

BOOK REVIEWS

National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength. Edited by W. Scott Thompson, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980, pp. xi, 518, \$8.95.

Reviewed by STEVEN MEYER*

As the title reveals, *From Weakness to Strength* is an attempt to provide a coherent blueprint for U.S. national security policy in the decade ahead. Most books of this type are written by analysts who are several times removed from the seats of power, or by former government officials without current policy responsibilities. What distinguishes this book from the latter is that many of its 17 contributors are members of President Reagan's defense brain trust. Thus, it is quite likely that many of their ideas and proposals will be put into practice within the next four years. For this reason alone the book has special significance to students of contemporary U.S. national security policy.

This reviewer approached the book with considerable skepticism fully expecting *From Weakness to Strength* to be all smoke and no fire; a compendium of tired rhetoric about American military inferiority and the Soviet threat, supplemented with military hardware wishlists of unfund-

able proportions. Some authors met my expectations. However, there are also several interesting and important essays in this volume which deserve attention.

The book is divided into four major sections: "The Politics of Weakness," "Quick Fixes," "The Politics of Strength," and "An American Strategy for the 1980s." The order of the sections suggests the outline of a strategic national security policy which is spelled out in the more detailed essays within each section. A brief survey of these essays will point out both the tenets of the policy they prescribe and the general character of the book.

The first essay, an introduction by editor W. Scott Thompson, asserts that U.S. national security policies to date have been a consistent series of blunders, ignorant decisions, and almost treasonous acts. While one might be sympathetic to this view, Thompson resorts to examples which clearly distort the facts. For instance, in arguing that the Carter administra-

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tion purposefully promoted nuclear inferiority as a desirable policy, he notes statements by NSC staffers and State Department officials and substitutes "inferiority" where they spoke of "parity." This essay, which is more rhetoric than substance, provides little in the way of introduction to the book.

Admiral Zumwalt's chapter, which is an attempt to assess military trends of the 1970s, is equally disappointing. He employs simple "bean-counting" without indicating any awareness of the nature of the beans he is counting. One learns, for example, that the Soviets have 12,000 SAMs, 2700 interceptor fighters, and thousands upon thousands of air-defense radars, but the potential effects this hardware will have on the penetration rate for U.S. bomber missions is never discussed. Certainly, the implied capability these numbers suggest are called into question by the Korean airliner incident of several years ago.

The Admiral writes: "Clearly, the U.S. military capabilities declined during the 1970s. Just as clearly, Soviet power grew." No one will argue with him here. Unfortunately, his chapter does not contribute to our understanding of the nature or dimensions of those changes, their causes, effects, or their political or military implications.

Thus, "The Politics of Weakness" begins with rhetoric on the one hand and a numerical barrage on the other, neither of which are particularly helpful to the serious student of strategic

policy. Fortunately, some of the essays in the next section successfully combine argumentation with factual evidence and illuminate important issues.

In the first of these essays, Fred Iklé examines an important and little understood issue: defense-related industrial mobilization. Iklé quite correctly recognizes that one of America's critical weaknesses lies in its inability to rapidly expand conventional weapons production. As a result of Soviet-American nuclear parity, it can be argued that the possibility of a "long" U.S.-Soviet conventional conflict has increased. Moreover, our allies and clients press ever-increasing demands for modern equipment and chafe under the long lead-times their orders incur. One need only think back to the 1973 Middle East War, which resulted in a substantial depletion of the U.S. advanced weapons stocks (i.e., precision guided munitions, anti-tank rockets, electronic countermeasure pods, etc.) that were normally earmarked for the NATO forces.

However, Iklé's essay is weakened by its brevity and lack of illustrative examples. He could have discussed the fact that, even with full funding, it took the U.S. over four years to double tank production. Similarly, he could have discussed how the complexity of modern U.S. aircraft greatly inhibits our ability to rapidly expand production — irrespective of funding. Interestingly enough, Iklé's observations contradict those who believe adding large percentages to the de-

fense budget will quickly enhance U.S. military capabilities. It is a shame that Iklé could not have been given more space (at the expense of the two earlier essays) to explore this critical problem in greater detail.

Geoffrey Kemp's paper on defense innovation and geopolitics is, like that of Fred Iklé, one of several that deals with the real national security problems facing the U.S. Arguing that the Western alliance needs to adopt a broader perspective regarding threats to its security (i.e., not just a Soviet attack at the Central Front), Kemp covers such issues as power projection to the Persian Gulf, relations with India, arms transfer policies, and the military utilization of the oceans and outer space. He advocates greater concentration on long-term planning, beyond current crisis modes, which can be responsive to the links between technology, the economy, and national defense.

