THE CHINESE MIRROR HAS TWO FACES?
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION

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of
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by
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explains why and when China will deploy its troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Of interest here is the relationship between two categories of explanations: geopolitical-material and organizational drivers versus social drivers in Chinese decisions to deploy troops, and to what extent China’s two images – as a member of the great powers and as a member of the Global South – is relevant to Chinese deployment decisions. In order to explore the research question and tease out the causal mechanisms at play, the dissertation uses a controlled comparison of three cases of Chinese peacekeeping activity: participation in the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); the Chinese ‘missing’ participation to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and the Chinese participation in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Within each case there are multiple causal process observations, and in total the research spans almost a decade-long period. The theoretical innovation of this research is in debunking the popular conception that Chinese deployment to UN peacekeeping can be explained by geopolitical-material and organizational concerns alone, and illustrating that image – a social construct based on an actor’s self-perception – can also be a driver in Chinese deployment decisions, where actions are taken to project an image consistent with China’s own self-identified foreign policy role. Moreover, this dissertation finds that China has particular concerns in staying aligned with its great power reference group. This dissertation is the first comprehensive, theoretically-informed analysis of China’s engagement in the United Nations peacekeeping regime. These findings contribute to our academic understanding of China as a foreign policy actor, and also provide policy-relevant insights for those working on China-related tasking at the United Nations and elsewhere.
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My most important thanks are saved for three special groups. Thank you to my sister and brother-in-law – Tracy Richardson and Enda Curran – for always keeping me in good spirits and for introducing me to Haigh’s. Thank you to my happiness, Jason Fung, who consistently believed in my doctoral adventure, even when I doubted my own abilities. His passion and discipline for his work ended up being infectious for my own dissertation routine. Last, thank you to my parents, Alice and Chris Richardson, who only ever asked me to just try my best. With their support, I managed to complete a doctorate. I am and will always be grateful for my parents’ encouragement. I dedicate my dissertation to them.
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A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE WORDS

For this dissertation, Chinese words are translated into English using the Romanization system of *pinyin*. When citing article and book titles, I also use the Chinese characters for greater clarity. Unless the author themselves uses a Westernized format for their publications (e.g. Hongying Wang), following Chinese custom, the family name is placed ahead of the individual’s name (e.g. Hu Jintao). The same practice is followed when referring to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.
INTRODUCTION AND PUZZLE

When China assumed its seat at the United Nations Security Council in 1971, it was a self-labeled ‘student’ of the United Nations bureaucracy, generally following the lead of the Soviet Union. Even in the immediate post-Cold War period, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Chinese Ambassador was still pegged with the unhappy moniker of “Ambassador Look Out The Window.”¹ China was regarded as aloof to the issues stirring the UN Security Council, only departing from its general disinterest to issue vetoes against Taiwan-related affairs. However, in the last twenty years, the Chinese ambassadors themselves have gone from being “foot soldiers of the Chinese revolution” to “internationally oriented professionals,”² and China is now well-recognized as playing “an important role in facilitating cooperation about the member states of the United Nations.”³

Over the last decades, China has become increasingly engaged at the United Nations and more focused on promoting UN relevance, legitimacy and competency in dealing with matters of international peace and security. In recent memory, on matters of peacekeeping alone, Chinese officials have spoken out against “a tyranny of the minority in the council;”⁴ chided “countries with resources and technical capacity”⁵ to contribute more to peacekeeping, and repeatedly called upon the United Nations Security Council to undertake action to address insecurity in Somalia.

³ Zhang Xiang, “UN official hopes China will contribute “strength and wisdom,” Xinhua, September 20, 2011.
⁵ Bill Varner, “UN Peacekeeping Efforts Hit by Economic Distress, Arab Unrest,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2011.
However, China is still perceived as a state defending the bulwark of state sovereignty: issuing veto votes to shield Myanmar and Zimbabwe from UN Security Council censure; preventing sanctions in response to nuclear activities in Iran and the threat of sanctions against Sudan, condemning the UN Security Council sanctioned, North Atlantic Treaty Organization led action in Libya as activities that “armed action against sovereign countries”⁶ and vetoing UN activity aimed at condemning the Syrian use of force internally. China is one of the most outspoken critics of humanitarian intervention and remained cool to the responsibility to protect doctrine.⁷

In terms of peacekeeping, rhetorically at least, China emphasizes its commitment to peacekeeping missions that have Security Council authorization, host state consent, and a minimum use of force.

This seemingly inflexible stance on sovereignty has led critics to dismiss Beijing as irrelevant for discussions on intervention, or to view China as such an insurmountable obstacle that it should simply be ignored.⁸ Yet given China’s veto power at the United Nations Security Council and growing involvement in global affairs, better understanding China’s views and practice regarding questions of sovereignty, intervention and the deployment of Chinese forces overseas is very much needed. Peacekeeping is a lens to investigate these issues, where China is the largest peacekeeping contributor of the United Nations permanent membership today. Such a question speaks to a broader question of under which conditions China is more or less likely to cooperate on matters of global security governance.

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What is of interest here, is that a closer examination of the Chinese record on peacekeeping shows that China has flexibility in practice: Chinese troops deploy to interventionist missions (Darfur); to ‘breakaway republics’ (Kosovo); to states that recognize Taiwan (Haiti), and to states where diplomatic relations are still tentative (Liberia). Moreover, China is absent from missions where China and the host state have close diplomatic and dense economic relations (Chad and the Central African Republic). What explains the puzzling pattern of China’s peacekeeping participation? In the literature on China and peacekeeping there is no compelling, systematic and perhaps most usefully – theoretically-informed analysis to explain China’s deployment patterns. This dissertation closes this gap, illuminating the variables and causal processes that drive Chinese troop contributions. The dissertation debunks the popular conception that Chinese deployment is driven by predominantly geopolitical or material concerns, illustrating that China is also motivated by socially-constructed concerns, taking on foreign policy activities that project an image that is consistent with China’s own self-perceptions of its role in the world. In focusing on the process of how peacekeeping missions come together, the empirical chapters highlight the implicitly political nature of peacekeeping, teasing out the concerns and disagreements between stakeholders on what wider role peacekeeping can serve as a tool of global governance in the world today.

WHY STUDY UN PEACEKEEPING IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS?

Relevant to Our Times

Peacekeeping is the deployment of civil and military personnel to support peace and security in third countries, using measures short of enforcement. Unmentioned in the UN Charter,

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peacekeeping was established in the period of Cold War, as a pragmatic response to the
constrained foreign policy toolkit in the context of East-West rivalry. In hindsight, this was a
period of operational restraint, with a modest tempo of no more than five missions at a time.
However, in the post-Cold War euphoria, after the 1990 Gulf War, there were sixteen
peacekeeping operations worldwide. The total number of deployed military increased from only
thirty peacekeepers in 1947, to over 20,000 peacekeepers by the 1960s, to over 75,000
peacekeepers in 1990. To date, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has fielded a
total of 66 missions, with increasingly complex mandates. As former United Nations Deputy
Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown notes, in recent years the United Nations has had over
100,000 peacekeepers on mission – putting the organization in charge of the second largest
fielded military in the world after the United States.

Despite its ups and downs, peacekeeping has remained one of the basic instruments to maintain
international peace and security. UN peacekeeping has become a more fluid concept, defined by
three interlocking principles, which are discussed in depth in the next chapter. These principles
as originally conceived are:

- consent of the host state to the presence and activities of the UN peacekeeping mission;
- impartiality in how the mission operates, showing no preference to the parties of the
  conflict and no attempts to alter the military balance of the mission,
- the use of force only in self-defense.


In the post-Cold War period, however, the quality of UN peacekeeping missions has changed, putting pressure on the durability of these peacekeeping principles in practice. During the Cold War, peace operations were truly ‘traditional’ missions – peacekeepers monitored a signed truce and ceasefire over clearly demarcated territory, with use of force for self-defense. However, in the post-Cold War era, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on more interventionist mandates – as exemplified by multidimensional; peace-building, and even transitional authorities mandates. Thus, even consent-based peace operations are now becoming increasingly intrusive in host state affairs.\(^\text{13}\) Peacekeepers are in environments where there is no reliable peace to keep, as the difference between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and war are blurring.\(^\text{14}\)

Concurrently, peacekeeping has become an oft-used tool to promote security as host countries navigate their development from violent conflict to peace. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations asserts that the institution of peacekeeping “has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates.”\(^\text{15}\)

Over the last decades, for better or for worse, peacekeeping has become the most visible face of the UN collective will to promote and at times enforce international peace and security. As David Lanz notes in his study of the suggested responses for the Darfur situation in the popular media, a majority of suggested solutions called for an external peacekeeping force – whether it was through deploying UN peacekeepers or using the United Nations peacekeeping apparatus to supplement African Union efforts.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{13}\) Though a peacekeeping scale back is possible in the future. One current line of thinking in UN circles is that peacekeeping operations need to become less ambitious in mission scope, size and budget.


\(^{16}\) Lanz developed a database of 229 articles from ten international newspapers during 2003 – 2005. David Lanz, “The globalization of Darfur: making sense of a trajectory from forgotten conflict to global cause
The United Nations planned a drawdown of peacekeeping commitments with the downsizing of ‘mega missions’ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan (given this name due to the manpower, resources and technical skill required to deploy to landlocked, lesser developed host states). The emphasis on a downsizing of peacekeeping missions was in part recognition that mission mandates were completed and a desire to focus institutional focus on renewing energy for in this era. As the security environment becomes more complex and demand for peacekeepers is still high, UN peacekeeping is under strain – facing shortages of troops and police; enabler units (like engineers, medical units that provide the backbone supporting the mandate of the peacekeeping mission), and funds in the current global economic crisis. The UN peacekeeping budget for the 2011 – 2012 fiscal year is $7.26 billion, which is still “less than half of one percent of world military expenditures in 2010.” Yet the disparate goals between states that set the peacekeeping mission mandate; states that fund the peacekeeping mission, and states that deploy to the peacekeeping mission have come to a head in recent discussions on the future of peacekeeping, in the context of challenges like circumscribed consent from the host state; a lack of viable political will for peace; unclear exit strategies for the missions, and large deployments to land-locked countries with little infrastructure.

However, such efforts to downsize did not last long. By the end of 2010, new deployments to Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan increased the numbers of UN peacekeepers, and a high of 125,000 blue-helmeted troops were in the field by August 2011. As shown in recent developments in Sudan

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19 One of the hanging points in the discussion of the United Nations’ $7 billion-a-year peacekeeping budget focused on leading troop contributors demands in troop reimbursement rates. This would be the first increase in payments in a decade. Bill Varner, “UN Peacekeeping Efforts Hit by Economic Distress, Arab Unrest,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2011.
alone, peacekeepers are regarded as timely measures to address insecurity. For example, the United Nations is still continuing the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and when the United Nations completed the mandate for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), it was quickly replaced by two separate missions: the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Mission (UNISFA). As Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy noted, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations remains at the ready to send ceasefire monitors to Libya, and is listening to African Union calls for peacekeepers in Somalia. In the context of military overstretch in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and financial strains in the United States and Europe, the United Nations is becoming an even more attractive option to bolster international peace and security.20

These demand pressures for UN peacekeeping assets led Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to lament in February 2011

Securing the required resources and troops [for UN peacekeeping] has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.21

this does not mean that the troop contribution – finding the manpower to actually carry out the UN Security Council-authorized mandates – has gotten any easier over time. It is now the case that a small minority of countries provide the majority of peacekeeping troops.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon ominously warned of the growing problems with the peacekeeping procurement system as it stands today:

Those who mandate [UN] missions, those who contribute to uniformed personnel and those who are major funders are

separate groups... tensions and divisions are inevitable, with potentially negative impacts on our operations.\textsuperscript{22}

The Guatemalan UN Representative was even more to the point, calling the current division of labor amongst troop contributing countries, finance contributing countries and mandating countries “an accident waiting to happen.”\textsuperscript{23}

In this context, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support issued the 2009 \textit{New Horizon} initiative, where they called upon “an expanded base of [troop-contributing countries… to enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet future requirements.”\textsuperscript{24}

In 2010, the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) also called for measures to “expand the available pool of capabilities” for peacekeeping, charging the Secretariat “to develop outreach strategies” with its different troop contributing countries.\textsuperscript{25}

Therefore, there is recognition amongst the policy and academic communities that the peacekeeping enterprise is hardly a problem of the 1990s, and indeed, the peacekeeping force generation enterprise as it stands is in need of repair.\textsuperscript{26} As one observers notes “[the] capacity of

\textsuperscript{24} Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, \textit{A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping} (New York: United Nations, July 2009), vi.  
\textsuperscript{25} UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010 Substantive Session, 64th Session, Supplement No. 19, A/64/19 (22 February – 19 March 2010), paragraph 75.  
the UN to put an end to a civil war or an interstate conflict will depend largely, although not exclusively, on the quality of the blue helmets and their origin.”

A useful lens to study Chinese foreign and military affairs
As peacekeeping is a high profile, cross-cutting matter, this dissertation illuminates Chinese attitudes regarding a variety of issues. For example, peacekeeping policies provide insights on the evolving Chinese approach to non-traditional security, where China is for the first time dispatching helicopters for humanitarian missions in earthquake-ridden Pakistan and navy assets for tsunami relief in Indonesia; participating in anti-piracy missions off the Gulf of Aden; and actively discussing counter-terrorism methods with its neighbors. Furthermore, peacekeeping activities also reflect what degree of risk and responsibility China is willing to assume in managing international affairs. Dispatching security forces abroad bears a certain set of hazards for Chinese troops: the potential to have to use force in chaotic conditions could contribute to perceptions of a resurgent China, for example. Moreover, studying Chinese activities in mission areas like Darfur and Haiti illuminates the nature of China’s security, foreign and economic policies as components of Chinese grand strategy.

In recent history, China has adopted a view towards ‘comprehensive security’ now including “cooperative activities such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations,” reflecting a change that China is “less country-oriented and more multilateral and issue-oriented” Peacekeeping also provides a useful lens to examine currents in Chinese foreign and security policy, as Chinese troops only deploy abroad through UN peacekeeping. For example, when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown noted Chinese troops participating in the NATO-led International Security Force

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Afghanistan (ISAF) “as a possibility for the future;”\(^{29}\) the Chinese response was swift and blunt: "[except] the United Nations' (UN) peace-keeping operations approved by the UN Security Council, China never sends troops abroad. The media reports about China sending troops to participate in the ISAF in Afghanistan are groundless."\(^{30}\) This position was reiterated recently by General Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army: “…other than the troops dispatched abroad for United Nations peace-keeping purposes, no other soldiers are stationed outside China…”\(^{31}\) Thus, in contrast to recent research on Chinese attitudes to security regimes,\(^{32}\) this dissertation makes a unique contribution in looking at the Chinese response to a security regime where there is the option to deploy forces overseas.

Peacekeeping also focuses the discussion on China’s principled stance of non-interference, which scholars note is increasingly difficult for China to uphold.\(^{33}\) As other regional bodies, comprised of smaller, non-Western states, like the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), the League of Arab States, and the African Union (AU) treat matters of non-intervention with more flexibility,\(^{34}\) some argue that “[with] emerging global interests, China has to, under certain circumstances, intervene in the internal affairs of other states where and when the interests of its companies and citizens are at stake.”\(^{35}\) Recent events in Libya show such modifications of the principle of non-interference. Initially, China had a muted position on Libya, though China emphasized the effect of the crisis on Chinese interests. For example on February 22, 2011,


China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu noted that some Chinese citizens were injured amid the turmoil and businesses damaged, and that China hoped that Libya can "restore social stability and normalcy as soon as possible and spare no effort to protect the safety of Chinese people, organizations and assets in Libya."  

On February 24, 2011, the Chinese National Petroleum Company staff confirmed that their facilities were attacked, as crowds set fire to facilities and attacked their workers. On February 26, 2011, China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1970 introduced to the UN Security Council agenda by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, calling for a host of sanctions on Libya (to include an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo) and referring Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to probe whether war crimes were taking place in the “widespread and systematic attacks” against Libyan protesters. This was only the second time that the UN Security Council referred a case to the ICC, and the first time that the UN Security Council had done this unanimously.  

In the intervening three short weeks from when Chinese facilities were attacked in Libya, the Chinese blogosphere was alive with reports and commentary on the plight of Chinese workers in Libya. Over seventy-five Chinese firms, working in the oil sector, the railway and irrigation construction industries, and network development, had led to over 36,000 Chinese citizens working in Libya. These Chinese workers were blogging as they fled the violence in Libya, earning monikers like “the Chinese Moses” for fleeing across the desert to Chinese government organized planes, buses, and boats waiting to rescue workers. As a sign of how important the evacuations were, by February 28, 2011, China had dispatched People’s Liberation Army’s Air  

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Force transportation aircraft to evacuate Chinese citizens, and deployed the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy guided missile frigate, Xuzhou, from anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to support evacuation efforts by escorting passenger ferries of Chinese nationals. By the start of March, China had evacuated 32,000 Chinese citizens, with 9,000 already returned to China, 21,000 in a third country, and 2,100 Chinese nationals en route to a third country. As more Chinese firms and nationals go abroad, it remains to be seen whether the Chinese principled stance could change for time.

The commitment to non-intervention is not only challenged by imperatives of protecting Chinese citizenry and assets abroad. As events in the Libyan uprising show, China’s non-intervention policy is evidently not cost-free. China abstained from UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that authorized member states to take all necessary means to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya. Though this was a landmark vote for China, in that China permitted a limited use of force for humanitarian purposes, Libya still highlights the burden of non-interference – as a Libyan National Transitional Council official noted “a distinction between less supportive nations like China and strong backers of their cause such as France, Italy, Britain and the United States” when it came to assessing oil contracts signed by the previous regime.

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42 On March 17, 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 passed with abstentions from Brazil, China, India, Germany and Russia – all five states asserting that peaceful resolution of the conflict had not been exhausted, with Brazil, India and Germany citing concerns about “unintended consequences” of such an intervention, and China and Russia noting that implementation questions were unanswered.
Brings the question of “What is China?” to the forefront
As Jonathan Holslag notes, “China’s diplomatic schizophrenia and the complex image of an
economic giant, political worm and military worm” is confusing to many observers. China is a
difficult state to categorize in international affairs, and peacekeeping is an issue that brings the
contradictions in China’s position in the world today to the forefront. China still views itself as a
developing economy and lobbied to gain an affiliation with the now ‘G77 plus China.’ However,
China is the seventh largest financial contributor to the peacekeeping budget, ahead of developed
economies like Canada. China only deploys troop enablers that typically cost more to train and
maintain than the average soldier. China holds a veto-empowered position on the UN Security
Council, and, as this dissertation will highlight, can play a significant role in designing
peacekeeping mandates.

Studying peacekeeping illuminates the tensions in the Chinese position in the world. For
example, it is uncertain whether China will grow into a ‘helpful fixer’ role, with modest increases
in its troop enabler contributions, continuing to define responsible power by the Chinese hallmark
of kilometres of paved roads and number of patients treated in field hospitals; or whether China
will shed its troop commitments in favour of mandate design, financial contributions and behind-
the-scenes dealings – tasks typically adopted by great powers of the UN Security Council.
Moreover, it is unclear to what extent China’s long-standing reluctance regarding intervention
will change after repeated Chinese participation in peacekeeping missions that attempt to promote
better governance, rule of law, judicial reform and other statebuilding activities in the host state.

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45 Jonathan Holslag, China's Next Security Strategy for Africa, Asia Paper (Brussels: Brussels Institute of
    Contemporary China Studies, 2008), 18.
46 The top ten providers of assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations budget for the fiscal
    year 2011 – 2012 are as follows are the United States (27.14%), Japan (12.53%), the United Kingdom
    (8.15%), Germany (8.02%), France (7.55%), Italy (5.00%), China (3.93%), Canada (3.21%), Spain (3.18%)
    and the Republic of Korea (2.26%). An explanation of the formula used to derive peacekeeping
    assessments and a complete breakdown of state payments is also in this document. Implementation of
    (September 23, 2009).
47 This paragraph draws directly from Courtney J. Richardson, “A Responsible Power? China and the UN
The larger question of whether and how China will reconcile its rhetoric and practice also remains to be seen.

There is a growing understanding that Chinese foreign policy is driven by a desire for an intangible good: peer recognition of China’s status as part of a particular reference group, in line with China’s own self-image. Yong Deng simply calls this the Chinese focus on attaining a “we feeling” as one of Beijing’s foreign policy goals. Observers use various terms for this search for peer recognition. Marc Lanteigne catalogues multiple drivers for Chinese foreign policy – including that of “acquisition of greater prestige.” Lanteigne finds that “Beijing has sought to gain a level of global prestige which it feels it is due as a once and future great power.” Yong Deng notes “[what] distinguishes China’s present status conception is its emphasis on both material power and international legitimacy,” which is attained by way of “social recognition.”

In common with these terms is, first, the sense that something is missing in Chinese foreign policy – it is not enough for China to be a great power due to population size, geographic area, and economic mass – but Chinese greatness should be routinely accepted by other states because of China’s past position as a great power. As Michael Hunt observes,

[to] the extent that this long and rich imperial past defines the future for which Chinese strive, it is not in the crude sense some would have it – as a system of middle kingdom arrogance to be

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49 Marc Lanteigne notes these different drivers to be: promotion of external peace and stability; perpetuation of regime and domestic stability; reduction of risks and costs of information gathering; attainment of effective relations with other great powers; economic development and security. Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternative Paths to Global Power (London: Routledge, 2005).
51 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 51.
52 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 22.
revived – but rather as a standard (or perhaps more accurately a national myth) of cultural achievement and international power and influence to live up to.\textsuperscript{53}

However, a standard is only relevant if other states also understand that there is a standard and respect the notional pecking order that flows from that standard. Therefore, in these conversations about Chinese prestige, there are two implicit assumptions: external recognition from peer groups of Chinese uniqueness and special position of Chinese superiority; and, that the search for peer recognition is inherently comparative, with “connotations of ranking and competition.”\textsuperscript{54}

**Data richness**

Given the possible limitations and sensitivities in conducting research on Chinese foreign affairs, there is a silver lining in researching China’s engagement in peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{55} First, peacekeeping offers a discrete universe of cases: 68 missions have been fielded to date; 59 missions since China assumed its seat at the United Nations Security Council in 1971.\textsuperscript{56} Second, in researching peacekeeping, there are public materials that are a baseline of agreed upon facts. These sources include, but are not limited to, deployment databases, UN Security Council voting records and provisional verbatim records of debates and statements. In this sense, peacekeeping is an excellent topic to research because of the open source, consistently catalogued and already agreed sources providing for data richness, which all address core concerns for case study research.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{54} Sanna Kopra, “A responsible developing country: the People’s Republic of China’s climate change foreign policy and national image building” (paper presented at the symposium on “China’s Appeal and its Discontents,” Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Hong Kong, June 23, 2011), 1.


\textsuperscript{56} For detailed records, see appendix one: Table Of Chinese Peacekeeping Contributions.

More importantly, as one interlocutor said plainly, “China is of course very proud to participate in peacekeeping,” and thus peacekeeping is a topic that is relatively conducive to accruing primary sources through interviews. The growing literature on Chinese participation in international institutions, regional politics and non-traditional security are useful tertiary sources for this dissertation research.

**Why Study China?**

**Position at the UN Security Council**  
Scholars have gone as far to say that no major military, social, demographic or environmental conflict can be mediated multilaterally without at least tacit Chinese consent or cooperation, given the sheer size of the Chinese economy, land mass and population. Moreover, through its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, China holds formal authorities to exert itself on the regulation of international peace and security. It is important to understand the dynamics amongst the Security Council states, and in particular the workings of the P5. Besides their ability to cast veto votes, in practice, most of the proposals for UN Security Council activity are directed by the P5.

Researching China is of even more importance in the period of its rise and greater interaction within the international system, as China exercises pursues its own approach to the international order. Ann Florini notes that studies of rising powers like China and research on global

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60 At the Security Council, a minimum of nine out of fifteen votes are required for a UN Security Council Resolution to pass. One negative veto vote from any of the permanent members, the so-called ‘P5’ of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – will terminate a Resolution. The composition, agenda-setting and voting procedures of the UN Security Council are outlined in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (accessed August 20, 2011); available from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/scrules/htm.  
governance have been left as largely separate affairs. Examining the Chinese approach to UN peacekeeping, a tool of global governance shaped at the Security Council, contributes to the debate on the rise of China and what type of global security provider China will be. Joel Wuthow makes this point clearly:

> [the] relationship between rising powers and existing institutions does not take place at an abstract level, but occurs in the context of how specific countries operate within specific institutions, each with their own memberships, rules and purposes. China’s behavior in the Security Council is a part of the larger narrative, but has largely been left unexamined.

Scholarly works examining China at the United Nations have been mainly historical in nature and sporadically produced. This dissertation updates the conversation by looking at a series of peacekeeping cases in recent history. However, the empirical focus on the single critical case of China should not be interpreted as precluding research on other UN members. The cases in this dissertation reflect that it is necessary to examine the China in relation to other states at the UN Security Council and other comparative groupings.

**Examine the evolution in Chinese foreign policy**

China has stayed on a similar foreign policy track since the early 1990s, where the fundamental preference of the Chinese state has been to accept that the international environment is peaceful enough to support economic development and modernization at home. With this change in

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international outlook, there were changes in Chinese foreign policy in general and in regards to peacekeeping activities in particular, as detailed in the next chapter.

China’s increasing involvement in UN peacekeeping, and the sharp increase in the deployment of troops after 2003, are part of an evolving Chinese foreign policy approach away from a more conservative foreign policy stance of “bide your time, hide your capacities” (*taoguang yanghui*) and a move towards a so-called “new diplomacy.”66 As Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros note:

In recent years, China has begun to take a less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and, at times, more constructive approach toward regional and global affairs. In contrast to a decade ago, the world’s most populous country now largely works within the international system. It has embraced much of the current constellation of international institutions, rules, and norms as a means to promote its national interests. And it has even sought to shape the evolution of that system in limited ways.67

New diplomacy manifests itself in many ways in Chinese foreign policy and foreign relations. For example, the expansion of PLA activities to include tsunami relief missions, anti-piracy missions off the Gulf of Aden,68 and joint exercises with various militaries, all show a Chinese military more engaged in high-profile activities of regional and international concern.69 The notion of watching Chinese peacekeeping activities as a means to understand broader trends has been taken on by my defense analysts in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Tokyo, respectively.70

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69 Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan (Philadelphia: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).
Potential for a greater Chinese role in peacekeeping

Scholars note that there are “recurring generalizations on the core issue of who should theoretically participate in these types of operations,” namely: middle, neutral states without globalized national interests with professional armies that could undertake their part-military, part-diplomatic role as peacekeepers. In effect, this meant that in the Cold War period that there were states like Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway, with large numbers of troops from quickly developing countries like India and Pakistan.

However, in the post-Cold War era, there has been a change in the types of states that deploy to the United Nations. With the deployment of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia from April 1989 though March 1990, there was a leap in the number of countries willing to deploy assets to UN peacekeeping. Before the UNTAG mission, there were only 26 TCCs; after UNTAG there were 76. Many of these states are now members of the developing world, often shouldering large economic and development burdens of their own, and some with still professionalizing militaries. Therefore, as a corollary, UN peacekeeping faces personnel shortages and capability gaps, hampering success in implementing mandates. There is growing recognition that peacekeeping requires a diverse and sustainable base of contributors to meet today’s peacekeeping needs. The United Nations recognizes the need to broaden the base of contributors if peacekeeping is to remain an effective tool for managing international peace and security. A mix of developed and less developed troop contributing countries (TCCs) within a UN peacekeeping mission is a powerful combination that can deliver enhanced operational capability and stronger political leverage on the parties to the conflict. Moreover, the United Nations needs to balance remaining politically inclusive and receptive to offers of military assets, while ensuring that the mission can meet demanding mandates in challenging conditions. With

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the experience of peacekeeping deployment, states have taken part in the collective burden sharing of protecting international security and have an understanding learned by practice that shapes their approach to mandate discussions, finance debates and policy workshops.

To this extent, the peacekeeping regime has much to gain from continuous and increased Chinese contributions as a TCC. China is a member of Global South and a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. In China’s decidedly non-Western, anti-Imperialist character, it is a possible candidate for peacekeeping missions with contested consent – like that of UNAMID in Darfur, for example – as China is in a unique position to assure wary governments that peacekeeping is not enforcement or regime change by stealth, while still deploying capable assets, and a deeper understanding of UN Security Council deliberations. China thus is a pivotal node for the UN peacekeeping regime in a way that other permanent members of the UN Security Council are not – simply put, if China supports a peacekeeping mission, it brings a certain kind of legitimacy to the mission because of its well-known reluctance against intervention.

The importance of engendering smooth relations with China has not been lost on UN officials. UN officials seek to increase the number of Chinese troops deployed, given the size of the Chinese military and their solid record of service. UN officials understand that Beijing has a high-level commitment to deploy to UN peacekeeping given China’s desire to project an image as a peace-loving nation, upholding international peace and security. Therefore, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) approach is to capitalize on the potential growth of China as a TCC. DPKO undertook concerted efforts to encourage Chinese deployment levels in the last decade. For example, actively supporting the Beijing-based Challenges Forum in 2004, and sending the Under-Secretary General for UN Peacekeeping Operations to visit China in 2005. Prior UN outreach to China included seconding personnel through the ‘UN Dialogue with the
Global South’ program to Tsinghua University in Beijing, and also frequently praising China’s peacekeeping efforts, so as to sustain positive foment for China’s participation in peacekeeping.

Many studies have focused on the role of states like Canada, the United States and Japan in the UN peacekeeping regime. Though the writing on China and UN peacekeeping is growing, it is divided into main types: in-depth case studies of Chinese activity in a single peacekeeping mission or issue, or general overviews of Chinese peacekeeping activity. There is yet to be a

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72 Under the Global South program, staff members become fellows at partner universities located in Beijing, Delhi, Johannesburg, and Mexico City for one academic semester. Fellows’ responsibilities have included: 1. Developing links with researchers, academics and research institutions in the region in order to discuss and research issues of common interest such as the rationale/perceptions involved in decisions by troop contributing countries to participate in UN peacekeeping. 2. Providing guest lectures and briefings based on actual experience in UN peacekeeping, conflict prevention and mediation or humanitarian affairs for university students and faculty, NGO and governmental fora as well as academic conferences and roundtables; writing op-ed pieces for local newspapers, book reviews and journal articles. 3. Designing collaborative projects for further work by the sponsoring UN office and appropriate local counterparts. For more on the Global South program, see its webpage (accessed August 1, 2010); available from http://www.un.org/globalsouth/.


systematic and theoretically-informed study of the Chinese conception of peacekeeping, which would bring greater theoretical and policy understanding of China’s peacekeeping potential.

**Tabula Rasa/Socialization**

Though the Chinese civilization has a long history, the People’s Republic of China is a young state formed in 1949, and is therefore a relative newcomer to international affairs. For much of China’s first decades of foreign affairs, Beijing remained closed off from international institutions and refused to participate in many of the mechanisms mediating international affairs. In the last twenty years, China started to join international institutions: joining 21 international institutions by 1965 and 75 international institutions by 2000. Because China was closed off from international affairs for so long, as Alastair Iain Johnston notes, China presents an interesting case of *tabula rasa* to see whether the Chinese state will be socialized into the international system, and therefore comply with international norms.\(^7^7\) There are also scholars who discuss whether China itself will be a norm entrepreneur, promoting a more conservative view of intervention and pro-sovereignty activity at the United Nations.\(^7^8\)

It is worth pausing here, as socialization is tricky to study in international affairs. Accepting that international institutions are social environments,\(^7^9\) it is still the case that states are not socialized per se, but that their foreign policy actors are socialized. When examining a state to understand how decisions are made and policies are implemented, we truly are examining the actions of their foreign policy actors. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that such analogies between the state and

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individual levels of analysis are possible, as the practice of international diplomacy is anthropomorphized. However, there is still a variation amongst state agents and differing levels of pro-group conformity due to differing levels of exposure to international environments. This dissertation disagrees with Li Xiaojun’s stance that the “homogeneity of leadership makes Chinese leaders care more about their social identities in the international community than their counterparts in democracies.”

Instead, this dissertation contends that China may present a strong case to study because first, the Chinese state, defined by its senior leadership, has had a limited number of administrations since the founding of the People’s Republic of China and second, Chinese foreign policy actors who tend to peacekeeping as their daily portfolio, have a somewhat streamlined and therefore similar background (college degree holders, Chinese Communist Party members, with significant training and exposure to Communist party doctrine). Therefore, China presents a possible case of a state with a somewhat cohesive body of foreign policy actors and serves as a strong test case in the ‘norm maker’ or ‘norm taker’ debate.

In joining the discussion about the socialization of China, this dissertation pays particular focus to reputation and image as drivers in Chinese peacekeeping activity. Managing perceptions of China is a key concern for Chinese foreign policy actors. China established the Overseas Propaganda Department in 1990, the Information Office under the State Council in 1991, and the Ministry of National Defense Information Office in 2008. These organs were established in part to address communications and promote China’s image abroad. Besides these bureaucratic initiatives, China releases white papers on defense, security and foreign policy concerns at regular intervals; hires professional media firms to lend their expertise to Beijing, and lobbies for...

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81 For detailed analysis of Chinese government and Chinese companies use of public relations firms, see Xin Jinming and Jennifer Liu, “China Lobby Curries Favor With U.S. Government,” Caijing Magazine,
international platforms to educate foreigners about China. The emphasis on promoting a positive Chinese reputation and sharing a positive image of China is no different with UN peacekeeping. For example, in the words of a Chinese military spokesperson:

China is a peace-loving country. In addressing grave issues involving peace and security, we are a responsible country [...] Chinese peacekeeping activities demonstrate our country’s image as a responsible superpower.

Yet, much of the recent academic and policy scholarship regarding Chinese engagement in UN peacekeeping lacks conceptual clarity regarding the analytical differences between reputation and image. For example, journal articles, news reports and policy analyses imply a logical link between Chinese deployment to UN peacekeeping and China’s desire to reinforce its image/reputation as a responsible state. However, these studies cannot tell us when this factor matters; what triggers image concerns, or why these image concerns matter.

However, many of these analyses use reputation and image at face value or combine the terms without noting their analytical differences. The wider literature about Chinese participation in international institutions also reflects similar muddled thinking. Though often used

82 Chinese officials did meet some success with the hosting of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010.
84 For example, Chen asserts that participating in peacekeeping operations helps to protect human rights, contributing to a good reputation for Beijing. Jing Chen, “Explaining the Change in China’s Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping: A Norm Change Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 58 (2009): 157 – 173.
87 For example, Wang Hongying takes the term national image at face value in her analysis, and Rosemary Foot combines reputation and image pathways in explanations for human rights in China.
interchangeably, the concepts of reputation and image are actually different. Reputation is still a material concern: an actor builds a good reputation in the eyes of others, so as to keep up the flow of goods and benefits based on that reputation. Therefore, reputation-based actions are akin to consequentialist behavior. In contrast, image is a social construct, based on an actor’s self-perception – action is taken to project an image consistent with one’s role. In the case of image, what is being maximized here is the sense of self-worth and social regard for acting consistently with that of the peer group. Therefore, image-based actions are akin to appropriateness-driven behavior. Both are optimizing concepts: reputation-based actions seek to maximize material pay-off and therefore a positive reputation is a means to an end; image-based actions seek to maximize self-worth and positive status markers from a self-identified reference group and therefore garnering social praise is the end and of itself.

Moreover, in view of the peacekeeping literature, despite the plethora of data, robust explanations for troop deployment behavior remain inadequate. The balance of studies focus on explanations to do with geopolitical-material, organizational and social categories, however, few studies have attempted to operationalize the particular category of social drivers (i.e. image). Therefore, it is the assumption that there is much to be gained from utilizing each of these independent variables separately, especially because their results are difficult to establish in practice. For the sake of analytical focus, this dissertation does not address the literature regarding the creation of modern Chinese statehood, Chinese nationalism and domestic identity.  


**Dissertation Format**
The dissertation format is as follows: Chapter 1 details China’s historical role in the UN peacekeeping regime to today, so as to give context to this dissertation, while demonstrating conventional, materialist explanations cannot explain the variation in Chinese participation behavior. Chapter 2 covers the empirical puzzle; methodological framework; hypotheses; case selection; sources, and methods. The dissertation hypotheses are drawn from the literatures on Chinese foreign policy and United Nations peacekeeping. The next section of the dissertation focuses on the empirical work. Chapter 3 discusses the Chinese participation in the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeeping mission from 2004 – 2008, where China was the first state to deploy peacekeepers. Chapter 4 discusses what is termed in this dissertation as the “missing” Chinese deployments to the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) peacekeeping mission in 2007 – 2010. Chapter 4 discusses the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping mission from 2011 – 2012. Each case study follows a format outlining the nature of the predicament that China faced in regards to the peacekeeping mission; the relationship between China and the host state of the peacekeeping mission; a historical analysis of the Chinese activity vis-à-vis the inception of the peacekeeping mission through its deployment; an examination of the hypotheses against the historical record, and then conclusions. Chapter 6 offers an analysis, potential future research streams and the conclusion.
CHAPTER ONE: CHINA AND UN PEACEKEEPING

DEFINING PEACEKEEPING

Despite peacekeeping being an activity clearly associated with the United Nations, the term goes unmentioned in the UN Charter and UN documents offer little definitional guidance on peacekeeping. In the 1990 edition of *The Blue Helmets*, the UN’s own account of peacekeeping, has the following definition “A peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.”

However, as Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard point out, by the 1996 edition of the tome, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali no longer used this definition – as peacekeeping had entered a new phase, moving beyond a delineation of only matters of international peace and security to deal with matters of internal security, and the United Nations was already in practice using some means of enforcement – noting the murky separation between achieving peace and maintaining host state consent. Moreover, as Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin note, in the United Nations’ 2008 *Capstone Doctrine*, peacekeeping was simply placed as one of many peace and security activities of the United Nations – giving a flavor of what peacekeeping *is not*, but not defining what peacekeeping *is*.

The wider peacekeeping literature is still debating the term – with some scholars arguing that peacekeeping by definition should be restricted to efforts in place once there is a peace to keep

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(i.e. in support of ceasefires), and with other scholars arguing a more maximalist view that peacekeeping by definition should include efforts to restrain or end hostilities. Even with these varied definitions, scholars and practitioners coalesce around certain key themes. For example, Paul F. Diehl defines peacekeeping as “...the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory those forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved.” William Dutsch, in turn, defines peacekeeping as “… internationally authorized, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect… transitions from war to peace...” Marrack Goulding, who oversaw the creation of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, defines peacekeeping as

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.

The elusiveness of defining the term in part reflects the growing list of situations that peacekeeping is used for and also in part reflects the inherently political nature of peacekeeping itself. Furthermore, governments and international agencies are keen to call a variety of military actions peacekeeping activities in order to legitimize their efforts. In order to sharpen our

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The Principles of Peacekeeping

The principles of peacekeeping are inductively deduced, drawn from perceived successes in the field. Over the decades of UN peacekeeping missions, these principles have evolved with the perception of their success or failure in regards to the tactical and strategic environs that peacekeepers operate within. The evolution of these principles reflects various actors’ negotiations over the dilemmas that peacekeeping faces (e.g. inserting military forces into a sovereign host state), and addresses two fundamental questions to peacekeeping. First, when should the United Nations intervene in a conflict – what circumstances can the mission be expected to address and encounter? Second, how should the United Nations intervene – and conduct itself in the field?

Peacekeeping clusters around the three inter-locking principles:

- consent of the host state and other parties to the presence and activities of the UN peacekeeping mission;
- impartiality on the ground in how the mission operates, showing no preference to the parties of the conflict and no attempts to alter the military balance of the mission, and,
The use of force only in self-defense and in defense of the mandate\textsuperscript{98}

These peacekeeping principles emerged from practice, starting with the guidelines from the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956. During the early Cold-War period, peacekeepers typically were composed of small, unarmed military contingents monitoring ceasefires between states. Authorized under Chapter VI of the UN charter, such peacekeeping missions must depart when consent is withdrawn from the host state. By the mid-1950s, peacekeeping entered its first golden age, where there was a proliferation of missions – ten missions started between 1956 and 1974. The UNEF I guidelines are used as a starting point for peacekeeping principles because the mission had the principle of consent (as exemplified from support from Egypt the United Kingdom and France) and the use of force only in self-defense, implying an emphasis on non-coercive military functions for peacekeeping. From 1974 through 1988, only one peacekeeping mission, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), was established.

Then peacekeeping entered its second golden age in the post-Cold War era, with an emphasis on a more unified, effective United Nations Security Council. With its greater potential to work cohesively in the governance of international security affairs, the United Nations authorized fourteen new missions and experienced a sharp increase in budget growth. Only 11,000 peacekeepers were fielded in 1988, increasing to 78,000 peacekeepers by 1994. During this growth in peacekeeping missions, the United Nations made a number of changes that have implications for how their peacekeepers work today. Most importantly, peacekeepers were inserted into environments where there was no peace to keep, or where peacekeepers had to address breakdowns in law and order and humanitarian crises with lower-level spoilers. In

\textsuperscript{98} The principle of self-defense was broadened to include defense of the mandate with the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in 1973. However, this broader authority is rarely invoked because it is so broad that deriving operational guidance is difficult when faced with concerns about perceived compromise of impartiality and potentially circumscribed consent.
contrast, these peacekeeping missions invoke Chapter VII authorities of the UN Charter, in reference to threats to international peace and security, are missions characterized by a lack of host state consent; a wider scope for the use of force to include self-defense and in defense of the mandate, and are known as ‘enforcement’ missions. A United Nations Security Council vote is needed to withdraw a Chapter VII mission. Consequently, in the first doctrinal stock-taking efforts with the 1992 publication of *An Agenda for Peace*, there was an ambitious departure from traditional peacekeeping efforts in the new post-cold war era. *An Agenda for Peace* ambitiously stated that consent was “hitherto” required for peacekeeping and that the time of “absolute and exclusive sovereignty” had passed. In a similar vein, *An Agenda for Peace* called for the establishment of peace-enforcement units and reiterated the need for stand-by military units for the United Nations, as mentioned in Article 43 of the UN Charter.

However, following the failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, peacekeeping entered its second lull, where between 1994 – 1999, peacekeepers eventually dropped to 11,000 in number and only one new mission was established under United Nations auspices during this period in Eastern Croatia. In 1995, the United Nations then issued the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, which was a response to the blurring between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which had led to the failure of Bosnia and Somalia. The *Supplement* advocates a return to the strict interpretation of traditional principles:

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the last few years have confirmed that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping are essential to its success. Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not.  

Peacekeeping missions picked up in number in 1999 – with sixteen new operations authorized since 1999. In 2000, the United Nations issued the Brahimi Report, advocating a less ambitious departure from traditional principles, arguing that the applicability and interpretation of peacekeeping principles depends on the ground conditions. The Brahimi Report posited that there were problems with the whole ideology of peacekeeping: strategically adhering to traditional principles even when confronting genocide led to errors in judgment at the tactical and operational level. The Brahimi Report was notable in arguing simultaneously that “consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping,” however, at the same time, peacekeepers must have the ability “to pose a credible deterrent threat…” is required. The Brahimi Report argued “no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force.” Asserting that “United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers” and that “peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do

Thus, the Brahimi Report solidified the understanding that consent, impartiality and the use of force in self-defense are still bedrock principles of peacekeeping – however, with the important distinction that “impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement.”

However, in the last decade, the United Nations has faced a series of operational challenges in the field, which has challenged its circumscribed reading for the use of force. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, the United Nations secured very robust rules of engagement and a large number of reinforcements into the region; in Liberia in 2003 and Haiti in 200X, the United Nations mediated the use of force when addressing low-level violence, civil unrest and looting; Cote d’Ivoire saw the United Nations go as far as take attack helicopters to the rebels. Therefore, once again, as the United Nations proved to be operationally dynamic on the ground, in a case-by-case basis, as necessary and as possible, the formal position on doctrine became increasingly incongruous. Once again, the United Nations started addressing the principles of peacekeeping and their relevance in the international peace and security issues that peacekeepers were sent to address. The 2008 Capstone Doctrine was not presented as new doctrine, but as a codification of existing guidance on peacekeeping. The Capstone Doctrine reaffirmed the United Nations’ support for the three principles of peacekeeping: calling for consent to be distinguished in two ways: strategic consent from main parties and tactical consent from local spoilers; impartiality (not to be confused with neutrality), and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. However, the Capstone Doctrine made two important points about consent – calling for consent to be bifurcated into strategic consent from main parties and tactical consent from local spoilers, while noting that peacekeepers were to “manage”

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consent of parties, including “as a last resort, the use of force.” (Implications – page reference 31 – 35).

The *Capstone Doctrine* also separated robust peacekeeping from that of peace enforcement, defining the former as the use of force at the tactical level, with UN Security Council authorization and with the consent of the main parties of the conflict; while the latter is defined by no need for consent from the parties of the conflict, with the use of force at only the strategic level. The *Capstone Doctrine* also added new “success factors” defined as credibility (the rapid deployment of the mission, a commitment to the mandate and the ability to deter spoilers), legitimacy (UN Security Council mandate and local input), and local ownership (partnering with local actors for statebuilding activities) as success factors for a peacekeeping mission.

Consent is the principle that, at least in theoretical terms, separates Chapter VI consensual peacekeeping operations from Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. However, even this Chapter VI/Chapter VII division is becoming increasingly blurred. As Ian Johnstone notes, “the distinction has come to look increasingly artificial” with the realities on the ground.\(^\text{109}\) First, many mandates today have, in effect, combined Chapter VI and Chapter VII language. For example, the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is widely-regarded a consent-based Chapter VI mission, yet it has Chapter VII and “all necessary means” language vis-à-vis protection of civilians. Second, given political constraints, Chapter VII-like language can be found in Chapter VI mandate. For example, the UN Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has the authority to “Take all necessary action to ensure that its are of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind… and to protect civilians…,” yet the mandate is all under Chapter VI. Also, Chapter VII missions exist, even with full consent of the host government. For example,

the complete mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is under Chapter VII, even though it has the consent of the Liberian state. Last, in order to accommodate host state wishes, mandates can migrate from Chapter VII to Chapter VI in their *de jure* language, though still keeping sub-sections (such as those regarding protection of civilians) to leave a mix of both Chapters (as in the case of the revision to the 2010 mandate for the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)).

Acknowledging the complications with defining peacekeeping, this dissertation will assume a broad definition: *the deployment of civil and military personnel to support peace and security in third countries, using measures short of enforcement*. As the goal is to capture the Chinese experience across a spread of peacekeeping missions, this dissertation will focus on the typology of peacekeeping missions as they are today:

- *Traditional peacekeeping* is primarily characterized by host state consent, and mainly composed of military forces – not in theatre to impose peace, but with a mandate limited to monitoring ceasefires, overseeing troop withdrawals and buffer zones. An example of such an operation would be the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) or the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).

Non-traditional operations include:

- *Multidimensional peacekeeping*, which also has host state consent, but the mandate is more complex – so as to include monitoring and implementing comprehensive peace agreements – meaning that the UN peacekeeping missions becomes involved in substantial political and institutional reform of the host state, by conducting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, humanitarian relief operations,
election monitoring etc. An example of such an operation would be the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) from July 1991 – April 1995.

- **Robust peacekeeping/peace enforcement**, which is characterized by a lack of full and reliable consent from the host state and other local actors. These are operations in a “grey area,” – not enforcement operations like the 1991 Gulf War, but more like the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) from July 1960 – June 1964.


With a baseline understanding of peacekeeping, the chapter narrows its focus to examine China’s historical experience of peacekeeping to give context to the following chapters.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CHINA AND UN PEACEKEEPING**

Though there are limitations with an historical approach to understanding peace operations, such an approach enables analysis on the continuity, changes, and possible direction of Chinese peacekeeping practice and policy trends. To this end, Chinese participation in peacekeeping policy can be segmented into four contrasting periods.

