VODOU AND POLITICAL REFORM IN HAITI: SOME LESSONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

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The record of attempts by developed nations to promote democracy in the developing world is, at best, uneven. Foreign efforts to build democracy in places as diverse as Somalia and Vietnam have failed, in part because of developed nations' inability to understand traditional culture and religion. These foreigners have bypassed traditional local cultures in their designs for political reform, missing opportunities to lash reforms onto structures familiar to the people of the region. Today, the political potential of religious and cultural institutions remains largely untapped.

Haiti, a chronic example of this problem, may provide the international community an opportunity to change its approach to intervention. Throughout Haiti's turbulent history, foreign attempts to influence its political dynamic invariably have been unsuccessful. Some initiatives have succeeded briefly but have failed over the longer term, in part because foreigners or Haitian elites who sought to control the nation's political behavior routinely have misunderstood, ignored, trivialized, or suppressed fundamental tenets of traditional Haitian culture. Policies conceived first in Paris during the colonial era, then at the Vatican, later in Washington during the U.S. Marine occupation of 1915-1934, and most recently by the United Nations, have all tended to provoke internal friction and exacerbate social divisions, making stable governance and political development even more elusive.

But the history of foreign initiatives in Haiti need not necessarily determine the outcome of the current attempt by the international community to contribute to Haiti's recovery and rehabilitation. Indeed, the current U.N. operation has sought to distinguish itself from past interventions by its conscious tolerance for Haiti's culture and religion. Whether the United Nations' enlightened respect will be sufficient to engage Haitian society in political

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change remains an unanswered question, which is best understood by examining why previous interventions so routinely have proven inept.

Previous foreign initiatives in Haiti have paid attention only to the tiny, mostly urban, self-interested ruling elite, who have little in common with the Haitian population as a whole. The Haitian elite remains critical to democratization since they must cede power for political reforms to take root. They must supply investment capital and management expertise to sustain productive economic enterprise. But elite cooperation, if indeed it can be won, will not be sufficient to implement reforms across Haiti's social and economic landscape and make them last.

Haiti's history illustrates that the broad constituency of ordinary citizens must be engaged in political change. Earlier reforms have been short-lived because Haitian peasants were not active participants in reform, perceived no stake in its outcome, and consequently did not demand that it endure. Those who should have benefited from reform were instead estranged from it. In the end, foreign initatives meant to inspire political reform seldom have outlasted the presence of the foreign troops or clerics sent to enforce change. Inevitably, these reforms gave way to authoritarian rule, and the centuries-old cycle of repression and violence began anew. That cycle will not easily be broken.

Democracy-building in Haiti is particularly nettlesome. Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with a per capita income below $250 per year and a high concentration of wealth in the hands of a small elite based in Port-au-Prince. Although Haiti has two official languages—Créole and French—roughly 90 percent of its citizens speak only Créole, while the business of government ministries and the courts is conducted only in French, making government incomprehensible to ordinary Haitians. Less than 20 percent of the population can read and write.[1] Western preoccupation with the democratic process and the rule of law may be foreign to Haitian citizens, but explained in terms of religious symbols and anchored by local cultural structures, these types of reforms are not beyond reach.

Both the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF), which entered Haiti in September 1994, and the U.N. Mission in Haiti, which replaced the MNF in March 1995, have sought to break the cycle of failure by appealing to the broader Haitian constituency. However, the international community's plans for implementing secular, modern political remedies are alien and incomprehensive to all but a few. Despite the United Nations' policy of cultural tolerance and sensitivity, many foreign personnel involved in the delivery of relief services and development assistance still deride traditional religious beliefs and imperatives as backward and an impediment to progress. Yet in Haitian society those very practices dictate the patterns of everyday life. If the U.N. Mission does not devote more attention to Haiti's rural majority and urban middle class, the mission is likely to befall the fate of its predecessors.

The challenge, then, is to work within the existing cultural framework to build opportunities for change among the people without threatening their belief system. For democratization to endure, we must go one step further

and not only be sensitive to traditional Haitian culture, but also engage its energies to build tangible political and economic reforms. In Haiti, the local culture and belief structure spring from Vodou.

Vodou: Origin, Practice, and Political Significance

> Every society creates practices and ceremonies which enable its people to achieve spirituality in a way that makes sense for them in the context of their culture and environment. Practices vary as cultures vary. Ultimately, all people worship the same god, but they do so differently in ways that allow them to relate religion to their own culture and experience. Vodou is no different; it relates spirituality to Haiti's cultural roots; to the African experience from which Haiti's people came and from which their religion evolved.[2]

This description by Vodou priest Max Beauvoir challenges popular misconceptions of Vodou as primitive and polytheistic. Vodou is, in fact, fundamentally monotheistic and differs from Judeo-Christian practice in that worship occurs through a pantheon of spirits, or *loa*, rather than directly to the supreme being. The Vodou deity is not anthropomorphic, as in most Western faiths, but instead represents an unapproachable force that exists in all things and finds expression through a multitude of anthropomorphic *loa*.

Despite an estimated 40 million devotees worldwide, Vodou has no sacred texts, no agreed written form, and no precise connotation among scholars or practitioners.[3] It is a pre-literate religion and a relatively young faith, dating back in recognizable form perhaps 500 years. Nevertheless, its oral and graphic traditions communicate an enormously rich pantheon of spirits in ornate liturgical variations that have evolved over centuries.

The term itself has numerous spelling variations, including *vodun, vaudun, vodu, vodoux,* and *voodoo.* The name of the religion, Vodou, comes from the Créole word *vodou,* which is the term for spirit used by the Arada peoples of West Africa. Today the term Vodou collectively identifies the various forms of African-based spirit worship in Haiti.[4] While some aspects of Haitian Vodou are unique, its ceremonies have much in common with modern Vodou practice elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere and among Vodouists residing in West Africa.

Originally, the term *vodou* described a dance ceremony used to evoke the spirit world, as practiced initially in the serpent cult of the Arada people of historic Dahomey, now known as Benin, and by slaves arriving in Haiti primarily during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Arada were but one of more than 70 different African ethnicities brought to Haiti in the course of the slave trade, each with its own variation of religious and ceremonial practice.[5] Europeans learned of Vodou in 1797 from the French intellectual Médéric Moreau de St. Méry of Martinique, who misunderstood the religious dance *vodou,* and extrapolated his impressions to characterize the entire relig-

ion. His book *Description Topographique, Physique, Civile, Politique, et Historique de la Partie Française de l'Isle de St. Dominique*, one of the first scholarly studies of Haiti, began the historic pattern of foreign misunderstanding and patronizing of Vodou practice.

