the counter-insurgency, launched in the absence of a visible insurgency, greatly increased popular demand for the UPDA troops and other

³⁵ Atkinson (2010), p. 7.

insurgent movements.³⁶

In the course of attacking Acholiland, the NRA raided many cattle for their own benefit, reportedly even ferrying them away on trucks. In the power vacuum in the early days of the war, the neighboring Karamajong took advantage and also raided Acholi cattle, and some Acholi believe that the NRA encouraged or benefitted from Karamajong raids. Cattle-raiding is sorely remembered by Acholi to this day, given that cattle were for many both a primary source of livelihood and an important way to provide a secure future for descendants. Finnstrom writes, "The people in the north have tended to see the army's looting of their cattle as a deliberate strategy. As one old man put it, 'they remove the cattle to make the Acholi poor, to be able to control the Acholi.'" Another of Finnstrom's informants brings home the memory of these early days of the war, "The NRA did to us what the Turk slave hunters did to us in the 19th century. They both treated us like animals, with contempt and open abuse; devastated our land, social infrastructure, decimated our culture and drove us out of our homes, into the bushes and hills".³⁷ A male formerly abducted youth in a return site who was interviewed for this study remembered a looting that took place over 20 years ago, "There was a situation in 1996. 37 people were killed when Lakwena came and massacred people here, including my father. After killing the people, they [the UPDF] took away everything that was here, including the cows..."

Even though the Acholi had experienced persecution under Idi Amin, never

³⁶ Atkinson (2010), p. 8.

³⁷ Finnstrom, p.74-76.

before had the army reached so deeply into rural society in so many destructive ways. Finnstrom argues that the destruction that followed Museveni's takeover affected the Acholi society to such a degree that even elders and other well-respected Acholi became instrumental in the recruitment of young people to the various rebel groups that challenged the NRM. As the army's misconduct increased, so did popular support for opposition groups, in many cases people felt that there was no alternative means of survival.³⁸

In addition to the UPDA, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena gained force as resentment against the NRA built among Acholi. The HSM started out as a peaceful religious movement focused on cleansing and healing but became militant and aimed at fighting the NRA. The HSM was surprisingly victorious in a number of instances, despite limited means and experience. After making a major push toward Kampala, the Holy Spirit Movement was defeated by government troops and Alice Lakwena fled to Kenya in 1987.

Joseph Kony emerged as Alice Lakwena's successor, eventually calling his rebel army the Lord's Resistance Army or the LRA. After a time, the UPDA/M began losing popular support and engaged in talks with the NRM that led to a peace deal by 1988. The LRA was not included in these talks and became increasingly violent. From the early days, Kony demonstrated his willingness to inflict violence against civilians, at times targeted, and at times indiscriminate, but usually aimed at those who were part of the

³⁸ Finnstrom, p.74-76.

NRM.³⁹

The NRA continued aggressive counter-insurgency tactics in the early phases of the LRA war. This violence was often indiscriminately waged against civilians, and extra-judicial executions were common. In 1991, the government launched a four-month counter-insurgency campaign called Operation North. Atkinson describes this operation as one in which the entire Acholiland was closed off while government troops looted, raped, killed and screened and detailed Acholi in large numbers.⁴⁰ Many Acholi politicians and others were accused of being rebel collaborators and were arrested, creating even greater resentment among the Acholi people.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the government mobilized Arrow Groups, or local defense units. The NRA then left the Acholi people with little defense as the LRA stepped up brutal attacks or “collective punishment” in retaliation for the government’s actions. Kony continued his practice of abducting children and adults and began to maim and mutilate civilians.⁴² Although some elders originally supported Kony’s rebellion, his use of violence eventually eroded almost all popular support.⁴³ This pattern, of brutal counter-insurgency tactics and widespread retaliation through LRA violence waged against civilians, would repeat throughout the war.

³⁹ Atkinson (2010), p. 9.

⁴⁰ Atkinson (2010), p.11.

⁴¹ Refugee Law Project, *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences, and the Search for Solutions to the LRA War in Northern Uganda* (2004); (accessed March 2011) available from: http://www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers/RLP.WP11.pdf

⁴² Branch, “Political Dilemmas,” p. 178, in Atkinson (2010), p. 12.

⁴³ Refugee Law Project (2004).

After this period of retaliation, the level of LRA activity lulled in 1992 and 1993 and Betty Bigome, Minister for the Pacification of the North, engaged in talks between the Government of Uganda and the LRA/M. These talks failed due to several blockages, including disagreement about the amount of time the LRA should have to assemble and disband: Kony asked for six months and Museveni demanded seven days. After this failed peace attempt, violence again flared. The LRA began to receive support from the Government of Sudan in Khartoum, who sought an ally in their war against the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (which the Government of Uganda had been supporting). The rebel army became a more effective fighting force as a result and also gained haven in South Sudan near Khartoum-backed military installations.⁴⁴ The rebels continued their attacks on civilians in Acholi, sometimes because of specific grievances and sometimes to demonstrate that the government could not protect the people of Acholi. An attack on 300 people in Atiack in 1995, one of the research sites of this study, is one of many examples of the large-scale violence that ended virtually all popular support for the LRA.

During the heightened LRA activity following the failed peace talks, the Government of Uganda began a process of forcing people in Gulu district into "protected villages." While previous displacement had been voluntary and a temporary survival strategy, 200,000 people were now forcibly displaced into camps. The UPDF utilized intimidation, murder and bombing and burning of villages and anyone found

⁴⁴ Atkinson (2010), p. 13.

outside of camps was under threat of being labeled a rebel and killed. Although people had no choice but to go to camps, they were not protected in camps or ensured basic services.⁴⁵ Some reports claim that government forces went so far as to shell villages in order to force people into the camps.⁴⁶ This counter-insurgency tactic has commonly been referred to as a “scorched earth” policy.⁴⁷

Violence continued intermittently, and reached new heights with Operation Iron Fist in 2002. The Sudanese and Ugandan governments met and agreed that the 10,000 UPDF troops could enter southern Sudan to rescue children and go after the LRA. This operation yielded heavy LRA casualties, but many more civilians suffered. Ugandan troops attacked the LRA, bringing brutal retaliation from the LRA that lasted through 2004 and affected civilians beyond the Acholi sub-region.⁴⁸ An additional 400,000 people were displaced as a result of this process and in response, the UPDF increased child recruitment to increase their ranks.⁴⁹

The Government of Uganda reacted to LRA retaliation to Operation Iron Fist by clamping down on their policies regarding displacement camps and the total number of people in camps climbed to approximately two million, including over 90% of Acholi people. The humanitarian situation became even more severe with so many people in

⁴⁵ Atkinson (2010), p. 15.

⁴⁶ The Feinstein International Center, *Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay: Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique (2003)* (accessed March 11, 2011); available from: <https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=21938098>.

⁴⁷ Kennedy Amone-P’Olak, “Coping with Life in Rebel Captivity and the Challenge of Reintegrating Formerly Abducted Boys in Northern Uganda,” *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol 20, No 4, 641-661.

⁴⁸ Refugee Law Project. http://www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers/RLP.WP11.pdf

⁴⁹ Mazurana and McKay.

camps with no means of supporting themselves other than through humanitarian handouts. Many people were in camps, or in and out of camps, for over 10 years. Atkinson writes, “Forced encampment in these conditions meant forced dependency, forced vulnerability, forced humiliation, and forced congestion within camps and forced isolation from outside. The physical, psychological, social and cultural damage caused by forced encampment is almost unimaginable...”⁵⁰

Camp Life and Abduction: The reality for those people subjected to camp life deserves attention given that this recent past sets the stage for this study, which was conducted among Acholi people who were current or former residents of these camps. Amone-P’Olak writes that the IDPs in northern Uganda felt that the ‘villagization’ strategy was aimed to create government control and to breakdown the “alleged resistance of the Acholi people, to make them dependent on handouts, direct their movements, closely monitor them for any signs of rebellion, and above all, to undermine their cultural foundation and local moral world...” Army detachments, placed in camps to protect IDPs, were located in the center of camps, effectively using the camp residents as a dense human shield to outside attack and limiting their own effectiveness and response time.⁵¹ Finnstrom reflects on the feeling among people in these camps that they were severed from the rest of Uganda and from Ugandan nationhood. Military domination was coupled with humanitarian aid, and so survival was tied to dependency. Finnstrom argues that cultural and social agency diminished

⁵⁰ Atkinson (2010), p. 16.

⁵¹ Amone-P’Olak.

under this logic of domination and violence, although he also sheds light on the persistence of hope and resilience even under these conditions of extreme duress.⁵²

Everyone in camps was exposed to physical violence. In 2005, Makerere University partnered with the World Health Organization to conduct a survey of over 2,500 residents of northern Uganda. Their findings lay out in stark terms the extent of the violence that displaced people experienced as a result of war. This violence was perpetrated by the LRA, by government troops, and even by family members: 40% of respondents had been abducted, 31% had a child abducted, 49% were threatened to die, 25% witnessed someone being sexually violated, and 24% had been physically beaten or injured by a family member.⁵³

In camps, psychological trauma and the physical violence of war, inflicted by both government and rebel troops, affected every dimension of life. However, many more deaths occurred from the conditions in the camps than from the casualties of war. In 2005, the World Health Organization estimated that conditions in the camps were resulting in 1,000 excess deaths a week compared to expected mortality rates without the camps, and only 11% of these were casualties of war. Overcrowding contributed to malaria, the first most prevalent cause of death, which disproportionately affected children under five, the majority of whom pertained to

⁵² Finnstrom, p. 132-168.

⁵³ International Center for Transitional Justice, *Forgotten Voices: A Population Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda* (Berkeley 2005) (accessed March 11, 2011); available from: <http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/2/127.pdf>.

families that had no bed nets.⁵⁴

The majority of people in Acholiland and many people in neighboring areas were in camps, but a large minority was missing from these camps because they were abducted by the LRA. The UN has estimated that 20,000 to 25,000 children were abducted during the LRA war. Survey evidence from the Survey on War Affected Youth suggests that at least 66,000 youth between the ages of 14 and 30 were abducted.⁵⁵ Children were used as soldiers, porters, and sexual slaves. Child soldiers were often forced to commit atrocities so that it would make it harder for them to return home. About half as many girls were abducted as boys, but they suffered severely upon abduction. Reportedly, the LRA favored preadolescent girls because they were believed to be free of sexually transmitted diseases and therefore were favored for wives of LRA commanders.⁵⁶

A Failed Peace: In 2005, Khartoum and the SPLA/M signed a peace agreement that ended the north-south Sudanese civil war as well as the military assistance that the LRA provided to the Sudanese government. The LRA began moving west from their main bases and established a base in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic

⁵⁴ World Health Organization, with the Ministry of Health, Republic of Uganda, *Health and Mortality Survey among Internally Displaced Persons in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda* (July 2005), (accessed March 11, 2011); available from: <http://www.who.int/hac/crises/uga/sitreps/Ugandamortsurvey.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Survey on War Affected Youth, *The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda* (accessed March 11, 2011); available from: <http://chrisblattman.com/documents/policy/sway/SWAY.Phase1.FinalReport.pdf>.

⁵⁶ World Health Organization (2005).

of the Congo.⁵⁷ The peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the LRA/M began in 2006 and marked the end of overt violence in northern Uganda and the beginning of a tenuous peace that was never sealed with Kony's signature. For lack of a better term, this period of relative peace and the absent of large scale LRA violence in northern Uganda marks the beginning of the "post-conflict" or "recovery" period.

The new semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan had a vested interest in peace in Uganda and the Vice President, Riek Machar brokered talks which led to a cessation of hostilities in 2006.⁵⁸ Despite Kony's hesitations about the process, in May of 2007 the talks produced agenda items including Agenda Item #2 on Comprehensive Solutions, which addressed issues related to reintegration and economic recovery and led to the Poverty Reduction and Development Plan (discussed later in this study).⁵⁹

The following months were excruciating for those invested in the peace process as Kony balked among rumors that the Government of Uganda was manipulating the peace process. In October of 2008 GoSS president Salva Kirr signaled an end to South Sudan's open ended commitment to the Juba talks and stated a deadline for signing. The peace process ended, in most people's view, in late November 2008 when Kony failed to appear to sign the peace agreement.⁶⁰ The UNDP soon launched Operation

⁵⁷ Conciliation Resources, *Northern Uganda* (accessed March 8, 2011); available from <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda-update/chronology.php>.

⁵⁸ Atkinson (2010), p. 35.

⁵⁹ United States Virtual Presence Post, *Implementation Protocol to Agenda #2 Comprehensive Solutions*, (accessed March 9, 2011); available from http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/images/Yu8DB4YOs2gjURx1jdaNqQ/lra_signedfeb2208.pdf.

⁶⁰ Atkinson (2010), p. 35.

Lighting Thunder, bombing LRA camps in Garamba, DRC. These attacks were widely perceived as ineffective and as provoking predictable retaliation against local civilians without offering any protection (the LRA killed more than 1,000 in the following three months and abducted as many as 200,000). The LRA is still assembled in DRC, western South Sudan and southeastern CAR.⁶¹

International Agencies During the War: Increasingly over the course of the emergency period (especially after 2003), and now in the recovery period, international organizations have been active in the conflict-affected areas of the north, setting up and working in IDP camps, satellite camps, and communities of return. These organizations, despite their good intentions to protect Acholi lives, became suspect to many Acholi people. Because they worked in Uganda, they worked under the auspices of the government. The harshest criticism of the humanitarian aid that was provided during the war is that it facilitated the government's neglect of the camps and implicitly endorsed the government's hated policy of forced encampment.⁶²

Humanitarian aid was co-opted on various levels. Fundamentally, the government did not allocate sufficient funds to deal with a humanitarian crisis that they were either complicit in creating or at least responsible for ending, and humanitarian actors provided funding for the provision of services that were essentially the government's responsibility. Humanitarian aid was also subject to more specific

⁶¹ Atkinson (2010), p. 25-31.

⁶² Humanitarian Policy Group, *Chris Dolan and Lucy Hovil: Humanitarian Protection in Uganda – A Trojan Horse?* (accessed March 14, 2011); available from <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/288.pdf>.

political manipulation. Finnstrom provides an example from during the 1996 elections where people in camps were told that relief and humanitarian assistance would be withdrawn if the NRM were not voted in. The horrendous conditions in camps and the dependence on humanitarian aid, led anthropologist Chris Dolan to call the situation in camps “social torture” and to argue that Uganda’s international partners were complicit in this process.⁶³

Although Dolan points to the complicity of humanitarian agencies in what he refers to as “structural violence” in camps, humanitarian actors exhibited limited power to change the structural conditions in Uganda, and failing to respond to the humanitarian emergency would have constituted an equal or greater negligence in the face of suffering. Attempts to change the structural conditions in Uganda, either through support for the war effort (which would have been outside of the realm of humanitarian organizations but not necessarily their host countries), or through international pressure for better protection for IDPs, was subject to the political will of the Government of Uganda. Gains were made, for instance when Francis Deng went to Uganda on behalf of the UN and worked with officials to create the Policy for Internally Displaced Peoples, but the humanitarian community had limited capacity to hold the government to the principles of the policy.⁶⁴ Regardless of intention or blame, one of the main criticisms and reasons for Acholi suspicion toward humanitarian actors has to

⁶³ Finnstrom, p. 137.

⁶⁴ Chris Dolan and Lucy Hovil, *Humanitarian Protection in Uganda: A Trojan Horse* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from Humanitarian Policy Group: www.hpg.org.

do with the length of the crisis in northern Uganda. Because the emergency in northern Uganda at some point ceased to be an “emergency,” which is by its very nature temporary, the humanitarian response came to be more than a stop-gap measure, and increasingly began to substitute for a state solution to a political conflict.

Meanwhile, some officials in the government felt abused by the international community. The Minister for Crisis Preparedness and Response commented that NGOs should be called “No-Government Organizations” because they try to dictate policy and resist coordination by the government.⁶⁵ Despite the involvement of the international community at increasing levels toward the end of the LRA violence in Uganda, needs still greatly outstripped demand.⁶⁶ Humanitarian aid to northern Uganda was dramatically cut after the LRA-inflicted violence ceased and as the government rolled out the policy of “voluntary returns” to rural communities.⁶⁷

Grievances and the LRA War: Acholi grievance over the events that followed Luwero is only one of several explanations that must be taken into account when attempting to explain the rise of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda. The reasons for the LRA war are complex and often simplified until real meaning is distorted. Grievances paved the way for early LRA recruitment, although these grievances do not easily explain later stages of the conflict when the majority of fighters were abducted

⁶⁵ Interview by Author with Ugandan Government Official (Kampala, Uganda, 04/17/ 2008).

⁶⁶ Interviews with NGO workers and citizens in the north from March-April 2008 showed that this perception is commonly expressed in northern Uganda. Interview by Author with an NGO Official (Gulu, Uganda, 4/7/2008).

⁶⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Uncertain Future for IDPs While Peace Remains Elusive* (accessed November 14, 2009); available from www.internal-displacement.org.

rather than ideologically motivated. This trend can be seen in other wars: Gurr finds that the role of grievances is often pronounced in the beginning stages of conflict, but then gives way to other factors, including group mobilization, leadership, and state response.⁶⁸

Even in the wake of the horrendous LRA war, the grievances expressed in the early days by the LRA are still present and have been exacerbated through the process of war. Finnstrom, an anthropologist who lived with Acholi people in IDP camps, found that although the Acholi people did not embrace the horrendous tactics used, in some cases they agree with the grievances expressed by the LRA.⁶⁹ Now, leaders representing the North frequently speak out against Museveni, showing the continued potency of their negative perceptions. For example, the leader of the Uganda People's Congress, Olara Ottunna, accuses Museveni of implementing the "Luwero formula" in northern Uganda, whereby the army would "commit atrocities and immediately come back and say this was committed by the other side... In Acholi Pii government forces killed and boiled human parts and immediately turned around and said it was the LRA."⁷⁰ Although ethnicity alone cannot explain grievance and violence, understanding the overlays of ethnicity with a myriad of other factors helps to understand the relationship of the Acholi people to the main actors that provide education services: the government and the international community.

⁶⁸ Ted Gurr, *Why Minorities Rebel*, p. 189.

⁶⁹ Finnstrom.

⁷⁰ Finnstrom.

Politics Under Museveni

After taking power in 1986, Museveni again maneuvered ethnic issues to his political advantage. He restricted political-party activities citing the problematic ethnic nature of national political groups and his desire to promote national healing. Museveni argued that in developing societies like Uganda, divisions were unprincipled and based on parochial considerations such as ethnicity, religion and region. Lacking a significant middle class, he argued, it was not possible to practice multiparty democracy.⁷¹ Museveni invited other leaders to join him in a “broad-based” government wherein all people could participate in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) based on individual merit rather than party politics. Importantly, the “no-party” system provided Museveni with a way to neutralize political threats and to boost the appeal of the NRM.⁷²

Ironically, even under the no-party system, virtually every MP joined or was associated with an ethnically-based caucus that represented their ethnic identity. Carbone points out that the formation of these caucuses created a direct contradiction to two fundamental principles of the No Party Movement. First, the Parliament under the No Party system was an individualized assembly, yet these organized arrangements sprung up to fill a need that the assembly was not fulfilling. Second, Museveni had declared war on ethnicity as an organizational principle, yet these caucuses organized

⁷¹ Sabiti Makara, Lise Rakner and Lars Svasand, “Turnaround: The National Resistance Movement and the Reintroduction of a Multiparty System in Uganda,” *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 185 (2009).

⁷² Andrew M. Mwenda, “Personalizing Power in Uganda” *Journal of Democracy*, 18 no. 3 (2007).

around locally defined and relevant issues. Ethnic caucuses showed how difficult it was to get rid of both political organizations and political ethnicities.⁷³

In 2005, Museveni's government passed reforms that greatly strengthened the Executive Branch, including the abolition of both the Human Rights Commission and the two-year term limit for the office of the president. These reforms were reportedly passed with the aid of bribery, blackmail and intimidation. In what Mwenda explains as an attempt to direct attention away from these changes, Museveni's government proposed to reintroduce multi-party political competition. Although candidates would now be allowed to run from opposition parties, Museveni allegedly took measures to ensure his continued power, including intimidation when Besigye gained force as an opponent in 2006. Besigye, the leader of the Democratic Change Party, was jailed on charges of treason plus a rape allegedly committed in 1997 and was not released until almost two-thirds of the campaign period had passed. The Electoral Commission's finding that Museveni won the re-election with 59% of the vote is contested by Mwenda and others.⁷⁴

Although both Museveni and Besigye are from western Uganda, voting patterns in the 2005 elections showed that regional politics played a defining role in electoral outcomes. Although the ruling NRM party maintained a strong lead in Western Uganda and the Central Regions, in both the presidential and parliamentary elections,

⁷³ Giovanni Carbone, *No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 177.

⁷⁴ Mwenda.

opposition candidates prevailed in the northern districts.⁷⁵

Today, the regional patterns of support continue. For northern Uganda, this dynamic creates challenges that overshadow reconstruction efforts. Opposition party members from, or allied with, the North accuse Museveni and others from the National Resistance Movement Party of negligence or worse in northern Uganda. Similarly, members of the NRM may feel that their attempts are futile because, in the words of one Member of Parliament (MP), “anything the ruling party tries to do the people in the North will discredit it.” In this environment of suspicion, the people of the North suffer. Whatever actions the ruling party takes to improve the situation in northern Uganda will be criticized and labeled inadequate or corrupt. Because the ruling party will not be praised or appreciated by constituents in the North for their efforts, they may see less potential political gain in response to investments in the recovery process. In the case of northern leaders, inadequacies in development and services can be used for political advantage, and so in a perverse way, failures and underdevelopment are politically useful.

Clearly, in modern times, as in the colonial period, identity continues to play a role that overlaps with economic, social, and political forces. Because conflict and grievance has occurred along lines that can be described as ethnic, ethnicity continues to be a part of the dialogue in Uganda. Identity issues are not confined to the north – south conflict. Conflict between other identity groups and the central government

⁷⁵ Carbone, p. 198.

continue to flare. For instance, in September of 2009, riots erupted over a dispute between the Kabaka (leader) of the Buganda Kingdom and the central government when the Kabaka was allegedly barred from visiting part of his kingdom.⁷⁶

Socio-Economic Impacts of War and Education

The experience of war in northern Uganda has led to greater overlap between identity issues and economic factors or, in Stewart's terms, the "horizontal inequality" affecting Acholi people. The poverty that affects northern Uganda is chronic,⁷⁷ and is highly likely to be passed on to future generations.⁷⁸

As a result of violence and displacement in northern Uganda, the region has fallen even further behind the rest of the country than before the LRA war. Poverty indicators provide evidence of the economic exclusion of northern Ugandans in the post-war period. The Ministry of Finance reported that if real consumption had grown during the period between 1992 and 2003 in northern Uganda at the same rate as the rest of Uganda, real consumption in the Northern Region would be 38% higher and

⁷⁶All Africa, *The Nation's 60 Year Old Conflict* (accessed May 2, 2010); available from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201001250132.html>.

⁷⁷ According to Hulme and Shepard, those that remain poor for five or more years; pass on poverty to subsequent generations; and/or die a preventable poverty-related death can be defined as chronically poor. Corcoran and Yaqub in Hulme in David Hulme and Andrew Shepherd, "Conceptualizing Chronic Poverty," *World Development* 31, no 3 (2003), pp 403-423.

⁷⁸ Empirical studies show that war increases the likelihood of chronic poverty and that those that stay poor for five years or more have a high probability of passing on that poverty to subsequent generations. The potential for households to fall into chronic poverty during and after conflict is heightened by the combined effect of the loss of human, financial, physical, natural, political and social capital as a result of war and displacement. Orero, et al find that the chronic poverty inflicted by war can be passed on to subsequent generations, particularly because it can irreversibly disrupt the provision of basic goods and services like food, healthcare, and education at critical junctures in individuals' lives. Max Baldwin Orero, Charlotte Heime, Suzanne Jarvis Cutler and Sarah Mohaupt, *The Impact of Conflict on the Intergenerational Transmission of Chronic Poverty* (Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2007).

aggregate national consumption would be 3.3% higher.⁷⁹ The GoU also recognizes that the Northern Region suffers from a high risk of HIV/AIDs due to conflict-related factors such as rape and the commoditization of sex (with soldiers being the main buyers) as well as other factors such as low education.⁸⁰ The socio-economic setbacks in northern Uganda deepen the cleavages between North and South, and particularly for the Acholi.⁸¹

Of particular interest to this study is the impact that the war had on education. This cannot be divorced from the impact that the war had on children more broadly. Although the extent to which a pre-war/post-war comparison of the state of education in northern Uganda is limited due to the scant data for the tumultuous years before and during the war, the following paragraphs discuss the impact of the war on education and youth.

The Survey on War Affected Youth (SWAY) provides invaluable information about various dimensions of youth life collected through large scale surveys of male and female youth in Acholiland. Findings are drawn from over 1000 household surveys and interviews with 750 male youth and 619 female youth in Acholiland between 2005 and 2007. This study was foundational in the author's understanding of the breadth of need in northern Uganda, as well as the opportunity for actors to better align

⁷⁹ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. *Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004/5-2007/8)*, accessed May 3, 2010; available from <http://www.finance.go.ug/docs/PEAP%202005%20Apr.pdf>.

⁸⁰ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Case of Northern Uganda* (Kampala, Office of the Prime Minister, 2003).

⁸¹ Finnstrom.

themselves to meet these needs. The findings from the SWAY reports on female and male youth provide critical insights which support the following analysis. As the SWAY reports note, “youth have been both the primary victims and the primary actors in the two-decade long war in northern Uganda.”⁸² Understanding their reality during the war and the way it affects their prospects is of critical importance to post-conflict recovery.

Violence, Abduction and Return: Because the LRA used abduction as their primary mode of building their fighting force, and usually targeted youth, as many as one third of Acholi male youth and one sixth of Acholi female youth experienced abduction of at least one week. Although the experiences of these abducted youth varied, most witnessed or were victim to high levels of violence and some also perpetrated violence against other abductees, civilians and/or soldiers. Abducted youth were used as soldiers, porters, and cooks and one fourth of abducted girls were also given to commanders and soldiers as “forced wives.” Little abduction occurred since 2006, when a ceasefire was signed between the LRA and the Government of Uganda.⁸³

Reception centers played an increasing role as the conflict progressed. Groups such as World Vision and the Gulu Support the Children Organization received children returning from the bush and attempted to offer psychological support and medical services and to facilitate reunification with families. After the Amnesty Act was passed

⁸² The Survey of War Affected Youth, *Special Report on Women and Girls for the Juba Peace Process*, (accessed March 11, 2011); available from <https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pagelD=21938098>.

⁸³ Jeannie Annan, Moriah Brier, and Filder Aryemo, “From “Rebel” to “Returnee””: Daily Life and Reintegration for Young Soldiers in Northern Uganda, *Journal of Adolescent Research*, Vol 24 (2009), p. 639-667.

in 2002, these centers also played a role in helping youth to get their amnesty certificates. Despite the important function that these centers played, they did not attract all returning youth, especially in the case of girls. Half of male youth went straight home, and among girls, spontaneous (or self) reintegration was the most common mode of return. Because of this, many returnees did not receive the physical, material and/or psychosocial assistance offered in the reception centers.⁸⁴ The stigma that girls face returning from the bush, where they often experienced forms of sexual violence, may have been a factor in their avoidance of reception centers. Reception centers may have also been unable to signal to girls that they could offer adequate protection from the other returnees and other dangers.

According to the SWAY project, the majority of youth were able to return to their communities without experiencing major forms of discrimination. The reception at home by family and community was generally found to be strong and positive.⁸⁵ However, for some youth the thought of returning to rural communities was excruciating. The practice of “burning the bridge” was a tactic used by the LRA wherein abductees were forced to kill family or community members so that they would not be able to return home. Fear of retribution, guilt, and shame explain why many youth will never feel comfortable going back to their communities. A study of male youth in northern Uganda in 2006 showed that for these reasons, relocating to an urban center

⁸⁴ Mazurana and McKay.

⁸⁵ Annan, et al (2006).

or joining the army was preferable to some former abductees.⁸⁶

Youth Physical and Psychosocial Health: The SWAY project found that the psychosocial health of male youth surveyed in 2005 and 2006 was remarkably robust. Two thirds of youth reported low to medium amounts of emotional distress, despite the many traumatic incidents that most youth had survived. Over 90% reported high levels of social functioning and low levels of aggression. Only a small percentage of female youth experienced disabling symptoms of emotional distress (although emotional distress was understandably higher among those who were forced wives and/or mothers in the LRA because of their increased exposure to violence). One in six girls reported problematic family relationships, but this was not because of being abducted, although forced mothers that had problems with family relationships were less likely to experience improvements over time. Family connectedness, peers and social support were a key protective factor promoting the psychosocial well-being of youth.⁸⁷

Although youth have shown themselves to be emotionally resilient, many cannot escape the physical trauma they have suffered as a result of war. Nearly a sixth of male youth were found to suffer from a serious injury or illness that inhibited their ability to work, and nearly a third of these injuries were inflicted by the LRA. Two-fifths of male youth and one-fourth of female youth were found to eat just once a day.⁸⁸ After returning home, many female youth continue to experience violence, this time in the

⁸⁶ Amone-P'Olak.

⁸⁷ Jeannie Annan, Christopher Blattman and Roger Horton, *The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda* (Unicef Uganda, 2006); Annan et al, 2008.

⁸⁸ Annan, et al (2006).

form of domestic abuse. The SWAY survey found that formerly-abducted females reported experiencing more sexually violent events than non-abducted females and that 13% of female youth reported experiencing domestic violence by a family member or husband in the previous two months.⁸⁹

Opportunities: Education and Livelihoods: The war uniquely impacted education facilities, personnel, and potential learners. In cases where schools were reasonably secure, they could provide learners with some protection by promoting a sense of normalcy. However schools in communities were often more often unsafe, especially because the LRA specifically targeted schools for abductions.⁹⁰ In one study conducted in 2005 of 134 abducted boys, 37 out of 41 boys who were abducted during the day were abducted from school.⁹¹ The chilling account of the Aboke girls of northern Uganda details the extent to which the LRA targeted children who were physically in their schools, in this case, well educated girls who would be a prize for high level commanders and drew high level attention to the LRA's activities.⁹² The LRA also took schools as strongholds or temporary shelters while they waged war. When communities fled or were relocated to camps, they could no longer maintain community schools sites and so schools fell apart over time. Under these conditions, expecting

⁸⁹ Annan, et al (2008).

⁹⁰ Women's Commission, *Learning in a War Zone: Education in Northern Uganda* (New York, 2005). According to this source, over 28,000 children were abducted into the LRA army and 80% of the fighting forces are children. The Survey for War Affected Youth (SWAY) suggests a more accurate framing and estimate may be at least 66,000 youth between the ages of 14 and 30. Annan, et al (2006).

⁹¹ Amone-P'Olak.

⁹² Els de Temmerman, *Aboke Girls* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001).

children to sit and learn productively in schools day after day is unimaginable. In camps, crowded and under-resourced Learning Centers substituted for normal schools.⁹³

Thousands of children commuted long distances at night to sleep in churches or centers where they felt safer from abduction (given the prevalence of abductions from huts at night) and sometimes in order to be able to attend the schools that continued classes during the day.⁹⁴ These “night commuters” poured into town centers from rural areas, seeking refuge for the night before returning home in the morning, all the while horrifically exposed to theft, violence and abuse.⁹⁵ Clearly, the capacity of these children to learn in a classroom was horrifically compromised.

The majority of youth were school-going before they were abducted and suffered a loss to their education as a result of the severe disruption of their lives and the time spent in the bush rather than in the classroom.⁹⁶ Obstacles to returning to school include those related to the costs and opportunity costs of going to school, as well as the shame of being in a classroom with younger students. For the 30% of female youth that returned from rebel groups with children, stigma and the responsibilities of caring for their children were highly likely to make a return to school impossible. As a result, girls who returned from the bush were found to have an average of a third fewer

⁹³ The Government of Uganda strategy for providing education during the war centered on these Learning Centers, which were conglomerations of various displaced schools that offered classes within camps.

⁹⁴ Interview by Author with NGO Official (Lira, Uganda, 03/19/2008).

⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Abducted and Abused* (accessed March 11, 2010); available from <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12306/section/2>.

⁹⁶ Amone-P'Olak.

years of education.⁹⁷

The primary education school system was effective in the most basic sense during the war, as both male and female youth were generally able to enroll in primary school. Amazingly, despite the war, primary education enrolment in northern Uganda nearly tripled from 1996 to 2006 because of the introduction of free primary education in 1996 and the close proximity of Learning Centers to families living in IDP camps. During this period, UPE and camp life may have both contributed to the slight increase in the ratio of girls in school.⁹⁸ The Gender Parity Index for primary school students, a measure of the difference between male and female enrolment, reduced from 8% to 6% from 1996 to 2006.⁹⁹

A significant minority of youth reported being functionally illiterate, both because they could not access education and because of the dearth of remedial programming (one out of five male youth and one in three female youth reported being functionally illiterate). Many learners struggle to attend school consistently because of direct and indirect costs of school, and during the conflict years, because of abductions. Lack of consistent attendance is a factor in the high repetition rates: up to a quarter in

⁹⁷ Mazurana and McKay.

⁹⁸ Annan et al (2008).

⁹⁹ GER represents the total number of children who are enrolled in school divided by the number of children at school going age. For this reason, when many children who are over or under age are enrolled, this percentage can be greater than 100%. The Net Enrollment Rate represents the total number of children who are enrolled in school divided by the total number of children of school going age. This is generally a better indicator of enrollment, but the figures that are available for northern Uganda are highly unreliable and are therefore not included. Report on Educational Needs Assessment for Northern Uganda. Ministry of Education and Sports (Education Planning Department).

2006.¹⁰⁰

The poor quality of schools in northern Uganda also explains repetitions and low literacy rates. Schools in northern Uganda suffered during the war from a shortfall in teachers and classrooms and children routinely underperform compared to other regions. The Pupil-Teacher Ratio in primary schools grew from 47:1 in 1996 to 67:1 in 2006, compared to the national average of 48:1. At the primary level, the number of children obtaining Division I (the highest achievement category on national exams) increased only 1% in 13 years, from 4% in 1989 to 5% in 2006, remaining far behind the national average of 24% in 2006. Few female teachers are willing to teach in the conflict-affected rural areas due to fears about continuing insecurity and inadequate facilities for women.¹⁰¹

Although primary school enrollment is relatively high, few males, and even fewer females make the transition to secondary school. Access at the secondary level in the north lags far behind the national average and there has been little progress over the last decade. Gender ratios at the secondary level remain heavily slanted towards boys: In Pader, boys are three times as likely to be enrolled in secondary as girls.¹⁰² The economic returns to education are substantial and so youth continue to look to

¹⁰⁰ At both primary and secondary levels repetition and desertion increase the cost of producing graduates and also reflect on the quality of education in the school system.

¹⁰¹ Interview by Author with Government Official (Lira, Uganda, 03/23/2008).

¹⁰² GER represents the total number of children who are enrolled in school divided by the number of children at school going age. For this reason, when many children who are over or under age are enrolled, this percentage can be greater than 100%. The Net Enrollment Rate represents the total number of children who are enrolled in school divided by the total number of children of school going age. This is generally a better indicator of enrollment, but the figures that are available for northern Uganda are highly unreliable and are therefore not included.

education as an important strategy for improving their lives.¹⁰³

Economic options open to youth are scant. Casual labor is the most common form of livelihood for youth. The median male youth surveyed by the SWAY project reported having paid work just 7 days per month and to earn 55 cents per day.¹⁰⁴ Most surveyed female youth (in 2006) were found to work less than two days a week and to earn at a level comparable to men. Brewing alcohol was the most popular source of income among surveyed female youth (agriculture was second) given the low level of capital that is required for brewing as well as the ability to work concurrently with household activities.¹⁰⁵ With increasing returns to ancestral lands, subsistence agriculture takes on increasing importance for male and female youth.

Grievances and a Conflict-Prevention Approach in Northern Uganda

The sections above have analyzed aspects of the Acholi world view related to the LRA war, the conflict with the NRM in Luwero Triangle, and other aspects of history dating back to colonial times. The understanding of the relationship of the Acholi people to the state, and to the international community that has been involved in Uganda and supports provision of education services, sets the stage for the following findings related to education in northern Uganda and the potential for conflict prevention.

¹⁰³ Annan et al (2006).

¹⁰⁴ Annan et al (2006).

¹⁰⁵ Annan et al (2008).

PART TWO: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: EDUCATION AND CONFLICT

This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between education, conflict and conflict prevention in a post-conflict environment where national and international actors are involved. Each of the three aforementioned concepts is broad and boasts a tremendous corresponding body of literature, and so it is important to define the aspects of the concepts and their relationships that are most important to this study. The following examines each component of this triad individually and in detail and well as the most relevant aspects of their linkages.

