
Citizenship and Pluralism

The Role of Government in a World of Global Migration

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On June 6, 2006, outgoing United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan pronounced to the General Assembly, “we are in the midst of a new migration era.”¹ According to UN statistics, international migrants numbered 191 million in 2005—more than twice the number recorded in 1970. About one-third of all migrants live in Europe, and approximately one-quarter live in North America. Between 1990 and 2005 alone, Germany and Spain received more than 4 million migrants each, while the United States gained 15 million new foreign-born residents. International migrants make up over 20 percent of the population of 41 countries in the world.² Annan proclaimed that international migration is highly beneficial to both sending and receiving societies, but conceded, “we must all be aware of the social and cultural tensions that have arisen in many countries where there are large and recently established populations of foreign origins.”³

Given the large-scale movement of people around the world—a trend that will surely continue in the coming decades—how should governments manage the new diversity in their populations? How can countries create national unity out of diversity? Put in the words emblazoned on the U.S. Great Seal, is *e pluribus unum* possible?

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Any long-term strategy for successful immigrant integration must place citizenship policy front and center. Citizenship policy includes both the legal structures that enable foreign nationals to acquire citizenship and the policies and laws that target ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious minorities with immigrant backgrounds.⁴ In an increasingly global world, countries feel their sovereignty is weakened by international economic bodies, trade agreements, global culture, and, importantly, the movement of millions of people, not all of whom are authorized to enter. While these flows at times escape the reins of legislators and policymakers, governments continue to exert substantial control over domestic populations inside their territories. It is here that smart citizenship policy can make a real difference.

This paper argues that *multicultural citizenship* offers the best hope of successfully accommodating diversity within liberal democratic states. Multicultural citizenship does this by balancing government recognition

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..... of pluralism—providing standing to minorities and honoring diverse backgrounds—with concrete public support to immigrants. This support must include legal guarantees for equal access and protection of minorities, such as anti-discrimination legislation in workplaces, equitable access to public schools, and the right to practice peace-

..... ful religious beliefs; affirmative public support in the form of assistance to immigrant communities that wish to set up community organizations; and reasonable accommodations in public institutions, such as the right to wear religious apparel.

Citizenship policy is critical to immigrants. Citizenship remains the primary way of accessing the rights and benefits governments provide and it is a powerful means to make a claim of membership within a national community. To become a citizen is to become an insider. Lack of citizenship, regardless of cultural commonality, language fluency, or economic stability, always carries the possibility that immigrants can be excluded from the receiving society, including the most extreme exclusion of all: expulsion from the receiving country's territory.⁵

Citizenship policies are also vital for receiving societies. Advocates of multiculturalism clash with those who suggest that it is a nice philosophical ideal that fails in practice; more assimilatory citizenship, they suggest, is the answer. However, the concrete benefits of multicultural citizenship

include higher levels of naturalization, greater incorporation into the political system, and less violent debates about the accommodation of diversity. Promoting multicultural citizenship is not only a normative or moral argument about the right way to include outsiders—it is also a practical necessity. Liberal democracies are predicated on the belief that those who reside in a country participate in its governance. Thus, failure to integrate immigrants undermines the legitimacy and vitality of democracy.

Multicultural citizenship, when done right, also helps prevent segregation and alienation of immigrants' native-born children and grandchildren—the type of alienation that can lead to violent conflict over socio-economic exclusion, as in the Paris suburbs in 2005, or to domestic terrorism, as in the July 2005 London subway bombings. Drawing largely on the academic research on citizenship and immigrant incorporation in Europe and the traditional Anglo-settler societies, the following article will provide an overview of three types of citizenship—ethnic, civic, and multicultural—and will discuss variations on the multicultural model.

BEYOND ETHNICITY:

NATURALIZATION AND THE CENTRALITY OF CIVIC CITIZENSHIP

In the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers often made distinctions between “ethnic” and “civic” citizenship.⁶ Such distinctions are most readily apparent in the laws and policies regulating foreigners' access to legal citizenship in their country of residence. Ethnic citizenship is based on bonds of common descent. German nationality law prior to 2000 typified this approach in Europe; it extended German citizenship to those of German descent living in Eastern Europe (even if these individuals no longer spoke German), while denying citizenship to the children of Turkish migrants who were born on German soil and had never lived in another country. In Japan, this *jus sanguinis* model—one based on blood and culture—remains the primary means to acquire citizenship.

