Dumbwaiters and Greased Pigs: Globalization, International Security, and Philanthropy's Enduring Challenge

STEPHEN J. DEL ROSSO

Industrialist Andrew Carnegie, once considered the world's richest man, established Carnegie Corporation of New York as a grantmaking foundation in 1911 with $125 million of his personal fortune. At the time, the federal budget was $690 million and the total annual expenditures of all American colleges and universities amounted to $75 million.[1] To put this into contemporary perspective, the $40.7 billion of grant money provided by American philanthropies in 2006[2]—a figure often cited to demonstrate the power of this sector—represents a microscopic .013 percent of the $3 trillion federal budget and only 11 percent of the combined $364 billion[3] operating budgets of the country's 4,200 institutions of higher education. Seen in this light, it was not so implausible or wildly ambitious as it might seem today that Carnegie's earlier philanthropic investments were aimed at abolishing war—what he called, "the vilest fiend ever vomited forth from the mouth of Hell"[4]—before moving on expeditiously to "the next most demeaning evil or evils."[5] However daunting the goals, in relative terms, at least, the financial resources he could muster approximated those of the most powerful U.S. governmental and academic institutions of his day.

Stephen J. Del Rosso, *a former career diplomat with the United States Foreign Service, directs the International Peace and Security Program at Carnegie Corporation of New York. He received a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School in 1981 and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of Carnegie Corporation of New York.*

Almost a century later, while absolute philanthropic resources are at historic levels but constitute only a fraction of their previous relative magnitude, promoting peace and addressing an array of related "demeaning evils" remain primary objectives of some of America's leading foundations. The 68 members of the major affinity group of private funders in the peace and security field have spent an estimated $100 million[6] to address a wide range of challenges, including reducing and eliminating the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, preventing violent conflict, rebuilding war-torn societies, and advancing more individually-centered notions of human security.[7]

But such worthy goals have not insulated the sector from critics who question the opportunity costs of philanthropic investments. In recent years, both the role and tax-free status of American foundations have come under increasing scrutiny, while questions of accountability, transparency, and suspected profligacy abound. Characterized "as the most unaccountable major institution[s] in America, for good or ill,"[8] they have attracted repeated attention from Congress. As then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee Charles Grassley once complained, "Every dollar that featherbeds a foundation executive doesn't help a person in need."[9] Nor by extension, he might have further charged, does it serve the cause of international peace and security.

FOLLOWING THE MONEY

So, what can philanthropy show for itself in demonstrating to the American public, and indeed to the world, that featherbedding is a rarity, its money has been well spent, and it has made a meaningful difference in mitigating some of the gravest global problems? More specifically, what has the sector learned from its experience in the immediate post-Cold War years, when it last made a concerted effort to redefine security and help advance the cause of peace, that it has applied to the similarly challenging post-9/11 era? Carnegie Corporation's current International Peace and Security program was once named Avoiding Nuclear War. As of this writing, so far, so good; but this seems a rather qualified achievement for assuaging critics or helping any of us sleep better at night—in whatever type of bedding.

As in the immediate post-Cold War years, much has been written since 9/11 about the new security challenges facing the world. Through grants to American think tanks and academic research centers, foundations have underwritten a large proportion of this scholarship. Perhaps most striking is not so much what has changed from one era to the next but

what has remained the same. The end of the Cold War and the aftermath of 9/11 provide instructive vantage points from which to assess the nature and effect of the rhetoric that each development spurred. Notwithstanding a certain reordering of priorities and new twists on old themes, there is a certain "*déjà vu* all over again" quality to much of the contemporary security discourse that belies the seemingly epochal transformations on the world stage and the responses needed to address them. This is especially apparent among the traditionally progressive wing of the American foundation community (the focus of most of this essay), which continues to seek an overarching conceptual framework for its collective philanthropic efforts. This framework is deemed necessary to foster collaboration and provide clarity of purpose to counter the presumed power and influence of its more focused competitors on the other side of the ideological divide.

In attempting to explain this apparent continuity and shed some additional light on the current role of American foundations in the peace and security field, it is useful to examine these issues through the lens of a fundamental notion that has informed and driven much of the grantmaking in this field over the past two decades and that remains central in both rhetorical and programmatic terms: the multifaceted phenomenon of globalization. Some of the key challenges confronting the NGO and academic peace and security establishment, and the foundations that support it, relate to efforts at coming to terms with this phenomenon. But like the proverbial greased pig at the county fair, the notion of globalization continues to elude the grasp of foundations, and with each fruitless lunge, diverts them from greater understanding of their capabilities, limitations, and accomplishments. At the same time, accepting the inherent indeterminacy of globalization, while abandoning efforts to endow this amorphous term with all-encompassing significance, presents certain opportunities for American philanthropy to get on with the conceptually less coherent and transcendent, but still vital, task of grantmaking.