Education: This dissertation is most concerned with education as it is delivered in an international context, with a range of actors including: students and their families, government officials and providers at all levels, international funders, non-government organizations, and local and national officials. Literature of the international education field reveals three prevailing approaches to education, each of which are reviewed briefly below and then in detail in the subsequent chapter. The literature review conducted for this dissertation focuses on these approaches to education given the hypothesis that examination of these approaches will shed light on the stated research question. In the case of each of these approaches, operational priorities stem from the theoretical underpinnings and are discussed in a subsequent chapter.

The humanitarian approach to education is based on the fundamental belief that

education is a right that must be protected at all times, including during emergencies. Humanitarian action has been linked to humanitarian law since inception and more recently to the growing body of human rights law and refugee law, both of which enshrine children's right to education. Although education was not always funded as a core component of humanitarian aid, education actors have succeeded in securing a small but important and growing place for education within humanitarian responses.¹ The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies has made important gains in terms of providing guidelines and standards to guide humanitarian agencies working in conflict and crisis.² The humanitarian approach to education is based on the imperative to protect children during war (further discussed in the following paragraphs on education and conflict). This dissertation focuses on the impact that the humanitarian intervention had on access to education and ramifications in the post-conflict period.

The author determined two main streams within the second approach; the development approach. The first, a human-centered development approach, heralds from a thoughtful tradition that embraces the many facets of poverty and freedom.³ In theoretical terms, human-centered development aims to create the conditions whereby individuals have the capabilities necessary to claim their rights and to live full lives. In operational terms, human-centered development actors often work to alleviate poverty by addressing unmet needs. Because education plays an important role in determining

¹ Fumiyo Kagawa, "Emergency Education: A Critical Review of the Field," *Comparative Education* 41, no. 4 (2005): 487–503.

² Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies: www.inee.org.

³ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Random House, 1999).

people's access to opportunity, education is critical component of human-centered development.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) make the broad vision of a human-centered development approach operational by recognizing the various facets of poverty and seeking to galvanize actors around measurable goals to eradicate poverty by 2015. In terms of education, the international community has coalesced to the greatest extent around Goal #2: Achieve Universal Primary Education. MDG #2 builds on the international advocacy effort that led to the formulation of the Education for All goals (the result of the 1990 World Conference on Education for All).⁴ This dissertation examines the impact of the emphasis on primary education (and corresponding visible indicators of progress in the primary sub-sector) and the way that this emphasis has influenced the post-conflict agenda and donor interaction in Uganda.

The predecessor to the human-centered focus of the development approach is an economic-growth focus to educational development. This approach focuses on the belief that higher economic growth will improve the quality of life for all. Theoretical underpinnings of this approach relate to the role of human capital in overall economic development and are quantified in a variety of studies that show public and private returns to investments in education.⁵ Within the literature about economic growth, there is debate about the most effective way to invest in order to stimulate returns. For

⁴ Peter Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005).

⁵ Paul Shultz, "Returns to Education," in *Handbook of Development Economics*, ed. by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (Amsterdam, Elsevier Science Publishing Company, 1988), 542-630.

some, the focus is on investments that will yield an increase in gross national income, assuming that an overall increase in wealth will be used efficiently and/or will trickle down and thereby reduce poverty overall.⁶ More recently, economists have explored the importance of investing in ways that allow the poor to share in the potential for economic growth, thereby promoting equity and social mobility and more effectively reducing poverty.⁷ Certain types of investments in education and in agriculture have been put forward as particularly important for this type of inclusive, pro-poor growth.⁸ It is widely accepted that economic growth is necessary in order to reduce poverty, but advocates of pro-poor growth argue that simply ensuring economic growth without examining the distribution is not a sufficient strategy for poverty reduction. This dissertation examines the impact of policies in the education sector in Uganda that aim for economic growth through investments in education, regardless of the distribution of those investments and the corresponding potential growth.

The third approach is a conflict-prevention approach that recognizes that education can play a role in either promoting or preventing future conflicts; therefore

⁶ Trickle-down economics was common in development thinking in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the notion that maximizing economic growth will reduce poverty is increasingly questioned, a fairly recent study provides evidence that economic growth reduces poverty dollar for dollar. David Dollar and Aart Kraay, "Growth is Good for the Poor," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 7 (no. 3), 195-225 in Asian Development Bank, *What is Pro-Poor Growth?* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from: <http://www.adb.org/poverty/forum/pdf/ProPoor.pdf>.

⁷ Martin Ravallion, *Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from: <http://web.usal.es/~bustillo/RavallionPPGPrimer.pdf>.

⁸ Economic Commission for Africa, *Pro-Poor Growth Strategies in Africa* (accessed March 1, 2011); available from: http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Meetings_Events/espd/poorgrowth/Gauci_and_Gueye.pdf.

actors should analyze interventions from a conflict-sensitive perspective.⁹ A conflict prevention approach to education can only be understood in the context of the relationship between education and conflict. For this reason, the following sections examine not only literature that pertains to conflict prevention, but also aspects of the broader literatures on education and conflict that are of particular relevance to this study.

Conflict: Given the context of the LRA war in Uganda, this dissertation focuses most on the aspects of the literature regarding conflict which can be applied to intra-state wars. Wars within countries often have a communal bent and fundamentally challenge the sovereignty and power of the state. There has been an increase in these types of wars since the end of the Cold War and in some cases the causes of war are relatively new. However, in many cases, including Uganda, it has been argued that a fundamental root cause of war can be traced back to the colonial policies that arbitrarily drew lines around and through diverse groups of people, determining their shared fate as citizens of one country or another.¹⁰

The broad literature on conflict includes volumes about the causes, onset and prolongation of violent conflict; conflict management; mediation and negotiation, and

⁹ Among others, Bush and Sartarelli have written about the way that education can either promote conflict or conflict prevention. Other authors contributions to this theory are discussed in the following paragraphs. Bush and Sartarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict* (Italy): UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, 2000).

¹⁰ Richard H. Shultz, "State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis" *Annals of American Academy of Political Science*, Vol 541, Small Wars (September 1995), pp 75-88.

peace-building.¹¹ Because this study focuses on a service that is delivered by the state or other actors with significant resources, factors that create the potential for conflict and can be affected by the distribution of development resources related to education are of primary interest.

This study is concerned with the *potential* for a return to conflict. For this reasons, Rubin, Pruitt and Kim's writing on the social factors that encourage the potential for conflict that are of great relevance to this study. The authors posit that periods of rapidly expanding achievement or opportunity can give rise to expectations that outstrip reality. If this is the case, when the level of opportunity decreases, conflict is especially likely to occur. The authors also find that conflict is encouraged when one party develops the awareness that the other party is of no greater merit, yet they are afforded greater privilege. This leads to an invidious comparison through which aspirations rise, based on the feeling that the other party does not have the right or the merit to continue to monopolize the privileges in question. The authors also note that social mobility helps to discourage conflict because true social mobility invalidates invidious comparisons. If everyone knows someone who has rose from disadvantaged beginnings, than no person can fully claim to be held back by an unfair ruling group.¹² These insights will be explored in the context of the increased access to education and resulting increased expectations around education that occurred during the war.

¹¹ Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies* (Oxon: Routledge Publisher, 2009).

¹² Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict, Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1994), 19.

Because this study focuses on education, a service delivered mainly by the state, structural considerations that drive the distribution of this service are important. Authors writing in the conflict field identify structural exclusions as a form of violence and/or a source of grievance that can be mobilized. Galtung argues that when a group monopolizes resources or uses them for means other than the development of the populace, then excluded people's actual levels of realization are below their potential. In Galtung's words, this constitutes indirect or "structural violence."¹³ Kabwegyere, a Ugandan who studied under Galtung, goes on to argue that the presence of structural violence in Uganda in the post-colonial period set the stage for future uses of violence against the ruling elite.¹⁴ Stewart writes about horizontal inequalities, a related concept. When identity groups experience economic exclusion, the resulting horizontal inequality may transform into significant grievances against the state that can create the potential for violence. More broadly, Stewart argues that groups' relative performance in economic, social and political dimensions is an important source of individual welfare and can cause political and social instability.¹⁵ The notion that groups that are excluded from economic or other benefits may experience a form of structural violence and that the inequalities that they experience (or perceive) may drive them into conflict with the state provides a framework for understanding why local leaders' grievances related to

¹³ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.

¹⁴ Kabwegyere.

¹⁵ United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research, Francis Stewart: Horizontal Inequalities, A Neglected Dimension of Development (accessed February 17, 2010); available from <http://www.wider.unu.edu>).

education create a potential for conflict in northern Uganda.

The Acholi people in northern Uganda have a shared identity that overlaps with common experiences of social and ethnic marginalization as a result of the war, but also other underlying factors. Conflict literature points to the importance of understanding ethnicity and grievances associated with identity because ethnicity can be mobilized by actors who seek political or other gains from conflict. The extent to which ethnic identity is truly a driver of conflict is debated extensively in the literature, with arguments falling into three camps. The primordialist school of thought, now seldom embraced, sees ethnic identity as absolute and a fundamental driver of human behavior. The starkest examples of primordialist (or essentialist) ethnic studies may include endeavors to measure and specifically describe the physical attributes of groups as evidence of their distinctness. More common in recent literature are the social-constructivist approach and the instrumentalist approach. Both reject the idea of ethnicity as an objective fact, but rather discuss ethnicity as a concept that has meaning because of a shared set of circumstances and experiences. The social-constructivist approach lays out a vision of ethnicity as having gained meaning through fluid and changing historical and cultural events. The instrumentalist approach emphasizes the extent to which ethnicity exists as a means to an end: Individuals or groups with a political and/or economic agenda mobilize ethnicity in order to garner support and

wage conflict.¹⁶

Review of Acholi literature shows that the Acholi ethnic identity pre-dates colonialism and is tied to the characteristics and culture of the Acholi kingdom, but that identity was further constructed as a result of interaction with colonialists and missionaries. Additionally, instrumentalist actors have repeatedly mobilized ethnicity as a way of promoting political outcomes, and identity has become further entrenched through conflict dynamics and corresponding shared experiences.

Conflict literature points to the importance of grievances held among an identity group as an indicator of the potential for conflict. Grievances held by an ethnic group do not provide a sufficient condition to predict violent conflict. Marginalized groups exist all over the world, including in the United States, and only in a minority of cases do these groups wage violent conflict against their government or any other group. Similarly, it would be incorrect to state that all conflicts involving ethnic groups can be explained neatly by horizontal inequalities. Even in the case at hand, one in which grievances ran deep among the Acholi population, these grievances offer only a small part of the explanation of the LRA war. Except for in the early days of the war, fighters did not join the LRA guerilla army by choice. Fighters were mostly abducted and so the question of whether or not they had grievances against the state was somewhat irrelevant. Rather than attempt to discuss grievances as an immediate predictor of

¹⁶ A useful description of the primordialist approach, the instrumentalist approach, and the ascriptive approach to ethnic studies is reviewed in the follow text: Ashley J. Tellis, Thomas S. Szayna, and James A. Winnefeld, *Anticipating Ethnic Conflict* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 1997).

conflict or individuals' decision to take up arms, grievances among an ethnic group can be understood as an indication of the *potential* for violent conflict. From this lens, grievances deserve the attention of the state and the international community, not because they necessarily caused the LRA war, but because they create the *potential* for future wars.

Conflict Prevention: A conflict-prevention approach to development emerged in response to the recognition that under-development creates insecurity that affects the global community and that development can exacerbate or mitigate the potential for conflict. In 1995, then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali, wrote about new types of conflict within states and the need for post-conflict peace-building to avoid lapses or relapses into conflict. He later endorsed the importance of economic and social development as the basis for lasting peace, setting the stage for a conflict prevention approach to development.¹⁷ In 2000, the UN Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations took this line of thinking further and argued that humanitarian and development work should be viewed through a conflict sensitive lens.¹⁸ In 2001, then Secretary General Kofi Annan pledged to move the UN to a conflict prevention focus and emphasized the importance of structural causes of conflict, including economic and social under-development.¹⁹

¹⁷ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. A/50/60;1995/1.

¹⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations 2000* (accessed February 16, 2010); available from http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

¹⁹ Kofi Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General* (New York: United Nations

In response to the UN Report in 2000, Wood wrote a report for the United Nations Development Program that further defined the principles of conflict prevention approach to development. Peace-building is understood as the umbrella term for actions that are “aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompass a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.” “Conflict-prevention” falls under the broader peace-building umbrella and in the broader peace-building field refers to measures taken to keep low-level or long-festering disputes from escalating into violence or increasing levels of violence, but can also include early warning systems, confidence building measures, preventative deployments and sanctions.²⁰ When considering a conflict-prevention approach to *development*, the emphasis is on the long-term attempt to integrate the assessment of risk factors related to conflict and attempts to address these factors into normal development processes and cooperation. Wood argued for the need to identify the “untapped potential” of development as part of a comprehensive UN approach to peace-building and conflict prevention.

Wood emphasizes the importance of development actors’ vigilance when setting the objectives and content of development programs so that social exclusion and inequality is addressed. This requires a substantial understanding of the country in question, but also the ability to listen to and learn from a wide range of actors – and this

Department of Public Information, 1994).

²⁰ *USIP Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding* (accessed March 5, 2011); available from: www.usip.org.

must include those actors who are affected by violent conflict. A conflict-prevention approach thus demands that development actors understand the impact of conflict on equality, inclusion and poverty eradication aims, and that they propagate and maintain a culture of consciousness around risks and opportunities.²¹

Having briefly examined education, conflict and conflict-prevention and the aspects of the relevant literatures that are most important to this study, it is now important to discuss the most relevant aspects of the relationship between education and the potential for conflict.

Education and Conflict: A growing field of literature explores the role of education during and after crisis. This field has often been referred to as “education in emergencies and reconstruction.” Pigozzi, in a paper for UNICEF in 1999, defined this field by referring to the types of emergencies that it encompasses: both natural disasters and man-made conflict, including civil strife or wars (also referred to as “complex emergencies”). The logic of the education in emergencies and reconstruction field is fundamentally driven by a human-rights approach and refers to the conventions related to children’s rights to education (including the Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child). The emphasis on reconstruction also stresses the idea that education is not purely an emergency or a stop gap measure, but rather an opportunity for transformation through the rebuilding of the education system. In Pigozzi's words, crises "allow for the possibility of reconstructing a social

²¹ Bernard Wood, “Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building,” (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2001).

institution that helps develop and form the human resources that determine the way a society functions."²² The Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies has been fundamental in the creation and distribution of knowledge about the dynamics of education in emergencies and strategies to protect the right to education and reconstruction education systems after conflict.²³

The concept of education and fragility builds on the lessons and the momentum of the education in emergencies and reconstruction field. However, where the education in emergencies field emphasizes human rights and protection, the education and fragility literature emphasizes the need to study and fund education for the sake of mitigating state fragility and promoting stability. Miller-Grandvaux explains the link between education and fragility and national security in the US. In 2002, President Bush's National Security Strategy elevated development to the "third pillar" of US foreign policy (the other pillars being defense and diplomacy), recognizing that underdevelopment is a national security threat to the US. In response, USAID formulated a fragile states strategy in 2005. Although the definition of a "fragile state" created much debate, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development definition states that states are fragile, "when governments and state structures lack capacity and/or political will to deliver safety and security, good governance, and

²² Joy Pigozzi for UNICEF, *Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach* (accessed March 14, 2011); available from: http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/documents/store/Pigozzi_Education_in_Emergencies_and_for_Reconstruction_1999.pdf.

²³ Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies.

poverty reduction to their citizens.”²⁴ Various indices rank states according to factors that measure fragility, including the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, which measures economic, political, social, and physical security. This index would consider Uganda a weak or a fragile state: because of low ratings for security and economic welfare, Uganda is ranked as the 27th weakest state, just after Rwanda (24th) and just before Djibouti (38th).²⁵

Both the education in emergencies literature and the education and fragility literature recognize the need to understand the way that conflict disrupts education, how education can promote conflict, and how education can promote peace and stability. In a sense, education and fragility is a broader concept because it refers not only to countries that are in or recovering from conflict, but to any state where fragility is a factor. Despite the overlap between the material that is covered and prioritized by these literatures, the emphasis is slightly different. Education in emergencies literature is rooted in human rights and places more emphasis on protection *during* emergencies, while education and fragility literature is concerned with security and places more emphasis on actions in the *pre- or post-conflict stage* in order to promote peace and stability.²⁶ This dissertation is concerned with understanding the impact of the LRA conflict on education, but the emphasis of the study is on understanding the

²⁴ Yolande Miller-Grandvaux, “Education and Fragility: A New Framework,” *Journal of Education for International Development*, Vol 4, no 1 (2009).

²⁵ Brookings, *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* (accessed March 14); available from http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_states_index_basket_scores_pullout.pdf.

²⁶ Yolande Miller-Grandvaux.

contribution of education to conflict or conflict prevention. Given that this study focuses on the post-conflict period as well as the objective of peace and security (rather than the protection of education rights) this study can be located more specifically within the education and fragility framework.

Conflict's impact on education: Because of war's deleterious effect on human development, violent conflict is often referred to as "development in reverse."²⁷ However, the extent to which war affects development is context specific and depends on a variety of factors, including the length and intensity of the conflict and the groups that were implicated in violence and most harmed.²⁸ The following discussion of conflict's impact on education relates to *violent* conflict, recognizing that conflict is an inevitable and often constructive part of any learning, development, or political process.

UNESCO and other actors have advanced the understanding of the ways and the extent to which conflict affects education. In "Protecting Education from Attack" O'Malley, *et al* takes stock of the many forms of attack that are waged upon education during times of conflict. Two of the types of attacks on education that the report mentions are clearly seen in northern Uganda: abductions (sometimes directly from schools) and the use of education institutions as military/security bases. Common motivations for attacks on education include those seen in northern Uganda: to oppose

²⁷ It is difficult to isolate the extent to which war causes poverty versus the extent to which poverty causes war. However, there is a strong correlation between instances of war and instances of poverty which point to a vicious cycle between the two conditions: Of the 40 poorest countries in the world, 24 are either in the midst of armed conflict or have only recently emerged from it." UK Government White Paper, *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor* in Smith and Vaux.

²⁸ Buckland.

the government (where education or other institutions might be perceived as a symbol of the state), to create instability, to abduct children in order to augment fighting forces, and to silence any opposing groups or exact revenge.²⁹ Attacks on education can be vicious and widespread. During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, teachers were seen as a symbol of the elite and were singled out in widespread killings. The education ministry was brought to a standstill because of the violence, but also because it was shelled.³⁰

The impact of attacks on students, education staff and communities throughout the world are widespread and are both immediate and long-term. Learning and teaching is severely limited under conditions of attack due to physical insecurity and psychosocial ramifications. Brain-drain may result as people flee dangerous regions and teachers refuse to teach in insecure areas. As education and employment cycles are disrupted, a generation of youth may be undereducated and therefore frustrated by a lack of opportunity.³¹

Nicholi and Triplehorn have written extensively about the impact of conflict on learning. They find that children's cognitive development is harmed during war, given that literacy, numeracy and critical thinking skills are delayed as a result of the dynamics mentioned above. Conflict exacerbates many of the conditions that are seen in poor countries, making sufficient teacher training and provision of materials less likely, and

²⁹ Brenden O'Malley, *Protecting Education From Attack: A State-of-the-Art Review* (Paris: UNESCO, 2011).

³⁰ Anna Obura, *Never Again: Education Reconstruction in Rwanda* (Paris, IIEP, 2003).

³¹ O'Malley.

increasing the stress on teachers, which can translate to a greater use of authoritarian teaching methods, including corporal punishment.³² The impact of conflict in a holistic sense on children and youth cannot be overemphasized. As stated in a foundational study by Machel on children and conflict,

“Not only are large numbers of children killed and injured, but countless others grow up deprived of their material and emotional needs, including the structures that give meaning to social and cultural life. The entire fabric of their societies – their homes, schools, health systems, and religious institutions – are torn to pieces.”³³

In recognition of the widespread impact of conflict on education, the notion that education must be protected during emergencies has gained force over the past two decades. Not only is education seen as a right that must be protected, but education is seen as a way of protecting children’s sense of normalcy and their other rights. According to Nicholai and Triplehorn, education began to gain recognition in humanitarian terms in the early 1990s through initiatives such as Norwegian Refugee Councils’ campaign to include education as the ‘fourth pillar’ of humanitarian response. Related advocacy activities by a variety of actors in the education sphere have garnered

³² Susan Nicholai and Carl Triplehorn for Humanitarian Practice Network, *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict* (accessed March 14, 2011); available from: <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2525>.

³³ Graca Machel, *Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children* (New York: United Nations, 1996); in Nicholi and Triplehorn.

support and increasing levels of funding for education during humanitarian crises.³⁴ Because 50% of children who do not attend school are estimated to live in countries in crisis or emerging from conflict, protecting education during conflict is increasingly recognized as a critical strategy in order to achieve Education for All goals.³⁵

The ICRC defines “protection” as encompassing “all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of relevant bodies of law...”³⁶ Protection is composed of three different types of activities: i) responsive action aimed at preventing abuse, stopping it, or alleviating effects; ii) remedial action aimed at restoring dignity and ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent to abuse; and iii) environment-building action aimed at creating and/or consolidating an environment that is conducive to the full respect for the rights of the individual.³⁷ Nicholai and Triplehorn see these types of activities as falling along a continuum, with efforts to address violations of children’s rights on one end (i.e. by providing services, reuniting former combatants with their families, etc) and on the other, activities that focus on securing governmental and community respect for children’s rights through training, advocacy and strengthening local mechanisms of

³⁴ Nicholai and Triplehorn.

³⁵ Alan Smith and Tony Vaux, *Education, Conflict and International Development* (London, UK: Department for International Development, 2003).

³⁶ ICRC in Save the Children, *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict* by Susan Nicholai and Carl Triplehorn.

³⁷ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action*, New York: United Nations, 2002, 12. This framework is referred to as the ICRC Protection Egg.

enforcement and dissemination.³⁸ Dolan points out the contradiction between what he calls the “soft” and the “hard” end of this continuum. In implementing “soft” protection activities, humanitarian agencies put primacy on children’s rights rather than action to change the structural environment in which rights are guaranteed. “Hard” protection activities do not substitute for the state but rather continue through persuasion and denunciation to hold the state accountable for its failure to ensure the rights of its citizens.³⁹ Ironically, in the sense that the activities at either end of the spectrum have diametrically opposed approaches, they may in fact work against each other.

On the soft end of the continuum, a variety of strategies are utilized by humanitarian actors to protect children who suffer human rights violations. The INEE Minimum Standards Handbook is the most authoritative source of guidance on the basic protection activities for education actors concerned with a minimum standard of service provision for learners and schools. This guide book covers topics including community participation, access, curricula, and teacher selection and recruitment. INEE also delves into policy formation, although it does not offer guidance for cases where governments are not open to reforms.⁴⁰ Other organizations, for instance Save the Children, have developed their own best practices about how to protect children during emergencies,

³⁸ Nicholai and Triplehorn.

³⁹ Overseas Development Institute, *Chris Dolan and Lucy Hovil, Humanitarian Protection in Uganda: a Trojan Horse?* (accessed March 14, 2011); available from: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=288&title=humanitarian-protection-uganda-trojan-horse>.

⁴⁰ INEE, *INEE Minimum Standards for Education* (accessed Marc 14, 2011); available from www.ineesite.org.

for instance through the creation of safe spaces and non-formal education that can quickly ensure that learning continues.⁴¹

UNESCO's *Protecting Education from Attack* draws attention to some of the activities on the hard end of the spectrum that aim to change the structures and the environment in order to promote individual rights. The report stresses the need not only for monitoring and reporting and other efforts to strengthen accountability, diminish impunity, and deter attack. These activities clearly require a tremendous amount of coordinated effort and gains are likely to be slow (as compared to the immediate effect of providing services to disenfranchised children). However, it proves much easier to state the need for actions that address structural and environmental threats than it is to chart a way forward. For instance, even the UNESCO report is at a loss when considering which groups can consistently and objectively provide monitoring data related to attacks on education.⁴²

Education's impact on the potential for conflict: Because poverty is a predictor of conflict, and education is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, promoting education is sometimes considered a conflict prevention strategy.⁴³ This could be considered an *education approach to conflict prevention*, even if the hoped-for impact

⁴¹ Carl Triplehorn, *Education Care and Protection of Children in Emergencies* (accessed March 1, 2011); available from: http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15136&URL_DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201.html.

⁴² O'Malley.

⁴³ Almost 60 percent of countries rated "low" on the Human Development Index have been involved in conflicts since 1990, in contrast to less than 25 percent of the 84 countries that have a "medium" rating. Peter Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005).

on conflict prevention would be indirect in nature. Smith and Vaux note that early literature on education in conflict follows this strain of thinking and advocates for the potential benefit of education in countries affected by crisis. However, these and other authors recognize the need for more detailed analysis in local contexts in order to determine whether or not education will actually promote conflict prevention.⁴⁴ This recognition leads a variety of authors from a wide range of institutions involved in international education to promote an approach to education that is conflict-sensitive. Although there is no one term for this approach, this dissertation argues that there is an emerging consensus for the need for a *conflict-prevention approach to education*. Such an approach can be defined in the following manner:

*Conflict Prevention Approach to Education: An approach that recognizes the dual nature of education and seeks to harness the content and distribution of education to redress the impact of conflict and to promote peace and stability rather than conflict dynamics. This approach recognizes the need to integrate into long term processes analysis concerning: the impact of conflict on education; local priorities, grievances, and perceptions; and conflict dynamics and risk factors. Such an approach should be pursued in coordination with a broader strategy that recognizes the other dimensions that affect conflict dynamics.*⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Smith and Vaux.

⁴⁵ See Annex I for a sample of authors that write regarding this concept.

Review of the literature on education and conflict finds key mechanisms by which education can impact conflict (or inversely, promote peace). This study focuses on the distribution of services and frustrated expectations around education. Uneven distribution of educational services can incite grievances among excluded groups. Exclusion from educational activities hurts children who can derive an immediate benefit from the school-going experience as well as families who derive benefit from the child-care function of having their children in school. Over the long-term, exclusion deprives a generation from learning opportunities and this adversely affects their potential in the economic, social, and political sphere. On an even more profound level, a group whose children and youth are denied educational opportunities may feel that they are being denied the opportunity to be represented and to participate fully in civic life and national affairs.

Denial of education can be an explicit tactic during war or a consequence of political processes. When groups have expectations about the quality or level of access to services that they will receive, for instance in the period after war where people often expect conditions to approach, the frustration of these expectations can promote conflict.⁴⁶ The poverty and unemployment which results from exclusion to quality education is also noted as a driver of conflict, especially when youth turn to fighting forces for lack of better options for survival.⁴⁷ Conversely, the existence of meaningful educational opportunities may provide youth with a reason to stay away from violent

⁴⁶ Buckland.

⁴⁷ Education for All Global Monitoring Report (Paris, UNESCO, 2011).

movements or criminal activity and may provide communities with an incentive to want to maintain a peaceful status quo.⁴⁸

Other mechanisms that are outside of the scope of this study receive attention in the education and conflict literature. The content of curricula is a direct way for governments to send messages to students that can either promote conflict or peace. Courses such as history and social studies can be used to propagate the domination of one ethnic group over another. Textbooks and other educational material can also be used to foster militancy.⁴⁹ Authoritarian teaching styles and the use of corporal punishment can limit children's ability to think critical and convey messages about the use of violence.⁵⁰ Government level processes are important: corruption, mismanagement, and lack of accountability can exacerbate grievances around education.⁵¹

The challenge of reconstructing education systems after conflict is a complex and daunting one, yet some experienced authors have attempted to provide lessons learned. In reality, few lessons learned can be universally applied, given the complexity of political environments in which reconstruction takes place. Still, such accumulated wisdom sets the stage for further learning in this area.

Advocates of peace education posit that education can promote peace through

⁴⁸ Baines, et al, *War Affected Children and Youth in Northern Uganda* (Chicago, MacArthur Foundation, 2006).

⁴⁹ Bush and Sartarelli, *The Two Faces of Ethnic Conflict* (New York: UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, 2000).

⁵⁰ Bush and Sartarelli.

⁵¹ Miller-Grandvaux.

curricular and extra-curricular activities and that the way schools interact with students and communities can foster peaceful ideas and relationships. UNICEF defines peace education as, “the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavior changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level.”⁵² Buckland the prevalence of peace education programs in post-conflict countries, but also notes that there are few evaluations of such programs.

Sinclair argues that a renewal of curricula and pedagogy can harness the positive potential of education and teaching. Such a renewal can include the removal of past bias and initiatives to improve pedagogy and enrich the curriculum with skills, values and concepts in the areas of conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian principles and responsible citizenship.⁵³ Davies instead focuses on the role of education as generally fundamentally reproducing the violence of societies, based on her analysis that educational institutions tend to be conservative and to reflect the violence and inequalities that exist in society, and in some cases, even to magnify these tendencies. Her aim for education is less ambitious than that of Sinclair: Davies mainly hopes for education to *interrupt* the process of moving toward more violence. She models an

⁵² Margaret Fountain, *Peace Education in UNICEF* (New York, UNICEF, 1999).

⁵³ Margaret Sinclair, “Protecting through Curriculum: A Call for Collaboration,” in *Education Under Attack*, ed. Brenden O’Malley (Paris: UNESCO, 2010).

interruptive school, perhaps too ideal to exist in most cases but worth imagining nonetheless. Such a school would embrace forums for positive conflict, promote dialogue, emphasize rights and responsibility, create a playful and safe environment that allows risk-taking and limit-testing, and not be beholden to limitations imposed by testing and other societal institutions.⁵⁴

Reconstruction after violent conflict often occurs in an environment of scarcity combined with tremendous need. A sense of urgency prevails and in response, demonstrating visible improvements as a form of showing political will and as a way to demonstrate a peace dividend is important. However, the impulse to emphasize physical reconstruction must be checked by the realization that quality is often most affected by conflict and that teachers are the key to recovery. Immediate responses need to be linked into a longer-term, developmental vision for the sector. Buckland suggests that the way to move forward in such a difficult and demanding environment is to carefully consider the sequence of reforms and to conduct reconstruction in an iterative fashion.⁵⁵

National leadership is repeatedly stressed as a critical factor for effective reconstruction. Obura writes about the case of Rwanda, where she found that the Ministry of Education, “accomplished a remarkably rapid restart in a very short time...” She finds that in this case, the ministry’s lead and level of determination is the decisive factor in what will be accomplished during reconstruction. In recognition of the vital

⁵⁴ Lynn Davies, *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos* (London: Routledge, 2004).

⁵⁵ Buckland.

leadership role of the ministry, Obura finds that external partners need to listen carefully and support the ministry's sense of significant and control.⁵⁶ In addition to the importance of national authorities owning the process of reconstruction, national leadership is important for the sake of donor coordination. As Buckland writes, "perhaps the most important lesson to emerge from global experience is the importance of a strong national authority as the key to effective donor coordination."⁵⁷

The need for national leadership and donor coordination around national goals is now considered a best practice. However, no lesson can be universally applied. As Smith and Vaux note, education, "is almost always run by the state, and the state may be a party to the conflict. This makes intervention in such a situation extremely difficult..." The literature on education seldom goes beyond this type of acknowledgement of the difficulty of providing education aid in complex political environments. This study explores education reconstruction in the context of questionable political will for reform, thus adding to a relatively untouched corner of the literature.

Inherent in any post-conflict response are many decisions about who should be prioritized for services. Buckland argues for a systems approach that takes into account needs in the formal and non-formal sector. Although primary education must be prioritized as the fundamental building block of the education sector, ignoring

⁵⁶ Anna Obura.

⁵⁷ Buckland.

secondary education puts the educational pipeline in peril.⁵⁸ Despite the logic of this argument, Miller-Grandvaux notes a fundamental donor bias toward primary education. She quotes research stating that, “Education systems... have been pressured by the international Education for All campaign to focus on basic education to primary school children. Secondary schools have been neglected... this focus has been shortsighted in several ways: the alarm over out-of-school youth, who cannot attend secondary school; the shortage of teachers, due to inadequate secondary education; and the bottleneck at the entry of middle school.”⁵⁹

After conflict, many youth and adults have missed out on educative opportunities and so the importance of non-formal education in the form of accelerated learning, adult education, and vocational training should be emphasized. These activities are expensive and difficult to coordinate, although they are often proscribed.⁶⁰ In Rwanda, Obura found that the government run accelerated learning program was very popular and demand quickly outstripped supply. She also argues for a new and different type of programming for people out of the formal system. Obura notes that some children or youth will never have time to participate in educational programs as currently conceived, even if they are accelerated. She suggests two-hour weekly outreach programs for these disadvantaged children and youth so that “Rwanda would have provided for all the children...” She argues that this will make all the children feel

⁵⁸ Buckland.

⁵⁹ Moulton in Yolande Miller-Grandvaux.

⁶⁰ Buckland.

integrated and cared for and will make “the child, every child, feel that she or he has been reached by the long arm of the Ministry of Education.”⁶¹

⁶¹ Obura.

METHODOLOGY

Case Selection

This case study of education in Acholiland, northern Uganda focuses on the “recovery” period, during which time there has been relative peace due to the expulsion of the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda. This period is also referred to as the “post-conflict” period given that the violence of war in Uganda is over, although this is an imperfect term given that the LRA are still at-large, even if they are not currently in Uganda. Specifically, research focuses on the period from May 2008-July 2009. The author took three trips to northern Uganda during this time span. The first was an exploratory trip during which time she interviewed officials in Kampala and in northern Uganda. During the second trip, in the fall of 2008, the author collected interviews in return sites and camps in Acholiland in northern Uganda. On the third trip, during summer of 2009, the author conducted interviews with officials in northern Uganda and in Kampala. The broader frame of reference for this study begins in October of 2006 when the Government of Uganda began to urge IDPs to return to their homes. This was just two months after the LRA and the Government of Uganda signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.⁶²

This in-depth case study is of interest because of the similarities with other post-conflict countries, particularly in Africa, where civil war has ravaged civilians and education facilities. Post-conflict Acholiland is also of particular interest to the

⁶² All Africa, *Amuru Closes More Camps* (accessed March 7, 2010); available from www.allafrica.com.

education in fragility field. Much of the relevant literature within this field has explicitly or implicitly focused on situations where the government is a willing partner and is committed to reforms. In some cases, this is facilitated by a change in power. In such circumstances, the challenges are tremendous, for instance in Rwanda where the education sector came to a stand-still during the conflict. The opportunities and enthusiasm for reform are significant. Uganda presents a different set of challenges and opportunities. Reconstruction does not start from scratch: The Ministry of Education still stands strong. Yet, the prospects for reform are more limited. The same government accused of demonstrating little will to stop the LRA war remains in power and enjoys a fair amount of good favor from the international donor community. The government promises recovery in northern Uganda, but analysis of actual plans and disbursements show that these promises belie remarkably low aims for the education sector. Recovery promises stem from an unsigned peace agreement between the government and a warring party that enjoys no leverage in Uganda. This case explores the prospects for a conflict-prevention approach to development in this context. The findings from this study relate to the education and fragility field as well as the conflict prevention field. This case also provides insight into the plight of former IDPs moving from camps back to their homes during an incredibly fast and massive return process.

Interviews

Interviews with current and former IDPs in Acholiland, northern Uganda are the bedrock of this study. At the time of research, the policy of returns dominated life in

Acholiland: 70% of IDPs in Acholiland had left camps to return to their homes and another 15% had left the main camps (referred to as “mother” camps) and were in satellite camps (also referred to as transit camps) closer to their homes.⁶³ Because the process of returns was so central to life in Acholiland at the time of research, the author’s main focus was to understand the situation in return sites and perceptions about education among the recently returned. As discussed below, research came to include 67 individuals in camps who had not yet returned or did not plan to return. Therefore, the 222 interviews conducted with this group of people can best be termed interviews with *current or former IDPs*.

This study sought to understand why and how dominant approaches to education in northern Uganda worked against the goals of a conflict prevention approach. Current and former IDPs interview responses related to their reality and priorities shed light on the impact of the conflict and potential avenues for a conflict prevention approach.

