

# *Hemispheres* 2002 Edition

**State-Building: Risks and Consequences**

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# Political Policy and the Revolution in Military Affairs by Jonathon Perle

**Perle discusses the interplay between the technological revolution in military defense and public policy.**

## Introduction

There have been a great many studies conducted on the current “revolution in military affairs” (RMA)<sup>1</sup> over the last ten years. Most of the research, thus far, has focused on ideas such as “net centric warfare” and “OODA loops,” terms which have meaning within the military, but are technical in nature and are highly specialized. What has been lacking, and is needed, is a thorough, comprehensive assessment of the political policy consequences of the RMA, rather than simply the military ones. With but one or two very specific exceptions, no studies have taken a look at the broader implications, for civilian policy makers of the RMA. This paper will offer an introductory examination into the political effects of the current RMA, and examine how civilian policy makers can best take advantages of the technologies and concepts of operations (CONOPS), that are currently emerging within the military.

When the evidence is examined, it becomes clear that the RMA has the potential to radically alter the decision-making calculus and the cost-benefit analyses of top civilian policy makers. Different aspects of the RMA will bring greater protection for troops, limit collateral damage, and allow the United States to strike anytime and anywhere, thus making a U.S. threat of force credible in nearly all circumstances. This, in turn, will allow civilian policy makers more latitude in the decision to go to war, as they will have at their fingertips a force that is capable of destroying the enemy in the most surgical way possible, while offering the best protection possible to U.S. personnel.

While the formal term, revolution in military affairs, and studies associated with it are relatively new, revolutions in military affairs have occurred many times throughout history. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century alone there were a number of key RMAs that marked different periods of warfare. The machine gun in the early part of the century, the tank and the aircraft carrier during World War II, and nuclear weapons in the post-World War II world have all dramatically changed the nature of warfare. The current RMA, which began in the 1970s with the beginning of precision munitions, stealth, and computer networking capabilities is now beginning to mature, and will have a fundamental impact on the foreign policies of regimes which possess the relevant technologies.

As of now, the United States is the only country with the capabilities to implement the current revolution in military affairs. Already, pilot programs such as the Army’s Force XXI, which connects all the tanks in a battalion in such a way that each tank commander can see every other tank (both friendly and hostile), are offering glimpses into the future. A tank commander now has at his fingertips a picture of the battle that was once designated to only the battalion commander. At the other end of the spectrum, the President can sit in his office and actually watch a pilot fly his F-15 fighter jet. This situation has created a duality, whereby every senior civilian and military leader has access to information that was only available on-site before, and very low-level military personnel have access to information that used to be only available at the

highest levels. Therefore, it is conceivable that low-level personnel will begin to make some decisions that were previously made at much higher levels, while higher level personnel may make decisions that were the purview of the commander in the tank or the pilot in the fighter just a few years ago.

## Precision

Perhaps the most visible of all RMA technologies over the last ten years has been precision-guided munitions. Certainly during the Gulf War, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, precision weapons have been a vital and dramatic part of the U.S. arsenal. Depending on the type of weapon and the conditions involved, precision bombs can have accuracies measured in feet. Even more importantly, technological innovations in precision are approaching the point where every weapon hits its target, each and every single time. This is a remarkable, unprecedented event that will have dramatic consequences for foreign policy decisions.

By way of comparison, it is useful to look at the historical record of weapons accuracy. At the battle of Gettysburg, it is estimated that the Union expended 240 rounds of ammunition for every Confederate soldier killed.<sup>2</sup> Eighty years later, during World War II, it took 108 bombers and 648 bombs to achieve a 96% chance of hitting a 400 x 500 foot German power-generation plant.<sup>3</sup> In 1943, the *entire* U.S. 8<sup>th</sup> Air Force attacked only 50 targets for the year.<sup>4</sup>

In comparison, during the Desert Storm portion of the Gulf War, allied forces attacked 150 targets in the first day. The F117-A fighter-bomber, carrying laser-guide munitions, flew only 2 percent of the U.S. sorties, but damaged over 40% of the strategic targets. While not every bomb found its mark, F-117s did hit over 80% of their strategic targets—an unprecedented accuracy rate.<sup>5</sup> This accomplishment should be contrasted with conventional “dumb” bombs dropped in the normal manner. Twelve sorties of F-111E aircraft, used 168 dumb bombs to destroy two targets during the Gulf War. Twelve sorties of F-117s, using smart munitions, managed to destroy 26 targets, with only 28 bombs.<sup>6</sup> Just ten years later, six B-2 bombers, all operating from the continental United States (CONUS), struck 600 aim points, using the latest precision-guided munitions. In contrast, it took 336 aircraft, using conventional munitions, to hit 860 aim points.<sup>7</sup>

These dramatic capabilities, while obviously of great utility and importance to military leaders, are of extremely high value to policy makers as well. A strong case can be made that the United States, being the only power to experience the RMA transformation, will be more likely to engage in conflict around the globe, as a result of its precision weapons.

One of the limiting factors in warfare for the United States over the past decade has been unwillingness to cause civilian casualties or excessive destruction. The desire has been so great, in fact, that the United States has often conducted operations in an inefficient manner, and has even put American pilots’ lives at risk in order to avoid civilian casualties.

Precision, as it continues to develop, may well solve this problem for the United States. While target location error (TLE), and the circular error probable (CEP) of current all-weather munitions are still not at a small enough level to radically change U.S. chances of engaging in conflicts, one day they soon will be. Certainly in smaller conflicts, such as in Kosovo, the United States had a much easier time engaging in warfare than if it did not possess precision weapons, and it is unclear whether Kosovo would have happened at all, or would have happened much later, without precision weapons.

One can already begin to see from the above facts how precision weapons are policy-altering capabilities. If U.S. leaders need no longer fear the repercussions at civilian casualties, then the political decision to go to war becomes that much easier. Perhaps even more importantly, precision weapons can have an effect on foreign policy and political calculations long before a decision to go to war ever has to be made.

Once countries understand that the United States can hit a target anytime, anywhere, in any weather, the coercive and deterrent capabilities of the United States increase greatly. While precision will not make the United States an omnipotent force, it does act as a “force multiplier,” allowing each individual U.S. aircraft to cause destruction in a manner disproportionate to aircraft equipped without PGMs.

Such a capability was demonstrated during the war in Kosovo. A key strategic bridge, the Novi Sad, was serving as a main conduit for Milosevic’s forces. F-15s, the planes, much touted in the popular press and shown on television, were sent in to destroy it. They were unable to do so with conventional munitions. A little later, a single B-2, armed with eight 2000 lbs. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), struck the bridge at its key structural points, bringing down the entire structure. U.S. policymakers should note the larger significance of this event, beyond merely the destruction of one bridge. Prior to precision-guided weapons, a tactical nuclear weapon would have been the *only* way that the United States could have reliably taken out the bridge, if it had needed to do so immediately. The use of a nuclear device carries with it numerous problems, making it nearly impossible for the United States to use one. Thus, relatively small explosives, when combined with precision, can have a capability far out of proportion to their explosive power, even to the point where they may serve in the role that some nuclear weapons once did.

What leader’s foreign policy decisions would not be affected by such a capability in the hands of the United States? The moral constraints that so often shackle U.S. effectiveness and/or action will be removed. With smart weapons, every target that can be seen can be destroyed. And with new intelligence and reconnaissance platforms, such as the Joint Surveillance and Attack Radar (JSTARS) aircraft, which can, if flown off the coast of Florida, track every car and truck in real-time, there will be very few targets that cannot be seen. Thus, any adversary must calculate that when a President says “attack,” the target will be destroyed, rather than just damaged.<sup>8</sup>

## **Aspects of Extended Range**

Going hand-in-hand with advances in precision are advances in the range of weapons. Though the United States has long had ballistic missiles, which can reach any spot on the globe, they are expensive and restricted by treaties. Shorter-range systems, however, are becoming longer-range. The current Tomahawk cruise missile, for instance, has a range of approximately 600 miles. The extended range cruise missile, currently in development, will have a range of approximately 1,200 miles. The B-2 bomber can fly anywhere in the world, drop its payload, and return home with one, perhaps two, in-flight refuelings.

Again, while these are impressive military feats, they have great implications for policymakers. Having systems that can fire from larger distances means more protection of American personnel, resulting in fewer U.S. casualties. In a democratic society, such as the United States, in an era of instant communication and information, the casualties of war, both those of the United States and our enemies, are readily accessible by the public. Part of a

President's job is to reassure the public and make the case for military action. This job, which is carried out by the President, NSC, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and their subordinates, has become a key feature of the U.S. foreign policy landscape. Thus, any device, technology, or method of operation that makes U.S. troops safer makes warfare more politically feasible.

Extended range munitions also mean that the United States does not have to pre-position as many forces for combat. The consequences of such a situation are numerous. First, pre-positioned assets are vulnerable to attack far more than those based in the continental United States. Virtually every other part of the globe is more vulnerable to a conventional military attack than the U.S. itself. Second, the United States must now negotiate with states, such as Saudi Arabia, for basing rights and access.<sup>9</sup> Such agreements force concessions from U.S. policymakers that are not necessarily in the best interest of the United States. Third, pre-positioning assets overseas is very expensive. For every unit that is stationed outside the United States, two units must be kept within the United States for the sole purpose of being able to rotate out. This cost is a substantial sum of money, which could be re-invested in other military endeavors, or in the domestic realm.

## **Stealth**

While the short length of this paper precludes writing about all the numerous aspects of the RMA and its effects on policy, one of the most important technologies in the current revolution in military affairs is stealth. Virtually the entire United States military will eventually be restructured to become a stealthy force. The reasons for this transformation are military, but their effects will have a great impact on U.S. foreign policy.

The reason stealth will become dominant in the future is the result of another aspect of the RMA: precision. However, whereas every country on the planet, through GPS and other means, has or will soon have access to precision weapons, only the United States has access to truly good stealth capabilities, for the moment. As weapons get smarter, cheaper, and more accurate, eventually even poor countries will have precision-guided weapons capable of destroying any target that they can "see." Already a glimpse of this was seen in the Falklands War, where the Argentines managed to hit 4 British ships with just six first generation, non-stealthy, non-supersonic cruise missiles.<sup>10</sup> The only solution to avoiding the problem is to put heavy armor on the ships, which the United States does not do for a variety of reasons,<sup>11</sup> or make it impossible for the enemy weapons to see the ships in the first place.

The ramifications of going to stealthy platforms are enormous. In the first place, it will be up to the civilian leadership, recognizing the need, to push for it. Many in the military are attached to the current platforms, such as carriers, and thus will be unwilling to make the necessary changes. But those changes must come, or policy makers will find themselves in trouble.<sup>12</sup> Imagine the consequences, for the President and U.S. prestige, if a carrier were to be sunk by a cruise missile. While the loss of 5,000 men and \$5 billion worth of equipment would be devastating, the political consequences would be disastrous. The American aura of invulnerability would be shattered, and a carrier would no longer represent the same might that it once did. Other enemies would be emboldened. And what would the response of the United States be? To send in another carrier? For the last 50 years it has been American carriers which have been the symbol of American power, and its main projector. Thus, its destruction would be a devastating act, the political ramifications of which far exceed the purely military value.

## Conclusion

Although I have only touched upon a few issues, and only upon their surfaces, one easily gets the sense of the interconnectivity between the RMA and political policy. The new technologies and concepts of operations emerging today will shape U.S. foreign policy tomorrow. Though the RMA may at first appear to be simply a militarily significant concept, the reality is that it will have repercussions throughout the policy world as well. Until now, policy makers, who are either unaware of or indifferent to the potential for the RMA to alter the political calculus, have ignored this aspect of the RMA.

The effects of stealth, extended-range munitions, and precision, when combined with advanced information systems, will keep U.S. personnel safe, limited collateral damage, and, ultimately, make it easier for the United States to go to war. Furthermore, the effects of an RMA-equipped U.S. force will give policy makers a greatly effective deterrent and coercive tool.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> RMA is used in this paper both in a general and in a specific sense. The term “an RMA” refers to any revolution in military affairs, while “the RMA” refers only to the current revolution in military affairs. The use of “RMA technology” is a reference to weapons and systems which comprise the current RMA.

<sup>2</sup> Conversation with the Gettysburg library.

<sup>3</sup> Air Power Studies Centre, APSC Paper Number 53, “Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare,” Richard P. Hallian, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base, Fairbairn.

<sup>4</sup> “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” Jeffery McKittrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Krause, Richard Blanchfield, and Dale Hill, Strategic Assessment Center-Science Applications International Corporation.

<sup>5</sup> “The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity,” John Orme, *International Security*, Winter 1997 v22 n3.

<sup>6</sup> *Gulf War Airpower Survey*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

<sup>7</sup> “Some Weapons Save Money and Lives,” Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., Lexington Institute, August 8, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Though there is not enough space in this paper to deal with matters of cost and logistics, precision guided weapons will save vast sums of money. If one bomb can be used instead of ten or twenty, then the cost of manufacturing, shipping, and expertise will be reduced.

<sup>9</sup> The United States has been denied base access for diplomatic means numerous times since the 20th century. More well known examples include French refusal of overflight permission to bomb Libya, which forced the U.S. give concessions to Portugal for the right to use the Azores, denial by Saudi Arabia of some basing rights, and UAE and Oman denials of overflight rights. There are scores more lesser known cases where U.S. operations have been hindered by access denial. For a more in-depth study, see

“Basing and Other Constraints on Land-Based Aviation Contributions to U.S. Contingency Operations,” Adam Siegel, Center for Naval Analysis; March, 1995.

<sup>10</sup> In addition, the missiles were fired in the most inefficient manner possible. Argentinean fighter pilots flew only feet off of the ocean, popped up, and fired their missiles before returning to skimming the sea, in order to avoid the superior British jets. Had they had the capability to fire the missiles in a more leisurely manner, it is very likely they would have been able to destroy the British carrier. At the time the war ended, the Argentineans were in talks to buy 40 more Exocets.

<sup>11</sup> The U.S. Navy made the conscious decision long ago to use long-range weapons and speed as its primary defenses, rather than armor.

<sup>12</sup> Though this section’s examples have been in the Navy, all three of the major branches—Army, Navy, and Air Force, face similar problems of transformation. In each case, current platforms, for different reasons, are vulnerable to new kinds of attack by precision weapons, and thus are potentially a liability for foreign policy makers.

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## Has the Arab League Helped or Hindered Pan-Arabism? By Rachel Sassoon

### **Sassoon constructs a detailed analysis of Arab nationalism, unity, sovereignty, and independence examined through the reciprocal relationship between pan-Arabism and the Arab League.**

*“The Jordanian government considers that to advocate any national unity or federation, by (the right) political means or proper and lawful statements, without encroachment upon the rights of others, should not be regarded as a matter for disagreement...”*

*(Memorandum of Jordanian Government, Nov. 1946; quoted in Khalil, p.34)*

Issued by the Jordanian Government concerning the debate over Syrian unity in the years immediately following the establishment of the Arab League, this statement is almost amusing, and undoubtedly very ironic. For if there is one thing that can be said with certainty surrounding the issue of the meaning of pan-Arabism and unity, it is that there was never at any point any agreement on the matter. Since the Arab leaders and states themselves have never been unified in a definition of pan-Arabism, it is hardly surprising that the different opinions on the subject held by its scholars are just as abundant. This makes the question of the relationship between the Arab League and pan-Arabism – whether the League has advanced or prevented the pan-Arab cause – far from straightforward. And if the question itself is complicated, the answer is many times more so.

An analysis of the relationship between the Arab League and pan-Arabism first requires some examination into the concept of pan-Arabism. Defining pan-Arabism is no easy task; in fact, it is impossible to formulate a precise explanation, for there is none. Over the years and between the players in the Arab world, pan-Arabism has taken on numerous identities, often more than one simultaneously. Furthermore, the fact that pan-Arabism is far more of a theoretical than a concrete notion makes it even harder to capture its essence. Thus, though it may not be possible to define pan-Arabism exactly, there are a number of points that can be made about it that are worth bearing in mind while considering the question at hand. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman describes the ideology of Arabism as one that developed in the colonial Fertile Crescent states, where the traditional sources of legitimacy and authority were weakest. Its appeal to the people lay in its simplicity: an ideology based on linguistic, ethnic and religious ties was more comprehensible than one based on specific regional alternatives (Maddy-Weitzman 5-6). But perhaps what the people found most attractive about pan-Arabism was that it challenged the status quo. For those who had little at stake in the regimes headed by leaders committed to doctrines and mentalities deeply influenced by Western liberalism and backed by Western powers, an ideology that offered an alternative more in accordance with the majority of society was an appealing one (Taylor 19).

Pan-Arabism thus touched upon a deeply felt desire to be free of foreign control and achieve independence. The “establishment of the mandate system made political independence the key issue for all Arab governments, and in most instances Arab elites used the language of Arab nationalism in the struggle for statehood” (Barnett 61). Although there was not just one language of Arab nationalism – rather, there were many that ranged from complete unification to leaving the boundaries established by the colonial forces intact – all variations were “unified in [the] belief that independence implied not simply juridical statehood but also the elimination of foreign control” (Barnett 66). Whether it was the ruling elites or the people of the Arab world,

all shared an urge to remove foreign forces from their soil and have total control over their fate. Even those Arab nationalists who wished to see true political unification believed that territorial independence was a prerequisite (Barnett 66). And as for the rulers who were more interested in consolidating their own power, they too obviously needed to be free of foreign intervention, and found that Arab nationalism could be used as a tool to advocate and achieve independence. One of the basic foundations of pan-Arabism was thus the drive for independence, and even when the Arab world freed itself from the colonial chains and became a region of independent states, this tenet of pan-Arabism, although it receded into the background, did not disappear. Pan-Arabism found new targets: imperialism, hegemonic pretensions, and economic exploitation (Nafaa 146). Beneath the surface, the concern with foreign intervention that gave so much momentum to pan-Arabism in the first place, remained, capable of re-emerging when it was felt that foreign forces were closing in on the Arabs.

In Hassan Nafaa's article on Arab nationalism, he says that the history of pan-Arabism has been characterized by constants and variables. In his opinion, the constant of pan-Arabism has been its objective, "which was and still is independence and unity; the independence of each Arab state is the condition for unity." The variables have concerned the content of independence, the ways and means of achieving it, but never the substance, which has remained the same (Nafaa 140). Nafaa's linking of independence and unity points to one of the problematic dynamics of the region: precisely whose independence was at stake? When the leaders emphasized the need for independence, were they talking about the region or their own state? Part of the problem was that it was not clear, although this ambiguity seems to have been a tactical move on the part of the Arab leaders. Even though they obviously wished for the entire region to be free from foreign intervention, what the leaders really wanted was to ensure their own survival and security. Yet they could not openly claim that this was all that concerned them, and so they needed to associate themselves with pan-Arab ideas that would in turn help guarantee their self-preservation. For Michael Barnett, "defining the norms of Arabism was an exercise of power and a mechanism of social control" (Barnett 7). Understanding that the achievement of their goals rested on their legitimacy and popularity, which in turn depended on whether they were seen as following the norms of Arabism, Arab leaders engaged in "the game of Arab politics," whereby they attempted to be the one who defined these norms so that abiding by them corresponded to their own particular interests (Barnett 8-9). And while achieving independence was one of their main goals, unity was one of the defining issues of pan-Arabism, thereby tightly intertwining the two concepts.

*"Unity was one of those catchall words that few could define and even fewer could object to"* (Barnett 73).

In dealing with pan-Arabism and its ideals, no leader or regime could afford to fail to address the issue of unity. As one of the key components of Arabism, unity provided a test of the degree to which a leader was a true Arab nationalist. Yet as the opportunity for Arab independence began to seem more within reach during the late 1930s and early 40s, the debate between the Arabs became more centered around the meaning of unity, and it soon became clear that there was no consensus on what exactly this entailed. Barnett's division of the Arab states into maximalist and minimalist camps is helpful for understanding the broad range of interpretations given to unity. Syria, Iraq and Transjordan, members of the maximalist camp, advocated a notion of unity as the unification or federation among Arab states; and although the support for this in these countries was not overwhelming, the political elites kept the idea alive.

On the other hand was the minimalist camp, comprised of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Yemen, which opposed unification as defined by the maximalists, and pressed instead for a regional association with some cultural, economic, and political cooperation, within the bounds of state sovereignty (Barnett 73-4). In the early 1940s, proposals for Arab unity were submitted from both camps. Although it is clear that British support for Arab unity helped push the Arabs towards independence and their own regional organization, there is disagreement as to the extent of the British role. For Taylor, laying the foundations of this organization came in response to a British initiative, and he claims that, “it is significant that the first step toward a system of Arab solidarity was reactive rather than self-generated” (Taylor 21). On the other hand, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman argues that although the British may have provided encouragement, in the end they followed an Egyptian-led initiative (Maddy-Weitzman 10). The difference between the two claims is interesting and their implications for the Arab League are relevant to some extent; yet since both agree that the British had some sort of a role, what is more significant is the difference in the proposed unity plans.

In February 1943, Nuri al-Said of Iraq proposed the unification of “historical Syria” – a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan – and the formation of an Arab League by the new Syrian state and Iraq, but open to all other Arab states as well. His plan was in accordance with the “long-standing goals of the Arab nationalist movement – i.e., ‘Fertile Crescent’ unity – and with wartime Arab preoccupations with the ‘Palestine problem’” (MacDonald 35; Maddy-Weitzman 12). Egypt, however, opposed such a scheme. By 1943, Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, then Egyptian premier, had concluded that promoting pan-Arab causes would bolster his internal standing, thus leading him to propose a plan of his own in March of 1943. He suggested holding a pan-Arab congress in Cairo to discuss plans for an Arab federation or cooperative Arab system that would not entail redrawing the map and would preserve the existing structure of sovereignty and independent existence of the Arab entities (Maddy-Weitzman 14; Taylor 22). When Nuri proposed his Fertile Crescent project, he stated: “The achievement of unity may necessitate sacrificing the rights of sovereignty and the traditional interests... It is also possible to require the Arab leaders to make sacrifices like these” (Khalil 12). However, as the struggle between Iraq and Egypt for leadership over the Arab world, as manifested through their proposed unity projects, demonstrated, it was not possible. In fact, since the competition between the two had more to do with concrete and specific calculations of small groups of decision-makers than a result of broad-based ideological pressure (Maddy-Weitzman 17), there was certainly no chance of leaders sacrificing their interests in the name of the greater good.

Over the course of the following year Pasha met with various Arab leaders in order to advance his plan, and on September 25, 1944 the Alexandria conference was held. Participating were delegations from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Transjordan, and there as observers were delegations from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Morocco and Palestine. The primary problem discussed at the conference was of the appropriate structural organization of the league that was to be created. Three forms were debated: 1) a unitary state with a central political authority; 2) a federated state with a central parliament and executive committee with full political power over federal issues; 3) a loose confederation with an emphasis on coordination and cooperation. By common agreement, the third option was selected (MacDonald 37). Signed by the participating states at the conference, the Alexandria Protocol held that: “The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meeting which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate their political

plans so as to insure their cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries” (MacDonald 315). Emphasizing the protection of the states’ sovereignty and independence rather than political unity, the protocol “demonstrates that all-inclusive Arab unity was not considered a matter for practical politics” (MacDonald 40). While true unity may have sounded appealing in theory, Arab leaders came to the conclusion that it was inconceivable; yet rather than publicly reject the idea of unification, they developed a meaning of unity that allowed for “formal association that did not threaten their sovereignty and autonomy” (Barnett 78).

In other words, plans were made to establish a league in the name of pan-Arabism, but that would actually help prevent a plan for serious regional integration. Thus “one of the paradoxes of contemporary Arab politics is that pan-Arabism has been used as a tool to block any movement toward greater unity” (Taylor 111). Such a paradox is the inevitable result of the basic dilemma Arab regimes found themselves in: they were caught between the attractive idea of one strong Arab nation, and the regional structure of the Arab world that predisposes its components to think and act in terms of the geographic and sub-cultural characteristics separating them. In response to this dilemma, Arab regimes tended to articulate a commitment to the ideal of unity while acting in terms of individual regional policies (Taylor preface). Thus it is beginning to become clear that there was a substantial gap between the pan-Arab ideal of unity and the reality of regional politics. Whether or not these Arab leaders and regimes were true Arab nationalists, what is certain is that they were concerned with their own survival and narrow interests. And as they maneuvered down the path to independence, a process of nation-building was taking place throughout the Arab world, which began to solidify the Arab states and meant that regimes were developing their own particular interests. Whereas the Arab nationalist focus on freedom from foreign intervention demanded a change in the status quo, as the states were granted independence, it became in the ruling groups’ interest to preserve the new status quo and thus their own power bases (Taylor 17).

This divide between the unity of the Arab nation and the diversity of its regional components corresponds to the dynamic between universalism and particularism. Universal ideologies are appealing – they are broad and encompassing, attract wide support, and appear to give everything a higher meaning. Yet they are also theoretical, and much of their attractive simplicity comes as a result of not having to transform theory into practice. As long as they are only ideas, universal theories encounter few problems or conflicts. However, universalism in such an abstract form cannot provide enough direction for the complexities of day-to-day life, thus necessitating the development of a narrower, more focused perspective. Particularism – grounded in reality – fulfils such a requirement; but its downfall is that it is not as theoretically appealing and cannot attract the support that universalism can. This dynamic between universalism and particularism occurs on many levels of people’s lives, and the Arab world is no exception. Arab regimes had their own narrow interests of staying in power, and a desire to pursue them meant following particular policies; yet such a particularist outlook was not enough since to remain in power also required that they establish domestic stability. And such domestic support could only come from presenting a universal ideology.

Finding themselves caught between universalism and particularism, Arab leaders needed to associate themselves with ideas of Arab nationalism that would provide them with the legitimacy required to maintain power. Yet this produced a problem: the more they relied on such Arab nationalist symbols, the more their societies held them accountable to the norms of Arabism, and the more vulnerable they became to other Arab leaders. Arab nationalism was

therefore “both an aid and a threat to domestic stability, the government’s autonomy, and perhaps even the state’s sovereignty” (Barnett 50). Resorting too much to Arab nationalism could end up having a counterproductive effect: instead of enabling a regime to secure its *independence* it could further its *interdependence*. Thus when Arab leaders spoke of independence, they were referring not only to the desire to be free of foreign intervention, but also to create the conditions that would protect them from the influence of other Arab leaders. One method employed to this end was an appeal to sovereignty and pluralism in Arab politics, which was designed to help regimes create a sense of their own legitimacy. However, by “stressing the legitimacy of each Arab state and the differences between them, and by doing so in fairly aggressive ways, Arab leaders created the conditions for individuation and fragmentation” (Barnett 51).

Against such a background, it is hardly surprising that Arab leaders had an incentive to create institutions that appeared to be about unity, but in actuality failed to fulfill their promises. Such institutions would be able to give them the legitimacy and domestic support that came from being seen as an Arab nationalist, which was needed to strengthen their regimes, without constraining their actions or making them vulnerable to penetration by other Arab leaders. As a result of “creating institutions that gave the appearance of action but delivered little of it, Arabism came to be identified with the self-interested and manipulative acts of Arab states.” An important ramification of this was that Arabism developed a deficit that contributed to disillusionment with it: there was growing evidence of the significant gap that existed between ideology and practice in Arab politics (Barnett 51-2).

It is in the context of this gap and these dynamics between universalism and particularism that the League of Arab States was created. Placing its establishment in this context is important and may be helpful in understanding the League’s role and its relationship with pan-Arabism. In many ways, what characterized pan-Arabism came to characterize the League. The events surrounding the League’s creation and the Pact signed by its members that describes its objective demonstrate both the prevalent concern with independence and sovereignty, and the pan-Arab ideal of unity. It is clear that the establishment of the League in 1945 was in no way a step towards unity, but rather was designed to preserve the territorial status quo. “In the final analysis, it represented the victory of regionalism over universalism in the dynamics of inter-Arab politics” (Taylor 23). Yet as much of a victory as it may have been for regionalism, it was not a complete one, for although created to preserve the states’ independence and sovereignty, the idea remained that the “Arab League is somehow delinquent if it does not at least give lip service to the concept of Arab unity” (MacDonald 301).

On March 22, 1945, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan signed the Pact of the Arab League (Yemen signed on May 10, 1945), as a continuation of the Alexandria conference. In its opening, the Pact states that the League is: “Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states; And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states...” (MacDonald ). Some of the Pact’s main points include the following: The League is composed of independent Arab states (Article 1). There should be cooperation on: economic and financial affairs; communications; cultural affairs; nationality, passports, visas, etc.; social affairs; and health problems (Article 2). Resort to force to solve problems between states is prohibited; and the League’s Council will mediate in differences that threaten to lead to war between member states or between a member and non-member state (Article 5). In the case of aggression or threat by a state against a member, the member may demand the immediate

convocation of the Council, who will unanimously decide what to do. If the aggressor is another state, his vote will not count (Article 6). States that desire to form closer bonds may conclude agreements to that end (Article 9). Thus, as MacDonald points out, the “primary purpose of the League is to foster non-political activities and only incidentally to enter the political arena.” Furthermore, not only is there no allusion to eventual unity – apart from Article 9, which talks of “closer cooperation and stronger bonds” – but the very prospect of political unity is forsworn by the emphasis on the states’ sovereignty and independence (40, 43-4).

In other words, although it seems that the League was created in the context of the great divide between universalism and particularism, perhaps this was not so. After all, the Pact does not seem to be characterized by the infamous characteristic of Arab politics, namely, the gap between reality and public expression. In fact, what may be most surprising about the League is that it seems to have been very much grounded in reality upon its creation, with the Pact making no pretensions that it was striving for political unification of the Arab world. And yet something about the League allowed it to assume the role of a pan-Arab institution. MacDonald talks about ‘Arab unity’ as the “sacred cow of the League: it gives little nourishment, but no one dares kill it” (41). Be this as it may, the League’s ‘universal’ influence was a result of more than just its “sacred cow;” some other part of its identity contributed to it possessing the universal-particular dynamic, and for serving as somewhat of a pan-Arab institution despite all its emphasis on the importance of sovereignty and independence.

