

Summaries and Analysis

Political Leadership - 25 Nov 2010

Executive Summary - 07 Jun 2010

Security - 07 Jun 2010

Regional Statistics - 17 Nov 2010

Special Profiles

Southern Sudan - 25 Nov 2010

Maps - 09 Dec 2009

Politics

External Affairs - 25 Nov 2010

Internal Affairs - 02 Jun 2010

Defence

Security And Foreign Forces - 11 Oct 2010

Non-state Armed Groups - 07 Jun 2010

Air Force - 05 Feb 2010

Defence Production And R & D - 12 Jan 2010

Procurement - 12 Jan 2010

Navy - 12 Jan 2010

Army - 12 Jan 2010

Armed Forces - 12 Jan 2010

Defence Budget - 12 Jan 2010

Strategic Weapon System - 12 Jan 2010

Context

Infrastructure -

Demography -

Geography -

Natural Resources -

Economy -

[2 Images](#)

Political leadership, Sudan

Date Posted: 25-Nov-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

[Political Overview](#)

[Leadership](#)

[Political Profiles](#)

[President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir](#)

[Ali Osman Mohamed Taha](#)

[Salva Kiir Mayardit, president of southern Sudan](#)

Political Overview

[TOP](#)

Official Name:	Republic of the Sudan
Political System:	Presidential federal republic
Declaration of Independence:	1 January 1956 (from Egypt and UK)
Head of State:	Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
Next Election:	Self-determination referendum for southern Sudan (January 2011)

Leadership

[TOP](#)

President and Prime Minister:	Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (NCP)
First Vice-President:	Salva Kiir Mayardit (SPLM)
Second Vice-President:	Ali Osman Mohamed Taha (NCP)
Minister of Agriculture:	Abd-al-Halim Isma'il al-Muta'afi
Minister of Antiquities, Tourism and Wildlife:	Ahmad Babikir Nahar
Minister of Cabinet Affairs:	Luka Biong
Minister of Communications and Information Technology:	Yahiya Abdalla Mohamed Hamad
Minister of Culture:	Al-Samu'al Khalafallah al-Quraysh
Minister of Defence:	Major General Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn
Minister of Electricity and Dams:	Usamah Abdallah Muhammad al-Hasan
Minister of Environment, Forestry and Urban Development:	Joseph Malwal Dong
Minister of Finance and National Economy:	Ali Mahmood Abdul-Rasool
Minister of Foreign Affairs:	Ali Ahmed Karti
Minister of Foreign Trade:	Elias Neyama Lel
Minister of General Education:	Farah Mustafa Abdalla
Minister of Religious Guidance and Endowments:	Azhari al-Tigani Awad al-Sayid

Minister of Health:	Abdalla Tiya Guma'a
Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research:	Peter Adwok Neyaba
Minister for Human Resources Development:	Kamal Abdul-Latif
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs:	Joseph Lual Achwel
Minister of Industry:	Awad Ahmad al-Jaz
Minister of Information:	Kamal Mohamed Obeid
Minister of the Interior:	Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamid
Minister of International Co-operation:	Jalal Yousif al-Degair
Minister of Investment:	George Boreng Niyami
Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources:	Kamal Ali Muhammad
Minister of Justice:	Mohamed Bushara Dousa
Minister of Labour:	Dak Dop Pishop
Minister of Livestock and Fisheries:	Faysal Hasan Ibrahim
Minister of Minerals:	Abdul-Bagi Al-Gailani
Minister of Parliamentary Affairs:	Halima Hassaballa Al-Naeem
Minister of Petroleum:	Lual Achwel Deng
Minister of Presidential Affairs:	Major General Bakri Hassan Saleh
Minister of Roads and Bridges:	Abdul-Wahab Mohamed Osman
Minister of Science and Technology:	Eissa Bushra Mohamed
Minister of Transportation:	Chol Ram Pang
Minister of Welfare and Social Security:	Amira al-Fadil Mohamed al-Fadil
Minister of Youth and Sports:	Magid Siwar

Political Profiles

[TOP](#)

President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir

[TOP](#)

Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was born in rural northern Sudan in 1944. He joined the army and graduated as an officer in 1966 during the first civil war, going on to serve alongside Egyptian forces in Sinai during the disastrous October 1973 conflict with Israel. He spent most of the rest of the 1970s in the United Arab Emirates as Sudanese military attaché, returning to operations in Sudan in 1979. In 1981 he was appointed commander of the elite parachute brigade. From 1987 he served as a senior commander in the Kordofan region, just north of the Sudan People's Liberation Army's (SPLA) area of operations.

Bashir led the coup that overthrew the government of prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi on 30 June 1989. Thereafter he held the positions of head of state, prime minister and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) for National Salvation. Until 1993, he was also

minister of defence. He became national president in 1996 and was elected to the post of president of the ruling National Congress Party in October 1999. He remained commander of the armed forces. In the December 2000 polls, Bashir was re-elected after winning over 86 per cent of the vote. The main opposition parties did not participate in the elections.

Under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the incumbent remained the head of state over the transition period until elections were held. These were originally due by July 2009, but were eventually held in April 2010. Bashir subsequently secured victory with 68.24 per cent, according to official results, a majority negating the need for a second-round run-off. A win by Bashir had seemed a probable outcome, but looked set to be a certainty after two key challengers - Yasir Arman of the SPLM and Sadiq al-Mahdi of the main northern Umma Party - withdrew from the race shortly before the April elections.

Bashir and his NCP, which dominated in the north, may regard their electoral victory as entrenching their legitimacy, although the polls' credibility was dented by opposition boycotts and Bashir still faces an International Criminal Court arrest warrant, issued in March 2009, relating to alleged crimes in Darfur (which he denies).

President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir votes in the April 2010 election (PA Photos)

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Ali Osman Mohamed Taha [TOP](#)

Second Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, born in 1947, has been close to President Bashir since they attended the same secondary school. He was a long-serving member of the National Islamic Front (NIF; reinvented as the National Congress), and was the leader of the students' union at Khartoum University in the 1970s, later becoming a judge.

Some observers believe that Taha has been a driving force behind the Bashir regime and that it was a power struggle between Taha and his rival Hassan Abdullah el-Turabi that led to Turabi's marginalisation in 2000. Turabi was leader of the NIF and arguably the most powerful politician in Sudan until Bashir introduced a state of emergency in December 1999. After Turabi's removal, Taha was widely considered to be one of the most powerful individuals in Sudan.

He was the primary representative of the government in peace talks with the SPLM/A and, from September 2003, directly negotiated with John Garang of the SPLM/A in Kenya. This boosted his international profile and his position within the ruling movement.

Salva Kiir Mayardit, president of southern Sudan [TOP](#)

Salva Kiir Mayardit, born in 1951, is president of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and also first vice-president of Sudan. He assumed leadership of southern Sudan and the

SPLM/A and took up one of two national Sudanese vice-presidencies after the death of John Garang in a helicopter accident in July 2005. Garang, who had been appointed president of southern Sudan and vice-president of Sudan only weeks earlier in July, had led the SPLM's representation at the various rounds of peace talks that led to the CPA.

Like his predecessor Garang, Salva Kiir is a member of the Dinka tribe, the largest group in the south. He was a founder leader of the SPLM and rose to become a leader of the SPLA. He also served as Garang's deputy.

As expected, Salva Kiir reclaimed the presidency in southern Sudan following the April 2010 elections. According to the election commission, he secured 92.99 per cent of the vote, with his sole challenger, Lam Akol Ajawin, leader of SPLM splinter group the SPLM Democratic Change, taking only 7.01 per cent. Salva Kiir was also again appointed first vice-president of Sudan. The south's focus is now on the looming referendum vote on self-determination, which is due to be granted in January 2011.

Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir addressing reporters following the announcement of his victory in the southern Sudan presidential election. (PA Photos)

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1 Image

Executive summary, Sudan

Date Posted: 07-Jun-2010

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

[SUDAN AT A GLANCE](#)

[RISK POINTERS](#)

[National Overview](#)

- [The Darfur Crisis](#)
- [US Pressure and Sanctions](#)
- [Oil Interests](#)
- [Defence](#)
 - [Military overview](#)
 - [Procurement](#)
 - [Naivasha agreement](#)
- [Politics](#)
 - [Political overview](#)
 - [North-south peace process](#)
 - [April 2010 election](#)
- [Economy](#)
 - [Economic overview](#)
 - [North-south economic issues](#)
 - [Non-oil sectors](#)

SUDAN AT A GLANCE

[TOP](#)

National Flag: Sudan

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Area:	2,505,813 km ²
Language:	Arabic (official), Dinka, Nuer, Bedawi, Fur
Religion:	Sunni Islam, Animism, Christianity
Population:	39,150,000 (April 2008 population census; figures released in May 2009)
Neighbours:	Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Uganda
Capital City:	Khartoum
Primary Port:	Port Sudan
Primary Airport:	Khartoum
Currency:	Sudanese pound (SDG), which replaced the former Sudanese dinar (SDD) that was phased out between January-June 2007

RISK POINTERS

[TOP](#)

National Overview

[TOP](#)

The Republic of the Sudan, the largest country in Africa, has been ravaged by conflict since it gained independence in 1956. The traditional view of the north-versus-south war having been caused by irreconcilable ethnic and religious differences between Arabian and African legacies is an oversimplification, as authoritarian government policies have provoked a more widespread rebellion since the mid-1990s. In 1995, northern opposition groups joined the southern rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to form the umbrella National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to fight against President Omar al-Bashir's Islamic-military government, which seized power in 1989. Thereafter a variety of armed groups from Sudan became arrayed against the government, with a major insurgency also developing in the Darfur region. In the east of the country, another insurgency, albeit low-level, had been waged over perceived marginalisation. The discovery of significant quantities of oil further complicated the conflicts. Under extreme pressure from the US, prospects for north-south peace were advanced in July 2002, when the government and the SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol. This framework agreement outlined a peace deal under which the south would become a self-administering part of Sudan for a six-year period; a referendum would then be held to determine its final status. Negotiations in Kenya resolved outstanding issues on 26 May 2004 and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was finally concluded on 9 January 2005. However, implementation of the deal has proved more problematic, with both the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP)-led government accusing the other of causing delays. With the national and southern elections finally held in April 2010, the focus shifts to the 2011 referendum, for which the stakes for the north and south will become considerably higher, and with it the potential for fresh instability.

