THE "RUSSIAN FACTOR" IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Anka Feldhusen

The New Regional Map

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in an awkward geographical situation: to the east, an overpowering Russia by virtue of its sheer size and other neighboring countries with which it had disputes of various kinds; and to the west, looming across central Europe, the magnetic European Union. In the past, Russia's geographical size and its economic, demographic and military advantages have defined Ukraine's understanding of itself as a nation. Although Russia itself emerged from Kievan Rus', which was located in present-day Ukraine, Russia has been the dominant factor in Ukraine's view of itself and the world since 1654. In that year, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky signed an alliance with Russia against the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom. Consequently, Ukraine's first three years of independence—from 1991 to 1994—and, in particular its foreign policy, were marked by Russian influence.[1]

Today, however, Ukraine is in the process of turning its back on Russia. It has formulated a more independent foreign policy and looks toward the West, the European Union and, perhaps more immediately, NATO. Nevertheless, Russia finally acknowledged Ukraine's borders and sovereignty in the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, signed in Kiev on May 27, 1997.

What happened to enable Ukraine to become more assertive and to fear its overwhelming neighbor less—especially under a president, Leonid Kuchma, whose campaign goals were closer relations with Russia? Is this trend because of Russia's growing weakness in dealing with its neighbors and former Soviet republics? Or is it a growing sense of Ukrainian tional arena: Russian weakness; Russian boldness; NATO enlargement; and Ukrainians' own changing mentality.

As for the future of Ukraine's more assertive position, it will depend mostly on the resolution of the following issues: the status of the Crimea; the

Anka Feldhusen is a Diplomat with the German Federal Foreign Office. She served as Second Secretary at the German embassy in Kiev, Ukraine from 1994 to 1997. She then earned her M.A. in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where she specialized in European security issues. This article is an abridged version of her master's thesis. She is currently working as First Secretary in the German Foreign Office's headquarters in Bonn. Anka Feldhusen graduated cum laude from the Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques. The views expressed in this essay are the author's own and do not represent the official position of the German Federal Office or the German Government.

self-reliance and self-confidence? Did the West help Ukraine find its orientation towards European structures? Or did Russian behavior push Ukraine into the arms of the West? Have Ukrainians freed themselves of the centuries-old vision of partaking in a Russian Empire? Does Ukraine's new self-confidence have a future? Or is there still a chance that Russia can reclaim Ukraine, or a dominant influence in it, at any time?

This paper will argue that four factors have influenced Ukraine's path to a more assertive foreign policy and a stronger position in the international stationing of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea; implementation of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership; relations with NATO; and economic issues (in particular, dependence on energy resources).

These issues are closely linked to forces traditionally underlying Russian foreign policy as defined by Alfred Rieber: permeable frontiers, and relative economic and cultural marginality between a Christian Europe and the Islamic world.[2] The result has been a constant search for an empire to ensure Russia's external security and to fulfill its ideological needs. But this close linkage also makes it so much more difficult for Ukraine to overcome the Russian influence in its foreign policy.

This is why Ukraine today, by focusing on "new regional alliances" such as GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), the Central European Initiative and the Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation, seeks to improve its position between Russia and the West, and to avoid becoming a bridge between Russia and NATO, a situation that Kuchma fears because, in his words, "in the event of war, bridges are destroyed first."[3] These alliances are very different in nature and geography, but they all have a drive towards the West. Although Russia is a member of both the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, it does not have as central a role there as in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which Kuchma perceives as a vehicle for Russian domination.

Following geography, in the Baltic-Black Sea organizations, Russia is positioned at the margin, whereas Ukraine could be called upon to play a central role, an inversion of Ukraine's geohistorical role as the "land on the edge" (literal translation of "Okraina"). By actively seeking alliances within and outside the CIS, President Kuchma is in fact trying to redraw the map surrounding Ukraine, as the last part of this paper and the following map will show.

The Way to a More Assertive Ukraine

Russia still is very much present in Ukraine. It has four diplomatic and consular representations in the country (more than in any other state of the former Soviet Union), its major oil and gas pipelines run through Ukraine, and large Russian minorities live in Ukraine, in particular in the eastern regions and in the Crimea. Ukraine depends on Russian energy to a large extent, and Russia therefore is its major trade partner. Ukraine nevertheless managed to assert itself vis-à-vis Russia as we will see in the following section.

Russian weaknesses, or "Ukraine outshines its noisy neighbor"

First of all, Russia's own weaknesses have contributed to Ukraine's increasing self-confidence. Russia's domestic troubles, in particular the assault on the Parliament in October 1993, have provided Ukrainians with a feeling of relative superiority.

The war in Chechnya has contributed to a general sense of relief in Ukraine, especially in the armed forces and among mothers—and even among the Russian minority—of not belonging to Russia any longer and thus not being obliged to fight in its war.[4] Ukrainian politicians across the entire democratic and democratic-nationalist spectrum sharply criticized the Russian invasion of Chechnya and the ensuing bombing of Grozny.[5] The government newspaper ran a story with the headline, "Democracy cannot be brought by tanks,"[6] despite the rather lukewarm official reaction from the Ukrainian government.[7]

But above all, the Chechen affair eased Ukrainian anxiety since it precluded Russia from actively supporting a secessionist region in a neighboring country, like the Crimea in Ukraine, without providing a dangerous precedent to its own regions. Indeed, "at a moment when Russia found it politically impossible to protest, Kiev unilaterally abolished the Crimea's special status. Russian leaders, embroiled in a bloody war against breakaway Chechnya at home, found themselves publicly supporting Ukraine's peaceful moves to thwart the Crimea's ethnic-Russian separatists."[8] This put the Ukrainian government in a more solid position in its dealings with the unruly Crimean peninsula and has more or less led to the abolishment of its autonomous rights.