**1971 – 1980: Inactivity**

On October 26, 1971, China assumed its seat at the United Nations Security Council. For the first nine years in this position, Beijing remained estranged from all peacekeeping commitments new

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and continuing. China condemned new missions and extensions of previously existing operations. Furthermore, China refused to contribute to peacekeeping funds, sent no personnel on missions and created its own voting pattern at the United Nations Security Council – dubbed the “fifth voting style” – where Chinese representatives were present during a vote, but did not actually cast their own ballot.\footnote{The voting patterns are as follows: 1) voting for an operation; 2) voting against an operation; 3) abstention; 4) being absent for the voting process and not voting, and 5) being present for the voting process yet not actually casting a vote.} Maintaining this position until the early 1980s, the initial Chinese position is interpreted as showing Beijing’s position of “strict moral opprobrium”\footnote{Samuel S. Kim, \textit{China, the United Nations and World Order} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 115.} regarding peacekeeping affairs, while the ‘moral veto’ did not require China to take a stand and isolate itself amongst UN members for blocking potential missions.


1988 – 1998: Increased Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions

In November 1988, China joined the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which had been in existence since 1965.\footnote{The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (accessed May 6, 2012); available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/CTTEE.htm.} In 1989, China sent twenty civilian officials to support election work in Namibia under the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).\footnote{Stefan Stahle, “China’s Shifting Attitude Towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” The China Quarterly 195 (September 2008): 631–655.} In 1990, five military observers were sent to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, marking the first time that China contributed personnel to a UN peacekeeping mission. In 1992, China voted for UNSC Resolution 754 establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC).\footnote{United Nations Security Council Resolution 745 (S/Res/754), February 28, 1992.} China also sent a military unit to participate in UNTAC – forty-seven military observers and a total of eight hundred engineering personnel served in UNTAC, comprising China’s first United Nations peacekeeping troops. In the case of Cambodia, China also weathered its first peacekeeping casualties when several Chinese peacekeepers were killed during Khmer Rouge attacks. As Yin He points out, the UNTAC peacekeepers were the only formed military unit sent on UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s,\footnote{Yin He, China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations, Asia Paper (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2007), 24.} though observers were sent on multiple operations.\footnote{During the 1998 – 1998 period, Beijing deployed 437 Chinese military observers sent on five peacekeeping missions, including UNTSO, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), UNTAC, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the United Nations Observation Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).} In 1997, Chinese agreed in principle to participate in the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), joining the Class A standby arrangements system in 2002.\footnote{Samuel S. Kim, “Chinese Foreign Policy Faces Globalization Challenges,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, eds., Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 276 – 306.}

Out of the thirty-six UN peacekeeping missions established between 1988 through 1998, China voted for all traditional peacekeeping missions, peace-building missions, and the continuation of
traditional peacekeeping missions established during the Cold War. However, China abstained from authorizing peace enforcement missions, with the exception of the UN Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF). Then-Ambassador Li Zhaoxing stated that authorizing the UNITAF was “an exceptional action” taken “in view of the unique situation in Somalia,” which no longer had a functioning government to offer host state consent.

China remained inactive regarding the Rwandan genocide and also abstained from the vote establishing the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). However, China did vote for the resolutions that allowed UNPROFOR to use force in specific cases, and also voted in favor of all the resolutions that led to the subsequent follow-on missions in the former Yugoslavia. In the case of UNSC Resolution 678, authorizing peace enforcement action in Iraq with the “all necessary means” clause to restore international peace and security after the invasion of Kuwait, China chose to abstain from the vote – though it did send twenty military observers to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).

Though there was increased flexibility on the Chinese attitudes towards authorization and participation in peacekeeping missions, how Chinese officials framed the Chinese approach to peacekeeping is important also. For example, though the then-Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Li Zhaoxing praised UNTAC as a “successful example” for “resolving conflicts through peaceful means,” he also stressed that “outside forces” should not “interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia” as this would lead to the failure to create an “independent, peaceful, unified and

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124 These missions were the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), which operated for the period of December 1995 – December 1996 under UN Security Council Resolution 1031, December 15, 1995. IFOR was followed by the Stability Force (SFOR), which operated for the period of January 1996 – December 2005 under UN Security Council Resolution 1088, December 12, 1996.
territorially integrated” state. Moreover, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the Chinese delegation offered three arguments against the use of force: that force was an ineffective tool of conflict resolution in international relations; that the use of force violated the principle of state sovereignty, and because of the traditional stance on peacekeeping, the use of force was immediately precluded. Furthermore, Fravel also notes that when the Security Council voted on a resolution calling for a robust extension or modification of operations in Yugoslavia, the Chinese delegation usually reiterated their stance against interventionism.

1999 – Present: New Era of Participation

1999 ushered in a period of active participation in the UN peacekeeping regime. China voted in favor of UNSCR 1264, which authorized a Chapter VII multinational force headed by a regional power, Australia, to take all necessary measures to restore peace and security to East Timor. Following the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), China also voted in favor of UNSCR 1272, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) under a Chapter VII mandate. By early 2002, China had sent a total of 76 civilian police participated in UNTAET, with one officer becoming the deputy UN police commissioner, and a number of Chinese officials serving in the UNTAET civilian administration. Analysts noted that the peacekeeping missions in East Timor signaled that China saw “enforcement-featured mandate[s] like that of UNTAET could be politically acceptable.”

China was also active in the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiBH), sending a total of fifteen police officers to the peacekeeping mission. In March 2003, China sent a 175-person engineering company and a 43-person medical unit to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In December 2004, China sent a 240-person transportation company, a 275-person engineering company, and a 43-person field hospital to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This was later followed by a second dispatch of peacekeepers, specializing in “…the safe transportation of goods and other peacekeeping troops… during their eight month tour of duty…” China also voted to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in October 2002, sending one police officer to the mission. In 1999, China abstained from authorizing UNSC Resolution 1244, establishing the Chapter VII mission of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Yet in 2004, China sent a total of nineteen police officers were dispatched to UNMIK, followed by a third batch of eighteen police officers in July 2005.

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In April 2004, China voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1542, establishing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This marked the first time that China sent peacekeeping contributions to a state with which it had no diplomatic relations, China dispatched a 125-person formed police unit, and a further five civilian police officers to MINUSTAH. As He notes, the formed police unit sent to Haiti is a self-contained police force – equipped with batons, shields, pepper spray, water canons, light machine guns, and armored personnel carriers, the formed police unit therefore has capabilities that individual police and military troops could perform.

In March 2006, China sent 182 military logistics troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) – including one mine clearance company, one engineering company, one support company and one field hospital. Following the death of a Chinese peacekeeper, China still committed 1000 peacekeepers to UNIFIL. In May 2006, China then committed 435 military logistics troops to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) – these included a 275-engineering company, a 100-person transportation company, and a 60-person field hospital. Thus, the trajectory of Chinese policy has gone from disdain regarding UN peace operations to cautious, qualified deployment to these missions.

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WHERE CHINA IS TODAY

Chinese Peacekeeping Deployments

As of December 2010, China had fielded 17,390 peacekeepers across nineteen missions.\textsuperscript{145} China also notes that nine peacekeepers have been killed while on mission. In April 2012, China had 1,911 Chinese personnel across a variety of roles deployed to thirteen of the sixteen UN peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{146}

![Figure 1: Chinese Deployment to UN Peacekeeping, 1990 – 2012.](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/)

China started increasing its troop contributions and made concerted engagement in the UN peacekeeping regime at a time of severe overstretch in UN operational capacity. Chinese participation in the UN–AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Interim Force in


\textsuperscript{146} UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police contributors,” (accessed on June 2, 2012); available from \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml}. UN numbers are from April 2012, the most up-to-date numbers publicly available.
Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), for example, supported high-profile, large-scale missions short of desperately needed enabler units giving even greater support to Chinese statements of responsible power.\textsuperscript{147} Chinese peacekeepers are regarded as becoming more flexible in the field, showing more acceptance of the fluid nature of their deployment and a willingness to use their capabilities to execute tasks beyond those initially requested.\textsuperscript{148} There is now a dedicated Office for Peacekeeping Affairs within the PLA and a Peacekeeping Division within the Ministry of Public Security, staffed increasingly with officers with experience in both the UN Secretariat and peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{149} Between the Ministry of Public Security and the PLA, China now maintains three peacekeeping training centres. China continues to lobby for more officers at UN Secretariat and in senior positions in the field: in September 2007, PLA Major General Zhao Jingmin was the first Chinese officer to be appointed as Force Commander of a UN peacekeeping mission, when he assumed responsibilities for the military-related tasks for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).\textsuperscript{150} In January 2011, PLA Major General Chao Liu was appointed force commander of UNFICYP.\textsuperscript{151}

China is very specific in its peacekeeping deployments: dispatching ‘enabler units’; individual police and individual liaison officers; and formed police units (forces of even greater utility as they train, deploy and operate in the field as a team). These troops are typically more challenging for the UN Secretariat to source, since most militaries from developing states do not have these high-value capabilities. Given China’s focus on more development-oriented activities such as

\textsuperscript{147} I thank Richard Gowan for this point.
\textsuperscript{148} Interview with UN official, New York, Aug. 2010.
\textsuperscript{149} This paragraph draws in part from Courtney J. Richardson, “China’s Growing Involvement in Global Peacekeeping,” in Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner and Center on International Cooperation, 2010), 105.
\textsuperscript{150} “Secretary-General Appoints Major General Zhao Jingmin of China as Force Commander for Western Sahara Mission,” UN Document SG/A1089 BIO/3918 (28 August 2007).
\textsuperscript{151} “Chinese General to Lead UN Peacekeeping Force,” The Straits Times, January 14, 2011.
drilling waterholes and delivering healthcare, China is yet to deploy ‘blue-helmeted’ peacekeepers. However, statements indicate that this may change. The Chinese offered one thousand troops to the UNIFIL mission in September 2006, though the UN encouraged China to continue with its comparative advantage in deploying enabler units. In July 2010, the PLA noted that in order to deploy infantry troops abroad, Chinese decision-makers would ‘take into account our national defence policy, which is defensive in nature, the international community’s response, as well as our troop’s capability’.

Such conditions reflect two subtle points. First, the PLA is aware of the need not to foster negative perceptions of a resurgent China. Second, the statements imply wariness that the potential costs of underperformance in the field fall on the PLA.

**WHAT IS THE CHINESE RHETORIC ON PEACEKEEPING?**

China states that guiding peacekeeping principles are UN Security Council authorization, host state consent and a minimum use of force. Reaffirmed during speeches, conference minutes, and Security Council deliberations, these views indicate China’s commitment to its conservative view of peacekeeping missions: namely to support traditional peacekeeping missions, and a preference not to support more robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, which, with more interventionist mandates, challenge the principles that China espouses. These mutually reinforcing principles indicate that the Chinese position is in part driven to support traditional missions.

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sovereignty at the United Nations. The insistence on the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference are clear in official Chinese statements:

> respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in a country’s internal affairs must always be observed. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization composed of sovereign States rather than a world government...

Chinese peacekeeping rhetoric may seem arcane in its most whole and strictest interpretation. However, Chinese officials are very careful to frame concerns using United Nations peacekeeping language, sending a subtle reminder that the Chinese position on peacekeeping is in step with core United Nations doctrine. For example, at the 2009 Open Debate of the Security Council on UN Peacekeeping Operations, the Chinese Ambassador noted the following: “Facts have proven that the Hammarskjold principles are important guarantee for the success of peacekeeping operations and remains effective in practice...” As recently as a 2011 Open Debate on Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Security Council, Chinese representative Li Baodong again emphasized that "Peacekeeping operations should adhere to the Hammarskjold principles, which constitute the premise and foundation for smooth conduct of UN peacekeeping operation..."

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157 In emphasizing the Hammarskjold principles of peacekeeping, China refers to the following principles: consent of the parties of the conflict to the presence of the peacekeeping mission; the peacekeeping mission does not constitute enforcement actions; the military functions of the peacekeeping mission would be strictly limited; the peacekeeping mission be neutral and not try to influence the politico-military power balance between the two countries, and that the mission itself is temporary. For more detail, see *Second Report of the Secretary-General on the Feasibility of a UN Emergency Force*, UN Document A/3302 (6 November 1956).
**Why the commitment to this principled stance?**

The Chinese rhetoric on peacekeeping reflects wider Chinese foreign policy tenets of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs of the state, as reflected in the touchstone to Chinese foreign policy, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Jia Qingguo asserts that there are four sources that drive the Chinese stance on matters relating to sovereignty and intervention: “the nature of the existing international system; China’s experience with the outside world in modern times; its international status; and its domestic politics.”\(^{158}\) The following section turns to each of these four sources in turn.

Though China has become more engaged with international institutions over the last twenty years, these are still relatively new changes for a state that was not an active party to the redesign of the post-World War II international system. Thus, within international forums, China has pursued what Samuel Kim calls a “maxi-mini strategy,” maximizing security or economic benefits derived from the current international order, while minimizing Chinese responsibilities within the international system.\(^{159}\) Approaching international affairs with the skepticism of a weaker state influences China to assert its absolutist stance on questions of intervention: by reiterating its own principled stance against intervention, China shields itself from challenges to Chinese sovereignty of its multi-ethnic state (over contested areas like Tibet or Xinjiang, for example) and questions about its stance on human rights.

The Chinese experience of the “century of humiliation,” approximately from 1839 – 1949, when the Chinese state was shaped by war and unequal treaties, and fractured between different warlords, foreign concessions and invading colonizers is central to the myth of the founding of

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the Chinese Communist Party, as the protector of the Chinese people and territory.\textsuperscript{160} As Wang Jisi points out the Chinese leadership have a “persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats.”\textsuperscript{161} The Chinese wariness of UN Security Council “power politics,” “hegemony,” “gunboat diplomacy” and “might is right” are references to the Chinese experience at the turn of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{162} The weight of the Chinese state’s traumatic entry into the twentieth century is so great that “the loss or gain of sovereign rights by other actors was always seen through this prism of China’s own sovereignty in a way that often overemphasized the possible implications of intervention elsewhere for China’s own sovereignty claims.”\textsuperscript{163} Others note that the Chinese stance on peacekeeping is a result of “[justifying]… opposition in terms of sovereignty in order to safeguard Chinese sovereignty from future intervention.”\textsuperscript{164}

In regards to China’s international status, Beijing has a unique position within the international system. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council which still presents itself as a non-Western, non-Imperialist, developing state. The Chinese courtship of developing states – through appeals to the Group of 77 or the Non-Aligned Movement – reflects interests in presenting China as a developing state. China’s original position as a weaker state within the Cold War bipolar and post-Cold War unipolar international system, fed the Chinese skepticism on the limited utility of force and the premium of the peaceful resolution of conflict. Moreover, China is the only P5 member to have fought against a UN-authorized operation, the 1950 Korean War.

\textsuperscript{162} For example, see the statement of Chinese representative, Tang Jiaxuan, Statement to the 54\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly, UN Document A/54/PV.8 (22 September 1999).
Features of the Chinese political system may also influence its position on intervention. Michael Davis asserts that the one-party system “is fundamentally at odds, both in principle and practicality, with the sovereignty deprecating features of a substantial humanitarian intervention regime.” Given China’s focus on growing Chinese pride in their nation-state, delivering economic goods, and guaranteeing limited political freedoms, it seems doubtful that Beijing would be supportive of interventionism. In recent years, the United Nations has accepted a widening definition of what constitutes threats to the peace and therefore what peacekeeping activities are permissible under Chapter VII aegis. The United Nations has also become more involved in more interventionist mandates, not just in the use of force, but also in the reform of electoral, governance and security systems within the host state. These trends are at odds with the Chinese domestic political system, with its view that state rights guarantee human rights and that special attention to Chinese characteristics must inform any conversation about the Chinese state or economy. Moreover, concerns about supporting break-away republics may come too close to challenging the Chinese position on reunifying China and Taiwan into one single state entity, which is a key goal for the Chinese state.

Complementing Jia Qingguo’s analysis, it is also worth noting that in a time of China’s much reported rise and the fear-mongering that this rise generates in relation to power transitions and decline of great powers, Chinese commitment to these principles are to emphasize in effect not only China’s self-protection from external criticism, but also signal China’s commitment to being...


167 Michael Beckley notes that “the rise of China” was the most read about news story of the 21st century – ahead of even the September 11, 2001 attack, the most recent Iraq War, President Obama’s 2008 election or the Royal Wedding of 2011. For more detail see, Michael Beckley, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise is Limited” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2011), 1.
an engaged global citizen, committed to the United Nations and uninterested in attempts to revise the state system without taking into account the interests of the less powerful. By bolstering this mechanism of international peace and security, China upholds the relevance of the United Nations Security Council as an arbiter of international politics and designator of legitimate activity. The importance of supporting the multilateral order through the UN Security Council cannot be overlooked.

However, given the fluidity of the United Nations mandate and the spread of situations the United Nations is called to address with peacekeeping, China has made ‘exceptions’ to its typically non-interventionist stance. Though China espouses a firm commitment to more conservative principles in regards to peacekeeping, it is flexible in the application of these principles in practice. The following section analyzes the Chinese practice in regards to two key principles: host state consent and UN Security Council authorization.

**WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF CHINESE ACTIVITY IN PRACTICE?**

**Case Sketches Regarding Host State Consent**

Examining China’s post-Cold War peacekeeping record, there is evidence of China moderating its absolutist commitment to host state consent when it deems necessary. The cases of three 1990s peacekeeping missions, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, and more recently in the case of Darfur, highlight to what degree China can be flexible on this principle.

*Somalia*

In regards to UN peacekeeping in Somalia, China authorized three consecutive peacekeeping missions, even though there was no host state consent given to any of these missions. Beijing supported all UN Security Council resolutions on the matter of the humanitarian and security situation in Somalia from January 1992 through November 1994. During that time period, three
different peacekeeping missions were authorized by the UN Security Council: the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission deployed to monitor the March 1992 Mogadishu ceasefire agreement;\textsuperscript{168} the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was ground-breaking in that it was a Chapter VII mission deployed to use force for explicitly humanitarian purposes, and the expansion of the UNITAF mission to the March 1993 United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), which was the first Chapter VII mission deployed to undertake enforcement actions.

China voted for these missions in the absence of Somalia’s consent. As there was no government sitting in Mogadishu, there was no agent representing Somalia at the United Nations able to convey consent to a peacekeeping mission. China, however, did reference its commitments to host state consent, noting that the UNITAF mission was “an exceptional action in view of the unique situation in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{169} Following the authorization of the Chapter VII UNOSOM II mission, Beijing emphasized “the unique situation of the absence of any effective, functioning government in Somalia,” concluding that the mission was “in favour of the United Nations taking strong, exceptional measures in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{170} China was clear to emphasize that in the case of Somalia that ‘exceptions’ to a typically non-interventionist Chinese habits should remain just that – as exceptional, non-precedent-setting behavior. Thus, the Chinese position was clear – supporting UN Security Council resolutions 794 and 814 enabling both the Chapter VII missions UNITAF and UNOSOM II was possible because there was no legitimate Somali government to convey Mogadishu’s stance at the United Nations.

\textit{Haiti}

In regards to UN peacekeeping in Haiti, China found it permissible to stretch the definition of state consent. In June 1993, the UN Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 841, under Chapter VII, setting an arms and fuel embargo and freezing the financial assets of the Haitian government that overthrew the elected regime of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. China noted that the Haitian situation was “a matter which falls within the internal affairs of that country, and therefore should be dealt with by the Haitian people themselves.”\(^{171}\) China was not alone in its reservations in regards to UN Security Council Resolution 841, both non-permanent members Pakistan and Brazil registered skepticism. However, China did cast its vote in support of the sanctions, specifying two conditions: first, that there was the request by the legitimate, deposed government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide seeking United Nations support for measures already undertaken by the Organization of American States (OAS); and second, China noted that the UN Security Council was considering extending OAS-enforced sanctions, which already had the support of other regional groupings and the General Assembly,\(^ {172}\) thus the Chinese view was “that any action by the Council should be complementary to, and supportive of, the actions by the relevant regional Organization.”\(^ {173}\)

Again, Beijing emphasized the exceptional nature of the vote:

> The Chinese delegation, as its consistent position, does not favor the Security Council’s handling [of] matters which are essentially internal affairs of a Member State, nor does it approve of resorting lightly to such mandatory measures as sanctions by the Council. We wish to point out that the

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\(^{173}\) Ibid.
favorable vote the Chinese delegation cast just now does not mean any change in that position.\textsuperscript{174}

On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 940, under Chapter VII, which authorized a US-led force to remove the illegitimate government from Haiti to facilitate the restoration of the elected Haitian government.\textsuperscript{175} Both China and Brazil abstained from the vote.\textsuperscript{176} Chinese statements at the Security Council emphasized the need for peaceful resolution to conflict and concerns about a “dangerous precedent” emphasizing that “China does not agree with the adoption of any means of solution based on the resort to pressure at will or even the use of force.”\textsuperscript{177} It is of note that China did not invoke a principled stance against Chapter VII operations, instead, China emphasized the need for a peaceful solution to conflict. It is possible that China took this stance since the Haitian government had asked for United Nations support, therefore providing an element of consent.\textsuperscript{178}

Following the further degrading of conditions in Haiti, the UN Security Council unanimously authorized the deployment of an advanced planning team, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).\textsuperscript{179} In an attempt to elucidate why China would support such a resolution having abstained on Resolution 940, the Chinese representative stated:

China has consistently… opposed interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the use or threat of the use of force in international relations… Still less should resolution 964,
which has just been adopted, be understood as an affirmation of this so-called formula.\textsuperscript{180}

The Chinese voting pattern and commentary on Haitian peacekeeping activities in the mid-1990s shows that China can accept support from regional actors to supplement the consent in correspondence from a deposed government.

\textit{East Timor}

In response to the deteriorating security situation following the East Timorese referendum to separate from Indonesia, the UN Security Council authorized the UN Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), which was deployed to East Timor to oversee the August 1999 referendum on East Timorese independence, and the subsequent establishment of the Chapter VII Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) peacekeeping mission, deployed to restore security to East Timor.

Given the similar governance concerns shared between Jakarta and Beijing, it is surprising that there was Chinese support for peacekeeping activities in East Timor, a territory annexed by Jakarta in 1975. Both Beijing and Jakarta preside over multi-ethnic states; struggle to prevent secession movements of ethnic minorities,\textsuperscript{181} and share a firm insistence that state sovereignty equates to a rejection of foreign military forces on their soil.\textsuperscript{182} In the debate regarding these missions, Beijing held that its support would only be possible with Jakarta’s consent. China was not alone on this point, Russia and the United States, and regional actors like Australia and Asia Pacific Economic Community insisted for Jakarta’s consent.

\textsuperscript{180} UN Security Council Official Records, 49\textsuperscript{th} Session, 3470\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, UN Document S/PV.3470 (29 November 1994). Commentary of Chinese representative Li Zhaoxing.

\textsuperscript{181} For China, flashpoints are seen as Xinjiang and Tibet. For Indonesia, flashpoints are seen as Aceh and Irian Jaya.

However, it cannot be overlooked that Indonesia’s “induced” consent was paper-thin, given the concerted and unrelenting pressure on Jakarta from the international community. Indonesia’s abrupt about-face is perceived as a response to World Bank threats to cut off aid; pressure from Japan, Indonesia’s largest trade partner; restrictions on U.S. military aid, and support for a rapid-reaction force to East Timor from a series of regional powers, like Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Indonesia was told that it “must invite the international community to assist in restoring security” by U.S. President Clinton and UN Secretary-General Annan stating “the international community is asking for Indonesia’s consent to the deployment of such a force.” Therefore, it is widely understood that Jakarta’s consent to the Chapter VII INTERFET mission is seen as largely co-opted. Beijing’s willingness to accept induced consent as legitimate instead of a more robust consent indicates a more permissive stance on an absolute interpretation of state consent.

**Darfur**

In recent years, China has also become more proactive in securing host state consent. In contrast to the Chinese experience in the run up to the INTERFET mission, where China was not a lead in securing Indonesia’s consent, China was key in securing Sudan’s consent for the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As detailed in chapter four of this dissertation, China’s behind-the-scenes efforts at bringing Sudan to the table are a departure from the long-held Chinese position against intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign states. China was seen as having a particularly important role in winning Sudanese cooperation given their bilateral relationship.

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China abstained from all UN Security Council resolutions that tried to place sanctions on Sudan, insisting that ultimate responsibility for the Darfur situation was shouldered by Sudan and voicing concerns that sanctions would undermine diplomatic efforts.\(^{185}\) Beijing opposed peace enforcement activities in Sudan, and maintained strict insistence that Khartoum’s consent was needed before deploying any peacekeeping missions into Darfur. Therefore, China endorsed the deployment and consequent expansion and strengthening of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as the mission had the support of Khartoum. China voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1679, which called for the AU-led mission to becoming a Chapter VII UN-led mission, explaining that such a vote was permissible since Sudan’s consent had already been secured.\(^{186}\)

China lobbied to include language that required Sudan’s consent before authorizing a peacekeeping mission amendments to UN Security Council Resolution 1706, which expanded the mandate and operational footprint of the UN Mission in Sudan to include a deployment to Darfur to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 and the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement.\(^{187}\) However, when the final language of the resolution noted “that the


Council invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment,” China abstained from UN Security Council Resolution 1706.\textsuperscript{188}

In response to criticisms of China’s “business is business” approach regarding trade and diplomatic relations with Khartoum,\textsuperscript{189} China reoriented its relationship with Sudan and applied pressure on Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{190} Ultimately, China became one of the key proponents and participants of UNAMID, securing Sudanese support for UN Security Council Resolution 1769, authorizing the hybrid peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{191} Though China’s maneuvering still reflected its commitment to host state consent, China did change from shielding Sudan from criticism to later using its leverage to nudge and cajole Sudan into accepting UNAMID.

Thus, though China states its commitment to host state consent in absolutist terms, in practice, China accepts shades of consent. Recent history shows Beijing accepting conditions of no host state consent (Somalia); accepting the “presence of consent” from a legitimate, deposed government requests for support as consent (Haiti);\textsuperscript{192} accepting induced consent under concerted international pressure (East Timor) and consent achieved under Chinese insistence (Darfur) as permissible conditions of host state consent.

\textsuperscript{189} In response to a question on the civilian killings in Darfur and China’s role as the largest investor in Sudanese government oil projects, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Zhou Wenzhong made the comment: “Business is business… the situation in the Sudan is an internal affair.” For more detail see, Jehangir S. Pocha, “Burying China’s Complicity in the Killing Fields,” \textit{The New York Times}, May 3, 2005.
Case Sketches Regarding UN Security Council Authorization

China holds that the UN Security Council should authorize all peacekeeping missions. As a member of the Permanent Five at the UN Security Council, China holds a veto over all UN Security Council Resolutions. When faced with resolutions it does not agree with, China typically uses a combination of activities: attempting to modify the resolution’s language, threatening its veto to bring about change and sometimes abstaining from the vote. On infrequent occasion, in comparison to the other P5 powers, Beijing will cast a veto on the resolution. On very rare occasion, Beijing has reversed its veto. China still frequently shows its moral opposition to interventionist mandates by issuing abstention votes.

Since 1997, China has cast six vetoes at the UN Security Council. Two of those vetoes were peacekeeping-related: in 1997, vetoing the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission with verification and institution-building tasks in Guatemala, and in 1999, vetoing the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP), a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission mandated to monitor and report border activities that could spark instability in Macedonia. Since China holds that Security Council authorization is key, it is worth examining these two veto votes in depth.

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194 It is also worth noting that China threatened a veto two times in relation to MINUSTAH, a peacekeeping mission based in Haiti (vetoes threatened in 1996 and January 2007). In the latter case, China threatened to veto an extension of MINUSTAH, perhaps in connection with Haitian President Rene Preval’s earlier support of Taiwanese membership at the 2006 UN General Assembly. A compromise was reached where MINUSTAH was extended for eight months, from February – October 2007; therefore ensuring President Preval would take no ‘pro-Taiwan’ activities in the General Assembly meetings of September 2007. Usually UN peacekeeping missions are only extended six months at a time.
On 10 January 1997, China vetoed the draft resolution contained in document S/1997/18 regarding sending military observers to Guatemala to observe the peace accords that ended the thirty-year civil war. The motivation for this veto – the sole dissenting vote in the face of fourteen votes favoring establishing a UN peacekeeping mission, was Taiwan’s relations with Guatemala. The Chinese representative noted at the UN Security Council discussions:

The Government of Guatemala has, for four consecutive years, unscrupulously supported activities aimed at splitting China at the United Nations, in flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in disregard of the solemn warnings of the Chinese government...

China did leave a small window for Guatemala, noting that Beijing “may reconsider” changing its veto vote if Guatemala changed their Taiwan-related outreach. Eleven days later, China reversed its veto – putting its full support behind the United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), an operation of 155 UN military observers. Such a reversal was the result of ten days of Sino-Guatemalan negotiations, where the two states had to address the contentious issue of Guatemalan recognition of Taiwan, and Guatemala’s invitation to the Taiwanese Foreign Minister to attend the peace accords signing ceremony. The reversal was prompted by Mexico and other Member States threatening to take the proposed peacekeeping mission to the UN General Assembly for a vote under the Uniting For Peace formula – in which the General Assembly can act because of the failure of the UN Security Council to act because of a veto vote in regards to matters that indicate a threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of

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198 Diplomats noted that Guatemala agreed to stop pushing for full United Nations status for Taiwan, but that it did not have to withdraw its relations with Taiwan, nor publicly apologize for its invitation to the Taiwanese Foreign Minister. For more detail, see Paul Lewis, “China Lifts Veto On Guatemala Monitors,” The New York Times, January 21, 1997.
aggression – and it was believed at the time that there would have been overwhelming support for the operation. Therefore, if China is willing to not only leave open an option to modify its vote, but can acquiesce to modify its vote, then there is some indication that China is flexible in how it applies its UN Security Council authorization.

Macedonia

On February 25, 1999, China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution on extending the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP). By a vote of thirteen in favor, to one against (China), with one abstention (the Russian Federation), the Security Council did not adopt the eight-nation draft resolution (S/1999/201), sponsored by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States to extend the UNPREDEP mandate by another six months. In explaining their vote, China noted that the situation in Macedonia had apparently stabilized in the past few years, and its relations with neighboring countries had improved. Moreover, the Secretary-General, in his recent report, had indicated clearly that the original goals of the Security Council in establishing UNPREDEP had already been met. In that context, there was no need to further extend the mandate of the mission… In view of the UN’s current financial crisis, it would not be fair to continue to assess Member States for UNPREDEP; the United Nations already insufficient resources should be used where they were most needed.

Though these comments allude to the Chinese commitment of “standardized standards” (i.e. ‘no playing favorites’ amongst peacekeeping mission) and a preference for not having “open-ended

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200 On 25 February 1999, the UN Security Council voted regarding a six-month extension of the UNPREDEP mandate. However, given China, on 25 February 1999, used its veto in the Security Council to prevent a renewal of UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
operations,” Taiwan concerns cannot be discounted in China’s decision. Macedonia gave Taiwan diplomatic recognition just before the UN Security Council vote. Although there was much support for the proposed resolution, China still vetoed the extension of the operation – only to receive regret and opprobrium from Macedonia, several United Nations Member States, and Secretary-General Annan.

Beyond these veto votes, China’s preference is to abstain from voting, therefore demonstrating its principled opposition without preventing UN Security Council action. China’s “normative veto” is understandable for two reasons. First, China has held a longstanding opinion that the use of the veto represents wielding hegemonic power. In reluctantly using the veto, China has made “a concerted effort not to allow itself into having no choice but to cast a solo veto.” Second, Samuel Kim asserts that China has managed to maximize its UN Security Council leverage “… if not normative influence, in the decision-making process, not by hyperactive engagement or coalition-building leadership but by following an indeterminate strategy that has vacillated between tacit cooperation and calculated aloofness.”

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202 Pang Zhongying, “China’s Attitude to UN Peacekeeping,” *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 1 (spring 2005): 87 – 104, 100. It should be noted, however, that China’s then-Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Qin Huasun flatly denied the vote was in any way linked with Taiwan, asserting that peacekeepers were no longer needed in Macedonia as the mandate was fulfilled and China did not consider the situation in Macedonia to represent a threat to international peace and security. For more detail, see “Taiwan Criticises China UN Veto,” *BBC*, February 26, 1999 (accessed November 29, 2008); available from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/285835.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/285835.stm).


However, as this chapter has shown, China exhibits tolerance of peacekeeping activities that challenge its principles, and in the recent case of Darfur, paradoxically, there is evidence of China exerting its influence so as to secure support for its principles. And, as Chinese participation in anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia indicate, there may be further changes to acceptable use of force that is concomitant with China’s growing confidence in conducting its role in international affairs. Therefore, research is needed to understand the discrepancy between Chinese principles on peacekeeping and the Chinese practice of participating in the UN peacekeeping regime.
CHAPTER TWO: EXPLANATIONS FOR CHINA’S PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION

PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Chinese troops deploy to interventionist missions (Darfur); to ‘breakaway republics’ (Kosovo); to states that recognize Taiwan (Haiti) and to states where diplomatic relations are still tentative (Liberia). However, China is absent from missions where China and the host state have close diplomatic and dense economic relations (Chad and the Central African Republic). The inconsistent nature of Chinese deployment to UN peacekeeping is puzzling and leads to the research question: what explains China’s peacekeeping participation?

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Focusing on Chinese Deployment to UN Peacekeeping

This dissertation focuses on one dependent variable, the deployment of Chinese forces to a UN peacekeeping mission, and has a binary interpretation of the dependent variable: either China deploys troops to the mission (1), or China does not deploy troops to the mission (0). Troop deployment is defined as actual Chinese troop dispatch to a UN peacekeeping mission, which may differ from the initial number of troops committed.

The decision to focus on deployment to UN peacekeeping as the dependent variable, as opposed to other means that China has to engage in the peacekeeping regime, such as budget support, is made for four reasons. First, when China deploys its troops to UN peacekeeping missions, it is confronted with the messiness of being in the field: discriminating between low-level ‘spoilers’ and more significant threats to peace, and how to operate with other militaries, for example. The decisions made as they related to the difficulties of being in the field draw into sharp focus Chinese discussions about ‘walking the walk’ of proactively engaging in international peace and security affairs. Second, troop deployments are seen as one of the most legitimate means to
support the UN peacekeeping regime, as peacekeepers have to interpret mandates into an implementable plan for nurturing peace. Peacekeeping experience signals that states have participated in the collective burden of fostering international security, often at threat to their own troops’ safety. Third, through troop deployment China earns an understanding by practice that can inform its experience in mandate discussions, finance debates and other policy forums – and thus, deployment is very much the cutting edge for research. For all these reasons, deployment is of particular interest and, as this dissertation will further explain, deployment presents one of the most problematic means for China to engage in peacekeeping. Fourth, deployment is completely at the discretion of the troop contributing country (TCC). In contrast to other mechanisms of which to affect UN peacekeeping (e.g. working groups, voting, budgetary contributions) – this act of deploying forces to a peacekeeping mission is truly voluntary, which in many ways is what makes it a very complex task to understand. States do not have to account for non-deployment, in a way that they will be asked for their lack of budgetary contributions or voting decisions. Therefore, unlike “opting out” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for example, which sends a signal of non-cooperation with the international community – non-deployment to the multilateral peacekeeping regime is still relatively non-controversial.

This dissertation does not focus on police deployment by China for three reasons. First, police deployments are a relatively new phenomenon only since the last twenty years, and thus, the UN doctrine on how and when police are deployed does not have such a long heritage. Second, China views police as solving development problems, and thus policing assets are not viewed though the lens of dealing with international security. Signalling such a perception of police assets, third, police are sent abroad by the Ministry of Public Security, though troop deployments

208 Interview, Chinese Civilian Police Training Institute official, Beijing, December 18, 2011.
have to be approved by the Chinese State Council – one of the highest bodies of governmental and foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{209}

**The Concept of Deployment**

As Bellamy and Williams remind us, it is important to distinguish between states’ *predispositions* towards UN peacekeeping and the specific *decisions* that states take in relation to their individual options to deploy.\textsuperscript{210} This dissertation conceptually conceives of deployment along a heuristic continuum: stretching from deployment to non-deployment to ‘missing deployment.’ Deployment (1) is defined as when Chinese soldiers are fielded to the peacekeeping mission. Non-deployment (0) is defined as when there are no soldiers deployed to the peacekeeping mission. Missing deployment is a sub-category of non-deployment, and is defined as no troops deployed to a peacekeeping mission where one would expect to find Chinese troops given Chinese interests, but in fact no Chinese troops are fielded. This concept of deployment was developed after working at the Headquarters-level within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations system (DPKO), which highlighted two points. First, given the priority DPKO places on cultivating a relationship with China, it is rare for DPKO officials to decline offers of Chinese troops, instead developing “work arounds” in order to try to accept offers of Chinese assets.\textsuperscript{211} Second, within DPKO it is informally understood that there are different pathways that lead to a country’s deployment and non-deployment to a particular peacekeeping mission. These different pathways include, but are not limited to:

- A state offers troops that meet the profile of the mandate, and its troops are accepted by the host state, resulting in deployment (1);

\textsuperscript{210} Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Reflections on Broadening the Base of Troop/Police Contributing Countries,” February 2012, unpublished paper, 3.
\textsuperscript{211} For example, opening or closing billets on mission in order to facilitate Chinese entry to the mission. Interview, DPKO official, New York, October 2010.
• A state offers troops that meet the profile of the mandate, but its troop offer is ‘crowded out’ as the mission is already fully staffed, resulting in non-deployment (0);
• A state offers troops that meet the profile of the mandate, but the host state declines permission for these troops to enter (e.g. because of historical animosity between the offering state and host state), resulting in non-deployment (0);
• A state does not offer troops to the particular peacekeeping mission, resulting in non-deployment (0).

It is important to note that it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to reconstruct a complete set of events for every single peacekeeping mission that China could deploy its troops. Instead, these different pathways are used as a heuristic guide to elaborate on the dependent variable. With this heuristic guide, it is possible to make prudent assumptions to separate cases of non-deployment from cases of missing deployment – i.e. where we would assume China would have deployed troops, but there are none. For example, given the history of Sino-Indian rivalry, it is doubtful that Chinese troops would be acceptable in the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Therefore, because extant theory can explain the lack of Chinese troops deployed to this particular mission, UNMOGIP is a case of non-deployment. However, there are cases of missing deployment, which are fruitful areas for research. For example, the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) is a case of missing deployment, because China has close diplomatic and strong economic relationship with the host states, which both actively sought Chinese involvement in the peacekeeping missions. Moreover, China had already demonstrated an interest in the UNAMID peacekeeping mission, with a similar mandate, in a state contiguous to the MINURCAT mission space, within the same time frame. Moreover, interviews indicate that DPKO officials expected China to deploy to the mission when it was in
need of assets.\textsuperscript{212} If the host state would have welcomed Chinese troops, and the UN needed Chinese forces, then there are little barriers to Chinese deployment. The fact that MINURCAT is a case of “missing deployment” makes this a case for closer examination.

ASSUMPTIONS

This dissertation is based on two assumptions.

Separating Reputation and Image Explanations
The first assumption is that reputation and image are treated as two separate explanations that motivate China to deploy its soldiers as peacekeepers. As discussed in the introduction chapter, the two terms are often used interchangeably, and this has led to further muddled thinking.

Reputation is held in the opinion of the observer, defined “as the impression others hold about its preferences and abilities.”\textsuperscript{213} Therefore, a reputation is “not something I can keep in my pocket; it is what someone else thinks of me.”\textsuperscript{214} With incomplete information, uncertainty and change, an observer uses reputation to supplement their understanding of an actor; as a crutch to ascertain an actor’s preferences and abilities, and towards assessments of an actor’s future action and decision-making matrix. It is also possible for a single actor to have multiple reputations, as observers may view the same behavior through different lenses. However, Mercer does not extend his analysis to see what the actor can gain from establishing a reputation – indeed, actors can use reputations as a means to an end: consistent action builds an actor’s credibility for future exchange. Therefore, reputation can be used for instrumental ends to gain a better outcome in

\textsuperscript{212} Interview, DPKO official, New York, August 1, 2011.
repeat bargaining situations. Cooperation as a result of reputation effects is a means to an end, maximizing cooperative activities so as to keep up positive flow of goods and benefits.

Mercer explains that a reputation forms in two steps: first, an observer explains an actor’s behavior in dispositional, not situational terms. For example, an observer would note that Chinese decision-makers were resolute on their 1999 veto of an extension of the UN Preventive Deployment to Macedonia (UNPREDEP) because Macedonia is a ‘pro-Taiwan’ host state, which reflects Chinese disposition regarding Taiwan policy and not because of situational factors, like a lack of funds to allot to mission extensions. Second, observers use the past to predict similar behavior in the future (i.e. Chinese decision-makers will be resolute on banning any peacekeeping mission in a ‘pro-Taiwan’ host states). Therefore, a reputation forms when both conditions are met (i.e. Chinese decision-makers have a reputation for being resolute on ‘the Taiwan issue’).

In contrast, image is really shorthand for self-image – the image actors have of themselves based on their identity, and thus a projected image should match actors’ self-perception. Therefore, image is an optimizing concept, maximizing an actor’s sense of self-worth. Decisions are made in light of the question, ‘does this image match my self-perception?’ For example, Chinese decision-makers would participate in UN peacekeeping operations in part because of a Chinese self-image as a great power upholding international peace and security. There is some evidence towards that self-image: Chinese nationals assert that their government should be involved and demand that the government remain active in international affairs.

If self-images are contradictory or ambiguous, then it can be difficult for an actor to maintain consistency “between behavior and a conception of self in a social role.”215 This caution is

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relevant for observers of Chinese foreign policy, given the contradictory Chinese self-image. Hongying Wang codes at least nine images projected by China in its general foreign policy.\textsuperscript{216} Wang theorizes that there are multiple images as some images are open to interpretation (i.e. it is unclear what exactly makes a Marxist state Marxist); because there are discrepancies between image and behavior (i.e. how can observers reconcile Beijing’s non-interventionist stance in contrast to voting for and deploying to interventionist missions), and because a single behavior can be interpreted differently across time and differently by separate actors (i.e. Chinese peacekeepers may be perceived as needed by some, or as evidence of the China threat theory by others).

In sum, reputation-based actions seek to maximize material pay-off and therefore a positive reputation is a means to an end, and reputation-based actions are akin to consequentialist behavior. In contrast, image-based actions seek to maximize self-worth and positive status markers from a self-identified reference group and therefore garnering social praise is the end and of itself. Therefore, these two explanations can be separated conceptually. However, finding data to show that these two explanations are different can be difficult for researchers.

In order to isolate image-driven activities from those of reputation-driven activities, this dissertation uses Alastair Iain Johnston’s theory of social influence as a causal mechanism that can triggers image concerns.\textsuperscript{217} Johnston posits that social influence – the distribution of social rewards and punishments from the reference group of states to the target state – can elicit the target state, under certain conditions, to modify its behavior. Social punishments are defined as

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“shaming, shunning, exclusion, demeaning or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity.” These punishments are social in nature – only the reference group that the target state identifies with and approves of can execute punishments on the target state. In order for punishments to have an effect, the target state must have a prior identification with the reference group. The strength of the social opprobrium relies on two conditions: first, the nature of the self-categorization of the target state in question, and second, which other states – because of the target state’s self-identification – become important and are therefore perceived as legitimate observers and critics. There are also two prior conditions: first, that there must be an intersubjective normative consensus about what good behavior looks like (i.e. both the states and the target state must agree on what activities are acceptable), and second, as these are social punishments, they must not only take place between the reference group and the target state – these social punishments must be made in public spaces.

It is worth noting that decisions taken in response to social influence are still about maximizing something, and that something is social status and esteem through praise from social interaction. Thus, decisions are still made with an optimizing calculus in mind. However, one would assume that if an actor was only concerned about large social status gains, then the actor would continually shop for a group that would give it the largest social status payoff possible. However, states do not shop around continuously for the greatest pay-off – instead signaling and appeals are made towards certain groups because values are sticky and thus support is sought from only certain groups. Thus, though maximizing social status is driven by a consequentialist-calculus, a sense of appropriateness constrains which group is chosen – therefore separating the group that can exert social pressures on the target from others that are deemed irrelevant because of their divergent values. Cooperation as a result of image finds that the welfare being maximized is the

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end in and of itself—so maximizing positive status markers as defined by the group is the end in and of itself. Status-maximizing is still a maximizing activity, a consequentialist activity, but the stickiness is driven from role-based appropriateness.

Teasing out actions in response to social influence is a complex task—essentially because we are looking for moments where action is taken because officials are sensitive to opprobrium, and then find action consistent with this activity. Johnston notes three conditions that should highlight when social influence is at play. First, the target state should end up standing alone if it continues on its original policy path. We should be able to see that the target state’s initial position—if kept—will leave it isolated (i.e. commitment to pro-social behavior is only made when non-commitment means standing in a dwindling minority). Second, the target state should stress backpatting and opprobrium in its statements explaining its changes in behavior. Third, the commitment to participate in the institutional activity should take place in the absence of material motivations. The application of this theory will take place in each case study.

Two Images of China in Peacekeeping: Global South State and Responsible Power
This dissertation’s second assumption is that China is projecting two self-images in its peacekeeping activity.

One image conforms to its self-categorization as a Global South state respectful of sovereignty. China’s Global South image is shown through its commitment to traditional sovereignty. Traditional sovereignty is defined by noninterference in the internal affairs of states, and stands in contrast to other interpretations of sovereignty.²¹⁹ Principles that shape China’s participation in

²¹⁹ Like responsible sovereignty (for more detail, see Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen John Stedman, Power & Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2009); the responsibility to protect (for more detail, see The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), and also the idea of sovereignty as “contingent” (for
UN peacekeeping missions are as follows: UN Security Council authorization; host state consent; minimum use of force, and non-intervention in domestic affairs of the host state. These mutually reinforcing ‘golden principles’ indicate that the Chinese position is in part driven to support traditional sovereignty at the United Nations. The insistence on the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference are clear in official Chinese statements.

The other image China conforms to in its peacekeeping practice is its self-categorization as a responsible power, which over the last decade has meant a more active role in international institutions and being supportive of these institutions as a means to secure Chinese interests. The connection between peacekeeping and a responsible power image are clear in Foreign Ministry documents. And, though there are few assessments on the impact of peacekeeping as a component in Chinese diplomacy, the public statements of Chinese government officials are indicators. For example, in a September 2006 interview, the Deputy Chief of General Staff for


For example, the PRC Mission at the UN made the same statement in 2006: “In deploying PKOs, selectivity or double standard should be avoided. PKOs must continue to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and be carried out with the authorization and under the guidance of the Security Council. They should fully respect the views of the parties concerned, be strictly neutral and adhere to the principle of using force only when it is necessary.”


For example, in China’s Foreign Affairs, an annual foreign affairs compendium of the Policy Planning section of the Foreign Ministry notes that “… always valuing and supporting PKO consistent with the UN Charter, China has gradually expanded its involvement in these endeavours and thus projected an image of a peace-loving and responsible major country.” China’s Foreign Affairs, 2005 (Beijing: World Affairs, 2005), p. 422.
China’s People’s Liberation Army described China’s involvement in the UN peacekeeping regime as follows:

China is a peace-loving country. In addressing grave issues involving peace and security, we are a responsible country […] Chinese peacekeeping activities demonstrate our country’s image as a responsible superpower. The quality of our troops is highly praised by international organizations and other countries [and] in the course of our peacekeeping activities under the UN Charter, China sets a glorious example.\(^{225}\)

Moreover, China’s responsible power image is only further emphasized as China started real, concerted engagement in the UN peacekeeping regime at a time of severe overstretch of UN operational capacity; thus, Chinese participation in several high-profile UN missions short of desperately-needed assets like engineering, transportation and medical units that the Chinese can supply (e.g. to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo).

**Explanations for Why States Become Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Applying TCC Explanations to the Case of China**

The existing literature presents a multitude of generalizable arguments for why states become TCCs, and these explanations can be grouped into two categories: first, geopolitical-material, and organizational explanations, and then, ideational explanations. The following section covers these explanations, some of which are closely inter-related, and applies these arguments to the case of China. This is not to say that China only responds to single motivations in its individual peacekeeping deployments, but rather to highlight the different potential explanations for troop contributions. Given the apparent preponderance of explanations to deploy, then it is the case that this is an opportunity to set up a critical test to see which of these factors – which ultimately all predict deployment – really do come into play in deployment decisions. It is then important to

work out which additional observable explanations are unique to each explanation for China’s deployment.