Though frequently dismissed by outside observers as no more than a cult, Vodou is very much a functioning and enduring religion. Like most other established religions, the Vodou faith includes a professional priesthood (whose members must complete long and rigorous training), permanent places of worship, an ethical code that strongly influences secular behavior, longstanding local congregations, and a complex theology. In fact, it is the most prevalent of the three main faiths operating in Haiti today. While in the past it was said that Haiti was 90 percent Catholic and 100 percent Vodou, a more accurate picture of Haiti today would depict roughly 70 percent Catholic, 20 to 25 percent Protestant, and 95 percent Vodou.

Along the central West African slave coast, Vodou represented the only unifying force among groups that otherwise displayed unique cultures, spoke different languages, and frequently fought one another. That religious affinity took on even greater importance among diverse people thrust together in the alien setting of the island of Hispanola should be of no surprise. After the Arada people and others from West Africa found themselves in Haiti or elsewhere in the New World, tribal distinctions blurred and their ceremonial rites proved especially durable, forming the core of what many consider to be the true Vodou.

The common thread that links the variations in culture and language in a Vodou community centers on the development of spiritual power. This process is marked by stages of initiation into a special quality of mind called *konesans* (knowledge), which combines aspects of ritual knowledge and spiritual insight. Vodou recognizes a three-part hierarchy of involvement in *konesans*: Ordinary devotees who are more or less active in the service of the *loa*; the *hounsiz*, or spouses of the *loa*, who have made a lifelong commitment to the spirits; and the *houngan* and *mambo*, the male and female leaders or priests who have the power to make new *hounsiz*. Thus, the *houngans* and *mambos* control the pattern of authority in their communities and assure the proper transmission of *konesans* to their initiates.[6]

Over time, however, Haitian Vodou acquired a second pantheon of spirits less benevolent than *loa* of African origin. The more aggressive *Pétro* spirits, reflecting the cruelty and deprivation of the plantation slave experience, were eventually absorbed into the Vodou faith. In some cases *Pétro* spirits are new and unique; in others they represent the dark alter egos of pre-existing African-based *loa*. For example, the *Rada* Goddess of Love, *Erzuilie*, is a benevolent spirit. But in her *Pétro* form, *Erzuilie Dantor*, she takes on an entirely different character, becoming a jealous and angry spirit who demands complete control of her followers. These spirits, along with lesser "nations" of *loa* and the liturgical variations of each locale, comprise the collective ceremonial practice of the African diaspora in Haiti, which provides a bond and cultural identity that is both vibrant and unique.[7]

Although regional and local variations in Vodou practice persist, some melding has occurred within the common Haitian experience. For example, the "nations" into which *loa* are organized originally reflected the place of origin in Africa from which specific *loa* emerged. There are said to be 21 "nations" of spirits, which in colonial times tended to be worshipped by slaves with a corresponding lineage. Today, that ethnic and geographical allegiance has been lost, and the term "nation" is used instead to classify the variety of spirits along with the types of rites being offered to them.

Political regimes have come and gone, but Vodou has endured.

Westerners have difficulty understanding the array of Vodou spirits. By conceptualizing *loa* as individual gods, they overlook the unifying force of Vodou. Unlike the Judeo-Christian deity, Vodou's supreme being, *le Bon Dieu* or *Grand Maitre,* does not concern itself directly with human affairs. Conversely, the *loa* are decidedly more anthropomorphic than god-like: they exhibit human traits and emotions and have human needs (e.g., they must eat or they will grow weak). Their number and variety is astonishing: over 400 different and distinct *loa* have been identified, often representing the elevated *esprits* (spirits) of family ancestors revered in individual congregations throughout Haiti.[8]

As practiced today, Vodou is centered around a ceremony (also called *vodou)* involving music, dance, invocation, blood sacrifice, and other offerings by which devotees call forth individual *loa* to accomplish specific benevolent aims such as curing physical ailments, relieving depression or anxiety, or improving prospects for a coming harvest. The actions of the *loa* (and, consequently, the practice of Vodou) are an essential part of everyday life and social harmony for the vast majority of Haitians.

The sign that a person is summoned to be something more than an ordinary participant in a *vodou* ceremony occurs when a spirit manifests itself in his or her body. This experience of "possession" by a *loa* indicates that the spirit is calling the devotee to its service. The initial call is characterized by the possessed individual thrashing about, rolling on the ground, and being unable to speak coherently.

Intercession by the *houngans* is required to determine which *loa* is manifest in the individual and to civilize its manifestation so that one can communicate with the *loa* through the individual who has been possessed. One *houngan* likens this process to breaking a colt for saddle.[9] Indeed, the *loa* is said to "mount" and "ride" the possessed one, who is described as a *cheval* (horse). This process of civilizing the newly possessed, like other aspects of Vodou practice, is overseen in every detail by the *houngan* or *mambo* through the

exercise of spiritual authority, demanding the total obedience of the *hounsiz*. Moreover, once trained by the *houngan* or *mambo*, devotees are expected to become a *serviteur*, or a servant of the *loa*, who participates in ceremonies to beckon the *loa* forth and attend to the *loa*'s earthly needs. Because of the important role of the religious leaders in local communities, any foreign attempts to re-socialize Haitian political behavior must employ the efforts of the *houngan* and *mambo*.

Religious Syncretism in Haiti: Form or Substance?

Vodou is a flexible religious structure that has adapted to Catholic and other religious influences while its core remains intact. However, the common perception of Vodou as a mixture of African, Christian, and even Indian faiths is only partially accurate. While Vodou does incorporate aspects of ceremonial practice drawn from other religions, they do not alter Vodou's theological foundations. Fundamentally, Vodou remains African in concept and theology.

To perceive the relationship between Vodou and other religions, particularly Roman Catholicism, as a genuine example of syncretism is to confuse form with substance. By way of example, the *vévé* (Vodou line drawings in flour meant to call forth designated spirits during rituals for the *loa*) are vaguely reminiscent of Indian sand drawings, but the similarity is coincidental. On the other hand, the appearance of Christian names among the *loa*, or the inclusion of French-Catholic invocations in the body of *vodou* ceremony reflect cultural accommodation and Vodou's adaptability in the face of relentless persecution by the missionary church and colonial officials in early times, and more recently by Catholic and Protestant clerics and by the Haitian government.

