Feinstein International Center

Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

Response Analysis: What Drives Program Choice?

Daniel Maxwell
Heather Stobaugh

8/1/2012

Table of Contents

Feinstein International Center

Introduction

A 2004 assessment of emergency food security interventions in the Horn of Africa found that programs consisted of a narrow range of pre-existing packages that were not based on available evidence or analysis, but rather on questionable assumptions, which resulted in little impact on improved food security (Levine & Chastre 2004). Since then, major efforts have gone into strengthening food security analysis, including the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) tool (Food and Agriculture Organization 2006), the SENAC-ENCAP project, and various situational analysis and needs assessment tools as well as the development of various food security tracking indicators. At the same time, a much wider range of response options are available. Cash and market-based interventions have grown along with new modalities of in-kind food assistance. Furthermore, livelihoods support has greatly expanded and major improvements in nutrition programming have occurred with the development of new food products. But the question still remains: Have the improvements in analysis and expansion of program options led to improved food security programs?

This research considers "response analysis": the analytical process by which the objectives and modality of program response options in an emergency are determined. The research question was whether improved analysis drives program response choices in humanitarian food security interventions? Answering this question requires two separate steps: (1) understand the link of food security and nutrition analysis to response choice and program design; (2) consider the impact of these programs in addressing food insecurity. This research protocol addressed the first step: the link of response analysis to response choice and program design. The objective was to better understand the details that agencies and donors use to make actual program choices in response to food security crises; understand approaches and methods (formal or informal) used in practice; and learn how to build a stronger evidence base of the way analytical practices can inform program choices.

This study was supported by a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). This report summarizes the findings of the study, and constitutes a final report to the donor. The findings summarized here are spelled in greater breadth and depth in two other forthcoming outputs that resulted from this research. The first is an article entitled, "What Drives Program Choice in Food Security Crises? The 'Response Analysis' Question" (Maxwell et al. 2012), which has been accepted for publication in a special edition of *World Development* in 2012. The second output is a much more detailed exploration of response analysis intended to inform agency practice and policy. Entitled "Response Analysis in Food Security Crises: A Road Map," it has been submitted to the Humanitarian Practice Network, and is also in the process of publication—hopefully by late 2012 or early 2013. Both of these outputs have been shared with the donor along with this somewhat more abbreviated report.

Feinstein International Center

Research methods

Data collection

An in depth literature review was conducted on both published and gray literature regarding decision-making, the use of evidence and analysis, and response analysis in humanitarian practice. Only a limited amount of published literature exists on the topic, but there are several tools and program guidelines that relate directly to response analysis. These tools, guidelines, and other publications were compiled and reviewed. Quantitative data was also collected from donors, including the US, Europe, and Canada, on budgets and resource allocation for different responses. The data was compiled to document existing donor budgets and how the allocation of resources for funding food security interventions in emergencies has evolved over recent years.

A series of semi-structured, open-ended interviews was conducted with more than 150 experts and other practitioners engaged in humanitarian response from around the world. Interviews were held with a range of people from UN agencies, government authorities, international NGOs, local NGOs, coordination bodies, and other key informants from universities, research centers, and data analysis agencies. Interviews were open-ended with little prompting so as to gain un-biased answers from respondents. Most interviews were conducted in person, but some interviews were conducted by telephone and Skype. Researchers also traveled to Kenya and Ethiopia to speak with individuals in national and field offices to observe how decisions are made at all levels of an organization. Partnerships were formed with operational agencies and country-level food security clusters around the research topic. Agency staff and cluster members were interviewed in detail about the process of utilizing assessment information and other inputs to make program design choices. Table 1 lists organizations from which individuals were interviewed.

Feinstein International Center

Table 1. Organizations Interviewed (some in multiple locations)

National NGOs
- Access Aid and Development - Somalia
- Africa Rescue Committee (AFREC) - Somalia
- Advancement for Small Enterprise Program (ASEP) - Somalia
- COCOP-NORDA - Kenya
- Jubba Land Charity Center (JLCC) - Somalia
- Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development (NAPD) - Somalia
- Relief Society of Tigray (REST) - Ethiopia
- Social-life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO) - Somalia
- Women and Child Care (WOCCA) - Somalia

International NGOs
- Action Contra la Faim (ACF)
- CARE
- Canadian Food Grains Bank (CFGB)
- COOPI
- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
- GOAL
- Horn Relief/ADESO
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
- Save the Children
- Oxfam
- World Concern

UN Agencies
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- Office of Humanitarian Affairs
- Office of Humanitarian Affairs–Inter-Agency Working Group (OCHA-IAWG)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- World Food Programme (WFP)

Red Cross
- Kenya Red Cross Society - Kenya
- International Committee of the Red Cross
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Donors
- Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
- UK Department for International Development (DFID)
- Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO)
- United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Office of Humanitarian Affairs – Humanitarian Relief Fund (OCHA-HRF), Ethiopia
- USAID Food For Peace (FFP)
- USAID Office for Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

Governments
- Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRM-FSS), Ethiopia
- District Steering Group – Isiolo, Kenya
- District Steering Group – Makueni, Kenya
- Emergency Nutrition Cluster Unit - Ethiopia
- Kenya Food Security Steering Group
- Kenya National Drought Management Authority (KNDMA)

Other Key Informants
- Cornell University
- Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET)
- FHI 360
- Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU)
- Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
- East Africa Regional Food Security and Nutrition Working Group
- Tufts University
- Independent consultants
- Other global experts

Selection of study sites

The focus of this study was the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA). The GHA was the proposed location (prior to the crisis that emerged in 2011) due to the researchers' knowledge of the area and connections with partnering agencies. While many of the interviews took place in Kenya and Ethiopia with examples from the food security crisis of 2011, several global key informants provided useful information regarding response analysis in various crises around the world. The situations addressed ranged from chronic food and livelihoods crises, in which there were both safety net and humanitarian emergency programs, to famine (much of the field work on this study was done in late 2011 and early 2012, and many of the agencies interviewed were working in Somalia).

Results

What is response analysis?

