

not be regarded as carrying on under very different conditions and with many modifications, the heritage of Descartes and of the philosophy of consciousness which he initiated.

Sartre receives more extended treatment in this book than does any other philosopher; and while the *réalité vécue* aspect of his thought may be somewhat over-emphasized at the expense of his argumentation, the account we are given of his thought is admirably executed on the whole. On one point, however, I would register my dissent from the author's judgment. She sees the *Critique de la raison dialectique* as marking quite simply the end of Sartre's Existentialism which is replaced by Marxism and a peculiar kind of dialectical sociology. I am not so sure; and, indeed, I think that large sections of that work, like the description of the relationship to one another of people in a queue and the account of the formation of groups, would be incomprehensible if one did not tacitly assume that the human beings Sartre is describing have the ontological structure of the *pour-soi* as set forth in *L'Être et le néant*. Of course, the medium in which they are situated is now the social and historical world and not that of the pebbles and mud which played such an important role in Sartre's early thought. But as the author herself very perceptively points out, there is a similarity between the viscosity of things by which free conscious existence is constantly threatened and "the equally viscous chaos of the Marxist historical origins of society." It could be argued that what Sartre has attempted to do is to deepen his earlier Existentialism rather than to abandon it, and to do this by displaying what Descartes called "la multiplication des seules" as a new and infinitely more complex human environment within which the individual *pour-soi* finds its ontological freedom strangely devalued. It is, of course, a large and difficult question whether institutions and historical processes can be understood as a dialectic which is decomposable into the dialectics of individual human lives, as Sartre now believes; and there can be no guarantee that the original characterization of the ontological structure of human existence can survive unmodified within this new milieu. But the very nature of this heroic and probably unmanageable task which Sartre has set himself betrays the same ineradicable moral individualism which runs through all of his writings. It is an individualism which has had to reappraise itself in the light of its social and historical conditions and which now faces prospects that seem almost more hopeless than they did when it counterposed itself mainly to a world of things and to other individual human beings. But Existentialism surely could not have survived simply as a philosophy of individual consciousness and without the amplification that such a philosophy can receive only by assimilating the full human experience of the social and historical world and, eventually, that of natural science as well, as Mrs. Warnock observes. Such an effort of assimilation need not mark the end of Existentialism. It may, in fact, be its only possible line of growth toward a more adequate formulation which need not retain the old and rather silly name but would still reserve a large place for the distinctive features of human existence, as I think Sartre's thought even now does.

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*The Subject of Consciousness.* By C. O. EVANS. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970. Pp. 240. Price £2.75.)

Since the revolution in method of Wittgenstein and Ryle, philosophers of mind have generally turned their backs on the methods of the introspective tradition emanating from Descartes. Professor Evans calls the old way the *self-approach* and the new way the *persons-approach*, and acknowledging that "the *persons-approach* has been very successful", he claims that we have nevertheless discarded something valuable. He attempts in this courageously unfashionable book to provide new answers to the questions of self-identity and self-knowledge from an introspectionist point of view.

Evans' theory hinges on dividing the elements of consciousness into those that are *objects of attention* and those that form the "background". The latter domain he calls *unprojected consciousness*, and includes in it not only the familiar peripheral residues of perception, but such inaccessible entities as the "master idea" that governs a visual search (for one's pencil, say) without being the *object* of one's attention (one could hardly search if one's attention were glued on the idea of one's pencil). Unprojected consciousness is defined negatively as whatever in consciousness is not an object of attention, but Evans attempts to give it some positive characterization. In particular, he elements (events? operations? states?) of unprojected consciousness all in one way or another depend on bodily activity, a discovery that is supposed to save them from Occam's razor in spite of the fact that Evans defines 'bodily' in such a way that a ghost might be said to have a body (p. 220). I think what he is getting at may be that we must consider the functions of unprojected consciousness to be bodily functions but need not tie ourselves to any particular physical realization.