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Websites of some of the leading American foundations with security-related programs and their links to grantee publications and projects reflect the ties between globalization and a host of substantive grantmaking

agendas. Among traditional funders, for example, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's description of its peace and security program begins, "Globalization is transforming our understanding of what constitutes a threat to security and what is required to create a more peaceful world."[10] Then–President of the Ford Foundation Susan Berresford cited "the challenges of globalization" as a reason for launching Ford's International Fellows Program.[11] Among other issues under the umbrella of its Program on Global Security and Sustainability, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation is concerned with "the economic consequences of globalization."[12] For the sake of full disclosure, this author also has invoked the same nebulous term in several internal Carnegie Corporation strategy papers.[13] Although the Open Society Institute deals mainly with issues indirectly linked to more traditional notions of security, its founder and chairman, George Soros, has even written a book on globalization.[14] Similarly, the so-called "New Philanthropists," such as Google.org, the Omidyar Network, the Skoll Foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation—not surprisingly, given their information-technology based origins—also have engaged in globalization-speak. But beyond general references to the increasing integration of the world, fueled by advances in information technology and the growing interconnectivity among various global challenges, across the board there has been an absence of deeper analysis about what this vague notion means operationally in grantmaking terms.

Harvard University's Stanley Hoffman once equated American foundations to "dumbwaiters between the kitchens of power and the academic salons."[15] While the term dumbwaiter may now be so outdated as to be mistakenly considered pejorative, the idea of foundations facilitating linkages between scholars and policymakers—"bridging the gap" in fellow political scientist Alexander George's more well-known formulation[16]—remains a widely acknowledged function of philanthropy. But the inherently nonlinear path between scholarship and policy is often poorly understood and only rarely captured by existing evaluative metrics. The conceptual disarray surrounding globalization, and the repeated invocations of this phenomenon to rationalize and frame many grantmaking efforts, has only complicated the task of transferring information into knowledge, knowledge into understanding, and understanding into effective policy.

THIS "THING" CALLED GLOBALIZATION

Beyond the foundation world, there has been no agreement on a single, universally accepted definition of globalization since the term came

into vogue in the 1990s. In a general sense, it has been used to describe both a relentless, unfolding process by which the world is "globalizing" and a condition that assumes the world is already "globalized."[17] Containing both objective and subjective aspects that vary with the user, particular definitions are often employed with the assumption that others understand the term in the same way. More often than not, it is invoked as a "fuzzy but familiar cliché"[18] used to explain everything from the decline of the auto industry in Detroit and the widespread popularity of rap music, to the border-spanning dangers of avian flu. This terminological disarray is especially evident within the academy, where globalization has become "one of the most over-used and under-specified concepts in contemporary social science."[19] The scholarly literature on the topic is often redundant and narrowly focused, and it commonly presupposes an authoritative understanding of what globalization means without explaining how it was arrived at or why it is preferable to competing interpretations. But the term also has been promiscuously bandied about in the inside-the-Beltway policy and think tank world, where it festoons countless memos, policy briefs, and public pronouncements as both an explanatory variable and all-purpose foil for a variety of contemporary challenges.

In recent years, globalization would appear to have lost some of its former discursive luster. Arguably, it has taken on a faintly anachronistic quality, given its close association with the Clinton administration and the exuberant assertions of a raft of once-ubiquitous "business gurus" who treated globalization as an unassailable, but superficially specified, truism. While overuse and definitional imprecision have helped lessen its appeal as a readily understood catchword for an array of distinct but interconnected trends, its resilience is impressive. As popularized by such widely-read commentators as *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, globalization continues to be broadly invoked and even further ingrained—however imprecisely—in the popular lexicon. Even as the novelty of divergent approaches to globalization has begun to wear off, the basic ideas behind the term have remained palpable and have continued to exert a powerful influence on contemporary discourse.

POST-COLD WAR SECURITY AND GLOBALIZATION

The expected transformation from the seeming stability of the bipolar Cold War system to a more fluid but hopeful "New World Order" has been exhaustively chronicled. Efforts to identify an overarching conceptual framework to characterize this era grew from a cottage industry after the

fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to a full-fledged academic and policy-oriented operation as the 1990s unfolded. Work on this theme was substantially promoted by American foundations, whose fixation with redefining security led to support for reams of policy-relevant research papers and scores of conferences and workshops. The concept of security—always contingent on whose security was considered to be at risk—became increasingly difficult to characterize in definitive terms. While diverse experts debated the implications of new—if poorly comprehended—international developments, one basic theme predominated: increasing concern about a multiplicity of emergent interconnected threats that, in combination, presented unprecedented challenges to the world.

