Toward a Political Community in the Aegean Area: New Opportunities for Greece and Turkey

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The summer of 1930 proved to be a season of great historical significance in Greek-Turkish relations when, in three short paragraphs written on July 12, 1930, the Greek Cabinet, under the leadership of Eleutherios Venizelos, responded positively to the initiative of French Prime Minister Aristide Briand to form a European Union. A fourth paragraph was added, stating that Greece would actually be sympathetic to the participation of Turkey, a Balkan as well as Mediterranean power, in this would-be European union.[1]

Sixty-nine years later the Greek government once again took a risk in December 1999, during the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki, when Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Foreign Affairs Minister George Papandreou decided to give another historical 'yes' to the stamping of Turkey's European passport.

However, many analysts do not believe that the new Greek-Turkish rapprochement will last long, and that when the two sides.again attempt to tackle delicate issues of high politics, they will be faced with new crises.

Following Helsinki, Greece and Turkey signed nine agreements in areas of so-called low politics: tourism, environmental protection, economic cooperation, investment, research and technology, maritime transportation, culture, cooperation of customs authorities, and cooperation to combat terrorism, drugs trafficking, and illegal immigration. But in October 2000 the rapprochement suffered yet another setback when dogfights broke out between Greek and Turkish airplanes above the Aegean, and disagreements during NATO's Destined Glory

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exercise led Greece to withdraw its forces. This illustrates that gradual rapprochement between the two sides is going to be very difficult and will encounter many ups and downs. Accordingly, the peoples of both countries wonder whether a real rapprochement can take place and under what terms it can be maximized.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Turkey, Messrs. Papandreou and Cem—the architects of the "seismic diplomacy" that occurred after the August 1999 earthquakes in Turkey and Greece, which eventually led to closer relations between the two countries—advocate a step-by-step approach which will first tackle issues of low politics and then proceed to issues belonging to the field of diplomatic-strategic action, such as Cyprus and the Aegean. Though this approach is not new between the two countries, its qualitative difference is that it is proceeding parallel to the economic integration progress between the EU and Turkey, initiated in Helsinki.

But can we really trace a typical preference toward functionalism[2] in the approach of both sides, according to which low politics and the upgrading of common interests might in the future have spillover effects in the sphere of what Hoffman has referred to as high politics,[3] leading eventually to a resolution of these major issues? How is this process going to affect the new Greek-Turkish rapprochement?

This article tries to address these problems by applying acknowledged methods of conflict resolution to this case and by providing some scientific evidence on the limits of functionalism and the preconditions for establishing a political community in the Aegean area. Building on relevant theories of David Mitrany,[4] Ernst Haas,[5] and Karl Deutsch,[6] I use the term political community to refer to "the belief on the part of both sides of the Aegean that disputes can be resolved by processes of institutionalized peaceful means while common social problems can be tackled by functional cooperation that leads voluntary organizations, specific groups, and citizens of both countries to a situation of mutual sympathy, consideration, trust, and partial identification in terms of self-interests, so that they can gradually transfer loyalty to political institutions that promote integration within a specific period of time." This definition eventually includes pluralistic security communities but goes well beyond them, as we will see below when discussing integration in the Aegean area.

ACCOMODATING DISPUTES BASED ON
THE MINIMUM COMMON DENOMINATOR

According to Ernst Haas,[7] disputes on the international plane are resolved with three types of compromise: accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator; accommodation by splitting the difference; and accommodation on the basis of deliberately upgrading the common interests of the parties.

Accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator is the most frequently used and elementary form of conflict resolution in the field of international relations. In this process gains and losses are easily identified, but the transaction never goes beyond what the least cooperative bargaining partner wishes to concede.

Though it seems logical for Greece to avail itself of this mode of conflict resolution, unlike Turkey, it has for many years been very reluctant to do so. This is because while this mode of conflict resolution presupposes concessions of equal value by each side, in the case of Greek-Turkish disputes there is no real balance in the antagonistic claims between the two sides.