**Geopolitical-Material Explanations**

*Secure National Interests*

Peacekeeping missions help protect civilians, strengthen the rule of law and shore up local security, promoting peace. For some member states, contributions to UN peacekeeping is a preventative action in threat mitigation, motivated by concerns to limit the spread of the conflict (i.e. refugee flows to neighboring states) or the scale of the conflict (i.e. limit the casualty numbers or IDPs).²²⁶ All the members of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) participated in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) because the operation was in their national interests. Therefore, the level of perceived threat from a particular conflict is believed to be a significant factor in decisions to deploy to a particular mission.²²⁷ For other member states with national interests in the host state, contributions to UN peacekeeping are a means to further security, as deploying personnel underscores commitments to local peace activities. Because political and economic overtures may not be enough to protect their interests, sometimes security commitments through UN peacekeeping are of mutual benefit between the host state and the TCC. Therefore, it is the assumption that states are more likely to deploy to UN peacekeeping missions when such activity is “decidedly in their national interests.”²²⁸

However, there is some indeterminacy about how this particular explanation works: some states deploy assets to some missions because of their national interests, but not to every mission. Other states deploy no assets to missions claiming it is against their national interest to dispatch

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Therefore, it is unclear at which times states in general will deploy their assets to peacekeeping for the sake of national interests. The record also shows states that deploy assets to peacekeeping, even when there is no particular national interest at stake.

More often than not, it is implied that there is a connection between China’s peacekeeping behavior and its economic assets abroad. Indeed, Chinese press report that ‘Chinese peacekeeping troops also collaborate with Chinese institutions and organizations in the country of residence to protect the rightful interests of Chinese people and companies’. Coupled with a willingness to work with less democratic regimes and a conservative, principled stance regarding intervention, there is the assumption that Chinese peacekeeping activities facilitate China’s search for foreign resources. However, large-n regression analyses of China’s peacekeeping deployments vis-à-vis broadly defined national interests show weak statistical significance between the two. These gaps in explanatory power imply then that perhaps there is more to be understood regarding national interests and its affect on deployment behavior. In this research, if securing national interests is important to China, we would expect to see perhaps two things: reference to Chinese national interests in explanations for Chinese deployment behavior (e.g. protecting Chinese nationals in the host country) or that deployments would follow negative

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229 For example, that deploying to peacekeeping dulls the military’s war-fighting skills and battlefield advantage.


changes in China’s economic relationship with the host states’ (e.g. spikes in the prices of commodities exported from the host country to China).

Reputation

Reputation is still a material concern: an actor builds a good reputation in the eyes of others, so as to keep up the flow of goods and benefits based on that reputation. Therefore, reputation-based actions are akin to consequentalist behavior, where actors seek to maximize material pay-off and therefore a positive reputation is a means to an end. Personnel contributions are perceived by some member states as important reputation-building tools to leverage for bargaining for other requests at the United Nations because peacekeeping is “a demonstration of impeccable internationalist credentials.” For example, continuous peacekeeping deployment is cited in the Indian and Nigerian bids for permanent positions at the UN Security Council. Indeed, participation in peacekeeping is “a sine qua non of the seriousness of [Security Council] candidacies.” Thus, because large and steady peacekeeping contributions are indicative of a strong commitment to the United Nations, there is some type of positive reputational benefit to deployment. In general, China’s Security Council cooperation is popularly written about in terms of reputational motivation.

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235 India announced its bid for UN Security Council representation in 1994, and the website of the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations notes “India's long-standing participation in UN peacekeeping operations testifies not only to the dedication and professionalism of the Indian soldiers but also the political will of the government to actively contribute to these operations.” For more detail, see India and United Nations Reform (accessed July 4, 2010); available from http://www.un.int/india/india_and_the_un_unreform.html. Reports noted that in closed door meetings at the May – June 2010 Africa-France Summit, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan emphasized the “crucial roles Nigeria had been playing in peace keeping operations across the world and the need to reward Nigeria with a permanent seat in the Security Council.” For more detail, see Daniel Idonor, “Nigeria, France Want Africa on UN Security Council Seat,” All Africa, June 1, 2010 (accessed May 1, 2012); available from http://allAfrica.com/stories/201006010076.html.


However, this particular explanation has two drawbacks. First, there are states that deploy to UN peacekeeping regularly, with no national interests in the host state or region, and some of these states show little ambition to join the UN Security Council, despite having credible commitment to the UN peacekeeping regime. Second, the reputation argument is to a certain extent unclear (what type of reputation, with which reference group?) and also to some degree unable to be falsified (at what point can it be said that action isn’t being taken for reputational purpose?). If we find that Chinese peacekeeping activity is driven by reputation concerns, then we would expect to uncover instances of bartering, and clear *quid pro quo* thinking in the run up to deployment reflected in interviews and through process-tracing.

*Military-to-Military Cooperation*

By deploying assets abroad to peacekeeping, governments also benefit from enhanced military-to-military cooperation with the host state and also with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations hierarchy. States may not have consular representation in every single country, let alone states that are unstable or conflict-ridden, and therefore can use peacekeeping as an entry-point for a national presence in terms of military-to-military cooperation and information-gathering in the host state. In deploying troops to UN peacekeeping China benefits from *military-to-military cooperation* in two ways: in furthering a relationship with the host state and also in terms of further military relationships at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. First, China can use their military assets to connect with the host state’s military. Since the Chinese overseas military presence through the Embassy network is still restricted by budget, scale and state-to-state diplomatic negotiation, peacekeepers are a means to enhance military-to-military relationships in countries where China has little military-diplomatic footprint,
or in states where China does have a military-to-military presence to build an added dimension of that relationship through their peacekeepers.\(^{238}\)

However, this explanation also has its limits in that it does not explain the variation in Chinese peacekeeping deployment. If this drive was constant, in the very least, we would expect to see Chinese peacekeepers in missions across the African continent, given the focus on Sino-African relations. However, in fact, China has only deployed to select Africa-based missions, therefore implying that military-to-military cooperation is of limited value. If we find that Chinese peacekeeping activity is driven by military-to-military cooperation concerns, then we would expect to find greater military cooperation with the host state after China deploys (i.e. military sales) or announcements of greater military and diplomatic contact immediately preceding or after the deployment.

**Organizational Explanations**

*Operational Experience*

Deploying to UN peacekeeping also enables China to gain *operational experience* at each level of the UN peacekeeping system. In terms of field experience for Chinese troops working in tough field conditions, for example, learning how to use advanced navigation systems and operate alongside other national militaries and local populations.\(^{239}\) In terms of leading on mission, where China now has two military heads of mission dealing with implementation of the rules of engagement on operation. In terms of experience at headquarters and command, working on strategic-level planning, drafting concept of operations, and helping to reset the policy agenda at peacekeeping forums.\(^{240}\) Trevor Findlay notes that this “invaluable overseas experience” is a


\(^{240}\) ‘Secretary–General Appoints Major General Zhao Jingmin of China as Force Commander for Western Sahara Mission,’ U.N. Doc. SG/A/1089 (August 28, 2007), and ‘Secretary-General Appoints Major
potent factor in institutional interests to become peacekeeping contributors. Informal interviews with former Chinese peacekeepers shows that gaining more operational exposure is a keen interest, with these former peacekeepers making a point that because China is in effect largely a peacetime military with its last open overseas conflict in 1979, training drills can only simulate real military experience to a certain point. Because UN peacekeeping is an internationally-acceptable venue to gain operational experience in conflict areas for troops, one would expect to see Chinese assets deployed to every mission, as every mission provides a unique laboratory of field experience. However, this is not the case. Therefore, in order to operationalize this explanation, we would expect to see that Chinese peacekeeping activity is driven by operational experience, then we would see that over time Chinese soldiers are taking on increasingly higher-ranking or new mission roles.

Excess Capacity

Some TCCs may be motivated by the need to deploy the excess capacity of their large militaries. The argument for this driver can be in part economic – so as to lower the maintenance costs of maintaining militaries by calling upon UN funding for their peacekeeping contingents – or also in part because there are concerns that large militaries have the potential to become a destabilizing force domestically. Member states with comparatively large, well-experienced militaries; capitals with close working relationships with their militaries and weaker socio-economic status typically have the profiles of states motivated by excess capacity and ‘coup-proofing’ concerns. In dispatching a volume of capable troops abroad, this keeps the “armed forces occupied outside of


the country rather than meddling in domestic affairs"\textsuperscript{243} the military at home and therefore reduces the likelihood that the military can be used to intervene in politics, by executing coups, for example.

However, if China was concerned about excess capacity of its military, then China would try to deploy larger numbers of its military abroad on UN peacekeeping mission. In fact, China’s highest commitment to UN peacekeeping is at 2,200 troops/month – miniscule fraction of China’s standing military. Other top troop contributors are regularly deploying in numbers five times higher, with troop numbers at 10,000 troops/month from TCCs like India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Given that DPKO welcomes Chinese troop offers, these data points imply that the excess capacity motivation does not hold for China.

\textit{Financial Gains}

TCCs receive a variety of reimbursements for their services. For some TCCs, deploying to UN peacekeeping can be a significant source of foreign exchange and revenue to bolster defense expenditure and other economic activities.\textsuperscript{244} UN reimbursement rates are competitive compared to other organizations (for example, the UN daily rate reimbursements for soldiers are almost double the reimbursement rates of that of the African Union).\textsuperscript{245} For many militaries then, UN peacekeeping serves as a useful source of government revenue, as the UN’s daily per soldier rate is normally much higher than what costs most militaries to maintain their soldiers. UN


\textsuperscript{245} However, there are rates where UN reimbursement rates do fall short. For example, contingent owned equipment reimbursement rates for utility and tactical air assets are seen as too low to motivate member states to commit these assets to UN peacekeeping. Interviews with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of the Military Advisor, August 2010, New York.
reimbursement rates can therefore not only cover the costs of the military units deployed on mission, but also generate a sufficient source of income that is sometimes paid directly into one government office or account. Therefore, some TCCs have an incentive to deploy as many soldiers as possible, so as to maximize reimbursement rates.

If China is concerned about reaping as much financial gains as possible, then China would again field troops in larger numbers, and field lower-grade troops that cost less in terms of training and maintenance. However, the record of peacekeepers that China commits on mission – for example, engineers to lay roads and handle well-drilling equipment; medical doctors working in the most advanced field hospitals (complete with very expensive equipment to check glaucoma etc.); logisticians and transportation officers, does not support the financial pay off explanation. Moreover, interviews with DPKO officials who are tasked with piecing together peacekeeping missions reveals that concerns about remuneration have not featured as central discussion points by Chinese officials when deployment offers have been made.\footnote{Interview, DPKO officials, August 2010, New York.}

\textit{Capacity Development and Professionalization}

TCCs can benefit from improvements in equipment, training and operational experience, promoting a greater professionalization of the TCC’s military.\footnote{However, some states perceive that though there are benefits to participating in peacekeeping operations, participating in missions other than war can degrade war-fighting skills.} For example, if a member state seeks to become a TCC, but is short of equipment to execute the requirements of their deployment, the UN can facilitate sourcing the equipment bilaterally. For example, in preparation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to deploy to the UN Disengagement Observer Group (UNDOF) in the Syrian Golan, the United Nations facilitated sourcing the Filipino detachment’s cold weather clothing, by pairing the Filipino contingent with other states able to make the bilateral donation of warm clothing. Similarly, peacekeeping serves as a venue for
further training and education for the potential peacekeepers. For example, the United Nations can be a guide for the TCC. If a member state seeks to deploy to UN peacekeeping, the process of becoming a TCC benefits that state. For example, DPKO officers encourage TCCs to target their commitments to their military’s skill-level (i.e. ‘walk before you can run’). In doing so, there is a process that TCCs are encouraged to follow: first, deploying a few military observers to a UN mission, followed by perhaps embedding a staff officer in the peacekeeping mission headquarters and perhaps sending an officer to DPKO’s Office of Military Affairs (OMA). As training standards and procurement needs are met, then infantry company deployments and larger contingents are accepted on to peacekeeping missions. The cache of holding more senior posts on mission and headquarters is another motivator that OMA officers use when building their relationship with TCCs. By purposely easing the TCC into peacekeeping, DPKO avoids TCC overreach and aligns expectations, growing TCC skills and experience.

Capacity development also appears to not apply to China. If capacity development is a motivation for deployment, then one would assume that China would deploy to any mission, since all missions provide an opportunity for troop contributors to receive new kit and equipment. However, this argument does not seem to hold with China, which has deployed high-grade enabler assets repeatedly and selectively on mission. Moreover, China is increasingly taking on a regional training role, as China operates three state-of-the-art peacekeeping training centers, training other smaller states, or hosting other high-level meetings on peacekeeping matters. For example, the PLA Peacekeeping Centre in China hosted a Senior Commander Training Course for PLA generals in the summer 2010, where military leadership discussed such issues as

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humanitarian access, protection of civilians and ‘robust peacekeeping’. Furthermore, China is now itself donating equipment to other states. Thus, though there is always capacity to be developed, this argument may not be as robust an explanation as initially perceived.

**Ideational Explanations**

**Upholding the United Nations-led Multilateral System**

Traditionally, middle powers and smaller states perceive that deployments to UN peacekeeping missions will embody their stake in upholding state sovereignty and international stability through the United Nations. By contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions, these states with less material capabilities than the great powers show their commitments as stakeholders in the international community, and support for the United Nations, where each state, no matter what size, gets one vote. In doing so, smaller states see that UN peacekeeping deployments allow these states to ‘punch above their weight’ and show their commitment to the international system buttressed by the UN conflict management system. With consistent troop contributions, these states niche peacekeeping participation profile “brings [these states] greater respect and authority in international institutions, especially the UN, allowing them more voice in international security issues than they otherwise would.”

This type of motivation is similar to views of non-aligned members that the United Nations-led security apparatus as an alternative to great power hegemony. States like Ghana (inscribing the

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United Nations’ peace and security language into its constitution) and so-called ‘rising powers’ like Brazil, China and India see the importance of international peace and security led by the United Nations over that of great power hegemony. China also has interests in investing in and actively supporting the United Nations as the cornerstone of legitimate international action in regards to promoting international peace and security, so deploying to the peacekeeping regime in greater numbers, bolsters the viability of the United Nations-led approach to peace and security. If it turns out that supporting the multilateral system is key for China, then we would expect to have references to bolstering multilateralism throughout Chinese discussions of deployment to the particular mission.

Image

In contrast, image is a social construct, based on an actor’s self-perception – action is taken to project an image consistent with one’s role. In the case of image, what is being maximized here is the sense of self-worth and social regard for acting consistently with that of the peer group. Therefore, image-based actions are akin to appropriateness-driven behavior. There are at least three variants of the image-based arguments, which all highlight a state’s focus on role-based behavior. First, member states deploy to UN peacekeeping so as to raise their international profiles to commensurate status with their own self-image, underscoring their commitments to international peace and security for different audiences. For example, Mongolia’s deployment to UN peacekeeping is partially driven by a desire to raise their regional profile to a status that Mongolia finds appropriate. Jordan also provides another case, where policymakers in Amman see that UN peacekeeping underscores Jordanian commitment to peace and security through multilateral mechanisms, leveraging their resources as a middle-power in the volatile Middle East.

253 Columbia/SIPA, Increasing the Contributor Base to UN Peacekeeping, 2009, unpublished paper, 11,
Moreover, rising powers are thought to be especially keen to gain recognition of their status and are therefore “particularly sensitive to prestige and image issues which might be advanced through peacekeeping.”

Second, some states view themselves as “global good Samaritans” and are also likely to be involved in multilateral security issues because of a redefined sense of national interest. These states will see a “linkage between their long-term interest and the common good – at some times and places, states can overcome their bounded origins as sovereign security managers to act as “global citizens.” Middle-powers like Canada and Australia, and smaller powers like Norway and Sweden, are cited as examples as states that closely identify as global peacekeepers, despite having limited traditionally-defined national interests in states like Afghanistan, Somalia and the Balkans. Participation in peacekeeping is seen as “the quintessence of good international citizenship.” Implicit to this argument is the belief that middle powers can provide some type of public good through their peacekeeping behavior, offering stability in the international system when the hegemon cannot or does not.

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255 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Reflections on Broadening the Base of Troop/Police Contributing Countries,” February 2012, unpublished paper, 10.
257 However, it is worth noting that even for these four examples, their enthusiasm for peacekeeping waxes and wanes also. Canada is currently debating what its peacekeeping approach should be after its controversial deployments to Somalia and the Balkans, and public dissent that deploying to NATO-led missions in Afghanistan could not be sold as peacekeeping to the average Canadian. Norway is redirecting its peacekeeping activities through NATO-led streams over the United Nations also. For more detail, see Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The West and Contemporary Peace Operations,” Journal of Peace Research, 46, no. 1 (2009): 39 – 57.
Third, some TCCs explain that they have *perceived obligations* the need to ‘give back’ to the international community. Interviews show this to be part of the explanation offered by states like Rwanda and Sierra Leone, which want to graduate from hosting missions to deploying skilled forces to peacekeeping missions. Another facet of perceived obligation is the ‘hemispheric solidarity’ that states use to explain their deployment to peacekeeping missions in their region. For example, in the case of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), many Latin American states noted an obligation to deploy to a mission in their neighborhood. Chinese officials have intimated that deployment is in part in line with the Chinese self-image as a responsible great power, and that participation in peacekeeping is part of a Chinese perceived obligation to support the international community. Moreover, peacekeeping is used to raise a positive profile of China, not only does peacekeeping bolster the Chinese commitment to be accepted as a responsible power in international affairs, but peacekeeping deployments also blunt criticisms of defense spending and modernization, as the Chinese military can be seen as a ‘force for the greater good.’ The question arises as to which image of China Chinese officials are keen to project: that of China as a great power or China as a member of the Global South.

If it turns out that the Global South image is important to China, then it is the case that China would presumably focus upon signals coming from other Global South states that would back the peacekeeping mission. In this case then, the observable implications of this driver is China’s interest in host state consent and regional organization support. The host state is the country

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whose government has to offer consent for the peacekeeping mission. Offering consent is also one of the ways that host governments, often in the developing world – a community that China self-identifies with – can give their recognition and support for a mission. However, as this dissertation shows, there is still a range of ‘consent.’ Consent can be transient (in the cases of Sudan with UNAMID and Chad with MINURCAT), or it can be relatively consistent (in the case of South Sudan’s consent for UNMISS). What is also interesting, is that China shows a range of behavior regarding consent: consent was so important to China, that it worked to secure Sudan’s consent to the UNAMID mission; China appeared unperturbed at the transient and elusive consent offered by Chad to the MINURCAT mission, and fully supportive of South Sudan’s consent of the UNMISS mission.

Another component of the Global South reference group is relevant regional organizations. China places value in the legitimizing impact that regional organizations have in establishing peacekeeping missions. The emphasis on regional organizations is important enough to China that in January 2010, China for the first time ever organized a thematic debate at the United Nations Security Council, choosing the issue of how regional organizations could promote multilateralism and boost international security.\textsuperscript{263} Scholars assert that regional organization support is key for China when pursuing cooperative activities with Western countries against pariah states.\textsuperscript{264} Reports note that the Chinese action on the Libyan Arab Spring was framed in reference to the legitimizing impact of the African and Arab groupings.\textsuperscript{265} In doing so, China emphasizes its role as a member and peer of the Global South – noting that there is a role for

\textsuperscript{263} I thank Sarah Teitt for this reference.
South-South solidarity and China’s support for its Asian and African brothers, for example. Though the Chinese victimization narrative may decline in prominence in the period of China’s rise, China still emphasizes its commitment to the Global South regarding so-called Western ‘intrusions’ on state decisions and activities. In doing so, China can use these regional organizations for strategic and normative reasons – by being part of the group, China does not stand alone in blocking or slowing progress on international security concerns. Therefore, if this particular Global South reference group really matters to China, then deployment will be shortly after support for the peacekeeping mission from the host state and the regional organization. Moreover, Chinese officials should note these two reference groups in their reasoning for Chinese deployment.

However, if it turns out that China cares about its peer group of other P5 countries because of China’s status as a responsible great power, then it is the case that China will respond to signaling from the lead state, and deployment will be as a consequence of lead state opprobrium and backpatting and reference the lead state. Lead states vary for each peacekeeping mission and are typically not only the biggest advocates to getting the mission authorized and deployed, but are also significant supporters of the mission, whether through personnel, supplies or funds. For these reasons, lead states are always permanent members of the UN Security Council. The United States was the lead state for both the Darfur (UNAMID) and South Sudan (UNMISS) missions; France was the lead state for the MINURCAT mission.

**Case Selection**
To analyze the conditions and process for China’s deployment decisions, I use the case study method. A large-n method would allow for many more variables across a wider number of observations, but is still limited in presenting little understanding of the process of how missions
The case study method is selected because it enables research into the intervening process between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Establishing a causal nexus through the case study method enables research into evidence of the presence of predominantly intangible causal mechanisms, parsing through which combination of factors determine China’s deployment behavior, and which factors, if any, are catalysts for China’s troop deployment. Moreover, the case study method does not ignore the context of the events, and in allowing the researcher to dig into the messiness of the case, enables the researcher to isolate and recognize patterns of the independent, intervening and dependent variables.

In order to tease out variety in the cases, cases are selected for their variance on the independent variable of Chinese reputational concerns, which requires detailed explanation. The success of the Beijing Olympics, however, was prioritized as the most important foreign policy goal for China by 2006. This meant that China was especially aware of external pressure in the form of reputational threats. This dissertation views the Beijing Olympic Games as a time when China would be most sensitive to its reputation, so as to reduce perceptions of a confrontational China and promote the message of a harmonious China by way of Olympic harmony of the Beijing Games. The dissertation does not treat the Olympics as an exogenous shock, on the assumption that China will again host major world events (like it did so soon after the Games, with the Shanghai World Expo of 2010), and therefore, moments of heightened sensitivity to reputation will be possible again for China.


Therefore, this dissertation takes a controlled comparison of three cases of Chinese peacekeeping activity: participation in the UNAMID/Darfur peacekeeping mission; the Chinese ‘missing’ participation in the MINURCAT/Chad peacekeeping mission, and the Chinese participation in the UNMISS/South Sudan peacekeeping mission. The UNAMID and MINURCAT peacekeeping mission are twin comparisons, as missions that were established in the run up to the Olympic Games, with similarly interventionist mandates, in countries contiguous to one another, facing the same security concerns. UNMISS was selected because this is a mission established in 2011, well after the Olympic Games had closed. These cases also have the benefit of being in the same regional neighborhood, with peacekeeping missions used to address similar security issues. Using a controlled comparison, I can observe variation on the dependent variable, troop deployment, where China deployed large numbers to Darfur and South Sudan, but declined troop deployments to Chad. Within each case, the congruence method, process-tracing, and discourse analysis are used to establish a macro-historical analysis while examining closely each particular decision-making moment. Each case establishes multiple causal process observations over the period of study.

These three case studies, in and of themselves, also provide an opportunity for key tests of other alternative explanations because they establish a tough test in presenting three least-likely cases to rule out alternate explanations for China’s decisions to deploy to UN peacekeeping. To summarize, in a most-likely case the independent variables posited for a theory are at values that would lead to strong predicted outcomes. Conversely, in a least-likely case, the independent variables are at low values, therefore expecting a low-level predicted outcome. In this design, the

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most-likely case can cast doubt on explanations that do not fit; and least-likely cases can serve to support explanations for cases where the explanations should have little utility. This approach works well because there are an abundance of explanations for China’s deployment – grouped across geopolitical-material, organizational and social categories – so therefore the most-likely case and least-likely case approach focus me to be explicit in my variables and language.

The strongest evidence to support an explanation is a case that is least likely for that particular explanation, and where all alternate explanations predict a different outcome from that particular explanation, but those alternative explanation outcomes are different than what actually happened in that particular case. Therefore, if one explanation turns out to be accurate (i.e. predicted the actual outcome of the case) and others can be ruled out (because they predicted different outcomes for the case), then the case provides evidence supporting the “toughest test case.” As Bennett and George note, “[theories] that survive such a difficult test may prove to be generally applicable to many types of cases, as they have already proven their robustness in the presence of countervailing mechanisms.”

All three cases of UNAMID/Darfur, MINURCAT/Chad and UNMISS/South Sudan cases are all least-likely cases for deploying troops to a UN peacekeeping mission in response to image concerns, given the preponderance of geopolitical-material and organizational concerns in each case. Therefore, each case can be considered a tough test, with unique opportunities to find out in detail which of the explanations can hold up under detailed scrutiny. In order to uncover the causal pathways between the independent and dependent variables, this dissertation uses three

research techniques for within-case and cross-case comparison: the congruence method; process-tracing, and discourse analysis.

**RESEARCH APPROACH: STRUCTURED, FOCUSED COMPARISON**

Research is structured in that “general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection.” This dissertation has a relatively clear-cut universe of cases: only those of UN peacekeeping missions.

The general research questions are:

1. What was the original Chinese stance regarding the selected peacekeeping mission?
2. Did the Chinese stance regarding the selected peacekeeping mission change over time?
3. What were the critical junctures in the selected peacekeeping mission’s life-cycle?
4. What mechanisms were at play in order for China to modify its approach to the peacekeeping mission?

Research is focused in that the dissertation examines “only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.” For example, the MINURCAT peacekeeping mission is easily an opportunity to study the implementation of a protection of civilian agenda; the effect of an explicitly non-political mandate in the field; the potential drawbacks of a mission with only fleeting consent, and a test case of the European Security and Defense Policy. However, in order to complete this dissertation, analysis hone in on the interactions between China and the UN Headquarters in New York; Chinese activities on the UN Security Council, and the relationship between China and the host state.

In order to overcome the problem of “infinite regress” – where the researcher reaches further and further back into history in order to find explanations for events – this dissertation focuses research using critical junctures. With critical junctures, there is a clear beginning point to the problem under analysis; a focus on certain milestones in which decisions are made that re-route how policy options are formulated, viewed and offered, and with hypotheses to guide the research, will mean a narrowing of the possible outcomes. James Mahoney explains the concept of critical junctures succinctly:

Critical junctures are choice points when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives. The junctures are “critical” because once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available… Before a critical juncture, a broad range of outcomes is possible; after a critical juncture, enduring institutions and structures are created, and the range of possible outcomes is narrowed considerably.”

Using this concept from comparative historical research, I assume that foreign policy actors recognize critical junctures, “characterized by the selection of a particular option (e.g. a specific policy, coalition, or government) from among two or more alternatives.” Choices made at those moments are momentous “because it leads to the creation of institutional or structural patterns that endure over time.” These outcome of these choices are not made without friction: “institutional or structural persistence triggers a reactive sequence in which actors respond to prevailing arrangements through a series of predictable responses and counter-responses.”

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It is important to note that critical junctures are not limited to grand, public or large-scale events, as James Mahoney notes even “… small events and random processes can shape developments during critical junctures, leading to the adoption of options that could not have been predicted by theory.” For example, as this dissertation will show in the Darfur case study chapter, a particular speech from Chinese officials in November 2006 in Abuja was a ‘point of no return’ for Chinese foreign policy actors – progressing with a UN peacekeeping mission was the only way forward for China after that point. The trick here is that the research must “show how this choice activates key variables that favor certain outcomes over others” (i.e. how other options are dropped from the menu of options).

**WITHIN-CASE AND CROSS-CASE COMPARISON RESEARCH TECHNIQUES**

**Congruence Method**

With the congruence method, a theory is taken and then assessed for its predictive or explanatory powers in a particular case. If the variance in the dependent variable is as predicted by the theory with the variance on the independent variable, then there is the prospect for a causal relationship. So, establishing that there is some agreement is a first step to refining the theoretical framework and improving testability of the theory. The goal with using the congruence method is “not to test such theories, but to refine them if possible so that they can be tested.” A standard to abide by when using the congruence method is that of “congruity”: “similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesized causes and observed effects.” As George and Bennett caution, congruity does not mean that a drastic change to the independent variable will lead to a radical change in the dependent variable. Hypothesized effects can be

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279 For further reading, see George and Bennett, chapter 9.


reduced, magnified, postponed or accelerated – the point is whether “the independent and dependent variables are congruent; that is, whether they vary in the expected directions, to the expected magnitude, along he expected dimensions, or whether there is still unexplained variance in one or more dimensions of the dependent variable.” In order to assess whether the relationship between the independent and dependent variables are red herrings or actually causal, and what role intervening variables can play and what the causal processes may be – process tracing is a complementary method to refine the theoretical framework and improve testability.

**Process Tracing**

Complementing the congruence method, process tracing is used to ferret out and weigh alternate explanations for the chain of events so as to draw inferences about possible explanations for the cause of events. Taking portions of evidence in each case, I assess to what extent the evidence supports the observable or assumed implications of each of these hypotheses. In answering my research question, process tracing has two benefits. First, process tracing can establish the order of events and therefore illuminate causal mechanisms between the hypothesized catalyst and outcome. Second, in my experience with this dissertation research, process tracing also has the benefit of enabling the research to go “backward from observed outcomes to potential causes – as well as forward from hypothesized causes to subsequent outcomes” – in doing so, this method allowed me to consider variables that I had not originally found of interest.

In order to focus process tracing efforts, this dissertation relies on empirical logic tests distinguished by Stephen Van Evera:

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• Hoop tests to dispense with alternative explanations, which help tease out the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the result to occur (e.g. “was the accused in the state on the day of the murder?”).

• Smoking gun tests to provide support for a hypothesis, but not necessarily eliminating those explanations that fail to pass – thus providing sufficient but not necessary conditions for confirmation of the hypothesis. (e.g. “were you holding the smoking gun?”).

• Straw in the wind tests: to add information that may support or challenge a hypothesis, but these tests are not decisive in and of themselves, and are therefore neither a necessary nor a sufficient standard for rejecting or supporting hypotheses.

• Doubly decisive tests: can confirm hypotheses and reject all others, which can provide the necessary and sufficient criterion for accepting a hypothesis. Though this type of test is admittedly rare, it is possible to combine a hoop test and a smoking gun test to accomplish the same result, according to Van Evera.285

Discourse Analysis
As this dissertation goes beyond strictly material concerns as drivers for Chinese foreign policy, it assumes that discourse – conversations, speeches, bodies of text, and other media – help solidify new ideas, practices, and norms. Thus, from the systematic study of the Chinese discourse regarding troop deployment to UN peacekeeping missions, this dissertation will uncover how practices came into being and lead to new insights about Chinese foreign activities.

Discourse analysis enables me to find the critical moments in the discussion when the language used by the Chinese foreign policy actors changes, in order for these actors to participate in the discourse with credibility, authority, and legitimacy. For example, there could be a shift in

explanations for troop deployment – away from emphasizing the support for a traditional mandate (and therefore supporting an image of China as a state supporting traditional interpretations of sovereignty), and more emphasis on the nature of the threats that a responsible power must address. Moreover, as Hopf notes, discourse analysis also allows the researcher to study when certain language is “selected against.” ²⁸⁶ For example, do Chinese foreign policy actors no longer refer to their deployment to UN peacekeeping missions as an example of Chinese rise to great power status, but instead start emphasizing the peaceful and more development-oriented activities of Chinese peacekeepers? Therefore, in “selecting against” certain language, it is possible to consider how Chinese foreign policy actors are seeking to establish credibility and legitimacy for Beijing’s peacekeeping activities. Moreover, while some qualitative methods seek to understand what social realities mean for actors,²⁸⁷ discourse analysis probes how these realities were produced.²⁸⁸

Two specific forms of discourse analysis are of use in this dissertation. First, predicate analysis, which is often used to study the language used in materials typically used by International Relations analysis (i.e. speeches and meetings minutes, interview transcripts, and government documents), “focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns.”²⁸⁹ Through predicate analysis, the researcher can deconstruct the underlying meanings within each sentence of the discourse. Second, informal argument analysis,²⁹⁰ which is often used when the discourse is assumed to be between a large number of actors, and

over a relatively long period of time, requires the analyst to specify the argument’s role in the discourse about a contested practice (e.g. to facilitate deliberation, reframe issues, persuade others etc.), and to consider the arguments in relation to one another (as it is expected there will be conflicting threads of debate). Then, the analyst identifies specific beliefs that are held by dominant actors, so as to identify where the starting point of the arguments used to uphold or change practices, and the background of preexisting beliefs that are assumed for making the arguments. As the next step, the analyst considers where immediate background beliefs came from, and why and how they have changed over time – this requires process tracing and is highly context-sensitive. The analyst has to be alert for changing terms of the debate – what language is used to denormalize and delegitimize previously supported beliefs, so as to alter the balance of political support for newer ideas.

**DATA SOURCES**

In order to source data, field research was conducted throughout the length of this dissertation, primarily in New York and Beijing, supplemented with research trips to Shanghai, Canberra, and Sydney. For the duration of the research and writing phase of the dissertation, field research was frequently conducted in New York for interviews at the People’s Republic of China’s Permanent Mission at the United Nations, other Permanent Mission to the United Nations, within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and also with retired senior UN officials.

**Semi-structured Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were used not only to source new data, but also as barometers for the interest and recent currents in Chinese foreign policy. To this end, interviews with members of China’s foreign policy and national security circles – including practitioners and the academic and policy community that specialize in Chinese policy as it regards UN peacekeeping operations, were particularly helpful. Thus, this dissertation was built on conversations with officials in the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Beijing-based diplomatic community, who in each of their various portfolios work on Chinese multilateral affairs.

My reasoning for approaching the think tank community in Beijing was that it would be relevant given the cross-over from academics into policy work. Chinese foreign policy centers are playing roles within a widening policy landscape, and the work of these centers – what is funded, what is published, what is discussed at workshops, can serve as a crude indicator for what is of interest with policy practitioners.291 Scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Chinese Foreign Affairs University; the Langfang Police Training Academy; Tsinghua University; Peking University, the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and Fudan University, amongst others, helped inform how I should be thinking about my research.

Documents
In order to help reconstruct the discourse and decision points regarding UN peacekeeping deployments, this dissertation draws from a variety of primary and secondary sources to include:

Primary sources:

- Chinese government documents (e.g. White Papers on Defence), statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Public Security, and Ministry of Defense concerning UN peacekeeping missions;
- Chinese official statements at the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping, and other extraordinary meetings pertaining to

peacekeeping, for example, the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations and the UN Peacekeeping Working Group,

• Chinese voting and S/PV records at the United Nations

• English and Chinese news sources, to include Xinhua, the *People’s Liberation Army Daily*, and the *China Daily*.

Secondary sources:

• English and Chinese language publications, such as *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Peacekeeping*, *Security Studies*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *China: An International Journal* etc.
CHAPTER THREE: CHINA’S DEPLOYMENT TO THE AU-UN HYBRID OPERATION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)

INTRODUCTION

In the lead up to the deployment of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the Darfur crisis was linked to Chinese foreign policy. China had run a gauntlet of criticisms over its diplomatic, economic and arms relationship with Sudan, including the connection of the 2008 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games\(^2\) to the Darfur crisis under the ‘Genocide Olympics’ moniker. Initially, China rebuffed the shaming campaign as an irrelevant sideshow to the events planned in Beijing and that such criticism was completely unfounded. China also reemphasized that the responsibility for Sudanese domestic affairs were under the stewardship of Khartoum and Sudanese sovereignty should be respected. Simply put, as Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong stated in 2004 “business is business” and as China made efforts to “separate politics from business… [the] internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair.”\(^3\)

Though China continued to bluntly dismiss critics for their misguided assumptions about Chinese influence, China took a host of bold measures in the 2004 – 2008 time period under examination here: exchanging visits of heads of state; dispatching special envoys and using good offices to mediate between Sudanese actors and activist states like Britain, France and the United States. To bridge differences, China emphasized holding dialogue on an equal footing with Sudan to gain consent for a UN peacekeeping mission in the troubled area of Sudan. Indeed, by March 2007, Chinese officials were counseling Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping presence. These efforts marked the first time that Chinese officials admitted to urging a state to accept a peacekeeping mission, signaling a departure from Chinese policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs of the host state. China actively brokered UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which ushered in

\(^2\) Hereafter called the Olympic Games or the Beijing Games.

UNAMID. China was one of the first states to pledge assets towards the operation, and Chinese engineering units were the first peacekeeping forces to arrive in Darfur. Given the initial Chinese position of not only downplaying any Chinese influence over a sovereign Sudan, but also the Chinese repetition of the principles of non-interference in respect of Khartoum’s consent to a potential UN-led peacekeeping mission, these are stark changes in Chinese foreign relations.

Such change in the Chinese approach to Darfur is perplexing. First, such changes in Chinese activity regarding Darfur has implications for future Chinese activity with so-called ‘pariah states.’ Not only is Darfur a precedent-setting example regarding the Chinese core stance of non-intervention – especially in the context of an interventionist, protection of civilians, Chapter VII mandate of the UNAMID mission – there is also the expectation that China may again serve as a mediator between the West and so-called ‘pariah states,’ like Myanmar or Zimbabwe, for example. Second, changes in China’s approach to Darfur is surprising because China typically acts like a state that is impervious to shaming attempts. When faced with criticisms on the June 4th incident or Chinese human rights standards, for example, China has vigorously dismissed critics, and even used criticisms as overtures to expound justifications for China’s approach to these affairs. And, when criticism has been too great for China, officials have stood behind repetitions of its principle of non-interference.

Two popular explanations are offered to elucidate the changes in Chinese practice regarding Darfur: first, that China responded to the Dream for Darfur ‘Genocide Olympics’ shaming campaign, so as to protect China’s reputation in the run up to the much wanted Beijing Games; and second, that China and the lead state pushing for the UNAMID mission, the United States, had mutual interests in a peaceful and stable Darfur, which led China to become active supporter.

of UNAMID. However, detailed historical analysis and process tracing shows demonstrated in this chapter shows that these arguments are unsatisfactory and incomplete.

In order to uncover what motivated the changes in the Chinese stance over the Darfur issue, this chapter is based on a key premise reiterated during numerous research interviews: Darfur itself was not of intrinsic importance to China or Chinese Communist Party stability; however, the smooth and successful conduct of the Olympic Games, was the top foreign policy priority for China by 2006. A second important point is that despite the changes in the Chinese approach to the Darfur issue, China stayed within its original policy parameters, oscillating between two sets of benchmarks: what was unacceptable UN activity in Darfur (i.e. sanctions against Sudan) and what was permissible UN activity in Darfur (i.e. activity only possible with Security Council authorization and host state consent). These broad benchmarks set a range of permissible activity regarding the Darfur crisis. With the growing acceptance that African solutions to African problems was not a viable solution for Darfur; rising anti-China rhetoric via the Dream for Darfur’s ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign, and, because of closer contact with US officials, a better understanding that a United Nations-led solution was not a prelude to regime change in Sudan – supporting, and even advocating for the mission became a possible option for China. When it comes to deployment to UNAMID, in the words of one senior UN official “to work on Darfur, as China had, and not deploy, would be like climbing [Mount] Everest and not putting a flag there.” China was in the position to choose first what types of assets it could send, allowing China to select its comparative advantage of engineering units – staying away from the so-called ‘tip of the spear’ assets, while winning praise and reputational benefits for dispatching hard to find enabler units, and gaining intelligence and operational experience. By deploying to

295 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and International Relations scholars, interviews with author, Beijing, December 2008.
296 Senior UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, interview by author, New York, July 10, 2010.
the mission, after having pushed the mission to fruition, was the pinnacle of what China could do to support a peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict and counter its critics.

This chapter finds evidence for some geopolitical-material and organizational explanations being present in China’s decision to deploy assets to Darfur, to include, amongst others: operational exposure; military-to-military diplomacy with other UNAMID units, and perhaps uncovering other resources when prospecting for water wells. However, as this chapter will show, there is little evidence of the external reputation hypothesis, in particular and that process tracing demonstrates that these geopolitical-material and organizational explanations are necessary though insufficient explanations for Chinese flexibility on the Darfur issue. Instead, as this chapter will demonstrate, there is significant evidence of Chinese sensitivity to ideational concerns – in particular, image concerns – as shown by Chinese sensitivity to social influence. However, based on China’s rhetorical frame of belonging to the Global South, it is surprising that though the African Union publicly endorsed UN involvement in Darfur by January 2006 – the Chinese response to supporting the AU overture was not for another eight months, in September 2006. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that despite the Chinese initial commitment to defending Sudanese sovereignty and consent, it was Chinese interventions that wrangled consent from Khartoum, much at the cost of a closer Sino-Sudanese relationship. The timeline shows that China did not perceive Sudanese intransigence with the UNAMID mission as affecting China’s decision to deploy to the mission – indeed, troop deployments were used as an inducement to procure Sudanese consent. Counter-intuitively, this chapter finds strong evidence of China modifying its Darfur activity in response to social influence from the P3, in line with an emergent Chinese identity as a responsible great power.
CONTEXT

Sino-Sudanese Relations

China and Sudan are close economic partners, with cooperation in their agriculture, communication, energy, infrastructure construction, and water conservancy sectors, and China is Sudan’s major international trade partner. By the end of 2003, Chinese investment in Sudan was over $2.7 billion, primarily in the oil sector (pipelines, gas stations and crude oil processing plants). China was the primary partner in building the pipeline from South Sudan to Port Sudan. China purchases two thirds of Sudanese oil at approximately 400,000 barrels of oil a day in 2007, which was over a 500% increase compared to their trade in oil in 2006. Sudan is the main site of China’s offshore oil production, which is crucial to meet the growing petroleum needs of the Chinese economy without subjecting China to fluctuations in the international oil markets. Sudan’s oil exports to China went from $1.8B in 2006 to $4.1B in 2007 to $6.3B in 2008, placing Sudan as China’s fifth-largest exporter.

China has also agreed to build the Sudanese presidential palace and has constructed other dams, bridges and civil infrastructure in Sudan. China is also engaged in military sales with Sudan. Human rights organizations criticized Chinese sales of heavy military trucks, artillery systems, helicopter gunships, armed personnel carriers, munitions and arms to Khartoum for use in the Sudanese civil war, and in Sudanese military and janjaweed in attacks against civilians. Chinese technology transfers were noted by human rights organizations as enabling Sudan to become self-sufficient in their production of small- and medium-sized weapons. The Chinese government response was to clarify the Chinese position on arms

301 Trade figures are from UNComtrade database through a search for import of oil in recent years to China from Sudan (accessed May 24, 2012), available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/ce/ceSearch.aspx?it=oil&r=1&rg=156&p=148&y=recent&px=HS.
sales,\textsuperscript{303} and also reference non-Chinese sources to emphasize China’s relatively low rank as a small arms trader and its compliance with international arms trade agreements.\textsuperscript{304} Politically, Beijing has used its position on the UN Security Council to water down resolutions aimed at pressuring Sudan to stop the killings in Darfur. For example, China insisted on Sudanese consent for UN Security Council Resolution 1706, authorizing the UN peacekeeping force to protect civilians.\textsuperscript{305} Critics asserted that with China’s position at the UN Security Council, Sudan was able to stall UN efforts regarding Darfur, permitting a continuation of the violence in Darfur in the run up to the authorization of the UNAMID mission.

However, the Sino-Sudanese relationship must be put into a wider context. It is often assumed that the Sino-Sudanese relationship is only a recent phenomenon due to the Chinese interest in Sudanese oil exports. In fact, Li Anshan notes that relations between the two states can be traced for thousands of years, through the Tang, Song and Yuan Dynasties, with Imperial courts hosting Sudanese delegations.\textsuperscript{306} Indeed, a long and enduring bilateral relationship is often referred to by both states: common histories featuring subordination to foreign conquest; mutual ‘independence struggles,’ and warm relations because Sudan was the fourth African state to recognize the People’s Republic of China in February 1959. Both countries’ leaders highlight the friendship between their two states, with Chinese rebukes of Sudan often tempered by reference to Sudan and China as equals. For example, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China was providing assistance "selflessly" to African countries because they too had suffered "aggression by Western

\textsuperscript{303} Chinese policy on arms sales is that these activities are guided by a focus on the self-defense requirements of the receiving state; causing no damage to the peace, security and stability of concerned regions; and non-interference in the internal affairs of the receiving country. For more detail, see Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Holds a Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Journalists on the Darfur Issue of Sudan, April 11, 2007 (accessed on September 9, 2011); available from http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/sudandarfurissue/t311958.htm.

\textsuperscript{304} Li Shijia and Bai Jie, “PRC Envoy: Not ‘Objective’ to Accuse China Alone of Arms Sales to Sudan,” Xinhua, March 7, 2008.


powers" and had similar hardships. Even as President Hu chastised Sudan to make progress on Darfur, President Hu noted that "although the distance between China and Sudan is great, the friendship between the two people is deeply rooted."

Moreover, scholars caution against a popular view that overstates the influence of China on Sudan because of the Sino-Sudanese oil relationship. The Sino-Sudanese relationship was perceived to be all the more unique given Sudan’s position as a pariah in international affairs. As Sudanese status waned in the eyes of other members of the UN Security Council, Sudanese ties with China became perceived as more important, magnifying the impact of the Dream for Darfur coalition’s efforts to link China to the Darfur crisis. For all that the bilateral relationship may be “deeply rooted” it is certainly not always lockstep during the period under analysis in this chapter. Gaafar Karrar Ahmed writes explicitly about the delicate, and at times tense relationship between Sudan and China. Furthermore, research shows that Sudan may not be as important to the Chinese economy as initially assumed. As China-Hao Huang notes “Sudan’s contribution to China’s total energy needs is important but not strategic… Sudan’s producing oil fields are aging, and its proven oil deposits modest by global standards…” Moreover, China is not the sole player in the Sudanese energy market – India, Malaysia, Japan and the United Arab Emirates are all important also. Again, explanations that because of the Sino-Sudanese relationship that China must be involved in addressing the Darfur issue fail to elucidate why China engaged the Darfur

issue when it did, and what mechanisms pushed China to modify its activity regarding the Darfur issue.

The African Union and the Darfur Crisis
The first alert of the crisis were reports from the human rights community in February 2003.\[^{312}\] By the summer of 2003, UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Khartoum, Dr. Mukesh Kapila, started writing memos outlining the conditions in Darfur, calling for UN involvement against a systematic campaign of government-led atrocities against civilians.\[^{313}\] By the end of 2003, Sudan had closed access to the Darfur region, leaving UN officials and human rights groups to work with refugees in neighboring Chad to learn of what was going on in Darfur. In December 2003, UN Humanitarian Coordinator Jan Egeland asserted at a press conference that Darfur “has quickly become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.” Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed Egeland’s view a few days later, when he was “alarmed at the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Darfur region of Sudan, and by reports of widespread abuses against civilians, including killings, rape and the burning and looting of entire villages.”\[^{314}\] However, even within the UN Secretariat there were conflicting opinions on what to do regarding Darfur.\[^{315}\]

A tipping point for coverage and attention on the crisis came with the March 2004 interview with Humanitarian Coordinator Kapila. He organized an interview stating that "[this] is ethnic cleansing, this is the world's greatest humanitarian crisis, and I don't know why the world isn't doing more about it," before going on to compare Darfur to the beginning phase of the Rwandan


\[^{315}\] James Traub, Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur, Occasional Paper (Brisbane: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2010).
genocide. After this bold public statement from Kapila, the European Union called for a no-fly zone over Darfur under UN auspices in April 2004. Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, on April 7, 2004, Annan emphasized that “the international community must be prepared to take swift and appropriate action,” specifying that this “may include military action.”

Egeland delivered a general briefing to the UN Security Council on April 2, 2004 where he predicted “ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands” was possible in the very near future.

On April 8, 2004, Sudan, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) in N’Djamena, Chad, giving the provisions to deploy the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the HCFA. As Cristina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm note, “AMIS was the most concrete manifestation of the AU response to Darfur.” However, according to Badescu and Bergholm, “AU members were hesitant to deploy AMIS, given the Union’s lack of finances, human resources and management skills necessary to sustain a multidimensional peace operation in a crisis as complex as Darfur.” AMIS was a troubled mission from the start, with a vast mandate, unclear rules of engagement, circumscribed

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322 Konaré noted in January 2006 that the mandate was “not clearly understood by commanders at all levels.” Cited in Cristina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, “The African Union,” in The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, ed. David R. Black and Paul D. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2010), 100 – 118, 105.
consent from Sudan, and a serious shortage of manpower and assets. AMIS frequently came under attack from janjaweed rebels and government forces, and had only 7,000 personnel deployed at the end of 2005. AMIS troops were supplied from Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa; police from Ghana, and observers from Egypt and Libya.