The Darfur Crisis [TOP](#)

Conflict broke out in the Darfur region in early 2003, eclipsing the north-south conflict. The activities of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) were initially dismissed by the government as the work of bandits operating in the notoriously lawless Darfur region. Notable attacks in February and April 2003, as well as the SLM's issuing of political statements, detracted from the government's dismissals. Further confirmation of the political nature of the crisis was found in the emergence of another anti-government group with an Islamist agenda: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Both groups were coalitions of forces from local sedentary peoples (Fur, Zaghawa and Mesalit) that had suffered raids by nomadic Arab tribesmen, known as Janjaweed, who were alleged to be backed by the authorities, although this has been denied by Khartoum. The Darfur rebel movements believed the grievances of all groups and regions should be addressed in a peace accord more comprehensive than that envisaged by the CPA process. Despite considerable international pressure on all sides and the deployment of a small African Union peacekeeping force - the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) - none of the several ceasefires negotiated by November 2004 had been effectively observed on the ground. Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) between the government and one SLM/A faction in May 2006, other groups were called on to join the peace process, but without success. Fresh rounds of internationally mediated peace talks have been attempted, leading, for example, to a goodwill and confidence-building agreement (February 2009) and a framework accord (February

2010) between the JEM and Khartoum, but fighting again broke out between the rival sides in May 2010, highlighting the fragility of the process. Further factionalisation of the rebel groups since 2006 has also been a serious challenge to reaching a comprehensive, inclusive peace agreement.

US Pressure and Sanctions [TOP](#)

Sudan was listed by the US as a 'state sponsor of terrorism' in 1993. In the context of the US-led war on terrorism, the threat of US action against its Islamist government has been a concern in domestic and international relations. The Khartoum regime has previously been linked with Osama bin Laden and some other radical Islamist groups. Bin Laden resided in Sudan from 1991 until his expulsion in 1996. President Bashir helped ensure that Sudan was not on the receiving end of immediate US retaliation (as it was after the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania) by condemning the 11 September 2001 attacks and offering to co-operate with the US. Although the US has not been entirely satisfied with Khartoum's show of support, it remains keen to continue co-operation on terrorism issues. This and the signing of the CPA with the SPLM/A held the incentive of normalising relations with the US and the lifting of financial, economic and trade sanctions imposed in 1997. However, since mid-2004, such incentives have been balanced by international concerns over the conflict in Darfur, and, more recently, delays in fulfilment of the CPA. Washington has engaged in diplomatic efforts aimed at facilitating agreement between the NCP and SPLM on key issues such as the referendum law and pushing forward implementation of the CPA. Under President Barack Obama, the US has a new policy towards Sudan that offers incentives as well as placing potential penalties on Khartoum.

Oil Interests [TOP](#)

The development of Sudan's oil industry added a new dimension to the already complex civil war, with control of the oil-rich areas in the south becoming the government's primary strategic objective. By expanding the oil industry the government increased its revenue, thereby generating more resources with which to fight the war and 'pacify' potentially oil-rich territory. This cycle was slowly tilting the war in the government's favour from 1999, although US pressure on Khartoum seemed to have begun to curb its rearmament drive. The SPLA and the allied Beja Congress (from the east of the country), in turn, saw oil installations as legitimate targets. Even so, oil companies operating in Sudan arguably ran a greater risk to their reputation than to their capital as they came under intense criticism from human rights groups protesting at alleged government atrocities and the forced resettlement of non-Arab villages away from the exploration zones. From 2002, the three main Western (Swedish, Canadian, Austrian) oil companies working in Sudan suspended their operations or sold off their interests in Sudan due to adverse publicity. This left the Sudanese oil sector dependent on Chinese and other Asian capital, although there has been some diversification of interests since the CPA was signed. Oil interests continue to have the potential to undermine relations between the former rivals, as highlighted by previous disputes over the Abyei region. While the status of Abyei appears to have been resolved for now following the two sides'

voiced acceptance of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in July 2009, it is just one area of potentially oil-rich land that both have coveted, with further north-south border issues still unresolved.

Defence [TOP](#)

Military overview [TOP](#)

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is characterised by formal and informal structures. At the formal level is a conventional force structure with army, navy and air force (nominally including air defence force). Informal forces have operated in parallel to the regular armed forces and the main thrust of military activities has been conducted by a large number of regional and tribal militias, collectively known as the Popular Defence Force (PDF) and only loosely linked in to the SAF chain of command.

Procurement [TOP](#)

From 1999, when oil exports began and revenue began to be accrued, Khartoum was eager to boost its battlefield capabilities by procuring a range of Warsaw Pact surplus weapons systems, including some relatively advanced technology. Emphasis has initially been placed upon boosting stocks of battlefield armour, long-range artillery and attack helicopters. It was announced in April 2002 that Russia and Sudan would sign a military co-operation accord. Then Russian minister of defence Sergei Ivanov said Moscow was ready to upgrade Sudan's existing armoured vehicle and helicopter fleets and to supply it with MiG-29 'Fulcrum' fighter aircraft, Mil Mi-17 'Hip' utility helicopters and Mil Mi-28 'Havoc' assault helicopters, T-80 main battle tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and BTR-90 armoured personnel carriers. Twelve MiG-29 'Fulcrum' fighter aircraft were duly delivered in 2003-2004. With Russian and Chinese assistance, Sudan has also looked to expand its indigenous defence industry so that it can produce more sophisticated equipment. Sudan has been under a mandatory EU arms embargo since 1994, which was strengthened in 2004 due to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. It was further amended in 2005. In March 2005, the UN Security Council extended its partial arms embargo of July 2004, previously aimed at the armed factions in Darfur, to include the government. The embargo did not exclude deliveries to the Sudanese government that would not be used in Darfur.

Naivasha agreement [TOP](#)

Under the Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period signed in Naivasha on 25 September 2003 (and coming into effect following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005), the government and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) undertook to second 20,000 troops each to 'joint/integrated' military units to provide security in contentious areas and potentially form the basis of a reconstructed national army. These would be deployed as follows: 24,000 in the south; 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains; 6,000 in the southern Blue Nile; and 3,000 in Khartoum. Outside of these zones, the SAF would remain as an independent entity under Khartoum's control. Surplus SPLA units would be based entirely within the southern zone and retain their own chain of command.

Politics [TOP](#)

Political overview [TOP](#)

A major development in Khartoum politics after December 1999 was the power struggle between President Omar al-Bashir and the charismatic Islamist Hassan el-Turabi. While Turabi was widely seen as the driving force behind Khartoum's National Islamic Front (NIF) regime, his plans to shift power away from the presidency seemingly proved too much for Bashir. He declared a state of emergency in December 1999, the Turabi-controlled parliament was dissolved and Turabi was replaced as the secretary-general of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Although he retaliated by establishing the opposition Popular National Congress party (PNC; since renamed Popular Congress Party: PCP), he failed to rally supporters or initiate a split in the regime. President Bashir's attempts to open up Khartoum's political system and broaden his political base were cautious. The Political Associations Law, which legalised political parties for the first time since the 1989 coup, was an obscure piece of legislation that required parties contesting elections to adhere to an Islamist political agenda. Those registered presented no threat or challenge to Bashir's NCP at the December 2000 elections. Bashir beat his closest rival, former president Jaafar Nimeiri, in the presidential elections with 86.5 per cent of the vote. Although the major opposition Umma party returned in the run-up to the elections, it refused to take part and its mainstream faction rejected post-election offers to participate in the government.

North-south peace process [TOP](#)

The north-south peace process gained momentum in September 2003 when Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, the effective successor of Turabi as the regime's ideologue, assumed leadership of the Sudanese government delegation in Kenya. Critical agreements were made on interim security structures (September 2003), banking and the division of oil revenues during the transitional period (January 2004), the status of sharia in Khartoum (May 2004) and the administration of three border regions beyond the established southern zone (May 2004). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 and Taha now shares the vice-presidency with the SPLM (first the late SPLM/A leader John Garang, now Salva Kiir Mayardit), thereby further marginalising the northern opposition parties. The overall division of power envisaged by the CPA is: 52 per cent to NCP; 28 per cent to SPLM; 14 per cent to other NDA parties; six per cent to southern parties opposed to the SPLM. It remains premature to envisage Khartoum accepting the formal secession of the south in 2011, should this be the direction south Sudan decides upon.