William Van Cleave's contribution is a rather weak and superficial examination of the U.S. strategic force problems. He provides little information regarding "the threat" yet offers a number of quick fixes. Unfortunately, these fixes are briefly described and lack any analysis of their strengths, weaknesses, or prospects of success. Van Cleave makes liberal use of "upgrades," "adaptations," "program accelerations," "priority funding," and "product improvements" to enhance U.S. strategic capabilities. What remains

unstated is how and why these fixes will help. Nor are any cost figures given. Finally, Van Cleave's greatest worry, America's upcoming "window of vulnerability," and his proposals to quickly "fix" the situation, run right up against Iklé's poignant observation: we simply lack the plant and construction capacity for rapid expansion of America's military forces.

Richard Burt examines the "hidden" crisis in relations between the members of the Atlantic Alliance. In contrast to those who find the root of America's national security problems in hardware, Burt, like Kemp, recognizes that the most critical problems have to do with "software." The neutron bomb fiasco, the on-again/off-again three percent real increase in NATO defense spending, and the debates over LRTNF¹ all highlight the weakness in the West's armor and the need for consistent leadership and coherent policy planning.

Clearly, the most substantive and complete piece in the book is the contribution by Albert Wohlstetter. In a thoughtful analysis of Western security problems in the Persian Gulf, Wohlstetter helps the reader to understand the military and non-military aspects of the threat to Western access to Persian Gulf oil. In all the excitement over Soviet military moves in the region, we have forgotten that an equal if not greater threat lies in the radicalization and destabilization of the region (e.g., the Iran-Iraq war). Wohlstetter's outline of various na-

1. Long Range Theater Nuclear Force modernization program.

tions' historical interests and activities in the region adds depth to his analysis and enhances the reader's understanding. Noting the shift in proximate basing rights (from complete Western dominance in 1950 to Western-Soviet "equivalence" in 1979), Wohlstetter argues for more long-range planning, more Western cooperation to reinforce political stability and military security in the region, and an increase in U.S. power projection capabilities.

"Quick fixes in intelligence" are discussed by Robert Ellsworth. In a piece that is all too brief, Ellsworth poses a series of problems concerning intelligence collection, analysis, and communication, and proceeds to offer corrective solutions. Unfortunately, the reader is never told enough about the problems (or the solutions) to be able to grasp what difference any such changes would make. Moreover, Ellsworth neglects any mention of the relative emphasis placed on political vs. military intelligence and related issues regarding the apportionment of our intelligence capabilities, e.g., Soviet nuclear weapons research and development versus Soviet conventional weapons research and development.

Miles Costick looks at the evolution of Soviet military technology and the ways in which it has been aided by technology transfers from the West. The author's effort to gauge and analyze the "technological" balance leaves much to be desired. If technology is the knowhow necessary to produce a product, Costick's argument that technological superiority lies with

the Soviets for such items as "ICBM payloads and yields," "air defense missiles," "ship size and firepower," and "mobile ballistic missiles," is clearly misguided. He confuses technological choice with technological capability. To take on simple measure, there is no operational Soviet weapons system (perhaps with the single exception of the Alpha submarine) that the U.S. could not build, given its specifications, should we choose to do so (e.g., high throw-weight, large yield ICBMs). There are, however, many U.S. weapons systems which the Soviet Union could not build due to their technological constraints. What Costick fails to point out is that, even with inferior military technology, the Soviets appear to obtain substantial military utility. We should not confuse technological capabilities with military capabilities.

The technological balance aside, Costick's more general point is correct and well taken: the Soviets are closing the "qualitative" gap and the West cannot count on favorable technological asymmetries to balance high Soviet procurement rates forever. The most compelling part of the essay deals with the costs and benefits of technology transfers to the U.S.S.R. In essence, Costick illustrates how, for short-term profits in trade, the West contributed to Soviet military capabilities and must now pay "a price many times greater to offset those capabilities." Given the general militarization of Soviet science, technology, and industry, it is hard to be-

lieve that this development was unforeseen. Historically, the Soviets (and the Russians before them) have been great consumers of foreign technology to augment their military might and Costick argues that this trend has not ended.