Evans' startling central thesis is that the self, the subject of consciousness, is to be identified with unprojected consciousness. This stroke is claimed to sail us between the Scylla of Pure Ego Theories (by allowing the self to be "experiential") and the Charybdis of Serial or Bundle Theories (by providing for the necessary unity of self and "polarity" of consciousness), but even in terms of the metaphors of introspectionists this appears to be an outright category mistake: identifying the audience with what goes on backstage. Evans notes the objection, and his way out is as remarkable as his way in: he simply denies that 'I' refers to the self. "In order to supply a token which can be used to symbolize the subject of consciousness let us choose the token I. ['I' and 'I' are thus different "tokens".] This would enable us to bring out the subject-object duality of consciousness in the descriptions we give ourselves of our experiences in the form 'I have an experience X'." (p. 176). But if 'I' is an arbitrary token (and could as well be 'a' or 'b') surely the correct grammatical form would be "I has an experience X", and how one would get from such a proposition to a first-person claim becomes totally mysterious. How Evans can find himself immune to Shoemaker's warnings on this score (he cites him several times) is a perplexing question. (Evans makes many ecumenical attempts to discuss the views of persons-approach philosophers—Hampshire, Strawson, Ryle—but he does not have a good ear for the nuances of ordinary language; at one point (p. 199) his argument is marred by the supposition that "aware" is a verb.)

Evans recognizes that his view is not intuitive, but claims it is the most parsimonious and powerful of self-approach theories and offers some strong support for this claim. Even supposing he is correct, this is scant recommendation to the persons-approach man who holds that his own approach exhausts the topic, as Evans recognizes. What insights, we may ask, have been given that are unavailable to the persons-approach, or what problems solved that are not generated merely by adopting the self-approach? I find very little. What strikes me as true in Evans' analysis—and a lot strikes me as true—seems both familiar and readily translatable, and there is much that strikes me as false. One of Evans' central claims is, I believe, not only a major error, but perhaps the characteristic error of the self-approach. Evans holds that unprojected consciousness, while by definition outside the beam of attention, is nevertheless "experiential" (see, e.g., p. 180), a claim I take to imply that we have privileged, non-inferential access to what happens in our unprojected consciousness. While I endorse the claim that there are many epistemic goings-on outside of our awareness, and agree that these are somehow bodily events, and that they are a precondition—too often ignored or underestimated—of there being any objects of consciousness, I remain unconvinced that we have any non-inferential access to them. The "introspective evidence" Evans introduces to support the claim in fact strikes me as supporting the contrary. For instance, he suggests at several points (pp. 80, 168) that in view of our necessary inability to attend to elements of unprojected consciousness "it is only in retrospect" that we can acquaint ourselves with such elements; but what can this mean? It must mean that we say to ourselves something like: "I was attending to x then and was not aware of y at all, but since the absence of y from my unprojected consciousness would have somehow alerted me to pay attention to this absence, y was (must have been) in my unprojected consciousness at that time". For instance, I was listening to Jones as I drank my coffee, and was not aware of the lip of the cup touching my lip, but I would surely not have tipped the cup unless I had somehow felt the lip of the cup, so the feeling of contact must have been in my unprojected consciousness. This is surely how we do come to populate the domain of unprojected consciousness, but this is itself an inference, not a report of any sort of non-inferential experience to which we pay quasi-attention.

Whatever valuable insights one may find in Evans' analysis must be measured against the renunciations a reading of his book requires. If one is to penetrate his theory one must (1) acquiesce for the nonce in *qua-ing* essentialism ("the self *qua* subject", "the subject *qua* unprojected consciousness"), (2) permit stipulation to pass quite often for argument, (3) cultivate a high tolerance for extended sprees of uncashed metaphor, and (4) endure detailed expositions of the theories of numerous 19th and early 20th century introspectionists whom Evans tries—and fails, I think—to resurrect. I think all this should be done. The author requests, and deserves, an open-minded reader, which in this case means playing the forbidden language games. If our favorite strictures are worth anything we ought to be able to recall them once we've finished the book, and if anything in it has struck us as valuable we can go back with all our tools and rules and dig it out. To this reader, however, the rewards do not seem proportional to the efforts required.

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