In this environment, a Vodou *loa* may acquire the name of a Catholic saint to defend core Vodou practice. This adaptation gives the ceremony a vaguely Christian aspect and makes utterance of the spirit's name acceptable without changing the African character of the *loa*'s origin or function. For example, the ceremony by which a devotee becomes the *serviteur* of *Damballah*, the snake spirit (the most powerful of the *loa*), involves an eclectic offering which includes, among other things, a picture of St. Patrick.[10] The basis for associating the two may be obvious enough, but inclusion of the picture in the *lave tét* (offering) to *Damballah* does not mean that Vodou succumbs to Christianity. Beyond theological mimicry of Christian practice or liturgy, this has the symbolic meaning of offering the saint who rid Ireland of snakes to the Vodou *loa* of the snakes.

By the same token, Catholicism often tolerates Vodou symbolism as the price of gaining new converts. Protestant faiths are less willing to do so. In rural Catholic churches it is not unusual to encounter portraits of the Virgin surrounded by *vévé* of the *loa*. It is tempting to argue that the faiths coexist without actually merging, but the complex relationship between Catholicism and Vodou is not so easily explained. For while the Catholic church hierarchy has viewed Vodou as heathen and wrong, Vodou practitioners perceived Catholicism merely as the means by which Europeans expressed their faith in a

universal diety in which Vodouists already believed. The uneasy harmony between Catholicism and Vodou is marked by periods of intense political competition. Full appreciation of that relationship requires a separate course of study not possible here.[11]

While Vodou does involve the practice of sorcery and magic, it is primarily a system for sharing spirituality through communal rites that involve a ceremony or pattern of movements that unite people and *loa*. Haitian intellectuals and some Westerners who want to recognize Vodou as a religion rather than a cult often de-emphasize the *magie noire* (black magic), in some instances arguing that it is altogether distinct and different from the "true" Vodou.

This conception may seek to limit Vodou magic to *magie blanc*, but the distinction is unconvincing. As ethnographer Alfred Métraux notes in his book, *Vodoo in Haiti*, magic is an ambiguous term, and attempting to separate *magie blanc*, or magic used for good purposes, from *magie noire* is a dubious and alien attempt at moral arbitration. No Haitian peasant would ever say, "Ah, that spell he cast is black magic, therefore, it is not Vodou."[12]

The distinction between *blanc* and *noire* lies more in the purposes to which magic is put and less in the nature of the rites themselves. An analogy is found in attempts to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons: virtually all weapons are neither until they are employed. So it is with the magic of Vodou. *Magie noire* is not, as some claim, a separate body of practices falling outside "legitimate" Vodou.

While most Vodou is indeed benevolent, those who seek to characterize Vodou's darker side, the *Pétro* rites, as a separate, discredited practice, or even as a separate religion, must accept the fact that *houngans* must be able to practice both forms, known in Vodou as *"servir à deux mains"* (serving both forms of the religion), if only to counter effectively the spells of the *bokô*, a practitioner of *magie noire*.[13] These spells frequently are channeled through *wangas* and *gardes*, objects (such as a special stone) that the faithful believe direct invisible forces for aggressive or protective purposes.[14]

Consequently, exclusion of black magic from other aspects of Vodou appears arbitrary, a contrivance intended to weed out those aspects of Vodou that are least defensible to Western minds. Such a false distinction is akin to arguing that exorcism is not really part of the Christian heritage. A more reasonable approach would be to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate purposes to which Vodou rites are put, without seeking to advance the argument that some such rites are not actually Vodou.

While misuse of *magie noire* clearly is the exception rather than the rule, often it is the only aspect of Vodou in which foreigners have displayed sustained interest. This is because of the threat posed, at least in theory, by contact with substances used in Vodou ritual such as *coup poudre* (white powder or zombie powder), which can reduce people to mere zombies. Although the powder frequently does contain trace amounts of tetrodotoxin, a lethal neurotoxin obtained from puffer fish that is more deadly than cyanide, the actual threat it poses appears to be minimal due to its low concentration in the powder.

The Lexicon of Vodou

bokô	sorcerer; a medical practitioner of Vodou and doctor to the common people; directly below the *houngan* and *mambo* in the Vodou religious hierarchy
coup poudre	zombie powder; white powder
dechoukaj, deshoykay	uprooting; to eradicate
feuyaj	herbal medicines
houngan	the highest Vodou priest
ounfo	temple; the core of a Vodou community
hounsiz	spouses of the *loa*
garde, wanga	objects that carry invisible forces for aggressive or protective purposes
konesans	knowledge; a heightened state of mind characterized by ritual knowledge and spiritual insight
laku	homestead or homesteads; extended family compound that usually contains the tomb of a revered ancestor
lav tét	offering
loa	spirit or spirits
lugaru	werewolf
mambo	the highest Vodou priestess
Négritude	the ideological conception of black African culture articulated by Sengalese poet and statesman Leopold Senghor
Noirisme	the Haitian adaptation of Négritude
pép andeyo	people on the outside; the disenfranchised masses
Pétro	malevolent Vodou spirit and rite that developed in Haiti
Pitit Guinée	children of sub-Saharan Africa; the shared Haitian heritage that springs from its African roots
Rada	benevolent Vodou rite brought to Haiti from the Dahomey region of West Africa (modern Benin)
shampwel	member of a secret Vodou society
Ti Legliz	little churches; the Haitian version of the basic Christian communities of Latin America
Tontons Macoute	the internal security force of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier
Vodou	the religion and belief system about relationships between the natural and supernatural, living and dead
vodou	the dance and religious ceremony from which the religion derives its name

Principal *Loa* of the Vodou Pantheon

• *AGASSOU*	The Master of Family Lineage.
• *AGOUÉ (AGWÉ)*	Spirit of the Sea and of Salt Water.
• *AIDA-WEDO*	The Rainbow or Serpent Rainbow; wife of *Damballah.* (*Wedo* refers to her city of origin in Africa.)
• *AIZAN*	The First Priestess; Aizan protects the *ounfo* (temple), presides at all initiations, and therefore does not take possession of anyone.
• *BARON SAMEDI*	God of the Dead, Chief among the *Guédés*, or spirits that inhabit the underworld.
• *BOSSU TROIS CORNES*	A three-horned chthonic *Pétro* spirit.
• *BRIGITTE-LA-*CROIX	Goddess of Money and Justice; wife of *Baron Samedi;* also associated with black magic.
• *DAMBALLAH*	The Cosmic Snake Spirit; first among the *loa*, from whose egg the world was hatched and who holds the earth in its coils; spirit of knowledge and of fertility.
• *ERZULIE*	The Goddess of Love; a giftgiver, worshipped by those who seek luxury.
• *GUDS*	Collectively, the Spirits of Death; also associated with sexuality.
• *GRAND BOIS*	Spirit of the Woods and Forest.
• *LEGBA*	Spirit of the Crossroads (where the spiritual and material worlds intersect) and of Communications. The first spirit called at each ceremony, he must "open the gate" to permit other *loa* to descend from *Guinan*, of mythical Africa.
• *LOCO*	The First Priest; administrator of all Vodou temples.
• *MARASSA*	The Sacred Twins who appear as the Sun and the Moon. In Vodou, all twins are believed to possess supernatural powers.
• *MYSTERES*	Collectively, the Spirits or *Loa.*
• *OGOU*	The principal warrior *loa;* his spirit is invoked to provide power or defense.
• *SIMBI*	Spirit of the Fresh Water, Ponds, Rainfall, and Medicine.
• *SIRÉNE*	Goddess of the Sea; a Mermaid.
• *PAPA ZACA*	Spirit of Agriculture; represented as a poor peasant begging for food.