The lead essay in "The Politics of Strength" section, by Edward Luttwak, offers a short discussion of "The Meaning of Strategy." What is largely a superficial attack on systems analysis can be summed up in two sentences: America's inability to devise and execute a "master plan" blinds us to the fact that our adversary may in fact have such a global strategy; and, correspondingly, the U.S. can no longer afford to view the world in terms of discrete problem areas and crises. Instead, it must identify and develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy.

Like Wohlstetter, Henry Rowen's contribution is concerned with the West's dependency on Persian Gulf oil. Rowen outlines a number of possible events that could lead to interruptions of the West's oil supply. He argues that it is the threat of sudden interruptions, and not high prices, that should most worry the West, and observes that it is counter-productive to push "friendly" suppliers to increase oil production with the hope of holding prices down. Rather, it is more advantageous to let them underproduce and thereby provide a cushion should interruptions occur (assuming, of course, that they are not part of a cutoff). Rowen's call to consider non-military solutions to some of America's pressing national

security problems (many of which are themselves non-military) will hopefully be heard by the new Administration.

Kenneth Adelman addresses the problems of and prospects for revitalizing America's alliances. He chronicles the decay of U.S. alliance relations around the globe from both military and political perspectives. The distressing fact noted is that Soviet alliance relations have been growing simultaneously. Like Kemp, Adelman argues that the West — most notably, West Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan — will have to broaden the scope of their definition of vital interests if they are to rebuild a solid global defense posture.

Francis West discusses America's requirements for conventional forces beyond NATO's central front, on the assumption that "the prime military challenges to U.S. interests lie outside West Germany." He argues that America's one and one-half war strategy is not relevant to current threats, for the key assumptions under which that strategy was devised no longer holds true. He then recommends a series of fixes from submarines to infantry to space weaponry, which will achieve "conventional essential equivalence."

Given President Reagan's professed economic goals, the costs of defense are critical. Yet Leonard Sullivan is the only author to directly address budgetary issues. Sullivan compares the prospective costs of a number of alternative defense policies, which include an interesting mix of conven-

tional and nuclear force options. However, there are two problems in his analysis. First, the sources for his cost figures are not identified, which prevents an assessment of his assumptions regarding hardware costs, contracting and procurement practices, military pay, etc. Secondly, he employs an unconventional budget-generating methodology which is not adequately explained. It is essentially a "sinking fund" budget process in which operations, maintenance and replacement costs are uniformly costed out over the lifetime of individual weapons systems. Since we do not buy military systems this way, the *average* annual cost figures Sullivan reports are not accurate reflections of the *actual* annual costs. Nevertheless, as a comparison of the long-term budgetary implications of different policies, his tables are quite interesting. The validity and reliability of his cost estimates and their attendant assumptions, however, remain open to question.

Senator Nunn's paper addresses two issues: U.S. and Soviet military spending and U.S. military manpower problems. His discussion of U.S. and Soviet military spending is a comparison based upon a simple rehash of the results of never-validated CIA estimates. He goes on to describe what the U.S. could buy with Soviet levels of military spending, without noting that those figures represent what it would cost the U.S. to build Soviet systems in the U.S. economy with U.S. technology. In fact, even with an infinite military budget,

many U.S. systems could not be built in the Soviet economy with Soviet technology. Much more insightful is Nunn's discussion of U.S. military manpower problems. It is important to understand that the real manpower problem lies beyond the "all-voluntary army vs. draft" debate, and has to do with the acquisition and retention of skilled personnel. Nunn properly focuses attention on the problems of commanding and maintaining our increasingly sophisticated defense systems. What good is a fleet of the world's most advanced air superiority fighters if only ten percent are able to fly at any given moment? And why purchase nuclear powered ships if the Navy cannot hold on to a sufficient number of nuclear engineers to sail them?

The last section of the book, "American Strategy in the 1980s" consists of two complementary and general pieces. Charles Burton Marshall offers a general treatise on strategy and the implications of the difference between U.S. and Soviet approaches. Tracing the U.S.-Soviet experience in the U.N. and SALT negotiations, Marshall argues that the current imbalance is rooted in these divergent conceptions of strategy.