For MacDonald, the Arab League was “more than an alliance but less than a sovereign federation;” it has served as an agency through which the Arab states have “consciously confirmed their own national sovereignties and secured their region from external control, if not always from external interference” (282). A tool for leaders to bolster their standing, the League enabled them to “couch their policies, however narrow or particularist in intent, in terms of the interests of the Arab nation as a whole” (Maddy-Weitzman 21). Yet it is this tool’s role in part of the paradox of the League that is perhaps of most significance; while the League helped leaders increase their legitimacy, it simultaneously allowed them to be held accountable by both public opinion and their opponents. Thus the League’s importance as a pan-Arab institution may be found in the very fact of its creation: in establishing the League, the Arab states gave fundamental and symbolic expression to their shared Arab identity. Although the Arab leaders may have designed the League to protect their newly acquired independence and sovereignty, in signing the Pact they recognized that there were specific Arab issues, which in turn meant conceding “that unilateralism was a violation of the norms of Arabism and that they were mutually accountable and thus mutually constrained in these critical areas” (Barnett 81). The League was important in a pan-Arab sense, not because it claimed to be heading towards political unity, but because it provided a forum for leaders to debate and define the norms of Arabism, which were so important in strengthening the individual Arab states.

It is only at this point, with the background of pan-Arabism and the creation of the Arab League, that it becomes possible to focus more carefully on whether the League helped or hindered pan-Arabism. A definite answer in either direction does not exist, and anyway it is obvious that proof can be found to back up either argument. Furthermore, a careful examination of all aspects of the League since its creation in 1945 is obviously far beyond the scope of this paper. Much has been written on Arab politics and its changing nature over the last half a century; in general, there is a rough consensus that a process of state consolidation has occurred throughout the Arab world, which has come at the expense of pan-Arab ideals of unity. In this respect it seems that the Arab League, if it did not impede the development of pan-Arabism,

certainly has not helped it. It is a common argument that with the changes in Arab politics over time, in the last few decades there has been greater agreement that the regional order should be based on norms of sovereignty (Barnett 13). However, it is worth remembering that at the very creation of the League, the emphasis was on independence and sovereignty rather than unity. Once again, we find ourselves faced with the 'catch 22' of the League, whereby Arab nationalism led to the establishment of an institution designed to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Arab states, which in turn situated the states in a relationship of interdependence with one another.

Thus it seems that the Arab League both helped and hindered pan-Arabism. This is the crude answer to the question being analyzed here, yet it is not simply saying that the League did a bit of both, nor is it an implication that it did both because it obviously did not strictly do one or the other. As we have seen from the discussion up to this point, the question itself is a most complex one, and there are many factors that must be accounted for in trying to answer it. The very nature of the League, in the events leading to its creation and in its role from thereon after, was such as to cause it to both help and hinder pan-Arabism. Sometimes it did just one or the other, but more often than not it did both simultaneously; even when the League was not conducive to the Arab states reaching an agreement or resolving a crisis, the very fact that the League was serving as an arena for the issue or conflict inevitably meant that pan-Arabism was being given a chance to be redefined and thus to continue to live and have an influence on Arab states. This phenomenon was a result of the inherent contradictions and paradoxes in the Arab League. Barnett divides up his analysis of the 'game of Arab politics' into stages and events, arguing that they served as points during which the meaning of Arabism was reconsidered and redefined, and that the changing content of the dialogues suggests in turn a change in the underlying structure of Arab politics. These events as he identifies them are: the creation of the Arab League; the Baghdad Pact; the rise and fall of the UAR; the 1967 war; Camp David; and the Gulf War (Barnett 12-3, 17). Regardless of the argument Barnett is trying to make, these events are useful landmarks for showing the League's role in relation to pan-Arabism, as they all illustrate the tension between pan-Arabism and state interests, between unity and sovereignty. I wish to only briefly survey these events; firstly, in order to examine this tension and present a very rough outline of Arab politics since the creation of the League. And secondly, in order to present a few 'larger' themes that arise from these events, before finally discussing the Gulf War in slightly more depth as the last major significant incident in the Arab world until now.

Taylor describes the League as a vehicle through which latent rivalries were brought to the surface (24), and in the years immediately following its creation, a number of these rivalries surfaced. One such struggle emerged in 1946 over the meaning of Syrian unity. A few comments from the Jordanian side – in favor of real unity – and from the opposed Syrian (and Lebanese) side should suffice to illustrate the problem. On November 19, 1946, the Jordanian foreign minister issued the statement: "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, while adhering to the Pact of the League of Arab States, will never give up the Covenant of Syrian unity or federation" (Khalil 26). A few days later Lebanon responded with a statement about how "Lebanon has joined the Arab League on the basis of her independence within her present boundaries..." and the Syrians responded that "the attitude of the authorities of the Kingdom of Jordan...is contrary to the general principles of international law...as well as the Pact of the League of Arab States, which provides that every Arab State should respect the system of government existing in the other States" (Khalil 28). In other words, just over a year after the Pact was signed, its signatories were arguing over its meaning and using their interpretation of

the League to support their argument. Whereas Syria stressed the sovereignty of the states, the Jordanian foreign minister pointed out, at a meeting of the League's council: "It is indeed strange that we should be held accountable for our national aspiration to unity or federation, when it is the realization of this aspiration that was aimed at by the Pact of our League, in letter and spirit" (Khalil 33).

The principle inter-Arab rivalry, however, was the traditional one between Egypt and Iraq. Iraq and Syria presented the most serious of the early union plans in 1949, to which Egypt was adamantly opposed for fear that the unification of the Fertile Crescent would greatly strengthen Iraq. But having already agreed to the norms of pan-Arabism by signing the Pact, Egypt could not oppose the unity plan outright. Instead, Egypt proposed a security pact, so that the October 49 League meeting became a contest between the Iraqi unification plan and Egyptian defense plan. The victory of the latter led to the signing of the 'Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty' in 1950, thereby further institutionalizing the members' sovereignty and territorial integrity (Taylor 25; MacDonald 76, 328; Barnett 99-101). Thus the League provided a tool for protecting the independence of the states and defeating a unity plan, but also led to the creation of another treaty that further tightened the bonds between the Arab states.

Egypt's victory over Iraq did not last for long. Even though Iraq had signed the security pact in 1951, which held in Article 10 that the contracting states must not act "in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty," in 1955 it signed the Baghdad Pact. The controversy over the Baghdad Pact almost destroyed the League (Macdonald 330; 77). Presenting it as a danger to Arab nationalism and an action based on disunity, Nasser challenged the pact and proposed an alternative based on unity instead. Although Syria, Lebanon and Jordan finally agreed to follow Nasser's lead and condemn the Iraqi actions, the conference of Arab leaders ended, characteristically, without issuing a final statement. As inconclusive as the meeting may have been, it still had the consequence of emphasizing to the Arabs that they were best off maintaining independence from foreign intervention, while trapping them further in the web of Arab symbols they were creating (Barnett 113-20).

The next major event in Arab politics was the rise and fall of the United Arab Republic – the political federation created by Egypt and Syrian between 1958 and 1960. However, this call for unification had not been desired, rather it was the result of the domestic chaos in Syria, Nasser's role as an Arab leader, and the symbolic significance of the UAR that further radicalized Arab politics and added to the grievances against conservative regimes (Barnett 135). The creation of the UAR is an example of the effect the pan-Arab ideal of unity was capable of making if pushed too far: "symbolic exchanges led them [Nasser and Syria] to accept a political agreement that both considered against their strategic interests but absolutely necessary for their symbolic standing and thus regime survival" (Barnett 131). The disintegration of the UAR illustrates the persistence of fundamental differences over the meaning of Arabism: Nasser saw it as interdependence of Arab security and power among sovereign Arab states; the Syrian Ba'athists saw it as an organic link among Arabs that demanded a singular political authority (Barnett 137). Together, the rise and fall of the UAR demonstrate the tension between unity and diversity, and show that even during its collapse, both sides redefined Arabism in order to have their individual policies be consistent with it.

Similarly to the creation of the UAR, the 1967 war with Israel was the outcome of a build-up of symbolic competition, which led the Arab leaders to undertake policies that were strategically bad, but politically necessary (Barnett 158). For Fouad Ajami, the severe defeat on



the Arab side marked a Waterloo in pan-Arabism, signaling the beginning of its retreat (357). Yet Barnett points out that pan-Arabism did not completely disappear or lose its appeal after 1967, and that unification attempts had already dropped off by 1964, thus making it a mistake to place such an emphasis on the 1967 war as a Waterloo in pan-Arab politics. Furthermore, not only did the Arab states find themselves involved in a war they had not really wanted because of the overpowering nature Arab nationalism had on them, but they emerged from the war still talking in terms of unity – only this time defined more in terms of unity in ranks and unity against Israel (Barnett 163-4, 167). Thus even when the Arab states met in Khartoum in August 1967 to debate the meaning of Arabism in the wake of their military defeat and to agree to recognize each other's sovereignty, the idea of unity lingered, it was just given a slightly different face (Barnett 167).

Many agree that 1973 was a chance for the triumph of state solidarity (Ajami 358). In the absence of substantial solidarity in the Arab system as a whole, the period after 1973 was characterized by regimes' inclinations to form bilateral pacts and narrow alliances instead (Taylor 72). This stress on state interests was particularly noticeable in Egypt, which began to question its relation to Arabism and to assert its own sense of Egyptian nationalism. Understanding that such sentiments would make him less susceptible to Arab symbols, Sadat encouraged them. Yet at the same time he attempted to redefine Arabism so that it was consistent with his policies towards Israel, and to defend his policies by saying they were consistent with Arabism and permitted by Egyptian sovereignty. Even when Sadat managed to reach Camp David, having survived the other Arabs' attacks on him that he was betraying Arab nationalism, he still found himself restricted by pan-Arabism; his concern that he would be seen as abandoning the Palestinians – a major defining point of Arab nationalism – led to long, drawn-out negotiations over a framework for a West Bank settlement (Barnett 183-192). While Sadat was breaking away from the norms of Arabism and yet finding himself still constrained by them, the other Arabs were having the opposite problem. Although they evicted Egypt from the League after it signed the peace treaty with Israel, which on the surface appeared to illustrate a tightening of the ranks among the other Arab states, this appearance was misleading since the unintended effect was that they began developing more separate identities (Barnett 199-200). Thus the Arab League was simultaneously a place for unity and fragmentation.

Before moving on to discuss the Gulf War, it is worth noting a few points that arise out of the preceding analysis and that may help to determine the extent to which the Gulf War was similar or different to the other major events in Arab politics. Firstly, we need to confront the idea presented at the start of this brief historical overview, namely, that there has been a change over time in Arab politics, with a shift away from the theme of unity and toward the establishment of an order based on complete recognition of sovereignty and independence. But as we can see even from these five events that Barnett uses to support his argument, the shift is not that clear-cut or straight-forward. Firstly, the notions of sovereignty and independence existed at the creation of the League; in fact, it was these concepts, and not the concept of unity, on which the League was based. Yet as we have already seen, this did not preclude the League from having a role in promoting unity, a role it assumed simply by virtue of it providing a forum for debating and defining the norms of Arabism, and thus inevitably intertwining the Arab states in each other's affairs. From the establishment of the Arab League then, there has been a built-in tension between universalism and particularism, which both pushed the Arab states closer together and pulled them further apart. And at every 'major point' since 1945, this duality is evident. Even with the solidifying of the state and the growing disillusionment with Arab

nationalism that does seem to have occurred, the pan-Arab sentiment and rhetoric have not disappeared. The fact that however much the meaning of Arabism may have changed over the years, Arabism has always been reinvented and redefined, but never destroyed or abandoned, is significant in itself. It helps raise the question: to what extent has there been a fundamental change in Arab politics? In other words, how accurate is it to say that these events were key moments for Arab nationalism?

Related to this issue is the state of pan-Arabism's health today, that is, if it is even alive at all. And if it has vanished from the scene, at what point did this happen? There were those who thought that the establishment of the Arab League itself killed pan-Arabism: it "represented a vindication for statism and a vanquished Arabism" (Barnett 80). However, for those who believe that Arab nationalism lived on after the League was created, 1967 is often pointed to as a major turning point that led to its retreat (e.g. Ajami). Writing in 1978, Ajami declared that pan-Arabism, if not already dead was nearing its end, and that the Arabs were left with a "profound fragmentation of the Arab existential and political crisis" (355, 369). Yet in the same year, Michael Hudson declared that despite repeating political failures, the "ideal of Arab integration is not only very much alive but may even be gaining ground" (Hudson 81). This integration is not in terms of political consolidation and institutionalization, but rather in terms of Arab cooperation. He says that the Arab world may yet enter a process of increased social, economic, and eventual political consolidation, but first it must develop "region-wide institutions to enhance the capabilities of an all-Arab political system." The League is important in that it has "become a significant factor conducive to functional integration." This increased potential for regional integration comes partly as a result of the consolidation in the state level (84-5, 94). Writing at the same time as Ajami and Hudson, Halim Barakat declares that Arab society is genuinely seeking a transformation, that is, a development of higher forms of awareness by reconstructing and recreating Arab reality. For Barakat, the failure to achieve this transformation has not been because of having a utopian and unrealistic dream, but the result of the Arabs' inability to devise rational structures and strategies: "the problem lies not in the ideal of unity, but in the gap or imbalance between this goal and actions designed to achieve such a historical task" (Barakat in Hudson 67-8).

The types of arguments made by Hudson and Barakat are important because they highlight the fact that there may be more than one way of conceiving the pan-Arab ideal of 'unity', and so before we can announce the death of pan-Arabism, we must be sure to understand exactly how it is being defined. This failure to define pan-Arabism is the core of Hassan Nafaa's response to Ajami: "Ajami seems to confuse the idea and its implementation, the ideology and the political movement." Pan-Arabism is both an idea and a political movement, and thus it is wrong to say that pan-Arabism failed or died because the idea did not become a reality (Farah 139). Bearing this point in mind, we can return to the question of the extent to which Arab politics have fundamentally changed. We need to consider the possibility that closing the gap is not about transforming the ideal into a concrete reality, and that the divide between public expression and reality constitutes the basis of the League thus making it both help and hinder pan-Arabism, and preventing a closing of the gap.

*"The American forces came and Saudi Arabia opened its doors to them under the false pretext that the Iraqi army will move towards them...The joint policy with the foreigner has become exposed" (President Saddam Hussein).*

*“The options before us are clear: an Arab action to protect the higher interests of the Arab nation, preserving Iraq and Kuwait, or foreign intervention that we will have no say or control over” (President Hosni Mubarak).*

[*The Times*, August 11, 1990]

The Gulf War is another event in Arab politics that has been argued to be a turning point, leading to an increased decline in pan-Arabism (Barnett 220; Lewis 405). Yet during all stages of the crisis, on both sides of the split between the Arab states, it is possible to observe similar tactics, concerns and symbols, and thus to see the Gulf War as an extension of the prevalent dynamic tension in Arab politics as discussed above. During the months preceding the invasion, Iraq and Kuwait both employed pan-Arab rhetoric in order to defend their claims, and the League served as the forum through which they debated their respective notions of Arab values. A memorandum to the League sent by Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister, on July 15, 1990, opens by stating: “the Arab lands, despite its division into several states, form but one home for the Arabs,” and that Iraq has dealt with Kuwait “on the basis of these national and brotherly principles.” Kuwait replied by maintaining that it “has always dealt in its relations with Arab brothers in accordance with the principles and values embodied in the Arab League Pact, particularly the...recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the state...”. Iraq, in turn, rejected Kuwait’s claim to be pursuing Arab principles and values (Khadduri 107-8). Thus by individually defining Arab norms, both parties could claim to be Arab nationalists, while refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the other’s claims; but framing their arguments within the bounds of Arabism restricted the scope of these definitions and led them to become further intertwined.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, a number of crucial issues were raised. First of all, it challenged the fundamental ground rule on which the League had been founded: the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each Arab state. Until this point, borders had been left pretty much unchanged, for fear that to question them too much would be opening a Pandora’s box. Thus the Arab states rejected Iraq’s claim to Kuwait, but they also defended the preservation of Iraqi independence when it was challenged following the insurrections in the north and south of the country (Faris in Ibrahim 216-7; Lewis in Sifry and Cerf 406-7). Secondly, it brought to light the previously inconceivable concept of Arab states forging open alliances with foreign powers against other Arab states, which was first given expression in the 1950 defense treaty (Faris in Ibrahim 217). Saddam capitalized on this point (as illustrated by his quote on the previous page) and tried to undermine the legitimacy of the other Arab powers by presenting them as collaborating with foreigners and thus destroying Arab unity. However, the opposing Arab camp, led by Egypt, was just as concerned with the idea of a foreign intervention, and so this became a key theme for them as well. Repeatedly emphasizing the need to find an “Arab solution” to the problem, Mubarak emphasized that Arab nations should stick together: “This is not an arena for fighting Iraq but only asking it to be reasonable. It is a brother to us, to our states and people” (quoted in Sammakia, *AP* 10 August 1990). The fear was that a failure to resolve the crisis within the Arab world would lead to foreign intervention that would affect not only Iraq, but also the entire region, with serious consequences for many years to come. This fear was felt by the people even in the countries that were against Iraq, who held massive protests against the war: “the protestors were motivated by their concern about foreign interference more than anything else” (Faris in Ibrahim 223).

Thus when the Arab states finally convened 8 days after the invasion, at a League summit in Cairo on 10 August 1990, what was at stake were the rules of the game of Arab politics: the “need to preserve a concept of pan-Arab security” (Barnett 218). But when the Arab states met, they were too divided to reach an effective solution, and while some advocated to not only demand an Iraqi withdrawal but also condemn its actions, others called only for a withdrawal (Khadduri 239). According to Fred Halliday, “the Iraqi action against Kuwait poses more clearly than at any time for nearly thirty years the question of Arab unity and of the unity of Arab politics in general. Iraq has captured Kuwait in the name of Arab unity, and no Arab state can be neutral or indifferent to that crisis” (in Sifry and Cerf 396). But it was not just the Iraqi invasion that highlighted the issue of Arab unity. The League summit in Cairo was a portrayal of the pull towards unity and then attempt to achieve it, together with the incapability of doing so. The resolution voted on at the summit: 1) condemned Iraqi aggression and called for Iraq to withdraw its forces; 2) reaffirmed Kuwait’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; 3) condemned Iraq’s threats against the other Gulf states and supported their right to self-defense; 4) decided to comply with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states’ request that Arab forces be deployed to help defend their territorial integrity against external aggression. Reaffirming UN resolution 660, it stopped short of imposing economic sanctions (Khadduri 164). Of the 20 states present at the summit, the resolution was voted on 12-8, with Iraq, Libya and the PLO voting against; Algeria and Yemen abstaining, and three governments, including Jordan, expressing reservations. However, in line with the League’s policies which require unanimity for security resolutions to be binding, the vote was binding only on those who voted in favour, thus constituting an admission of failure to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis (Walker, The Times 11 August 1990).

The Cairo summit was both an attempt at unity, with even Egypt – Iraq’s traditional rival – calling for unity among Arabs in finding a solution, and a recognition of its impossibility because of the divisions between Arab states. And the Arab League, embodying this duality in its very structure, could do nothing during the crisis but “provide a fig leaf for some Arab governments to cooperate with the West in fighting Iraq, and a forum for others to condemn it” (‘Arab Unity’s Paling Symbol’, The Economist 7 December 1991). Beginning even before the invasion, and lasting for many months after the war had ended, Arab leaders made many calls for the Arab nation to stand united. At the Arab League Council in Tunis on 17 October 1990, Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat appealed to his “Arab brothers [and] Arab leaders:” “We should not break each others’ backs within the Arab nation. We should solve this problem in a way that would protect everyone’s dignity, safeguard everybody’s rights and protect the Arab regime” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 October 1990). Colonel Qaddhafi, in a meeting on 26 January 1991 said: “There is no solution without an Arab unity, because without such unity we will remain foreigners...we now find an Arab in alliance with a non-Arab against another Arab, and an Arab attacking another Arab...” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 January 1991). And in the aftermath of the war, President Mubarak issued a pan-Arab appeal at a joint session of the People’s Assembly and the Consultative Council, where he called the Iraqi people the brothers of the Egyptian people and the Arab nation, and insisted: “We do not want the Arab nation [to be] two nations. We do not want the same Arab people to be divided people deceived by malicious aims that prompt them to fight within the same country” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 March 1991). These multiple calls for Arab unity and an Arab solution from all parties in the Arab world seem to suggest that the one thing they were truly united on was

appealing to the nation's need for unity. But this alone was not enough to bring them effectively together.

*"Let constructive and effective Arab solidarity always be our slogan."*

[Dr. Ismat Abd al-Majid, Secretary-General of the Arab League,  
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 1991]

While such a slogan may be easy enough to express, to follow up on it, especially in a region where real solidarity has been severely lacking, is quite a bit harder. Furthermore, slogans can be a risky business: Saddam Hussein's adventure in the Gulf crisis "showed once more...that the most dangerous of men to the Arabs was he who actually believed and tried to implement their slogans" (Rubin, MERIA June 2001). Yet as dangerous as he may have been, it seems he may have still have emerged the 1990 Arab summit's hero. One Arab diplomat predicted that he would remain a hero long after this: "Experience shows that all this ganging up against Iraq is more likely to revive nationalist fervour, and make a hero out of Saddam" (Bulloch, *The Independent* 12 August 1990). Halliday believes that Saddam did in fact revive the dynamic of secular Arab nationalism, with its core goals being political unity and the redistribution of oil wealth, which many thought had been dead for a few decades. Even those who disliked the means Saddam chose to achieve these ends felt that "Iraq embodies some of the goals of the revolutionary and radical nationalist movement, so long kept on the defensive in the Arab world" (Halliday in Sifry and Cerf 396-8). These goals Saddam appeared to have brought to the surface, were alluded to in Dr. Ismat Abd al-Majid's speech to the Arab League that he made upon being elected as the new Secretary-General: "Differences might occur over interpretations and ideas regarding the way to achieve pan-Arab objectives. However, these differences should be transient because, in the long run, the Arab states' interests are but one" (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 1991).

Thus not only was there abundant usage of pan-Arab rhetoric and talk of unity among Arabs, but it seemed there were more concrete references to the joint Arab interests as well. The League, as "an institutional expression of the goals and aspirations of the Arab people," still had a special role to play, and "all Arab countries without exception demonstrated a sincere desire to preserve the Arab League." And the new Secretary-General promised to work hard "to deepen Arab solidarity and promote Arab League action according to the letter and spirit of the Arab League Charter and the other Arab charters" (Dr. Ismat Abd al-Majid, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 1991). However, we already know that the Arab states were far from being in agreement over what the 'letter and spirit' of the League were, thus making constructive action based on the League's Charter virtually impossible, and almost something of an oxymoron. Barry Rubin argues that the Gulf War illustrated the dangers of pan-Arabism, since it was this ideology that Saddam Hussein had used to legitimize his invasion of Kuwait; and at the beginning of the 1990s, Arab governments seemed to be acting more individualistically than ever before. Yet, by the end of the decade, the "enduring appeal of Arab solidarity" could still be observed, although he emphasizes that this process was more verbal than practical (Rubin, MERIA June 2001).

The "distinction between the principles by which they live and act, and public expression" has continued into the twenty-first century (Rubin, MERIA June 2001). All the calls for unity and the promises to achieve Arab solidarity voiced in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis remain in the realm of public expression, and the gap between them and the real actions and

policies of the Arab states is not too different from the one that existed over fifty years ago. Today, just like in 1945, the states are concerned with the principle they set as the foundation of the League – their independence and sovereignty. When they first created the League this independence was expressed more in terms of freedom from foreign control and intervention; but in a more discreet manner, was also about independence from one another. The Gulf War was an illustration of these two desires: the Arab states spoke out both against Iraq's challenge to Kuwaiti sovereignty and independence, and against the possibility of foreign interference in their affairs. And the Arab League – the main forum in which they voiced these interests – served one more time as both an aid and a hindrance to pan-Arabism. On one hand, the League brought them together in a pan-Arab environment where they could express their common fears against foreign intervention, and even against the interference by one Arab state in another's domestic situation. Yet, on the other hand, the very fact that they were gathered together and employing the pan-Arab calls for unity brought with it the familiar danger – the threat of undermining their sovereignty by making them vulnerable to one another and to the constraints that come with pan-Arabism. And the knowledge of what this could do to their particular interests made it inevitable that the demand for unity would remain at a universal level.

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## Political Considerations and Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity: An Iranian Case Study by Raluca Mihaila

**Examining the notion of universal jurisdiction, Mihaila uses the case study of the mass executions of Mojahedine-e Khalq (MKO) political prisoners and Iranian penitentiaries, underscoring the political influences leading to impunity among the international community.**

The introduction of the concept of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity in the last decades of the twentieth century has given impetus to the globalization of justice. Universal jurisdiction seeks to involve indiscriminately all states, as they become united by a common conscience of humanity and human rights. The concept was triggered by the need to address severe violations of human rights given that the national courts of the state where the crimes were committed were unable or unwilling to bring the perpetrators to trial. In this paper I address the issue of accountability, -process of establishing responsibilities of perpetrators for their crimes -, in conjunction with international crimes. For this purpose, I will focus on the case of mass executions of Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) political prisoners in Iranian penitentiaries in the second half of 1988. My hypothesis is that there exists a strong associative link between impunity, -absence of accountability -, for crimes of the Tehran leadership and political factors. That is, the initial lack of willingness and action to bring those responsible to trial, as well as the more energetic recent reaction, are related to political considerations such as the fear of being identified as supporters of Mojahedin-e Khalq, the policy of appeasing the Tehran leadership, and later reevaluations of this policy. My procedure will consist, first, of showing how the aforementioned events constitute *de jure* crimes against humanity under international law, despite the lack of uniformity in defining crimes against humanity. Secondly, I will attempt to identify possible significant political factors that contributed to the ‘tolerance’ of the international community when there exist important precedents (International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia/International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda/Gen. Pinochet), which surpassed objections such as the diverse legal attitudes of several countries towards the retroactive jurisdiction on crimes committed in the past and scarce human and financial resources. I will attempt to show that this type of counter-arguments is not solid enough to cover the entire spectrum of this case and that the prevalent motives lie in the political arena.

### **Mass-execution of Political Prisoners, 1988, Iran: Crimes Against Humanity?**

Although an active participant in the anti-Shah revolution next to the religious figures and other political factions, the MKO, a leftist militant group overwhelmingly composed of students and intellectuals, soon emerged as the main post-1979 opposition group to the theocratic regime in Iran. The religious leaders focused on consolidating their position in power by brutally repressing all opposition in the immediate post-1979 years.<sup>1</sup> This is the moment when most opposition members, especially from the MKO, were imprisoned and sentenced because of their political convictions, fled the country or went underground. Although the war with Iraq shifted the attention of the government to the external enemy, the end of the war in 1988 was marked by a reversal of governmental attention to the opposition that continued to be active, as the ambitious Eternal Light military campaign of the armed wing of the now Iraqi-based MKO<sup>2</sup>

proved. Consequently, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious decree) to execute all political prisoners who continued to identify themselves with the MKO. Eyewitnesses testified that the massacre started on July 31, 1988, and that for a period of about 6 -7 months kangaroo trials, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, rape and mass executions continued. The events were documented by eyewitnesses, declarations of government officials, were compiled by Amnesty International and the MKO and the NCRI and noted in international documents such UN resolutions or reports, or the UK Immigration and Nationality Directorate country assessments. In the first part of the paper my analysis will point out that there exists significant factual evidence to consider the 1988 events to be crimes against humanity, for which the revolutionary Tehran leadership bears responsibility.

Although there existed a legal nexus between the concept of crimes against humanity and international armed conflict, when the former was introduced into international law in the aftermath of the WWII, the increasing emphasis on the importance of human rights and evidence of crimes committed against civilians in peacetime in different countries have dissolved this initial link: “if the normative content of “crimes against humanity” had remained frozen in its Nüremberg form, then it could not possibly apply to the situation in Rwanda... because there was no “war” in the classic sense of an inter-state or international armed conflict. However, the normative content of “crimes against humanity” has undergone substantial evolution since the end of the WWII.”<sup>3</sup> Moreover, it is now considered that crimes against humanity are “gross violations of fundamental rules of [...] human rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict, as part of an official policy based on discrimination against an identifiable group of persons, irrespective of war and the nationality of the victims.”<sup>4</sup> The events in Iran, directed against civilians during peacetime, and so grave that they could shock the human conscience, can, thus, be evaluated in light of such developments in the interpretation of applicability of the concept of crimes against humanity.

