

CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

SAM ROVIT

When China began to open its doors to the West, party leaders gave top priority to economic development, deemphasizing the role of the military. Deng Xiaoping himself stated that the international situation made it possible for China to spend less on defense and more on economic construction. But the military has not been entirely neglected in the pursuit of these new policies. Sam Rovit focuses on what the Open Door has meant for the Chinese military — and concludes that its gains from Westernization have been substantial.

INTRODUCTION

Given the fourth place priority accorded to Chinese military modernization under the Four Modernizations, one might assume that the military has benefited little from the Open Door policy. China's opening to the West and Japan ostensibly was aimed first and foremost at developing China's economic infrastructure. Serving as the blue-print for the Open Door, the Four Modernizations enunciated by Zhou Enlai in 1975 relegated defense modernization to third place, behind agriculture and industry, but ahead of science and technology.¹ Although it was later moved to fourth place,² defense was not ignored. With one million Soviet troops on China's northern border, it is doubtful it could be otherwise.

Even in its subordination, the military remains an enormous budget commitment, both in terms of allocated funds and manpower. Further, as a review of events since 1979 will show, the Open Door has been a boon to the military. To be sure, its low ranking in the budget pecking order has prevented the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from going on a weapons-buying binge. Yet purchases of advanced equipment have occurred. Indeed, contact with Western military counterparts has been extensive. China has become a serious and seriously-taken participant in world arms control fora, and has spawned a flourishing and lucrative trade in arms.

In addition to those benefits directly associated with the Open Door — benefits which clearly would not have occurred had China remained closed — the military has experienced numerous other changes which arguably can be

Sam Rovit received a MALD degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1987. He is a candidate for a Master of Business Administration degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

1. *Beijing Review*, 24 January 1975, p. 23.

2. The earliest reference seems to be a speech by newly appointed Defense Minister Geng Biao in Tokyo, April 11, 1981, in John Shirer, ed., *China Facts and Figures Annual* (hereafter, CFF), Vol. 5 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1982), p. 284.

attributed to the Open Door policy and/or the fourth-place ranking of defense modernization in the Four Modernizations. These other changes range from enhancements in the social status of the military to the restructuring of the PLA's leadership and modifications to strategy.

Although this study focuses on what the Open Door has meant for the Chinese military, several other topics must be explored, if only briefly, for their implications upon both the military and the Open Door. There is the Chinese threat assessment and the state of the military — both of crucial importance in the decision to give military modernization a low priority. There is the strategic calculation that had to be a factor in the decision to open to the West. Finally, there is the military's acquiescence to its relegation to fourth priority of the Four Modernizations.

These underlying issues are essential to an understanding of how the PLA has fared under the Open Door policy and to an analysis of what might cause China to close its door. Should the military pressure to close the door at some time in the future, it will not be because of dissatisfaction with the benefits it has reaped under the Open Door, but because the assumptions underlying China's threat reassessment and the Four Modernizations will have proved wrong.

CHINA'S THREAT ASSESSMENT

In order to justify, in part, the lowly ranking of defense modernization, Chinese leaders have had to be convinced that the external threat to the country's security was offset by its existing forces. In the late 1960s, China perceived a threat from the Soviet Union. There were military clashes between both nations and China had good reason to fear a nuclear strike in 1969, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Brezhnev's announcement that the Soviet Union had the right to invade aberrant Socialist states.³ The heightened Soviet threat occurred at a time of Chinese weakness (the country was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution) and several have argued it was a prime reason behind China's break-out from isolation.⁴ As David Armstrong has pointed out, the Soviet threat in 1969 was beyond China's military capability to counter, compelling China to: seek political accommodation with

3. Ralph Clough et. al., *The United States, China and Arms Control* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 8. Amos Yoder, *Chinese Policies Toward Limiting Nuclear Weapons*, Occasional Paper 22 (Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, March, 1980), discusses the fears of pre-emptive attack prior to the Oct. 14, 1964, detonation of China's first nuclear bomb, and Soviet overtures to the United States concerning American reaction to a Soviet nuclear strike aimed at preventing Chinese H-bomb development, p. 14.

4. Hammond Rolph, "China's Changing World View," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1984), p. 169; Clough, p. 9. Also, Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., *China Under the Four Modernizations*, Part 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 13 August 1982), pp. 582-583. But see Michael Yahuda, "China's Nuclear Option," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1968, who argues that the complexities of deterrence could force China out of isolation due to the need to communicate intentions, capabilities, and strategies.

the West; avoid provoking the Soviet Union; rely on the "people's war" strategy outlined by Mao;⁵ and take realistic stock of the situation.⁶

A realistic appraisal showed that China lagged so far behind the Soviet Union that a crash program to close the military gap would have probably bankrupted the country.⁷ In fact, Chinese military expenditures increased steadily from 1949 until 1971 (with the exception of 1966-1967). Then, coinciding with the death of Defense Minister Lin Biao, they leveled off and in constant dollars have stayed roughly the same since. Again, the exception is a spike at the time of the war with Vietnam in 1979. And, although expenditures have steadily increased in current dollars, they have steadily decreased as a percentage of gross national product.⁸

Objectively, China's position vis-a-vis the Soviet threat was neither greatly ameliorated by the time of Zhou Enlai's 1975 speech placing defense modernization third on a list of four, nor by the January 1979 opening to the West.⁹ One key difference was that China now had medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and at least one observer credited China's nuclear deterrent with the decreased commitment to defense since 1973.¹⁰

With the passage of time, the probability of an unprovoked attack apparently diminished in Chinese minds, convincing them they could afford to direct resources to their economy. This is evident from statements by Chinese officials on the subject of opening to the West.

THE DECISION TO OPEN TO THE WEST

What took shape in the 1970s was a more realistic assessment on the part of the Chinese government of China's backwardness and inability to rectify its military deficiencies quickly; a new confidence in China's ability to deter Soviet attack with the acquisition of ballistic missiles; and, through the Shanghai Communique, the introduction of a new element in Sino-Soviet relations: the United States.