The Japanese case points to the limits of ethnic citizenship, especially for industrialized countries. Put simply, as an industrial nation, Japan needs people. The country's fertility rate (the estimate of the total number of children a woman will bear in her lifetime) stands at 1.25, a level equal to Poland and just below that of Italy, Spain, and Russia.⁷ Demographers suggest that a country needs a fertility rate of 2.1 to maintain a stable population, balancing deaths with births. Some might suggest that fewer people would be a good thing, especially on Tokyo's crowded subways, but absent immigration, low fertility means fewer new workers to take over for

those who retire, fewer people to care for an aging population, and, perhaps of greatest concern to governments, fewer income earners to pay for social services and government expenditures through their taxes.

Of course, countries can “import” workers through temporary guest-worker programs or turn a blind eye to unauthorized immigration while benefiting from migrant labor. Such a strategy is risky in the long term, as large unauthorized populations invite public and political backlashes and are inherently exploitative. Guest-worker programs are difficult to enforce. “Temporary” workers often become permanent as they build ties to their new country, have children, earn higher wages, and achieve upward mobility. This was the lesson learned in Europe after the guest workers of the 1950s and 1960s failed to return home once temporary labor programs ended. It is the lesson of the American Bracero program of 1942 to 1964, a temporary labor program that laid the groundwork for large-scale contemporary Mexican migration to the United States. In Japan, the lure of higher wages attracts men and women from across Asia and South America, but only a small number acquire formal citizenship because the process is long and arduous in a country deeply suspicious of those not of the Japanese “race.” The perpetual exclusion that results becomes costly if migrant workers prefer to send financial remittances home rather than invest them in their country of residence. According to the World Bank, remittance receipts around the globe totaled \$160 billion in 2004.⁸

The alternative to ethnic citizenship is a civic model, predicated on the belief that a person’s primary attachment to a country is political rather than ethnic or cultural. Civic citizenship implies, at a minimum, a relatively straightforward and achievable process of citizenship acquisition for foreign-born migrants (often called naturalization), and automatic or speedy citizenship for the children of migrants born in the host country (*jus soli*). In the United States, most legal immigrants only need to wait five years, show basic reading and writing ability in English and some knowledge of American history and civics, and demonstrate “good moral character.” Countries with civic citizenship differ in the details, such as the years of residence required, level of linguistic ability needed, or exceptions for those married to citizen spouses, but common across civic conceptions of citizenship is the belief in individuals’ fundamental equality, regardless of ethnicity, culture, religion, race, or national origin, and their ability to be part of the country based on adherence to widely held civic values, such as democratic governance and the rule of law.

Civic citizenship, especially in the area of naturalization policy, is critical for all countries of immigration that consider themselves liberal democracies. The very legitimacy of liberal democracies rests on the ideal

that those governed have a say: government of the people, by the people, for the people. Absent a civic path to full membership, the growing number of international migrants around the world will make up increasingly larger proportions of national populations while having limited or no voice in governance.

On the ground, countries are increasingly accepting civic citizenship. Social scientists Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy report that from 1990 to 2002, European countries such as Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands all made significant moves to more civic-territorial notions of citizenship—changes that, in the case of Germany, represented a striking departure from past policies.⁹ These scholars also point out the dangers of ethnic citizenship. In countries with stronger ethnic conceptions of membership, such as Germany and Switzerland, migrants and ethnic minorities are more likely to engage in political protest rather than work “within the system,” and their claims are more likely to be transnational or centered on the homeland, rather than on their country of residence. The implication is that ethnic citizenship, rather than contributing to a homogeneous cultural core, excludes and alienates, generating dangers for the political community.

MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: DEALING WITH DIVERSITY

In the latter half of the 1990s, scholars and commentators moved away from simple dichotomies of ethnic versus civic citizenship to talk about multicultural citizenship.¹⁰ Multicultural citizenship rests on a civic notion of naturalization, but it differs from classical liberalism—the foundation of civic citizenship—in its view of how countries of immigration should formulate integration and accommodation policies.