The Greek side believes that there is only one issue to be resolved with Turkey—the legal delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf—while Ankara insists on a large number of unilateral claims whose aim is to change the status quo in the Aegean. This mode of accommodating differences is therefore not expected to produce any real results unless Ankara decides to negotiate on the basis of the least common denominator argued by the Greek side, or Athens agrees to enlarge the agenda of the issues under resolution according to Turkish claims. Neither case seems very likely to take place in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, sticking to this mode of conflict resolution is very dangerous, as it could lead to increased tensions between the two. Both sides are therefore obliged to use other methods of conflict resolution which, though more advanced, might produce a breakthrough.

HELSINKI AS A MODE OF SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE

Splitting the difference constitutes a more advanced mode of conflict resolution in which the demands of the parties are reduced and concessions of roughly equal value are exchanged. The differences between the two parties are therefore resolved not on the basis of the minimum common denominator but somewhere between the final positions of the two parties. This process usually involves the services of a mediator.

In the case of Greece and Turkey it could be argued that the European Council has decided to play a quasi-mediator role. It can also be argued, however, that the European Union can by no means be regarded as a neutral mediator towards Greece and Turkey, since Greek membership to the Union implies that the latter is obliged to express its solidarity towards its members. Furthermore, what Athens refers to as the "communitarization of the Greek-Turkish dispute" has actually led the Union into the position of being a part of the dispute.

It can be argued that the decision of the European Council in Helsinki has already elaborated the principles as well as the procedures and institutional framework for the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes. The two sides are obliged to

attempt to settle their disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, and to submit their differences before the International Court of Justice by the end of 2004 at the latest.

If one views the positive Greek vote in Helsinki towards Turkey's EU candidacy as a means of splitting the difference, it is crucial to examine what Turkey has placed on the table. First, Turkey issued a statement some ten days prior to the meeting of the Helsinki European Council stating that it has no territorial claims on Greece, and that it considers Agenda 2000, the well-known Commission document on the terms of accession, to include appropriate procedures for the resolution of bilateral problems existing between the two countries.[8] To this extent Turkey stated that it was ready to resolve problems with Greece through peaceful means.

Second, Turkey has accepted the Helsinki European Council decision, meaning *inter alia* that pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Helsinki European Council conclusions, it will abide by the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. This means that Turkey is obliged to withdraw the *Causus Belli* towards Greece should the latter attempt to extend its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles, pursuant to the 1982 U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea. According to the express wording of paragraph 4 of the Helsinki European Council conclusions, the peaceful settlement of disputes obliges candidate states to make every effort to resolve all outstanding border disputes and other related issues.

Should this process fail, the Helsinki European Council decided that candidate states should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. In actual fact, the European Council will monitor the whole process very closely and "will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004."[9]

Moreover, according to Agenda 2000, all candidate countries should in any event commit themselves to submitting unconditionally to compulsory jurisdiction before accession negotiations are completed, including advance rulings of the International Court of Justice on any present or future disputes concerning border or maritime frontiers.[10]

One needs also to take into account that the Helsinki European Council stated that Turkey must fulfill the political criteria for accession with particular reference to "the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a)." Paragraph 9(a) refers to Cyprus, stating that the European Council welcomes the launch of talks aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on December 3, 1999 in New York (though they did not produce any real results). It also expresses the European Council's strong support for the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

The European Council's reference to paragraph 9(a) serves as a reminder to Turkey that, according to the Luxembourg European Council Decision, the strengthening of its links with the European Union also depends on its "support to negotiations under the aegis of the U.N. on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions,"[11] which "are based notably on the establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-community federation."[12]

Furthermore, the European Council decided that the EU Council decision on Cyprus' accession would be made without any preconditions regarding a political settlement of the Cyprus issue.[13]

It is also worth noting that according to paragraph 12 of the Helsinki European Council conclusions, the accession partnership with Turkey will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions. The Helsinki European Council conclusions, as well as Turkey's "roadmap to European Union" which will be elaborated in detail by virtue of the adoption of the so-called Accession Partnership, should therefore be regarded as setting a procedural framework within which Greece and Turkey have decided to solve their disputes by splitting the difference.