-
5. Simplified, "people's war" is defensive and involves protracted war, mass mobilization and trading space for time. See George Tan Eng Bok, "Strategic Doctrine," in Segal and Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 6.
 6. David Armstrong, "The Soviet Union," in Segal and Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 190.
 7. At the time, China had not completed development of any ballistic missiles while the Soviets had 800 ICBMs and 750 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets had 15 divisions in the Far East, of which four were tank divisions, while the Chinese had only four tank divisions in their entire force and the tanks they used included the obsolete T-34 and the then outclassed T-54. The Chinese did not have infra-red night-fighting equipment. The Chinese air force relied principally on obsolete MiG-15s, MiG-17s and MiG-19s. See *The Military Balance 1968-1969* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).
 8. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1979) *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1973-1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1984).
 9. A Rand Corp. report concluded that the Soviets had between 8 and 17 divisions, 270 fighter planes, and 230 long-range bombers in excess of their defensive needs along the border with North China, *CFF* Vol. 4, 1981, p. 104, citing *New York Times*, 4 January 1982, p. A2.
 10. Clough, p. 11.

Hua Guofeng came to power after Mao's death with the help of the military and promises to back military modernization.¹¹ But his successor, Deng Xiaoping, despite his commitment to military modernization, scaled back the emphasis on the military. Deng recognized that China's major challenge was economic development.

Although Deng has credited a favorable international environment for allowing China to concentrate on economic development,¹² that is only part of the story and represents, to a certain extent, a self-serving reappraisal of external threats. Some have argued that domestic economic concerns and the interminable war in Afghanistan make any aggressive moves by the Soviet Union on China quite unlikely, and Deng certainly seems predisposed to take this view.

A major reason for downplaying military modernization, is the understanding that China can never hope to have a modern military unless it develops its agricultural, industrial and scientific sectors. This appears to have been accepted by all key leaders. *Hongqi* quoted Hu Yaobang as saying China must "strengthen our national defense on the basis of economic development."¹³ Yang Dezhi, the then Party Controller of the PLA, in a speech summarizing a conference of the whole army's chiefs of staff, said the army must recognize that the construction of national defense must be subject to economic construction.¹⁴ And, Deng said in an October 10, 1984 speech to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission:

Quadrupling China's gross annual value of industrial and agricultural production (between 1980 and 2000) is of great significance. It means that by the end of the century, China's GNP will reach \$1 trillion . . . If reflected in our national power, we will become a relatively strong country. This is because by that time, if we use 1 percent of our GNP for national defense, it will amount to \$10 billion . . . We can do a lot with \$10 billion, and improving some of our equipment will be an easy job.¹⁵

China opened to the West because it needed capital and technology. The alternatives — autarkic development or development with the aid of the Soviet bloc — had already been tried without success or were considered unviable, given the nature of the the international environment. As Deng Xiaoping explained in 1985, "China's history over the past few centuries has showed that a closed-door policy leads only to backwardness . . ."¹⁶

11. Ellis Joffe, "Civil-Military Relations," in Segal and Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 26.

12. In a speech March 12, 1982, Deng said the international situation made it possible for China to spend less on defense and more on economic construction. *The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* (Beijing: Foreign Language Publishing, 1983), p. 248-254. In a speech February 3, 1985, Deng said "There has been some change in our view on the danger of war. We feel that the factors inhibiting it are on the increase." *Xinhua*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service — China (hereafter *FBIS-CHI*) 4 February 1985, p. A1.

13. *Xinhua*, 2 November 1982, *FBIS-CHI*, 2 November 1982, p. K1.

14. *China Official Yearbook 1983/1984* (Hong Kong: Dragon Pearl Publications, 1984), p. 528.

15. *Xinhua*, 31 December 1984, *FBIS-CHI*, 2 January 1985 p. K3.

16. *Xinhua*, 28 August 1985, *FBIS-CHI* 28 August 1985, p. D1.

True, China could have chosen a different road to development. Instead of emphasizing consumer goods and light industry, China could have pursued industrial goods and heavy industry — the Stalinist model. The latter path also tends to coincide with military needs, or rather, is more compatible with a scale of priorities in which military modernization is highly placed. Economic development through the modernization of heavy industry was the path taken after 1949. But comparison of China's economy in 1975 with the more dynamic economies of Taiwan, Japan, or South Korea had to have had a sobering effect on Chinese advocates of heavy industry-based development.

In addition to the obvious economic benefits of opening to the West, there are clearly significant military gains to be had. From a strategic perspective, ties with the United States introduce a wild card into any Soviet calculation concerning an attack on China, thus strengthening the Chinese deterrent,¹⁷ which in turn strengthens the position of those favoring the Open Door.

From a material perspective, access to Western weapons, technology, information, operational methods, and the Western educational system are all critical to modernizing the Chinese military. Finally, commerce on an equal basis with the West, and particularly with the United States, gives China stature in the global community. While this has been most noted in China's participation in economic organizations and economic matters, there have been equally important changes in arms control fora.

THE PLA: LIVING WITH FOURTH PLACE

Why has the military accepted its lowly ranking? Several reasons might be offered. Ellis Joffe has suggested that the military is committed to the principle of civilian supremacy and has not resisted its implementation when the civilians have been in a position to lead effectively.¹⁸ Joffe also argues that the bulk of the professional military has welcomed the disengagement from political affairs.¹⁹

The new realism discussed earlier is also a factor. Yu Qiuli said in July, 1983, that "The People's Liberation Army would not be able to match a better-equipped aggressor even if it modernized its weaponry over the next 10 to 20 years."²⁰ This was a brutally frank assessment, but it was not unique.²¹ In March of the same year, Defense Minister Zhang Aiping voiced similar doubts about China's ability to absorb advanced technology, as well

17. As Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," *China Quarterly*, 90 (June, 1982): 265, have pointed out, how quickly China can reach some standard of military power is secondary to the psychological effect that any increased cooperation between the West and China in the field of defense can have on the Soviet Union.

18. Joffe, in Segal and Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 27.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Washington Post*, 27 July 1983, p. A24, cited in Martin L. Lasater, "The PRC's Force Modernization: Shadow over Taiwan and U.S. Policy," *Strategic Review*, (Winter, 1984): 52.