Classical Western liberalism, in rejecting the hierarchies of birth of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, is predicated on a fundamental respect for universalism and individual equality. For government to be fair to all, states must ignore and remain neutral to particularities of ethnicity, religion, or national origin in public institutions. America’s separation of church and state and France’s historic refusal to recognize ethnic designations or affiliation in government statistics or programs are two examples of this stance.

The multicultural critique of classical liberalism, in some cases advanced by self-defined liberals, starts from the premise that cultural neutrality in public institutions is impossible. Since democracy is based on government by the majority, minorities face inherent disadvantages in the public sphere. The traditional liberal response is to erect a system of equal rights, such

as freedom of speech and religion, but critics claim that cultural inequality remains pervasive. Not only are the institutions of government created by people with specific values and cultural baggage, but seemingly innocuous decisions carry significant cultural bias. Thus, the former “Lord’s Day Act” in Ontario, Canada, which mandated Sunday store closings, could be seen as a neutral day of rest imposed by the legislature to protect employees from working seven days a week, but it could also be interpreted as forcing a Christian template of work and rest on those with other views.¹¹ Similarly, a law in the German state of Baden-Württemberg endorsed by the Federal Administrative Court in 2004 bans Muslim headscarves and all “ostentatious” religious symbols for teachers, but at the same time declares nuns’ habits to be “professional dress” exempt from the ban, a distinction which privileges certain religious traditions over others.¹²

According to proponents of multicultural citizenship, true equality demands explicit political *recognition* of cultural minorities and *accommodation* of their needs. If legislatures mandate store closings one day a week, Jewish owners should be able to close on Saturdays, but stay open on Sundays. Since religion is fundamental to many people’s lives, states should allow residents to wear religious dress. The “politics of recognition” provides concrete benefits to minorities and dignity to groups that otherwise have their particularities ignored or discredited.

ATTACKING MULTICULTURALISM: THE RETURN OF ASSIMILATION?

Since 2000—before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—a backlash against multiculturalism has spread in public debate on immigration and in policy circles from Europe to Australia.¹³ Countries such as Australia and the Netherlands—previously at the vanguard of the multicultural movement—now avoid the language of multiculturalism and retreat from policies that acknowledge ethnic communities as distinct entities worthy of government support. The 2003 Law on Dutch Citizenship includes stricter requirements for would-be citizens, demanding demonstrated oral and written knowledge of the Dutch language as well as of Dutch politics and society. Similar changes in the United Kingdom’s Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 changed naturalization from a largely bureaucratic process to one that now mandates formal ceremonies meant to increase pride in British citizenship. The rituals of national identity appear to be more salient now than a decade ago.

Behind the reassertion of unitary rather than plural nationhood lie

at least three sets of concerns about multiculturalism. The first complaint rests on a fear of political fragmentation: if we all celebrate the distinctions that make us unique and different from one another, do we forget to invest in the bonds that hold a country together? Such critics reject multiculturalism and promote a homogeneous national identity around a civic (and sometimes cultural) core to which immigrants should assimilate. In the United States, prominent political scientist Samuel Huntington calls for a return to the roots of the American creed that is based on “the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English conceptions of the rule of law...and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth.”¹⁴ The lament over the “disuniting of America,” to borrow a title from a prominent critic of multiculturalism, is echoed in Europe, Canada, and Australia.¹⁵

A second critique of multicultural citizenship bemoans the loss of shared community, saying its absence undermines public support for redistributive socio-economic policy. In this argument, specific collective endeavors, such as the establishment of the welfare state, rely on a feeling of shared fate with fellow citizens. When ties of membership attenuate as multiculturalism valorizes particularistic memberships, it is posited, support for universal social policies or other broad public programs wither. As Richard Gwyn puts it, “It cannot be coincidence that the higher the various cultural walls have gone up...the stronger popular resistance to paying taxes has become.”¹⁶ Given persistent economic inequalities that seem to be growing in the twenty-first century in countries such as the United States, some ask whether recognition of difference creates false boundaries between similarly situated socio-economic groups, sapping energy away from political mobilization for economic redistribution.¹⁷

