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# Military Mergers: The Reintegration of Armed Forces After Civil Wars

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Over the past decade, the number of internal armed conflicts throughout the world has increased dramatically. Many of these conflicts end through foreign intervention, but they often do not result in outright victory for one party. In these situations, the future role of the armed forces in society, specifically their composition and relationship to civilian authority, is crucial to the long-term viability of formal peace accords. Creating legitimate military and police forces that will be accepted across the political spectrum is a difficult task. Therefore, the problem of integrating armed groups that were formerly at war with each other can be daunting.

Civil war scholar Charles King has argued that “negotiated settlements to conflicts are most likely in situations in which opponents are roughly equal in terms of power, resources, and goals.”<sup>1</sup> However, when all parties are roughly equal in terms of military strength, none of them will be eager to demilitarize or give up their hard-fought security gains. Thus, an increasing number of peace negotiations today face the inevitable challenge of downsizing and reintegrating bloated military forces. This paper argues that in most cases, a simple merger of the formerly warring parties—if implemented effectively—provides the best security guarantees for both sides and helps ensure that conflict will not recur.

The article analyzes six armed conflicts from various part of the world to demonstrate the issues that arise in such mergers: Bosnia, Kosovo, South Africa, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Angola. Although the sample size is limited, similar problems confronted policymakers in each situation, so some generalizations

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can be drawn from these diverse circumstances. The patterns that emerged from these conflicts lead to the following conclusions:

1. Political will to integrate is an absolute prerequisite to successful reintegration.
2. The specificity of the peace agreement will often determine how effectively the parties integrate later; a more specific agreement leads to more positive results.
3. The creation of unrealistic expectations for the integrating parties is detrimental; if outside resources for helping the integration process do not exist, the international community should avoid promising them at all costs.
4. The integration of the new armed forces' command structure is absolutely essential.
5. Outside trainers can achieve very positive results by introducing an ethic of professionalism and teaching the formerly warring parties western-style, civil-military relations.
6. Often, tasking the new military with a secondary role, such as responsibility for civil reconstruction projects, can hasten integration and free up scarce resources.

#### **FORMING NEW ARMIES: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS**

Of the six military mergers analyzed here, only two can be considered a success. In South Africa and Mozambique, the parties have not resumed fighting. Moreover, the military structures of the formerly warring parties have merged enough so that conflict is not likely to recur. The remaining four conflict areas have either had only qualified success—El Salvador and Bosnia—or have resumed small-scale or full-scale fighting—Kosovo and Angola. The following analysis seeks to identify the factors that determine the success or failure of military reintegration projects.

As Chart 1 demonstrates, there is almost no correlation between the amount of international resources committed to reintegration, the existence of an outside enforcement mechanism, and the ultimate success of the merger. Although one would expect the intensive efforts of the international community to speed up and promote reintegration, these resources are often wasted when not used correctly. Fortunately, there are several actions that the international community can undertake to improve its success ratio.

In contrast, the successful reintegrations have several things in common. First, in each successful case, all warring factions were completely—or at least mostly—committed to the peace process. Second, the peace agreement or agreement on military reintegration specifically set forth how the integration would

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occur and what was expected from each side. Finally, the command structure of the new military was integrated, so that representatives from each side had a voice in the new structure, but no party was able to veto the actions of the other.

The sections that follow analyze these factors in detail. Each section looks at one component part of the overall problem of military reintegration and then proposes solutions to it that should be applicable to future attempts to reintegrate formerly warring parties.

**CHART I:**

Factors	Bosnia	Kosovo	El Salvador	South Africa	Mozambique	Angola
Spoiler?	Greedy	Total/Greedy	Limited	None	Limited	Total/Greedy
Specificity of Peace Agreement	Low	Low	Medium	High	High	Low
Unrealistic Expectations Created?	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Somewhat
Outside Resources?	High	High	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
Outside Enforcement Mechanism?	Yes	Yes	Partial	No	Partial	Partial
Foreign Trainers?	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	???
Alternate Role for Military?	Somewhat	Somewhat	Somewhat	Somewhat	No	No
Integrated Command Structure?	Attempted	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Civil-military Relations Problematic?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Somewhat	Somewhat	Somewhat
Faces External Threat?	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Successful Reintegration?	Not Likely	Not Likely	Somewhat	Yes	Yes	No

## A. COMMITMENT TO THE PROCESS

Political will to integrate is a threshold problem without which no reconciliation is possible. The institutional arrangements created by peace accords should develop mechanisms that generate trust and increase cooperation between parties. However, as the examples of Angola and Bosnia demonstrate, political will cannot be manufactured from the outside. It is important to distinguish whether commitment to a peace agreement is sincere or merely a military tactic to buy time or rebuild military strength.

Unfortunately, the international community is often hesitant to allow civil wars to be fought to their logical conclusion. For example, the international community is generally reluctant to encourage secessions, because the governments who

intervene in a civil war might themselves be threatened by secessionist movements.<sup>2</sup> Thus, civil wars are often halted before the warring parties achieve their desired goals or exhaust themselves.<sup>3</sup> Naturally, this leaves behind parties that may be tempted to use the negotiated peace process only until a better opportunity presents itself. Stephen John Stedman, a scholar of civil wars and peace processes, explains that these disgruntled parties often act as spoilers of the peace process.