On top of it all, Russia faces economic difficulties that will be less easily solved than Ukraine's. Although most data indicate that Russia's economic situation is better than Ukraine's,[9] there are polls showing that living standards in Ukraine's rural areas are actually higher than living standards in comparable Russian areas.[10]

Russian Boldness

While Russia has weakened economically, domestically and in the international arena, the leadership in Moscow has become more conservative and more aggressive toward Ukraine. Indeed, it still acts like a bullying older brother, in particular in the economic realm where Ukraine is most vulnerable.

In January 1996, Ukraine raised the transit fees for Russian oil pumped through its Druzhba pipeline to Central Europe. Although it had announced this rise a month and a half earlier and individual Russian oil exporters had agreed to pay the higher fee to keep their supplies flowing west, Russia's Fuel and Energy Ministry refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new rates, and long discussions were necessary before the issue was put to rest.[11]

In September of that year, Russia imposed a 20 percent value-added tax (VAT) on several Ukrainian goods, especially vodka, and thus unilaterally broke the free trade agreement between the two countries.[12] This resulted in equal taxation from the Ukrainian side and a trade war, although President Yeltsin had announced in May 1997 that Russia would lift the VAT on Ukrainian

goods. During his state visit to Russia on February 26, 1998, President Kuchma signed a ten-year economic cooperation program that finally settled the matter and ended the trade war.

But the issue in which Russia most offends Ukraine is the Crimean problem. Although the legal case regarding ownership of the Crimea and particularly of Sevastopol favors Ukraine, Russian politicians have always been vocal in their claim to the peninsula. In 1948 the Soviet Union placed Sevastopol in the "category of cities with a republican status," but it was not separated in an administrative-territorial sense from its surrounding region, the Crimea Oblast.

In 1954, Khrushchev handed the Crimea over to Ukraine, his home republic, in celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian alliance of 1654.[13] According to the Soviet Constitution of 1978 and the Ukrainian constitution of 1996, the Crimea, including its port in Sevastopol, is an integral part of Ukraine, Sevastopol having Ukrainian republican status and not being under Crimean jurisdiction. The Russian Constitution of December 1993 does not mention the Crimea as part of the Russian Federation.

Although Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry have always stressed the fact that the Crimea legally belongs to Ukraine, the Russian parliament, as well as separate Russian politicians, have on several occasions issued statements asserting Russian sovereignty over the Crimea. On July 9, 1993 the Russian parliament adopted a resolution, "On the status of Sevastopol," by 166 to one.[14] The resolution included the preparation of a law on the Russian federal status of Sevastopol. Even the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Council of the Federation, a usually docile, Yeltsin-backing body, on December 5, 1996 voted overwhelmingly for two motions demanding that Kiev recognize Sevastopol as a Russian city,[15] which prompted First Deputy Foreign Minister Anton Buteiko to speculate publicly on Ukrainian membership in NATO.[16]

An additional psychological aspect, usually stressed in the statements of Russian politicians, is the fact that the Crimea served several times as a battlefield (during the Crimean War and the Second World War), making it a place of Russian/Soviet glory. Then-Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed wrote in an open letter that "renunciation of the national shrine of Russia, the heroic city of Sevastopol ... will deal a heavy blow to the national self-consciousness of all Russians and to the idea of Russian statehood."[17] Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has made the issue of the Crimea and Sevastopol the focal point in preparing for his presidential election campaign of 2000, calling Sevastopol the eleventh prefecture of Moscow. In his comment on the Friendship Treaty he said that it was absurd that Russia should be renting Sevastopol from itself: "Sevastopol is a Russian city and will be Russian irrespective of whatever decisions are taken."[18]

NATO Enlargement

NATO enlargement has brought a host of positive developments for the region, and has helped resolve various problems Ukraine has had with its neighbors. Romania's urgent wish to join NATO led to its seeking to abolish any territorial

disputes it could have had with its neighbours and in particular to the signing of a major treaty with Ukraine. Poland's move towards NATO certainly accelerated its signing a joint declaration, "Regarding Understanding and Accord," with Ukraine. And last but not least, the proximity in time between the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997 and the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet as well as the signing of the Friendship Treaty between Russia and Ukraine can hardly be a coincidence. Yeltsin's visit to Kiev, which had always been linked to the signing of a major treaty with Ukraine, had been put off six times before he finally came four days after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and three days after initialing the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Until the beginning of May 1997, Western observers in Kiev had been quite pessimistic about the signing of a text between Russia and NATO because of Russia's ambiguity towards Ukraine's sovereignty.

The signing of the treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership on May 31, 1997, concluded a month of foreign policy achievements for Ukraine, which left the country with a much more solid legal infrastructure concerning its borders. Agreements not only with Romania, Poland and Russia, but also with Hungary, Moldova (as a guarantor of a peaceful settlement in Transdnistria) and Belarus (on border demarcation) have strengthened Ukraine's position in the region and given the country a much stronger position in its policy vis-à-vis Russia. Now that none of Ukraine's neighbors has claims on Ukrainian territory, a softer attitude on autonomy in the Crimea could not be tolerated as it would not create a precedent for other irredentist regions.

Changing Mentalities

Changing mentalities within Ukraine have also contributed to the country's more assertive behavior as a nation. Although there still is a gap between Ukrainians living in the western parts of the country (historically part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland) and Russian-speaking Ukrainians/Russians living in the industrialized eastern parts, the risk of secession that was still palpable in mid-1994 faded in the following years. Before 1994, Ukrainians in the east and in the west lived more or less on two different "mental maps"[19] — the east and the Crimea looking toward Moscow, the west toward Vienna and Budapest, with Kiev in the center successfully bringing these two halves together. The Chechen war, heightened international recognition, a sense of economic parity throughout the country (with the exception of Kiev) and a huge capacity for patience did not exactly push the country to grow together, but prevented it from further slipping towards secessionism.