The interview strategy for this research was greatly informed by work that the author did to support Marc Sommers’ study on Rwandan youth.⁶⁴ The author worked as Dr. Sommers’ research assistant for six months in 2007, during which time she learned about a research methodology that Dr. Sommers developed for his study in conjunction

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Marc Sommers, *Stuck: Rwandan Youth and the Struggle for Adulthood* (Athens: University of Georgia Press) in partnership with U.S. Institute of Peace Press, *Studies in Security and International Affairs Series* (Forthcoming Fall 2011).

with Dr. Peter Uvin, who separately conducted a study of youth in Burundi.⁶⁵ Similar to the Rwanda and Burundi methodology, the interview questions used in this study were open-ended and unstructured. However, while the Rwanda and Burundi interviews were conducted without preference for the order of interview questions, in this study eight questions about the general situation in Acholiland always preceded eight questions about education (although the order was otherwise flexible). This sequencing was designed in order to solicit responses about the general situation without leading people to respond by relating to education. Despite the similarities described, the focus of this study was different from the aforementioned given the focus on education. The questionnaire is included in Annex II.

Interviews aimed to understand the basic reality in which current and former IDPs were living. A question about the situation for children and youth and Acholiland aimed to give respondents a chance to talk about whatever aspects of life were most important to them. Another question in the first group of eight asked whether or not there were different types of youth or families in the area, as a way of understanding how people differentiate themselves, and also as a way of learning whether or not being educated was heavily correlated with identity. Interview data showed that whether or not people return to communities, how they behave, and their level of education were the primary ways of differentiating families, and this information fed the coding strategy of subsequent questions. A pair of questions sought to learn about the plans that

⁶⁵ Peter Uvin, *Life After Violence* (London: Zed Books, 2009).

people hold to improve their lives and the obstacles that they face. Analysis would shed light on the role that education plays in these plans, as well as the level of hope people have the prospects that they anticipate. Another set of questions sought to understand the way that life changed as a result of the war by asking respondents about life during their parents' times and how life is different upon return to the community. The last question in first set was "When you think about peace, what does it mean to you?"

The second set of questions all pertained to education. The author asked whether or not interviewees or their children were studying in camps, and if so, what the benefit of the experience was to them. Interviewees were also asked about any opportunities that they saw for learning, and the obstacles that they faced. Further questions about the differences between people who were educated and people who were not aimed to further understand the benefit of education and the effect of education on opportunity and identity.

The interview strategy was designed to capture information about the general situation in Acholiland as a background for understanding perceptions and experiences related to education. At times, people mentioned war-related and traumatic experiences. However, the author did not otherwise ask questions related to the losses and abuses that people suffered during the war. Similarly, the author did not ask questions specifically about other forms of abuse that people suffer in their lives unless the respondent chose to bring up these themes in their interview. With respect for the losses and lives of the interviewees, the author decided that these topics would have

required a different focus and methodology than that which was used for the purpose of learning about education and the current situation. The traumatic experiences that people in northern Uganda have lived through are documented in several other important sources which are considered in this research, even if they were not investigated as a primary point of interest of this research.

Interviews generally took about one hour, although they may have taken more or less time depending on the level of engagement of the interviewee and the other pressures on their time. Unlike in Peter Uvin's research in Burundi, people were not shocked or surprised to see a foreign author. This maybe the legacy of the humanitarian intervention, during which time foreign aid workers, and to a much lesser extent foreign researchers, would not have been an extraordinary sighting, especially during lulls in the violence. Although some interviews were conducted with people in groups of two or three people (or more in a few cases in camps), most interviews were done individually. In order to conduct interviews in Acholi, the author worked with translators that were selected based on their experiences working with IDPs in Acholiland. Working with these individuals greatly enriched the research process, given the rich discussions that we shared after conducting interviews.

222 current or former IDPs were interviewed in camps and in villages of return. For each of these individuals, demographic information was collected (see Annex III) and is referred to in the following text. Charts showing further detail of the demographic information collected are included in Annex IV.

Sampling

Districts, Sub-Counties, Parishes: Two districts out of the four in Acholiland were selected for study. Amuru District and Pader District are both relatively new districts, having been created by Parliament in 2006. Amuru was carved out of Gulu District and Pader was carved out of Kitgum District. The estimated population in Amuru District at the time of research was just over 200,000 and the estimated population in Pader District was approximately 370,000.⁶⁶ The districts both represent the larger Acholi sub-region referred to as Acholi-land in terms of the extent to which they were affected by the war and associated displacement. The majority of the inhabitants of both districts and of the broader Acholiland speak the Acholi and subsistence agriculture is the most common occupation and form of survival. Pader District differs from Amuru in that it neighbors the sub-region populated by the Karamajong, pastoralists who raided cattle during the LRA war and were a both a source of insecurity in Pader at the time of research and a reason why some people in Pader were reluctant to leave camps.

Interviews took place in Amuru District (181 interviews) and to a lesser extent in Pader District (41 interviews). The author focused in Amuru District in order to gain understanding of the differences between various sub-countries within a single district. This decision was also supported for logistical reasons. The author was based in Gulu Town, adjacent to Amuru District. The author relied on Save the Children for some logistical support, and Save the Children was more interested in Amuru District and

⁶⁶ Uganda Bureau of Statistics, *2002 Uganda Housing and Population Census* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from: http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/census_tabulations/cenTableC1.pdf.

familiar with the terrain. Within Amuru District, the author conducted interviews in three out of the four sub-counties (Atiack, Amuru, and Purongo). In each sub-county, interviews were conducted in two parishes. The parishes were selected in consultation with Save the Children and sub-county officials with the aim of conducting interviews in the poorest parishes that were accessible by road. That being said, many parishes were barely accessible by road or were accessible only during dry spells. In each sub-county, Save the Children was active in one of the two parishes where interviews were conducted. Save's activity was usually limited to the development of an early childhood center in the community, although in one case, Save was also engaged in livelihood activities. When in Gulu Town, the author worked out of an office provided by Save the Children and enjoyed the opportunity to share findings with interested and knowledgeable staff.

In Pader District, the author conducted interviews in two parishes in Adilang Sub-County. The interviews in Pader provided the author with exposure to a different part of the region, although despite the different context (marked especially by insecurity due to Karamajong raids), the responses from individuals in Pader were generally not found to be significantly different. The sample size in Pader was a considerable limitation to the examination of differences between districts, although it was sufficient to confirm that the major trends found in Amuru District were not abnormal when tested in another district in Acholiland.

Before conducting interviews, the author sought permission from the Resident

District Commission. This post represents the long arm of the Office of the President in each district. Districts are otherwise run by elected officials, and in the north, these officials usually pertain to opposition parties. After gaining permission from the RDC, the author paid a visit to the district officials and sub-county officials that would both inform her study and provide permission to conduct research in their areas. These individuals generally seemed invested in their work and were helpful, with the exception of one official who tried to extort the author and deferred to a visibly drunk deputy to provide contextual information. This official oversaw one of the poorest sub-counties in northern Uganda and the prospects for the sub-county under his leadership were bleak.

Research Sites: Given the period of return and the fact that the majority of Acholi people had returned to their land at the unique point in history when this research was conducted, the author initially chose to focus interviews in communities of return (also referred to as “ancestral villages” or “return sites”). This decision reflected the author’s interest in former IDPs’ experiences and the reach of education into these rural areas. After a short time, a theme emerged in these interviews. Many people were talking about the youth who refused or were reluctant to return to their ancestral villages. As a result, the author decided to conduct some interviews in camps. In each sub-county, the author selected a camp that was closest to one of the return sites in the selected parishes. In Purongo Sub-County, the author conducted interviews at a satellite camp rather than a mother camp. This satellite camp was similar in function to

a mother camp and was large in size, although people had located there in order to be closer to their land. 67 people were interviewed in a camp or satellite camp, compared with 155 people who were interviewed in return sites. See Annex V for site selection detail.

There are some limitations associated with the way that location was determined for research sites. The author ascribed meaning to the place where each person was encountered. If a person was encountered in a community of return, they were categorized as a person in a return site, and similarly for a person in a camp. Although these categories are useful for looking for differences in perspectives, they cannot be considered absolute characterizations. Clearly, people in Acholiland were in transit at the time of research, and many people found in camps during one month would be in return sites in the next month. Also, some people moved back and forth between camps in order to access services in camps while still working their land in communities of return. Another important note is that this research was about education, yet the site of research with current and former IDPs was in return sites and camps, not in schools. This decision reflects the author's interest in the situation in northern Uganda and perceptions about education within broader return sites (and camps). However, this decision naturally biases responses. For instance, one can imagine that interviews held within schools among learners would shed more light on the actual content of education. Interviews held with people in rural communities, many of whom were not in school, may be predisposed to focus more on the extent to

which educational opportunities do or do not reach communities.

Communities naturally hope that the presence of a research team led by a foreigner indicates some chance that they are being considered for future programming. This factor introduces bias to the research because respondents may have tried to demonstrate a great deal of need, to show their compliance with behaviors that they assume the author would condone, or to express their appreciation and continuing demand services they receive. During community level research and when meeting with officials, the author aimed not to create false expectations by clearly stating verbally and in writing that interviews and research were not linked to any forthcoming benefit to the community. The author's association with Save the Children may have also biased findings, although measures were taken to counter this potential bias. The author traveled in a Save the Children Land Rover in cases where the roads or weather were too treacherous for a non-expert driver. However, the author traveled in an unmarked car whenever possible. In some cases, especially when research was conducted in communities where Save the Children operated early childhood centers and when the author rode in a Save the Children vehicle, responses may have been more likely to focus on education.

Interviewees by Age and Gender: This study was concerned with education for children and youth in Acholiland. The author felt that the perspectives of youth and non-youth would be equally important for this study. For this reason, the study aimed to interview an equal number of youth and non-youth. Periodically, the author

tabulated the number of youth and non-youth interviewed in order to ensure that roughly equal numbers were interviewed. Interviewees were diverse in terms of their age and were fairly evenly divided between age groups, although none was younger than 12 years old.⁶⁷ For the purpose of looking for trends within the data, interviewees age 12-24 will be considered youth and interviewees over 25-years old will be considered non-youth. Despite the various definitions of youth that exist, 25 years of age roughly corresponds with the time of life when a person is married with dependents.⁶⁸ An equal number of youth and non-youth were included in the study: 111 of each.

Although children's perspectives would be of interest to this study, the author decided not to interview any children under the age of 12 years. This decision was influenced by the realization that interviewing children would require a fundamentally different methodology that would both appropriately contextualize children's responses and ensure that children were not exposed in any negative way through the process of interviewing. The exclusion of children's voices is certainly a limitation to the findings.

The author sought out views from both female and male interviewees and attempted to gain interviews in equal proportions. Out of the 222 people who were interviewed, 120 were female and 102 were male. The larger number of females in the

⁶⁷ Age groups of participants were the following: 12-17 (although only two participants were under 14 years-old), 18-24, 25-29 30-35, and 35+.

⁶⁸ As noted by Peter Uvin in his study on Burundian community members. This division, though imperfect, allowed for some contrasting between younger and older interviewees and their potentially different concerns and perspectives.

sample was not intentional, but occurred because women were more available for interview. This can be explained by women’s disproportionate household duties, which meant that they were more likely to be found near their homes and available for interview. Men were more likely to be casualties of war and there are generally more women in communities of return than men, although the exact ration of women to men in Amuru and Pader Districts is not known.

Age Groups of Respondents Split by Gender		
Age Group	Gender	Number of Participants
12-17 (only two participants were under 14 yrs)	Female	26
	Male	26
12-17 Total		52
18-24	Female	35
	Male	24
18-24 Total		59
25-29	Female	20
	Male	15
25-29 Total		35
30-35	Female	15
	Male	14
30-35 Total		29
35+	Female	24
	Male	23
35+ Total		47
Grand Total		222

Formerly Abducted Respondents		
	Number	Percent
Female	32	27%
Male	43	42%
Total	75	34%

Formerly Abducted: Although formerly abducted individuals' experiences were of interest, formerly abducted youth were not the focus of this study *per se*. The Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) project found that the categorization of "formerly abducted" is less important than other ways of differentiating vulnerable groups in northern Uganda. SWAY finds that ascription of the label "formerly abducted" can create or reinforce stigma and distort the provision of aid in a way that is destructive. In keeping with this finding, and in order to capture information about abduction status without making it the focus of the study, the author asked each interviewee whether or not they had been abducted, and if so, for how long. Intermittent tabulation of results showed a considerable number of formerly abducted people were in the sample collected and so the author made no attempt to artificially include more formerly abducted people than the sampling method allowed.

Twenty-seven percent of the females and 42 percent of the males who were interviewed reported that they had been abducted for at least some period of time (a total of 75 out of 222 interviewees).⁶⁹ Among interviewees between the ages of 25-35 abduction was most common. Within this age range, almost half of all interviewees reported that they were abducted.

The great majority of people who were abducted reported that they were abducted for less than three months and often as little as a few weeks. Average reported lengths of abduction were not significantly different for females and males.

⁶⁹ This number may be biased upward if participants thought that they had something to gain by reporting themselves as formerly abducted.

Interview analysis showed no differences between the way that formerly abducted individuals responded and people who had never been abducted. However, SWAY also notes that individuals that were abducted for long periods of time may be particularly vulnerable. This research did not interview enough formerly abducted people to be able to further inform that finding.⁷⁰

Sampling of Current and Former IDPs: Upon arrival at each research site, the author walked at random through the community or camp and asking people if they were willing to be interviewed. The author returned each day to the same return site until she had walked throughout the village. She made special efforts to walk to the parts of the village that were furthest from the road or access point, including when this required walking or driving through the brush. In the camps, it was not possible to walk thoroughly through the camps due to their size. The coverage in camps was more limited, although efforts were made to move between huts on the outer rings and huts deeper inside the camps. This method of walking through a community, and returning various days until the community became familiar, was utilized in the previously referenced research in Burundi and Rwanda.

The method created a bias in terms of who was interviewed because a person needed to be present and visible in the return site or in the camp in order to be interviewed. With the understanding that some people were more likely to be working or otherwise away during midday, the author made efforts to arrive early and stay late

⁷⁰ Annan, et al (2006).

rather than come at midday each day. People were generally open to being interviewed and no interview was ever refused, although some people were clearly preoccupied because of having many things to do or more pressing worries and in these cases, interviews were short. Youth in camps were often found playing cards and these youth were happy to engage and share their perspectives.

Educational Levels: Of the interviewees, 161 reported that they were not currently in school and also provided information regarding the highest level of education that they had achieved. The vast majority of females and majority of males have not been exposed to post-primary education. Only 10% of the women and 20% of men had attended any secondary school. Twenty-five percent of women in the research sample and 8 percent of men have had no education whatsoever. Forty-eight of the participants reported that they were currently in educational programs. These were both females and males, although males were more likely to be studying. The majority of the females who said that they were studying were in Upper Primary (P4-P7). The majority of the males who said that they were studying were in secondary school doing their O levels (S1-S4).⁷¹

Other Stakeholders

In order to gain further insight into the various approaches to education and implications for conflict prevention, interviews were conducted with individuals from different stakeholder groups relevant to education. The same basic questionnaire was

⁷¹ For additional charts showing demographic detail, see Annex III.

utilized for these individuals as for the current and former IDPs. However, the questionnaire was slightly adapted in order to be appropriate. For instance, stakeholders in Kampala were asked to reflect on the situation for children and youth “in northern Uganda,” as compared to community members in northern Uganda who were simply asked about the situation for children and youth “here”.

Stakeholder groups interviewed for this study (other than former and current IDPs) included, teachers, local leaders, national leaders, NGO/CBO workers, and donors. Talking with each of these groups provided a basis for analyzing their priorities, goals, and the obstacles they faced. Although there were other stakeholders affected by education, these were considered to be among the most important groups. Clearly no stakeholder group is composed of all like-minded individuals, and there are important professional and personal distinctions even within each stakeholder group. However, utilizing these categories of stakeholder groups yielded conceptually interesting results and contrasts.

Current and former IDPs interviews were naturally different than these interviews in a number of ways. Because policymakers, national administrators, and donors usually had limited time, it was rarely possible to cover all of the questions in the questionnaire. These individuals provided a great deal of information about the substantive programs and plans that they oversaw, which took up time in the interview. Interviews ranged from half an hour, in the case of a few very busy ministry officials, to two hours or more. Sometimes individuals in these groups were less willing to provide

personal information about their experiences. Teachers fell in the middle, proving will to provide personal and professional information. Despite the differences in stakeholders' behavior during the questionnaire, because the questionnaires used for each group were essentially the same, there were many opportunities to compare the different ways that stakeholders responded.

Donors have a strong hand to play in Uganda, and so their perspective is critical. The major donors in Uganda are organized under the Education Funding Agency Group (EFAG) which meets periodically to discuss issues related to education. The majority of donor organizations that are members of this group were included in the research sample of ten individuals. Half of the people included in this sample were Ugandan and half were international staff. Although the majority of the organizations in the EFAG Group were included in this sample, the sample remained relatively small. A greater number of interviews might have yielded interesting comparative results between different agencies and between Ugandan and international staff. Individuals in donor agencies were willing to talk, in some cases extensively, but in one case where two individuals from the same organization were interviewed, the second interviewee was not convinced why he should lend his time to the study given that his colleague had already contributed and that their work in northern Uganda was limited. Details regarding the individuals among the donor group that were interviewed are included in Annex VI (along with further detail for interviewees in other stakeholder groups).

Twelve individuals from the national government, both policymakers and

administrators, were selected to interview as part of this stakeholder group. This sample included five Members of Parliament (MP), three of whom were elected on the mandatory female ticket (referred to as “Lady MPs”). One of the MPs was from the majority party (the National Resistance Movement) and did not represent a northern District. The remainder pertained to the political opposition and represented northern districts. This is a small sample and was mainly used as a source of key interviews and to triangulate or contextualize findings from local leader interviews. These interviews were the hardest to obtain, naturally, but provided critical insight into political dynamics that affect recovery in northern Uganda.

Also included in the national leaders stakeholder group were technical leaders at the national level. The author interviewed six commissioners (or Acting or Assistant Commissioners) in the Ministry of Education, covering almost all major sectors of interest (with the notable exception of secondary education, as a commissioner was only available for a brief meeting). Additionally, high level functionaries were interviewed to represent the National Curriculum Development Centre and the Education Service Commission (set up by the Office of the President to review policy). In order to determine an interview strategy, the author mapped major offices that pertain to education policy and education in the North and also targeted Members of Parliament that could paint an informed picture of political and policy issues related to the North.

Interviews with local leaders included nine individuals who were elected or

appointed centrally to represent Gulu or Amuru District and play a role that impacts education, as well as one person hired by Amuru District. Interviews with local policymakers and administrators included the following two senior officials from Gulu District (the larger district from which Amuru District was recently created) and eight from Amuru District. All but one of these local leaders was male, despite efforts to include women in the sample. Five of the interviewees were elected in local elections. One interviewee was appointed through the Office of the Prime Minister, three were civil servants hired by the Ministry, and one was an employee of the local government. All of these interviewees were from Acholiland. For further detail showing a mapping of local administration and policy positions, see Annex VII.⁷²

NGOs and CBOs working on education in Uganda represent a broad array of countries, values, and relevant programmatic areas. Both international and local organizations were included in the sample, as well as individuals with varying levels of responsibility and different nationalities. Research targeted ten individuals working on education programs at major international and indigenous organizations with a constituency in northern Uganda.⁷³ These interviews provided important insights into

⁷² This information in the chart in the annex and the sampling strategy was elaborated based upon personal experience and review conducted during the following interviews: Interview by Author with Former Norwegian Refugee Council Official (Gulu, Uganda, 05/22/2009). Interview by Author with African Revival Official (Gulu, Uganda, 05/22/2009). Interview by author with Dickson Wanglobo, Consultant to the District Education Office, Amuru. May 23, 2009. Interview by author with the District Education Officer for Amuru District, May 23, 2009.

⁷³ Sources used to determine major actors include: *Uganda: Gulu District - Humanitarian Presence by Cluster and Sub County as of June 2008* (accessed April 20, 2009); available from [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Af.nsf/luFullMap/C784C6884BD3A56E8525748000616491/\\$File/ocha_PRG_uga080607b.jpg?OpenElement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Af.nsf/luFullMap/C784C6884BD3A56E8525748000616491/$File/ocha_PRG_uga080607b.jpg?OpenElement); Minutes of Education Cluster Meetings 2008 October-March.

the work being done by NGOs as well as the perspectives of some relatively very well-off and well-educated northern Ugandans (7 of the 10 people in this sample were from northern Uganda, 3 were international).

Twenty-two teachers were interviewed in each of the sub-counties where community research occurred.⁷⁴ These teachers were chosen at random upon arrival at schools. Interviews included teachers at primary, secondary and at technical schools (although the emphasis was on primary schools). Where possible, efforts were made to interview women, although only three interviews with women were possible due to the low number of female teachers in schools in Amuru.

A considerable limitation to this study as it pertains to these stakeholder groups is the small number of people who were interviewed in each group. A much larger sample of each group would have yielded more significant results with less risk of mischaracterizing any one group. Even with a larger sample size, this study would have run the risk of over-generalizing, given the diversity that exists among individuals from each of the groups mentioned above. Given time and logistical constraints, the author chose to include this relatively small sample for each of the groups mentioned because it allowed her to talk to such a range of individuals. In order to triangulate and

Provided by Education Cluster member to author. August, 2008; *Uganda Child Rights NGO Network (UCRNN) Uganda Child Actors Directory* (accessed April 2009); available from <http://www.ucrnn.net/ngodirectory/search/searchorganisations.php?organisation=&servicetype=&district=17&Submit=Submit>; and author's personal experience and research in Amuru and Acholiland. April-August 2008.

⁷⁴ Additionally, teachers' perspectives were gleaned when talking with local and national officials, many of whom taught for years before joining politics or the civil service.

contextualize the findings from these groups, the author made significant use of grey literature related to policies and their impact.

Data Analysis

Interview data provided insight to the situation for children and youth and their perceptions about education. The author analyzed this information in order to understand people's goals, perceptions of the benefits of education and the obstacles they face, and notions of peace. By reviewing and analyzing this data, the author gained insight into the role that education plays and can play, the way that people interact with the education system, and also into local priorities. A conflict-prevention approach rests on an understanding of the impact of conflict on education and local needs and priorities. Analyzing interview data was crucial for gaining insight into how such an approach could or would address these priorities. Interviews with teachers provided context and an additional view of the education system and the challenges affecting educators. Teachers were generally happy to talk about their experiences and to share insights into the many challenges that they face and their creative ways of managing their classrooms.

Interviews with representatives of donor agencies and non-governmental organizations provided particular insight into the way that organizations position themselves to provide education services and the frameworks that guide their institutions. Donor agencies often referenced the MDGs and their harmonized modalities of support. This trend informed the notion that donor agencies are driven by

a human-centered approach to development and that this approach is reinforced through harmonization, a best practice in the development field. Individuals from non-governmental organizations were often highly informed of local realities and were implementing programs to redress the impact of the war, yet the scale of operations was generally very limited and scattered. NGO's efforts to involve local and/or national government ranged from perfunctory to concerted. Although interviews with NGOs were analyzed and integrated into the findings, this study focuses more directly on government and agency action in northern Uganda. This focus evolved through the research process as the author learned of the scope of non-governmental action and the widespread issues in the education sector. Although non-governmental organizations provide critical support to many people, their scale is small in comparison to the widespread need and in the absence of government vision and leadership.

Interviews with local and national elected leaders contextualized the interviews done in camps and return sites, but were also important for understanding the rhetoric of grievance related to northern Uganda. Where current and former IDPs often talked about their own needs and challenges, local and national leaders aggregated the issues facing their constituencies. Just as in the US, opposition party members self-aggrandize by criticizing members from the majority party in the sitting government. Local leaders from opposition parties were likely to criticize the Government of Uganda. Still, to the extent that they expressed grievances, and the extent to which those grievances could be reflected in the individual experiences of current and former IDPs, their narrative

provides insights into local priorities. National level leaders in the education sector, and especially in the Ministry, were more likely to be non-partisan and technically driven. Interviews with these individuals, combined with policy analysis, provided insight into national plans and priorities.

The author analyzed the answers to specific questions separately, and privileged analysis of responses to key questions, including the question about the situation in Acholiland, the question about plans for the future, questions about the benefits of education, and the question about peace. This strategy was employed because these questions were considered the most important to understand the characteristics of life during the recovery period and the role of education (other questions were subsequently analyzed and integrated into the analysis). The responses to these questions were reviewed and through iterative analysis, the author created codes that related to types of responses. The creation of these codes allowed the author to understand the main themes driving individuals' responses. These themes drove the authors' focus in terms of which aspects of education were most pertinent to the discussion about conflict and conflict prevention. Once responses were coded, the author was able to examine trends in the responses, splitting responses by the demographic characteristics of the interviewees. This analysis offered insights into the different realities of youth versus non-youth, formerly abducted people versus people who were not abducted, women versus men, people in camps versus people in return sites, etc. In the case of interviews with people other than current and former IDPs, the

author reviewed the data and created codes, but these codes were used only to inform the analysis that is presented in qualitative terms, given the small numbers of people interviewed in each category.

The process of analysis described above offered benefits, but also limitations. The author did not determine which aspects of the education system were most important prior to conducting her study. This precluded her ability to ask questions in-depth about themes that emerged through interview analysis but were not obvious at the time that interviews were conducted. For instance, local leaders talk about the deterioration of the secondary schools in northern Uganda. This is an important theme in this study, yet the author did not have the opportunity to ask current and former IDPs about the quality of secondary schools. The advantage of this approach is that it left room for the data to point towards the issues that were foremost on people's minds without predetermining the focus of their responses. The obvious limitation of this approach is that the data is not as robust as it would be under a more pointed mode of questioning related to education.

PART THREE: EDUCATION IN ACHOLILAND DURING THE RECOVERY PERIOD

THE HUMANITARIAN APPROACH: INCREASED EXPECTATIONS

Humanitarian Actors' Support of National Policies: Increase in Access

Although humanitarian aid was slow to come to northern Uganda, it came to play a major role. International advocacy had an impact on the funding in northern Uganda, and advocacy for education within the humanitarian sector may have also contributed to increased funding levels. In 2003, Jan Egeland, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs visited and pronounced northern Uganda the worst overlooked humanitarian crisis in the world at the time. Egeland pledged to triple humanitarian assistance to the troubled districts.⁷⁵ Funding flows responded to the Under-Secretary-General's rallying call. Funding through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) rose from \$136 million in 2003 to \$200 million in 2005 and then to \$327 million in 2007.⁷⁶ Within the education field, funding increased after 2003 as well.⁷⁷ In

⁷⁵ FTN Coalition Asia, *Food Aid in Northern Uganda*, (accessed March 7, 2010); available from http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:dmnQKdFxlqKJ:ftncoalitionasia.org/docs-reports%255CFood_Aid_IN_UGANDA.doc+how+much+aid+northern+Uganda&cd=21&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a.

⁷⁶ The CAP is the main coordination tool for the humanitarian community and the means through which agencies request funding for emergencies. The CAP is therefore a useful indicator of funds committed to an emergency (although additional funding may occur outside of the CAP process). UN OCHA, *Consolidated Appeals Process* (accessed March 18, 2010); available from <http://ochaonline.un.org/HUMANITARIANAPPEAL/webpage.asp?Page=1243>.

the later phases of the conflict, many education actors were present, having receiving funding through the CAP process and otherwise. These actors funded and implemented a range of programs, especially those which supported the government's learning centers (makeshift schools within camps that hosted multiple displaced teachers and learners).⁷⁸

The humanitarian response in the education sector in northern Uganda coalesced around the international and national imperative to provide access to education for IDPs. The Government of Uganda implemented the Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy in 1996 which eliminated tuition for all primary school students throughout the country.⁷⁹ The Internally Displaced Persons Policy of 2004 stated that all IDPs should have the same access to education as other children in Uganda. Learning centers were proposed as the best way to ensure access for students that had relocated to camps, and humanitarian aid supported this strategy.

As a result of the humanitarian support to government initiatives, the rate of primary school enrollment in northern Uganda tripled between 1996 and 2005. Surprisingly, in 2005 in the most conflict-affected districts (Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader), the Net Enrollment Ratio for primary education (the number children in school divided by

⁷⁷ Funding for education climbed from \$280,000 in 2002 to \$3.5 million in 2005 and peaked at \$11.2 million in 2008. UN OCHA.

⁷⁸ For example, by 2004, a volatile phase of the conflict in northern Uganda, AMREF, AVSI, IRC, CRS, CARE, Save the Children, NRC, UNICEF, USAID and the World Bank were active in areas including psychosocial and life skills education, accelerated education, alternative education for out-of-school or non-school children and youth, and support and development of learning centers. WFP also provided food which was often distributed through school feeding programs. Women's Commission, *Learning in a War Zone* (accessed March 10, 2010); available from www.womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/ed_ug.pdf.

⁷⁹ ODI.

the number of school aged children) was significantly higher than the national average, showing the impact of access to tuition-free education in camps.⁸⁰ The learning center strategy was effective because children living in camps were in close proximity to schools and therefore did not have to commute.

The humanitarian intervention and UPE are not the only factors that influenced enrollment in northern Uganda: The insecurity during the war also played a role. Families' livelihood activities were severely limited during the war due to camp rules and security threats, and so children may have experienced less competing demands on their time, leaving them freer to enroll in school. For instance, before the war, cattle herding played an important role for some families. When families fled and lost their herds,⁸¹ they may have decided to educate children who would have otherwise not attended school because of the rigors and opportunities associated with being groomed for cattle herding.

Unmet Needs in the Recovery Period

When conducting community interviews in August and September of 2008, the author first asked community members, "What is the situation here for children and youth?" This question was designed to allow individuals to talk about whatever themes were most on their minds when thinking about children and youth.

Almost every respondent interviewed in communities and camps responded by

⁸⁰ Ministry of Education and Sports (2005) in ODI. Figures for primary enrollment by region before the war were not available.

⁸¹ ACORD, *What do you remember? A rough guide to the war in Northern Uganda 1986-2000* (accessed March 11, 2010); available from www.acord.org.uk/r-pubs-Cope%20Working%20Pater%2033.PDF.

referring to unmet needs, whether social or economic. The trend in the responses is telling and points to the severe strain that families face as they return to their villages without sufficient humanitarian or government support. Not all poor communities would respond in this way. In other contexts the same question did not necessarily lead to a discussion of unmet needs. In Burundi, Peter Uvin asked about the situation and found that youth talked about many things, including the sort of jobs that there were in or class distinctions that defined their communities.⁸² In Rwanda, when Marc Sommers asked this question, it elicited many responses related to building houses, a key concern for male youth trying to establish themselves as adults worthy of a good marriage.⁸³

Statistics and observation confirm that needs are in fact severe in northern Uganda, but the extent to which needs dominated interview responses may also be a reflection of the learned behavior of community members during the war. During the humanitarian phase, respondents may have learned that when they express unmet needs, aid workers listen and occasionally respond.

Education as a Basic Need

Although the quality of education in IDP camps was often extremely poor (as demonstrated by the heightened pupil-teacher ratios previously noted), the population in camps experienced a tremendous shift in terms of access to education. Community members' responses to the question about the situation in northern Uganda showed that education was of just as much concern as the fulfillment of other basic needs such

⁸² Peter Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi* (New York: Zed Books, 2009).

⁸³ Marc Sommers, *Two Francs* (forthcoming).

as clean water and health services. Despite the dearth of health services and potable water in the sub-region, education was specifically mentioned more than other basic services. 39 out of 71 respondents that talked about their needs for services talked specifically and predominantly about education. The remaining responses referred to health, water, or basic services in general. This finding shows that in the period following humanitarian support to education in camps, community members consider education a basic need for their children.

Some factors may have created a bias that affected this finding. The author arrived in some of the villages in a Save the Children vehicle. Although Save the Children implements agricultural projects in addition to education projects, they are known for their early childhood learning centers in the region. The association with Save the Children may have created the impression that the author was in a position to deliver a message regarding the need for education projects. Secondly, the author returned to villages multiple days. Although the questionnaires were designed so that questions that were specifically about education were held until the end so as not to bias previous questions, individuals could have mentioned to their neighbors that the author appeared to be interested in education.

Several factors mitigated the extent to which the question about the situation for children and youth would receive a biased answer. The author traveled in an unmarked vehicle at least 75% of the time. A Save the Children vehicle was only used in the cases where the author's vehicle was not able to pass by road. Furthermore,

interviewees were not told that the questionnaire pertained to education. The author also introduced herself as being affiliated only with a university in the US, not with Save the Children.

If community members did in fact assume that the author was attached to an NGO and could send a message regarding needs for education, this could have influenced the extent to which they talked about education when asked about the situation in northern Uganda for children and youth. This would then indicate a level of familiarity with humanitarian and development actors, as well as a demand for education services. If community members were not assuming anything about the author and answered in a way that was unbiased, then we can understand that they see education as a need on par with other needs at the time that they were interviewed. In either case, community members clearly communicated their need for education services. The analysis of the qualitative responses (referenced in a following section) shows the extent to which community members were disturbed by their lack of access to education for their children.

Community Members Say there are Many Benefits to Education

Despite the significant gains in terms of primary access, the quality of education provided in northern Uganda was far behind the quality of education provided in the rest of the country. Quality indicators including the pupil-student ratio and national examination scores show that the north was woefully behind the rest of the country in

2005.⁸⁴ The District Inspector of Schools in Amuru District talked about the learning centers in camps,

These were crowded schools, with poor infrastructure, in very harsh conditions and environments...the facilities were not there...even the playground... there has not been any effective learning and teaching. If you check the performance within the years, it has been poor.

Given the poor conditions in northern Uganda and in learning centers in camps, the author aimed to learn exactly why families would invest in education. Were children actually learning or was there some other reason why families would make the effort to keep their children in school? Although some did not see the real value of education, others gave a variety of reasons why they now see education as so important.

Although many community members questioned the real impact of the education that was provided in the camps, the majority of people saw some benefit from increased access to education. Out of 156 people that answered the question, “If you or your children were learning anything while in the camp, has it been useful?” Forty-one people pointed to some knowledge that they or their children attained. Parents and youth talked about the reading and writing skills that learners gained in camps. Some respondents simply said that they can now write their name or read road signs, others reported that they could read and write and calculate at the market. Youth

⁸⁴ ODI.

also talked about being able to do things for themselves and being able to reason and consider the right thing to do in a situation. Thirty-four parents and youth also talked about how going to school helped them to learn good social behavior.⁸⁵

Economic benefits (or hope of future economic benefits) associated with the education received in the camps were mentioned by 27 parents and youth. Parents most often talked about their hope that their child would be able to put his education to use to help them in the future. Some youth talked about their ability to help themselves by using their skills (such as radio repair and tailoring) and being able to gain or seek employment.

Some people thought that education in the camps was a way to make progress in the school system regardless of whether or not they were learning or deriving other benefits. Six respondents said that being able to simply pass to the next year in school was of intrinsic benefit.


For many people, the real impact of education received in camps is questionable because the quality was poor or because they were not able to continue to a high enough level to see the benefit. Forty-eight people responded to the question about the benefit of education by saying that being in school while in the camp did not yield any benefit for them or their children. Some said that since they cannot read or write education was not useful. Others pointed to overcrowded classrooms as a sign that education was useless. Some said that they may have studied or learned something,

⁸⁵ This theme will be discussed in the next chapter.

but they had to drop out before achieving a level that would have allowed them to experience the benefit of education. Some parents who did not see the benefit of education thought that if their children were able to attain a higher level of education, then education might then prove to be useful.

The following chart summarizes these findings and shows that 69% of people thought that the education they received in camps was beneficial, and those people were most likely to point to skills and knowledge they had attained. The social and economic benefits of school were key motivating factors for 22% and 17% of respondents, respectively. For those that could not point to any real benefit of school in camps, we can infer that they felt that the quality of school was insufficient to yield economic or social benefits or in terms of real learning.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ The responses about the benefits of schooling while in camps are further analyzed in a subsequent section.



With Increased Access to Education, Increased Hopes


Even though the quality of education was compromised during the war and in camps, a surprising number of respondents stressed their need for education. It seems plausible that the dramatic increase in access to education during the humanitarian intervention in northern Uganda had an influence on expectations related to education. The following paragraphs discuss another finding from the data that provides further evidence for the argument that the humanitarian provision of education increased the expectation of education and the extent to which community members look to education to improve their lives.

Interviewees in northern Uganda were asked, “What is your plan or hope for improving your life?” Women and men with higher levels of formal schooling were significantly more likely to mention education as the central aspect of their plan to


better their lives. As shown in the chart below, 92% of respondents with post-primary education mentioned education as their plan. Among those who had not made it to the post-primary level, about half of trended responses for interviewees focused on education. The other half of respondents focused mainly on agriculture, but also on other related ways to improve their livelihoods. The more education a person receives, the more they rely on education in their life.