Although ‘crimes against humanity’ as a legal category is not as clear in content or legal status as ‘genocide’ or ‘breaches of the Geneva Conventions’, and although there is no consistent abstract definition at the international level, a series of common elements are identifiable in all formulations. Given that the prosecutors of the Yugoslav and Rwandan crimes reached a consensus as to the elements that constitute crimes against humanity, and that there now exists a definition in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the claim that there is no uniformity in defining crimes against humanity and in procedural rights and sentencing, if strongly desired by the international community, proves untenable. As the Rome Statute of the ICC is the document that has the most extensive jurisdiction, I will formulate my claim that the 1988 events in Iran constituted crimes against humanity based on Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC:

“Any of the following acts, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

- (a) Murder
- (b) Extermination
- (c) Enslavement
- (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population
- (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law
- (f) Torture

- (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
- (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred in this paragraph or any crimes within the jurisdiction of the court
- (i) Enforced disappearance of persons
- (j) The crime of apartheid
- (k) Other inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”

The first condition requires that the act be committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale. The term ‘widespread’ is sufficiently broad to cover both a large number of victims as the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary proportions. The 1988 executions proved to be the cumulative effect of a series of acts of extraordinary proportions, thus combining the two situations. The numbers circulated vary: these consist of a number of documented victims and a number of estimated victims. Amnesty International recorded the names of over 2,000 political prisoners reportedly executed in 1988 in their 1987-1990 Iran Report, the Special Representative of the UN Human Rights Commission (1989) “received more than 1,000 names, but it was alleged that there were in all probability several thousand victims,”<sup>5</sup> and the MKO had claimed the number of victims to be in the tens of thousands. By contrast, the Iranian government had acknowledged executing less than 1,000 political prisoners in the 89/90 Iran Yearbook, and Ayatollah Montazeri’s memoirs, as the UN Commission on Human Rights stated,<sup>6</sup> put forth the number of executed at approximately 30,000. The MKO published information regarding the number of victims and the ways in which they were executed in the January 1999 edition of *The Lion and Sun*, an MKO monthly. The large total number of victims and accounts of concurrent deaths of 2,800 (in one day only, July 31, according to Montazeri’s memoirs) or of 860 (August 14-16, 860 bodies belonging to executed political prisoners were transferred from Evin prison to Beheshte Zahra cemetery in Tehran, according to an ex-prisoner’s account) meet the requirement of widespread crimes, aimed at excluding isolated inhumane acts committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a single victim.

The alternative to ‘widespread’ requires that the acts be committed pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy, that is, they be systematic. Because a number of factors coincide in showing the planning of the executions in correlation with involvement of the highest Iranian echelons in the mass executions of 1988, the evidence in this paragraph also serves for determining the next requirement of Article 7, which is governmental involvement. The strongest proof comes from the memoirs of Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, a 79-year old cleric who had for ten years been the designated successor of Khomeini and who, following a dispute between the two over the 1988 mass executions, had been under house arrest ever since. The memoirs introduce the key document on the

way the massacre began and was conducted, Khomeini’s fatwa, which reads:

*“Those who are in prisons throughout the country and remain steadfast in their support for the Monafeqin<sup>7</sup> [Mojahedin], are waging war on God and are condemned to execution...Annihilate the enemies of Islam immediately. As regards the cases, use whichever criterion speeds up the implementation of the [execution] order<sup>8</sup>”*

Moreover, a number of high-ranking officials acknowledged the official character of the executions and expressed their support for it. The then President Ali Khamenei, now the regime's Supreme Leader, said at a meeting at Tehran University: "as regards mass executions...those in prison who have contacts with the Monafeqin, who mounted an armed incursion against the Islamic Republic, do you think we should have given these prisoners sweets for this? They are condemned to death and we execute them. We do not joke with this". Similarly, Abdulkarim Moussavi Ardebili, the then-Chief Justice, declared: "they must all be executed...There is not going to be any more of this sentencing and appeals"<sup>9</sup> and tried to give the events an aura of popular initiative and support: "the judiciary is under tremendous pressure...People ask why we do not execute them, while they should all be executed. The judiciary is no longer going to take a lot of trouble taking files to and from courthouses."<sup>10</sup> These declarations are complemented and corroborated by accounts of the international press or NGOs on the planned nature of the executions and the level of awareness of high-ranking officials. The French *Le Monde* wrote on March 1, 1989: "Imam Khomeini summoned the Revolutionary Prosecutor [...] to instruct him that henceforth all of the Mojahedin, those in prisons or anywhere else, should be executed for waging war on God". Similarly, Amnesty International "has received accounts of similar events [executions] in many different prisons [...]. This suggests to Amnesty International that the massacre of political prisoners was a premeditated and coordinated policy which must have been authorized at the highest level of government,"<sup>11</sup> which constitutes precisely the first requirement for crimes against humanity. The evidence in support of this first requirement conforms to the thrust of the legal formulation, which is to exclude a random act which was not committed as part of a broader plan or policy.

The list of prohibited acts contains acts which independently amount to crimes against humanity. As I will show, the 1988 events in Iran concentrate more than one prohibited act, but not all of the prohibited acts. One such act is, *inter alia*, extermination (Article 7 b). Extermination is a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. It involves an element of mass destruction and an intention to destroy a group of individuals because of their membership in a particular group. The killing of members is seen as an incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group. In this context, it is the membership of the individual in a particular group rather than the identity of the individual that is the decisive criterion in determining the immediate victims of the crime of extermination, thus relating extermination to persecution. The group is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal conduct. As it appears from the declarations of the revolutionary leaders, their intention was to eliminate the MKO, as a group, and no declaration brought to light so far has individualized charges or execution. 'Extermination' is a broad category, which covers situations in which the group is political, by contrast with the very similar 'genocide', which excludes political groups as its target, given that this type of group is not considered to be sufficiently stable for purposes of genocide. The numbers of political prisoners executed evidence the mass destruction of political prisoners identified with MKO. The procedure preliminary to the execution is relevant for determining that one particular group was targeted through extermination. All prisoners targeted by Khomeini's fatwa, regardless of their sentencing status in prison, were brought before so-called "amnesty commissions", whose task was to evaluate their political identification with MKO. Amnesty International was told by one prisoner, held there at that time, that the first question asked by the commission was: "what is your political affiliation? Those who answered 'Mojahedin' were sent to their deaths."<sup>12</sup> The only

ones who were given a chance to survive after this first question were the ones who would answer with the leadership's derogatory term, Monafeqin, and would agree to repent on public television and condemn the MKO as terrorist and waging war against God. As the MKO members have a very strong emotional sense of belonging to a unique organization, almost all of the thousands of prisoners taken to the "amnesty commissions" ended up hanged or shot.

Membership and its consequences for the treatment of the prisoners is also important for determining whether there has been persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds, another prohibited act under Article 7 (h). Witnesses tell of wards where they identified the victims by their political affiliation. For instance, one eyewitness estimates "that out of 900 Mojahedin prisoners in Gohardasht Prison at the beginning of summer of 1988, 600 were executed."<sup>13</sup> MKO members were persecuted based on their political affiliation by being denied human rights and fundamental freedoms to which they were entitled without distinction, by a series of acts that affected both the prisoners and their families. One initial manifestation of persecution of MKO political prisoners was the ban on family visits. Amnesty International states that for three months the families were turned away from the prison gates with no clear explanation. The uncertainty and anguish in which the family lived, along with the prisoners' inability to communicate with their loved ones, was a double denial of fundamental human rights, to both prisoners and their families. Only in October and November 1988 did the authorities begin to inform the families of the execution of their relatives. But inhumane denial of human rights followed prisoners and their families even after the executions. Families were informed of the execution and required to "sign undertakings that they would not hold a funeral or any other mourning ceremony."<sup>14</sup> They were not informed where their relatives were buried. For a regime that claims to draw its legitimacy from religious observance, the denial of such rituals associated with death is extremely grave and suggests certain political dimensions of their religiosity. Moreover, in denying burial rituals, the Iranian officials violated the first principle of right to life of the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, a treaty much more likely to be respected by Iran, as it was signed by it and it is based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and has been compiled by eminent Muslim scholars.<sup>15</sup> The MKO gathered data on a series of mass graves in Iran that reportedly contain MKO victims of the 1988 massacre, who were denied proper Islamic burial ritual, and whose families have not been able to identify.<sup>16</sup>

However, the most severe form of abuse on the prisoners' fundamental human rights was the death sentence imposed on political grounds, as suggested by the proceedings of the commissions sent to determine their fate. There existed three types of victims: the ones who were already in prison but sentenced to death, the ones who were in prison serving their sentence and the ones who were arrested specifically for the purpose of being executed pursuant to Khomeini's fatwa. It is very difficult to document the identities and numbers of MKO members rearrested under the auspices of the fatwa, but the MKO claims that the number of such cases was not negligible. However, given the fact that there exist no accounts documented by impartial or international bodies, I will only focus on the topic of prisoners already serving their sentence. Indisputable principles of national and international criminal law affirm the illegality of all sentencing imposed after the guilty party had already been convicted. However, the wave of executions of 1988 targeted primarily prisoners already serving their sentences. Most of the political prisoners had been serving their sentences for years when they were brought in front of the so-called "amnesty commissions", which were to act as a second judicial instance in their cases. As explained earlier, the commission, which was not a regular court, would only ask the prisoners, who had not been allowed legal representation, about their political affiliation, and

execution or continuation of the prison term were decided immediately. This type of procedure not only violated international law provisions regarding the right to fair trial and sentencing, but also Iranian constitutional legal provisions (Art. 34 [Recourse to Courts], Art. 35 [Right to Counsel], Art. 36 [Sentencing] of the Iranian Constitution) and the aforementioned Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (Art.V [Right to Fair Trial]). Political prisoners already serving their sentence seems to have been the main group of victims, the fatwa referring to anyone still identifying himself with the MKO, no matter the status of the person either in prison or society. Ayatollah Montazeri's letters of dissent denounce to Khomeini unlawfulness of the executions of such prisoners: "on what criteria are you now executing people who have not been sentenced to death?"<sup>17</sup>

Article 7 (g) focuses on rape and any forms of sexual abuse as prohibited acts. Although Iran is bound by many international and national documents to prevent torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (signatory of the convention against torture, Art. VII of the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, constitutional provisions, etc), there is ample evidence that, even before the ITCY recognized the use of rape as a method of torture or as inhuman or degrading treatment, the Iranian prisons were witnessing a massive process of rape of young girls about to be executed. Montazeri specifically mentioned women in his dissent letters sent to Khomeini in regards with the 1988 events: "if you insist [on mass executions] at least allow the women to be spared, especially women with children."<sup>18</sup> Also, Ayatollah Montazeri acknowledges in his memoirs that the rape of girls in prisons was a widespread and systematic practice: "many of those who were being arrested in connection with the Mojahedin were girls and they were executing them on charges of waging war on God...I told the judiciary officials and Evin officials and others, quoting the Imam, that they must not execute girls from the Mojahedin. I told judges not to write death sentences for girls. This is what I said. But they perverted my words and quoted me as saying: "Don't execute girls. First marry them for one night and then execute them."<sup>19</sup> The reference to rape is implicit in the reference to marriage for one night. Islam recognizes the institution of *sighe*, temporary marriage based on the verbal consent of the partners, a form widely encouraged by the revolutionary authorities and which is considered by both Iranian and Western feminists to be institutionalized prostitution.<sup>20</sup> In the case of girl-prisoners it is clear that there could not have been any consent, but the guards used the concept metaphorically, so that they could have sexual relations with them in a framework approved by Islam.

Although in a very schematic way, I have shown the various ways in which the 1988 events in the Iranian prisons amount to crimes against humanity, according to Article 7 of the ICC Statute. The events fulfill the preliminary requirements of admissibility (systematic manner, governmental involvement, civilian population) and there are several prohibited acts that can be identified in the events (extermination, rape, persecution on political grounds, etc). I now turn to the echo these events created in the international community and the possible reasons why it allowed for the allowing the impunity of the Iranians responsible. Given the establishment of the first two ad-hoc tribunals for such gross abuses, ITCY and ITCR, and the principles and precedents derived from them, the present silence surrounding the 1988 abuses, despite impressive reports and demands for accountability from Amnesty International and from the NCRI and MKO themselves, is perhaps inexplicable. In this second part of my paper, I suggest a correlation between political considerations and international reticence to bring the responsible to justice, despite available punitive instruments.

## **Political Motivations in Achieving Accountability for the 1988 Crimes**

The sight of mass violations of human rights and humanitarian law in recent years has given new impetus to international determination to bring violators to justice. Because of a combination of political constraints, scarcity of resources and lack of will, accountability has not been and will not be in the foreseeable future an all or nothing question, no matter the international community's vision of justice and hope for deterrence of impunity. Accountability is rather a matter of degree and of compromise approaches, which render an outcome of partial accountability and, correlatively, partial impunity. However, concern with achieving accountability is pervasive and is reflected in the increasingly intensive NGO activity, like the Center for Justice & Accountability, Redress Trust initiatives. In mid-1999 International Network Against Impunity was launched to serve as focal point for information regarding progress in the field of universal jurisdiction. Also, in the past decade important steps were taken in the creation of a system of international criminal justice as an effective tool in the struggle to end impunity for international crimes.

The spectrum of available penal instruments ranges from the national courts of the states within whose territory the crimes were perpetrated to UN bodies and national courts of other states. Given that Iran's theocratic regime is still in power, it is highly unlikely that Iran will prosecute its own leaders. Therefore, in such cases, recourse is customarily made to extra-territorial jurisdiction, to the exercise of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. International criminal tribunals have already been established by the UN Security Council in response to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Similarly, the UN Security Council could have passed a resolution establishing a Commission of Inquiry of the situation in Iran at the moment of the mass executions. Subject to receiving substantial evidence from the respective Commission of Inquiry on the nature of the mass-executions and the admissibility as crimes against humanity, an ad-hoc international tribunal could be established by the UN Security Council only. In this context, the tribunal would have the task of trying those responsible of grave breaches in the Geneva Convention and crimes against humanity. This is the most powerful instrument available because a Security Council mandate, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requires member states to cooperate. Other possible approaches, in the United Nations framework, are the establishment of a similar commission by the Commission on Human Rights, subject to holding a special session on the case, by the Secretary-General, or by the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Outside the UN framework, recourse can be made to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts of various countries, as in the case of the former Chilean dictator Pinochet in Spanish courts, or of the very recent case of Rwandan criminals in Belgian courts. Thus, a nation could have claimed jurisdiction over Iranian offenders, regardless of the fact that the offenses were not committed in the respective state and of any link between the interests of the prosecuting state and those of the offenders. This type of action is becoming increasingly used in the international arena, as domestic legislation facilitating such actions already exists in various countries (Canada, France, etc), and it is increasingly viewed as complementary to the ICC or potential ad-hoc UN tribunals in the struggle for overcoming impunity. Thus, the recent weeks have witnessed the initiation of prosecution of Rwandan criminals by Belgium courts. This example eloquently exemplifies both the increasing use of universal jurisdiction and of complementarities to other punitive instruments in an attempt to eliminate partial impunity and bring all criminals to justice.

I suggest a link between specific political factors that determined the complete lack of will to effectively use the punitive instruments available in the case of Iranian leaders until very recently, and others that determined the recent, more energetic reaction from the international community. However, given that my study is based on observations of the international community reaction towards Iran and comparison subjects, (states other than Iran in similar situations, such as Iraq or Yugoslavia), a causal relationship cannot be established between political considerations and the 'tolerant' international attitude; only an associative relationship can be established by such a study.<sup>21</sup> An associative relationship correlates two factors without implying that one of them determined the outcome of the other. Before evaluating these factors, however, I address potential counter-arguments to my claim. As I mentioned in the introduction, support for the lack of willingness or of action for prosecution of Iranian criminals could be due to factors other than political ones. Once such possibility is that of negating the events as international crimes. Although I have shown in the first part of the paper that the 1988 events in Iran constitute crimes against humanity, the UN Commission of Inquiry might deliver a contrary statement. However, even if the events prove not to be considered crimes against humanity, the question remains as to why the UN Security Council has been unwilling to establish a commission whose mission would be precisely clarifying the nature of the 1988 events. Another frequent counter-argument in many cases of inaction in the face of grave human rights violations is the lack of resources: from financial resources to launch an investigation that would clarify the circumstances and the facts to human resources, - to the lack of trained personnel and availability of staff -. However, although I agree with the claim that the cost of prosecution of criminals is very high, such difficulties were coped with in the cases of ICTY or ICTR, and the willingness to document such abuses for history and to punish the criminals overcame the scarcity of resources. The UN resolutions on the establishment of the tribunals urged states, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute equipment, qualified staff, pre-trial detention facilities, etc. to the tribunals, and, although, many delays were registered, an important number of contributions came from a series of countries, among which Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, United States, Italy, France, Pakistan, Mauritius, Cameroon, even Iran (offer to provide detention facilities for persons convicted by the ICTY). Contributions to the Voluntary Fund to Support the Activities of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, as of June 1996, amounted to almost \$7 million, with Pakistan donating \$1 million. Thus, although both the ICTY and ICTR were plagued from the beginning by inadequate funding and lack of specialized staff, many states responded in help of the tribunals' needs. Another factor that could apparently serve as explanation for the lack of initiative in prosecuting Iranian criminals is the long period of time since the events. Most states, including the ICC, have legislation barring prosecution of crimes after a number of years (3,10, 15 years) depending on the country and the crimes. "Customary international law seems to bar statutes of limitations for crimes against humanity, however, and forty-three states have ratified the UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. French and Belgian courts have specifically ruled out statutes of limitations on crimes against humanity."<sup>22</sup> Thus, the reticence to prosecute crimes based on such considerations is untenable in the existent legal framework and considerations, other than legal, must be present also.

I suggest that the political constraints of the aforementioned punitive instruments contributed significantly to the international community's unwillingness to make the Tehran leaders accountable for the crimes committed by their regime. Madeline Morris summarizes the effect of political constraints: "all too often accountability fails for lack of will at national and/or



international levels". She suggests that this is the case mostly when the regime responsible for offenses is still in power. In this case "there may be a denial that offenses were committed. Alternatively, offenses may be acknowledged but resource limitations may be used as a pretext for inaction that is actually born of a lack of will."<sup>23</sup> Consequently, national and international bodies charged with the handling of international crimes typically adopt a compromise position, in our case described by the non-binding resolutions and documents incriminating human rights abuses. In the case, however, that foreign courts initiate legal punitive action, the government of the country in which the crimes occurred will most likely try to block the prosecution. This may have important implications in relation to access to information and evidence. Such governments may press to have the case dropped, as Chile has in the Pinochet case. Once again, the outcome is correlated to the political will of the prosecuting state and the degree of independence of its judiciary. Various observers have also already pointed out certain political restrictions on the UN's punitive initiatives: international criminal tribunals are established by the organizations' decisions, not by a ratified treaty, thus allowing for political bias and undermining judicial independence. In the case of universal jurisdiction exercised in national courts, the political will of the prosecuting state can be a critical factor in the possibility of prosecution, particularly where the law does not allow victims to initiate criminal proceeding directly. However, the existence of a democratic government and of an independent judiciary and perhaps that presence of a large community of exiles from the country of the crimes can greatly help overcome issues of political will. This was the scenario in the Pinochet case, where the conservative government, under pressure from South American trade partners to drop the case, could not overturn the independent judiciary, the strong popular support for the prosecution and the influence of the large Chilean exile community. By contrast, the independent judiciary and intense lobbying of the Iranian exile communities in EU countries and the US are kept silent by the political will of appeasement of the Tehran leadership. Other examples of cases political will influence on achieving accountability for international crimes are the release in August 1999, by the Austrian authorities, of top Iraqi official Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, active in the genocide against the Kurds, despite a criminal complaint against him and the refusal of arrest, by the South African authorities, of former tyrant of Ethiopia, Mengitsu Haile Mariam, despite charges of genocide and crimes against humanity by the Ethiopian government. The standardized, codified International Criminal Court emerges as little politically biased as it was established through voluntary ratification of the ICC Treaty, rather than through the politicized Security Council. However, the presumably apolitical ICC is not a viable solution for prosecution of the Iranians responsible, given its jurisdiction *ratione temporis*, which limits the court's jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed after the entry in force of this statute. Thus, while ideally full accountability for international crimes against humanity would be the norm, impunity remains a recurrent pattern.

Specific political factors could also arise from the respective country's foreign policy. Thus, an analysis of various countries' foreign policies towards Iran and of the reaction produced by the regime's crimes suggests a positive correlation between the two. I will focus on two main countries that are prominent members of the international community and attempt to run this regression analysis in their cases: the United States and France. I will focus on these two countries because the MKO lobbied intensively there for action against the Iranian regime's crimes and because they are representative of the most active members of the international community's relations with Iran. The two coordinates that dominated the post-1979 period of foreign relations with Iran are the initial relentless opposition to the theocratic regime and the

ensuing attempt at ‘normalization’ of relations. The initial period was characterized by the US’ severance of diplomatic ties with Iran and the latter’s tense relations with the Western European countries, especially with France, which, since 1981 had hosted the leader of the Mojahedin, Massoud Rajavi and the headquarters of the Mojahedin. However, the echo of the 1988 events followed the initiation of the ‘normalization’ period. The United States was “paying Khomeini’s price”, as the Boston Globe headline on the Irangate affair in its April 25, 1987 issue read. Thus, “while the United States were selling arms to Iran behind the back of Congress and the world, the State Department was quietly trashing the first effective anti-Khomeini opposition in Iran, called the People’s Mojahedin, as “anti-democratic, anti-American” and using ‘terrorism.’”<sup>24</sup> The Irangate affair period was marked by the US’ attempt at appeasing the Tehran regime, which, contributed to a cumulative effect on the 1988 crimes against the MKO prisoners. Thus, in the context of the Reagan administration trying to placate Khomeini with missiles and intelligence and taking measures against the regime’s main domestic opponent, - as Item 4 on the list of the US concession to Iran read: “an official announcement terming the Mojahedin organization terrorist and Marxist” -the 1988 massacre of Mojahedin political prisoners echoed in silence in the United States. Political considerations deriving from the 1987 developments silenced the concern with foreign gross human rights abuses that characterizes the United States.

Conformed to the idea that the Tehran Islamic regime was not likely to be overthrown in the future, the US shaped its foreign policy accordingly, trying to encourage the ‘moderate’ factions in the theocratic regime. Lennart Frieden, a Moderate Party member of the Swedish Parliament questioned the political considerations involved in the new US policy: “it is with a mixture of bewilderment and anxiety that I look today at the US administration’s approach to the medieval regime in Iran. The State Department has given clear indications that it is willing to start a new chapter with the mullah’s regime, while there has been no clear sign of change in Iran’s policies. I only ask why?”<sup>25</sup> This policy has its origins in the Carter administration approach, which linked human rights to the US foreign policy. Ex-president Carter’s decision to “combine support for our more authoritarian allies and friends with the promotion of human rights within their countries”<sup>26</sup>determined a constant balancing between perceived American strategic interests and human rights considerations. Walter LaFeber argues that by 1980 Carter’s human rights policies had become hopelessly compromised by exceptions made for security reasons<sup>27</sup> Thus, in the context of rapprochement to Iran, the adapted version of this policy of conflicting interests imposed limitations on US advocacy for human rights in Iran in such cases as crimes committed against opposition groups, including the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Criticism of this policy of appeasing the Tehran regime has been voiced more arduously much later in the 1990s, as the Tehran regime has not given any indication of positive change in its human rights record. A May 30, 1995 letter to President Bill Clinton from members of the Congress stated: “after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the West tried to strengthen the ‘moderate factions within Iran so as to promote respect for international norms. This policy has failed.”

The study of the ties between France and Iran provides a model for the transformation of the relations between Iran and the European countries after the revolution. In the first decade of the Revolution France had been advocating for respect for human rights in Iran, to the anger of Ayatollah Khomeini: “I am very grateful to my French friends who gave me the opportunity to pass on the voice of justice and righteousness to the Iranian nation from Paris, and to lead and guide the revolution. But I did not expect my French friends to mention and cast human rights in our teeth about a bunch of criminals, a gang of thieves, a group of torturers, rioters and anti-humans, because they were murderers and killed human beings.”<sup>28</sup> Most importantly, France had

offered political asylum to the leaders of the Iranian opposition, ex-president Bani-Sadr and MKO leader, Massoud Rajavi, which led to the expulsion of the French ambassador from Iran in August 1981, and the expulsion of MKO members from France was a recurrent theme of all contacts of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with French politicians. However, France gradually began to show willingness to improve its relations with Iran, in the context of the political stability that the regime seemed to enjoy at Tehran. The prospect of lucrative Iranian trade investment contracts for French corporations, a recent high priority for French leaders (as Germany, UK and Japan had already done) gave impetus to the ‘normalization’ of relations, and France adopted a diplomacy of compliance towards Iran. This policy was based on granting some limited and gradual concessions, especially furthered by Iran’s help in the release of French hostages in Lebanon, in 1986. Thus, as a consequence, the MKO was expelled from France. This trend of improvement in relations was sought despite the 1987 war of embassies between the two countries, the severance of diplomatic ties for a short period due to bombing in Paris in which Iran was allegedly involved, and the recalling of ambassadors of the European Community following Khomeini’s fatwa on Salman Rushdie. France and Germany were the first countries to return their ambassadors to Tehran. Bound by its commitment to improve relations with Iran, France also adopted a second-best approach in the issue of human rights in Iran and in regards to the Mojahedin-e Khalq: they advocated for respect for human rights but in a framework that could still further friendly relations between the two countries. Consequently, France expelled the MKO from its territory but tacitly allowed members to return and continue their lobbying activities in a non-official manner. Constrained by the cumulative effect of the aforementioned compromise approach, France was not able to take a strong political stand in the question of the crimes against humanity committed in 1988 against Mojahedin political prisoners. Political considerations of foreign policy dominated the indignation and desire to punish the regime’s crimes and the French officials opted for non-binding international condemnation of the regime in a manner that would not lead to the materialization of the international indignation into trials like that of Gen. Pinochet or of the Rwanda criminals.

However, recently the international community, including France and the US, has become increasingly aware of the undisturbed continuation of Iran’s human rights gross violations and of Iran’s ranking as first in supporting international terrorism in the last years and, correlatively, of the lack of basis for a more tolerant and friendly attitude towards Tehran. This attitude could have suggested to the Tehran regime that the respective countries have shown understanding and, maybe, approval of the regime’s ‘particularities’ and provided a moral justification for the regime to continue its abusive policies. The realization of the detrimental effects of the promotion of friendly relations with Iran has been accompanied by an international outcry for binding condemnations of Iran’s human rights record, which could open the way for investigation for the regime’s crimes against humanity, and potentially, for the 1988 mass executions of prisoners. The most recent action is the call for International Condemnation of Iranian regime following the UN Human Rights Commission’s resolution adopted in its current session in Geneva condemning flagrant human rights abuses in Iran. More than 2000 parliamentarians and dignitaries around the world signed the petition that called for “adoption of binding international penalties against the Iranian regime”<sup>29</sup>. Although difficult to document because of the sensitivity of the issue, there can be observed a thread connecting foreign policy considerations with the attitude towards Iranian human rights crimes. This attitude ranged, according to the status of the countries’ relations, from open, unconditional condemnation of the

regime's crimes and support for dissenting factions in the immediate post-1979 period to a second-best approach of non-binding resolutions and reports in the 'normalization' period.

The second type of political consideration that I propose to have contributed to the impunity of Iranian leaders for the 1988 crimes is the fear manifested by the decision-makers of the international community of being identified as supporters of the political organization to which the victims of the Iranian mass-executions belonged. The organization has always enjoyed a controversial status, as its pre-1978 struggle against the Shah of Iran was associated with anti-Western, and particularly, anti-American feelings, as resentment of attacks on American citizens or interests in Iran is still felt and as its ideology is blended with Islamic Marxism. Thus, in the United States, in an ironic, but expected, official reply to the demand of allegedly almost 200 congressmen for the reasons for the US avoiding supporting Iran's main enemy, the Department of State placed the Mojahedin-e Khalq on its list of 30 foreign terrorist organizations, in a move considered by Khatami's government spokesperson, Ayatollah Mohajerani, as "America's biggest positive move"<sup>30</sup> towards the mullah's regime. Thus, the fear of manifesting support for a controversial organization may have influenced the US Department of State decision to designate the MKO as terrorist. The classification was received with extreme anger by the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which filed a case against the US Department of State and against Madeline K. Albright, the then-Secretary of State. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Secretary of State's record contained substantial support for her findings that the MKO engage in "terrorist activities" and refused to set aside the designation.<sup>31</sup> However, the same indignation was manifested by various Congressmen, such as Gary L. Ackerman and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, in their letter to the US president, in which they expressed their, "to say the least, confusion with the designation", as they "have found it to be a legitimate resistance against one of the most brutal dictatorships."<sup>32</sup> The objective validity of the report was doubted by other congressmen and the theory of the Department of State's alleged political bias was put forth: "it is apparent that the State Department never planned to issue a fair report."<sup>33</sup> There exist in the American Congress a group of most vocal supporters of the organization, who sponsored a series of letters of support, which were allegedly signed by many other representatives. Nevertheless, although the MKO appears to have a much larger basis of support, only the names of the congressmen in the aforementioned active group are available, and information on the names of other signers of letters cannot be obtained. Thus, as a manifestation of the same fear felt at the State Department level, it is interesting to note that 224 Members of Congress allegedly signed a 1997 Statement on Iran, as affirmed in the letter to President Clinton signed by Ackerman and Ros-Lehtinen, but the names of the Congressmen were never made public and many of the respective Congressmen specifically stated that they did not support the MKO, in an attempt to break any link that an indictment of Iranian leaders would create between them and the MKO. Certain European counter-parts share the same desire to condemn the Tehran regime's crimes but, at the same time, not to be associated with the diverse Iranian dissident factions, and especially with MKO, which has a record of violence. The real dimensions of the preoccupation with the possibility of being identified as supporters of the Iranian opposition movements are highlighted by the interpretations given by the Tehran regime itself and by the Mojahedin-e Khalq to such manifestations. Thus, both parties tend to exploit such declarations in terms favorable to their lines of action, and the tension is intensified in cases when the human rights violations are directed towards MKO members. The regime insists that human rights statements are actually covert forms of support for the opposition, thus providing a reason for casting doubt on the sincere intentions of the West of 'normalization' of relations,

while the MKO accentuates the support ‘by association’ given to the resistance by identifying the regime as human rights violators. In this context, a strong articulation of accusations of crimes against humanity against Mojahedin prisoners acquires interpretational variations difficult to overcome and which pose real obstacles to politicians and countries’ foreign policies’ lines of action. Political consensus, however, as to the undesirability of the oppressor government and the uncontroversial nature of the victims generates a completely different attitude. Decision-making factors’ identification with victims of an oppressing regime appears much stronger in the case of the Iraqi victims suffering from Saddam Hussein’s decisions. David J. Scheffer, United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, affirmed:

*“the United States is determined to see Saddam Hussein and his inner circle stripped of their power and brought to justice. Political opponents of any kind are subject to imprisonment, torture, and summary execution. The United States supports the creation of an international criminal tribunal for Iraq, as was done for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, we are assisting various non-governmental organizations to gather evidence for the use in prosecution in foreign domestic courts if the opportunity arises. This is a man and a regime who have brutally and systematically committed war crimes and crimes against humanity for years, are committing them now, and will continue committing them until the international community finally says: ‘enough.’<sup>34</sup>”*

This paper has attempted to show the intricate forms of association between political factors and international reactions to grave human rights violations, such as the mass execution of Mojahedin-e Khalq political prisoners in Iranian prisons in 1988. The events’ nature asks for an investigation from forums with jurisdiction over such breaches of international covenants and prima facie elements suggest the characteristics of crimes against humanity. Despite such evidence, however, the political dimensions involved limited the reaction to the events in the international arena: foreign policy considerations leading towards compromise in an attempt to ‘normalize’ the relations with Iran and to support its ‘moderate’ factions (Khatami). The controversial nature of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization to which the political prisoners belonged, its past anti-Western and violent record and the manipulative interpretation differences both the Iranian government and the MKO tend to make relative to condemnations of human rights abuses by the international community also contributed to the specific reaction the international community had vis-à-vis the 1988 crimes. Despite the voiced ideal to disallow impunity for international crimes and the diverse punitive instruments available, the international community’s political considerations fuse into its determination to bring the Iranian responsible to justice and contribute to its compromise approach. Recent changes in the nuances of the same political considerations, however, have allowed for a more decisive approach towards overcoming impunity and might prove beneficial to this ultimate goal. In this paper, I have focused on one particular range of political considerations, as different from those strategically and morally motivated, such as the political stability of the respective country and region, the possible retaliation against civilian population in the country, detrimental effects on the social fabric of the country. The political considerations targeted in this paper were the economic and military advantages, as well as the individual position of a elected official in the political arena of his country and of the international community, which have an overall detrimental effect, even when they lead to the desired effect (achieving accountability), because they set the roots of the punitive action in a context of strategy and policy motivated framework.