Stedman argues that there are several effective ways to evaluate and handle spoilers. He classifies spoilers into three types: limited spoilers who want certain concessions, but support the process as a whole; greedy spoilers who will take all they can get up to a point of diminishing returns; and total spoilers who feel they have no stake in the peace and want it to fail at all costs.<sup>4</sup> To deal with total spoilers, Stedman advocates using force or a "departing train" strategy of continuing the process without them.<sup>5</sup> Against greedy spoilers, he recommends a long term strategy of socialization—establishing "a set of norms for acceptable behavior by internal parties who commit to peace" and then carefully "calibrating the supply of carrots and sticks" to ensure that the spoiler abides by prescribed norms.<sup>6</sup> Finally, he argues that limited spoilers can be induced to remain committed to the peace process when their "reasonable demands" are met.<sup>7</sup>

While Stedman looks at peace processes as a whole, his analysis can also be extended specifically to military reintegration. Of the six examples, South Africa is unique in that no party sought to spoil the process in any fashion. In each of the other conflicts, spoilers played a large role. More importantly, the way in which the international community dealt with them often determined whether or not military reintegration would succeed. For example, in Angola's civil war, Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels repeatedly acted as greedy or total spoilers. Once they are recognized as such, Stedman's model helps to explain why the merger of Unita with the government military was a complete failure in spite of a process that very closely resembled the one used successfully in Mozambique. As Stedman explains, the U.N. continually tried to appease Unita and its leader in order to induce them to demobilize and reintegrate with the government military. It should have treated Savimbi more forcefully after his many infractions against the peace accords became known. In contrast, Mozambique's Renamo faction, a limited spoiler, was successfully induced to integrate its military command with that of Frelimo, thus slowly gaining political legitimacy.<sup>8</sup>

In Bosnia, a conflict that Stedman does not analyze, two potential spoilers are making reintegration nearly impossible. The Bosnian Serbs—greedy or total spoilers—have refused to participate meaningfully in the reintegration process. The international community supported the integration of the Federation military (Bosniacs and Croats) even though the Serbs refused to cooperate.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the international community was correct to use this departing train strategy, because once the Yugoslav regime no longer supplies all the military needs of the

Bosnian Serbs, they may still attempt to join (or at least cooperate with) the Federation Military.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately for Bosnia, the Bosnian Croats have also acted as a greedy spoiler. Until very recently, Croatia supported the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) financially, and leaders of the HVO in Bosnia openly stated that they were not interested in military reintegration.<sup>11</sup> In spite of their obstructive behavior, the international community has continually tried to induce the Croats to stay on board by allowing them to benefit from the Train-and-Equip program. Recently, however, the international community has taken a harsher stance towards HVO; whether or not this can save the stalled military reintegration process remains to be seen.<sup>12</sup>

It is perhaps ironic to talk about spoilers in Kosovo since the Kosovar Serbs never willingly signed a peace agreement, and have only been integrated in very small numbers into the new Kosovo Police Service, and not at all into the former KLA. In this process, both the former KLA and the Serbs have acted as total spoilers, and hope for real military reintegration is dim.<sup>13</sup> Finally, in El Salvador, the former FMLN guerrillas acted only as limited spoilers, stalling the reintegration process temporarily when their most important demands were not met.

As these examples demonstrate, military reintegration generally failed in situations where one or more parties were willing to spoil the reintegration process completely, or a more limited spoiler was mishandled by the international community. While this is not the only factor that influences the success of military integrations, the spoiler problem represents a threshold issue without which integration will not occur.

## RECOMMENDATION

Frequently, external actors who involve themselves in a peacemaking process commit a substantial amount of political capital and economic resources to the cause. Understandably, they do not want to see the peace process fail. In many of the cases discussed here, however, this fear of failure leads the outside actors to send precisely the wrong signals to the warring parties. For example, the U.N.'s appeasement of Unita only harmed the peace process since it enabled the spoiler to rearm, thus upsetting the military balance that had allowed an agreement to be negotiated in the first place. Once civil war broke out again, the parties fought for two full years to reestablish military balance to a degree that allowed further peace negotiations to occur.<sup>14</sup> As difficult and politically unpopular as such decisions will be, there may be some situations where it is better to allow a real military stalemate to develop than to accidentally strengthen the party which is blatantly violating the accords.<sup>15</sup>

## **B. THE REINTEGRATION PROCESS: INCENTIVES, RESOURCES, AND TRAINING**

Even if all parties to the conflict support the peace agreement and do not seek to spoil the process, unresolved grievances, distrust, and mutual suspicion will continue long after the actual fighting ends. The commitment of all sides to the peace process must be continually groomed and reaffirmed; thus, the process by which reintegration takes place becomes vitally important. While political will cannot be manufactured from the outside, external parties can discourage defection from the integration process, thus reaffirming the commitment that does exist.<sup>16</sup> Outside parties with a stake in the peace process must constantly be aware of the incentives their well-intentioned actions create on the ground.

