

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A UNITED GERMANY

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The German Foreign Minister clarifies the German foreign policy position in the context of the recent war in the Gulf. He discusses 1) Germany's hope to change its constitutional restriction against committing forces outside NATO territory, so that in the future it can play a greater role in UN military undertakings; 2) Germany's general intention to be more involved in world politics; 3) the creation of social and security structures for the new, united Europe as the focal point of German foreign policy; and 4) the process of internal unification and its repercussions on foreign policy.

The unification of Germany is an occasion to take stock of our responsibilities and of the tasks we face in the field of foreign policy. The first point to be noted is that the unification of Germany is proving to be a major contribution to the creation of a free and united Europe. It has not produced a new problem for Europe but rather solved a European problem. Today we Germans face two challenges. Following external unification we must complete the country's internal unification. And secondly, we have to meet the larger responsibility of this united Germany: to comply with the requirement of our constitution and to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe. German foreign policy remains a policy for peace.

This we have reaffirmed in the Two-plus-Four Treaty in words to the effect that the united Germany will never employ weapons except in conformity with the United Nations Charter and with the German constitution. The Chancellor has said that as a member of the United Nations we have assumed the obligations laid down in the United Nations Charter. These include measures in the cause of collective security. Up to now, however, our constitution, but also our country's division, have restricted our ability to comply fully with those obligations.

The values we defend in the pursuit of our foreign policy, and our adherence to freedom, human dignity, self-determination, and the maintenance of peace, are the lessons of our history. The pursuit of this policy has paved the way to unity and earned us the confidence of our neighbors and the nations of the world. We shall continue to base our policy on these values. Recent opinion polls in France, the United States, and many other countries show that no one seriously doubts the peaceful outlook of the Germans. That is a compli-

ment to the Germans in the old Federal Republic, and, equally, to those who, by means of a peaceful revolution, have won their freedom in the new federal states.

The Western Alliance

Not only the signatories of the Two-plus-Four Treaty, but the entire community of nations have demonstrated that the unification of Germany as a state with definitive frontiers is a significant contribution to peace and stability in Europe. In that Europe the European Community has proved itself an area of stability, both politically and economically, which is becoming increasingly attractive to the whole continent and beyond. The larger Germany brings into the European Community its larger responsibility: a greater commitment to European integration on the path to economic and monetary union and then to political union.

Speaking in the Bundestag on 13 March, the Chancellor emphasized that the development of a common European security and defense policy within the ambit of the European Community and Western European Union is not intended as a substitute for NATO. To us the culmination of that policy is European union. And as such it will also bolster the European pillar of the Western Alliance. The growing European identity is not intended to make the Atlantic wider but the alliance stronger. The Western Alliance, the alliance of the North American and European democracies, has likewise in past decades shown itself to be a factor conducive to European and world stability.

We want it to stay that way. German-American friendship and European-American friendship and partnership were permanent features of the Federal Republic's policy and remain permanent features of united Germany's policy. We know we must bear this in mind as we seek to make a success of the GATT round: here too partnership must be the word. Conscious of the importance of this European-American partnership, we accept the American president's offer of partnership in leadership. We shall work for the further development of our alliance as prescribed by the London summit of 1990. Our aim is to equip the alliance to use the new opportunities and cope with the challenges of the future.

Through having pursued its political and security objectives on the basis of common values, the Western Alliance has established its own identity. From the outset it was more than a mere reaction to Soviet hegemonic policy after World War II. In fact, the Western Alliance was an indication that lessons had been learned from the mistakes of World War I. Hence the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact does not affect the existence of the Western Alliance. We have never left any doubt that we see the Western Alliance as something more than a traditional military alliance. It represents a harmony of values. The basic distinction between the Western Alliance and the Warsaw Pact was that the latter was an instrument of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe whereas the former is a community of states sharing the same values and seeking to defend freedom and democracy.