Last is Paul Nitze's contribution, which attempts to look at American security problems in a broad manner. Reminiscent of NSC-68, Nitze argues (using Soviet terminology) that American security is a multi-dimensional animal. In addition to the classical military balance, Nitze points out the non-military components

(e.g., economic strength, energy independence, etc.), and political/psychological components (e.g., morale, international image, etc.), of the larger power balance. The "correlation of forces" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. he feels, is not solely a function of comparative military hardware inventories. A country's reputation and willingness to use force may be more important in influencing international events and securing its interests than statical bean-counting suggests. Hopefully, when the time comes to choose between vastly expanding the military budget or strengthening the economy, Nitze's broader perspective will be taken into account.

Lastly, I should mention that there

are three discussion sections in the book where the authors hash out some of the problems in greater detail. The reader will find illuminating and entertaining exchanges in these discussions which help to amplify some of the writers' original points.

The greatest weakness of *From Weakness to Strength* is its superficiality. The issues raised are too numerous to receive thoughtful and well articulated treatment in a single book. Contrary to its intended purpose, the book does not offer coherent strategic policy to bring us from weakness to strength. However, the essays do provide an inside look at the thinking the new defense establishment will bring to the government.

Arabia, The Gulf and The West: A Critical View of Arabs and Their Oil Policy.
By John B. Kelly, New York: Basic Books, 1980, pp. 530, \$25.00.

Reviewed by GARY SAMORE*

Western understanding of the states in the Persian Gulf lags far behind the vital importance of these countries for Western political and economic interests. A new book by British historian J. B. Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of Arabs and Their Oil Policy*, provides some essential missing ingredients for a fuller understanding of the Gulf region, though his analysis

and policy prescriptions contain several serious shortcomings.

At his best, Kelly provides incisive and highly readable descriptions of the history and local politics of the conservative Gulf States — the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, and the small sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates. In these colorful accounts, Kelly demonstrates an excellent feel for the curious, often

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absurd, blend of tradition and modernity in the region. In particular, he emphasizes the primordial tensions — dynastic snobbery, tribal feuds, ethnic hostility, sectarian divisions, and mutual dislike of émigrées and natives — which teem below the superficial “carnival of consumption” and “frenzy of construction” made possible by oil wealth. In addition, Kelly recounts in comprehensive and highly critical fashion the history of Western involvement in the Gulf, particularly since 1968 with the final dismantling of the British colonial system and the construction of an American strategy designed to insure regional security by building a “special relationship” with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Kelly’s central argument is that this attempt to replace Western domination of the Persian Gulf with a system of egalitarian relationships, based on common political interests and economic interdependence, stems from a dangerous illusion. The author contends that Arabs and Persians cannot be trusted and Americans who believe they can be are deluding themselves. The historical animosity and cultural differences between the Moslem Middle East and the Christian West, combined with the “wilful and erratic behavior” inherent in the Arab and Persian character, will inevitably result in rapacious and irresponsible oil policies, efforts to blackmail and humiliate the West, and invitations to the Soviet Union. Further, according to Kelly, Western attempts to “appease” the Persian Gulf countries have only inflated their “ridiculous

pretensions” and escalated their unreasonable demands.

The most serious flaw in this controversial thesis is the tendency of Kelly’s sweeping indictment of Middle East character and emphasis on the irreconcilable tensions between Moslem and Christian societies to conceal the critical distinctions between radical and conservative regimes. For example, the importance of “Moslem revenge” is clearly greater for Khomeini’s Iran than it ever was for the Shah. Similarly, the oil policy and foreign policy of Saudi Arabia can be much more accurately seen as an outcome of the conflicting objectives of maintaining close ties with the United States on the one hand, and assuming an active role in Arab and Islamic politics on the other, rather than as a simple expression of hostility toward the West.

By overlooking these critical distinctions, Kelly’s analysis obscures the fact that the central danger to any Western strategy based on cooperation with Persian Gulf regimes arises from the threat of internal political instability leading to the replacement of relatively friendly and responsible regimes with hostile and erratic ones. Similarly, the threat of oil supply interruptions from internal political upheaval is, in many ways, greater than the threat of oil manipulation for political blackmail. As a consequence, Kelly’s analysis does not focus sufficiently on the prospects for violent political change in the region and the role of the West in either accelerating or delaying such change.

For example, although Kelly’s an-

alysis of Saudi Arabia's internal politics contains excellent descriptions of the dark side of the Al-Saud family ("riddled with feuds, conspiracies, betrayals, violent deaths, and exploits of pretenders"), and the momentous waste of oil revenues ("a frenzy of consumption, extravagance, and corruption"), his judgments on the future viability of the monarchy are rather tentative and modest. Kelly's colonialist nostalgia appears to flow from a contemptuous attitude toward the petty "Oriental despots" of the Gulf and a certain reluctance to admit their ability to adjust to the forces of modernity.