21. Col. Monte R. Bullard, U.S. Army liaison in Hong Kong, wrote that PLA officials in Guangzhou, Kunming, Chengdu, and Xinjiang Military Regions told him that even if the United States gave China modern weapons systems, the PLA did not have enough qualified people to handle them. "The U.S.-China Defense Relationship," *Parameters*, (Vol. XIII, No. 1): 46.

as the wisdom in becoming too dependent upon another country.²² These views are evident in *National Defense Modernization*, one of six volumes dealing with modernization of various sectors of the Chinese economy. The textbook — for that is what it is — emphasizes the subordination of national defense modernization to economic construction and the importance of self-reliance.²³ At the same time, the textbook urges soldiers to learn from the West and uses as examples of “modern war” the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Falklands War, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Michael Ng-Quinn sees both co-optation and coercion of the military as part of the reason for its acquiescence. He argues that for a civilian-dominated leadership to give priority to a nonmilitary area, such as economic development, “a political compromise must first be struck with the military.”²⁴ What the military can be given include political power, budgetary resources, and “social rewards.” Ng-Quinn points out that Deng instituted checks and balances in the control of the military (by bringing in more players and avoiding an overlap of authority) and excluded from leadership those who gained power through factionalism, making professional merit the criterion for promotion.²⁵ Politicization of the military has dropped dramatically, with the military’s representation on the Party Central Committee declining from 50 percent in 1969 to 34 percent in 1977 to 20 percent in 1982.²⁶ Ng-Quinn argues that Deng’s call for retrenchment in the military through cuts in the number of noncombat personnel²⁷ and a consolidation of the command structure is another way of reducing military influence and strengthening political control. Others probably would reply that cutting personnel frees funds for new weapons.

In return for accepting lower budgetary priority, Ng-Quinn proposes, the military has been co-opted through social rewards such as uniforms, parades, and the restoration of ranks.²⁸ He contends that the increased participation of the military in civilian production can be explained by the desire to give soldiers dual purpose skills (*liang yong ren cai*) that will enable them to achieve social mobility upon returning to civilian life.²⁹ Production of civilian goods also benefits the state, turning a nonproductive sector into a productive one, thus contributing to overall economic development.

One of the most telling signs that the military may be chafing under the existing budget constraints is Deng Xiaoping’s continued retention of control

22. “Several Questions Concerning Modernization of National Defence,” *Hongqi*, No. 5, 1 March 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, 17 March 1983, p. K 2-7.

23. *National Defense Modernization* (Beijing: CPLA Fighters Publishing House and the Science Popularization Publishing House) in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) CPS-85-011, 4 February 1985, Chapter 2, No. 4, p. 24 and Chapter 2, No. 5 p. 24.

24. Michael Ng-Quinn, “The Chinese Military: Political Demands and Control,” *Armed Forces and Society*, (Winter, 1986): 257.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 258-259.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

27. *The Military Balance 1985-1986* (London: IISS, 1986) p. 113, listed Chinese armed forces at 3.9 million with possibly 2,345,000 conscripts.

28. Ng-Quinn, p. 264.

29. *Ibid.*

over the military and the fact that a 25 percent cut in military personnel has been rumored since 1981.³⁰

But analyses of how the PLA is being subdued or placated tend to ignore the fact that the military remains a sizeable, and stable, budgetary commitment. Where Western analysts may consider the official defense budget figures for 1984 and 1985 at just over 18 billion *Yuan*, unrealistically low,³¹ what is more significant is that the Chinese military budget was estimated to be 8.6 percent of gross national product and over 30 percent of central government expenditures in 1983.³² Despite defense's low priority, it is estimated that over 10 percent of China's industrial output is in the form of military goods.³³ Of perhaps greater importance, as Sydney Jammes has pointed out, is that "the defence effort pre-empts a large share of the finest scientific, engineering, and managerial talents of the economy . . ."³⁴ Between the continued immense commitment to defense and the return to social status items such as ranks and parades, one can see that the lowest priority of the Four Modernizations is still very much a priority. Budget constraints have prevented an *increase* in resources allocated to the military, but not all benefits require large budget commitments. This is especially true where the Open Door is concerned.

THE CHINA ARMS TRADE

Exports

For the ten-year period, 1968 until 1977, China is estimated to have imported \$675 million worth of arms and exported about \$2 billion worth.³⁵ Principal sources of arms were the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, while the principal recipients of Chinese arms were Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, and Tanzania.³⁶ Lesser recipients included Egypt, Iraq, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Congo, Sudan, Tunisia, Zaire and Zambia.³⁷ During the six-year period, 1978 through 1983, arms imports totaled \$510 million, while arms exports climbed to almost \$3.5 billion, \$2.5 billion of which occurred in 1982 and 1983.³⁸ Principal suppliers included the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, with smaller shipments from West Germany and the United States. Principal recipients included Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Kampuchea, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.³⁹

30. *CFF*, Vo. 5, 1982, p. 41.

31. *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p. 112. The IISS points out that China, like all socialist countries, excludes a number of items from its defense budget, including research and development costs and pay for the troops.

32. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1973-1983*.

33. Sydney Jammes, "Military Industry," in Segal and Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 120.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

35. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977*, p. 124.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 155-157.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1973-1983*, p. 100.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 131-134.

A significant difference between pre- and post-1978, aside from the large increase in exports, is the increase in shipments to the Middle East. Whereas 1.1 percent of Chinese arms went to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during the pre-1978 period, OPEC received 60 percent of Chinese arms post-1978. In large measure, this can be attributed to the Iran-Iraq War and China's supply to both parties.⁴⁰ For example, China reportedly agreed to ship \$1.6 billion worth of arms through North Korea to Iran in early 1985,⁴¹ although Chinese leaders denied the story.⁴² This followed shipments to Iraq totaling \$1.5 billion between 1979 and 1983.⁴³ But there have been other significant deals as well, particularly with Egypt, a country ripe for Chinese penetration due to the presence of a great deal of Soviet-designed equipment that is a legacy of Egypt's erstwhile close relations with the Soviet Union. China sold Egypt 60 MiG-19 jet fighters in 1979, for example,⁴⁴ and \$200 million in naval vessels in 1984.⁴⁵