The trend of increasing emphasis on education with higher levels of academic attainment becomes more visible when further differentiating the responses among those that did not attend any post-primary education. Among the 28 people with no education whatsoever, only eight people responded with education as a central factor in their plans. Among those with only lower primary education, only five of 18 said that their plans focused on education. These findings support the notion that individuals who received access to education in camps are now more likely to see education as a source of hope, and to be disenchanted if services are not available, as is the case for so many people leaving camps and returning to ancestral lands. The following charts show the relationship between higher levels of education and hopes around education as the best plan for a better life (these results are further disaggregated and discussed in the subsequent chapter).

Plans: Post Primary Education



Plans: No Post-Primary Education



There are several possible explanations for why exposure to education has increased community members expectations about the role that education will play in their lives. As demonstrated above, the majority of community members report that they derived either economic, social, or academic benefits from the education they

received. If they experienced positive returns from education, they are more likely to seek further education.

Gaining access to education services may be enough to demonstrate the potential of education and thereby influence attitudes and spur continued demand. An NGO worker in Gulu Town reflected on changing attitudes as a result of camp life,

The situation since 2002 has been quite bad, but you know, people changed... It is positive that the mother would like to have the school less than 5 kilometers away and before it was 15 kilometers away and this [behavior change] was due to the camps... So it is not that everything is negative, and there has been some behavior change...

Education may lead to an important demonstration effect, even if the cases of education leading to employment may be the exception rather than the norm. The success of one educated person can play an important role in creating expectations around education because of the disproportionate good fortune and higher standard of living that an employed person achieves compared to a subsistence farmer. One person who achieves enough education to gain employment and thereby elevate his or her status may inspire others to look to education. With the influx of humanitarian organizations in northern Uganda, the demonstration effect may have gained strength given the increased demand for educated paid volunteers and local staff.

Education as a Need, Not a Right

The inherent urgency in meeting needs during an emergency makes rapid basic service provision a priority for humanitarian actors. However, the ICRC (among other organizations) espouses a greater framing vision for what can ideally be achieved when the full rights of individuals are known and respected. Along these lines, ODI recommends taking an approach that welcomes participation and encourages community members to have expectations and know their rights. This sort of approach is seen as a way to mitigate dependency upon aid in camps by ensuring IDPs have a role in determining their own welfare, rather than relegating IDPs to the role of passive recipient of aid.⁸⁷

Interestingly, the community members' responses related to education (or their other basic needs) do not show any understanding of education as a universal or legal right. Rather than make demands or talk of claims that they have on their local or national government, they speak in the language of needs, referring to the challenges they face because their basic needs go unmet. A father's response is typical of the tone of community member response, alluding to unmet needs rather than a sense of rights that should be claimed, "The young children, especially from 0-11 have very many problems. They don't have easy access to schools. There are small pools of water around, so the kids fear moving long distances to schools." If humanitarian approaches in northern Uganda did aim to empower IDPs to know and claim their rights to

⁸⁷ Overseas Development Institute, Dependency and Humanitarian Relief.

education, the impact is not noticeable when listening to community members talk about education and the challenges they suffer.

Increasing Focus on Formal Education – Part of a Long-Term Trend

The previous sections provided evidence that the humanitarian intervention in northern Uganda in support of government policies increased enrollment and expectations around education in northern Uganda. In many ways, this trend can be seen as an acceleration of a long-term trend in northern Uganda (and Uganda as a whole) wherein foreigners have introduced or emphasized formal education and communities have increasingly valued this education as vital to their development.

Education has always been important to the Acholi people in northern Uganda although values about the form of education children and youth receive have changed over time. Before the colonial period the Acholi society was non-centralized and based on chiefdoms. Acholi shared a distinct culture, language and common experience that bonded them together.⁸⁸ Ssekamwa writes that indigenous groups in Uganda, including the Acholi people, considered education the transfer of practical skills so that individuals could be helpful to self, family, and tribe. Youth were expected to know their history and social and collective behavior for living in harmony within their tribe.⁸⁹

Ssekamwa describes teaching and learning in the pre-colonial period as having taken place in homesteads around a fire at night, as well as in any place where people carried out economic, political and social activities. Education was non-literate and non-

⁸⁸ Atkinson (1994).

⁸⁹ J.C Ssekamwa, *History and Development of Education* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2000).

exclusionary: All members of a society could participate in educating the young and all were collectively responsible for the children and youth. In the case of a youngster that showed a proclivity for a certain vocation, specialized teachers would take it upon themselves to transfer specific knowledge. Because the purpose of education was highly practical, short lectures would be accompanied with demonstration and practice. Community teachers also used creative methods such as play, drama, and games.⁹⁰

With the advent of missionary, and then state education, values around education changed dramatically. Catholic and Protestant missionaries came to central Uganda in the late 1800s and focused teaching on reading, writing, numeracy, agriculture and some technical skills. Muslims pre-dated Christians in Uganda and imparted lessons based on the Koran and on trade, which was their main economic activity.⁹¹ These activities were concentrated in central Uganda, which became the region where the administrative was concentrated, but also spread throughout the country to varying degrees, although the north was notably less developed than other regions.⁹²

During the colonial period, families that had access to missionaries and the education that they provided began to value education more than traditional ways of making a living and advancing in life. The Secretary of Education in Amuru reflected on his forefather's exposure to education through missionaries and the way that this

⁹⁰ Ssekamwa.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Kabwegyere.

exposure made his family different from those that preserved traditional livelihood strategies.

People were divided into two. There were others in some families, when these Europeans just came, they landed into the British hands, so they were informed and knew the importance of education. Then there were others that were not educated at all. Therefore they were concentrating on animals. So when a child is grown up, they tell the child not to go to school. They tell the child to look after the animals. Those that weren't informed didn't value education.

Ssekamwa finds that the imported form of education in Uganda created differences between people and within clans as learners came to identify with their educators rather than uneducated locals. The new system of education, unlike the indigenous forms of education, required special knowledge and literacy that only came from interaction with the foreign system. This invalidated the former system whereby all responsible parents could help to educate the children. As a result of the missionary influence, people began to view agriculture and technical education as inferior to formal learning.⁹³

As independence drew near, the aims of the education system had to adapt to fulfill the need for qualified administrators.⁹⁴ In response, an effort was made to increase the number of students. Under President Obote's first term from 1966-1971,

⁹³ Ssekamwa.

⁹⁴ Ssekamwa.

he implemented a plan aimed to develop educational facilities that served every child. Despite crises in funding and human rights during the reign of Idi Amin ('71-'79) plans continued to increase enrollment in primary school.⁹⁵ This focus on expanding education has continued under every phase of leadership and the number of children in formal education has continued to climb.

The introduction of UPE in 1997 and Universal Secondary Education in 2006 represent efforts by the current government to dramatically increase enrollment. In northern Uganda, these landmark events occurred at a time when many people were in camps and the delivery of education services was visibly supported by humanitarian actors. As access to primary education increased in camps, values around education again shifted in favor of formal education.

The story of an educated father in a remote return site in Amuru Sub-County shows the changing values around education and formal education versus traditional livelihoods and learning. This father managed to achieve four years of secondary school education and was elected to a local leadership post. He has eight adopted orphans, some of whom are studying at the secondary level, and he is paying their school fees. He reflected on his parents' emphasis on cattle and espouses his own view that education is a better way to improve than having a large number of cattle.

Our parents did not value education during those days. But myself I see that education is the key to everything including whether you are going to

⁹⁵ Ministry of Education, *Education for National Integration and Development* (Entebbe, 1997).

get employment or not. Back then, our parents used to have so many head of cattle. All this area was for grazing! My father had 200 head of but they had no way of improving life.

Ssekamwa describes the way that an increasing emphasis on formal education crowded out the role of informal education by all members of a community. In northern Uganda, this dynamic may be occurring, but causality may run in both directions. Informal learning was crowded out during the war because communities were scattered before settling in camps and were unable to meet and to share as they did in rural communities due to security concerns in camps.⁹⁶ The lack of informal learning opportunities around livelihood activities may have pushed families to look to formal education to train children and youth in the absence of informal learning opportunities. At the same time, the emphasis on formal education may have caused families to devalue informal learning (a trend which Ssekamwa indicates has been occurring since colonization).

During Returns in Acholiland, Hopes for Education Go Unmet

Policy of Returns Dominates Community Life

During the period when research was conducted (March 2008-July 2009), the process of returns and the challenges associated with returning to ancestral lands dominated life for northern Ugandans. According to the head of the UNHCR in northern Uganda, between Museveni's announcement that IDPs should begin returning home in

⁹⁶ This finding is discussed in a subsequent chapter.

October of 2006 and March of 2010 almost all northern Ugandans were in transit from camps. As of March 2010, an estimated 73% of 1,323,000 IDPs in Acholiland had left camps to return to their ancestral lands and another 15% had left the main camps and were in transit camps closer to their villages. This mass migration left only approximately 160,000 people in camps and half of the 121 camps had officially closed.⁹⁷

The government policy for IDPs in northern Uganda is that all people in camps should return home via a “voluntary return” process. Whether returns are truly voluntary is complicated by the termination of humanitarian aid in camps as well as other factors. For example, the Amuru Resident District Commissioner reportedly advised landowners of camps that were closed to charge high rents to those who refused to leave the land and return to the villages.⁹⁸ There is no stated deadline for camp closures, but the UNHCR hopes that they will all be closed by the end of 2010.⁹⁹

Interviews with community members in northern Uganda in August and September of 2008 were conducted mainly at return sites, but also at camps and transition camps. During this period, the return process was in full swing and community members talked about the main pull factor influencing returns to villages: the hope of a good harvest and a better life. A father in Amuru District explained that now his family is, “*generally fine because we have returned to our ancestral home. Thus*

⁹⁷ All Africa, *Amuru Closes More Camps* (accessed March 7, 2010); available from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201003030424.html>.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

we are able to access our agricultural land.” Access to land means that families can grow food to eat, and hopefully to sell, and can begin to have a better life free from the indignities of camp life. Social and health benefits are associated with leaving congested camps, where malaria, HIV/AIDS and alcoholism were commonplace.

Despite the optimism about agricultural opportunity in return sites, the needs are many. The lack of services in communities is well documented and affects people throughout northern Uganda. Museveni’s 2006 announcement that IDPs would begin returning home was a surprise, and despite his assurance that money had been set aside for resettlement costs, the provision of services in rural areas had not been assured as of early 2010.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, as noted above, many community members who were interviewed for this study expressed concerns about the lack of services in their villages. The most common concerns have to do with access to education, clean water, amenities, tools, and health facilities. A father at a return site in Amuru Sub-County elaborated,

...The nursery center does not have teachers (they do not attend classes).

The same applies to the primary school where there is only the head teacher. It's difficult for women to access salt, soap and also medical care for the children. There is only one borehole which is not sufficient for the large population here.

¹⁰⁰ Humanitarian Practice Network, *Heading Home? Protection and Return in Northern Uganda* (accessed March 8, 2010); available from www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2863.

People Return Home and Humanitarian Aid Phases Out

Now there is relative peace in northern Uganda and the majority of IDPs have returned to their ancestral lands. Those still in camps face increasing pressure to return home, including the continued withdrawal of humanitarian aid in camps in line with the government policy of returns. In the words of an aid worker from the Netherlands, the effect of the “halt to the provision of aid” is that “people have no choice but to go back.” Although staying in camps is not an option for most northern Ugandans, at the time that research was conducted, return sites had not been prepared for their arrival.

Critics point to the international community’s failure to help northern Uganda during the recovery period. According to an official from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs speaking in 2008, the international community contributed 90 percent of the funding for emergency aid while the war was in progress, but accepted responsibility for a little over 20 percent of the finances required to pay for reconstruction.¹⁰¹ The 2010 Consolidated Appeal warns, that the humanitarian gains made during the 2006 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the LRA and the Government of Uganda are in danger of “unraveling” due to “diminishing humanitarian programming that is unmatched by a significant increase in recovery programmes...”¹⁰² An NGO worker in Gulu Town protested the withdrawal of

¹⁰¹ Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, *Aid Vacuum in Northern Uganda* (accessed March 7, 2010); available from <http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/icc/Uganda/eb-080709-uganda-mc-redirected>.

¹⁰² United Nations Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, *Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal* (accessed March 17, 2010); available from

aid from northern Uganda, saying, “...the peace agreement hasn’t been signed, so the emergency isn’t over. And the issue of protection is worse than before...”

The gap in the provision of services in northern Uganda during the recovery period can be further explained by examining the role that the Government of Uganda took during the crisis. During the war, the GoU allowed the humanitarian community to take the lead in terms of responding to basic needs in camps. The Government took some measures to protect IDPs, such as the landmark Policy for Internally Displaced Persons in 2005, but in many people’s eyes, such measures were too little, too late. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that, although the creation of an IDP Policy was progressive, commitment to implementation was questionable, and the result was that, “numerous local and international organizations have filled the vacuum, further enabling the government to abdicate from its responsibilities...”¹⁰³

The challenges of bridging a humanitarian intervention and sustained development are well noted in the literature.¹⁰⁴ The challenges in northern Uganda were exacerbated by the extent to which the humanitarian intervention was entrenched and the corresponding impact on modes of operation. Service delivery focused on camps because the majority of residents in Acholiland were confined to these areas in town centers. Although people lived in dire straits, the chaos and fear surrounding the

<http://ochaonline.un.org/HUMANITARIANAPPEAL/webpage.asp?Page=1824>.

¹⁰³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Uncertain Future for IDPs While Peace Remains Elusive* (accessed November 14, 2009); available from www.internal-displacement.org.

¹⁰⁴ One of many sources on this topic is the following: Jonathan Moore, “The Humanitarian-Development Gap,” *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 833 (1999): 103-107.

LRA violence may have suppressed their expectations of the government. Now, as humanitarian actors retreat and people return home, local actors are being called upon to take up a bigger role. Challenges abound in this complex environment and the influx of development aid is slow. Ironically, a high ranking government official in Kampala admitted that in some ways things were easier when the humanitarian paradigm was dominant and people were confined in camps:

...Sometimes it was easier to manage a war situation than now, a non-war. You know in a war situation – the people run, stay in the camps. What is critical is safety. And people respond to safety. But now, when people are coming out, people are beginning to think that there is freedom and they can do anything, they are beginning to see the need for services, but they [services] are limited...”

The Government Response: The Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan

The Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) is the Government of Uganda’s plan to rehabilitate the north. Recognizing the negative impact of the long conflict in the north on development and poverty reduction, the GoU committed rehabilitate the north in the Comprehensive Solutions Protocol (signed in 2007 during the Juba peace talks in southern Sudan).¹⁰⁵ The GoU developed the PRDP in order to fulfill this commitment. The PRDP provides a framework for coordinating actors and to

¹⁰⁵ The agreement “recognizes the regional disparities and imbalances in terms of socio-economic and infrastructural development of the country as a result of history and the conflict.” Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, *Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions* (Juba, Sudan, 2007).

raise funds.¹⁰⁶ The GoU aims to fund one-third of the PRDP and to attract the rest of the targeted \$600 million from international actors.

Suspicion surrounds the implementation of the PRDP for several reasons, including the delayed implementation schedule. The PRDP, which was developed after a two year consultative process, was scheduled for implementation between 2007 and 2010. USAID reports that implementation began in July of 2008.¹⁰⁷ However, no evidence of programs or projects being implemented was available in June of 2009. Despite the stated emphasis on reconstruction of LRA-affected areas, the PRDP will spread resources among 40 districts, some of which were only marginally affected by the LRA conflict. Many northerners view this decision as largely political and feel that the breadth of coverage dilutes the potential of the plan to effectively address the needs in the North.¹⁰⁸

The PRDP espouses sophisticated conflict prevention rhetoric about the need to reintegrate the north and address the root causes of conflict. The document contains a basic analysis of conflicts affecting northern Uganda as well as the causes of conflict (described as political and historical, security-based, and socio-economic). The PRDP claims that interventions in the north so far have been de-linked to an overall strategic framework and that the region has been “approached largely from a development perspective that assumes that state authority is functioning normally and thus the

¹⁰⁶ Uganda Clusters, *USAID Presentation on USAID* (accessed March 15, 2010); available from <http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/prdp.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ Uganda Clusters.

¹⁰⁸ Interview by Author with Member of Parliament, (Kampala, Uganda, 06/12/2009).

implementation of a poverty reduction strategy is feasible.” According to the PRDP, “civilian state authority has yet to be fully realised in the north...” and state interventions have been based on sectors (i.e. through budget support), which is not appropriate in the conflict setting. The PRDP aims to achieve increased growth and prosperity by addressing the structural causes of conflict and the impacts of the conflict through an approach that includes the following objectives: i) consolidating state authority, ii) rebuilding and empowering communities, iii) revitalizing the economy, and iv) promoting peace building and reconciliation. The plan claims to incorporate both emergency period and development strategies aimed to help the North to recover.¹⁰⁹

Although the PRDP claims to take into account the causes and impact of the conflict and aims to establish a conflict prevention approach, in the education sector, the strategies outlined in the PRDP operationalize a development approach more than a conflict prevention approach. Despite acknowledging the importance of addressing recovery period issues that would be important for conflict prevention; such as providing alternative training to school dropouts and increasing community ownership, plans for the PRDP in the education sector show that the lion’s share of funds will be directed towards infrastructure rehabilitation for priority areas (classrooms and teacher houses). As in the human-centered development approach, the emphasis is on the 2nd MDG and on the visible indicators of development aimed to increase enrollment. The

¹⁰⁹ “Moreover, the promotion of the development agenda is viewed as a key integrative mechanism to resolving the remaining conflicts in the country while consolidating the gains that have been realised.” Government of Uganda, *Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 2007-2010* (Kampala, Uganda, 2007).

Government of Uganda will continue to focus on paying formal education sector costs including teacher salaries and capitalization grants for schools just as in other regions of the country.¹¹⁰ The government will focus on infrastructure, the formal sector, and recurring costs. This begs the question of how this strategy is any different than the development strategy of a government that is continuously working to fulfill its obligation to deliver services through the country.

Although rehabilitating schools in northern Uganda is critical and should be a part of any recovery strategy, the basic infrastructure needs in northern Uganda are in fact so great that they cannot be fulfilled within a time span that will be beneficial to the war-affected children and youth. In the absence of new, innovative, and time-sensitive measures, the crisis of access to education will only be addressed in the long-term: The tremendous infrastructure needs cannot be tackled in any short or medium term time frame. Although short-term measures cost money and could be seen to be drawing away from lasting structural solutions, from a conflict-prevention perspective, implementing a blend of measures, some of which may actually target those affected by the conflict, is a worthwhile endeavor.

Abject poverty in northern Uganda has almost doubled in the past 18 years (from 31.3% in 1992 to 61% in 2006) and total enrollment has tripled (from 356,182 in 1996 to 983,539 in 2006). A huge gap in education provision is opening as people leave camps and return to ancestral lands. As much as 20% of schools may be more than 5km

¹¹⁰ Interview by author with a USAID Official, (Kampala, Uganda, 03/25/2008).

from the next school, meaning that many students commute further than 5km from schools (and commuting paths are treacherous).¹¹¹ The most recent figures available from the Ministry of Sports and Education (MoES) at the time of data collection (July 2009) estimated a shortage of 8,723 primary school classrooms and 15,030 primary school teachers' houses in the North.¹¹² The costs of rebuilding in order to meet critical needs are so high that they will not be met: The cost of building the needed primary classrooms is at least \$168.9 million USD. The cost of building the required teacher's houses is at least \$70 million USD. The Ministry of Education finds that if the infrastructure needs in the primary, secondary, BTVET and tertiary sectors in the north are to be met, \$306 million USD should be mobilized in the next three years.¹¹³ Additionally, to meet the shortage of teachers in the north (and in order to meet the desired pupil-teacher ratio of 1:50) the northern region would have to add 19,076 teaching personnel to their payroll. At an average monthly salary of \$107 USD, meeting the post conflict short term teacher costs would add up to \$24.5 million USD/annum.¹¹⁴ These costs would total approximately \$380 million over three years.

The Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) aims to rehabilitate the north

¹¹¹ Ministry of Education and Sports.

¹¹² Figures were converted to USD using a conversation rate as of December 27, 2009 (1 USD: 1,868.60 UGX). MoES cost estimates were utilized, although in cases where development partners build schools and teacher's housing, these cost estimates may be too low. The cost of classroom construction is estimated at \$8027 USD. The cost of construction for teacher's housing is estimated at \$11,238 USD. Ministry of Education and Sports, xi.

¹¹³ Because of these untenable costs, the MoES recommends that in the short term, the focus be only on renovation. Renovation of current primary schools will cost \$25.9 million USD. Ministry of Education and Sports.

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Education and Sports, xiv.

in order to redress the impact of the conflict and to prevent future conflicts. The PRDP is intended to address the full range of sectors in the north, including costly initiatives such as infrastructure.¹¹⁵ In planning documents, the second strategic priority under the plan, rebuilding and empowering communities, is allotted 280 million USD (47%) of the total almost \$600 million that GoU aims to raise. This priority area is intended to cover support for all of the following: emergency assistance to IDPs; IDP return/resettlement; and community empowerment and recovery programs in health, education, water, and livelihood support.¹¹⁶ During the emergency, education received a far smaller amount of funding than health, water or livelihood interventions. Clearly, \$380 million will not be made available for the education sector alone.

Although there is no budget for education activities that are specifically conflict-sensitive within the PRDP, the MoES does recognize recovery period needs. The MoES identified critical activities to redress the impact of the conflict, such as reviewing the curriculum to focus on requisite post-conflict competencies and skills and reforming teacher training to incorporate competencies for delivering psycho-social support. Regardless, planning documents show that the MoES recommends that these issues should not be tackled immediately or even in the medium term, but rather as part of a long-term plan (within the next ten years and beyond).¹¹⁷ Given that the PRDP essentially aims to build back dilapidated schools in an area of the country where

¹¹⁵ Government of Uganda, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 2007-2010 (2007).

¹¹⁶ Uganda Clusters.

¹¹⁷ Ministry of Education and Sports.

service provision is lacking, the PRDP is better described as a development plan that seeks to galvanize donor funding rather than a truly conflict sensitive program in the education sector.

Challenges to Education in Communities of Return: Why the PRDP is Not Enough

Community members' interview responses show that infrastructure shortages are a major concern, but they face many other barriers to accessing quality education that are not addressed in the recovery plan. Great disappointment with the education system is palpable, as in the words of a female youth in Lolim Transit Camp in Amuru Sub-County,

The war that persisted here has spoilt the future of our children because education has become a nightmare. The youth lack what to do individually to improve their life. The school is very far.

Distance to schools and insufficient infrastructure is a major obstacle. Some respondents said that the nearest school was 4, 5, 6 or 7km from their homes and that the roads were treacherous and subject to flooding. This suggests that building new schools, in addition to rehabilitating priority schools, is necessary. Distance creates a barrier for those that have a hard time commuting such as young children and girls that are expected to do house work. More than half of the people who talked about education in response to the first interview question talked about distance to schools. A father in a remote village in Lodi return site (Amuru District) explained the difficulty for small children,

The young children, especially from 0-11 have very many problems. They don't have easy access to schools. There are small water bodies [flooded areas] around, so the kids fear moving long distances to schools.

Even under the prevailing policy of UPE, expenses related to education create a formidable barrier, especially for orphans and child-headed households. In the Lodi Village in Amuru District, villagers discussed some of the hidden costs to education. Community members listed the following costs, which add up to roughly \$7.60 per term or \$22.80 per year (a significant burden for families that are living on less than \$1 a day). Families also factor in the opportunity cost of sending children to school who would otherwise be contributing to the household by doing chores or farming as well as the difficulty of sending children to far away schools where lunch is not provided.

Hidden Costs of Education at a Tuition-Free Primary School (USD)

- \$.55 per term for the World Food Program feeding fee (this is no longer relevant where WFP has discontinued feeding)
- \$.27 per term for the report card fee
- \$1.38 for the Parent-Teacher Association fee
- \$2.70 for uniforms (or more for larger children)
- \$2.70 per term for exercise books¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ These estimates are based upon community consultation. Actual costs vary by school. Women's Commission found that in 2004 in Kitgum and Gulu, cost of school materials, uniforms, PTA, lunch fees and building fees totaled between \$2.70 and \$8.30 per term. Xanthe Ackerman, *Education in Amuru District, Northern Uganda: Statistical Analysis and Community Perspectives*, (Gulu, Uganda, 2009). Report delivered to District Education Officer in Amuru District and produced in collaboration with Save the

The poor quality of schools and teaching was mentioned by some and echoed in later questions about the challenges related to education. Some, like a female youth in the Lodi return village in Amuru Sub-County indicated that teachers are not committed: “...The primary school is also far away, and the teachers are so relaxed that they do not teach.” Other community members focused on the insufficient number of teachers and their poor behavior, including absenteeism and drunkenness.¹¹⁹ Some community members feel that without adequate teaching staff, teachers will not be able to control children in schools. A mother in the Juba village in Atiak Sub-County explained,

The children are generally disrespectful which we attribute to the inadequate teaching staff in the schools (especially those children who have remained in the camp).

Teachers may also resist returning to communities or continue to live in towns even if posted to rural areas. Teachers, like others, have become accustomed to the amenities that are available in the trading centers that have sprung up around camps. Teachers may fear returning to rural areas, as they could be more vulnerable in the case that violence returns. The District Inspector of Schools in Amuru explained that the local government wants to build teacher’s houses to increase the amount of time teachers spend in communities, yet this may not always solve this problem,

They are also constructing teachers’ houses so that they can live within

Children in Uganda. Estimates for amounts in USD are based on a conversion rate of 1 USD: 1800 UGX.

¹¹⁹ These themes are discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, and were also reflected in the responses to the question, “What are the biggest obstacles to education?”

and work within the timetable. Although, also to the contrary, some teachers resisted returning, so they just abandoned their teaching. You may find a school is displaced in Amuru and has to return some 15 or 20km away. Then the teacher who is used to this life in the camp, in the center, they will refuse.

The following chart shows the types of responses to the first interview question (What is the situation for children and youth here in northern Uganda?) that had to do with education.

What is the situation for children and youth here?		
Responses Related to Education		
Education	Distance to Schools and Poor Infrastructure	28
	Expense	11
	Lack of Learning Opportunities	4
	Quality, Performance and Lack of Teachers	4
	Interest Level and Child Concentration	3
Total Responses Related Primarily to Education		50

Clearly, rehabilitating high priority schools (and to a lesser degree, teacher housing) is an important strategy that will redress a major obstacle to education for the children within the reach of the rehabilitated schools. However, the depth of infrastructure needs and the breadth of issues in the education sector demands additional complementary solutions and innovations that will allow for time-sensitive

responses to help the children and youth affected by conflict.¹²⁰

Families Take Risks for Education: Evidence of Value of Education and Lack of Opportunity in Return Sites

As described above, families place value on the education that their children received in camps and they face constrained educational opportunities in areas of return. Families take risks and make significant sacrifices in order to maintain children in school in camps, thus demonstrating the value they place on education. Although many camps have closed and actors are beginning or planning to curtail services in remaining camps order to discourage continued settlement, some schools continue to operate in camps. Some families maintain a hut in camps as well as in their ancestral lands. This survival strategy, which is not uncommon in the wake of complex emergencies and returns, allows families to access services in camps, including education for their children. These people cling to the remnants of the humanitarian support of education services because doing so gives them better service than what is offered in their communities of return.

In response to the first interview question, six people spoke immediately about how they or their children stay in camps in order to access education. Respondents described families that are split apart, the lack of supervision and care for children who stay behind in camps, and the distance to schools for children in return sites. This

¹²⁰ The conclusion makes some suggestions along these lines.

theme illustrates an important gap in care for children in the recovery period.

A youth explained that he enjoys being in the village with his family, but in order to access education, he and his siblings stay in the camp:

Staying here [in the village] is enjoyable because we stay here with both parents (mothers) so we do not starve... But we (three of us) still stay in the camp to access education. We also cook for ourselves. My mother normally sends foodstuff to us in Amuru Camp and then my younger sister (10 years old) cooks for us.

The quality and availability of schools affects families' decisions to keep their children in camps, and some communities are more affected than others. A School Management Committee member in a return site in Amuru Sub-County talked about the local community school. He explained that although residents took pride in having their children go to the local school, the school only provides Primary 1 through Primary 5 because of resource shortages. The SMC member explained that because Primary 6 and Primary 7 are not available in the community, "...some parents have left children in the camp... Some children stay alone if they are big..." He explained that if the local school still does not offer classes up to Primary 7 when the camp closes, the children from the village will continue to try to live near the camp site because the nearest school will still be there.

The findings of this study confirm findings in humanitarian reports including the report from the International Displacement Monitoring Centre: "The returns process is

generating new protection concerns, in particular in relation to children. The scarcity of services in return areas has led to voluntary family separation, leaving thousands of children in camps without care-givers and at heightened risk of neglect, abuse and exploitation, including sexual violence and dropping out of school.”¹²¹ The risks that families are willing to take show both the value they place on education and the lack of opportunity at return sites.

Limitations of the Humanitarian Approach and the Transition to the PRDP

The ICRC describes humanitarian aid as providing protection through: i) responsive action aimed at preventing abuse, stopping abuse, or alleviating effects; ii) remedial action aimed at restoring dignity and ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent to abuse; and iii) any activity aimed at creating and/or consolidating an environment conducive to full respect for the rights of the individual.¹²² This description and the overall vision espoused for humanitarian aid apply to all activities conducted during a humanitarian emergency, including education. Although the support of education provision during crisis was not always considered a fundamental part of the humanitarian response, through the INEE – SPHERE collaboration, education is now formally recognized as a part of the humanitarian response.

Education efforts in camps in northern Uganda served to protect children and

¹²¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

¹²² Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action*, New York: United Nations, 2002, 12.

youth and also to remediate some of the impact of the conflict. Funding for programs that aimed to create a normalizing environment in and around schools increased toward the end of the conflict, although tremendous challenges remained and many needs went unmet. However, soon after the emergency phase of the conflict ended, funding for the humanitarian effort to remediate the impact of the conflict on children's education was practically halted. The PRDP is the main vehicle to deliver educational services during the recovery period, but as shown above, it cannot reach the most-conflict affected in a way that will remediate the impact of the conflict.

Humanitarian aid aims to provide protection by creating an environment conducive to full respect for the rights of the individual through political, social, cultural, institutional, economic and/or legal means.¹²³ Despite this stated goal, humanitarian aid for IDPs has only a limited capacity to make structural or environmental changes given that humanitarian law does not pertain to IDPs after the conflict is over. The Geneva Conventions, so central to the logic of humanitarian law, proscribe actions for times of violence and for refugees. However, no arguments are made that pertain to IDPs returning to villages with inadequate services.

In Uganda, humanitarian law and advocacy was able to change the institutional environment for IDPs during the war, but this change does not apply to returnees. After Francis Deng visited Uganda, then the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, the Government of Uganda announced the IDP Policy

¹²³ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action*, New York: United Nations, 2002, 12.

which institutionalized expectations for IDPs *during war*,¹²⁴ but not in the wake of war. Although the IDP Policy does reference the GoU's commitment to facilitate the voluntary return, resettlement, integration and re-integration of IDPs, in terms of education and other sectors, the language of the policy pertains only to efforts that will be taken during the period when IDPs are in camps.¹²⁵

For returnees, the violence of the war is over along with their protection as IDPs, but the daily consequences of war have not been remediated. Access to education is still a far off reality for many people. Children start school late, study in open air, and suffer through overcrowded classes. Youth whose education was interrupted during the war struggle to find livelihood activities and a way forward, yet few programs seek to remediate what they have lost.

The ICRC, along with other organizations, stresses the goal of changing the social environment such that individuals are aware of their rights. Humanitarian actors that write and reflect on these issues refer to the "rights of the IDPs."¹²⁶ Perhaps this has been a useful tool for advocating for funding, but this language has not trickled down to the individual level in northern Uganda. Community members are left with the feeling that they have needs which are not met, but they do not volunteer an understanding of their rights or the way to claim rights.

¹²⁴ Brookings Institute, *Uganda's IDP Policy*, (accessed October 20, 2010); available from http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0131humanrights_miller.aspx.

¹²⁵ IDP Policy, 2004.

¹²⁶ Norwegian Refugee Council, *The Cluster Approach in northern Uganda* (accessed March 8, 2010); available from www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/72/pdf.

Humanitarian aid aims to be neutral, but even in the education sector, it is not. The provision of education has accelerated the trend of valuing formal education over informal forms of education and has increased the feeling that education is a need that must be met. Although humanitarian aid aims to promote the rights of aid recipients, the impact can be more accurately described as having promoted the needs of aid recipients. In the wake of conflict, expectations around education are heightened, and it seems that the PRDP cannot quickly deliver.

THE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH: HUMAN-CENTERED DEVELOPMENT AND MDGS

The Development Partnership Framework in Uganda Sets the Stage for Harmonization

International actors have committed themselves to supporting the poverty reduction activities of the Government of Uganda and to harmonizing around national goals as stated in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The PEAP is the guiding document for development and actors that are guided by the development approach in Uganda. The PRDP ascribes to the principles and modalities outlined in the PEAP as well as the larger, overall poverty reduction strategy for the country. The PEAP was first formulated in 1997 and subsequently became the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for Uganda. The PEAP cites economic returns associated with investment in education in Uganda, especially at the primary level. The importance of education on child survival rates and family size is also noted.¹²⁷ Such discussion of education's ability to contribute to growth as well as health and other goals show the influence of the economic growth and human-centered development models.

The PEAP is the central planning document in the education sector in Uganda. Consistent with the best practices for development documented in the Rome Declaration, donors in Uganda have harmonized around the PEAP and thereby reinforce the goals set forth therein. International donors in Uganda committed themselves to

¹²⁷ International Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: *Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan Summary and Main Objectives* (accessed April 4, 2010); available from <http://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/Uga/01/#2>.

providing support only for programs that are in the PEAP, to increasing budget support and to working more closely together. These principles are enshrined the “development partnership principles” in the PEAP’s third volume and ensure that the agreed upon development priorities are funded.¹²⁸

Uganda’s purported success as an aid recipient may contribute to donors’ tendency to support national goals and initiatives. Donors cite Uganda as a success story in terms of pro-poor changes in spending patterns and macroeconomic stability.¹²⁹ These claims are not universally accepted, but they are prevalent in the development discourse about Uganda.¹³⁰ Donors lauded Uganda’s homegrown PEAP and made it a model for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which is the choice poverty reduction framework of the World Bank.¹³¹ In order to promote absorption and efficiency, donors have worked progressively with the GoU to increase levels of budget support, Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs) and donor coordination around sector groups. Uganda’s experience has been touted as a way to promote these modes of intervention.¹³²

¹²⁸ Foster and Mijumbi in Overseas Development Institute, *Politics and the PRSP Approach: Uganda Case Study* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1363.pdf.

¹²⁹ Foster and Mijumbi in Overseas Development Institute.

¹³⁰ Researchers from ODI have raised questions about these claims, pointing to troubling indicators of inequality and lesser development gains along non-economic lines. Overseas Development Institute, *Politics and the PRSP Approach*.

¹³¹ Christiansen with Hovland in Overseas Development Institute, *Politics and the PRSP Approach*.

¹³² Overseas Development Institute, *Politics and the PRSP Approach*.

Agreement on International Goals and Targets Promotes Further Harmonization

The confluence of international and national goals around primary education has further promoted donor harmonization in Uganda. In 1987, Museveni's Education Policy Review Commission (EPRC) noted low levels of primary attendance and achievement. The EPRC submitted recommendations in 1991, including the recommendation to abolish primary school fees.¹³³ International advocacy also played a role. A year before the EPRC released its recommendations, delegates from 155 countries and as many organizations at the Education for All Conference in Thailand committed to universalize primary education.¹³⁴ Free primary education (FPE) was implemented in 1997; one year after President Museveni made FPE a central campaign promise.¹³⁵ Now, Uganda notes that the Education for All goals set in Jomtien (including completion of free and compulsory education of good quality, equitable access for all, elimination of gender disparities, and achievement of measurable learning outcomes) and the MDG goals are long-term international commitments that have been incorporated into sector planning.¹³⁶

The confluence of Ugandan and international goals around primary education led to greater education funding and the development of instruments to promote

¹³³ Education Policy Review Commission, *Education for National Reintegration* (Entebbe: Ministry of Education, 1991).

¹³⁴ UNESCO, *The World Conference on Education for All* (accessed April 7, 2010); available from http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/background/world_conference_jomtien.shtml.