In any case, the full compliance of candidate states with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.[14] This means that Turkey must remedy its internal and external affairs in order to satisfy these preconditions.[15] These include:
- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities;
- The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.

However, upgrading the common interests between the parties as a mode of accommodating the differences in the framework of international relations is often confused with integration.[16] This type of conflict resolution is typical not on the international level, but in the framework of a political community.[17] I will therefore proceed to analyze the issues of upgrading the common interests as part of the process of economic integration in the Aegean area.

TOWARD A POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE AGEAN AREA

No-War Community

The exact state of affairs in the Aegean area following the Helsinki compromise resembles a no-war community: a formal or informal international arrangement that constitutes a limited political community, within which, as in any security community, the only command is not to resort to war or large-scale

violence in the settlement of disputes.[18] This command is backed up by relatively effective formal or informal sanctions, which may include continuing defense preparations for self-help.

In contrast to the pluralistic security community analyzed below, the existence of a no-war community does not in principle rule out the possibility of war: preparations for war are also made within the framework of a no-war community.

Though no-war communities in the short term resemble security communities, in the long term they may be disrupted by an arms race. On the other hand, they may evolve under certain circumstances into a pluralistic security community. It can therefore be argued that Turkey's declaration of *Causus Belli* concerning the 12-mile territorial waters, the existence of the 4th Turkish corps (the so-called Aegean Army), and the arms programs of both countries constitute elements signifying the existence of a no-war community that could easily lead to a full-scale arms confrontation.

The Creation of a Pluralistic Security Community

Turkey's withdrawal of the *Causus Belli* could easily open the road towards a pluralistic security community in the Aegean area. As pluralistic security communities do not entail systematic preparations for war, limiting the arms race between the two sides therefore constitutes a major requirement for the passage to a pluralistic security community.

The establishment of security communities entails a real guarantee that its members will not have recourse to violence in order to solve their differences, but will choose other methods of solving disputes.[19] But under what circumstances could Greece and Turkey establish a pluralistic security community in the Aegean area? Deutsch indicates there are three main prerequisites:
- Compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making;
- Capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence;
- Mutual predictability of behavior.

First, the compatibility of main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units is an essential condition for establishing a pluralistic security community. The democratization of Turkey and the adoption by its leaders of the European values of humanism and democracy will therefore contribute to peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, these values will be more effective politically when they are not merely held in abstract terms by the Turkish leadership, but are incorporated into Turkey's political institutions and habits of political behavior, in order to permit "these values to be acted on in such a way as to strengthen people's attachment to them."[20]

This is actually the only valuable manner of interaction and osmosis between values, institutions, and habits that can lead to a certain "way of democratic and

tolerant life" for the construction of an open society in Turkey.[21] It is essential, there-fore, that Turkey build democratic institutions, as this is the only way of establishing a community of democratic values and practices that will lead to the establishment of a pluralistic security community in the Aegean area. This also constitutes part of the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey's accession to the European Union.

However, securing compatibility in values on both sides of the Aegean also depends to a large extent on the establishment of favorable conditions for social learning in Turkey. Social learning in this respect is essential, since the main issue is whether the habits previously learned not only by Turkey's political and social elites, but by the peoples of the Republic of Turkey, will be compatible with those now expected of them in their new European surroundings. Furthermore, while the claim of incompatibility in values is constantly used by various political forces in the European Union to exclude Turkey's EU candidacy, Greece has repeatedly proclaimed that it rejects any arguments based on the so-called clash of civiliza-tions, as "the EU is by no means a closed Christian Club."[22]

But we should not underestimate the social, ideological, and religious ten-sions that the peoples of Turkey will face during their long adventure towards EU membership. In the final analysis the Europeanization and democratization of Turkey through the social learning process depends on the correlation of power amongst the various political and social forces within a certain period of time. Should the pro-European forces turn the scales to their side, social learning could produce remarkable results in the next two decades.