The Western Alliance is and will remain a constant feature of European and global stability. And it will be a major element of the emerging structures of cooperative security in Europe. No one will see this alliance as a threat, but all will regard it as a guarantor of their own security.

Rule of Law

Another permanent feature of our policy in Europe is our membership of the Council of Europe. That organization has created the European legal area—or to be more precise, the area of European democracies in which the rule of law and human rights prevail.

We have been able to achieve our unity because we have lived by the mandate of our Basic Law, and because, meeting the responsibility expressed in the Letter on German Unity we have worked for a state of peace in Europe, which made it possible for the German nation to recover its unity in free self-determination. And I consider it worthwhile to abide by such a policy. This also embraces the consistency of German-Soviet relations. The Joint Declaration of 13 June 1989 and the German-Soviet Treaty of 9 November 1990 have endorsed, enlarged, and reaffirmed the German-Soviet relationship as a constant element of German foreign policy.

And starting from the basis of all these permanent features of our foreign policy, the united Germany faces its larger responsibility. This manifests itself in the commitment of our greater influence to the cause of European union, to the creation of one Europe, and to the solution of global problems.

Clearly, the division of Germany has been a burden on German foreign policy for decades. Berlin crises, tension between the two Germanies, and the unresolved frontier questions have time and again brought this home to us, the ones most affected by the division of Europe. But at no time have we compromised the priorities and the values laid down by our constitution. At no time have we made the mistake of putting unity before freedom or of pursuing a separate German course instead of being part of Europe's community of nations. And we have gained both—German unity and the chance to bring about European unity.

The awareness of this strengthens our resolve to adhere to the fundamental values and principles of our foreign policy. We shall fall back on them as we draw up concepts for meeting Germany's larger responsibility. United Germany's newly acquired scope will certainly not be used to pursue any new objectives in terms of power politics, nor will there be any "renationalization" of German foreign policy. We will use our influence to secure a greater European commitment to the European Community and for the benefit of the whole of Europe. We appeal to the nations of Europe to accept this European offer made by the Germans.

Central and Eastern Europe

While the area of stability formed by the members of the European Community, the Western Alliance, and the Council of Europe is making dynamic

progress, we see ourselves faced with new, huge, and traumatic challenges in Central and Eastern Europe. The nations of that region are struggling to consolidate their democratic structures and to solidify the success of their reforms. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military structure and the removal of Communist dictatorships have released national currents. Some of them are seeking a European orientation, others not yet. Yugoslavia is confronted by a serious conflict in its desire for national identity, democracy, and economic reform.

In the Soviet Union the will for democratization, national self-determination, and the search for an economic reform concept meet with resistance from the old structures. The transitional phase this vast country is going through poses huge problems and challenges not only to the Soviet Union itself but to all Europeans, indeed to the whole international community. It is true not only for the Soviet Union but, despite all the differences, for Yugoslavia and

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the other countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, that the development of new forms of coexistence can only be brought about by a peaceful political dialogue. That dialogue must be conducted on the basis of democracy, rule of law and respect for the human and minority rights of all concerned. Today Europe is a continent that has solved long-standing problems in a dramatic yet peaceful fashion. In the West there is a zone of stability, while in the East and Southeast old and new problems await a solution. Now the aim must be to provide a stable framework for these dramatic developments so that we may avoid national and European wars.

Our larger German responsibility becomes evident from the fact that here, too, we are contributing the lessons we have learned from our own history. We want to help ensure that in tackling the problems confronting Europe today we come up with European and not nationalistic solutions.