From this research, our definition of "response analysis" is *the analytical process by which the objectives and modality of program response options in an emergency are determined, and potentially harmful impacts are minimized.* The research also suggests several other components that refine or round out this definition. First, response analysis certainly does link assessment information or situational analysis to program design, by facilitating the choice of specific response options. However, response analysis is not a static, one-off activity done prior to designing an intervention. If done well, response analysis should be conducted alongside disaster risk reduction and other preparedness actions prior to emergencies as well as with routine monitoring during responses when it might be important to introduce different modalities or even different program objectives. Second, appropriateness and feasibility are certainly two criteria for consideration in response choice, in addition to cost-effectiveness and timeliness. Third, response analysis helps identify potential risks. These could be to recipients, to the reputation of the implementing agency, to the security of agency staff, or to markets, producers, or consumers. There could also be the risk of corruption and diversion of assistance, of fueling conflict, or of causing some other harmful side effect.

Why is response analysis necessary? Changing donor resources

Previously, organizations chose a type of emergency response mainly because available donor resources were limited to funding a certain type of program. However, major shifts in funding patterns have occurred and a much wider range of donor resources have become available. Our research shows four major shifts in donor resources over the past ten years. First is the untying of food aid from donor source markets and the general preference for local and regional purchase of in-kind food assistance. Figure 1 shows the changes in humanitarian food aid procurement modalities from 2001 to 2010, with the amount of food purchased locally (i.e., within the recipient country) and regionally (i.e., within a country neighboring the recipient country) rising by 28.3 percent and 56.1 percent respectively (Maxwell et al. forthcoming).

Figure 1. Humanitarian food aid 2001–2010, by source (MT)[1]



Source: Maxwell et al. 2012

Second, emergency food assistance interventions have been shifting away from in-kind food aid programs towards cash transfer or voucher programs. A third shift consists of a widening of livelihood interventions in response to food security crises. This is encompassed in the expansion—beyond the provision of seeds and tools—to a variety of trade- and microfinance-related livelihoods responses as well as pastoral livelihood responses (LEGS 2011). The last major shift has occurred in the transformation and expansion of emergency nutrition programming. A much larger emphasis has been placed on newly created nutrition products, including ready-to-use therapeutic and supplementary foods, fortified blended foods, and other supplements. Despite these developments in cash and voucher, livelihood, and nutrition programs, there is no global system for tracking these changes in terms of either budgetary allocation or nutritional equivalents; therefore, it is difficult to demonstrate these shifts in in terms of monetary values.

Changes in donor resources shifted not only across the donor community, but also within specific donor agencies. We analyzed the funding patterns for three of the five largest food aid donors, the United States (USAID), the European Union (ECHO), and Canada (CIDA). This research demonstrates that the Office of Food for Peace (FFP) within USAID, which was traditionally seen to fund only in-kind food aid (tied to US markets and shippers), now allocates $300M for cash and other forms of emergency response. This is in addition to other resources managed by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Bureau of Population and Refugee Movement (BPRM), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), which all have recently been allocating larger amounts of funding towards locally and regionally purchased food aid, cash, vouchers, and livelihoods programs.

[1] "Direct transfer" is an in-kind transfer purchased in the source market of a donor country.

Figure 2. USAID Food for Peace, USDA, and BPRM resources for emergency food assistance, 2005–2011



Source: Maxwell et al. 2012

Figure 2 shows that while a large portion of US funding is still allocated to one type of response (in-kind food aid), funding is beginning to support a wider range of responses (including cash, vouchers, and local or regional purchase).

ECHO has also been known to be a leader in supporting cash-based interventions in food security emergencies. Figure 3 shows how ECHO's funding allocations have changed over time, with the majority of funds shifting from in-kind food aid in 2007 to a variety of other interventions, including livelihoods, nutrition, and other sectoral interventions, in 2010.

Figure 3. ECHO humanitarian food assistance funding by program type, 2007 and 2010[2]



Source: Maxwell et al., 2012

Lastly, CIDA's humanitarian food assistance funding has also changed over the past decade, to allocating almost all resources towards "untied" food assistance (i.e., food aid that is purchased locally or regionally), as shown in Figure 4. Beginning in 2010 and 2011, a small percent of funding was also allocated to cash and voucher programs.

Across the entire donor community, the largest category of funding is still in-kind food aid; however, this analysis shows that donors are now supporting a growing range of responses. With a wider range of food assistance, nutrition, and livelihood interventions now developed as well as broadening funding opportunities, the need for response analysis in order to choose the most appropriate response option is increasingly evident.

[2] While this presentation of ECHO's humanitarian food assistance funding data is not directly compatible with the figures representing US and Canada funding, it is the only format approved for external publication.

Figure 4. CIDA humanitarian food assistance funding by program type, 2005–2011[3]



Source: Maxwell et al., 2012

A roadmap to the process of response analysis

To date, there has been no overall road map that guides program designers through the process of linking assessment and situational analysis to program choice. Our effort to develop such a road map, growing out of this research, is suggested in Figure 5. This was constructed on the basis of the cumulative evidence from the research, and thus represents an "ideal type" description of the way in which choices for response are made—no individual respondent reported doing it like this. It is oriented around the available options and choices that are made—either explicitly or implicitly—in selecting response options, and the logical order in which these decisions are made. This "logical" order is not always the way that decision-making occurs.

[3] These figures are in Canadian dollars; however, the exchange rate between US dollars and Canadian dollars is approximately 1 to 1. These figures represent informal data provided by CIDA.

Figure 5: A "Road Map" to Response Analysis



Source: Based on Maxwell et al. 2012

Figure 5 is a deliberate and linear simplification of a complex and iterative process. For example, some decisions about interventions may have already been made based on the kinds of assessments undertaken. Some kinds of potential risks (which appear last in Figure 5) may actually preclude the selection of certain modalities of intervention (which are labeled "second order" choices in Figure 5), etc. In the case of a chronic or protracted crisis, the depiction of a specific event that triggers the crisis is also not necessarily accurate. In such a case, program decisions may be triggered by annual assessments, Consolidated Appeals Processes (CAP), or donor calls for proposals. We should reiterate that Figure 5 is our amalgamation of factors from numerous interviews.