These flaws in Kelly's central argument are apparent in his vehement attempt to demonstrate that the American strategy of entrusting Gulf security to the joint care of Saudi Arabia and Iran was a failure even before the overthrow of the Shah. For example, Kelly contends that the idea of promoting these countries as guardians of the Gulf was ridiculous, since they would be military midgets no matter how much they were supplied with sophisticated weapons. He further contends that their dominance in the region would be dangerous, since it would unleash their expansionist tendencies against each other and against the smaller Gulf states. In fact, the "twin pillar" policy of combining Iranian muscle and Saudi money was rather successful. For nearly a decade, radical forces, such as Iraq and South Yemen, were effectively restrained and subversive movements, such as

the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, were quelled. Moreover, Soviet opportunism and influence in the Gulf were strictly limited.

The total flaw in the American strategy was not the danger of expansionism but the assumption of Iranian internal stability. Hence, the revolution in Iran has been responsible, in varying degrees, for the oil crisis of 1979, tensions in American-Saudi relations, greater Soviet opportunities, and the present Iran-Iraq war. As Kelly points out, the American strategy contributed to the Shah's downfall. The overt American-Iranian cooperation put the Shah on the wrong side of Iranian nationalism, while the flood of oil revenues fueled the Shah's grand ambitions to modernize Iran from above and to centralize power at the top. Furthermore, American vacillation during the revolution undercut the Shah's position. Instead of expanding on these critical points, however, Kelly insists on condemning any Iranian regime, arguing that the fall of the Shah was "due as much to the seemingly in-eradicable vices of Persian society — vanity, self-deception, inconstancy, nepotism and venality."

Where do we go from here? Clearly, the collapse of the Shah has made a more active Western role in the Gulf necessary, as American support for Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war illustrates. But possibilities for cooperation and for "responsible" Arab behavior, illustrated by the Saudi decisions to temporarily increase oil production to compensate

for shortages created by the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, still exist.

Kelly suggests a more extreme Western strategy. Since the cause of Western problems in the Gulf was the decline of strong colonial presence, the cure must be a reimposition of greater Western control. According to the author, cooperation based on mutual interests must be replaced by domination based on fear, if not occupation.

Ironically, the main target of Kelly's assault, Saudi Arabia, appears to be the last important Persian Gulf oil producer with which a relationship based on cooperation is possible, at least as long as the present political system survives. To be sure, Saudi fears of an American invasion are an important determinant of the Saudi's moderate behavior, however, a relationship based entirely on intimidation is likely to be counterproductive and unwieldy. In this regard, Kelly overestimates the value of military power and underestimates the importance of political action, such as American efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict — a factor which Kelly

hardly mentions. Even if Saudi oil fields could be easily seized, Kelly overlooks the political and military burdens of prolonged occupation, particularly since American domestic and international support for such a step does not presently exist. In the future, a deterioration of stability in the Gulf region may make American intervention necessary as a last resort, but present circumstances do not favor the seizure of Saudi oil fields or the use of overt military threats to demand more accommodating OPEC oil policies.

In conclusion, Kelly's analysis of the Persian Gulf and his prescriptions for Western strategy are often marred by an unabashed nostalgia for colonialism and an indiscriminate dislike for Arabs and Persians. As a consequence, the soundness of his arguments is blurred by vitriolic ethnic slurs and polemical attacks. Nonetheless, his book represents both an important contribution to our understanding of the Gulf and a forceful, though flawed, statement of a possible Western strategy designed to protect vital interests in the Gulf.

Internationalization to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1980, pp. 224.

Reviewed by MITCHELL REISS*

Internationalization to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, published by the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), discusses a means for resolving the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

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tion which is inherent in the use of plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle. The book is divided into two sections. Part I is SIPRI's evaluation of the feasibility of internationalizing the "sensitive" parts of the fuel cycle to reduce the threat of proliferation. It consists of a brief essay advocating the establishment of international mechanisms to control and manage plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle. Part II contains the twenty-one papers submitted at SIPRI's symposium on the same topic in November/December 1979. While some of the strictly technical papers are of value, the remainder are based upon a shaky foundation as outlined in Part I, and are distinguished by their breadth of scope rather than by their depth of sophisticated understanding.