Vodou Social Organization, The Priestly Mandate, and Political Power

The political power of Vodou clergy springs from their spiritual authority. As the spiritual leaders of communities that frequently lack effective secular institutions or social services, the *houngan* or *mambo's* political influence is magnified. In rural areas, the heart of the community lies in the *ounfo* (temple), which is led by *mambos* and *houngans*. For people with these ties, Vodou is a localized phenomenon that provides a way of remembering the dead and the *loa* to which they are linked. Their ceremonies usually take place on family lands, initially in extended family compounds called *laku* that were established by liberated slaves, and the ceremonies are seldom an affair for non-family members.[15] *Laku* normally contain the tomb of a revered ancestor from four or five generations ago. Where no family member is a formal *houngan* or *mambo*, a priest may be brought in to assist in the veneration of family spirits. However, many Haitians practice *Vodou familial* (family Vodou) in which no priest is engaged. In the absence of an *ounfo*, these family devotions generally occur at the ancestral tomb itself.[16]

In urban areas, these priests help create communities by initiating followers into familial relationships. The urban *ounfo*, on account of migration, is more often a "family" by initiation, a *société* with its own traditions and very much dependent on the spiritual gifts of its presiding *mambo* or *houngan*. In his own *ounfo*, the priest organizes the liturgies and discipline, instructs initates, and offers consultations to clients in need of spiritual advice. For the ordinary devotee, the urban *ounfo* is a supplemental family of like-minded individuals, or even a surrogate family when one departs ancestral lands.[17] Though scholars characteristically associate *laku* solely with rural religious practice, urban areas also are subdivided along these traditional lines. Accordingly, a Vodou map of Port-au-Prince would subdivide the city into *Laku Breat, Laku Blain, Laku Manigat, Laku Mouzin,* and various others.[18]

Vodou priests derive additional power from their roles as healers because the *houngan* and *mambo* also serve as medical practitioners, prescribing *feuyaj* (herbalist remedies) on a regular basis to a population sorely lacking Western medical practice, especially in rural areas.[19] François Duvalier, the Haitian politician most successful at harnessing Vodou, won the loyalty of the people in part by providing them with medical care, earning him the title Papa Doc.

Finally, Vodou priests gain influence in their societies through their power to appoint Vodou devotees to positions of authority within Vodou's secret societies, which are the enforcement arm of Vodou's ethical code for the parish laity. These societies mete out public justice and may utilize *magie noire*. They help compensate for the frequent absence or corruption of police and other justice system officials in the countryside. In a country sorely lacking in communications infrastructure, the societies also maintain remarkably fast and efficient human communication networks that extend beyond Haiti to include the *diaspora*. Often they are complemented in rural areas by secular organizations tied to the *ounfos* that settle disputes and dispense aid to the needy, again compensating for the absence of effective governance. Taken together, these

Vodou groups constitute the primary indigenous social and political organizations in rural Haiti, in effect functioning as organic governance.

In effect, the *houngan* or *mambo* may serve as priest, doctor, benefactor, and police chief rolled into a single authority figure. Yet Western prejudice tends to ignore their community leadership in favor of government officials whose role at the local level may be ineffective, predatory, or both. This is a critical mistake: any attempts to install democracy and the rule of law in Haiti must enlist the *mambos, houngans,* and their Vodou social structures.

The Historical Context of Vodou

The Colonial Era

From the early history of Vodou in Haiti, French authorities brutally tried to marginalize the religion's political significance to no avail. Vodou's revolutionary potential was made more potent by French slave-holding practices and demographic phenomena.

Essayist Federico Henriquez Gratereaux sees the French treatment of the slaves as responsible for the profound cultural differences between Vodou in Haiti and in his native Dominican Republic. The French practice of slavery, in sharp contrast to methods employed by the Spanish in eastern Hispanola, was so exploitative and demanding that Haitian slaves routinely were unable to work for more than seven or eight years. Haitian slaves were treated so unmercifully that many were unable to bear children, preventing future generations from acquiring the French language and culture of their colonial masters.

So many slaves died from sheer exhaustion that French plantation owners were forced into a cycle of continually replacing the fallen work force by importing new slaves. Although generations of slaves had resided in Haiti by the late eighteenth century, a half million more slaves were needed to sustain the export economy in the few decades preceding the slave revolt of 1791. (Not surprisingly, many of the leaders of this Haitian Revolution, which ultimately liberated the state from France, were African-born.[20]) Even though Haiti was an old colony, a high percentage of its slaves were African-born or were only second-generation Haitians too recently transported from Africa to have shed their African ways.[21] As the colony aged, the work force remained fresh and preserved its links to African Vodou.

In the neighboring Dominican Republic, by contrast, the plantation economy gave way early on to a cattle-based economy. This new economic organization dispersed the slaves among the European population and, owing to the less onerous nature of the work, slaves were able to live longer and create families amid the Spanish colonial community. Fewer slaves died, fewer new slaves from Africa were required, and the cultural linkage to African spirit worship attenuated during the long process of acquiring Spanish culture and religion. This fundamental difference in the social development of the two

countries explains the endurance of Vodou in Haiti and its relative absence among neighboring people of similar ethnic and geographic origins.

