

# CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: VEILED APOLOGETIC OR AN EFFORT AT SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE?

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The relationship between culture and development is everywhere apparent and nearly everywhere in question. Is it possible to imagine development, whether economic or political, occurring in an environment in which the cultural dimension is totally absent? The question is obviously rhetorical, since any concern about social processes must include consideration of the total context in which they occur. To speak of culture is not to speak of some marginal phenomenon. It is everywhere pervasive. Likewise, to speak of development as simply a search for societal identity, driven by individual psychological peculiarities, is to ignore the crucial historical and political context of the process. What, then, is the problem? Why is the juxtaposition of the two terms, culture and development, the subject of such persistent controversy, whether among students of the social sciences or of foreign policy?

The problem is not whether culture and development are related, but how. It is the answer to this question that often gives rise to controversy, as different formulations yield different — and at times incompatible — views of the nature of society and social change.

In the first place, the meaning of neither culture nor development is self-evident; the critical question of how they intersect in lived experience also lingers unanswered, as does the fundamental issue of time and space. What periods are under consideration? What spaces are compared? I assume, in the remarks that follow, a focus on contemporary societal transformation in the Third World. Although the reference to the Third World has become commonplace, the term has become obsolete with the emerging significance of internal differences among the states so classified.<sup>1</sup>

Is culture the prevailing aesthetic expression of a particular society? Are the forms of artistic expression the key to cultural specificity? Or is the question broader, deeper, and more elusive? Does culture adopt a structure of

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1. The term was used originally to describe largely nonindustrialized states, some of which had recently achieved political independence and all of which were situated outside of the major capitalist and socialist countries. Increasingly, however, the limits of the term became evident since the states that were classified as neither first world nor second world were dissimilar in many significant ways. Nevertheless, unlike the term LDC (less developed country), which has a more neutral if economic tone, "Third World" conveys some of the political connotations earlier associated with decolonization and the struggle for development.

feeling, in Raymond Williams's sense, a way of being, relating, and even dreaming? Is it how humans envisage their own mortality and the kinds of myths they weave to console themselves in the proximity of death? Is this what underlies the diversity of cultures and the universal longings to which they respond? These constructions of mind and spirit are also temporal events. Cultural constructions are created in particular spaces, defined by their creators as much as the contexts in which they are produced. They are, in sum, social products as well as works of individual genius.

In practice, however, contemporary postwar American studies of development focus much less on these possible interpretations than on other dimensions of culture. It was culture defined as a set of beliefs, values, norms, and attitudes that figured prominently in a literature devoted to identifying the prerequisites of economic modernization and political change. The subject of investigation therefore was less the social underpinnings of such factors than their psychological meaning and their behavioral expression.

What of development? Separated but not entirely detached from its historic connection with the enlightenment idea of progress, the term is most readily connected in postwar parlance with the expansion of capitalist economic growth. That such growth was accompanied by significant changes in social and political relations was recognized by both policymakers in Washington and social scientists. Unraveling the nature of these connections proved to be as contentious as defining its individual components. What, for instance, does political development entail? Is it a process, condition, or goal? Does it refer to the expansion of participatory democracy and equality, or are such connections severed? Why, in fact, has the attention devoted to political development in this sense taken a back seat to micro and macro analyses of economic growth, as though that subject precluded political consideration?

More can be said with respect to the facets of development that can be considered. However, the major difficulty lies not so much in defining what is meant by the terms culture and development as in inventing a language that can accommodate both. Such a language requires an appropriate grammar of the terms' respective structures of meaning, as well as a strategy that conveys the dynamic processes to which they are both subject. A worthwhile discussion needs to be free of the essentialist approach to culture that blots out significant differences, and that lends itself to an unacceptable reductionism. History as well as politics must be brought to bear on such analyses, to revive questions such as these: if culture is the subject, whose culture prevails in our assumptions? Who defines the accepted values and codes of behavior? Who determines what is accepted as a given orthodoxy? What institutions and relations of power perpetuate such givens? What is the social cost of such decisions? Similar questions need to be posed with respect to development, whether economic or political.

This notion is quite far from what appears in conventional interpretations of development, let alone in efforts to consider the interrelationships of culture and development. Such an emphasis on the personalization of culture in terms

of attitudes and norms of behavior, as well as the tendency to psychologize the analysis of politics in combination with an elitist interpretation, have led to a powerful undermining of political analysis. At worst, the effect has been to promote an ahistorical and trivial form of political discourse that is contemptuous of its subject.