Coming at a time of widespread interest in the subject of nuclear non-proliferation, it is disappointing that SIPRI prescribes a cure worse than the disease itself. The problem lies with the dissemination of technologies and materials that can be used in both nuclear energy programs and in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This "gray area" makes it difficult to distinguish clearly between the use of plutonium for energy purposes and its diversion for the construction of explosive devices. While SIPRI admits that the separation of plutonium from other waste products is prone to military exploitation, the superficiality of their analysis leads them to support a method for restraining plutonium diversion that will actually increase its availability, and hence in-

crease the chances for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

SIPRI proposes an "international arrangement" which would monopolize and control the use of plutonium as the best means to protect against its possible diversion for nuclear weapons use. Authority for this scheme would be vested in an international institution. Consensus would be achieved by permitting all parties to this agreement to enjoy access to plutonium, in return for surrendering a portion of their sovereignty. SIPRI rationalizes that since "the technology will eventually spread in any case . . . it is better to establish international control over this development so that it is not misused for military purposes, even at the risk of speeding up the process." SIPRI views internationalization as a panacea. Yet the argument advocating this approach contains no detailed, coherent plan for its establishment or implementation and the proposition that universalizing access to plutonium will create a sufficient disincentive for diversion remains unconvincing.

In their headlong flight to achieve consensus in the international arena, it is not surprising that SIPRI has overlooked recent technical and economic developments that cast doubt on their justification for, and promotion of, an international approach to plutonium management in the field today. Previous projections of uranium scarcity have been revised in light of more efficient technologies in the fuel cycle and the deflated pros-

pects for nuclear power growth. Additionally, a greater realization that plutonium will not provide the key to the solution of energy problems in the near and medium term, together with new reports predicting only marginal economic benefits from commercial fast breeder reactors, have dampened prior expectations. Finally, the United States, a recent convert to the dangers of a plutonium fuel cycle, has exercised its influence to promote the use of the less proliferation-prone "once-through" nuclear fuel cycle (based on low enriched uranium and encompassing only the "front end" of the cycle), as a means of meeting energy needs while at the same time avoiding the risks of proliferation. All of these factors reduce the need to introduce plutonium into the nuclear fuel cycle.

Also absent from SIPRI's study is any discussion of alternative paths to decrease the likelihood of plutonium diversion. The establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Bank with deposits of low enriched uranium and international cooperation for the storage of spent nuclear fuel offer promising alternatives in addressing the two most prominent concerns of those states desiring a nuclear power

capability: energy security and the storage of spent fuel. It is therefore regrettable that *Internationalization to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* does not address the merits of these approaches.

SIPRI's analysis, as well as many of the papers presented in Part II, suffer from an insufficient appreciation of the time element involved. The objective of any non-proliferation scheme ought to be to slow down the spread of the facilities and materials that could be used for nuclear weapons. No system will be fail-safe; any country that is determined to acquire nuclear weapons can do so, given enough time and money. Thus, it is the *rate* at which nuclear technology is disseminated which is the significant feature in any non-proliferation plan. The elimination of premature reprocessing and unwarranted plutonium recycling then, is to be preferred to the chimera of international control over its quicker dissemination. Any scheme, to be both successful and safe, must reconcile legitimate energy requirements with the prevention of nuclear proliferation. This can best be met by the delay, rather than the internationalization, of gray area technologies and materials.

States and Social Revolutions. By Theda Skocpol, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 407, \$8.95, paper.

Reviewed by GEORGE DIMITRACOPOULOS*

Revolutions and revolutionary behavior have occupied scholarly attention throughout the ages, from Aristotle to Hannah Arendt and Poulantzas. The recent contribution to this body of work by Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, should be of interest to historians, historiographers, and political scientists alike for its originality, methodological rigor, and the bold departure the author makes from traditional theories.

The new dimensions revealed by Ms. Skocpol, an Associate Professor of Sociology at Harvard University, can be identified in her choice of subject matter and method of analysis. In order to arrive at an understanding of the nature of revolution and its causes, Skocpol has chosen the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions as the most appropriate for her endeavor. Although these revolutions occurred in different historical periods, the author argues that they have a common denominator since all three consist of transformations of "Old Regime" states into modern ones.

Professor Skocpol defines social revolutions as "... rapid transformations of a society's state and class structures ..." during which fundamental changes in social structure occur together, in a fashion that she

characterizes as mutually reinforcing. She explains that this definition of revolution differs from others because it demonstrates the complexity of the object to be examined while underlining the importance of the relationship between the state and the class structures for the study of revolution.