A final critique of multicultural citizenship worries not only about a lost ability to engage in collective projects, but also about the real possibility that multiculturalism creates or reifies invidious distinctions that can relegate some to “second class” status.¹⁸ The genius of old-fashioned liberalism, in this formulation, is its blindness to people’s particularities and its ideal of equal treatment for all individuals. Under multiculturalism, with its recognition of ethnic, cultural, religious, or other collective group identity, people might be forced to be ethnic, even if they want to be just American or British. By artificially underscoring an individual’s background, such policies take away individual self-identification and potentially reify the very categories that served as the basis for unequal rights and discrimination in the past.

MULTICULTURALISM AS A PATHWAY TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

Does multicultural citizenship impede current and future projects of community-building and, in the case of immigrants, does it hinder the integration of diverse peoples into a common citizenry? The available evidence, often lost in the heat of political rhetoric and anecdotes of failed multiculturalism, suggests that multicultural policies have not brought cultural chaos. Instead, they might very well facilitate immigrant integration. In contrast to fears of fragmentation, naturalization rates—calculated as the annual number of naturalizations over the non-citizen foreign “stock”—are higher in countries that embrace multiculturalism than in those more ambivalent or antagonistic to recognizing pluralism. Countries such as Germany, Italy, and Switzerland—considered “weak” multicultural states—recorded an annual naturalization rate of less than 1 percent in the early 1990s, compared to a rate of about 6.5 percent in the Netherlands and Sweden in 1994 and 10 percent in Canada for the same period. The United States and Great Britain—considered “moderate” countries of multiculturalism—had intermediate naturalization rates of about 3 to 4 percent.¹⁹ The statistical evidence consequently suggests that multiculturalism policies, to the extent that they facilitate immigrants’ legal and participatory citizenship, *encourage* common bonds of community in multiethnic societies rather than undermine them.

For those worried that recognition and support of ethno-cultural difference undermines common cause for redistributive policies, there is no empirical evidence that adopting multicultural policies undermines government provision of public benefits. The academic research in this area is limited, but in a recent study by Keith Banting, Richard Johnston, Will Kymlicka, and Stuart Soroka, the researchers find that “countries with strong [multiculturalism policies] saw the largest rise in social spending and the greatest strengthening of their redistributive effort.”²⁰ Their research also suggests that significant changes in the proportion of immigrants in a country—rather than the absolute number—might slow down growth in social spending, but that multiculturalism policies could potentially attenuate, rather than exacerbate, such trends. The researchers conclude by arguing, “it is possible that [multiculturalism policies] can acknowledge diversity in a way that makes it less threatening to members of the dominant group.”²¹

Finally, any response to those worried about reifying differences requires a nuanced accounting of the costs and benefits of publicly acknowledging ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural differences. Many of those against state recognition of difference advocate universal, republican

citizenship *à la française*. In the republican model, individual citizens have equality before the state and enjoy direct relations to government as individuals rather than as members of any particular group.

Indeed, in its bid to be neutral, government must bypass intermediate collectives based on religion, ethnicity, or culture and refuse to consider background, to the point of refusing to collect population statistics on ethnicity and race, as in France. Proponents of this position are found on the political left and right, in Europe and in traditional Anglo-settler countries of immigration. For example, in 2003 California voters debated Proposition 54, which would have amended the state constitution to prohibit state and local governments from using race, ethnicity, color, or national origin to classify current or prospective students, contractors, or employees in public education, contracting, or employment operations.²²

Making ethnicity an illegitimate basis for identification and political action carries significant dangers. It runs the risk of making inequality invisible and leaving minorities out of the political process altogether. State-sanctioned categories of ethnicity (or race, or religion, or national origin) clearly reinforce the salience of those categories for individuals who check off the boxes and analyze the resulting statistics. But absent such information, it is impossible to know whether discrimination or institutional barriers generate inequality between groups because of their differences. While some inequality is inherent in all societies, if ethnicity, race, or religion stratifies people's life chances, not only will this undermine social cohesion, it will also sow the seeds for violent outbursts, as in the Paris suburbs of 2005.