For students of development, whether economic, social, or political, the question of how culture and development are related conjures up a particular school of thought. It evokes memories of Max Weber and the continuing debates around the relationship of Protestantism and capitalism, in both western and non-western settings. The debates may have changed in character, the pitfalls of ethnocentric interpretations having been pointed out over the years, but the relevance of the subject persists. So too the risks persist that are entailed in its common interpretation, a false reductionism that is implicit in what Pierre Bourdieu has described as the "ritual question of the cultural obstacles to economic development . . . ." <sup>2</sup> Those who posed this ritual question, according to the French sociologist and ethnographer, were concerned in rather abstract fashion with the "rationalization" of economic behavior, and with identifying what they believed to be the cultural constraints that stood in its way. The "ritual question" often led to the right answer, namely, the identification of certain cultures, or cultural expressions such as particular regions, as inhibiting modernization. In certain contexts, notably where unequal relations of power existed and where struggles to legitimize domination occurred, this form of explanation could lend itself to the justificatory arguments of those in power.

The interpretations of Weber offered by various prominent theorists of development in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s reveal such a reductionist tendency, in a gradual shift from the social to the personal, from the psychology to the typology of political style. <sup>3</sup> Among Weber's works, one essay has special significance for students of political development. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* offers an interpretation of the relationship among culture, values, and economic change that seemed destined to be taken up by students of development.

Reviewing the intellectual background of development theories, Lucian Pye credited Weber with "elaborating, with great erudition and profound historical insight, the distinctive qualities of the traditional and the rational-legal forms of authority." He also cited Weber for the identification of the "charismatic form of authority with its emphasis upon the affectual type of social action." <sup>4</sup> But beyond this, according to Pye, "an even greater contribution" was Weber's belief that there was an inner coherence in all societies. It was manifest "in the form of a systematic relationship among the social, economic, legal, and

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2. Pierre Bourdieu, "The disenchantment of the world," *Algeria 1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1.

3. Portions of the following were published in I. L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1986).

4. Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 61.

political forms of behavior on the one hand, and the nonrational spirit or ethos of the society, as best expressed in its religion, on the other."<sup>5</sup> What Weber achieved in his study of Calvinism and capitalism, Pye continued, was nothing less than the correlation of the individual and the social, the psychological dimension and the social system. In Pye's words, "The social, economic, and political realms were seen as no more than different aspects of basic human acts, all conditioned and given coherence by the psychological makeup of man. Weber thus set the stage for relating questions of social structure to the profound psychological insights of Freud."<sup>6</sup> But whether Weber set out to do what Pye described is another matter. Psychological insights were not a primary consideration of Weber's analyses. But Pye's account conveyed the manner in which political development theorists read Weber's study of Calvinism and capitalism.

No doubt Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* raised issues that were well within the mainstream of contemporary development studies. The relationship between capitalism and rationality, central to Weber's essay, was reproduced with few changes in interpretations of development. It was opposed to non-rational "traditionalism," described as the "most important opponent with which the spirit of capitalism, in the sense of a definite standard of life claiming ethical sanction, has had to struggle . . . ."<sup>7</sup> Weber's comments on this worthy opponent presaged what development theorists were to write about "traditional" society. In Weber's terms, modern capitalism repeatedly "encountered the immensely stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalist labour. And today it encounters it the more, the more backward (from a capitalist point of view) the labouring forces are with which it has to deal."<sup>8</sup>

Weber's explanation offered inspiration to development theorists seeking confirmation of the importance of nonmaterialistic factors in social analysis. Weber referred to the "anthropological side of the problem," although he quickly modified this by asserting that there was not enough research to sustain such an emphasis.<sup>9</sup> Modern capitalism emerged in certain areas, according to Weber, because of internalist reasons. What was lacking where it failed to appear was "the development of the spirit of capitalism."<sup>10</sup> Education was required to arouse it. Then, the Calvinist ethic would emerge and play its role. This role Weber referred to as "a calling," which in time became an end in itself. Far from describing it as rational or as a source of personal happiness, Weber was more critical of its effect. Indeed, he described the internalizing of such a calling as a deformation. How else to describe a

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5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 58-59.

