

“10+3” MECHANISM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH EU EXPERIENCE

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

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In December 27-29, 2004, the 8th “ASEAN plus 3” or “10+3” summit meeting—between 10 members of Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) and three Northeast Asia countries of China, Japan and South Korea—was held in Vientiane, Laos. The first “ASEAN plus 3” summit meeting was held in December 1997, at that time ASEAN had 9 countries—Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippine, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, with Myanmar waiting for accession. That summit meeting was the first time that the East Asia country leaders gathered without any other participants from outside of the region. Since then, the “ASEAN + 3” meeting has been held regularly each year. After Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1999, this meeting was called the 10+3 mechanism. Since its coming into being, the framework has been trying to solve regional problems and promote regional cooperation

Compared with the high integration level of Europe Union, 10+3 mechanism is still in its very preliminary period of promoting East Asia regionalization; and it probably won't reach the level of EU in the foreseeable future, owing to different driving forces and constraints in the two regions. One of the major elements that guarantee EU achievement is said to be the homogeneity of democratic system in each member country, which 10+3 mechanism is going to lack for quite some time in the future. On the other hand, the willingness of promoting regionalization manifested by East Asia countries derives more from the desire for economic stability and continuing growth, in contrast with the longing for permanent security in West European countries in the early 50s. Different constraints and motivations determine

the different path of integration in these two regions.

With all the differences, there are some interesting similarities between the development of 10+3 and the early EU experience. To name only a few, 10+3 was born out of the East Asia financial crisis, while European integration came after the scourge of World War II; Before the initiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) were put on the table, there was an episode of Bilateral Monetary Swap Agreements in East Asia, in contrast with that of Coal and Steel Community in Europe before it started building a common market. Taking into account all the similarities and differences, a comparative analysis of these two integration processes might produce some useful findings for future development of 10+3 mechanism. This thesis, when combing the evolution and projecting the future of 10+3 process, tries to explore similarities and differences of these two integration process, for the purpose of extracting useful EU integration experiences while recognizing specific distinctions and constraints in East Asia. The thesis basically consists of four parts. The first part explores the genesis and evolution of 10+3 and theoretical diagnosis of its driving force. The second part addresses the two crucial steps of 10+3: the financial cooperation and the initiation of various FTAs across the region. The third part set forth the development of institution building, security cooperation in the framework. The fourth part argues that regional relations with United States will be indispensable in the future. The concluding part discusses various uncertainties on the development of 10+3.


Context and Genesis

McCormick, author of *the European Union*, summarized several causes for

integration: Countries are united by force; they went together to confront a common enemy; they start from their shared values and agree putting themselves under the governance of a new institution; or they each want to advance economic growth and improve their people's living standards more quickly and effectively by uniting each other¹. Specifically, McCormick argues that although economic factors played a major role in European integration after World War II, the initial task for European cooperation is on security issues--avoiding the reappearance of the entrenched France-German rivalry.²

The background for East Asian regionalization is complicated. First, even the concept of East Asia itself is rather confusing. Most of European countries live in a one-piece continent, only a few separated by the Atlantic Ocean; while East Asia as a geographic region is completely different, with many countries scattered in the Pacific Ocean (Map 1). The exact meaning of East Asia used to be ambiguous. Geographically it often refers to the vast area in the eastern part of Asia, including Russia's Siberian territory, Mongolia, North and South Korea, Japan and China. In modern international relations, however, it is often related to affairs with China, Japan and the two Koreas--South Korea and North Korea, with Southeast Asia countries included only occasionally. People sometimes don't care too much about the difference among East Asia, Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia. At the same time, East Asia area has other appellations, most famous of which is West Pacific Rim-- often called by East Pacific countries including US, or Far East—an older term used typically by Britain and other European countries.

Map 1: East Asia



However, from 1990s on, the definition of East Asia seemed to be more clear.

When former Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed floated the idea of East Asia Economic Community in 1991, the concept of East Asia was clear--it implied exactly the Southeast Asian including the Indo-China countries, and Japan, South Korea and China³. After the East Asia Summit Initiative was declared in the 2002 summit meeting, the geographic scope of East Asia became increasingly fixed. When the first East Asia Summit comes true in 2005⁴, this new content of East Asia will be more recognized.

The increasingly well defined concept of East Asia indicates the rising emergence of a regional identity on one hand; however, on the other hand, it implies that the formation of an East Asia identity is only a short story. Unlike the long desire for a “United States of Europe” in European countries, there had never been such an idea of East Asia federation during the long history in this region. The major reason for this was probably that the natural separation by Pacific Ocean hindered the ambition of these continental powers, including the Chinese Empire, to conquer the oceanic states. There is another reason which is closely related to the first one. China was traditionally a self-sufficient agrarian empire thanks to its vast cultivated land in the continent, which made its survival seldom dependent on conquer other lands by nomadic aggression or sea expansion.

The first ambition of uniting this area by the oceanic state of Japan was defeated by the Alliance during World War II. Thanks to its strong naval power which greatly increased its force projecting capability, Japan wanted to unite this region under the banner of “Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”.⁵ It is the first regional

state which possessed such an ambition. Japan's defeat proved the same rationale as Europe powers did that the attempt to unite a region by force is unacceptable in modern international system. However, Japan's ambition showed that in East Asia there could be an identity of one region.

When Cold War era ensued, there is little room for the consolidation of East Asia identity. In the context of East-West struggle, countries in East Asia were inevitably divided. Although regionalism arrived in Southeast Asia with a certain institutional form as is shown by ASEAN, its rationale was closely associated with the balance and counterbalance of power strategies, not so much with economic integration, still less the sense of regional identity. The promotion of regional cooperation was only sincere hope arising out of numerous potential conflicts in the region. In Northeast Asia the concept of regionalism was literally non-existent, owing to the geopolitical confrontation and ideological opposition among regional states.