There are two distinct areas where external actors can wield significant influence over the process: the signing of the peace agreement, and the manner in which they monitor compliance after the agreement is signed.

### **SIGNING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT**

During peace negotiations, both the parties and the international community may be tempted to leave many of the detailed issues associated with military reintegration to a later date. They do so with the hope that the warring parties will be more reasonable after tensions have somewhat dissipated.<sup>17</sup> The case studies demonstrate that this is generally a strategic mistake.

For example, in South Africa, military research groups from both sides were given several months to draft papers outlining their view of the future of South Africa's military.<sup>18</sup> These proposals were then discussed by leaders on both sides to create a detailed, mutually satisfactory integration program. These discussions helped all parties adjust to the impending changes before they occurred, and taught the military leadership how to work together constructively, thus enabling them to serve as role models for ordinary soldiers once the merger began. While it may not be possible to replicate this process exactly during the contentious peace negotiations of a more violent civil war, efforts should be made to settle the details of military reunification.

The other instances where military reunification was relatively successful—Mozambique and El Salvador—also began with peace agreements that specified every detail of the reintegration. In Mozambique, the General Peace Agreement detailed the number of soldiers, the command structure of the new military, and the exact timeline for the merger. Similarly, the peace accords in El Salvador specified what would happen with each part of the security sector including internal security forces, intelligence agencies, and paramilitary groups.<sup>19</sup> In fact, the major setbacks of the peace process in the country occurred over issues that were not outlined specifically in the peace accords.<sup>20</sup>

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By contrast, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Angola, where the peace agreements were somewhat less specific with regards to military reintegration, the process has been fraught with problems. Although negotiators in Angola attempted to draft very specific provisions, both Unita and the government stalled. Therefore, only the general outlines of what a new, unified military would look like were decided. This gave Unita more maneuvering room to stall the integration process once it was underway.<sup>21</sup> The Dayton Peace Accords, although remarkably detailed in many other respects, largely ignore the issue of military reunification.<sup>22</sup> In part, this is due to the fact that the U.S. had struck a verbal side agreement with the Bosniacs that promised them substantial military aid in return for abandoning their Islamic sponsors.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, in Kosovo, the difficult issue of what to do about the KLA was left to a separate agreement. Unfortunately, this agreement is so vague that former KLA leaders and the international community have interpreted it in completely different and incompatible ways.<sup>24</sup> In all three cases, misunderstandings about the reintegration have been frequent, arguments have been heated, and progress has either stalled or broken down completely.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The conflicts analyzed here demonstrate that, however unpleasant they may be, the difficult details of military reintegration should be discussed before a peace agreement is signed. Negotiators of such treaties may be understandably concerned that focusing on details of command structure, verification mechanisms, and so forth will only increase the chances of completely derailing the peace process. However, if one or more parties are not willing to resolve these issues during peace negotiations, they are unlikely to be more inclined to do so later.

Although it will be impossible to completely plan the merger of two militaries during the peace negotiations, the agreement should at least aim to answer the following questions: *Should demobilization precede or follow the integration of all armed forces?* Generally, it is probably best to demobilize all unneeded soldiers first, and then to choose those who will be integrated into the new military during the demobilization process. However, South Africa agreed to merge all forces and then slowly begin the process of discharging excess personnel in order to ease the transition to civilian life for its former soldiers. This method nearly bankrupted the South African Defense Ministry—since it continued to pay the salaries of redundant soldiers—but it did manage to avoid some of the social unrest that often follows the large-scale dismissal of former combatants.<sup>25</sup> While there may not be one correct answer to this question, the issue should be discussed during the peace process in order to avoid creating unrealistic expectations for former combatants.

*How many soldiers will remain in the new military?* It may not be possible to answer this question with complete accuracy, since guerrilla forces often do not know exactly how many people fought in their ranks, and the government will not know exactly how much money it can budget for the military after the conflict ends. For example, in Mozambique, the government has been unable to recruit the number of soldiers it initially planned to have, because the limited compensation the government pays enlisted men has caused them to seek employment elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> However, a rough estimate of the size of the new military is necessary to ensure that both former combatants—many of whom will have to return to civilian life—and international donors—who may fund the new, integrated military as well as the demobilization programs—will know what to expect.

*What type of command structure will the new military have?* While it may be too complicated and time-consuming to work out all of the details of a military command structure during the peace negotiations, all formerly warring parties should be encouraged to agree to an ethnically or politically integrated structure. By signing the agreement, the parties should understand that they are committing to taking military orders from the other side at times. In Mozambique and South Africa, setting clear boundaries in the beginning helped the integration process later on.<sup>27</sup> The current impasse over military reintegration in Bosnia can to some degree be traced to the lack of agreement on command and control issues before the Dayton Agreement was signed. The command structure of the Federation Military was not decided upon until eight months after Dayton, and now it must often be forcefully maintained by the international community.<sup>28</sup> Negotiators should be aware of these potential pitfalls and should ensure that all parties are committed to legitimately unifying their military commands.