April 2010 election [TOP](#)

President Bashir and the NCP headed for a comfortable victory after boycott-riddled national elections from 11 to 15 April 2010. Results released by the National Election Commission gave Bashir 68.24 per cent in the national presidential election, a majority negating the need for a second-round run-off. A win by Bashir had seemed a probable outcome, but looked set to be a certainty after two key challengers - Yasir Arman, of the SPLM, and Sadiq al-Mahdi, of the Umma party - withdrew from the race shortly before the April elections. Meanwhile, as

expected, the SPLM dominated in the south and the party's leader, Salva Kiir Mayardit secured the presidency in the south. According to the election commission, he secured 92.99 per cent of the vote, with his sole challenger, Lam Akol Ajawin, leader of SPLM splinter group the SPLM Democratic Change, taking only 7.01 per cent. The polls, which included national presidential, parliamentary, gubernatorial and local elections, as well as the southern presidency and parliamentary votes, were originally to be held from 11-13 April, but were extended by two days owing to technical challenges at the start of the polling process. For now, the CPA partners may continue to co-operate in government, but the south's focus will be on the 2011 self-determination referendum, with tensions likely to grow in the run-up to this vote.

Economy [TOP](#)

Economic overview [TOP](#)

Sudan's overall economic growth has been impressive at just over 10 per cent in 2007 and estimated at around seven per cent for 2008, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures, although likely lower in 2009 amid the global financial crisis. Furthermore oil production has boosted gross domestic product (GDP) and government revenues considerably since 1999. Nevertheless, it remains a poor country. International investment became threatened by the conflict as Western oil companies became concerned by the damage working in Sudan would do to their reputation, although non-Western oil companies were not affected by this pressure and development continued apace. Oil now accounts for more than 90 per cent of exports. Sudan's debt burden is significant, standing at about USD35 billion in 2009, according to IMF figures.

North-south economic issues [TOP](#)

The Naivasha peace talks between the government and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) resolved issues of wealth-sharing for a transitional administration in January 2004, including oil revenues. While there would be one new national currency (the Sudanese pound, introduced in January 2007) and one central bank, the latter would have two 'windows', allowing for interest-free Islamic banking in the north and Western-style banking in the south. There would be a single National Petroleum Committee with representation from both sides but a Southern Sudan Land Commission separate from a National Land Commission would be established to arbitrate land disputes.

Non-oil sectors [TOP](#)

Non-oil sectors of the economy still account for over 90 per cent of GDP but remain under-developed. Agriculture remains the occupation of the majority of Sudanese (raising livestock, farming cotton and growing various low value crops for export to the Middle East) but is very far from achieving the potential of Sudan's vast land area and access to the Nile's waters. This resource is just beginning to be harnessed with the construction of major hydroelectric projects as part of a significant expansion of the electricity sector. Trade and manufacturing are very limited, although the government has attempted to expand them. A range of minerals,

including gold, silver, chromium and zinc, is believed to lie under the Sudanese hills awaiting sufficient stability for full exploration and exploitation activities.

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Security, Sudan

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SECURITY

[Terrorism and Insurgency](#)

[National Separatist](#)

[Political](#)

[State Stability](#)

[Political stability](#)

[Social stability](#)

[International Relations](#)

[Bilateral](#)

[Multilateral/Regional](#)

Terrorism and Insurgency

[TOP](#)

- While the insurgency in southern Sudan, previously the main threat to Khartoum, was effectively ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005, delays in the peace pact's full implementation have exacerbated growing north-south tensions and remain a threat to the successful conclusion of the CPA. The referendum due by January 2011 also poses risks for renewed instability.
- Meanwhile, conflict has continued in Darfur, where a May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement between the government and one of the rebel factions failed to improve security. The fragmentation of rebel movements since 2006 has further complicated efforts at launching comprehensive and inclusive talks.

- **Further insecurity is caused by overspill of regional instability. Chad and Sudan have sporadically accused each other of backing the other's insurgent groups, but both countries attempted to reach a rapprochement in early 2010. Attacks by the rebel Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in southern Sudan have caused thousands of civilians to flee.**

National Separatist [TOP](#)

For two decades, the main internal threat to Khartoum was posed by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which fought for an autonomous or independent southern Sudan, and associated opposition groups that opposed the authoritarian Islamist nature of the National Congress regime. These opposition forces united for the first time in 1995 under the umbrella of the Asmara-based National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and launched their first joint offensive in January 1997. By the end of the year, the SPLM/A threatened Juba in the south, which had never fallen to the rebels, for the first time in five years. In the east, NDA forces threatened Damazin, on the Blue Nile, and the Roseires hydroelectric dam that supplied 80 per cent of the power for Khartoum, 700 km to the northwest. The rebels had also opened up fronts in Bahr el-Ghazal in the west and the Nuba Mountains in the central region.

However, the rebel campaign began to wane in 1998 with the onset of serious famine. In the same year, the opposition forces' patron states became preoccupied when war erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Uganda became heavily involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo. From 1999, Khartoum began to benefit from new oil export revenues but Sudan faced increased pressure from the US and Europe over its record of human rights abuses and past support for Islamist terrorist groups. The war thereafter entered a broadly stalemate phase, with the SPLM/A controlling most of the south's less-productive rural areas and the various pro-government forces tightening their grip on the new oil-producing border regions and southern garrison towns.

The opposition failed to achieve either of its strategic objectives: cutting the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway or capturing/disrupting the Roseires hydroelectric dam. Even when the rebels were at their strongest in 1997, government forces still managed to maintain their hold on these assets. Still, the development of Sudan's oil industry, much of which is based in southern Sudan, changed the nature of the civil war. The oil-rich areas and infrastructure became the primary strategic targets, with government forces attempting to secure areas for exploitation while rebel forces attempted to hamper the expansion of exploration operations.

The peace process that was launched in June 2002 at Machakos, Kenya, increased hopes that the civil war might be brought to an end. Progress and compromise unimaginable before mid-2002 had been made by late May 2004, when the outstanding issues were agreed upon pending a comprehensive peace treaty. Agreement had been reached on the south holding a referendum on secession after six years; the establishment of transitional national and southern governments in the interim; provisional joint security arrangements during this period; wealth-sharing in the south and a dual banking system; the partial application of sharia (Islamic law)

in the federal capital; and the joint administration of three disputed regions outside of the south's traditional borders. Finally, in January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that effectively ended the long-running civil war was signed by the parties.

However, the fact that the two sides - especially the government, which has been threatened with the continuation of US sanctions - were forced to the negotiating table by international pressure inevitably gave rise to concerns about the sincerity of their intentions to implement agreements in the envisaged six-year transitional period. The government's bottom line concession to allow a referendum on the secession of the southern provinces in 2011 is still fundamentally opposed by some members of the regime, as well as opposition elements.

Although the CPA has remained in place despite the growing cracks and delays in implementation of key measures, and in spite of the fact that general and southern elections were finally concluded in April 2010, the promised referendum vote could hold greater risk for fresh instability.

Political [TOP](#)

The Darfur Crisis

Conflict has continued in the Darfur region of western Sudan since February 2003, displacing around 2.7 million people by the end of 2008. Tens of thousands of Darfurians have been killed and the conflict has threatened the lives of hundreds of thousands more through the collapse of local agriculture and humanitarian provisions. It has been described as one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world, yet despite intense international pressure and African and international attempts at mediation, a comprehensive peace agreement with all the warring parties has yet to be signed.

A region the size of Spain (500,000 km²) with a population of up to six million, Darfur accounts for one-fifth of Sudan. Perceived political marginalisation has particularly affected the two million non-Arab agriculturalists of the region, who have gradually lost influence within the region as Arab pastoralist settlers have increased in number. Conflicting economic priorities of the settled and nomadic populations have engendered sporadic and localised conflict between the various groups since the 1970s. This has been exacerbated by deteriorating climate trends and strained water resources as the Sahara advances and the population booms. The Darfur conflict therefore has both regional and national dimensions. The main insurgent groups involved in the conflict have been factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) (not to be confused with the SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), although there has been significant fragmentation of rebel movements since 2006.

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) emerged in February 2003 when it briefly captured the town of Gulu in the Jebel Marra region of Northern Darfur state. The group was originally known as the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), but its secretary general, Minni Arkou

Minnawi, announced a name change in March 2003 when the group articulated its aims as seeking a "united democratic Sudan", a separation of state and religion and co-operation with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA; an umbrella organisation for groups opposed to the Khartoum government) in order to "remove the dictatorial regime". With specific reference to the three states of Darfur he claimed that the government "introduced policies of marginalisation, racial discrimination and exploitation that had disrupted the peaceful co-existence between the region's African and Arab communities". The group's membership united the three main non-Arab peoples of the Darfur: the Mesalit, Zaghawa and, especially, the Fur. The group subsequently factionalised, with Minnawi, a Zaghawa, leading one faction and Abdel Wahed Mohammed al-Nur, a Fur, leading another. Minnawi's faction was the only one to have signed the Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006 along with the government, with al-Nur's faction holding out for further concessions. Since then further fragmentation has taken place, with several other factions emerging.

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

Fighting alongside the SLM/A, and for much the same cause, is the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). This group made its formal appearance when it claimed to have co-operated in a major attack on el-Fashir airport in April 2003. The JEM's Paris-based leader, Dr Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad, was formerly an Islamist with the Popular National Congress (PNC), but broke away to form his own group. The JEM is largely drawn from the Zaghawa people and operates mainly in Western Darfur state, with strong but ambivalent links across the border to Chad's powerful Zaghawa clans. The JEM also refused to sign up to the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 and, on 30 June 2006, announced the formation of a new coalition, called the National Redemption Front (NRF), with al-Nur's SLM/A and another Fur group operating in Darfur, the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance. The JEM has since split further.