It is understandable that in recent months the world's attention has focused on the Middle East. Establishing a stable peaceful order in that region demands the greatest efforts not only from the countries in that region but also from responsible states and communities of states. But in contributing to the solution of problems in the Middle East we must not neglect our immediate neighbors, the Central and Eastern Europeans. Supporting the reform policies in those countries calls for European solidarity, European stability, and a common European effort to build for the future. It requires a tremendous effort from all Western nations. Transitional periods always mean instability. Thus by helping to solve temporary economic problems we are helping to

maintain stability. As in the past, we Germans will continue to face up to our responsibility. This we are also doing in the light of the challenges confronting us in the new federal states because we know Europe must not be divided once again by a "poverty boundary," nor by uncontrolled developments in the East. On the other hand, successful economic development in the new German states will most certainly be an encouragement to reformers in the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

Where Central and Eastern Europe are concerned we Germans have a special role to play, not only on account of our geographical situation and our economic strength, but also because of our historical ties and links with our Eastern neighbors, including the Soviet Union. It is a moving historical experience to note that those links have actually been strengthened by the tragic events of the '30s and '40s. Poland's president has described Germany as the "gateway to friendship in Europe." True enough, we aim to set the seal on good German-Polish relations with a treaty to be signed before the end of this year. We want to do the same with Vaclav Havel's Czechoslovakia.

We shall as a united Germany seek to influence our partners and friends so that they too meet their responsibility toward Europe as a whole. All problems affecting Eastern Europe affect us too, and they require European responses. We will advocate that the European Community remain open to the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Anyone wishing to keep them out would be abusing the Community's name—it being a "European" and not a "West European" Community; and they would be detracting from the spirit of the Treaties of Rome. But those who offer them a chance of accession give them the strength to master their difficult transition.

New Security Structures

During this phase the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) urgently needs fresh and powerful stimulus. The first conference of foreign ministers under the Paris Charter, to be held in Berlin in June, will be an opportunity for this. The CSCE process and the Charter for a New Europe constitute at present the only framework for stability which spans the whole of Europe and embraces the two superpowers. Its institutions must be used, developed, and expanded. The Conflict Prevention Center and the new CSCE procedure for the settlement of disputes agreed upon in Valetta are a modest beginning, it is true, but they are of fundamental importance. Yet we need more. We need a decision-making executive body as an institution of pan-European security and cooperation. We need a European security authority. And why not, in the distant future, a European security council as well under the aegis of the United Nations so that we can enlarge our continent's scope for decisionmaking and action?

The new political, economic, and cooperative security structures must also leave room for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Those nations are turning toward the European Community and the Council of Europe. This

does not create problems for anyone, but rather will enlarge the area of stability. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and hence the termination of the Soviet Union's hegemony, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe rightly lay claim to complete security on the same terms as everyone else. It is in Europe's interest as a whole to ensure that no power vacuum is created and that no political disruptions occur in Europe. This is the foremost purpose of the new European security architecture.

The nations of Central and Eastern Europe must be able to occupy a secure place within Europe's security system. In relation to the Soviet Union it is important that these countries should establish a neighborly relationship based on equal rights to replace the hegemony of the past, a relationship based on renunciation of force and cooperation.

A stable pan-European architecture presupposes that one of its main components, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, is upheld without modification, and ratified. We hope and expect that in the Soviet Union too the view taken during the negotiations and upon the signing of the treaty will prevail. The ratification and observance of this treaty will give added stimulus to the efforts to eliminate short-range nuclear systems and nuclear artillery in Europe. There is no longer any room for such weapons in the system of European peace and stability to which we aspire.

The Soviet Union

We are aware of the difficult problems facing the Soviet president and appreciate the fact that he is sticking to his external course in spite of heavy domestic pressures. The responsible role played by the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council during the Gulf crisis is evidence of this, as is the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military institutions as a logical consequence of the abandonment of Soviet hegemonic claims in Europe. Nor, I feel, should we forget in this connection President Gorbachev's support for the ratification of the Two-plus-Four Treaty.

It is in our interest that the Soviet Union be able to solve its internal problems in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter for a New Europe, and in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Council of Europe. To achieve this it will have to continue the process of democratization so courageously begun by President Gorbachev. We all need a stable Soviet Union which is able to play its role as an indispensable element of the new architecture embracing the whole of Europe.