A good indicator of the calmer relationship between eastern and western Ukraine is witnessed in the language question. Although Russian has not been granted the status of an official language and efforts to strengthen Ukrainian as the legitimate state language continue, the acuteness of the language question has largely abated and the hysteria surrounding it has disappeared. The Ukrainian Constitution of June 28, 1996 guarantees the "free development, use and

protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities."[20] Many influential newspapers are published in Russian, primary schools still teach Russian, and universities in the eastern regions have not abandoned Russian either. At the same time, Ukrainian is more widely spoken in the streets of Kiev, television broadcasts mainly in Ukrainian and President Kuchma, like many other government officials who had to learn Ukrainian when elected to office, now seems very much at ease speaking Ukrainian.

Kuchma's presidency itself seems to reflect the changing mentalities. He was elected on a pro-Russian platform; his flyers—in Russian—asked for a union with Russia and the other countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[21] Although his program also asserted that the people should be the true masters of their country, Kuchma very concretely proposed to enter into an economic union with Russia immediately, arguing that Ukraine could not overcome its economic difficulties on its own. In his inauguration speech, Kuchma defined Ukraine as a historical part of the Eurasian economic and cultural sphere and identified its principal national interests as lying within the territory of the former Soviet Union. But he also called for "new, substantive relations with the West."[22] In the months following his election, Kuchma turned into an ardent defender of Ukrainian statehood, saying as early as October 1994 that he had not become Ukraine's president "in order to become a vassal of Russia."[23]

The Future of a More Assertive Ukraine

The positive developments described above have led Ukrainian's foreign policy experts to describe Ukraine's foreign policy as more stable, deliberate and predictable.[24] But the future of the country's more assertive position will depend mostly on the resolution of issues closely linked to Russia's external security and ideological needs.

The Status of the Crimea

Above all, Kiev has to clarify its relationship with the Crimea in order to prevent the region from slipping into a Russian sphere of influence. The Crimea's autonomous status, which had been abolished in 1945 (the Crimea becoming a simple "region" or *oblast*), had been reestablished after a referendum on January 20, 1991. Ninety-three percent of the Crimea's ethnic Ukrainian population even voted for autonomy. This gave the Crimea its own constitution and parliament. Yet in December 1991, 54 percent of the Crimean population voted for an independent Ukraine; between February and May 1992, however, relations between Kiev and the Crimean capital, Simferopol, deteriorated dramatically, and Crimean political forces prepared a referendum on the peninsula's independence.

Although the Crimean Parliament eventually declared independence on May 5, 1992, negotiations between Kiev and the Crimea defused the crisis

and avoided the referendum, which could have been followed by a violent conflict (as had happened in Abkhazia). The negotiations resulted in a law dividing powers and responsibilities between the two sides, granting the Crimea a far-reaching autonomy. In return, the two sides recognized the Crimea as an inseparable part of Ukraine whose laws could not violate the Ukrainian Constitution.[25]The new Ukrainian Constitution of June 28, 1996 granted the Crimea a large measure of autonomy. The peninsula had its own parliament and council of ministers (government), but its judiciary remained part of the unified system of courts of Ukraine. [26]

But internal political difficulties, decreasing industrial production and increasing crime rates prevented the Crimea from benefiting from its autonomy. The new Ukrainian Constitution legalized the position of an official representative of the Ukrainian President in the Crimea, and the holder of this position gained more and more influence over Crimean politics in the absence of a unified political class on the peninsula. Indeed, a new law on political parties stipulated that a political party must be registered in Kiev and be active in more than half of the Ukrainian regions. Most of the Crimea's parties lost their official status due to this law.[27]

This turbulence gave Russian politicians repeated reasons to interfere in the Crimean question, unnecessarily burdening Ukrainian-Russian relations. "There [were] fears that the port [Sevastopol] could become a Taiwan-like obsession with Moscow, blocking friendship between the two countries for decades to come."[28] To avoid this, the joint statement by the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed in Kiev on May 31, 1997, in which "the heroic pages of the history of Sevastopol" are recalled, attempted to soften the feelings of Sevastopol's inhabitants towards the Black Sea Fleet agreements, which comprised the legal framework for keeping the Russian fleet stationed in the Crimea.[29]

Since then, Ukraine has worked to improve its relations with the Crima. After rejecting four previous drafts, the Ukrainian parliament finally approved a new constitution for the Crimea on December 23, 1998, by a vote of 230 to 67. The constitution allows the Crimea to keep its own government and permits the peninsula to sign foreign trade deals independently. Its legislation must always be in accord with Ukrainian law, though, and all taxes and duties collected on Crimean territory are to be directed to the republic's budget. With regard to the Russian population on the peninsula, the constitution introduces provisions for safeguarding the Russian language.[30]

By clarifying its relations with the Crimea, Ukraine can now hope to benefit from the major economic asset that the peninsula represents. Resorts, historic palaces, a moderate climate and a varied countryside with mountains and beaches make the Crimea an attractive place for tourists and investors. The Crimea also enlarges Ukraine's shoreline along the Black Sea considerably. Rights to exploit the bottom of the Black Sea (a joint-venture including the British firm JKX is drilling for oil off the Crimean shore) are an important plus for Ukraine's faltering economy.

The Black Sea Fleet

The future stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is just as important as the peninsula's political status. This fleet was a small but prestigious part of the Soviet navy and acted as counterpart to the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. Stationed in Sevastopol, which has always been Russia's major warm-water port and was therefore of predominant strategic importance, the fleet should have become Ukrainian property after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Under Russian pressure (threats of cutting energy supply among others), Russia and Ukraine decided instead to divide the fleet by half, with Russia buying an extra 32 percent of the fleet from Ukraine. Although both countries agreed relatively quickly on this mode of sharing, the question of the home port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet remained open until May 1997.