¹³⁵ The World Bank, *Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda: Universal Primary Education and Poverty Reduction* (accessed April 8, 2010); available from <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/reducingpoverty/case/58/fullcase/East%20Africa%20Edu%20Full%20Case.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Government of Uganda, *Re-Costed Education Sector Plan* (Kampala, Uganda, 2007).

efficiency and harmonization. FPE generated donor interest and aid flows increased to support primary education. As a result, education's share of official development assistance increased from 6 percent prior to 1997 to 15 percent after the abolishment of school fees.¹³⁷ The increased funding for education projects created new challenges, which then led to further reform. Over 100 projects were funded by different agencies during the early years of FPE, making government coordination of projects impossible.¹³⁸ In response, in 1998, the Government of Uganda launched the Education Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP) and a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) which focuses on improving the quality of basic education and funding access and equity in primary education.¹³⁹ Uganda became the first country in Africa to have coordinated and harmonized donor support in the education sector.¹⁴⁰

Donors Organize Behind the PRDP

Just as donors harmonized around Uganda's PEAP (as discussed above), they harmonize around the PRDP. Donors recognize the PRDP as the GoU's framework for all assistance to northern Uganda and as an outgrowth of the PEAP.¹⁴¹ The PRDP is to be

¹³⁷ Mayoka, *Uganda's Experience in Coordinating Education Sector Aid and Initiatives at Country Level* (Presentation at ADEA Conference in 2005).

¹³⁸ Mayoka.

¹³⁹ Michael Ward and Tony Read, *Education Reform in Uganda – 1997-2004: Reflections on Policy, Partnership, Strategy and Implementation* (London: DFID, 2008).

¹⁴⁰ The World Bank, *A Better Managed Education System in Uganda* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21308931~menuPK:3266877~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html>.

¹⁴¹ Uganda Clusters, *Principles for Good International Engagement in the Development of Northern Uganda* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from [http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/dwnlds/0502Programs/PRDP/PRDP2008/NURD/DP Principles for engagement in Northern Uganda.doc](http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/dwnlds/0502Programs/PRDP/PRDP2008/NURD/DP%20Principles%20for%20engagement%20in%20Northern%20Uganda.doc).

funded through budget support from donors (as well as national contributions) and is a modality that aims to coordinate all aid for northern Uganda and to increase absorption of international funds.¹⁴²

Harmonized Modes of Engagement May Compromise Donors' Ability to Engage in Post-Conflict Environment

Many donors in education in Uganda have adopted the move towards harmonization and direct budgetary support as a way of supporting national progress toward the main goals of the development agenda. In the education sector, as the government moved towards emphasizing universal primary education and MDG#2, this trend has accelerated. As noted by an official from the European Union, the international emphasis on accountability and on the MDGs was tied to the move toward direct budgetary support and harmonization, "Most of us have moved away from projects because we felt there was more assurance for improved public finances, tracking indicators, and performance in the MDGs. We thought there was a general commitment from the government and that led most donors to align with the PEAP. This translates into general budget support...."

Analysis of the impact of conflict and the intersection between education and conflict in the local context is essential for a conflict prevention approach to education. However, the efforts to streamline aid and support the national government priorities

¹⁴² Off-line support may be provided for discrete areas such as return and resettlement, and infrastructure and construction. Uganda Clusters.

limit donors' engagement with and understanding of local issues that affect the potential for a return to conflict, even as it promotes donor alignment around an insufficient recovery plan.

The Education Funder Agency Group (EFAG) is comprised of the main multi- and bi-lateral donors in education in Uganda. A point person represents this group to the Ministry of Education, thus streamlining donor coordination, but also limiting donors' access to and interaction with policymakers. Additionally, as donors increase direct budgetary support, they decrease project aid. Project aid allows donors to engage in key issues in various locations, and through this modality, donors often gain expertise which informs their broader programs. With lower levels of project aid, donors may be less likely to gain experience in northern Uganda and to develop an understanding of issues that could be pertinent to conflict prevention. When asked about the situation in northern Uganda, an official from the Belgian aid agency remarked, "It's really difficult for us to answer that question because we are not present. We don't have projects in northern Uganda. So for education, I really cannot answer that question."¹⁴³ Comments from another donor representative expressed the same sentiment, "...Given the fact that we haven't been on the ground implementing [in the North] we don't have a solid education program..."¹⁴⁴ These quotes show that when donors are not on the ground in a particular area, they feel less able to analyze local conditions, much less conflict dynamics.

¹⁴³ Interview by author with Belgian official, June 13, 2011 (Kampala, Uganda).

¹⁴⁴ Interview by author with official from donor agency, June 8, 2011 (Kampala, Uganda).

The lack of donor presence in northern Uganda is a factor of low levels of project aid but may also reflect the general reluctance to engage that development agencies make have had during the conflict due to security concerns or the feeling that northern Uganda was not yet ready for development initiatives. An official from a German aid agency explained that his organization is not working in northern Uganda because their focus is on “sustainable development.” This comment also refers to the German agencies’ orientation work at the policy level rather than the regional level.

Donors’ engagement in regional issues is further limited by efforts to harmonize their support. Even beyond the education sector, donors have committed to the Government of Uganda that when they direct their funding and/or provide program or technical support, they will engage in no more than two sectors.¹⁴⁵ Within education, many donors engaged in a similar division of labor process and committed to providing support in only one sub-sector within the education field.¹⁴⁶

Donors that ascribe to the harmonized approach point to the benefit of streamlining their support and putting national actors in charge. An official from an agency explained that their agency does not have projects in the north because they do not “go area-based,” because they “try to have the executing agency [the relevant ministry] make the decisions...”¹⁴⁷ This approach offers the obvious benefit of promoting national ownership over ideas, a critical factor in development. A Ugandan

¹⁴⁵ Interview by author with official from Belgian embassy, June 11, 2009 (Kampala, Uganda).

¹⁴⁶ Aid Harmonization, *Initiatives for Uganda* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from www.aidharmonization.org.

¹⁴⁷ Interview by author with donor agency official, June 15, 2009 (Kampala, Uganda).

who had worked both in the ministry and now in a donor agency described alignment around national goals as an on-going process, because even with this approach, ministries are often unable to provide sufficient leadership and take ownership, “In many cases they are passive because they are handling very many projects. This country has been the darling of very many initiatives so they lose track In the end we are left to drive the process and the ownership is lost.” Moving even further towards direct budgetary support could, therefore, arguably further reduce the burdens on the national government.

For some donors, even beyond the desire to promote national ownership and objectives, the decision to focus on a sub-sector within education is related to the belief that this focus will lead to greater systemic results. Driving policy reform or building partnerships within a sub-sector may feel more important than addressing pockets of inequality or other factors such as regional disparities or issues relevant to conflict prevention. For instance, at the time of research, the German agency PEVOT worked with public and private entities in the business, vocational, and technical education arena (BTVET). Supporting the passage of the BTVET Act of 2008 was a major priority because it set the framework for better quality assessment and the potential to link the sector more effectively to labor market needs. PEVOT also works to build private-public partnerships that will increase the demand for skilled labor. An official from PEVOT explained that under this the national-level vision, “We are not excluding any region, but when we say we are working on the system level, this means the whole improving

of the vocational system. Anyone who participates in the system should benefit...” Despite this broad aim, the same official noted that the north is not well placed to benefit from vocational opportunities as they are currently implemented, “What we can observe is a low general level education and people who are not prepared properly for the life of work or ideas. There is no vision in terms of what to do and there is no business culture or entrepreneurial skills or attitudes.” Naturally, this “system level” approach offers the potential to improve conditions for a large pool of people. This approach aims to create the environment for economic growth through skilled labor, without specific consideration of the potential impact on conflict dynamics.

The move towards harmonization, direct budget support, and alignment around national goals is in line with a much broader movement in international development aid, in post-conflict aid, and in Uganda as a whole. In Uganda, the ratio of budget support to total donor aid has steadily climbed in recognition of the countries’ progress in terms of macroeconomic reforms and largely due to the government’s continued efforts towards the MDGs and the PEAP. In 2003, budget support constituted 43% of all donor aid, up from 23% just three years prior.¹⁴⁸

As stated in the Rome Declaration, harmonization, alignment, and direct budgetary support that promotes these goals, are increasingly recognized as best practices for development actors. More recently, these practices have been lauded as critical for development in difficult circumstances, including in countries affected by

¹⁴⁸ Michael Atingi-Ego, *Budget Support, Aid Dependency, and Dutch Disease: The Case of Uganda* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005).

conflict and even when government commitment is questionable.¹⁴⁹

Harmonization's Impact on Donor Leverage and Conflict Prevention

Klees has argued that harmonization increases donor leverage over national priorities because national actors have to negotiate broad scale priorities with donors and agree on conditions *ex ante* rather than simply pursuing their objectives by finding willing donors for discrete programs or projects.¹⁵⁰ This argument may be especially convincing in a country like Uganda where foreign aid comprised 30% of the budget in 2008/9 (with half of this amount provided as direct budget support).

Donor leverage in Uganda is apparent in several forms. First, donors have offered positive reinforcement in the form of massive increases in funding levels for macroeconomic reforms and progress towards the MDGs, and in the education sector, progress towards MDG #2. Donor leverage has also been exerted in at least one case where governance issues were not addressed: The donor community announced that it would cut budget support by 10% in 2010 because of high level corruption issues that were raised in 2008/9 and not addressed.¹⁵¹

Whether or not donors have leverage, or will chose to exert leverage, over politically sensitive issues other than corruption is harder to discern. Major political issues in Uganda have gone unaddressed by donors even with the advent of

¹⁴⁹ Overseas Development Institute, *Harmonization and Alignment in Fragile States*, (accessed March 21, 2011); available from: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2443.pdf>.

¹⁵⁰ Steven Klees, *World Bank Development Policy: A SAP in SWAPs Clothing* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from <http://www.tc.edu/cice/Issues/03.02/32klees.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ All Africa, *Donors Cut Budget Support* (accessed March 21, 2011); available from: www.allafrica.com.

harmonization, including the lack of inclusiveness and political space created by President Museveni's "no party" Movement. The "no party" rule, which was in effect from 1986-2005, allowed members of the old parties to stand for election but limited parties' activities based on the claim that parties are too often religiously and ethnically affiliated. Most donors held back from criticizing this system even though it failed to respect some civil and political rights, and even while conflict in the north continued and northerners complained of under-representation.¹⁵²

As the examples above show, whether or not donors chose to exert their leverage under harmonized modes of engagement depends upon their priorities. Donors exert their leverage to create incentives for the agreed upon objectives of the development approach, but were less likely to engage on deep-seated political issues. This relationship is of concern for post-conflict Uganda. Development partners' use of leverage over major, agreed upon development priorities may be at the cost of leverage over issues that affect only a portion of the population.

Although many donors in the education field toe the line in terms of harmonizing around the PRDP, USAID stands out as an outlier both in terms of the degree to which support is harmonized and the level of engagement in northern Uganda. Among donors, USAID is often among the more reluctant to provide full budgetary support in instances where corruption or other factors are at play.¹⁵³ Whether or not corruption is

¹⁵² Overseas Development Institute, *Politics and the PRSP Approach*.

¹⁵³ U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, *Budget Support* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from www.u4.no.

the rationale, USAID has a large number of directly funded, cross cutting projects in northern Uganda, including the only donor-funded project for the north that is run out of the MoES (by a USAID and Ministry combined team).¹⁵⁴ The Education Advisor from USAID was the point person, representing and coordinating all donors on the issue of northern Uganda. USAID has engaged on issues pertinent to northern Uganda and funded a regional PRDP summit. USAID's initiative may be explained by a combination of an extraordinary personal effort from individuals within the education department as well as USAID's direct involvement in northern Uganda in a variety of projects outside of the education sector.¹⁵⁵ Even with USAID's leadership role in the north, USAID has not notably challenged the priorities or strategies of the PRDP.

Implications for Conflict Prevention

The international move towards harmonization and alignment recognizes the importance of national leadership for the sake of development and also privileges the sovereignty of the national government over individual donor initiatives. A representative from the EU expressed the importance of these ideas: "The only way is to give them the reins and the management.... Governments are sovereign entities and should be able to operate their affairs."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴SPRING and NUTI projects are both USAID funded and implemented by agencies to promote peace and reconciliation. Within the education sector, the Replica Program has notable breadth, offering a variety of services to combat the many impacts of conflict and operating in all the districts of the north. STS International, *Evaluation of the Replica Project* (accessed March 16, 2010); available from http://www.sts-international.org/Research_reports_instl_mats/STS_report_REPLICA-Uganda_evaluation_Creative_Associates_final.pdf.

¹⁵⁵ Interview by author with a USAID Official. Kampala, Uganda, 03/25/2008.

¹⁵⁶ Interview by author with EU Official, June 4, 2009 (Kampala, Uganda).

The ODI recognizes the need to hand over the reigns as a way of supporting the sovereignty of the nation, and in order to promote the process of building legitimacy with citizens. This is linked to the notion that government provision of services is a fundamental aspect of the social contract that binds citizens and their government. If donors go around governments and provide services, governments have limited opportunity to build their legitimacy and will be weakened.¹⁵⁷ However, provision of aid to governments from external actors does not necessarily solve the issue of a weak social contract. Aid that flows through government empowers local actors and reinforces structures of power. The extent to which this aid is used to increase the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of citizens through fair and inclusive provision of services depends on many factors. The extent to which harmonized donors can perceive and leverage these factors depends on their level of engagement and their priorities.

¹⁵⁷ Overseas Development Institute, *Harmonization and Alignment in Fragile States* (accessed March 24, 2011); available from www.odi.org.

THE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH: THE STATE VISION FOR GROWTH

Economic Growth for Those Who Can Compete: Sciences as Compulsory

In addition to the national and international push to fulfill the goals of the development targets approach, national actors push education policies aimed to achieve economic growth. Museveni has emphasized science and technology since the early days of his Presidency. In 1991, the Education Policy Review Commission found that the post-primary education system needed to adapt to the changing world.¹⁵⁸ In 2001, Museveni made clear his belief that Uganda needs better science and technology for economic growth. In keeping with the President's message, the Ministry of Education and Sports recently made sciences courses compulsory. Students must now pass science subjects and their scores will be taken into consideration for government scholarships to tertiary institutions.¹⁵⁹

Uganda's recent move to abolish secondary school fees for qualifying students is also driven in part by the logic of economic growth. In 2007, Museveni announced the Universal Post-Primary Education and Training (UPPET) policy, which aims for 90 percent of P7 graduates to enter academic secondary schools and another 10 percent to enter technical or vocational schools. This policy is seen as a way to prepare youth for the knowledge economy. Universal Secondary Education (USE) refers to tuition remission

¹⁵⁸ Education Policy Review Commission.

¹⁵⁹ Betty Udongo, *Untitled*. (PhD diss., Western Michigan University, 2009).

for secondary education under UPPEP.¹⁶⁰

Secondary education is a critical part of the President's overall plan to transform the economy of Uganda through industrialization. By moving people away from subsistence agriculture and into industry, the President aims to create jobs and growth. Within this framework, secondary education is seen as a bridge to tertiary education (where students can learn technical skills required to support industry).¹⁶¹ USE aims to contribute to poverty-reduction goals given that tuition remission is intended to be available for all qualifying students.

Although business, vocational, and technical education and training (BTNET) is a small part of the overall education sector, Museveni emphasizes the importance of vocational education as a means to further his vision of industrialization and structural transformation.¹⁶² The President has referred to a growing need for technical skills in the market place, especially in growing industries such as manufacturing, construction, oil refining, and services.¹⁶³

Local Leaders Perspective: The Rest of Uganda Grows, Northern Uganda Lags

Northern government officials are up in arms about Uganda's move to make

¹⁶⁰ MoES Re-Costed ESSP.

¹⁶¹ Buganda Post, *Museveni's Voluminous 2009/2010 New Year Message* (accessed April 12, 2010); available from www.bugandapost.com/main/archives/1015.

¹⁶² BTNET covers a range of subjects designed to help students prepare for the world of work in a wide range of courses of study including: construction, plumbing, metal fabrication, information technology, hotel and tourism, tailoring, agro-technical, etc. The majority of BTNET institutions require that applicants have a secondary school diploma.

¹⁶³ Policy, Law, Economics and Politics, *Uganda: Museveni New Years Statement* (accessed April 12, 2010); available from <http://www.polity.org.za/article/uganda-museveni-new-years-statement-31122007-2007-12-31>.

science courses a core component of the secondary school curriculum. The policy was put forward without adequate funding to promote the quality of facilities and teaching and therefore increases pre-existing inequalities between schools. Students in marginalized areas do not have the same access to good science instruction and laboratories and therefore are unlikely to test as well as students from more well-resourced areas.¹⁶⁴ The Director of the National Curriculum Centre conceded that the implementation of the science policy has been riddled with challenges.

The GoU policy of allocating 75% of university government scholarships for science courses and the remaining 25% for humanities courses further increases the importance placed on passing well in science courses.¹⁶⁵ The LC5 of Amuru talked about the difficulty northern students will have accessing government scholarships to universities:

We have no labs or chemicals and therefore we cannot say we are able to teach science. And that spells out why our children don't go for science subjects – and you know it is mostly those science students that are sponsored by the government....

USE aims to target “the needy but bright children in the remote, rural and poor communities who cannot afford the cost of education.”¹⁶⁶ The Education Sector Plan of 2007 claims that through the Universal Post-Primary Education and Technical program, “all students who successfully complete P7 have the opportunity to pursue academic

¹⁶⁴ Betty Udongo, *Untitled* (PhD diss., Western Michigan University, 2009).

¹⁶⁵ Betty Udongo, 54.

¹⁶⁶ Uganda Statehouse, *State of the Nation Address on New Year's Day 2007* (accessed April 12, 2010); available from <http://www.statehouse.go.ug/news.detail.php?newsId=1243&category=News%20Release>.

secondary education.”¹⁶⁷ Local leaders in northern Uganda argue that these aims are not met. Although some students benefit from tuition remission at the post-primary level in northern Uganda, local leaders say that USE does not go far enough to help the conflict-affected.

The Secretary of the Education and Health Committee in Amuru District explained that UPPET would have to offer more benefits in order to actually help the conflict affected,

They talk of USE, but that one doesn't work! The child needs books, mattress, the government does not provide. So where you need to go for boarding you can't.

Some leaders also expressed the concern that USE is not helpful because it does not address the quality of education that is offered. The MP of Pader explained that in northern Uganda, the success of one student creates a ripple effect throughout the extended family structure. For this reason, the opportunity to attend a quality secondary school (that can lead to tertiary opportunities) may be even more important in the impoverished North:

...If you at least have one successful person, the extended family structure ensures that at least the family is taken care of. But if you spread out the opportunities, like through USE, you will have nothing. I have seen families in ruins because they go to USE, assume everything is fine, and in the end of the day, the education of the household collapses...

¹⁶⁷ Ministry of Education and Sports, *Re-costed Education Sector Plan*.

Local and national leaders stressed the importance of vocational training for those who can no longer access formal education. They did not, however, talk about government-run vocational and technical education in its current form as being an important aspect of poverty reduction. The Assistant Chief Administrative Officer of Amuru emphasized the importance of vocational options for those who could not succeed in the formal education system,

I would say for those who ... have dropped out, they need vocational skills like bricklaying, carpentry, tailoring, and also promoting income generating activities like pottery keeping...If they are self-reliant, the next generation, they will be able to pull their children at a higher level.

Current and Former IDPs' Perspectives: Plans and Education, Demand for Post-Primary Education

Just as the national government focuses on investing in education as a means of increasing gross domestic product and output, individuals in northern Uganda want to invest in education in order to enter the wage economy and increase their potential earnings. When asked the question, "What is your plan or hope to improve your life or your children's lives?" the majority of respondents talked about education. Although some community members focused on simply reestablishing themselves on their land and within their social ambit, those that articulated plans for the future that went beyond getting settled in communities tended to focus on education as a way to

improve their economic standing.¹⁶⁸ People of all ages aimed to attain higher levels of education and shared the belief that education, at whatever stage of life, is the best plan to improve one’s livelihood. Often the drive to access wages is driven by both the desire to have a better life and to help one’s family, as in the case of a male student in Atiak Camp who was in his third year of secondary school, “I plan to continue with my education so that I can get employed in order to support my family members.” Although this finding was noted in a previous chapter, the following paragraphs aim to shed additional light on the different responses of men and women, youth and non-youth, and current and former IDPs.

The following table summarizes the way that people’s responses to the question about hopes and plans were categorized. 103 people indicated that their primary plans and hopes revolve around education or vocational skills training.¹⁶⁹

Plans for Yourself and Your Children	
Education and Training	
Education (for Myself)	48

¹⁶⁸ Some respondents were not able to see beyond their immediate need to reestablish themselves on their land and survive. A significant number of people expressed “plans” that were really just survival strategies, such as farming and going back to their land (discussed in the following paragraphs). Others expressed “plans” that were survival strategies in terms of their health: they “planed” to stay healthy, avoid HIV/AIDS, and maintain positive relationships (in the case of women who are dependent on their husbands for survival). Responses were trended according to the main theme in the response (no response was trended more than once).


¹⁶⁹ As previously discussed, it is important to note that this number is biased upward to some degree because of the potential for respondents to perceive the researcher’s interest in education based. However, the researcher did take measures in order to mitigate this risk, as previously noted. Except when safety required travel via Save the Children vehicle, the researcher traveled in an unmarked car. At the point in the questionnaire when the question about future plans was asked, no specific questions about education had been asked that would indicate a specific interest in education.

Vocational Training (for Myself)	11
Education for (My Children)	44
Sub Total Education and Training	103
Livelihood Strategies	
Go Home	15
Farming	42
Livestock	4
Small Business or Sales	11
Sub Total Livelihood	72
Relationships and Family Health	28
No Plan	9
Total	212

The importance of education as a fundamental part of a plan for a better life is more pronounced among youth than non-youth. 53% of youth (59 interviewees) said that education was their plan to improve their futures while only 39% of non-youth (42 interviewees) referred to education. When youth talked about education, they were almost always talking about their own education (85% of the youth who said their plan to improve their lives was to obtain education were referring to their own education). When non-youth talked about education, they were mostly talking about their children's education (only 12% said that they were planning to invest in education for themselves). Non-youth were much more likely to refer to livelihood plans that would support their families' needs more broadly (although this plan for many people would indirectly support education).


Youth in camps were more likely to prioritize education and to be currently pursuing education. Of the youth in camps that were interviewed, 62% (24 out of 39) said that their plan was education, compared to 49% (35 out of 72) of the youth in

return sites. Of the 47 people who were still pursuing education, only two were non-youth. Just over half of the youth interviewed that were in camps were currently pursuing education (51% or 20 people) while just over a third of the youth interviewed in return sites were pursuing some form of education (35% or 25 people). This is equally true for both formerly abducted youth and youth who were never abducted. Formerly abducted youth were almost equally likely to be found in camps (30% of the total sample of abducted youth were found in camps and 35% were found in return sites), and they were equally likely to prioritize education (45% of abducted youth said education was their plan and 46% of youth who were not abducted said education was their plan). The following chart shows the extent to which youth were more likely to say that education was their plan.



The scarcity of post-primary opportunity in return sites may explain why youth interviewed in camps were more likely to say that education was their plan than youth

in return sites. Youth seeking post-primary education are less likely to stay in return sites because the opportunities are usually in more developed areas. Camps were either formed in town centers, or have become town centers over the course of the war. Therefore, youth living in camps are more likely to be able to access a local secondary school or training programs offered by NGOs. The research supports this. Despite these trends, for some, movement between camps and return sites is fluid; given the on-going process of returns and that some families divide themselves and their time between a camp and a return site in order to maximize their opportunities. The following chart shows that people who were in camps were more likely to prioritize education.



Males were more likely to say that education was their best plan, as compared to females. Males are also more oriented towards investing their own education than females. 52% (23 out of 44) of the women who said that education was their plan were referring to education for their children, while only 35% (20 out of 57) of men were

referring to education for their children. This finding was not biased by different relative ages of males and females in the sample: For both males and females, almost exactly half of the sample was youth and half was non-youth.


A larger sample size of men and women would be necessary to make strong conclusions from the finding that women were more likely to emphasize their children's education than their own. However, this suggestive finding is of interest given the conventional wisdom that when women control resources, they are more likely to invest those resources in ways that yield positive gains for children's welfare.¹⁷⁰ Women's biological drive to care for their children may be an important factor, but so too is their dependence upon their family for their own wellbeing (and their low expectations about educational opportunities for themselves). In the absence of educational and employment opportunities, a good marital relationship can offer a woman relative security, but husbands often die before their wives and even good husbands cannot guarantee a woman's wellbeing given the hardships of life in northern Uganda.¹⁷¹ Investing in children is a strategy for some women (and men) who hope to be taken care of later in life. A woman in a return site explained that her plan is to, "continue paying my children's school fees so that they can then improve my living situation."

¹⁷⁰ Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development, Matthais Doepke and Michele Tertilt: Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development? (accessed March 17, 2011); available from: <http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/abstract.php?paper=281>. This paper reviews a wealth of research that points to the advantage of investing in women for overall productivity and for children's welfare. Relevant findings in agriculture are reviewed by the World Bank: World Bank, *Gender in Agriculture Sourcebook* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2008).

¹⁷¹ A quarter of women in many societies in Sub-Saharan Africa are widows, and this number is surely higher in northern Uganda where adult men were the most common casualty of war. Betty Potash, *Women in African Societies: Choices and Constraints* (California, Stanford University Press, 1986).

Compared to the males in the sample, women were more likely to say that their plan was to protect themselves from HIV and invest in their marriage and their families in general. The nature of the women's responses showed a significant group of women that think of their HIV status and their relationships before anything else and are dependent upon a good relationship with their husbands in order to be able to have a decent future. Although it was only a small group of people that chose to respond to the question regarding their plan by talking about their sexual health, their families and their relationships rather than economic or educational plans, given that these were spontaneous responses, the fact that 27 people responded this way, and that all but four of these respondents were women, is of interest. Sixteen of the 23 women said that having good relationships with their husbands, their children, and/or their parents was the best plan for their future. For eleven of the 23 women who talked about their families as a part of their plan, simply avoiding HIV, getting tested for HIV, or helping children to avoid HIV is the best plan.¹⁷²

¹⁷² Some women responded by referring to HIV and their relationships, and were therefore counted twice.



Living in camps offers better educative opportunities than living in return sites, but this relationship appears even stronger for female youth. Female youth in camps were twice as likely to be studying as female youth in return sites: 10 out of 21 youth in camps were pursuing education while only 10 out of 40 female youth in return sites were pursuing education at the time of research. Although, these numbers are too small to say definitively that female youth have more opportunities in camps than in return sites, this evidence suggests that a significant number of female youth who are pursuing education are residing in camps, and that these camps offer some opportunities that return sites cannot. This is logical given that there are few educational opportunities beyond the primary level that are accessible from return sites.

Education for Employment

“To me it is not just education that is important it is ‘real’ education. This involves taking someone to a very high level where a child can get a good and paying job.”

Community members described a variety of reasons why they thought education was beneficial and worth pursuing, but the majority focused on the potential economic benefits associated with increased access to wages through education. For many, the intrinsic benefits of education are secondary to the potential to gain employment and get out of agriculture. Many of the non-market benefits of education, including those related to health and reproductive health, the environment, overall inequality, or democracy, were never mentioned.¹⁷³

All of the interviewed current or former IDPs were asked questions about the purpose of education, whether or not education would help them to achieve their plans, and the rationale for pursuing education. The responses to this group of questions were analyzed together because the questions all sought to understand the benefit of education. The advantage of analyzing all of these responses together was that it provided a greater number of responses and therefore many more data points in order to look for comparisons between groups. The disadvantage is that some of the nuance in terms of responses to each question is lost in this analysis.¹⁷⁴ The questions about the

¹⁷³ These and other non-market benefits to education are discussed in detail in Walter W. McMahon, *Education and Development: Measuring the Social Benefits* (England: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁷⁴ In order to understand current or former IDPs' rationale for pursuing education for themselves or for their children, the author analyzed the responses to the following questions:

Would it help your life or your children's lives if you were able to pursue any of the available educational options? How?

How are people that have finished primary school different from those who have not?

How are people that have attended some secondary school different from those who have not?

rationale for investing in education were asked after learning about interviewee’s plans and were asked regardless of the respondents’ answer to the question about plans.


The economic benefits of education were the most common benefit associated with education. 31% of responses related to the primary function of education as a way to get employed or elected and another 10% talked about education as a way to improve their livelihoods. Education provides many benefits beyond qualifications that lead to employment, and some community members reflected on these benefits. However, often the other mentioned benefits to education, such as learning English and becoming economically independent, were closely associated earning an income or having an improved livelihood.

The following chart and graph show the number of responses related to the rationale for pursuing education that were trended according to various categories.

Rationale for Education	
Economic Benefits	
Educated are Eligible for Jobs, Elections, Opportunities	179
Better Life or Improved Livelihood	36
Allows for Further Education and Training	26
Sub Total Economic	241
Learning	
Educated Can Speak Some English	80
Educated are More Knowledgeable	78
Have Plans, Can Relate and/or Reason Better	15
Sub Total Learning	173
Social and Family Benefits	

The responses to these three questions were trended together as they all answer aspects of the same line of inquiry: What is the rationale for pursuing education and what difference does education truly make? Each response was only trended once, however respondents may have given responses to all three questions (therefore multiple responses per interviewee were trended).

Educated are Able to Help Others	51
Instills Disciplined Behavior and Respect	21
Helps Family Life, Farming, and Hygiene	21
Educated Enjoy Social Status	14
Sub-Total Social and Family	107
Other	
The Impact of Education is Questionable	59
Total Responses	580



The perceived economic benefit associated with education is strongly associated with obtaining secondary education in order to then gain employment. A male youth in Lodi return site explained, “The difference between us (me) who is in secondary school is that I stand a higher chance of getting employed by some NGOs.” A male youth in a camp in Pader District talked about education as a way out of work,

Those who finished secondary school get jobs which are not related to


agriculture (like teaching). You find those who stopped in primary or those who never studied at all are always cultivating crops nothing more than that.

A male youth in Apowegi return site in Amuru explained that the real impact of education occurs if you complete secondary school and then get a job,



The person who finished primary is almost the same with those who never completed secondary.”

There were slight variations in the way that different demographic groups responded, although in every case, the economic benefits of education were the most common benefit mentioned.¹⁷⁵ Youth were slightly more likely to talk about the learning-related benefits of education, while non-youth were more likely to talk about the social and family-related benefits of education. This may be explained by the fact that more youth in the sample were in school, and that youth have a higher level of education than non-youth in general. Non-youth are more likely to have children. Perhaps this explains the relatively larger number of non-youth that talked about the potentially positive socializing function that education may have.

¹⁷⁵ Variations of more than 5% are discussed. This is roughly equivalent to a spread of 21 responses or more out of a total of 433 responses.




Women and people in return sites were slightly more likely to focus on the social benefits of education and the way that educated people contribute to society. The responses that were categorized as *social and family benefits* included discussion of how education helps children to behave better and to better take care of themselves, as well as the impact of education on a person’s social contribution and role in society. A male adult in a return site talked about the effect of education on behavior, “When you find someone who has studied primary, he is polite and respectful unlike someone who hasn’t gone who is rude and treats people cruelly.” Some of the responses in this category also pointed to learning and economic benefits of education, but the emphasis was on the way that these benefits would be harness to help others in the community, including the parents. A female youth in a camp explained, “They have more knowledge compared to those who stopped in primary because they are the ones who become resourceful in the community and people would consult them over many issues.” The following charts show the number and percent of women and people in return sites whose responses focused on social and family related benefits to education.




The most significant differences in responses can be seen by disaggregating responses by level of education. People with a post-primary level of education were significantly more likely to discuss the economic benefits of education and were less likely to say that the benefits of education are questionable. Naturally, a person who has invested in post-primary education is more likely to believe that this investment will yield benefits. A female adult in a return site had only had a few years of primary education explained why she did not see any benefit to education, “To me there is very limited difference between those who completed P7 and those who never studied at all.

At the end of it all, both categories end up being peasant farmers.” In contrast, a male youth in a return site who was in secondary school still had hope that his studies would lead to some form of employment, “There is a difference because there are more opportunities for the person to get jobs than those who stopped in primary or never studied are all at least their document can help when getting employment opportunities.”



People who were formerly abducted and people who were never abducted responded very similarly, as can be seen in the following charts.



Statistics Support Leaders’ Perspective

Community members are convinced that education is their best plan, yet local

leaders are pessimistic. Local leaders' opinions are validated by the statistics for post-primary education in northern Uganda. The reality in terms of post-primary education in northern Uganda is bleak in contrast with the plans and hopes that community members express. For example, in Amuru District, two of eight sub-counties did not have secondary schools and in another two sub-counties secondary schools were still displaced in Gulu Town as of mid-2009 (students will incur significant costs in order to attend and live away from their homes). Universal Secondary Education tuition grants were not available in 5 of the 12 secondary schools in Amuru District at the time of research.¹⁷⁶

Among children of secondary school-going age in northern Uganda, only 12% enroll in secondary school (15% of boys and 8% of girls) compared to 17% nationally (18% for boys and 16% for girls). Although secondary enrollment improved in recent years in Uganda overall, it did not significantly improve in northern Uganda from 2000 to 2006.¹⁷⁷ In particular, girls have a difficult time making the transition to secondary school, especially in conflict affected areas. The Gender Parity Index in northern Uganda is .53 girls to every boy, although in Amuru District, at the epicenter of LRA violence, the GPI is closer to .32.¹⁷⁸ Few girls finish the primary cycle, and so their chances of even starting post-primary education are low: In Amuru District in 1996, only 19% of girls that

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Education and Sports.

¹⁷⁷ Figures presented are the Net Enrollment Rate for 2006. The GPI for northern Uganda is recorded as 66/31 in 2000 and 66/34 in 2006. Ministry of Education and Sports.

¹⁷⁸ EMIS data for nine out of twelve schools in Amuru Districted showed the overall GPI to be .32. EMIS 2008.

had enrolled in primary school completed the seven year cycle (compared with the national average of 44% completion).¹⁷⁹

In most cases, BTVET education is only available for secondary school graduates, and most conflict-affected children in northern Uganda do not even manage to finish primary school. In northern Uganda, the Ministry of Education officially notes the existence of only one BTVET institution that accepts P7 leavers (all others require a secondary school diploma). In 2006, total enrollment for that institution was only 143 males and 25 females.¹⁸⁰ Despite the MoES official report, the Commission of BTVET believed that there were in fact five BTVET institutions in the north that would accept P7 graduates. Either way, the number of students that can enroll in BTVET courses without a secondary school diploma is limited.

Although tuition remission is available for the vocational schools that accept P7 leavers, scholarships are dependent upon school completion exam scores. The government policy is that those with qualifying scores will receive tuition remission under the recent Universal Post Primary Education and Technical Act (UPPET). Conflict affected children, whose education may have been disrupted or of a significantly lower quality, are at a disadvantage. Only students who have finished primary school in the preceding exam cycle and receive qualifying grades will receive the government tuition remission under UPPET funding. The Commissioner for BTVET explained that students

¹⁷⁹ The primary completion rate in Amuru District for boys is reportedly on par with the national average. Ministry of Education and Sports, *Report on Education Needs Assessment for Northern Uganda*.

¹⁸⁰ Ministry of Education and Sports, *Report on Education Needs Assessment for Northern Uganda*, 16.

must have had significant advantages in order to take advantage of tuition remission,

...They must have passed P7 reasonably well which means that they came from well organized set up...You must have been in the P7 the previous year.... And you must have passed with aggregate 4-28 in the Uganda Primary Leaving Examinations [the best range for exam scores]... In the north, very many people get in the 30s [indicating that these students barely passed their primary school completion exams] so they really don't pass to come into our schools...

Despite the challenges to vocational training, some northern youth do qualify for government scholarship. The demand for technical education is significant in the north, according to the Commissioner, because even among those with relatively well-off families, formal education is less of an option.

The role of vocational education in poverty reduction is limited. The unit cost of BTVET is four to five times the cost of providing academic secondary education and up to 32 times the cost per student of providing primary education,¹⁸¹ so unless vocational education is reconceived, it will not be scaled up significantly. Very little of the education sector budget goes to vocational education, and of this, the majority goes to schools that require secondary diplomas. Therefore, vocational education is rarely an option for marginalized youth. According to the Commissioner, the students entering the technical schools “among the most privileged,” and are from families that “were not seriously displaced.”

¹⁸¹ Ministry of Education and Sports, *Re-Costed Education Sector Plan*.

Community Members Lack Other Plans

Despite the reality of scarce post-primary education opportunities, community members cling to education as the best plan to improve their lives. Although education poor families can only hope that they win the lottery of scholarships given out by NGOs, this offers more hope than any other plan.

Communities have limited exposure to or hope in other paths to improve their livelihood, such as agricultural extension or training in business activities. Some interviewees said that farming was their plan, but they described farming in a way that indicated that it was a fall back or default plan because they had no other options, including a mother in Kilokiotido, a remote return site in Pader: “My plan is to continue cultivating the agricultural land to at least support my children, but there are so many problems that I do not know what to do.”