The European Union, NATO and the United Nations supported AMIS. The European Union donated 300 million euros to AMIS. NATO deployed its strategic airlift capabilities to move the African units to Darfur. The United Nations offered guidance on mission structure, seconding military and police advisers, logisticians and other technical personnel. Western governments actively supported the view of “African solutions for African problems,” which some charged as an excuse to avoid Darfur while simultaneously quieting the critics at home. Prime Minister Blair stated in Khartoum in October 2004, “I don’t think there is any desire on the part of the African Union for outside troops… my very strong understanding is there is not a desire for outside troops from the EU or from Britain to come here…” Indeed, as late as June 2005, South African President Thabo Mbeki told President Bush that it was “critically important that the African continent [deals] with these conflict situations on the continent… We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It’s an African responsibility and we can do it.”

The AU led seven rounds of Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Abuja, Nigeria. However, the AU itself still lacked a unified position on Darfur because of differences in opinion on the value of Sudanese sovereignty amongst the AU Commission, the AU leadership

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323 Sudan only wanted peacekeepers to use force in self-defense.
and the fifty-three states that comprise the AU. The African states were coalescing into camps: those of the Arab-African states and those of the Sub-Saharan African states – although amongst each camp, the members still differed in their respect for Sudanese sovereignty. For example, Algeria, Egypt and Libya all supported little interventionism and were unwilling to challenge Sudanese sovereignty. Nigeria and at times, South Africa, were willing to rebuke Sudan on occasion for the Darfur crisis, and held particular moral authority since they contributed troops from the start and had shown commitment to mediation in their own ways respectively. In an attempt to sidestep these differences and cut through the multi-level efforts by various African actors, the AU Commissioner, Alpha Oumar Konaré pushed on April 28, 2005 to have the AU coordinate all Darfur activities, in order to streamline efforts in the peace process. On May 5, 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed between Sudan and the SLM’s Minni Minawi faction, but the SLM’s Abdel Wahid al-Nur and the JEM both rejected the DPA. What is of note here is that though the AU fostered the talks, Addis Ababa was still beholden to pressures from international partners, mainly the United States and the United Kingdom who wanted results, given mounting domestic pressures at home to resolve the Darfur crisis. However, after the DPA, the anti-Sudanese movement broke into over fifteen different groups, many without clear political goals and with varying levels of support – further complicating the negotiations environment.

**HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S POSITION VIS-À-VIS DARFUR**

With the context of the crisis outlined, this section discusses the changes in the Chinese approach to Sudan regarding the Darfur issue. In order to understand the initial Chinese position on Darfur, it is worth examining the Chinese voting record and statements to the Security Council and the press. UN Security Council Resolutions that are key to dealing with the Darfur situation are summarized in Table 1 below.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>UN Security Council Resolution</th>
<th>Resolution Intent</th>
<th>China’s vote</th>
<th>Votes cast the same as China</th>
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| 1556 July 30, 2004             | - calling on Sudan to conclude a ceasefire agreement without delay  
- deployment of international monitors and AU protection force  
- called on Sudan to disarm *janjaweed* or face sanctions  
- imposed arms embargo on “non-governmental entities” | Abstention        | Pakistan                                        |
| 1564 September 18, 2004        | - calling for an International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) on Darfur to investigate rights violations                                                                                                                   | Abstention        | Algeria, Pakistan and Russia                     |
| 1590 March 24, 2005            | - established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)                                                                                                                                                                           | Unanimous yes vote by UNSC | Unanimous yes vote by UNSC                    |
| 1591 March 29, 2005            | - arms embargo  
- banned offensive military flights  
- targeted sanctions                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Abstention        | Russia and Algeria                               |
| 1593 March 31, 2005            | - referred Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC)                                                                                                                                                             | Abstention        | Algeria, Brazil, and the United States           |
| 1672 April 25, 2006            | - sanctions on four Sudanese officials in line with UNSCR 1591                                                                                                                                                       | Abstention        | Russia and Qatar                                 |
| 1679 May 16, 2006              | - called on non-signatories to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement  
- called for accelerated transition to a UN operation in Darfur  
- obliged Sudan to permit a UN assessment mission into Darfur                                                                                                                                                   | Unanimous yes vote by UNSC | Unanimous yes vote by UNSC                      |
| 1706 August 31, 2006           | Mandated UNMIS, under Chapter VII, to take over AMIS                                                                                                                                                                   | Abstention        | Russia and Qatar                                 |
| 1769 July 31, 2007             | established the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur Mission (UNAMID)                                                                                                                                                     | Unanimous yes vote by UNSC | Unanimous yes vote by UNSC                      |

Table 1: Key UN Security Council Resolutions on the Darfur issue

April 2004 – August 2006: Chinese Acknowledgment that the Darfur Situation is a Concern

As the opening move by the UN Security Council on Darfur, the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement in early April 2004. Presidential Statements are text on a common
position taken by the UN Security Council, drafted by the penholder, with negotiations on the text
possibly going all the way to the Ambassador-level. Though these statements are non-binding
and do not require a formal vote, they are read from the Chair of the UN Security Council before
being entered on the official record. Therefore, Presidential Statements require unanimity
amongst Security Council members and no public airing of differences, and can therefore send a
message of unity and credibility in a single message from the international community.
Presidential Statements, unlike press statements (which are also non-binding), do remain on the
permanent record. James Traub notes that Algeria, China and Pakistan were successful in
weakening the Security Council’s language to urging “the parties concerned to fully cooperate in
order to address the grave situation prevailing in the region.” 328

In a May 7, 2004 briefing to the UN Security Council, the acting High Commissioner for Human
Rights Bertrand Ramcharan stated that in Darfur the violence by the Sudanese government and
the janjaweed “may constitute war crimes and/or crimes against humanity.” 329 In response, the
Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on May 25, 2004 demanding “that those
responsible be held accountable” and condemning “large-scale violations of human rights and of
international human rights law.” 330 Both US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan visited Darfur in late June 2004, officially marking the focus of the United
Nations on the Darfur crisis. Citing that an estimated one million Darfurians were internally
displaced, on July 9, 2004, the US Congress called the Darfur violence “genocide,” and in

328 James Traub, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power (New
York: Picador, 2007), 220.
The World Conference on Human Rights: Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan,
AFR/921 (7 May 2004).
September 2004, the Bush administration also used the term, though Secretary of State Colin Powell emphasized that “no new action is dictated by this determination.”

Under US initiative and with strong UK support, in mid-July a Security Council Resolution was introduced threatening sanctions on Sudan. However, Algeria, Angola, Brazil, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and Russia all objected to coercive measures. France gave tepid support for the proposed Resolution. Instead, on July 30, 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1556 was voted on calling on Sudan to conclude a ceasefire agreement without delay; facilitate international relief for the humanitarian disaster in Darfur, disarm the janajweed and bring to justice those who violated international law. UN Security Council Resolution 1556 sponsored the deployment of international monitors and an AU protection force, and urged UN member states to support these efforts. UN Security Council Resolution 1556 noted that the Security Council would consider a response under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the authorization of the non-military coercive actions, which is a step weaker than the full threat of sanctions. China and Pakistan both abstained on voting, with the Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative Ambassador Zhang Yishan responding that the resolution “was too harsh and would be unhelpful.”

As the situation in Darfur deteriorated further, on September 18, 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1564 passed, calling for an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and threatening sanctions against Sudan if it failed to address the escalating violence in Darfur. This was a

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significant move, as it was the first time that the Security Council had invoked the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in a Resolution.335 UN Security Council Resolution 1564 was sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Romania; with Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia abstaining because the threat of sanctions could drive Sudan to withdraw from interaction with the UN. Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution 1564 was revised four times over ten days in order to address concerns about sanctions and fend off a threatened Chinese veto. The final version of UN Security Council Resolution 1564 noted that the Security Council “shall consider” imposing sanctions, rather than automatically imposing sanctions on Sudan, and stated that the Security Council “welcomes” steps by Sudan to reduce the administrative obstructions to aid and humanitarian works entering Darfur.336 Even with these moves, Ambassador Wang Guangya still cautioned “The resolution should focus on the Sudanese government’s continuing to cooperate rather than the other way around,” and reiterated that "[instead] of helping to solve the problem, sanctions may make them even more complicated."337

The United States and the United Kingdom continued to feel out the position of the other permanent members in regards to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur throughout the winter of 2004, with the United Kingdom in particular advocating for more coercive measures against Sudan, including referring Darfur to the International Criminal Court and enforcing an arms embargo. According to Ian Taylor, Britain and the United States, informally known as ‘the P2,’ issued three proposals for a resolution during that period, but China made it clear that it would not endorse

any resolutions on the matter, and “announced informally that it would use its veto right if Chinese interests in Sudan came under threat.”

On January 25, 2005, The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was released, noting that though the Darfur situation was not genocide, but “acts of genocide” and crimes against humanity were being conducted in Darfur. In response to the possibility of utilizing the sanctions mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 1564, China “[pledged] to veto any bid to impose an embargo against Khartoum,” formally undermining the credibility of the sanctions threat. On the wave of reporting on Darfur, the UN Security Council pushed for three resolutions in March 2005. According to sources, “the Chinese representative [began to strike] a more conciliatory tone and showed willingness to discuss the resolutions provided that the integrity of country [Sudan] would be guaranteed… The results of the bargain were three diluted resolutions.”

On March 24, 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 passed unanimously, endorsing the deployment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which called for a maximum deployment of 10,715 military personnel, plus a civilian component to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Even though UN Security Council Resolution 1590 had nothing directly to do with Darfur, “China objected to any form of communication between the AU observer mission that had already been approved for Darfur and the UN peacekeepers in the south of the country.”

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On March 29, 2005, the UN Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 1591, which imposed an arms embargo on all the different actors in Darfur; banned offensive military flights over Darfur, and also put forth targeted sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze) for those in violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. China, Russia and Algeria all abstained from the Resolution. Procedural delays by China and Russia meant that the Sanctions Committee created by UN Security Council Resolution 1591, composed of Security Council members and a panel of experts, was delayed in starting its work. On March 31, 2005, the United Kingdom drafted UN Security Council Resolution 1593, referring Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC), allowing the ICC to act against alleged perpetrators of crimes in Darfur. UN Security Council Resolution 1593 was authorized under Chapter VII, allowing coercive measures for non-compliance. Algeria, Brazil, China and the United States all abstained. Wang Guangya did state “the perpetrators must be brought to justice. The question before the Council was what was the most appropriate way to do so.”

At the January 2006 African Union Summit, African countries rejected the Sudanese candidacy for the rotating AU presidency following the objections of other African heads of state and human rights watchdogs. With recognition that the “African solutions for African problems” was no longer working, in January 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council accepted “in principle” that the UN could have a peacekeeping presence in Darfur. In February 2006, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to start preparations for such a mission. On 10

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March 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council confirmed the AU willingness to transition from an AU-led AMIS mission to a UN-led operation, as long as there was Sudanese consent. ³⁴⁹ It is a common misperception that only Sudan demanded an “African character” for the UN mission. In fact, the AU stressed strong preference for an African character of the mission in its leadership and composition. It was becoming apparent that key donors to AMIS were losing patience for the mission, with Canada, the European Union and the United States making it clear by May 2006 that they were less and less willing to fund the peacekeeping force.

Concurrently, US congressmen kept the pressure on for action in Darfur – even suggesting ideas like NATO intervention. Senate Resolution 383 ³⁵⁰ House Resolution 723 were initiatives urging the President to help deploy a NATO bridging force to protect civilians until a UN force could deploy. ³⁵¹ Furthermore, President Hu’s April 2006 visit to Washington, DC for meetings with President Bush provided another opportunity for the United States to initiate conversations with Chinese officials on Darfur. Chinese and American officials kept Darfur and Sudan on the agenda for their follow-up meetings.

On April 25, 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1672 passed with China, Russia and Qatar all casting abstention votes. ³⁵² UN Security Council Resolution 1672 placed sanctions on four Sudanese officials in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1591. Even though it had little practical effect, since these individuals did not travel and carried little in the way of foreign


³⁵⁰ Calling on the President to take immediate steps to help improve the security situation in Darfur, Sudan, with an emphasis on civilian protection, S.RES 383, 109th Cong. (2006); (accessed on May 20, 2012); available from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109sres383ats/pdf/BILLS-109sres383ats.pdf

³⁵¹ Calling on the President to take immediate steps to help improve the security situation in Darfur, Sudan, with an emphasis on civilian protection, H.RES.723, 109th Cong. (2006); (accessed on May 20, 2012); available from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hres723ih/pdf/BILLS-109hres723ih.pdf

assets, Ambassador Wang Guangya still stated “this [was] not the right moment... We have to be careful with any step the Council is going to take.” China and Russia also worked to reduce the proposed list of sanctioned individuals from seventeen people to four. When China abstained from the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1672, Chinese officials noted that “clarifications on the inclusion of individuals on the sanctions list” were missing, hence, China could not vote in support of the resolution.

On May 16, 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1679 passed unanimously, urging non-signatories to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement; calling for an accelerated transition to a UN operation in Darfur, and obliging Sudan to permit a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations assessment mission into Darfur. A Chapter VII mandate was used to put Sudan in violation of international law if it blocked the UN assessment team. China stated that the Resolution “should not be construed as a precedent for the Security Council’s future discussion or adoption of a new resolution against Sudan…. We believe that, if the UN is to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Darfur, the agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese Government must be obtained.” Both China and Russia held that the UN Security Council Resolution 1679 UN peacekeeping mission had to be acceptable to Sudan. Sudan then exploited the precondition by making it a loophole: refusing to give its cooperation, while avoiding sanctions for its behavior and blocking any entry for forces.

353 Gerard Aziakou, “Not yet time for UN sanctions on Sudan officials: Russia, China,” Agence France Presse, April 17, 2006.
On August 18, 2006, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hédi Annabi warned that Sudan was appearing to gear up for a sizeable military offensive targeting Darfur.\(^\text{357}\) The day after, on August 19, 2006, Sudan issued a statement saying that the British-American-led initiative was contrary to the Darfur Peace Agreement, which did not call for a UN peacekeeping force, and that these new initiatives were not supporting peace in the region.\(^\text{358}\) President Bashir threatened that any attempts to replace the African Union with the proposed 17,000 UN hybrid force – would find that Darfur would become a “graveyard” for peacekeepers.\(^\text{359}\) The United States responded that the Resolution represented the “will of the international community” and referred to the International Criminal Court’s potential involvement in the Darfur crisis.\(^\text{360}\) Sudan declined any involvement in discussions at the United Nations in the run up to the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1706.\(^\text{361}\)

Initially, China acknowledged that Darfur was an issue through its muted concern regarding the Darfur crisis, but Chinese officials did not explicitly articulate China’s stance on whether the UN should deploy a peacekeeping mission, instead focusing on support for the African Union mission and emphasizing respect for Sudanese sovereignty. For example, at the January 2006 African Union Summit, Vice Foreign Minister Lü Guozeng supported AU urgency on replacing the AMIS monitoring mission, but did not play an active role at the talks.\(^\text{362}\) In March 2006, Chinese officials reiterated support for resolving the Darfur crisis in the framework of African mediation,

\(^{358}\) “Sudan reiterates opposition to replacing AU troop with UN forces in Darfur,” \textit{Xinhua}, August 19, 2006.
\(^{361}\) I thank Sonja Regler for this insight.
while respecting Sudanese sovereignty, but did not elaborate on replacing the AMIS mission with United Nations troops.\textsuperscript{363} In April 2006, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya noted the concern of the UN Security Council about Sudanese obstruction of the emergency relief operations in Darfur, but made no further comment on other Darfur-related issues.\textsuperscript{364} In May 2006, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing emphasized that “strengthening the African Union Mission in Sudan is the consensus of all Security Council members and the international community as a whole, and the top priority at present is to turn that consensus into reality.”\textsuperscript{365} However, Foreign Minister Li declined to comment on when the UN Mission in Sudan would replace AMIS. Therefore, though the question of Darfur was in the attention of senior Chinese officials, at this juncture, the Chinese position was defined by the absence of a stated opinion regarding the use of UN peacekeepers in Darfur.

**August 2006 – February 2007: China Voices Opinions About UN Peacekeeping in Darfur**

On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council voted on UN Security Council Resolution 1706, stating that the situation in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security authorizing a force of troops, civilian police and formed police units at about 22,500-strong as a Chapter VII, multidimensional operation, with the goal of improving the security situation on the borders between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{366} Somewhat controversially, UN Security Council Resolution 1706 “invited” Sudan to give its consent to the mission’s deployment, effectively giving Sudan control over the mission. Russia, Qatar and China all abstained from voting for the mission. Critics claimed that the Chinese vote signaled diplomatic cover for Sudan and that there would be no forceful implementation of UN Security Council

\textsuperscript{363}“China backs Sudan’s efforts to resolve Darfur crisis,” *Sudan Tribune*, March 26, 2006.
Resolution 1706. Within hours of the vote being made public, Sudan made it clear it was not going to give consent.

Shortly afterwards, on September 13, 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized in London that "China is very much concerned about the stability in Darfur… we support the international decision to send in peacekeepers.” However, Wen still stressed “in order to have an effective implementation of the operation by the peacekeepers, consent from the Sudanese government and from the African Union are needed.” On September 14, 2006, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya stated "We sent a message to [Sudan] that we feel the UN taking over is a good idea, but it is up to [Khartoum] to agree to that…We are not imposing on them. We need to have them consider it and agree to it.”

Again, US Congressmen kept the pressure on for a military intervention on behalf of Darfuri civilians. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) introduced resolution 559 (S.RES.559) in the US Senate calling for the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Darfur on September 7, 2006. In a more public snub, US Congressman Donald M. Payne and Africa policy specialists Susan Rice and Anthony Lake published a Washington Post op-ed lamenting the slow response on Darfur and calling out China because it would be “unlikely to compel Sudan to admit the United Nations,” and outlining the option of a United States or NATO-led strike and naval blockade followed by UN troops in Sudan under the responsibility to protect.

On November 2, 2006, in meetings preceding the Beijing Summit of the Forum on the China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), President Hu Jintao noted that he hoped Sudan could maintain

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368 “China pushes Sudan to let UN troops into Darfur,” Sudan Tribune, September 14, 2006.
stability in the Darfur region and strengthen dialogue with the parties involved in the conflict. Yet, Hu still emphasized Chinese recognition of the Sudanese concerns over Darfur.\textsuperscript{371} President Hu appealed to President Bashir in public and in bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the FOCAC meetings. For example, President Hu stated in regards to Darfur "[we] hope the Sudanese government can strengthen dialogue with each party concerned, coordinate positions and strive to find an appropriate settlement so as to maintain stability, and constantly improve the humanitarian conditions in the region."\textsuperscript{372}

Not only proposing, but forcefully advocating for the hybrid mission was the first critical juncture that put China on a different path regarding the Darfur issue. A compromise, proposed by China and the United States, for a hybrid AU-UN force was put forward in Addis Ababa on November 17, 2006.\textsuperscript{373} With input from the UN Security Council, the Arab League, the African Union and other African leaders, Khartoum agreed in principle to the Annan Plan of phased support for peacekeeping in Darfur, which would eventually culminate in an AU-UN joint peacekeeping mission. The United Nations would assist in the funding and logistics of the hybrid force (the light support package), and then the United Nations would deploy 1,000 military engineers and civilian personnel to assist AMIS (the heavy support package). For the final phase of the Annan Plan, Khartoum agreed in principle to accept an AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, of approximately 17,000 soldiers and 3,000 police officers, predominately African in character, with command and control structures supported by the United Nations. It was known that Sudan had accepted a much larger force than the 12,000 troops it initially wanted. The Annan Plan also stipulated that there must be a ceasefire between Sudanese troops and Darfur-based rebel

\textsuperscript{371}“Hu urges to maintain stability in Darfur in talk with Sudanese counterpart,” \textit{Xinhua}, November 2, 2006.
\textsuperscript{372}Hu Jintao Mets with Bostwana and Sudanese Presidents, November 2, 2006 (accessed on August 26, 2010); available at: \url{http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2924/2926/t279647.htm}.
movements, and that Sudan had to reach out to rebel movements that did not sign the May 5, 2006 truce. All parties at the talks agreed to take into account "the security situation along the Chad-Sudan and Central African Republic borders," where violence has spilled over from Darfur. Concurrently, the United Kingdom kept the pressure on Sudan. Through December 2006, Prime Minister Blair and Minister for Africa Lord Triesman repeatedly noted that Sudan could face sanctions if it did not give consent for the hybrid force, and through December 2006, Prime Minister Blair repeatedly stated that he would support a no-fly zone over Darfur, which had been discussed as a background option for the preceding two years.

Journalists reported from anonymous interviews that it was not clear what made the Sudanese leaders change their minds. But a United Nations official who was present said the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, had played a role in persuading Sudan's foreign minister, Lam Akol, that there was no hidden agenda in the effort to introduce a stronger peacekeeping force.

US Special Envoy for Darfur, Andrew S. Natsios stated in congressional testimony in February 2007 that “China’s Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya played a vital and constructive role in helping to broker the Addis compromise and has been active in subsequent Security Council deliberations designed to accelerate the introduction of the hybrid force into Darfur.”

Interviews indicate that within the closed-door meetings, Ambassador Wang Guangya openly admonished Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol to accept the proposed joint UN-AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur. It is important to note that the Chinese push was made in front of other senior UN and foreign officials – making this approach different from a private,

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bilateral *sotto voce* meeting between the two countries. In pushing Sudan in front of other senior officials, China was making sure that those intimately involved in the Darfur question would be aware of China’s changing stance. After Sudan’s back-peddling on getting from the agreement to concrete steps towards a UN-led peacekeeping force, the Chinese senior leadership maintained pressure on Sudan to make progress on peacefully resolving the Darfur crisis. Thus, China had shifted from passively echoing concern over the Darfur crisis to one of advocating for a UN-led peacekeeping mission for Darfur.

Knowing that President Hu was returning to Africa in February 2007, Natsios visited Beijing in January. As a sign of the elevation of the Sino-US discussions on Darfur, Natsios met with some of the most senior foreign affairs officials, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi. Meetings were also held between Natsios and those working on the Darfur question in their daily portfolio, including Assistant Foreign Ministers Cui Tiankai and He Yafei, and Special Envoy Zhai Jun. Natsios focused his efforts on clarifying the US government position on the Darfur question: that the United States was keen to avoid state collapse (like in Somalia); that the United States was not interested in enforcing regime change (unlike in Iraq), and that “our interests… are solely humanitarian.” In doing so, Natsios emphasized the commonalities in Chinese and American goals for Darfur. Natsios recalled speaking openly about US expectations towards China: “… we look to Beijing to join with the international community in applying more forceful measures, should Khartoum remain intransigent. China’s substantial economic investment in Sudan gives it considerable potential

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leverage, and we have made clear to Beijing that the international community will expect China to be part of the solution." Sonja Regler emphasizes the importance of the open discussion and off-the-record meetings with the African Affairs specialists at various Chinese think tanks and universities, where Natsios and his Chinese interlocutors could consider the evolving Darfur situation and again clarify that the official US stance on Darfur was distinct from American activists’ recommendations.

In February 2007, during the first trip to Sudan by the Chinese President, President Hu privately urged President Bashir to get rebels who did not sign to the Darfur peace agreement to sign on to the peace process. Visiting Sudan was not part of the initial plans for President Hu’s African tour. Meetings in Sudan with President Bashir were scheduled in light of mounting pressure on China regarding Darfur, and the meetings were a reflection of Chinese recognition that Darfur was becoming a more serious concern for Chinese foreign policy. In reference to these meetings, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya stated “Usually China doesn’t send messages, but this time they did… It was a clear strong message the proposal from Kofi Annan is a good one and Sudan has to accept it.” Senior Chinese diplomat Li Junhua noted that Bashir was “very forthcoming” in private talks with President Hu. The significance of President Hu’s visit to Darfur was the public nature in which Chinese officials discussed Chinese pressure on Sudan, which contrasted the November 16, 2006 meetings in Addis Ababa, in which reports obliquely referenced Chinese persuasion but the nature of Chinese pressure on Sudan was not made public.

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385 International affairs professor, interview with author, Beijing, March 5, 2011.
386 Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, interviews with author, Beijing, March 2, 2011.
Gaafar Karar Ahmed notes that the Hu meetings were the first in which Chinese officials signaled that China was unable to oppose Western states at the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{389} Sudan was unhappy with the Chinese pressures. According to Gaafar Karrar Ahmed, President Bashir stated “We were convinced that China was not, and did not expect, to be an instrument for the American pressure against Sudan.”\textsuperscript{390} Ali al-Sadig, Spokesperson for the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the Sudanese concerns regarding Special Envoy Andrew Natsios’ visit to Beijing: “China is a strategic ally of the Sudan. It should work with the Sudan through the systematic diplomatic dialogue between us, and any American move towards Beijing is fruitless.”\textsuperscript{391}

While visiting Khartoum, President Hu issued Beijing’s Four Principles on Darfur: first, to respect Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity; second, to solve the issue by peaceful means and by sticking to dialogue and coordination based on equality; third, that the African Union and the United Nations should play constructive roles in a peacekeeping mission in Darfur; and fourth, to improve the situation in Darfur and living conditions of local people. Adding the third principle, the Chinese position made it publicly clear that China’s position was in favor of allowing an AU-UN peacekeeping effort. Such statements were a marked shift from the ‘elephant in the room’ approach that Beijing took in early 2004 through 2006. However, China still allowed Sudan some flexibility. For example, the four principles outlined by President Hu first and foremost recognized Khartoum’s authority over its territory, emphasized equality in its dealings with Sudan, and vaguely supported “constructive roles” for the UN and the AU in Darfur. When examined collectively, the Four Principles reiterate much of the Chinese stance since 2004, carefully calibrating the departure in the Chinese position on non-intervention. Most importantly, Beijing refused to consider any discussion of sanctions against Khartoum.

Concurrently, Chinese leaders clearly kept pushing for a win-win relationship between Beijing and Khartoum. On the sidelines of the FOCAC meetings, President Hu emphasized the need to consolidate the mutually beneficial ties between the two states, underscored by their mutual respect and benefit. In practical terms, President Hu expressed Chinese interest in collaboration on water conservation, agriculture, infrastructure construction and communications, and a particular interest in helping reconstruction in Southern Sudan. Moreover, Ambassador Wang Guangya noted also that China “never twists arms,” clarifying, that from the Chinese perspective at least, trade relations were not being used as bargaining chips with Khartoum. When President Hu visited Khartoum, his first meeting took place at the Chinese-constructed Friendship Hall, and included visits to other Chinese-built facilities. The Presidential meetings saw agreements for China to build new schools and a Presidential Palace; a reduction in import tariffs on select Sudanese goods and Chinese grants and loans totaling $117M. China also secured a statement from President Bashir that Sudan supported the one-China policy, and opposed any efforts to separate Taiwan from China.392

March 2007 – January 2008: Increased Pressure from China on Sudan

After accepting a UN peacekeeping mission in principle, Sudan then changed their approach as the Secretariat planned the mission’s modalities. In early March 2007, President Bashir sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, where Sudan withdrew complete support for the Annan three-phase plan, instead stipulating the limits on Sudan’s support and requirements for allowing the UN access to Darfur. In addition, President Bashir accused the Annan plan of contravening the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement; objected to full UN involvement in command and control issues as a prerequisite for UN funding and troop contributions, and made efforts to limit the UN to technical and financial assistance roles. President Bashir wanted military consultants ranking below the force commander to be appointed by the AU. In response,

Secretary-General Ban publicly rejected any attempts by Sudan to modify the Addis Agreement of November 2006. The United Kingdom and the United States sought to increase the pressure on Sudan by calling for sanctions, suggesting travel sanctions for Khartoum elite and enforcing a no-fly zone.\(^{393}\) In this period, in the face of increased Sudanese obstinacy, the Chinese leadership reduced its vacillation in the Chinese stance between laying a hardline for Sudan and giving it cover from international criticism. China distanced its position from Sudan, and made it clear that a UN peacekeeping force was a viable and needed solution.

In New York, on March 12, 2007, Ambassador Wang Guangya pushed Sudanese President Bashir to explain his correspondence with UN Secretary General Ban. This action reflected differences in the stance between China and Sudan, though Ambassador Wang was still cautious to term the letter as “miscommunications and misunderstanding.”\(^{394}\) Ambassador Wang emphasized that China understood Khartoum had agreed to the Addis Ababa communiqué, and that President Bashir’s letter was not what the Security Council expected from Sudan. However, Ambassador Wang called for the United Nations and Sudan to bridge their differences, stating that sanctions would only push Sudan further away. Despite distancing itself from Sudan, when Sudan was threatened with sanctions, the Chinese position was clear: Ambassador Wang emphasized that Sudan was a sovereign state, with a right to reservations about initiatives on Sudanese soil.\(^{395}\)

In preparation for the second round of U.S.-China Dialogue on Africa, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun arrived in Washington, DC on March 9, 2007 to meet with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer.\(^{396}\) This dialogue focused on a host of issues relevant to Darfur, including peacekeeping, debt sustainability, Chinese companies’ reputational

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\(^{394}\) “China seeks explanation of Sudan letter challenging UN Darfur plan,” *Sudan Tribune*, March 12, 2009.


\(^{396}\) The first Sub-Discussion on Africa was in November 2005 under the umbrella of the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue process.
risks in Africa, and transparency in the extractive industries. At these meetings, Chinese officials noted the need for the international community to step up efforts on Darfur, and discussions focused on areas of mutual benefit between China and the United States. 397 Given the context of regime change in Iraq and state-building in Afghanistan, US officials continued the conversation that Natsios shared in Beijing earlier that year. US officials continued to emphasize that regime change was not a goal of the US administration, while highlighting that supporting the peacekeeping mission had reputational benefits for China, and would promote stability to protect Chinese investments in Sudan and Chad. Discussions on the same theme continued with the June 2007 two-day senior dialogue in Washington, DC between US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and State Councilor Dai Bingguo. The clarification in the US stance was important. At the same time that Chinese officials were engaging with US policymakers, Sudanese officials were still telling Chinese officials their view that the UN force was simply a first step to a regime change of the Sudanese state, akin to the 2003 Iraq War. 398 Even when Sudanese officials pressed their Chinese counterparts to resist proposed sanctions on Sudan, according to Gaafar Karrar Ahmed’s private interview records, President Hu held to the view that President Bashir would first have to accept UN peacekeepers before China could make any headway regarding threatened sanctions at the UN Security Council. 399

Also during this period, a New York City-based advocacy group, Dream for Darfur started its ‘Genocide Olympics’ media campaign against China. Dream for Darfur, worked from May 2007 through August 2008 to pressure China into taking a stand vis-à-vis Darfur. The Dream for Darfur campaign was not about an Olympic boycott. In fact, the campaigners emphasized their

support for the Olympic Games, but that with accepting the responsibilities of hosting the Games, China had to be held to a higher standard. Because of China’s oil and arms relationship with Sudan, China should use its leverage to “insist that Khartoum accept a robust international peacekeeping force to protect defenseless civilians in Darfur.”

Dream for Darfur relied upon taking the moral high-ground in their appeals to Chinese officials and other targets of their campaign, emphasizing their role in educating others and generating news and public debate linking Darfur and China. Dream for Darfur also employed a “bank shot” strategy—where they “took aim at targets that had some stature with China because of the Olympics” – in doing so, Dream for Darfur could broaden the number of actors it could ensnare in the campaign. By shaming a more diverse set of actors, all important to China because of their role in the Olympics, Dream for Darfur guaranteed that any action by these actors would at least mean further media coverage, if not increased pressure on China.

What made Dream for Darfur unique was their linking of Darfur to not only China, which had happened haphazardly already, but their linking of Darfur to the Beijing Olympic Games. Dream for Darfur applied pressure on China by focusing their efforts on branding the Beijing Games as the “Genocide Olympics,” believing that China could “only be pressured to act by appealing to its sense of national pride and honor” – hence the branding of the 2008 Olympic Games as akin to the 1936 Berlin Games. In doing so, the campaign presented a special challenge to China. First, the incendiary label identified the Darfur crisis as genocide – an emotionally-charged term for one of the most abhorrent activities a state can execute. Second, the term targeted China as involved in the Darfur crisis. In tying China to the crisis, the Dream for Darfur coalition linked

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401 Like in billiards, where the ball is hit off one surface in order to hit the second target, so as to score a point.
402 The International Olympic Committee, the United States Olympic Committee, corporate sponsors, the artistic director of the opening ceremonies, athletes, US and UN policymakers all became targets of the campaign, for example.
China to the public consciousness and public conscience, presenting a direct threat to the Chinese narrative as a responsible member in international society. As the campaign was solely about Darfur, China could not use domestic policy as a defense (as when rebuffing criticism of China’s Tibet activities in the run up to the Games), nor could China offer statistics to methodically counter critics (as in the case of the environmental impact of the Games).

Dream for Darfur opened their media campaign in late March 2007, including the headline grabbing ‘Genocide Games’ Wall Street Journal op-ed by Hollywood actress Mia Farrow and her son, Ronan Farrow, lambasting China for its relationship with Sudan in natural resources, arms, and other military support. In May 2007, the Save Darfur Coalition’s advertisements in newspapers around the world spotlighted China’s “unique position to pressure the Sudanese government into stopping the bloodshed and allowing United Nations peacekeepers into Darfur to protect civilians.” These materials accused China of using its UN Security Council power to obstruct rigorous peacekeeping resolutions regarding Darfur and asked China use its leverage to “insist that Khartoum accept a robust international peacekeeping force to protect defenseless civilians in Darfur.” Dream for Darfur also started pushing ahead with their ‘bank shot’ strategy. In the ‘Genocide Games’ op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, the Farrows’ compared

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405 Ronan Farrow and Mia Farrow, “The Genocide Games,” The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2007. It is also worth noting that having rejected the Farrows’ opinion-editorial article, The New York Times ended up writing an article about the op-ed – signaling an immediate interest in the story, as did other newspapers that referenced the Farrows’ writing.
Steven Spielberg’s position as Artistic Director for the Opening Ceremonies of the Games and Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film for the 1936 Berlin Olympics. As entertainment reporters called Spielberg’s representatives to ask for his response to the Farrow piece, it was explained that Spielberg was “taking steps with China” and repeatedly stated that a formal decision from Spielberg would be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{408}

Chinese officials responded swiftly to the Dream for Darfur criticism. Statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry as early as the day after the Farrows’ op-ed noted that

\begin{quote}
We don't think it is appropriate to link the Olympic Games in Beijing with the Darfur issue and we don't think it will be popularly accepted or echoed by people around the world...It is a totally misguided approach for people to link the Darfur issue with the Games and try to tip the balance in their favor in order to enhance their own reputation.\textsuperscript{409}
\end{quote}

Chinese officials granted meetings with Dream for Darfur members. In June 2007, Dream for Darfur met with the New York-based Chinese Deputy Consul General Kuang Weilin and soon after, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong.\textsuperscript{410} Indeed, in the first meeting with Consul Kuang brought to the meeting “printouts from the [Dream for Darfur] website, each page marked up in hand-written Chinese documenting what Kuang believed to be errors in the campaign’s publications…,” while emphasizing that the “… Olympics had nothing to do with Darfur.”\textsuperscript{411}

Within five days of the Farrows’ op-ed article, on April 2, 2007, Spielberg responded with a private letter to President Hu, calling on China to “change its policy toward Sudan and pressure

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\textsuperscript{408} Dream for Darfur final report, in the author’s possession.
\textsuperscript{410} The Save Darfur Coalition was the designated point of contact to meet with Chinese Special Envoy Liu Guijin.
\end{flushright}
the Sudanese government to accept the entrance of United Nations peacekeepers to protect the
evictims of genocide in Darfur…” and that he had “recently come to understand fully the extent of
China’s involvement in the region and its strategic and supportive relationship with the Sudanese
government” – presumably through the efforts of Dream for Darfur.\(^{412}\) And as R. Scott Greathead
notes, at this juncture, it was unclear if Spielberg would quit from his Olympic post, though this
was the implication of his letter.\(^{413}\)

In response to advocacy efforts, on May 9, 2007, over one hundred members of Congress signed
a strongly-worded letter to President Hu Jintao, urging efforts to end the Darfur crisis, ominously
warning of a “disaster for China” if the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing were marred by ongoing
accusations of Chinese complicity in the Darfur genocide as Khartoum’s largest trading
partner.\(^{414}\) By the end of July 2007, Spielberg’s representatives leaked that Spielberg might be
willing to quit his Olympic post –ABC News was the first source to carry the story, which was
later picked up by The New York Times and Reuters.\(^{415}\) Most worryingly for Chinese officials was
that as the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign picked up pace there were suggestions that there could
be a boycott of the highly symbolic Olympic torch lighting opening ceremony. 2008 US

\(^{412}\) For full text of the Spielberg April 2, 2007 letter to President Hu, see All Things Considered, NPR, July
\(^{413}\) R. Scott Greathead, “China and the Spielberg Effect,” in China’s Great Leap: The Beijing Games and
\(^{414}\) From the letter: “President Hu, the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympic Games are going to be an
important event for the image of the PRC. Millions of people will visit China, and over a billion people will
tune into their radios and televisions to witness the expression of international peace and solidarity, through
friendly competition in sports. It would be a disaster for China if the games were to be marred by protests,
from concerned individuals and groups, whom will undoubtedly link your government to the continued
atrocities in Darfur, if there is no significant improvement in the conditions. Already there are calls to
boycott what is increasingly being described as the 2008 ‘Genocide Olympics.’ As Sudan’s single largest
trading partner, and the main beneficiary of their significant crude oil exports and construction contracts,
we urge you to protect your country’s image from being irredeemably tarnished, through association with a
genocidal regime, for the purposes of economic gains.” For full text of the Spielberg April 2, 2007 letter to
President Hu, see All Things Considered, NPR, July 24, 2007 (accessed on June 26, 2011); available at:
\(^{415}\) Russell Goldman, “Spielberg Mulls Quitting Olympics to Pressure Chinese on Darfur,” ABC News, July
presidential candidate Bill Richardson, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and 2008 French presidential candidates Francois Bayrou and Ségolène Royale, all came out in support of a boycott of the opening ceremonies because of China’s perceived indifference over Darfur. By June 2007, concerns about an international boycott of the Beijing Olympics because of Darfur were very real, with commentators noting that public perceptions were that the Chinese could have an important role in limiting the Darfur crisis. The centerpiece of the first phase of the Dream for Darfur advocacy campaign against China, was the genocide torch relay, which commenced exactly one year before the Games, on August 9, 2007 from the Darfur border, traveling thorough Rwanda, Armenia, Germany, Bosnia, and Cambodia over a five-month period. China was aware of these events, which enforced the association between Darfur, genocide and the Olympics with the message of “Please China, Bring the Olympic Dream to Darfur.” China unsuccessfully tried to have the events in Rwanda and Armenia shut down. In Cambodia, Chinese efforts to block the genocide torch relay developed into a minor media storm.

Dream for Darfur notes that Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun was dispatched to Khartoum in early April 2007 – just days after the Farrow’s article – in an attempt at ‘damage control’ visiting Sudan for four days with an agenda to bolster Sino-Sudanese relations, discuss the Darfur issue, and tour Sudanese refugee camps. Emphasizing how special this event was, Helene Cooper of


417 At each torch relay, Dream for Darfur representatives, Darfurian refugees and genocide survivors lit a torch in commemoration of those who had been killed in genocides.

418 After the Dream for Darfur event permit was revoked by Cambodian authorities, the group still visited Phnom Penh, with international news articles noting that Mia Farrow had faced one hundred armed police in riot gear and that the US Ambassador to Cambodia was forbidden to take part in any events. See “Stage set for showdown over Darfur ceremony in Cambodia,” Associated Press, January 18, 2008; “Observer: Dream deferred,” Financial Times, January 18, 2008; “Mia Farrow arrives in Cambodia for banned Darfur protest,” Agence France Presse, January 18, 2008; Ek Madra, “Mia Farrow vows to defy Cambodian Darfur rally ban,” Reuters News, January 19, 2008, and Ker Munthit, “Mia Farrow faces off with Cambodian police, blocked from genocide ceremony,” Associated Press, January 20, 2008.
The New York Times called Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai’s visit to Sudan and three refugee camps “a rare event for a high-ranking official from China.” However, International Crisis Group asserts that “Plans were already underway for Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun to visit Sudan when the [Dream for Darfur] campaign… began…”419 Within days of his return to Beijing, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai completed a briefing for Chinese and foreign journalists of his trip, where he stated “I hope the Sudanese government shows further flexibility towards the plan…As far as I am concerned, the consultations on the second phase have ended in Addis Ababa on April 9…” pushing Sudan forward on realizing the agreement. Moreover, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai also re-emphasized China’s “constructive role in realizing the peace, stability and development in the Darfur region,” while chiding the international community to “pay special attention to the methods of conducting dialogue with the Sudanese government in the future to make its work more effective.420"

On May 10, 2007, China appointed veteran Ambassador Liu Guijin as Special Representative for African Affairs, though he was a de facto specialist on only Darfur. This was a remarkable move for China, and Ambassador Liu’s appointment is the second critical juncture for changes in the Chinese approach on Darfur. As Ambassador Liu himself noted in an interview, to be named a “special envoy for a country, which is thousands of miles far away from China – that is something unprecedented, the first time in history.”421 With the appointment of Ambassador Liu, China signaled it was not only taking on a large commitment to address concerns about Darfur, but that China was going to push forward with making the AU-UN joint operation a reality, and work with Sudan to secure its consent and on the modalities of the force structure. Once appointed, Liu completed two trips to Sudan within two months, meeting with representatives

from the African Union and then the Arab League on the matter of Darfur. In May 2007, China committed to send 275 multi-functional engineering soldiers to Darfur, creating a foundation of troop commitments to the forthcoming mission.\footnote{Christensen notes that “… in early 2007, Beijing committed to send hundreds of engineering troops to Darfur in support of Phase II [of the Annan Plan]…” Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 3 (July 2009): 89 -104, 94.} China also pushed forward with more formal meetings with the European Union and the United States on Darfur.\footnote{For example, Partners in Competition? The EU, Africa and China, hosted by the EU Commission, Brussels on June 28, 2007; and the Symposium on China-Sudan Relations, hosted by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the London-based Center for Foreign Policy Analysis in Beijing on July 26, 2007.} Yong Yu, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson noted that these efforts underscored “the readiness of China to cooperate with the international community to stop the violence in Darfur and return stability to the region….” Tellingly, the spokesperson emphasized “that China and the US share between them a joint vision about Darfur, and both are working to resolve the problem through diplomatic means.”\footnote{Gaafar Karrar Ahmed, The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict, Occasional Paper of the China in Africa Project, September 2010, South African Institute of International Affairs, 9.}

By May 2007, there were an increasing number of statements praising China’s role in resolving the Darfur conflict. UN Secretary-General Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson, praised China’s “positive role” in resolving the Darfur conflict. Eliasson noted “the Chinese pushed the Sudanese government to accept the UN so-called heavy support package, another 3,000 peacekeepers to come to Darfur. And they were definitely active on that….”\footnote{Jan Eliasson’s Remarks to the Atlantic Council’s Globe Leadership Series, Washington, DC, May 16, 2007, (accessed on September 24, 2011); available at: www.acus.org/files/070516-Jan%20Eliasson%20-%20transcript.pdf.} British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett noted that “[on] Sudan… there has been some criticism of China, but actually China has played really quite a positive role, particularly in the negotiation of the Darfur peace agreement… China, along with all the rest of the international community, very much regrets that that peace agreement has not been honored by the government of Sudan, or indeed
necessarily by the rebels.” US Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios told a US Senate panel that China’s “subtle diplomacy” had supplemented, not undermined, the policy of sanctions against Sudan.427

On June 25, 2007 Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui attended the Paris-based Ministerial Meeting on Darfur,428 where eighteen countries, who were key donors to Sudan, including China and the Group of Eight industrialized nations, reaffirmed their support for the AU-UN peacekeeping force. However, by the end of the meeting, there was still no firm agreement as to which other countries would contribute soldiers, nor any sign that China had tempered its opposition to imposing sanctions on Sudan. Concurrently, anticipating Bashir’s continuing intransigence, the UN Secretariat dispatched the 2007 High Ranking Operational and Technical Advisory Team Mission.429

In order to secure the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, Ambassador Liu worked closely with Alpha Ouma Konaré, AU Commission Chairman, and Arab League officials. Though Ambassador Liu was strongly urging the African Union to accept the hybrid force proposals, he again reiterated that there were limits on how China would pursue their objectives: “No matter how many troops you send, without a political presence and cooperation of the

429 High Ranking Operational and Technical Advisory Team Mission (HROTAT) aimed to supplement the well-established process for generating force elements by introducing an enhanced quality control element to assess whether the potential troop contributing country (TCC) had requisite capabilities to meet UNAMID challenges and prevent unnecessary expenditure of UNDPKO time and effort. The Five Mission had two objectives. Thus, HROTAT worked to assist potential TCCs prepare for the demands of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly those TCCs that were less experienced peacekeepers and whose military forces did not possess critical capabilities. Second, to preserve the integrity of UNAMID, the Five Mission was designed to be a mechanism primarily to validate TCCs’ UNAMID pledges, with the recognition that it could take several months to generate and prepare suitably equipped and trained forces for such a demanding expeditionary mission.
government, we cannot find a long-lasting solution.”430 This was a similar refrain from Ambassador Liu, who had stressed that Sudan has “a sovereign Government. Whether one liked the Government or not without its cooperation, it would not be possible to carry out a successful peacekeeping operation.”431 It is no coincidence that UN Security Council Resolution 1769, unanimously authorizing the UNAMID mission, passed on July 31, 2007, the last day of China’s one-month rotating presidency of the UN Security Council.432 Ambassador Liu Guijin noted that Sudan’s acceptance to allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur "could not be separated" from Chinese efforts. "[From] the highest leader in China to relevant foreign ministry officials, we have always used our method of using our words and made use of every opportunity and channel in every aspect of work, especially with the Sudanese government," stated Ambassador Liu.433 Ambassador Liu likened China to playing the “role of bridge… We have been trying to give advice and to persuade Sudan to be more flexible to accept the UN plan.”434

Sudan announced in October 2007 that troops from Nepal, Scandinavian countries and Thailand, all suggestions of the UN and AU, were unacceptable. With press reports of Sudan’s foot dragging, and the persistence of the ‘Genocide Olympics’ headlines, associating Steven Spielberg with genocide, Spielberg sent a second letter to President Hu on November 15, 2007 – three and a half-months after the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1769, asserting that

> Sudan is continuing to defy the international community, creating obstacles to the deployment of peacekeepers, increasing violent campaigns against Darfuris and expelling humanitarian officials essential to the very survival of millions of desperate citizens… China’s earlier efforts were encouraging, its silence in the wake of Sudan’s recent actions and the resulting chaos on the ground has been disturbing.

Spielberg ended his second letter by calling upon President Hu to “urge Sudan to accept and rapidly facilitate” the UN peacekeeping force.435

China dispatched a 315-strong engineering unit for Darfur, with the Chinese contingent as the first peacekeeping contingent to arrive in Sudan at the end of December 2007. China also committed humanitarian aid,436 and donated $500,000 to the Trust Fund for the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team for Darfur at the United Nations.437 By March 2008, China had provided approximately $11M to Darfur-related projects and $1.8M in aid to the African Union. Chinese firms were also recruited to complete water supply projects, dig wells and construct small-scale power plants in Darfur.438 At the close of March 2008, besides a formed police unit from Bangladesh, the Chinese forces were the only additional deployments to UNAMID.