Choosing among the "first order" response options fundamentally involves deciding whether to intervene to address nutritional status or to protect food security directly through food aid or cash-based transfers, or to assist indirectly by protecting livelihoods (or through some other kind of intervention including, at least in theory, water, health, or protection

interventions, although those tend to fall outside the scope of this study). This step, labeled by some agencies as "response choice" or "objective-setting," does not necessarily require an "either/or" decision. It may be appropriate to implement multiple interventions at the same time. This choice, or set of choices, should be informed by good contextual analysis, causal analysis, and needs assessment information; however, our research suggests that these choices are mainly shaped by program history, organizational capacity, and agency mandate.

"Second order" options present the choices around the modality in which to achieve the general objective set by the first order decision. Indeed, this step is referred to by some agencies as "modality choice" regarding specific activities or modes of intervention. The most common example of this kind of decision is the choice between in-kind assistance and some kind of cash transfer or voucher that enables the recipient household to choose what they want. Many of the specific response analysis tools reviewed were related to making these choices. In many ways, therefore, the most progress in terms of analysis has been made in this category.

"Third order" options deal with slightly more detail-oriented decisions. Many of these details, such as conditionality, targeting, and the choice of food products, weigh quite heavily in the response decision-making process, even to the point of solely determining the overall objective or modality of a program. Thus, we propose that these choices are still considered a part of response analysis, rather than program design (albeit the line is a bit fuzzy between the two).

In all choices, there are other factors and adjacent decisions that must be taken into account when choosing the best response option. Figure 5 depicts various forms of risk assessment and "other considerations" across all first, second, and third order options because they tend to be crosscutting.

Response analysis in practice

Procedures for analyzing response options varied widely—from little to no systematic analysis to the use of sophisticated processes and tools. But for the most part, these processes were not explicit and weren't necessarily labeled "response analysis." Much of what is done to make response choices revolves around informal discussions, rapid assessments, recollection based on experience, and in many cases assumptions where hard data is not available.

Table 2 summarizes the range of interview responses regarding the factors and considerations taken into account in making the decisions outlined in Figure 5 regarding response options. Table 2 is a compendium of issues raised and organized by the emergent logic of all the interviews.

Table 2. Response Analysis Considerations	

External context
• Situational analysis
  ○ Needs assessment
  ○ Causal analysis
  ○ Projection/forecast
 	
Feasibility analysis
• Market assessment
• Donor resources
• Organizational capacity
• Partner agency capacity
• Government policy
• Access and security
• Timeliness
• Record of past programs
  ○ M&E records
  ○ Lessons learned documentation
• Influence of large agencies
• Conditionality/targeting considerations
	Internal context
	• Organizational considerations
	  ○ Mandate and mission
	  ○ Objectives in field
	  ○ Capacity and skill set
	
	Appropriateness considerations
	• Internal comparison of response options
	• External analysis of gaps in response
	• Risk assessment/prevention of unintended consequences
	  ○ Market distortion risks
	  ○ Staff security and safety
	  ○ Recipient community security
	  ○ Risk of theft, diversion, or corruption
	  ○ Reputational/legal risks to agency
	  ○ Do-no-harm analysis
	• Cost effectiveness
	• Assessment of recipient preferences
	• Evidence of post-distribution dynamics

Source: Analysis of field interviews

Much of the discussion in the interviews was about "feasibility" and "appropriateness"—though few respondents were able to give a good definition of these terms, much less break them down into their component parts. However, these terms turned out to form a good rubric under which to try to organize the issues.

External context considerations

Early warning, needs assessments, and situational analysis. Most agencies report that they base program choices on some kind of assessment, but these are highly variable in nature. As already noted, much of the response choice is dictated by the nature of the assessment—which is to say that some element of response choice has often already been determined before the assessment was undertaken and thus the assessment was shaped accordingly. Hence, agencies that already know they will undertake nutritional programs focus on nutritional assessments; food assistance agencies focus on current food security status, etc.

For the most part, agency staff do not consider conducting needs assessments as part of response analysis, but nevertheless see it as necessary for making informed choices. Good analysis—including current needs but also critical examination of livelihood systems, underlying causes, political economy considerations and trends—*is* the foundation on which the analysis of response options can take place. Without good analysis of the situation,

response analysis is a fairly hollow exercise. When sufficient time and resources allow for good assessments prior to decision-making, programs are obviously based upon evidence more than on assumptions. Unfortunately, despite good attempts to collect and use empirical evidence, the application of that evidence is highly influenced by personal opinions and biases. Often, a significant gap exists between the analyst and the implementer, whereby data collected by analysts is interpreted in very contrasting ways by implementers.

Internal context considerations

Organizational mandate. Clearly organizations were created to serve some purpose, and staff continually ask themselves if what they are doing is in line with the mandate of the organization for which they work. This is perhaps the most influential factor on program choice (which is tied closely with organizational capacity). Humanitarian agencies have invested in specific capacities in order to carry out their organization's mandate, which inevitably constrains them to only certain kinds of responses. Organizational mandates often fix the "first order" response options—regardless of what an assessment might suggest. An organization with a child-protection mandate may ask itself, "what is good for children in this situation?" whereas an organization charged with protecting the food security of the general population may ask itself a different set of questions.

Some agencies are large enough to have the ability to choose from a range of response options; however, they often choose to limit their response to the most familiar territory. In the words of one donor, "certain agencies are going to propose certain activities" almost regardless of the circumstances. Organizational mandates can also lead to decisions based more on assumptions and biases than on evidence. For example, beliefs that "free handouts" create dependency can ultimately eliminate the possibility of unconditional aid, whereas vehement opposition to "making people work in an emergency" eliminates the option of conditional aid. This is not to say that agencies should throw mandates out the window and consider any and every possibility. Rather, agencies must find the balance between acting on their mandates and hindering good response analysis with evidence-based program choices.

Feasibility considerations

Broadly speaking, "feasibility" covers everything from the availability of donor resources; to cost considerations; to organizational capacity and partner capacity; government policy; humanitarian and physical access; time considerations, considerations of past programming successes and failures, and the influence of large agencies. Donor resources are clearly a major consideration. Rather than trying to define "feasibility" here, we discuss all these constituent factors.

Market assessments. Since the application of market-based approaches, such as cash transfers or vouchers, have become widespread, agencies have increasingly recognized that

a key element of determining the appropriate response is conducting some kind of market analysis. In fact almost all agencies, particularly donors, note that they require market analyses for market-based interventions. This particularly includes cash and voucher programs, but also things like the monetization of food to control prices spikes, working with traders to improve their access to credit, access to distant markets, etc. Some agencies use sophisticated tools like MIFIRA, but some do little more than check the availability or price trends of certain commodities in local markets. Although many acknowledge that in-kind transfers also have market impacts, the practice of conducting a market analysis to assess the potential impact of in-kind transfers is much less frequent.