Some community members had plans for how to improve their lives that included either raising livestock or starting small business activities, although they were not able to articulate how they would get the capital needed for these plans. In the words of a male youth in Pader, “The biggest obstacle to my plan is that I am not having enough money to see that I get these things and so I am not motivated.”

Leaders Want Affirmative Action, Not Development Policy

Because of the impact of the war, leaders representing northern Uganda argue for affirmative action that goes beyond the measures that are currently being implemented and planned for northern Uganda. Many feel that children in the north have been exposed to extraordinary challenges that have derailed their opportunities

and that these children should be given additional help so that they may gain productive skills and begin to compete nationally as they once did. The Secretary of Education in Amuru talked about how children in his district cannot compete:

For us last year we got only one first grade [the highest level of examination marks] compared to children from some other districts where they got over 50 in first grade...

The Vice Chairman of Gulu District also expressed his concern that children from northern Uganda cannot compete and therefore their futures are bleak.

No schools will admit people with weak passes. Because you are a rebel, there is nothing you can do. You cannot be employed. You are doomed to be a pauper.

Local leaders want affirmative action, not only because they feel that their students and schools need attention, but also because they feel in a disadvantaged position in terms of local taxes and administration. In addition to the poor quality of schools, the Local Council Speaker addressed the low level of revenue in Amuru District, which affects the District's ability to provide services. He connected the policy of decentralization with a disadvantage to poor and war-affected districts or newly created districts such as Amuru.

Can I go and tax the poor community who has been in the IDP camp? ... They [central government] want you to implement with local revenue. When I compare with Wakiso [a central district], you find Wakiso can fund the local government of Amuru for about five years...

Evidence shows that the concerns about northerners' ability to compete are well founded. The government sponsorship program does not provide as many

opportunities for the groups that face the most challenging circumstances. Elite prep schools are the feeders for government sponsorship, but the elite government schools in the north have been dilapidated and are now a shadow of what they once were. The World Bank report on tertiary education discussed the disadvantages that students in deprived regions and rural areas in Uganda face,¹⁸²

*The government now sponsors about 4,000 new entrants into the system every year... Those who perform better in A-level examinations tend to graduate from better performing government and private boarding schools, whose fees are so high that only the wealthier families can afford them... On average 65 percent of the total scholarships [between 1996 and 2001] were awarded to students from the twenty top-ranked A-level schools (Liang, 2002)... Students from deprived schools in regional or rural areas are a much more appropriate target for receiving special government funding...*¹⁸³

According to a former Ugandan Member of Parliament, the district quota system is a limited but potentially promising aspect of the government sponsorship program. This system aims to bring in 11 students from each district as a way of reducing regional disparity and inequality in general. However, evidence suggests that this program, like the larger scholarship program, is highly flawed. In the 2008/9 academic year, 800 students were admitted to tertiary institutions under this system. The list was dominated by the best performing schools, and these are not located in the dilapidated

¹⁸² No more recent comprehensive report has been issued by the World Bank or any other organization.

¹⁸³ Xiaoyang Liang, *Uganda Tertiary Education Sector Report: Africa Human Development Working Paper No 50* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004).

northern region. Two districts from the greater north had no students qualifying for government scholarship because they did not meet minimum standards. Northerners are also grossly underrepresented in the competitive subject areas related to science, technology and agriculture.¹⁸⁴

Not surprisingly, the World Bank report showed that the Central, Western and Eastern Regions have significantly higher tertiary enrollment than the Northern Region. There are many explanations for this, including the rural nature of the north, poverty, and of course the impact of war.¹⁸⁵ Given the challenges that persist in the education sector and the fact that the PRDP does not address competitiveness or secondary education, these imbalances are not likely to diminish.

Highlighting the Past in Order to Make Claims in the Post-War Period

When local and national leaders talk about education before the war in northern Uganda, some highlight the achievements of the Acholi people rather than the historical underdevelopment of the northern region. According to several interviewed northern leaders, the north was not always so far behind. An MP from Pader asserted that by 1964, “the two communities with the highest level of education were the Baganda and the Acholis.”

The assertion that northern Uganda produced excellent students with a place in national affairs highlights all that has been lost in northern Uganda in recent decades as a result of the war. Highlighting achievements, as well as the currently lack of

¹⁸⁴ Betty Udongo.

¹⁸⁵ Xiaoyang Liang.

opportunity, is the basis for the claims for affirmative action for northern Uganda students. The Local Councilman 5 from Amuru (the highest ranking elected official from the district) also referred to past, which he called the “glory days” in contrast to the current situation for students:

The people from Acholi used to excel nationally. The records could speak by the number of offices that they held in government, in universities, but we are almost being reduced to zero.... And in terms of the national examinations, I don't think we sent more than ten people in the University...

Implicit in leaders' comments about Acholi's stunted potential is the notion that other groups may be purposefully denying Acholi's past record of achievement as a way of skirting their responsibility to restore schools in the North to their pre-war state. The MP from Pader called the claim that Acholis were never well educated “political misrepresentation.” He insinuated that those making such a claim aim to portray Acholiland as a place where education was uniformly poor before the war so that they would not be obliged to spend resources in order to restore the competitiveness of schools.

Restoring some of the secondary schools so that students can actually compete nationally is a priority for many leaders in northern Uganda, including the MP from Pader (the Head of the Opposition). He emphasizes the need to rehabilitate the Acholi and Lango schools so that students “can get in Baker [one of the oldest secondary schools in northern Uganda] what they get in Budo [one of the most revered schools in Central Region]”. He rightly asserts that there is no government initiative that addresses

the quality of secondary schools in the north.

NGOs Fill the Gap Left by UPPET

NGOs do respond to the local demand for better quality education at the secondary level and to demands for vocational training outside of the formal system. NGOs including Windle Trust and United Movement to End Child Soldiering rehabilitate or build schools, provide scholarships, career counseling, and/or psychosocial counseling for conflict-affected students (sometimes based on merit, but in other cases, based solely on need). Several NGOs also offer vocational training for conflict-affected youth who would not qualify for government-run vocational school. Norwegian Refugee Council, for example, has offered basic literacy and numeracy paired with vocational courses in a variety of areas, including carpentry and joinery, brick-laying and concrete practice, motor vehicle mechanics, tailoring, and catering.¹⁸⁶ These initiatives are at best loosely coordinated within northern districts and depend upon external funding. These activities make an important impact for those who are lucky enough to receive services,¹⁸⁷ but are not guided by the PRDP in any meaningful way. The NGO response in these areas is extremely limited in contrast to the need for these services.

Growth and Fairness versus Affirmative Action

The central strategy of the PRDP is rehabilitation of priority schools with the logic

¹⁸⁶ Women's Refugee Commission, *Youth and Sustainable Livelihoods: Linking Vocational Training to Market Opportunities in Northern Uganda* (accessed November 15, 2010); available from http://womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/ug_ysl_rep.pdf.

¹⁸⁷ Windle Trust, United Movement to End Child Soldiering, the Acholi Education Initiative and others provide such support in the north.

that if free primary education is accessible, then children have a fair chance of enrolling and benefitting. Proportionality or equality in terms of access to education is an underlying value or principle of Universal Primary Education. However, in northern Uganda, families and local leaders feel that just because they can access a “free” education it does not mean that they have a fair chance when compared to other learners throughout the country. They have fewer resources to cover the costs associated with education and the quality of education that their children receive is inferior. The evidence is clear: Primary School Leaving Exam results show that northern students are not getting the same benefit from education as learners elsewhere in the country. The PRDP claims to be taking “affirmative action” by investing a large sum in the North through the PRDP. Many northern leaders would not agree that the PRDP is truly an affirmative action measure because it will not restore the level of development to what it was before the war (or what it would have been in the absence of the war). To these leaders, ‘affirmative action’ would mean extra-proportional distribution of resources until the North recovers.

Although the motivation and impetus for the UPPET is different than for the PRDP and UPE, the assumption that students should be able to compete within the education system in a way that is fair is the same. UPPET pushes Uganda toward growth by providing opportunities for those who can help themselves enough to enter the formal system. This is considered “fair” because benefits are distributed based on exam scores, and exams are the same for all. Distribution of university scholarships is

also thought to be fair and objective. However, closer examination shows that even the northern students who are lucky enough to go to secondary school are at a disadvantage when competing for university entrance and sponsorship because of the quality of their secondary schools. Leaders stress the need to improve conditions until northern students can compete with their peers, and they refer back to better days for students as a way of signaling the impact of the war and the responsibility of the state to restore northern schools.

The international community's role in addressing the grievances about the way that education is delivered through the formal system in Uganda is limited. Donors are harmonized around national policies. Harmonization may give donors leverage over certain issues, for example Education for All. However, supporting the overall budget and maintaining a political ally in Eastern Africa is the priority for most donors. The need to harmonize and maintain good relations most often trumps any effort to address the contentious issue of resource distribution.

Macrae, *et al* point out that harmonization and the selective provision of aid to governments that are deemed to be good performers means that although the international community aims to help the poorest of the poor, they may neglect to do so in countries that are labeled "poor" performing.¹⁸⁸ The Uganda case shows that harmonization and the logic of supporting good performers may also mean that the poorest of the poor in "good" countries are also neglected in favor of the majority, or

¹⁸⁸ Joanna Macrae, et al, *Aid to 'Poorly Performing' Countries: a Critical Review of Debates and Issues,* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004).

groups with more political representation. As seen in USAID's portfolio for northern Uganda, project aid may provide donors with more opportunities to be involved in redressing inequalities, even though project aid is considered the least desirable form of aid by the Government of Uganda.¹⁸⁹

Framing the debate about northern Uganda in terms of affirmative action makes it clear that the process for addressing grievances is essentially political rather than developmental. Northern Ugandan leaders demand a redistribution of resources and some build their political platforms by promising to fight for redistribution. If international actors chose to insert themselves into such a political process, it would be potentially damaging to their political relationships with the sovereign Government of Uganda. NGOs, on the other hand, do not bear the full burden of political relationships on behalf of their country of origin, and continue to have leeway to deliver aid through projects. Just as humanitarian organizations filled a tremendous gap in services during the war, NGOs fill the current gap in the provision of recovery period services in northern Uganda.

Northern leaders demand better schools and non-formal options for their constituencies. If these needs were met, whether by foreign or by national actors, would northern leaders be satisfied? Rothchild finds that perceptions about the process that determines resource distribution can be even more important than the outcomes.

¹⁸⁹ Partnership Principles between the Government of Uganda and its Development Partners, in Tony Killick, *Promoting a Third Phase in Rwanda-Donor Relations* (London, Overseas Development Institute, 2005).

He writes, "...there is a connection between some groups' dissatisfaction over the process embedded in the regime and the outputs and outcomes of the process (the unfair distribution of resources)." In order for rules to have an equalizing effect on conflict in an ethnically divided society, they must "take into account both individual and collective sense of worth and must acknowledge the legitimacy of claims to equitable distributions."¹⁹⁰

If Rothchild's assertion is correct, then project aid or NGO support in marginalized areas can only have a limited impact on conflict prevention in the short term. Unless such aid can meet needs so effectively that grievances are no longer valid, stakeholders will continue to have grievances until the rules of the game have been changed in their favor. Other the other hand, if international actors are able to provide educational opportunities that allow individuals from a marginalized population to better enter the political sphere and to better participate in national politics and civil affairs, then these individuals may be able to affect some of the rules governing the distribution of resources in such as way as to improve the overall feeling of representation and fairness among the group.

¹⁹⁰ Rothchild, 75.

CURRENT AND FORMER IDPS' PRIORITIES AFTER WAR

Communities affected by conflict have critical insights into the impact of conflict and the nature of peace. As such, their perspectives can inform a conflict prevention approach to education and development more broadly. This study asked community members to define peace in order to gain insight into the way conflict affected them and what their world would look like if peace were restored.


When community members were asked, "When you think of peace, what does peace mean to you," they were most likely to focus on the importance of social relationships. For many, in order to have peace, one must be at peace with others and thereby achieve contentedness and togetherness. One father in a remote return site explained,

... Above all peace is staying in the home and without quarrels or too much misunderstanding. To me I feel there is need to have respect for each other so that you do not overstep on ones shoes to bring about conflict.

To put it more simply, in the words of a female youth in Amuru, peace is "good co-existence with cooperation among people." A male youth in Atiak Camp echoed these sentiments by saying, "peace to me is when the community is united and also when there is happiness." A father in a satellite camp said, "Peace to me is just life. To promote peace, I think we need to have good interpersonal skills so that we respect each other."

The following chart shows the percentage of the 180 trended responses that

refer to harmony and unity within the community versus other categories.



In contrast to the 60 people who described peace as having to do with harmony and staying well together, happiness, and unity in the community; 49 people equated peace with returning to ancestral lands or moving freely. These concepts are linked because lack of freedom is tied to life in the camps, where insecurity, but also UPDF soldiers impeded movement. 14 of these 49 stressed returning home as the true indicator of peace, as in the following response from a male youth in Lolim Satellite Camp, "Peace is staying well among each other. For peace to come true it's important that people should go back to the village." Ancestral villages are the place where traditional life can begin again and where cultivation occurs. Thirty-five people talked about "moving freely" or having freedom to move. Thirty people responded by

equating peace with having their basic needs met. A female youth in a remote village in Atiack explained, “To me, peace is when you can afford to get the basic requirements of life that makes you happy, but here, I do not see any peace at all.”

Forty-one people defined peace as the absence of war and violence, or negative peace. The number of people whose responses are trended as referring exclusively to negative peace may seem low given the long-standing violence in northern Uganda. This may be explained by several factors. First, many people referred to negative peace, but then also listed other conditions. In these cases, the responses were categorized according to the other conditions given that the commonly held definition of positive peace includes the end of violence along with other factors. Second, some people talked about “moving freely” as an aspect of peace along with other factors. These 36 responses were categorized separately from negative peace because “moving freely” was understood to mean both freedom from the restrictions of insecurity and camp life and the ability to return home. Third, and importantly to the points raised in this chapter, people’s lives and livelihoods were devastated during the war in ways that go beyond violence and war. Now, their definitions of peace often go beyond negative peace and represent other aspects of a holistic peace that were missing during the war, as well as their hopes for peace in the post-conflict period.

Concerns about Social Relations

Social relationships are critically important to the notion of peace that many

community members described. Yet many interviewees decried the dysfunctional state of social relations. Community members mentioned social behavior as one of the major issues that defines the “situation” in northern Uganda and expressed great concern about what they see as anti-social patterns among children, parents, and especially among youth. When asked the open-ended question, “What is the situation for children and youth here in Acholiland, northern Uganda?” the majority of people responded by talking about social issues, even over issues related to accessing basic services. Out of 157 responses for this question which were coded and trended, 87 people talked about social relationships (56%). Given the extremely poor conditions in northern Uganda, and that this theme emerged spontaneously, this is remarkable.

The emphasis on social relationships was more evident among youth and people in camps. Among the 46 respondents who were in camps, 78% referred to social relationships compared to 46% of people in return sites. People in camps may have been more likely to refer to social relationships because of the negative impact of camp life on social relationships. In camps, where people live in very close proximity with little or no privacy, many people report socially destructive behavior such as drinking, promiscuity, and laziness.

People in return sites were more likely to respond to the same question about the situation in Acholiland by talking about their need for basic services (54% of people in return sites talked about access to basic services while only 22% of people in camps talked about access to basic services). People in return sites may have been more likely

to talk about basic services rather than social relationship because of the pressing nature of finding access to water, health and educational facilities.

Among the 73 youth whose responses could be trended, 67% talked about social issues. Non-youth were more likely to refer to their basic needs (55% talked about basic needs and 45% about social relationships). Youth’s emphasis on social relationships may be a reflection of the dysfunctional behavior that many youth reportedly display and the efforts that other youth make, in contrast, to live constructively. Comments from one male youth in a camp were a typical description of youth in camps, “The youth here are fighting and idle so you find them womanizing and eloping with girls, drinking alcohol, some don’t have people to support them in school so they always stay at home.”

The following charts show the way that people in various demographic groups responded to the question about the situation in Acholiland. The category “Access to Basic Services” includes comments related to access to basic services in general and to health and/or education services. The category “Social Issues” includes a variety of responses, including referring to the need to return to normal social relationships and youth’s need to be united with one another (detail below).

Responses: Situation in Acholiland		
Theme of Response	Demographic Group (percentage of total answers from group)	
	Youth	Non-Youth
Social Issues	49 (67%)*	38 (45%)
Access to Basic Services	24 (33%)	46 (55%)
	Female	Male

Social Issues	47 (58%)	40 (53%)
Access to Basic Services	34 (42%)	36 (47%)
	Camp	Return
Social Issues	36 (78%)*	51 (46%)
Access to Basic Services	10 (22%)	60 (54%)
	Not Abducted	Formerly Abducted
Social Issues	55 (55%)	32 (55%)
Access to Basic Services	45 (45%)	26 (45%)

The findings above show that among all groups of people interviewed for this study, a significant group wanted to discuss social relationships as a fundamental characteristic of the situation in Acholiland, and that this trend was even more pronounced among youth and people in camps. There were two main groups of responses that comprised the broader category of social relations. The first was “Youth are not united and/or they need to be organized”. Responses in this category talked about the way that youth need to join together, both for social and for economic benefit. Ten of these responses were positive and referred to the improving social situation, often as a result of returning to camps or because of activities to unite youth, such as in the case of this quote from a male youth in a return site, “Youth here are now engaging themselves in some drama activities. Before if you were not in the garden then you were sleeping or you had to go back to the garden. These days, girls are living well among each other, not like it used to be in the camps.” Another eight responses referred the need for play equipment and other activities to bring youth together, and five referred to youth’s inability to work together.

The second group of responses that comprised the broader category of social relations was “We need to return to normal social relations”. This category included responses that referred to the poor behavior of parents, children and youth (particularly as a result of camp life), as well as some responses about how youth who returned to their villages are faring better. The following chart provides the full detail of responses that were categories as referring to social issues.

Social Issues		
Youth Need to Be United/Organized		7
	Youth are Improving	10
	Not Collaborating	5
	Need Play Equipment	8
Need to Return to Normal Relations		
	Children's Behavior	6
	Poor Parenting	4
	Youth are Improving	19
	Youth are Spoiled	28
Total		87

Most of the comments related to social relationships pointed to the negative nature of social interactions or other deficiencies. Some responses, however, pointed to the positive behavior of youth or improving relationships. People who were located in camps were more likely to emphasize the negative nature of social relationships than people in return sites. This can be accounted for by the feeling that many people have in return sites that social relationships are improving. Formerly abducted people were less likely to say negative things about social relationships (although the numbers of formerly abducted people in the sample preclude strong evidence of a trend). This may reflect an additional effort on their part to reintegrate to their communities, a feeling that whatever social issues they have now are minor compared to when they were

abducted, or an unwillingness to talk about social issues. The following chart shows the breakdown of which demographics offered negative responses as compared to positive responses or responses that stressed the improvements to social relationships associated with returning to ancestral lands.

Positive or Negative Remarks About Youth		
Nature of Response about Youth	Demographic Group (and percentage of total responses by group)	
	Youth	Non-Youth
Negative	28 (61%)	20 (65%)
Positive	11 (24%)	4 (13%)
Better After Return	7 (15%)	7 (23%)
	Female	Male
Negative	24 (62%)	24 (63%)
Positive	7 (18%)	8 (21%)
Better After Return	8 (21%)	6 (16%)
	Camp	Return
Negative	26 (81%)	22 (49%)
Positive	2 (6%)	13 (29%)
Better After Return	4 (13%)	10 (22%)
	Not Formerly Abducted	Formerly Abducted
Negative	36 (72%)	12 (44%)
Positive	6 (12%)	9 (33%)
Better After Return	8 (16%)	6 (22%)

Throughout the course of this research, the term “spoiled” was often used to describe people who have been so influenced by war and camp life that they behave in ways that are perceived as socially unacceptable and destructive. Camp life is often blamed for the behaviors that people, and especially youth, now display. Of the 87 people that responded to the question about the situation in Acholiland by talking about social issues, 28 specifically talked either about youth that behave in abhorrent

ways. The following quote from a man in a return site is typical and shows the concern that many current and former IDPs feel, “The situation of the youth here is really alarming. Those who are better are the ones who were outside the camp setting. Those who are within the camps are just wasting their lives and it is really alarming. The young girls are all just getting pregnant at a very tender age compared to the right age.”

Nineteen of the people that talked about the need to return to normal social relationships noted that those who return to ancestral villages are faring better than youth that remain in or near camps. A female youth in a return site looked positively upon the improving situation for youth who escaped camp life, “The youth here are better. While at the camp, there was too much of everything about the youth. They would drink, steal and do all sorts of evils but I see they are now changing from here. Even the females are better off. We are going back to our original cultural roots as before the war.”

However, some feel that even in return sites, youth still engage in socially destructive activities. A male youth in a return site lamented, “Since the youth are not in school, they are digging and going to the garden. After the garden they go to the bars and most of the time they get into fights. Their future is not so bright... The young girls who have given birth usually can’t take care of their families.” The belief that returning to ancestral villages promotes a better life and behavior among youth is widespread. A secondary school teacher in Pader attributed the positive change in villages to the break from dependency on humanitarian aid, “The lives of those who have returned are better

because they do not depend on relief. They practice good hygiene and there is less theft in return sites.”

Although only a small percentage of the total number of people whose responses were trended for this question talked specifically about spoiled youth (18%), this finding is still significant. The references to spoiled youth were spontaneously offered in response to a general question about the situation for children and youth. A variety of other responses also talked about the need for youth to have better social relationships, as detailed above. Yet, almost one in five people offered responses that specifically talked about the way that youth are behaving in socially destructive ways, pointing to their feeling that camp life has left indelible scares on the younger generation. Youth and non-youth both made these remarks (12 out of the 28 responses were from youth), as did male and females (12 males and 16 females) and people in camps and in return sites (11 from return sites and 17 from camps). A higher proportion of people in camps talked about the spoiled youth, although these numbers are generally too small to draw conclusions about which groups are more predisposed to take about spoiled youth.

This research did not verify whether or not youth in camps and newly returned youth are actually engaging in anti-social behaviors such as those described above. It is possible that only a minority of the youth actually drink, fight, and fail to care for their children. Regardless of the actual number of youth engaging in these behaviors, the perception that youth are susceptible to anti-social behavior is widespread.

In many ways, youth have had to bear the brunt of the war in northern Uganda. Because the war in northern Uganda raged from 1986 to 2005, youth under 25 years old never experienced life without war. Today’s youth share the experience of having spent their childhood and adolescence in camps where they were subjected to physical threat and constrained opportunities. Youth are the future for northern Uganda, yet community members see indelible scars of camp life in some youth’s behavior.

Social Relationships and Being United

Although many youth do not want to return to rural areas, those that do return get little or no support for their reintegration. Now that they have the opportunity to “return” to a life that they may have never known, many youth are willing to work but feel that they lack a supportive social network. Some youth interviewed for this study felt that activities to help them to unite and organize could help them to build social relationships and succeed in the post-war period. Out of the 157 people that responded to the question of the “situation for children and youth in northern Uganda,” 30 people (19%) talked about youth’s need to be united. Youth were more likely to respond in this way than non-youth. This trend was slightly more evident among male youth, but the sample of people that responded this way is too small to definitively note strong trends.

Youth Are Not United		
	Youth	Non-Youth
Youth are not united	4	3
Youth are fine or improving through organization	8	2
Youth don’t have enough to do	4	1
Youth need play equipment	8	0

Total	24	6
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Youth's desire to be socially organized is inherently linked to their desire to do better economically. Youth want to be socially organized, and this desire may overlap with their feeling that if they were more united and organized, they would stand a better chance of receiving aid from international or government groups. It is difficult to disaggregate these motivations in the absence of a specific line of inquiry related to social organization and organization for economic motives. However, because social relationships emerged as a theme in the response to several questions (the benefit of education, the definition of peace, and the situation in Acholiland) the author places weight on the stated importance of social relationships. Clearly, the population in Acholiland is also suffering economically. If social organization is believed to lead to economic empowerment or receipt of aid, then a lack of unity may be perceived as detrimental for social and cultural reasons as well as for economic reasons.

Respondents that talked about youth's need to be united felt that youth need to be organized through savings programs or recreational activities or through other initiatives so that they can better support one another. Individuals reflected on the way that youth are "...always doing things on our own and individually" rather than being "united." Others felt that youth are not sensitized about important issues that affect the whole community such as HIV/AIDS. A small but passionate group of respondents focused on play equipment and structured recreation and discussion groups (such as those called "straight talk") and stressed the importance of supporting such positive

interaction. Surprisingly, for some the lack of recreation ranked very high on their list of grievances – just after their basic needs. One male youth in a remote return site said, “The youth here are facing problems of lack of means of survival. They are not getting the expected yield because of lack of good species of crops. Secondly, they don’t have any entertainment like fields, balls.” Female youth respondents referred to straight talk clubs or dance rather than sports. A male youth in Lodi return site in Purongo Sub-County explained that now that youth are at home and not going to discos, they need extra-curricular activities:

The lack of extra-curricular activities makes the youth redundant. The youth do not drink as they used to when in the camps. Socially we the youth like to interact after garden work.

Lack of organization, opportunity, and recreation in communities of return may contribute to some youth’s hesitation to return and begin an agricultural life. A female youth’s comments elucidated the difference between urban and rural youth and the feeling of separateness that some may fear in the village: “The youth here [in the village] are not like the youth in the center. Here they are separate unlike those in the center who support each other...”

Ten of the respondents that focused on youth’s need for unity reflected on the positive impact that social organization has had on youth’s lives, despite ongoing challenges. The examples of how youth are organized and supporting one another included: drama groups, meetings with peer educators, friends conversation groups, farming groups, and traditional dances. One female youth from an urban return site

explained:

Generally we are fine because... every evening we, the youth, come together to dance traditional dances in a recreational way. This makes life really enjoyable.

Another male youth in a very remote return site linked to youth's reality to the agricultural way of life that many have accepted by returning to their ancestral land. His comment shows that the youth in his village are trying to create a sense of community and social mores that may not have existed in the camps:

The youth who are foresighted are engaged in agricultural activities. The youth here are united thus I feel comfortable staying here... The youth normally come together to make by-laws to ensure that youth with anti-social behavior are brought back (sensitized) into having good behavior.

Leaders and NGO Officials' Reflections on Youth: A Symbol of Culture Lost

Unlike community members that talk about the way that youth disappoint their society, local leaders and NGO workers were more likely to talk about the way that society disappoints youth. Community members describe the symptoms of anti-social behavior; other stakeholders talked about dynamics related to social fabric, culture, and tradition. For instance, the District Coordinator for the Concerned Parents Association, a group that originally formed to advocate for daughters that were abducted by the LRA, explained how camp life affected the transmission of culture and informal education:

You cannot teach children so much about how to take care of their homes and selves because of influences from their neighbors. In the homestead [before the war] people were sparsely located. In the evenings, the girls would be with their mothers – they would be training them. The boys

*would sit around the fire, they tell stories, culture, lots of things. That was not possible in the camp.*¹⁹¹

Traditional Acholi culture was disrupted as a result of the war in several ways. The homestead, wherein extended families co-located and helped to look after one another's children, was uprooted when people fled to camps. Relations were no longer able to look after one another's children as they were scattered. Additionally, the large number of deaths interrupted inter-generational ties. Adult males were the most frequent victims of violence, and the many health-related deaths in camps contributed to the destruction of family bonds.¹⁹²

The Speaker of the Amuru District Council explains how war has also disrupted the traditional Acholi extended family structure. During the early years of the war, he was abducted and his uncle helped him to recovery upon his return.

... Communities are starting to be only nuclear families. Catering for vulnerable children has become difficult... vulnerable children and orphans used to be catered for in the extended family, but that is gone due to the erosion of the culture.

The Speaker of the Amuru District Council reflected on the use of the term "spoiled". He reflected on the way that Acholi culture is being degraded by what he calls "individualism,"

¹⁹¹ Camp curfew and the fear of attracting rebels to gatherings made such meetings impossible in camps. Finnestrom, 146.

¹⁹² The World Health Organization conducted a survey in the districts of Acholiland during the first six months of 2005 and found that 70 percent of the victims of violent death during this period were adult males and 17 percent were children under 15. World Health Organization, *Health and Mortality Survey among Internally Displaced Persons in Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda* (accessed May 10, 2010); available from <http://www.who.int/hac/crises/uga/sitreps/Ugandamortsurvey.pdf>.

Formerly we used to say, when you get a child or a youth, it would be the responsibility of everyone to take care of. Now when we say the youth are getting spoiled, that is individualism: You look at yourself only without correcting the behavior of the youth. The situation of the youth is the reflection of the loss of Acholi culture.

Concerns about the effect of camp life on culture were often expressed during the war. Dolan notes a discourse around erosion of culture dating back to at least 2001, when ACORD published a report on the “cultural demoralization” in camps demonstrated by “prostitution, divorce and early sexual relationships among young children...” In the same year, the Acholi Religious Leaders reported a “collapse of cultural values” and noted “scores of unattended children everywhere [in camps], idle youth loitering about and men drinking alcohol.” Dolan argues that various actors, from IOM and UNOCHA to local actors and community members saw social breakdown in everyday indicators within crowded camps, including the breakdown in the physical separation and privacy that was traditionally maintained between the sexes, lack of parental oversight, and a disruption of traditional practices such as burial and funeral rites.¹⁹³

The NGO/CBO officials interviewed were all native to northern Uganda and were implementing programs for this population. The notion that this population’s culture has been damaged could be used to explain or justify the programming that these organizations implement, which ranged from scholarship provision to accelerated

¹⁹³ Chris Dolan, *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006* (Berghahn Books: New York, 2009), 168.

learning and vocational training, to psychosocial interventions. Many of the NGO workers interviewed had had the opportunity to leave northern Uganda at some point and so may have felt able to analyze the dynamics affecting the broader Acholi community as a somewhat removed but highly informed observer. As Dolan suggests, where community members experience the indicators of social breakdown, NGO/CBO workers may see a larger pattern of social malaise. For NGO workers, advancing the narrative of a lost culture could be seen to promote their own agenda, given that NGO interventions need justification and continued funding.

Local leaders may also feel able to make highly informed observations about the social impact of war. Local leaders are also driven by the logic of elections. They need to create a narrative that has resonance with the local population in order to garner support. While populations see only symptoms, local leaders' refer to a bigger pathogen, showing their constituents their analytic ability. They also take a combative stance: By casting this issue as the impact of camp life on culture, not just the actions of rogue or anti-social individuals, local leaders imply that the pathogen is caused by the scars of war and therefore the government is responsible.

Horowitz writes about the role of cultural revival among ethnic groups whose boundaries were changing during the colonial or post-colonial period. He found that during a process of assimilation to other identity groups or differentiation within the ethnic group, such revivals attempted to, "recapture a fading culture or a glorious past, in order to explain an unsatisfying present..." In Acholiland, a different sort of

differentiation is occurring as a result of war and camp life. Some individuals act in socially unacceptable ways, thus separating themselves, or differentiating themselves in a sense, from the larger Acholi community. This trend, according to community members and local leaders, is most prevalent among the youth. When discussing this phenomenon, local leaders talk about lost culture, and in so doing, rally the Acholi people to once again take care of their own and retain the sense of cohesion that they once enjoyed. Horowitz found that cultural revival tends to foster ethnic conflict because such movements can harden group boundaries, promote the ethnic group rather than the national identity, and provide a foundation for ethnically based political organizations.¹⁹⁴

Horowitz' interpretation implies a zero-sum game approach to ethnic identity: any increase in ethnic identity corresponds to a decrease in national identity. However, in northern Uganda, a cultural revival that encourages caretaking of conflict-affected individuals may be a positive and important force, even if it does promote the strength of ethnic identity.

Interestingly, although community members, local leaders, national leaders, and NGO/CBO workers all talk about social relationships, whether through the language of individual behavior or in terms of cultural erosion, no donor referred to this theme. One donor referred to the challenge of working with "traumatized" people but did not elaborate on what trauma looks like at the local level or what can be done for trauma.

¹⁹⁴ Donald Horowitz, "Cultural Movements and Ethnic Change," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 433 (1977) 6-18.

This remark is far removed from other stakeholders' explicit descriptions of social malaise and the impact on daily life,

... Doing this [reconstruction] with a traumatized people, especially the younger generation, and formerly abducted and victims – it is very tough challenge.

Donors' lack of focus on the impact of camp life and war on social relationships is interesting given the extent to which actors that are involved with community members and constituents stressed these issues. Of course, donors do not need to raise funds for programs and do not need to convince populations to vote for them and so the motivations discussed above do not apply. Furthermore, not being from northern Uganda, they are not likely to be familiar with the traditional culture of the North, and having not traveled to the North, they would not have insight into the relationships between individuals. Perhaps they feel slightly more able to talk about trauma because trauma is assumed after specific, measurable acts have occurred, such as violence or rape. A breakdown in social relations, however, is a slow and comparatively invisible process with no common definition.

Impact of Social Issues on Education

When talking to teachers, it is clear that social behavior has real implications in the classroom. Out of the 22 teachers who were interviewed and asked about the situation for children and youth, thirteen focused on children's undisciplined behavior (others reflected on poverty, issues related to being teachers, or other themes).

Teachers find that some youth in their schools exhibit the same worrying anti-social behavior as the youth who are described as idling around camps. A secondary school teacher in Amuru lamented the use of drugs in his school. He found that there is an important difference between those students who are involved in extra-curricular activities and those who are not, and therefore he sees the need to promote games for the students.

We have some reports of girls and boys taking marijuana... several cases of fighting, drunkenness. Some children are in football clubs, netball clubs and some children and youth go to church. Others participate in quarrels...We have also involved the police to monitor the youth because youth are using the empty building to smoke opium.

Some of the youth who are in school are being supported by NGOs as a way to help them recover from the conflict. These students may or may not be motivated by the academic opportunity. In some cases, teachers may find that little separates these youth from those who are out of school. A secondary education teacher in Atiak explained,

Some come to school because they are being sponsored by some NGOs and they are not interested generally in studies. Most of the youth are not concerned about their health. They think they are immoral and engage in several relationships, they contract AIDS, and many are child mothers.

Teachers express concern about children's defiance and lack of respect as well as their bad behavior. A male primary school teacher in Amuru District complained, "The children here today are not respectful especially to teachers. They do not want to

respond when they call them, they do not follow what we tell them, yet they are young children.”

Teachers worry because the children’s difficult behavior is seen as “making a lot of work on the side of teachers and children,” and because they believe that children who lack respect will not be able to succeed. One teacher observed that “...if you are bad mannered then you will not go further with your study.” Another teacher linked disrespectful behavior with student’s poor performance, “They do not respect us teachers and they are very bad mannered. That is why they are failing their exams.”

Unlike community members who blame camp life for anti-social behavior, teachers focus more explicitly on the traumatic experiences that children had during abduction. A teacher in Pader provided the following description of the way that trauma impacts behavior in the classroom,

You find that when they come back from the bush [abduction], some of them have these nightmares and are so shy, even to talk to teachers. Then some of them are arrogant – maybe you try to correct them – they are so harsh... So you find that they come back – some were raped – there are very many who are mothers...They tend not to feel free. They cannot look directly into your eyes. They are isolated. They are victims of stigmatization...

Teachers also explain that because of student’s behavior and the traumatic experiences they have had, teachers have to discipline students in a special way. A secondary school teacher in Pader talked about how she handled the delicate issue of disciplining children who she thought had the potential to be violent:

They tend to be harsh and always scare you that if you punish them, they can kill you... those are the ones that have just come out... And then some are the contrary – they are too shy to even approach a teacher... They feel like “how can I be seen talking to the rest.”... I call them in a good way... I only call them one-to-one to have an interaction...

Unlike community members, teachers are more likely to focus on extreme cases of trauma and social disruption rather than every day social challenges and relationships. There are several possible explanations for this divergence. McKay researched ritual cleaning and healing in communities and found that when community members are asked to forgive a formerly abducted person, they are also asked to leave behind words and thoughts that relate a person’s former experience as an abducted rebel.¹⁹⁵ This finding seems plausible based on interviewees’ behavior during this study: Although formerly abducted people composed a third of the sample for this research, it was extremely rare that any interviewee discussed traumatic events that occurred while abducted (and the questionnaire did not probe further in this area as it was not explicitly the topic of research). Teachers may not feel obliged to keep quiet about difficult themes as they are often not from the community where they teach.