Finally, then-Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Lazarenko signed three agreements on the Black Sea Fleet on May 28, 1997. According to the information available,[31] the agreements grant Russia three bays out of five, Ukraine keeps one bay for its fleet, and one bay will be demilitarized and used for commercial purposes.

Politicians in both countries reacted critically to the agreements. In Ukraine, the leader of the nationalist movement, Rukh, Vyacheslav Chornovil, feared that "to leave the Russian Black Sea Fleet [in Sevastopol] for 20 years is to force a pervasive and permanent atmosphere of agitation and strain not only in the Crimea, but in Ukraine."[32] Taras Kiyak, member of the Constitutional Center faction and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian parliament, also considers "a number of provisions of the agreement ... dangerous to Ukraine," among them "the 20-year length of the lease and its extremely low price."[33] In Russia, voices against the agreements were even louder, and the deputy chairman of the Duma, Sergey Baburin, predicted that the Duma would only ratify the agreements together with the Friendship Treaty if they were interpreted as sealing "Russia's right to Sevastopol and laying the groundwork for talks between Russia and Ukraine on the Crimea."[34]

Eventually, the Duma ratified the agreements together with the Friendship Treaty on February 17, 1999. But the Black Sea Fleet is still where it was, and Russian military personnel deny rumors that other ports may be reinforced in order to accommodate the fleet. According to a Russian naval officer, "the fleet will not leave Sevastopol,"[35] and while the Russian Black Sea Fleet occupies bays in Sevastopol, Ukraine still loses money it could have earned from the commercial use of the piers.

Implementation of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership

In the words of the Russian-Ukrainian Declaration signed in 1997, "the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, signed in Kiev on May 31, 1997, begins a new era in Russian-Ukrainian relations and constitutes a solid basis for the further development of mutually advantageous cooperation."[36] Whether one shares the optimism of this statement or not, the treaty—or better, the use that Russia and Ukraine

are going to make of it—is one of the main issues for Ukraine's future assertiveness. President Kuchma compared the signing of the treaty to cutting the umbilical cord between the two countries, and said he would only believe in it after seeing Yeltsin's signature.[37]

The most important provisions of this relatively short treaty, comprising 41 articles, are found in articles one, two and three. The Parties, "as friendly, equal and sovereign states, shall base their relations on mutual respect" (Article I). They "shall respect each other's territorial integrity and confirm the inviolability of their common borders" (Article II) and "shall base their relations with each other on the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the nonuse of force or the threat of force, including economic and other means of pressure, ... [and] noninterference in internal affairs" (Article III).[38] The treaty thus refers twice to Ukraine's greatest concerns in its relations with Russia, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

Ukraine ratified the treaty on January 14, 1997, by an unexpectedly large majority of 317 to 27. In his comment, President Yeltsin welcomed the "convincing ratification" and expected the Russian parliament to "give equally convincing support" to the document.[39] Although Duma speaker Seleznev and his deputy Ryzhkov had repeatedly expressed their conviction that the Duma would ratify the treaty a few weeks later,[40] the Russian parliament finally voted on February 10, 1997, to delay consideration of the treaty, allegedly because the Russian Foreign Ministry supported postponing ratification until after the Ukrainian parliament has ratified the agreements concerning the Black Sea Fleet.[41]

On December 12, 1998, Duma Vice Chairman Baburin said that the Russian parliament was keeping the treaty in the "political refrigerator,"[42] but the Duma suddenly ratified the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation on December 25, 1998, by a vote of 244 to 30. Initially the Federation Council, under the influence of nationalist members like Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, refused to follow the Duma. But in the end it also approved the treaty on February 17, 1999, by a vote of 106 to 25, with 17 abstentions. However, the Russian government has stipulated that the treaty would only enter into force once Kiev had also ratified the BSF agreements. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov's comment on the Duma ratification, calling it "a step toward the unification of the three slavic nations"[43]—a new union agreement with Belarus had been signed on the same day—shows that Russian intentions concerning the implementation of the treaty might not coincide with those of Ukraine.

Ukraine's Relations with NATO

As Grigori Yavlinski, one of Russia's least virulent NATO-enlargement opponents once said: "NATO enlargement, for Russia, is like having a tank in your neighbor's garden. The tank might be beautifully painted, with girls on it and lots of flowers, but nevertheless it is still a tank."[44] So far the tank has not even come to the next-door neighbor's garden, but Russia is showing its distaste for NATO-linked military operations in Eastern Europe.[45] In particular, its reaction to the

"Sea Breeze 1997" exercises on the Crimea and in southern Ukraine have shown that Russia is far from accepting that Ukraine might join NATO.[46] The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, signed between the Alliance and Ukraine in Madrid on July 9, 1997, puts NATO-Ukrainian relations on relatively solid ground.

Like the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the Charter is a political document, not subject to ratification by the NATO member-states. Nevertheless it is built on a "political commitment at the highest level" (Chapter I) and can be considered of equal legal value as the Founding Act. Ukraine's desire for security against the Russian threat is visible throughout the document. Chapter II states that "no state can regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence," and that all states must "respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states," as well as the "inviolability of frontiers." Chapter III explicitly states NATO's support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. It also stipulates that "NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security." However, the Charter does not extend a NATO self-defense guarantee to Ukraine, and the crisis-consultative mechanism remains vague so far. "[NATO and Ukraine also] share the view that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a participating state must be in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the host state or a relevant decision of the UN Security Council."[47]

Ukraine's interest in joining NATO is expressed in Chapter II, where the Charter states that it is "the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or to change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve." Ukraine also reaffirms its determination "to increase the interoperability [of its armed forces] with the forces of NATO and Partner countries," a provision that is missing in the Founding Act between Russia and the Alliance. Chapter III of the Charter also establishes a NATO-Ukraine Commission that will meet not less than twice a year. Its inaugural meeting took place on October 10, 1997, at the ambassadorial level. It does not, however, create any institutional structure like the Permanent Joint Council.[48]

Besides reflecting a genuine search for reassurance against Russia, the Charter states two important points. First, "the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements" leaves NATO's door open for Ukraine without explicitly referring to it. This leaves a wide range of interpretation for both parties. Second, by increasing the interoperability of Ukraine's forces with the forces of NATO and Partner countries, Ukraine not only follows the logic of the Partnership for Peace Program, but also paves the way towards future membership in NATO.