When time passed into early post-cold war era, there appeared many elements contributing to East Asia regionalism. In the economic field, the transformation of the economic structure and the increase of intra-regional trade volumes activated the stepping up of regional economic interdependence⁶. In the political field, the cold war structure was eased. National confrontations were replaced by intra-regional dialogues, economic interactions and cross-border networks. At the same time, ASEAN actively drove the pace of regionalism in order to expand its export and to gain more international influence. Some groupings which involved regional countries appeared. In 1989, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which was

committed to promoting the economic and technological cooperation among countries along Asia-Pacific region was established.⁷ In 1994, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) came into being which acts as a forum for trans-regional security dialogue. These trans-regional frameworks laid a foundation for future formation of regional mechanism.

In 1997, East Asia financial crisis promoted the appearance of the first East Asia integration mechanism. Just as EU was born out of the catastrophe of WWII, the appearance of East Asia integration was also the offspring of a calamity. According to Geng Xiefeng, one of the earliest Chinese scholars observing East Asian regionalization, the direct factor that led to holding the first “ASEAN+3” meeting was East Asia's financial crisis beginning from the second half of 1997.⁸ ASEAN countries which suffered most from the crisis, feeling their weakness in withstanding the pressures from international financial organizations, decided to promote regional cooperation in East Asia. China and Japan, the two most influential regional powers, quickly joined forces to push it. If there had been no such an overwhelming crisis, the gathering of regional leaders might have not come so quickly. Just as the deputy secretary-general of ASEAN Pengiran Mashor Pengiran Ahmad said, “The crisis was to be East Asia’s wake up call and it catalyzed efforts towards greater integration which was essential to make the region more resilient and less vulnerable to similar attacks in the future”⁹.

China’s accession to WTO in 2001 is another driving force for regional integration. The accession to WTO means China would be committed to its WTO

obligations with no way for returning; otherwise its credibility will be severely damaged. China is, therefore, more integrated into world trade and economic system, which means it has to comply with the rules of international trade system. This commitment provided crucial assurance for regional countries to step up cooperation with China, which implied to other countries in the region that China now is a more credible partner to do business with, since China made such great efforts to join WTO. It is not incidental that the year of China's accession to WTO also became the starting time of negotiating China-ASEAN free trade agreement. Besides, it is after China's accession to WTO that Japan began seriously thinking about strengthening China-Japan economic relations in a certain form of a binding agreement.

It is rather thought-provocative here to find out that although China is not a democratic country—in the standards of many other states, some form of regional arrangements between China and other countries with heterogeneous political systems can still be reached. This kind of arrangement need to be tested by time since it is in violation of the past experience that successful regional arrangement can only succeed among states with homogeneous political systems, or more directly, democratic systems, as EU and NAFTA showed. However, it shows at least that there exists some interaction between international and regional commitments, which might manifest that the commitment to international rules can partly make up for the lack of domestic rule of law in a undemocratic state.

Motivation and Calculation

During Europe's integration process, economic, security and political driving

forces are intertwined. Economic integration is the instrument for promoting political and security objective. Behind the scene of economic integration, political integration directly works for the objective of permanent security. The integration forerunners know well that political and economic integration would do great good to their security by preventing any potential dominators from within or outside. Beyond security concern, the integration had another ulterior motivation. The European powers regretted their loss of dominant leverage on world affairs and would like to catch up with the powerful United States by uniting.¹⁰

From the very beginning, EU created several supranational institution which made the integration more confederalist than intergovernment-oriented¹¹. Although there have always been twist and turns, member states have transferred quite some sovereignty to a supranational regime. There were different considerations underlying the transfer of sovereignty. Some decision-makers hold that sovereign states transfer some limited power to EU only for their own interest, and if they think EU is going to hurt their national interest, they will withhold their sovereignty or even withdraw the sovereignty they have already entrusted to EU. While more cosmopolitan others, especially those upholding the enhancement of EU organizations, contend that since EU creates its own institutions to push integration, it will have its own logic of development which its members have to get adapted to. Actually, there are no clear borderline between these two trends. The integration process of EU is always influenced by these two forces. In its history more than one country has once threatened to leave EU, or some countries chose not to join one of the policy

arrangements EU has made. But still, the EU institutions collected the power its members transferred and made such huge achievements today.¹²

Born of a financial crisis which was far from being as catastrophic as World War II, 10+3 mechanism is and will be more based on the objective of economic regionalization, with very low-level security and political goals. For sure, the main purpose of advancing regional economic cooperation is to increase wellbeing of each other, and member states pin high hope on the enhancement of communication, interdependence and security brought by economic interaction. There has even been a developing sense of a loosely knit community to reach more consensus and avoid future regional tension. However, as mentioned above, East Asia as a regional identity only emerged in the last decade, so the regional aspiration for a political or security supranational organization is almost non-existent. In addition to the existing regional political situation and security arrangement, the political and security objective of 10+3 will be only limited to very primitive cooperation such as increasing communication, building mutual trust and reduce future regional conflicts, instead of political or security institutionalization.

The different level of objectives determines the different level of institution form between 10+3 and EU. While EU was a supranational organization of confederalist features, 10 + 3 is and will be in long run only an intergovernmental mechanism at most. Although there will be some transfer of low-level sovereignty resulting from the implementation of FTAs, member countries won't trust their core sovereignty such as making fiscal and monetary policy or even making a single

constitution, onto 10+3 mechanism at least in the least future.

“10+3” was also an echo the emerging new regionalism, one school of liberalism. In the eyes of Hettne, the leading figure of new regionalist school, regionalism has resurrected and developed much faster since the early 1990s; Distinct from the old regionalization trend from 1950s-1970s which, as Europe witnessed, was mainly prompted by economic integration, the new regionalism covers various areas--economic, social, environment, political and security cooperation, etc¹³. The subsequent development of “10+3” meetings reflected such a trend, with issues discussed becoming increasingly broader—from financial cooperation in the very beginning to free trade area negotiation, from reaching an agreement on solving South China Sea disputes to strengthening anti-terrorist coordination. The Final Report of East Asia Study Group in 2002 predicted that future 10+3 topics will cover “not only economic and financial cooperation measures, but also political, security, environmental, energy, cultural, educational, and institutional measures”.¹⁴