8. Ibid., 60.

9. Ibid., 30.

10. Ibid., 68.

situation in which, as Weber noted, "a man exists for the sake of his business, instead of the reverse."<sup>11</sup>

In conventional interpretations of political development, the behavior associated with this "calling" was described as rational. Its absence, accordingly, described nonrational behavior, an important ingredient in the arbitrary definitions of traditional as opposed to modern societies that appeared in the writings of development theorists. Whether students of political development were faithful to Weber's spirit is another question. They certainly did not heed his warning against substituting "for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history."<sup>12</sup> And they ignored his warning that a lopsided interpretation of this relationship "accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth." Generally, critical commentaries on the Weber thesis, which abounded, were scarcely acknowledged by political development scholars. Hence the proposition that the emergence of capitalism was not a function of the Calvinist ethic alone, as the European and the Third World experiences indicated, was ignored.<sup>13</sup> In the late 1960s, S. N. Eisenstadt attempted to bring the Weber thesis and its related arguments up to date.<sup>14</sup>

Given the general thrust of development studies, it was scarcely surprising that the Weber thesis received such a warm welcome. Weber's work was cited as an inspiration in the works of various social scientists concerned with the conditions of economic growth. Those like Bert Hoselitz, founder and editor of *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (EDCC), conceptualized the problem posed by Weber in broad terms: "Does economic development mean only a change in certain aspects of overt behavior, notably the acquisition of new skills or the exercise of new forms of productive activity, or is it accompanied by or contingent upon more basic changes in social relations, and even the structure of values and beliefs of a culture?"<sup>15</sup> Hoselitz raised the question in other works as well. His conclusion was that it would be useful to be able to determine the "culture traits" compatible with, as well as antagonistic to, economic and technological growth.<sup>16</sup> Critics of conventional interpretations of political development and modernization argued against the limits of such theses, notably those propagated in Hoselitz's journal.<sup>17</sup>

There were other works, however, that were far more extreme in their application of the Weber thesis. Titles such as *The Achievement Motive* (1953) and *The Achieving Society* (1961), by David McClelland, which were often cited in development studies, carried the general thrust of the Weber thesis con-

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11. *Ibid.*, 70.

12. *Ibid.*, 183.

13. M. Rodison, *Islam and Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 77-78.

14. S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

15. B. Hoselitz, ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 8.

16. *Ibid.*, vi.

17. A. Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," in J. D. Cockcroft, A. Gunder Frank, and D. Johnson, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), Ch. 12.

siderably further. McClelland indicated a general dissatisfaction with existing interpretations of social change. He felt that they were too materialist in character. In comparison, in his own work he dwelled on the impact of early childhood training and its implications for the emergence of the entrepreneurial spirit.

Everett Hagen argued from a similar perspective, claiming that the explanation of social change could be located in "the internal structure and functioning" of societies. In his interpretation, "both the barriers to growth and the causes of growth seem to be largely internal rather than external."<sup>18</sup> Finding inspiration and confirmation in the work of psychoanalysts and sociologists,<sup>19</sup> Hagen insisted that the key to social change was to be found in the relationship of "personal to social structure."<sup>20</sup> Another writer put the matter more crudely: "Change in underlying material conditions usually presupposes changes in the contents of the mind, since material conditions are passive whereas mental conditions are potentially dynamic."<sup>21</sup>

It was not the significance of the relationship between personality and society that distinguished the writings of various social theorists on development, but the weight these writings attributed to the interrelated elements and the manner in which their interrelationship was conceived. Talcott Parsons, for example, who wielded an inordinate influence on postwar American social science, was preoccupied with this very subject. He continually sought to define the boundaries between individual, culture, and society and the nature of their reciprocal relations. From his reading of Freud, Durkheim, and Weber, Parsons elaborated the concept of internalization, which he described as far more radical than most people recognized.<sup>22</sup> Internalization, according to Parsons, described the integration of socially sanctioned structures of meaning. It was a key to the process of socialization,<sup>23</sup> which, in turn, was an essential element in the political vocabulary of theorists of liberal democracy and political development. *The Civic Culture, Political Culture and Political Development*, and *Comparative Politics* elaborated on this concept.<sup>24</sup> But the tensions that Parsons recognized as central to the relationship of the individual to society were muted in such interpretations. It was the conformist aspect of internalization that was reproduced in the studies on political development.