From the time Spain ceded western Hispanola to France under the Treaty of Ryswich (1697), French colonial authorities had become alarmed about Haitian culture and religion being a potent source for organizing the disenfranchised and impoverished majority. The colonists sought to destroy the slaves' religious practices by waging war on their belief systems. The French fears were not without basis, for slave revolts and uprisings were virtually as old as the colony, and many of them were flavored by Vodou. Before the successful revolt of 1791-1804, significant rebellions had occurred in 1522, 1691, 1697, and under French domination in 1757.[22] During these revolts the Maroons (slaves who had escaped to form their own communities in Haiti's interior) waged campaigns of Vodou-inspired terrorism against slave-holders. Haitian tradition holds that the 1791-1804 slave revolt which eventually toppled the French colonial government was born at a *Pétro* ceremony at Bois-Caïman, demonstrating Vodou's revolutionary potential and confirming the worst fears of colonial authorities.[23] Scholars debate whether the ceremony had much bearing on the outcome of the revolution, but nonetheless, the Haitian Revolution is popularly believed to have played a major role in creating the long-standing perception of Vodou as subversive and threatening.

The Black Republic Through the U.S. Marine Occupation

By 1804, French forces were defeated, and the Vatican was in retreat, its European clerics having been expelled from the new black republic following its schism with revolutionary General-turned-Emperor Jacques I (Dessalines). Haiti's revolutionary and early post-revolutionary leaders—Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henri Christophe—learned lessons from the expulsion of the French and sought to suppress Vodou practice in various ways.[24] Just as Vodou forces threatened French colonial authorities, prompting them to outlaw the religion as early as 1704, the authoritarian Haitian regimes that filled the void upon the departure of the French realized that Vodou could easily undermine them.[25] The new Haitian ruling class adopted their former colonial masters' view of Vodou as a "spiritualized militancy" that challenged the government's legitimacy. As a result, Vodou practice was formally outlawed almost from the beginning of the black republic.[26] Yet the government's efforts to suppress Vodou were unsuccessful. In addition, the absence of Vatican influence in Haiti for more than a half century after the Haitian Revolution enabled Vodou to prosper in peasant villages and the countryside unopposed by Catholic missionary zeal.[27]

Subsequent governments, as well as the U.S. Marine occupation force of 1915 to 1934, perpetuated the practice of de-legitimizing Vodou by repressing observance of the religion and exploiting its power. Though the marines established a communication and transportation infrastructure virtually from scratch, their social and political legacy was soon nullified, as also happened with the Force Armées d'Haiti (FAd'H), which the marines created and Duvalier later sought to control.

Even as the marines left the shores of Haiti, no relief for traditional culture and religion was in sight, for the Haitian government enacted anti-Vodou legislation in 1935. Although the measure was unevenly and sporadically enforced, it was not rescinded until the passage of the current constitution in 1987. Moreover, in 1941 Haitian President Elie Lescot, the Haitian National Guard, and the Catholic church joined forces to eradicate Vodou. They launched an anti-superstition campaign and spent the next two years trying to destroy Vodou beliefs. They sought to demolish every shrine and holy object associated with the faith and tried to impose an anti-Vodou oath. Ultimately, this campaign backfired. The elites' sabotage of Vodou angered the masses and contributed to the rise of Duvalier, who capitalized on mass resentment of the state's actions through a strongly nationalistic, anti-church, and pro-Vodou platform.

The Duvaliers, Vodou, and Cultural Dualism

François Duvalier, who proclaimed himself "president for life" and reigned from 1957 until his death in 1971, is credited with politicizing Vodou in the modern era. Although earlier leaders and governments had tolerated Vodou, Duvalier distinguished himself by linking Vodou practice with the administration of political power in the countryside.

Duvalier embodied this powerful connection between politics and traditional culture in 1959 by creating the *Tontons Macoute,* an internal security force charged with balancing the power of the FAd'H and the foreign influences on it. The creation of this force was a means of controlling the masses by leaving them in fear of their own religious imagery. A Créole term meaning "Uncle Knapsack" or "Uncle with Knapsack," the name *Tontons Macoute* derives from Haitian legend and folklore, referring to scary figures who come out at night to carry off naughty children. The *Tontons Macoute* often wore sunglasses and dark clothing, incorporating traditional Vodou symbols of the *Guédés* (spirits of death) and their leader, *Baron Samedi* (the principal *loa* of death and the underworld), into their mission to terrorize the people.

While Duvalier courted the *houngan,* he gave guns to members of Vodou's secret societies and built the *Tontons Macoute,* who carried out their mandate with brutal excess. These societies were comprised of Vodou's young enforcers, typically men in their twenties whose presence filled the local power vacuum created by the absence of legitimate police. Usually directed by a local chief—who might also be a *bokô* (sorcerer)—the societies often employed intimidation and *magie* to maintain public order. Their roles as enforcers of Vodou order were easily converted into enforcing Duvalier's personal edicts as well.

Duvalier was not original in his attempt to appease the influential chiefs of Vodou secret societies and exploit the religion's political power, but he was the most successful. Haiti's first mulatto president, Alexandre Pétion, who ruled from 1807 to 1818, also had recognized the importance of Vodou to the people, and saw the futility of trying to eradicate it. He informally tolerated

Vodou religious practice, but when King Henri I (Christophe), ruler of northern Haiti from 1807 to 1820, posed a political and military challenge to Pétion's authority, Pétion and his mulatto successors sought to ally themselves with Vodou's hierarchy by providing powerful priests with extensive tracts of land.[28]

Duvalier's co-option of Vodou for political purposes leads some analysts to conclude that Vodou itself has been irretrievably corrupted, in the sense that the religion is linked with repressive practices and extremist right-wing politics in the public mind. This conclusion is no more persuasive than the notion that televangelists or extremist cults invalidate Christianity's fundamental precepts to the millions of mainstream adherents. Even so, the *Tontons Macoute* enhanced their power by associating with Vodou's darker side. *Houngan Macoute* Marcel Pierre, an early and loyal follower of Duvalier, and others are alleged to have used the Vodou pharmacy of psychotropic powders and poisons to kill enemies of the regime, enhancing the power of the *Tontons Macoute* and decimating any credibility the Vodou religion may have held.[29]

Duvalier merely exploited pre-existing biases in Haiti to his advantage. He recognized that the return of Catholic clergy to Haiti after 1860 and the demise of the plantation economy had produced two essentially different Haitian polities pitted against one another: an urban, Francophone elite educated mainly in Christian schools and a rural, illiterate Créole-speaking peasantry who were Christian in name, but Vodou in spirit. Duvalier, ever the politician, spoke to this larger audience.