## **Appendix: Excerpts from MKO Documentation on Mass-Graves in Iran**

The mass graves are located in different cities around the country. They have been located by local residents, former prisoners, and families of victims or from testimonies by former prison officials\*:

1. Ahwaz, Khuzistan Province
2. Amol, Mazandaran Province
3. Arak, Central Province
4. Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province
5. Borazjan, Bushehr Province
6. Gatchsaran, Kokhliuyeh Province
7. Gonbad, Mazandaran Province
8. Gorgan, Golestan Province
9. Hamedan, Hamedan Province
10. Isfahan, Isfahan Province
11. Kerman, Kerman Province
12. Kermanshah, Kermanshah Province
13. Lahijan, Gilan Province
14. Mashad, Khorassan Province
15. Orumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province
16. Qazvin, Qazvin Province
17. Saleh-Abad, Ilam Province
18. Shiraz, Fars Province
19. Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province
20. Tehran, Tehran Province
21. Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Keddie, Nikki R., *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1981, pp. 259-261.

<sup>2</sup> The operation was launched on July 25, 1988 and took the National Liberation Army (military wing of MKO) 170 kms deep inside Iran. The MKO claims to have confronted 200,000 regime soldiers and to have inflicted 55,000 casualties. After four days of heavy fighting they were forced back in Iraq (Information provided by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), available online at <http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/nla/etl.html>).

<sup>3</sup> Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994).

<sup>4</sup> Interim Report of the Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia, established by the Security Council in its resolution 780 (1992).

<sup>5</sup> Excerpts from the Report by the Special Representative of the UN Human Rights Commission to the Commission's 189 session, UN Document E/CN.4/189/26, January 26, 1989.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights in Iran, E/CN.4/2001/NGO/51, January 23, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Monafeqin: derogatory term used by the Iranian mullahs for the Mojahedin, Farsi lit., "hypocrite."

<sup>8</sup> Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montaseri's memoirs, cited in United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights in Iran, E/CN.4/2001/NGO/51, January 23, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Both at Tehran Radio, December 5, 1988 and August 6, 1988, respectively.

<sup>10</sup> Radio Tehran, August 6, 1988

<sup>11</sup> AI, Iran, Violations of Human Rights, 1987-1990, Section 1.2.1: The Massacre of 1988.

<sup>12</sup> Idem.

<sup>13</sup> AI, Iran, Violations of Human Rights, 1987-1990, Section 1.2.1: The Massacre of 1988.

<sup>14</sup> Idem.

<sup>15</sup> I. b) "Just as in life, so also after death, the sanctity of a person's body shall be made inviolable. It is the obligation of the believers to see that a deceased person's body is handled with due solemnity", Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, Sept. 19, 1981.

<sup>16</sup> I attached a sample of documentation on the Iranian mass graves from the period in the appendix.

<sup>17</sup> Reuters, March 29, 1989.

<sup>18</sup> Ayatollah Montazeri's memoirs, cited in a statement by Women's Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, Crimes Against Humanity, Crimes Against Women, January 2001.

<sup>19</sup> Idem.

<sup>20</sup> Afshar, Haleh, Islam and Feminisms: An Iranian Case-Study, St. Martin's Press, NY, 1998.

<sup>21</sup> The 'treatment' group was the group of leaders towards whom the international community showed overwhelming willingness to prosecute them, and the 'control' group was the group of Iranian leaders. In

such a case, only conclusions of an associative nature can be drawn, and not of a causal one, because of the confounding factors present in the study of the two groups.

<sup>22</sup> Human Rights Watch, *The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights Criminals Abroad*, available online at <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/chile98/precedent>.

<sup>23</sup> Morris, Madeline, *Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International Guidelines against Impunity: Facilitating Accountability*, 59, *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, Fall 1996.

<sup>24</sup> Evans, Rowland and Novak, Robert, *The Real Iranian Terrorist*, *The Washington Post*, April 3, 1987.

<sup>25</sup> Frieden, Lennart, "Let There Be Action on Iran", speech at an international parliamentary seminar in London, cited in National Council of Resistance of Iran, *Iran under Khatami, the Myth of Moderation*, France, 1998.

<sup>26</sup> Carter, Jimmy, *Keeping Faith*, Bantam Books, New York, 1982, p. 143.

<sup>27</sup> LaFeber, Walter, *From Confusion to Cold War: The Memoirs of the Carter Administration*, *Diplomatic History*, Winter 1984, Number 6.

<sup>28</sup> Khomeini's message to the president of France, 1981, cited in Bozorgmehri, Majid, *Relations between Iran and France during the First Decade after the Revolution*, *Ettel'aat Siasi va Eqtesadi*, Dec. 1996.

<sup>29</sup> International Condemnation of Iranian Regime, petition, available online at <http://www.iran-e-azad.org/petition0501.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Agence France Press, March 27 1998.

<sup>31</sup> MKO, Petitioner, v. United States Department of State and Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State, Respondents, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 97-1648, June 25, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Letter to President Clinton, October 28, 1997.

<sup>33</sup> Statement by Senator Dave Durenberger, November 2, 1994.

<sup>34</sup> *The Global Challenge of Establishing Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity*, address by David J. Scheffer, University of Pretoria, Center for Human Rights, Pretoria, South Africa, August 22, 2000.

\* All information, available online at [http://www.mojahedin.org/Pages/english/f\\_english.html](http://www.mojahedin.org/Pages/english/f_english.html), is MKO data, not verified so far by other organization, and can therefore, be biased or incorrect.

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# Against Rising Tides: Global Climate Change by Arielle Kristan

**Small island states are now facing new challenges as a result of global climate change. Kristan examines the formation, role, and influence of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in international climate negotiations and also considers the ramifications of the United States' departure from the Kyoto Protocol.**

## Introduction

Charles Fleming, former Ambassador of the small island state of St. Lucia, once said, “If we wait for the proof [of global climate change], the proof will kill us” (Davis 1996 : 4). This statement aptly indicates the severity of the dilemma confronting small island states in the global climate change regime. They produce negligible amounts of greenhouse gasses, but face potentially disastrous consequences from sea-level rise (SLR) and increased incidences of severe weather. Yet, historically they wield little power in international politics. As greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise and scientific evidence reinforces the occurrence of climate change, this daunting discrepancy between vulnerability and power becomes increasingly dangerous for small island states.

This research will begin by addressing the challenges that climate change presents to small island states. Vulnerability studies suggest several useful frameworks through which to view the situation of small island states. The interaction of the effects of climate change and the compromised ability of small island states to deal with them created an environment of “apocalyptic urgency” (Shibuya 1996: 548) within the regional conscience in the late 1980s. The analysis of vulnerability contained in section one will ultimately provide the basis for subsequent examination of how highly vulnerable nations have effected change in international climate negotiations despite a severe disadvantage in resources and international political power.

The second part of this research will consist of an overview of the role of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in international climate negotiations. It will cover events from the earliest discussions of climate change until the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 6) in The Hague, Netherlands and Bonn, Germany. This section will identify factors that have informed the negotiating strategies of AOSIS. Of particular note will be the discourse of vulnerability that pervades these negotiating strategies, and its effect on their persuasiveness. Part Two will conclude with an examination of the difficulties inherent in AOSIS’s transition from agenda-building to policy-forming phases of international negotiations.

Part Three of this research will focus specifically on the current state of the Kyoto Protocol and attempts by AOSIS to ensure its implementation. COP 6 witnessed the unilateral abandonment of the Protocol by the United States. Subsequent agreements made in desperation to salvage the Protocol weakened commitment levels. The Protocol that has evolved in the four years since Kyoto is less stringent than necessary for significant abatement of climate change. Thus the question emerges: How can small island states best utilize their limited resources to guarantee the livelihood and continued existence of small island states? The analysis of current trends and past precedence contained in this research suggests a tripartite course of action focused primarily on facilitating adaptation programs. While redirecting efforts and resources toward these programs, they must maintain a symbolic presence in international negotiations and promote international awareness of their unique situation.

## **Methodology**

This research relies upon a variety of primary and secondary sources. The constantly evolving nature of the global climate change regime and the specificity of the topic chosen for this research required a multi-faceted approach to gathering materials. Primary sources include the texts of relevant conventions and protocols and interviews with individuals involved in the field of climate change. Interviews were conducted between September and December 2001 in Washington DC, and by email with individuals in London and the Solomon Islands. Secondary sources include reports published by non-governmental, intergovernmental, and regional organizations, journal articles, newspaper articles, scholarly works and relevant Internet sites.

Interviews focused on several topics relevant to this research, including the negotiation process, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the position of small island states, and the cooperation of AOSIS with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Farhana Yamin and Jacob Werksman, attorneys for the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, provided information about their work with AOSIS. Katherine Silverthorne of the World Wildlife Fund's Climate Change Program discussed cooperation between AOSIS and NGOs as well as basic facets of the negotiation process. Boni Biagini spoke about cooperation between AOSIS and NGOs and the potential for the Global Environmental Facility to benefit AOSIS. She was recently hired as senior environmental specialist and NGO coordinator of the GEF. Daniel Reifsnnyder, director of the Global Change Office of the United States Department of State, provided insight into the position of the United States in climate change negotiations. He also discussed the leadership of the European Union and the negotiating strategy of AOSIS. Moses Biliki, Director of Environment and Conservation in the Ministry of Forests, Environment and Conservation of the Solomon Islands, serves as his country's GEF focal point. He offered an insider's perspective on the GEF and indicated the resources necessary to complete the process of applying for aid.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview representatives of AOSIS within the time limits of this research. Further research should include the first-hand accounts of ranking individuals within the AOSIS administration as well as representatives of small island states. The time limits of this research also required stopping the analysis of climate negotiations after COP 6. An analysis of the COP 7 negotiations in Marrakech would enhance the discussion of the current state of negotiations and the place of AOSIS within them. Finally, this research does not include any monetary data regarding the funding that AOSIS has received from aid partners. Nor does it provide information on the cost of participating in climate change negotiations, due to the difficulty of obtaining this information.

## **Part I: Global Climate Change and the Vulnerability of Small Island States**

### *Global Climate Change*

The issue of global climate change first entered the international conscience in a significant way in the late 1980s. In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), consisting of representatives from the international scientific community. That same year, discussions on global climate change began in the UN General Assembly. In 1990, the IPCC published its First Assessment Report, which recommended

international action on global climate change (UNFCCC 2001(b)). Since 1988, the IPCC has emerged as the foremost scientific authority on global climate change. Its reports were accepted at the Second Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as the “most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate change” (Fermann : 79). Thus, its findings constitute the basis for international negotiations in the field. Since this paper focuses on those negotiations, all discussions will use IPCC findings as a reference.

According to the IPCC, global warming occurs as the result of the build-up of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Levels of all anthropogenic greenhouse gasses are rising and are currently at levels significantly above their baseline atmospheric levels. These gasses, which include methane, nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons and carbon dioxide, trap solar radiation in the earth’s atmosphere, causing a warming of the lower atmosphere and the surface of the earth. CO<sub>2</sub> is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas, and the focus of most emissions-reduction plans. The combustion of fossil fuels accounts for three-quarters of the increase in CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere. The remaining quarter stems from deforestation, which depletes the ability of forests to absorb CO<sub>2</sub> and releases CO<sub>2</sub> stored in trees and soil. The atmosphere has experienced, and continues to endure, unprecedented increases in atmospheric concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> that amount to a thirty-one percent difference since 1750 (IPCC 2001: 7). This process is detailed more specifically in the 1991 IPCC First Assessment Report.

The IPCC Third Assessment Report, published in 2001, provides the most current information about climate change. Its findings indicate that global temperatures increased by an average of 0.6 degrees Celsius in the twentieth century. Since the 1960s, temperatures in the lower atmosphere have increased by 0.1 degrees Celsius each decade. Perhaps most pertinent to the condition of small island states are changes in average sea level and ocean temperature. The average global tide level has risen by between 0.1 and 0.2 meters since 1900. Ocean heat content has increased perceptibly since 1950, when data first became available (IPCC 2001: 4). Increases in ocean temperature both increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and indicate the occurrence of thermal expansion, which causes sea-level rise.

#### *The Vulnerability of Small Island States*

For purposes of this paper, “small island states” will refer to those nations identified as such by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC further characterizes the small island states as a region, a nomenclature that will be used throughout this paper as well. The Alliance of Small Island States is a political organization currently comprised of thirty-nine small island states and four observer nations. To a large extent, the membership of AOSIS overlaps the small island state region. Appendix A lists the members of both groups.

The concept of vulnerability has evolved during the last twenty-five years. Many definitions exist, but all refer to the interactions that “exist between exogenous [forces] and the internal capacity of a community to withstand or respond to the event” (Kasperson 2001: 2). The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) defines vulnerability as a function of “the exposure to hazard by external activity and coping capacity of the people to reduce the risk... at a certain point in time” (UNEP 2000: 13). The IPCC uses a similar definition, but applies it specifically to climate change. In its 1997 publication *The Regional Impact of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability*, the IPCC defines vulnerability in terms of interaction between the sensitivity of a given system to changes in climate, and its adaptive capabilities. The IPCC definition, therefore, is most specifically relevant to the focus of this research.

However, the IPCC definition noted above does not pertain directly to the “people” or “community” affected by climate change. Rather, it serves primarily to conceptualize environmental vulnerability. The UNEP notes that the locus of vulnerability lies with the “individual [as] related to social structures of household, community, society and world system” (UNEP 2000: 12). Vulnerability thus can only be quantified in the context of its effects on people. While climate change will cause environmental impacts across the globe, it will perhaps most severely affect human populations living in small island states. This research deals with small island states as communities of individuals living within complex natural ecosystems. It is imperative to consider the effects of climate change on individuals and the extent to which those individuals, organized within social structures, can adapt to the effects. Thus, this research will focus primarily on the social and developmental impacts of climate change.

The first discussion of the vulnerability of small island states emerged from the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) III meetings in 1972. Over the next sixteen years, the international community recognized a wide variety of disadvantages specific to island nations, especially “developing” island nations (Briguglio 1995: 1615). These discussions led to a comprehensive study presented by UNCTAD at the Malta meeting on Island Developing Countries in 1988.

As a result of the Malta meetings, UNCTAD commissioned Lino Briguglio, of the Foundation for International Studies of the University of Malta, to prepare a comprehensive index of vulnerability in small island developing states. Published in 1995, this study focused on economic vulnerability indicators in an attempt to move beyond GDP as a measure of development levels. GDP per capita does not take into account the unique challenges that confront island states, and thus is a poor indicator of development and need for aid. Although the study focuses on economic vulnerabilities, Briguglio includes “proneness to natural disasters” and “environmental factors” as special disadvantages of small island states (Briguglio 1995: 1617). The inclusion of proneness to natural disasters in the study indicates the challenge that extreme weather events have historically posed to economic and human development in small island states. Six of the ten states with the highest proneness to disasters are island states. Even more striking is the fact that island states comprise nine of the ten most vulnerable states (Appendix B).

Briguglio’s study illustrates the severe disadvantage that small island states face in terms of general vulnerability. Though small island states cover a large geographic range, have diverse political systems, and vary in size and elevation, several characteristics apply broadly to the region. Island climate is moderated by maritime influences, and therefore temperatures remain uniformly high throughout the year. Small island states have large exclusive economic zones, and economies dominated by tourism and agriculture (IPCC 1998: 333). High population densities put pressure on natural resources, especially coastal resources. These characteristics of small island states suggest that any ecosystem impact will have a magnified economic and social impact.

#### *Vulnerability and Climate Change*

Global climate change poses a set of varying conditions to which all states must adapt. Even among the group of small island states, several factors determine the extent and severity of observed climate changes. Location plays an important role, as evidenced in the differences between Caribbean and Pacific states. Between 1900 and 1995, Caribbean island states experienced a mean temperature increase of slightly more than 0.5 degrees Celsius, accompanied by a 250 millimeter decrease in rainfall. However, for the Pacific island states, the temperature

increased less than 0.5 degrees Celsius and there was no marked change in precipitation patterns (IPCC 1998: 333).

Global climate change will impact small island states in two primary ways: sea level rise and severe weather events. In 1997, the IPCC reported that oceans would warm between one and two degrees Celsius by 2100 (IPCC 1998: 334). Thermal expansion, in addition to the slow melting of ice packs, will cause sea levels to rise. The IPCC projects that water levels will rise between two and nine millimeters each year over the next one hundred years, with the possibility of a meter of total change by 2100 (IPCC 1998: 334). At the same time, increases in ocean surface temperature may increase the frequency of severe weather events.

Although uncertainty exists as to the future extent of sea level rise, any mean increase will prove significant to small island states. Actual sea-level rise will vary from island to island as a result of currents, wind, tides, ocean circulation, and local atmospheric conditions and will likely be more significant than mean rises (IPCC 1998: 341). Moreover, even with an immediate stabilization of greenhouse gasses, sea levels will continue to rise beyond the year 2100, as a result of warming caused by historic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 1998: 341). Most importantly, many island nations are extremely low-lying. Thus, any perceptible sea-level rise may destroy highly populated coastal communities, flood fresh-water aquifers, and threaten fragile ecosystems. Ultimately, some islands may be rendered completely uninhabitable or totally inundated by water.

Projections of increases in extreme weather events, which include cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, droughts and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) weather pattern also include a degree of uncertainty. Several factors will determine the severity of impacts, including island elevation, existing weather patterns and location. Unfortunately, climate models and current scientific knowledge are limited in their ability to predict possible trends in severe weather. This limitation is particularly acute for the small island states, because modeling programs are more accurate for large areas of lands, and quite ineffective for small landmasses (IPCC 1998: 337). However, recent research indicates that the frequency of tropical cyclones may increase between ten and twenty percent with a doubling of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere, projected to occur before 2100. At COP 5 in 1998, the Pacific Island delegations reported observing a significant increase in disruptive weather events (SPREP 1999). Combined with sea-level rise, an increased incidence of tropical storms may produce dangerous storm surges. Severe weather events also pose a direct risk to human health, disrupt transportation systems, damage agriculture, impose financial burdens and raise the cost of insurance.

The above discussion addresses the sensitivity of the systems of small island states to climate change. It does not, however, indicate the vulnerability of such states. As noted before, vulnerability analysis must take into account the ability of communities to adapt and respond to changes in their environment. That ability depends upon a wide range of factors. Briguglio's study indicated that, in general, small island states are highly vulnerable to external conditions.

There are specific characteristics that render small island states less able to effectively adapt to rising sea levels and increased severe weather events. Many of these are economic. Due to their resource-based economies, sensitivity to external market forces, high transportation costs, and relative isolation, small island states simply do not have the financial capital to unilaterally adopt adaptation measures. The IPCC also cites technological and human resource capabilities, cultural and social acceptability of plans and institutional support as possible constraining factors (IPCC 1998: 347). Thus, small island states are both highly sensitive and extremely vulnerable to the effects of global climate change.

## **Part II: AOSIS in the Global Climate Regime**

### *The Formation and Evolution of AOSIS*

The small island states participate in climate negotiations as the Alliance Of Small Island States, an organization that emerged from the Second World Climate Conference in 1990, a preliminary meeting to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Though AOSIS now concerns itself with several issues of concern to small island states, a shared vulnerability to climate change served as the primary impetus to its founding. As a result, discourses of vulnerability have largely informed the political response of small island states to global climate change. This strategy helped AOSIS achieve considerable success in early climate negotiations.

Shortly after the Second World Climate Conference, the Ford Foundation began funding the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) to work with AOSIS on legal matters (Werksman 2001). FIELD's relationship with the Alliance was based on the recognition that small island states were posed to become "front-line states" both in terms of the impacts of climate change, but also in terms of the international legal and diplomatic response," according to FIELD attorney Jacob Werksman (2001). The Ford Foundation realized that AOSIS did not have the technical knowledge, financial resources, or sheer representative power necessary to effect meaningful change in climate negotiations. Members of FIELD's climate program provide "legal and technical assistance, training and advice to AOSIS, both prior to and during international negotiations on climate change" (Werksman 2001). According to Dan Reifsnyder (2001), director of the Global Change Office of the US State Department, the contribution of lawyers from the developed North enhanced the Alliance's effectiveness in climate change negotiations.

AOSIS also works with local branches of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Greenpeace (Silverthorne 2001). Regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the South Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP) also work alongside AOSIS. This close cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has allowed small island states to overcome their lack of technical capacity and political insignificance. For example, the United Nations Development Program has worked closely with SPREP to build capacity and implement the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Pacific island states (SPREP 1999).

Despite these varied alliances, AOSIS has maintained a "sense of unity and new-found confidence" throughout climate change negotiations (Davis 1996: 19). The Alliance is currently led by Ambassador Tuiloma Neroni Slade of Samoa and represents forty-two sovereign nations, three of which are observer nations. It comprises the largest unified voting block in the United Nations, with one fifth of the total membership (Davis 1996: 22). Officially, it is part of the G-77 plus China, and has participated in negotiations as such. Though a rift arose between AOSIS and other members of the group during pre-UNFCCC meetings in Geneva, the small island states generally enjoy the support of other developing nations (Paterson 1996: 58). The G-77 plus China represents over 140 member nations and may potentially wield considerable political power due to its sheer size

### *AOSIS in Agenda Building Activities*

Conflict among economic, scientific, and vulnerability discourses marked the early stages of climate negotiations. The priorities for most developing nations lay in development and access



to technology, while industrialized countries continued to frame the issue in terms of economic tradeoffs and scientific uncertainties (Paterson 1996: 85). AOSIS approached the issue from a radically different perspective: the question of sea-level rise represented a “crisis point” for small island states. At the Second World Climate Conference, AOSIS representatives raised the principle of “representation proportionate to risk” (Davis 1996: 18). This alludes to the disproportionate vulnerability to climate change that small island states face.

Ultimately, AOSIS enjoyed much success in pre-UNFCCC negotiations, primarily as a result of their emphasis of vulnerability. This strategy proved to be “a powerful motivating force for action, as well as a source of political discourse against economic and scientific issues” (Shibuya 1996: 548). Concerns about the survival and well being of small island states took priority over the economic and development priorities of other nations. As a result, representatives from small island states held several significant positions of power at the Rio Summit. Ambassador Robert Van Lierop, elected leader of AOSIS in 1992, was chosen to co-chair Working Group II at the Rio Earth Summit. This represented the first time that any island nation held a leadership position at a UN meeting (Shibuya 1996: 552). In both spirit and practice, AOSIS led the world through the early phases of climate negotiations. However, this symbolic leadership produced only modest results. The Second World Climate Conference called for the launch of formal international negotiations, which led the UN General Assembly to open initial debate on a framework convention. Nonetheless, many scientists and technical experts deemed the Ministerial Statement of the Conference a failure because it did not require a high level of commitment from participating countries (UNFCCC 1993). AOSIS gained the platform from which to lead climate negotiations, but was unable to persuade other countries to wholeheartedly follow it.

### ***From Agenda Building to Policy Debate: Pre-Kyoto Negotiations***

Despite its early leadership in global climate change dialogues, AOSIS met with only moderate success translating its goals into actual policy. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was opened for signatures at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, became the pivotal document in the nascent climate change regime. As a framework convention, it was successful in several regards. It established climate change as a serious problem, while advocating ambitious strategies to combat it. Furthermore, the UNFCCC garnered broad international recognition and commitment. Finally, it was timely and countries moved quickly towards its implementation (Fermann 1997: 23).

The UNFCCC contains several Articles that expressly benefit AOSIS. It recognizes as an objective the need to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” while leaving determination of that level to later meetings (UNFCCC 1992: Article 2). Even more importantly for small island states, Article 4 stipulates that Annex I (developed) countries “assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.” Article 8 specifically mentions the unique concerns of small island states and urges all Parties to address these concerns.

Although some aspects of the UNFCCC benefit AOSIS, the Convention represents a compromise between the concerns of small island states and those of developed nations. It reinforces the right of countries to develop and encourages the promotion of “a supportive and open international system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development” (UNFCCC 1992: Article 3, Section 4). Thus, it addresses questions of vulnerability only within

economic and development frameworks. This was the tendency that AOSIS had so vociferously opposed in the agenda-building stage of negotiations. Nor does the UNFCCC address the question of emissions reductions in developing nations, a result of strong resistance on the part of the G-77 and China. This provides early indication of the periodically contentious relationship between AOSIS and its G-77 partners.

The Conference of the Parties negotiations that followed the UNFCCC further indicated the obstacles preventing the Alliance from significantly influencing international climate change policy. At COP 1, AOSIS called for a twenty percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2005 (Silverthorne 2001). Known as the “AOSIS protocol,” this goal utilized scientific evidence produced by the IPCC as a policy basis. The final COP 1 agreement did include the AOSIS protocol among several others to be considered for future implementation (Fermann 1997: 74). However, it failed to adopt stringently binding emissions reductions for developed nations. Another AOSIS proposal—compensation to victims of global climate change—was rejected outright. AOSIS enjoyed the full support of developing nations on this proposal, but the financial concerns of developed nations stymied its ambitions (Paterson 1996: 86). These early negotiations marked the beginning of the Alliance’s struggle against more politically powerful Parties. They also indicate an incipient shift in power from AOSIS to the developed nations of the European Union.

Nonetheless, at COP 2 AOSIS remained vocally critical of Annex I nations. The Alliance protested that the emissions-reductions proposals of industrialized countries fell short on environmental grounds. This became more complicated when sixteen countries refused to accept the IPCC’s scientific analysis as a basis for policy formation (Fermann 1997: 50). Moreover, AOSIS maintained that no proposals except its own met the negotiating requirements established in discussions within the UN General Assembly (Paterson 1996: 85). At the same time, AOSIS opposed proposals for the stabilization of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, insisting instead on actual cuts. In essence, AOSIS resisted all compromise on the question of emissions. This negotiating stance is understandable, considering the basis of vulnerability from which the Alliance operated.

#### *The Kyoto Protocol: Disappointment for David and Goliath*

AOSIS won a decisive battle at COP 3 in Kyoto with the help of an unlikely ally—the United States. AOSIS was a key proponent of the inclusion of Article 12 in the Kyoto Protocol, which establishes the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM facilitates Joint Implementation projects between Annex I nations and developing nations. The United States supported Article 12 because they believed that it made the Protocol economically feasible and more acceptable to US interests. AOSIS stood to gain fewer direct benefits than the developed nations from its inclusion. However, the CDM establishes international cooperation, which is essential for small island states in order to reduce their vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, AOSIS countries will receive a fee from every transaction processed through the CDM that will go to an adaptation fund (Werksman and Cameron n.d.a: 260).

In a practical sense, the Kyoto Protocol ended all debates over emissions-reduction levels. It represented a compromise between the positions of AOSIS on one hand and Annex I nations on the other. Article 3 states that Annex I Parties must reduce their emissions by, on average, five percent below 1990 levels in the commitment period from 2008-2012 (UNFCCC 1997). This fell significantly short of the “twenty percent by 2020” that AOSIS had demanded in earlier negotiations. Nor does the Protocol contain any requirements for developing nations to reduce their emissions. This issue became a point of contention for the United States in

subsequent negotiations. Consequentially, the Protocol satisfied neither the United States nor AOSIS. Yet, both signed the Protocol and committed to continued negotiations.