Donor resources. Donor resources are perceived to be the single most influential factor driving response choice. In many aspects, donor resources have become considerably more flexible in recent years (Maxwell et al. 2012). Nevertheless, it is an extreme feasibility consideration to ensure that whatever the proposed intervention, it has the support or can garner the support of a donor. Much of this is about negotiation as the process moves along—there is rarely a process in which the "correct" response is chosen by some analytical process, and then it is presented to a donor. Usually, a discussion with donors is going on simultaneously to the analysis process—and hence in a way this means that donors and donor resources are still a major factor.

Capacity. Another related factor that constrains a more evidence-based approach to program choice is organizational capacity. Several issues arise under organizational capacity. First, many agencies specialize in certain responses and simply do not have the technical expertise to expand into other response options. Even when individuals recognize that an approach different from their norm may be most appropriate, their hands are tied due to the lack of specialized personnel with the ability to appropriately design and implement such a response. Attempts to hire temporary emergency experts are often explored, but limited by resources. Second, many agencies expressed the lack of ability to carry out the necessary assessments in order to choose the most appropriate response. For example, many analyses, such as EMMA or MIFIRA, require a great deal of expertise, funding, and time, that often are not available. Third, when agencies do have the technical knowledge and adequate information to conduct response analysis and choose an appropriate response, they may be limited by the capacity of implementing partners—particularly when access is limited and programs are implemented through small local organizations.

Government policy. National government policy sometimes can restrict options for response, or at least shape them in important ways. This depends on the individual government, and is highly variable. Policies can range from limiting the physical access of humanitarian agencies, to controlling information, determining the type and amount of resources, dictating which programs are allowed to be implemented, and even restricting agencies from being active in a country all together.

Access and security. Humanitarian access to affected populations in a crisis is increasingly restricted—because of intolerable levels of insecurity, by national governments, non-state authorities, or some combination of these. This was particularly clear in Somalia in 2011 when few humanitarian agencies had access at the time the famine was declared, and many of those were subsequently barred from areas controlled by al-Shabaab. This classically leads to heavier reliance on local partners, or in some cases local communities, to handle an externally funded response. In such cases, the range of response options may be severely restricted.

Timeliness. Clearly, timeliness is an important consideration in the feasibility of any response and can have a strong influence on program choice. Some donors even require an analysis of timeliness (and cost effectiveness) as a rationale for program proposals, which spurs agencies to examine the issue when choosing response options. Despite this, few organizations provided strong examples of how these factors are measured and weighed between different program options. The problem is that there is scarcely any good way to assess the timeliness of a certain intervention. Food aid—even emergency food aid—can take up to five months to be delivered. Cash interventions are presumably the quickest, but experience from 2011 indicates that it takes time to scale these up as well. Part of the problem is that much programming is informed by current needs assessments—rather than early warning *per se*—and thus is almost by definition late by the time it arrives.

Seasonality/phase of crisis. Often assessments give a snapshot of needs or current conditions, but in many—if not most—contemporary food security crises, current conditions change with seasons, which is to say that programs have to adapt as they go. This adaptability—and the link of program change to any kind of analysis—is frequently not built in to programs. Additionally, emergency programs might be added on in particularly bad seasons, but they may be operating alongside other longer-term programs—particularly safety net programs that were designed to take seasonality into account. While often related to seasonality in drought-related crises, the phase of the emergency is also important to the choice of response. Sometimes this isn't just a consideration of seasonality, but also of "stages" of the crisis—particularly in temporal terms—and "managing" this by concatenating different response options at different stages.

Record of past programs. The results of monitoring and evaluating previous programs can be a very important piece of evidence in choosing a response. Both general project monitoring and evaluation and more specific "lessons learned" documents can provide extremely useful information, but this can also be a double-edged sword. Sometimes a strong track-record in one particular intervention modality becomes established as an agency "default" option. This can be positive, meaning that agencies develop a strong expertise in that option. But it can also result in the preclusion of other options—even if evidence suggests that another option may be preferable.

Influence of large agencies. In some cases, the choices of a few donors or large agencies can be very influential in determining the overall response. This may happen when large agencies with large program budgets are looking for local implementing partners, but the contents of the program may already be more or less fixed—meaning that the prospective partners have little to no choice about their own response options.

Conditionality of assistance. Respondents expressed very different views about determining whether assistance should be conditional or unconditional. Again, few specific methodologies exist to help make this determination, so the decision more frequently reflects agency perspectives than any particular analysis. In no case did anyone report a method for assessing whether and how much members of a prospective recipient community could work during an emergency, or what kind of a mix between conditional and unconditional assistance would be appropriate to the context.

Deciding on a targeting strategy. Though targeting may be considered mostly a program design choice—not one contingent on response options—there is a curious linkage evident between choices about targeting strategies and conditionality. Agencies more likely to worry about developmental impacts are more likely to worry about reducing inclusion error; agencies more concerned with vulnerability impact worry more about reducing exclusion error. Targeting was often not mentioned in interviews about response analysis, at least in part because, as noted, that is seen as part of program design, not response choice. And yet the feasibility of certain kinds of targeting (such as the capacity of a local partner to manage certain kinds of targeting) does play into decisions about response choice.

Appropriateness considerations

Comparative analysis. Though mentioned by only a handful of agencies, the sensible step in response analysis would be to compare the relative merits of all (or at least several) response options. This would certainly be the case for second order options in Figure 5. It is actually rarely done for first order options, which tend to be set by organizational mandate and capacity. Comparative analysis tools often consist mostly of market analysis methods—particularly for the choice between in-kind food aid, cash transfers, and voucher programs.

Looking at the overall response. Along with comparing alternative response options against one another, an important component of program decision-making is to look at the overall response in an area and think about what is missing. In theory, it is the job of clusters or government coordinating bodies to ensure that there are no major program gaps. But coordination is not always functional or prescriptive about the specific response of individual agencies. A handful of agency staff mentioned program diversity as a good thing, “not putting all your eggs in one basket.” At a systems level, there is little that one agency can do that does not depend to some degree on other actors. This implies the need for a kind of

"systems thinking" that is quite absent in single agencies and unsuccessful at the cluster level.