What is crucial in this regard is that the citizens of Turkey be convinced rather than forced to accept the European prospect as essential to their future. Furthermore, as with all learning processes, Turkish society need not merely use this new information for guiding its behavior in light of the memories, prefer-ences, and goals it has had thus far—it may also use them to modify the inner structure of their preferences, goals, and patterns of behavior.[23]

The second precondition for the establishment of a pluralistic security society is the capacity of the participating political units and governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence. This presupposes that each side has political practices, habits, and functioning political institutions capable of leading to mutual under-standing and deliberation. In this case, each side must ensure that messages from the other are not merely received, but given real weight in the decision-making process. Accordingly, it is essential for the establishment of a pluralistic security society that communication be restored on both sides of the Aegean, not only on the political level but also on the bureaucratic-technocratic level.

The third precondition for a pluralistic security society is the existence of a minimum degree of mutual predictability of behavior; Greece and Turkey must be able to expect compatible behavior from each other and be able to predict one

another's actions.[24] While this may be based on mere familiarity, which could contribute to the building of mutual trust between the two countries,[25] the extent to which mutual familiarity can lead to the gradual establishment of a common political civilization depends on Turkey's European steps and the adaptation of its political institutions and practices to commonly accepted European rules and values.

Furthermore some mutual predictability of political behavior is an essential condition for pluralistic security communities. The capabilities of mutual predictability of political behavior between the two sides in the framework of the would-be pluralistic security community of the Aegean area should be of a very wide range and should also include predictability of the emotional responses on both sides.[26]

Respect for the rule of law constitutes the safest way of establishing predictability of mutual behavior, since the very idea of the rule of law presupposes the shaping of predictable patterns of behavior which must in every case be compatible with the commands of the rules of law applicable in a political community. Respect for the rule of law in Turkey is therefore also essential to establishing conditions of mutual predictability on the two sides of the Aegean. However, according to the 2000 Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession, the country does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria in this respect.[27]

Turkey also is obliged to undertake economic reforms aimed at establishing a functioning market economy that will be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. To the extent that Turkey will manage to establish a substantive market economy free of state intervention, conditions of mutual predictability will be re-enforced as they acquire quasi-institutional characteristics based on the functioning of the market economy.

Accordingly, essential social devices such as the rule of law and the market system will produce predictability by contract.[28] However, this can function only to the extent that the market succeeds in fulfilling basic human needs in Turkey and avoids producing mass unemployment. Furthermore culture and certain traditions in Turkey could lead to failures of predictability by contract.

UPGRADING COMMON INTERESTS AS A MODE OF INTEGRATION

The presence of economic links between Greece and Turkey, albeit of less importance for both countries, should not be confused with economic integration, as the latter presupposes various characteristics. Apart from free trade and abandonment of any unilateral right to restore trade restrictions, economic integration presupposes joint action to deal with problems resulting from the removal of trade barriers, promotion of more efficient utilization of the area's resources, and some

degree of harmonization on national policies that affect price structures and allocation of resources and, eventually, the free movement of capital and labor.[29]

From this we can conclude that the process of integration in the Aegean area is in its initial stages, as it was initiated only in 1996 with the implementation of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey. One could of course also argue that even in this case the integrative process is far from free, as many restrictions still exist as regards free movement of labor while various harmonization policies are still in their infancy.