Despite their disappointment in the results of Kyoto, AOSIS member states ratified the Protocol and began implementation procedures. Since all AOSIS member states are classified as developing nations (Annex II), none were required to actually reduce greenhouse gasses under the Protocol. Nonetheless, many member nations did initiate emissions mitigation measures. For example, the National Communication of Samoa<sup>1</sup> concludes that Samoa emits an insignificant amount of greenhouse gasses. However, since it is among the most vulnerable countries “it is ethical...that Samoa should recognise its obligation toward reducing GHG emissions” (UNFCCC 2001(a): 16). This is important for maintaining the moral authority of small island states in the negotiation process. The government thus called for the following actions (UNFCCC 2001(a): 20-23):

- Development of regulations concerning importation of use of motor vehicles, certain appliances, and refrigerants
- Regulations of the activities of foreign bio-prospectors
- Promotion of better land-use practices, including agro-forestry
- Discouragement of poor development activities.
- Development of school curricula designed to raise public awareness of climate change, sea-level rise, and mitigation measures
- Cooperation with Annex I nations in bilateral programs designed to build community capacity and protect infrastructure

Samoa, and the other AOSIS nations that followed its lead, thus sent a strong message of full participation in the Kyoto Protocol to the international community. Of particular importance is the emphasis on Samoa’s willingness to participate in bilateral assistance programs.

COP 4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina and COP 5 in Bonn, Germany, involved intense negotiations and discussions focused on creating a workable plan to implement the Kyoto Protocol. COP 4 produced the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, in which delegates pledged to reach agreement on several pivotal issues by COP 6. These issues included the financial mechanisms, technology transfer, joint implementation and Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the UNFCCC. As noted above, UNFCCC Articles 4.8 and 4.9 deal with the aid to highly vulnerable nations. COP 5 provided a final venue for delegates to examine these issues before moving into the critical COP 6 negotiations (Climate Change Knowledge Network 2001). Members of AOSIS used this opportunity to report the findings of their respective National Communications. The National Communications emphasized the extreme vulnerability of small islands and the need for adequate adaptation aid (SPREP 1999).

### **Part III: Cop 6 and Beyond**

#### ***COP 6: The United States Pulls Out***

COP 6 opened at The Hague, Netherlands on November 13<sup>th</sup>, 2001 with the objective of finalizing rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Dutch Environment Minister Jan Pronk proposed a plan that would severely limit the ability of the United States to meet emissions reductions through carbon sinks and emissions, requiring instead that at least half of all reductions occur through domestic policy measures (Fuller 2000). This underscored the conflict between the United States and the European Union over the use of flexibility

mechanisms. The Pronk plan also included new funding to be directed toward both adaptation programs and technology transfer. The United States, Canada and Japan were among the key supporters of this aspect of Pronk's proposal. However, disagreements among the delegates, primarily between the United States and the European Union, precipitated the abandonment of talks at The Hague.

COP 6 resumed in July of 2001 in Bonn, Germany. However, the newly installed Bush Administration had previously announced that the United States would not support the Kyoto Protocol. In a speech to The Royal Institute of International Affairs Conference, Dr. Harlan L. Watson of the United States State Department called the targets adopted at Kyoto "arbitrary and in many cases unrealistic." He also said that the US objected to the fact that Kyoto "does not include developing countries, and its costs would harm the U.S. economy" (United States State Department 2001). Dr. Watson's comments indicate the unwillingness of the United States to move beyond discourses of uncertainty and economic tradeoffs. This attitude has made it unresponsive to the concerns of small island states about vulnerability and adaptation. It also alienated the United States from other developed nations.

However, the United States guaranteed that it would not stop other nations from adopting the Kyoto Protocol. In order to meet the required representation of fifty-five percent of countries representing at least fifty-five percent of emissions, the European Union entered into intense negotiations with the "umbrella group," including Japan, Russia, Canada and Australia (Climate Change Knowledge Network 2001). In order to gain their support, the EU consented to compromises in emissions reductions, thereby securing a major diplomatic victory and asserting its leadership on climate change. It also appeased its Green Party constituents and gained a platform from which to criticize the United States (Reifsnyder 2001). However, the compromises at Bonn called into question the ability of the Kyoto Protocol to effectively mitigate climate change.

## **Part IV: Policy Recommendations and Conclusions**

### *Against Rising Tides: A Strategy for Survival*

Since 1992, members of the international community concerned with global climate have focused their attention on negotiations established and carried out within the system created by the UNFCCC. The Parties have committed considerable time, energy and other resources to regime building and constant negotiations on the assumption that Kyoto was the only means to address the problems of global climate change. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, has emphasized that the European Union does "not see a solution to the climate problem outside the Kyoto Protocol" (Prodi 2001).

However, the abandonment of Kyoto by the United States at Bonn, and President George W. Bush's subsequent promise to create a different climate treaty, disrupted that assumption. The question arises constantly: how can any climate treaty effectively reduce emissions without the participation of the United States, the largest contributor of anthropogenic greenhouse gases? Even as negotiations continue on Kyoto, it is imperative that countries, regions, and NGOs begin to look beyond the existing climate change regime for long-term answers. Unfortunately, the single-minded focus of the international community has retarded the development of such strategies, especially on the international level.

For AOSIS, the situation is particularly acute. According to William Nordhaus, a preeminent scholar of climate change, the Kyoto Protocol as it currently stands will only reduce emissions 0.8 percent below current levels (Nordhaus 2001: 1283). This will have little

mitigating influence on the effects of climate change. Meanwhile, according to some models, even if countries adhere strictly to their Kyoto Protocol limits and cease producing greenhouse gasses after 2020, sea levels will rise between fourteen and thirty-two centimeters, peaking between 2050 and 2100 (Australia's Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation: 2000). Likewise, historic emissions of greenhouse gasses will continue to influence climate systems, potentially causing increases in severe weather events.

The above review of the current status of the Kyoto Protocol, the state of leadership within the climate regime and scientific evidence predicting dire consequences for small island states suggests that AOSIS and its member states rethink their current strategy. A three-fold strategy encompassing adaptation, negotiation, and awareness-raising activities will allow AOSIS to most effectively use its limited resources to ensure the well being and survival of its member states. The following section focuses on suggested actions for AOSIS as a regional organization. However, where appropriate, it indicates possible courses of action for individual states.

#### Adaptation

The Alliance of Small Island States played a crucial role in bringing climate change to the forefront of the international consciousness. As detailed in this research, it enjoyed considerable influence in the agenda-building stages of climate negotiations, but has since diminished in importance. The commitment of Annex I countries to financing mitigation and adaptation projects through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) provides an important opportunity for small island states to gain valuable support. This suggests that small island states should reduce their role in climate change negotiations while refocusing resources toward cooperative programs specifically designed to aid at-risk communities and infrastructure.

Adaptation projects cover a wide gamut of possibilities designed to improve the ability of a community to live with the effects of climate change. This can include rigid sea level control measures like bulkheads, levees, sea walls and raising barrier islands. It may also involve plans for providing adequate drinking water in case of aquifer contamination, preservation of wetlands as a buffer, and relocation of infrastructure away from at-risk areas. In the most extreme case, contingency plans may establish guidelines for the evacuation of communities or entire areas (Edgerton 1991).

The GEF emerged from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit as a financial mechanism to support the Convention of Biological Diversity and the UNFCCC. It has since evolved to support other global environmental treaties. Its programs currently fall into four "focal areas" including biodiversity, climate change, international waters and ozone depletion. Each of these focal areas is subdivided into "operational programs" (GEF 2000: 8-9). In general, the GEF focuses on programs that generate global environmental benefits. This would seemingly eliminate adaptation programs that tend to generate only domestic benefits. However, at COP1, particularly vulnerable Parties, including members of AOSIS, overpowered influential donor countries to win the inclusion of preliminary adaptation programs in the GEF Operational Strategy. As a result, highly vulnerable countries may receive full-cost financing of adaptation activities. To date, these programs have mainly encompassed "enabling activities." This can include activities related to preparing national communications and national climate change programs (Werksman and Cameron n.d.a: 255).

However, member nations of AOSIS will require more funds directed toward concrete adaptation measures, and the GEF appears to be poised to meet these needs. Several factors make it an ideal venue through which to finance mitigation and adaptation projects. Boni

Biagini, GEF senior environmental specialist and NGO coordinator, noted that the small size of the GEF allows it more flexibility to work on small-scale projects. This is essential for small island states to attract the attention and resources that they need. Furthermore, the GEF is fundamentally based in the precepts of the UNFCCC. Therefore, the constant negotiations and revisions to the Kyoto Protocol have no bearing upon its programs. This stability is necessary for small island states to implement necessary long-term survival strategies (Biagini 2001).

The World Bank administration of the GEF may raise some questions within the environmental community about the mission of the Facility. However, a review of its initiatives thus far indicates that the GEF is well suited to help small island states overcome their vulnerability. From 1991 to June 1999, it provided \$884 million to 227 climate change programs (GEF 2000: 23). Among the GEF's focus areas, only biodiversity programs received more funding (\$991 million in grants). Although these funds are distributed among all developing nations, the GEF also finances two regional programs specifically for small island states. The Pacific Islands Climate Change Assistance Program includes funds for institutional strengthening, training and planning activities. In the Caribbean, the GEF will collaborate with the Caribbean Community on the development of a sea level/climate change monitoring network, databases, information systems, and resources inventories. Ultimately, selected CARICOM states will test programs designed to effectively monitor resources and create economic and regulatory proposals (GEF 2000: 13).

Though bilateral and multilateral assistance programs also represent viable possibilities for financing adaptation programs, they are weaker options than aid through the GEF. First, they require more resources on the part of small island states to attract partners and develop cooperative agreements. Perhaps more importantly, the GEF has a clear and powerful mandate to promote sustainable development. The "New Delhi Statement" adopted in 1998 commits the GEF to "promot[e] global environmental protection within a framework of sustainable development by providing new and additional grant and concessional funding...its beneficiaries are all the people of the globe" (GEF 2000:1). For both donor and recipient nations, the GEF provides a guarantee of the quality and purpose of its programs. Since the GEF has its basis in the UNFCCC, continued negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol do not affect its operation. Therefore, the United States, although refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, is the largest contributor to the GEF.

Moses Biliki, Director of Environment and Conservation in the Ministry of Forests, Environment and Conservation of the Solomon Islands, offered some insight into the challenges and opportunities for small island states in attracting GEF funding. He serves as the GEF Focal Point in the Solomon Islands, which makes him the primary contact for all GEF activities. The Solomon Islands has taken several concrete actions to attract GEF aid: signing and ratifying relevant conventions, integrating relevant programs in medium-term development strategies, completing enabling activities under the UNFCCC, and applying for the National Capacity Self Assessment under the Clean Development Mechanism. These steps have required substantial human and financial resources. The application process necessitates qualified and committed officers who understand the complex systems and requirements of the GEF, office space, and funds for payment of officers. Biliki suggests that small island states develop strategies incorporating their own special issues, regional priorities, subregional programs and national priorities (Biliki 2001). His comments indicate that AOSIS can play a role in this process by clarifying its priorities and programs and encouraging its members to adopt them. It can also serve to attract and distribute funding for training and paying officers.

## Negotiation

Although adaptation programs are essential for protecting the short-term interests of small island states, their long-term survival requires concrete emissions reduction measures. The representative of Tuvalu, a country comprised of nine coral atolls lying on average only two meters above sea level, used an apt metaphor for this at COP 5 negotiations. He said that “providing us with capacity building, adaptation and other imaginative measure to mitigate climate change while refusing to institute domestic policy and political measures that will genuinely reduce global emissions is like treating us like the pig you fatten for slaughter at your eldest son’s 21<sup>st</sup> birthday party” (SPREP 1999). AOSIS can best encourage more stringent reductions by maintaining a symbolic presence in the climate regime and differentiating itself from the G-77 plus China.

The European Union has emerged as a leader in climate negotiations as a result of their willingness and ability to work for compromise among Annex I nations. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol will go into effect in 2002. This is a significant step toward creating an effective climate regime. The European Union has stressed their dedication to advancing climate negotiations and has played an integral role in agenda setting, international policy formation and national policy development (Fermann: 1997). The centrally concentrated power of the EU allows it to dictate environmental policy for its members, who have historically contributed twenty-two percent of total carbon emissions. This allows it to lead by example, and to demonstrate the potential feasibility of emissions reduction strategies. Moreover, most European nations have strong Green constituencies that will keep pressure on their governments for environmental responsibility. These factors suggest that AOSIS can depend upon the European Union to keep climate change on the international agenda.

However, the European Union’s priorities are significantly different than those of AOSIS. Therefore, AOSIS must be vigilant in order to ensure that issues of vulnerability remain prominent in international climate change discourses. To do so, AOSIS should maintain its ties to international organizations like FIELD, while simultaneously refocusing efforts on training its own lawyers. Currently, FIELD does help to train lawyers for AOSIS, but there is still a deficit of individuals from small island states participating in climate change negotiations (Yamin 2001 and Reifsnyder 2001). Training local lawyers will allow AOSIS to speak with more moral authority and represent itself more independently.

AOSIS’s moral authority, unity of purpose and cohesion have been essential factors in its past successes. However, its cooperation with the other members of the G-77 plus China has at times compromised its negotiating ability. Due to the group’s collectively limited economic power and small population, AOSIS representatives have been reluctant to criticize China and India, two traditional diplomatic powers and major greenhouse gas contributors (Reifsnyder 2001). Moreover, the G-77 plus China also includes countries from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These countries oppose any restrictions on emissions and lobbied for the inclusion of Article 4.9 in the Kyoto Protocol (Biagini 2001). Article 4.9 calls for Annex I nations to compensate oil producing nations hurt by emissions reductions, which may impose a significant burden upon Annex I nations. This detracted from the legitimate issues of vulnerability that AOSIS raised. Therefore, it may be advisable for AOSIS to reevaluate and restructure its relationship with the rest of the G-77 and China.

## Awareness-Raising

The strength of European Green parties and the resultant leadership of the European Union in the climate change regime indicate the importance of public pressure in international

environmental regimes. This is reinforced by the success of the Montreal Protocol, in which NGOs rallied public opinion behind the elimination of chlorofluorocarbons. AOSIS has understandably focused its resources toward other major actors in the climate change regime, namely national governments and regional organizations. In the process, it has wholly neglected the general populations of those countries that are most influential in the negotiation process.

Participation of individual small island states in bi-lateral or multi-lateral aid agreements may help raise awareness in donor nations. In fact, individual states may have an advantage in the process of awareness raising. They may be able to take advantage of extant cooperative relationships to gain support from traditional allies and business partners. For instance, Canada has a historically strong economic presence in the Caribbean (Reifsnyder 2001). Also, many former colonies and protectorates still have strong diplomatic ties with their colonizers or “protectors.” The Republic of the Marshall Islands, a former protectorate of the United States, is a member of AOSIS and one of the most highly vulnerable nations to climate change. The Compact of Free Association between the two nations provides for aid and defense of the islands by the United States. This alliance may also provide a means to raise awareness of the threat of climate change among US citizens.

AOSIS can also take proactive measures to increase international awareness. An international campaign will require significant resources. However, AOSIS has already established ties with a variety of international NGOs and philanthropic foundations. Many of these have broad mission statements that should allow for AOSIS to shift its focus toward awareness. For example, the Ford Foundation, which originally funded FIELD to work with AOSIS, includes the promotion of international cooperation and the reduction of injustice in its mission statement (Ford Foundation 2001). As AOSIS refines and clarifies its role within international climate negotiations, it will free up resources to dedicate to awareness projects.

## **Conclusion**

AOSIS achieved success in early climate negotiations by injecting questions of morality and ethics into a highly scientific and economic discipline. The force of its conviction propelled the agenda-building phase of negotiations and gained AOSIS a significant voice in the climate regime. AOSIS negotiators left no doubt about whether climate change deserved attention. However, when the focus switched to questions of how to properly combat the threat of climate change, the “voice of conscience” that AOSIS had cultivated was lost amid discourses of economics, development, and scientific uncertainty.

The challenge now is two-fold: how can AOSIS regain its influence in the climate regime and ensure the continued survival of small island states? The tripartite strategy detailed in this research addresses both concerns. As the passage of time and increasing greenhouse gas emissions exacerbate the threat to small islands, the pressure on AOSIS to protect its member states will intensify. The recognition of their extreme vulnerability at Malta in 1988 and the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 compelled the small island states to action. Perhaps the realization that the current actions of the climate regime do not adequately address its concerns will cause AOSIS to revise its current focus. If so, it should craft a strategy to effectively protect the valuable cultural, natural and human resources of small island states.

## **Appendix A**



*Countries identified as “small island states” by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*

Antigua and Barbuda	The Bahamas	Barbados
Cape Verde	Comoros	Cook Islands
Cuba	Cyprus	Dominica
Dominican Republic	Micronesia	Fiji
Grenada	Haiti	Jamaica
Kiribati	Maldives	Malta
Marshall Islands	Mauritius	Nauru
Palau	St. Kitts and Nevis	St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Samoa	Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles	Solomon Islands	Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago	Tuvalu	Vanuatu

Source: IPCC 1998

*Member Nations of AOSIS*

Antigua and Barbuda	Bahamas	Barbados
Belize	Cape Verde	Comoros
Cook Islands	Cuba	Cyprus
Dominica	Fiji	Federated States of Micronesia
Grenada	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana
Haiti	Jamaica	Kiribati
Maldives	Malta	Marshall Islands
Mauritius	Nauru	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea	Samoa
Singapore	Seychelles	Sao Tome and Principe
Solomon Islands	St. Kitts and Nevis	St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Suriname	Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago	Tuvalu	Vanuat

Observer Nations: American Samoa, Guam, Netherlands Antilles, U.S. Virgin Islands  
Source: (AOSIS Home page on-line)

**Appendix B**

*Index of Vulnerability and Disaster Proneness of Selected Small Island States*

Country	Vulnerability Index	Vulnerability Rank	Disaster Proneness
		Rank	
Antigua and Barbuda	.843	1	14
Bahamas	.633	11	*
Comoros	.602	17	8
Dominica	.600	18	2
Dominican Republic	.512	34	52
Grenada	.635	10	*
Haiti	.461	48	32

Fiji	.573	24	27
Jamaica	.631	12	7
Mauritius	.614	14	13
St. Kitts and Nevis	.733	5	18
St. Lucia	.715	6	5
St. Vincent	.649	9	16
Seychelles	.756	3	*
Tonga	.759	2	11
Vanuatu	.751	4	1

Source: Briguglio 1996: 1627, 1630.

\*These islands are not considered “disaster-prone” based on the methodology of the source.

NB: This study included 114 countries, including twenty-nine “island developing countries.” The data in the table above were selected as a representation of the ten most vulnerable island states, as well as to indicate correlation between vulnerability and disaster proneness.

## Notes

The UNFCCC required each party to submit a National Communication detailing emissions levels, and projected courses of action.

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## The Euro and the Cost of Non-EMU by Sara Mohammadi

**What does the future hold for the Economic and Monetary Union? Mohammadi conducts an in-depth study of the rise and fall of the European Monetary System, the costs and benefits of economic integration and the adoption of a single currency.**

### Introduction

In the weeks to come, Britain and the rest of the world will witness rather new phenomenon, as eleven EU members, including France and Germany, unify their currencies under the “euro”. Given the potential gains possible from such membership even Britain has plans to become a full fledged member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), yet she chose not to rush in replacing the sterling with the euro. Perhaps Britain, given her past experiences in early 1990s with the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) has made the right economic and political choice, or perhaps she has underestimated “the cost of non-EMU” under the guidance of her Euroskepticism?

The source of this perpetual skepticism and uncertainty is whether the potential gains from EMU membership and a single currency will materialize in light of all the economic, political and institutional objections challenging the entire project. It is also clear that part of the hesitation in adopting the “euro” comes from the breakdown of the European Monetary System (EMS) in early 1990s. Perhaps Britain has learned from her past experience that if certain preconditions do not exist, an economy will face the worst of two worlds from further integration: an ‘incomplete internal market’ (or forged integration) susceptible to asymmetric shocks in the presence of limited monetary autonomy to respond to these shocks accordingly. They also realize that whereas exit from the previous EMS arrangement was possible, induction of a single currency arrangement is almost irreversible and dangerously unthinkable. The case in point: there are *great benefits* possible from the EMU for UK, but first the fruition of previous processes of integration are necessary as preconditions, otherwise these benefits will not materialize. UK will fall into a dynamic process of integration, where integration creates the need for further integration, and this may ultimately mean a surrender of economic and political independence.

This paper first examines the creation and breakdown of EMS within a historical-theoretical framework, in order to deduce some tools for evaluating the move towards a single currency. In the second part, the paper discusses the gains and disadvantages associated with a single currency for the EU members. Then, giving some consideration to the findings in the first part, the paper analyzes the prospects for a beneficial and prosperous EMU. The last part of the paper provides concluding observations and some recommendations for UK’s successful induction of a single currency.

## Failure of the EMS and Lessons for Monetary Unifications

### *Historical Framework of EMS*

The idea of monetary integration has been one of the EU main aims subject to a turbulent history. Even before 1990s EU members were examining ways to coordinate their monetary policies more closely, to reduce the currency fluctuation among the members, and to counterweight the non-European vehicle currency—the dollar. These initiatives gathered momentum and culminated in the Werner Report adopted in March 1971 that proposed a three-stage program towards European monetary unification and incidentally contributes to the main features of the present EMU design. However external events, such the dollar crisis coupled with oil price shocks, and lack of macroeconomic policy coordination, conspired to sink the project. This also included the 1972-78 ‘snake in the tunnel’ joint float against the dollar between West Germany and smaller dependent countries.

The key initiative of monetary integration, which set Europe on the road towards the euro, came in 1979 with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS)—a system of quasi-fixed exchange rates monitored by the Governors of the Central Banks. The EMS was made up of the European Currency Unit (ECU) and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).<sup>1</sup> The ECU was originally an accounting unit for the community’s internal budget, but later it became more like a thirteenth currency as a basket of other EU currencies. The ERM ‘fixed’ EU member currencies parities in terms of the ECU within bands of +/- 2.5% (in the case of Spain and Britain it was +/- 6%). The EMS all in all went through 12 currency realignments from 1979-1990.

However, in 1992 the ERM was wrenched apart when there were the two violent speculative attacks, so a number of currencies could no longer keep within these limits. The targets in September 1992 were primarily sterling and the lira. On what became known as Black Wednesday, the British pound and Italian lira were forced to leave the system. At the same time, speculators gambled that weaker currencies would devalue given that voters might reject the Maastricht treaty. The second wave of speculation, in July 1993 targeted the franc despite its low inflation rates. The Bank of France and Bundesbank intervention and rise increase in French interest rates, allowed France to resume its position, however, within a broader band of exchange rate. By August 1993, all the remaining EMS bands in the system were widened to +/- 15% fluctuation.

### *Forces Behind the ERM*

It was hoped that the mechanism would stabilize exchange rates, boost trade within Europe and control inflation. The arguments for a loose exchange rate union were as follows:

(i) *Reduce uncertainty*: When exchange rates float, time and resources (transaction costs) are wasted to reduce uncertainty, but with exchange rates fixed to the ERM bands, trade decisions can be made on a more predictable basis. Hence this leads to increase in intra-trade among EU members;

(ii) *Eliminate the confusion and costs involved with calculations*: Consumers and producers have to always be concerned about relative prices when exchange rates are floating. The ERM simplifies economic calculations;

(iii) *Reaffirm commitment to further integration and be a means of regional policy coordination*. The ERM was a divergence indicator: whenever a currency diverged from other currencies by more than three-quarters of permitted amount, corrective action—intervention and policy change—would be taken.; and

(iv) *Enhance anti-inflationary reputation* by importing Bundesbank anti-inflation credibility. This is based on the credibility theory of EMS. The member countries welcomed a fixed parity with the Deutschmark and adopted the deflationary policy stances of the Bundesbank hoping to reduce inflationary pressures and reduce interest rate premium at home.

### ***The Accomplishment and Breakdown of ERM***

Many economists and EU leaders would argue that the ERM of the EMS was a fairly successful, despite the setback in the early 1990s. There is obviously much more to their claims. For example, they attribute the increased intra-trade among members to the EMS. However one cannot be certain whether the 90% increase was only a result of the EMS, because over those two decades, there was a worldwide growth cycle powered by globalization and trade liberalization movement. Artis and Taylor (1988) have shown that the ERM was subject to fewer misalignments compared to the dollar (most took place over five years) and improved exchange rate predictability. Again, the reduction in economic volatilities may not mirror the performance of the EMS mechanism, but be attributable to other endogenous factors.

Others, including some UK leaders, argue otherwise. The early 1990s was not just a setback, but a complete dismantling of the system that left the weak EU economies in a helpless position as they faced the dilemma of maintaining credibility at cost of bearing the inflationary pressures encouraged by tight German monetary policies following its reunification. In case of the UK membership, many argue that it was a matter of 'bad time, bad reasons'. The United Kingdom remained out of the system until October 1990, fearing a threat to national sovereignty. It was the economic pressures of an emerging recession and high interest premiums, which lured her into joining the EMR, in order to reap the anti-inflationary reputation. The effects of German unification, Germany's stubborn monetary policy geared towards its economic interests, the removal of exchange controls, and the inappropriately high exchange rate, all destabilized the system. Despite the pool of reserves used for corrective intervention, UK and Italy left the system while remaining members adopted wider bands of +/- 15%.

### ***Lessons to be Learned: Theory of Optimum Currency Areas***

The ERM, like other forms of monetary unions, was basically a case for an optimum currency area (OCA), which trades the gains in credibility and efficiency (exchange rate stability) against the loss of monetary sovereignty and stabilization power. The use of exchange rate for adjustments is diminished as important differences among nations are eliminated. With this in mind it is possible to sketch the criteria that each country of an optimal currency area should meet:<sup>2</sup>

(i) *A high degree of openness to trade in real goods and services:*

Countries that are have high degrees of intra-trade are more likely to constitute optimum currency areas, because greater trade leads to greater savings in transaction costs and risks associated with floating exchange rates. Furthermore, a high propensity to import associated with high intra-trade reduces market output disturbances and need for domestic monetary policy, as the high degree of openness acts as a stabilizer. This is dependent on other factors explained below.

(ii) *A high degree of factor mobility (especially in labor market) across national boundaries:* Integration of markets for factors of production, especially of labor markets are essential. If the mobility of labor remains on a very low level, it leaves marginal impacts on wage or employment dispersion. In fact labor mobility is low or nonexistent, then even capital

mobility cannot offset the costs of adjustments (the economic efficiency loss). Obstacles to labor mobility include language and cultural barriers, which may not be removed by economic integration of an area. A more direct obstacle to labor mobility is the differences in labor market institutions, which are described below.

(iii) *Less dissimilarities in national economic structures and institutions less conducive to asymmetric shocks:* High degree of integration through extensive intra-trade is not sufficient criteria for an optimum currency area. Similarities in economic structures, policy regimes and institutions are necessary as well. Otherwise, even symmetric shocks could cause asymmetric consequences. The most significant dissimilarities are:

(a) Differences in labor market institutions: such as degree of centralization of wage bargaining by labor unions, which lead to divergent wage and price developments. Following a symmetric supply shock one member country might find itself in a situation where wages and prices increase faster than in other countries, which makes it difficult to correct for these differences when exchanges rates are 'irrevocably' fixed;

(b) Difference in legal systems: may persist despite years of integration. Legal system differences may have profound effects on outcome of market functions. For example, due to varying legal traditions, companies in different member states have varying financial resources. Some go directly to the capital market, while others refer to the banking system. As a result, the same interest rate rise by a union institution, (e.g. ECB) will be transmitted in investment spending in different ways across member states;

(c) Differences in financial markets: creates the risk that the symmetric monetary shocks are transmitted differently across member countries. Although as mentioned above, some of the differences in financial markets are attributable to differences in legal systems, some however have developed over time as different member states pursued different monetary policies. For example, in environments of low-inflation, such as Germany, investors are willing to invest in long-term bonds, where as investors in Italy, a high-inflation country, are reluctant to invest in long-term bonds due to sensitivity to unexpected inflation spikes. This consequently results in asymmetric consequences for the same interest rate changes.<sup>3</sup>

(iv) *A diversified structure of production and demand:* Trade integration as a high degree of intra-industry trade (which results from economies of scale) also leads to regional concentrations of industrial activities. According to the European Commission differential shocks in demand will occur less frequently in a monetary union with a high degree of intra-trade. The reason is as follows: since trading between the member states is largely based on economies of scale and imperfect competition, the structure of trade leads to a situation where most demand shocks will affect these countries symmetrically. The removal of barriers with completion of the single market will reinforce such tendencies in the trade structure.<sup>4</sup> However, at the same time, the removal of trade barriers makes it possible for firms to concentrate production so as to profit from static and dynamic economies of scale. This means, for example, that computer industry could be concentrated in Germany, while car industry is more concentrated in France. So industry-specific shocks become country-specific or region-specific shocks. Therefore, economic integration without diversification will be more subject to asymmetric shocks.

(v) *A presence of significant supra-national fiscal redistribution:* A monetary unification should be supported by a transfer mechanism of economic resources across membership from healthy to suffering economies, in order to offset the loss of monetary sovereignty and taxation powers. The economic resources for such transfers can be supported through tax mechanisms.



Although, it is always difficult to convince taxpayers to pay for benefit of others, especially when they are of a different nationality.

In the case of Europe, the EU member states had already set to ‘completing the internal market’ as specified in the Cockfield Report or White Papers, and reinforced by the 1986 Single European Act. The report introduced some 300 measures in order to complete the single market by 1992. The measures that eliminated physical and technical frontiers may have contributed to the increased intra-trade in the area, but the single market overall still remained incomplete, especially with physical capital and labor immobility. Members participating in the EMS pursued uncoordinated fiscal objectives, which were in any case, restricted given their reduced monetary adjustment tools. Meanwhile, their economic structures, labor market institutions and legal systems had wide differences that made each state conducive to asymmetric consequences in light of symmetric shocks.