Risk analysis. The notion of risk analysis or risk assessment was raised by nearly all agencies and covers a wide range of specific topics. These include: (1) risk of undermining markets; (2) staff security and safety; (3) risks to the recipient community; (4) risk of aid being diverted; (5) reputational risk to the implementing agency; (6) risk of fueling conflict; or (7) legal risks such as counter-terrorism laws. Risk analysis is highly influential in program choice. Whether or not decisions around risk are empirically driven or assumptions driven depends highly on the type of risk. Some are based on empirical evidence, such as government policies or security threats that are well backed by reliable information. However, other types of risk are often based on estimates and assumptions regarding which programs are riskier than others.

Cost effectiveness. One major component of appropriateness is the relative cost efficiency or effectiveness of response options. Different agencies have different ways of measuring this, though only a few have comparative information that can be used for decision-making purposes. A simple measure that is applicable to response option decision-making is the "alpha value" used by WFP to compare the cost efficiency between in-kind food and cash or voucher programs. But while many agencies mention cost effectiveness as an important criterion, few had good examples of how to factor this in—particularly in a context of fluctuating global and local prices.

Assessment of recipient preferences. Frequently overlooked in the process of determining response options are the preferences of the intended recipients of aid. Only about one in five interviewees mentioned recipient preference. When it did come up, recipient preference was often used to justify the preferred or modal response, rather than as a driving decision-making factor. For each different program modality, agencies reported that beneficiaries preferred their type of assistance. Few tools exist for assessing recipient preference. While at face value, it might not appear that a sophisticated tool is required to have a discussion about preferences, it does require sensitivity to the context. Recipients could be highly influenced by previous interventions types as well as the circumstances in which they are asked (Lentz et al. forthcoming).

Perceptions about post-distribution dynamics. Perceptions about what happens to assistance after it has been transferred to the recipient in many ways tend to shape the mode in which that assistance is made available. For instance, many respondents told us that food aid is widely subject to inter-household sharing after distribution; however, cash is less susceptible to this and therefore tends to "stick" to the targeted household. There is some evidence of both these allegations, but hardly enough to make it a hard and fast rule that cash is easier to target than food aid—which is to say that much of this is driven by

perception, not data. This ability to make assistance "stick" can also be responsible for changes in targeting criteria. One notable example mentioned was a shift from general food distribution to distribution targeted only at households with a malnourished child. Post distribution dynamics came up as the major reason for considering gender and intra-household dynamics as part of response analysis: some of the generalizations about intra-household control over cash and other assets don't always prove true, so some level of context-specific information and analysis is critical.

Other factors

Analysis vs. instinct and the lack of accumulated evidence. Many experienced program staff noted that they tend to operate on the basis of accumulated experience and instinct, rather than always waiting for an analysis to be completed. In one sense this is good—sometimes analysis takes too long time to conduct. However, in another sense, it can simply be a means of justifying whatever is most convenient to the agency. This can lead to a kind of "program inertia" that many respondents mentioned, referring to an organizational inability to change its preferred ways of addressing a crisis, irrespective of new analysis. Although this can be quite negative when available evidence contradicts the program choices, previous experience can prove to be extremely valuable when decisions need to be made within tight time-frames and when evidence is not available. Many respondents rued the lack of evidence about what kind of programmatic responses work best under different sets of circumstances.

Logistics. Logistics was mentioned several times as an influencing factor in determining program choice. This includes the availability of certain commodities, the ability to transport personnel and commodities, timeliness of different responses, and environmental and social factors that may or may not be able to support different types of programs.

Figure 6. Factors Affecting Program Response Choice



Source: Interview Data

Summarizing the constraints to evidence-based response analysis

While ideally all program choices would be made on the basis of the analysis of the best response suited to the specific needs and context in a given emergency, the fact is that many other factors enter into the process. The practical issue therefore is how to move programming decisions away from assumptions and biases and towards evidence. But first, we must understand what all these other factors are and why they are so influential. Given all the different considerations discussed in the previous sections, we attempted to depict these influencing factors in a graphic (Figure 6) that represents both how influential each factor is and how evidence-based each factor is. The main categories shaping the program decision-making process include (1) diagnostics; (2) other external factors; (3) program experience; and (4) organizational ethos. Figure 6 depicts factors present when considering a program choice with the size of the "balloon" being roughly proportional to the influence

that factor has on decision-making. The position of the "balloon" depicts the factor as "more evidenced-based" or "more assumptions-based."

Managing the constraints to evidence-based response analysis

While the constraints to evidence-based decision-making are many, respondents had many suggestions for how some of these constraints can be managed. Below are some of the most salient examples.

1. *Using good ideas from different tools ("piece-mealing" tools).* Experienced programmers simply borrow good ideas from different tools to construct their own analysis.
2. *Phasing of different interventions.* Different responses are more or less appropriate depending on the "stage" of the emergency.
3. *"No regrets" programming/DRR.* Experienced programmers have devised interventions that can address an emerging crisis and prevent it from becoming worse, usually consisting of disaster risk reduction (DRR) or livelihoods protection and resilience-building kinds of interventions.
4. *Organizational change.* To actually address all the constraints to response analysis requires substantial change at the agency level. This requires a major organizational effort to broaden the range of response options—and putt in place the analytical capacity to deliver them appropriately.
5. *Training and awareness-raising.* Much of the nature of a particular response—and the incorporation of evidence into a response—depends on individual senior managers, particularly at the level of country directors or regional managers. Training and discussion of response analysis should therefore include not only field teams and program managers, but senior decision makers as well.
6. *Challenging assumptions.* Often a member of staff who is willing to challenge long-held assumptions can significantly change the way business is done. Assumptions very frequently fly in the face of evidence, but evidence is distorted or interpreted through an organizational lens that tends to reinforce pre-existing assumptions.
7. *Systemic thinking.* The research confirms that agencies (donor, government, UN, and non-governmental) need to take a larger view. Nothing is stand-alone. Good programmers and managers are always thinking about where the gaps are; how what their agency is doing fits in with the larger community of practice, etc.
8. *Using informal networks.* When information is restricted or unavailable due to host government policies or a lack of access, participation in discussion platforms and working groups as well as the use of personal connections within other agencies can serve as a strong platform for information.
9. *Establishing good long-term relationship with local governments.* These long-term relationships are key to moving things forward and working in areas that may not be possible otherwise.
10. *Understanding the broader politics.* Priority must be made for understanding the broader politics of the system to know how best to capitalize on opportunities.