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In retrospect, the debate over redefining security can be seen as largely informed by a related and, at times, overlapping effort to articulate the vision of a "globalized world," where a confluence of disparate phenomena underpinned a new sense of both insecurity and promise. While hyperglobalists breathlessly touted globalization's unprecedented ability to break down boundaries, leading to a post-national, post-capitalist world in which the borders of the sovereign state "may someday...have no more significance than those of American postal zones,"[20] others were more skeptical about this presumed integrationist nirvana. A "Revenge of the Empiricists" critique arose within the academy, often supported by foundations, challenging the more grandiose and unsubstantiated claims of the first wave of post-Cold War globalization adherents. Just as some security studies scholars (re)asserted that the essential realist calculus of military competition and global power politics remained unchanged, a cadre of international political economists argued that globalization was neither new nor remarkable in its current form and that it reflected a long-standing background condition in world affairs.[21]

Toward the end of the decade, a burgeoning number of scholars embraced a more eclectic understanding of globalization that went beyond international economics to include social, cultural, meteorological, and epidemiological factors. As with the analogous, additive approach to security, scholars appended such diverse developments as the spread of pathogens, early concern about climate change, migration flows, and organized crime to a steadily expanding list associated with globalization.

Also beyond the strictly economic manifestations of this phenomenon, but far less threatening than the above litany, were analyses of the rising number of border-transcending NGOs—from Greenpeace and Amnesty International to the Campaign for the Elimination of Landmines.[22] On the governmental side, the myriad forces of globalization were seen as playing out regionally in the boundary-spanning European Union, which advanced methodically despite the stubborn persistence of national identities among the world's oldest nation-states. Concurrent with these developments were the technologically-driven, homogenizing effects of Westernization and, specifically, the Americanization of global culture, which reflected the United States' presumed hegemonic influence in the world and became, for some, synonymous with globalization.

A recurrent theme in much of the security literature of the day was the apparent tension between the integrative imperatives of globalization and the more atavistic, disintegrative impulses opposing them, evocatively characterized by Benjamin Barber's notion of "Jihad vs. McWorld."[23] For Barber, "McWorld" was a proxy for the diverse centripetal forces of globalization that bind states and people ever closer through "technology, ecology, communications, and commerce."[24] Pulling in the opposite direction were the centrifugal forces—represented by "Jihad"—that encompassed a far broader spectrum of phenomena than the holy war (in its most prevalent, if often misconstrued translation from Arabic) declared by militant Islamists against the United States. Echoing Samuel Huntington's provocative "Clash of Civilizations" thesis, Barber's jihadism involved "the retribalization of large swaths of humankind: a threatened balkanization of nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe."[25] Much of this retribalization was manifested through modern appeals to nationalism—devotion and loyalty to a self-defined group based on ethnic or religious criteria—made politically salient through a revived interest in national self-determination, the venerable notion that each such group deserves a state or caliphate of its own.

Barber was neither the first nor the last to identify these antinomies, but his clever depiction helped popularize the notion that the world was being torn apart by what he termed "the deeply dialectical...dynamics" of the Jihad vs. McWorld struggle, "operating with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets."[26] The once-fashionable Hegelian dialectic that he invoked denoted, of course, inherently contradictory ideas colliding with each other to produce a synthesis that, in turn, becomes the premise for a series of further collisions and syntheses. But as explained below, this is a

fundamentally flawed understanding of the nature of the emergent post-Cold War challenges that continues to cloud contemporary responses, not least in the foundation world.

PHILANTHROPIC FALLOUT

What impact did such an eclectic notion of globalization and its presumed obverse have on foundation grantmaking during this period? First, among other effects, the synergistic threat represented by unfolding developments in a globalized environment encouraged some of the leading foundations to turn away from more traditional notions of security based primarily on the risk of military attack. For these funders,[27] security became defined in avowedly non-military terms, with issues such as environmental degradation, demographic pressure, and economic dislocation added to a growing roster of threats warranting serious attention. The zeitgeist of the era was perhaps best captured by Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy,"[28] in which he extrapolated from the multiple problems afflicting West Africa to predict a future racked by "ever-mutating chaos."[29] To counter the fissiparous tendencies threatening to break apart the world, foundation-supported scholars and policy experts promoted such multilateral approaches as "Cooperative Security" that sought an integration of purpose and means among states to solve global problems resistant to even the most powerful state acting alone.

Second, the presumed dialectical struggle between the integrative and disintegrative forces described by Barber led to increasing foundation attention to the "jihadist" threat posed by ethnic and sectarian conflict. Variations on Carnegie Corporation's interest in preventing deadly conflict, to name only one major foundation effort of the time, became a common theme of American philanthropy as a "New World Disorder" replaced its more optimistic forebear.[30] While many foundation-supported scholars and conflict resolution practitioners rejected essentialist arguments linking such conflict to primordial loyalties[31] and innate cultural differences, this phenomenon, whatever its cause, was seen in opposition to the countervailing, integrative forces of globalization. A succession of identity-inflamed civil wars during the 1990s—from Bosnia and Rwanda to East Timor and Kosovo—prompted foundation support for "integrationist" responses to such fragmentation. This was exemplified by the development of a new doctrine, the "Responsibility to Protect,"[32] which sought to subordinate the sovereign rights of individual states no longer capable of guaranteeing the safety of their citizens (and, in some cases, actively promoting their destruction) to a more transcendent, globalized norm.