Besides the common considerations of the above objectives, 10+3 mechanism also reflects specific calculations of each partner. As the neighbor of most other East Asia countries, on land or at sea, the Chinese leadership think that if it keeps stable relations with its neighbors by some degree of economic interdependence, the security pressure it faces will be eased greatly. This kind of security pressure doesn't necessarily mean those countries themselves will invade China one day individually or jointly, but rather mean that other members will stand neutral if China is facing potential conflicts with another member or non-member state, such as U.S. According

to Japan's media analysis, China's FTA agreement with ASEAN should be viewed as a part of its security strategy¹⁵. China is strategically prioritizing political, rather than economic interests, to promote economic integration with ASEAN. For example, China is opening its agriculture market to ASEAN countries even though its farm sector is overpopulated and noncompetitive. At the same time, well aware of the perceived "China threat" –both economic and military– felt by its neighbors, China has been making efforts, through its support for regional political and economic structures, to reduce regional anxiety.¹⁶ Besides, China also wants to pull Japan over through the mechanism regional cooperation. China wants to increase interdependence and reduce tension with Japan by collaborating with Japan in building 10+3.

China's realistic calculations on 10+3 are mostly restrained to defensive security, not so offensive ambitions to be a regional hegemon, or strategic struggle with other regional powers such as U.S or Japan, as some one U.S offensive-realist holds.¹⁷ The purpose of China's trying to increase economic interdependence is to expand the common interest and then exert political influence, but not to require other countries to exclude U.S existing interest in their countries, such as U.S military bases and troops, or U.S investment or trade opportunities. China's leadership knows well U.S leverage in the region and the willingness of regional countries to accept U.S protection¹⁸. Also, faced with various domestic tough issues, economic, social or political, China's top priority is to solve these issues, and the promotion of regional integration also worked for it. The ambition for ideological struggle or geopolitical

rivalry will do nothing but impede the solution of domestic problems and threaten its internal security.

As for ASEAN, they also have calculations on 10+3. In addition to economic motives, ASEAN hopes to restore its falling political influence in world and regional affairs since the financial crisis in 1997-98, which is partly realised as China and Japan both respect the leading role of ASEAN in current 10+3 mechanism¹⁹. First of all, ASEAN want to capitalize on 10+3 to enhance its leverage on next round of WTO negotiation. Early in 1991 Dr Mahathir proposed setting up a new regional body, the East Asian Economic Group, later renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), to strengthen the negotiating power of Asian economies vis-a-vis such blocs as the EU and the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Also, by expanding economic cooperation with China and Japan, ASEAN can attract more attention from U.S by incenting it to invest more to and offer more benefits in ASEAN, as is shown by latest U.S performance in Tsunami assistance to Indonesia and some other members. ASEAN also want to balance U.S power in terms of political and security leverage by approaching China. Moreover, with the fear of China's rise never evaporating, ASEAN want to constrain China's future assertion, since many of its members have disputes with China on the sovereignty issue of South China Sea islands (Spratly islands) or issues of diasporas Chinese in the region.²⁰

Probably Japan is the member that is most ambivalent to 10+3. Japan's attitude is lukewarm to 10+3 and its evolution into East Asian Community²¹. The major reason is that Japan gives priority to its military alliance with the U.S and the relevant

multilateral trade liberalization. Its enthusiasm on regional integration will not only cause U.S. misgiving but also might give free rein to the shift of Japan policy gravity to Asia.²² Partly for the purpose of coordinating with U.S. global trade liberalization effort, it is also Japan's long-standing policy to pursue it only in a multilateral framework based on the WTO and APEC. Its bilateral FTA arrangement only started three years ago and ended up with only two states of Singapore and Mexico as of today. It is still hesitant to sign up a regional FTA agreement with ASEAN, two years after China and ASEAN reached it.

Japan's unenthusiastic attitude toward 10+3 also has another important reason. With close economic relations with ASEAN countries since 1950, Japan was used to seeing ASEAN as its "back garden."²³ Regional ties deepened further following the formation of ASEAN in 1967, and Japan rapidly became one of the region's most important economic players. In the past decade, however, China's economic relations with ASEAN developed rapidly. Furthermore, China has taken initiative in building 10+3 and played a leading role in promoting its development since 2001. With its economic size almost three and a half times larger than China, Japan reasonably can't accept being in second position after China in 10+3 mechanism.

However, 10+3 also brings apparent opportunities for Japan, such as regionalizing its currency yen, building a regional bond market to channel its rich capitals, having larger access to China's huge market, winning more trust of regional countries, enhancing its global leverage, etc. For these considerations, Japan will still keep its pledge it made in 1999 10+3 joint statement "to strengthen cooperation with a

view to advancing East Asian collaboration in priority areas of shared interest and concern”²⁴

Financial Cooperation as the prelude

The united coal and steel operation in 1951 turned the first leaf for integration among the Western European countries. However, when they decided to take this step, they probably didn't realize the significance of this step. Actually only when they signed the Treaties of Rome seven years later did they feel the real power of integration, with removing trade barriers as the first essential step. But still we could boldly say if there had no the coal and steel cooperation initiative, there wouldn't have been the EU integration as it was. But why they happened to choose this industry as the starting point? It is not an incidental idea. Above all, the forerunners took the security issue into account. Since coal and steel are the raw materials for weapons and tanks, and the places producing these materials used to be contesting hotbed, this cooperation strongly signaled their determination of abjuring war by committing them to binding obligations.²⁵ Thus we can find out that this first step of cooperation was an imperative for the restoration of regional security, which was one of the most concerning issues lingering on the mind of regional people and elites at that time. Also the economy of scale in this heavy industry was a factor for cooperation, which makes the step more economically sensible.

This prelude of Europe integration can find a match in 10+3 experience. As it was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the first 10+3 summit meeting was held shortly after the East Asia financial crisis began. The central topic the leaders

discussed at the meeting was how to step out of the crisis as soon as possible. Then it was recognized that a financial and monetary cooperation framework as a crisis-prevention and crisis-management mechanism should be built in the region, which became the first important step of 10+3 cooperation and had a great significance on its further buildup.²⁶ Then in the 2000 meeting, the leaders approved the Chiang Mai Initiative, consisting of several bilateral monetary swap agreements to protect any regional currency from being attacked by “hot” money.