Ignoring ethnicity also hurts immigrants' political incorporation. For all of liberal democracy's focus on the individual—as a voter and as a possessor of rights—politics demands action by groups of like-minded people. In the French republican model, the individual citizen is the primary political actor, but in French politics, groups of people—brought together in political parties, unions, or some other collective—work together to influence outcomes. The foundations of “groupedness” are not equally compelling. While immigrants might have various affiliations—to other homebuyers, to other parents, to other soccer enthusiasts—ties based on ethnicity are surely among the strongest and most deeply felt. Individual immigrants might choose not to privilege such ties, but for many people, shared origins, similar migration experiences, common language, cultural habits, dress, and food all create a sense of common identity and potential collective mobilization, despite intra-ethnic differences based on accent, class, region, or even religion.

On a practical level, ethnicity is a particularly effective way to orga-

nize for group objectives. Especially in cases where people need each others' assistance to become citizens or to engage in the political system, it is easier to ask for help from fellow immigrants who speak the same language and come from a similar background. Political integration is grounded in informal ethnic networks, facilitated through local immigrant community organizations, and encouraged by co-ethnic leaders.²³ To ignore the ethnic community blinds us to a key mechanism that facilitates immigrant inclusion in the political system. Critics who worry that multiculturalism ghettoizes immigrants overlook the fact that the alternative might be a complete absence of help or participation.

Unions, civic associations, and political parties are obvious substitutes for ethnic community-based representation, and they can surely do some of the work. However, these vehicles of participatory citizenship also carry some practical problems. Union strength and numbers are in decline in many Western industrialized countries, and migrant access to mainstream organizations, including political parties, is difficult, in part due to linguistic barriers, but also because many mainstream groups do not seem particularly inclined to reach out to new communities.²⁴ These organizations could do much to teach immigrants political skills and provide them with knowledge about citizenship and the civic ideals of their adopted country, but for this to occur, unions, parties, and other collective actors also need to become multicultural in ideology and practice.

MODELS OF MULTICULTURALISM: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

So far this paper has suggested that multicultural conceptions of citizenship are a state's best choice for dealing with immigrant-generated diversity. However, there are important variants in translating multicultural ideals into public policy that must be recognized. These variants hinge on the way that immigrants are recognized by government, the extent of benefits provided to immigrants through specific public programs and policies, and the institutions and laws in place to prevent segregation of groups into separate (and oftentimes stratified) enclaves.

Multicultural Recognition: Which Identities, Which Labels?

As should be clear by now, any successful citizenship and integration policy must include symbolic recognition of diversity as a fact and as something to be celebrated. Ignoring diversity can generate significant problems in creating an unequal political playing field where certain communities are more legitimate than others. Research conducted with immigrants and

refugees in the United States and Canada shows that foreign-born residents find their origins highly salient to their lives, and they appreciate society's recognition of their unique heritage.²⁵ This does not mean that they cannot recognize and value their adopted country, as most speak approvingly of how lucky they are to be able to draw upon the best elements of both their homeland and adopted country to create a better future.

However, countries differ in the categories used to recognize and identify groups, and such classifications have important implications for political incorporation.

The United States and Great Britain, for example, tend to use the language of race and policy around race relations as the dominant way to deal with diversity. Canada tends to couch multiculturalism in ethnic terms of hyphenation, although antiracism and discrimination feature prominently in more recent government policy. This disparate categorization means that a Jamaican immigrant might be Jamaican-Canadian in Canada, African-American in the United States, and Black in Britain. In all three cases, national origin or race trumps religious or West Indian cultural identification.

Policymakers need to be aware of the tradeoffs of these labels. Using race to understand diversity clearly helps identify and tackle inequalities that stem from overt or institutional racism. In the Canadian case, ethnic multiculturalism—despite government anti-racism rhetoric—provides fewer rhetorical tools to make claims around such forms of discrimination.²⁶ At the same time, and especially for immigrants, race-based language does not deal adequately with substantial variation within “racial” categories and ignores other important sources of discrimination, such as religious affiliation. In terms of feelings of belonging, race is not a particularly good basis for inclusive citizenship because, as Christian Joppke puts it, “Race is different. Its content is not a positive heritage (however modified) transplanted into the new society, but the negative experience of oppression at the hands of the receiving society.”²⁷ Policies need to be flexible enough to recognize various collective identities without any particular label becoming a stigmatizing designation.