Upgrading the common interests is, according to Haas, a mode of accommodating differences between the parties that is qualitatively different from the other modes of conflict resolution, as it constitutes a mode of accommodating differences in the framework of political communities. The theories of both Haas and Deutsch emphasize the integration processes in light of attaining the interests of the various pressure groups, and consider integration a complex process of feedback and social learning. Unlike mere compromise, however, upgrading the common interests as a mode of conflict resolution is often identified as integration,[30] as it signifies that a solution can be found in which neither party sacrifices anything.

Furthermore, as things tend to change to their opposite, Haas speaks of the "integrative function of conflict," which allows the parties involved to re-evaluate the general trend of objectives.[31] Conflict therefore is an opportunity for growth and new consensus among the various parties. It could in fact be argued that the mere existence of conflict constitutes a potentially positive disruption of any pre-existing situation as it is transformed into an opportunity for starting again on a new basis with the other side.

This positive disruption could also lead "the parties in redefining their conflict successfully by working out solutions at a higher level, which implies the expansion of the initial mandate"[32] of the governments, or the expansion of the initial task that certain international organizations have either been called upon to perform or for which they have been established.

When parties engaged in a conflict decide to establish an international organization to upgrade their common interests so as to resolve their conflict, one can refer to the functionalism described by David Mitrany,[33] in which the "needs of peace and social advance are satisfied"[34] through some means of associating the nations for common action. In this framework, nations should organize activities along the lines of specific ends and needs according to the conditions existing in a specific place and time.

The main aim of functionalism, therefore, is "to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for cooperation while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition."[35] For Mitrany the problem is how to "weld together the common interests of all without

interfering unduly with the particular ways of each."[36] To do so, the parties involved must select and organize specific activities according to their nature and to the conditions under which each has to operate.[37] Regardless of the theoretical approach under which the upgrading of common interests is pursued, the outcome is similar, as every side agrees that this mode of conflict resolution maximizes the spillover effects of the decisions that have been taken at the international level.

According to this view, "policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task."[38] This means that in the conflict resolution process both parties should avoid mere talking and proceed with measures and commitments. The whole system should be built on moving rather than static equilibrium.

As for the method itself, upgrading common interests combines intergovernmental negotiations and the participation of non-state actors that are active on the social level. However, each time the parties come to agreement on the mode of upgrading their common interests, it is essential that this cooperation is institutionalized; otherwise, the end product will suffer sustainability problems and be unable to produce any real spillover effects.

The institutional form that may be chosen each time will depend on the nature of the task itself. It could mean common committees of experts and bureaucrats of the various countries involved in the process, or intergovernmental and/or interparliamentary committees. These in turn could possibly lead to the establishment of international organizations that deal with certain contemporary problems (like environmental protection) or perform certain tasks (like building non-nuclear power stations or exploiting natural resources) which affect the welfare of the people on both sides. This might also include civic diplomacy or the active participation of the so-called third sector, including private enterprises and NGOs.

According to George Papandreou, Greece's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki was not the victory of any one against the other; rather it was a victory of the common interest.[39] He further concluded that it "serves Greece's national interests, EU interests, and Turkey's national interests."[40] Should Greece and Turkey decide to follow the path of upgrading their common interests as a method of accommodating their differences, the political leadership in each country needs to follow certain procedures that will lead to the discovery of the common elements that may unite rather than divide them.

This means that Greece should not take a one-sided view towards the communitarization of Greek-Turkish relations. Instead, it must approach this issue as the starting point of establishing a sustainable partnership agreement with Turkey that will lead to the upgrading of the common interests of both countries. It should be a partnership agreement that will not only spell out the European

roadmap of conditions, criteria, and/or deadlines for Turkey, but constitute a real partnership between Greece and Turkey, leading to a two-way road map of cooperation and economic integration in the Aegean area.

How, therefore, can the two countries upgrade their common interests? They can:

- Build on the experience already acquired in Kosovo and within the U.N. framework, when in September 1999 both countries supported a joint effort to help the U.N. respond to natural disasters;
- Cooperate on the regional level in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, and the Mediterranean;
- Implement any low politics agreements already signed;
- Transfer technical assistance and knowledge from Greece to Turkey, which will facilitate Turkey's European perspective;
- Enhance economic cooperation among entrepreneurs of both countries;
- Maximize contacts between civil society organizations on both sides of the Aegean;
- Strengthen civic diplomacy.