*How much outside assistance will the reintegrating military receive and for how long?* This is often a difficult issue to resolve during negotiations, since donors are generally not present at the peace conference itself. Unfortunately, international donors are often reluctant to give aid to former combatants or future soldiers in an integrated army, although the success of the entire peace process often hinges on the successful reform of the security sector.<sup>29</sup> Additionally, donors may be interested in giving at first, but when the integration takes longer than expected—as it almost always does—their interest may ebb as other crises move into the spotlight.<sup>30</sup> Whether or not international donors are willing to support the reintegration process financially, all parties at the negotiation should try to gain a clear understanding of how much assistance they can expect to receive, thus avoiding proposals that cannot be carried out effectively due to lack of resources.

In sum, the peace agreement should be as specific as possible under the circumstances, and should avoid creating unrealistic expectations for the warring parties.

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## AFTER THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED: HOW CAN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ENCOURAGE COMPLIANCE?

Even after the peace negotiations have concluded, external actors often have substantial influence over the peace-making process. While the international community cannot create peace when one or more of the warring parties do not want it, they can help to generate trust between the parties and strengthen their overall commitment to the peace process. Unfortunately, these opportunities for generating trust are often wasted by international community promising too much and then failing to deliver, or by disagreements among external actors that undermine compliance. What can be done to improve this often chaotic process? The following observations suggest some solutions:

*Decide early who will monitor compliance, and centralize the function of overseeing military reintegration as much as possible.* While this may seem like a simple solution, it is often very difficult to achieve in practice. Various donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs will be on the ground at the same time, funding different projects, and often cooperating much less than might be expected. In Bosnia, for example, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is charged with overseeing civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords, while IFOR is supposed to enforce compliance. However, the project integrating the Bosniac and Croat militaries—the Train and Equip program—is funded exclusively by America and several Islamic countries, and organized through a private company, MPRI.<sup>31</sup> Many of the Contact Group countries that participate in IFOR and the OHR oppose the Train and Equip program. Needless to say, coordination has often been less than smooth, and many violations of the Accords go unpunished.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, in El Salvador, at least two dozen international organizations were involved in implementing the peace accords. While a round table was established to coordinate the activities of different groups helping to restructure the security sector, coordination was still problematic at times.<sup>33</sup> Inevitably, a large number of organizations will take part in the reintegration process. Ideally, their representatives should all report to, or at least coordinate with, one central body that makes the final decision on difficult compliance issues.

*Gauge whether enough resources exist to avoid social unrest.* All too often, the mandate of the peace-building force and the resources available to it are terribly mismatched. A large body of literature has generally addressed this problem in peacekeeping efforts,<sup>34</sup> but it is equally true for the single task of reintegrating formerly warring parties. Of the conflicts analyzed here, Mozambique and South Africa stand out as examples where the costs of reintegration were underestimated by planners, causing dangerous periods of social unrest, and potentially derailing the peace process.

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The Mozambican government, anxious to maintain a relatively large military, seriously underestimated the amount of resources available to fund the armed forces. As a result, a demobilizing soldier had the option of finding a second income and received greater financial assistance than a soldier in the newly integrated army. Understandably, some parts of the army soon mutinied, creating a renewed political and social crisis.<sup>35</sup> In South Africa, the decision to merge all former combatants before discharging those that were not needed created a serious financial crisis for Nelson Mandela's new government.<sup>36</sup> Even if the government has sufficient resources to pay the newly integrating soldiers adequately, external monitoring forces are often grossly under-funded. Pier Segala, chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission in Mozambique, commented that the U.N. "should not assume monitoring responsibilities unless it can guarantee that an adequate number of military observers and staff is on the ground."<sup>37</sup>

While it may not always be possible to accurately estimate the level of resources necessary to complete the military reintegration, donors should be encouraged to devote a much larger relative portion of their resources to reforming the security sector. Often they are hesitant to provide resources because they may view former combatants as somehow more 'at fault' than civilian victims of the conflict are. However, usually the military and security sectors are the major sources of destabilization and human rights violations. Once these sectors are "fixed," trust will be generated on all sides, and much of the remaining peace process can fall into place.

*Invest in training.* Finally, the importance of training or retraining those soldiers joining the new military cannot be underestimated. While training programs alone may not guarantee the success of the merger, foreign military educators can do much to help parties overcome their mutual distrust, teach western doctrines of civil-military relations, and instill a professional ethic in soldiers who often received no formal training prior to combat.

Recently, several commentators have written rather alarmist articles about the use of private militaries in conflict areas.<sup>38</sup> MPRI, the private American company that currently runs Bosnia's Train and Equip program,<sup>39</sup> has been a particular target. While in some cases the combat training activities of such companies may be objectionable, they have generally played a positive role in the case studies analyzed here. In Bosnia, MPRI works closely with the U.S. State Department, enabling the U.S. to help the Bosnian Federation Army indirectly without overtly abandoning their neutral stance. The company's program in Bosnia has successfully trained multiple classes of officers in defensive tactics, civil-military relations, and the general operations of a western military.<sup>40</sup> The training program has been the most successful aspect of military reintegration.