Another possible reason for teachers’ emphasis on severe disruptive behavior,

¹⁹⁵ In northern Uganda and in Sierra Leone, cleansing and welcoming rituals can be used to impose rules of community behavior, including that certain words are not uttered, such as “rebel wife” or “rebel baby”. Susan McKay, “Reconstructing Fragile Lives: Girls’ Social Reintegration in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone,” *Gender and Development* 12, no. 3 (2004), 19-30. Annan, Brier and Aryemo found that “forgetting” the past is an important part of the advice and guidance given by friends and families of formerly abducted youth. Jeannie Annan, Moriah Brier, and Filder Aryemo, “From ‘Rebel’ to ‘Returnee’: Daily Life and Reintegration for Young Soldiers in Northern Uganda,” *Journal of Adolescent Research* 24, no. 639 (2009), p. 658.

even if this behavior is the exception rather than the norm among youth, may be their own feelings of trauma or emotional upset at having to deal with isolated difficult cases (especially if they feel ill-equipped to do so or in danger). Lastly, teachers may be influenced by stereotypes about formerly abducted youth, even if these stereotypes are not fully borne out in reality. Dolan noted a disjuncture between the discourse about formerly abducted and therefore traumatized students and reality, as manifest in head teachers' belief that returnees were a problem, coupled with an inability to identify who the returnees actually were.¹⁹⁶

Current Education Sector Response to Youth Needs and Social Issues

Members of Parliament for the northern districts understand the situation for youth similarly to local leaders as well as concerns about the way that youth's disenfranchisement will affect society. Still, national policymakers and administrators do not articulate policy objectives targeted at this group. A few national policymakers refer to the need for vocational education for youth but none flesh out plans for how to serve the economic needs of this population of heavily conflict-affected young adults. Civil servants who were interviewed sit within the formal education sector and rarely if ever made comments that relate directly to youth. Tellingly, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan does not discuss youth or include any specific provisions for this highly conflict-affected group.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Dolan 2009, p. 170.

¹⁹⁷ Uganda Local Governments Association, *Education Recovery in the Greater North, Eastern, and North Bunyoro Districts Under the PRDP Framework: Blue Print and Costed Regional Priorities* (Uganda, 2008).

The Head of the Opposition and MP from Pader explained his painful realization that reconstruction must focus on children and the future rather than trying to make up for the opportunities that youth have lost, “We have to make a brutal decision – to shift the social services focus to the young people [children]... This is now about protecting the future because we can’t change the past.”

Clearly, there are many practical challenges to helping the youth in northern Uganda. As pointed out by the MP from Pader, there are not enough resources to help all conflict-affected young people, and so attention within the education sector goes to the children. Some believe that vocational training is a way to help the youth, but there are no national resources for vocational training programs that help the most-conflict affected. Vocational education as currently conceived is expensive and is not effective in terms of helping female youth.¹⁹⁸

Donors show little understanding of the situation for youth, rarely reflecting on this group of people in a way that shows insight into their reality in the post-conflict period. Funding patterns clearly illustrate that youth are not a part of the donor’s development agenda except for through standard education sector support. Engagement around social issues among donors is also rare. An exception is the USAID-funded Replica Program which is implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Education and provides psychosocial training for teachers, as well as other activities

¹⁹⁸ For example, in the case of the one institution in northern Uganda that accepts P7 graduates noted in the Ministry of Education and Sports report on northern Uganda, only 17% of enrolled students were female in 2006. Ministry of Education and Sports 2008.

designed to help children in the post-conflict environment, such as drama.

A few NGOs in Amuru and Pader Districts implement programs that target youth both in and outside of the education sector. For instance, the United Movement to End Child Soldiering promotes peace education, psychosocial counseling, and career counseling, and bases operations in schools and among scholarship recipients that they have brought back into the formal education sector. The Concerned Parents Association, a local CBO that was founded by the parents of abducted children, works with youth and community members through a variety of projects, including scholarship and income generating activities. Saint Monica's Tailoring School, a vocational school for child mothers that is funded by a Catholic church, reaches out to some of the most vulnerable members of society and spares little expense to rehabilitate them to the point where they can survive outside the compound walls. Other NGOs focus on adults and provide basic literacy and/or vocational training in order to improve productivity and economic opportunities for these groups.¹⁹⁹ Local officials are encouraged by the central government to work with NGOs that have a local presence.²⁰⁰

Although some actors, such as NGOs and local leaders, conduct or advocate for programming that aims to address youth needs, the majority of youth are excluded from programs that recognize, incorporate, and address the social needs that they expressed in interviews. NGO and CBO projects are implemented with approval from

¹⁹⁹ As previously noted, NRC provides vocational training for illiterate youth. LABE and ECHO-Bravo provide catch-up classes and basic literacy for youth and adults.

²⁰⁰ Interview by Author with an NGO Official (Washington DC, 11/24/2009).

local governments but are not driven by any sort of framework that guides interventions for youth. To varying degrees, local officials may influence decisions about where services are located. These programs are, however, subject to many supply-driven factors rather than driven by the local governments' strategic vision and priorities for the post-conflict period. NGOs and CBOs engage in a variety of activities, and provide a smattering of relief to those who are lucky enough to find out about programs or be recruited, but do not provide a systematic response to post-conflict issues.

Youth that remain in trading centers are even less likely than youth returning to rural areas to get social support or to receive assistance of any kind. Local leaders speak disparagingly of these youth and do not know how to help them other than to encourage them to return to rural areas. There are little or no development opportunities for youth in urban areas, with the exception of some vocational programs. Even the adult literacy programs that were available during the conflict in camps are phasing out. The dearth of programming for urban youth in northern Uganda is part of a broader trend throughout Africa.²⁰¹

The development approach generally ignores social relationships and cultural values as these issues fall outside of the priority focus of poverty reduction and growth. Funding, monitoring, or analysis of social relationships by development actors is uncommon. In contrast, community members and those with links to the community emphasize the importance of restoring traditions and values and bringing the children

²⁰¹ Sommers finds that although youth flock to urban areas during and after conflict, little programming is targeted towards these youth. Sommers 2006.

and youth back into line with respectful and appropriate behavior. These ideas are linked with peace and recovery in a profound way: One of the biggest scars of war is the breakdown of traditional relationships and an indicator of peace to some community members is living together with “unity” and “harmony” in the traditional way. By ignoring the importance of social relationships, the development agenda fails to address a critical issue in terms of recovery and peace as defined by some community members.

Implications for the Education Sector

A growing literature recognizes the importance of engaging youth in post-conflict environments. Urdal, Kaplan, and Collier articulate various aspects of the Youth Bulge theory, which associates large numbers of unemployed or uneducated youth with the potential for a security threat through (i.e. because of the potential for recruitment to armed groups or gangs).²⁰² Others such as Boyden and de Berry and the Women’s Refugee Commission have highlighted youth’s unique and deep-cutting experiences during war and their need for appropriate responses (including psychosocial programming) for their protection and development.²⁰³ Literature on the reintegration of young soldiers may pull on both security and protection-based rationale for

²⁰² Henry Urdal, “A Clash of Generations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (3): 607–630; Paul Collier and Nicolas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 3-12; and Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996).

²⁰³ Jo Boyden and Joanna de Berry (eds) *Children and Youth on the Frontline* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); Women’s Refugee Commission, *Learning in a War Zone*. Accessed March 8, 2010. Available from http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/ed_ug.pdf; and Women’s Refugee Commission, *Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict* (New York: Women’s Commission, 2000).

programming.²⁰⁴ The growing literature on youth intersects with education literature to a somewhat limited degree given the challenges of addressing this group through the formal education sector.

In northern Uganda, youth interact with the education sector to a surprising degree given the low primary completion and secondary school enrollment rates. Youth under 18 years of age are very likely to be pursuing education close to their homes. Of the 52 interviewees that were between 12 and 18 years of old, 74% said that they were still pursuing educational opportunities in some form.

As youth transition into parenthood, they rarely stay in school because they begin to invest in their children instead of themselves. In the interview sample for the study, only 3% of parents reported that they were currently engaged in some sort of education. For many, the transition to parenthood occurs between the ages of 19 and 25. Of the 74% of youth between 12 and 18 years of age that were in school at the time of interviews, only 4% reported having children. In contrast, of the 59 youth who were between 19 and 24 years of age at the time of interviews, 66% had children, 75% were married, and only 12% were still pursuing some form of education.²⁰⁵ Although youth

²⁰⁴ For example: Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, *Young Soldiers, Why They Choose to Fight* (Switzerland, International Labour Organization, 2004); Ilene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and K. Peters, P. Richards, K. Vlassenroot, What Happens to Youth During and After Wars? A Preliminary Review of Literature on Africa and an Assessment of the Debate (accessed May 17, 2009); available from <http://en.scientificcommons.org/1156054>.

²⁰⁵ Selection bias could be an issue. Older youth that are in secondary school may have been underrepresented in the sample because if they were at school at the time of interviews. If such selection bias did occur, it would not likely affect the findings of interest here; that the majority of youth have interaction with the education system, first as students, and then as parents (at which point most stop

are likely to terminate their own education once their children are born, they will begin to interact with the education system again once their own children enroll in school.

Youth's interaction with the education system is increasing as the average levels of educational attainment increase in Uganda. This is also true in northern Uganda, although rates of educational attainment have increased less in northern Uganda when compared to national averages. The number of youth that have attended primary school is higher than for non-youth, given the dramatic increase in students due to UPE. In the sample for this study, a similar trend was found at the post-primary level: 27% of youth in the sample for this study reported having attained some post-primary education while only 10% of non-youth had attained any post-primary education. Despite gaps in service discussed in previous chapters, the education sector interacts with youth more than any other service sector. In the absence of any funded government sector dedicated to youth issues, the education sector may have a comparative advantage in terms of addressing youth's post-conflict priorities and societies' priorities related to youth.

Given that the education sector intersects with youth, either as students or soon after as parents, what role can education play in helping youth to improve their social relationships? Getting into school may be an important first step for many youth. Of those who responded to questions about the benefits of education, 18% talked about social and family-related benefits. For example, a male youth in a remote return site in

investing in their own education).

Atiak explained, "Primary studies might help but not so much. But those who finish primary are well mannered and avoid bad behavior." A father in a return site in Amuru commented, "When you find someone who has studied primary, he is polite and respectful unlike someone who hasn't gone who is rude and treats people cruelly." Schools have the potential to positively socialize youth, although this potential is severely limited in the context of overcrowded classrooms and teachers with inadequate training.

For many, getting into school will not affect social behavior. As seen in the teachers' comments, even some of the youth that are in school display the troubling behaviors witnessed at camp sites. Youth foremost talked about their need to be organized, and mentioned the potential impact of extra-curricular activities that could help them to share ideas and feel united. Schools may be well placed to act as conveners.

The impact of extra-curricular activities for youth is striking. The Survey on War Affected Youth (SWAY) studied the role of youth groups in camps. Over half of the 750 male youth surveyed had participated in such groups. SWAY found that social support is a critical factor in protecting male youth from high levels of distress and aggression and low social functioning. More than half the youth said that peer support was the best way to cope when feeling distressed, particularly in the absence of family support. Youth groups were seen as one of the only enjoyable parts of camp life, perhaps shedding light on why youth in areas of return miss the opportunity to 'be organized'

and share experiences in groups. The SWAY report notes the remarkable levity and playfulness with which a youth described his dance group, despite his disappointment about being unable to afford the last two years of secondary school and his struggle with his alcoholic and abusive father.²⁰⁶

The role of education in helping conflict-affected youth in northern Uganda to build social relationships among themselves and their communities is limited so long as the education system focuses on formal education as currently conceived. The education system has the potential to address social issues as discussed by communities and stakeholders in northern Uganda. Those who are in school can benefit from being organized in such a way that they can help themselves through peer mentoring and social and recreational activities. Those who are in contact with the education system but are not consistently attending classes, and those who are outside of the education system could be served by extra-curricular programs or by educational programs designed for the post conflict environment such as accelerated learning, vocational training without educational requirements, and community-based education. Such interventions may be able to help youth to bond together, to feel organized, and to be accepted as productive members of their society.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation hypothesized that studying different approaches to education and the operational priorities of each approach could shed light on the relationship

²⁰⁶ Annan, et al (2006), 13-20.

between education and conflict. A local perceptions study and analysis of interviews with stakeholders in education shed light on a perplexing dynamic. Although international and national education actors state their commitment to using education interventions to reduce the potential for future conflict, their actions fail to address or in some cases exacerbate grievances and frustrations that increase the potential for conflict.

The three main approaches identified were a protection-based approach that drives humanitarian aid, a development approach (with an emphasis on human-centered development or an emphasis on economic growth), and a conflict prevention approach. Although these approaches have different implications for the delivery of education services, ideally, the outcomes are mutually reinforcing. Protection and continued service delivery during war means that development will more easily continue or start again after war. Development is a fundamental building block of peace building and conflict prevention in order to demonstrate a peace dividend, and because development provides protection from a return to war.

A conflict prevention approach to development is concerned with redressing the root causes of conflict and any impact of war that could lead to future violent conflicts. Such an approach assumes that grievances related to underdevelopment could be catalyzed by leaders seeking to mobilize violence. To set the context for considering the role of such an approach, this study reviewed some of the major events that have impacted the Acholi people in northern Uganda. War, politics, and poverty have all had

socio-economic consequences that have overlapped with, and contributed to the formation of, the Acholi identity. The prevalence of marginalization and grievance affecting Acholi people points to the potential benefits of a conflict prevention approach that is sensitive to local priorities and grievances and integrates these and other risk factors into long term processes.

Summary of Results

Humanitarian Approach – Protection without Politics: A range of actors provided humanitarian aid in northern Uganda, including various UN agencies and NGOs working mainly in camps but also in communities that avoided displacement. Although funding for education and for northern Uganda in general was initially very constrained, these humanitarian aid flows increased as the conflict progressed and humanitarian actors became entrenched.

The first stated and primary goal of a protection based approach, which drives humanitarian actors in the education field, is to protect a child's right to education.²⁰⁷ In this sense, the humanitarian intervention can boast a measured success: The fact that primary school enrollment in northern Uganda during the war tripled is staggering considering the severity of the conflict. Although the quality of the education that was provided in camps was very poor in most cases, the majority of children in northern

²⁰⁷ As Nicolai and Triplehorn argue, creating conditions that allow children to continue going to school during conflict protects children in a variety of ways, when schools are safe from physical attack, because children benefit from the sense of normalcy that attending school promotes. Susan Nicholi and Carl Triplehorn, *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict*, (London: Overseas Development Agency, 2003). Education is also believed to protect displaced adolescent boys and girls from all forms of recruitment and abuse. Education is prioritized as a fundamental human right that must be protected. Alan Smith and Tony Vaux, *Conflict and International Development* (London: DFID, 2003).

Uganda were enrolled in primary school during the war. Individuals and institutions that advocate for education to be included in humanitarian responses no doubt deserve some of the credit for the funding that flowed to support education in northern Uganda, even if the appeals were for far greater levels of funding.

Humanitarian provision of education increased expectations around education. Interview analysis showed that with increasing levels of education, individuals were significantly more likely to value education as the main way to improve their situation, even if the quality of the education they had received was poor. The increasing importance of education can be seen as the continuation or perhaps an acceleration of a long-term trend in Uganda, in which formal education is increasingly valued above other forms of learning and as a path to livelihoods that are seen as superior to traditional forms of living on agriculture and animal husbandry.²⁰⁸

Although providing access to educational opportunities is a foundational priority for the humanitarian approach, some argue that protection must include broader goals. A protection-based approach to education, as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), seeks not only to protect through service provision, but also to address the environmental and structural factors that lead to the violation of educational rights.²⁰⁹ Humanitarian aid actors in general, including education actors, can

²⁰⁸ J.C Ssekamwa, *History and Development of Education* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2000).

²⁰⁹ The ICRC describes the three functions of humanitarian aid as: i) responsive action aimed at preventing abuse, stopping abuse, or alleviating effects; ii) remedial action aimed at restoring dignity and ensuring adequate living conditions subsequent to abuse; and iii) structural or environmental change. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action*, New

claim very limited success in this area. The development of a national policy for IDPs could be seen as evidence of progress along these lines, although humanitarian reports expose the GoU's failure to implement the policy.²¹⁰

Failed opportunities to advocate for structural changes during the crisis are evident. Two examples of missed opportunities startled the author. First, although Uganda has a policy of providing special stipends to teachers who are willing to teach in "hard to reach areas" such as the pastoralist region of north-eastern Uganda, there were no stipends available at the time of research for teachers willing to teach in Acholiland. Despite having been ravaged by 20 years of war and the obviously poor conditions for overstretched teachers, Acholiland was not included when the cabinet-level decision was made to provide stipends for teachers in "hard to reach" areas.²¹¹ This seems an obvious entry point for any considering advocacy work that could change the environment in which education services are provided.

Second, the lack of advocacy around non-formal education for northern Uganda was notable. The importance of non-formal education in emergency and post-conflict settings is well documented.²¹² Uganda stands out in sub-Saharan Africa for their successes with non-formal education, including accelerated and community-based

York: United Nations, 2002, 12.

²¹⁰ Chris Dolan and Lucy Hovil, *Humanitarian Protection in Uganda: A Trojan Horse?* (accessed March 11, 2011); available from www.microconflict.eu.

²¹¹ Interview by author with ministry official, June 16, 2009 (Kampala, Uganda).

²¹² Nicholai and Triplehorn lay out a model for protecting the well being of the child which includes accelerated learning as one of three measures to return children to school. Nicholi and Triplehorn, p 18.

education.²¹³ An advocacy group formed in 2003 and gave rise to the Adult Education Center which lobbies for adult education and has had some successes related to non-formal education.²¹⁴ Despite the demand for non-formal education in northern Uganda for conflict-affected youth, this advocacy group remained dormant during the conflict with regard to issues for learners in the north.

Approaches to protection and the provision of humanitarian aid differ, both in practice and in theory. Although the ICRC discusses actions to change the environmental structure, Nicholai and Triplehorn's focus is more explicitly on rights. They describe child protection as a 'continuum' with efforts to address violations of a child's rights on one end (including, for instance, ensuring access to safe schools) and activities focused on securing governmental and community respect for children's rights on the other end. In the middle are activities aimed at garnering respect for rights, including among the beneficiaries of protection activities.²¹⁵ This approach is based on the respect for human rights and would aim to convey a basic understanding of rights and an ability to claim rights to the target population.²¹⁶ In northern Uganda, interview responses point to the limited extent to which rights-based language and understanding has permeated discussion of education. Rather than feel empowered, aware of their rights, and able to claim their rights from duty bearers, people have come to see

²¹³ Deborah Glassman, Jordan Naidoo, Fred Wood (eds), *Community Schools in Africa: Reaching the Unreached* (New York: Springer, 2008).

²¹⁴ Interview by author with official from Adult Education Network, April 28, 2008 (Kampala, Uganda).

²¹⁵ Nicholai and Triplehorn, p. 9.

²¹⁶ Overseas Development Institute, Dependency and Humanitarian Relief.

education as a need that should be met by service providers (whether NGOs or government). Perhaps the ideal of promoting human rights in a war is too ambitious. Finnstrom's description of the nature of aid provision in camps makes the idea of instilling rights a farce: "In Acholiland, when rebel presence was high, international organizations sometimes simply dumped the relief in the center of camps so they could take off as soon as possible."²¹⁷

The length of the conflict had an important effect on the role of humanitarian aid in northern Uganda. A crisis is, by definition, temporary. Protection activities in education are designed to be short-term in nature, in order to redress the impact of a temporary crisis. Measures to meet the needs of children in camps ramped up as the war dragged on, but measures to address the structural and environmental conditions that created the war did not. People in camps accepted and were grateful for humanitarian aid, but on some level, the provision of this aid allowed for their internment in displacement camps to continue.²¹⁸ Similarly, supporting the learning center strategy promoted to access of education during the war, but also implicitly supported the policy of displacement camps where the only possible standard for education was basic access. Creating access to education in this context simultaneously promoted expectations about future provision of education and failed to address structural factors that would affect education in the post-conflict period.

This critique does not mean to undermine the work of the humanitarian actors

²¹⁷ Finnstrom, p. 150.

²¹⁸ Finnstrom.

and the advocates for education that secured access for thousands of children in northern Uganda, but rather aims to shed light on the nuanced implications of these events. Despite all of the limitations of humanitarian aid, if the only alternative is to withhold humanitarian aid, then few would argue about the lesser of the two evils. Ironically, perhaps the greatest limitation of the flawed humanitarian intervention for education in northern Uganda may be that it ended when the conflict ended: The duration and extent of the intervention was determined by the level of violent conflict rather than the level of need among northern Ugandans. This is consistent with humanitarian law but does not address the way that the experience of war continued to affect northern Ugandans several years after the violent phase of conflict had ended. During the war, community members were considered IDPs and were targeted for humanitarian aid. Once the violence ended, they were expected to return to homes where services are lacking, yet they have no official status under the Geneva Convention or the International Convention on IDPs.

Humanitarian aid can never truly be neutral, and this is no less true for the education sector. In northern Uganda, the provision of education aid had an impact on people's expectations about the role that education would play in their lives. This trend was even more pronounced among the youth that remained at camp sites at the time of research. Expectations are not inherently bad; individuals that have positive

expectations are actually more likely to achieve the results they desire.²¹⁹ However, having expectations that cannot or will not be fulfilled can naturally lead to frustration and therefore the potential for conflict.²²⁰

Structural Exclusion: An *economic* development focus (as opposed to a *human-centered* development focus) appears in certain aspects of nationally-driven policy behind education. The President of Uganda emphasizes the need for a new generation of learners who will be better able to take advantage of the economic opportunities of the modernizing world. In particular, policies implemented during Museveni's tenure emphasize science, high-level technical skills, and secondary education as a means to prepare for technical university studies.²²¹

The emphasis on science and technology as a means to promote industrialization in Uganda, and the recent move to make science subjects a compulsory aspect of secondary school exams, raise major concerns among leaders in northern Uganda. Schools in northern Uganda are dilapidated and do not have adequate science facilities or the same level of science instruction as schools in Central and Western Uganda. The emphasis on science achievement is perceived as an obstacle that makes it almost impossible for Acholi students to score well enough on secondary school leaving exams

²¹⁹ Carlos Bozzoli, Tilman Bruck and Tony Muhumuza, *Conflict Experiences and Household Expectations on Recovery: Survey Evidence from Northern Uganda* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from www.microconflict.eu.

²²⁰ Increasing expectations that cannot be fulfilled make a return to or an escalation of violence more likely. Pruitt, Dean and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict, Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004).

²²¹ Buganda Post, *Museveni's Voluminous 2009/2010 New Year Message* (accessed April 12, 2010); available from www.bugandapost.com/main/archives/1015.

to gain entrance to, and scholarships for, tertiary education. High level technical education is seen as irrelevant for most conflict-affected people who do not have the required diploma and/or scores to enter technical institutes.

Museveni claims that “Uganda’s economic transformation will critically hinge upon industrialization...” but current educational policies do not prepare the 88% of Ugandans who live in rural areas and are primarily living in poverty and engaged in agricultural activities to participate.²²² The “National Industrialisation Policy” is Museveni’s plan to “transform Uganda from a peasant society into a modern, industrial, and prosperous country.” The one paragraph in this document that deals with human capital makes it clear that only those able to access high level technical and vocational or tertiary institutions are considered.²²³

Donors that may be concerned about the non-inclusive nature of reforms have had little success holding the government accountable. Two examples show donors’ failed or limited ability to question non-inclusive policies. Despite concerns about the way that the Universal Secondary Education policy could adversely affect equity (by providing tuition remission to people not necessarily in need while failing to help those who cannot qualify because of the poor quality of their primary education) some donors felt unable question the policy, given that it was a Presidential Elective. As one donor representative explained, it was “something you can’t question... It [a Presidential

²²² Paul Onapa, *Championing Policy on Chronic Poverty and Social Protection*, (Kampala: The Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2010).

²²³ Uganda Invest, *Uganda Industrialization Policy* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from: www.ugandainvest.com/admin/docs/National%20Industrial%20Policy.pdf.

Elective] commands that the ministry address it.”²²⁴ In terms of technical education, PEVOT’s push for a more inclusive system that allows multiple paths of entry based on experience (rather than strictly requiring a secondary school diploma), has led to adaptations in policy but not in implementation.²²⁵

Non-inclusive policies run the risk of entrenching pre-existing horizontal inequalities that affect ethnic groups, regional groups, and rural and/or non-elite Ugandans. If these policies are successful and create public and private returns, groups that are excluded from these policies will experience increasing deprivation relative to those who benefit.²²⁶ Northern Uganda is familiar with the experience of relative deprivation: Between 1992 and 2006, Uganda as a whole enjoyed an economic growth rate of up to 6% and a reduction in the abject poverty rate from 56% in 1992 to 31%; meanwhile the abject poverty rate in northern Uganda climbed to 61%.²²⁷ Without transformative measures, Ugandan youth will continue to be excluded from growth-oriented education policies. Local leaders point to Acholi people’s past accomplishments, arguing that those that enjoy government scholarships are not inherently better or more capable.²²⁸

Meanwhile, most current and former IDP youth say that education is the best

²²⁴ Interview by author with official from donor agency, June 14, 2009 (Kampala, Uganda).

²²⁵ Interview by author with donor agency official, June 14, 2009 (Kampala, Uganda).

²²⁶ When an individual or group is excluded from growth experienced by others in society, they will experience relative deprivation even if their own level of well-fare has not changed. This is based on the understanding of poverty as more than just an absolute measure: it is also an experience that is defined in relative terms. Martin Ravallion, *Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2004).

²²⁷ Mabazi in Betty Udongo, 63.

²²⁸ Pruitt, et al highlight invidious comparisons as a factor that makes the onset of conflict more likely. Pruitt, et al.

plan to better their lives. A secondary school diploma is seen as the key to entering the wage economy. In the early recovery period, hopes were high. For most, these hopes do not match reality. Local leaders and statistics paint a grim picture: going to post-primary school is the exception, not the norm. Local schools are so poor that few students will score high enough to receive tuition remission at the post-primary level.

Education in reconstruction literature points to the importance of inclusion in the education system as an important antidote to the perceived threat that disenfranchised youth pose.²²⁹ Yet, in Acholi, with the increasing push toward growth, frustrations are higher than ever. In 2007, UNDP noted that the, “expectations these youth harboured... could not be fulfilled... one could quickly witness the emergence of a roaming group of youth... The consequence could be rapidly increased levels of crime and a new and deteriorating security situation...”²³⁰ Youth all over Uganda may share in feelings of frustration about the difficulties that they face as they try to improve their lives. Yet in northern Uganda, the exclusion implicit in the government’s growth agenda overlaps with other forms of exclusion related to the conflict, including the destruction of the education system and quality provision of education.²³¹

Development Objectives and Business as Usual: Despite discrete government

²²⁹ Peter Buckland, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005).

²³⁰ Ingunn Bjorkhug, et al, 48.

²³¹ Talbot and Davies refer to the notion of multiple and overlapping exclusions for groups affected by conflict. Entire groups may suffer from exclusion, and individuals within that group may suffer doubly because of exclusion from education as a result of gender-related factors or war-related disabilities. Lynn Davies and Christopher Talbot, “Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts,” 52, no. 4 (2008), 509-517.

policies that push for growth, a human-centered development approach focused on MDG#2 is central to the education sector in Uganda. Uganda's progress toward universal primary education has led to increasing levels of international funding and the development of modalities designed to increase absorption, including donor commitments to harmonize and align behind national goals. Although harmonizing behind donor priorities is considered a best practice that allows governments to better oversee development programs with lower levels of duplication and lower transaction costs,²³² this practice in northern Uganda raises concern. Harmonized procedures leave donors little room to engage in specific regions or around issues related to the marginalization that has occurred in the north, despite the clear and astounding deficiencies in education activities considered in the proposed recovery plan.

In Uvin's study of development aid and conflict in Rwanda leading up to the 1994 genocide, he talks about Rwanda's adept ability to play the development "game." In this context, this refers to Rwanda's cooperation with structural adjustment policy guidelines set forth by the World Bank. Even as Rwanda's human rights record deteriorated and politics of exclusion permeated government institutions, donors increased their funding and lauded Rwanda for increasing levels of absorption of international funds. Uvin refers to two Rwandas that existed in parallel: one Rwanda that was a model of development and increasingly levels of prosperity; another Rwanda that perpetuated structural violence and human rights abuses and would disintegrate

²³² Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Rome Declaration on Harmonisation* (accessed February 15, 2010); available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/50/31451637.pdf>.

into genocide.²³³

Similarly, an observer in Uganda may perceive two incongruous realities. In one, Museveni took the presidency and created an unprecedented level of stability and growth. His government is a willing and proactive partner in the task of economic policy reform, poverty reduction, and in military affairs. In terms of education, this Uganda very much plays by the rules and shares the emphasis on MDG#2. As a result, development partners fall back and support national leadership, including with regard to recovery programming for northern Uganda.

In the other Uganda, the one in which most Acholi people live, Museveni's actions not only failed to end the war for over two decades, but also contributed greatly to civilians' suffering by forcing them into camps where they were abused rather than protected. These sentiments run so strong among some Acholi people as to inspire calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try Museveni for his actions in Acholiland.²³⁴

Acholi people or others affected by the LRA war are not the only ones to point to instances of structural violence and human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch documented and called for an end to pre-election intimidation leading to the elections that saw Museveni take his fourth term.²³⁵ In early 2010, a petition was submitted to

²³³ Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (Connecticut: Kumerian Press, 1998).

²³⁴ Uganda Genocide Network, *ICC Must Try Museveni* (accessed March 25, 2011); available from www.ugandagenocide.info.

²³⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Uganda: Halt Pre-Election Intimidation Campaign* (accessed March 25, 2011);

the ICC to try Museveni for the killing of 42 people (800 were arrested) that protested in Kampala over tribal rights.²³⁶ Authoritarian and violent tendencies in the regime were further exposed by Museveni's silence about a bill that proposed the death penalty for individuals who repeatedly engaged in homosexual activity,²³⁷ and the subsequent mass outing and death-call published in a local newspaper.²³⁸

So which of these two Uganda's wrote the PRDP and promised "affirmative" action for the north?²³⁹ During the war, enrollment in primary schools increased from just over 350,000 to almost 1 million students with little or no corresponding development of local primary schools in rural areas. The only area that the PRDP was explicitly prioritizing for implementation at the time of research was *rebuilding of targeted* primary schools. The Ministry of Education and Sports estimates that over 8,700 classrooms were needed in northern Uganda in order for the sub-region to meet the national classroom/pupil ratio. The funding that the government has called for will not cover this expense, and does not lay out a vision for addressing the poor quality of schools, teacher training needs, psychosocial interventions or other factors of critical

available from: <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/10/uganda-halt-pre-election-intimidation-campaign>.

²³⁶ All Africa, *Mengo Backs Anti-Museveni ICC Petition*, (accessed March 25, 2011); available from www.allafrica.com.

²³⁷ BBC, *Uganda President Museveni Wary of Anti-Gay Bill* (accessed March 25, 2011); available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8456624.stm>.

²³⁸ Museveni remained silent even when local newspapers printed a hit-list of people thought to be homosexual, including their addresses and the command, "Hang Them". International pressure mounted after a prominent gay rights activist was bludgeoned to death, despite his earlier appeals to authorities to protect him from attack. The Washington Times, *Killing of Gay Activist in Uganda Triggers More Threats of Violence* (accessed March 25, 2011); available from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/14/killing-gay-activist-uganda-more-threats-violence/?page=3>.

²³⁹ Government of Uganda, *Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 2007-2010*. Kampala, Uganda, 2007.

importance for recovery.²⁴⁰

It is now a widely accepted truism that aid is political and can promote peace or war depending on the way that it is delivered.²⁴¹ This is no less true during a tenuous recovery period. It is therefore incumbent upon donors to examine their policies in the context of past, current or potential conflicts in the countries where they operate.²⁴² In Uganda, where donors have privileged progress around access to primary education and their commitment to harmonize behind national plans, they have failed to engage in a dialogue around the real need for economic recovery and the reintegration of Acholiland and other conflict-affected areas.

Conflict Prevention without Commitment: This dissertation studied the ways that dominant approaches worked against the goals of a conflict prevention approach. Analysis of the impact of the conflict, local priorities, and grievances showed the extent to which Acholi people focused on education as one of the only plans they could conceive to improve their lives. The ability to get through education and to be able to compete on a national level is critical, and the potential of the education sector to envelop conflict-affected people and promote social reconstruction is evident in local responses. Yet national and international activity failed to address these priorities and

²⁴⁰ Figures determined through analysis of the following report: Ministry of Education and Sports (Education Planning Department), *Report on Education Needs Assessment for Northern Uganda* (Kampala, Uganda, 2008).

²⁴¹ Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

²⁴² This responsibility is explicitly noted, for instance, in the OECD Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation. Sited in Peter Uvin's article for the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violence Conflict* (accessed March 24, 2011); available from: <http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/610/Impact%20of%20Aid%20Uvin.pdf>.

the use of the conflict-prevention rhetoric has obfuscated this reality.

These findings point to the need for deeper consideration of the underlying factors that affect the potential for a conflict-prevention approach. In the absence of national and international actors' prioritization of an approach that challenges the structural conditions that led to or could lead to conflict, technical best practices lose meaning. If and when governments want to genuinely reform, international actors can be ready with technical solutions and funding. Given this reality, it is more realistic in many cases for external actors to aim for a "conflict-sensitive" approach that recognizes the potential to adversely affect conflict dynamics and takes measures to mitigate this risk rather than the broad and assuming goals of a truly transformative conflict-prevention approach.

Opportunities

Clearly education actors must understand the local political context and be humble about their potential to leverage the transformative potential of education in the absence of national leadership. The following recommendations take this into account, but also point to small openings where international actors may be able to create incremental pressure for equitable reform.

International Donors: Prioritizing Pathways: International actors could engage the limited leverage that they have in order to promote social equity, which Rubin,

Pruitt, and Kim posit is a factor that mitigates the potential for conflict.²⁴³ Local leaders in Uganda demand affirmative action that would address the poor quality of schools and the dearth of pathways out of poverty for Acholi people. In these terms, the international communities' hands are somewhat tied: affirmative action is a form of redistribution, and redistribution is a political issue that will likely be determined by domestic affairs. On a broader and less immediate level, an international agenda to promote *pathways* out of poverty could create the space for engagement on this issue in Uganda and beyond in a way that would be less political.

Some ground work has already been laid for a changing focus in international education. It is well recognized that the progress toward universal primary education has been tremendous in Uganda and beyond.²⁴⁴ The abolishment of primary school tuition in many African countries has far-reaching implications for poverty reduction and gender equality.²⁴⁵ However, some of this progress has come at the cost of quality, given the huge influx of students that entered primary education systems as a result of UPE.²⁴⁶ The celebration of universal primary education masks inequalities in primary education, because not every "free" education is equal. In the wake of the progress

²⁴³ Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994).

²⁴⁴ UNDP ranks Uganda as likely to meet the goal of 100% net enrollment in primary school by 2015 (2005/6 net enrollment was 84% with 49% of enrolled students being girls). UNDP, *UNDP in Uganda* (accessed March 20, 2011); available from: <http://www.undp.or.ug/mdgs/25>.

²⁴⁵ Abby Riddell, *The Introduction of Free Primary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Paris: UNESCO, 2003).

²⁴⁶ For instance, in Uganda, the number of students enrolled in primary school more than doubled with the implementation of UPE in 1997.

towards access in Africa, many actors state the need to focus on quality.²⁴⁷ Going a step beyond the current conversation among international education actors about the need to emphasize quality, the recommendation put forward in this study is that international actors should adopt a focus on *pathways out of poverty*.

The creation of pathways out of poverty requires at least some level of distribution of quality schools that allow students from different groups to compete at a national level. Measuring literacy and numeracy provides the bedrock for an emphasis on quality. Additionally, beginning to measure entrance rates and/or exam results at the post-primary level, disaggregated by region and by gender (and ethnicity if the political environment allows), could begin to provide insight into social mobility.²⁴⁸

This is admittedly an ambitious recommendation and that would not easily be implemented. Admittedly, few donor countries can point to true social mobility in their home countries. For example, in the US capitol city, the achievement gap for African American students in math is above 50%,²⁴⁹ and the myth of social mobility is hampered by the recognition that 1 in 10 schools in America is a “drop out factory” (with less 40%

²⁴⁷ Brookings is currently leading an advocacy agenda among international donors to promote a learning-based agenda. USAID stresses the need to focus on literacy and numeracy, in addition to access. Brookings Institution, *Equitable Learning is the True Intent of the Education MDGs* (accessed March 29, 2011); available from: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0920_mdg_winthrop_adams.aspx. USAID, *Quality Education and MDG #2* (accessed March 29, 2011); available from: <http://blog.usaid.gov/2010/08/quality-education-and-mdg-2/>.

²⁴⁸ The measures suggested here are straight forward, and depending on government capability and willingness to cooperate, could be relatively easy to attain. Pass rates, exam results, and transition to tertiary education are not necessarily the best measure of learning or of the whole benefit of education, but competitiveness in these terms is clearly a priority in northern Uganda. A notable limitation to this recommendation is the difficulty of collecting data in some of the most fragile states.