On January 10, 2008, Ambassador Liu further elaborated, in perhaps his most candid statement: “the cooperation of China with states such as Sudan does not necessarily mean its approval of offences against human rights there… the Chinese Government does not support any massacre committed by the Sudanese government against its people.”439 At the Addis Ababa African Summit on 31 January 2008, Chinese Special Representative Liu Guijin stated bluntly “the patience of the international community has started to run out about what is happening in Darfur.” However, Sudanese refusal to accept non-African troops, and escalating military activity in Jebel Moon, in the western area of Sudan, were preludes to the most direct statement from Ambassador Liu. On March 7, 2008, at a press conference in Beijing, Ambassador Liu called Darfur a “humanitarian disaster” – a departure from the “developmental problem” that China previously

labeled the Darfur crisis. Ambassador Liu also put China clearly with members of the international community, as he reiterated that the international community must “speak in one voice” to persuade Sudan to accept the full-fledged hybrid force.440

January 2008 – October 2008: The Olympics Commence and No Changes in Chinese Activity

In this phase of Chinese activity, there were no changes in China’s approach to the Darfur issue – despite the fact that there were three separate and well-reported sources of pressure on China: the second phase of the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign by Dream for Darfur; the resignation of Steven Spielberg citing his concerns with Chinese policy to Sudan, and third, efforts to get an International Criminal Court indictment against the Sudanese leadership. This section will detail each source of pressure before turning to the Chinese stasis regarding the Darfur issue.

In the second phase of their campaign, Dream for Darfur stepped up their efforts to include an international day of action on February 12, 2008, to host events outside Chinese embassies in Australia, England, France, Italy, Portugal, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal and around the United States.441 During the day of Action, the Nobel Women’s Initiative published an open letter to President Hu Jintao. Signed by eight Nobel Peace Laureates, over a dozen Olympic athletes, and others, the letter urged China to intensify diplomatic engagement with the Sudanese government to bring peace to Darfur. Dream for Darfur organized advocacy events along the official torch relay route in Hong Kong, and partnered with other advocacy groups for events in London, Paris and San Francisco. China requested to shorten the torch relay stops in San

441 The United States locations were Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Washington.
Francisco because of protesters. Though these Dream for Darfur events were overshadowed by the Tibet-related protests, there was still press coverage for Darfur. For example, there ended up being three-days worth of news coverage because of the speculation on whether Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, would allow Dream for Darfur representatives to enter the city. Dream for Darfur also sought to move the Darfur issue ‘up the official chain’ – securing an open meeting and giving testimony on ‘Darfur, China and the Olympics’ with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and worked with the US Mission to the United Nations to get an Aria-style meeting at the UN Security Council where the organization’s representatives testified in June 2008. With the Games starting on August 8, 2008, Dream for Darfur also led two other efforts – the Darfur Olympics (a week-long effort with daily webcasts from a Darfur refugee camps in Chad) and also ‘Switch Over to Darfur,’ which encouraged viewers to turn off their televisions during official sponsors’ promotions. In order to raise attention for these two efforts, Dream for Darfur used a satirical cartoon with a ‘Gen Gen Genocide’ character that was to resemble the official mascots of the Beijing Games.

Besides efforts by Dream for Darfur, Steven Spielberg also put pressure on China. Six weeks after the announced deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping mission, on February 13, 2008, Spielberg publicly withdrew from working on the Olympics: “while China’s representatives have conveyed to me that they are working to end the terrible tragedy in Darfur, the grim realities of the suffering continue unabated… my conscience will not allow me to continue with business as

444 Aria meetings are essentially open meetings, where concerned states and other actors can exchange their views at the UN Security Council.
usual.” Press coverage of Spielberg’s resignation eclipsed the reporting on the day of embassy action – in resigning because of the slow pace of Chinese activity over Darfur, Spielberg added his voice to linking the Darfur crisis to China and kept Darfur on the international agenda. The timing was not coincidental – if not perceived as an ally of the advocacy community, Spielberg would surely be under their criticism.

In response to these Dream for Darfur efforts, Chinese officials repeated their earlier efforts of firmly framing the Darfur issue as completely separate from the Olympics in response to Dream for Darfur and Spielberg’s resignation letter, while using harsher language towards Sudan. For example, in response to Spielberg’s departure from the Olympics, Chinese officials stated “the Darfur issue is neither an internal issue of China nor is it caused by China, it is completely unreasonable, irresponsible and unfair to link the two as one.” Foreign Ministry officials recast the Spielberg resignation:

It is understandable if some people do not understand the Chinese government policy on Darfur, but I am afraid that some people may have ulterior motives, and this we cannot accept… China is also concerned about the humanitarian crisis there… we have been playing a positive and constructive role in promoting peace in Darfur… This did not come easily and our efforts have been applauded by the international community.

A few days later, Chinese Ambassador to Sudan Li Chengwen stated that “China helped push forward the Sudanese government, the AU and the UN reaching consensus on the resolution of the hybrid force to Darfur, which did not come easily and our efforts have been applauded by the international community.”

international community."⁴⁴⁹ Ambassador Li closed his interview reminding others “as is obvious to anyone in the international community that is not biased against China, China has been playing its due part in helping resolve the Darfur issue, and that stance of China definitely deserves objective and just treatment.”⁴⁵⁰

In the face of these activities emphasizing the link between Darfur and the Olympics, and after Spielberg’s resignation, Ambassador Liu continued with his sterner language: “firstly, [the] Sudanese government should cooperate further with [the] international community, and show more flexibility on some technical issues; secondly, rebel groups of Darfur area should return to the negotiation table; thirdly, international community, including some Western countries, should use their influence to persuade relevant forces respectively; fourthly, as two important players of a tripartite mechanism, UN and the AU should strengthen consultation with Sudanese government, exchange views with it more frequently, and take more pro-active attitudes to find solutions for specific problems.”⁴⁵¹

China was under a third source of pressure to take Sudanese officials to the International Criminal Court. On June 16, 2008, the UN Security Council adopted a unanimous Presidential Statement calling upon Sudan “to cooperate fully with the [International Criminal] Court, consistent with resolution 1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity for the crimes committed in Darfur.” The Presidential Statement was the initiative of Costa Rica, a rotating member of the UN Security Council. Costa Rica saw that since referring Darfur to the ICC in 2005, the case against Sudan had stalled. What is interesting here is that initially, Costa Rica pushed for a Security Council Presidential Statement. However, when Libya, China, Russia and South Africa stonewalled the draft statement, Costa Rican officials decided to drop efforts towards a Presidential Statement and

instead turn towards a UN Security Council Resolution instead, which would only require nine yes votes— but these would be publicly recorded votes, spotlighting each states’ position on the ICC issue. The United States, traditionally opposed to the ICC, did not dismiss the option of a Resolution outright— but instead hesitated— given the popularity of the Darfur activist community. However, according to interviews with the Costa Rican officials working on the case, “it was the Chinese mission that really panicked.”\textsuperscript{452} China quickly agreed to sign a presidential statement supporting the ICC, and to talk to Libya in exchange for Costa Rica ditching all efforts to pass a Security Council Resolution. In the view of Political Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations, China’s change could be explained as it was “easier to hide behind the shield of consensus than to vote… and China could not afford, in the face of the Olympics, to have another issue besides Tibet.”\textsuperscript{453}

On July 14, 2008, the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor issued an indictment against President Bashir with three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity, including murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape, and two of war crimes. The following day, Chinese officials stated their “grave concerns and misgivings” over the move, reminding others that the “ICC’s actions must be beneficial to the stability of the Darfur region and the appropriate settlement of the issue, not the contrary.” Foreign Ministry officials declined to discuss if it would issue a veto, simply stating ”China will continue consultation with other members of the UN Security Council but, as for the outcome, [we] don't know.”\textsuperscript{454} In the intervening eight months before three judges issued their verdict on the indictment, Sudan, the African Union and the Arab League all lobbied the Security Council to postpone the case by a year, arguing that sole focus on AU and UN efforts to end the Darfur conflict was needed. Russia

\textsuperscript{454} Peter Walker and Julian Borger, “China May Veto Attempt to Arrest Sudanese President on Veto Charges,” \textit{The Guardian}, July 15, 2008.
and China supported these efforts, but the United States, United Kingdom and France were unwilling to accept any delays.\footnote{Rebecca Hamilton, \textit{Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide} (NY: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2011), 151.}

Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun visited Sudan at the end of August 30, 2008. According to the Chinese Foreign Minister, bilateral discussions with President Bashir included

in-depth opinions with the Sudanese side on the bilateral relations, the Darfur issue, especially the prosecution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the Sudanese leader. [Jun] reiterated China’s consistent position of supporting the solution of the Darfur issue through political means and expressed admiration for Sudan’s adherence to solving the Darfur issue by political means and position of cooperating with the United Nations. [Jun] stressed that China is the friend of the Sudanese people and wiling to make joint efforts with the international community including the Sudanese government, other countries in the region, the African Union and the UN to settle related issues at the earliest date possible.\footnote{Special Envoy of the Chinese Government and Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Visits Sudan Successfully, September 4, 2008 (accessed on October 30, 2010); available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t511195.htm.}

During Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun’s visit to Sudan, Sudanese media were reporting an expected Chinese veto to block the possible arrest warrant.\footnote{“Sudanese media hail expected China ‘veto’ to block Bashir arrest warrant,” \textit{Sudan Tribune}, September 2, 2008.} However, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun dismissed discussion of a veto “at this stage” when there was no arrest warrant issued, while reiterating Beijing believes that there are “criminal issues [in Darfur] that require resolution.”\footnote{“Sudanese media hail expected China ‘veto’ to block Bashir arrest warrant,” \textit{Sudan Tribune}, September 2, 2008.} On March 4, 2009, after eight months of consideration, the three judges of the ICC agreed to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir on five counts of war crimes and two counts of crimes against humanity, dropping charges against him for genocide.\footnote{David Charter, “ICC issues war crimes arrest warrant for President al-Bashir of Sudan,” \textit{The Times}, March 4, 2009.}
During this time period, despite the multi-faceted, media-courting efforts of Dream for Darfur—Chinese officials did not tender any new government initiatives and remained with their harsher language for Sudan and emphasizing their helpful activities relating to Darfur. This is an important point. Effectively, China had reached the limits of its cooperation on Darfur. With the deployment of UNAMID, the international community was now focused on getting the mission to full deployment in the field. Arguably, as Chinese forces were first in the field, providing a backbone capability of well-drilling for the force, Chinese officials simply felt that there was no more for China to do after having coaxed Sudanese consent and deployed hard-to-find high-value assets to the field. “What more are we supposed to do?” was a comment put forward by Chinese government officials in interviews with the author.

This point becomes clearer when looking at issues on the Chinese policy agenda. The Beijing Olympics started on August 8, 2008, and the Chinese emphasis was on a smooth opening for the Games. As a variety of domestic issues arose, the Chinese focus shifted from Darfur to becoming preoccupied with domestic issues. On March 10, 2008, violence in Tibet started, after monks led protests commemorating the anniversary of the 1959 uprising against Chinese rule. As the protests grew in scale, reports noted that the protests had stretched to other Tibetan populations in Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces. Journalists labeled the protests “the biggest challenge to Beijing’s authority there since 1989,” and China responded by using force to arrest protesters. Aware that the world’s attention was growing in the run up to the Olympics, and that there were calls for boycotts of the Games because of the perceived heavy-handed use of force, China could not be seen as weak in the face of domestic anti-government protestors. Soon after, on May 12, 2008, the Sichuan earthquake, and its aftershocks that continued for a fortnight, killed at least

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460 During this period, Dream for Darfur staff visa applications to visit China for the Games were declined. Joey Cheek, an American Olympic speed-skater and active member of the Team Darfur advocacy group, which had worked with Dream for Darfur, had his visa revoked just before his Beijing departure.

461 Interviews with Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Beijing, December 2008.

68,000 people. In response, China worked to rescue victims, deliver aid and gain access to the area. As a signal of the significance of the earthquake, the State Council declared a three-day national morning period for the earthquake victims starting on May 19, 2008, which was the first time that such a period had been declared for the purpose other than the death of a state leader. Thus, the bandwidth that Chinese leaders could spend on foreign affairs, let alone on only Darfur, became even more constrained.

CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING CHANGES IN CHINA’S DARFUR ACTIVITY
This chapter argues that there were four phases in Chinese activity on Darfur:

- April 2004 – August 2006, where China acknowledged that Darfur was a problem, but remained quiet on a role for a UN peacekeeping mission;
- August 2006 – March 2007, when China voiced opinions supporting a UN peacekeeping mission;
- March 2007 – December 2007, when China switched to an active persuasion of Sudan, working to get the mission established on the ground;

And within those four phases, there were two critical junctures, which marked a resetting of the Chinese path towards a more explicitly pro-UN peacekeeping and less overtly pro-Sudanese path:

- The November 17, 2006 meetings in Addis Ababa where the Annan Plan was agreed to in principle by Sudan at the behest of China
- The May 2007 appointment of Ambassador Liu Guijin to become China’s Special Representative for African Affairs, representing an elevation of the Darfur issue for Chinese foreign affairs.
What explains the changes in the Chinese position and the Chinese pursuit of a more critical line with Sudan? Much of the writing on Darfur and China tacitly assumes that other countries (like the United States), regional organizations (like the African Union) or international bodies (like the United Nations) were pushing a ‘solution’ for the Darfur situation, which China was opposing. As this chapter will demonstrate, though there was at times some level of engagement from these states and organizations, it was not until early 2007 that there was unanimity of effort on one ‘solution’ for Darfur, in the shape of the unanimous vote for UNSRC 1769. Moreover, analyses often assume that China was the sole dissenter, impeding UN activity on Darfur. When looking at the UN Security Council voting regarding Darfur, China was not alone – often voting in tandem with Russia and a collection of developing or Arab states that were rotating members on the UN Security Council during this period, like Algeria and Pakistan, all skeptics of interventionism. Moreover, as the Ambassador of Pakistan to the United Nations Munir Akram noted in a 2006 interview, at the height of the reporting on China’s intransigence regarding Darfur, “China was not nearly as active on Darfur as people think. The proposals [to restrict UN Security Council activity vis-à-vis Darfur] came from us or from Algeria.”

463 Given the contours of China’s policy regarding Darfur and the perplexing nature of the Chinese changes in their stance, there are two popular explanations for the changes in China’s activity. The following section evaluates these explanations and illustrates why these arguments are incomplete.

There are two variants in this “shaming China over Darfur” explanation. First, analysts explain Chinese activity in Darfur simply as the result of the “Genocide Olympics” shaming campaign led by the Dream for Darfur coalition.464 For example, Rebecca Hamilton argues: “In an admittedly rare instance, the Olympics, when activists in the West could threaten an image China

actually cared about, public shaming had worked.” Monroe Price notes that Dream for Darfur will be infamous for gathering “under a single banner, much of the accumulated discontent, anxiety, and suspicion about China and human rights.” Second, there are those that attribute all the changes to do with the “Spielberg effect” of director Steven Spielberg quitting his role as Artistic Director to the opening ceremonies, driving Chinese policy responses and modification on the Darfur issue. For example, Helene Cooper at The New York Times went as far to say that “Credit goes to Hollywood – Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg in particular…” for changing Chinese activity in Darfur, and that such Hollywood star power, “could accomplish what years of diplomacy could not.” According to Helene Cooper, “China soon dispatched [Chinese senior official, Zhai Jun] to Darfur, a turnaround that served as a classic study of how a pressure campaign, aimed to strike Beijing in a vulnerable spot at a vulnerable time” could achieve success.

Though Chinese officials were well prepared for a litany of foreign criticism in the run up to the Olympics – dismissing concerns about Tibet and Xinjiang as ‘internal issues;’ allowing greater press freedoms as proof of China’s openness; developing statistics to counter environmental concerns and migrant worker advocates – Chinese officials did not anticipate the ‘Genocide Olympics’ uproar, and indeed could not have predicted the persistent focus on China when modifying Chinese activity regarding Darfur. Indeed, as this chapter illustrates, critical junctures

that signaled changes in Chinese activity in Darfur came *ahead* of the major efforts of the Dream for Darfur coalition’s campaign. In addition, though Spielberg’s first letter to President Hu in April 2007 precedes the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, changes in Chinese engagement, as evidenced by its tone and approach to Sudan, were already taking place in March 2007. Lastly, even as Dream for Darfur escalated their shaming campaign, with Chinese deployment to Darfur, China had reached its limit on Chinese engagement.

This is not to argue that Dream for Darfur had no effect on China. As this chapter details, Chinese officials were cognizant and bothered by the ‘Genocide Olympics’ efforts, which concentrated anti-China criticism “in a way [China has] never before experienced.”

A more nuanced explanation is to see Dream for Darfur advocacy efforts as amplifying sporadic connections between China and genocide in Darfur. Dream for Darfur was a source of indirect influence on China by its contagion effect of keeping the Darfur-China connection in the news. As the campaign continued, a constellation of other actors, including members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Olympic athletes, and other public commentators made the same demands on China: use China’s leverage with Khartoum to end the Darfur genocide, or risk

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470 Sophie Richardson, “Challenges for a “Responsible Power,”” in Minky Worden (editor), *China’s Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges* (NY: Seven Stories Press, 2008), 283 – 295, 291. It is true that by 2007, there were many groups within the United States, Europe and Australia that were turning their attention to the Chinese role in the Darfur crisis. University divestment campaigns often targeted Chinese firms, and there was a smattering of coverage of actor George Clooney’s December 2006 visit to Beijing to meet with Chinese officials about Darfur. However, these efforts were not sustained and focused solely on China.


having the Olympics become a platform to protest China’s complicity in the first genocide of the twenty-first century. As Hamilton notes, three months following the publication of the Genocide Olympics op-ed saw a four hundred percent increase in the number of English-language newspaper headlines linking China with Darfur, compared to the three months prior.475 After Dream for Darfur initiated their campaign, China took increasingly public positions in opposition to Sudan, though Beijing’s stance did not change. Thus, though Chinese substantive policy changes were well underway, the expression of how China projected its stance became increasingly open. Therefore, though the Dream for Darfur group was important in spotlighting attention on China, analyses that attribute all changes in the Chinese approach to the pressure of the Dream for Darfur group or to Steven Spielberg’s resignation as Artistic Director of the Olympic Games,476 are over-determined arguments on the impact of the campaign. Moreover, these shaming explanations do not illuminate what mechanisms were at play to get China to change its policies – these analyses draw causal inferences without uncovering causal mechanisms that can illuminate the changes in the Chinese approach.

A second explanation offered for the changes in Chinese activity imply that China’s decision to engage in Darfur was at the behest of the United States, the lead state in support of the UNAMID peacekeeping mission. For example, Thomas Christensen, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, notes “… Beijing’s policy, however, began to change for the better as 2006 progressed, in part due to diplomatic engagement with the United States”477 Christensen asserts “… in early 2007, after a dialogue about the region between the US State

Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing agreed to send more than 300 military engineers to Darfur, the first non-African peacekeepers committed to the UN operation.\textsuperscript{478}

The importance of constructive relations with the United States cannot be overlooked when understanding changes in Chinese activity on the Darfur issue. Interviews indicate that Chinese foreign policy elites thought about the Darfur issue as not only an international cooperation issue, but also as an issue in Sino-US relations.\textsuperscript{479} The notion that Darfur became important for Sino-US relations can be thought of in two ways. First, though there was the consistent message from the United States that President George W. Bush would attend the opening ceremonies of the Games, interviews with Chinese officials found a consistent Chinese concern that President Bush would have withdrew his attendance in an effort to cause China to ‘lose face’ over Darfur.\textsuperscript{480} Thus, the importance of assuring the United States on Chinese activity in Darfur was key for China given the importance of the Games. Second, efforts by the United States, along with that of Britain and France, encouraged China to actively engage in addressing the Darfur issue. The United States and China elevated the Darfur matter worthy of meetings between Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo and US Deputy Secretary of State Jon Negroponte. However, it is unclear why China may have responded to US overtures when it did, and what mechanisms pushed China to modify its activity regarding the Darfur issue.

We must turn our attention elsewhere to understand China’s evolving approach on Darfur. China’s position on Darfur in broad terms was clear and consistent: China would not allow a peace enforcement operation in Darfur – a mission that would take place without Sudanese consent – threatening a veto of such a mandate; China could not abide by sanctions against

\textsuperscript{479} Chinese university scholars and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, interviews with author, Beijing and Shanghai, December 2008.  
\textsuperscript{480} Chinese university scholars and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, interviews with author, Beijing and Shanghai, December 2008.
Sudan, abstaining from these votes; and China was unwilling to use the threat of either of these coercive activities against Sudan. In short, at the cornerstone of China’s Darfur activity was a consistent commitment that China did not oppose a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur, but that China did object to any overriding of Sudanese sovereignty, and that settlement of the Darfur crisis should be reached by political means. However, within this stance, China did leave a back door ajar to have a peacekeeping mission go forward if Sudan consented to hosting a peacekeeping mission. In hindsight, such a position was well thought-out on the part of China. As the Darfur situation further deteriorated, it only became more contentious for China to satisfy the concerns of the different stakeholders. For example, as early as January 2006, the African Union had made requests for a UN peacekeeping force to replace AMIS. China was in no position to ignore the collective opinion of the African Union, composed of many of China’s economic and political partners. Moreover, Chad in particular was consistently pursuing measures to stop Darfur refugees and rebels from crossing its border, and pushing forward its objections at the Security Council. China resumed diplomatic relations with Chad in August 2006, and sealed deals for oil exports in early 2007, and therefore the views of the N’Djamena became more important to China. Therefore, as the ‘African solution for African problems’ deteriorated, broad parameters were already in place for China to authorize a peacekeeping mission as long as no sanctions were placed on Sudan and Sudan granted its consent.

Such flexibility on Darfur within the broad parameters of Chinese foreign policy was possible because as one Ministry of Foreign Affairs official put it: “Darfur is a soft policy issue for China.” In comparison, issues that China has traditionally been shamed over – the June 4th incident, for example – were categorized as “hard policy issues… things China is sensitive over.” Flexibility regarding Darfur in order to secure a welcoming environment for the Beijing Olympic

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481 Interview with Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, interview with author, Beijing, February 2, 2011.
Games, was necessary given the primacy of the Olympics for Chinese foreign policy. With the growing acceptance that ‘African solutions for African problems’ was no longer possible; a better understanding that a United Nations-led solution was not a substitute for regime change in Khartoum (the result of closer contact with US interlocutors), and the ‘Genocide Olympics’ contagion effect – meant that supporting the a UN-led peacekeeping mission became a possible option for China.

As soft an issue that Darfur may have been for China, it is still important to note how the deviation from the Chinese norm of non-interference. Two data points help illuminate this remark. In comparison to the Chinese stance on the Rwandan genocide, Srebrenica massacre, or massive human rights abuses in the Former Yugoslavia – where China followed the boilerplate Chinese response of disengaging from matters of peace and security, obliquely referring to these incidents as “internal issues.”482 The Chinese labeling of Darfur as a “humanitarian disaster” and willingness to publicly deviate so far from its core stance of non-interference is certainly instructive, especially in light of the complete inflexibility that China showed regarding the anti-Chinese protests in Tibet in March 2008. Countries that criticized China in regards to Tibet were met with Beijing’s severe disapproval, as documented by China’s ostracizing of France.483

This chapter demonstrates that material concerns were not primary for China, and that instead ideational drivers, through susceptibility to social influence – “a class of microprocesses that elicit pro-normative behavior through the distribution of social rewards and punishments” was at play in Chinese decisions to deploy.484 As the historical analysis highlights, by each of the

482 See chapter 1.
critical junctures, Chinese officials were conscious of image concerns in part because of their receptivity to social punishments, showing public conformity over time with Darfur planning because of the cognitive dissonance derived from social pressures from relevant reference groups to China.

To further illuminate the effects of social influence, it is worth using the counterfactual: had there been no image concerns for China, and given that a UN peacekeeping presence was costly for China in having to secure Sudanese consent – China could have simply maintained its original emphasis on respecting Sudanese sovereignty and downplaying China’s role in Darfur. Moreover, given that US officials consistently relayed that the President would attend the Opening Ceremonies in support of the Chinese people and the international sporting event, and the Chinese emphasis on using veto votes to quash sanctions that could effect its economic interests – material concerns would have been addressed by staying within the familiar reach of Chinese policy. However, Chinese officials pursued a different path. This is not to say that all of China’s change in approach to the Darfur question can be explained by social influence as the causal mechanism. The muddy set of independent variables and context in this particular case are corroborated by the Chinese drive to secure business deals with Sudan, for example. In China’s evolving approach to Darfur there is evidence that internal image concerns by way of social influence worked to mediate China’s typically realist concerns regarding Chinese interests. Let us turn to Johnston’s three guides to tease out the mechanism of social influence.

First, the Chinese commitment to participate in multilateral institutional activity (i.e. a UN peacekeeping mission for Darfur) should take place in the absence of material side payments. Understanding this precondition requires taking a step back for further thinking here. It is understood that there are a host of factors that motivate states to deploy to UN peacekeeping
missions. In recent years, China has remained within the top fifteen troop contributors to UN peacekeeping. However, it is worth thinking through the correlation between supporting the peacekeeping mission as a means to securing Chinese assets on the ground in Darfur. This relationship may be more complex than initially assumed. Simply inserting peacekeeping personnel – even Chinese peacekeeping personnel – does not automatically make for a more secure environment from the get go, as the literature on peacekeeping and protection suggests. Two data points show that this particular point was not lost on Chinese officials. Internal documentation reveals the well-founded Chinese concerns about deploying their peacekeepers in hostile environment like Darfur – where open fighting was ongoing; insecurity was rife and consent for the mission from the state and local actors was still fleeting at best. The effect of these conditions on peacekeepers daily tasks was a real concern for Chinese officials – citing worries about taking fire, returning fire and dealing with injured Chinese personnel. Furthermore, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials are also rethinking their role in supporting Chinese economic actors, given the baptism by fire regarding Darfur.

Similarly, reputation concerns for China regarding the Genocide Olympics campaign also need to be thought about more thoroughly. For example, a worry for Chinese officials was that the US President and French Presidents would shun the Olympic Opening Ceremonies to show displeasure to China regarding Darfur. However, it is worth asking why would Chinese officials be so intent on having representation from great powers at the opening ceremonies? After all, the

485 See chapter 2.
486 For further detail, see the discussion papers from the Challenges of Protecting Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations Symposium (papers presented at the annual meeting of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations in Canberra, Australia, April 27 – 29, 2010).
487 Office of the Military Adviser, UN Department of Peacekeeping, correspondence with author, August 2010.
attendance of the US and French leaders does not ‘get’ China anything else apart from prestige of having these officials in attendance, adding further legitimacy to China’s “coming-out party.”  

Moreover, it is unclear whether a reputation for merging China with the P3 on matters of intervention was a reputation that China necessarily wanted. And, as pointed out in the introduction, such a reputation comes at a potential cost to China – building a reputation for a softer stance on sovereignty related issues might have encouraged foreign officials to push Chinese boundaries regarding intervention to support the Arab Spring, for example.

Second, China did indeed stress social praise once Chinese behavior was in line with its reference group. Chinese officials did just this when the spotlight turned back to China each time Steven Spielberg sent his letters to President Hu, for example, as shown in the historical analysis section of this chapter. However, Chinese officials cited social praise from officials from the P3, over praise from other African officials. Third, as it became clear that staying on China’s original policy path, and appearing to side with Sudan at all times would leave China isolated from its reference groups (i.e. commitment to pro-social behavior is only made when non-commitment means standing in a dwindling minority) – Chinese policy began to shift. However, as shown in this chapter – by January 2006, African Union officials were openly acknowledging the need for United Nations support to the AU-led peacekeeping mission. By May 2006, Great Britain, France, and the United States had coalesced around the option of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission. Both of these groups of actors are synonymous with the larger reference groups that China wishes to appeal to: the reference group of the African Union (representative of the developing state self-image of China) and the reference group of other permanent members of the UN Security Council dealing with matters of international peace and security (representative of China’s responsible power image). However, in the case of Darfur, there is strong evidence of

\[490\] Nicholas Kristof’s term.
China modifying its Darfur activity in response to social influence from the P3, in line with an emergent Chinese identity as a responsible great power, and therefore succumbing to social influence from China’s great power reference group over that of the developing countries reference group.

This is not to say that within these two reference groups that there was concrete consensus on what a UN peacekeeping mission would look like; however, there was consensus that staying with the ‘AU only’ solution was no longer tenable. The interesting point made by the historical analysis of the Darfur chapter is that China did not come around to working on supporting the peacekeeping mission until September 14, 2006, with Ambassador Wang’s comments that China felt “the UN taking over [the AU-led AMIS operation in Darfur] is a good idea…,” and that the Dream for Darfur group and Congressional pressure may have helped move China towards securing consent from Sudan. Such changes are surprising because China has spent significant effort resisting ‘Western’ defined visions of “good behavior” – instead arguing that these views were not important to China. Instead, the case reveals that ideational concerns worked in ways not necessarily expected, revealing Chinese preferences and susceptibility to P3-led pressure on China over that of the developing states reference group. Most interestingly, if China did stand alone, then it would remain isolated – not necessarily defending a pariah state, but becoming a pariah itself over the Darfur issue.

In deciding to deploy to UNAMID in early 2007, before UN Security Council Resolution 1769 had passed, China could assuage the concerns of Sudan. Assets committed by China, a state firmly set against intervention in Darfur and a state dissenting against the US-led regime change in the Middle East, was a powerful signal that Sudanese sovereignty concerns would be respected by UNAMID. Moreover, China also selected assets to its best advantage. Chinese deployments of high-value well-drilling engineering units, meant that Chinese force protection concerns were
relatively minimized, while also garnering China further operational experience, intelligence and praise – as China was willing to send assets to a complicated security environment, and indeed was the first troop contributing country to have its assets arrive in Darfur.

The UNAMID mission represents the first time that China persuaded a sovereign state to accept a peacekeeping operation. Though a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy is that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state, the Darfur case highlights the exact contours of that principle, and lends credence to the views put forward by Zhu Zhiqun, that “‘non-interference’ does not mean that China rejects political and economic reforms or endorses human rights violations in Africa.” The Chinese public pride in their efforts is summed up in a quote by Vice Foreign Minister and Special Envoy Zhai Jun, in April 2007 “Actually, it is due to the important role played by China that Sudan is willing to accept Annan’s three-phase peacekeeping plan in principle and show flexibility to this issue.”

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491 Zhu Zhiqun, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (London: Ashgate, 2010), 40.
CHAPTER FOUR: CHINA’S MISSING DEPLOYMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD (MINURCAT)

INTRODUCTION

By late 2006, the growing regionalization of the Darfur crisis and the deterioration of Chadian-Sudanese relations, supplemented by UN inability to get access into Darfur, led to increasing pressure for the United Nations to do something regarding instability in Chad. Cross-border incursions, anti-government rebel movements, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were tangible evidence that N’Djamena’s sovereignty was of concern. After previous attempts for a mission failed in the fall of 2007, the dual missions of the European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (known by its French acronym EUFOR Tchad/RCA, herein referred to as EUFOR throughout the dissertation) and the United Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) were authorized. Sanctioned by both the UN Security Council and the European Council, EUFOR deployed in March 2008 as a one-year military bridging mission. Concurrently, MINURCAT was authorized for other governance functions, to include policing, civilian protection and rule of law taskings. Upon the departure of EUFOR in March 2009, MINURCAT assumed military responsibilities as well through mission closure in December 2010.

Studying this mission in depth provides an opportunity to learn about Chinese decision-making regarding peacekeeping in particular, and international security cooperation more broadly. Both the MINURCAT and the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) missions took place during the same time period; in countries contiguous to one another; precipitated by the same simmering disputes between Chad and Sudan. The MINURCAT mission was marred by many of the same issues facing UNAMID: a powerful host state; a lack of real host state consent, and a mission mandate that was negotiated between a series of players – activist lead states, intermittent
regional players and the host state itself – leaving a complicated environment for the peacekeeping mission to come to fruition.

Despite the similarities in these cases, China took a markedly different approach regarding Chad when compared to Darfur (as discussed in the previous chapter), where China evolved from doggedly defending the need for Sudanese consent for the peacekeeping mission to eventually advocating for the UNAMID mission and deploying Chinese assets to Darfur. In contrast, regarding the debates surrounding the establishment and closure of MINURCAT, China was an unobtrusive UN Security Council member, offering only rote commentary and following other members of the UN Security Council with its conservative voting patterns in regards to the crisis. Beijing did not publicly nor privately come to N’Djamena’s defense to protect Chadian consent, nor did Beijing play an active role in shaping the contours of the peacekeeping debate and the mission mandate. This guarded Chinese stance was even more surprising, given that Chad explicitly recognized China over Taiwan in August 2006 in order to court Chinese diplomatic support over its Sudanese border issue. However, though China showed informal interest in contributing enabler assets to MINURCAT in early 2008, when pursued through official channels, the initial Chinese interest fizzled. All other formal UN overtures to participate in the mission were shunned by China. Therefore, in comparison to the Darfur issue detailed in the previous chapter, the Chinese position was more of what one would expect of conservative Chinese diplomacy in the face of a robust mandate and shallow commitments to consent.

How can the Chinese approach and lack of deployment to MINURCAT be explained? If one were to accept conventional wisdom, that geopolitical-material and organizational factors are satisfactory explanations for China to deploy to Chad, then one would have expected Chinese deployment to MINURCAT. Chinese investments in Chadian oil fields and infrastructure projects were growing in the period under study here, as was the relationship between the
governments in Beijing and N’Djamena. Therefore, China had material interests to protect through fostering Chadian stability through a UN peacekeeping mission. Hence, from the viewpoint of conventional wisdom, the MINURCAT mission is ‘missing deployment’ of Chinese assets.

This case outlines support for the theory outlined in this dissertation: the passive role that China took to this particular peacekeeping mission and the missing deployment of Chinese assets is because China, at least in part, did not necessarily foresee reputation nor status gains from deploying to the mission. Indeed, the MINURCAT mission lacked the contentiousness for China of the Darfur issue and was less polarizing for China in comparison to addressing the complexities of the UNAMID mission. MINURCAT was without genocide controversy, the shadow of regime change and was ultimately a peacekeeping mission without a political section. Most importantly, there was little consistent international concern for the mission – especially once the United Nations could gain access in Darfur. Therefore, without serious reputation or image gains for China, there was less incentive for Beijing to overcome barriers to entry to the mission: learning about the complicated politics of UN peacekeeping in Chad; managing the evolving political-economic Sino-Chad relationship, and utilizing the still new Chinese Embassy in Chad as a liaison, meaning that the staff were still feeling their way through local politics in N’Djamena. Lastly, this case serves as an illustration that the understanding that Chinese economic concerns are a sole determinant of peacekeeping practice is too simplistic to address the complexity of Chinese foreign policy drivers.

The chapter first offers a summary of Sino-Chadian relations and a brief context of the Chad issue, before turning to the historical analysis of the phases of Chinese engagement regarding MINURCAT. To complete this analysis requires a detour into European Union politics regarding the EU-led tandem mission to MINURCAT. To study MINURCAT without understanding the
European Union experience of working with Chad would leave too incomplete an analysis, as both the European Union and the United Nations faced many of the same problems. The chapter will focus on the mission in Chad only, because the Central African Republic (CAR) was not the main focus for the MINURCAT mission, taking only five percent of the military assets offered by the United Nations. Interviews confirmed that the CAR was widely regarded as a side-player to Chad by many of the protagonists working on the MINURCAT operation. In order to extend the argument, the chapter addresses three points: first, establishing that China had multiple opportunities to commit its military assets to the MINURCAT mission; second, uncovering what China did regarding those opportunities to deploy, and third, developing a convincing argument for why China selected a policy option of not deploying to the MINURCAT mission.

CONTEXT

Sino-Chadian Relations

China is an important player in the Chadian economy. In January 2007, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) purchased the assets of the Canadian firm EnCana, thereby acquiring the exploration licenses in the Bongor region in the southwest of Chad. Soon after China gained permission to complete exploration activity in the northern Erdis region of Chad. Chinese firms also won the contract to build a second oil pipeline, linking the Mougo site to the refinery sites in Djemaya.\(^493\) CNPC struck oil in July 2007 and one of its subsidiaries signed a joint venture with Chadian Oil refinery in September 2007. In 2007, China’s oil imports from Chad totaled $76M; by 2010, China’s oil imports stood at $493M.\(^494\) In a series of cooperative agreements in the same period, China agreed to provide preferential loans, build government

\(^493\) International Crisis Group, Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa Briefing (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009), 15.
infrastructure and facilities for water and energy supplies, while also providing anti-malarial medications and humanitarian aid.\footnote{Le Tian, “Ties with Chad gather momentum,” \textit{China Daily}, September 21, 2007.} By 2008, Chinese contractors had won the rights to build road networks, irrigation systems and cement factories in Chad. However, Chinese firms remain only one player in the busy Chadian oil industry. Indeed, Canadian firms (EnCana), British firms (Cliveden), American firms (Exxon-Mobil) and Malaysian firms (Petronas) are all active in the Chadian oil industry.\footnote{International Crisis Group, \textit{Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap}, Africa Briefing (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009).} China confirmed military sales with Chad in 2007, informing the UN Register of Conventional Arms that China sold ten light armored vehicles to N’Djamena.\footnote{UN Register of Conventional Arms, (accessed January 6, 2012); available from \url{http://www.un.org/disarmament/conarms/Register/}.} By early 2008, there were unconfirmed reports of both Chinese military advisors in N’Djamena and further sales of light armored vehicles and arms via Cameroon.\footnote{“New Forces in the arms bazaar,” \textit{Africa-Asia Confidential} 2, no. 2 (November 2008): 3 – 6.}

Diplomatic relations between Chad and China were established in 1972 and severed in 1997, when the Chadian government recognized Taiwan, on the basis of Taiwanese aid for Chadian infrastructure projects. After a series of Sudanese-backed aggressive rebel attacks that almost overthrew the Chadian government, Chad broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in August 2006, formally recognizing China as the sole Chinese state in an attempt to access material and political support to secure President Idriss Déby’s government. There was speculation that such a move was made because of China’s close relationship with Sudan.\footnote{See interview with former U.S. Ambassador David Shinn in, “Chad seeks greater intervention from China in rebel conflict,” \textit{MediaGlobal News}, March 11, 2008.} China established diplomatic relations with Chad soon after, dispatching then Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to offer an assistance package and open the Chinese Embassy in N’Djamena in January 2007. The Embassy of Chad was established in April 2007, with President Déby visiting Beijing at the end of September 2007 to meet with President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice
Chairman of the Central Military Committee Cao Gangchuan. During that particular visit President Déby praised China for its “positive” role vis-a-vis the Darfur issue with Sudan.

By early 2007, Chad started to ask Beijing to apply pressure on Sudan to end its support to Chadian rebel groups. For example, such matters were discussed with the Chadian Foreign Minister’s visit to Beijing in April 2007 and comments were made bluntly to the press in 2008, where the Chadian Ambassador to the United Nations noted that “China was a friendly country to both the Sudan and Chad,” hoping that “China would bear more pressure on the Sudan to stop the process of destabilization in Chad.” President Déby said himself that establishing diplomatic relations with China was aimed at encouraging the Chinese to use their diplomatic leverage with Sudan, so that they could avoid any open confrontation between Chad and Sudan, which would risk the national interests of all these countries.

President Déby also remarked that previously “[it] used to be that when we had problems with our neighbor sending mercenaries to invade us that none of our complaints before the United Nations would pass, because China blocked them,” however, with Chad’s diplomatic realignment with China, “we have been able to raise our concerns without taboo” and that the relationship between Chad and China was “solidly based” with “China is making an attempt to change [the thinking of] the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir…”

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500 President Déby has conducted his first state visit to China in 1994.
503 International Crisis Group, Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa Briefing (New York: International Crisis Group, 2009), 15.
Chadian Minister for External Relations Ahmad Allam-Mi gave a sober assessment of the success of Chadian appeals to China:

it is in the Chinese interest to pressure the Sudanese to be a lot more reasonable. China is making some effort to exert more pressure on Sudan so that we can broker a dialogue, so that we can normalize our relations. But we trust that China will do yet more, it is not yet enough…  

However, despite this commentary from Chadian senior officials, the historical record shows that China did not take an official stance on the Chad/Sudan conflict, making an effort to avoid a position that would upset growing Chinese bilateral relations with Chad and Sudan respectively. Indeed, when Sudanese-backed rebels attempted to overthrow President Déby in February 2008, China avoided public commentary on the issue. Interestingly, China chose to remain quiet even with Sudanese officials welcoming Chinese engagement in the Sudan-Chad dispute. The following section details how the MINURCAT mission came together and what role China played in mandating and deploying to the mission.

**HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S POSITION VIS-À-VIS CHAD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNSCR</th>
<th>Resolution Intent</th>
<th>China’s vote</th>
<th>Votes cast the same as China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>August 31, 2006</td>
<td>- Mandated UNMIS, under Chapter VII, to take over AMIS with reference to the CAR</td>
<td>Abstention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>September 25, 2007</td>
<td>- Authorized tandem missions of EUFOR/TCHAD and MINURCAT</td>
<td>Unanimous yes vote by UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>September 24, 2008</td>
<td>- Authorized the extension of the MINURCAT mandate</td>
<td>Unanimous yes vote by UNSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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509 For example Sudanese Ambassador to the UN Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad welcomed Chinese involvement in 2008, noting that “the Chinese are very honest brokers.” Adelia Saunders, “Chad eyes China role in conflict,” *UPI*, March 14, 2008.
Table 2: Key UN Security Council Resolutions on the Chad issue

April 2006 – May 2007: Recognition of the Sudan-Darfur-Chad Problem and Deadlock

The Chad-Sudan Tripoli Agreement was signed in mid-February 2006, in which the two states agreed to prevent rebels from using their own territories for hostilities against the neighboring state. However, a short few months later, in April 2006, on the eve of the presidential elections, Chadian rebels attempted a coup, using bases in Darfur as their launch pad. With this event, Chad formally entered the UN Security Council agenda when Secretary-General Annan briefed the UN Security Council that the Darfur crisis could become a growing regional contagion. During the briefing, Secretary General Annan shared with the UN Security Council the Chadian Foreign Minister’s letter that pointed to Khartoum’s continued efforts to try to destabilize N’Djamena. Soon after, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement noting “persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect… the region, including the security of Chad.”

In response, Chad asked for UN support in addressing insecurity. On May 18, 2006, Chad requested that the UNHCR Representative in Chad to supplement Chadian forces present in their IDP camps, noting that United Nations or European Union forces could be suitable for such a task. Again, during the Chadian portion of the UN Security Council’s UNAMID preparation trip,

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the Security Council met with President Déby, who requested international protection for humanitarian workers. With the return of the Council’s Ambassadors to New York, there was a push for the UN Security Council to consider protection of Chad-based camps. For example, on June 15, 2006, French Ambassador to the United Nations Gerard Araud stated: it was “…appropriate for the Secretary-General to consider the question of international protection for the camps and to make recommendations to us.” On June 17, Déby officially requested UN support to secure the Sudanese border. France maintained pressure for support for Chad, stating there would be a role for the United Nations to address border control issues. Though China declined the opportunity to comment during this discussion, the United Kingdom and Tanzania gave commentary underlining the need to address insecurity in Chad.

At this point, it was clear that there was growing interest for some type of international action – yet, it was unclear if this action would be in the guise of the United Nations-only initiative. Chad had already expressed interest in European Union involvement and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was focused on undertaking the UNAMID mission – unprecedented in its scale, austere conditions and its ‘hybrid’ nature in sharing responsibilities with another regional organization – and therefore DPKO was wary of another difficult mission under UN auspices. Instead, DPKO officials were suggesting African Union or European Union involvement in Chad instead. France put forward the idea of a Force de Gendarmerie Africaine, but President Déby quickly rejected the option of an African-only initiative, since the African Union forces were taking so long to deploy to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

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In Secretary-General Annan’s July 2006 briefing to the UN Security Council regarding the Security Council’s Mission to Sudan and Chad, he proposed two innovations regarding Chad: first, that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established in 2005, could offer a liaison function in Eastern Chad and CAR for monitoring refugee and IDP camps, and second, that the planned UN mission in Darfur could monitor border security from the Sudanese side. Using this Secretary-General Report as an entry point, an initial draft resolution put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom asked the Secretary-General to “report to the Council on the protection of civilians in IDP camps in Chad.”\(^{515}\) Though the UN Security Council held no meetings on Chad or Sudan until August 28, 2006\(^{516}\) France pursued agreement for a draft resolution through informal discussions. The second draft of the resolution pushed further, asking the UN to monitor transborder activities and making the first suggestion of a formal UN presence in a multidimensional operation in Chad and possibly the Central African Republic. The final draft resolution included all of these options.

In recognition of the increasingly regional effects of the Darfur conflict, the UN Security Council Resolution 1706 passed in August 2006, included the statement that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) would also assist in addressing regional security issues in close liaison with international efforts to improve the security situation in the neighboring regions along the borders between the Sudan and Chad and between the Sudan and the Central African Republic, including through the establishment of a multidimensional presence consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police liaison officers in key locations in Chad, including in the internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and if necessary, in the Central African Republic, and to contribute to


\(^{516}\) When UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson called for a closed door meeting on Sudan.
the implementation of the Agreement between the Sudan and Chad signed on 26 July 2006.\textsuperscript{517}

The African Union Peace and Security Council also issued a communiqué on 20 September 2006, calling for “any steps that could be taken, including the United Nations, to enhance security along the borders between Sudan and Chad and between Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as ensure the protection and security of refugees in Chad.”\textsuperscript{518}

On October 30, 2006, the Security Council held closed door meetings on the Central African Republic with Chadian Prime Minister Élie Doté in attendance. In that meeting, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations offered two slightly modified options from those in the earlier Secretary-General Report: pursuing a liaison presence or a multidimensional mission in eastern Chad and the northeastern Central African Republic. Consequently, President Déby sent a note verbale to the United Nations, supporting a limited deployment of an international civilian force to ensure security at the refugee camps. President Déby pushed for an African gendarme force, with financing provided by European powers or the United Nations. The note verbale was careful not to be perceived as further antagonizing Sudan – emphasizing that Chad was not to be used as “a rear base for an intervention in Darfur under United Nations auspices without the prior consent of Sudan.”

However, by the close of 2006, Chad was hosting 232,000 Darfuri refugees along with 48,000 Central African Republic refugees. Out of the Darfuri refugees, over ninety percent of the Sudanese refugees were located at camps near the Chadian-Sudanese border, which Chad was trying to move so as to reduce criticism from Khartoum that N’Djamena was allowing Sudanese rebels to use the camps as a base to attack Sudan. With the further deterioration of the Chad-


Sudan relationship, Chad sent a *note verbale* on November 15, 2006, calling upon the United Nations to deploy a “United Nations force” along its border with Sudan so as to “effectively implement Security Council Resolution 1706” while accusing Sudan of instigating a “scorched-earth” policy in Darfur and eastern Chad and alleging genocide was being conducted at their borders. Soon after, on December 2, 2006, President Déby confirmed that Chad would welcome, *in principle*, the deployment of a UN force in eastern Chad, according to paragraph 9 (d) of UNSCR 1706. Perhaps as a precursor to his reluctance to work through such a mission, President Déby stated that any further details would have to be discussed at the technical level.

On December 5, the Security Council held informal discussions on the regional situation in Darfur. According to analysis by Richard Gowan and Alexandra Novosseloff, there was little interest beyond discussing the hybrid option for Darfur. Later, President Déby attempted to offer some clarification with a December 9 letter to the UNSC President stating that the deployment of an international presence at the border with Sudan so as to promote area security and refugee and IDP protection would be acceptable. Ten days later, on December 15, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement about the increasing armed groups in eastern Chad.\(^{519}\) The Security Council called for the Secretary-General to commit to “improving security conditions on the Chad side of the border with the Sudan and the monitoring of trans-border activities between Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic.”\(^{520}\) Gowan and Novosseloff argue that it was at this point that the regional insecurity began to be dealt with as two separate problems: addressing Darfur on the one hand, and Chad and Sudan on the other.\(^{521}\)

In light of the findings of a November DPKO-led assessment mission, Secretary-General Annan called for a wide-reaching mandate, including, but not limited to protection of civilians, demobilization and reintegration of armed combatants, monitoring and investigating human rights and strengthening local law and order capabilities – though any explicit political mandate was conspicuously absent – with Annan outlining the need for a political and civil affairs component so as to keep “facilitating political dialogue.”\(^\text{522}\) By the close of 2006, approximately 90,000 Chadians were displaced due to the increase in fighting – out of a total population of 1.1 million Chadians in the eastern part of Chad.\(^\text{523}\)

Secretary-General Annan called for a separate UN presence in Chad and the Central African Republic, which would work closely with the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and other peace operations in the region. Secretary-General Annan proposed two options: a monitoring mission to liaise with the parties, provide improved security through confidence building measures and an early warning system; or a monitoring and protection of civilians mission, which would execute those same tasks in addition to providing protection and deterring attacks to civilians under threat within force capabilities. This second option would require a larger force of 160 UN police and the training of up to 580 Chadian gendarmes to deal with daily law and order.\(^\text{524}\)

The report noted “the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic are increasingly interlinked, posing considerable threats to subregional security.”\(^\text{525}\) In his conclusion, Secretary-

\(^\text{522}\) UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006)*, paragraph 63.