The significance of this assertion lies in the assumption that the state itself, once formed, becomes separated from the social classes that it encompasses. This fundamental premise should be contrasted with the traditional Marxist interpretation which considers the state as the organization through which one class dominates others. The definition further emphasizes the concept of transformation in structures which distinguish social revolutions from rebellions and coups-d'etat, which may have causes and ends similar to those of a revolution, but do not succeed in bringing about the larger structural transformation of a true revolution.

Having once defined the concept of revolution which is further elaborated in the body of the book, Theda Skocpol proceeds to place her theory in the context of traditional thought and to justify her choice of methodology. The book thus presents the reader with a most critical and comprehensive survey of contending theories on

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revolutions, illustrating the evolutionary changes that the field has undergone over time. From rather simplistic descriptions of the revolutionary cycle, the object of study has shifted to the causes of revolutions and the relationship between the causes and the events. To this analysis Ms. Skocpol then adds a structural dimension.

The structural dimension results from the methodological necessity of a multilevel analysis for the study of social revolutions. Having once admitted the complexity of the subject, room must be made for the fact that "... actions and interactions at one level are at least partially accounted for by attributes and behavior at another level ..."¹ Thus Professor Skocpol argues that the analyst of revolutions must explore not only national or sub-national behavior (i.e. relations between social classes), but also international relations. Her originality in this respect consists not only of recognizing the effect of the relations of states to one another upon the causes of revolutions, but also the role of such relations in the consolidation period of the new regime.

Perhaps the most critical choice a scholar has to make is that of the method to be used for the interpretation of the existing or collected data. Ms. Skocpol has chosen comparative historical analysis as the method through which to analyze the three revolutions. Comparative historical

analysis, she argues, differs from the natural history approach both in objective and in method of analysis. "Whereas the goal of comparative historical analysis is to establish causes of revolutions ..." writes Professor Skocpol "... the natural historians sought to describe the characteristic cycle, or sequence of stages that should typically occur in the processes of revolutions ..." Furthermore, comparative historical analysis focuses on both comparisons of similar and fundamentally different cases in order to identify and evaluate the underlying causes of revolutions. This does not suggest, however, that there should be a similarity of processes in all cases. Rather, it suggests that similar sets of causes may be applicable to different cases. Within this framework, then, Skocpol examines the structure of the old regimes in France, Russia, and China, revealing not only the problems in the relationship between the state — here conceived as an autonomous juridical and political entity — and the social classes out of which it emerged, but also the dynamics of the relationship of these social classes to one another. Thus the reader is exposed to the multiplicity and complexity of factors that lead to the creation of "objective" revolutionary situations and hence the development of social revolutionary outcomes.

"The historical experience ..." writes William A. Williams in his

1. See, James Rosenau "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited" in Jonathan Wilkenfeld ed. *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics*, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973, p. 26.

book *History as a Way of Learning*, "... is not one of staying in the present and looking back. Rather it is one of going back into the past and returning to the present with a wider and more intense consciousness of the restrictions of our former outlook. We return with a broader awareness of the alternatives open to us and armed with a sharper perceptiveness with which to make our choices. . . ." ² The significance of this assertion is of a dual nature. On the one hand, it

identifies the attitude an interested reader should face toward various historical works. On the other hand, it sets a number of conditions that have to be met by authors before their works can be considered monumental. There should be no doubt that Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*, surpasses these conditions. It is a challenging book and a satisfying one, with the potential to refine our view of not only the past but also the present.

2. See William A. Williams' *History as a Way of Learning*, New York: New Viewpoints, 1973, p. 8.

The Future of United States Naval Power. By James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, pp. 248, \$15.00.

Reviewed by MILES A. LIBBEY III*

The early 1980s are an exceptional time to try to define the future of U.S. naval power. Almost one hundred years ago the U.S. Navy first moved toward the front ranks of the navies of the world when the "White Squadron" of protected cruisers was authorized by Congress in 1883. Parity was achieved by the pen at the Washington Naval Conference in 1920 and the clear supremacy of U.S. naval power was realized during World War II. Yet, in just the last decade, both increasing age and a declining budget have "sunk" so

many ships that the U.S. Navy has shrunk by one half. It is, therefore, a propitious time to "explore the efficacy of naval power in a purportedly new international and American political environment."