Third, recognition of the multiplicity of integrated global security threats led foundations to promote the cause of interdisciplinary scholarship as necessary both to understand and respond to emergent challenges. Foundations such as the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, the Ford Foundation, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, among others, put a premium on grant activities bringing together scholars from diverse fields to address a range of problems viewed as intrinsically interdisciplinary. Despite the compelling rationale, these activities were susceptible to disciplinary tokenism, whereby a few economists or anthropologists were brought together with larger groups of political scientists or scholars from other disciplines with little meaningful intellectual cross-fertilization. Even more balanced disciplinary exchanges had to deal with fundamental differences over methodology, which often impeded efforts by diverse scholars to learn from each other and craft broadly informed recommendations.

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Fourth, even as some foundations realized that the pendulum may have swung too far in the direction of non-military threats and took corrective action in the form of renewed interest in some still-salient "hard" security concerns, the Jihad vs. McWorld narrative dynamic continued to inform foundation grantmaking. Early efforts during the 1990s to counter the threat of "loose nukes"—in which the detritus of Cold War nuclear arsenals could be used by a malevolent assortment of criminals and terrorists to wreak new types of havoc—played directly into prevailing notions of a world rent by countervailing integrationist and disintegrationist tendencies. Loose nukes represented a threat that was quintessentially disintegrative. No longer was global security threatened—or so it was thought—primarily by a hair-trigger standoff between two nuclear-armed superpowers, integrated, at least doctrinally, in their obeisance to the grim logic of Mutually Assured Destruction. In the equally but distinctly dangerous post-Cold War era, the world was now imperiled by what Friedman called "super-empowered individuals"[33] who, armed with weapons of mass destruction, posed fragmented, seemingly undeterrable threats unimagined in earlier times.

The apparent tension between disintegrative and integrative impulses in the military realm also played out at the state level. North Korea's

emergence as a presumptive nuclear power, as well as missile tests by India and Pakistan, further challenged the preexisting nuclear monopoly of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and threatened to usher in a far more unpredictable and splintered strategic environment. Perhaps the most salient expression of efforts to thwart the disintegrative impulses at play from the former Communist world to post-colonial Africa was the Clinton administration's policy of democratic expansion, which sought to transcend Barber's jihadism under the integrationist banner of Western-inspired democracy. This policy echoed in, and was abetted by, foundations through their major support for democratization and market reform in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.[34]

In terms of policy impact, these trends in foundation approaches to an increasingly melded conception of new and old security challenges had a decidedly mixed record—at least as measured in the continued prevalence and lethality of the security threats that they were designed to address. No matter how many foundation-supported expert meetings were convened, scholarly tomes and policy-relevant briefing papers written, and dialogues to help mitigate conflict in ethnically divided states facilitated, the 1990s proved bloody, violent, and threatening on many fronts. Despite some notable achievements,[35] most foundation-promoted work to usher in a new era of peace and security fell short of the ambitious aims first articulated amid the heady optimism accompanying the end of the Cold War. In the former Communist world (such as in the three Baltic States), some foundation-supported political and economic reform efforts helped promote positive change, even if their individual and collective effects were difficult to measure definitively. But at the same time, other well-intentioned experiments in massive social engineering went decidedly astray—the "shock therapy" in newly independent Russia providing the most graphic example.

On the more positive side, perhaps the most enduring legacy of this period of philanthropic investment in peace and security—albeit the most difficult to assess—were the hundreds of individual scholars and policy experts whose research was supported and promoted by foundation largesse. If good policy is informed by good ideas, and good ideas are best developed outside of government, where the press of everyday business and the crises of the moment do not impede rigorous analysis, then the many individuals supported by foundations during the 1990s could be seen as creating what political scientists call "the necessary but insufficient conditions" for the formulation of such policy.[36]

A more direct conduit for helping shape policy was the revolving door of think tankers and academics who served for a time in government. In

their official capacities they could expend the intellectual capital amassed previously, often with foundation support, when they still had the luxury of doing more than getting to the bottom of their inboxes. Although there was no shortage of "big ideas"—such as the reaffirmation of Democratic Peace Theory[37]—generated by scholars and policy experts throughout the decade, political will remained the key determinant of whether ideas could be translated into policy. On this score, the record of foundations was less clear, notwithstanding all the related dissemination and advocacy efforts they had encouraged and underwritten. But again, despite the increasing attention being paid within foundations to assessing impact, much of the behind the scenes information exchange with the policy world—from formal briefings of administration officials to more informal inside-the-Beltway interactions—was simply off the radar screens of even the most well-conceived philanthropic evaluation systems. To be sure, there were many trace elements of ideas generated in think tanks and the academy that could be detected in the policy realm, but such largely anecdotal evidence rarely met the increasingly exacting standards of these systems.