Multiculturalism, State Support, and Level Playing Fields

Among multicultural models, the American variant can be catego-

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alized as *laissez-faire*. A broad array of civil rights laws work to protect individuals from discrimination, and “ethnic” political mobilization is legitimate—even the norm in certain American cities like New York—but government cannot use taxpayer dollars to support specific cultural groups. Here, the United States more closely follows the model of the neutral state. Rather than make decisions about which backgrounds are more deserving, civic groups are expected to mobilize from the ground up to influence policy within a system of political pluralism.

While *laissez-faire* multiculturalism is better than ethnic citizenship or pure republican civic models, the *laissez-faire* approach can perpetuate inequalities between immigrant groups that have wildly varying levels of the resources and skills needed to engage in bottom-up mobilization and lobbying.²⁸ In contrast, Canada’s more *interventionist* multicultural model directs some public monies to immigrant settlement in areas such as language training, job counseling, translation, and interpretation services. This money, in the form of contracts and grants, tends to go to local non-profit organizations. In providing this public funding, the Canadian state engages in a type of political redistribution; it provides some resources for poorer or more marginal immigrant groups so that they can have some voice in local community affairs or policy, thereby equalizing the political playing field to a degree.²⁹

Such interventionist multiculturalism appears to generate a favorable attitude to the country among immigrants in Canada, and it contributes to their inclusion in their adopted nation. Despite grumbling about high taxes, immigrants have a sense that government cares about them.³⁰ This suggests that public provision of social benefits—both universal benefits available to all residents, as well as particular policies aimed at helping migrants—can offer political benefits as well, in the form of higher rates of citizenship and a stronger sense of membership.

From Multiculturalism to Segregation?

Finally, there has been much recent debate on the limits of multiculturalism and whether it can be taken too far. Some commentators and scholars have suggested, for example, that the Netherlands’ application of multiculturalism in the 1990s began to border on segregation. Immigrant communities were not only recognized and given the tools to build their own cultural institutions, but cultural differences became cultural and socio-economic silos. Koopmans and colleagues, in considering high levels of Dutch institutional support for migrant minorities but relatively weaker “Dutch” affiliations, suggest that too much multiculturalism risks cultural

retrenchment and socio-political segregation.³¹ Some Dutch social scientists challenge such a pessimistic view of the Dutch multicultural experiment, but theoretically a *segregationist* multicultural model is possible—immigrants are given a common legal status, but government policy isolates and separates newcomers from the native-born.

If founded, the danger of socio-economic segregation is a genuine threat to national cohesion and political stability. Immigrants who cannot break into the economic mainstream might take their frustrations into the street or channel their energies to violent ends, while majority taxpayers—who come to associate ethnic minorities with welfare use and marginality—might draw increasingly rigid distinctions between a native-born “us” and an immigrant “them.” Such stratification, real or imagined, does little to help create a sense of common bonds.

A final element of any successful multicultural citizenship policy requires integrative institutions and laws which work against second-class citizenship. These would include, first and foremost, strong anti-discrimination laws and government bodies to which individuals who believe they were denied jobs, homes, or other benefits because of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or culture can turn. Surprisingly, a number of European countries, among them Sweden and Germany, have been slow to adopt such basic protections. Moreover, successful multicultural citizenship would require re-crafting national school systems to embrace diversity, thereby showing tenth-generation children the benefits and legitimacy of different backgrounds, but within a framework of civic values inclusive of all. In cases where the supposed neutral elements of liberalism actually take on strong cultural tones, the promise of democratic decision-making holds: in a country where everyone has a say in government, those who disagree can organize to convince others of their views.