ASEAN countries regarded this initiative as a historical event, because they could draw on regional foreign reserves instead of relying on IMF dominated by western countries to stabilize future exchange rate fluctuation, avoiding the recurrence of the disastrous financial crises. According to Institute of Southeast Asia Study, by October 2003, the Initiative has collected \$32 billion dollars under 14 bilateral agreements²⁷. Though it is still not a huge amount of money if allocated on average to each country, this form of regional financial mutual assistance turned out to the prelude of 10+3 cooperation. Given the core status of finance in world economy, this initiative seems to signify the sincerity of regional countries to economic stability, to some extent like European countries when they signed the Treaty of Paris on united coal and steel operation.

Free Trade Area as the First Step

As the implementation of coal and steel obligations in Europe entailed the coordination in other industrial areas, the monetary cooperation promotes the cooperation on other areas in East Asia. Four years after the Paris Treaty made

progress, “Europeanists felt something more was needed to give integration real momentum.it was increasingly difficult to develop those two sectors in isolation”²⁸. This worry shortly led to the Rome Treaty, the commitment to create a common market and to the harmonization of member’s economic policies. In East Asia, when they began to cooperate on stabilizing the exchange rate, the regional scholars also felt the urge to take further step.

In late 2001, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), consisting of well-known scholars from the 10+3 members, reported to the leaders on the vision of “an East Asian Community”. On the basis of this report, another group called the East Asia Study Group (EASG) which is made up of high-ranking officials, set twenty-six concrete measures as the short-term and long term objective of 10+3. They include not only economic and financial cooperation measures, but also political, security, environmental, energy, cultural, educational, social, and institutional measures. Some medium and long-term economic measures are:

- Form an East Asian Free Trade Area;
- Establish an East Asia Investment Area;
- Pursue a more closely coordinated regional exchange rate mechanism;
- Pursue the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit into an East Asian Summit.²⁹

The establishment of a free trade area (FTA) seems to be the first step of a successful regional economic integration, and East Asia seems to be no exception. On Nov 29, 2004, the 8th summit meeting officially showed its tendency on the establishment of regional free trade area. The Statement of its Chairman noted, “We

exchanged the views on the establishment of East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and welcome the decision by economic ministers to set up an expert group to conduct a feasibility study on EAFTA”.³⁰ It showed the summit now seriously put the establishment of FTA as the top priority of regional economic integration. As to the strategy to this objective, the secretary general of ASEAN Ong Keng Yong prescribed the road starting from regional FTA in terms of East Asian specific situation: “ASEAN and the +3 countries decided to give a special attention to the acceleration of sub-regional FTAs that so far can help to maintain East Asian development in a good shape”. He called for “fusing the various FTAs” to form a single East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), ultimately leading to an East Asia Economic Community.³¹

The Secretary’s remarks also showed the different conditions in East Asia and Europe in terms of the establishment of FTA. When Western European countries began removing the tariffs, they did not have any other subregional economic arrangement among the members except the Benelux Economic Union³². But it is quite different in present East Asia. There are already many bilateral or subregional FTA agreements. In the 2002 meeting, ASEAN and China signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which provided for an ASEAN-China FTA by the year 2010 for the 6 old ASEAN members and by 2015 for the 4 new members³³. In the 2003 meeting, Japan and ASEAN signed the agreement of Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP), committed to a future FTA arrangement between the two parts. South Korea also decided to talk with ASEAN on FTA in 2005. ASEAN has been pushing FTA among members since 1992 and is

expected to become a tariff-free FTA by 2015³⁴. China, Japan and ROK also showed interests on the research on a Northeast Asia FTA. Besides, there are some country-country FTA agreements signed or in process such as Japan-Singapore, Japan-ROK, Japan-Philippines, China-Thailand, China-Singapore and ROK-Singapore, etc.

The present subregional FTA arrangements could be a feasible transition toward a regional FTA, although this model hasn't been tried yet in other regions. Above all, it is a reflection of reality in East Asia. There are many difficulties to reach a regional FTA agreement now, given the big difference among the members in terms of the trade liberalization level, the venerability of sectors and development level, etc. However, it might be attractive for some of the members to reach a subregional or bilateral FTA first according to their economic complementarities and political determination. As a Japanese scholar observed, this approach could address specific problems without waiting for consensus in a larger group³⁵. This approach reflects the pragmatism and flexibility of statecraft. It also conforms to the traditional political principle since Bandung Conference in 1955, i.e. seeking common grounds and putting aside the differences.

This approach of building a regional FTA from subregional ones also generates a benign cycle of "competition to cooperate". China-ASEAN FTA agreement in 2002 stimulated Japan to take actions. Also in country-country FTA arrangements, Japan's initiative pressed China to change its previous stance that it was not going to sign any additional bilateral FTA agreement with any ASEAN member. At the same time, the

subregional FTA will oblige its signatories to lower their tariffs and eliminate other market barriers, which will ease the way for a total regional FTA. Take Japan as an example. When it has to open its agricultural sectors to the country such as Thailand or Malaysia with whom it is negotiating establishing bilateral FTA agreement, after absorbing the small impact of opening it will be more readily to extend the opening of the sector to other 10+3 members³⁶.

That East Asian is going to have a different way of FTA arrangement with EU (and NAFTA) is attributable to other reasons. One is that 10+3 have more members than EU did initially—with only had 6 members. It is also interesting that EU first made the policy and then extended this policy to new members, while 10+3 members probably won't expand in the long run—if Taiwan becomes one part of China and the two Koreas unite—but a FTA initiative will be divided by several pieces before it becomes a common policy. This partly explains another reason of the difference between Europe and East Asia. There is much diversity among regional countries in terms of economic structure, political systems, religion, culture and value³⁷. In addition to difference in the level of economic development and foreign policy orientation, it will be a very optimistic forecast if 10+3 members will reach a common within two decades, compared with the twelve years it took Europe to do that³⁸.