As the 1990s came to a close, claims, counterclaims, and new conceptualizations about globalization continued apace with no end in sight. While some 500 books were published on this subject during that decade, close to 5,000 would be published during the early years of the new millennium,[38] to say nothing of the proliferation of websites devoted to various aspects of the phenomenon. But this vast increase in chatter about globalization did not lead to consensus about its nature or effects. Rather than advance general understanding, it fueled a largely recondite debate with little resonance in the "real" world. Even policymakers were not immune to nebulous pronouncements on this theme. For example, one high-level U.S. Department of State official defined globalization as "the sum total of connections and interactions, political, economic, social and cultural, that compress distances and increase the permeability of traditional boundaries to the rapid flow of goods, capital, people, ideas and information"[39]—intuitively appealing but offering limited practical guidance. Summarizing the inherent definitional challenges posed by the "complicated and contentious" nature of globalization, John Micklewaite and Adrian Woodridge pointed to the basic inability of those invoking the term to "bring the wider picture . . . into focus."[40]

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GLOBALIZATION IN A POST–9/11 WORLD

In retrospect, some of the difficulties in responding to the preeminent security challenges of the post-Cold War era can be attributed to failed attempts to bring the wider picture of globalization properly "into focus." The same can be said about the aftermath of the traumatic events of 9/11. While faith in the promise of globalization may have been "shaken by terrorism, anthrax, and war,"[41] and some experts even proclaimed the era of globalization to be over,[42] the notion remained resilient in the face of such seemingly transformative developments. The failure of the world's most powerful state to protect itself from external attack, and thereby uphold one of the main pillars of state sovereignty, was more widely viewed as evidence of globalization's "dark underside"[43] than a refutation of its continuing salience.

Beyond the border-spanning nature of terrorist networks, one of the most significant themes emerging from 9/11 was the clash between the radical Islamism of Osama bin Laden and the imperatives of an increasingly globalized and presumably secular world. Not only does this theme literally reflect the seeming persistence of the Jihad vs. McWorld dialectic, but the appeal of Islam's radical offshoots would appear to present a major challenge to the Western-inspired march of globalization.[44] As commentators across the political spectrum argued at the time, the United States was targeted, not so much for what it has done, but for what it is: the main driver and beneficiary of globalization and all that it is perceived to represent. However facile, this view became part of a wider and more complicated discourse about the nature and future direction of globalization and its relation to America's role in the world. Moreover, the similarity between some anti-globalization rhetoric targeted against Western capitalism in general, and U.S. policy in particular, and the anti-American diatribes of al-Qaeda and its allies, served to further underscore the complex linkages surrounding the many popular conceptions of globalization.

9/11 IN PERSPECTIVE

In 2008, almost seven years after the events of 9/11, the world seems to be a scarier place. A successor to the attacked twin towers has yet to be built, and like the phantom limb syndrome suffered by amputees, many Americans continue to feel the pain of what has been lost—far beyond the physical void at Ground Zero. The events of 9/11 have been generally characterized as a major watershed in U.S. and world history. But what really

changed? Marking the first anniversary of 9/11, German publisher Josef Joffe challenged conventional wisdom about the presumed epochal transformation that had taken place that day by pointing out that, "Cataclysmic as it was, 9/11 was more like a bolt of lightning that illuminated essential contours of the international landscape than an earthquake that reconfigured it."[45] Well into the first decade of the new millennium, the world—and especially the United States—was forced to deal with the unfinished business of the Cold War and its aftermath, while at the same time struggling to understand and respond to a perceived new sense of vulnerability. The major security threats dominating the final decades of the twentieth century did not vanish after 9/11. Rather, they took on novel and more potent characteristics that, together with a growing list of newer security concerns, presented a potentially combustible combination of threats and challenges.

As was the case after the end of the Cold War, American foundations were instrumental in helping advance new thinking about these threats. A prime example is the December 2004 final report of then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World: A Shared Responsibility," which was informed by the work of a wide range of foundation-supported researchers. Beyond what some considered the debilitating limitations it placed on the use of force authorized by the UN Security Council,[46] the report gave official sanction to an eclectic notion of security that avoided privileging any particular threat. Instead, it categorized six "clusters of threats" along a continuum, ranging from weapons of mass destruction to poverty and disease. Similar to evolving notions of globalization, the variable and contested nature of security threats was acknowledged in the report. But while the context may have changed, the rhetoric recalled an earlier era. For example, the report declared, as if for the first time, that these threats were interrelated and could not be addressed by any single nation acting alone—a theme that, as noted, was central to much of the debate over new conceptions of security following the end of the Cold War.

Echoes of an earlier era also extended to the presumed need for a comprehensive framework for understanding the new security environment. In a number of instances, many of the experts assembled with foundation support to discuss this challenge were the very individuals who had met a decade earlier for the same purpose. Once again, the conceptual default for this framework was associated with globalization, even as its meaning continued to prove elusive. A host of new security challenges—most notably terrorism "with global reach," as well as diverse and seemingly interconnected threats such as climate change, energy dependence, and migration

pressures—were linked to this amorphous concept; and, as before, the results remained inconclusive. Further echoes of the 1990s could be heard in the policy realm as well. Recalling the Clinton administration's strategy of "democratic expansion," the Bush administration's post-9/11 embrace of democratization, especially in Muslim-majority Middle Eastern states, and of the once eschewed practice of nation-building in so-called "failed states" (a construct also developed under the Clinton administration's watch), reflected an integrationist, globalized response to a series of disintegrative, particularist threats.