From ninth place among arms exporters in the pre-1978 period, China has catapulted to fifth place today with estimated exports in 1985 of \$2 billion.⁴⁶ This is important for China's military for several reasons. First, as a major world supplier, the Chinese military gains influence around the world. Second, arms exports increase the economies of scale for China's defense industries. Third, exports produce much needed hard currency. And, finally, as the CIA observed in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, the substantial hard currency earned by arms exports puts the military in a good position when it decides in favor of certain weapons imports.⁴⁷

The importance attached by the Chinese leadership to arms exports can be seen in China's participation in AUSDES, the May 1984 Australian Defense and Security exhibition in Canberra.⁴⁸ It was the first foreign display of Chinese weaponry in 30 years. The Chinese also participated in Asian Aerospace '86 in Singapore⁴⁹ and the Farnborough Air Show held September, 1986, in Great Britain.⁵⁰ In addition, several exhibitions have been held in China, including NATSEDES '83, a naval electronics exhibition held July, 1983, in Shanghai,

40. Michael R. Gordon, "War in Gulf Spurs China's Arms-Export Role," *New York Times*, 19 May 1987, p. A9.

41. *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p. 175.

42. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: China, North Korea*, No. 3, 1986. (London: The Economist Publications, 1986), p. 11.

43. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1973-1983*, p. 134.

44. *The Military Balance, 1979-1980*, p. 104.

45. Harlan Jencks, "Watching China's Military: A Personal View," *Problems of Communism*, (May-June 1986): 73fn.

46. Julian Baum and Daniel Sneider, "China Hawks its Military Wares on the World Market," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 November 1986, p. 10.

47. Testimony by Robert Gates, deputy director for intelligence, CIA, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, International Trade, Finance and Security Economics Subcommittee, 98th Cong., 1st sess., *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China — 1984* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 111.

48. *CFF*, Vol. 8, 1985, from *Australian*, 2 May 1984, p. 1.

49. *Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly* (hereafter, DFAW), (Washington, D.C.: The Perth Corp.) January 27-February 3, 1986, p. 1.4.

50. DFAW, September 8-14, 1986, p. 2.

and Asiandex-86, the Asian Defence Technology Exhibition held in November, 1986.⁵¹

To potential purchasers, China has demonstrated its production efficiency and cost-effectiveness by delivering aircraft 12 months from order, compared to 18 months for most other countries, and its version of the MiG-21, for example, sells for one-fifth the price of a U.S. F-16.⁵²

Can the increased activity in Chinese arms exports be linked to the Open Door policy? At Asiandex-86, Premier Zhao explained that China was seeking to raise money through arms exports to pay for upgraded defense technologies. Said Zhao, China's exposition of its military equipment "is an outgrowth of China's opening to the outside world."⁵³ Yitzhak Shichor has suggested that China's past minor role as an arms exporter was due partly to limited quality and quantity (most resources were directed toward nuclear weapons), partly to a preoccupation with internally-generated development (and thus negligible requirements for hard currency), and partly to "Maoist righteousness."⁵⁴

With the establishment of a credible nuclear deterrent, Chinese leaders have found it possible to divert resources toward conventional weapons.⁵⁵ This reflects the apparent acceptance by China of its inability to close the nuclear gap with the two superpowers and the decision to adopt the French theory of "proportional deterrence," by which a small but secure nuclear force can keep a larger one at bay.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the decision to pursue a broad economic modernization and to attract Western technology and equipment has generated a need for hard currency, which in turn has required increased exports.

Finally, the death of Mao, according to Shichor, removed an inhibition against participating in the world arms trade. Until the early 1980s, Chinese arms transfers to places such as the Middle East had been regarded as gifts rather than deals and of minor significance in economic terms, their *raison d'être* being support for liberation movements.⁵⁷ With the Open Door, however, the Chinese desired good relations with the West and support for liberation movements dropped dramatically.⁵⁸

51. Harlan Jencks, p. 73; Julian Baum and Daniel Sneider, "China Hawks its Military Wares on the World Market," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 November 1986, p. 10.

52. DFAW, September 8-14, 1986, p. 2; and Baum and Sneider, "China Hawks its Military Wares on the World Market."

53. Baum and Sneider, "China Hawks its Military Wares on the World Market."

54. Yitzhak Schicor, "The Middle East," in Segal and Tow, *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 265.

55. While it is difficult to know how the PLA's budget is allocated, a U.S. military delegation visiting China from April 30 to May 16, 1979, was told that nuclear weapons wouldn't receive much in the budget because they are already considered sufficient. CFF, Vol. 4, 1981, p. 100, quoting Capt. William R. Heaton, Jr., "China Visit: A Military Assessment," *Army*, 29, 11 November 1979, pp. 25-26.

56. "French and European Security: An Interview with General Pierre Gallois," *The Fletcher Forum*, 10 (Winter 1986): 48. For an interesting comparison of the French and Chinese nuclear forces, see B. W. Augenstein, "The Chinese and French Programs for the Development of National Nuclear Forces," *Orbis* XI, No. 3, 1967.

57. The relative lack of an economic function previously in Chinese arms exports is discussed in Stockholm Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade With The Third World* (New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975), p. 141.

58. Larry Niksch, "Southeast Asia," in Segal and Tow, eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, p. 242-243; see also CFF, Vol. 5, 1982, report that Premier Zhao told a Manila audience that China retained only political and moral ties with Communist parties in Southeast Asia and would supply them with no weapons.

Imports

As is evident from the figures cited above, Chinese arms imports have trailed exports by a good deal. This is primarily attributable to budget constraints, concerns over the ability to absorb high technology, and fears of becoming dependent upon foreign suppliers. In a fairly succinct summation of the Chinese position, Premier Zhao Ziyang said in 1983 that:

If the United States is willing to sell weapons to us, and if we need them and can afford them, I wouldn't rule out the possibility of buying some weapons. . . . (But) we rely mainly on our own efforts . . . It is simply impossible for a country as large as ours to achieve the modernization of national defense by buying weapons.⁵⁹

Making a virtue of necessity, Yu Qiuli said in 1983 that "China has never supported the theory that weapons alone determine the outcome of a war . . . but it is aware of the major role that sophisticated armaments play."⁶⁰ Yu added that China would develop its own technology and rely on foreign technology "in limited instances."⁶¹ Later in the year, Yu said "We have never pinned our hopes for modernizing our military equipment on imports."⁶²

Bearing out Zhao's and Yu's remarks, foreign suppliers have indeed experienced frustration in attempting to breach the Chinese arms market. At the same time, purchases have been made which would have been inconceivable prior to the Open Door policy. These purchases illustrate that money can be found for sufficiently important items, budget priority notwithstanding.