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18. E. E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962), 55.

19. *Ibid.*, 193.

20. *Ibid.*, 86.

21. J. J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values and Politico-Economic Development," in J. J. Spengler and R. Braibanti, eds., *Traditions, Values and Socioeconomic Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), 53.

22. T. Parsons, *Social Structure and Personality* (London: Collier-MacMillan Publishers, 1970), 80.

23. *Ibid.*, 91-92.

24. See G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 11, 16; Almond in Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, 26; G. Almond and G. B. Powell, *Comparative Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 23; L. Pye and S. Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) — both the Introduction and Conclusion, in particular; and, from a critical perspective, C. Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, part 3 (July 1971).

Where do Weber and Parsons fit in the annals of political development studies? From the perspective of their contribution to the analysis of the relationship of personality to politics, what was the legacy that theorists of political development inherited and exploited?

Not all students of Third World politics were interested in psychology, psychoanalysis, or social psychology. But among those who accepted the conventions of conservative political theory implicit in the elitist interpretation of democracy, the tendency to adopt psychological explanations of politics was commonplace. In this circle the habit of discussing fundamental social and political change in terms of stress was widespread. Similarly, the tendency to analyze dissident political movements in terms of their appeal to those identified as psychologically unbalanced found a warm reception. The reasons for these responses are not difficult to find. By displacing political analysis from the political to the personal level, political differences and conflicts were reduced to matters of deviance and other personality malfunctions. The approach was convenient, albeit a distraction from the ostensible purpose of political explanation.

Daniel Lerner's exploitation of this approach was evident in *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958). But he applied the approach to European conditions in an earlier essay on neutralism, in which he claimed that "the psychological mechanism underlying neutralist sentiment is neither apathy nor apoplexy, but ambivalence . . . . When this inability to choose persists against all considerations of greater good or lesser evil in an actual situation, a new conception of reality may be internalized which ignores or denies the need to make a choice at all."<sup>25</sup> There was no attempt to mask the underlying ideological thrust behind this form of mystification. As Lerner wrote in his conclusion, "Either way, as privatized apathetics or apoplectic antagonists, the neutralists would represent a total loss to the Free World, a serious and unnecessary loss . . . ."<sup>26</sup> The description did not contradict the view of neutralism current among scholars of political development, particularly those who were policy oriented. Lerner's approach demonstrated how a psychological or pseudopsychological language might be used to target an undesirable political position. But in other works dealing more directly with political development, another dimension of this approach emerged. By describing the process of social change in terms of pathology,<sup>27</sup> a breakdown occasioned by the rupture with traditional lifestyles, theorists of development injected a reductionist element into the discussion of social and political change. Treading the line between individual, societal, and political change, some development theorists concluded that Third World change was best understood in

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25. D. Lerner, "International Coalitions and Communications Content: the Case of Neutralism" [special issue on international communications research], *Public Opinion Quarterly* 16 (Winter 1952-53): 684.

26. *Ibid.*, 687.

27. The description appears in an essay that situates development studies in the context of Western intellectual history. See L. Binder, "Crises of Political Development," in L. Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 37.

terms of the quest for personal and political identity.<sup>28</sup> Although buttressed by references to the works of various psychologists and social psychologists (Erik Erickson among them), the notion of political identity emerged as an impressionistic and ahistorical phenomenon.

Lucian Pye presented just such an interpretation in *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* (1956), a work in which he argued that Third World populations in search of political identity were likely to interpret their quest in personal terms.<sup>29</sup> In a subsequent essay on the "non-Western political process" (1957), the approach was extended to the discussion of politics in Third World societies. In Third World states, Pye argued, there was a mix that revolved "around issues of prestige, influence, and even of personalities, and not primarily around questions of alternative courses of policy action."<sup>30</sup> Parson's discussion of dichotomous schemes characterizing societies at different stages of evolution recommended such an interpretation. In Pye's essay the implications of such an approach were evident. Third World societies were viewed as apolitical and, more precisely, as departing from the political norms of modern, Western, liberal democratic states.<sup>31</sup>