Since the signing of the Charter and during discussions about NATO enlargement, high-ranking Ukrainian politicians have expressed the desire to go beyond the Charter provisions and attain actual NATO membership. Considering Russia's aversion to NATO enlargement in general and the idea of Ukraine joining the Alliance in particular, this discussion shows how much Ukraine has liberated

itself from the "Russian factor" in its foreign policy making. Volodymyr Horbulin, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council and one of the principal foreign policy decision makers in Ukraine, stated as early as January 31, 1997, his belief that Ukraine will be a member of the Alliance before 2010.[49] In March 1997, the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, Yuri Shcherbak, predicted that Ukraine would join NATO between 2002 and 2007.[50]

Whereas prior to 1997, politicians always referred to Ukraine's non-bloc status, the new Ukrainian Constitution of June 28, 1996, does not mention any nonaligned status and the "Fundamentals of National Security," approved by the parliament, provides specifically for "entry into existent and newly formed or emerging systems of universal and regional security."[51] Today the biggest obstacle for Ukraine's ascension to NATO, apart from Russian objections, lies with Ukraine's own economic situation. But cautious voices also might come from the Alliance itself.

Economic Issues

Ukraine must improve its economic relations with Moscow and diversify its sources of energy in order to loosen Russia's grip on its economy. Ukraine's high indebtedness to its neighbor gives Russia leverage that could nullify any political efforts for greater independence and assertiveness. In fact, Russia has already tried several times to swap parts of the Ukrainian debt for shares or total takeovers in the privatization of strategic Ukrainian companies. Russia's success in these attempts would be a new incarnation of its centuries-old economic-imperial strategy[52] and could be much more dangerous than temporary energy dependence for the long-term future of an independent Ukraine.

Only recently Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma signed an agreement on economic cooperation through the year 2007. That accord is aimed at doubling trade turnover between the two countries, which totaled U.S.$14 billion in 1997 (roughly the same as in 1995). The two leaders also agreed to cooperate in the construction of military transport planes.

Although the trade agreement helped economic relations between the two countries, Kiev is still struggling with its energy dependence on Moscow. After a period of paying for the energy it received from Russia, Ukraine was again threatened to be cut off from its primary energy supplier, the Russian Gazprom, for arrears in payment. To minimize this threat, Kiev has made an effort to diversify its energy sources, having signed several agreements to import natural gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Ukraine's overall level of debt should undoubtedly improve once the Black Sea Fleet agreements are implemented, but Ukraine still has to resolve the issue of the "zero option" agreement, in which Kiev renounced Ukraine's share of all former Soviet assets in third countries and in Russia in return for relief from any part of Soviet debt. Ukraine signed this agreement with Russia in December 1994, but has neither published nor ratified it, following harsh public criticism. Kiev's share of the Soviet debt amounts to U.S.$13.5 billion and 2.8 billion transfer rubles (the currency denomination used in trade among

COMECON countries), whereas its part of the Soviet assets amounts to U.S.$12.1 billion, 7.8 billion transfer rubles, U.S.$600 million in real estate and other nonfinancial assets, as well as 42.1 tons of gold.[53]

A "New Map" of the Region?

President Kuchma has tried to "redraw the map" surrounding Ukraine by actively seeking alliances within and outside the CIS, in particular within the Baltic-Black Sea-Cooperation framework, the coalition with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) and the Central European Initiative (CEI). These initiatives have the potential to improve Ukraine's geopolitical position, and to overcome its position as a mere buffer between Russia and NATO. As President Kuchma stated: "we do not want Ukraine to become a buffer, because love from both sides can lead to squeezing."[54]

Although relations with Russia were the absolute priority in the beginning of Kuchma's presidency, by the fall of 1995, he had turned to the West, calling EU membership in "a vision" for Ukraine.[55] Kuchma, raised in a time when there was no boundary between Ukraine and Russia, now had to demarcate the Ukrainian-Russian border. Perhaps the experience of a new line between the two countries, characterized by passport controls at the border, made him realize that Ukraine was no longer part of Russia. He may also have realized that the new border obstructed the formerly clear view to Moscow, and opened a path to the West.[56]

In any case, Kuchma has actively sought to free Ukraine from the narrow framework of the CIS, overshadowed by Russia, for "Ukraine has not succeeded in resolving any of its major problems within the framework of the CIS, whose members have concluded numerous agreements that remain on paper."[57] Ukraine never joined the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security and is only an associate member of the CIS Economic Union. Kuchma perceives the CIS, in fact, as a vehicle for Russian domination, and tries circumvent it by concluding bilateral treaties within and outside the CIS and by participating in regional alliances.

GUAM

In the fall of 1996, Presidents Shevardnadze of Georgia, Aliyev of Azerbaijan, and Kuchma established the "Union of the Three," based on a shared pro-Western orientation, mistrust of Russia and the desire to profit jointly from the export of part of Azerbaijan's oil. In mid-October 1997, Moldova was admitted to this "union," and the four presidents issued a joint communiqué registering their shared strategic interest and affirming both their intention to deepen political and economic ties and their mutual interest in questions of regional security, thus creating GUAM after the initials of the four countries. A forum of choice for GUAM is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna, and in particular the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. Here the GUAM states consult each other, issue joint

communiqués and make joint démarches. Their foreign ministers meet on a regular basis. Although GUAM remains a purely informal grouping (in comparison with the CIS or the Russia-Belarus Union), it serves Kuchma's efforts to undermine the CIS and to extricate Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence.

Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation

In June 1992 the neighboring states of the Black Sea, under the leadership of Turkey, decided to create a framework called the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), in which they could improve economic and political ties as well as military cooperation, and address environmental issues concerning the ecosystem of the Black Sea. They created a zone of free movement of people, goods and capital and envisaged a regional development bank. In their latest move, the member states of the BSEC have drafted guidelines for talks on confidence-building measures related to the activities of their naval forces in the Black Sea.[58]

Ukraine held the presidency of the BSEC in the second half of 1997 which, according to members of the presidential administration in Kiev, helped strengthen the country's European authority. One goal of the Ukrainian presidency was to have the BSEC recognized as a regional economic organization under Articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter.[59] In general, Ukraine has been actively working to promote cooperation with the BSEC and to link it with the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), thus creating a zone of cooperation stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Ukraine has observer status in the CBSS, which was established in March 1992 and counts all the Baltic rim states as its members, as well as Iceland, Norway and the European Commission.

Central European Initiative

The Central European Initiative (CEI) was launched in 1992 by Italy. Its members are Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Belarus and Ukraine, which joined in June 1996. The major aims of the CEI lie in economic cooperation, in particular in creating trans-border transportation corridors. Ukraine sees the practical use of the CEI in the creation of a transport corridor between Trieste, Italy, and Kiev, with the hope that the CEI can help overcome the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, and the expectation that the CEI can help harmonize legal norms across countries as practiced in the EU.

Within the CEI framework, Ukraine also continues bilateral and multilateral actions, such as signing a cooperation treaty with Moldova and Romania on February 26, 1998. The signatories pledged to protect ethnic minorities and to put aside territorial disputes. The document, which was sponsored by the European Council, also draws up free-trade zones and sets common policies on border traffic.[60]

For Ukraine the political use of the CEI is paramount. By being a member of the CEI, Ukraine wants to show the rest of the world that its foreign

policy is directed toward the West. In the same spirit, Ukraine is working to become a member of the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), which it sees as a bridge to the EU. While it is not yet a member, Ukraine is concluding bilateral free trade agreements with member states of CEFTA, such as Lithuania and Latvia. Sponsored by Poland, Ukraine also has been invited to become a permanent participant of the Summit of Central European States. For Kiev this means acceptance in a club where it feels it historically belongs.[61]

Political Implications of the "New Map"

Russia's reaction to Ukraine's efforts to strengthen relations with regional partners has been suprisingly muted. Although Moscow persistently criticizes Ukraine's unwillingness to participate further in the CIS, it obviously does not view Ukraine's new coalitions as dangerous. Nonetheless, according to the presidential administration in Kiev, Russia does try to sell the idea via mass media that Ukraine's "Drang nach Westen" (drive toward the West) is purely an elite concept and not supported by the general public.[62] This view is not entirely without foundation, as we will see later.

Throughout the twentieth century, Russians from Lenin to Solzhenytsin have stressed that Russia without Ukraine cannot play the role of an imperial superpower. Today, for a majority of Russians, an independent Ukraine is still considered historically and culturally unnatural.[63] However, a look back at the New Regional Map, to which Ukraine now belongs through a growing number of agreements, shows Russia positioned at the margin—inversing Ukraine's geohistorical role as the "land on the edge." The will for Ukrainian national assertion thus seems very real, and its capability growing.

Indeed, the above-mentioned initiatives indicate that Ukraine is on its way to resolving its "fundamental dilemma between balancing or bandwagoning a regional hegemon" (seeking a balance of power or joining the stronger rival), something that still seemed impossible at the end of 1996.[64] Whereas membership in the EU and even NATO will not be achieved in the short term, active participation in particular in the CEI can help Ukraine build credentials and improve its economic situation by diversifying trade relations.

Ukraine's effort to broaden its relations and to release itself from Russia's grip should be strongly supported by the West, which has been trying to build a counterweight to Russia via Kiev since Moscow's foreign policy switched from "Westernization" to a more "Eurasian" perspective in 1993.[65] "Long recognized as the lynchpin keeping the Soviet Union together, an independent Ukraine is the only assurance the West has that Russia does not, once more, become an empire."[66]

Rebalancing Ukraine's Foreign Policy

Multiple factors have indeed caused Ukraine's renewed self-assuredness. Russia's boldness certainly pushed Ukraine towards the West, but this could not have happened without Ukraine's growing self-confidence and the new degree of

freedom from the centuries-old feeling of belonging to a Russian empire. At the same time, Russia's internal weaknesses gave Ukraine the occasion to pursue a more independent path without fear of repercussions.

The future of Ukraine's assertiveness is less clear. Now that the Crimean and the Black Sea Fleet issues might reach acceptable outcomes, Ukrainian officials should be able to meet their counterparts in Moscow with more self-assuredness than before. But there is a trend in Ukrainian relations with Russia that prompts the Ukrainian side to concede to Russian hegemony while in Moscow. Ukrainian officials are unable to resist the "Russian factor," even though the same officials downplay the matter once back to Kiev, and Ukraine's "Drang nach Westen" prevails once again.