These frustrations have been evident in dealings with both Western Europe and the United States. In a 1977 visit to Europe, Minister of Foreign Trade Li showed interest in the British Harrier jet,⁶³ but several years of talks produced no sale. Just after China had turned down the Harrier in 1980 the French announced they were prepared to sell the Mirage 2000 jet to China, but Hu Yaobang said China was not ready to buy.⁶⁴

British companies in November, 1982, secured a \$170 million contract to refit Chinese destroyers with Sea Dart missiles and advanced electronics.⁶⁵ At the April 1983, deadline on the Sea Dart deal, however, China backed out, saying the price was too high.⁶⁶

Despite Washington's lifting of restrictions on many classes of exports to the PRC in 1980, by mid-1981 Beijing had bought only one Cessna aircraft with reconnaissance cameras, though Party Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian indicated an interest in U.S. technology and possibly technical advisers.⁶⁷ Stuart

59. "Chinese Leaders on Sino-U.S. Relations," *Beijing Review*, 3 October 1983, p. 8.

60. Yu Qiuli, "Modernizing Defense," *Beijing Review*, 10 January 1983, p. 6.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Beijing Review*, 1 August 1983, p. 15.

63. *CFF*, Vol. 1, 1978, p. 77.

64. Stuart and Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," p. 258-259.

65. *CFF*, Vol. 5, 1982, p. 45, from *New York Times*, 3 November 1982, p. 46.

66. George Lauriat, "Bluewater on a Budget," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 121, 28 July 1983, pp. 38-39.

67. *Kyodo*, 4 July 1981, *FBIS-CHI* 128, 6 July 1981, p. B1.

and Tow conclude from the plethora of concurrent negotiations that Beijing is employing a strategy of *yi-yi-zhi-yi* — making the barbarians fight barbarians.⁶⁸ They also note that many of the negotiations appear to have been designed more to improve relations and investigate overall arms-transfer policy than to conclude specific agreements, the equivalent of government arsenal browsing.

Nevertheless, significant purchases have been made, including an artillery shell plant from the United States in 1985, naval gun mounts from Italy (probably in 1985), tank technology from Israel (possibly in 1982), French and British avionics packages for the F-7 jet fighter, a \$550 million U.S. avionics package for the F-8 jet fighter, 24 Sikorsky helicopters worth \$150 million in 1984,⁶⁹ 30 Alouette and Super-Frelan helicopters and 50 Dauphin II models from France in 1979 for anti-submarine use,⁷⁰ \$23 million in Super Puma helicopters from France in 1984,⁷¹ 1,500-2,000 armored vehicles from Brazil in 1981,⁷² Exocet missiles from France in 1984,⁷³ five General Electric engines for use either on two Luda-class destroyers or a more advanced ship,⁷⁴ and an unspecified number of RASIT ground surveillance radars from LMT Radio Professionnelle, Thomson-CSF France.⁷⁵

In addition, China is reportedly negotiating with the United Kingdom to acquire an in-flight refueling capability,⁷⁶ and with the Americans to cooperate on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology.⁷⁷ China is also negotiating with the United States for large caliber artillery ammunition.⁷⁸

Although the list of imports lacks power projection weapons — planes, ships, and tanks — it still represents sophisticated equipment of great value to the Chinese military modernization effort and equipment which would not have been available in the absence of an Open Door policy. A common denominator among the imported weapons is the emphasis on anti-tank, anti-plane, anti-ship, and anti-submarine warfare — essentially defensive and thus aimed at the Soviet border threat (which is heavily mechanized) and the growing Soviet naval threat, particularly submarines.

THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Information can be exchanged formally, through agreements to cooperate on technology development, or informally through touring delegations having contact with their military hosts. The exchange of information is exceedingly

68. Stuart and Tow, p. 257.

69. Jencks, p. 71fn.

70. Stuart and Tow, p. 259.

71. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 176.

72. *CFF*, Vol. 5, 1982, p. 45, from *Jeune Afrique*, 1073, 29 July 1981, p. 40 and 1080, 16 September 1981, p. 57.

73. *FBIS-Soviet* 240 12 December 1984, p. 81.

74. *DFAW*, April 21-27, 1986, p. 2.

75. *DFAW* July 14-20, 1986, p. 3.

76. *DFAW*, September 8-14, 1986, p. 2.

77. *DFAW*, April 21-27, 1986, p. 2.

78. *DFAW*, November 17-23, 1986, p. 3.

difficult to catalogue, and an assessment of its importance is even more difficult. Given the historical Chinese emphasis on defeating the enemy without fighting and on deception, it would seem that information would be very highly valued.⁷⁹ In the current environment of limited budgets, inexpensive acquisitions such as the exchange of information become especially attractive.

A very crude but potentially useful approach to assessing the increase in information transfer under the Open Door is an examination of military delegations visiting the PRC and PRC delegations visiting other countries. Although a useful method, one rarely knows how productive the delegation's visit has been, whether issues of substance were discussed and if so, whether they were discussed with people in influential positions. After then Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's October 1986, visit to Beijing, however, Brig. Gen. Jon A. Reynolds, the U.S. Embassy's senior military official in Beijing, remarked that the increasingly routine visits involving majors and colonels were just as important as those by more senior officers or Cabinet members because the visitors on both sides are likely to rise to higher posts in the military, and influence relations for the long term.⁸⁰

Major military delegations to and from the PRC, with a few exceptions, began only in 1980. Delegations to the PRC went from none in 1978 to about three in 1979; 19 in 1980; 34 in 1981; 29 in 1982; 23 in 1983; and 33 in 1984.⁸¹ Of these delegations, the vast majority were from OECD countries and none were from the Soviet Union. This works out to an average of over 27 delegations a year since 1980, or two a month. And it does not include delegations of middle rank officers — the ones Gen. Reynolds envisages as forging the alliances of tomorrow. The American delegations which made the news (and thus were included in the figures above) typically included assistant secretaries of defense, congressional armed service committee members, Pentagon officers, or military academy faculty members.