## **Road to Economic and Monetary Union**

### ***Maastricht Treaty and the Euro***

In 1991 while forces against the stability of EMS were building up, European leaders met in a Dutch town to draft the Maastricht Treaty (the ‘Treaty’) of the European Union, to reaffirm 1972 Paris summit commitment to EMU and to ensure the realization of an internal market secured by the 1986 Single European Act. The treaty in Maastricht was a significant act of consolidation, a reinforcement of commitments to carry forward integration and improve the ways this could be achieved. It transformed the 1957 Treaty of Rome in terms of membership and scope. The process of integration was pointed towards an ultimate destination of economic and monetary union (EMU). The Union’s tasks were expanded into two new areas: a common foreign and security policy and judicial cooperation, such as coordinating policy on immigration, drugs and terrorism. Many discussions were geared towards a major challenge that will preoccupy EU for the next decade—an eastwards enlargement of EU membership. In short, integration divulged its eventual intent, as economic was broadly spilled to political affairs. The whole complex of relationships explains the change of title from European Economic Community to the European Union. The treaty set up a timetable for economic and monetary union and introduced the convergence criteria, which were certain standards that national economies had to meet in order to join the final stage of EMU—the single currency countries must meet to adopt the single currency. These consist of five criteria:

- (i) A budget deficit be below 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
- (ii) A public debt less than 60% of GDP;
- (iii) An inflation rate within 1.5% of the three EU countries with the lowest rate; and
- (iv) Long-term interest rates within 2% of the three lowest EU interest rates.

The EMU, however, was initiated by the 1989 Delors Report, which served as basis for the monetary unification goals. The report laid out three stages towards building a single currency:

- (i) *Stage I*: Free movement of capital, narrowing of the ERM bands, closer co-operation between central banks and coordination of economic policies among member states;
- (ii) *Stage II*: Convergence of monetary and fiscal policies, establishment of the European Central Bank, ‘fixing’ the exchange rates of participating member states;

(iii) *Stage III*: Introduction of single currency as an electronic currency in 1999 and launch of euro notes and coins on January 1, 2002

The setbacks EMS experienced under speculative attacks in 1992-93, paved a rocky path for the Treaty as several member states opposed to its ratification. Nevertheless, the treaty drafted in Maastricht survived and was ratified by end of 1993. To many members, except UK, the next step envisioned in Delors Plan was inevitable. In fact, the words of Jacques Delors summarizes the intuition behind such decision:

*“the EMS was the indispensable trial run which, in addition to its intrinsic benefits, provided invaluable experience for those who would go on to lay the foundations for Economic and Monetary Union. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that we make progress towards European integration by increments - sometimes, admittedly, one step forward and two steps back - but all these concrete measures, succeed or fail, prepare the ground for more ambitious initiatives and serve as a learning experience.”*

[ Lecture by Jacques Delors, “Towards Economic and Monetary Union”, The European Institute, Washington, DC, 9 May 1996]

### ***“The costs of non-EMU” for the United Kingdom***

The potential net benefits of EMU and membership are substantial and difficult to deny. The main advantages of inducing a single currency may be summed as follows:

(i) *Reduction of transaction costs and reserve expenditure*: This is an obvious benefit of creating a single currency. Consumers and producers no longer have to convert EU member currencies into each other. It has been estimated that such reduction would contribute a 1- 2% rise in GDP of member states. Furthermore, as evidenced during the EMS currency crisis, maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime requires a pool of reserves. With a single currency, these reserves can be used efficiently for better purposes.

(ii) *Efficiency for the entire area*: Exchange rate movements and its associated uncertainties—direction of movement, volatility and potential realignments tends to have a negative impact on trade. The advantage of a single currency, in comparison to fixed exchange rates, is that the latter arrangement is not really irrevocable (as past experiences have confirmed) and therefore do not eliminate exchange rate risks fully. A single currency brings about transparency that increases investment activity and economic growth. Although one can argue that a single currency does not lead to a single price across the EU. These price differences could attributable to monopolies, transportation costs and national habits and preferences.

(iii) *Economies of scale in money markets*: As the money market for EU expands, the average cost of money (i.e. interest rates) will go down, which may act as stimulus to investment in the private sector and reduce the government burden in the public sector. An percentage point reduction of 0.5% on risk premium is estimated to yield a 5-10 % rise in Community income.

(iv) *Price Stability: the goal par excellence of European Central Bank*: The European Central Bank is responsible for implementing the European monetary policy, which includes setting the interest rates for EMU members. The Bank is accountable only to the European Parliament, but not to individual member parliaments, and although it works jointly with the European System of Central Banks, it shares no monetary power to national central banks of member states. Its main goal, as defined by the Maastricht Treaty, is maintenance of price

stability. However, this documented anti-inflationary reputation of ECB lacks historical confirmation, unlike the case of Bundesbank. This is further discussed in the costs of EMU.

(v) *A stimulus for further integration and reaffirmation of membership*: A successful EMU depend mainly on some solid progress in coordinating economic policies and Community measures. The induction of a single currency reaffirms members' commitment to the membership, and encourages them to engage closely and cooperatively in instrumentation of policies. Above once the single currency is induced, its will be head for the exit door, so members will have more incentive for a committed and conscientious participation.

### ***The Costs of EMU for UK and Some Other Considerations***

Of course the potential gains from an EMU membership does come with costs. The degree of economic integration among the members, in general, affects the scope of these costs and offsets the EMU advantages. The main argument deduced from OCA theory examined previously is the loss of sovereignty. The citizens of member states forgo not only their national moneys with which they identified their nationhood, but with it they also lose the choice of conducting domestic economic (and possibly political) policies according to their preferences. Although since the adoption of the '1992' project that eliminated capital controls, the national banks have substantially lost their independence in the international nexus. Nevertheless most member states realize that by giving up their national currency, they are also giving up the freedom in the adjustment policy, that of changing ones exchange rate currency. Unlike the ERM, once a single currency is inducted, member states do not have the choice of exit to adjust their currencies. This puts strains on their budgetary balance, which can be offset by high labor mobility and fiscal transfers. Asides from this main objection, many have raised marginal criticisms with respect to the negative economic effects of the Euro upon its induction on January 1, 2002. Some of these are as follows:

(i) *Logistic challenge*:<sup>6</sup> The induction of euro requires the exchange of 15 billion notes. The Central Bank floors have to cope with the weight of such cash, and the police forces have to ensure a secure distribution of the currency. Most recently, 250,000 euros were stolen in Amsterdam, and 11 security vans "frontloading" euros in Germany have been robbed this year.<sup>7</sup> These logistical tasks coupled with slipping of illegal euros into circulation may pose a short-lived effect on the economy.

(ii) *Costs of changeover to the Euro*: Asides from the potential indirect costs of adopting a single currency, there are direct costs of the euro attributable to the changeover of a currency. These entail public awareness campaigns, change of payment systems, conversion and replacement of cash machines and creation of new notes and coins. These costs are difficult to estimate, but a study suggests, an estimated cost for the changeover of approximately 160-180 billion euros—more than the size of the Irish economy.<sup>8</sup>

(iii) *Consumption and Production woes*: The short timetable, and unfamiliarity with euro notes and coins means also confusion and delays in transactions are inevitable across trading grounds, retail shops and banking institutions. The European retail organization has estimated that for each transaction that takes 20 seconds more than usual, retail turnover may experience a fall by 10%. If queues grow in response to logistic and calculative delays, consumers could defer purchases. This could depress spending and hit sales in the eurozone economies temporarily. Although, there is also a case that spending may be increase as people try to dispose cash in other euro currencies earned in informal, or black economy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that property prices have spiked in Spain mainly as a result of this case.

(iv) *Perils of technical pricing:* Various case studies have shown how the arrival of euro will affect price formation, which may in turn lead to undesired and subtle price changes. The case of a French vending-machine company provided by IBM Europe best illustrates the complications faced by businesses and the economy. The coffee dispenses a cup for FFr 2, or 0.3049 euros. The French company may round up the price to 0.35. This may put off buyers and increases costs of keeping the machines stocked with sufficient 5 cents change. The company may also round down the price to 0.30 euros, by compensating a 1.5 % of its revenue per cup. In any case, neither is a win.<sup>9</sup>

(v) *ECB as a Bundesbank model?* It is not clear whether ECB it should be guided by a monetary target like the Bundesbank model, and whether ECB credibility can contribute to price stability in this sense. Some member states have expressed less interest in inflation safeguards, arguing that some inflation might make adjustment process less costly in periods of slow growth, and this lessens the rise in unemployment rate. Thus there is no assurance that national representatives governing ECB policymaking will charge price stability as the overriding goal. The case in point: Germany's experience should not be transposed to the ECB to handle the novel EMU.

### ***Does EU have what it takes for EMU to survive, prosper and materialize its potential gains?***

As mentioned before, despite its basis on the 'four freedoms' and ambitious goals of 'completing the internal market', the 'Europe 1992' program had not established an optimum currency area *well* integrated by its set deadline. The lack of *coherent* integration undermined the resilience and survival of the EMS in 1990s. Hence, the crucial question that remains is whether EU now constitutes an OCA, after almost a decade after the EU members passed the Single European Act and ratified the Maastricht Treaty. In a sense this question asks how *well* integrated is Europe under the developments currently taking shape? Has the EU systemized and arranged the economic, political and institutional preconditions necessary for the prosperity, survival and realization of the next big step?<sup>10</sup>

To answer these questions, one can look back and examine what changes have (or have not) occurred over the past decade and what implications each bears for the EMU. Before we evaluate the present stage of integration, we have to keep in mind two caveats. First, the concept of integration has not formal definition and this is in itself a hindrance to examining the effects of actual integration process. Second, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of global processes such as trade liberalization and globalization from the particular effects that stem from the EU integration process.

(i) *Markets for goods and services:* The formation of custom unions and completion of the internal market has increased intra-trade significantly, and this has led to reductions in the price differences of goods and services in individual countries. However, the price dispersion remains significant for non-tradable such as healthcare, because production and consumption activities take place in the same locality and are heavily influenced by transport costs as well. The markets for construction and energy have not been fully deregulated and taxation in these two areas has not been harmonized across the member states. The result is segmentation and wide price dispersions for these two services.

(ii) *Markets for factors of production:*

(a) Capital: The upsurge of capital flows in the EU has been a significant contributor to greater economic integration, it has served to speed up the spill-over of

technological know-how. Furthermore, foreign direct investment (FDI) increased rapidly during the 1990s to circumvent geographic barriers and benefit from economies of scale. The increased intra-EU FDI compensates, in this case, for the lack of integration in the market for goods and services.

(b) Labor: Contrary to capital, labor market remains significantly rigid, and continue to lack integration, especially in the markets for unskilled labor. The low labor mobility has left marginal impacts on employment and wage dispersions. The reasons for labor immobility are language and cultural barriers and the differences in labor market institutions (discussed earlier). However, it should be fairly noted that due to further integration of goods market and introduction of the euro, labor market institutions, especially trade union behavior in wage bargaining process, have become more interrelated as a response to the need for more flexible labor markets.

(iii) *Convergence of interests rate and inflations rate levels*: On the macroeconomic level, monetary integration has accomplished a significant decrease in the difference of inflation rates across member states, and an overall decrease in the inflation rates which reflects the emphasis on price stability objective. Similarly, long-term nominal interest rates have continued to converge, although skepticism concerning the realization of the EMU project following the EMS currency crisis in 1992 and 1993, temporarily increased the differences in interest rates.

(iv) *Synchronization of Business Cycles*: The business cycles of EU members still lack synchronization, due to differences in industrial structures, uncoordinated fiscal policies and functioning of the labor markets. These differences mean that when an external condition changes, economic development in individual member states will not concur. As a consequence, there has been no development towards homogenizing the employment structures between member states. In fact the EU commission (1999) confirms that the inequality in the distribution of unemployment has remained unchanged from 1985 to 1998.<sup>11</sup>

(v) *Differences in standards of living*: The standards of living vary among the member states (for example, compare Belgium to Greece). This also reflects the differences in wage levels, labor productivity and prices of non-tradable. So it is questionable whether integration has progressed in this direction. The most suitable mechanism that can compensate for the lack of integration in this area is an effective fiscal redistribution—an active regional policy for structural funds, which the EU has been progressively working on. The effectiveness of such fiscal transfer, however, will be revealed only through time.

(vi) *Nationhood and Identity*: Several surveys carried out indicate that EU citizens have not developed a strong sense of European identity. As Elisabeth Bakke noted in simple words: “It seems that the Union so far has failed to capture the imagination of ordinary people.”<sup>12</sup> In the absence of a keen European identity, integration will be more conducive to the language and cultural barriers of labor mobility. Furthermore, the question of nationhood also spills over broadly in political affairs. EU politicians and leaders should start thinking in terms of EU interest (perhaps as a federation) and not in terms of the German, or French or Greek interest. Finally, language an integral element of identity remains as a traditional barrier to communication and labor mobility.

## Conclusions

### *Concluding observation: Is EU ready?*

Above, the paper examined the question of whether or not the economic, political and institutional conditions in the EU have been prepared (i.e. similar) through the evolution of integration over the past fifty years, and especially over the past decade. It is evident that European Union has created, or rather forged, new ties among states that may lead to a genuine federation. The 'Europe 1992' initiatives has stimulated trade between the members, therefore contributing to more uniform prices of individual goods. At the same times, the monetary integration developed a move towards increased the homogeneity of inflation rates, which was further expanded to interest rates with the euro project and introduction of ECB. The environment, however, still lacks certain preconditions, with the dissimilarities in the standards of living, unemployment levels and synchronization of the business cycles. Integration needs to progress in these dimensions in order to address the immediate concerns of EU economies, such as persistent unemployment problem. The United Kingdom, in this sense, has rightly postponed the move towards a single currency, but at the same time, she should be working on coordinating policies and harmonizing her economic structure with the rest of the eurozone, in order to make the future transition successful.

Concluding recommendations: What should be the EU agenda?

Given the centrality of a single currency for the future evolution of European integration, the EU leaders should be now concerned with the conditions necessary for its success and survival. The following areas are concerned with these conditions, and should be pursued as the primary agenda of EU countries and their focal point of cooperation.

- (i) Creation of Employment and more flexible labor markets;
- (ii) Harmonization of taxation policy (including excise duties and value added tax on consumption, income tax on wages, and corporate tax on production);
- (iii) An effective fiscal redistribution banked by a well-endowed regional fund;
- (iv) Promotion of European citizenship and identification with the EU;
- (v) Greater coordination not only in economic policies, but also in decision-making of political affairs;
- (vi) Reformation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): As Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) have shown SGP the fines that are levied are likely to result in cataclysmic political fallouts, and as a result countries will exercise prudent and desperate measures to either avoid fines or be eligible for the EMU.<sup>13</sup> An Italian Professor, Gustavo Piga showed how certain governments use swaps to manage their public debts, which accumulates as hidden liabilities and concealed counterparty risk for other EU members.<sup>14</sup>

***Concluding Remarks: Rethinking Europe's Future?***<sup>15</sup>

By concentrating on the larger picture, one can realize unprecedented scale of what is really happening in Europe, and by tracing the historical and ideological antecedents of what is taking shape currently, one can evaluate the economic forces behind the EU and move towards EMU. EU leaders and integrationists have developed a religious faith in the ability of European spirit to overcome difficulties and conflicts. They are convinced that further and fuller EU expansion means elimination of all their miseries and realization of their ambitions. With this mindset, members locate themselves into a dynamic process of integration; one step taken towards integration is forged with further integration. The evolution of integration transforms from an economic venture into an adventure without any means of exodus. So is the case with the transition from the first stage of monetary union to the second stage in the early 1990s. What this paper suggests is confirmed with the following quote from Jacques Delors, "Unsure about

the scope afforded by the Maastricht Treaty on the strictly political front, they are banking on the 1999 deadline and the expectation that, in spite of the inevitable problems, the experience of joint sovereignty in the monetary sphere will bring about a quantum leap in the direction of truly political integration.”<sup>16</sup> In Albert O. Hirschman’s celebrated terminology, where exit is too easy there is little incentive for voice—for sincere and constructive cooperation. So the greater degree of integration forged by previous economic ventures, commits essentially members to conscientious and cooperative participation.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The countries that joined by 1991 were Germany, France, Italy, Britain, Spain, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal.

<sup>2</sup> See Paul De Grauwe, *Economics of Monetary Union*, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2000 for an in depth coverage of EMU as an OCA.

<sup>3</sup> The setbacks of the EMS in early 1990s confirm this. When the interest rates were dragged up by Bundesbank, the Italian budget was immediately affected, and Italian government was forced to spend on interest payments since its debts all had short term maturity. This significantly increased the Italian budget deficit.

<sup>4</sup> EU Commission, ‘Economic Evaluation of the Internal Market’, *European Economy Reports and Studies*, 1996.

<sup>6</sup> Jorn Madslie, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/in\\_depth/business/2001/euro/default.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/in_depth/business/2001/euro/default.stm) , *BBC Online*.

<sup>7</sup> “Euro notes and coins: Gearing up”, *The Economist*, Volume 361 Number 8249, page 93.

<sup>8</sup> Dharshini David , [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/in\\_depth/business/2001/euro/default.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/in_depth/business/2001/euro/default.stm), *BBC Online*.

<sup>9</sup> Andrew Freeman, ‘A survey of European business and the euro’, *The Economist*, Vol 361 No. 8250, 2001.

<sup>10</sup> A well integrated EU exists when the club of European economies melt together to form the European economy, and coherent integration can be related to degree of convergence with respect to formal and institutional frameworks among EU member states.

<sup>11</sup> EU Commission, “European Economy”, *European Economy Reports and Studies*, , 1999a.

<sup>12</sup> Elisabeth Bakke, “Towards a European Identity?” *ARENA Working Paper*, 19, April 1995, page 2.

<sup>13</sup> See Eichengreen and Wyplosz, “The Stability Pact: More than a minor nuisance?” *Economic Policy*, 1998.

<sup>14</sup>Government use of derivatives: “ Italian Fiddle?”, *The Economist*, November 10, 2001, page 99.

<sup>15</sup> Title borrowed from David P.Calleo, *Rethinking Europe’s Future*, Princeton University Press, 2001 .

<sup>16</sup> Lecture by Jacques Delors, “Towards Economic and Monetary Union”, *The European Institute*, Washington, DC, 9 May 1996.



## Perspectives on Assyrian Nationalism by Sener Akturk

### **Akturk conducts a historical examination and interprets the causes, emergence, rise and fall of Assyrian nationalism in its attempts to establish a nation-state.**

Assyrians are the indigenous people of Mesopotamia. They pride themselves on being the heirs of the ancient Assyrian Empire. They still speak the language of Christ (Syriac) and were among the first Christians in the world. Their 'national' church sent missionaries to India, China and Japan as early as the seventh century. Their national identity, as they claim it to be, is as old as history; their forefathers founded one of the first civilizations on Earth, and their religion encompassed the entire Asian continent. Such claims of nationality and national history are thought-provoking for scholars who have studied the history of nationalisms. Thus, I seek to find the particular events and broader processes through which Assyrian nationalism is synthesized, raised and then failed.

In this paper, I will argue that a territorially and linguistically defined group of Semitic Christians adopted a secular national identity that was constructed for them by the Orientalist scholars and European missionaries. I will further argue that the internal sectarian division among these Christians and successive massacres and attacks of their Muslim neighbors necessitated the formation and adoption of a secular identity like the Assyrian nationalism. Then I will conclude by proposing that the incorporation of the Assyrians into a *Verbindungsnetzschafft* will enable a retention of their cultural and linguistic ties without the bloody repercussions of establishing an Assyrian nation-state (i.e. *Gesellschaft*) despite their demographic inferiority.

Mordechai Nisan's narration of the Assyrian people's history in his informative *Minorities in the Middle East* provides a starting point for a historical examination of the Assyrian national identity.<sup>1</sup> According to Nisan, Assyrians are the heirs of the ancient Assyrian Empire<sup>2</sup> and the ambiguity of defining this old Eastern community may be considered resolved if we accept their view, which says "We were Assyrians long before we were Christians."<sup>3</sup> Ethnic solidarity assured no intermarriage between the Assyrians and other Christians or Muslims.<sup>4</sup> Linguistic continuity of Syriac enabled these people to transfer their life experiences to succeeding generations.<sup>5</sup> Jesus spoke the language of the Assyrians and a church stood in Urumiyah<sup>6</sup> in the second century.<sup>7</sup> The personality of Nestorius whose views were condemned as being heretic by the Byzantine Orthodox Church provided the Assyrians with the *raison d'etre* for a 'national' church.<sup>8</sup> Born in persecution, these Christians in the Kurdistan Mountains would preserve their Assyrian identity, Syriac language and now their sectarian Christianity.<sup>9</sup>

Yet even Nisan, who asserts an *a priori* Assyrian 'nationality' into his interpretation of Middle Eastern history, cannot escape from contrasting pacific Assyrian Chaldeans of the Mosul plain with those brave Assyrian Nestorians in the Hakkari Mountains, thus hinting at a fundamental sectarian division among the Assyrian people.<sup>10</sup> Chaldeans are the followers of the Chaldean Catholic church which was established by a group of Nestorian clergy who formed a union with the Roman Catholic church in 1552 and recognized Papal authority in 1683, thus breaking from the independent Nestorian church.<sup>11</sup> The conflict between the two churches invited European involvement while exacerbating division within the Assyrian community.<sup>12</sup> Assyrians' cooperation with the Europeans provoked the enmity of their Kurdish neighbors and Ottoman sovereigns, leading to the massacre of the Assyrians by the Kurds and the Turks in the First World War. The massacres of 1915 catalyzed the fledgling Assyrian national consciousness and also initiated a series of flights, as a consequence of which, Assyrians finally

settled in the environs of Mosul in Northern Iraq.<sup>13</sup> The various attempts to settle the Assyrians in Canada and Brazil were unsuccessful.<sup>14</sup>

By attaching Assyrian nationality to the ancient Assyrian Empire, Nisan asserts an Assyrian nationality that is ‘as old as history.’<sup>15</sup> On the contrary, the usage of the term ‘Assyrian’ as a specific reference to the people that we now know as Assyrians is fairly new. The Ottoman Empire, when it finally created a *millet*<sup>16</sup> out of the so-called Assyrian people in 1844, created a Catholic Nestorian, that is, a Chaldean, *millet* as opposed to an Assyro-Chaldean or an Assyrian *millet* as the Assyrian nationalists would like it to be. The so-called Assyrians were commonly referred to as the ‘Nestorians’ or ‘Chaldeans’ before and at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1833, Eli Smith published a book about his research in Armenia and his visit to the Nestorian and Chaldean Christians.<sup>17</sup> The term ‘Assyrian’ did not even appear in the index of his book. Smith identified the people that he met as ‘Nestorians’ or ‘Chaldeans’ and draw stark contrasts between these two groups.<sup>18</sup> The Assyrian myth is likely to have been revived by the publication of the Orientalist Henry Layard’s “Nineveh” in 1849.<sup>19</sup> But even then, the usage of the terms Nestorian and Chaldean overwhelmed the usage of the ‘Assyrian’ for a while.

What is most remarkable about the 19<sup>th</sup> century is the explosion in the number of books written about the Assyrians, Nestorians and Chaldeans.<sup>20</sup> This fact alone testifies to an insightful correlation between Orientalist ‘research’, missionary activity and the rise of the Assyrian identity in the golden age of colonization. “Archbishop of Canterbury’s Appeal for the Assyrian Christians” in 1886 marks the level of legitimacy the term ‘Assyrian’ gained in less than fifty years.<sup>21</sup>

Even today, the definition of an Assyrian is the topic of a heated debate. Based on its own investigations and consultation with scholars versed in historical and ancestry knowledge, U.S. Census Bureau has classified the following people as Assyrians: Aramean, Assyrian, Chaldean, Chaldo, Jacobite, Kaldany, Kaldu, Kassdem, Kasdu, Nestorian and Telkeffe.<sup>22</sup> Yet the Chaldean church insists on preserving the term ‘Chaldean’ as part of its identity.<sup>23</sup> I assert that the Chaldeans’ unrelenting resistance to the secular national identity building effort of their Assyrian brethren points out to the *incompleteness* of Assyrian nation building in the year 2001.

European-originated Christian Missions’ impact over the Assyrian nationhood is an issue that has been and still is debated. Nisan emphasized the role of the Missionaries in standardizing Syriac, increasing literacy, and mobilizing nationalist thinking and encouraging political leadership.<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, Eden Naby, in his close examination of the Assyrian community in the Persian city of Urumiyah, claimed that the coming of the Christian Missions in effect put an end to Assyrian unity, as they brought Western education, coupled with Western Christian denominational dissension, to the Nestorian Assyrians.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, children who attend Missionary schools were taught the languages of their mentors but the classical Syriac needed for connecting to Assyrian tradition, philosophy and literature was not taught.<sup>26</sup> Every Missionary school became a bastion of imperialist ambitions. The Lazarist Mission’s influence was sufficient to establish Salamas (an Assyrian town in West Iran) as a Catholic, French-oriented base.<sup>27</sup> The American Mission became the exclusive organ of the Presbyterian Church, and rather than help the old church, Americans encouraged the establishment of a breakaway, native Presbyterian congregation.<sup>28</sup> By the beginning of the century the Presbyterian Church had effectively pushed the Nestorian culture in Urumiyah into the background.<sup>29</sup> Even though the British and American missions concerted their efforts, Assyrians sought Russian political protection and favor through mass conversion to the Russian Orthodox faith.<sup>30</sup> Nestorian Church property was transferred to Russian Orthodox control.<sup>31</sup> As these examples reveal, religious

identity and conversion patterns were correlated to a clientalist exchange of favors in which indigenous Assyrians converted to the denomination of the European power that is expected to provide the most benefits.

As a partial conclusion, since Assyrians did not have their own sovereign state or their own 'national' education system, external powers were able to manipulate and fragment Assyrian nationality. Assyrians needed to be able to form their national identity without any external (i.e. imperialist European) manipulation.

According to Eden Naby, many Assyrian intellectuals opposed the denominational fragmentation of the Assyrian community orchestrated by the European imperial powers. Even though acknowledging the economic and political benefits of the European interference, these intellectuals also understood that the denominational divisions and separate spheres of European influence prevent the unification of the Assyrian nation. The secularist-nationalist Assyrian periodical *Kukhva* began its publication in 1906, after all the Western missions established their periodical presses.<sup>32</sup> *Kukhva* served as the organ of the newly emerging local Assyrian leadership and attempted to keep alive the nonsectarian Assyrian language, literature and cultural heritage, despite pressure from the Mission presses.<sup>33</sup> *Kukhva* voiced support for Assyrian unification efforts both inside and outside Urumiyah.<sup>34</sup> It also promoted efforts to improve inter-communal relationships between Assyrians and their Muslim neighbors.

*Kukhva* was a cause for and the expression of the first stirrings of Assyrian nationalism. Even though the Assyrian national myth was created by the European Missions and Orientalists,<sup>35</sup> once it is created, Assyrians gradually embraced this identity as a means to define themselves in an increasingly 'nationalized' world. Progressive Assyrians of *Kukhva* condemned the sectarian divisions and the foreign Missions, and called for the unification of the Assyrian nation on a secular basis.

*"Kukhva editorial declared that although Assyrians had derived much benefit from the presence of the Missions, they were prepared now to build their own schools and churches and conduct their affairs by themselves. Struggle and hardship are better than being victimized and exploited by 'people...who sell their nation for a salary or a position.' The editorial ended by requesting that the Missions depart and take their 'little disciples' with them."*<sup>36</sup>

Condemnation of the foreign Missions was the end result of a severe sectarian division that divided the Assyrians into four different *millet*s in Persia. Unlike the Armenian and Jewish communities in Urumiyah, the Assyrians had four *milletbashis* (community heads) serving Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox and Nestorians separately.<sup>37</sup> In another case, the Persian Constitution of 1906 had given the Assyrians (yet they were referred to as "Chaldeans/Nestorians") the right to send one delegate to the legislature.<sup>38</sup> Yet, the Russian interference in the relationship between the Assyrian community and the Iranian government, through the institution of the Russian Orthodox Mission, had lost the Iranian Assyrians their first opportunity for legitimate participation in government.<sup>39</sup>

The dedication of the Western Missions to the proselytism of the native Christian church led to sectarian dissent in a *millet*, which had persevered as a unit for centuries under Islamic governments.<sup>40</sup> Being aware of this fact, progressive Assyrians attempted to neutralize the discord wrought by the Missions through fostering better relations with the Persian authorities, opening channels of communication among Assyrians divided by sect and separated by geography and improving conditions in Assyrian territories so that migration to the West would

not be the sole alternative available to the ambitious youth.<sup>41</sup> World and local events conspired to doom the attempt.<sup>42</sup>

The First World War was a disaster for the Assyrians. Threatened by the Kurdish and Turkish attacks, Nestorians of (Ottoman) Hakkari fled to the Russian occupied Urumiyah and once the Turkish troops captured Urumiyah in 1918, most of the Assyrians fled to the British occupied Northern Iraq. At the end of the war, the surviving Assyrian community had become too widely scattered to attempt a unification on the scale of that preceding World War I.<sup>43</sup> The geographic unity had been destroyed.<sup>44</sup> At the end of the Great War, very few Assyrians stayed in Turkey and virtually none in Iran. Many Assyrians moved to Western European countries and the United States, creating an ever-growing Assyrian Diaspora within the Western world.

As a partial conclusion, the term Assyrian itself, along with the concept of an Assyrian nationality were created by the Orientalist scholars and foreign Missions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Yet once created, the Nestorians and some Chaldeans, embraced this national identity as a means to overcome the religious-sectarian confrontations that they face. We are also justified to say that the same secular and nationalist minded Assyrians attempted to integrate the Assyrian society into the political and social framework of the Islamic society within which they lived. But their efforts were crippled by the European powers that benefited from an enmity between Muslims and Christians and the ensuing instability in the Middle East. At the same time, even though many neighboring Muslim communities (i.e. Iraqis, Syrians) gradually transformed themselves into societies (= *Gesellschaft*) with national bureaucracies, national education and mass media, Assyrians, due to their failure to establish a nation state, remained as a *Gemeinschaft*.