However, there is also negative impact for this approach of reaching FTA. As Kawai holds, one important issue deriving from this subregional FTA is how to ensure consistency across different arrangement. Different treatment of rules of origin can be counterproductive³⁹. The leaders and trade experts have to attach an early

importance to it, taking some constructive measure to avoid future obstacles. One solution is to try coordinating the principles and measures among different FTA agreements.

Institution-building

At the very beginning of its integration, EU was in fact a complex of supranational organizations. One major intention of those integration forerunners was to balance national bureaucracy and push forward supranational interest. They took this as a necessary step to build a “United States of Europe”⁴⁰. However, the 10+3 mechanism has not set up any permanent institutions yet, except a 10+3 unit was just set up within the ASEAN Secretariat, in light of the Statement of Chairmen of the 8th summit in Dec. 29, 2004.⁴¹

The difference of institutionalization level between them reflects many reasons. First, as mentioned at the beginning of paper, member countries don't want to give up power to a supranational agency, or they do not have an impetus to build into one state as Europe do, which accordingly inhibit a desire to set up supranational organizations. Second, unlike EU which consisted of members of similar western democratic system, the East Asia countries have various political regimes, and this increases difficulty of initiating and transferring sovereignty to supranational organizations. Actually, this is one of the major concerns of those who are not so sanguine on the future of 10+3. They think institutional build-up is an inalienable link process, without which integration looks a man without vein system. According to them, the different political system, or more directly, the lack of westernized democratic system which builds its

legitimacy on public participation, will desperately impede such an institutionalization process. Even though there is such kind of institution building, but it can be readily switched without the guarantee of legitimacy. Bearing this well in mind, the political elites would rather set this institutionalization issue aside and take more concrete actions on enhancing regional coordinations in the intergovernmental framework.

Though 10+3 have no specific institutions, it has developed rather fast embracing many other submechanisms. First, the annual summit meeting was accompanied by other subset summit meetings. To emphasize the role of ASEAN, 10+3 summit is still held in the form of a forum meeting held by the annual ASEAN summit, which invites each year the leaders of other three northern countries of China, Japan and North Korea. These three countries usually also hold trilateral summits during the 10+3 summit. Also there is series of bilateral summits between ASEAN and China, Japan or South Korea respectively. Besides enriching the overall 10+3 mechanism, these subsummits also have concrete agenda and political significance, reflecting the participants' pragmatism and flexibility on the pattern of summit.

10+3 mechanism also embraces meetings of different levels. With the summit as its core, there are also various regular or contingent ministerial-level meetings covering almost every area such foreign affairs, trade, finance, development, environment, health, regional and public security. There is also the level of high-ranking official meetings from various areas, with previously mentioned EASG, East Asian Study Group, one of them. Meanwhile, in order to seek for the long-term progress and feasible direction, 10+3 also established EAVG, East Asia Vision Group,

which totally consists of senior scholars across all member countries. This group drafted the significant 2002 Final Report, reminiscent of the contributions of those wise pundits in the early time of Europe integration. Moreover, many unofficial forums also played an increasingly role in mobilizing the enthusiasm of investors and businessmen, which is the absolutely necessary partners in promoting regionalization.

10+3 summit and European Council, the EU summit mechanism, play different roles in the integration process. The European Council, characteristic of its biannual member summits, is the newest institution of the five major EU organizations⁴², while 10+3 summit will have been the oldest mechanism, if it eventually goes on the road of institutionalization. The European Council is the most influential of the EU five major institutions, but it is the most ambiguous, to such an extent that its founding declaration “was kept deliberately vague; it said nothing about the precise powers of the new body or its relationship to the other institutions and gave it no legal standing”⁴³. “The European council is more a process or a forum than an institution.”⁴⁴ Worried that it would threaten the existed institutions and cause bureaucracy, some members refused the idea of creating a new secretariat. So the European council turned out to be the only branch of EU that doesn't have a secretariat or regular working staff.

Unlike the ambiguous function of the European Council, 10+3 summit has clear authority in shaping future institutions and directing their activities. The establishment of 10+3 unit under the jurisdiction of ASEAN secretariat, on one hand, shows the wariness of the regional leaders on institution building, in the context that no member

state is ready to transfer its sovereignty to a supranational organization; on the other hand, avoid the competition for dominance between China and Japan by leaving an impression that ASEAN plays a leading role in the mechanism. The setup of 10+3 unit is only a small step, but it is of significance since it started the institution-building process in 10+3 mechanism. It implies that there is now an intergovernmental agency which professionally coordinates the 10+3 routine affairs and tries to strengthen its existence and promote its development. Imaginably, it will assume some primary work as those EU supranational agency is doing, thus partly make up for the lack those specific institutions in the 10+3 mechanism.

Security Cooperation

The scenario of regional security arrangements is of essential difference between Europe and East Asia. As they had a trans-Atlantic security cooperation with U.S, European countries didn't put too much emphasis on their own security building. In East Asia, there used to be a multilateral security arrangement called Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) from 1955-1977, but there is no region-wide security arrangement now⁴⁵. The major present security arrangement is in the form of bilateral security alliance treaties between U.S and regional countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Philippine, Thailand, etc. These treaties formed bases for regional security assurance. Meanwhile, although without alliance relations, U.S also has access to naval facilities in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. Other countries in the region, such as China, Vietnam, North Korea, Myanmar, Lao mostly rely on their own military power for defense, since they have no military alliances

with others.

Under the auspices of ASEAN, there are also two other forms for regional security cooperation. First is the political Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, which is basically a political commitment to no war among members. China became the first non-ASEAN-member country when it acceded to TAC in 2003; Japan also followed up in 2004.⁴⁶ Second is the forum of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) created in 1994. Its major purpose is for multilateral security dialogue, information change and persuasion by trust building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Membership of the forum included all the East Asia countries plus United States, Russia, India and EU, etc. In 2000, North Korea was admitted to the forum. The function of ARF is in part similar to that of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but is also distinct from it for the equal role of “second-track” or unofficial diplomacy—with the “first-track” diplomacy or official diplomacy.⁴⁷

Recently, 10+3 also shows its interest on regional security issues. Though it is not the clearly stipulated function of 10+3, the regional security cooperation seems to increase its weight in 10+3 agenda. In the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation at their 3rd Summit, it didn't clearly commit itself to security issues, though leaving some room for future actions. “The ASEAN Plus Three Leaders expressed greater resolve and confidence in further strengthening and deepening East Asia cooperation at various levels and in various areas, particularly in economic and social, political, and other fields”.⁴⁸ It is reasonable that the summit was going to emphasize more on

economic and social, political field, because security issue in East Asia is very complex and sensitive, not least current North Korea issue and Taiwan issue. So the discreet way for 10+3 is to put the difficult task aside and start from easy topics.