Tension between these groups—mulatto and black, elite and peasant, haves and have-nots—was exacerbated further by the religious education received by the elites, which sought to distinguish Christian worship from Vodou in moral terms. The elites were taught that they represented the Children of God, while the uneducated and potentially troublesome Vodouist masses were derided as the Children of Satan. This division devalued and denied the only common denominator of Haitian cultural heritage: a concept Haitians call *Pitit Guinée.*

For Haitians, *Pitit Guinée* describes the essential quality of their identity: a shared heritage and loyalty to their common lineage. *Pitit Guinée* is a touchstone that transcends most divisions within Haitian society. This common ancestry links Haitians to an African "garden of ancestors" that predates colonialism, slavery, and even the nation of Haiti itself.[30] Literally translated "children of Guinea," meaning the children of all of sub-Saharan Africa, *Pitit Guinée* embodies Haiti's cultural identity and acknowledges the origins of Haitian spiritual beliefs including its core, Vodou.

Despite the existence of this potentially unifying cultural concept, colonial religious education reinforced the split between elite mulattos and the masses of African ancestry. The social and political racism of the U.S. occupation of 1915 to 1934 played upon this schism.[31] The occupying forces divided Haiti along lines of color, favoring the mulatto elite for leadership roles and creating a Haitian military structure that thereafter promoted the interests of mulattos and *les blancs.*

The racial discord raised by discriminatory U.S. practices during the period of marine occupation gave rise in the 1920s to the popularity of a philosophy, *Noirisme*, which Duvalier later exploited to turn Haiti's black majority against the mulatto minority in competition for spiritual, political, and economic power.[32] In effect, Haitian intellectuals adapted Senegalese poet and statesman Leopold Senghor's aesthetic and ideological concept of *Négritude*, which affirmed the independent validity of black African culture. Although Haitians were united in opposition to the U.S. military occupation, they were divided internally by color. During this period, Vodou was further politicized because religious practice tended to correspond with color, leading to the perception that bias, though subtle, was nonetheless both racial and pervasive.

Many say this bias still persists. The rural Vodou-practicing masses perceive a donor assistance network in food, medicine, education, and other aid that has evolved to favor Christians and mulattos and their institutions over Vodou organizations. Even today, Haitians question why foreign aid, principally from the United States, is distributed almost exclusively through Western, generally Christian institutions (i.e., non-governmental organizations [NGOs] such as CARE, Adventists' Development and Relief Agency, and Catholic Relief Services), shunning the large numbers of Vodou-based organizations and networks that already exist in the countryside and that are closest to those who most require humanitarian assistance. Attempts by Vodou organizations to work with Western NGOs have been rebuffed.

The Pogrom and Today

Ironically, one bright spot of the Duvalier era was that by fusing the secret Vodou network with the *Tontons Macoute* apparatus, Duvalier effectively ended centuries of Christian persecution of the Vodou faithful.[33] Unfortunately, that development brought persecution of a different kind.

This marriage between Vodou and internal security forces spawned clear abuses throughout the era of the two Duvaliers, François and his son and successor, Jean-Claude. In a true example of a popular uprising, the people of Haiti forced Jean-Claude, also known as Baby Doc, into exile on February 7, 1986. That same day, Haiti's Catholic bishops called publicly for restraint and an end to the bloodshed that punctuated the Duvalier era.[34] The priests, nuns, and lay workers of the Conference of Haitian Religious (CHR) proclaimed the beginning of the *Dechoukaj*—literally, uprooting or complete eradication.[35] Through its *Radio Soleil*, the CHR charged that the departure of Duvalier had failed to accomplish the departure of Duvalierism. The CHR concluded that the transitional government, the National Governing Council, was incapable of bringing the guilty to justice, allowing the *Tontons Macoute* to escape unpunished.[36] Although the principal targets of the ensuing violence were said to be the *Tontons Macoute*, Vodou leaders soon realized that the real targets were the *houngan* and *mambo* whose power and influence were coveted by both the Catholic church and progressive Protestants. Before the month was over, crowds were hunting down and killing Vodouists—whether members of the *Tontons Macoute* or not—at a rate of one or two per day.[37]

The actual number of Vodou clergy killed in what Vodouists have come to call "The Pogrom" is impossible to judge with precision. Journalists estimate that as few as 100 priests and priestesses died in the inquisition. Vodou organizations report figures closer to 2,000. Though the number of substantiated killings is fewer, more than 500 cases have been individually corroborated by eyewitness accounts, confirmed by graveside visits, or documented by other means, as described in the extensive unpublished manuscript, *Deshoykay Vadoun*, compiled by the Vodou organization Bode Nasyional in 1986 and reviewed by the author.[38]

The rationales given for the individual executions were creative, ranging from the occasional straightforward assertion that the victim was a *shampwel* (member of a secret society) to the not infrequent claim that the Vodouist was in fact a *lugaru* (werewolf).[39] Some were killed for having committed atrocities as *Tontons Macoute*, while others were killed simply because it was convenient. The punishments that were meted out upheld the grisly tradition of Haitian violence that has accompanied political change since the colonial era, as victims routinely were tortured, burned or buried alive, or beheaded.

More important than the debate over the number killed, however, is evidence that many were neither affiliated with the *Tontons Macoute* nor guilty of any abuse. Instead, they were victims of a zealous Haitian Christian clergy eager to exploit public anger at the *Tontons Macoute* excesses as an opportunity to resume their long-standing inquisition to eradicate Vodou's power altogether. For while many of those who died were *houngan* or *mambo*, they were not necessarily *Macoute*.

Leading Vodou priests claimed that the Catholic bishops of Haiti and, indeed, Rome itself were behind a well-orchestrated campaign to mobilize youth groups against Vodou. Protestant clergy were involved as well.[40] While the Catholic church hierarchy repeatedly claimed that it had not sanctioned or inspired these events, individual priests exhorted others to become involved. Some clergy publicly issued incendiary tracts calling for Haiti to rid itself of the evil of Vodou. Others claimed that Vodou priests "eat children and have catacombs in their houses."[41]

In a few cases, Catholic and Protestant clergy joined forces, attempting to exploit the pogrom to destroy Vodou completely. In Plaine-du-Nord, for example, the local Catholic priest Father Kerveillant sought to use the turmoil to enlist the cooperation of militant Protestants in the desecration of sacred Vodou sites. He found them willing to help.

> "Strike while the iron is hot," the Protestants told him. "All over the country it is being done. This is our chance to rid ourselves and this country of this pestilence," they said. . . . "It was a good idea, I told them," recalled Father Kerveillant. "But it wasn't done soon enough. Either they had to do it immediately, before the people could suspect what was going on, or they had to wait longer, for the people to be psychologically prepared."[42]

Violence following the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier prompted Vodou to retrench and coalesce. Vodou's social role and political visibility grew as its organization evolved from what had been an informal linkage via secret societies and a Vodou network, to public advocacy groups and national professional associations of Vodou priests and priestesses. Bode Nasyional (National Body), known informally as "the gathering," is one of two principal Vodou organizations founded in 1986 on the heels of the pogrom. Its founder and leader, *Houngan* Max Beauvoir, boasts a membership of more than 1,500 priests. The second major Vodou national organization is Herard Simon's Supreme Council of Zantray, also known as the Children of Haitian Tradition, which claims to represent 600 *houngans* and 30,000 lay members.[43]

Europeans and Americans have asked Haitians to pay an extraordinary price for enlightenment and development by accepting the notion that their traditional beliefs are primitive, demeaning, and morally indefensible.