After the Great War, efforts for Assyrian nation-building concentrated in Iraq since Iraq became the only Middle Eastern country with a significant Assyrian population. Assyrian integration into the Iraqi society was remarkably problematic yet more fruitful was the construction of an Assyrian nationality and nationalism in the Iraqi territory.

Throughout the years of British Mandate in Iraq, Assyrians supported and served to protect the British colonialism from Arab insurrection. As Hanna Batatu notes, the British-officered, locally recruited "Iraq Levies" were expanded and was now drawn exclusively from the small, unintegrated racial and religious minority of Assyrians.<sup>45</sup> The Assyrians Levies' devotion to protect the British colonialism and the tragic events like the Arab-initiated massacre of the Assyrians in 1933 perpetually alienated Assyrians and Muslims from each other.<sup>46</sup>

Yet still the *Kukhva's* dream of integrating Assyrians into the political structures of the Middle East was partially realized in Iraq. Pyotr Vasili, the founder of the Iraqi Communist Party, was an Assyrian.<sup>47</sup> "Arabized" Assyrians and "Arabized" Chaldeans made up 22.7% of the Iraqi Communist Party in the 1941-1948 period,<sup>48</sup> a ratio that is disproportionately high with regards to the Assyrian minority's share in the Iraqi population. Moreover, the Iraqi government formally recognized the Assyro-Chaldean cultural and linguistic rights in 1972, but little was done to give a concrete significance to this declaration.<sup>49</sup>

Hanna Batatu divides the people that we think of as Assyrians (in Iraq) into three groups: 1) Arabized Chaldeans, who are two times more politically active and different than the 2) Arabized Assyrians who in turn, are politically active and distinct from the 3) "nonintegrated, unassimilable Assyrians whose name still irritates Iraqis".<sup>50</sup> In his narrative of an ex-Assyrian Levy and a politically prominent "Arabized" Assyrian (Tariq Aziz, Foreign Minister of Iraq), Adam Haddad mentions that at least one third of the Assyrian people prefer to call themselves as Chaldeans or Christian Arabs.<sup>51</sup>

Today, the Assyrians are considered to be the third largest ethnic minority in Iraq.<sup>52</sup> In 1991, they were believed to represent 133,000 people, or less than 1 percent of the population.<sup>53</sup> We would expect this number to be even lower because of the increased migration of the Assyrians to the Western countries after the Gulf War. The demographic inferiority of the Assyrians makes it impossible for them to establish a *Gesellschaft* in the form of a modern nation state. Unless we approach to the problem from a different (i.e. postmodern) vantage point, Assyrians are doomed to live as a deprived “community” among other communities (i.e. Kurdish, Turkoman) within the framework of an Iraqi “society.”

Yet, according to the Assyrian representative of Sweden in the Fourth World Conference on Women, there are over three million Assyrians spread all over the world.<sup>54</sup> Despite the nationalist claims of the self-identified Assyrians on [www.nineveh.com](http://www.nineveh.com), it is not certain whether the three million Assyrians around the world would identify themselves as national Assyrians.

Since both subjective and objective definitions of a nation are unsatisfactory and misleading, we should treat any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a nation as such.<sup>55</sup> Like the 41% of Tamil speakers who refused to consider themselves national Tamils and prefer identification as Muslims,<sup>56</sup> at least one third of the Assyrians in Iraq refuse to consider themselves as Assyrians and prefer to be identified as Christian Arabs.

Some Assyrians’ preference of religious identification (Chaldean) over the national one (Assyrian) should not surprise us. Before the advent of the Modern Era, the world was divided between religiously defined multicultural global orders. As Richard Eaton brilliantly demonstrated in his “Islamic History as Global History,” the pre-modern world had a cosmopolitan atmosphere that was multiethnic.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, Nestorian Christianity also had a cosmopolitan atmosphere that was multiethnic. According to the Assyrian nationalist myth, any historical connection to the Nestorian Church is considered to be a mark of Assyrian-ness. Yet, in the 8<sup>th</sup> century, Nestorian Church was described as *the most missionary church that the world has ever seen*.<sup>58</sup> Nestorian Missionaries traveled as far as India, China and Japan and converted numerous Indian, Chinese and Turkish people and kings to Nestorian Christianity.<sup>59</sup> From a historical perspective, it is unreasonable to claim that all the Nestorians and their historical associates, Chaldeans and Jacobites, are descendents of the ancient Assyrians. It is equally unreasonable, then, for the self-defined Assyrians of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to claim parts (or the whole) of the ancient Assyrian territory of the 1800 B.C.

History is complicated. Almost all of the ancient peoples and empires were shuffled and blended together throughout history; especially throughout the religious cosmopolitanism of the Medieval Ages. Thus, as Hobsbawm once noted, nations are not as old as history; indeed, the modern sense of the word is no older than the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>60</sup> Assyrian ‘nation’ is not an exception to this rule. As my inquiry to the history and the causes of the Assyrian nationalism shows, the term Assyrian was invented, or rather, revived by Western archeologists and Missionaries like Layard and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Once invented, many Nestorians and Chaldeans gradually accepted this term (i.e. Assyrian) as their national identity. The massacres of 1915, the need to undermine the denominational divisions and similar pressures popularized the ‘Assyrian’ national identity even further.

What prevented the unification of the Assyrian peoples and the realization of the Assyrian national identity formation? The imperialist (i.e. Russian and Western) opposition to a secular identity formation; competition among the European powers to culturally and linguistically patronize the Assyrian people; and the failure of the Assyrian attempts for

collective participation and representation in the political institutions of Iraq, Iran and Turkey are all valid answers that explain the *incompleteness* of the Assyrian national identity formation to a certain degree. Yet the Assyrians' failure to establish a nation state and their successive failure to teach and propagate the Assyrian language, culture and history on a massive scale seems to be the primary reason for the *incompleteness* of the Assyrian national identity. Nation is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state', and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it.<sup>61</sup> Even though the aspiration to establish a nation-state is enough to mobilize nationalist thinking, aspiration alone is not enough to construct a full-fledged national identity.

Many features of a full-fledged national identity emerge in the process of constructing political and legal, social and economic institutions for the nation-state. Karl Deutsch conceptualized the "making" of a nationality as a historical process of political integration that increases communication among the members of an ethnic group or a "people."<sup>62</sup> According to Deutsch's formulation, *since* Assyrians failed in their attempt for political integration, *then* Assyrians also failed to make the progress from a *people* to a *nationality*. The "printing capitalism," which Benedict Anderson holds responsible for the emergence of nationalism,<sup>63</sup> creates nationality insofar as it is a network of communications with a prevalent stream of national consciousness that flows within, informing and imposing national knowledge to the "people" who should be transformed into a "nationality." An alternative scholarly perspective perceives nation-building as the process through which a *Gemeinschaft* (community) is transformed into a *Gesellschaft* (society). The concept of a people is very similar to a *Gemeinschaft*; whereas, the *Gesellschaft* closely resembles a "nationality." Therefore, I feel justified to substitute *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* for a "people" and a "society," respectively.

A *Gesellschaft* also necessitates a power elite that oversees the communications network and only allows the information that it approves. In other words, information is restricted and the communications network is closed (by a power elite) in a *Gesellschaft*. Nation-states are very capable of creating such closed networks of communication and 'filtered' information flows. Under these conditions, a *Gemeinschaft* can transform itself into a *Gesellschaft* either by establishing its own sovereign state or by becoming a constituent part of a multinational state with full social, economic and cultural rights.<sup>64</sup>

Yet in our contemporary 'postmodern' world, communication flows through interpersonal and mass communication networks which often supersede and undermine the closed networks of the nation-states.<sup>65</sup> In accordance with the German terminology that was employed in describing the nationalization project, Richmond calls this transnational information network as the *Verbindungsnetzschafft*.<sup>66</sup>

As Richmond observes, in reality, *Gesellschaft* relationships never completely replaced *Gemeinschaft*, but were superimposed on them, creating more complex social systems.<sup>67</sup> This is especially true for the Assyrian people, since they were made up of multiple *millets* (officially recognized Chaldean *millet* in the Ottoman Empire and four different *millets* in the Persian city of Urumiyah), and a *millet* is a community (i.e. *Gemeinschaft*) in the modern sociological sense of the term. Moreover, following the Assyrian nationalists' failure to unify these religiously defined communities into a secular *Gesellschaft*, Iraqi elite superimposed its own secular Pan-Arabic *Gesellschaft* upon the Assyrian people through the nation-building efforts of the Ba'athist regime.<sup>68</sup> But the features of the Assyrian communities still persist and protect the ethnic Assyrians of Iraq from being integrated into the Iraqi *Gesellschaft*. Yet some other core features of a *Gemeinschaft*, like its reliance on religious-sectarian preferences, prevent the unification of

the various religiously defined Assyrian communities (=Gemeinschafts) into an overarching secular-nationalist Assyrian *Gesellschaft*.

Religious-sectarian and secular-nationalist propaganda and ideologies compete and reconcile in cyberspace. The well-preserved, non-integrated and unassimilable Assyrian *Gemeinschafts* found channels of expression in the emerging framework of the *Verbindungsnetzschafft*: The Internet is probably the most popular and certainly the most novel of these channels. Klas Gustafson's "Neverland in Cyberspace" attest to this situation by pointing out to the fact that "Assyria is the land that is not to be found in geographies, but has an address—in the Internet."<sup>69</sup> Albert Gabriel's article on the same issue has a slogan-like title which summarizes the relationship between the *Verbindungsnetzschafft* and the Assyrian nationalism: "Assyrians: '3,000 years of history, yet the Internet is our only home'."<sup>70</sup>

But it is also important to note that the representation of the Net as escaping all authority is simply inadequate.<sup>71</sup> Although the *Verbindungsnetzschafft* broke into the closed networks of the nation-states, it also allowed these states to devise far more sophisticated and exclusive structures of administration and surveillance by employing these new technologies.<sup>72</sup>

Bearing all this information in mind, we can now draft a resolution to the 'Assyrian National Question' from a more contemporary (and postmodern) vantage point. In the classical *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* scheme of national identity formation, the establishment of a nation-state was the necessary medium of national identity formation because only the nation-state had enough resources to construct and control a national network. However, the advent of the *Verbindungsnetzschafft* created alternative networks out of state control by making means of communication available to many individuals and communities. Individuals and communities can create their own cultural-linguistic-religious networks by their own initiative. Thus, they do not desperately need government endorsement to promote their (indigenous) culture and language as they used to. Yet, they still need government permission, that is, a right to access the available technology within the territory of the nation-state. Today, it is easier to give concrete meaning to the concept of social and cultural rights since the implementation of these rights does not require direct government endorsement or participation anymore.

In conclusion, it is not just the Assyrians of Iraq but all the Assyrian communities (*Gemeinschafts*) around the world can develop their cultural and linguistic networks if their respective host states build the minimum technological infrastructure to make the *Verbindungsnetzschafft* structures (=Internet, cable TV, e.t.c.) available to the indigenous people. It is not unrealistic to envision a Northern Iraq that is interwoven with Assyrian (as well as Kurdish and Turkoman) cultural and linguistic networks (websites and local broadcasting in Assyrian). Resolution of the competition between sectarian identifications (Chaldean, Nestorian) and nationalist aspirations, and the form of the Assyrian national (re)unification, if it ever happens, may emerge within the relatively peaceful means of communication (i.e. internet/cyberspace) instead of violent inter-communal warfare. Then, Iraq can preserve its territorial integrity while becoming an increasingly multiethnic state with its respective cyber-nations culturally flourishing within their *Verbindungsnetzschafft*s. Thus Assyrians can ensure their collective identity, not through government agencies, sponsors or subsidies, but through self-initiated effort via the new means of communication.

Moreover, establishment of a separate Assyrian nation-state in Northern Iraq is out of the realm of possibilities because of the remarkable demographic inferiority of the Assyrians (less than 1 percent of the population) and the lack of national unity among them. Yet preserving the status quo would be synonymous with the denial of Assyrians' cultural and collective rights.

Therefore, the multiethnic restructuring of the Iraqi state through a technologically advanced communications infrastructure seems to be a realistic solution to the questions and demands of the Assyrians. Iraqi government's formal recognition of Assyrian cultural and linguistic rights is an indication of its tolerance, if not willingness, of the flourishing of Assyrian culture. To give a concrete meaning to this formal recognition is possible if the Iraqi government allows the Assyrians actually to enjoy the cultural and linguistic rights that they 'officially' possess. The transformation of the Assyrian *Gemeinschafts* into a *Verbindungsnetzschafft* is already taking place in the Diaspora; but what is even more necessary is the incorporation of the Assyrian *Gemeinschafts* of Iraq into a *Verbindungsnetzschafft*. Thus, we can avoid the violent consequences of creating a *de jure* Assyrian nation-state (i.e. *Gesellschaft*) while actually allowing the religious-sectarian and secular-nationalist Assyrian communities to organize themselves around a *Verbindungsnetzschafft* that is capable of fulfilling the need to retain cultural and linguistic ties among the Assyrians.

## Appendix

*Sample list of scholars who have published books about Assyrians or Nestorians, accompanied by the year of their birth and the year of their death in parenthesis, emphasizing the fact that most of these scholars lived in the 19th century when Colonialism and Orientalism were very powerful.*

- 1) Austen Henry Layard (1817-1894)
- 2) Thomas Laurie (1821-1897)
- 3) Asahel Grant (1807-1844)
- 4) Adrian Fortescue (1874-1923)
- 5) William Chancey Emhardt (1874-?)
- 6) Edward Leves Cutts (1824-1901)
- 7) Charlotte Eliza Couling (1860-?)
- 8) Arthur John Maclean (1858-1943)
- 9) Justin Perkins (1805-1869)
- 10) William Walker Rockwell (1874-?)
- 11) Eli Smith (1801-1857)
- 12) David Tappan Stoddard (1818-1857)
- 13) R. Campbell Thompson (1876-1941)
- 14) Alex J.D. D'Orsey (1812-1894)
- 15) Paulos Karolides (1849-1930)
- 16) W.A. Wigram (1872-1953)
- 17) A. H. Sayce (1845-1933)
- 18) Erwin Cornelius Schonig (1901-?)
- 19) Christopher Johnston (1856-?)
- 20) George Smith (1800-1868)
- 21) George Stephen Goodspeed (1860-1905)
- 22) Carl Engel (1818-1882)
- 23) Francis W. Galpin (1858-1945)
- 24) Aubery Russell Vine (1900-?)
- 25) George Vance Smith (1816-1902)
- 26) Francois Lenormant (1837-1883)



27) Ronald Sempill Stafford (1890-?)

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Nisan, Mordechai. "Assyrians: An Ancient People, a Perennial Struggle," *Minorities of the Middle East*, Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.156.

<sup>3</sup> Bailis Yamlikha Shamun, "What's in a Name?" *The Assyrian Star* (Chicago), 34, 1, January-February 1985, p.9. cited in Mordechai Nisan, p.156.

<sup>4</sup> Mordechai Nisan, Ibid, p.157.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p.157.

<sup>6</sup> City in northwestern Iran, in the Iranian Azerbaijan. Present day Reziyah, Urumiyah was an important city of Assyrian concentration from where the Assyrians fled to Hemedan in 1918. Also called Oormiyah.

<sup>7</sup> Mordechai Nisan, "Assyrians: An Ancient People, a Perennial Struggle," Minorities of the Middle East, (Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, 1991).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p.158.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p.158.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p.159.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p.161.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p.161.

<sup>13</sup> During the massacres of 1915, Nestorians of the Hakkiari mountains sought refuge in the Russian occupied Assyrian populated Persian city of Urmiyah. Once Turks captured Urmiyah in 1918, tens of thousands of Assyrians fled to the British occupied Iraq via the Persian city of Hemedan. When the Great War ended in favor of the Allies, Chaldean patriarch requested a European protected state for Chaldeans, Nestorians and Jacobites in Mesopotamia. Britain did not entertain this proposal. At the same time, Turkey and Iran refused the repatriation of Assyrians in Hakkiari or Urmiyah. Finally, the Assyrians were resettled in the Mosul region in Northern Iraq due to the lack of any other viable options.

<sup>14</sup> The attempt to settle the Catholic Assyrians (Chaldeans?) in Brazil faced fierce opposition from the Brazilian urban nativists who agitated to shut Brazil's doors in order to preserve racial purity and demographic proportion of the white-European (Aryan) race. For a further treatment of the issue, look at Jeffrey Lesser, "Immigration and Shifting Concepts of National Identity in Brazil during the Vargas Era," Luso Brazilian Review, 1994, 31:2.

<sup>15</sup> Eric J.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.3: "Nations, we now know, are not as old as history. The modern sense of the word is no older than the 18<sup>th</sup> century."

<sup>16</sup> *Millet*, even though it means ‘nation’ in modern Turkish, referred to a (religious) community that was administered and contacted through a *milletbashimilletbasi* (head of the community) in the Ottoman Empire. It is crucial to notice that a *millet* is not a ‘society’ (=Gesellschaft) but a religiously defined ‘community’ (=Gemeinschaft), since the distinction between a Gemeinschaft and a Gesellschaft is fundamental for my argument in this paper.

<sup>17</sup> Eli Smith, Researches of the Rev. E. Smith and Rev. H.G.O. Dwight in Armenia including a journey through Asia Minor, and into Georgia and Persia, with a visit to the Nestorian and Chaldean Christians of Oormiah and Salmas. Volume II. (Boston, Crocker and Brewster, 1833).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. “We were also not sorry to give countenance...to the Nestorians in opposition to the Chaldeans. For the latter seemed always to announce themselves as a Roman Catholic with a tone of self-congratulation for their orthodoxy...While the Nestorians declared their sentiments with diffidence, as if they expected a frown from everybody...for their heresy. It was not unimportant to show them, that they are not alone in their disapprobation of the papacy.”

<sup>19</sup> Austen Henry Layard, Nineveh. (New York, George P. Putnam, 1849).

<sup>20</sup> See the Appendix for a list of authors whose works have corresponded to the keywords ‘Assyrian’ or ‘Nestorian’ in the Joseph Regenstein Library in the University of Chicago.

<sup>21</sup> “Archbishop of Canterbury’s Appeal for the Assyrian Christians” published as an Appendix (A) of the Portuguese Discoveries, Dependencies and Missions in Asia and Africa, compiled by the Rev. Alex J.D. D’Orsey. (London, W.H. Allen, 1893).

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.nineveh.com/2000/>. It is important to note that the same website endorses a proposal to unite all eleven identifications under the unitary title of the ‘Assyrian.’

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.nineveh.com/2000/>. “Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox Church and the Census 2000” by W.M. Warda.

<sup>24</sup> Mordechai Nisan, “Assyrians: An Ancient People, a Perennial Struggle,” Minorities of the Middle East. (Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, 1991). p.162.

<sup>25</sup> Eden Naby, “The Assyrians of Iran: Reunification of a ‘Millat,’ 1906-1914” published in the International Journal of Middle East Studies. (volume 8, No.4, October 1977). p.239.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p.239-40.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p.240.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p.240.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p.240.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p.241.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p.241.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. “By 1906, the year when *Kukhva* began publication, the three major Western missions had already established their periodical presses. The American periodical called *Zarira d Bara* (Ray of Light), was

the first Assyrian language newspaper in Urumiyah and very possibly the first newspaper, in the modern conception of the term, to be published in Iran. It ran from 1850 to 1914. The Roman Catholic periodical, *Qala d Sharara* (Voice of the Truth) was founded in 1896. *Aurmi Artuduksyita* (Orthodox Urumiyah), published by the Russian Mission, appeared irregularly in the first part of the century but on a more regular basis in 1911, perhaps as a consequence of the Russian occupation of Urumiyah that year.” p.241.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p.243.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. “Kukhva also voiced support fro unification efforts outside Urumiyah: the formation of cultural societies in Salamas and Tehran, a drive to build an interdenominational church for Assyrians in Tiflis, and a Society of Friendship and Culture formed in Tkumi (Tugun, a village in Hakkari, Turkey), whcih included among its members Assyrians and Kurds.” p.244.

<sup>35</sup> In this paper, I use the word ‘Orientalist’ and ‘Orientalism’ exactly as Edward Said uses it in his *Orientalism*. (New York, Vintage Books, 1979).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p.245.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. “The corrosive influence of the foreign Missions manifested itself in another aspect of Assyrian relations with Persian authority. It was the practice of small *millats* in Urumiyah, as elsewhere in Iran, to deal with the Persian government through the offices of a community leader called *milletbashi* (community head). Unlike the Armenian and Jewish communities of Urumiyah, by the turn of the century the Assyrians had not one but four *milletbashis* serving Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox, and Nestorians separately.” p.246.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p.245.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p.246.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p.249.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p.249.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p.249.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p.248.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p.248.

<sup>45</sup> Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978). p.90.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. “The Assyrians, a foreign and unassimilable people, whome the English employed as mercenary troops and whose very name still irritated Iraqis, had nursed a bitter hatred against Arab Mosul ever since 1933, when officers from this town played a prominent role in the crushing of a forlorn Assyrian rebellion.” p.869.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.404.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p.699-700.

<sup>49</sup> Mordechai Nisan, "Assyrians: An Ancient People, a Perennial Struggle," Minorities of the Middle East. (Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, 1991). p.166.

<sup>50</sup> Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978).

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.nineveh.com/levies/story1.htm>, Adam Haddad, "The Day Mam Nona Met Tariq Aziz."

<sup>52</sup> Iraq: A Country Study, Federal Research Division- Library of Congress, ed. By Helen Chapin Metz. (Washington D.C., U.S. government as represented by the Secretary of the Army, 1990). The largest minority in Iraq is the Kurds, followed by the Turkomans.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> <http://www.nineveh.com/whoarewe.htm>

<sup>55</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789. Programme, Myth, Reality. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). p.8.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p.7.

<sup>57</sup> Richard M. Eaton, "Islamic History as Global History," published within Islamic and European Expansion. (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993). p.24.

<sup>58</sup> Mingana, Bulletin fo the John Rylands Library. Vol.IX, p.347, cited in Rev. John Stewart's Nestorian Missionary Enterprise. (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1928). p.139.

<sup>59</sup> Rev. John Stewart, Nestorian Missionary Enterprise. (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1928) the entire book; especially chapters 3 through 8.

<sup>60</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). p.3.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. p.10.

<sup>62</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1993). p.7.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p.7.

<sup>64</sup> While conceptualizing a minority that is a constituent part of a multinational state, I think of the example fo Canadian Quebec that retained its 'French-ness' to such a degree that in a country with 99% literacy rate (i.e. Canada) it is still possible to find Candian citizens (in Quebec) who only speak French.

<sup>65</sup> Anthony H. Richmond, Global Apartheid. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1994). p.200.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. p.200.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. p.200.

<sup>68</sup> Amatzia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89. (New York, St.Martin's Press, 1991).

<sup>69</sup> Klas Gustafson, "Neverland in Cyberspace" published in Dagens Arbete (Sweden 1999) and also appears in <http://www.nineveh.com/neverland.htm>.

<sup>70</sup> Albert Gabriel, "Assyrians: 3,000 Years of History, Yet the Internet is Our Only Home" appears in the <http://www.cs.org/publications/CSQ/csqinternet.html#Gabrial>.

<sup>71</sup> Saskia Sassen, "Digital Networks and the State," published in Theory, Culture & Society. 17(4). p.23.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

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## An Interview with Richard Perle - Chairman, Defense Policy Board, Department of Defense. Conducted by Angela Hokanson

*Richard Perle is currently Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory panel to the Department of Defense. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under the Reagan Administration. He has assumed a number of diverse positions, among them Director of The Jerusalem Post, Producer of the PBS production The Gulf Crisis: The Road to War (1992), and Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Hollinger Digital, Inc. Mr. Perle received his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Southern California and completed his Masters in Political Science from Princeton University.*

*Hemispheres interviewed Mr. Perle in an effort to understand the potential role of the United States in current and future endeavors in state-building, with emphasis on US involvement in Iraq.*

**Hemispheres:** You've received quite a bit of press lately for your views on Iraq, views that have seemed to gain currency in the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup>. In an interview that you did recently with PBS, you stated that, "there can be no victory in the war against terrorism, if at the end of it Saddam Hussein is still in power." Why is this necessarily true?

**Perle:** Well, for several reasons. First, Saddam has been one of the most important sources of support for various forms of terrorist activity for a long time now. That support includes sending checks to the families of suicide bombers, which helps to encourage this whole culture of suicide bombing. He has ties with terrorist organizations, some of which are based in Baghdad. He has been training terrorists. We have viable information about the training facility of Salmon Pak, an area not far from Baghdad where there is, among other things, a passenger aircraft to train hijackers. But, beyond all of that, he is capable of using weapons of mass destruction. He has done so in the past, he has used gas against Kurdish villagers, he has used gas against the Iranians, and we know he has anthrax and other biological weapons, so he is a particularly dangerous individual who is both related to terrorism and possesses weapons of mass destruction. That is why it's essential that we deal with him.

**Hemispheres:** Given that there is all this evidence that Saddam Hussein has sponsored terrorism, and is sponsoring terrorism, what is different about his regime that makes it different from other regimes that sponsor terrorism? And, would be setting a precedent for ourselves that we wouldn't want to uphold if we went after Saddam in this manner?

**Perle:** Well, in fact the President has indicated that we are going to deal with all regimes that support terrorism, but we're obviously not going to do it all at once. So there's an order in which we have to do these things. And Saddam is high on the list because he's more dangerous than most of the others. But there are others, too, that we need to contend with.

**Hemispheres:** If getting rid of Saddam Hussein is really in the national interest of the U.S. as much as some people believe, what considerations are holding us back from taking a more active

role in toppling his regime? Is it lack of support of the American public? Is it potential lack of support of the international community? Is it the practical dangers of invasion?

**Perle:** Well, all of the above. To begin with, until recently you didn't have an administration that acknowledged the danger that Saddam poses or the importance of regime change. The Clinton Administration chose essentially not to deal with Saddam by not responding effectively even to such serious developments as the expulsion of the UN inspectors. That administration contented itself with ineffective, symbolic, pinprick attacks. So now you have an administration that takes Saddam seriously, but then you have the further, not inconsiderable problems of devising the strategy and getting the necessary support to take action. And I think that's now happening.

**Hemispheres:** Why have our policies toward Iraq vacillated so much in the ten years since the Gulf War, even within particular administrations themselves?

**Perle:** I think the explanation is different in all three cases: for the post-Desert Storm period when the first Bush administration was in power and the period of the Clinton administration and then this last period of a year with the second Bush administration. In the case of George H.W. Bush, I think they simply made an error. They didn't finish Desert Storm by removing Saddam from office, they didn't destroy the Republican Guard although they had it in a position where they could have done so. And there were a number of reasons for that, including I think the belief that Saddam would go anyway, because they just didn't believe that he could survive a defeat as large as the defeat that was imposed upon him. They were wrong about that. They left office before ever discovering that error and taking action to deal with it. Now, the Clinton administration simply was weak and they didn't want to take on anything that they were not convinced at the outset would be an automatic success. And that sounds harsh, but I had discussions with them at the time. They didn't realize the danger and they had no interest in taking Saddam on, so they chose not to do so. The present administration came in and began a review of our policy and that review was underway on September 11<sup>th</sup> and it is now being accelerated. And I think we can begin to see the outcome of, if not the review, at least the President's thinking on this, which was pretty clear in the State of the Union message. So now the planning has to catch up with what I think is the President's predisposition.

**Hemispheres:** Do you believe this decision will be forthcoming in the next few weeks, months?

**Perle:** Well, I'm not sure of the exact timing, but I think the only way you can read the State of the Union message is that the President has made a decision. If Saddam were to radically alter his policies very quickly—it would be hard to make that notion persuasive, but I suppose that its not impossible—unless that happens, I read that State of the Union address to suggest that he's going to take some action.

**Hemispheres:** The rhetoric used in the State of the Union address—is it constructive? Is it needlessly inflammatory? If Bush doesn't follow up with the rhetoric that he's been using, does it detract from the credibility of the United States?

**Perle:** Yes, it certainly does, which is why I think that he would not have said what he said if he didn't have in mind taking some action.



**Hemispheres:** Colin Powell and others have propounded the view that the international coalition against terrorism is a crucial element in the successful campaign against terrorism. Will going after Iraq sacrifice this coalition and does this matter?

**Perle:** Well, I don't think it will. But one has to ask the question what is meant by the coalition. Nobody's ever defined it. If you define it as those countries that are involved in one way or another in suppressing terrorism, then I think if you start to look country by country, many of them are doing this because it is in their own interest, they themselves could be victims of terrorism. Some of them are doing it to support the United States, because they have other interests that they think will be satisfied by close cooperation with us. Countries are doing different things, and for the most part they are simply trying to apprehend terrorists who are operating from their own territory, which is partly surprising. They should have done it a long time ago. It would be an exceedingly unfriendly act for any country that wants a good relationship with the United States to allow terrorists to operate without bringing them under control. Some are exchanging intelligence with us, but those intelligence-sharing relations are mutually beneficial because we share intelligence with them. And so the point I'm leading up to is that the motivation for continuing cooperation would exist under any set of circumstances, so you have to ask whether countries that are working with us would stop working with us if we were to go after Saddam Hussein. It's not at all clear to me why one should assume that they would. Some of them are working with us secretly, as opposed to openly. And I don't know of any country—although within countries there are individuals who benefit from Saddam being there—but from a point of view of governments, there is no government who is friendly to Saddam Hussein. So I don't think that we would see a change in behavior, on the part of any governments we care about, if we were to go after Saddam Hussein. The generalizations about what would happen to “the coalition” are just useless. You have to say, for example, “would the Belgians, who are now cooperating with us, and trying to find terrorists who are operating out of Brussels, would they stop cooperating with us?” Of course they wouldn't. So when you subject that statement to a little analysis, the concern disappears. Having said that, a lot depends on how the war—if there is a war with Saddam's regime—how it comes out. If he's defeated and the Iraqis are dancing the streets, because they've been liberated, as I believe they would, then I don't see any problem at all with our relationships with any of the countries. If we were to get bogged down, and ultimately withdrew with our tail between our legs, that would be another matter altogether. I don't think that will happen, I don't think we can afford to let that happen. And I don't think we'll start on this until we're confident. And by the way, I think a victory has the potential to catapult the United States in the region because I believe we would have been seen to have liberated that country.