This happened during Kuchma's state visit to Moscow in March 1998, when the Ukrainian side was induced to sign a the ten-year economic cooperation agreement that was heavily criticized once the delegation was back in Kiev, with politicians calling it "Ukraine's surrender to the grip of the Russian bear."[67]

Kiev's official foreign policy, as stated by administration officials, can only be a "pragmatic foreign policy that is formulated very slowly, because nothing else is possible with Russia," the big neighbor that still "threatens Ukraine's inner stability, in particular through the work of its security services."[68]

The results of the 1998 parliamentary elections did not really give any indication as to how the Ukrainian-Russian relationship will develop. Although the left-wing parties, which constitute 38.2 percent of the seats in the new parliament, are anti-Western and denounce Ukraine's partnership with NATO, they do not openly support a return to Soviet structures. The other parties, which constitute 36.5 percent of the seats, either advocate an openly pro-Western foreign policy or a healthy balance between the West and the CIS.[69] Most of the independently elected parliamentarians (25.3 percent of the seats), who primarily represent business interests, also have an interest in good relations with the West. As Paul Goble said:

> The vote for the Communists was not necessarily a vote for closer ties with Moscow, let alone a return to some kind of revived Soviet Union ... most voted the way they did out of domestic considerations rather than foreign policy calculations. And even if some Communist candidates did promise to improve ties with Moscow, they also spoke out in favor of strengthening the national governments they hoped to be elected to. Indeed, precisely because of the legacy of the past, many of the Communists adopted campaign rhetoric as nationalist as any of the other candidates.[70]

Thus, although the election results certainly do not inspire much optimism for the future of economic and legal reforms in Ukraine, the "Russian factor" in the country's foreign policy does not seem overly encouraged by the popular vote.

These two examples, the Ukrainian-Russian economic agreement and the election results show that although the "Russian factor" is still alive, it seems to be receding. Ukraine is still dependent on Russia, but Russia is also dependent on Ukraine. The vestiges of Soviet structural integration still link

the two economies, as do Russian pipelines through Ukraine. But most importantly, if Russia cannot reintegrate Ukraine into its empire, it still wants to maintain it as a friend.

This psychological moment will probably be more decisive than any economic factors in determining the quality of future Ukrainian-Russian relations. In order to ensure this friendship, Russia will probably have to acknowledge Ukraine's assertiveness and reduce its influence over its neighbor. The "Russian factor" might never totally disappear from Ukrainian foreign policy because of geographic determinism, but the positive implications of the "new map" should provide Ukraine with a strong foundation as it makes the transition from a "land on the edge" to an self-assured member of Europe. ■

Notes

[1] For an analysis of these years see John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship," in *International Affairs* 59, no. 4 (October 1993): 677-704; or Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, *Back in the USSR* (Cambridge, MA: SDI Project, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 1994), 66-85.

[2] Alfred Rieber, "Persistent factors in Russian foreign policy: an interpretative essay," in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 322.

[3] President Kuchma in an interview with German journalists in Kiev on May 30, 1997, author's notes.

[4] "Human blood is not water," *Uryadovy Kurier*, no. 239 (December 14, 1994): 1.

[5] For reactions see "Chechen Conflict arouses Ukrainian Ire," *Intelnews Weekly Digest*, December 19, 1994.

[6] *Uryadovy Kurier*, no. 239 (December 14, 1994): 1.

[7] See *Intelnews Weekly Digest*, December 19, 1994.

[8] Chrystia Freeland and Matthew Kaminski, "Ukraine outshines its noisy neighbour," *Financial Times*, June 2, 1995, 3.

[9] For a comparison see the respective Economist Intelligence Unit's country reports.

[10] Data from the Hungarian economic weekly, "Heti Vilag Gazdafag," Spring 1997.

[11] Chrystyna Lapychak and Ustina Markus, "Ukraine's Continuing Evolution," *Transition* 3, no. 2 (February 7, 1997): 31.

[12] In 1995 Ukraine increased its exports to Russia from U.S.$4.36 to U.S.$5.52 billion, whereas imports from Russia only rose from U.S.$7.74 to U.S.$8.14 billion, a trend that continued in 1996. Moscow thus had to fear a decreasing trade surplus with Ukraine which would make Kiev less dependent on Moscow. See Joachim Weidemann, "Rauheres Klima zwischen Kiew und Moskau," *Neue Zuericher Zeitung*, September 18, 1996, 5.

[13] "Legal Status of Sevastopol," press release of the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington, DC, February 5, 1997, available at http://www.TRYZUB.com/UKRAINE/Statements/9.html, accessed March 8, 1998.

[14] *Intelnews Weekly Digest*, July 12, 1993.

[15] James Meek, "Crimean Port Vote Splits Neighbours," *The Guardian*, December 6,

1996, 15.

[16] Quoted in Volodymyr Pedchenko, "Ukraine's Delicate Balancing Act," *Transition*, June 1997, 75.

[17] Reprinted in *Krymskaya Pravda*, October 10, 1996, 1.

[18] Quoted in John Thornhill, "Russians protest at Crimea accord," *The Financial Times*, June 2, 1997, 2.

[19] For the concept of mental maps and foreign policy see Alan K. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 177-192.

[20] *The Constitution of Ukraine*, official English translation (Kiev: Ukrainian Legal Foundation, 1996), Article 10.

[21] "Kandidat v presidenty Ukrainy, Leonid Kuchma, za soyus s Rossiey i stranami SNG," copy of the original election flyer, put at the disposition of the author by the Presidential Administration in Kiev.

[22] The inauguration speech was published in *Uryadovy Kurier*, no. 112-113 (July 21, 1994): 2-3.

[23] Quoted in Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: the Politics of Reform," *Problems of Post-Communism* 42, no. 6 (November/December 1995): 50.

[24] Serhiy Tolstov and Oleksandr Potyekhin, "Ukrainian Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Political Thought," *The Ukrainian Review* 44, no. 4, 13.

[25] For these early events in Crimea see Taras Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine, Triangle of Conflict* (London: RISCT, 1994), 14-28. A good analysis of the problem can also be found in Oleksiy Haran, Yaroslav Koval, and Andriy Shevchuk, "Ukraine and Crimea in Russia's geopolitical concepts," *Political Thought* 3 (1994): 208-218.