A key theme of post-Cold War security discourse was how best to take advantage of America's "unipolar moment"[47] and responsibly exercise the capabilities that had accrued to what French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine famously called the world's "hyper-power"[48] and what his U.S. counterpart, Madeleine Albright, dubbed "the indispensable nation."[49] While American hubris may have been a force to be reckoned with during the 1990s, it seemed to be on steroids following 9/11 when the Bush administration's "preemption doctrine" served as the near creedal justification for its ill-fated intervention in Iraq and prosecution of the boundless "War on Terror." But soon enough, the primary task at hand was no longer how to exercise an excess of American power in a world in which many global problems were once viewed as readily susceptible to overwhelming American military might. Instead, the multifarious challenges associated with vague notions of globalization forced a reassessment of what to do with *too little* American power—or more accurately, a mismatch between the nature of American power and a host of newly apparent "asymmetrical" and "disintegrative" threats. Such is the persistent influence and suppleness of globalization, that this ambiguous concept also has been invoked in reference to the multipolar, state-centric challenges posed by the rising military and economic power of China, the oil-fueled reassertiveness of Russia, the technological competitiveness of India, and the feared implosion of nuclear-armed Pakistan, among other key concerns on America's overloaded global security agenda. Similarly, the

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nuclear aspirations of North Korea and Iran—viewed, in large part, as responses to U.S. policies—have been seen as hastening the disintegration of the global nuclear proliferation regime.[50]

TAKING STOCK

In both the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras, foundations attempted to help fill a conceptual and practical void by promoting a reassessment of extant security challenges and the means of addressing them. Some of the specific challenges may have differed in the transition from one period to the next—for example, after 9/11, the nexus of terrorism linked to militant Islam and weapons of mass destruction displaced China's growing military might as the United States' preeminent security concern; Iran emerged as a particularly vexing "rogue state;" and the war in Iraq (and increasingly in Afghanistan) proved far more costly and intractable than the first Gulf War—but the rhetoric used to characterize them remained remarkably consistent. It continued to involve the search for an organizing principle to make sense of an array of newly emergent threats. In some important ways, this search harkened back to the effort made at the end of World War II, when the so-called wise men of the era devised a postwar template for dealing with the existential menace posed by Soviet communism.

After the Cold War and after 9/11, globalization, in all its diverse manifestations, became the overarching principle of choice in this effort. But unlike the relative conceptual clarity and parsimony of the Cold War system (even if empirically contestable), globalization proved a far less useful guide. General, largely unsubstantiated claims about globalization's impact and the interconnectivity of a host of traditional and nontraditional security threats were made repeatedly, if perfunctorily, both to rationalize and guide grantmaking. But these invocations proved almost literally chimeral; like the mythical beast, globalization became an amalgam of many mismatched parts that defied ready categorization. As a result, notwithstanding the presumption of a new organizing framework, much of the grantmaking in the security field during this period failed to reflect any clearly discernable strategic vision. Not surprisingly, its impact has been similarly difficult to perceive and measure.

As for the presumed dialectical opposition between Jihad and McWorld that has become a recurrent, almost ritualized theme throughout the related globalization and security literature, it has only sown further confusion. Rather than a stark, binary opposition and "clash," the actual relationship between the forces of disintegration and integration

calls for a more nuanced understanding. The two seemingly contradictory forces are better considered as inextricably interconnected, containing within themselves both integrative and disintegrative impulses that suggest a more variegated, complex, and overlapping relationship. Instead of Jihad vs. McWorld, what we have been witnessing in recent years is more akin to Jihad through McWorld and vice versa—the forces of disintegration employing the instruments of integration to serve their own purposes while, at the same time, shaping and being shaped by those instruments. A few examples underscore this point. In the late 1990s when the Zapatista rebel leader Subcomandante Marcos first railed against the forces of globalization, he made his case using an archetypical instrument of globalization: the World Wide Web.[51] Brown University scholar James Der Derian has pointed out that, while there was only one al-Qaeda website on 9/11, only a few years later, there were hundreds more.[52] During the attacks of that day, the terrorists utilized an icon of modernity—in this case the jet airplane—to advance their pre-modern cause.[53] Whatever else can be said, the dynamic at play in these instances involved something far more intricate and inscrutable than a "simple" dialectic.

As noted, there had been some indications in recent years that the term globalization—if not the ideas behind it—was becoming passé. The events of 9/11 seemed to diminish its relevance in the face of another inscrutable force that gripped the popular imagination. But invocations of globalization persisted. New life was breathed into the concept by, among others, Friedman, who in a follow-up to his 1999 paean to the clash between integration and fragmentation, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*,[54] published *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century in 2005.* In his description of a process of "shrinking and flattening" that is "connecting all world knowledge centers" together into a single global network that he labels "Globalization 3.0," individuals—in addition to states and multinational corporations, which were the respective primary global actors in versions 1.0 and 2.0—can now collaborate in unprecedented ways across the developed and developing worlds.[55]