**Hemispheres:** If the U.S made the decision to act on the belief that getting rid of Saddam was really a priority, what do you think we could expect in terms of U.S. intervention? Would we see something similar to the tactics used in Afghanistan currently, with U.S. troops certainly on the ground, but with tactical support to other soldiers also being a key element? What methods would be used?

**Perle:** Of course there are a great many ways of approaching this. My own view is something similar to what was done in Afghanistan, combination of the United States and the allies on the

ground where the U.S principally supplies airpower and some on- the-ground support of local forces. Much of Saddam's army, I believe, will defect very early in a conflict. And his behavior, the way he moves his own troops around, the way he has his troops organized, really suggests that he has doubts about their loyalty. He's not a popular man; he's killed a great many people. Something like the Afghan approach would work.

**Hemispheres:** Can you tell us a little about the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and what role they might have in a U.S.-led stance against Saddam's regime?

**Perle:** Well, this is a matter of some controversy. The INC has been around for a long time. I know some of the principals and have a lot of confidence in them. It is led by a fellow called Ahmed Chalabi, who is a Ph.D. in mathematics, which is not necessarily what one looks for in a revolutionary leader, but he's a serious, intelligent guy who has been and I think remains very much committed to a future Iraq of the kind we'd like to see: democratic, renouncing weapons of mass destruction. That is sort of what we'd like to see. There are others who don't share that view, either because they're looking at the now, and judging their current capabilities. Their current capabilities are limited, which is what you would expect since they haven't had any significant outside support. They also as an umbrella group potentially represent all of the Iraqi opposition and I think that it's very important that we deal with the group that brings the various elements of the opposition together.

**Hemispheres:** Many American people have grown concerned in the last few years about the burden borne by the Iraqi people as a result of sanctions and the like. How would the U.S. help ensure that the removal of Saddam would not cause a civil war between competing factions in Iraq and make life potentially worse for the Iraqi people? And, how responsible would the U.S. be in assisting to rebuild Iraq if we aided in eliminating Saddam's regime?

**Perle:** Well, I think we would be deeply involved, that we have a large interest in being deeply involved. And Iraq is not a poor country, they have resources, and the means with which to rebuild. So I think we would have a big interest and would take seriously the reconstruction of Iraq. But it's hard to imagine that the Iraqi people could be worse off than they are today. They are ruled by a man who arbitrarily kills Iraqi citizens whenever he finds it convenient to his own purposes of remaining in power. The regime is thoroughly corrupt; a great deal of national wealth gets skimmed off by a small number of people at the top. The image of privation of the Iraqi people is due largely to the way in which Saddam manipulates the situation. He has large unexpended balances, including humanitarian assistance, the oil-for-food program, money that he doesn't spend, and then he blames the embargo for the shortages of food and medicine. So he's been controlling the situations for his own purposes. I think that almost anything that follows Saddam is going to be better for the people of Iraq.

**Hemispheres:** I have a bit of a more fundamental question now. In your view, what is the foundation for the making of war in foreign policy? Is it simply a matter of maximizing material benefit and safety for ourselves regardless of its effects on other countries, or do we require a moral justification? And, if a moral justification is required, how do we differentiate between a country that seeks to develop and use weapons of mass destruction, and ourselves, a country that has amassed weapons of mass destruction and used them?

**Perle:** Well, of course there's got to be a moral component. We're a democracy, and I don't mean that if we were to embark on a course of aggrandizement there would be popular support. And we're not inclined to do it anyway. We certainly have the means to do it. We have a very powerful military establishment, that were it devoted to predatory behavior, it would have surely exhibited that by now. We have no history of it in modern time, and no one argues for it. If we had chosen to do so, for example, we could have held on to much of Europe after World War II and we didn't. We could have held on to Japan—we didn't. In all the history prior to the rise of American power the victors in war benefited themselves materially from their victory. They either looted or took territory or imposed reparations or in various other ways sought to benefit from their victories. World War II was probably the crowning exception to that rule where we not only relinquished all the territory that we could have acquired, we actually embarked upon the Marshall Plan to rebuild the economies of Europe, we wrote a democratic constitution for Japan and helped them rebuild themselves as a democracy. From the point of view of the full course of history, it's sort of a remarkable story that's really without precedent. So I think we use force when we think its necessary to protect ourselves. That's true even of some wars, that on reflection were almost certainly unwise—Vietnam, for example. We went in to Vietnam in the belief that we were stopping—I say we—the people responsible at the time, from Jack Kennedy on, went into Vietnam in the belief that this was necessary to protect the United States because a defeat would mean a Communist victory, which would strengthen the Communist world in the Cold War. We're in Afghanistan not because we want anything out of Afghanistan, but because it was a base of operation against the United States. So I don't think we have to apologize to anyone for the military operations that we've undertaken. They are, as I've said, quite unprecedented. I think you said how do we square our possession of nuclear weapons with the effort to prevent others from acquiring them? I think that the simple answer is self-defense. If you're a peaceful person, and you possess a gun, and your neighbor says to you, "I'm going to destroy you; I hate you," and starts building a bomb in his basement, do you wait for him to explode that bomb or do you defend yourself? And the fact that you may have a weapon, or even a bomb, doesn't mean that it makes sense to wait until you're attacked. It is self-defense, the right of which is recognized under UN Charter 51, that would justify our acting preemptively if we were in a situation in which another country was about to acquire a weapon of mass destruction and where the only way in which we could protect ourselves against it would be to act first.

**Hemispheres:** Shifting gears a little bit, how does national missile defense (NMD) fit into the larger picture? We've recently witnessed terrible attacks on the U.S. using airplanes, and, other than that, very rudimentary weapons. What makes you think that missile attacks, and not attacks using other weapons, are the most probable threat for the United States?

**Perle:** Oh, I don't think that. I think that missile attacks are on a list of ways in which we might be attacked, certainly not the only one. But if you take the view that there are a number of threats and we are only going to protect against some of them, then of course the ones in which you are not protecting against become the Achilles' heel. So, the fact that there are other ways in which we might be attacked is not by itself a reason for not pursuing a defense against missiles. One of the reasons is that a number of countries are making a very large, and for them, extremely costly, investment in acquiring missiles. So I think we have to assume that they're doing it for a

purpose. They're not doing it because they want to sacrifice a significant portion of their national income to that, they're doing it because they think these weapons will be useful to them. And in many cases these are countries that are quite hostile to the United States. So I think in part we have to be guided by what others are doing. I mean, you could put the same argument to Saddam, or to the North Koreans. You could say to the North Koreans, who are desperately poor, "Why are you wasting money on ballistic missiles? You could be using all these cheaper, more rudimentary means of attacking?" I don't know what their answer is, but we have to be guided in part by how we see the threat emerging. By the way, let me just add: I think it would make sense for us to begin the deployment of missile defense, if only to deal with the possibility of an accident. Because the costs of an accident would be so catastrophic, the costs of a defense in relation seem to be, for a wealthy society like ours, quite manageable. And it takes a long time, so the sooner we start on it, the better. And the first defense we develop will certainly not be the last one. The technology is going to develop over time, and you've got to start somewhere, sometime.

**Hemispheres:** It appears that support for missile defense has grown, with nations becoming less hostile to the idea, or even coming out in favor of it. Do you think the momentum for missile defense will continue to grow, in the U.S. and abroad?

**Perle:** Well, I think there is strong support in the U.S. All the polls that we've seen indicate that. And that's really what matters because I think we're going to do this whether others like it or not. Others aren't in a position to defend us against a missile attack. We'll certainly listen to what other people have to say. But at the end of the day we've got to decide what we need to do to defend ourselves. But the opposition has diminished sharply, in part because it was based on a theory. And the theory was, during the Cold War, that any effort to build a defense would be responded to by an arms race, by a desperate effort by the other side, in this case the Soviet Union, to build a larger offense so that they could be sure to overwhelm the defense. And that sense of foreboding persisted even after the end of the Cold War. But now I think people are coming to realize that the Cold War is in fact over, and there is no reason to fear that an arms race will be the outgrowth of an American missile defense. So people are coming to relax a bit.

**Hemispheres:** The U.S is now sending military advisors to the Philippines in order to help fight insurgents who are allegedly sponsoring terrorism. Are we just involving ourselves in several interminable conflicts at once?

**Perle:** Well, I don't think that one is interminable, but to tell you the truth, I haven't studied it very closely. The number of people we believe are involved in the Abu Sayyaf organization is rather small, and what they've been doing is basically intimidating: taking hostages, trading hostages for money. It's the kind of insurgency which, when dealt with when its small, is a lot easier than when it gets out of control. So I think if we thought it was interminable, or if our involvement were interminable, we never would have done it.

**Hemispheres:** But if there are groups of terrorists operating in so many countries, how are we not going to spread out military too thin with so many endeavors at once?

**Perle:** Yes, I think the answer to that is until now, the cost of allowing terrorists to operate was very small. There was no penalty attached to it. If a country chose to allow terrorists to operate in their territory, they didn't pay a penalty for that, because the response to acts of terrorism was generally against the terrorists themselves and not against the country that gave them sanctuary. So its not surprising that under the circumstances, a number of countries chose to allow terrorists to operate in their territory. The Afghans, for example, were paid for doing it. The Taliban was receiving lots of support from Osama bin Laden: money, weapons. From their point of view it was a good business. Now it's not a good business anymore, because we've demonstrated that if you do that, you will become an enemy of the United States and you may even see your regime destroyed, as is the case with Afghanistan. I think eventually the message is going to get across to all countries that whatever the benefits of allowing your territory to be used by terrorists operating against the United States, the costs are even higher. So I think a great many countries will now clamp down on terrorism, because I think their sense of the cost/benefit ratio will change dramatically. And that would be significantly reinforced if we removed Saddam Hussein from office. Then I think the message would be very clear: if you are involved in terrorism and if you pose a threat to the United States, you are in jeopardy. And I think a lot of regimes will change their policies. Some have already started to do so.

**Hemispheres:** All nineteen of the September 11<sup>th</sup> hijackers were either of Egyptian or Saudi descent. Our relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia has been closer in recent years than that of our relationship with many other Arab countries. But do our policies toward these two countries need to change in light of the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>? Should we be doing things that we have been afraid or wary of doing in the recent years?

**Perle:** You know, its very interesting. You're quite right to make that observation. To complete the thought, the populations of the Arab world that are closest to the United States, that are friendliest to the United States, are the ones with which whose governments we have the most difficult, hostile relations. So there's a great deal of popular sentiment for the United States in Iran, and in Iraq as well. Where there is very little popular sentiment is where we're closely associated with the governments. And the reason is these are repressive governments. Egypt has a repressive government, so does Saudi Arabia. And yes, I think we need seriously to re-think how we relate to these governments that are certainly not democratic and that control the distribution of wealth and in other ways are unpopular with their own people. They rule frequently be force. We need to re-think our relationship with the Arab world and the Muslim world and we need to re-think the relationship between modernization and democratic, pluralist institutions and the kind of political climate that lends itself to terrorism. People talk about the root causes of terrorism. I think it has a great deal more to do with repressive regimes than it does with poverty. These Saudis and Egyptians [hijackers] were not poor, but they lived in repressive regimes.

## An Interview with Stanley Karnow - Journalist and Pulitzer Prize Winning Author. Conducted by Anglea Hokanson.

*Stanley Karnow is an award-winning journalist and author. He was working as a foreign correspondent for Time in Vietnam in 1959, and he continued covering the Vietnam War until its conclusion. Karnow has also written for The Saturday Evening Post and the Washington Post, reported for NBC News, and worked as an associate editor for The New Republic.*

*Karnow is the author of several books, including In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines, for which he won a Pulitzer Prize in History in 1991. In addition, he also helped create and produce "Vietnam: A Television History" in 1983, a PBS documentary which was created in conjunction with the writing of his book Vietnam: A History, which has sold approximately 1.5 million copies.*

**Hemispheres:** We'd like to talk first about some of the recent developments in the Philippines, in terms of the increased U.S military presence in the form of these military advisors. In a radio interview that you did on WBUR in late January, just as these "military advisors" were entering the Philippines, you stated something to the effect of situations like this are very "foggy" and "murky", and the US doesn't really know what we're getting into by entering the Philippines in this manner. Can you explain to us a bit to us why this might be so, why this mission in the Philippines, which on the surface might seem to be a rather small-scale endeavor, might escalate and manifest itself in ways that we aren't expecting or aren't prepared for?

**Karnow:** Well, let me say a couple of things – nothing is ever small scale. Comparisons are not always exact; when we had to look at Vietnam it was a spec on a map. When you get there you discover it is much bigger and complicated than you think it is. If the police are trying to catch one sniper on the roof of a building in Chicago, you have to get two thousand policemen out there with all kinds of hooks and ladders and so forth. Everything may seem small and far away, but when you actually get there, you discover it is much bigger and more complicated than you think it is. The Philippines is a very complicated place. First of all, its not a very homogenous country, there are something like 8,000 islands in the Philippines, people speak about five or six different languages, and there are 85 dialects, Where we are at the moment is down in the island of Mindanao, part of which finds people who are the Muslim minority, that have been in dissidence. If you go back in history, when the US took over the Philippines in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, they were up against a strong nationalist movement throughout the Philippines, and when they eventually defeated the atrocities, then they had to go down to Mindanao where there was a Muslim minority – which were called Moros, for some strange reason people seemed to think there was some kinship between them and the Moroccans, which was a preposterous idea. The battles that went on there were quite fierce, you had the kind of resistance you hear about today, suicides; in fact, the resistance was so fierce from these people the US had to invent a new weapon – a 45 pistol, which is a heavy duty handheld pistol. It was very hard to really ever hit anything with it, you would have to get real close because it bucks all the time. At any rate, it took a long time because there were always these pockets of resistance, and they've gone on forever. They have been resisting the central government and part of it is ideological, part of it is religious, part of it is fundamentalism, and a lot of it is just sheer banditry. Some of these movements I think is nothing more than a just of bandits that

kidnap people and hold them for ransom. They have been holding some Americans for several months. They are very brutal, they are known to decapitate people, and not only outsiders, but when they run into local Philippines who resist them, they can be very brutal.

The other problem in the Philippines is that the government army is not exactly a model of efficiency. There has been a lot of corruption in the army and in many cases you find that the soldiers in the Army can be just as brutal towards civilians as their opponents are. They are capable of going into villages, ripping them up, tearing them apart, stealing money from people, and raping women. When you get involved in situations like these, the complication is who is in command. I don't want to say that history repeats itself, but if you take Vietnam as a model – the initial American involvement was in the form of military advisors, like in the Philippines now. Eventually we began to find that the government army we were dealing with was quite incompetent, corrupt, ineffective, and as the situation got worse, by 1965 there was this frustration. We weren't bringing any progress and the other side was making a lot of progress. The decision was to put in American combat troops, and I'm not going to say this is the same situation here, we don't know what's going to happen here, because it is extremely difficult to be an advisor. It is very hard for advisory groups to operate except in cases where you have a very strong central government. It did work in the Philippines back in the 1950s. There was a left wing pro-communist movement called akid bhalaha (spelling?). They were defeated partly because the president of the Philippines at the time, Maxi Psi (spelling?) was a very effective man, he operated with a CIA advisor, probably several, but one in particular was very effective. The communist movement was defeated partly too because the movement itself began to split up, although it became quite close to moving into Manila. So that was a success story, but the present movement down in Mindanao is different because you have a religious component and a fundamentalist component. Undoubtedly this weaponry is coming in from the world and for a while there was some evidence they were being armed by Libya. I suspect that there is a Bin Laden connection but I do not really know. Of course they are close to Indonesia which is another big Islamic country, where we have not even begun to scratch the surface of the fundamentalist movement. The Indonesian government is not very strong either, its army is scattered and it is an enormously big country. We know there are Islamic training camps in Indonesia and it is just a short ways from the southern Philippines. I suspect that there is a lot of movement back and forth between the Philippines and Indonesia. Where we are going eventually in the Philippines is very hard to say, but I think it is going to be a very serious situation. It is very hard to deal with the Philippines because it is an extremely fragmented place, both because of its size and different languages. In many ways it is still a feudal society and it is run by an oligarchy of a couple hundred families. There is a lot of period peasant unrest and you have rebellions of one sort of another going on – some of them political and some of them protests against conditions. You have pockets of protest in the various islands. It is almost as if you put up a map and you look at it and it would look like a hide of a leopard with all these little spots all over the place. We have different movements, different rebellions, protest movements, dissidence, and all sorts of things to pacify this country (if we can use this word) is a very long haul. I think we are just beginning, we are seeing just the very beginning of something that I think could escalate. I spend a lot of time in the Philippines and my guess would be we are just at the start of something there.

***Hemispheres:*** I know there have been delays already, I mean we're not on schedule, the training that supposed to happen hasn't, I don't know how closely you've been following in the

newspaper, given that if it had any potential effort to be small scale and it just not going to be, what lessons have we learned or ought we have learned from the Vietnam War, in regard to our increasing involvement in Afghanistan and the Philippines and beyond?

**Karnow:** Well the problem with lessons is this: Each situation is different and you cannot take the results of one situation and apply them to another, they are all different. Let me go back to another place in time; the basic difference in the case of Vietnam is that it was a very geographically limited area. The aim of the Vietnamese communist nationalist movement was to basically take control of the whole country. The country was partitioned in 1954 and their aim was to unify the country under their control. They had absolutely no intention of going beyond their borders, except to say that they wanted to have a lot of influence in the two neighboring countries of Cambodia and Laos; because the three countries of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos had been part of a French colony called Indo-China. There was a limit, there was no aim on the part of them to have a world wide crusade. The difference here is that we are up against a fundamentalist Islamic movement that has no borders—we are in World War III at this point, the Filipino the Muslim fundamentalists (terrorists) have connections with other groups all over the world. They have connected with groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Middle East, and even as far as Algeria. We have had cases where people have been arrested getting on airplanes in Manila on their way to another part of the world. You never found that in Vietnam. So Vietnam is not a model for anything you could do in the Philippines, because it was so localized, and even though it was localized it was enormously difficult and in the end we lost. Here we have to think of it not just in terms of the Philippines, but we have to think in global terms.

There are people who are saying we have to do something about Saddam Hussein, I don't know that Saddam Hussein is not helping to train Filipinos, maybe he has agents in the Philippines, maybe Filipinos are going there for training, to the middle east. There are a lot of Filipinos, incidentally who work in the Middle East countries, a lot of Filipinos work abroad because the conditions are so bad. They have become expatriate workers and lots of them work in Saudi Arabia and in those countries, individually a lot of Filipinos are quite skilled and they do a lot of work the local people can't do; who knows? I don't know enough about them to know which Filipinos working in the Middle East are perfectly innocuous and which ones may be connected with dissident groups. So this is a vast panorama we are facing, vast, you have to look at the Philippines as just one part of a huge global situation and whatever we have there, a few hundred troops, a few hundred advisors, is nothing, it is really not going to be effective. I cannot see how it will be effective, but on the other hand I cannot see either how we have the means or resources to put in full scale combat operation, because once you begin to do it, you have to do it in the Philippines and other places. You can't replicate Afghanistan in the Philippines or Afghanistan in Indonesia, we have not even gone into Indonesia. There is a vast, extremely complicated intelligence component to this, and how you handle that I don't know.

**Hemispheres:** It appears that the Abu Sayyaf extremist group, while a threat within the Philippines, it seems as though there are much bigger terrorist threats out there.

**Karnow:** Abu Sayyaf is much more a bandit group rather than a really serious fundamentalist/political group.



**Hemispheres:** Given what we know about it, why are we in the Philippines, of all places, doing what we're doing, now? Is it a staging ground for Indonesia, it is a place where Americans will be welcomed in the beginning steps of getting ready for an endeavor in Indonesia where Americans would more likely not be welcomed?

**Karnow:** It is like we are facing a kind of situation where we are trying to plug up a lot of radicals and they are all over the place. There is a feeling in Washington that we have to do something about that situation now, but what do we do? We sent in advisors in the hope that they can stiffen and fortify the Filipino army, constabulary, Filipino police, and be effective as a result of that. The first thing you come up against when you first go in there is a lot of protests in Manila against infringements on Filipino nationalism. A lot of that is hot air. The fact is, is that Filipinos are overwhelmingly pro-American. There are many Filipinos living in the United States, and they send back money to their families, the dream of thousands, millions of Filipinos is to move to the US, even despite the noise that comes out of the universities, or the nationalist groups. Most Filipinos you scratch has a cousin in Detroit or uncle in Seattle. A lot of Filipinos have very fond memories of the United States, even though there aren't many living who remember the American colonial period, many of them have quite fond memories of the US. Every high school band plays Susan Marches, you can go into the lowest levels of any village and people speak English in one sort or another, there is a very strong pro-American feeling. If you travel all over the Philippines you find American legion posts because so many Filipinos served in the American armed forces. There they live on pensions because if you get a pension of 10 to 15,000 dollars you can live very well in the Philippines, So, you find these American legion posts and guys sitting around playing gin rummy and living on American pensions. The veterans administration, the office in the Philippines, is the biggest one in the world, there is a very strong American component in the Philippines, most Filipinos, despite the noise coming from the nationalist groups, are very happy to see the Americans come in and hope they can do something—but that doesn't mean that it is going to be effective. You are up against a Filipino army with its own offices and they have a certain amount of pride. They don't want to go back to being, to use an offensive term that was used during the American colonial period when American officials used to refer to Filipinos as little brown brothers, they don't want to go back to that. I'm sure there will be friction there as Americans try to advise, the word "advise" is a very loose term—when you are in the middle of some kind of a military operation and your advisees, your tutees are making a mess of it, there is a tendency on the part of these big, brawny American noncoms, to say, "Let me take over here, I'll show you how to do it," that's the way it works when you are in a battle or some sort of skirmish. That eventually meets some sort of friction. From what I read, and all I know is what I read in the newspapers, we haven't exactly made a lot of progress in the Philippines

**Hemispheres:** Do you think that there is potential for friction, and to continue the analogy, if we've singled out the Philippines as a place where they have an army we can potentially work with where we are going to try to eliminate Abu Sayyaf, why aren't we just going to do it, if it seems ridiculous that a couple hundred military advisors will do the job...is it hesitation on our part not to seem to overbearing, not to get involved and have their be an adverse reaction are we just testing the waters?

**Karnow:** Well I don't think we're testing, I think we're in there to see whether this thing works or not. You have to do it very pragmatically, you can't just start off by saying we'll take the following steps and it'll produce results, you have to get in on the ground to see how it operates. We have very good forces, our forces are very well trained, but you have to come back a year from now to see if we had made progress in this whole thing. But its very tough terrain, very difficult terrain, jungles, and you are up against these little groups of guerrillas who can disappear into the tank, woods and jungles, again with an army that may not be competent to deal with these things. My feeling is that they haven't really recruited soldiers from that area. Soldiers are probably coming from other places and for them to be in Mindanao is like being in a foreign country. If you have a soldier that comes from lousanne(?) who speaks ticalog (?) and he's down in an area in Mindanao he can't even speak the language. To give you an anecdote – many years ago when Ms. Akino (?) was campaigning for president down in that area, she gave her speeches in English because she could not speak the local language, so those are the kinds of problems you are up against.

**Hemispheres:** Given that this stated war on terrorism is so porous and vast, and seemingly unending — In your opinion, should we be “fighting” the war on terrorism in the ways that President Bush has promised that we will, or are there other ways in which we can prevent, or at least reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks on us such as the one the occurred on September the 11<sup>th</sup>? Should military intervention be the first step in each country we encounter and suspect of harboring terrorist, or what other tools could we use to achieve some of our goals?

**Karnow:** I am not a military strategist, I am just a basic newspaper reporter, but it seems to me the basic problem you have to start with is intelligence. You have to know what you are dealing with and our intelligence has been terrible, it has been awful. After the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, everyone woke up and said why didn't we know what was going on. I mean we had people infiltrating these things and our problem of intelligence is that there is a long story about how we essentially emasculated our own intelligence services. We have laws against assassination, we have laws that hamstring the intelligence services, we became very reliant on satellite intelligence, which can be very effective, but it can't tell you anybody's intentions. You could take a picture from 50,000 feet up in the air, you can pinpoint a golf ball on the green, but that doesn't tell you what people are thinking and planning. And you would be very remiss, and we probably don't have much of an intelligence service in the Philippines or for that matter anywhere else in places like Indonesia and Algeria.

**Hemispheres:** Isn't there a way we should be retargeting foreign aid or rethinking our policies towards the arab world or building some institutions in failed states, instead of chasing terrorists from state to state after the problems that generate terrorism have already arisen?

**Karnow:** I think that there is a lot of baloney about some of these things, saying well, one of the ways you stop terrorism is that poverty breeds terrorists. Look at the people that we know about: First of all, Bin Laden does not exactly come from a poor family, he comes from one of the richest Saudi families. The guy that they have arrested in connection with the murder of the WSJ reporter, he's British, he went to LSE. Some of the guys piloting the airplanes were very well educated. The Palestinian suicide bombers, a lot of them come from not poor families, but they come from middle class families. What is motivating them is not any escape from poverty, what

is motivating them is sheer religious ideologies. One of the things you find totally lacking in any of the statements they put out is no concept of what type of societies they want to have. There is not talk about economic development, or social progress. At their worst, groups like the Taliban were repressive to women, they were cruel, they executed people on the slightest whim. These are not societies that are constructive, they are destructive societies, these people are destructive, there is a savagery to this that is almost incomprehensible, and I think a lot of this stuff about “let’s get in there and help to build their nations and have aid programs” What aid program do we give to Saudi Arabia? I mean its one of the richest countries in the world—Some of the Persian Gulf States have per capita incomes that are the highest in the world. It is not a simplistic formula that terrorism comes out of poverty and frustration. You could take any of the terrorists that we’ve identified, they are quite sophisticated people.

**Hemispheres:** If, in your opinion terrorism doesn’t directly stem out of poverty, if it really is a religious fervor of fundamentalism, what do we do about this fundamentalism that all of a sudden has become very dangerous to us as a country, is there anything to be done about it?

**Karnow:** First of all, I think we are doing what we can. I am extremely pessimistic, that should come through with everything I said, but, I think that there are two things that could be done. The Muslim countries themselves have to begin to do something about terrorism. They are all playing double games. On one hand you have the Arab League meeting the other day, you have the Saudis putting forward the peace plan which is about the Palestinian-Israeli problem, but at the same time they are doing this they are playing a double game. They are all subsidizing the terrorists at the same time because they are taking out reassurances. The Saudis are deathly afraid that these terrorists are going to turn around and start attacking them. In fact, if you look at Bin Laden’s program it was really started out by wanting to overthrow the Saudi government. Then you look at all these countries, these Muslim countries, the leadership is terribly worried, look what’s happening now in Egypt. Mubarak is one of the people that is pivotal to some sort of solution in the Middle East, but all of a sudden you have these crowds of people protesting because he is being too compromising, too mild, and he has the memory over his head over what happened to Sadat. Anwar Sadat went to Israel and worked out a peace plan, and came to terms with Israel. Mubarak is in grave danger of being assassinated, and his government overthrown. You could multiply that by situations in other countries. In so many of these countries the leadership is terribly worried that the terrorists, the fundamentalists are going to overthrow them. One of the things they are doing, at the same time, as they are talking of finding solutions, they are also subsidizing the terrorists as a way of paying them off. The first step if you are going to get any solution to this is you have to get these places to start cracking down on these terrorists instead of subsidizing them. The second thing is you have to get the United States involved in a much more vigorous way than we have been. I haven’t seen anything except rhetorical statements, it is true, the VP went there, but Colin Powell who is a man I admire, seems to be completely on the outside, just making statements on one side or another. Every expert that gets on television, and we are inundated in the news, Kissinger, Brysinski (?) they have nothing to say, they keep saying we have to have a peace, have to have a settlement, but they don’t know how to do it, and they have no answer to it. We are in a terrible fog. You guys your age, you have a very bleak future to look forward to.

**Hemispheres:** How do you think the American public will react to the continuation of this war on terrorism, especially to US casualties that, at some point we will have, are going to have to be endured if we really continue our agenda. Do you think the magnitude of the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> will change the public reaction?

**Karnow:** For the moment, the public, from reading all the surveys, the public is pretty strongly supportive of efforts that are being made. The casualties are very small at this stage, but, once again, there is a direct correlation between support and casualties, once the casualties begin to get heavy, the support begins to erode, and I hope that doesn't happen. For the moment, it is pretty good, but we are just scratching the surface at this point. I do not know if people realize that we are up against something that is going to go on for as long as they can foresee.

**Hemispheres:** Any ideas about how the Bush administration will try to maintain this public support for ventures that might be costly in terms of life and financial expenditures, are we going to see a continued gushing of American patriotism in order to maintain the support at home?

**Karnow:** I think that Bush is going to continue to do what he is doing, but, when you start using advisors you are not using combat troops. What you are doing is that you are saying you are going to fight these sort of sanitized situations; we are going to let them fight their own wars and we are going to help them to do it. The danger of that is that in many kinds of places you cannot be sure that the local, the indigenous armies, or police, are going to be effective, you do not know whether they are trustworthy or not. Take for example, Pakistan. One of the reasons that the Pakistanis are reluctant to extradite Pearl to the United States is the fear that under interrogation he might reveal that he was in concert with all sorts of people in high places in Pakistan, and they are, in fact, involved with the terrorist movement. So, how do you proceed in stiffening and strengthening an army, or police force or intelligence force of a country where you don't know which side they are really on? I am not talking about minor people, I am talking about high place people.