The encouraging developments in Europe, which have also rid the Third World of the East-West confrontation and made possible the solution of major regional problems, likewise require the involvement of the Soviet Union. It should not be excluded from any of these developments. Its contribution to the new world order is essential. Germany sees its task in creating broader and stronger ties with the Soviet Union from within the European Community and the Western Alliance. We do this aware of the central importance of the German-Soviet relationship.

The United Nations

There are no longer two German states competing with one another around the world. And in the United Nations, too, the German nation is represented by one government. This enables us to assume our global responsibility without restriction within the framework of the world organization as well. Our intention to lift the restriction we imposed upon ourselves—for good reason—with regard to our armed forces, by amending our constitution so that German troops will in future be able to participate in military operations of the United Nations, shows that we are prepared to live up to the larger responsibility that now falls to us. We shall meet that responsibility, and if we could do so as part of a European military system, that would be a major step toward a common European security policy.

But we view our involvement in the United Nations not primarily, and certainly not solely, in terms of the participation of German troops in UN military operations. We want to help strengthen the United Nations and make it more efficient. The termination of the East-West confrontation opens up an opportunity to do this. Strengthening the United Nations implies first and foremost increasing the ability of its institutions, the Secretary-General, and the Security Council, to solve international problems by political means. The United Nations should also be enabled to play a greater part in meeting global challenges, in protecting the natural sources of life, combatting hunger, misery, and want (which are also causes of the flow of refugees), in the demilitarization of international relations by supporting regional disarmament in all parts of the world, and in restricting the global export of arms. Where it is a question of assuming greater responsibility so that we can do justice both to our history and the values enshrined in our constitution, we can distinguish ourselves particularly by committing ourselves more strongly to the solution of these tasks confronting mankind. And we will use our greater influence in our efforts to secure worldwide respect for human rights.

Considering all that has happened in Germany's past, our country's place at all times can only be on the side of human rights, on the side of the right of self-determination, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of all nations. That was our basic approach during the Gulf War, and it will be our approach as we help create a peaceful order in the Middle East.

Facing the Challenges of World Politics

The question has been asked in recent weeks and months whether the Germans only feel at home when they have a special niche in international politics. I feel the Germans have furnished the answer to this question over the last forty-five years. No nation was so deeply affected by the East-West confrontation, the division of Europe, and the Cold War as the Germans. That was truly no niche for our people.

And the Germans in the GDR certainly were not sheltered from the international arena. Furthermore, at no time have the Germans in the Federal Republic as it existed prior to unification hesitated to assume their responsi-

bility for safeguarding peace and freedom. Germany has a conscripted army which has its roots in the people, is part of our democratic society, and is supported by a national security consensus. Ever since the Bundeswehr was formed it has done its duty in times of the highest tension and the most acute political confrontations, and when our country has been subject to pressure and threats. And no one had any reason to doubt the reliability of the Germans and their armed forces. If we now decide to make possible, by amending our constitution, for German forces to be deployed for purposes laid down in the United Nations Charter, that is no cause to question the principle of a conscripted army. The national consensus on matters of security, which will continue to be of great importance for the stability of our country, is guaranteed precisely by our conscripted armed services. So too is the integration of those forces into society. In the future as well the Bundeswehr will fulfill its mandate in accordance with the unchanged values enshrined in our Basic Law.

We know the responses to many questions differ in the old and new German states. This reflects different experiences over time. But our people are now united in the will to defend freedom and democracy. What the postwar development of democracy in the old Federal Republic up to 3 October 1990 meant to the people was manifest in the peaceful revolution to achieve freedom in East Germany. That commitment to freedom has restored to the Germans what the shame of fascism had taken away from them. We shall forever retain the dignity of a liberal democracy and a free society. The Germans have certainly had no place to shelter from the realities of the postwar era. Nor do I predict any for the future. The challenges differed depending on where we lived, in the West or in the East. Facing those challenges was no easy task. But we, and most particularly the East Germans, have stood the test. All in all, we can say with conviction that the nations of the world can rely on the Germans' determination to defend peace and freedom for themselves and for others.