Although characteristically glib, Friedman has again succeeded in presenting a complex idea in an accessible way. In his formulation, this upgraded version of globalization will thrive "*if* politics and terrorism don't get in the way."[56] [Italics added.] A clash might occur between opposing forces that would, presumably, produce something other than the idealized, "flattened" world he imagines. But similar to the earlier critique of Barber's binary relationship, rather than representing one side in a dialectical clash, "politics and terrorism" are actually part and parcel of the very

phenomenon Friedman seeks to define and are both implicated in its basic dynamic. To be fair, Friedman also describes how flattening can enable destructive power. His worldview, however, remains essentially Manichaean; recognizable forces of light battle equally discernible forces of darkness. Not only does his approach resonate disturbingly with the Bush administration's "you are either with us or against us" persecution of the War on Terror, but it also underestimates the difficulty of distinguishing light from dark, good from evil, integrating from disintegrating in the murky haze enveloping what is considered an increasingly globalized world.

LESSONS FOR GRANTMAKERS

What has the American philanthropic sector learned from its involvement in the evolving discourse over globalization and its repeated efforts to redefine security? International peace and security grantmakers often press their grantees to derive lessons from past experience to apply to new challenges. In the real world—as the most recent intervention in Iraq has graphically demonstrated—lessons are often mislearned, misapplied, or ignored. Did anyone in charge of post-invasion planning recall the widespread looting that followed America's 1999 "incursion" in Panama? Did the very different context in which post-World War II de-Nazification was implemented not give pause to those imposing de-Ba'thification on Iraq? It is not unreasonable to suggest that foundations also try to learn some lessons from their own experiences, both to improve their record of performance and to increase their credibility in the eyes of those diligently seeking their support.

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First and foremost, the futility of post-Cold War efforts to articulate a clear vision to guide thought and action in a new era should persuade foundations to abandon their quixotic quest for any kind of "universal field theory" to help make sense of what is going on in the world. Simply put, such a quest—enveloped, as it were, in the rhetoric of globalization—is a fool's errand. The forces at work in the world are far too complex, intertwined, and mercurial to conform to any neat and readily comprehensible framework to guide grantmaking. Instead, grantmakers should defend their respective programmatic foci on their own merits, devoid of any presumed linkage to

some amorphous and almost infinitely multifaceted phenomenon that, in grantmakers' terms, provides little "added value."

Second, and related to the above, the loose agglomeration that constitutes the so-called progressive foundation community, which has come together periodically since the end of the Cold War to reflect on its role, should not seek to emulate the laser-like attention its ideological counterparts on the right have directed toward certain ideas and issues. For better or worse, eclecticism is valued far more than coordination or even collaboration—to say nothing of focus—within the progressive wing of philanthropy. This is not surprising, given the democratic (both small and large "d") proclivities of this cohort. Nor is it necessarily a bad thing. While concerted efforts may, in some instances, be desirable and have, on occasion, proved valuable,[57] there is always the danger of a lowest common denominator approach to problems requiring more pointed, less consensus-driven action. This may be especially pertinent in the face of the diverse, globalized security challenges that, in any case, each foundation tends to interpret in its own, often idiosyncratic, way. Furthermore, although criticized by some for supporting overtly partisan research[58] and by others for not being partisan enough,[59] the abiding eclectic interests these foundations have in rigorous, independent analysis across a range of issues serves an important societal function.

Third, given the constantly shifting global environment in which security challenges play out, the mixed record of foundation-supported efforts in affecting foreign policy decision making over the past two decades should lead to a more nuanced understanding of how such policy is actually made. Evaluation systems, an obsession of foundations since the end of the Cold War and, more recently, receiving renewed attention with the advent of the corporate-minded, bottom-line focused New Philanthropists, need to better reflect the realities of the policymaking process. An unrealistic, almost naïve assumption persists within some elements of philanthropy of a far more linear relationship between idea generation and policy formation than is warranted given the circuitous route normally taken between what Hoffman described as "the kitchens of power and the academic salons." This is not just a question of quantitative versus qualitative assessments. It is admirable and necessary that foundations aspire to hold themselves accountable for the tax-free investments they are making, but it serves no one—least of all grantees—if such accountability rests on unfounded assumptions about how a grant becomes a policy. As even the upstart New Philanthropists have discovered, determining the causal links between grantmaking and positive social change is not as clear-cut as measuring price-earnings ratios.

At the end of the day, at least in the unruly international security realm, it may be enough, however unspectacular, if foundations help add to the store of potentially useful intellectual capital[60] that may someday find its place in the sun—even if for reasons beyond the wit and means of foundations to affect or, in some cases, perceive. As former grantmaker John Tirman underscored in recounting how fellow foundation officers were unaware that the work they supported may have contributed to the end of the Cold War,[61] despite all the self-reflection that is a constant, especially within the progressive foundation community, metrics of success (and failure) in this field remain stubbornly underdeveloped.