It was in *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (1962), a work dealing with Burma, that Pye elaborated on these themes at great length.<sup>32</sup> All politics had a psychological dimension, Pye argued. But the politics of transitional societies was the most affected by psychological conditions, he claimed. Contrary to conventional interpretations of Third World society as paralyzed by "tradition," Pye described the response of the Burmese peasant as one of energetic support for a form of economic activity that reflected well on the Burmese character. "Once the logic of the situation was clear to him in economic terms, he recognized with amazing spontaneity both the rational and nonrational components of the calculus of the market. He quickly came to appreciate the short-run principles of supply and demand and the long-run principle that resources invested rather than immediately consumed would in time produce even more resources."<sup>33</sup>

Change, far from being resisted, was actually supported at this time, although some were displeased with the transformations that followed. Emphasizing the response of those who benefited from the changes introduced, Pye noted that these people exhibited an appreciation of "the function of capital, the importance of indebtedness, and the fact that only the indebted peasant could become the rich peasant."<sup>34</sup> With the end of the British occupation the transformation came to an end, according to Pye. As Pye turned to the reasons for this shift, he turned away from the social character of

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28. See L. Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in *ibid.*

29. L. Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), 348.

30. L. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," in H. Eckstein and D. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics* (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan Publishers, 1963), 657.

31. *Ibid.*, 658.

32. L. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962: 4th printing, 1966).

33. *Ibid.*, 86.

34. *Ibid.*

economic change to a psychological description of its meaning. Contrasting pre-independence with the aftermath of the British withdrawal, Pye characterized the changes in the Burmese approach to the British colonialist legacy as fundamentally psychological. The withdrawal of British initiative and support, according to Pye, set the stage for the negative changes in Burma's economic life. In an effort to understand this, childhood rearing patterns were examined and linked to socialization processes. And these were matched against the general perception of Burmese politics as erratic, masked, and dissimulating.<sup>35</sup> The excessive sensitivity betrayed in the process of social change, according to Pye, was attributable to deeply felt sentiments of distrust. Hence the conclusion that "when people are being changed from traditionals into moderns, they are likely to be hypersensitive to the deeply felt sensation of being changed and manipulated by others who always protest that they are only being helpful."<sup>36</sup> The Burmese, in this account, were said to suffer from a fearful, anxiety-ridden personality type. They were prone to anticipate deception — and fearing it, they provoked its appearance. It was to be expected that the Burmese would therefore seek protective disguises enabling them to meet adversity by evading it.<sup>37</sup> And, indeed, evasion and ambivalence loomed as attractive options in this interpretation.

It was a long way from the earlier descriptions of Burmese peasants engaging in productive and rational economic activity to such descriptions of a politics of fear, anxiety, and paralysis. The reception accorded Pye's work, however, suggests that few objected to his method or his findings. Based on an extremely limited number of sources, its delegitimation of politics and political analysis met with little challenge from development scholars. The Burmese case inspired other works. Pye and Sidney Verba's contribution to the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics series on political development, *Political Culture and Political Development* (1965), involved a further elaboration of the notion of political identity and its relevance to Third World politics. Not only did Pye trace the notion in the works of contemporary psychologists,<sup>38</sup> but ironically, he expressed great misgivings about possible reductionist tendencies to which interpretations based on psychology could lead.<sup>39</sup>

The exploitation of a psychological and psychoanalytic vocabulary contributed to the depoliticization of political analysis in development studies. Behaviorism contributed to the same end. Far less defined, behaviorism lent

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35. "To exaggerate the picture somewhat for the sake of clarity, it can be said that the Burmese tend to seek in life those warm and close personal associations they occasionally experienced with their mothers, but their behavior is governed by the expectation that any human relationship may hold great dangers. The basic outlook is that people can be easily provoked to hostile responses. Behind every sign of friendliness there always lies the possibility of precisely the opposite pattern of behavior. And in an even more complex fashion, the acculturation process tends to reinforce rather a sense of distrust toward precisely those who would appear to be anxious to help, for helping is the same as controlling" (ibid., 126).

36. Ibid., 139.

37. Ibid., 150.

38. L. Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture."

39. L. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*.

itself to the most impressionistic claims about the relationship of attitude to politics. In discussions of political identity, the conformism that the behaviorist approach endorsed was evident. In discussions of political style, investigations of attitudes and their labeling became a substitute for the analysis of political differences.