Tensions escalated between the government and JEM in May 2008, after the rebel group of Khalil Ibrahim advanced close to the capital Khartoum, with clashes taking place in Omdurman, in what was potentially a show of its capabilities and willingness to extend its battle lines. Further clashes in early 2009 again heightened tensions. Preliminary discussions between JEM and the government, facilitated by Qatar and including the AU chief mediator, led the two sides to sign a goodwill and confidence-building agreement on 17 February 2009. However, the lack of a formal ceasefire underlined the fragility of this process.

In February 2010, the two sides signed a new framework peace accord, this time including a ceasefire commitment, although they failed to finalise the deal by an original (and over-optimistic) 15 March deadline. JEM subsequently suspended peace talks with Khartoum in early May amid claims of ceasefire violations. According to JEM, the Sudanese army had bombed rebel positions in West Darfur, while an army spokesman stated that Sudanese government forces had come under attack. Subsequent fighting between the two sides was reported in May, undermining the recent peace moves.

Moreover, there has been little progress in pushing forward with serious, inclusive negotiations with the various rebel movements. Indeed, the issue of rebel 'inclusiveness' has been a point of contention, with JEM critical of a framework deal Khartoum later signed with

the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella movement of small rebel factions, on 18 March. There has also been little success in securing the participation of al-Nur's SLM/A.

As long as key rebel factions fail to participate in an inclusive peace process, and unless both the rebels and Khartoum show clear will to push forward with what would involve challenging negotiations and compromise, prospects for achieving comprehensive peace in Darfur will be limited.

Low-level insurgency in the east

Unlike the conflicts in the south and west of the country, the insurgency in the east received far less international attention. While a low-level insurgency, the groups had similar grievances, namely perceived marginalisation by the government, and took up armed struggle in the 1990s. Following the signing of the CPA of January 2005, there appeared to be a renewed impetus in the east to push the government for a larger share of economic wealth and political representation for the region as well.

In February 2005, the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions, respectively based on the Beja and Rashaida peoples, formed the Eastern Front, which launched its first major offensive in June of that year. Breaking out of Hameshkoreb, 'liberated territory' on the Eritrean border that the rebels have occupied since the late 1990s, the Front launched an assault on the Sudanese government garrison at Tokar, about 60 km further north. The rebels claimed to have destroyed three government camps (not Tokar) and captured significant quantities of weapons. Both sides claimed to have inflicted significant losses. While fighting was sporadic, the Front operated in an area of strategic importance - near port and oil infrastructure - and as such was of concern to the government, particularly as the movement showed itself capable of effective hit-and-run style attacks. Sudan's oil terminal at Suakin presents an obvious target, while road and rail connections between Khartoum and Port Sudan are vulnerable to ambushes.

In May 2006, Khartoum released three members of the Eastern Front who had been arrested some two months before. This had been a key demand by the rebels before peace talks could go ahead. While previous attempts at mediation, such as those by Libya in December 2005, failed to appease the Beja and Rashaida groups, a new round of peace talks mediated by Eritrea in Asmara looked far more positive. Both the government and the Eastern Front appeared committed to finding a resolution to the conflict. The first round of negotiations, launched on 13 June 2006, led to a declaration of principles to guide future negotiations, as well as an agreement by both parties to cease hostilities. The second round, launched on 17 July that year, was briefly postponed, but resumed on 7 August. Issues discussed included wealth- and power-sharing, as well as security issues. By 18 August, the parties had reportedly decided on a framework for the development of the region, although there were differences over what money Khartoum should be allocating in terms of implementation. Khartoum appeared keen to build on the peace agreements already signed in other parts of the country and avoid the international spotlight that has fallen on other insurgencies in Sudan. An agreement was signed in October 2006, although there were delays in moving forward with implementation. In May 2007 three former rebel leaders from eastern Sudan were appointed to

senior posts in the Khartoum government as per the deal.

State Stability

[TOP](#)

- **The relationship between Sudan's central government in Khartoum and the rest of the country has never been an easy one. For much of Sudan's history as an independent state, the south has fought to be granted greater autonomy or independence. The more recent conflict in Darfur remains a further obstacle to political stability.**
- **While the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005 effectively ended the civil war with the south of the country and led to the formation of a government of national unity, the pact's slow implementation has led to a build-up of frustrations with Khartoum in the south and arguably made opting for unity less attractive for many southerners in an upcoming referendum vote.**
- **With the delayed national and southern elections finally held in April 2010, the focus shifts to the 2011 referendum, amid which the stakes for the north and south will become considerably higher. As such, there is potential for heightened instability and fresh violence.**

Political stability

[TOP](#)

The January 2005 north-south CPA raised hopes that Sudan would at last enjoy a new period of peace. The pact resolved many of the specific grievances that led to the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. However, at its root, the CPA was a political deal between the two main parties to the conflict: the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP). The decision of the SPLM to temporarily suspend its participation in the unity government in late 2007 amid frustrations over the implementation of aspects of the CPA highlighted the challenges the deal presented.

Considering such ongoing challenges it was always likely that the national and southern elections would be delayed, with the electoral commission in April 2009 rescheduling the polls to February 2010. However, by mid-year, the elections were again postponed to April 2010, with a key factor having been delays in the census results. The national census, finally launched in April 2008, was a provision of the CPA. The census has been a sensitive issue, with the results potentially leading to adjustments in political representation and the division of wealth set under the CPA. The results were subsequently also disputed by the SPLM, which particularly challenged the figures for the south.

Other sticking points have included the referendum law, including the proportion of votes needed for secession. The north-south border also has yet to be defined, although after years of uncertainty and conflict, the status of Sudan's disputed Abyei region appears to have been resolved (for the time being at least), following a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based in The Hague in July 2009. Under the CPA Abyei was to be accorded special administrative status, while the disputed boundaries of the area were to be determined by the

Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). However, the NCP-led government subsequently viewed its ruling in 2005 as giving too much oil-rich land to Abyei. This would potentially favour the SPLM, with the Abyei region also to be given a separate referendum to choose whether to remain part of Sudan, or become a part of the south. It was amid ongoing tensions over the region, including heavy fighting in May 2008 between former rival north and south forces, that the two sides referred the boundary demarcation to the PCA in 2008.

Both northern and southern officials subsequently voiced their commitment to the court's decision. However, initial acceptance by both sides does not mean that the potential for fresh conflict has been eradicated. For example, under the court's ruling, the eastern boundary of Abyei has been significantly redrawn, resulting in the region becoming a smaller strip of land than originally designated by the ABC's ruling. The crucial Heglig oil fields therefore now fall outside the Abyei region, but this is taken to mean different things by the two sides. For example, the north asserted that Heglig has been recognised as being part of Southern Kordofan state. However, the south claimed that Heglig falls within southern Unity state boundaries. Shortly after the 22 July ruling, some southern officials claimed that the issue still had to be determined by a north-south border committee. Therefore, while the rival sides' reported acceptance may have helped ease tensions in the immediate term, it is just one area of oil-rich land that has been coveted by these competing forces and further border issues remain.

As such at present Sudan is facing an accumulation of pressures. Beyond the April 2010 elections - which saw the NCP consolidate its power base in the north and the SPLM do the same in the south, with the re-election of Omar al-Bashir to the national presidency and Salva Kiir Mayardit to the southern presidency - the primary concern now facing the south is the referendum on self-determination due in January 2011. If that is perceived as being obstructed by the central government, there will be considerable anger in the south and a risk of fresh conflict.

The SPLM's decision not to participate in the bulk of the elections in the north, along with its dogged contest of polls in the southern and border areas, has arguably signalled more clearly than ever before that its focus remains on the looming referendum.

Fundamentally, it is not in Khartoum's interests to risk losing southern Sudan unless the elites have cut a deal beforehand: the majority of Sudan's oil sits squarely in the south, excluding the disputed Heglig and Bamboo fields. However, at the same time, the south desperately needs the north's oil infrastructure at present, as 98 per cent of its economy is oil dependent. In part, this means that the political elites on both sides will have to continue to co-operate with one another for their economic survival.

The north-south situation is likely to remain at a heightened level of tension up to and beyond the referendum in 2011. Both political leaderships seem generally to acknowledge the inadvisability of a return to war, but the danger of a breakdown in the peace process represents an ongoing threat to the country's stability.

Indeed, while Sudan's elections passed off relatively peacefully, there is no guarantee of longer-term stability. The transition period has done little to build trust between the parties and

as it nears its expiry, there appear as yet to be few plans in place for the post-referendum period.

Social stability [TOP](#)

Demography

For the ordinary people of Sudan, the main threat is from the hazards of endemic warfare, grinding poverty and natural catastrophe resulting in famine and disease.

Food insecurity in the west is particularly severe in Darfur. While the humanitarian situation is linked to the weather and agriculture production, it is exacerbated by the fighting, and humanitarian agencies have often had to withdraw from various areas because of the precarious security situation.

Food shortages in some areas of the south are exacerbated by localised conflict, of which there has been an upsurge in 2009. UN Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Southern Sudan Lise Grande indicated in August 2009 that more than 2,000 people had died in inter-tribal violence and more than 250,000 had been displaced since January that year. Ongoing tribal clashes continue to undermine efforts to bolster security in the region. The situation is complicated by the widespread availability of small-arms.