Then among the 26 future measures proposed in the 2001 Final Report of EASG, group of high-rank officials, security cooperation still wasn't directly mentioned, though at least two measures have relation to security issues. One is to "strengthen the mechanisms of cooperation on non-traditional security issues", and the other is to "build a framework for regional energy policies and strategies, and action plans". Apparently the item of non-traditional security cooperation was added shortly after 911 happened. Cooperation on fighting against terrorism and other forms of transnational crimes is the common task of each country and the least controversial area among regional countries, and it will surely gain U.S endorsement. As it was, they finally found an easy cut-in on regional security cooperation. Insofar as the economic stability of many members increasingly relies on oil importation, the coordination of energy policy becomes another non-traditional area for security cooperation.

The increasing interest of 10+3 on promoting regional security dialogue was further shown in its following summit meetings. In the 2002 meeting, China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which will build mutual trust towards solving this problem peacefully and benefit the regional stability. This was an important event, for it at least helped alleviate some misgivings of countries concerned on China's military

resort to solve the issue. Besides, this meeting reiterated the support for the peaceful reunification of Korea and commitment to ensure a peaceful resolution of DPRK nuclear issues.

In the 2003 summit meeting, China's accession to TAC became a highly conspicuous event. The TAC, though not a security treaty, is a highly political treaty. As the footstone for ASEAN members to deal with relations with each other, it provides fundamental principles correlated to security cooperation, including "mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; and renunciation of the threat of use of force"⁴⁹. The significance of China's accession to TAC is that it becomes illegal for China to open war with other Treaty's signatory parties, since the provisions in the Treaty are binding to its members. China's accession thus provided great assurances for the security of ASEAN members and regional stability.

The increasing credibility of China was subsequently reflected in the summit press statement that security cooperation would be one of the five areas where ASEAN is going to strengthen cooperation with China. In July 2004, the ASEAN Regional Forum decided to set up a forum in Beijing for defense officials to discuss security issues, implying that 10+3 is going to hold dialogues among military officers. In the just past 7th summit meeting, the press statement announced, "We exchanged views on regional and international political and security, and economic issues. We also discussed ways and mechanisms to strengthen the ASEAN+3 cooperation and its

future direction”⁵⁰. Noticeably, the discussed security issues were put in front of the economic issues, showing the increasing attention the leaders paid on it.

It is unrealistic now, however, to envision a solid, region-wide security arrangement in the mechanism with traditional military functions which is characterized of military alliance, in the context of great diversity in the region and remaining shortage of mutual trust between some countries. Furthermore, any regional security arrangement without the participation of U.S is impossible, given U.S security commitment to and military existence in this area now. But an arrangement without China or even assuming China as the potential enemy will also get little support, in consideration of its leverage on each of regional security problems and on the general regional stability.

The paradox here is that U.S seldom develops alliance with non-democratic states, except with some Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Is there any possibility for the attachment of a regional security arrangement involving both U.S and China, on condition that China’s political system hasn’t changed into multi-party system? It calls on the creativity and flexibility of all partners to go beyond the traditional security stereotype of bringing allies together while excluding competitor or potential rivals. It might be enlightening that the other Europe countries brought West German into the integration process at the initial period for the purpose of containing its expansionist impulse.

Came what will, multi-layered regional security cooperation will be also the case in East Asia, as NATO, OSCE and the present security building of EU itself

coexist in Europe. The bilateral military alliance between U.S and other regional countries will still be the foundation of regional security mechanism in the run. The ARF can continue to act as the forum promoting security dialogue in Pacific Area. Although its role is mitigated by current deadlock of North Korea nuclear issue, it can find a suitable position if some parties concerned are willing to incorporate into it the current Six-Party talk mechanism, as Francis Fukuyama suggested recently.⁵¹

The other layer is the security cooperation based on the 10+3 mechanism. According to EU experience, alliance with U.S is important, but the regional security cooperation is also necessary. In East Asia 10+3 could assume the latter assignment. This security cooperation, which will be different from traditional military alliance by focusing on the buildup of mutual trust, will develop on the basis of political commitment of TAC, combined with the current coordination on maritime security, fighting on terrorism and transnational-crimes, coordination of energy policy, and potential issues such as preventing regional nuclear proliferation, etc.

There is some favorable conditions for 10+3 to promote security cooperation. Economic integration itself emanates political willingness and offers assurances for regional security. The institution building on trade and finance, including a free trade area and exchange rate coordination, also nurtures trust building and the sense of security community. To be sure, 10+3 will play a constructive role in the evolution of regional security arrangement.

Indispensable Relations with United States

Like the close US-EU economic relations, it seems sure that US economic

interest in East Asia won't be hurt by the regional integration. It is unknown if the volume of trade or mutual investment would have been larger between U.S and Europe if the latter hadn't adopted policy of economic integration, but it is known that they are the largest economic partner of each other up to now⁵², even EU has taken some protectionist measures for the benefit of building its internal single market. The formation of a single market might increase additional economic opportunities for U.S and partly make up for the loss of European market protection. As to U.S-East Asia economic relations, though from 2000 to 2004 trade growth between U.S and regional countries is slower than intraregional growth, it is still faster than the growth in the previous ten years. As the largest provider of regional foreign direct investment, U.S investment in East Asia has also been growing even faster than before⁵³. In addition to the commitment of "open regionalism",⁵⁴ U.S has reason to believe that its future economic interest in East Asia is assured.