\(^\text{523}\) UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006)*, paragraph 27.

\(^\text{524}\) UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006)*, paragraph 70.

\(^\text{525}\) UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006)*, paragraph 53.
General Annan noted that “hostilities in Darfur and eastern Chad have already led to a regional humanitarian crisis… [i]f the current pattern of hostilities continues in the border areas, it may lead to additional displacement of populations, which in turn will lead to greater destabilization of the whole subregion.” The United Nations recognized that the camps were used as areas of forced recruitment, criminal activities, inter-ethnic discord and, in addition, competition for scarce resources like firewood, fodder and water were leading to increased tensions with the local populace in the area. As Secretary-General Annan concluded, “At present, apart from the border areas in which the Chadian army operates, a security vacuum exists, which is being exploited by various groups and criminal elements.” With little fanfare, Secretary-General Annan recommended the more robust protection of civilians mission – stating that the smaller mission “would be fraught with unacceptable risk and raise expectations that would likely be disappointed.” In a nod to the difficulties of taking on a mega-mission, Secretary-General Annan urged that the Security Council should ascertain the willingness of member states to step up as troop contributors at a time when organizational capabilities were already seriously stretched.

Secretary-General Annan’s recommendations were met with a wide range of feedback. Chad felt that the Secretary-General’s recommendations went too far, with President Déby again reiterating Chadian support for a force in principle only. He noted that all actual features of the mission would have to be discussed further, stating that the UN presence should focus on only civilian

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526 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006), paragraph 54.
527 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006), paragraph 38.
528 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006), paragraph 85.
529 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the CAR pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of the Security Council Resolution 1706, S/2006/19 (22 December 2006), paragraph 87.
and police roles securing camps.\footnote{Security Council Report, \textit{December 2006: Sudan (Darfur)/Chad/CAR} (accessed May 18, 2012); available from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gfKWEMLiIsG/b.2266987/k.DECB/December_2006BRSudan_DarfurChadCAR.htm.} The Security Council offered varying criticism on the recommendations. Indonesia, Italy and Qatar pushed for DPKO recommendations to come under further consideration, thus offering subtle support to Chad. In contrast, Congo, Ghana and the P3 pushed for bolder recommendations, voicing frustration with the cautious nature of the Secretary-General’s report.\footnote{UN Security Council Official Records, 62nd Session, 5621st Meeting, UN Document S/PV.5621 (16 January 2007).} The United Kingdom bluntly asked for ‘better’ recommendations, skeptical that the Secretary-General’s requests were even possible. In sum, though the Secretary-General recommended a more robust option than what Chad and smaller Security Council players would have liked, for the P3 and those states keenly involved in Chadian politics, the recommendations were not robust enough. Notably, China made little response to the Secretary-General’s recommendations. France drafted a Presidential Statement advising revised recommendations from the Secretariat by mid-February 2007 after another technical assessment review.\footnote{UN Security Council Official Records, S/PRST/2007/2 (16 January 2007), 1.} The Presidential Statement also called for an advance mission so as to “accelerate preparation for an early decision on the possible deployment of a multidimensional UN presence.”\footnote{UN Security Council Official Records, S/PRST/2007/2 (16 January 2007), 1.}

In light of the report, events continued apace at UN Headquarters. A second DPKO technical assessment mission was sent to Chad in January 2007 for a three-week period, in order to finalize recommendations on the concept of operations for a UN multidimensional mission in the two countries. By this time, the situation had further deteriorated, with Chad maintaining a state of emergency in the capital and in three regions in eastern Chad bordering Sudan and the CAR. Sudanese-based rebel groups briefly occupied a few Chadian towns, though Chadian forces were able to push them back into Sudan. The number of Chadian IDPs had risen to 120,000 at the start
of February 2007 and the refugee numbers had crept up to 232,000, further exacerbating local tensions.

This assessment mission, sent by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon again ended with recommendations for a larger security presence, encompassing monitoring and protection of civilians. There were also recommendations for a political agenda to the mission, which was a source of disagreement for President Déby. What is key to note here is that by February 2007, the idea of a mission for Chad and the CAR was becoming more concrete – though at the same time, the ability of such a mission to come together and succeed was still elusive, given Chad’s hesitation to give consent; unknown interest levels of potential troop contributors and operational constraints (i.e. the fast approaching rainy season).

Following this technical assessment mission, Secretary-General Ban gave another Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic. In this Report, Secretary-General Ban again emphasized the complications of achieving a mission on the ground: the Foreign Minister of Chad and other Chadian officials emphasized that any UN presence in Chad “should not be made directly contingent upon the establishment of an inclusive dialogue in Chad,” underscoring that a political section to the mission would be unacceptable; while rebel groups emphasized that the United Nations could be perceived as belligerent if viewed as part of a Chadian military presence. In meetings with Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi, President Déby himself stressed that Chad had only asked for a civilian force back in November 2006 for the eastern Chad camps, emphasizing that there had been no

request for a military presence.\textsuperscript{536} President Déby noted his concerns that a UN mission in Chad was being pursued because the United Nations had made little headway in deploying a mission to Darfur, and called for details in writing about this proposed mission. All of these comments clearly outlined President Déby’s consent with preconditions for the mission.

Secretary-General Ban called for an advance mission of the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MiNUTAC) to prepare for a possible UN multidimensional presence called for in the Security Council Presidential Statement of January 16, 2007.\textsuperscript{537} The MiNUTAC mission was to be merged into the future UN peacekeeping presence in Chad and the CAR. The proposed multidimensional mission was advanced in order to address a protection of civilians, good offices, and human rights mandate (again emphasizing the need to liaise with the African Union, AMIS and UNMIS and Khartoum) and the facilitation of improved relations between Sudan and Chad. The multidimensional mission was also to “patrol and observe potential flashpoints in the area of operations” though this was to “not interfere with the sovereign responsibility of the Chadian and Central African Republic authorities to secure their border with the Sudan.”\textsuperscript{538} Secretary-General Ban offered two force options: a smaller force of 6,000 troops largely dependent on military aviation and fewer bases to execute their mandate, accepting a higher degree of risk regarding protection of civilians and force vulnerability, or a larger force of 10,900 troops, which would offer lower risk regarding protection of civilians and less vulnerability to weather constraints.\textsuperscript{539} Both options were to be buttressed with 800 Chadian

gendarmes and police along with 260 UN police to bolster the mission. Secretary-General Ban recommended the larger force option.

In response to the Secretary-General Ban’s report, the UN Security Council held closed-door meetings on Chad on February 27, 2007. Out of the members of the UN Security Council at the time, the P5 – including China – as well as Ghana and Peru favored the option of a multidimensional presence. Italy, Panama and South Africa challenged whether the conditions for deploying the mission were acceptable, while Congo and Qatar were skeptical about the attitude of the Chadian authorities. France started to push forward with a resolution, relying on support from the African members of the UN Security Council. This French draft resolution called for a peacekeeping force under Chapter VII for Chad and the Central African Republic. Tentatively called Opération des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad (ONURCAT) its mission was to “protect civilians in the Chadian and Central African bordering regions with Sudan and to reduce tensions along the borders of these three countries.” However, once France started circulations of the draft resolution, it ran into a stumbling block. Both the Security Council and the Secretariat were first awaiting a reply from Chad on whether such a mission would be acceptable.

On March 8, 2007, the Secretariat informed member states that Chad had requested the advance mission MiNUTAC to delay its deployment. Following these communications, the UN Security Council had informal discussions with the Chadian Minister for External Relations Ahmad

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Allam-Mi on March 23, 2007. In these meetings, Minister Allam-Mi put forward an alternative to the proposed peacekeeping operation, which did not include any military component. Minister Allam-Mi noted that Chadian authorities had control of domestic security affairs, underlining that there was no need for an internationalized military presence, as both Chad and Sudan had agreed to re-energize their commitments to the Tripoli Agreement from February 2006. Chad preferred a “civilian international presence” for their eastern territories with a 2,500-strong military police force to address refugee camp security. The silver lining in this proposal was that Chad noted it was willing to negotiate the mission’s size and composure as long as the mission reflected Chadian preferences and not the Secretariat’s request. After a spate of cross-border attacks on both countries, tensions again spiked with accusations from each country of their neighbor violating the Tripoli Agreement in early April 2007. Relations between Chad and Sudan calmed after Eritrea and Libya dispatched observers to watch the Chadian-Sudanese border, and talks between Chad and Sudan led to an agreement signed in Saudi Arabia on May 2, 2007, where both states agreed to support African Union efforts towards peace in Darfur and to take steps towards the Tripoli Agreement.

Though the Secretariat took heed of Chad’s request at this juncture, the discussion about a multilateral operation was not completely shelved. Indeed, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes gave a briefing to the UN Security Council in early April, in which he challenged whether a multidimensional presence should be dependent on Chadian consent – especially given the dire humanitarian situation.

Under-Secretary-General Holmes urged conversations for the multidimensional operation to conclude swiftly, as in his assessment, “an international security presence is essential to ensure the protection of refugees and displaced persons in eastern Chad.” As the UN Security Council members delivered responses to Under-Secretary-General Holmes’ briefing, China steered the conversation back to reminding states to “avoid politicizing humanitarian issues” and that “… the Chinese Government has actively participated, to the best of its abilities and in various ways, in international humanitarian relief efforts in Africa.” In contrast to the P3 members, the Chinese position avoided any comment on the need for a UN presence, beyond that for humanitarian purposes.

May 2007 – December 2008: French elections, military mission EUFOR TChad/RCA established, police and civilian mission MINURCAT established

France already had a long-established relationship with Chad and effectively became the lead state for the peacekeeping operation in Chad. After Chad’s independence, to help maintain Chadian stability, France established a permanent military presence in 1986 under Operation Épervier. Concurrently, as a signal of the importance of the Darfur issue in French electoral politics, France had already completed several inter-ministerial fact-finding missions in Sudanese refugee camps and Chadian internally displaced persons camps in mid-2006. The Darfur issue rose to the top of French electoral politics, and in the run-up to the May 2007 presidential election, each candidate vowed action on the issue.

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With the election of French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Bernard Kouchner was appointed Foreign Minister. The Darfur issue was such a priority for Foreign Minister Kouchner, that on May 19, 2007 – his second day in office – Kouchner convened a meeting to discuss the policy options on the matter. Kouchner visited N’Djamena later that month. There was a growing acceptance in the French security establishment that given the focus on the UNAMID mission, there would be little opportunity for new peacekeeping missions in the Darfur neighborhood unless there was concerted French leadership. Thus, French strategists started to view Chad as a prime area of French effort, given their close relations with Chad and possibility to influence N’Djamena.

In order to break the deadlock over military forces, it was France that proposed a European Union bridging force to address the situation in Chad until the United Nations could enter. It was the French assessment that the best means to secure Chad’s consent was to present a European Union mission with a large French component, instead of a United Nations-led mission. Furthermore, an EU-led mission would further French goals of promoting the security agenda of the European Union Common Security and Defense Policy. However, the French idea received only tepid feedback from EU members and DPKO. Chad was also unenthusiastic about the French suggestion.

France approached other EU states to build support for the mission in May 2007. France was met with European skepticism regarding French intentions: critics asked whether the European Union could be seen as legitimizing an intervention against the rebels on behalf of President Déby, if the

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European Union should be shoudering the French security budget in Africa, and whether the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy should stretch all the way to the African continent. After much discussion, the European Council responded with three guidelines for a potential EU mission: an operation limited to three to six months; a sharply delineated area where EU operations would be conducted (e.g. around only the largest camps), and a transfer of the operations to the United Nations at the end of the EU mission.

With the EU Council Secretariat sharing the non-paper concerning “the possible actions of the EU in Darfur and neighboring countries,” Foreign Minister Kouchner went to Chad for June 9 and 10, as the next phase of attempting to secure Chadian consent. At the conclusion of these meetings, the United Nations was informed by Minister for External Relations Allam-Mi that President Déby now agreed in principle to the deployment of an international military presence in eastern Chad, comprised of French and other European Union forces.\footnote{UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic, S/2007/488 (10 August 2007), paragraph 25.} This signal was a significant move for Chad. This understanding was achieved because Foreign Minister Kouchner conceded to President Déby that there would be no political mandate for the European Union force, and ultimate authority for the porous Chadian border and its refugee and IDP camps would remain under N’Djamena. In so doing, there was acceptance of the EU mission in principle by Chad. With this consent in place, France and Chad established a working group led by a special adviser to the French Foreign Affairs Minister and President Déby’s diplomatic adviser. A new non-paper, “an international presence in Chad and CAR,” circulated by France, became the working basis for the operational parameters of the mission.
Maintaining the pressure to address Chadian security in its regional context, the UN Security Council also announced their own one-week mission to Africa for June 14 – 21, 2007.\(^{553}\) During this trip, the UN Security Council Ambassadors visited Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire; Accra, Ghana; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Khartoum, Sudan, and Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With the British and South African Ambassadors heading the meetings with the African Union, the Security Council focused discussion on prospects for deploying to regional hotspots, including Chad, and the best means to cooperate with regional security organizations. During these meetings, the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council both reiterated the need to address “the state of bilateral relations and the necessity of a ceasefire” along the Chad-Sudan border.\(^{554}\)

France led discussions on Chad during the Paris meetings in June 2007 of the International Contact Group on Darfur. France was still cautious at this phase, with a spokesman noting “an agreement of the Chadian authorities is emerging in favor of international intervention, we are continuing to work with Chad, the UN and the EU on the preparation of an operation to secure the areas of Chad most affected by the Darfur crisis.”\(^{555}\) In the expanded International Contact Group meetings in Paris that followed, President Déby’s acceptance, in principle, of an international military force was welcomed. On July 23, the European Union Council of Ministers made a formal statement that they too supported the deployment of a UN multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern CAR. Thus, it was at this juncture that the United Nations revised their concept of operations for the multidimensional international presence in eastern Chad and the northeastern CAR. The International Contact Group formally endorsed the

\(^{553}\) UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 June 2007 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2007/347 (13 June 2007).


\(^{555}\) The Ministerial meeting of the enlarged international contact group (Paris, June 25th, 2007) (accessed January 12, 2012); available from [http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/article1872.html](http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/article1872.html).
CAR request for support, increasing pressure on Chad to accept a mission. On June 28, President Déby accepted the UN concept of operations, leading to the start of the actual planning of the mission.

France circulated another non-paper on the situation in Chad and the CAR, aiming at this phase to identify potential troop contributing countries for an EU mission. However, the European Union remained split on what to do. Though Belgium, Italy and the UK remained supportive of France’s initiative, and there were discussions of deployment as early as October 2007, the majority of the EU’s members remained cautious, asking questions about the nature and size of French commitments; how the Darfur issue would effect political developments in Chad, and the shape of the EU exit strategy. Germany and Sweden were more forceful, blocking the next phase of the EU planning process because of the irresolution of these questions. Discussions on Chad went forward on July 23, with foreign ministers in Brussels agreeing to request a crisis management concept for the mission, signaling a move to the next phase of planning for the potential operation. In late July, a joint EU-UN assessment mission was dispatched to Chad, signaling that the two secretariats were working closely at bringing the mission to reality.

At the UN Security Council there were also divisions amongst the players regarding the potential force for Chad. The focus of the Security Council remained Darfur, and though supportive of the EU-led mission in principle, US officials expressed concern that the Chad deployment would be well ahead of the Darfur mission, pushing that the two missions should be deployed at the same time. In response to the French proposal, DPKO sent out its own proposal for a UN component to the EU mission. DPKO suggested that the UN component would be deployed for a longer presence of at least one year; with a political mandate for its mission, and a clear division between UN peacekeeping forces and the Chadian gendarmerie being trained by the United Nations – alluding to concerns about human rights standards of the Chadian gendarmerie. DPKO
and OCHA held meetings with EU member states in New York. DPKO reaffirmed the need for a memorandum of understanding with Chad to clarify responsibilities between the parties.

In response, Secretary-General Ban dispatched another UN delegation to Chad and the CAR to consult with stakeholders and clarify the mission options and recommendations in the Secretary General’s February 2007 Report on Chad and the Central African Republic. In these meetings, Chadian officials clarified their interests in the prompt deployment of a civilian UN mission, as a first step towards addressing instability, and that a military presence was not favored now but would be eventually discussed as a second phase of deployment.556

Secretary-General Ban issued another set of recommendations regarding peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR on August 10, outlining what a joint EU-UN mission would look like in another Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central Africa Republic.557 The United Nations conceived of a two part international multidimensional presence: UN civilian staff, police and military liaison officers, and a European Union force, which would be responsible for protection of civilians and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. This international presence would complement the Chadian police and gendarmes that would monitor the camps. In this report, Secretary-General Ban made three recommendations: first, the UN would outsource the military function to the European Union, which had been accepted by President Déby. This military force would be in place for one year from when it was declared as operational by the European Council, at which point there would be an “appropriate follow-on arrangement, including a possible United Nations successor operation....”558 Secretary-General Ban recognized that the

potential follow-on force did not necessarily have Chadian consent: “... it will be essential to secure the early consent of the Chadian Government to the deployment of a possible follow-on force.” Second, Secretary-General Ban conceded that there would be no multidimensional presences in the border areas per President Déby’s insistence. Third, the Chadian police and gendarmes selected to maintain law and order would be serving under their national authority, though trained and monitored by UN police forces.

The main objective of the UN mission would be to contribute to the protection of refugee, IDP and civilian populations at risk in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic. Cooperating with the other peacekeeping missions in the area was still a priority, as the international multidimensional presence was to “[liaise] closely with the Government of the Sudan, the African Union, the African Union mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation, BONUCA and Cen-SAD to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region...” In order to prepare for the peacekeeping mission, informal working-level contacts were initiated between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the European Union planners at regular intervals, and UN personnel from their standing police capacity were dispatched to N’Djamena.

Secretary-General Ban made it clear in his August 2007 report that his recommendations should also be seen in the context of rapidly evolving events in Darfur, and in particular the acceptance by the Government of the Sudan of the heavy support package and the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation. In this regard, I welcome the Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) and would

like to reaffirm my intention to move expeditiously with its implementation. The two deployments – one in Darfur and the other in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic – would have a material impact on the security situation in the region, which would have to be considered and monitored closely. Progress on the political track in Darfur will also have an impact, since it would likely lead to increased instability in Darfur and the possibility of an eventual return home of Sudanese refugees currently in Chad and the Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{562}

Informal consultations regarding Secretary-General Ban’s report began at the Security Council on August 21, with the majority of UN Security Council members supporting the recommendations of the Secretary-General. Though UN Security Council members stressed the need for a political mission, the Secretariat responded by noting that President Déby was specific in rejecting a political mandate for the mission. The Security Council adopted a presidential statement on August 27, indicating a readiness to mandate the mission, while respecting the views of Chad and the CAR.\textsuperscript{563} Soon after, France started circulating a draft resolution in New York. The draft was first shopped to fellow members of the P3, then on to P5 members China and Russia, African and European members of the Council, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Secretary-General Ban visited Chad in early September. At the end of that trip, on September 7, Chad signed a joint communiqué, explaining its intentions to facilitate the deployment of an international presence in Eastern Chad and the CAR, while also working with Sudan to normalize relations, and promote political reconciliation at home. Chad sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General on September 11, welcoming an “international presence in eastern Chad in order to contribute to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian populations at risk…” Chad was also careful to note that after six months of this mission in place, it would conduct a joint preliminary assessment with the European Union and the United Nations, so as


“to prepare for the transfer of the tasks discharged by the European Union operation to other contingents… with the consent of Chad…” With this letter made public, the EU sent a letter on September 13, requesting a formal UN Security Council authorization for the EU force, providing the legal basis for the mission.

It was at this point that planning slowed again, with debate at the Council on how the mission should come together. The United States focused on funding concerns, refusing to support assessed contributions as the means to finance the training of the Chadian police, noting that this would create precedence for future missions. European members at the Council focused on the language calling for the EU deployment and what would be required from European states. China, Indonesia, Qatar and Russia honed in on the need for explicit consent for the two missions from the host states. Only African members at the Security Council did not raise significant questions, signaling acceptance of the proposed force. The P3 had correctly assumed that China would not object to ‘outsourcing’ part of the overall tasks to a regional organization, as China had previously supported other missions led by regional organizations.

UN Security Council Resolution 1778 was unanimously adopted on September 25, 2007, authorizing tandem missions: the Operation European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR), providing the military component to protect civilians, promote regional security, and rule of law and human rights; and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (known by its French acronym, MINURCAT) as a civilian and police operation to provide training for a local gendarme force, the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité.

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Calling the border area situation between Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan a “threat to international peace and security,” UN Security Council Resolution 1778 called for “a multidimensional presence to intend to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, *inter alia*,” by offering protection to civilians, IDPs and refugees; supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the northeastern CAR, and creating conditions for the reconstruction and development in those locales.  

In order to execute the mandate, at this particular phase, a tripartite structure was proposed for the mission:

- **EUFOR** was authorized with 3,307 EU soldiers (3,107 to be deployed in Chad, and the balance of two hundred soldiers to be deployed in northeastern CAR). At this time, EUFOR had a broad Chapter VII mandate to establish security in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, protect UN staff and humanitarian personnel, and contribute to the safety and security in the zone of operation. EUFOR was to address larger political objectives of the European Union, to support the UNAMID mission and prevent spillover effects of that crisis into the region. EUFOR had an ambitious end state: to have a self-sustaining Safe and Secure Environment in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR.

- **MINURCAT** had a maximum of 300 police personnel and fifty military liaison officers and supplemental civilian personnel to execute its tasks in areas of civil affairs, human rights, rule of law and mission support. The main task of MINURCAT was to select, train and mentor Chadian police and gendarme personnel of the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*, along with assisting the promotion of the rule of law in Chad and the CAR.

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• Département Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) was a Chadian police component, under the authority of Chad, which was to maintain law and order in only the refugee and IDP camps in the eastern part of Chad. MINURCAT would select, train and give material support to the DIS.

These missions were in tandem and complementary with one another, with the European Union committed to a one-year deployment in the region, handing over authorities to the United Nations at the end of their stint. However, even as the European Union conceived of their mission as a bridging force before a United Nations replacement, it still was unclear if and what type of replacement Chad would give its consent to. Indeed, negotiations about the nature of any follow-on mission would prove to be complicated.

The European reluctance for the EUFOR mission continued: it took five rounds of intra-EU negotiations to finally establish the force, with France committing significantly more assets than it initially proposed.\(^{568}\) Though the EUFOR mission had over a dozen EU members and three non-EU members contributing also, the mission still had major shortcomings in key assets like rotary wing and tactical aircraft.\(^{569}\) Thus, it took EUFOR a further six months to reach their initial operating capacity on March 15, 2008. It was from this deployment landmark that the clock started for EUFOR withdrawal on March 15, 2009 – even though EUFOR did not reach full operational capacity until September 2008.

\(^{568}\) France committed 57% of EUFOR personnel – approximately 2,000 troops of the 3,500-strong force.

MINURCAT faced similar problems, with deployments slowing down after the initial tranche of personnel arrived in Chad. Secretary-General Ban issued his first report on MINURCAT in December 17, 2007. The Report twice referred to the UN concern about consent, with references to Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmund Mulet’s visit to Chad on November 16 and 17, 2007, where meetings with the Chadian Prime Minister Nouradine Delwa Kassiré Coumayoke were spent ensuring Chad’s “full support to MINURCAT’s deployment” and efforts to establish a working status of forces agreement. A technical assessment mission was sent to Chad soon after, along with the appointment of José Victor Da Silva Angelo, a veteran UN Development Program official as the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Chad for the MINURCAT mission.

Cross-border rebel attacks led to further stress on the mission, with both Chad and Sudan filing letters at the Security Council on the resumed border violations in mid-January 2008. The Secretariat decided to keep the pressure on for the MINURCAT mission to ramp up, dispatching Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support Jane Holl Lute to visit Chad from January 22 to 23, 2008 to oversee MINURCAT deployment timelines, and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno to visit Chad on January 25, 2008, to finalize the status-of-mission agreement with Chadian authorities. With the deteriorating security situation, EUFOR operations were temporarily suspended, though EU member states expressed

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570 MINURCAT international staff were deployed by early December 2007. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic, S/2007/4739 (17 December 2007), paragraph 17.
support the mission mandate. DPKO responded by evacuating personnel. Libya and the Republic of the Congo took on mediation roles, while the African Union issued a statement that “no authority that comes to power by force will be recognized by the AU.”

With cross-border tensions reaching a high in February 2008, when Chadian rebels got as far as N’Djamena, getting as close as 500 yards of President Déby in his presidential palace. These rebels departed from bases in Sudan. On February 3, DPKO Africa Director Dmitry Titov briefed on the situation on Chad, and during that meeting, Chad sent a formal letter to the UN Security Council President requesting assistance in regards to the siege of N’Djamena. Chad “is currently facing an attempt to overthrow its legal government by force… Chad appeals to all States to provide all aid and assistance needed to help end this aggression,” and that Chad “solicits the support of the Security Council in this regard.”

France put forward a draft Presidential Statement on international military aid for N’Djamena. However, Russia and Vietnam expressed concerns about the draft statement wording of “all necessary means” in support of Chad in absence of a formal request by Chad itself for military aid. In response, France modified its text, in order to reach to some consensus on the request for member states “to provide support as requested by the Government of Chad.”

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China, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Vietnam noted that they could not support this version of the text. There are two possible explanations for the Chinese position regarding the draft presidential statement: first, concerns that the draft could be interpreted as overriding Chadian sovereignty; second, concerns that the draft could imply Sudanese responsibility for the rebel group attacks on Chad, given the rebels’ bases were in Sudan. Eventually, the Presidential Statement was agreed upon on February 4, 2008, condemning the attacks and calling upon all member states to “provide support, in conformity with the United Nations charter, as requested by the Government of Chad.”\(^{581}\) This Presidential Statement also emphasized that the Security Council “reaffirms its full support” for MINURCAT and EUFOR, noting that these were missions “to contribute to the protection of vulnerable civilian populations and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.”\(^{582}\)

In response to the strained Chad-Sudan relationship, the African Union played a greater role in attempting to mediate the conflict. Under AU auspices, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade negotiated the Dakar Agreement between Chad and Sudan in March 2008, outlining that both states were committed to their previous commitments on border issues and that they would take steps towards normalizing relations.

Deployments of EUFOR and MINURCAT resumed in mid-February 2008, and the SRSG for Chad Victor Angelo arrived in Chad at the start of March. Soon after arriving in N’Djamena, SRSG Angelo initiated monthly bilateral talks with the UN Security Council members with Embassy representation. In these meetings, the SRSG’s office discussed the future of the MINURCAT mission and asked for troop contributions from these states. The SRSG’s office perceived China as a possible troop contributor, given China’s history of peacekeeping contributions and expressed willingness to consider deployment to missions with the host country’s support. In March 2008, bilateral meetings between the SRSG’s office and Chinese


Embassy officials produced a tentative offer for enabler unit contributions from Beijing, much in line with the types of assets already deployed worldwide by China. This information was relayed back to New York for the Force Generation Service to work with at UN Headquarters.

China also played a facilitator role between Sudan and Chad, dispatching Special Envoy Liu Guijin to meetings in Chad, France, Sudan and the United Kingdom in February 2008. In a March 2008 press conference, Ambassador Liu noted that China was not a formal mediator, but it had been stressing to both Chad and Sudan that a peaceful resolution of their dispute was needed. In private briefings with China-based Ambassadors, Ambassador Liu emphasized the need to get Sudanese rebels, some backed by N’Djamena, to come back to the negotiations with Sudan, while noting that the conflict between the two states would not be easy to resolve. Again, there were limits to the role that China was willing to play. Internal records show that France attempted a P5 démarche to pressure both Chad and Sudan to come back to negotiations and relinquish their support for each other’s rebel groups. However, France predicted that the maneuver would not work without Chinese support, and the ability to secure China’s pressure on Khartoum would be near impossible. When the United States reached out to Chinese officials, they were able to confirm the Chinese refusal to apply pressure on Chad and Sudan through a joint démarche with the P5 members. China explained that it preferred to “work on the problem separately, through our own channels, for greater effectiveness…” emphasizing that “we share

the same opinions as other P5 nations… although we have small differences in how we express them…”

After informal consultations on CAR and Chad in early April, UN Security Council members noted their concern via a press statement over the continuing unrest in eastern Chad and the northeastern CAR. MINURCAT deployment was slowed by the logistical delays. Relations between Chad and Sudan broke down again in early May 2008, after a rebel attack on Khartoum. Blaming N’Djamena for the assault, Khartoum severed ties with Chad. The Security Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the attack on Khartoum. Each country filed multiple letters citing violations by the other of all political agreements towards peace between the two states. Again, MINURCAT and EUFOR examined downsizing options, so as to leave only essential staff on mission. The Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning

the attack, but calling for calm across the Chad-Sudan border. Soon after, in June, during a special mission to the continent, all fifteen Ambassadors of the UN Security Council visited Chad on 6 June so as to meet with Chadian government authorities and visit camps. In Chad, the UN Security Council affirmed its support for the protection of IDPs and refugees through the support of EUFOR and MINURCAT. In conclusion, the Security Council urged the Secretary-General “to deploy MINURCAT as quickly as possible.” In mid-June, N’Djamena accused Khartoum of supporting and being complicit in rebel attacks. The Security Council stepped in issuing a presidential statement, which condemned the rebel attacks and emphasizing the need to move towards the Dakar Agreement.

With the situation still tense, the planned EU-UN mid-term assessment missions visited Chad/CAR at the end of June to assess the region’s security status in preparation for the UN lead of military operations once the EUFOR mandate expired in March 2009. Both the European Union and the United Nations were concerned about the potential for a security vacuum, especially in light of Chad’s reluctance to allow a border-monitoring mission and Chadian concerns about domestic interference. DPKO remained reluctant to follow the European Union given the lack of support for the mission and the context of the Capstone Doctrine, which had just been adopted, which clearly states that a peacekeeping mission should be in support of a political process as a condition for success. The Secretary-General echoed similar concerns: “Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, and in the absence of a viable dialogue between the Government and all opposition groups, the resources invested by the international community in

In contrast, France held to the view that the Capstone recommendations would not be possible in the case of securing Chadian consent for the UN replacement mission.

France pushed forward with a draft resolution to renew the MINURCAT mandate in August 2008, circulating this draft to its Security Council partners and other European states for feedback. However, the September 2008 Secretary-General Report gave recommendations for a broader MINURCAT mandate with the EUFOR departure. In sum, the Secretary-General called for a Chapter VII mission with a military component in order to address regional insecurity, seeing value in a force of up to 6,000 troops and logistic enablers to follow on from EUFOR. The Secretary-General noted that “an expanded United Nations presence with a military component would best support the protection and return of refugees and internally displaced persons if MINURCAT strengthened its engagement with all actors...” The Secretary-General argued that these numbers were not necessarily high, but were similar to the numbers that were used for EUFOR. UN Security Council members, concerned about cost, signaled that they found this estimate high, and continued to apply pressure to revise the numbers downwards. For both DPKO and the Secretariat, there were particular concerns about the firm departure date set by EU states, as this signaled a disjuncture in the realities of getting a UN mission on the ground.

Public meetings to decide the future of MINURCAT were held on September 24, 2008. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1834, co-sponsored by Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Libya and the United States, which gave MINURCAT until March 15, 2009, noting that MINURCAT planned to carry on the military dimension of the mission upon the departure of EUFOR. Only the United Kingdom offered comment on the need for “clear objectives, an achievable mandate, a sensible time frame for deployment, measurable benchmarks and a realistic end state…,” questioning whether the proposed military component of the mission would “bring real value.”

However, a newer set of mission transfer problems emerged regarding the transfer of troops, assets and logistics. Casting a shadow over the debate at UN Headquarters, Chad sent a letter to the Security Council emphasizing that the September 2008 Secretary-General Report did not “accurately reflect its viewpoints on the question of an extended MINURCAT operation with a military component,” asserting that the MINURCAT mission “is not a conventional peacekeeping one implying some kind of ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’ or ‘good offices’ within the framework of any type of peace agreement,” and demanding that the force should be scaled for its tasks – i.e. no larger than 3,000 troops and better equipped than EUFOR. Chad also firmly reminded the Security Council that any reference to discussing deployment with potential TCCs was “inappropriate” because there was no agreement between Chad and the Secretary-General as a foundation for TCC outreach.

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Despite Chadian concerns, DPKO started briefing potential TCCs of the initial concept of operations in mid-September, giving follow-on briefings in early October and holding informal meetings with potential TCCs at the end of November.\textsuperscript{603} Given the explicit reluctance of Chad regarding the mission mandate, and MINURCAT’s potential expansion to a better equipped and non-neutral United Nations force – the DPKO request of EUFOR contributing countries to re-hat their troops under MINURCAT for another one-year period was met with lukewarm responses. Facing this new impasse, France held an experts’ meeting of the UN Security Council on November 11, 2008 to discuss the size of MINURCAT forces. Concurrently, the Secretariat engaged in intensive negotiations with Chad throughout the month of November 2008, in order to increase the force size to which Chad would consent.\textsuperscript{604} In early December 2008, the Secretary-General released his report on MINURCAT, which recommended a military force of 4,900 for Eastern Chad and echoed much of DPKO’s request for the follow-on UN-led military mission.\textsuperscript{605}

In regards to contributing Chinese assets on mission, DPKO officials pursued SRSG Victor Angelo’s lead from N’Djamena. When followed up, the Chinese interest in Chad fizzled and Beijing declined to commit troops at this juncture. Beyond the efforts of SRSG Angelo, beginning in October 2008, DPKO followed standard procedure establishing a parallel track to court contributions, by inviting country mission military advisors to attend general and bilateral briefings regarding the mission plan and concept of operations. In these meetings, DPKO officers highlight the force strength and necessary assets for mission success, and then try to target TCCs with suitable asset profiles in support of the mission. Though DPKO officials spent significant time working with officials from the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, again these efforts


\textsuperscript{604} Chad initially gave consent for about 3,000 troops in October 2008. The number then rose to 3,500 troops. After intensive negotiations with SRSG Victor Angelo, the numbers rose to 4,500 troops. After negotiations with Secretary-General Ban, the number rose to 4,900 troops.

were to no avail.\textsuperscript{606} China firmly refused to discuss deploying helicopters to MINURCAT (badly needed in order to stretch the light footprint across a vast and infrastructure sparse mission space) and any passing interest in deploying to MINURCAT was turned towards discussing Chinese contributions to more high profile missions, like UNAMID in Darfur.\textsuperscript{607}

Following a Security Council discussion of the future of the MINURCAT mandate, where the only Security Council members to respond to the delivered speeches were Costa Rica, France and Italy,\textsuperscript{608} France circulated its draft resolution on December 15, 2008. Chad responded that the modalities of the handover needed to be discussed and challenged the EU proposals to put the UN in control of its infrastructure, instead of N'Djamena. Most importantly, Chad refused to support future military components of MINURCAT. DPKO responded in a two-step move to force Chad to come to negotiations over the future mandate: asking France to mediate on behalf of DPKO with Chad, while asking the UN Security Council to signal approval of the DPKO proposed concept of operations. The Secretary-General noted in his December 2008 Report that “sixteen countries have indicated a willingness to positively consider contributing to a MINURCAT force. One potential contributor has indicated the possibility of contributing to the helicopter requirement.”\textsuperscript{609}

Therefore, in this phase of developments for the MINURCAT mission, China continued with its neutral position regarding the Chad issue. Chinese officials passively attended informal discussions and largely bypassed haggling on the mission mandate, size and timeline. Even on

\textsuperscript{606} UN officials posted in N’Djamena with MINURCAT, interviews with author, New York, October 12, 2011; and Force Generation Service official, interview with author via phone, September 17, 2011.
\textsuperscript{607} UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, interview with author by phone, November 17, 2011. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, interview with author by phone, February 16, 2012.
\textsuperscript{608} UN Security Council, “The situation in Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion,” UN Document S/PV.6042 (12 December 2008).
China’s touchstone issue – the sanctity of host state consent – China did not wade into the debate to defend Chad in the fall of 2007. Instead, China publicly raised concerns regarding an “all necessary measures” clause to support Chad in its defense against Sudanese-backed rebels, which instead implied the Chinese concern for a neutral position between the two parties. When troop contribution discussions started in anticipation of the transfer of authorities from the European Union to the United Nations, China consistently declined an offer to participate in MINURCAT, backing away from its previous tentative interest to join the mission.

**January 2009 – December 2009: EUFOR Departure and MINURCAT Assumes Military Commitments**

UN Security Council Resolution 1861 was unanimously authorized on January 14, 2009, calling for a military component for MINURCAT when the EUFOR mission concluded in March 2009. UNSCR 1861 called for 5,200 military personnel, 300 police officers, 25 military liaison personnel and sufficient civilian staff to support a comprehensive multidimensional peacekeeping operation. The MINURCAT mandate was renewed to March 15, 2010, with the option for extension. The mandate was robust, filed under Chapter VII with “all necessary measures” language.

Sensitive to a potential power vacuum, informal UN Security Council meetings were held to discuss the transfer of authority and urge Chad to sign a memorandum of understanding for the mission. On March 15, 2009, the United Nations assumed operations and responsibilities for the 2,085 force. Troop contributing countries meetings were organized for February 9, with a total of 1,877 EUFOR soldiers from Albania, Austria, Croatia, Finland, and Russia, and larger European Union contingents from France, Ireland, and Poland agreeing to be re-hatted under

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MINURCAT. EUFOR also gave its camps and other infrastructure to the United Nations, along with components of its intelligence database, and agreed to keep a Quick Reaction Force for the UN to call upon in the first month of taking over the complete mission. The handover between the European Union and the United Nations was not easy or smooth. An unfortunate side effect of the EUFOR missions was that the potential pool of TCCs available to deploy to the full-fledged MINURCAT mission had effectively shrunk: many European states who had already served under a European Union flag were awaiting other states to contribute to UN efforts before volunteering their assets again.

As the security situation began to deteriorate, there was a push by DPKO to find troop contributing countries that could produce the balance of the mission, especially in light of the oncoming rainy season. With the Secretary-General’s April 14, 2009 report of MINURCAT, the MINURCAT force size was noted at 2,079 troops – only forty per cent of the authorized strength. Crucial assets like logistics teams, engineering units and military helicopters were in dangerously short supply. Without these crucial enablers, it would mean a smaller mission footprint. Discussions continued through the summer and autumn about the lack of assets on the ground, and by December 2009, MINURCAT had only deployed less than fifty percent of its maximum troop deployment – with 2,411 troops on mission – while still missing crucial enabler units like military helicopters, engineering assets, and other transportation units. Though MINURCAT troop numbers benefited from over thirty-five troop contributing countries during the 2010 year, mobility continued to be a significant problem for the mission.

Again, tensions escalated between Chad and Sudan. Chad filed a note verbale with the UN Security Council, accusing Khartoum of launching armed attacks against Chad on May 5, 2009. A day later, Chad sent a letter to the Security Council “as a matter of great urgency” asking the Security Council to meet to discuss the attacks Sudan was accused of committing against Chad. In response, France started drafting a Presidential Statement to condemn the attacks on Chad. However, the initial drafts of the Presidential Statement were rejected by China and Libya for being too critical of Sudan. The Russian rotating presidency of the UN Security Council led a push to compromise on the body of the text and the addition of the phrase that the Chadian armed groups were “coming from outside.” China’s acquiescence to the additional phrase can be interpreted as leaving enough ambiguity to not be a seen as a direct criticism of Khartoum. Therefore, the Presidential Statement, drafted by France, led to a statement condemning military attacks by “Chadian armed groups, coming from outside.” Chad responded poorly to the Chinese opposition to any condemnation of Sudan by the Security Council, summoning the Chinese Ambassador in N’Djamena to government offices to explain the Chinese position and listen to Chadian protests. In an attempt to apply some salve to the Chadian wound, China announced plans to dispatch Special Representative for African Affairs Liu Guijin to N’Djamena and Addis Ababa to discuss Sudan-Chad relations with an aim to reduce and end the conflict between the neighbors. Ambassador Liu noted that the crumbling relations between the two states were detrimental to strategic issues, especially to the development of both states’ bilateral relations with China. After more discussions, in May 2009,

618 “China pledges to end Sudan-Chad conflict,” Sudan Tribune, June 1, 2009 (accessed March 15, 2012); available from http://www.sudantribune.com/China-pledges-to-end-Sudan-Chad,31358.
Chad and Sudan again signed agreements in Doha reaffirming their commitments to no longer support opposition groups within each others’ countries.

In July 2009, the Secretary-General issued another report, noting that by the end of June 2009, the MINURCAT force was only at 2,424 troops, or 46 per cent of the authorized strength. Missing enabler units hamstrung the mission, and the Secretary-General noted that the pledged number of helicopters had actually dropped since his earlier report. At the end of July 2009, Special Representative Victor Angelo briefed the Security Council on the situation in the Chadian neighborhood. At this meeting, every single UN Security Council member offered comment. Compared to the speeches of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Chinese representative made tame remarks, noting the Chinese deep concern with the Chadian-Sudanese bilateral relations; calling for both sides to use dialogue to resolve their disputes, and noting Chinese satisfaction with the MINURCAT deployment pace. Therefore, in this phase of transferring authorities from EUFOR, China again maintained its neutral position on the mission, playing no central role and firmly maintaining its background position.

**January 2010 – December 2010: Withdrawal of Chadian Consent and Mission Closure**

Negotiations for the MINURCAT mandate extension began in December 2009. However, on January 15, 2010, Chad withdrew its consent that gave MINURCAT its enhanced military mandate, formally asking the Security Council via a *note verbale* not to renew the MINURCAT mandate, which was expiring on March 15, 2010. Chad gave two explanations for its firm stance

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621 UN Security Council members in July 2009 included Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.
regarding the end of the mission. First, Chad asserted that the incomplete deployment of the mission had led to MINURCAT being incompetent to execute its mandate. At the end of January 2010, there were only 3,749 of the fully authorized strength of 5,500 personnel for the mission – less than seventy per cent of the authorized force. With a deficit in air assets and other troop enabling units, MINURCAT was significantly limited in what it could achieve on the ground. Second, Chad noted that its security climate had changed: a rapprochement with Sudan and recent defeat of rebel groups put Chad in a stronger position to guarantee its own border security. With this foundation to address insecurity in Chad, Chad itself could offer protection of civilians instead of relying on the United Nations to do so.623

Establishing a ceasefire with Sudan meant that Chad had good incentive to end the UN mission in order to make a satisfactory concession to President Bashir that the proxy war and Chadian militia sponsorship was in the past, and therefore the United Nations presence was no longer needed to deter Sudan. Moreover, President Déby was most likely emboldened by two regional examples of the United Nations acquiescing to strong host state refusals of peacekeeping mission, in which the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) accepted new terms dictated by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had to leave due to host state consent being so circumscribed by Ethiopia and Eritrea. Though Chad initially supported UN withdrawal starting on April 30th, it soon brought the date forward and sped up the planned timeline: requesting a civilian component

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623 President Déby’s visited Khartoum in February 2010, further cementing the rapprochement with Sudan, and the border between the two states was opened in April 2010, after being closed for a seven-year period. To guarantee security, a 3,000-strong Joint Border Force was established between the two states. Both states appeared committed to the peace agreements, with Chad refusing entry to Khalil Ibrahim, a leader of the JEM rebel group. In May 2010, Sudan expelled three Chadian rebel leaders from its territory. As further proof of the priority on neighborhood security, Chad refused to arrest President Bashir when he traveled to Chad for a regional summit, in spite of the warrant for Bashir’s arrest and Chad’s signatory obligations to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011), 20 – 25, 23. Chad formally expressed its commitment to assume full protection of civilian populations and security affairs in S/2010/250. UN Security Council, *Letter dated 21 May 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2010/250 (21 May 2010).
withdrawal by March 15, followed by a military component withdrawal on May 31, leading to a complete mission close by July 31. Since negotiations on the future of MINURCAT reached an impasse, the mission remained at partial deployment, pending discussions with Chad.624

The Secretariat and the UN Security Council were hesitant about a hasty withdrawal. Both DPKO and France countered Chad with the option for a progressive withdrawal of forces over the 2010 time period, since a military component withdrawal would effectively mean a withdrawal of the complete mission. As the lead state, France took the initial position of coordinating the remaining P5 members to work to get President Déby’s consent for another year-long extension of the MINURCAT mandate. In a worst case scenario, France was willing to push for at least a six or eight-month extension for MINURCAT to the end of 2010. However, even France had its limits, knowing that at least nominal consent from President Déby was needed. Without Chadian consent, any mission extension would be stillborn. In New York, the P5 members agreed to démarche Chad, to try to steer N’Djamena towards a mission extension, leaving DPKO to negotiate the modalities of what the extension would look like.625 When contacted in Beijing, Chinese officials responded that Chad’s consent was “very important” to the United Nations’ image and the image of UN peacekeeping; however, despite showing support in New York, Beijing-based Chinese government officials deferred commentary on participating in the démarche.626 Yet, at the same time, China was equally ambivalent about whether to support Chad’s bilateral request to vouch for a complete withdrawal of MINURCAT, making sure to tell

625 “Demarche: Request To The Governments Of China, France, Russia, And The United Kingdom To Support Continuation Of The Un Mission In The Central African Republic And Chad (minurcat),” Wikileaks Cable: 10STATE14164 (accessed May 21, 2012); available from http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10STATE14164&q=minurcat.
US officials of Chad’s appeal to China and noting that China did not respond to N’Djamena’s request.

UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy visited N’Djamena from 24 February – 1 March, meeting with President Déby and other senior Chadian officials in an attempt to push through the impasse. Back at Headquarters, DPKO responded with three different options. First, that the United Nations, in respect of Chadian wishes, could make an immediate and complete withdrawal. Second, that the mission’s footprint and corresponding protection area could be shrunk, to better suit the scale of the deployed forces. Third, that the UN Security Council could choose a new mission mandate through March 2011, just in case Chad could be persuaded to give its consent.

France attempted to push discussions forward with a P5 meeting on the MINURCAT future, still pushing to win a graduated withdrawal versus a complete withdrawal on a short timetable. With France holding the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council for March 2010, France kept the pressure on for negotiations to lead to mission extension. With success from the French initiatives, Chad agreed to a two-month extension of MINURCAT at the start of March. Moving quickly, on March 12, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1913, extending MINURCAT’s mandate through May 15, 2010. The resolution was sponsored by ten members of the UN Security Council, including Gabon and Nigeria.

It still remained unclear what shape the future MINURCAT was going to take. DPKO pushed for the mission to be downsized to 3,600 troops, which Chadian authorities flatly refused to approve,

asserting that this number was too high. In contrast, France offered a ‘right-sizing’ plan, with the gradual withdrawal of forces. Informal meetings at the Security Council and expert-level political-military meetings tried to advance compromise between the different groups. With the uncertainty about the mission future, by the end of March, Ireland publicized its decision to withdraw 400 peacekeepers, noting the uncertainty about the mission’s future.\textsuperscript{629} Finland followed shortly after.\textsuperscript{630} These moves were significant because they showed that the Security Council itself could not necessarily muster the necessary TCC support to keep MINURCAT together.