James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver are rapidly establishing themselves as part of the new breed of academics who are trying to untangle such seemingly simple questions as, "For what are navies useful?" In their first published book, the two Associate Professors of Political Science from the University of Delaware look

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at naval doctrine, size, and capability in light of the demands of the international and domestic environment.

In order to provide a framework for their study, the authors trace the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and naval power from the end of World War II to the end of the seventies, with particular emphasis on the last ten-year period. They note the less dogmatic and more pragmatic approach taken by the U.S. toward the Soviet Union during these years, the U.S. reluctance to use military force after Vietnam, and the constraints that increasing global interdependence has placed upon naval strategy. Terrorism, expensive technology, Law of the Sea restrictions, and the high kill-to-cost ratio of rapidly spreading precision guided munitions (PGMs) are also identified as important factors that will shape American naval power. While these are all important, the real question is how important each factor will be.

For example, the authors suggest that PGMs may "force another rupture in the theoretical and practical attempt to marry force and diplomacy." Here, as in too many other places throughout their book, the authors have let their extensive research overwhelm them. By quoting too extensively from other works, they have mesmerized themselves out of original thought and fail to place the tactical implications of PGM technology in proper perspective. The machine gun, tank, and other "offensive" weapons have always spawned their own defense and they always

will. "Point" or self-defense gun and missile systems are improving rapidly. Even in the interim, the political utility of a small navy using a PGM to attack a major navy will provide an ephemeral gain at best.

Obviously, if a major power is not willing to risk either the loss of a ship or the possibility that some level of force may be required to maintain its position, the ship should not have been deployed in the first place. If this risk has been considered by the larger power, then its willingness to retaliate — and its potential to do so at ever higher levels in a sustained manner — should make the marginal utility of an attack by the smaller force less attractive. In other words, PGMs offer the potential of a quick kill but they do not serve to equalize large force disparities. Since the larger navy can control the escalation of force both in terms of rapidity and magnitude, the smaller power should be deterred from the easy first kill — the next ones get a lot tougher. In this and in other areas, Nathan and Oliver do a very credible job of synthesizing the literature, but do not provide much insight or original thought for the future.

When the authors move from these tactical applications of force to the broader area of the utility of naval power as an international political tool, they gain strength. Despite the jerkiness imparted by their style of cutting and pasting quotes from others, Nathan and Oliver are very thorough in their treatment of the naval presence mission. They explain

the flexibility that naval forces have in sending a wide spectrum of diplomatic signals. The friendly interest expressed by a three-day destroyer port visit contrasts sharply with a fully equipped and supported amphibious group circling in international waters with a Marine landing force. They recognize the intrinsic advantage of being able to move a bit of U.S. sovereign territory, in the shape of a U.S. Navy warship, in and out of an area. An army or air force unit simply does not have the capability to loiter outside a contested area and can exert little influence short of occupation.

Unfortunately, the authors make the common mistake of assuming that because naval forces are particularly useful in the presence/policy role, the naval force structure should reflect this aspect of naval power or a special ship should be built to serve this purpose. They fail to see that the presence role is a *byproduct* of a ship's combat capability. Finding that "any debate concerning force structure and mission interrelationships must remain frustratingly inconclusive," the authors remain mired in the naval presence debate without resolving the real issues of naval power in combat.

When the "domestic environment" is examined, the result is an impressive and well-documented overview of public opinion. Included are some interesting studies which attempt to measure the interventionist tenden-

cies of businessmen and mid-level military officers. This and other data are used as a springboard to suggest implications for the naval force structure. Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that the relationship is ambiguous and, accordingly, that "the design of force structures will remain the province of the professional." Certainly public opinion is important, but it is hardly conceivable that it could be sensitive enough to suggest, for instance, that two large cruisers should be built or four amphibious ships. The American governmental machinery, however, may be sensitive to such issues. By failing to adequately account for the overwhelming role that Congress and the Executive have played in the last decade, the authors' treatment of the domestic environment carries little force.

In this book, Professors Nathan and Oliver have attempted to explain the ways in which the art of diplomacy has been performed with the tools of naval hardware. The result is an admirable and useful compendium of information which unfortunately lacks the level of analysis and degree of originality one is led to expect from the title. *The Future of United States Naval Power* is, nevertheless, both a comprehensive introduction to the role of naval power in domestic and international affairs, as well as a useful reference for experts in maritime affairs.