Although national Vodou organizations have attracted substantial followings, their political function remains ambiguous in a nation already overpopulated by political parties. The Haitian political landscape is cluttered with perhaps a dozen significant parties among the 70 or so formally registered or known to exist by the Provisional Electoral Council that was appointed by the Jean-Bertrand Aristide government in December 1994. Because many of the smaller parties were politically dormant during the three years of military rule, only 27 parties put forward candidate slates in the June 1995 parliamentary municipal elections. The largest of these, Organization Politique Lavalas, and several smaller radical and grassroots parties combined to form a coalition, Bo Table (the table), representing the Aristide government. Among the remaining 23 parties, an informal but surprisingly disciplined opposition coalition emerged after the first round of balloting, led by three major parties, Pati Nasyonalis Pwogresis Revolisyone Ayisyen, Congrès National des Mouvements Démocratiques, and Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie.

In the relatively free local and national elections in 1995, Vodou groups generally worked through established secular parties rather than attempting to field separate candidate slates under their own banner. Working through these political parties masks Vodou's political influence and political agenda. Western observers are unaware of which candidates represent Vodou, and therefore mistakenly assume that Vodou organizations are politically ineffective. Haitians themselves do not share that confusion, though Vodouists today do not seek an especially high political profile.

Lessons for the International Community: The Search for Lasting Political Change

Not since the revolution of 1791-1804 has Vodou unified Haiti and set its political course. Nevertheless, Vodou has been a perpetual political force, as virtually every Haitian leader since the Haitian Revolution has sought to exploit, marginalize, or manipulate Vodou according to their own secular political agendas. Political regimes have come and gone, but Vodou has endured.

External political interventions in the past, whether by the French, the Vatican, or more recently the United States and the United Nations, have failed to build a lasting political system because they have failed to engage the traditional society. Instead of forging a link between traditional culture and politics, foreign interests have held to an ethnocentric view of Haitian culture and its African ethos, working at cross purposes to their own political objectives. Despite recent growing tolerance and sensitivity, there has never been a positive link created between a reform agenda and the fundamental values of the Haitian people. Still fueled by arrogance and armed with misconceptions, Westerners have, in effect, told Haitians that they must renounce their cultural identity and abandon the spiritual roots that have nurtured them for generations. At no time since the collapse of colonial rule has a serious attempt been made either to approach the Haitian people through the medium of traditional culture or to comprehend fully the unifying themes already present in that heritage.

Past attempts have not persuaded most Haitians, especially the rural poor, that they have a personal stake in embracing Jeffersonian principles and peaceful political change. Before becoming politically engaged, ordinary Haitians must believe that change will improve their material and political well-being without sacrificing vital aspects of their cultural and spiritual identity. Instead, Europeans and Americans ranging from the well-meaning to the self-righteous have asked Haitians to pay an extraordinary price for enlightenment and development by accepting the notion that their traditional beliefs are primitive, demeaning, and morally indefensible.

The national attributes most frequently associated with stable, functioning democracies are not present in Haiti, making linkage of democratization to culture and religion all the more imperative. Democratization and political reform in Haiti today is hampered by present circumstances and inherited legacies which are not conducive to democracy. Haiti is a nation plagued by poverty, illiteracy, and disease. It is one wracked by sharp divisions of class and great disparities of wealth, and divided further by language, politics, and regional loyalties. Creation of a stable, viable democracy under such circumstances is a daunting task. Additionally, the most fundamental level of political organization in Haiti is anti-democratic. Local communities in the countryside evolved from *laku* (homesteads) built around patrilineal stem families.[44] As a result, local people may have little if any experience with functional democracy. Perhaps most importantly, stable democracy requires a high rate of lit-

eracy and a large middle class.[45] In Haiti, the rural peasantry is historically apolitical and largely illiterate. The Haitian economy has been weakened by erosion, overpopulation, the embargo, and capital flight, resulting in a tiny middle class. Haiti also lacks adequate supporting governmental institutions and possesses no tradition of political pluralism beyond personality cults. In short, the secular aspects of Haiti are not especially conducive to democracy. Sustaining democracy in Haiti will be difficult, if not impossible, if one fails to cast reforms in a supporting role to the unifying themes that do exist in Haiti, namely its cultural and religious traditions.

Western initiatives today still fail to link political reforms with traditional belief systems. One need look no further than the elections conducted following the return of President Aristide to appreciate that Haitians remain politically unengaged. Despite having the first opportunity in five years to vote in free elections and, owing to the presence of U.N. troops, the first chance ever to do so without fear, most Haitians simply did not bother to cast ballots. In the first three rounds of parliamentary and municipal balloting held in June, August, and September 1995, participation peaked at only 30 to 40 percent in June and plummeted thereafter to 10 percent of the registered voters in the parliamentary run-off election held in September. The dismal voter turnout suggests that ordinary Haitians do not yet associate Western-style participatory democracy with improving their economic well-being or preserving their cultural and religious roots.

Meanwhile, the internal groups in Haiti that are already engaged (the elites, the *Ti Legliz*, political parties, and disparate populist and peasant organizations) lack the capacity to unify Haitian society on behalf of political reform, both because they are indifferent to, or actively opposed to, the imperatives of traditional religion, and because they wield influence through the politics of confrontation or exclusion, playing upon the fear and envy that continue to divide Haitian society.