International Relations [TOP](#)

- **Sudan's relations with regional countries have been coloured by accusations and counter-accusations of involvement in each other's internal insurgencies and conflicts. Rapprochement with some of its neighbouring states has decreased regional disputes or 'states of belligerence', although the ongoing conflict in Darfur has meant that reconciliation with neighbours such as Chad has generally been short-lived.**
- **Meanwhile, relations with some among the international community have deteriorated amid, for example, the conflict in Darfur, as well as following the International Criminal Court's issuing of an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir in March 2009 over alleged crimes in Darfur, which he and Khartoum strongly deny.**
- **Both regionally and internationally, the upcoming referendum on self-determination will be followed closely, amid concerns over the risk of fresh instability if southerners overwhelmingly vote in favour of secession.**

Bilateral [TOP](#)

Diplomacy

Chad

Unlike Sudan's eastern neighbours, Chad was a benign influence on Sudanese security throughout the 1990s, thanks to the support the new National Islamic Front government gave to Idriss Déby in launching his successful insurgency against Chadian president Hissene Habré in 1990. Déby's government has since then been based on his border-spanning Zaghawa people. With the Sudanese Zaghawa providing the core of the JEM insurgent group in western Darfur in 2003, Déby was under considerable domestic pressure to provide support for the Darfur insurgents. A succession of mutinies and defections in the two years to April 2006 largely involved Chadian troops objecting to Déby's professed neutrality in Darfur. Forging an alliance with Sudan-based dissidents in December 2005, the resultant United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique: FUC) attempted to take over the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, on 13 April 2006, but were thwarted. Chad and Sudan have since sporadically accused each other of backing the other's insurgent groups, raising tensions between them. Relations deteriorated again notably following a rebel advance on N'Djamena (February 2008) and Khartoum (May 2008). Various reconciliations have been negotiated over the last few years, but such rapprochements have generally proved short-lived.

Fresh efforts were made in early 2010 to improve bilateral ties between Sudan and Chad, which may have initially helped to advance a preliminary peace deal signed by JEM and Khartoum in N'Djamena on 20 February, ahead of another framework accord negotiated in Doha on 24 February.

Uganda

Relations between Sudan and Uganda have traditionally been poor due to Kampala's support for the southern SPLA rebels, with whom Ugandan groups have close ethnic/linguistic ties, and Khartoum's support for Uganda's rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda severed diplomatic ties with Sudan in April 1995 after LRA rebels killed more than 200 people in one attack in northern Uganda. From 1995 to 1999 Kampala continued to accuse Khartoum of launching air strikes against targets inside Uganda, while Khartoum accused Uganda of direct involvement in its civil war. While there were encouraging signs of renewed diplomacy in December 1999 following peace talks in Nairobi, by February 2000 there were renewed tensions. However, in March 2002, bilateral relations seemed to have reached an all-time high when Khartoum allowed the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) to launch Operation Iron Fist against LRA rebels inside Sudanese territory. Khartoum withdrew the agreement in November 2002. While the official reason given was Uganda's inability to provide a date for the completion of its operations inside Sudan, the move came after Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni accused Khartoum of continuing to support the LRA. However, regardless of these mutual accusations, tenuous Sudano-Ugandan co-operation was maintained in the border area through 2003 and, by October 2003, the leadership of both countries renewed public unity. Museveni changed his tone to suggest that it was rogue elements of the Sudanese army that were arming the LRA.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) reached between the SPLA and the Sudanese government in January 2005 was a milestone in the relationship between the two countries. In mid-2005, the Ugandan government announced that President Bashir had agreed to joint operations against LRA leader Joseph Kony who, it was claimed, had retreated further into

southern Sudan. In 2006, mediation by southern Sudanese authorities led the LRA and Ugandan government to agree to enter peace talks. These were launched in the southern Sudanese city of Juba in July, although senior leaders of the LRA did not form part of the negotiating party and there was much distrust between the LRA and Kampala over each sides true intentions. Although a ceasefire agreement had been signed by late August, negotiations continued on a stop-start basis, finally stalling in April 2008 when Kony failed to attend a ceremony to sign the final peace deal.

Patience grew increasingly thin with Kony as he failed to attend subsequent meetings to address his ostensible remaining concerns. Concern also grew regionally and internationally that the LRA was again using the time of peace talks to regroup, amid fresh raids by the rebels, who had in recent years dispersed into the Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan and the Central African Republic. This made it increasingly likely that Kampala would push for renewed military action to tackle the LRA, and a joint military offensive was subsequently launched by the Ugandan, south Sudanese and Congolese armed forces against the rebels' main Garamba base in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, although this offensive may have flushed the rebels from their existing hideouts and thereby dented the group's command structure and cohesion, the operation did not achieve its primary aim of capturing the LRA leadership. Subsequent rebel raids and reprisal attacks have further aggravating issues of human security and population displacement in already fragile regions.

Multilateral/Regional [TOP](#)

Sanctions

Sudan was listed by the US as a 'state sponsor of terrorism' in 1993 and has had financial, economic and trade sanctions imposed on it by the US since 1997. The Khartoum regime has previously been linked with Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups; Osama Bin Laden resided in Sudan from 1991 until his expulsion in 1996. President Bashir helped ensure that Sudan was not on the receiving end of US retaliation (as it was after the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania) by condemning the 11 September 2001 attacks and offering to co-operate with the US. Although the US has not been entirely satisfied with Khartoum's support, it is keen to continue co-operation on terrorism issues. This and the signing of the CPA with the SPLA held the incentive of improved relations with the US and the lifting of the sanctions, although since mid-2004 this has been affected by the ongoing conflict in Darfur.

Under President Barack Obama, Washington has a new policy towards Sudan that offers incentives as well as placing penalties on Khartoum, in a shift driven by the administrations senior Sudan envoy, Major General (retired.) Scott Gration.

While the near constant state of civil war in Sudan and the enormous humanitarian crisis kept Sudan in the UN spotlight, the three UN Security Council resolutions on the situation in Darfur of July, September and November 2004 were the first official pronouncements on the Sudanese crisis. By March 2005, however, the UN Security Council imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on those suspected of having committed human rights abuses and violating the Darfur ceasefire agreement. It also put a ban on the sale or supply of military equipment to

rebel movements and the government. Resolution 1593 of March 2005 also saw the UN Security Council refer the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a result, the ICC launched investigations into human rights abuses in June 2005. Further action was taken in April 2006, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution to impose travel restrictions and financial sanctions on four Sudanese nationals over the ongoing conflict in Darfur.

Sudan has been under a mandatory EU arms embargo since 1994, which was strengthened in 2004 due to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. It was further amended in 2005. In March 2005, the UN Security Council extended its partial arms embargo of July 2004, previously aimed at the armed factions in Darfur, to include the government. Reporting back in January 2006, a monitoring committee set up under the terms of Security Council resolution 1591 of March 2005 found that small-arms and ammunition were still entering Darfur from other regions of Sudan, as well as from a number of other countries.

UPDATED

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Regional statistics

Date Posted: 17-Nov-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

Regional Statistics

[Stability ratings](#)

[Army](#)

[Air Force](#)

[Navy](#)

[Natural Resources](#)

[Economy](#)

[Infrastructure](#)

[Demography](#)

[Geography](#)

The spreadsheets below provide regional statistics for military and contextual information for

all of the de facto and de jure independent states and autonomous territories of North Africa. Regional ratings denoting the stability of all states and territories are also provided.

Stability ratings [TOP](#)

Country Stability Ratings provide a quantitative assessment of the stability environment of a country or autonomous territory. All sovereign countries, non-contiguous autonomous territories and de facto independent entities are included in the assessments.

To gauge stability, 24 factors (that rely on various objective sub-factors) are rated. The 24 factors are classified within five distinct groupings, namely political, social, economic, external and military and security. The stability of each factor is assessed by the Country Stability team as between 0 and 9. The various factors are then weighted according to the importance to the particular country's stability. Stability in each of these groupings is provided, with 0 being entirely unstable and 100 stable.

The weighted factors are also used to produce an overall territory stability rating, from 0 (unstable) to 100 (stable).

Finally, the team then assesses global stability levels, so that weighting and ratings are standardised across all regions.

The ratings are reviewed every quarter and updated as necessary. To simplify the presentation of these various ratings, provided below are the group and overall stability scores. These are colour coded, with green for high or very high stability, orange for moderate to low stability and red for very low stability. Countries coded black should be considered critically unstable.

[To view the Country Stability Ratings in a spreadsheet, click here.](#)

Army [TOP](#)

The Army spreadsheet provides statistics on service personnel and numbers of main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and reconnaissance vehicles for every state in the region.

[Please click here for Regional Army Statistics](#)

Air Force [TOP](#)

The Air Force spreadsheet provides statistics on service personnel and numbers of fighter aircraft, combat helicopters and transport aircraft for every state in the region.

[Please click here for Regional Air Force Statistics](#)

Navy [TOP](#)

The Navy spreadsheet provides statistics on service personnel and numbers of submarines, frigates, destroyers and patrol boats for every state in the region.

[Please click here for Regional Naval Statistics](#)

Natural Resources [TOP](#)

The Natural Resources spreadsheet provides statistics on oil reserves, production and consumption; gas reserves, production and consumption; and electricity production.

[Please click here for Regional Natural Resources Statistics](#)

Economy [TOP](#)

The Economy spreadsheet provides statistics on GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, external debts, exports and imports.

[Please click here for Regional Economic Statistics](#)

Infrastructure [TOP](#)

The Infrastructure spreadsheet provides statistics on railways, roads, waterways and main airports and ports.

[Please click here for Regional Infrastructural Statistics](#)

Demography [TOP](#)

The Demography spreadsheet provides statistics on population, population growth, population density and male and female life expectancy.

[Please click here for Regional Demographic Statistics](#)

Geography [TOP](#)

The Geography spreadsheet provides statistics on land area, elevation, coastline, average temperature and average rainfall.