Following these joint efforts, the conditions for tackling delicate issues might mature. The only way to get to peaceful change, argues Mitrany, is to do internationally what we do nationally. This means making changes of frontiers unnecessary by making frontiers meaningless through the continuous development of common activities and interests across them.[41]

One might therefore conclude that the true task of peaceful change is to remove the need and the wish for changes of frontiers.[42] This can actually be achieved through the functional approach, which would help the expansion of common work and of common habits and interests, making frontier lines meaningless by overlaying them with the natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies.[43]

THE LIMITS OF FUNCTIONALISM

What are the limits of functionalism in the Aegean area? First, as Haas noted some decades ago, "functionally specific international programs, if organizationally separated from diffuse orientations, maximize both welfare and integration," while programs tied to the totality of national foreign policies never seem to enjoy implementation.[44]

In other words, a Greek-Turkish partnership must for a long time be concentrated in specific fields of cooperation. Furthermore, other fields of low politics in which agreements have already been signed, such as tourism, must be implemented so as to produce positive economic results for the public and the private sectors of the two countries.

Second, many analysts believe that even if they do not lead to straightfor-
ward positive results, confidence building measures or limiting the arms race
could enhance the social learning process that is essential to the building up of
mutual cooperation in various fields of the economy.

We should always keep in mind that the social learning process is by no
means a neutral process from the economic or social point of view. Rather, it is
"based every time on the perceptions of self-interest displayed by the actors."[45] The
learning process can contribute to integration only to the extent that the actors
conceive that their self-interests are best achieved by adopting new approaches,
and that these approaches involve commitments to larger organizations.

As a consequence, the learning process that is being developed as a result of the
rapprochement of the two sides could have spillover effects in other sectors of social
and economic life only to the extent that the self-interests of the actors can be better
served via this process. The way in which both the private and public sectors conceive
their self-interests is therefore crucial for any spillover effects of the learning process.
On the other hand, learning often involves the redefinition of earlier conceptions of
self-interest as a result of exposure to new situations and possibilities. Accordingly, the
economic and political elites in both countries may come to the conclusion that
important economic interests in the region can only be pursued jointly.

Third, another observation concerns the process of spillover effects from
some low politics issues to others, and then possibly to issues of high politics.
Haas has stated that functional contexts tend to be autonomous.

Accordingly, experiences drawn from within a specific functional organi-
zation do not automatically spill over to other organizations; even the same
group of actors does not automatically follow the lessons learned in an earlier
phase. Therefore, any potential success in a specific field of low politics between
Greece and Turkey, such as tourism, cannot automatically have spillover effects
in another field, such as environmental protection. Accordingly, Greece and
Turkey must concentrate their efforts on examining whether there is any real
will within specific interest groups to exploit real opportunities in the area,
while acting on the basis of their own self-interests. Spillover effects to other
areas of low politics can be realized only as a result of the process of learning.
This presupposes a conscious decision on behalf of state and non-state actors to
exploit any new opportunities available to them, and to adapt the commonly
acquired lessons to new areas, on the condition that their self-interests are pur-
sued.

Fourth, a further observation concerns the establishment of a real civil soci-
ety in Turkey, with active voluntary groups and interest groups that constitute a
valuable precondition for the activation of any form of functionalism. Pluralism
of demands and interests is the key for making functionalism effective.