[26] *The constitution of Ukraine*, Chapter X. Other competences in Article 138: The competence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea comprises: 1) designating elections of deputies to the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, approving the composition of the electoral commission of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; 2) organizing and conducting local referendums; 3) managing property that belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; 4) elaborating, approving and implementing the budget of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on the basis of the uniform tax and budget policy of Ukraine; 5) elaborating, approving and realizing programs of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for socioeconomic and cultural development, the rational utilization of nature, and environmental protection in accordance with national programs; 6) recognizing the status of localities as resorts; establishing zones for the sanitary protection of resorts; 7) participating in ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens, national harmony, the promotion of the protection of legal order and public security; 8) ensuring the operation and development of the state language and national languages and cultures in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; protection and use of historical monuments; 9) participating in the development and realization of state programs for the return of deported peoples; 10) initiating the introduction of a state of emergency and the establishment of zones of an ecological emergency situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or in its particular areas. Other powers may also be delegated to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the laws of Ukraine.

[27] Joachim Weidemann, "Stille Machtuebernahme auf der Krim," *Neue Zuericher Zeitung*, October 17, 1996, 2.

[28] Meek, 15.

[29] Quoted from the English translation in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 53, no. 1-2 (Spring/

Summer 1997): 156-157.

[30] For details on the new Crimean Constitution, see its official publication in *Golos Ukrainy*, January 12, 1999, 6.

[31] The following details were published in the official government newspaper: Oleh Oliynik, "Uhody pidpysano, flot i bukhty dilimo," *Uryadovy Kurier*, no. 101 (June 6, 1997): 2.

[32] Roman Woronowycz, "Black Sea Fleet accord subject of controversy," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 15, 1997, 1.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Admiral Vladimir Komoedov, quoted in RFE/RL Newsline, March 8, 1999.

[36] Quoted from the English translation in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 53, no. 1-2 (Spring/ Summer 1997): 153.

[37] In an interview with German journalists on May 30, 1997, author's notes.

[38] Quoted from the English translation in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 53, no. 1-2 (Spring/ Summer 1997): 144-152.

[39] Quoted in *RFE/RL newsline*, January 15, 1997.

[40] Quoted in *RFE/RL newsline*, January 16, 1997.

[41] Quoted in *RFE/RL newsline*, February 11, 1997.

[42] Quoted in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, December 20, 1998.

[43] Quoted in *RFE/RL newsline*, December 28, 1998.

[44] At a lecture at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA., September 22, 1997, author's notes.

[45] See the reactions to the creation of a German-Danish-Polish corps in Szczecin, *RFE/ RL newsline*, February 9, 1998.

[46] See Joachim Weidemann, "Nato - ein heikles Thema in der Ukraine; Moskauer Unmut und alte Feindbilder," *Neue Zuericher Zeitung*, September 3, 1997, 5, and Carol J. Williams, "U.S.-Ukraine Military Exercises Rub Russians the Wrong Way," *Los Angeles Times*, August 29, 1997, 5.

[47] Volodymyr Horbulin, "National Security of Ukraine and International Security," *Political Thought* 1 (1997): 84.

[48] Charter provisions are quoted according to the official NATO English version available at http://xs4all.freenet.kiev.ua/NATO/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm, accessed March 8, 1998.

[49] Press conference at the presidential administration, January 31, 1997, author's notes.

[50] "Ukraine does not want to join NATO now or in the next few years. Strong security guarantees [in the Charter] will bridge this five or ten-year period," quoted in Sonia Winter, "Russia/Ukraine: Serious Negotiations Begin On NATO Charter," *RFE/RL newsline*, March 4, 1997.

[51] Volodymyr Horbulin, "National Security of Ukraine and International Security," *Political Thought* 1 (1997): 84.

[52] Rieber, 324.

[53] Transfer rubles were the Soviet pseudo currency used in trade among the Comecon countries. See Joachim Weidemann, "Rauheres Klima zwischen Kiew und Moskau," *Neue Zuericher Zeitung*, September 18, 1996, 5.

[54] Quoted in Pedchenko, 74.

[55] Meeting with the EU/G-7 ambassadors in Kiev, fall 1995, author's notes.
[56] For the role of boundaries see Henrikson, 178.
[57] *RFE/RL newsline*, February 25, 1998.
[58] *RFE/RL newsline*, February 28, 1998.
[59] Author's notes from a discussion with Andrei Fialko and Mykola Baltazhy, deputy heads of the Department of International Relations in the Presidential Adminstration, Kiev, March 19, 1998.
[60] *RFE/RL newsline*, February 27, 1998.
[61] Analysis by Andrei Fialko and Mykola Baltazhy, deputy heads of the Department of International Relations in the Presidential Adminstration, Kiev, March 19, 1998, author's notes.
[62] Ibid.
[63] See also Solchanyk, 51.
[64] Paul d'Anieri, "Dilemmas of Interdependence: Autonomy, Prosperity, and Sovereignty in Ukraine's Russia Policy," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 24.
[65] For an analysis of this aspect of Russian Foreign Policy, see Bruce D. Porter, "Russia and Europe after the Cold War: The interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy," in *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* Ed. Celeste Wallander (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 121-145. For an analysis of Western Europe and Ukraine in the past see, Vadym Levandovskyi, "Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts in the First Third of the 20th Century," *Political Thought* 3 (1994): 174-183.
[66] Natalia A. Feduschak, "Ukraine and the enlargement of NATO," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 53, no. 1-2 (Spring/Summer 1997): 92.
[67] Quoted in *RFE/RL newsline*, March 3, 1998.
[68] Analysis by Andrei Fialko and Mykola Baltazhy, deputy heads of the Department of International Relations in the Presidential Adminstration, Kiev, March 19, 1998, author's notes.
[69] As summarized in *Vybory - 1998: sovnishnopolitychni orientatsii partii ta blokiv* (Kiev: Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research, March 1998), 9-10.
[70] Paul Goble, "When Communists win elections," *RFE/RL newsline*, April 6, 1998.