Top-level Chinese delegation visits to other countries show similar jumps after 1979. The Chinese sent five delegations to Western Europe in 1978 (including one to observe a NATO exercise); no delegations anywhere in 1979; 13 in 1980; 14 in 1981; 24 in 1982; 5 in 1983; and 26 in 1984.⁸²

A good indication of the flavor of the kind of exchanges that have been going on behind the scenes of flashy visits such as that of Secretary Weinberger was provided in a *New York Times* article in November 1986. U.S. Army Col.

79. "Thus those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle," from Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 79. Also, "All warfare is based on deception," p. 66. Although Mao Zedong denied having read Sun Tzu, many of his lines are almost verbatim from *The Art of War*, Georges Tan Eng Bok, "Strategic Doctrine," pp. 4-5. See, for example, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p. 85: "know thyself and thine enemy."

80. John H. Cushman, Jr., "Courting the Chinese with Military Flowers and Candy," *New York Times* 2 November 1986, p. E4.

81. *CFF*, Vols. 1-8. State Dept. delegations were not counted as "military" although they may have discussed matters of significance to the military.

82. *Ibid.*

Al Wilhem taught for two weeks at the National Defense University in Beijing, giving three lectures and several seminars on American political and military science, the *Times* reported. He was the first foreigner to teach such courses at the school "which had just been reorganized along lines resembling similar American institutions."⁸³ Meanwhile, the Chinese officer in charge of PLA logistics had just completed a tour of the United States and a group from the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command was in China. "In a typical visit (in Summer 1986), a Chinese air force group observed the training of pilots, technicians and maintenance crews in the United States."⁸⁴

Coincident with the increased flow of people between China and the West has been a reestablishment of naval port-of-call visits by several countries for the first time since 1949. Among them were the United Kingdom, which visited in 1980; Australia, which visited in 1981; and the United States, which docked in Qingdao in 1986.⁸⁵ U.S. Admiral James Lyons, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said the week-long port call would promote further military cooperation between the United States and China.⁸⁶

The Open Door has also allowed information to flow into the PRC via cooperative ventures such as the possible Sino-American project on anti-submarine warfare mentioned earlier, and Sino-Australian discussions about joint production of the A-10 "Wamira" jet trainer.⁸⁷ Undoubtedly, however, the clearest example in which the Open Door has paid hefty information dividends is the alleged joint Sino-American operation of electronic intelligence gathering facilities in China since 1980.⁸⁸

Clearly, the extensive contacts with the West which China has made since 1979 would not have been possible had it attempted to promote economic development independently. But has it benefited the Chinese military? "They have definitely benefited," says a Pentagon official engaged in coordinating Sino-American military relations. "If it were left to the military (in China), there would be more interchange. I think the military is more positive about contacts with us — more so than foreign affairs."⁸⁹ The official added that Sino-American military contacts have involved training, maintenance and lectures.⁹⁰ Harlan Jencks also has observed that:

When Chinese professional soldiers visit abroad, the flow of information is maddeningly unidirectional. PLA delegations have intensively studied everything from the National Training Center

83. John M. Cushman, Jr., "Courting the Chinese Military with Flowers and Candy."

84. *Ibid.*

85. *CFF*, Vols. 1-8; Daniel Sutherland, "U.S. Navy Returns to China," *Washington Post*, 6 November 1986, p. A21.

86. Daniel Sutherland, "U.S. Navy Returns to China."

87. *DFAW*, January 20-26, 1986, p. 1.

88. *CFF*, Vol. 5, 1982, Calendar of Events, 18 June 1981.

89. Telephone interview, 28 November 1986, with an Asian specialist on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who requested anonymity.

90. *Ibid.*

at Fort Irwin to the National War College in Washington, D.C., but they have been extremely reticent to reveal anything about their own training or operations.⁹¹

U.S. officials believe that exposing the PLA to American thought and technology may give them a stake in China's opening to the West.⁹²

ARMS CONTROL

One benefit of normalized relations with the West is that China has finally come into its own in the realm of nuclear arms control. Long irked at being a member of the nuclear club, yet excluded from its deliberations, China prior to 1979 criticized SALT as "sham disarmament" and a form of collusion between the superpowers.⁹³ All that is changing. Chinese leaders now pledge to begin disarming if there is positive movement by the superpowers⁹⁴ and they speak of arms control in positive, albeit reserved, tones. Premier Zhao said in 1983, for example, that he lacked high expectations for then upcoming arms discussions but hoped they would be "beneficial to world peace and security . . ."⁹⁵

China's image as a responsible member of the community of nations and the apparent seriousness with which it now takes arms control resulted in remarkable pilgrimages to Beijing by both Soviet and American officials after the recent summit in Reykjavik.⁹⁶ Presidential advisor Edward L. Rowney visited Beijing immediately after the Iceland talks in order to give the American version of events, then returned for a second visit after the Geneva arms control session and the Vienna meeting between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze.⁹⁷

While participation in world arms control matters and consultation by the superpowers does not strengthen the PLA as a modern fighting force, the prestige associated with such stature and the influence China can muster are important inducements to China to keep its door open. This is particularly so where arms control issues affect China directly, such as whether Soviet SS-20s currently deployed in Europe are removed as a result of a U.S.-Soviet agreement and destroyed or merely redeployed in Asia.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is another inducement to keep the door open. A major technological breakthrough that could make it less likely for Chinese missiles to reach their targets would degrade the Chinese

91. Jencks, pp. 72-73.

92. John H. Cushman, Jr., "Courting the Chinese Military . . ."

93. Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett, "Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative," *Problems of Communism*, (March-April 1986): 40.

94. See Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's speech at the 38th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 27 September 1983, *Beijing Review*, 10 October 1983, p. 13.

95. "Zhao Discusses Sino-U.S. Relations," *Beijing Review*, 14 February 1983, p. 9.