In Turkey, political and civil society institutions are very weak, which limits the positive results that the process of upgrading the common interests on both sides of the Aegean might have to the integration process itself. While the EU is expected to provide economic and technical assistance in the framework of Turkey's Accession Partnership, especially for institution building, financing should focus more on non-governmental organizations, professional organizations, agencies, local authorities, and organizations of social partners. It should concentrate on helping organizations of civil society and interest groups in Turkey to develop the structures, strategies, human resources, and management skills needed to strengthen their economic, social, and administrative capacity. It is widely accepted that Turkey's accession to the EU will provide Turkish civil society with a stronger voice and give it more confidence in dealing with the state.[46] It is also believed that societal pluralism in Turkey will increase as the economy modernizes and provides more wealth, which will in turn lead to calls for reform not only on behalf of civil society organizations but "business organizations, which will push for reform at a faster pace than what the civilian-military bureaucracy elite is prepared to accept."[47] The upgrading of common interests will succeed only under these circumstances.

Fifth, the establishment of a real civil society in Turkey will facilitate civic diplomacy, while contributing to the building of the foundations of a political community in the Aegean area. "Where politicians cannot fathom crossing frontiers, citizens must."[48]

To this extent, cross-frontier initiatives already taken by schools, universities, teachers, students, hospitals and doctors, local authorities, and trade unions from both countries since the earthquakes of August 1999 have facilitated the entire process of common understanding and common learning. The differences between the two sides of the Aegean have become the strength and source of learning in the area. Civic activism and involvement on both sides has brought a new dimension to the concept of diplomacy in the area and proved that civic responsibility is the essence of a civilized society in the Aegean area.

CONCLUSIONS

The new functional rapprochement between Greece and Turkey needs to be understood as a procedure that facilitates both countries in gradually undertaking a positive approach as regards issues of common interest in the field of low politics for a certain period of time. These areas are built on by upgrading their common interests, while issues that divide them in the field of high politics are left aside, to be dealt with later.

We have therefore argued that this process should proceed alongside the economic integration already under way between the EU and Turkey, in order to

serve as vehicles for solving problems between Greece and Turkey and creating a real partnership between them that will eventually lead to the establishment of a political community in the Aegean area.

A political community that "is more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and marketplace than by signing pacts in chancelleries."[49] ■

NOTES

[1] *The Free Press,* July 13, 1930, 8; and *The Kathimerini,* July 13, 1930, 8. According to the well-known European activist Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, in 1930, "when Venizelos passed through Vienna I had an impassioned conversation with him on the problem of Turkey and Pan-Europe. He convinced me that Turkey under the rule of Kemal had become an integral part of Western civilization and that whatever the future of Pan-Europe, Turkey must be made part of it. He assured me that Greece could only cooperate with the movement if Turkey also were included. He spoke with admiration of Kemal and the impressions he had received on his journey to Ankara." Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Movement* (New York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1943),126.
[2] Functionalism is concerned with establishing peace systems: it shifts attention from national problems and solutions to the benefits of transnational solutions. To the extent that people's functional needs and welfare are met by patterns of international cooperation, they will tend to direct their expectations and loyalties to the relevant international agencies rather than to their nation-states. The main proposal of functionalism rests in the idea that economic and social decisions tend to spill over into the realm of the political.
[3] Stanley Hoffman, "European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 3(2) (1965): 89-91.
[4] David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1933); David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); and David Mitrany, *The functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson, 1975).
[5] Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); and Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation State, Functionalism, and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
[6] Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York, published jointly by The Technology Press of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953); and Karl Deutsch, et. al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
[7] Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation State,* 111-113; see also Ernst Haas, "International Integration, The European, and the Universal Process," in *Limits and Problems of European Integration,* Ernst Haas, David Mitrany, et. al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) 8-10.
[8] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem on the European Union, November 30, 1999, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bg/1999/03.htm.
[9] Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, December 10-11, 1999, press release, Brussels, November 12, 1999, Nr: 00300/1/99, available also on the Council's web site, http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm.
[10] *Agenda 2000,* Vol.1, Part 2, "The Challenge of Enlargement," II.8 Border Disputes, Communication of the Commission, Strasbourg, July 15, 1997, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/agenda 2000/strong/24.htm.
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