Politically, East Asia countries will still put its relations with U.S on top priority or only second to their regional policy. Regional security can't be guaranteed without U.S commitment. The dynamic U.S politics, society and culture are attractive to regional people. U.S East Asian economic growth can't sustain without US in the foreseeable future. A large proportion of their exports flow to USA. Their industrial advancement needs U.S technology and capital. Recognizing U.S paramount leverage on the region, China made solemn assurance several years ago that it wouldn't seek to exclude U.S military and economic existence in East Asia.⁵⁵

As a stable Europe is in the security interest of U.S, a developing and stable

East Asia also benefit U.S security interest. Different levels of intergovernmental talks in 10+3 mechanism are significant for strengthening interdependence and communication, which is the linchpin to regional stability. They not only talked about how to increase trade and financial relation, but also exchange ideas and worldviews unconsciously. What flows cross-border is not only goods and capital, but also people, services, information, ideas and cultures. Just as a Japanese scholar observed,

Economic integration will engage regional powers in stable regional interdependence where one's prosperity is in the interest of others, and make them more predictable and reliable to each other. Successful development of poor countries in Asia through integration in regional economic dynamism will help political stability and reduce the possibility that these countries will become hotbeds of terrorism. East Asia economic integration, thus, will help reduce tension and lighten America's security burden in region.⁵⁶

The U.S approach toward East Asia economic regionalization is likely to be consistent with its policy toward European integration. At the early beginning of EU integration, U.S was very supportive, "seeing it as a way to build Europe security as a bulwark against the Soviets and as a means to help West German rebuild"⁵⁷. Later, though it felt somewhat uncomfortable about Europe cooperation and its increasing reassertion, it was not the direct reason that produced the bilateral difference. All the way, U.S didn't take any irrational actions against EU integration, while European powers also took account of U.S interests in their integration. Moreover, such U.S stance stemmed from its belief of peace between democracies.

Though opposing East Asia integration at the beginning, U.S. are responding more positively to East Asia regionalization. When Mahathir proposed the conception of East Asia Economic Community in the early 1990s, he met strong objection from U.S. Then Japanese suggestion for the initiation of Asia Monetary Fund during the outbreak of regional financial crisis also invited U.S. opposition. As a “Pan-Pacific power”, U.S. used to be worried about any kind of regional cooperation without its participation. Confronting with the firm collective actions of 10+3 summit meeting and its following drive, U.S., however, couldn’t do anything but face the reality. The U.S. Trade Representative, Robert B. Zoellick, comment positively on ASEAN’s willingness to promote a free trade with other three Northeast Asia countries, and indicated that Bush Administration favored promoting free trade bilaterally, regionally and globally⁵⁸. U.S. is now considering negotiating bilateral free trade arrangement with Japan, South Korea, Singapore and some other ASEAN countries. It seems U.S. would rather participate into the integration process one way or another than distance itself from East Asia owing to its aversion to the regional cooperation.

However, a U.S. long-term strategy with respect to East Asia hasn’t taken shape. Unlike Europe, this region shares less with U.S., whether in political system, economic structure, even less in religion, culture or ethnicity. Moreover, regional situations are far from being stable, which is witnessed by current North Korea nuclear crisis, Taiwan issue, and the tension between Japan and its neighbors. U.S. policy adjustment is going to reflect the dynamics of the region under the steering of regional powers especially the increasingly assertive China.

Conclusion

Regionalization seems to be a trend accompanying globalization. This provides a promising future for 10+3 advance. The driving force is the market dynamism. At present the intra-regional trade takes up almost half of the total trade in East Asia and intra-regional investment about two thirds of the entire foreign investment flowing into East Asian economies⁵⁹. While the financial cooperation on the swap of foreign exchanges took the first step, the FTA is supposed to be the building block, as was the case of EU integration. Political willingness, in addition to the approach of pragmatism and flexibility to some tough issues, acts as the catalyst regional integration. Given that there is no regional security arrangement, which is different from the EU/NATO experience, security cooperation will also occupy enough weight with the development of economic regionalization, though it hasn't clearly manifesting itself yet.

However, the promising future doesn't cover the tough problems it is confronting, with some rather formidable. Take FTA for example. Now many of the subset FTA agreements set the time of the realization of zero tariffs of trade of goods to 2015. It might slide into a political rhetoric if there aren't feasible and detailed agendas, which now seems still far away yet. The heavy protection of some particular sectors which almost all the countries practice is not so easy to break essentially. Moreover, prescriptions are needed now on how to take effective measures to overcome the mess probably taking place during the synthesizing process of these subset FTA agreements, in order for the transition not to take too much time. As far as

economic problems are concerned, it makes little sense to think beyond FTA issues; with other economic issues either closely related the FTA problem, or too trivial or too grandiose to have any substantive contribution to the present integration.

The 10+3 development should also factor into the dynamics of regional politics. The Europe integration started from the cooperation of the two major powers—France and German, with other medium and small countries followed up. In contrast, East Asia economic cooperation didn't start from the coordination of the two major regional powers—China and Japan, but was initiated by a group of medium and small countries—ASEAN. The 10+3 summit couldn't have emerged and sustained without the initiative and continuous endorsement of ASEAN, which explains why ASEAN actually have been playing the leading role in the mechanism. Although China later appears more enthusiastic and tries to keep the momentum by measures such as signing FTA agreement with ASEAN, the development of 10+3 still to a great extent depends on how much incentive ASEAN perceives from the cooperation with Northeast Asia countries. At the same time, 10+3 shall also give ASEAN the convincing the reason why the mechanism shouldn't be expanded the mechanism to India, Australia, or U.S.