The British training team in South Africa was similarly helpful. Nine British officers led the team that assembled a fully integrated peacekeeping force comprising troops from the former apartheid force, the SADF, as well as two anti-apartheid

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guerilla groups in only a few weeks. While the new force performed only adequately during its first deployment, the experience forced the soldiers to work together one-on-one for the first time, thereby laying the foundation for future cooperation.<sup>41</sup>

In each conflict where foreign training teams have been employed, integration has proceeded more smoothly as a result. The presence of a neutral third party to oversee the officers' first personal contacts, arbitrate disputes, and instill a sense of professionalism is indispensable. Therefore, it should be part of every military integration effort.

Naturally, many of the recommendations above are easier to spell out on paper than to execute in practice. Many will be difficult to implement, and some will be more useful in certain situations than others. However, they provide a useful checklist for policymakers to consider when deciding whether or not to get involved in a peacemaking process at all. Once the decision to engage has been made, they may help external actors not to repeat the mistakes made in some of these reintegration efforts.

#### WHAT KIND OF MILITARY?

Unfortunately, both international actors and the warring parties are often too caught up in the details of the peace-making process to step back and consider what kind of military their country needs or can afford. Political considerations, such as keeping former combatants content and appeasing ambitious military officers on all sides, frequently result in nominally reintegrated militaries that drain already scarce public funds, and are far too large or unwieldy to be very useful to the state.

#### COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ARMY

While the officers and soldiers from one of the warring parties may be far more competent than those from another, the new military will only be acceptable to each party if all sides are equally represented. At the same time, the military will only be effectively integrated, instead of just merged on paper, once individual merit and good judgment trump political considerations. In any reintegration process, the international community must carefully balance these tensions. To manage the process effectively, several questions should be considered:

*Will the headquarters and command structure be ethnically and/or politically integrated?* As argued above, both the new defense ministry and the command structure of the military should be as integrated as possible under the circumstances. Enlisted soldiers will generally be influenced by their leaders' example. Thus, if the military leadership takes every decision along ethnic or political lines instead of following the best course for the armed forces as a whole, integration

will not occur at lower levels of the military. In South Africa, the seemingly cohesive decision-making by former MK and SADF leaders helped to reestablish order after thousands of former MK fighters mutinied in 1994.<sup>42</sup> In Angola, many Unita soldiers may have been happy either to demobilize or join the new integrated force, but Savimbi and his generals retained complete control over their forces. When the Unita generals walked out of the joint military en masse after losing a key election, their military structure remained completely intact, and going back to war was all too easy.<sup>43</sup> Integration of the parties cannot be successful until the leaders of each side become accustomed to working together to benefit the institution as a whole instead of merely catering to their own constituencies.<sup>44</sup>

*How deep should the integration be? Will individual battalions train as ethnically or politically separate groups, or must there be 'soldier for soldier' integration?* Again, more seems to be better when it comes to integration. Distrust and hostility between the parties can only be reduced once individuals from both sides work together and see for themselves that their former enemies are not as inhuman as they may have seemed during war. Foreign-sponsored training programs such as the ones mentioned above can be very helpful in this regard. For example, Bosnia's Train and Equip program has produced very positive results by forcing former enemies to sleep in the same barracks, eat the same meals, and study in the same classrooms.<sup>45</sup>

Unfortunately, military integration does not end with the conclusion of international training programs. These programs will lose their effect if recruiting for the new military still occurs along ethnic or political lines. In many cases, this is a very difficult problem to overcome. While Train and Equip aims to integrate the Federation Military on a soldier by soldier basis, this may not be possible since recruits sign up in their home regions, which—thanks to the war—are almost completely dominated by one ethnic group or another.<sup>46</sup> While these issues remain problematic, joint training efforts and joint work on simple tasks like civil reconstruction projects may help to improve the success rate of military integrations.

## FUNCTIONS OF THE NEW MILITARY

Often, parties just ending a civil war face no serious outside threat. In fact, one might expect the existence of an outside threat to spur the true integration of the former warring parties in order to defend against their joint enemy. While the sample of conflicts studied here is too small to test this hypothesis, it is clear that at least in Bosnia, the continued existence of Republika Srpska as a potential threat has not led to increased integration with the Bosnian Croats. On the contrary, the Bosnian Croats continue to look to an outside actor, Croatia, for protection in case of renewed conflict with the Serbs.

In the remaining cases, countries faced only an insignificant threat from the outside world, raising the question of what function the newly reintegrated military should serve. Too often, all parties to the conflict assume that the existence of a military is necessary, when limited resources could be spent on more vital tasks such as reconstruction and economic development. For example, in El Salvador, the military is not really needed to defend against outside enemies. Instead of preparing to defend the country, the Salvadoran Armed Forces have spent much of their time—even after the signing of the peace accords—creating internal security roles for themselves in order to justify their large budget.<sup>47</sup> South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola also face only a limited outside threat. However, the idea of abolishing the military altogether or creating a new type of defense force was entertained only in South Africa, and even there it was shelved after limited discussion. Alternatives to a traditional military are often not politically feasible immediately after a conflict, due to each side's need for security guarantees in the event of renewed violence. However, the various alternatives presented below could be considered long-term solutions to the security problem.