[Please click here for Regional Geographic Statistics](#)

UPDATED

Territories, Southern Sudan

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Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

Southern Sudan

RISK POINTERS

National overview

A fragile peace deal

Elections and referendum

Profile

Security

Political Stability

Social Stability

Border Disputes

Internal Affairs

Political System

Executive

Legislative

Judiciary

Leadership

President Salva Kiir Mayardit

Vice-President Riek Machar

Political Parties

External Affairs

Historical Background

Security Forces

Army

Police and Security Forces

Foreign Forces

Geography

Demography

Distribution and ethnicity

[Religion](#)
[Language](#)
[Infrastructure](#)
[Roads](#)
[Railways](#)
[Economy](#)
[Oil and wealth sharing](#)
[Agriculture](#)

RISK POINTERS [TOP](#)

National overview [TOP](#)

The relationship between Sudan's central government in Khartoum and the rest of the country has never been an easy one. For much of Sudan's history as an independent state, the south has fought to be granted greater autonomy or independence. After a two-decade war, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the National Congress Party (NCP)-led government of Sudan in January 2005. The CPA granted a great deal of autonomy to the south and also brought the SPLM into the national government, but implementation of key measures of the peace deal has been slow, causing ongoing political tensions. Although the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) should now have significant financial resources available from its share of Sudan's oil revenue, the south is a poor region with little infrastructure and a large number of displaced people. Ethnic tensions also continue to simmer despite rapprochement at the leadership level, with escalated inter-tribal clashes adding to political tensions. Sudan's delayed general elections were finally held in April 2010, albeit amid opposition boycotts, reinforcing the NCP's domination of the central government and the SPLM's majority in the south. However, for southerners, the primary concern now is the referendum on self-determination scheduled for January 2011. This could pave the way for the creation of the world's newest state, if the majority of southern Sudanese vote in favour of independence rather than continued unity with Sudan. If this referendum is perceived as being obstructed by the central government, there will be considerable anger in the south and a significant risk of a return conflict.

A fragile peace deal [TOP](#)

The January 2005 agreement raised hopes that Sudan would at last enjoy a new period of peace. On many levels, the CPA was a remarkable deal and a major success for the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) body that led the negotiations. The pact resolved many of the specific grievances that led to the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. It granted southern Sudan an autonomous regional government, dominated by the former rebel SPLM; offered southern Sudanese a self-determination referendum to opt between continued unity with Sudan or secession following a six-year interim period; provided the SPLM with a significant share of power in the transitional

central government ahead of elections (although majority control still rested in the hands of the ruling NCP) and a large chunk of state revenue. However, at its root, the CPA was a political deal between the two main parties to the conflict: the SPLM and the NCP. While many of the issues in the agreement are spelt out in detail, several others, such as the formation of key bodies related to the implementation process, were to be decided on at a later date. Major stepping stones after the signing subsequently became mired in controversy. Such items have included progress on border demarcation, and issues related to a national census, the general elections (which were finally held in April 2010) and the upcoming referendum. While discussions continue, ongoing delays in reaching consensus have led to growing tensions between Khartoum and the south, and remain a threat to the successful conclusion of the CPA.

Elections and referendum [TOP](#)

Considering the ongoing challenges in fully implementing the CPA, a delay of the elections to select the National Assembly and president, the southern government and the southern Sudanese president, as well as state assemblies and local governors, had been likely. The polls were originally due in 2009, but by April that year the electoral commission rescheduled the polls to February 2010. However, by mid-year, the elections were again postponed to April 2010, with a key factor having been delays in the census results. The national census, finally launched in April 2008, has been a sensitive issue, with the results disputed by the SPLM, which particularly challenged the figures for the south. The election process was included in the CPA to give it popular legitimacy before the southern referendum was called, as well as to demonstrate unity between the two parties. However, amid the ongoing tensions over the CPA, the south's focus shifted decisively to the referendum. Indeed, the SPLM's decision not to participate in the bulk of the elections in the north in April 2010, along with its contest of polls in the south and border areas, arguably signalled that its overriding objective is now to secure secession at the looming referendum. The key question is whether any subsequent separation process, if endorsed by voters, can be managed peacefully, or whether issues such as control over oil wealth will lead to fresh conflict. Moreover, concerns over Sudan's post-referendum preparedness in terms of planning and arrangements have also been raised by observers.

Profile [TOP](#)

Language:	Arabic, English (official)
Religion:	Traditional beliefs, Christianity, Islam
Time Zone:	GMT +3
Population	According to the 2008 population census, Sudan's total population stands at 39.15 million, of which 8.26 million are said to be in the south, although this has been disputed by the SPLM which believes the figure should be higher.
Neighbours:	Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Northern Sudan.
Capital City:	Juba

Primary Port:	Port Sudan, and Mombasa, Kenya
Primary Airport:	Juba

Security [TOP](#)

Political Stability [TOP](#)

Political risk is high in Sudan. Although much has changed for the better since the CPA was signed, tensions over the transition period have failed to build southern trust in Khartoum and have not appeared to foster an inclination towards unity with Sudan.

Amid CPA implementation delays, the SPLM's focus has increasingly shifted towards the southern regional government, where it dominates political life. Leadership from both the SPLM and NCP have publicly stated their unwillingness to go back to war, and it is unlikely that either party is interested in a new conflict at this time. However, the stakes in the upcoming referendum cannot be overstated, given that there is a clear risk the country could slowly return to conflict if the process is derailed.

In the April 2010 elections, President Omar al-Bashir secured victory in the national presidential poll as seemed likely, while Salva Kiir Mayardit reclaimed the presidency in southern Sudan. With the votes held, preparations are underway for the crucial referendum, although the outlook remains uncertain. The commission in charge of overseeing the southern referendum process was launched only in late June 2010, more than two years behind schedule, and voter registration has also suffered numerous delays. On 5 October 2010, a new referendum timetable was released under which voter registration was launched in mid-November, with a completion date scheduled for early December. Thereafter, a provisional referendum list is to be made available for inspection, with all objections and appeals to be considered before the final register is completed by 31 December, just a few days before the 9 January vote.

A separate referendum is supposed to be held concurrently in the Abyei region, but preparations have also suffered delays and the area remains a potential security flashpoint. Under the CPA, Abyei was given special administrative status, while the disputed boundaries of the region, straddling the north and south, were to be determined. Although the former rivals agreed to accept a July 2009 boundary ruling by the international Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), there have been delays in the demarcation of the Abyei border, and different interpretations of the PCA's ruling, in addition to the wider north-south border. However, beyond the implications of, for example, oil underlying the border demarcation issues, the vote will also stir up ethnic and social tensions, given the sheer diversity of the south, where migration and dislocation of communities have been common. Following the April 2010 elections, some post-poll southern divisions and tensions also emerged.

Ongoing political disputes increase the possibility that the referendum could be postponed. However, the south has already warned against any 'huge' delay. There is also a risk that key

procedures stipulated under the referendum laws might have to be missed out given the looming deadlines, something that could undermine the eventual outcome. The majority of southerners look increasingly likely to vote in favour of independence, but post-referendum planning still appears sketchy and it remains to be seen whether the north will accept such a result.

Social Stability [TOP](#)

Parts of southern Sudan suffered a rise in inter-ethnic violence in 2009, with the UN Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Southern Sudan Lise Grande indicating in August that year that more than 2,000 people had died in inter-tribal violence and more than 250,000 had been displaced since January.

A press statement by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 22 September 2009 stated: "Some of the more recent attacks have deliberately targeted women and children and have had little or nothing to do with cattle rustling, a traditional cause of violence between neighbouring tribes and ethnic groups in the region." It added: "UNMIS remains concerned that there may be elements that are directing attacks against institutions of the state." Some southern officials claimed political undercurrents in some such attacks. Khartoum denied any involvement.

Such tribal clashes undermine efforts to bolster security in the region. Attacks on civilians will only further stir historical rivalry between tribes and retaliatory attacks. The situation is complicated by the availability of small-arms, with disarmament campaigns likely to continue proving difficult. Meanwhile, suggestions of political motivations will further stoke southern tensions with the central government in Khartoum.

For example, in the Abyei context, Misseriya tribes have been broadly perceived as being aligned to the north, and the ethnic Ngok-Dinka who dominate the area with the south. These groups have fought over resources such as grazing lands and such issues may become increasingly politicised in the run-up to the referendum and raise the risk of further clashes.

Under the CPA, Abyei territory is "defined as the area of the nine Ngok-Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905". However, the CPA also stated that the Misseriya and other nomadic peoples were to "retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory". Nevertheless, protests broke out on 27 July 2009, with Misseriya demonstrating against the Abyei border ruling.

In discussing tensions in Abyei, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's October 2010 report on Sudan stated: "Lack of progress on referendum preparations, Misseriya frustrations over fears of their inability to migrate to the south this year, and rumours of Misseriya plans to organise large-scale settlements in the northern parts of the Abyei area have further polarised the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka ethnic groups and hardened their positions on key issues."

Insecurity is further exacerbated by, for example, the ongoing regional activity of the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has dispersed into areas of southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic in recent years amid

increased efforts by the Ugandan military to reduce the rebel threat in northern Uganda. A joint military operation by the Ugandan, Congolese and south Sudanese armies targeting the rebels in northeastern Congo has seen them disperse further into such regions and also led to reprisal attacks and raids.

Border Disputes [TOP](#)

Under the CPA, the Abyei region was to be accorded special administrative status, while the disputed boundaries of the area were to be determined by the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). However, the ruling NCP had disputed previous rulings by the boundary commission and tensions had flared between the former rivals in the area, including clashes between central government and southern forces in May 2008. The two sides reached an agreement in June of that year aimed at calming tensions, which included putting the dispute before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based in The Hague. Subsequently, the court ruled on 22 July 2009 that an earlier boundary panel had exceeded its mandate in parts and reviewed the region's borders.