96. Edward A. Gargan, "China is Invited to Kibitz in the Arms Game," *New York Times*, 30 November 1986, p. E2.

97. *Ibid.*

nuclear deterrent and open China to nuclear blackmail or attack. This is potentially what SDI proposes. In such an event, the assumptions underlying the Four Modernizations — that external threats could be kept at bay with the nuclear deterrent and thus that China could devote resources to economic modernization — would prove false, requiring a basic reevaluation of policy.⁹⁸ Such a reevaluation almost inevitably would result in the discrediting of the moderate-pragmatic faction (assuming it has not eradicated all remnants of the Gang of Four radicals) and, in any case, would surely thrust defense modernization into precedence over all else. With defense as the top priority, the development emphasis would shift from light to heavy industry, making the Open Door policy both less important to the Chinese and certainly less attractive to the West.

Although this scenario involves a number of “ifs,” it illustrates the importance of Chinese participation in arms control discussions, the basis for Chinese opposition to SDI,⁹⁹ and one potential threat to the continuation of the Open Door policy.

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND CIVILIAN PRODUCTION

The issues discussed so far — arms imports and exports, information, training and education, and arms control consultation — are ones which were made possible by the Open Door policy and its sanctioning of contact with the West. Since China opened to the West, however, numerous other major changes have been made in the PLA that cannot be directly linked to the Open Door, although they are intellectually consonant with an embrace of the “Western model” of military modernization. The impetus for these other changes is not clear. Some have suggested they are driven by contact with the West. Others have contended they represent “payoffs” to gain military support for the Four Modernizations, or attempts to consolidate political control over the PLA. In fact, it is possible that the changes are motivated by a little of each, as well as an honest attempt at living within budget dictates.

In a category of changes termed “professionalization and social rewards,” for want of a better title, one might include the following: the return of military parades in 1981 for the first time in 22 years;¹⁰⁰ a 1980 decree halting party enrollment among military units and requiring that vacancies of platoon and company commanders be filled only by graduates of military academies;¹⁰¹ the decline in the percentage of military training devoted to political training from 40 percent in the 1960s to 20 percent in the early 1980s;¹⁰² repeated promises that ranks and insignia would return (though it is not clear if they

98. Glaser and Garrett, p. 28, would agree and point to Deng's opposition to extending the arms race to space. See *Xinhua*, 6 September 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, 6 September 1985, p. B1.

99. See speech by Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Qian Jiadong, “China Seeks an End to the Arms Race in Space,” *Beijing Review*, 21 November 1983, p. 13.

100. *CFP*, Vol. 5, 1982, p. 43, from *Washington Post*, 3 August 1981, p. A1.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 44, from *Business Week*, 28 September 1981, p. 55.

102. *CFP*, Vol. 6, 1983.

have);¹⁰³ the reintroduction of noncommissioned officers into the PLA by the end of 1987 and the founding in 1986 of NCO schools and training classes;¹⁰⁴ and the restoration of issuing flight allowances, as well as the grading of pilots based on skill.¹⁰⁵

All of these changes reflect China's movement toward a more professional, as opposed to revolutionary guerrilla, military. They have occurred at the same time that senior leaders have been forced out. By 1982, many officers had been purged, transferred or persuaded to retire¹⁰⁶ and in 1984, 40 PLA leaders with rank equivalent to at least a U.S. three-star general were prodded into retirement.¹⁰⁷

Coincident with the depoliticization of the military, the return of social rewards, and the institution of merit-based promotions, has been a modernization in military strategy itself. As has been emphasized by Chinese leaders, people's war remains the official strategy, but it is "people's war under modern conditions."¹⁰⁸ In 1983, Yu Qiuli listed 10 guidelines for the military based on Deng's writings. They called for a thorough shake-up to improve preparedness, a strategy of "positive defense" including the capability to counterattack, continuation of emphasis on "people's war," and improvements in weaponry "not exceeding the capabilities of the national economy."¹⁰⁹

During training in 1981, the PLA stressed three changes: the change of the main target of attack from infantry to armored vehicles; the change in emphasis from training each service arm separately to coordinated training of an integrated army (combined arms); and the change of emphasis from training fighters to training cadres.¹¹⁰ Foreign armies were also to be studied intensively, and night operations were stressed.¹¹¹ These changes reflect both the exposure to the West, and Yang Dezhi's experience as Peng Dehuai's deputy during the Korean War. In combination, they imply a more offensively oriented defense — forward-based and concerned more with halting the enemy at the border than risking the real possibility of losing Beijing and the industrial North and of shifting its emphasis somewhat from people to technology. But, logically, given China's historical, strategic and technological positions, any major retreat from the people's war strategy would be unlikely.

The increased military production of civilian goods, jumping from 6 percent in 1975 to 22 percent in 1983,¹¹² is indicative of efforts to wring some

103. Yang Dezhi said in August, 1981, that the system of military ranks would be reinstated, *CFF*, Vol. 5, 1982, p. 43, from *FBIS-CHI*, 29 December 1981, p. K14. Then, in August, 1984, it was again reported that badges of rank would be restored in the PLA, *CFF*, Vol. 7, 1984. Lin Biao abolished ranks in 1965.

104. *DFAW*, July 14-20, 1986, p. 3.

105. *Ibid.*

106. *CFF*, Vol. 6, 1983, from *South China Morning Post*, 6 November 1982, p. 5.

107. *CFF*, Vol. 8, 1985, p. 351.

108. *CFF*, Vol. 6, 1983, from *FBIS-CHI*, 212 2 November 1982, p. K1, citing *Hongqi*, November 1982: "The anti-aggressive war to come would be a people's war under modern conditions. Mao Zedong's great thought on people's warfare is still an important magic weapon for defeating the enemy."

109. From *Liberation Army Daily*, 26 July 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI* 144, 26 July 1983, p. K1.

110. *FBIS-CHI* 12, 19 January 1982, p. K11.

111. *Ibid.*

112. Testimony of Robert Gates, Joint Economic Committee, p. 94.

productivity from the PLA in the country's efforts at military modernization, of possible concessions to the military (it makes it easier to attract recruits if they can be promised training in useful civilian skills),¹¹³ and of a desire to break down the barriers that have traditionally segregated China's military from its civilian sectors.