*Complete disarmament.* First, all parties to the conflict could agree to disarm completely. Assuming the disarmament could be monitored effectively, this would provide the best solution to both the resource and insecurity problems. Jacques Klein, the former Deputy High Representative for Bosnia, privately advocates such a strategy for all three Bosnian parties. Unfortunately, military leaders are not likely to advocate such a position, and mutual distrust will lead each side to assume that it would be left defenseless if its opponent were to cheat during demilitarization.

*An entirely new army.* Alternatively, the country could start over by dismissing all soldiers who participated in the previous conflict and slowly building an integrated army from scratch.<sup>48</sup> This solution may avoid the worst of the ethnic or political tension, but starting over is no panacea. First, due to the very young age at which many boys are recruited to fight in civil wars, there may not be enough military-aged men who were not involved in the conflict.<sup>49</sup> Secondly, many of these new recruits will harbor the hatreds and prejudices passed down to them from their parents.

*A National Guard or gendarmerie.* The parties could form a national guard or gendarmerie with some non-military functions. This option would preserve each side's perceived need for military protection, but would free up much needed resources. The new gendarmerie could continue to receive some military training, but would be used for other tasks such as border/customs control and reconstruction. The Kosovar Protection Corps follows this model to some extent, although KLA leaders and external actors differ somewhat in their interpretation of the Corps' function.<sup>50</sup>

*Service Corps.* Finally, all soldiers in the new military could be required to serve in completely integrated service corps in order to aid integration. The idea of a service corps was employed effectively in South Africa, where it was used to provide vocational training to former soldiers who had to be demobilized. Even the Salvadoran military successfully carried out several reconstruction projects in parts of the country.<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, neither of these programs was comprehensive enough. Often, they involved only portions of the military, or used only soldiers from one party. A mandatory service program for the entire merged military would not only free up scarce government resources, but force former enemies to work side by side, thus reducing prejudices and misconceptions.

While the options listed here may not be feasible in every conflict situation, they have been included to demonstrate that alternatives to traditional militaries do exist. Too often, these choices are dismissed without any real thought.

#### **CIVILIAN CONTROL—SEPARATING POLICE AND MILITARY FUNCTIONS**

During periods of civil wars, the functions of the military sector often increase dramatically. Frequently, the distinction between regular armed forces, internal security forces, and police become blurred, thereby encouraging widespread abuses of power. Reversing this process is a crucial but difficult task for parties truly committed to peace. These problems have proved particularly intractable in El Salvador, but South Africa and Kosovo also experienced them to some degree.

While commentators agree that it is important to establish a clear and workable distinction between army and police, they disagree on exactly where the division should be made and how it should be implemented. For example, FMLN negotiators in El Salvador made the dissolution of the various security services operated by the military their primary objective.<sup>52</sup> However, Robert Henderson, a South Africa scholar, believes that the organizational and professional skills of former intelligence and security forces suggest that demobilization of such units is not necessarily the best option. He believes that such actions can lead to the proliferation of private armies and security agencies, especially in times of limited employment opportunities and continued tensions.<sup>53</sup>

A look at El Salvador eight years after the peace accords were signed seems to suggest that Henderson is correct to some extent. Many security forces were not dissolved as planned, but simply renamed or absorbed completely into a new institution.<sup>54</sup> In Kosovo, the international community is experiencing similar problems with the intelligence arm and police force of the former KLA, which have refused to disband and may still wield some influence in the region.<sup>55</sup>

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While a detailed discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this study, several observations can be made. First, soldiers who served in militaries that were used for internal security purposes should be retrained for conventional army operations before joining a new, integrated force. Training programs run by outside actors such as Train and Equip in Bosnia, the British training program in South Africa, and to some extent the police retraining program in El Salvador can be very useful in this regard. To the extent that these programs focus only on the military and exclude training of the national guard, intelligence, and police services, additional programs should be set up to train these institutions. While this is a relatively expensive proposition, the security of the public is the linchpin of any peace agreement, and the significant destabilizing effect these forces can have should convince donors that their money will be well-spent.

Second, significant international oversight to ensure that new security sector institutions are transparent is absolutely vital.<sup>56</sup> Peace agreements that call for the dissolution of these groups will mean nothing if these groups can be reconstituted in their old form under a new name. In order to ensure that the distinction between military and police sticks, even after the international community has left, many analysts advocate reforming the way budgets are made in the military sector to improve transparency and accountability. Additionally, they point out that screening procedures for new applicants to security forces must be monitored carefully by impartial observers.<sup>57</sup>

While these few proposals alone cannot resolve the much studied problem of civil-military relations, they should serve as a helpful start for those policy-makers who are tasked with implementing security sector reform.