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This judgment may not please foundation CEOs, to say nothing of boards of trustees, and it should not deter foundations from continuing to seek plausible evidence of grant efficacy. But, particularly in the international security arena, there are inherent limitations in trying to measure the impact of even the most generous of grants that are, in relative terms, micro-interventions designed to effect macro-level change. Much of the grantmaking in this field reflects what sociologist Robert Merton called the "unanticipated consequences of purposive social action,"[62] which lay outside the purview of even the most seemingly comprehensive and systematic evaluation systems. This unpredictability is neither surprising nor altogether unwelcome—but it needs to be acknowledged unblinkingly if foundations are to have any prospect of understanding the true limits and potential of their capabilities. The widespread preoccupation among foundations with "exit strategies" (a concept derived from a very different set of circumstances in the financial sector) also needs to be tempered with the admission that foundations are free to decide on their own inherently subjective terms when to declare victory and go home. For example, intractable problems in the security realm, from nuclear proliferation to so-called failing states, are unlikely to be "solved" by even the most strategic and generous of foundation efforts. Similarly, the quest by foundations for the holy grail of sustainability among their not-for-profit grantees in this field is, in effect, often just a way of passing off the burden of providing support to other funders. The international peace and security field presents an array of large, messy, and often intractable challenges—notwithstanding

their indeterminacy and inherent resistance to quick fixes, these are just the kind of challenges that philanthropy should take on.

Although conclusive evidence of its impact and efficacy remains sparser than many foundations would like to admit, philanthropy in this field nonetheless serves a vitally important, if sometimes underappreciated, function. It not only supports the generation of potentially effective, policy-relevant ideas that may someday percolate into the policy realm, but it also promotes efforts to refine and challenge conventional wisdom—from critiques of U.S. conduct of the Iraq war to its relations with Russia. As conveners *par excellence*, foundations can gather the leading experts in a field on neutral terrain to share their insights and raise the level of debate about diverse issues in a way that would be difficult for any less impartial organization to replicate on its own. Similarly, they can promote the integration and synthesis of knowledge that has been already produced, but insufficiently distilled or categorized, and help disseminate it to policymakers in an accessible form. Without authoritative, outside analysis supported by foundations, public and policy-level debates about some of the most important issues of our time would be greatly impoverished. Foundation-supported efforts also can complement official policy when they, for example, help secure Russian nuclear materials or advance institutional reform in the UN or U.S. government aimed at rebuilding war-torn states. More ambitiously, foundations can supplement this policy by doing what governments cannot or will not do—such as funding unofficial Track II diplomatic dialogues with representatives from adversarial states when official relations are stalled, nonexistent, or in need of informal dialogue far from the klieg lights of summit meetings. And, unlike the U.S. Department of State's Policy Planning Staff where, as political scientist Richard Betts once said, "the amount of actual planning done is inversely proportional to its value to the policymakers,"[63] foundation-supported work can take the long view.

Without authoritative, outside analysis supported by foundations, public and policy-level debates about some of the most important issues of our time would be greatly impoverished.

The dizzying array of issues in the international peace and security field does not lend itself to narrow—or worse, narrow-minded—grantmaking that seeks unrealistically authoritative proof of its worthiness. As the sign that once hung in Albert Einstein's Princeton University office read: "Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be

counted counts."[64] Given the depth and breadth of the multifaceted security challenges facing the world in what is commonly referred to as an age of globalization, pushing against multiple doors in the hope that one or more may open is not an altogether unreasonable approach to grantmaking.

Part of the challenge is a function of a "societal info-glut" that, as Carnegie Corporation President and former university administrator Vartan Gregorian bemoans, has led to a fragmentation of knowledge within the academy that has increased "the scope and the intensity of specialization" and diminished any overarching sense of unity.[65] The same holds true for American foundations, which strive in their everyday work for ways of unifying the knowledge they consume and help generate. But the fragmentation, not only of knowledge, but also of the empirical reality from which it is derived, argues against any all-unifying, explanatory framework—at least one that holds promise of providing practical guidance. Grantmakers should be conversant with, if not expert in, the substance of their organizations' avowed interests but should not become obsessed with connecting the dots represented by these interests to some larger gestalt.

Such a gestalt is surely not to be found under the false rubric of globalization or other abstract principle. The "pig" remains greased and beyond the grasp of even the most agile and sure-handed of grantmakers. Funders must stop chasing such an elusive quarry, brush off the grit and mud they might have acquired in the process, and focus on less slippery, more tangible targets within their reach. In the international peace and security field, the quest for a "transcendent sense of the unifying principles"[66] is inherently problematic and, in many ways, an unnecessary distraction from the more prosaic task at hand. Andrew Carnegie, the self-made multimillionaire, instinctively knew this when he said "Concentration is my motto...having begun on one line, resolve to fight it out on that line, to lead in it, adopt every improvement, have the best machinery, and know the most about it."[67] Carnegie also had an abiding trust in the power of ideas to serve the greater good. The machinery represented by Hoffman's philanthropic dumbwaiters should continue to convey ideational "meals" between kitchen and salon—between the policy and scholarly worlds—and concentrate on whatever line its operators deem best. But in doing so, foundations should be less concerned with the coherence of the menu than the quality of the offering. ■

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