Following the PCA ruling, the undersecretary to Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mutrif Siddig, described the decision as "final and binding". There are certainly aspects of the PCA's decision that will be perceived in the north as favouring the government in Khartoum. The eastern boundary of Abyei has been significantly redrawn, resulting in the region becoming a smaller strip of land than originally designated by the ABC's ruling. The crucial Heglig oil fields therefore now fall outside the Abyei region. The government of southern Sudan appeared to accept the ruling as a *fait accompli*. However, initial acceptance by both sides of the PCA's judgement does not mean that the potential for fresh conflict has been eradicated. Indeed controversial issues remain, including over the north-south border and the status of southern Sudan beyond 2011.

Ahead of the referendum, the proceeds of the south's oil fields are shared between the central government and southern Sudan. Under the CPA, the Abyei region is also due to hold a separate referendum at the same time, to choose whether to remain part of Sudan, or become a part of the south. It is the hope of secession (on the part of many in the south) and fear of secession (on the part of the north) that has also made marking the borders of Abyei so contentious.

The same hopes and fears continue to bedevil the process of drawing the wider boundary between the north and south. While Abyei is important and has been a key flashpoint, it was just one area of potentially oil-rich land that had been coveted by both sides. Indeed, the wider border remains uncertain, even after the Abyei ruling. As such, the PCA ruling that puts the Heglig oil fields outside Abyei is being taken to mean different things by different players. The north now asserts that Heglig has been recognised as being part of Southern Kordofan state. However, the south claims that Heglig falls within southern Unity state boundaries. Shortly after the 22 July ruling, some southern officials claimed that the issue still had to be determined by a north-south border committee.

Map showing the new boundaries of the disputed Abyei region, compared to the former boundaries. (IHS Jane's)

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Internal Affairs [TOP](#)

Political System [TOP](#)

Official Name:	Southern Sudan
Political System:	Autonomous regional government
Declaration of Independence:	None yet - referendum on secession due in 2011
Head of Government:	Salva Kiir Mayardit
Next Election:	Southern Sudan is currently awaiting the key referendum vote on potential self-determination, due on 9 January 2011. A separate referendum is to be granted to the Abyei region that same day, but preparations for both votes have suffered delays.

Executive [TOP](#)

The president of southern Sudan, currently Salva Kiir Mayardit, is head of the regional government in the south. The president appoints an executive Council of Ministers in consultation with the southern vice-president and approved by the Assembly of Southern Sudan. The council is accountable to the southern president and southern Assembly.

Legislative [TOP](#)

The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly was appointed in 2005, comprising 171 members, pending elections originally planned for 2009. These were finally held in April 2010, with the SPLM securing the majority in the elections in the south as expected. Under the CPA, the SPLM received 70 per cent of the seats and the NCP 15 per cent, with the remainder of the seats divided between other southern parties.

Judiciary [TOP](#)

The CPA established provisions for an independent judiciary of southern Sudan. It comprises a Supreme Court, regional courts of appeal and any other courts and tribunals deemed necessary under the constitution of southern Sudan. The southern Sudan legal system is based on a common law framework.

Leadership [TOP](#)

President of Southern Sudan:	Salva Kiir Mayardit
Vice-President:	Dr Riek Machar
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry:	Samson Lukare Kwaje
Minister of Animal Resources and Fisheries:	Nyalok Tiong Gatluak
Minister of Cabinet Affairs:	Kosti Manibe Ngai
Minister of Commerce and Industry:	Stephen Dhieu
Minister of Communications and Postal Services:	Madut Biar Yel
Minister of Co-operatives and Rural Development:	Anne Itto Leonardo
Minister of Culture and Heritage:	Gabriel Changson Chang
Minister of Education:	Michael Milli
Minister of Energy and Mining:	Garang Diing Akuong
Minister of the Environment:	Isaac Awan Maper
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning:	David Deng Athorbei
Minister of Gender, Child and Social Welfare:	Agnes Kwaje Lasuba
Minister of Health:	Luka Tombekana Manoja
Minister of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology:	Joseph Ukel
Minister of Housing and Physical Planning:	Jema Nunu Kumba
Minister of Human Resources Development:	Mary Jervas Yak
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management:	James Kok Ruea
Minister of Information:	Barnaba Marial Benjamin
Minister of Internal Affairs:	Gier Chuang Aluong
Minister of Investment:	Oyay Deng Ajak
Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources:	Paul Mayom Akec
Minister of Labour and Public Services:	Awut Deng Acuil
Minister of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development:	John Luyk Jok
Minister in the Office of the President:	Cirino Hitend Ofuho
Minister of Parliamentary Affairs:	Michael Makuei Lueth
Minister of Peace and CPA Implementation:	Pagan Amum
Minister of Regional Co-operation:	Deng Alor
Minister of Roads and Transport:	Anthony Lino Makana
Minister of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Veteran Affairs:	Nhial Deng Nhial
Minister of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism:	Abdallah Albert Alfoger Chokho

Minister of Without Portfolio:	Priscilla Nyanyang
Minister of Youth, Sport and Recreation:	Makuac Teny Yoh

President Salva Kiir Mayardit [TOP](#)

Salva Kiir Mayardit, born in 1951, is president of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and also first vice-president of Sudan. He assumed leadership of southern Sudan and the SPLM/A and took up one of two national Sudanese vice-presidencies after the death of John Garang in a helicopter accident in July 2005. Garang, who had been appointed president of southern Sudan and vice-president of Sudan only weeks earlier in July, had led the SPLM's representation at the various rounds of peace talks that led to the CPA.

Like his predecessor Garang, Salva Kiir is a member of the Dinka tribe, the largest group in the south. He was a founder leader of the SPLM and rose to become a leader of the SPLA and also served as Garang's deputy. He secured re-election as president of southern Sudan in April 2010.

Southern Sudanese leader Salva Kiir Mayardit (left) sits beside Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir before his swearing in as Sudan's first vice-president in Khartoum in 2005. (PA)

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Vice-President Riek Machar [TOP](#)

Riek Machar, born in 1952, completed a doctorate at Bradford University in the UK before joining the SPLM/A in 1985. Although an early member of the movement, Machar split with John Garang in 1991 and led the SPLA-Nasir and later the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). In 1997 he entered into an agreement with the national government that saw him become president of the Southern Sudan Co-ordinating Council and an assistant to the president of Sudan. However, in 2002 he rejoined Garang in the SPLM/A.

Following Garang's death, Machar was elevated to the vice-presidency of southern Sudan. His involvement in the SPLM government is seen as an important means of maintaining unity between his Nuer ethnic group and the majority Dinka population.

Regionally, he facilitated peace efforts between the Ugandan government and the rebel Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army between 2006-2008.

He remained vice-president of southern Sudan following the April 2010 elections.

Political Parties [TOP](#)

Southern politics is dominated by the SPLM. Their partner in the national government, the

ruling NCP, is also represented in the Southern Assembly under the January 2005 peace agreement.

Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)

The SPLM is the political movement of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was formed by the rebel officer John Garang in 1983 when he led a mutiny against the Khartoum government. As the principal southern resistance movement, the SPLM/A advocated greater autonomy, rather than independence, for the Christian/Animist south. Although the organisation liked to stress its broad ethnic membership, it was dominated by the Dinka, Sudan's largest non-Arab ethnic group, and this created friction with other groups, especially the Nuer. This rivalry led to a damaging split in 1991 when Riek Machar, the leader of the SPLA's Nuer forces, split with the organisation. Despite having the stated objective of complete independence rather than regional autonomy, Machar was brought into the government's camp and became minister of the southern states. Apparently disillusioned with the government, he quit his ministerial position in January 2000 and reconciled with Garang's SPLM in 2002.

Following the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the SPLM and NCP formed the core of the Government of National Unity. Garang was appointed first vice-president of Sudan, in accordance with the peace agreement, but died shortly thereafter in a helicopter crash. He was succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardit. The SPLM received 112 of 170 seats in the Southern Assembly.

The SPLM, however, has suffered its own internal divisions since the signing of the CPA, with for example former minister of foreign affairs Lam Akol leaving and forming the SPLM for Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) in 2009. Nevertheless, it remains the dominant party in the south, with Mayardit re-elected as the southern president in April 2010 with 92.99 per cent of the vote. His sole challenger, Lam Akol Ajawin, leader of SPLM-DC, took 7.01 per cent.

National Congress Party (NCP)

The ruling party nationally has its roots in Hassan el-Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which achieved significant success in pushing for the implementation of sharia (Islamic law) during the Jaafar Muhammad el-Nemeiri regime. Although Turabi was temporarily arrested in the wake of Bashir's coup, the NIF provided the political support and ideological base for Bashir's regime. The NIF, operating as the National Congress, is widely considered to exercise pervasive control over the official government and Turabi was seen to be the real power behind Bashir's presidency. This, however, proved an underestimation of the president's political capabilities. Turabi's ambitions to formalise his power at the expense of the presidency were met with decisive action. Turabi was steadily marginalised from December 1999, losing his positions as speaker of parliament and secretary general of the party. Only two ministers followed him when he formed the opposition Popular National Congress party. The National Congress Party was one of the main players in the Government of National Unity following the peace agreement of January 2005, the other being the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The NCP and President Bashir secured

victory in the national elections in April 2010.

A win by Bashir seemed a probable outcome, but was seemingly a certainty after two key challengers - Yasir Arman, of the SPLM, and Sadiq al-Mahdi, of the main northern Umma Party - withdrew from the race shortly before the April elections.