## CONCLUSION

The reintegration of formerly warring parties represents the core of many modern peace processes. When a civil war has ended with a stalemate or an externally imposed solution/negotiation rather than with a military victory by one side, the ability of the two armies to integrate will determine the success of the overall peace. Considering the importance of the issue of military mergers to modern peace processes, it is surprising that so little scholarship has been dedicated to the subject. This brief study begins to draw lessons from the various military reintegrations that have been attempted over the past decade. The military mergers analyzed here demonstrate that relatively limited steps such as making peace agreements specific to military reintegration, forcing the military commands to integrate fully, and avoiding the creation of unrealistic expectations, can mean the difference between success and failure. ■

## NOTES

- 1 Charles King, "Ending Civil Wars," *Adelphi Paper 308, IISS* (1997): 40.
- 2 For a similar argument see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 229-230, 272-277.
- 3 See generally Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Civil Wars," *International Security* 20 (1996): 136.
- 4 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22:2 (5) (Spring 1997): 9-15.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 15.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 13, 15.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 12, 15.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 40-43. Stedman focuses on efforts to induce Renamo to participate in elections, but the same analysis holds true for military reintegration: foreign governments offered to train and professionalize the military in return for Renamo's cooperation.
- 9 See "Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement," *ICG Report* (October 28, 1999): 12. <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/>.
- 10 Unfortunately, the defeat of Milosevic and the rise to power of Vojislav Kostunica in Belgrade in the Fall of 2000 has not diminished Yugoslavia's (FRY) intense interest in Republica Srpska (RS). In March 2001, the FRY and RS signed an agreement strengthening their ties. Although this was not a military agreement, it does not aid the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See "Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *ICG Report* (March 15, 2001): 7. <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/>.
- 11 Croatia's obstructive behavior has improved somewhat since the death of hardline Croat leader Tudjman. In February 2001, Croatia finally cut off all funding to the HVO. See "Turning Strife to Advantage....," 2.
- 12 For example, when Ante Jelavic, the Croat member of the tripartite presidency, appointed a hardline Croat nationalist as the Croat representative to the military joint command in violation of the new constitution, the international community in Bosnia reversed the appointment by systematically destroying various pieces of HVO equipment until Jelavic relented. See Interview with Mirza Haijric, Assistant to President Itzebegovic, January 7, 1999. More recently, on March 7, 2001, the international community removed hardliner Ante Jelavic from his position as member of the tripartite presidency for calling for the independence of the Croat communities in the Bosnian Federation. See "Turning Strife to Advantage....," Executive Summary.
- 13 See "What Happened to the KLA?" *ICG Report* (March 3, 2000); "Kosovo Report Card," *ICG Report* (August 28, 2000).
- 14 See generally Victoria Brittain, "Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War" (1998): 56-59; Karl Maier, "Angola: Promises and Lies," (1996): 80.
- 15 For similar arguments, see Chaim Kaufman.
- 16 Mats Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars," *Adelphi Paper 303, IISS* (1996): 59.
- 17 For a similar argument addressing the demobilization of former combatants more generally, see Berdal, 74.
- 18 See William Gutteridge, *South Africa: From Apartheid to National Unity, 1981-1994*, (1995): 219-221.
- 19 See United Nations, *Acuerdos de Paz* (New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1992); Terry Karl, "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (2) (1992): 147-162; and Christine M. Cervenak, "Learning on the Job: Organizational Interaction in El Salvador, 1991-1995," (CMG, 1997): 1-6.
- 20 For example, the demobilization of the FMLN ground to a halt when it was discovered that the Peace Accords made no real provisions for concentration sites and when 140 'new' policemen were drawn straight from a military controlled anti-narcotics unit—an oversight in the peace negotiations. See Cervenak, 39-40.
- 21 The Lusaka Protocol provides only that the Unita generals who left the FAA should be reintegrated into it, that the new army should "reflect the principle of proportionality" (Annex 4.I.2.) and that a working group would be set up to "supervise the completion of the formation of the FAA." (Annex 4.III.Phase I). See Lusaka Protocol, 1994, Annex 4.
- 22 There are two annexes that specifically deal with military issues: Annex I-A, and I-B. Unfortunately, Annex I-A deals only with the immediate disengagement of forces, and the status of IFOR, while Annex I-B makes general recommendations for regional arms control and confidence building. A model for a new, integrated army is completely absent. Moreover, IFOR only guaranteed the implementation of Annex I-A, a decision that has greatly hindered the reintegration of the military. See "The Dayton Accord, General Framework: Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," (November 21, 1995): Annex I-A and I-B. See also "Is Dayton Failing?" which deplores that IFOR refuses to enforce large portions of the Dayton Accords.