The question of political identity and its subtle shift of emphasis from the political community to the actor and his attitudes was illustrated in *The Civic Culture*. There, political identity was associated with legitimacy; that, in turn, was described as a response resting on shared values in — rather than about — the work of political elites.<sup>40</sup> Attention was focused on the respondent, his attitudes, his conformism, his integration of existing political norms. A similar usage was apparent in some of the essays collected in the Pye and Verba volume.<sup>41</sup>

Discussions of political style elaborated on previous descriptions of political identity. From a common sense perspective, the proposition that individuals possess distinct political styles appears reasonable — provided that style refers to modes of political expression. But discussions of political style found in development studies did not rest on such simple propositions. Style became a synonym for political positions of various kinds. Differences in political styles — interpreted as attitudes — were then read as equivalent to differences in substantive political positions. And, accepting the validity of this approach, political style and substance became interchangeable. If you identified an individual's political style, you presumably knew his politics, whatever the context. But the dangers of such an approach are clear. Not only are political differences reduced to questions of style, but the identification of political style (i.e. attitude) becomes a substitute for the investigation of political content.

Political style, as Verba explained in his conclusion to the Pye and Verba volume (1965), was associated with “two aspects of political belief systems.” The first referred not to “the substance of beliefs but the way in which beliefs are held. The second aspect lies on the border between the system of political culture and the system of political interaction, and involves those informal norms of political interaction that regulate the way in which fundamental political beliefs are applied in politics.”<sup>42</sup> What does it mean to separate substance and style in this manner? If “the way” beliefs were supported presented difficulties in analysis, even more difficult was the clarification of “informal norms of political interaction.” Yet these categories, in fact, referred to familiar forms of classification. As developed in Verba's essay, the underlying distinction between the two views of politics was between the “ideological and the pragmatic,” a familiar breakdown in contemporary elitist theories of democracy.

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40. S. Verba, “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture,” in *ibid.*, 529.

41. The interpretation of political change in terms of political culture produced uneven results. See, for example, the following essays: R. Scott, “The Established Revolution,” and D. Levine, “Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism,” both in *ibid.*

42. Verba, “Conclusion,” 545.

According to this scheme, individual styles were linked to particular political doctrines. Inverting the approach, doctrines were then associated with particular styles so that the identification of one was a key to the other. Pragmatism was identified with moderation, ideological politics with fanaticism. The pragmatic approach suggested a piecemeal view of politics; the ideological was linked to a totalitarian conception. The assimilation of style and substance proceeded as follows: The "ideological style" was defined as involving a "deeply affective commitment to a comprehensive and explicit set of political values which covers not merely political affairs but all of life, a set of values which is hierarchical in form and often deduced from a more general set of 'first principles.'"<sup>43</sup> By contrast, the pragmatic approach was described as assuming an evaluation of problems "in terms of their individual merits, rather than in terms of some preexisting comprehensive view of reality."<sup>44</sup>

Whatever the formal intention of such analyses, they were selectively applied. Even so sympathetic a reader as Alex Inkeles, a contributor to development and modernization literature (A. Inkeles and D. Smith, *Becoming Modern*, 1974) argued that the approach obscured differences between attitudes and evaluations of politics.<sup>45</sup>

What are the implications of such arguments for the analysis of development? To what extent are works written over the past two decades still relevant? Those who follow the coverage of Third World politics in media as well as scholarly outlets will recognize the persistence of the approach. In a period of continuing turmoil throughout much of the Third World, where hunger, poverty, social injustice and political conflict compel attention, the seduction of explanations that focus more on individual actors than historical contexts and contemporary social and political systems, has its obvious attractions for those committed to containing fundamental societal transformation. Interpretations of political differences that reduce these to matters of individual psychology or even political culture, without grounding such descriptions in a social reconstruction of economic and political considerations, promise more mystification than explanation. For those committed to redefining the links between culture and development, progress lies in another direction, away from reductionism and the fragmentation of lived experience. The task ahead is to rethink critically an integrated social process in which cultural expression is given its due weight while situated in a dynamic network of social and political relationships. In such a context, culture and development coexist as parts of an integrated whole, the meaning of which is perpetually subject to investigation.

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43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*

45. A. Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 4 (December 1969): 1123. In the same text Inkeles noted a further qualification of the approach taken by the authors of *The Civic Culture*. On the basis of research carried out by his own team, Inkeles observed that "the participant citizen is not also consistently non-anomic, non-hostile, and satisfied with the performance of his government. Rather, we must say 'it depends' on the country — and no doubt, on the segment of the population being studied, as well."