²⁴⁹ The Washington Post, *DC Schools Insider* (accessed March 29, 2011); available from: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dcschools/2010/08/dueling_gaps.html.

of students graduating).²⁵⁰ Still, many people embrace the ideal of social mobility, and the measurement of achievement gaps can incrementally advance an agenda for change.

NGOs, Lobbies, and Government Involvement: The NGO community is often an incubator for innovation, and recovery-period programming is no exception. Accelerated learning, vocational skills, and extra-curricular programs have all been implemented in pockets of northern Uganda and beyond in order to address needs in the wake of conflict. Such programs have the potential to redress some of the impact of the conflict for those who are lucky enough to gain entrance into projects.

However, NGO activity faces at least two limitations. Coverage is a major obstacle to transforming the structural environment for conflict-affected youth. In some cases, discrete NGO activities that dole out benefits to only a few youth and have opaque criteria for selection could even aggravate grievances if youth feel frustrated by their inability to access benefits. Along these lines, Sommers stresses the need for inclusive programming for youth, recognizing that exclusion is the most serious concern of the many issues related to post-conflict youth, and that even though an inclusive approach may be “time consuming, avoidable, and costly... the alternative is far worse.”²⁵¹

Another major limitation occurs when NGOs work in isolation from one another

²⁵⁰ MSNBC, *1 in 10 Schools is a “Drop Out Factory”* (accessed March 29, 2011); available from: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21531704/ns/us_news-education/.

²⁵¹ Marc Sommers, “Education Amidst Conflict: The Youth Challenge,” *Praxis*, 24 (2009), 29-39.

and without government engagement. As noted by Rothchild, even when a marginalized group receives additional services or benefits, they may continue to feel aggrieved until the *process* by which services and benefits are allocated is reformed.²⁵² When many NGOs are working in the absence of government leadership and involvement, they do little to change process and can even facilitate a government's disengagement or lack of leadership in the provision of services to certain groups.²⁵³ Furthermore, it is hard to imagine inclusive programming for youth without national leadership.

These findings point to the need for NGOs to progressively work to promote national leadership that guides their activities. By prioritizing government involvement in programs and strategies for conflict-affected people, NGOs may promote the potential of more systemic solutions, or at least a government vision for NGO involvement. In a case like Uganda, goals may be more modest. Still, building non-governmental coalitions to lobby government may have some impact on the structural environment in which services are provided.

Facilitating State-Led Reforms: If and when a partner government is committed to and has a vision for reforms to address structural causes of violence; international donor and NGO partners can play a role by providing financing, sharing innovations and

²⁵² Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1997).

²⁵³ To be clear, NGOs operating in Uganda as a rule meet with local authorities to discuss their programs, but this is not the same as engaging progressively with both central and local authorities and advancing and pushing forward a national vision that sets the stage for concerted efforts in areas such as non-formal education.

lessons learned, implementing programs, and providing technical support. The literature on post-conflict reconstruction already offers many recommendations along these lines, and the following paragraphs aim to add to this discussion. These recommendations are offered with the recognition that they have limited application without strong government leadership for reform.

Funding Recovery Needs: The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) is a mechanism by which humanitarian actors can make appeals for emergency funding. This process reflects the humanitarian imperative to roll out programs as quickly as possible during emergencies. There is no parallel mechanism to facilitate recovery period funding.

Although many have made and accepted the argument that humanitarian aid and development aid need to be better linked during a recovery period in order to avoid a gap in services and planning,²⁵⁴ this argument has not received a great deal of attention within the education field. This may be due to the more pressing focus on advocating for education to be included in the humanitarian agenda in the first place. For instance, Nicolai urges key actors in the humanitarian field to incorporate, increase, and resource education as an integral component of every humanitarian response. She does not, however, address the issue of poor linkages between the humanitarian response and the influx of development aid for displaced or conflict-affected

²⁵⁴ See for example previous chapter on humanitarian aid as well as the following example, Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).

populations after the violent phase of conflict has ended.²⁵⁵

A funding mechanism for recovery period education programs could promote conflict sensitive programming under national leadership. Differentiating between humanitarian funding on the one hand, which in Uganda was often distributed for projects to be implemented outside of government control, and development funding, which is often contributed directly to the government's budget (or sector-specific budget), could promote a middle ground for the recovery period. Where appropriate, recovery period funding could go to actors that rapidly deploy resources but still garner meaningful government support. Setting up such a mechanism would require collaboration between the funding community and the implementing community and could not be achieved without widespread recognition that people recovering from violent conflict have needs that cannot be met by humanitarian and development programming alone. Such a mechanism could help to fund national governments' visions for recovery. These visions could be informed by the experiences and innovations of NGOs, such as the example that follows.

Community Schools: If the Government of Uganda were seeking program ideas to include conflict affected children and youth in northern Uganda in the education system, one NGO innovation that they might consider would be the community schools model. In Uganda over the past decade, community schools have earned a track record of success among hard-to-reach and urban populations. Save the Children has put

²⁵⁵ Susan Nicolai, "Mind the Education Gap: International Aid to Countries Affected by Conflict," in *Education, Conflict and Reconciliation*, eds Fiona Leach and Mairead Dunne (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007), 33.

thousands of children in school through this model, whereby community members help to build and manage primary schools that are located within villages.

Key aspects of the community school model apply not only to hard-to-reach children, but also conflict-affected children. Community schools are located within the community, recognizing that government schools are often too far away for children to attend consistently. The daily and monthly instruction schedule is built around community needs so that fewer children are excluded or forced to miss days due to household obligations. Teachers are recruited from within the community in order to encourage trust and commitment and also the prevalence of female teachers. School days are short and lessons are accelerated, making it easier for struggling families to commit to having their children in school. These characteristics show the potential of community schools to address the many barriers to education mentioned by individuals in northern Uganda, including long distances to schools, poor teacher commitment and attendance, and hidden direct and indirect costs.

The community schools experience shows that NGOs have the potential to work with the Government of Uganda in a way that promotes government commitment, sustainability, and broad lasting change, although this had not occurred in northern Uganda at the time of research. At the onset of community schools projects in central, eastern and urban Uganda, Save the Children engaged the government with the vision that the community schools would eventually be taken over by the government.

Although this process has been problematic in some ways and needs further refining,²⁵⁶ the government has taken over responsibility for a significant number of the original community schools, thereby using the Save the Children investment as a way to boost their capacity to expand access over a period of years. Other countries in Africa have also had positive experiences with community schools and the quality of these schools has often been better than other local alternatives.²⁵⁷ Community schools projects could be discussed as a recovery period strategy to quickly provide access to quality education.²⁵⁸

Youth: This study shed light on Ugandan youth's interest in social relationships. If there were national leadership in terms of the desire to envelop excluded youth in the education system, the Government of Uganda and its partners could draw on NGO programming that responds to these needs. Current and former IDPs in northern Uganda were found to be very concerned with social issues, especially among the "spoiled youth" who have been negatively affected by camp life. These youth were viewed by some as a symbol of all that has been lost during the war and as an impediment to living together in harmony. Teachers were extremely concerned with

²⁵⁶ When schools are taken over, some of the key aspects of the community school model are lost because they are not compatible with the government system. If community schools are used as a transition strategy while communities recover, this may not be as much of a limitation. Xanthe Scharff, *Education in Amuru District, Northern Uganda: Needs, Opportunities, Challenges*, Report prepared for Save the Children Uganda, 2008.

²⁵⁷ Deborah Glassman, Jordan Naidoo, Fred Wood (eds), *Community Schools in Africa: Reaching the Unreached* (New York: Springer, 2008).

²⁵⁸ This example is not presented as though it could apply universally, but rather as an example of an NGO innovation that could be discussed and examined with an eye towards broad-scale, recovery period programming.

the issue of social behavior and found that “spoiled youth” permeated their classrooms and create disruptions. Some youth had a different take on the issue. Many had in fact returned to ancestral villages and some discussed their need for organization and activities that can bring them together. Although local actors recognized the social disharmony that exists among youth, parents, and children, often pointing to the “loss of culture” that resulted during the war, donors interviewed for this study expressed no awareness of issues related to daily social behavior.

Communities and local leaders are not the only voice of concern about youth issues. Collier finds that countries that have high rates of unemployed and uneducated male youth (and access to lootable resources) are found to be more likely to experience conflict,²⁵⁹ and Thyne finds that countries with higher levels of secondary education, particularly for boys, are less likely to experience conflict (although this finding does not address the issues related to quality and competitiveness discussed above).²⁶⁰ A recent inter-agency report on conflict in Uganda stated concerns about grievances held among youth and their potential willingness to organize.²⁶¹ Despite the importance of working with youth, government interaction remains limited to the education sector, which leaves out many of the most conflict-affected.

Youth in Uganda would like more education and economic opportunities, but a

²⁵⁹ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 63, no 2(2004), 563-595.

²⁶⁰ Clayton, Thyne, "ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999," *International Studies Quarterly*, 50 (2006) 50, 733-754.

²⁶¹ USAID, *Uganda ICAF Summary*, Washington DC, 2010.

group of youth also volunteered that they would like to be organized so that they can more effectively meet with their peers and support one another. Their interest in increased social support is insightful. The Survey on War Affected Youth provides evidence that social support is critical for youth in Acholiland struggling to adapt to the recovery period. For instance, surveyed youth that engaged with peers, shared ideas freely, and sought opportunities to doing things together were better adjusted to community life and able to deal with the psychological stress of transitioning from their war-time experience.²⁶² Positive social engagement leads to better integration and resilience: supporting social needs could help youth to take up positive roles in their community.

The education sector is in closer touch with youth than any other sector and therefore potentially able to respond to the post-conflict needs expressed by youth. Despite low enrollment rates at the secondary level, many youth are still enrolled in school, and many older youth are interacting with the education system as parents. The education system could be mobilized in new and creative ways to provide low-cost programming for youth that need social support. Schools could be used as meeting points for extra-curricular activities or simple community youth group meetings. Teachers or others affiliated with schools may be ideal personnel to tap for ideas about how to work with disaffected or simply struggling youth in and out of schools. Youth in northern Uganda are advocates for their needs, yet no one is listening. Any future

²⁶² Pro-social behaviors outlined in MacMullin and Loughry (2002) were adapted by the SWAY project in northern Uganda. Annan et al (2006), 13.

programming for youth would benefit from listening to these young voices.

Sommers points out the irony of most discussions about post-conflict education and youth. Development and even emergencies and early reconstruction literature focuses on formal education and primary school as a fundamental way to protect children and youth. Yet the most conflict-affected youth are those that are most likely to be excluded from formal education.²⁶³ Perhaps in recognition of this fact, Obura makes a similar recommendation for post-conflict Rwanda as that which is stated above. She recognizes that some children or youth will inevitably be excluded from formal education. These children should receive basic extra-curricular programming, even as little as two hours a week, so that each child or youth is made to, "feel that she or he has been reached by the long arm of MINEDUC... In this way, Rwanda would have provided for all the children, during these interim years." Such an approach could meaningfully address youth's need to be organized and promote their resilience and recovery. Clearly, any measure to reach youth is difficult and expensive, but in a region where the majority of people can be classified as "youth," finding ways to promote resilience and recovery seems a worthwhile investment.

Humble Goals: Often overlooked is the fact that a conflict prevention approach to education is profoundly political in so much as it aims to interrupt or change entrenched allegiances and patterns of distribution, organizations, and even the teaching of history or other subjects that are central to the idea of nationhood. Such an

²⁶³ Sommers, *Education Amidst Conflict*.

approach cannot be reduced to technical guidelines and can only be done in support of a strong national initiative.

Development that focuses on the state is often a conservative force in that it strengthens existing power structures and reinforces the status quo. Donors have some leverage to promote peace through the thoughtful use of incentives and disincentives that seek to influence the social and economic environment and the way that actors behave and relate.²⁶⁴ The use of carrots and sticks will be determined by political and development objectives and will be made more effective by donor coordination. However, if conflict-prevention does not rank on this list of priorities, it may still receive lip service that further legitimizes the sitting government. In this sense, the conflict prevention agenda may be co-opted and also becomes a conservative force, rather than the transformational force that it purports to be.

This realization points to the need for humble goals for those who advocate for conflict prevention. As noted in Bush and Sartarelli's influential report on the two faces of education in ethnic conflict, the "add good education and stir" approach will not produce fundamental changes and can even do harm.²⁶⁵ This lesson is accepted in the literature about education in and after conflict. However, the profound and

²⁶⁴ Peter Uvin, *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict* (Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 1999) (accessed March 20, 2011); available from <http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/610/Impact%20of%20Aid%20Uvin.pdf>. Peter Uvin refers to the way that aid agencies can influence government action as "incentives" and "disincentives" and notes that there are both conditional and non-conditional methods for creating incentives for desired behavior or disincentives against undesired behavior. This framework relates to the influence of aid in situations of violent conflict.

²⁶⁵ Bush and Sartarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict* (Italy: UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, 2000).

fundamental limitations facing any non-state actor with the ambitious aim of improving situations for peace through education are seldom recognized, and often absconded in the quest of technical solutions.

ANNEX I: CONFLICT PREVENTION APPROACH TO EDUCATION

	Bush and Sartarelli (UNICEF) 2000	Smith and Vaux (DFID) 2003	Miller-Grandvaux (2006)	Buckland (World Bank) 2005	EFA UNESCO (2011)
Argument for Conflict Prevention Approach	"Peacebuilding" approach to education: address structural causes and manifestations of violence. Allow students to articulate, accept differences.	Education as a preventative tool based on country-specific analysis. Strategic and systemic.	Understand the relationship of education and conflict. Mitigate education's contribution to fragility. Build more resilient systems. Promote transformational development.	Building stronger resilience to conflict is a critical strategy for post-conflict reconstruction	New agenda to address the systemic failures to protect, provide, and reconstruct education and to do so in a way that promotes peace.
Mechanisms education & conflict	Uneven distribution, education as a weapon in cultural repression, denial of education as a weapon of war, manipulating history for political purposes, inculcating self-hate, segregating education to maintain inequality.	Language, access, curriculum, pedagogy	Access, quality, relevance, equity and education management can become triggers for fragility when affected by organizational violence, corruption, exclusion and elitism, transitional dynamics, insufficient capacity, and/or public disengagement.	Inadequate provision, discrimination (exclusion), distorted curricula, and frustrated expectations	Limited or poor quality provision leading to unemployment and poverty, unequal access that generates grievances and a sense of injustice, use of school systems to reinforce prejudice and intolerance

ANNEX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

The same questionnaire was used for all participants. Questions were preceded by a profile data collection form requiring information such as the respondent's age, number of children, level of education, whether or not they were abducted, organization where they worked and experience (when relevant) etc. Questions have been labeled in order to show how they will be analyzed: i.e. whether or not responses will be used to indicate the focus, needs and the situation of the people in the north (N); the goals and vision expressed by interviewees (G or V); and/or the rationale for pursuing education

(R). When this questionnaire was used in camps, questions 7 and 11 were necessarily altered to reflect their reality but to get at the same themes. When this questionnaire was used with other stakeholders, such questions were asked with the community members as the reference group (although question 4 was asked whenever possible both about the plan for northern Uganda and their plans/hopes for themselves and their children).

Questions to be asked of youth (and of parents/guardians of children):

General situation and socio-economic structure:

1) N. What is the situation for youth (children) here? *(To be asked first as an opener to get people talking about whatever is on their mind. Can be followed with whatever other question comes naturally)*

Probe:

- Probe into whatever theme the respondent brings up.
- Is it different for females/males?

2) N. Are there some youth (families) around here that are doing better or worse than others? *(Meant to understand what differentiates one family from another. Without leading respondents to say what matters, seeks to understand if education play any role or is it other factors such as inheritance, land, being a local leader, or health?)*

Probe:

- If the respondent talks about different categories, seek to fully understand the different categories of youth.
- If there are different situations of youth, what makes a youth (a family) different from another?
- Can youth (families) change their situation/change their category?

3) N. What is the situation with HIV/AIDS here?

Probe:

- How does HIV/AIDS affect your life? Is anything different now that people are in the community instead of in the camp?

Plans and Hopes:

4) V/G. Do you have a plan for improving your life (what are your hopes for your children's lives)? *(Meant to shed light on whether or not youth and families have plans and hopes, and if so, what they aim for).*

Probe as necessary:

- What is the plan?
- Does your plan involve land, education, credit, cooperatives, religious groups, etc?
- Will you do it alone or with others?

5) V-G. What needs to happen in order for these plans (hopes) to come true? *(In case the person indicates that plans and hopes cannot be realized unless something*

changes, this question aims to understand what needs to change in order for them to be able to realize their plan/hope. If they say that they have no plan, skip this question).

Probe:

- What are the obstacles you see?
- What are the opportunities you see to make this happen?
- If they say they need help, who do they need help from? Government, NGOs, church, mosque, teachers, neighbors, employer, etc?

Effects of the War and Hopes for Peace:

6) N. How is your life different than that of your parents? *(This question is designed to give respondents an opportunity to reply however first comes to their mind. They may, or may not talk about the war).*

a. How are opportunities for education different now than they were for your parents?

Probe:

- Economically, socially, personally, politically, etc

7) N. How is life different now that you have returned to the community? *(Trying to understand the new challenges and opportunities that youth and families face now that they have left camps).*

Probe:

- What are the biggest challenges now that you have returned, and what are the biggest opportunities?
- How has the political, social, and economic environment changed?
- Are the people who have returned to the community different than the people who have stayed in the camp?
- If you were abducted, how did it affect your education?

8) V. Where someone talks about peace, what does it mean to you?

Probe:

- What is most important thing that should happen in order to promote peace?

Education specific questions: (Profile form will have already determined level of education achieved by youth, parent/guardian, and children).

9) N. Were you or your children studying or learning anything when you were in the camps? *(Trying to understand and specifically note if the respondent was in any formal or non-formal learning environment prior to returning to the village).*

Probe:

- Early Childhood Development programs, primary school, secondary school, vocational school, adult literacy, etc
- What was different about the youth (children) that were engaged in learning activities as compared to those that were not?

10) R. If you (your children) were learning anything while in the camp, has it been useful to you? *(Meant to understand the perceived benefit of any learning that was done).*

Probe:

- If no, why not? Will it be useful in the future?
- If yes, how was it useful - in social, economic, or educational terms? (Just give general categories when probing, being careful not to probe too much in order to avoid leading the respondent to answer a certain way).

11) N. Now that you have returned to the community, what are the opportunities for learning? *(Meant to determine all available learning opportunities, even if they are not considered fully viable by the respondent).*

Probe:

- Primary, secondary, vocational, in the community, and any other type of learning.

12) N. What are the obstacles to pursuing learning opportunities?

Probe:

- Probe into whatever themes the respondent mentions.
- Is it easier or harder to learn now that you have returned to the community?

13) R. Would it help your life (your children's life) if you were able to pursue any of the

available educational options? How? (*Meant to understand the perceived potential benefit to learning opportunities*).

14) R. How are people that have finished primary school different from those that have not? (*Meant to assess the perceived benefit of finishing primary school*).

15) R. How are people that have attended some secondary school different from those who have not? (*Meant to assess the perceived benefit of attending secondary school*).

16) R. Is going to school a good way to advance in life, or are there other things that you would rather do with your time (or that you would rather that your child does with his/her time)?

Probe:

- Working and saving money, learning skills through vocational training, getting a grant and training for Income Generating Activities, being part of a cooperative, etc

ANNEX III: BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC/PROFILE DATA COLLECTION FORM FOR COMMUNITIES

Basic Data Collection Form

ID # for participant: (Initials followed by sequential number): |__|__|__|__|

Location: District _____, Sub-county _____, Parish _____,

Village_____

Consent Form to Participate in Research Study

FOR MINORS: *Before we begin, let me ask if you are the head of your household (circle one): yes no*

(if under 14 but not a head of household, read consent to parent/guardian)

INTRODUCTION: I am **[name]** from in Gulu Town. We are here to ask if you will participate in a research study conducted by Xanthe Scharff, from Tufts University in the USA.

STUDY PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to assess the situation for children and youth in the community. This study will be used only to better understand the situation here, as part of a research project, and has no other purpose. It is hoped that the information you give will help us improve services that are brought to the community and to the many children and youth here.

PROCEDURE: I will ask you a series of questions and will write down your responses. I

may at some point audio-record, but only if you have given permission.

NO BENEFITS: The purpose of this survey is not to offer assistance or programs, however. In return for your time we would like to offer you a small gift after completing the questionnaire.

TYPES OF QUESTIONS: I will ask you some questions about your life and if you have children, about your children. Your participation is entirely voluntary and there is no need to answer any question.

CAN SKIP OR STOP ANYTIME: You can refuse to answer any question, or you can tell us when a question makes you uncomfortable and we will skip that question. There is no need to answer any question that makes you uncomfortable. If you like, you can end the interview at any time.

CONFIDENTIAL: All your answers will be kept private and confidential, and the only person that will have access to this information is the head researcher for this study.

CONTACT: If you have any questions, or if problems arise, you may contact the Save the Children Office in Gulu Town. You may also speak to the LC3 or LC2, who has all of our contact information and are supportive of this study.

May we have your permission to ask these questions, and would you be willing to participate? (1=Yes, 2=No) |__|

SIGNATURE: I confirm that the purpose of the research, the study procedures, the

possible risks and discomforts as well as benefits have been explained to the participant.

All questions have been answered. The participant has agreed to participate in the study.

Signature of Person Obtaining Consent

Date

The participant agrees to be audio-taped YES NO Initial_____

The participant agrees to be photographed YES NO Initial_____

If respondent REFUSES TO RESPOND: Why?

PROFILE INFORMATION:

Name: _____

Ethnic Group (circle one): Acholi Langi Alur Other

Age (circle one - to be determined by memorable events if necessary): 12-14 14-17
18-24 25-29 30-35

Sex (circle one): M F

Marital Status (circle one): single married (includes co-habiting)
widow/widower married but separated other

Main livelihood activity (circle one and fill in if other):

Subsistence farming

Selling produce

Cultivating for others

Selling cooked goods

Bicycle Taxi

Selling other goods (fill in what) _____

Other (fill in) _____

Formerly Abducted (circle one) Yes No

Length of abduction (in years, months or weeks) _____

Highest educational level achieved _____

Currently in some form of educational program (circle one)? Yes No

Number of biological children _____

Ages of biological children (list for each) _____

Highest years of education achieved by children _____


ANNEX IV: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION DETAIL

Type of Site, Grouped by Access to Services		
Camp or Urban	Amuru Camp	11
	Atiak Camp	8
	Juba Site	26
	Lolim Satellite Camp	18
	LigeLige Camp-Pader	4
Camp or Urban Total		67
Return	Apowegi Village	32
	Lodi Village	29
	Loi Village - Pader	15
Return Total		76
Remote Return	Aywee Village	8
	Gunya Village	21
	Latoro Village	21
	Lodi-Adilang Village	7
	Kilokiotido-Pader	22
Remote Return Total		79
Grand Total		222

Length of Abduction in Years	Number of Participants
0.25 or less	55
0-1	8
1-2	6
2-3	10
3-5	1


Participants that Reported Having Been Abducted, By Age		
12-17	NO	37
	YES	15
12-17 Total		52
18-24	NO	41
	YES	18
18-24 Total		59
25-29	NO	18
	YES	17
25-29 Total		35
30-35	NO	15
	YES	14
30-35 Total		29
35+	NO	36
	YES	11
35+ Total		47
Grand Total		222

Level of Education - Participants Not Currently Studying			
	Female	Male	Total
None (out of 100)	25	6	31
Lower Primary	19	9	28
P4	9	8	17
P5	13	11	24
P6	18	8	26
P7	5	6	11
SUB TOTAL PRIMARY OR LESS	94	55	137
Vocational	0	1	1
S1-S2	5	6	11
S3-S4	1	9	10
Teaching Instruction	0	1	1
A Level	0	1	1
SUB TOTAL PRIMARY OR MORE	6	18	24
Total	100	73	161



Terminal Level of Education - Males

(out of 73)



In the chart showing male terminal education above, “Other” includes one of each of the following categories of response: vocational training, Advanced Level (secondary school), and teacher’s instruction.

Level of Education - Participants Currently Studying			
	Female	Male	Total
Adult Literacy	1	1	2
Upper Primary	15	12	27
Vocational	0	1	1
O Level	3	14	17
Teaching Instruction	1	0	1
Total	20	28	48

ANNEX V: SITE SELECTION FOR RESEARCH

The table below provides details regarding the research sites. Research sites with SCiUG involvement are highlighted in grey.

AMURU SUB-COUNTY, AMURU DISTRICT		
Research Location	Description	Brief Description
Apowegi Village, Toro Dak Atuba Parish	Return site with houses clustered around center, but also a transitory site for many people going back to ancestral lands. There is a primary school in the center which was founded by the community before the war and later recognized by GoU. There is an Early Childhood Development center (Save the Children ECD center) for the community which is in an area surrounded by grass at a short distance from the primary school. Within this coming year, many of these people will have left the center to return to huts on their ancestral land.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Save the Children Community • Primary school in immediate proximity
Aywee A and B Villages, Toro Dak Atuba Parish	These villages are loosely part of Apowegi and are governed by the same local leadership. The people here have returned fully to their ancestral land and are scattered far from the center where the primary school and ECD are located. These villages are not heavily populated but will become more populated as people move away from their temporary huts in the center.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities technically have access to the ECD in the center, but it is too far away to expect attendance • Primary School is approximately 4km away
Amuru Camp, Torokal Parish	This is the camp that is closest to Toro Dak Atuba and Aywee A and B.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Camp • Primary school in immediate proximity

PURONGO SUB-COUNTY, AMURU DISTRICT		
Research Location	Description	Brief Description
Lodi Village, Paromo Parish	Return site with houses clustered around center	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Save Community • Primary school 6m away along treacherous road
Adilang, section of Lodi Village, Paromo Parish	Remote part of Lodi Village. People have left the center cluster of houses and are now far away from the center, living on their ancestral lands. Individual interviews from Adilang were included as a part of the Lodi sample, but this site has been distinguished because houses are significantly further away.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community with ECD (but it is too far away to expect attendance) • Primary school more than 6km away along a treacherous road
La Toro Village, Pagengo Parish	La Toro was inaccessible due to rain and poor roads, so community members attempting to, or in the process of, returning to La Toro were interviewed from Olilim Satellite Camp. When they do return, they will be very isolated.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community with no ECD • Primary school far away along a treacherous road
Olilim Satellite Camp, La Toro Parish	The Chief of Purongo asked the team to visit this site, as there had allegedly been discussion of having an ECD in this area. People from this camp were in the process of returning home, and many more expected to return after the wet season (when roads would be clearer and grass would be more available for building huts).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Camp (no ECD) • Primary school in immediate proximity

ATTIAK SUB-COUNTY, AMURU DISTRICT		
Research Location	Description	Brief Description
Juba Village, Patiro Parish	Return site that is split by the Juba Road. Mix of traditional, pre-war livelihood strategies and strategies that have been adapted to urban life. Primary and secondary schools are accessible along a paved road.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Save Community • Accessible primary and secondary
Gunya Village, Patiro Parish	Return site that is extremely remote. Land is considered to be very fertile in this area and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community with no

	people have settled on their ancestral lands. Schools are very far away so many families keep their children in the camp in order to access school. They are afraid of what will happen as services decrease in the camp and it becomes harder for their children to stay and study. There have been some initiatives to start a community school for the children but these have not been successful.	ECD <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary school more than 6km away
Attiak Camp	Camp where people are in the process of returning to ancestral lands.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Camp (no ECD) • Primary school in immediate proximity

ADILANG SUB-COUNTY, PADER DISTRICT		
Research Location	Description	Brief Description
Kilokoitio Village, Ngekidi Parish	Return site where the community started a school before the war which was coded, although there is no physical structure. SCiUG is planning to erect the school block. SCiUG attempted to implement an ECD in this site, but this initiative was not successful for various reasons.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempted Save work in Community • SCiUG plans to build school block • Primary school in immediate proximity (without classrooms)
Loi Village, Ngekidi Parish	Return site that is about 4km from LigeLige camp where the nearest primary school is located. Not densely populated. People are in the habit of walking to and from the camp for school and other services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community with no ECD • Primary school 4km away along the road
LigeLige Camp, Ngekidi Parish	Community members were living in other nearby camps during the war, but they feared Karamajong raids and so they moved to this camp. LigeLige is both a transit camp and a mother camp. The host school at the camp has many school blocks as well as teachers' houses. The school expects that the number of students will not decrease despite the continuing return process. Their plans are to increase their capacity to deal with students that travel far to attend school, for instance by building dormitories for girls and boys.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Camp (no ECD) • Primary school in immediate proximity

ANNEX VI: DETAIL OF OTHER STAKEHOLDER SAMPLE

Sampled Donors included the following:

- Represent 6 bi-lateral aid agencies (German PEVOT, USAID, Netherlands, Belgium, Irish), 2 regional aid agencies (African Development Bank, European Union), and one multilateral agency (World Bank)
- 5 Ugandans and 5 ex-pats (one from northern Uganda)
- About half are education specialists, the other half are generalists
- Interviews covered 8 of 12 of the organizations that comprise the EDP group
- The UN agencies were not available for interviews, although the author did previously consult extensively with UNICEF

NGOs/CBOs

- 6 International NGOs (Save the Children, World Vision, Norwegian Refugee Council, Creative Associates, Association of Volunteers in International Service, Windle Trust), and four indigenous NGOs/CBOs (United Movement to End Child Soldiering, Literacy Adult Basic Education, Northern Uganda Girls Education Network, and Concerned Parents Association).
- 3 Ex-Pats, 7 Ugandans (all from the north)
- 6 Office or program leads, 3 Project Officers, 1 Community Development Associate

ANNEX VII: CHART OF LOCAL LEADERS RESPONSIBILITIES

<p>Central Government Representatives</p>	<p>Members of Parliament or District Counsel – Locally Elected</p>	<p>Local Elected Officials</p>	<p>Civil Servants <i>(recruited and appointed by central government or district service commission)</i></p>	<p>Education Specific Staff in Districts</p>
<p>Resident District Commissioner</p>		<p>LC5 – Chairman of the District – oversees the entire district</p>	<p>Chief Administrative Officer (recruited by the central government)</p>	<p>Secretary for Education and Social Services (elected as Counselor 5, then appointed to District Cabinet by Chairman.</p>

				Comparable to the national Minister of Education and Sports)
Assistant RDC	One Member of Parliament represents the municipality, town council, or county One Lady MP also represents the same area	LC4 – Mayor of the Municipality (this does not apply in Amuru because Amuru only has a Town Council as they have not yet received municipality	Assistant CAO (one appointed per county by central government)	District Education Officer – reports to the CAO (this is often filled by a civil servant that has served under more than one CAO). Technical staff.

		status).		
Cadres (community mobilizers/monitors)	One Counselor 5 represents each sub-county at the District Council (Chaired by LC5) Counselor 3 is elected to represent the sub-county and reports to the Counselor 5. Chairs the sub-	LC3 – Oversees the sub-county	Sub-County Chief (recruited by the District Service Commission)	Assistant DEO or Administrative DEO

	<p>county meetings.</p> <p>Boss of LC3, LC2, LC1.</p> <p>Lady Counselor 5 and Lady Counselor 3</p>			
		LC2 – Oversees the Parish	Parish Chief	District Inspector of Schools (reports to the Regional branch of the Education Standard Agency)
		LC1 – Oversees the Sub-Parish/Village	Sub-Parish Chief	County Inspectors of Schools (report to DIS)

ANNEX VIII: THE RECOVERY GAP

The Education Recovery Gap in Northern Uganda

Summary: In the recovery period in northern Uganda, as people return to their ancestral lands and humanitarian actors phase out support, many families experience decreasing access to education. The government response to the impact of war in northern Uganda is encapsulated in a recovery plan, however in the education sector, that plan proscribes little more than building school infrastructure. The basic infrastructure needs are in fact so great that they cannot be fulfilled within a time span that will be beneficial to the war-affected children and youth. With few exceptions, there are no widespread strategies to meet the needs of the conflict-affected children and youth during recovery period in a cost-effective and time-efficient manner (especially as related to access). Over the past decade, the population has trebled while school construction has halted and current schools have become dilapidated. In the absence of new, innovative, and time-sensitive measures, the access crisis will only be addressed in the long-term, because the tremendous infrastructure needs cannot be tackled in any short or medium term time frame.

Impact of the War

- While the rest of the country experienced a reduction in abject poverty from 56% in 1992 to 31.3% in 2006, abject poverty in the north has increased to

61%.¹

- In Acholiland (the sub-region most affected by the war), an estimated 1.1 million people were in IDP camps.²

Impact on Education and Student's Ability to Compete Nationally

- During the war, total primary enrolment tripled (largely due to the introduction of UPE, but also influenced by proximity of learning centers in camps). From 1996 alone, enrollment increased from 356,182 to 983,538.³ Schools were abandoned and dilapidated during the war and there was no construction to keep pace with population growth.
- The Pupil-Classroom Ratio at the primary level has increased by 24 points from 73:1 in 1996 to 97:1 in 2006 (compared with the national average of 71:1).⁴
- Students in the north cannot compete at a national level. Only 5% of students in northern Uganda in 2006 passed the Primary Leaving Exam with the highest marks, compared to 24% nationally.⁵ Secondary school graduates are not competitive for government scholarships to university. In 2007/8, entrance to the university scholarship scheme was dominated by the

¹ Mabazi in Betty Udongo, 63.

² Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

³ Ministry of Education and Sports.

⁴ *Ibid*, ix.

⁵ *Idid*.

best schools in the country, none of which were in the north (compared with 86% from the central region).⁶

Recovery Period Shortages and Gaps

- NGOs provided humanitarian support during the conflict (including education), but many are now pulling out and redirecting services to higher priority areas.
- A huge gap is opening as people leave camps and return to ancestral lands. As much as 20% of schools may be more than 5km from the next school, meaning that many students further than 5km from schools (and commuting paths are treacherous).⁷
- Currently, the Ministry of Sports and Education (MoES) estimates a shortage of 8,723 primary school classrooms and 15,030 primary school teacher's houses in the north.⁸
- The costs of rebuilding in order to meet critical needs are so high that they will not be met: The cost of building the needed primary classrooms is at least \$168.9 million USD. The cost of building the required teacher's houses

⁶ Betty Udongo.

⁷ Ministry of Education and Sports.

⁸ Figures were converted to USD using a conversation rate as of December 27, 2009 (1 USD: 1,868.60 UGX). MoES cost estimates were utilized, although in cases where development partners build schools and teacher's housing, these cost estimates may be too low. The cost of classroom construction is estimated at \$8027 USD. The cost of construction for teacher's housing is estimated at \$11,238 USD. Ministry of Education and Sports, xi.

is at least \$70 million USD. The Ministry of Education finds that in order to meet the needs in the primary, secondary, BTVET and tertiary sectors in the north, 306 million USD should be mobilized in the next three years.⁹

- To meet the shortage of teachers in the north (and in order to meet the desired PTR of 1:50) the northern region would have to add 19,076 teaching personnel to their payroll. At an average monthly salary of \$107 USD, meeting the post conflict short term teacher costs would add up to \$24.5 million USD/annum.¹⁰
- Because of poor services at return sites, families are splitting up, often leaving minors in camps alone so that they can access school. No NGOs or government agencies are addressing this child protection issue.¹¹

Peace Recovery and Development Plan – A Long Term Rehabilitation and Development Plan

- The Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) aims to rehabilitate the north in order to redress the impact of the conflict and to prevent future conflicts. The PRDP is intended to address the full range of sectors in the north, including costly initiatives such as infrastructure. The total estimated

⁹ Because of these untenable costs, the MoES recommends that in the short term, the focus be only on renovation. Renovation of current primary schools will cost \$25.9 million USD. Ministry of Education and Sports.

¹⁰ Ministry of Education and Sports, xiv.

¹¹ Findings from qualitative research conducted by author in northern Uganda, 2008-2009.

amount to be spent under the PRDP is \$600 million over three years: Clearly 300 million will not be made available for the education sector alone. In terms of education, the PRDP focuses almost solely on the task of rebuilding classrooms and teacher's housing in high priority areas.¹²

- The MoES finds that activities that are critical to redressing the impact of the conflict and preventing future conflict, such as reviewing the curriculum to focus on requisite post-conflict competencies and skills and reforming teacher training to incorporate competencies for delivering psycho-social support, should not be tackled immediately or even in the medium term, but rather as part of a long-term plan (within the next ten years and beyond).¹³
- Like the PRDP, district level plans do not articulate recovery strategies other than construction.¹⁴

¹² Government of Uganda, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 2007-2010 (2007).

¹³ Ministry of Education and Sports.

¹⁴ Review of Amuru and Pader District Plans.

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