The commitment of Japan is also indispensable for the advance of 10+3. Among the three major partners, Japan's attitude is most hesitant, because of its alliance with U.S, preference to multilateral trade liberalization, and the heavy protection of its agricultural sector. However, the most discomfoting issue is the talking of leadership competition between China and Japan. Although the concrete

significance of this “competition to cooperate” is not discernable, this argument indeed influenced Japan’s commitment to 10+3, which will also affect the initiative of ASEAN. However, Japan won’t ignore the potential benefit 10+3 brings. To solve the power competition problem, each major power, including Japan, China and ASEAN, should bear in mind the traditional Asia political rationale of equality and consensus. The deputy Secretary of ASEAN, Pengiran Mashor Pengiran Ahmad, is insightful to note that “As in ASEAN, it is likely that East Asia will not thrive on hierarchies. Rather, each member country will be treated as a partner and together they would work towards sustainable growth and development that would guarantee an environment of peace and stability”.⁶⁰

The political system of member states also affects the future of 10+3 development. The basic issue, which is of more academic than present policy value to East Asia integration, is whether the western style democratic system is the precondition, to which EU and NAFTA conform, of the success of regionalization, even for the lower-level economic integration. If this condition is indispensable, then it is a big question how far the 10+3 mechanism is going to progress toward its objective of building an “East Asia Community”⁶¹.

That the western-style political system is important is mainly because it offers a channel to examine the legitimacy of government’s integration commitments. According to EU experience, though in the early period the integration measures was made totally by the executive branch, but later all the issues that related to substantive transferring of national sovereignty were subjected to public endorsement and

parliamentary ratification.⁶² Current integration commitments such as FTAs made by most of 10+3 governments weren't examined by legislative ratification or referendum support yet. These commitments is said to lack legitimacy, since they might be discarded easily by any future government and thus heavily damage the integration process.

Could the legitimacy of commitments made by a non-western-style-democratic state be examined by an alternative way? Such as the continuous improving on life level and social wellbeing manifested by majority people, which in a non-legal way underlies people's satisfaction with integration commitments and ensure their sustainability? There is another alternative to examine the legitimacy of such commitments, i.e. if a more binding international commitment, such as China's joining into WTO, enhances the legitimacy of the state's policy decision, since any future government in the state will be hard to default on the obligation at will, will it also help enhance the legitimacy of the government's regional commitment? In a word, can a more binding international commitment help enhance the legitimacy of regional commitments in a non-western-style-democratic state? There might never be prior answers to these questions, before any region succeeds in practicing it.

Notes

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⁶ Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Regnier, *Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm shifting* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), prologue xv.

⁷ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, s.v. "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)", <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article?tocId=9344529&query=APEC&ct=eb>.

⁸ Geng Xiefeng, *New Regionalism and the Change of Asia-Pacific Regional Structures*. (Beijing: Beijingdaxuechubanshe, 2003), 127.

⁹ Pengiran Mashor Pengiran Ahmad, *East Asia Economic Community: Prospects and Implications*, <http://www.aseansec.org/15655.htm>.

¹⁰ McCormick, *the European Union*, 45.

¹¹ McCormick, *the European Union*, 11.

¹² Thitapha Wattanaputtipaisan, "The Newer ASEAN Member Countries And Asean-China FTA: Additional Market Access and More Challenging Competition", 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/2814.htm>.

¹³ Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum. "the New Regionalism Approach." *Politiea*, 17.3 (1999), <http://www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp?Cmd=View_Content&ContentID=11583> (accessed Dec 13, 2004).

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¹⁶ Naoki Munakata, “Whither East Asian Economic Integration?”, 15, *Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Brookings*, http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2002_munakata.

¹⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of Great Power politics* (New York : Norton, 2001), 15.

¹⁸ David Shamburg, China Engages Asia, *International Security*, winter 2004/05, 71.

¹⁹ ASEAN Secretariat, *Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation*, Nov. 28, 1999, ASEAN, <http://www.aseansec.org/5469.htm>.

²⁰ Lee Tai Woo, China, the USA and the South China Sea, *Security Dialogue*, March 2003, 29.

²¹ Mamoro Ishida, Key to a common currency, *the Japan times*.

²² Ibid.

²³ Economic Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile Japan 2005*, http://db.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=article&eiu_issue_id=348098834&eiu_article_id=578098857.

²⁴ ASEAN Secretariat, *Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation*.

²⁵ McCormick, *The European Union*, 46-47.

²⁶ Yoshihiro Iwasaki, “Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia: The Way Ahead”, *Asia Development Bank, Boao Forum for Asia Conference*, November 2, 2003 <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Speeches/2003/sp2004016.asp>

²⁷ Institute of Southeast Asia Study, *Southeast Affairs 2004*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004) , 16.

²⁸ McCormick, *The European Union*, 51.

²⁹ ASEAN+3 Summit, *Final Report of East Asia Study Group*, 7, http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/east_asia_vision.pdf

³⁰ Chairman’s Statement of the 8th ASEAN + 3 Summit, “*Strengthening ASEAN + 3 Cooperation*”, Vientiane, 29 November 2004, <http://www.aseansec.org/16847.htm>.

³¹ Ong Keng Yong, “Developing ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects”, *Keynote Address at the ASEAN-China Forum 2004*, <http://www.aseansec.org/16255.htm>

³² McCormick, *The European Union*, 32

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- ³⁵ Munakata, “Whither East Asian Economic Integration?” 18.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 21.
- ³⁷ Kawai, “Regional Economic Integration”, 29.
- ³⁸ McCormick, *The European Union*, 51.
- ³⁹ Kawai, “Regional Economic Integration”, 8
- ⁴⁰ McCormick, *The European Union*, 15
- ⁴¹ ASEAN + 3 Summit, *Strengthening ASEAN + 3 Cooperation*.
- ⁴² McCormick, *The European Union*, 174.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 176.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 174.
- ⁴⁵ Kawai, “Regional Economic Integration”, 26.
- ⁴⁶ Kawai, “Regional Economic Integration”, 28.
- ⁴⁷ OSCE. Encyclopædia Britannica Article. <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article?tocId=9066532&query=OSCE&ct=eb>
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- ⁵² McCormick, *the European Union*, 276
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- ⁵⁵ Shamburg, “China Engages Asia”, 75-79
- ⁵⁶ Munakata, “Whither East Asian Economic Integration?” 36-37.
- ⁵⁷ McCormick, *the European Union*, 274.

⁵⁸ Munakata, “Whither East Asian Economic Integration?” 36.

⁵⁹ Wen Jiabao, *the speech on the 7th ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting*, <http://www.bjyouth.gov.cn/jgkwlist.asp?id=16> (accessed Dec 16, 2004).

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