The desire to integrate civilian with military sectors — and thus to reap the “spin-off” effects so publicized in the Allied World War II efforts and the American space program — resulted in the 1983 merger of the National Defense Industries Committee with the government's National Defense Science and Technology Commission to produce the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.¹¹⁴ Ding Henggao, the minister of the new commission, said in 1985 that:

The integration of the defense industry with civil industry and the transfer of military technology to civil use are not only necessary for civil industrial departments in maintaining their ability to undertake scientific research and production and fulfill their task in coordination with the defense industry; they are also effective ways to increase economic results and make more contributions to the state.¹¹⁵

In less direct terms, but with the same intent, Yang Shangkun, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission, said in 1983 that not only should the army be “an iron wall” in defending the country, but also an important force in building “socialist material and spiritual civilization.”¹¹⁶

Can these various changes be said to have sprung from or been inspired by contact with the West under the Open Door policy? Would they be reversed if China were to terminate or curtail contact with the West? The answer is probably mixed. All that is clear is that there are now elements in the military who have a strong interest in the Open Door.

WESTERN CHANGES FAVORABLE TO THE PLA

Western defense establishments have reacted favorably, despite initial hesitation, to the Open Door policy and the prospect of increased contact and cooperation with the PLA. This is most evident in the changes in export control regulations in the United States. The PRC had been in the restrictive “Y” category up until Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's January, 1980,

113. *Ibid.* Besides the CIA, this has been suggested by Ng-Quinn, “The Chinese Military: Political Demands and Control,” p. 265. Civilian production increased by 22.2 percent in 1983, while defense production increased by only 16.3 percent, according to Ng-Quinn. Although “civilianizing” the military would appear to be at odds with the professionalization campaign, Ng-Quinn points out that the government has justified it by linking civilian production by the military with the overall goal of economic construction and thus, by implication, with defense modernization.

114. William T. Tow, “Science and Technology in China's Defense,” *Problems of Communism*, (July-August 1985): 17-18.

115. Quoted in Tow, *Ibid.*, p. 19, from *Xinhua*, 5 June 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, 14 June 1985, p. K19.

116. *China Official Yearbook 1982/1983* p. 528.

visit to China and Vice Premier Geng Biao's return visit to the United States in May of that year. Subsequently, the U.S. State Department announced that China would be moved to a special "P" category, apart from other communist nations.¹¹⁷ Category P allows the sale of items with non-lethal military applications.

On June 16, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited Beijing and announced the United States would consider the sale of certain lethal or "offensive-capable" conventional weapons on a case-by-case basis.¹¹⁸ The United States in May, 1983, placed China in export control category "V," a category for friendly but not allied nations. Under this category, export of "dual-use" technology — technology with both civilian and military applications — would be routinely approved.¹¹⁹

American support for China's military modernization was also evident in persistent and ultimately successful efforts to get the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Controls (CoCom) to relax regulations governing exports to China.¹²⁰

Perhaps without the Open Door, there would be no reason for the United States to pressure its allies to relax export control regulations, nor to change its own regulations. The Open Door represents an open market for the Western arms industry, but it is also seen as a statement by China that it is tilted toward the West and away from the Soviet Union, a situation very much to be encouraged in the eyes of Western military leaders.¹²¹

CONCLUSIONS

Jonathan Pollack has suggested three possible security developments that could force China to change the priority of defense modernization and, interestingly, none of them relate to military unhappiness with the Four Modernizations or the Open Door policy. The changes which could require reevaluation of the Four Modernizations are: stepped-up Soviet military actions or additional Soviet deployments in Asia; renewed military tensions or serious hostilities within the region; or unexpectedly rapid technological breakthroughs in the SDI race.¹²² If anything, they are developments which can be combatted more effectively with an Open Door policy than with a policy of non-intercourse with the West.

The effect of a missile defense system such as SDI has already been discussed. Examples of the other two include the phenomenal and recent growth of the

117. *CFF*, Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 119-120, from U.S. Department of State, *Munitions Control Newsletter*, 81 (March 1980) and Stuart and Tow, p. 255.

118. Stuart and Tow, p. 254.

119. Lasater, p. 54.

120. EIC, *China, N. Korea*, No. 2, 1986, p. 10.

121. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger while in China, September 23, 1983, to meet with Deng and Zhao, said "The U.S. President considers an economically and militarily strong China as important for maintaining world peace." *Beijing Review*, 3 October 1983, p. 8.

122. Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Changing Perceptions on East Asian Security and Development," *Orbis*, Winter 1986, p. 793.

Soviet Pacific fleet from a coastal force into a blue water navy of 830 ships (although by no means are all of these ships of "blue water" capability),¹²³ continuing problems with Vietnam, and the awkward position China now finds itself in vis-a-vis North Korea.

Growing military and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea comes at a time when Chinese trade with South Korea (through Hong Kong) now exceeds trade with North Korea.¹²⁴ Particularly troubling is the fact that North Korea has granted the Soviets overfly rights (meaning that Soviet planes flying from Vladivostok to Vietnam can do close reconnaissance work on the Chinese coast) and there have been suggestions that the Soviets were granted use of the port of Nampo, less than 200 miles from important Chinese naval bases.¹²⁵ In both cases, cordial military relations with the United States serve to strengthen the Chinese deterrent, making overt moves by the Soviet Union less likely and decreasing the probability that a regional conflict might escalate to one involving the Soviets.

One might be tempted at first to conclude that the Four Modernizations have resulted in neglect of military modernization and been of little benefit to the military arising from increased contact with the West.

But such is not the case. The important distinction is between budgetary *increases*, which have been constrained, and non-budgetary improvements, which have been avidly sought. The Open Door policy has greatly supplemented the military's modernization at relatively little cost — probably at a profit — and, through the military's participation in the Open Door, the policy of contact with the West has been strengthened and the security position of China has been improved.

123. Clyde Haberman, "Challenge in the Pacific," *New York Times Magazine*, 7 September 1986, p. 26.

124. Pollack, p. 786.

125. Julian Baum, "Better Soviet-North Korean Ties Put Peking on the Spot," *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 November 1986, p. 28.