11. *Using private funds.* Having a secure flow of private funds greatly influences timely responses and implementation of response of choice.

Response analysis tools

In recent years, a number of tools have been developed to assist programmers with response analysis. Much of the content of these tools overlap and no one tool is comprehensive. It is important to remember these tools are intended to help guide decision-makers to think through all aspects of various response options. They are *not* intended to provide clear-cut, "yes/no" answers to all decision-making situations. The range of tools is wide, but can be classified into six main categories: (1) market analysis tools; (2) livelihood-related response analysis tools; (3) nutrition-related response analysis tools; (4) modality analysis tools; (5) harm-mitigation tools; (6) process-oriented tools.

These tools are briefly laid out in Table 3. Note that some of the tools described may fit in more than one category—for example there is some overlap between market analysis tools and modality-specific tools, but not all market analysis tools are about modality choices, and not all modality choice tools are about markets.

Table 3. Response Analysis Tools				
Tool	**Decision Focus**	**Location(s) on RA Road Map**	**Description**	**URL**
Market analysis tools				
EMMA (Emergency Market Mapping and Assessment)[4]	Market interventions; Impact of disaster on markets	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	A multi-faceted tool that consists of gap analysis, market analysis, and response analysis. EMMA evaluates feasibility, outcomes, benefits, and risks. Step nine of EMMA is response analysis, which considers the range of response options and identifies the most appropriate and feasible responses given the capacity of the market system.	http://emma-toolkit.org/
WFP Market Analysis Framework[5]	Cash interventions; Impact of food aid on markets	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	Gives information on a range of market indicators: Terms of trade, price, and income elasticity; shock scenarios; import parity prices; and market integration	http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/manual_guide_proced/wfp243856.pdf
SCP Tool (Structure-Conduct-Performance)[6]	Not specific	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	Provides information of a range of market indicators used for early warning and assessment	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADL965.pdf
MIFIRA (see below under modality-specific tools)	In-kind or cash response/ LRP	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	Breaks down and addresses the two core questions of the "food aid decision tree": Are markets functioning? Is there adequate food in nearby markets?	http://www.basis.wisc.edu/ept/barrett%20background%20food%20security.pdf
Livelihoods sector-specific tools				
Participatory Response Identification Matrix (PRIM) within LEGS[7]	Livestock related livelihood interventions	Second Order Options; Livelihood assistance	Designed to facilitate stakeholder discussions to identify appropriate livestock-based responses. It draws on assessment information and participants' contextual knowledge. PRIM varies for slow-onset and rapid onset emergencies.	http://www.livestock-emergency.net/

[4] (Albu 2010).

[5] (WFP 2011).

[6] (FEWSNET 2008).

[7] (Watson 2011).

SSSA (Seed security System Assessment)[8]	Seed systems & interventions assessments	Second Order Options; Livelihood assistance	Seven-step method to assess whether seed systems programs are needed; Guide to the choice of relief or development actions	http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/work/Africa/Documents/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf
Nutrition sector-specific tools				
WHO Chart for Implementing Selective Feeding Programs[9]	Targeted; or Blanket feeding programs	Second Order Options; Supplementary/therapeutic feeding	Established criteria—global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence *plus* other aggravating factors—for determining feeding programs	http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2000/9241545208.pdf
WFP Decision Tree for Response Options—Nutrition Intervention Food Products[10]	Use of various food products in nutrition interventions	Third Order Options; Food/nutrition products	Information on food products to use in nutrition interventions (including purpose, target group, nutrient profiles, and appropriate conditions for each product)	http://www.edesianutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/DRAFT-WFP-DecisionTree-for-new-foods-March-2010.pdf
Decision Trees (in *Improving the Nutritional Quality of U.S. Food Aid*)[11]	Various usages of food and nutrition products	Third Order Options; Food/nutrition products	Decision trees and flow charts for implementing appropriate in-kind food and nutrition responses at each stage of acute and chronic emergencies	http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2011/DeliveringImprovedNutrition.pdf
Modality-specific tools				
MIFIRA (Market Information for Food Insecurity Response Analysis)[12]	In-kind or cash response; Local/regional purchase	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	Breaks down and addresses the two core questions of the "food aid decision tree": Are markets functioning? Is there adequate food in nearby markets?	http://www.basis.wisc.edu/ept/barrett%20background%20food%20security.pdf
Good Practice Review (GPR) Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies[13]	In-kind, cash, or voucher responses	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	Provides guidance on factors to consider when determining the appropriateness of cash or vouchers compared to in-kind alternatives	http://www.odihpn.org/download/gpr11pdf

[8] (Sperling 2008).

[9] (WHO 2000).

[10] (WFP 2010).

[11] (Webb, Rogers et al. 2011)

[12] (Barrett, Bell, et al. 2009).

[13] (Harvey and Bailey 2011).