Eventually, another technical assessment mission was dispatched leading to an aide-memoire paving the way for MINURCAT withdrawal. With this document, informal discussions were held at the Security Council, where it was agreed to transfer power to local authorities so as to pave the way for a gradual departure of MINURCAT forces. France intervened one last time, and in bilateral meetings of their heads of states on April 8, President Sarkozy managed to persuade President Déby to take on the extension of the mission’s mandate through October 2010. On April 9, in informal consultations, Alain Le Roy relayed Chad’s position to reduce MINURCAT’s size to 1,900 troops, with Chad assuming greater protection responsibilities.

France drafted another Security Council resolution, which it first circulated to members of the P3. Both the United Kingdom and the United States were reluctant to close the mission per Chad’s timetable, as they were concerned about setting another example of accepting terms dictated by host states when local conditions would still benefit from a peacekeeping mission. Another informal meeting was held at the Security Council, with Chad and CAR representatives present so as to hear the recommendations for the future of the MINURCAT mandate. Because of

\textsuperscript{629} “Irish peacekeepers to withdraw from Chad,” RTÉ News/Ireland, March 30, 2010.
\textsuperscript{630} “Finnish peacekeepers expected to leave Chad,” Helsingin Sanomat, April 1, 2010.
Security Council delays, mainly due to reluctance of the United States to accept the draft resolution, there was another technical rollover of the mission for a fortnight.\textsuperscript{631}

The United States added new elements to the resolution drafted by France, paving the way for a May 21 meetings with Chad at the Council. On May 25, 2010, UN Security Council Resolution 1923 passed by unanimous vote at the UN Security Council, revising the mandate of the MINURCAT mission.\textsuperscript{632} The vote was precipitated by last-minute negotiations between the Security Council and President Déby, which gave the UN a mini-mandate through October 2010. The MINURCAT mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1923 saw radical revisions to the mission’s protection of civilians tasking, giving complete control for protection of civilians to Chad. The mission was able to provide protections within the area of operations in the “immediate vicinity” of MINURCAT forces. With these mission changes, the MINURCAT presence was reduced to a maximum of 2,200 military personnel: a maximum of 1,900 soldiers in Chad and 300 soldiers in the CAR – supplemented by 25 military liaison officers and a ceiling of 300 police officers and civilians.

With its mini-mandate, the excess troops were started to withdraw on July 15, and the balance of the remaining troops began withdrawal on October 15.\textsuperscript{633} By October 21, MINURCAT military personnel had ceased their operational activity, and MINURCAT began to transfer its programs on child protection, internally displaced persons resettlement, rule of law and governance and human rights to Chad. The Secretary-General released a report on MINURCAT on October 14, and the next day, Chad presented an updated version of its plans to ensure security in Chad upon

the departure of MINURCAT. The Security Council released another presidential statement under French auspices on December 21, in which Chinese officials encouraged modifications of the text to include that the mission had been a success. In the view of a UN official interviewed, Chinese interlocutors kept pushing for a storyline that this was a “dignified withdrawal – a mission successfully done and therefore the mission should leave.” The Chinese commentary could be a result of not wanting the UN Security Council to be perceived as lame in confronting a small country that had controlled the UN presence, and therefore buttressing perceptions of the UN strength and ability to deal with matters of international peace and security. The complete withdrawal of MINURCAT was finished by December 31, 2010.

CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING CONSTANCY IN CHINA’S ACTIONS REGARDING CHAD AND CHINA’S MISSING DEPLOYMENT TO MINURCAT

This chapter argues that there were four phases of the peacekeeping mission:

- April 2006 – May 2007, where there was recognition of the Sudan-Darfur-Chad problem and deadlock on how to proceed on the matter at the UN Security Council;
- May 2007 – December 2008, when France started advocating that the military mission EUFOR be established, with a tandem police and civilian mission MINURCAT;
- January 2009 – December 2009, when EUFOR completed its mission and MINURCAT took over military commitments.

635 DPKO official, interview with author by phone, November 17, 2011.
January 2010 – December 2010, when Chad withdrew mission consent and the mission closed

However, in these phases, there were no critical junctures within Chinese activity. From the beginning, China played a cautious role at the UN Security Council: voting for all the Security Council Resolutions on Chad and neither publicly nor privately playing a major role in shaping the mission, careful to remain in a neutral position vis-à-vis Sudan and Chad. A review of the provisional verbatim records regarding MINURCAT show China only speaking a handful of times, and even then, giving indistinct commentary. Interviews of UN officials reveal that China offered “perfunctory commentary” on the need for host state consent, despite the multiple opportunities to advocate on behalf of an intransigent Chad. Moreover, China showed no real interest in the force structure debate, which was quite heated at the UN Security Council. Furthermore, despite an informal expression of Chinese interest in contributing enabler units in bilateral meetings between the Chinese Ambassador and the SRSG in N’Djamena, when followed through at the UN Headquarters level, no offer for Chinese troops was made; indeed, when pressed on supplying badly-needed helicopters to the MINURCAT mission, the Chinese response was to consistently decline UN overtures, while noting that Chinese assets could perhaps serve in other missions. This last remark is no small point: Chinese officials were signaling not a disinterest in peacekeeping contributions in general, but disinterest in contributions to MINURCAT specifically. Moreover, it is worth remembering that the ‘crowding out’ of troop contributions argument does not necessarily apply to China. Thus, the Chinese experience with MINURCAT is summarized as lacking in critical junctures through China’s consistent neutral position between Chad and Sudan, and rejections of opportunities to deploy to the mission.

637 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, interview with author by phone, November 17, 2011.
The case study highlights that in comparison to that of the UNAMID case of the preceding chapter, two crucial precipitants differ: China bore no reputational nor image costs for its actions regarding Chad. By taking a largely neutral stance on the press statements and presidential statements and in voting with the rest of the UN Security Council on Chad, China did not stand as a block to other UN Security Council efforts to address the Chad issue. Let us turn to address the reputation factor first.

In terms of reputation, there was no real attempt by any party to shame China regarding Chad. In shaming China, there would involve sullying of China’s reputation, which would be intended to spur China to modify its behavior and therefore improve its reputation to gain other goods at another time. However, there was no landmark campaign against China (i.e. there was no ‘Chad Olympics’ campaign or some variation like this). In order to highlight this point, we can assume that if there was interest in linking China and Chad together, then there would be media stories regarding the two states during the time period under study here. Therefore, a search of articles within the LexisNexus news database is a crude indicator of whether China was associated with the collapsing Sudanese-Chadian relationship. For a search of articles during January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010 of newspapers around the world, only 350 articles were produced with the words ‘Chad,’ ‘China’ and ‘peacekeeping’ anywhere in the article. In comparison, with the same search settings regarding Sudan instead of Chad, 1852 articles were found in the same time period. When searching for articles with the words ‘Chad,’ ‘China’ and ‘peacekeeping’ within five words of each other (feasibly showing sentences that discuss China’s role in Chad and peacekeeping), only six articles were found in newspapers around the world in LexisNexus during that same time period. This is an indicator that in the public sphere at least, China was not being linked to the situation in Chad.

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638 A search of all newspapers in the same time period with the terms ‘Sudan,’ ‘China,’ and ‘genocide’ anywhere in the article produced 2870 articles.
Furthermore, if one assumed that China was concerned about the Chad affair and its impact on China’s political and economic relationship with Chad or other states, then it is reasonable to assume that there would be a ripple effect in Chinese academic work – where after a time lag, there would be articles by the Chinese academy regarding Chad. A search for 乍得 (zhade, the character for ‘Chad’) in any text of politics/military/law journals during the 2006 – 2011 time period, produces only one article the Chinese Academic Journal database, an aggregator source of Chinese language publication titles. In comparison, in the same time period, a search for 达尔富尔 daerfuer, the character for ‘Darfur’ in Mandarin Chinese produces 204 articles. In interviews, academics noted that the Chinese government and research community focusing on Francophone Africa still lagged behind those specialists working with other regions of the African continent, and that there had not been increased interest in Chad despite the recent peacekeeping missions there. 639 Again, this stands in contrast to the spike in interest in the Darfur issue alone and Chinese academics’ feedback that research funds increased dramatically on matters pertaining to the Darfur issue. 640

In regards to image, if China was sensitive to image concerns, then one would assume that China would be sensitive to signals from groups in which it seeks to be a member. If China was most concerned with its developing world image, then presumably China would pay attention to regional organizations’ or the host states’ views. In contrast, if China was most concerned about signaling its status as a global power, then it would be most sensitive to signals from other great powers at the UN Security Council. One way of realigning with the group is to be cognizant of signals of social opprobrium and pressure for not engaging with appropriate behavior of the

639 Peking University professor and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholars interviews with author, Beijing, December 17, 2011.
640 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar, interview with author, Beijing, December 19, 2011.
group. However, on the Chad issue, China was not put in isolation by either its developing world or great power reference group.

In regards to the great power reference group, in the MINURCAT case, China maintained its neutral position despite the overtures from the United States and the lead state, France, to have China join in diplomatic maneuvers at critical times during the MINURCAT life cycle. Both France and the United States recognized China as key to apply pressure on Chad, because China not only had re-established relations with Chad, but also because China had not ostracized Sudan. In having relations with both parties to the dispute, China was set apart from the P3 members because Beijing had the potential to persuade both parties to come back to negotiations. France and the United States actively tried to engage China for P5-led démarches at two key points for the mission: following the push against N’Djamena by rebel forces in March 2008 and again after Chad withdrew mission consent in February 2010. In both situations, China declined involvement – not necessarily out of principled disagreement, but referring to a preference for direct, bilateral engagement with Chad in March 2008; and while not privately pushing Chad to accept a mandate extension in February 2010, China did not privately nor publicly advocate on behalf of Chad, despite N’Djamena’s request of support from Beijing. Key to both these incidences is that China did not strive to set itself part in opposition to the P3, but sought to show a common position or at least not differ far enough to be seen as difficult. When China did push back, it was careful to do so with other UN Security Council members, including permanent members like Russia.

Moreover, there was no particular signaling from the developing world either calling for a Chinese role in implementing the Chad peacekeeping mission. Over the period of analysis here, China’s main imperative was to maintain positive relations with both Chad and Sudan. As shown in the case study, Chadian consent was touch-and-go at best. Moreover, Sudan was not
enthusiastic for the EUFOR or MINURCAT missions. In the very least, these operations would mean international presence and increased attention on Sudan’s heated border dispute with Chad, potentially putting Sudan under international criticism for its activities; if the peacekeeping operations were capable, it could mean bolstering President Déby’s confidence in tackling Khartoum because of increased security at home. Moreover, establishing a mission was an entrée for sustained UN Security Council interest and the potential for coordinated P5 impositions on not only Chad, but also Sudan. Therefore, there was little support from Sudan for either EUFOR or MINURCAT. With these two states unsupportive of the mission, they were unlikely to try to place opprobrium on China for its lack of overt support and active participation in the MINURCAT operation.

In short, MINURCAT was without genocide debate or the fear of enforced regime change for N’Djamena, and was ultimately made more docile without a political section. Most importantly, there was little consistent international concern for the mission – especially once the United Nations could gain access in Darfur. Therefore, from studying the case, we can infer that without serious reputation nor status gains for China, there was less incentive for Beijing to overcome its barriers to entry to the mission: learning about the complicated politics of UN peacekeeping in Chad; managing the evolving Sino-Chad relationship, where China had a growing role in the oil refinery and infrastructure sectors; and utilizing the new Chinese Embassy in Chad, which was preoccupied with addressing the safety of Chinese nationals just as the MINURCAT project took off.**641** Therefore, the neutral Chinese position and overall lack of interest in deploying assets to

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**641** These barriers to entry were significant enough because China still had to feel its way in addressing local politics in N’Djamena. In an example of what faced Chinese Embassy personnel in N’Djamena after opening in January 2007, in early February 2008, 212 Chinese workers for the oil conglomerate CNPC and other companies were evacuated from Chad to Cameroon, following rebel incursions nearby. Pulling off this feat was a significant move for the Chinese Embassy in Chad, given the lack of infrastructure and that many of the Chinese evacuees were without their travel documentation. It is arguable that Embassy staff were overwhelmed with the broader tasks of securing Chinese nationals in Chad in order to push more communication through to Beijing regarding peacekeeping assets in Chad in support of MINURCAT.
the mission can be in part explained by the lack of reputation and image-based precipitants. The absence of Chinese deployment to Chad implies that geopolitical-material and organizational concerns are not in and of themselves enough to explain China’s motivations to participate in UN peacekeeping mission. Therefore, this case offers support for the theory developed in this dissertation. In sum, the ‘missing’ Chinese deployment to Chad can be inferred in part from the ‘missing’ reputation and image-based precipitants for China in regards to the MINURCAT case.

CHAPTER FIVE: CHINA’S DEPLOYMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN (UNMISS)

INTRODUCTION

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) rebel group gave greater autonomy to the Southern government, guaranteeing a right to self-determination, culminating with a referendum on secession in 2011. South Sudan voted to split from Sudan in 2011. These changes ensured that Chinese foreign policy makers would face difficulties on three fronts. First, South Sudanese peoples would certainly view China’s rhetoric of noninterference in internal Sudanese affairs quite differently, given China’s experience as a staunch diplomatic defender and economic partner of Khartoum. China would have to make concerted efforts with Juba to overcome its negative reputation. Second, China would have to face the economic reality that eighty percent of its economic investment into oil would end up in South Sudan and that this oil would have to travel over Sudanese territory in order to reach processing facilities and ports in the north for market access. Third, China would have to address realignment of its relations with Juba, while not turning its back on Khartoum.

These difficulties put China in a vulnerable position, and managing the political reality of a referendum and the division of Sudan into two countries with separate governments has been no small task for China. Establishing relations with Juba would take serious effort. There would not be a fast rapprochement in the lead up to South Sudanese independence. The primary concern for Beijing is that, in the past, it has had a relationship with Khartoum and the NCP. In particular, China has played a central role in supporting the Bashir government in its conflict with the SPLM/A – the same party that would eventually come to lead the Republic of South Sudan.
Commentators called the division into the two Sudans “one of the biggest diplomatic tests yet” for China. 642

China previously asserted that Sudanese internal conflict was beyond the UN Security Council mandate as a domestic affair. However, with South Sudanese secession, this Chinese position was far less tenable, as the issues that were precisely internal conflicts became inter-state issues. Since the referendum results require China to be proactive on both sides of the Sudanese border, and given its close relationship with Sudan, China was in a delicate position about the start of the UNMISS mission. Therefore, the question remains what incentives were in place for China to act in the case of UNMISS, at a time when China is presumably less reputation sensitive?

This chapter argues that China’s participation in UNMISS can again be explained in part by geopolitical-material and organizational concerns – building a better relationship with Juba would facilitate the flow of Chinese oil from South Sudan – but that understanding the social dimension of China’s concerns is also key to explaining China’s decision to transition its assets to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UNMISS is a Chapter VII state-building mission, with a measure of state consent behind it, with a strong protection of civilians mandate. However, in the case of UNMISS, both China and the lead state, the United States, were likeminded about their goals for the mission to promote South Sudanese stability. Moreover, the Global South, represented by the African Union and League of Arab States’, voiced its support for the referendum and backed the plan for a peacekeeping mission to bolster Juba. In the run up to the South Sudan mission, China was not a headliner state in opposition to UN activity in South Sudan, but framed itself as a cooperative player amongst the UN Security Council and members of the Global South. Therefore, in line with the theory advanced in this dissertation, China’s

deployment is expected for this mission. The chapter first offers some context for Sino-South Sudanese relations, followed by an historical analysis of China’s actions regarding UNMISS.

CONTEXT

**Sino-South Sudanese Relations**

After independence from Great Britain in 1956, Sudan suffered four military coups and two phases of civil war (1956 – 1972 and from 1983 – 2005). The second phase of Sudanese civil war ended with the signing of the CPA in 2005. The CPA sanctioned two separate, yet cooperative government structures: the Khartoum-led Government of National Unity, which had a power-sharing agreement between the NCP and SPLM, and the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan in Juba, which was under SPLM control. The CPA committed both parties to “make unity attractive,” and keep the Sudanese people in one cohesive state, whilst also respecting the South Sudanese right to referendum and therefore, the possibility of independence. The CPA specified that the referendum was to be held in 2011 so as to “confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.” The CPA established wealth- and power-sharing arrangements, election schedules and constitutional reform goals, and also offered a framework for dealing with three key disputed territories: Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan. The CPA came to an end after the South Sudanese referendum and with South Sudanese secession in July 2011. With the rush to independence, many key issues remained unsolved, becoming complicating factors in the process of establishing peace within and between the two Sudans.

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In principle, the CPA created a politically acceptable space for relations to develop between the SPLM and China. The CPA provided an entry point for China to engage the SPLM directly and officially, as it legitimized the rebels who were transformed into a political party working within a governmental framework, therefore validating the context within which China communicated with the SPLM. Despite the formalization of an uneasy peace between the Northern and Southern Sudanese, China still needed to hedge its bets regarding a possible secession of the Southern state. Therefore, despite China’s original position to support the CPA clause of “making unity attractive,” as it became clear that the referendum was moving forward, and that the uneasy unity the vote would most likely lead to Southern secession, China chose to support the goal of a legitimate referendum and the termination of the CPA, ultimately favoring stability in the Sudanese territories.

Supporting the legitimate referendum process was not sufficient, however. China also faced significant vulnerability after the referendum. Most of the Chinese oilfields are located in the southern area of Sudan, or in the contested border areas straddling the two countries. Moreover, the current Sudanese oil-processing infrastructure is firmly within Sudanese territory and the only viable pipeline is through Sudan. Therefore, the gradual diversification of China’s relations to beyond that of just Khartoum and to building relations with the Government of South Sudan was an economic necessity. There was a need to hedge China’s position by establishing some type of relationship with the Government of Southern Sudan, just in case the referendum results called for a separate state.

While the task was clear, it was not an easy one to implement. As Daniel Large points out, it took almost two and a half years after the signing of the CPA for relations between the SPLM and China to begin, with the impending referendum being the catalyst for increased contact. This was not say that the SPLM did not invest significant effort reaching out to China and other key
players for the South. Analysts note that the SPLM started as early as 2004 in their quest to gain Chinese recognition. Then-SPLM leader John Garang had concluded the South Sudanese position would be in part dependent upon Chinese support and influence, given China’s twin authorities of veto power at the UN Security Council and close relations with Sudan. These two facts meant China had the potential to slow or even derail the South’s chances of secession. China’s initial focus was to respect Khartoum’s wishes and avoid direct relations with South Sudanese factions. Thus SPLM officials had to send a concerted message to encourage China to accept the referendum as inevitable and secure Chinese recognition for the likely outcome of a Southern Sudanese state. These messages consistently highlighted the economic implications for Beijing should the referendum take place, as they were well aware of Chinese concerns over a potential partition of Sudan and implications for Chinese economic investments there.

During Salva Kiir’s first friendship visit to Beijing in March 2005, as Vice President of South Sudan, he led a SPLM delegation to meet with relatively junior Chinese officials. Despite the lack of importance accorded to the visit by the Chinese authorities, such a move was still seen as a positive opening for Sino-SPLM relations by SPLM officials. Returning in July 2005 as the Vice-President of Sudan and President of the regional government in the south, President Kiir met with Chinese President Hu Jintao. President Kiir visited Beijing again in February 2007, using his new position to take a direct approach with his Chinese counterparts. According to sources, “Kiir and company brought a copy of the oil map and a copy of the CPA’s Machako protocol guaranteeing the South’s right to secede. He put the two documents on the table and

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said, ‘you figure it out’.

648 This meeting is noted to be the “genuine political breakthrough,” where Kiir was able to meet with top leaders in China to discuss core concerns of the South Sudanese state. 649 Kiir met with President Hu again in Beijing in July 2007, where he and his delegation repeated that the impending outcome of the referendum would be secession, and that the geographic distribution of oil assets would mean that the China would eventually have to work with Juba. During the July meetings, CCP officials invited the SPLM to establish party-to-party relations. SPLM officials welcomed the overture, seeing it as an opportunity “to ensure efficient development and management of oil resources to the benefit of the Sudanese people.”

650 After the February 2007 visit to Beijing by President Kiir, the contact between China and the SPLM carried on apace. China contacted the SPLM/A leadership as they were in regional government positions in the then-Southern capital, Juba. Given that the SPLM was part of the central Government of National Unity, China could still hold to its line of political non-interference while also engaging South Sudanese officials. China approached South Sudanese national and regional officials through two political tracks: political parties and government ministries. South Sudan has a similar political structure as China in which the state is dominated by a single political party. Therefore, presenting the opportunity for the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party to liaise with South Sudanese officials, mainly through SPLM/state training for officials and a CCP-SPLM dialogue. At the same time, China engaged South Sudan through state-led government ministries.

After visiting Khartoum, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun visited Juba in September 2008 to officially open the Chinese consulate, “creating good relationships between governments of China and South Sudan.” During his visit, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai met with South Sudanese officials, Chinese business leaders and members of the Chinese contingent to the UNMIS peacekeeping force. During his meeting with Sudanese officials, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai also “urged Sudanese government officials to focus more on economic development in South Sudan, warning that people in the South will vote for independence in the 2011 referendum if they do not enjoy the dividends of peace.” In June 2009 Special Representative for African Affairs Ambassador Liu Guijin met with South Sudanese officials, including SPLM Deputy Chairman and Governor of Blue Nile State Malik Aqqar and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, in Washington, DC, on the sidelines of the Forum for Support of the CPA. In December of that year, China dispatched the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General of the Department of Western Asian and Northern African Affairs Song Aiguo to visit Juba and meet with Vice President of Southern Sudan Riek Machar, Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, and Acting Undersecretary of Ministry of Regional Cooperation in Juba Beatrice Khamisa Wani.

China also broadened its relationship with the South through aid projects, including infrastructure construction in hydropower and road networks. In April 2009, the Chinese Consulate in Juba donated $100,000 to the Government of South Sudan. These state-led efforts were followed by increased investment in South Sudan, to include commercial engagement – with construction

651 “Sudan: Chinese official arrives southern capital to open consulate,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, September 1, 2008.
firms and services moving in to handle the Chinese contracts. China gave a $3M grant at the end of 2009 towards holding the referendum.\textsuperscript{655}

As a further signal of China’s reconsideration of relations, China made a point to reach out to US officials also. By 2009, Chinese officials were already emphasizing their like-minded approach with US officials to promote South Sudanese stability. When Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration met with Special Representative Liu Guijin, Liu made four key points. First, that both China and the US shared common goals, including the goal of a “stable, peaceful, and secure situation in the region.”\textsuperscript{656} Second, that China was pushing for the CPA to be implemented “whether conditions were ideal or not.” Third, Ambassador Liu recognized that the problems of South Sudan were of “growing importance to China as evidenced by the recent opening of the Chinese consulate in Juba.” Last, Ambassador Liu noted Chinese concern that for the referendum to be accepted, it “would depend on the credibility of the referendum.”

In reciprocation, South Sudan dispatched the Chairperson of the Special Committee of Development, Economy and Finance of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly Barry Wanji to Beijing in November 2008. A year later, in December 2009, Juba’s Presidential Advisor on Diplomatic Affairs Lieutenant General Alfred Ladu Gore visited China, meeting with Minister of the International Department of CPC Central Committee Wang Jiarui and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun.

The following section details how the UNMISS mission came together and what role China played in mandating and deploying to the mission.


\textsuperscript{656} “PRC/Sudan: PRC Special Representative For Darfur Stresses Common Goals With the United States,” Wikileaks Cable 09BEIJING1388 (accessed May 21, 2012); available from http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BEIJING1388&q=south%20sudan.
**HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S POSITION vis-à-vis SOUTH SUDAN**

<table>
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<th>UNSCR</th>
<th>Resolution Intent</th>
<th>China’s vote</th>
<th>Votes cast the same as China</th>
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<td>July 8, 2011</td>
<td>- Mandated UNMISS, under Chapter VII, to</td>
<td>Unanimous yes vote by UNSC</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>July 11, 2011</td>
<td>- Liquidated UNMIS</td>
<td>Unanimous yes vote by UNSC</td>
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*Table 3: Key UN Security Council Resolutions on the South Sudan issue*

**January 2010 – March 2011: Run-up to the Referendum and Secession of South Sudan, Gradual Readjustment of Chinese Foreign Relations with Juba and Khartoum**

As outlined in the CPA, the Southern Sudanese people were expected to vote by January 2011 on whether their region should remain within Sudan or whether it should separate to create an independent state. However, with increasing bellicosity between the SPLM and the NCP; pending legal rulings on which territories would be able to vote at what time, and massive logistical hurdles of actually staging a vote, it looked like the referendum was in danger of falling off schedule completely. Practical issues aside, because it was widely predicted that the Southern Sudanese would vote for secession, there were significant concerns that President Bashir would impede the referendum.

Though China was initially in favor of making the unity of Sudan attractive to all the Sudanese peoples as enshrined in the CPA, by early 2010, China had already started applying steady pressure publicly and privately to Sudan to keep its original commitment to the CPA and hold the referendum. In March 2010, Special Representative on African Affairs Ambassador Liu Guijin, visited Southern Sudan to meet with President Salva Kiir and Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, in order to underscore China’s support for the referendum. In order to reconcile the nuances of China’s evolving position, China was careful to explain that its emphasis

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658 “Chinese envoy affirms government’s support to ‘upcoming elections’ in Sudan,” *Sudan Vision*, March 2, 2010; “China affirms support for holding South Sudan referendum on time – envoy,” SUNA news agency in Khartoum, July 4, 2010 via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
was on respecting the will of the Sudanese people and striving for stability in the Sudanese territories: as Vice President Xi Jinping explained, “no matter what results the referendum… the top priority lay in maintaining peace and stability in Sudan and the region…”

At his inauguration at the end of May 2010, President Bashir made sure to emphasize his support for the referendum, and China was the only non-African country to send a senior official to witness the inauguration speech. This speech and the preceding election were very important in supporting the South Sudanese referendum, as it was feared that President Bashir would use his electoral canvass to attack and condemn the referendum. Therefore, President Bashir’s speech is of historic importance, as it indicated Sudanese commitment to a fair referendum. Special Envoy for Darfur, Liu Guijin, visited Sudan for five days in July 2010. Amongst the topics on his agenda, Liu held private discussions on the referendum and publicly called upon both the parties of the CPA to stay on course for the referendum. Sudan dispatched its Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Karti to visit China in mid-September 2010 to meet with his counterpart Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping.

Chinese activities were part of a broader political context, with the SPLM leadership building international support for a fait accompli of South Sudanese secession. Fears that one election delay could turn into multiple election delays, as had been the case for other territorial secession cases, South Sudan kept up the drumbeat for the referendum. By mid-June 2010, the SPLM leadership was publicizing support from both France and the United Kingdom for an independent South Sudan by way of referendum, and that further individual meetings were scheduled with

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660 President Bashir’s was broadcast live on Sudanese national television on May 27, 2010. A transcript of the speech is available through BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, dated May 29, 2010.
661 Fayez el-Zaki Hassan, “Chinese special envoy to Darfur concludes visit to Sudan,” Xinhua, July 7, 2010.
China and the United States, and also rotating UN Security Council members Turkey, Brazil and Uganda to gauge their support for South Sudanese secession. By June 27, 2010, Secretary-General of the SPLM and Minister of Peace and CPA Implementation Pagan Amum said that he “had pledges from the UN Security Council, especially from China to respect the choice of the people of southern Sudan on either separation or unity.”

Elevating the pressure, US President Barack Obama visited UN Headquarters in September 24, 2010 during ministerial meetings on Sudan, in order to give further impetus to Khartoum to hold the referendum on time. President Obama also met with key UN players on the sidelines, including China. A key goal for the US administration was to ensure that wholehearted support for the referendum was shared by the international community, and not perceived as a US-only initiative. President Obama noted that, "Ultimately only Sudanese leaders can ensure the referendum goes forward.”

The Arab League also made its position clear, insisting that the referendum to be held on schedule, arranging a special ministerial committee to discuss Sudanese affairs, especially arrangements on the South Sudanese referendum. In early October 2010, with just over three months to the actual referendum vote, US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice and UK Ambassador to the United Nations Sir Mark Lyall Grant led all the UN Security Council

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666 Meetings were also held with the Arab League, Russia, UN/AU mediation leads; African states (Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya, Uganda), the P3, Norway, and also the SPLM leader Salva Kiir and Sudanese Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. For more detail see, "International round table over Sudan" Sudan Vision, September 18, 2010.
668 “Arab League ministerial meeting to discuss South Sudan referendum arrangements,” SUNA news agency in Khartoum, September 13, 2010 via BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, dated September 13, 2010.
members to visit Sudan in order to deliver a formal message from the international community that Sudan should accept holding the referendum on time.\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{Letter dated 4 October 2010 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General}, S/2010/509 (4 October 2010); “UN envoys worried about Sudan violence,” \textit{AFP}, October 5, 2010. For the record of the briefing of the Security Council’s visit, see UN Security Council, “Security Council mission: Briefing by the Security Council mission to Africa (4 – 10 October 2010),” UN Document S/PV.6397 (14 October 2010).}

With the British taking on the UN Security Council Presidency in the fall of 2010, the South Sudan issue was once again elevated to the top of concern. With lobbying from South Sudanese groups, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague chaired an open meeting at the UN Security Council regarding the future of South Sudan. On November 16, 2010, coordination between the P3 led Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and French Minister of State Alain Jupeé to join the discussions regarding the future of Sudan and specifically the preparations for the referendum. South Sudan took a seat during UN Security Council meetings, where it was agreed that the referendum should take place on time. A Presidential Statement was issued that afternoon, affirming that the outstanding issues of the CPA, including the referendum for South Sudan, should be held on time and that the Security Council remained ready to support that process.\footnote{UN Security Council Official Records, S/PRST/2010/24 (16 November 2010).}

During the November 16 meeting, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Li Baodong noted “China supports the presidential statement that has been adopted by the Council (S/PRST/2010/24). We hope the contents of the statement will be implemented comprehensively.”\footnote{UN Security Council, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” UN Document S/PV.6425 (16 November 2010).} Ambassador Li went on to emphasize “the international community to create favorable conditions for the referendum, but not prejudge its outcome.” A similar Presidential Statement was made again in mid-December 2010, affirming again the support to the parties of the CPA ahead of the Southern referendum.\footnote{UN Security Council Official Records, S/PRST/2010/28 (16 December 2010).}
China stepped up its commitments to the referendum, accepting an invitation from both Khartoum and Juba to dispatch an observer mission to the referendum and bestowing the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission $500,000, along with referendum-related materials. Unlike its behavior on either the Darfur or Chad issues, China framed its role in Sudan as working diligently within the international community. Chinese Deputy Representative to the United Nations Wang Min noted China’s desire to "work together with the international community and the parties concerned to continue to play an active and constructive role in promoting the long-term peace, stability and development of Sudan." Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei noted that "China hopes the referendum will be held in an atmosphere of justice, freedom, transparency and peace..." and in announcing the deployment of the Chinese observers, Hong Lei noted that "China will work with the international community and continuously play a positive and constructive role in promoting peace, stability and development in Sudan and this region at large..."

What explains the move from China’s conservative position of staying within the CPA to respecting the wishes of the South Sudanese people during their referendum? In fact, analysts asserted that China had a “natural preference for unity” over the fragmentation of the one Sudan into two, and interviews reveal South Sudanese concerns that China would provide diplomatic cover for Khartoum to drag its feet on the actual vote. However, China instead recognized that a peaceful, credible and smooth referendum voting was indeed in China’s favour.

and that the referendum should go forward in order to achieve a peaceful political outcome.

Chinese Ambassador to Sudan Li Chengwen explained his position succinctly

China's concern over the referendum conforms to the interest of the international community… No one would benefit from chaos of Sudan. Maintaining peace and stability of the Africa's largest country should be a consensus and common goal of both sides of Sudan and the international community… Whatever outcome the referendum turns out, China will continue its cooperation with Sudan's south…”  

In terms of bilateral relations with South Sudan in the pre-referendum period, in September 2010, South Sudanese officials at the minister/state governor level took part in agricultural, infrastructure and oil sector development discussions with Chinese officials. The following month, the director-general of the CCP international department Du Yanling, led the first party delegation to Juba, with a focus on discussing the same three sectors for economic cooperation. These meetings were part of a steady flow of contact between Beijing and Juba.

The referendum was scheduled for 9 through 15 January, 2011. On January 25, 2011, President Bashir pledged to recognize the election results. The elections were declared free and fair on February 7, 2011, with overwhelming support for a separation of South Sudan from Sudan. China responded that it respected the referendum results on February 8, 2011, welcoming the United Nations report of a “timely, fair, peaceful, credible” referendum. President Hu Jintao promptly called Juba to congratulate the arrival of the new nation on its founding day. The Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on February 9, 2011, welcoming the referendum

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results and calling for support for all the Sudanese peoples. In an open discussion about the referendum, China made only a short commentary, noting “China respects the will and choice of the Sudanese...” and recognizing that “[the] African Union (AU) is a major strategic partner of the United Nations in addressing the issue of the Sudan.” Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhaijun visited Juba in February 2011, delivering a message of diplomatic support in Sino-South Sudanese diplomatic relations, while also pushing for greater clarity on oil investments. In March 2011, Director-General Du Yanling returned to Juba, continuing party-to-party relations with the SPLM, inviting the SPLM leadership on an exchange to Beijing. On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became independent, and five days later, South Sudan joined the UN General Assembly. China signed a joint communiqué with Juba after the referendum, establishing formal relations and promoting the Chinese consulate to an embassy.

With the recognition of Southern Sudan, there was a shift in Chinese activity, in which China did attempt to build relations with Juba, even at some cost of relations with Khartoum. In a telling example, during its rotating presidency of the UN Security Council, China called a closed meeting of the UN Security Council for March 21, 2011 in response to a letter from the Government of South Sudan dated March 12, 2011, which alleged Khartoum’s support for militias inside Southern Sudan. Sudan worked hard to persuade China to call off the meeting. First, Sudanese officials asserted that such a meeting would bias the preparations towards a planned joint investigation into South Sudanese claims, and therefore the meeting should be canceled. When Chinese officials responded that the meeting must continue, Sudan then argued that the meeting should go forward without representation of either Sudan or South Sudan –

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thereby preventing South Sudan from airing its concerns on the record. China refused to reschedule the meeting. In the end, the meeting was attended by all UN Security Council members, the Governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan and DPKO officials and China allowed for an extended briefing from DPKO Assistant Secretary General Atul Khare, followed by a detailed statement of the claims from South Sudanese Minister for Peace and CPA Implementation Pagan Amum.

When Sudan took to the floor, its officials chose to “express… strong regret directly to the President of the Council” for calling the meeting, before pointing out the support that Sudan had thrown behind the CPA process and its own interests in supporting a strong South Sudan. Both the United States and the United Kingdom statements were coordinated in advance to send a balanced message to both parties about backing military proxies, while chiding both parties for restricting the movements of UNMIS. Russia commented that the Council would need to reflect on the South’s request for an ongoing UN presence in South Sudan, while still being mindful of the needs of the “Sudanese parties” – which those present saw as a reference to Russian sympathies for Khartoum’s interests in the debate on a possible new mission. China made its formal comments last, noting that Beijing was “deeply concerned” by recent events.

Though allowing the meeting to go forward, the Chinese commentary was careful to avoid apportioning blame on either Sudan or South Sudan. Instead China emphasized that the complete implementation of the CPA was the key to peace and stability in Sudan, and that all parties were to put mutual confidence and mutual commitments at the heart of their efforts towards a lasting peace. The meeting closed with responses from Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Atul Khare, His Excellency Amum and Permanent Representative Osman. Sudan tried one more time to cut short the process of the meeting, negotiating with the Chinese representatives to stop the meeting early, so neither Sudan nor South Sudan could respond to the
Security Council commentary. China refused the Sudanese request, and asked both parties to respond to the statements of the meeting. The Southern Sudanese welcomed UN support for the investigation into the alleged events. Sudan, however, complained that the meeting was a waste of time. This inflection point is important, as it shows China was willing, in a ‘semi-public’ forum, to signal that its interests were not as closely aligned to Sudan’s as perhaps other UN Security Council members assumed. From interviews of those present at the meeting and after, it is noted that Pagan Amum was very pleased with the outcome – from his perspective, getting China (the North’s supposed ally) to call a meeting despite strong objections from Khartoum was a massive diplomatic victory in itself.685

This initial thirteen-month period finds Chinese foreign policy in a period of readjustment, as Beijing steadily promoted its relationship with South Sudan, while still balancing relations with Sudan. Significantly, China called for respect of the South Sudanese people’s choice regarding the referendum, which in and of itself signaled that China was not as closely aligned to Sudanese interests as had been assumed. At the same time, China stuck to a conservative approach, focused on the theme of supporting both Sudans to resolve their internal differences amongst themselves. China was also cautious to be evenly critical: condemning each party’s human rights record instead of simply noting the failings of Sudan.

**April 2011 – July 2011: Sudan Rejects the Extension of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)**

With the tensions and sporadic violence against Sudan, South Sudan recognized that peace and security would still be a problem for their fledgling state, and therefore South Sudan would need a UN peacekeeping mission to bolster its security. South Sudan’s original request was for the United Nations to dispatch a traditional peacekeeping mission, placing peacekeepers to monitor

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the North-South border areas, which were still disputed. However, the UN Secretariat replied that a monitoring mission would be too difficult to do competently, on the assumption it would be impossible to get Sudanese consent. The United Nations’ preference was instead to strengthen South Sudan domestically, extending the government presence outside of Juba. The effects of the most recent phase of twenty-two years of civil war, exacerbated by secession, meant that only some of the most basic living needs could be met by the South Sudanese state; large sections of the country were without South Sudanese presence. Goodwill and referendum euphoria aside, there were serious concerns that the new state that emerged from Sudan – itself ranked as 154 out of 162 states of the 2010 Human Development Index – would not be able to function on its own.

The United Nations started its integrated mission planning process, dispatching an assessment mission to visit Southern Sudan from February 16 through the end of March 2011. This planning mission was on the ground for much longer than the customary technical assessment mission’s in-and-out visits, indicating how important and daunting the task of addressing peace and security within South Sudan would be. The Integrated Technical Assessment and Operational Planning Team (ITAPT) completed its report of Juba’s concerns and submitted it for review by the Secretariat for March 31, 2011. The ITAPT purposely did not consider a role for the United Nations peacekeeping mission in handling outstanding concerns of the CPA. Instead, the team focused on the configuration of a future UN Operation for Peace Consolidation in South Sudan (UNPACSS), which would help South Sudan become a fully capable state, while still respecting its sovereignty. In order to complete its report, the ITAPT met with senior South Sudanese officials, NGOs and also leading players for South Sudan’s future: the African Union, European Union, the Quartet (France, Norway, the United Kingdom and the US), the World Bank, regional powers (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda) and emerging players – already noted by South Sudan to be important for its future security and development – Japan and China. The ITAPT report
contained three separate military options to backstop the main focus of the statebuilding peacekeeping mission:

- monitoring and liaison function, relying primarily on the United Nations’ normative authority and placing all protection responsibilities on Juba;
- mobile response function, with a visible military presence of 6,500 troops in high-risk areas to deter or mitigate the escalation of conflict,
- nationwide presence, which would place 12,000 troops on a ‘protection by presence’ role with extensive security patrols in hot-spot areas and rapid reaction capabilities.

The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee reviewed the ITAPT recommendations for a potential UN presence, and publicly shared the Secretary-General’s recommendations in his May 2011 report.

The Secretary-General’s Report of May 2011 noted that South Sudanese officials had already requested a follow-on UN mission for South Sudan. The Secretary-General noted that insecurity had led to over 116,000 internally displaced persons in South Sudan in 2011 alone, and therefore argued that the mission’s deployment should be linked to the elections on a four-year mandated horizon, with a yearly review. The Secretary-General then proposed following the second option outlined in the IATPT report: a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a distinctly politically mandate under Chapter VI with tasks including good offices and support for peace consolidation, security sector reform, establishment of the rule of law, and protection of civilians.

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687 UN Security Council, *Special report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan*, S/2011/314* (17 May 2011); paragraph 33; paragraph 40.
The UN peacekeepers would still work under the principle of deterrence. However, if deterrence failed and the Government of South Sudan itself was unable to provide security, then the Secretary-General recommended “the use of force as a last resort to protect civilians in imminent threat of physical danger within its area of deployment and capability.” The Secretary-General also put forward strong language regarding Chapter VII provisions: “to provide, within capabilities, physical protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical danger, including through the use of force as a last resort when Government security services are unable to provide such security.”

The peacekeeping mission was to rely on an early warning system, with reach-back to the Joint Operations Centre and Joint Mission Analysis Centre at Headquarters. With these recommendations, the Secretary-General proposed a 7000-strong military presence, in mainly static formations, so as to respect Juba’s sovereignty. Of those military assets, 850 enabler troops would also be included to address the airfield and road requirements. When required, expeditionary troops and air support would be used.

The Secretary-General retitled UNPACSS as the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). To facilitate the arrival of the UNMISS mission, the Secretary-General asked for the dispatch of an advance team of senior managers who would set up the core of the mission by July 9, and a three-month technical rollover of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) from July 9 through October 9, 2011. July 9 was the specified date because that was the scheduled close for UNMIS, which was an UN peacekeeping operation mainly designed to support the implementation of the CPA, amongst other stability promoting tasks in Sudan. The technical rollover would provide Juba and Khartoum a window of time to work towards settlement of outstanding issues regarding the

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689 UN Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2011/314* (17 May 2011), paragraph 41r.
CPA, thereby creating better conditions for the forthcoming mission, while also allowing time for any assets to be re-hatted from UNMIS to UNMISS.

Sudan however rejected any extension of UNMIS. In their view, Khartoum “has candidly, and in a transparent manner, worked with all partiers to honour its commitments” to fully implement the CPA. UNMIS was established in 2005 to ensure its signatories’ compliance with the CPA. From Khartoum’s perspective, the CPA was now finished with the peacefully-held referendum for the South Sudanese peoples and questions about the positioning of the Blue Nile State and South Kordofan state were internal issues, not areas in which the United Nations should engage.

Therefore, Khartoum declared its decision to terminate the UNMIS presence from July 9, 2011 with the UNMIS mandate expired per UN Security Council Resolution 1978. What Sudan neglected to mention was that there had been a decisive change in Khartoum’s geopolitical power, when it took the main town in the disputed region of Abyei on May 20, 2011, solidifying its grip on the disputed region. Both Sudan and South Sudan also claim rights to Abyei, an area that is to the north of South Sudanese Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Unity States, ringed by oil fields. Though the South Sudanese referendum vote did occur, President Bashir prevented a referendum on the status of Abyei. President Bashir first refused the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission and would not acknowledge the authorities of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague; he later prevented the Abyei referendum from taking place. From President Bashir’s perspective, allowing Abyei to take its vote and most likely leave Sudan, would set a precedent for other Sudanese states to push for greater autonomy from Khartoum.

An SPLA-led attack on Khartoum’s forces in the area led to retaliation by Khartoum, taking

Abyei in May 2011. Sudan’s military claim to Abyei led to worries that Sudan and South Sudan could relapse into war. With this rump prize for having acquiesced to the referendum results, and giving up over a third of its original territory, Sudan had no need for a UN mission within its territory, where the UN presence would have meant human rights monitoring and reports on military movements along the disputed areas with the South. In an indication of the UN Security Council’s lack of unanimity, it wasn’t until early June that the Security Council finally issued a Presidential Statement condemning the Sudanese “military control over the Abyei Area” and the “resulting displacement of tens of thousands of residents of Abyei.”

With Sudan’s rejection of an extension, the Secretariat focused on a separate peacekeeping mission for South Sudan alone, dropping any reference to personnel in hot spot areas, typically found in the border areas with Sudan. The UN was left with the default of backing the only option put forward in the May 2011 Secretary-General Report, promoting the Secretariat’s endorsement of UNMISS with a 7,000-strong military force, focusing on internal statebuilding issues for Southern Sudan, but leaving the lightning rod issues of disputed areas – to include control of Abyei, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Jonglei – as external problems beyond the UNMISS mandate. South Sudan responded with two statements to the Security Council, expressing support for the Secretariat-proposed mission but also asking for border monitoring by the United Nations.

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Again, China monitored its relationship between South Sudan and Sudan, while at the same time showing its commitments to these states over that of alignment with the P3. At the end of Germany’s rotation of the UNSC Presidency in July 2011, the United States attempted to get a presidential statement regarding Sudan’s actions in the disputed territories, personally naming President Bashir as responsible for Sudanese attacks in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. Both China and Russia joined together to scupper the draft outright, refusing to give negative comment on President Bashir’s actions, signaling limits to China’s willingness to criticize Sudan.

However, China did depart from its standard line of non-interference, in pushing both Sudans to “adhere to peace and restrain themselves to solve their divergence through negotiations… on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement…” Special Envoy for Africa, Ambassador Liu Guijin also noted that China was pressuring both Sudans to end the outbreak of violence, which threatened the fragile peace agreement. Besides bilateral issues, President Hu discussed Chinese concerns vis-à-vis the Sudans during President Bashir’s end of June visit to Beijing, including guarantees that Chinese oil concessions could run smoothly and that outstanding CPA issues would be addressed peacefully by Khartoum and Juba. Observers saw this as a departure from China’s reluctance to publicly dock Khartoum for its actions regarding the South.

697 “Commentary reviews confrontation between Sudan, UN,” The Citizen, August 18, 2011.
**July 2011: Establishing UNMISS with UNSCR 1996**

Taking into account the Secretary-General’s recommendations, the United States led the effort to draft a mandate for UNMISS. Recalling the mainly bumpy experience of working with China regarding UNAMID, when it came to the potential peacekeeping mission for South Sudan, the P3 wrote most of the new mandate amongst themselves, purposely only approaching Chinese officials to discuss mandate issues at the conceptual level and circulating the draft mandate to China as few times as possible. The large, progressive mandate expressed in the United States-drafted resolution still faced downward pressures from the Europeans to reduce commitments, with the UK and France focusing on “efficiency” issues, (i.e. how to have a lower number of peacekeepers complete as large a number of tasks as possible).

On July 8, 2011, the day before South Sudan’s independence, the UN Security Council unanimously passed UN Security Council Resolution 1996, establishing the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The draft mandate was written by a collection of the P3 and Gabon, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa – representing a body of concerned states reaching from traditional powers to the Global South and to rising states. Mandated under Chapter VII, recognizing conditions in South Sudan as a threat to international peace and security, UNMISS is a one-year mission, with the option to renew the mandate, with clear and ambitious priorities. The UNMISS focus is at the county-level and includes an early warning system, infrastructure development and local capacity building, as part of a broad and progressive mandate for peacebuilding. UNMISS is split between three areas: peacebuilding, protection, and military-building. UNMISS tasks included supporting Juba “to govern effectively and dramatically” and “foster longer-term state-building and economic development” by offering advice and support on protection, political transition, governance, establishing state authority and constitutional development. In order to complete such an ambitious agenda, UNMISS has an authorized force...

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of 7,000 military personnel and 900-strong civilian and police units combined, most of which would be drawn from the 10,500 peacekeepers then deployed in Sudan under UNMIS. Because of Sudan’s refusal to allow peacekeeping assets in its territory, about 2,500 of the stationed peacekeepers on the northern side planned for withdrawal.

Despite the fact that South Sudan requested the UN mission, the UNMISS mandate was still placed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. South Sudan started belatedly trying to move the mission to under Chapter VI authorities in early July, after recognizing that a Chapter VII could imply that UN authorities could supersede Juba. However, by then it was too late for the text to be moved. The mandate was framed under Chapter VII authorities because the penholder, the United States was under quite significant pressure from human rights watchdogs and advocacy groups concerned that the South Sudanese who ‘made the mistake’ of supporting the North could be victimized by their own government. Therefore, this powerful mandate allowed the UN mission to stand up to South Sudan if the circumstances so required it.