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- 23 Tammy Arbuckl, "Building a Bosnian Army," *Jane's International Defense Review* (August 1997); Tom Hundley, "Critics Fear U.S. Planting Seeds of War by Training Bosnia Army," *Chicago Tribune*, July 13, 1997. See also Interview with Jaques Klein, Principal Deputy High Representative, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, January 7, 1999; and Interview with Ed Soyster, Spokesman for MPRI, December 15, 1998.
  - 24 "What happened to The KLA?" *ICG Report* (March 3, 2000); and "Kosovo Report Card," *ICG Report* (August 28, 2000): 10-13. Report explains that the Kosovo Protection Corps—designed by the international community to be an unarmed civil defense force—is viewed by most Albanians as the nucleus of a future army for an independent Kosovo.
  - 25 Berdal, 54.
  - 26 Chris Alden, "Swords Into Ploughshares? The United Nations and Demilitarization in Mozambique," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1997): 6. <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a003.htm>, posted on July 4, 1997.
  - 27 In Mozambique, for example, the highest ranking former Renamo officer recently sided with the Frelimo defense minister on the issue of conscription, overruling the objections of his fellow Renamo officers. See "Mozambique to Resume Military Registration in August," *Panafrican News Agency* (July 9, 1998), as cited in "Child Soldiers Organization Report on Mozambique," (1999). <http://www.child-soldiers.org/mozambique.htm>; and "Deputy Chief of Staff Support for Conscription," *AIM Reports* (122) (November 18, 1997).
  - 28 For example, SFOR had to threaten to destroy HVO equipment in order to force the Croat member of the tripartite presidency to rescind hiring decisions made purely on ethnic grounds.
  - 29 "Kosovo Report Card," *ICG Report* (August 28, 2000): 11-12. The report states that funding for the Kosovo Protection Corps has been insufficient and irregular. In the Summer of 2000 it threatened to dry up completely.
  - 30 For example, it was difficult to get renewed donor support for Bosnia when the Kosovo crisis took center stage.
  - 31 For a general review of a similarly disjointed structure of international aid in El Salvador, see Christine Cervenak, "Organizational Interaction in El Salvador, 1991-1995," *Conflict Management Group* (February 1997).
  - 32 Interview with Mirza Hajric.
  - 33 Cervenak, 201. In one instance, the peace negotiators had designated sites for FMLN demobilization, but in the chaotic implementation process, no one was charged with preparing these sites to take in former combatants.
  - 34 See generally Nicole Ball and Tammy Halevy, "Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community," *Policy Essay* 18 (ODC, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Susan Rosegrant and Michael Watkins, "A Seamless Transition: United States and United Nations Operations in Somalia: 1992-1993," Parts A and B (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1996). Argues that the peace-keeping operation in Somalia went seriously wrong due to a mismatch in mandate and resources.
  - 35 Chris Alden, "Swords Into Ploughshares? The United Nations and Demilitarization in Mozambique," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1997): 7.
  - 36 Gutteridge, 226.
  - 37 Weimer Kuehne and Fandrych, eds., "International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique," 22.
  - 38 Juan Carlos Zarate, "The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 34 (75) (1998); and Paul Harris, "Privatizing War: Military Advising Is Growth Industry," *Insight Magazine*, August 26, 1996.
  - 39 Recently renamed Train and Integrate.
  - 40 See Interview with Ed Beville, Train and Equip Spokesman for Bosnia, MPRI, January 8, 1999. See also "Train and Equip Fact Sheet."
  - 41 Gutteridge, 223.
  - 42 Christopher A. Ford, "Watching the Watchdog: Security Oversight Law in South Africa," *Michigan Journal of Race and Law* 59(3): 103.
  - 43 Brittain, 56; and Maier, 80.
  - 44 A sign of successful integration in Mozambique came when one of Renamo's top generals sided with the government over a conscription policy which many members of his own party opposed.
  - 45 Ed Beville, an MPRI trainer in Bosnia, explained to me that during their first meetings with the Croats and Bosniacs, the parties sat on opposite sides of the table, armed to the teeth, and refused to speak directly to each other, so that all messages had to be relayed through MPRI. By the time I visited the training center two years later, trainees from both sides were joking with each other, and working closely together.
  - 46 See Interview with Beville.
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- 47 This rather cynical view of El Salvador's Armed Forces is shared by several commentators. See Cervenak; and Philip Williams and Knut Walter, *Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).
- 48 I discussed this alternative with General Nash, former commander of IFOR in Bosnia, on December 7, 1998.
- 49 The problem of child soldiers is particularly acute in parts of Africa, including Angola and Mozambique.
- 50 "Kosovo Protection Corps to be Formally Established on 19 January," *U.N. Press Release*, January 14, 2000; "What happened to the KLA?" *ICG Report* (March 3, 2000); and "Kosovo Report Card," *ICG Report* (August 28, 2000).
- 51 Jacques Klein, the former Deputy High Representative in Bosnia, has worked on setting up a multi-ethnic border patrol unit in Bosnia that partially implements this idea as well. Interview with Professor Abram Chayes, March 18, 2000.
- 52 Williams and Walker, 151-152.
- 53 Robert D'A Henderson, "South African Intelligence under De Klerk," in Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt eds., *About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence* (1995), 158-159.
- 54 Williams and Walker, 153-162; and George Vickers and Jack Spence et. al., *Endgame* (Cambridge, Mass.: Hemisphere Initiatives, 1992), 13.
- 55 See "What Happened to the KLA?", 10-11.
- 56 For an elaboration of this argument see Nicole Ball, "Reducing Military Expenditure in Africa," Paper prepared for Global Coalition for Africa (April 1992); and Kevin A. O'Brien, "South Africa's New Intelligence Environment," in Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt eds., *About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence* (1995), 170-191, as cited in Berdal, 56.
- 57 Berdal, 57.
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