ECHO Decision Tree For Response Options[14]	In-kind, cash, or voucher responses	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based. Third Order Options; Conditionality	A series of questions (regarding market functions, security, beneficiaries' ability to work, etc.) to guide choice of in-kind, voucher, cash-for-work, and/or unconditional cash	http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/ECHO_Cash_Vouchers_Guidelines.pdf
Save the Children Risk Assessment Tool[15]	Cash transfer responses	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	A combination of open-ended questions and rankings of overall risks when determining the appropriateness of cash based responses	
Action Against Hunger Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment Guidelines[16]	In-kind, cash, voucher, livelihoods, nutrition, or other (WASH, health, etc.)	First Order Options; Food Assistance/Nutrition/ Livelihood/Other. Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based	Chapter 6 provides guidance on identifying appropriate solutions, through steps that decision-makers must consider when choosing a program. Decision tree includes series of questions for decision-makers when choosing a response in an acute food crisis.	http://www.actionagainsthunger.org/sites/default/files/publications/acf-fsl-manual-final-10-lr.pdf
ICRC Global FSA Guidelines[17]	In-kind, cash, or livelihood intervention	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based/ Livelihood Support	Section 7 on "How to choose an appropriate food security intervention" gives considerations when choosing in-kind food or other responses.	www.ifrc.org/Global/global-fsa-guidelines-en.pdf
ICRC Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programs[18]	In-kind, cash, or voucher responses	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based. Third Order Options; Targeting	Chapter 4 on "Decision-Making and Objective-Setting" looks at the questions to be asked when deciding if a cash transfer is appropriate and in which form.	http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/guidelines/guidelines-cash-en.pdf
ACF Implementing Cash-based Interventions[19]	In-kind, cash, or voucher responses	Second Order Options; GFD/Market-based. Third Order Options; Targeting and conditionality	Chapters 2 & 3 discuss the appropriateness of cash and assessment; Chapter 2 also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of unconditional vs. conditional transfers.	http://www.actionagainsthunger.org/publication/2009/09/implementing-cash-based-interventions

[14] (European Commission 2009).

[15] (Save the Children UK 2011)

[16] (ACF International 2010)

[17] (ICRC 2007a)

[18] (ICRC 2007b)

[19] (Le Cuziat & Mattinen 2012)

Harm mitigation tools				
B/HA (Benefits/ Harms Analysis)[20]	Unintended impacts, benefits-harms analysis	Cross-cutting considerations	Methodology and set of tools to help agencies understand context, consider unintended impact, and decide upon a choice to minimize harm and maximize benefits	http://pqdl.care.org/Practice/Benefits-Harms%20Handbook.pdf
DNH (Do No Harm)[21]	Negative impacts	Cross-cutting considerations	Process aimed to predict the potential impacts of different responses in conflict situations in order to avoid negative impacts of interventions	http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf
Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations[22]	Predicting and mitigation risks of corruption in humanitarian assistance	Cross-cutting considerations	Identifies the types of corruption that threaten humanitarian aid. Outlines policies, practices and to monitor, prevent, mitigate corruption in humanitarian work	http://www.transparency.org/content/download/49759/795776/Humanitarian_Handbook_cd_version.pdf
Process/consensus oriented tools				
RAF (Response Analysis Framework of FAO)[23]	Overall Response; Analysis Process	Overall response analysis process	Process of multi-stakeholder meetings in which various response options are discussed and scored according to different categories in a "Response Analysis Matrix"	http://www.fao.org/emergencies/what-we-do/emergency-relief-and-rehabilitation/response-analysis
RAP (Response Analysis Project of WFP)[24]	Overall Response; Analysis Process	Overall response analysis process	Process to analyze responses by defining needs, reviewing capacity, identifying a range of responses, and evaluating each response	http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp194140.pdf
Oxfam Response Analysis Guide[25]	Appropriateness of all response options	Overall response analysis process	Defines the role of response analysis and offers criteria for prioritizing response options by livelihood appropriateness and agency appropriateness	http://www.feg-consulting.com/spotlight/Rough%20Guide%20Response%20Analysis.pdf

[20] (CARE 2001)

[21] (Anderson 1999)

[22] (Transparency International 2010)

[23] (FAO 2011).

[24] (WFP 2008).

[25] (Oxfam 2008).

As Table 3 makes clear, there are lots of tools applicable to response analysis. Yet while program teams are often aware of at least some of these tools, they are infrequently used. Many reasons were reported to explain why this is the case. First, there are too many tools to choose from, and it isn't always clear what tool is used for what task or decision. Second, and probably most importantly, the existing tools are seen by many practitioners as being too complex, too time consuming and requiring too much technical expertise. The process of analysis for complex tools can be so time-consuming in a context where time frames are very constrained that program teams end up relying on assumptions to make choices, simply because the analysis takes too much time. Sometimes, the results of an analysis provide useful background information but don't necessarily provide the "answer" to the response choice question. There is also some lack of clarity about the various ways in which tools can be used.

Choosing the right/most helpful tools; using tools

While there are lots of individual tools available for response analysis, they often address one specific choice, rather than facilitating the process of considering all options and choosing among them. Choosing the correct response-analysis-related tool depends on several factors, including the context of the crisis, the timeframe relative to the crisis, organizational capacity to implement or use certain tools, and the specific decision to be made. Figure 7 maps out existing response analysis tools and the decision(s) they address in the response analysis process. While it is agreed that assessment tools provide useful information required to choose an appropriate response, these tools are not specific to the actual response analysis *process*. Furthermore, many guidelines, best practices, and standards exist regarding assessments as well as program design that are not captured in Figure 7 because they do not necessarily guide practitioners on *how* to choose the most appropriate program.

Figure 7: Tools Related to Response Analysis



Conclusions and new questions

Response Analysis is a relatively new activity. This study has documented the need for response analysis, and attempted to elucidate the best practices that individuals and agencies have developed for response analysis. Some of these practices are about actual factors to take into consideration; some are about pitfalls to avoid and about managing some well-known constraints. Some of the practices involve the use of tools, or adapting existing tools to new problems and constraints. Several final observations should be noted. First, agencies shouldn't wait until there is a needs assessment before starting the process of response analysis. Response analysis is actually part of emergency preparedness and contingency planning. Data necessary to conduct a reasonable response analysis has to be collected as part of—or concurrent with—needs assessment data, and there is a need for baseline information.

Second, part of response analysis is about how the work of one agency fits into the larger picture of what other agencies are doing, what government is doing, and what affected communities and diaspora communities are doing themselves. Hence there is an element of response analysis that is about coordination, and the right locus for that work is some kind of coordination mechanism—

either national government or cluster. But part of response analysis is also about the response of the individual agency—its mandate, its partnerships, and its commitments. Ultimately agencies are responsible for the work they commit to do. Some parts of response analysis must be conducted at the agency level, but ultimately the combined response must add up to a strategy that makes overall sense. So far, there is no formula for exactly how to split response analysis between individual agencies and clusters or coordination mechanisms, but elements of it must be done by each.