THE WAY FORWARD

In countries with significant ethno-cultural diversity, the glue that binds strangers together is common membership in a political body through citizenship. Citizenship is a legal status that accords rights and benefits, but it is also an invitation to participate in a system of mutual governance. Many existing accounts of immigrant integration and the challenges of reconciling unity and diversity assume that problems stem primarily from the characteristics of the immigrants who settle in these countries. While the

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characteristics of immigrants and their communities matter, robust citizenship is not just about the immigrants we receive, but also fundamentally about the reception we give them. This reception includes two important dimensions: the level of symbolic inclusion offered to newcomers and the level of substantive assistance provided through law, institutions, and government policies of multicultural support. Taken together, governments' actions and attitudes both inform understandings of citizenship and directly affect immigrants' ability to participate. ■

ENDNOTES

- 1 United Nations General Assembly, *The Secretary General's Address to the General Assembly*, June 6, 2006, <www.un.org/esa/population/hldmigration/Text/SG%20address%20to%20GA%20286%20June%29.pdf> (accessed September 29, 2006).
- 2 United Nations General Assembly, *International Migration and Development: Report of the Secretary General*, A/60/871, May 18, 2006, <www.un.org/esa/population/hldmigration/Text/Report%20of%20the%20SG%28June%2006%29_English.pdf> (accessed September 29, 2006).
- 3 *Secretary General's Address to the General Assembly*.
- 4 Thus, the focus here is not on minorities forcibly incorporated through slavery, such as the African American population in the United States, nor on long-standing territorially-based subnational communities such as the Québécois in Canada or Catalans in Spain.
- 5 Some scholars and commentators suggest that the world might be moving to a new "postnational" age in which rights are accorded based on common humanity rather than national citizenship, and where identities can be transnational, cosmopolitan, or subnational. Yet while the language of human rights and forces of transnationalism are powerful, citizenship remains a critical legal and moral status in contemporary nation-states.
- 6 William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- 7 Michael Balter, "The Baby Deficit," *Science* 312 (5782) (June 2006): 1894-1897.
- 8 World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005). From the perspective of receiving societies, remittances can be seen as lost consumer spending or investment, but from the perspective of developing nations, remittances are an important source of foreign currency and income.
- 9 Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 73.
- 10 Nathan Glazer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Amy Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-73.
- 11 Irene Bloemraad, *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 234.
- 12 Koopmans *et. al.*, 60-61.
- 13 William Brubaker, "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (4) (2001): 531-548; and Christian Joppke, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy," *British Journal of Sociology* 55 (2) (2004): 237-257.
- 14 Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 31-32.
- 15 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).

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- 16 Richard Gwyn, *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 8.
- 17 Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1995); and David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 201-202.
- 18 Barry, *Culture and Equality*; Neil Bissoondath, "A Question of Belonging: Multiculturalism and Citizenship," in William Kaplan, ed., *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 368-387; Gwyn, *Nationalism Without Walls*; and Hollinger, *Postethnic America*.
- 19 See James Clarke, Elsbeth van Dam, and Liz Gooster, "New Europeans: Naturalization and Citizenship in Europe," *Citizenship Studies* 2 (1) (1998): 43-67, for the European naturalization data, as well as Koopmans et al., *Contested Citizenship*, 39. The North American calculations are my own. The designation of weak, moderate, and strong multicultural states comes from Keith Banting, Richard Johnston, Will Kymlicka, and Stuart Soroka, "Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State? An Empirical Analysis," in *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 49-90. Banting and colleagues use eight measures of multicultural policies to classify Australia and Canada as strong multicultural states (from 1980 to 2000); Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States as moderate multicultural states; and Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland as weak multicultural states when it comes to immigrants.
- 20 Banting et al., 66.
- 21 Ibid., 84.
- 22 The proposition was defeated by California voters, with 64 percent opposed.
- 23 Bloemraad.
- 24 Louis DeSipio, "Building America, One Person at a Time: Naturalization and the Political Behavior of the Naturalized in Contemporary American Politics," in Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf, eds., *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation* (New York: Russell Sage, 2001), 67-106; Michael Jones-Correa, *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Janelle Wong, *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
- 25 Bloemraad.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 143.
- 28 Bloemraad.
- 29 Ibid., 161-188.
- 30 Ibid., 138-160.
- 31 Koopmans et al..