Today the United Nations is at least attempting to engage non-elites in the process of political reform, although not in ways that engage and utilize Vodou. Historically, the so-called *pép andeyo* (people on the outside) have been excluded from the corridors of power, a fact regrettably not much changed by popular acquisition of the vote. The United Nations' attempt to engage rural people, reflected in U.N. deployment throughout the country, represents acceptance of what should long have been self-evident: that a political offensive aimed principally at elite interest groups will not easily address the needs or concerns of the impoverished and largely rural majority. This simple realization is eloquently presented in the recent appraisal of Haiti's political scene by Robert Maguire, an expert on rural Haitian politics:

> U.S. [and, by extension, U.N.] policy debates about Haiti have centered more around the traditional, established, and primarily urban interest groups such as the economic elites and the military than on the citizenry more broadly defined. As a result, the concerns of

> that citizenry, which includes not only those who live in the impoverished and lower-class neighborhoods of Haiti's cities, but also the approximately 70 percent of Haiti's 6.6 million people who still reside in rural areas, tended to be largely ignored in the U.S. policy making process. A compelling challenge confronting policy makers, therefore, is to attend to the heretofore silent majority of Haitians, understand their concerns, and give their message serious consideration.[46]

The U.N. Mission in Haiti must reach deeper into the Haitian cultural milieu, into even the most remote villages. To create lasting political change, the U.N. Mission in Haiti must actively engage Vodou political structures—the *houngan* and *mambo* leaders, the community centers of the *ounfo*—to carry out the aims of the mission. That is not to suggest that the United Nations should follow Papa Doc's example of exploiting Vodou for political aims. Rather, the United Nations should make use of the existing cultural network, which comprises the Haitian self-identity, to provide the democratic government with a solid foundation.

The U.N. Mission in Haiti is paying greater attention and deference to Vodou than previous foreign interventions, but its attempts still miss the essence of Vodou and of political reform in Haiti. Actions by the United States and the United Nations are praiseworthy attempts to treat the local religious hierarchy with repect, especially by U.S. Special Forces teams operating in rural areas. However, the U.S. Special Forces' deferential treatment of *houngans* and *mambos* has no effect upon the larger networks such as the channels for delivering foreign aid. For the majority of Haitians, the current occupying force is distinguished from its predecessors by its benign intentions, but at the same time is akin to its predecessors in failing to value Haiti's cultural and religious legacy among the poor, predominantly rural population. While the United States and the United Nations have established a civil affairs bureaucracy guided by a Civil-Military Operations Center to bring together NGOs, occupying forces, and Haitian groups in order to coordinate relief and development priorities, that bureaucracy (unintentionally, perhaps) effectively excludes Vodou. Such deference is not symonymous with understanding. This approach, though a useful first step, is limited in its reach.

We must go beyond mere sensitivity to Vodou's spiritual and political influence. Those Western states and international institutions that seek to reform Haiti's political culture need first and foremost to make clear to adherents of traditional religion that democracy offers an enduring guarantee of their right to practice their faith without persecution or manipulation. More concrete steps should be taken as well, such as implementing a portion of donor assistance programs through domestic Vodou organizations. Initial opportunities for cooperation may be modest and largely symbolic, given the limited institutional capacity of Vodou's fledgling national organizations. But even small steps may pay substantial dividends in terms of Western credibility

among Haiti's poor. If we truly intend to weave democratic reforms into the fabric of Haitian society, we must account for cultural norms and spiritual imperatives that drive social organization and political expression to a very significant degree. Political changes must be perceived as fundamentally culture-affirming and materially advantageous, or those changes will prove ephemeral—to be discarded soon after those who enforce them depart.

Ultimately, Western judgments of Vodou's legitimacy as a religion or as a cultural force are irrelevant. Vodou in Haiti has enabled people to endure and find meaning in a harsh and difficult life. Although Haitians may answer cosmic questions with a belief system outsiders consider primitive or even bizarre, that system is no less valid to its followers. Consequently, Vodou should be no less important in calculating our policies in Haiti.

Notes

1. According to Department of Defense literacy testing of 15,000 refugees at Guantanamo Bay in 1994.
2. *Houngan* Max Beauvoir, interview with the author, Washington, DC, April 22, 1995.
3. Andre Singer, producer, and John Paul Davidson, director, *Divine Magic: The Power of Voodoo* (United Kingdom: Nonfiction Films, Inc. and SBS-TV, 1995) broadcast, September 1995, the Discovery Channel.
4. Carol Beckwith and Angela Fisher, "The African Roots of Voodoo," *National Geographic* (August 1995): 102.
5. Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 193.
6. Joseph M. Murphy, *Working the Spirit: Ceremonies of the African Diaspora* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 17.
7. James G. Leyburn, *The Haitian People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 143.
8. *Houngan* Max Beauvoir, interview with the author, Washington, DC, May 7, 1995.
9. *Houngan* Max Beauvoir, interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 8, 1995.
10. Selden Rodman and Carole Cleaver, *Spirits of the Night: The Vaudun Gods of Haiti* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1992), 4.
11. Leslie G. Desmangles, *The Faces of the Gods: Vodou and Roman Catholicism in Haiti* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992)
12. Alfred Métraux, *Voodoo in Haiti* (New York: Schocken Books, 1959), cited in Amy Wilentz, *The Rainy Season—Haiti Since Duvalier* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 174.
13. Rodman and Cleaver, 82-83.
14. Murphy, 16.
15. Michael Leguerre, *Voodoo and Politics in Haiti* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 80.
16. Beauvoir interview, June 8, 1995.
17. Murphy, 17.
18. Beauvoir interview, June 8, 1995.
19. Murphy, 19.
20. Federico Henriquez Gratereaux, "Black in Jest, But White in Soul," (undated occasional paper, translated 1994), 2.
21. Curtin, 193.
22. Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, "Resisting Freedom: Cultural Factors in Democracy: The Case for Haiti" (Madison: University of Wisconsin, unpublished paper, 1995), 6.
23. Murphy, 11-12.

24. Rodman and Cleaver, 12-13.
25. Wilentz, 163.
26. Robert Ferris Thompson, *Flash of the Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1983), 180.
27. James G. Leyburn, *The Haitian People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 142.
28. Rodman and Cleaver, 95.
29. Davis, 94-97.
30. Beauvoir interview, April 22, 1995.
31. Wilentz, 41-42.
32. Ibid., 41.
33. Ibid., 161.
34. Joseph B. Treaster, "Stop the Killing, Church in Haiti Asks," *The New York Times*, February 10, 1986.
35. Greene, 255-256.
36. Ibid., 212.
37. Marlise Simons, "Haiti's New Era is Unfolding Slowly," *The New York Times*, February 24, 1986.
38. Max Beauvoir, *Deshoykay Vadoun*, (unpublished manuscript, 1986).
39. Beauvoir, *Deshoykay Vadoun.*
40. Julia Preston, "Voodoo Adherents Attacked in Haiti," *Washington Post*, May 17, 1986.
41. Greene, 213-214.
42. Wilentz, 159-160.
43. William Booth, "Where Voodoo Knows Best," *Washington Post*, October 29, 1993.
44. Murphy, 14.
45. Seymour M. Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994).
46. Robert Maguire, "The Grassroots Movements," in Georges A. Fauriol, ed., *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 145.