Several issues remain unaddressed. A couple of the major ones are noted below. These questions are posed for the benefit of the humanitarian food security community generally with the hope that in the coming years they will be addressed:

1. *Is response analysis a one-off analytical procedure, or on-going analysis*? Response analysis is typically depicted as a "step" in a process. Yet the evidence is that assessment and situation analysis are more akin to an on-going process than a single step. Good programs are constantly undergoing small redesign adjustments. One challenge to organizations using response analysis is how to also make it an on-going process, rather than a one-off activity.
2. *Response analysis vs. causal analysis*. More than one key informant suggested that the problem is not about a "new step" called response analysis, but improving the analysis of causal factors. On balance, the conclusion of this research is that both improved causal analysis and response analysis are needed.
3. *Response analysis and different types of emergency*. Much of the documentation on response analysis—and indeed much of the results of this research—tends to focus on contextual and agency factors, but doesn't necessarily take into account the type of food security crisis. That is to say for the most part, response analysis tools and approaches developed so far don't distinguish between protracted crisis, rapid-onset crisis, slow-onset crisis, and conflict/displacement crises. Or a crisis might incorporate elements of all of the above (such as the Somalia famine of 2011–12). Response analysis tools and approaches will need to be finely tuned to contextual differences.
4. *Other conditioning factors*. Implementing agencies must take into consideration several other issues concerning response analysis tools and processes. These include the role of the state (which may vary from essentially being absent to being contested—and hence perhaps part of a conflict that is leading to the crisis in the first place—to being relatively facilitative, to being the dominant presence and perhaps not tolerant of independent analysis).
5. *Coordination.* There is likely to be a sort of "fallacy of aggregation" with regard to response analysis if it is carried out on an individual agency basis. That is, while it may well be reasonable for a single agency to conclude from a market assessment that its cash transfer program (or for that matter its food aid program) will have no adverse impact on local markets, if a number of individual agencies all have the same kind of programs, the cumulative effects could be quite different from what any individual agency calculated—even though their calculation was based on good analysis. For this and several other reasons, response analysis is a task that really requires strategic coordination, and would ideally be led by a cluster or other coordinating body.

Improving both assessment and response analysis is ultimately about making the response to an acute emergency or a protracted crisis more evidence-based. Response analysis is really all about answering the question "what works best under what circumstances to achieve the best outcome?"—in this case for food-insecure or malnourished populations. Clearly, the evidence base

needs to be expanded to be able to address this question in a comprehensive way. Needs assessments have improved, and a wider range of response options now exists to address needs. Response analysis fills a critical part of the evidence chain, but better monitoring and evaluation are also required, and building a culture of analysis in humanitarian agencies is critical.

Has the investment in improved analysis and the broader range of response options led to improved program response? This research has completed the first step in answering this question by better understanding the link between analysis and response choice. However, further research is needed to consider the second step, which is to examine the impact of the better analysis and larger availability of program options in addressing food insecurity.

Feinstein International Center

References

ACF International (2010). *Food Security and Livelihoods Assessments: A Practical Guide for Field Workers.* ACF.

Albu, M. (2010). *The Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit.* Rugby, UK: Practical Action Publishing.

Anderson, M. B. (1999). *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub.

Barrett, C. B, Bell, R., Lentz, E. C. & Maxwell, D. (2009). "Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis." *Food Security* 1(2): 151–168.

CARE (2001). *Benefits-Harms Handbook.* Atlanta, Georgia: CARE.

Le Cuziat, G. & Mattinen, H. (2012). *Maximizing the Nutritional Impact of Food Security and Livelihoods Interventions. A Manual for Field Workers.* ACF.

European Commission (2009). *The Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian Crises: DG ECHO Funding Guidelines.* Brussels: European Commission.

Food and Agriculture Organization (2006). "The Integrated Phase and Humanitarian Phase Classification Technical Manual." Nairobi, Kenya, Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia.

Famine Early Warning Systems Network (2008). "Structure-Conduct-Performance and Food Security." Washington DC: FEWSNET.

Food and Agriculture Organization (2011). "Developing a Response Analysis Framework for Food Security Emergencies: Discussion Papers." Rome, Italy: FAO.

Harvey, P., & Bailey, S. (2011). *Good Practice Review: Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies.* London: ODI.

ICRC (2007a). "Global Food Security Assessment Guidelines: A Step-by-Step Guide for National Societies." Geneva: ICRC.

ICRC (2007b). "Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programming." Geneva: ICRC.

Lentz, E. C., Passarelli, S., & Barrett, C. B. (forthcoming). "The Timeliness and Cost Effectiveness of the Local and Regional Procurement of Food Aid." *World Development.*

Levine, S. & Chastre C. (2004). *Missing the Point: An Analysis of Food Security Interventions in the Great Lakes*. London, Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group. HPG Network Paper 47.

Maxwell, D**,** Parker, J., & Stobaugh, H. (2012). "What Drives Program Choice in Food Security Crises? Examining the 'Response Analysis' Question." *World Development*. Special Edition on "Impacts of Innovative Food Assistance Instruments." (Forthcoming—accepted for publication).

Oxfam (2008). "Rough Guides to Emergency Food Security & Livelihoods Programmes: Response Analysis." London: Oxfam GB.

Save the Children UK (2011). *Cash Emergency Standard Operations Procedure: Annex SC Cash Transfer Program Risk Assessment Tool.* Save the Children.

Sperling, L. (2008). *When Disaster Strikes: A Guide to Assessing Seed System Security.* Cali, Colombia: International Center for Tropical Agriculture.

Transparency International (2010). *Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations*. Berlin: Transparency International.

Watson, C. (2011). "Protecting Livestock, Protecting Livelihoods: The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS)." *Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice* 1(1), 9.

Webb, P., Rogers, B. L., Rosenberg, I., Schlossman, N., Wanke, C., Bagrianksy, J. & Narayan, A. (2011). *Improving the Nutritional Quality of U.S. Food Aid: Recommendations for Changes to Products and Programs.* Boston, MA, Tufts University.

World Food Programme (2008). "Workshop Report: Response Analysis Project." Rome: WFP.

World Food Programme (2010). *Decision Tree for Response Options – Nutrition Interventions: Food Products (DRAFT).*

World Food Programme (2011). *Market Analysis Framework: Tools and Applications for Food Security Analysis and Decision-Making.* Rome: WFP.

World Health Organization (2000). *The Management of Nutrition in Major Emergencies.* Geneva: WHO.