With Sudan’s firm withdrawal of consent for the UNMIS mission, the Security Council cast a unanimous vote on July 11, 2011 to withdraw the mission effective that day. China made no commentary, presumably out of respect of Khartoum’s sovereignty, though the P3 all noted their ‘regret’ in having to support the mission closure and made direct calls to the SPLM and Khartoum to come back to the negotiating table regarding disputes in South Kordofan. When discussing the Secretary-General’s Report on the Sudan, the Chinese Deputy Representative Wang Min emphasized the “deep traditional friendship” between the South Sudanese and Chinese people and the mutual understanding between both nations. He briefly emphasized that China supported the UNMISS mandate, and the work of the good offices of the African Union through the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. However, Deputy Representative Wang spent time

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stating the “international community should normalize its relations with the Sudan soon so that its people can enjoy peace, dignity and development at an early date,”705 therefore emphasizing the need to focus on Sudan’s needs also.

China continued its focus on behind-the-scenes efforts to protect Khartoum from criticism. Following reports of increasing violence in South Kordofan in June and July 2011, China and Russia again worked together to abort a presidential statement crafted by the United States and the United Kingdom in August of that year, condemning Khartoum for its actions in South Kordofan and calling on the government to cease aerial bombardment.706 Journalists noted that China, India, Lebanon, and Russia all objected to the accuracy of the facts used as the baseline to condemn Khartoum. The United States then withdrew the proposed letter because of the Chinese and Russian opposition. Instead, condemnation of Khartoum’s actions in South Kordofan was passed to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. China, however, did make efforts to communicate with Khartoum that China was “paying attention to the ongoing violence” and was willing to take measures to calm the situation.707

The events in this transitional month-long period underscore China’s commitments to Sudan and China’s reluctance to take on any lead role in this phase of the mission. China did prepare for full diplomatic relations with Juba, dispatching the Director-General of the West Asia and North Africa division in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Song Aiguo to Juba again in July 2011. Chinese Housing and Urban-Rural Construction Minister Jiang Weixin visited Juba in July 2011 marking the establishment of diplomatic relations by representing China during the Independence Day celebrations. China was also the first out of the P5 to visit Juba in a senior official capacity,

706 The Citizen, Juba, in English 18 Aug 11; “Russia, China blocked calls on UNSC to condemn Sudan’s fighting in South Kordofan,” Sudan Tribune, August 13, 2011.
sending Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to visit President Kiir in August 2011, one month after South Sudan’s independence.\textsuperscript{708}

However, China was still relatively quiet on UNMISS, preferring to let the P3 and Norway (known as the Quartet) to take on the initial tranche of communication with Sudan regarding withdrawal of UNMIS and the entry of UNMISS. Moreover, in bilateral meetings with South Sudanese officials, China appeared to have little opinion about the potential of a peacekeeping mission. When South Sudanese officials noted that they would welcome UN Security Council support for a UN presence, Chinese officials “made no direct comment,” instead reiterating that brotherly friendship with Juba as something “important” for the South Sudanese to consider.\textsuperscript{709}

**August 2011 – December 2011: Planning and Deploying the Mission**

Special Representative of the Secretary-General Hilde Frafjord Johnson and an advance team had arrived in South Sudan the day before independence on July 8, 2011.\textsuperscript{710} Along with the arrival of the advance team, over 2000 international and national civilian staff, 203 UN military observers, 64 staff officers and 378 UN police were formally transferred to the UNMISS from UNMIS by the end of July.\textsuperscript{711} On August 8, 2011, Juba and UNMISS signed a status-of-forces agreement, which guaranteed the Mission freedom of movement throughout South Sudanese territory without the need for special permissions.

The UNMISS military structure is as follows: 7,000 troops to include 5,100 armed units in six battalions, with 1,580 enablers supporting the mission (these include staff officers, medical units,

\textsuperscript{708} “China’s foreign minister in first visit to South Sudan,” *BBC*, August 9, 2011.
\textsuperscript{709} Diplomatic advisor, interview with author, New York, April 20, 2012.
engineers, helicopters, communications personnel and MPs), and 165 military liaison officers. By September 2011, the strength of the UNMISS stood at 5,329 soldiers out of the 7,000 troops authorized. The majority of the UN presence was placed in the northern part of South Sudan, reflecting security assessments, with the bulk of the forces coming from India, Mongolia, Nepal, Kenya and Rwanda.

To some extent, the UNMISS mission was ahead of the curve: some of its assets, including headquarters, air and engineering assets, were already on the ground, meaning that the facilities could be upgraded from their regional to headquarters level. Despite having a relatively good balance of forces on the ground at the nascent stages of the peacekeeping mission, UNMISS forces took on a much faster operational tempo than initially expected with deterrence operations in Western Equatoria and the Upper Nile States. Therefore, the force generation process continued, and over 27 countries were approached to contribute to UNMISS by the end of November 2011.

China decided to re-hat the majority of its significant Chinese peacekeeping detachments from UNMIS to UNMISS. China kept its 275-member engineer detachment and a 60-member medical detachment in Wau, which was an UNMIS base upgraded to UNMISS regional headquarters. The bulk of the 350 Chinese peacekeepers in Wau, Western Bahr al Ghazal state work as enabler assets, completing construction, engineering, medical and maintenance of UN and national infrastructure. A few Chinese personnel are in staff positions in mission support units and force headquarters. It is repeatedly noted that the Chinese are vocal about their force protection concerns, and therefore, deploying the majority of their assets in Wau is a solid fit for Beijing. The main violence in these areas is cattle raiding, which is not targeted at UN assets.

712 “Chinese transport teams ends UN mission in South Sudan,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, September 12, 2011.
The liquidation of UNMIS took part in three phases. First, liquidating assets from north of the South Sudanese border; second, liquidating assets from south of border; and third, the transition back to South Sudan altogether.\footnote{It should be noted that the exact border separating Sudan and South Sudan, known by its longitude and latitude demarcation as the 1-1-56 line, is still not formally accepted by either of the Sudans.} Though UN Security Council Resolution 1997 mandated the drawdown for the end of December 2011, Khartoum required all military troops to leave Sudan by the end of August 2011. However, given the complications of working within individual requirements of multiple TCCs, limited aerial evacuation options and the difficulties of coordinating with Khartoum, this created a tight timeline for an UNMIS departure. China elected to repatriate its transportation unit from UNMIS, sending back 100 troops and 58 vehicles. The Chinese transportation unit delayed their repatriation from Wau until early September upon national orders, and ended up repatriating 75 personnel, leaving behind 25 personnel and their contingent owned equipment. Overall military liquidation of UNMIS was completed by the first week of October.

An eruption of SPLM-Sudanese violence in September 2011 led to estimates of an increase of up to 150,000 IDPs and hundreds killed. Sudan took a rebel stronghold in Blue Nile State in November 2011, but not without more scorched earth tactics creating up to 30,000 refugees.\footnote{Simon Martelli, “Sudan army 'captures' key rebel stronghold,” \textit{AFP}, November 3, 2011.} In November 2011, after Sudanese bombings of Yida, a South Sudanese refugee camp well within its territory, the United States tried to push for a Presidential Statement again condemning Sudan for its activities in South Kordofan and Blue Nile State. However, Russia took a firm line that it would only sign off on this statement if the United States also supported a press statement – a much less formal comment from the UN Security Council – condemning Juba for its search and detention of a Russian crew and its helicopter, which had transferred from MINURCAT to
UNMISS. The United States refused to support a press statement wrapping Juba’s knuckles, which gave both China and Russia the grounds to reject the Presidential Statement draft put forward by the United States.

Beyond politics at the UN Security Council, China continued building its bilateral relations with Juba. At the end of the year, commercial delegations from Beijing visited Juba in October and December 2011. These trips included visits from Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Yaoping heading a Chinese trade delegation with senior representatives from construction, engineering, power and telecommunications firms. Bilateral frameworks on trade and technical cooperation issues were signed. Senior member of the CPC’s Politburo visited President Kiir and SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum in January 2012. During this visit, CPC senior member Li Changchun signed off on bilateral agreements regarding capacity-building in the health, oil and water sectors. SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum visited Beijing in October 2011 in order to meet with CPC senior member Li Changchun, furthering discussions on party-to-party cooperation and addressing concerns about Chinese investments treatment under the new regime. At the conclusion of the meetings, Pagan Amum noted "We have given assurances to the Chinese leadership delegation to protect the Chinese investments in southern Sudan, and are desirous to see more investment in the future." SPLM Secretary-General Amum also visited with Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, maintaining pressure for China to assist South Sudan in dealing with its oil concerns.

715 Regarding the transfer of the Russian helicopter unit, see “Sudan; Russia Willing to Assist Country in Obtaining Debt Relief – Envoy,” Sudan Tribune, December 8, 2010. Regarding the detention of the Russian helicopter unit, see “South Sudan security forces briefly detain UN helicopter,” Radio Miraya, November 13, 2011.
718 Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Pagan Amun, Secretary-General of South Sudan’s Ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), October 30, 2011 (accessed May 24, 2012); available at http://ss.chineseembassy.org/eng/sbjw/t871992.htm.
In November 2011, North-South oil negotiations broke down and China intervened to mediate the dispute about the breakdown regarding the oil flows. Special Envoy Liu Guijin was dispatched to both Juba and Khartoum a month later in order to facilitate discussions between the two parties to broker agreements over their oil-related disputes. In this case, it was tangible evidence of Chinese willingness to take a greater role in relations with the Sudans, though it was unclear what options China could put on the table. Negotiations reached deadlock with Sudan’s demand that South Sudan pay transit and treatment fees for its oil that travels through Sudanese pipes and over Sudanese territory. Khartoum calculated by the end of 2011, Juba was in arrears of close to $727 million for 6-months of oil shipments that were transferred through Sudanese installations. Though agreeing to pay the fees, South Sudan balked at the Sudanese charge of up to $36 per barrel. The oil fee discussion reached a boiling point when Sudan not only threatened to close oil pipelines, but also threatened to seize oil without Juba’s permission in lieu of fee payment. Unafraid of brinksmanship, South Sudan responded that it would cease oil production, shutting off oil production of 350,000 barrels a day. As both countries rely on oil revenues for up to 98% of their total state revenues, such a move was drastic for both economies.

January 2012 – May 2012: Sino-South Sudanese Foreign Relations in the Context of UNMISS

In the final phase under study, the peacekeeping mission was no longer the sole focal point in relations between the two countries. For his Secretary-General Report of March 2012, the Secretary General noted that the UNMISS staff had reached 770 international staff, 1386 national staff and 232 UN Volunteers, with 5,028 troops out of the 7,000 troops authorized already.

present. The breakdown was comprised of 3,244 infantry troops, 1,544 enablers and 240 staff and military liaison officers. The Secretary-General specified that in August 2012, battalions from Mongolia, Nepal and Rwanda, and additional troops from Cambodia would replace residual UNMIS troops transferred to UNMISS. Additional engineering companies would come from Japan and the Republic of Korea. In order to handle the staggered repatriation of close to 1,200 troops back to Bangladesh and the rotation of 1,800 Indian troops, existing troop-contributing countries were asked to extend their stays so as to not have a sudden drop in troop numbers. The aim was to get to the mandated troops at maximum capacity in early 2012 and establish country support bases throughout the country, so as to increase the presence of the UN mission.

There were three overarching issues facing China during this last period, spanning Chinese peacekeepers’ security, escalating cross-border tensions, and managing increased cooperation with the United States regarding the Sudans. First, in January 2012, SPLM rebels attacked a Chinese camp, capturing 29 Chinese workers in Sudan’s South Kordofan state, releasing them ten days later. These were the third set of kidnappings of Chinese workers on Sudanese territory since 2004. The kidnappings were widely reported in the Chinese press, putting the spotlight on the government’s solution for saving the workers. China Daily put the kidnappings on the front page of the paper, the Chinese weibo debated the future of these workers and all the official papers had daily updates on the story. Chinese officials noted that "The Chinese embassy has started implementation of the emergency mechanism to follow up the issue and make contacts with the Sudanese authorities in this respect," and that China was pursuing bilateral contacts.

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721 A Chinese worker was shot in October 2011 and five oil company workers were killed in 2008, both episodes also happened in South Kordofan.
with Sudan to work on a solution to the crisis. China dispatched a working group, comprised of officials from government offices including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. China was careful not to chastise Sudan for the incident and the Chinese Ambassador to Sudan noted that this one incident did not characterize the “strong” Sino-Sudanese relationship.

This incident highlighted the lack of government infrastructure in place to support Chinese working in volatile political conditions. In response, Chinese officials announced that "A security unit has also been formed for China's peacekeeping engineers in South Sudan, in accordance with requirements of the United Nations..." These comments fed public interest in what these Chinese assets in South Sudan were doing and fueled speculation that this was the first formal deployment of Chinese combat troops. The Times of London published an article on the Chinese combat troop commitment to South Sudan. However, interviews confirm confusion in the press, as these assets were not ‘combat troops,’ but instead security elements organic to the already deployed Chinese engineering units. Following normal troop contributing country practice, these troops are required to undertake contingency training and internal protection tasks as part of standard military practice (i.e. engineers are tasked with maintaining site security etc.). Therefore, the apparent ‘move’ by Beijing to reshuffle these assets was most likely part of the

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higher profile emphasis of Beijing on safety and security of Chinese abroad. This interpretation is particularly likely when coupled with the Chinese still-non-committal statements about the future use of Chinese combat troops.

A second key issue in the Sino-Sudanese relationship was how to deal with the simmering conflict over oil and the cross-border dispute between the two Sudans. At the end of January 2012, South Sudan shut down its oil sector, amid allegations that the Sudanese were illegally siphoning oil and demanding unreasonably high fees to transport, process and dispatch South Sudanese oil. China responded that oil is “the economic lifeline of both Sudan and South Sudan,” and urged both sides to have calm and focus on African Union-led mediation efforts. China also warned both Sudans to “protect the legitimate rights and interests of relevant Chinese companies…”

Tensions between the two Sudans caused enough concern for the UN Security Council to issue a press statement, urging both parties to “return to talks to address the issues that have fuelled the current conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile” on February 14, 2012. On March 6, 2012, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement, again urging the parties to peacefully reach an understanding on the issues dividing them. Sudan bombed South Sudanese oil wells in March 2012, hitting the consortium partly owned by the Chinese firm Greater Nile Petroleum Company. The UN Security Council again issued a press statement on March 27, 2012, noting that they were “deeply alarmed” by the military clashes in the border regions and the potential for

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full-scale military conflict.\textsuperscript{732} By April 2012, South Sudan accused Sudan of siphoning more than six million barrels of oil over the preceding quarter, and that Khartoum had built a sub-pipeline so as to divert 120,000 barrels of South Sudanese crude to Sudanese refineries. Though Sudan did admit to diverting the oil, it also claimed that the oil was Sudanese and therefore, Sudan was well within its rights to claim its property.\textsuperscript{733} The Sudanese oil sector problems spread to China with the expulsion of the Chinese head of Petrodar, a consortium between China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec and Malaysia’s Petronas. Dr. Liu Yingcai was told he had 72 hours to leave Juba on the charge that Petrodar was in noncompliance with South Sudanese government orders in committing three errors: transferring South Sudanese oil to Sudan, purchasing Sudanese assets using South Sudanese money, and illegally loading South Sudanese crude in Port Sudan. Chinese officials downplayed these accusations and press outlets reported that Petrodar had already tried to alert Juba to the Sudanese oil diversion, therefore complying with South Sudanese policy.\textsuperscript{734}

Relations between Juba and Khartoum continued to weaken. After more clashes along the border areas between the Sudans, Sudan abruptly canceled the long planned April 3 Presidential Summit in Juba. Relations between the two states became increasingly tense with South Sudan seizing the disputed border area of Heglig, near the disputed Abyei area on April 10, 2012. Though a disputed territory, Heglig falls under Sudanese administration and accounts for half of Sudan’s own oil production. The UN Security Council responded by holding a meeting on April 11, with a briefing from Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, on the

\textsuperscript{734} Toh Han Shih, “Crude lesson to be learned for China,” \textit{South China Morning Post}, March 10, 2012.
Secretary-General’s Report on Abyei and the animosity between the two states. Tensions escalated with the Sudanese bombings of Bentiu, the capital of Unity State in South Sudan on April 12, and the Sudanese bombings of Mayom in Unity State, striking an UNMISS logistics base on April 16. The UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement calling for “a complete, immediate, and unconditional” cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of all security forces from Abyei on April 12. The African Union, the European Union, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Secretary-General all issued public statements condemning the violence between the two Sudans. On April 19, 2012, Sudan did not formally declare war on South Sudan, but President Bashir told Sudanese troops to prepare to march to Juba. The following day, South Sudan withdrew from Heglig. Sudan recommenced bombings with an April 23 attack on Bentiu, leading to President Salva Kiir stating that Sudan “had declared war on the Republic of South Sudan.” Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Hilde Johnson, and Head of UNMISS, Haile Menkerios briefed the UN Security Council on April 24, 2012 about Sudanese attacks on South Sudanese territory.

The third key issue for China was increasing cooperation with the United States, while managing its relationship with the Sudans. In mid-March 2012, Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs Zhong Jianhua made his first visit to Sudan and South Sudan. Special Representative Zhong replaced Liu Guijin, having served as China’s Ambassador to South Africa. During his four-day trip, Special Representative Zhong met with senior officials from both states in an effort to maintain Chinese neutrality. During his trip, Special

738 “Sudan's Salva Kiir says Sudan has declared war,” BBC News, April 24, 2012.
Representative Zhong refuted South Sudanese criticism that China was a latecomer in diffusing the tension between Sudan and South Sudan, asserting that “China is always helping to reduce the tension [between Sudan and South Sudan]. I think we are full of confidence to do something together with the international world and other countries here.”

At the end of April 2012, President Salva Kiir visited Beijing, his first visit since the establishment of an independent South Sudan. Though President Kiir cut short his meetings on 26 April, 2012, he did make time to meet with a series of senior officials – a sign of Juba’s elevated diplomatic position – visiting with President Hu; CNPC Chairman Jiang Jiemin; legislator Wu Bangguo, and Deputy Premier Li Keqiang to discuss Sino-Sudanese cooperation on agriculture and infrastructure cooperation. China again emphasized that oil was “the economic lifeline for both countries,” calling on South Sudan and Sudan to recognize that “oil cooperation is consistent with the fundamental interests of both countries. It is also consistent with the interests of Chinese enterprises and their partners.” Upon his departure from Beijing, Kiir had secured agreements for US$8 billion in loans from China for hospitals, hydroelectric dams, roads and universities, amongst other infrastructure development projects. Chinese officials also noted that Special Envoy to Africa Zhong Jianhua would soon make a second visit to Juba and Khartoum, following his March 2012 trip, for further mediation work. Preparations were also made for the South Sudanese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Beijing at the end of May 2012 to further discussion on Sino-South Sudanese cooperation and relations between the two Sudans.

740 President Kiir was due to stay in China through April 28.
742 Vice Premier Li Keqiang Meets with South Sudanese President Kiir April 25, 2012 (accessed May 9, 2012); available from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t926938.htm.
743 “South Sudan's Salva Kiir says Sudan has declared war,” BBC News, April 24, 2012.
It was not however a total victory for South Sudan in Beijing. China deferred Salva Kiir’s request for financing of a pipeline from South Sudanese oilfields to Lamu, Kenya, which would give South Sudan an opportunity to bypass working with Sudan. Reports were unclear if China was indeed “non-committal,” implying that China was hesitant to make a decision, or whether China was indeed “considering” joining Japanese and Indian firms already looking to sign on for the pipeline construction, implying greater Chinese interest in the South Sudanese proposal. Moreover, as soon as Kiir left, Sudanese National Congress Party External Relations Minister Ibrahim Ghandour arrived for an official visit with Beijing – meeting with Politburo Central Committee member Wang Gang, Deputy Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, and CNPC Chairman Jiang Jiemin. During that visit, at the invitation of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Minister Ghandour met with senior Chinese officials to discuss bilateral issues and Sudanese-South Sudanese relations. In what analysts have called a “public relations coup,” Minister Ghandour also took to a current affairs show on television to profile the Sudanese concerns about Juba’s “still behaving with the mentality of a rebel movement” out “just to endanger Sudan.”

As a sign that Sino-South Sudanese relations still had friction, and perhaps in response to the Chinese meetings with Sudanese officials, South Sudan made more public their criticism of China – pointing out that Chinese officials were tardy in coming to address South Sudanese concerns:

746 Wang is a senior CCP member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
748 “Eight billion dollars, a mike and no peace,” Africa-Asia Confidential 5, no. 7 (May 2012): 2.
“They appointed a special envoy who came very late”, excessively cautious: “Their role has not been very active… They definitely need to be more proactive”, and that the Chinese balancing act between Juba and Khartoum was not working: “By trying to move away from Khartoum so as to get closer to South Sudan and trying not to get too close to South Sudan so as not to cause displeasure to Khartoum … neither Khartoum nor Juba will be happy with China”.749

By this point, Special Representative Zhong had also been in touch with U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, Princeton Lyman, also a former Ambassador to South Africa. Both sides were keen to increase the contact between their two states regarding Sudan, as both Presidents Hu and Obama met on the sideline of a non-proliferations summit in Seoul on March 26, 2012. Amongst other topics of discussion, the two presidents reaffirmed that peace and stability between Sudan and South Sudan were common interests of both China and the United States. President Hu underscored that

China and the United States should continue to exert their own influence, support mediation efforts of the international community, the African Union in particular, and encourage Sudan and South Sudan to resolve their outstanding issues through negotiation…750

Others had also decided this was a key issue for Beijing to work on. In the run up to a new UN Security Council Resolution vote on the situation in South Kordofan and what to do regarding Sudan and South Sudan, Arab and African civil society groups and think tanks sent an open letter to the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi ahead of

the Sino-US Security and Economic Dialogue held in Beijing May 3 – 4, 2012.  These organizations called upon the US and China to work together to influence the Sudans to come together and to return to the negotiating table, just as the countries were on the brink of all out war.

In preparation for the US-China Security and Economic Dialogue, Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun and US Special Envoy for Sudan Princeton Lyman met beforehand. During their meetings, Special Envoy Lyman is understood to have urged Chinese officials to consider joining a ‘Contact Group’ for Sudan, along with the United States, Britain, Norway, and perhaps Ethiopia, Qatar, and Turkey. At the Security and Economic Dialogue, the South Sudanese question did come up for discussion, with an agreement reached that both the United States and China would maintain communication and consultation regarding the Sudans, while supporting the full implementation of the UN peacekeeping missions in Sudanese territories and work towards settlement of the outstanding CPA issues. Secretary of State Clinton openly criticized Sudan: “Together we need to keep sending a strong message to the government of Sudan that it must immediately and unconditionally halt all cross-border attacks, particularly its provocative aerial bombardments.” In contrast, Chinese officials refused to apportion blame, calling upon both Sudans to come together in cooperation.

On May 2, 2012, the UN Security Council voted unanimously for Resolution 2046, written under Chapter VII, which threatened sanctions against both Sudan and South Sudan if the two states did  

not cease hostilities and meet three clearly timed benchmarks: 1) within 48-hours the two states were to tell the African Union and the United Nations that they were committed to reducing hostilities; 2) within one week, both states were to activate their border security mechanisms; 3) and within two-weeks they were to enter AU-mediated peace-talks.\textsuperscript{755} It was widely acknowledged that China was uncomfortable with the potential of imposing sanctions on both the Sudans.\textsuperscript{756} However, China chose not to cast an abstention when the vote was called, nor did China threaten to veto the resolution. This was somewhat unexpected because though China has cast less than a dozen vetoes, it has not been unafraid to threaten vetoes in the past, for example when discussing sanctions in the Darfur phase of the conflict, or months earlier regarding coercive activities threatened against Syria. Instead, after diplomatic discussions that were called “substantive but not acrimonious,” China cast a yes vote for the Resolution.\textsuperscript{757}

The Chinese explanation for their vote was detailed three key points: first, that China is “always very cautious about use or threat of sanctions;” second, that China “has all along maintained that the international community should take an objective, impartial and balanced position on Sudan and South Sudan, avoid taking sides or imposing unbalanced pressure on the parties” and last that “China has all along maintained that African issues should be settled by Africa in African ways… Taking into consideration of the AU positions and requests on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan, China voted in favor of Security Council resolution 2046...”\textsuperscript{758} Moreover, Resolution 2046 \textit{threatens} sanctions, but did not actually impose them on either state, so this was a more palatable option for China.

\textsuperscript{756} Michelle Nichols, “Update 2-UN council threatens Sudan, S. Sudan with sanctions,” \textit{Reuters}, May 2, 2012.
\textsuperscript{758} Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong after Adoption of Security Council Resolution on Sudan and South Sudan, May 3, 2012 (accessed May 4, 2012); available from http://ss.chineseembassy.org/eng/sbgx/thybt/t928576.htm.
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING CHINA’S DEPLOYMENT TO UNMISS

This chapter argues that there have been five phases (to date) of the UNMIS/UNMISS peacekeeping mission:

- January 2010 – March 2011, in the run-up to the referendum and the secession of South Sudan;
- April 2011 – July 2011, when Sudan rejected an extension of UNMIS and therefore pushed the UN to consider an alternate peacekeeping plan for the Sudans;
- July 2011, when UNMISS is established with UN Security Council Resolution 1996;
- August 2011 – December 2011, when UNMISS planning and deployment take place;
- January 2012 – April 2012, where Sino-South Sudanese foreign relations develop in the context of UNMISS.

With these five phases of the peacekeeping mission, China overall diplomatic engagement with South Sudan and Sudan has tended towards caution, with China eschewing a high-profile role regarding the situation between the Sudans. Instead, the Chinese experience can be summarized as trying to keep out of the spotlight – calling upon the African Union or the UN Security Council to take the lead regarding the Sudanese situation – while China framed its multilateral efforts as being part of the international community, and focused on realignment in its bilateral relations with Juba, while maintaining relations with Khartoum.

For the most part, Chinese foreign relations did not change dramatically during the lifecycle of the peacekeeping operation. In the first phase of relations during the scheduling of the referendum and after secession, China changed its emphasis from keeping unity attractive to supporting the CPA being held on time and offering swift congratulations to the newly independent South Sudan. This was the only significant shift in Chinese actions. China started its cycle of reaching
out to both states in this period, supplementing its balancing act with another trend: as P3 pressure increased on Sudan, China’s reluctance to persecute Sudan would increase also. For example, as P3 pressure on Sudan increased in July 2011, China resisted P3 pressures, backing Sudan at the expense of a publicly unified UN Security Council, and promoting bilateral relations with both Sudans. China offered no comment on the UNMIS closure, instead reminding the UN Security Council to support Sudan. Again, as P3 pressure on Sudan, China stopped attempts to criticize Khartoum. China deployed the majority of its assets to UNMISS in August 2011, and China tried to mediate between the Sudans as cross-border relations came under increasing strain. Even when Chinese workers came under attack in early 2012, China was careful not to blame either state, turning Beijing’s attention towards working with the United States to address violence in the dispute Abyei region instead.

So what explains China’s deployment to the UNMISS peacekeeping mission? Path dependency is a possible partial answer. Already deployed in Wau, Chinese assets were simply rolled from UNMIS to UNMISS. However, this is still an incomplete explanation as China declined to keep its transportation assets in the field, repatriating those soldiers instead. Geopolitical-material explanations are partial answers also. China has oil concessions and Chinese nationals to protect in South Sudan. The UNMISS state-building agenda should promote the state presence throughout South Sudan, which would in theory promote Juba’s peaceful control and security over its territory. However, the UNMISS operation was not designed or mandated to address the persistent border insecurity between the two states, nor was it designed to address the outstanding referenda over the disputed territories of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. Therefore, the ability of the mission to directly influence security of Chinese assets is still remote – especially as the UNMISS operation is purposely not deployed in flashpoint border areas between South Sudan and Sudan. Equally important, it is a publicly known fact that currently sourced oil reserves are predicted to decline from their peak at the start of 430,000 barrels per day to below 250,000
barrels per day by the close of 2015, with South Sudanese oil output dropping steadily over the next two decades. South Sudan can only rely on its oil sector to fund its economy for a limited period of time because of this oil production decline. More importantly, this means that the relevance of the economic imperative to explain China’s peacekeeping participation may not be as strong as initially assumed in the case of South Sudan.

The case is suggestive of reputational and image factors as being present to explain why China dispatched its assets to the mission. Yet, difficulty remains in parsing out which causal mechanism – reputation or image – was necessarily at play, in part because negative social influence (i.e. social opprobrium for China) is not publicly shown in this still ongoing case.

Turning to the reputation factor first, UNMISS was a chance for Beijing to build stronger relations with Juba. By deploying to UNMISS, Beijing could underscore its commitments to strengthening the South Sudanese state, and perhaps parlay this reputation as a cooperative, supportive actor into some type of preferential treatment with Juba. Though relations with South Sudan are not exactly smooth, there is no definitive indication in the case study to dismiss this explanation altogether.

However, it can also be inferred that China was partially driven by image concerns. This is seen particularly strongly in China’s repeated remarks about conscientiously acting within international community constraints in Beijing’s liaisons with Juba and in China’s largely passive role in working through the UNMISS peacekeeping mission. In this sense, it was well worth it for China to be part of the mission, as UNMISS was supported by both of China’s great power and Global South reference groups. The CPA movement ending the 22-year civil war and birth

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of South Sudan were both significant diplomatic coups for US policymakers, especially against
the backdrop of long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and controversial interventions in Libya. The
United States lead on the UNMISS operation, in close coordination with France and Great
Britain, sent an important signal to China that the UNMISS operation is important to members of
the great powers, the P3.

In terms of the Global South reference group, the African Union regional bloc stands behind its
newest member of South Sudan, through the efforts of the African Union High Level
Implementation Panel, and remains actively supportive of UNMISS. For China to not be seen as
proactive and working within the international community, as part of the peacekeeping operation,
would be a significant loss for Beijing. Therefore, for China, it was best to stay aligned within
these reference groups and be part of the initial deployments to UNMISS.

This is not to say that China was solely driven by image concerns, or that these concerns are
unmoderated by China. Indeed, there were limits to Chinese engagement on the Sudan/South
Sudan issue. For example, China resisted pressuring Sudan at the UN Security Council on at
least three occasions (twice in July 2011, and once in November 2011), partnering with Russia in
behind-the-scenes negotiations at the UN Security Council to scupper statements regarding
Khartoum’s role in fomenting insecurity. These episodes suggest that China still had limits on
the extent that it wanted to be counted as a constant member of the P3, the great power reference
group.

To understand this point requires taking a step back and understanding the larger political context
in which Chinese officials operate. The recent experience of dealing with civil unrest in Libya
and Syria at the UN Security Council, has accentuated China’s concerns about ‘staying on the
right side of history,’ and not being perceived as unfailingly supportive of dictators. However,
Chinese analysts note China’s discomfort in mandating third-party intervention into what China views as Libyan domestic politics; concluding that Western interventionism is still a bridge too far for Beijing.\(^{760}\) Therefore, this skepticism about the validity of incursions against ‘strongmen’ leaders has affected the Chinese approach to handling Khartoum. Sudanese officials assert that their actions against South Sudan are rooted in the logic of the CPA. Because South Sudanese-based rebels refuse to disarm and still fight Khartoum, and because these rebels are backed by Juba, this makes Juba a security concern for Khartoum. In framing Sudanese actions in the context of civil unrest, Khartoum can make a solid appeal to a still intervention-wary China.

Therefore, from this case we can infer that Chinese decisions to deploy to UNMISS were in part due to Chinese reputation and image concerns. However, because of China’s focus on readjusting and balancing relations with both Juba and Khartoum, and with the broader backdrop of UN Security Council interventions into civil unrest in the Middle East, China took a mainly backseat role at the UN Security Council negotiations over the birth of the UNMISS operation. China went as far as supporting Sudan in its ‘semi-public’ role at the UN Security Council, but China went no further in its shielding of Sudan. Any more active a role would have placed China at the intersection of publicly defending Sudanese obstinacy and therefore opposing South Sudan. With Beijing’s goals for South Sudanese stability broadly in line with its great power and Global South reference groups, China could take a lower-profile role at the UN Security Council and minimize any potential for social opprobrium, while still being publicly in support of the UNMISS operation through deployment of Chinese assets.

\(^{760}\) Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, interview with author, Beijing, December 20, 2011. Beijing Foreign Languages University Professor, interview with author, Beijing, December 21, 2011.
Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusion

The preceding dissertation chapters intensively explored China’s activity regarding three related peacekeeping missions in the early twenty-first century, spanning almost a decade-long period. The research question under study here was how to explain why and when China will deploy its assets to UN peacekeeping missions, given China’s well-known hesitancy towards intervention and the use of force. The research is the first comprehensive, theoretically-informed analysis of China’s engagement in the peacekeeping regime. The theoretical innovation of my research is in debunking the popular conception that Chinese deployment is driven by predominantly geopolitical-material and organizational concerns, and illustrating that image – the concern to take actions consistent to self-perception and projected image, therefore belong within a select reference group of states – is a key component in explaining Chinese deployment. These findings contribute to our academic understanding of China as a foreign policy actor, and also provide policy-relevant insights for those working on China-related tasking at the United Nations and elsewhere.

Summary of Within-Case Findings

The UNAMID/Darfur case presents a most likely case for geopolitical-material and organizational explanations being sufficient explanations for China’s deployment. President Bashir of Sudan enjoyed a good political relationship with China; Chinese economic interests and a large overseas working population would suggest national interests for China to protect; lastly, the forthcoming Olympics would imply a need for China to cooperate with the international community, if only to have the reputation as an engaged member of the international community. These explanations all strongly point to an outcome of Chinese deployment to the UNAMID mission in Darfur. However, though China did indeed deploy to the mission, detailed process-tracing shows that China did not respond as strongly to these geopolitical-material and
organizational incentives. Indeed, image factors were important in explaining China’s decision to deploy. Ultimately, the increasing isolation of China from its two key reference groups of major powers (represented by the P5) and the Global South (represented by the African Union), pushed China to deploy to the mission. A second and very interesting finding in this case is that the reference group that mattered the most to China was that of the P3. Once it became clear that China was starting to become isolated from this particular group, China sought to revise its policy prescriptions and push Khartoum to accept a peacekeeping mission.

The MINURCAT/Chad case again presents a most likely case for geopolitical-material and organizational explanations. President Déby was looking to strengthen his relationship with China; the Sino-Chadian economic relationship with Chad was growing, and it was still the Beijing Olympics period – all of these explanations would imply that China would be interested in deploying to the mission, if only to secure its assets within Chadian territory and a positive reputation as a cooperative international actor. However, China did not deploy its troops to Chad, closing the door on the offer after low-level offers of deployment. The key difference in the Chad case was that Chinese image concerns were not triggered – at no point was China isolated from its reference groups, and the reference groups also did not call upon China for more active involvement for the much more low-profile Chad case.

The UNMISS/South Sudan case also presents a most likely case for geopolitical-material and organizational explanations. China’s recalibrating of its relationship to South Sudan, ensured that geopolitical-material and organizational concerns would color Beijing’s decision-making. By deploying to UNMISS, Beijing could underscore its commitments to strengthening the South Sudanese state, and perhaps parlay this reputation as a cooperative, supportive actor into some type of preferential treatment. However, these explanations are still partial answers also. As elaborated in the chapter, the likelihood of UNMISS to directly influence security of Chinese
assets is still remote and the economic imperative of oil revenues may not be as strong given South Sudan’s limited reserves. Again, the case is suggestive of image-related explanations for why China dispatched its assets to UNMISS. China’s repeated remarks about conscientiously acting within the international community in Beijing’s liaisons with Juba are telling indicators of China’s desire to be part of the mission, and therefore part of both its great power and Global South reference groups.

Summary of Cross-Case Findings

This dissertation has three central cross-case findings. First, though China is perceived as a bulwark of traditional state sovereignty, my research uncovers the circumstances in which the drive to act consistently with identity and derived image trumps real politik reputation calculations, encouraging China to go beyond its rhetorical limits in security cooperation. Together these cases are strongly suggestive that geopolitical-material and organizational explanations are at best incomplete accounts for Chinese peacekeeping deployments. Having falsified the complete explanatory power of these two materialist explanations, this dissertation demonstrates that image-related explanations – i.e. the desire to stay within its reference group and gain status as a multilateral security provider is key for Beijing. Second, the dissertation counter-intuitively demonstrates that when challenged to actively cooperate on matters pertaining to international peace and security – China is particularly concerned with garnering positive status markers from its great power peer group, and not necessarily the Global South peer group. This is a curious finding, given that China generally makes considerable efforts separating itself from the P3 on matters of peace and security. Third, my research uncovers that Chinese flexibility on accepting intervention norms is partly shaped by whether these particular incidences are perceived as ‘soft issues’ for China, so that China is susceptible to social influence and therefore accommodating in its policy response.
Therefore, this research indicates how social structures can interact with material conditions to form drivers for China to deploy to a mission. In doing so, these insights do not contradict arguments that material interests are key concerns for states in their peacekeeping practice. Rather, I demonstrate that social concerns are yet another category of concerns that China is aware of and seeks to pursue it is foreign policy activity, and that such social concerns can condition Chinese assessments of deployment decisions. In having established that these concerns are present in least likely cases, it is possible to infer that image could matter to China when it considers other peacekeeping deployments.

**Contributions to Theory**

These dissertation findings make four contributions to the broader International Relations sub-field. First, the cases shed light on China’s role within international institutions, which is still an under-examined area in the study of Chinese foreign policy. In studying China’s actions within the UN peacekeeping regime, we are able to reflect on China’s views, while utilizing new data for empirical study of how Chinese rhetoric does (or does not) inform actual Chinese behavior. Highlighted in the case studies is the process by which peacekeeping missions come together, and from that, inferences about the key variables and causal mechanisms that can assist the evolution of Chinese foreign activities regarding peacekeeping issues, and what interests matter to foreign policy elites as they strategize how best to attain goals in international institutions and beyond. This work joins analyses by Iain Johnston, Samuel Kim and Joel Wuthnow, yet differing in the dissertation’s focus on a security regime that involves deployment of Chinese troops overseas, with the potential for discretion of the use of force under Chapter VII authorities.
A second contribution is that we currently understand that the source of social influence matters in order to determine if backpatting or social opprobrium will have any effect on the target state.\(^{761}\) If the target state does not hold the source of social influence in esteem – as part of a relevant reference group – then we assume that the social influence will have little effect. However, as shown in this dissertation, there is an unclear relationship between the source of the social influence and whether China will be affected by that social influence. China has very vigorously and consistently shown itself to be different and separate from P3-led attempts at intervention, regime change and the use of force. However, as shown in the Darfur/UNAMID case China’s gradual isolation at the United Nations implies that China was still cautious about standing alone, in opposition to not only the Global South, but also to the P3. Therefore, even after robust rhetorical efforts and voting behavior at the UN Security Council, in order to separate itself from the P3 group, China was still most aware about its relationship to the P3. This remark implies a second related point: the relevant reference groups for China are issue-sensitive. Great power led social opprobrium for China’s human rights record may have little effect on Beijing’s decision-making calculus; yet, on select matters of international peace and security, perhaps P3-led social influence can have some impact on China’s thinking.

A third contribution from this dissertation is to join the conversation about what purpose image and status markers can serve as states conduct their foreign affairs. Recent research highlights the role of status markers in relation to conflict.\(^{762}\) However, this dissertation examines to what extent these status concerns can help produce cooperative behavior. These findings indicate that though “China’s status sensitivity appears unparalleled,”\(^{763}\) it is possible for these sensitivities to


be channeled in a direction that promotes multilateralism. In highlighting the conditions for when China may be more flexible – when an issue is a “soft issue” and therefore something Beijing is able to have some policy flexibility and compromise over. As illustrated in the Darfur case, because this peacekeeping debate was a “soft issue” for China, officials could choose to be more flexible in how they addressed Darfur policy. What can be inferred from this particular case study is that soft issues are those that China is susceptible to social influence regarding what Chinese policy should be – i.e. in line with both the Global South and the P3 reference groups to have a UN peacekeeping mission enter Darfur. The implied flexibility is from an implicit hierarchy of foreign policy issues that mattered to China in 2008: successful Olympic Games were paramount to China, as the Games signified China’s arrival and recognition as a great power peer. Therefore issues marring the Games were to be addressed; since Darfur was a lower ranking issue compared to the Olympics, it was a matter that Chinese officials could afford to modify their policy stance.

However, not all foreign policy concerns may be “soft” issues for Beijing to address, and there are foreign policy matters that China may not be flexible over. For example, Chinese domestic human rights standards and commitment to territorial claims over Taiwan may both stand as issues where appeals to China’s image via social influence, from great powers like the United States, may not have effect. These two issues are so closely intertwined with Chinese Communist Party and state stability that we can speculate that Chinese elites consider China peerless and without a reference group on these matters. Therefore, attempts to influence China on these sovereignty-related matters will be unsuccessful.

However, this is not to say that the implications of this dissertation regarding image and status markers are narrowly related to peacekeeping only. Beyond the peacekeeping sphere, another recent example is the Chinese defense cooperation at the UN Security Council regarding the
Libyan uprising, mentioned briefly in the introduction to this dissertation. After revolutions that would topple leaders of Tunisia and Egypt, anti-Gaddafi protests started in February 2011. China’s initial position was to not publicly criticizing Colonel Gaddafi. However, by the third week of February, aware of the increasing pressure on his regime, Colonel Gaddafi made a wide-ranging speech on February 22, 2011, with explicit reference to the June 4th incident:

> When Tiananmen Square happened, tanks were sent in to deal with them. It's not a joke. Do whatever it takes to stay united... People in front of tanks were crushed. The unity of China is more important than those people in Tiananmen Square.\(^{764}\)

By inadvertently tapping the Chinese concern to not return to one of the lowest diplomatic ebbs for the country since its founding – when China was ostracized after the government’s actions in ending anti-government protests in Tiananmen on June 4, 1989 – Colonel Gaddafi in effect re-framed Chinese decision-makers considerations regarding the Libyan affair. Chinese decision-makers were keen to distance China from Libya, so as to reduce comparison between the two governments, for fear of the potential social costs of being seen as supporting a dictator.\(^{765}\) It was not a direct reference to Tiananmen by Western officials, but concerns that Western officials would assume that China would condone a Tiananmen like crackdown and therefore ostracize China, that led officials to take a stiffer stance on the Libyan affair. A few days later, China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1970, imposing stiff sanctions on Libya and referring Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Chinese decision-makers feared that Beijing’s typical approach of an abstention vote in regards to a coercive UN Security Council Resolution could have been interpreted as supporting Colonel Gaddafi, especially with Gaddafi’s Tiananmen speech. In the face of such unanimous pressure to show resolve against Gaddafi’s actions, with the fourteen other UN Security Council members voting to impose sanctions, China

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\(^{765}\) Author interviews with Chinese government officials and policy analysts, Beijing, December 2011.
cast a yes vote to UN Security Council Resolution 1970, in part out of image-related concerns. Therefore, this case shows

**Contributions to Policy**

This dissertation shows the United Nations remains an institution of “first resort” for China, as opposed to one of “last resort” as lamented by then-Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy.\(^{766}\) The Chinese investment in the United Nations platform as Beijing’s path to providing global security (as opposed to regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) is an important advantage in how UN officials can approach China for support for the peacekeeping regime, compared to those states that can use alternate platforms or arrangements.

However, for the foreseeable future, China’s peacekeeping numbers will not reach levels like those of the ‘mega-contributors,’ like Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example. China does not have incentive to increase its contributions to such a high number, as China’s current contributions top those of the P5. Therefore, larger deployments on higher-risk missions, at the potential cost of promoting an imposing impression of China is most likely not worth the effort for Beijing. Similarly, China will not make the transition to deploying ‘combat troops’ in the foreseeable future either. In this climate of anxiety about Chinese deployments under the UN flag, it is unlikely that China will adjust its participation to send out these ‘tip of the spear’ assets – especially as the United Nations still focuses China’s contributions on enabler assets.

These findings are not to say that China will necessarily be a benign global security provider, and indeed policy analysts are not wrong to note that Chinese peacekeeping participation is partially driven to attain “diplomatic influence to facilitate access to markets, capital, and resources.”\textsuperscript{767} However, it is better to have China involved in providing for system stability than not. This is for two reasons. First, China’s material interests are no longer restricted to its neighborhood, and when security issues flare up, China is now simply too large a player to quietly wait on the sidelines.\textsuperscript{768} Engaging China to assume a role of a great power is beneficial to the smooth running of international affairs. Chinese troop contributions provides opportunities to weave China even deeper into the fabric of local politics and therefore increases the likelihood that China would be informed and engaged in these matters at the UN Security Council. Therefore, bilateral cooperation with China regarding peacekeeping is well worth pursuing at even higher levels.\textsuperscript{769}

**Future Research**

It should be noted that the argument presented here is at best probalistic, not deterministic. Moreover, because the research findings may hold to explain China’s experience in the recent past, these findings may not necessarily hold to explain China’s peacekeeping activity in the future.\textsuperscript{770} In order to build beyond the limits of this dissertation work, future iterations of the research project would code the entire catalogue of UN peacekeeping cases, thereby expanding the ‘n’ of the universe of Chinese peacekeeping decisions, to aid the development of a middle-

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Typological theory would differentiate under what conditions and in what sequence each category of explanation would take precedence in Chinese decisions regarding peacekeeping.

Another line of inquiry opened up by this dissertation is into the triggers for China’s image-conscious behavior modification. For example, as mentioned briefly in the history chapter of this dissertation, after China issued a veto of the extension of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) mission to Macedonia in 1999, China refused to recast its vote and withstood criticism from the UN Secretary-General, the P3, small powers at the UN Security Council, and regional players. China’s willingness to stand alone in this episode highlights that image concerns do not always come into play, and further research into the scope conditions for image-driven Chinese foreign policy is a logical next step. Understanding how it is that China can sometimes reframe international security issues, negotiating China’s stance in the context of international pressure in some cases but not others, is also worthy of more research.

Further work can also be completed in situating China in global politics, going beyond the findings of the single China case, to explore how emerging powers – like Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey, for example – use international institutions and efforts towards fostering peace as part of their status-seeking, image-driven behavior.

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Conclusion

Though security multilateralism was once considered a taboo in Chinese diplomacy, these three cases indicate that China is in part taking action consistent with its own self-image, and within a socially constructed sense of purpose pertaining to China’s role in the world. China’s emphasis on the centrality of the United Nations for the smooth conduct of international affairs and China’s commitment to multilateralism via the United Nations, means that in regards to some issues the Chinese mirror has two faces that are indeed closely aligned. China’s self-images as a member of the Global South and as a great power have much in common when it comes to peacekeeping deployments. Consistent troop contributions place China as part of the hardworking community of states that actually carry out the gritty, messy work in the field, while also placing China as a first among equals at the UN Security Council, as a great power making potentially costly commitments on behalf of international peace and security.

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### APPENDIX ONE: TABLE OF CHINESE PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

**Key**
- 2/50 = currently 2 Chinese staff deployed/total 50 staff deployed
- 50 = total 50 staff deployed; no staff currently deployed
- M = military observer and staff officer
- T = troops
- P = police
- E = experts on mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>PRC Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>April 1990 – present: 4/99E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>Jan 1949</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>First UN Emergency Force</td>
<td>Nov 1956</td>
<td>June 1967</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>UN Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
<td>June 1958</td>
<td>Dec 1958</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>June 1964</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>UN Yemen Observation Mission</td>
<td>July 1963</td>
<td>Sept 1964</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>June 1991</td>
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<td>March 1990</td>
<td>Chinese records note no deployments, but academics note 20 civilian observers were sent.</td>
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<td>May 1995</td>
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<td>UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
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<td>May 2002</td>
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</table>
China also counts the following missions towards their deployments, though these operations were not under UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations supervision:

- UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) – two observers were deployed from May 1998 – Jan 2000.
- UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) – three police were deployed from Jan 2004 – May 2005.
- UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) – one observer was deployed from Feb 2007 – Feb 2008.

Source: Chinese peacekeeping contribution numbers were compiled from three sources.

*Current contribution figures* are from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police contributors,” (accessed on June 2, 2012); available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml. UN numbers are from April 2012, the most up-to-date numbers publicly available.

Appendix Two: Map of the Darfur Region

Map of Sudan, March 2012
(Source: Cartography Section, Department of Field Support, United Nations)
Map of Chad, March 2009
(Source: Cartography Section, Department of Field Support, United Nations)
APPENDIX FOUR: MAP OF SOUTH SUDAN

Map of South Sudan, October 2011
(Source: Cartography Section, Department of Field Support, United Nations)