External Affairs [TOP](#)

External affairs fall under the remit of the national government. However SPLM representatives are present in most major foreign capitals.

Historical Background [TOP](#)

Date	Event
1820-1822	Ottoman Egypt invaded, occupied and annexed Sudan.
1884	Establishment of an Islamic state.
1898	Battle of Omdurman; British forces suppressed the Madhi state and established an Anglo-Egyptian condominium over Sudan.
1916	Sultanate of Darfur annexed to Sudan condominium.
1952	Self-rule granted within condominium status.
1955	Hostilities commenced between north and south.
1956	Sudan granted independence under a five-member Sovereignty Council.
1958	Ibrahim Abboud made chairman of Supreme Council (effectively president).
Early 1960s-1972	Anya Nya, a southern rebel group, fought an intermittent campaign for independence against the government.
1964	Five-member Committee of Sovereignty re-established under Ismail al-Azhari.
1969	Coup established Revolutionary Command Council under Jaafar Muhammad el-Nimeiri; Democratic Republic of Sudan proclaimed.
1971	New constitution adopted, Nimeiri confirmed as president. Sudanese Socialist Union declared sole legal party.
1972	Addis Ababa conference ended civil war. Southern provinces granted autonomous status.
1975-1977	Repeated coup attempts.
1983	Nimeiri re-elected. Sharia (Islamic law) introduced. Reinstatement of sharia as the basis of Sudan's legal system in 1983 was opposed by both secular Muslims and the southern Christians. SPLM/A was formed.
1984	The SPLM/A established a base in Ethiopia.

1985	The SPLM/A adopted a more pro-Western approach. The group was operating extensively in the Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces. Nimeiri deposed in bloodless coup. Transitional Military Council set up under Abdel Rahman Swar el-Dahab. State of Emergency declared.
1986	40 political parties competed in general election. Coalition government led by Sadiq al-Madhi's Umma Party. Ahmad Ali al-Mirghani, chairman of Supreme Council (head of state).
1986-1987	The conflict spreads to the Nuba Mountains and other areas of Sudan.
1988	Coalition government under Sadiq al-Mahdi concluded a peace agreement with the SPLM/A.
1989	Sadiq al-Mahdi overthrown in coup. General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir became president (June).
1991	In May, rebel forces in Ethiopia, assisted by Khartoum, were victorious and the new regime expelled SPLM/A forces. The SPLM/A split, with the formation of the SPLA-Nasir (or SPLA-United, later the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM)).
1993	Peace efforts in Nigeria failed.
1996	In April, Khartoum signed an agreement with the SSIM.
1997	Rebels, including northern dissident forces, for the first time launched major offensives in east and south, seizing large swathes of territory (January-April).
1998	Fighting intensified in the north. In the south, an impending famine further complicated matters. Peace talks resumed in Kenya but were inconclusive (May). The SPLA announced a three-month ceasefire to facilitate aid deliveries (August). In September, the government and John Garang issued a joint statement announcing that ceasefire negotiations would commence in Nairobi at the end of October. In October, the SPLM/A and its allies in Dar Nuba launched a new offensive in the Nuba mountains, the traditional buffer zone between the north and south.
1999	New law introduced, ostensibly allowing political parties to register for the first time since the 1989 coup (January). Oil exports commenced (August).
2000	Reik Machar resigned as vice-president. Umma Party withdrew from rebel NDA; Umma leaders returned to Khartoum (March-April). Presidential and parliamentary elections held. Bashir re-elected for a second five-year term (December).
2001	IGAD summit attended by Bashir and Garang but failed to agree a ceasefire (June). SPLA repelled government offensive in the Nuba Mountains and made significant territorial gains in western Bahr el-Ghazal (June). Government forces retook Raga in Bahr el-Ghazal (October).

	US peace envoy John Danforth dispatched to Sudan (November).
2002	<p>Ceasefire agreement for Nuba region signed (January).</p> <p>Riek Machar agreed to reunite his SPDF with John Garang's SPLA (January).</p> <p>Machakos Protocol signed between government and SPLA in Kenya. Bashir and Garang met in Uganda (July).</p> <p>Second round of peace talks suspended due to heavy fighting around Torit (September).</p> <p>Government and SPLA signed a ceasefire agreement. The SPLA accused the government of breaking the truce within 10 minutes of it coming into force (October).</p>
2003	<p>Peace talks resumed in Naivasha, Kenya (April).</p> <p>Vice-President Ali Osman Taha assumed leadership of direct talks with Garang in Naivasha (September).</p> <p>Agreement reached on security during six-year transition period; Sudan to create two national armies (September).</p> <p>SPLA sent its first 'goodwill' delegation to Khartoum (December).</p> <p>Government and NDA signed an agreement in support of the peace process (December).</p>
2004	<p>Wealth-sharing agreement reached between north and south (January).</p> <p>Outbreak of SPLA factional fighting in Shilluk Kingdom of Upper Nile state (March).</p> <p>Agreements reached in Naivasha on the partial application of sharia in Khartoum, the division of powers within the transitional federal government, and the status of southern Blue Nile state, Nuba Mountains (southern Kordofan state) and Abyei region (May).</p> <p>Final SPLM-government talks convened in Nairobi (October), agreeing to conclude a comprehensive peace deal by end of year (November).</p>
2005	<p>Ruling NCP and SPLM/A sign the CPA in Nairobi, Kenya, effectively ending the civil war (January).</p> <p>Donor conference in Oslo, Norway, raises more than USD4.5 billion in pledges of aid to help with post-war recovery in the south (April).</p> <p>NDA signs a reconciliation agreement with the government, which enables it to become part of the power-sharing government (June).</p> <p>John Garang sworn in as first vice-president of Sudan (9 July); Garang died later that month in a helicopter crash.</p> <p>Salva Kirr Mayardit replaced the late Garang as first vice-president of Sudan (August).</p> <p>Power-sharing Government of National Unity formed (September).</p> <p>Autonomous government of southern Sudan formed (October).</p>
2006	<p>The Juba peace agreement resulted in part of the mainly Nuer SSDF (led by Paulino Matip) joining the SPLM/A. The rest remained in opposition (January).</p> <p>Around 150 people were killed in the heaviest fighting between northern Sudanese forces and the southern forces since they signed the CPA. Fighting concentrated around the southern town of Malakal (November).</p>

2007	<p>Second anniversary of the signing of the CPA saw the NCP and SPLM trade accusations over the slow implementation of the agreement (January). SPLM temporarily suspended participation in government of national unity over CPA implementation delays (October).</p>
2008	<p>National census, as required by CPA, commenced (April). Fighting erupted between southern forces and government troops in the disputed Abyei region (May). Sudanese president signed a roadmap agreement, agreed with the SPLM, aimed at easing tensions in Abyei (June). Armies of Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan launched joint offensive against Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army on Congolese territory (December).</p>
2009	<p>Sudan announced elections for February 2010 (April). Sudan postponed general elections from February to April 2010 (June). The international Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled on Sudan's disputed Abyei boundaries, with northern and southern officials voicing their commitment to the decision (July). Representatives of north and south Sudan signed an agreement aimed at pushing forward implementation of the CPA (August). Voter registration launched but ongoing sticking points between CPA partners over issues such as the census and referendum (November).</p>
2010	<p>Salva Kiir Mayardit reclaimed the presidency in elections in southern Sudan (April). Southern Sudan government troops clashed with alleged southern militia forces in Unity State (June). Commission in charge of overseeing the southern referendum process was finally launched (June). New referendum timetable released (October). UN Security Council delegation visited Sudan and emphasised that the referenda must be held on time (October). Voter registration for the south's January 2011 referendum launched (November).</p>

Security Forces

[TOP](#)

Army

[TOP](#)

There are three forces of importance: the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which is now an official organ of the government of southern Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Joint Integrated Units (JIU). Under the agreement on Security Arrangements during the interim period, signed in Naivasha on 25 September 2003 and coming into effect following the signing of the CPA in 2005, Khartoum and the SPLA undertook to second 20,000 troops each to 'joint/integrated' military units to provide security in contentious areas and potentially form the basis of a reconstructed national army. These would be deployed as follows: 24,000 in the South; 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains; 6,000 in the southern Blue Nile; 3,000 in Khartoum. Outside of these zones, the SAF would remain as an independent entity under

Khartoum's control. Surplus SPLA units would be based entirely within the southern zone and retain their own chain of command.

According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's October 2010 report on Sudan, the strength of the JIUs has remained constant at 32,900 (around 83 per cent of mandated strength) since April 2009.

Police and Security Forces [TOP](#)

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, law enforcement is undergoing restructuring. A new police force is being trained for southern Sudan, with international institutional and training assistance from, for example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

With Sudanese elections held in April 2010, the south is now keenly awaiting the January 2011 referendum on potential self-determination. The Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) will be involved in issues such as securing polling centres and crowd control.

Southern Sudanese police officers perform training exercises during a visit by southern officials and a UN Security Council delegation in October 2010. (PA)

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Foreign Forces [TOP](#)

Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, UNMIS was established under UN Security Council resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005. UNMIS has a Chapter VII mandate (protection of observers and civilians) and is tasked with several roles, including, among others, monitoring implementation of the ceasefire agreement; assistance with the formation of joint integrated units between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and government forces; assistance in the disarmament and demobilisation of remaining forces; assistance in the restructuring of the police forces; promoting human rights and the rule of law; support for preparations and conduct of elections and the 2011 referendum. At the end of October 2010 mission strength was 10,592 personnel, including troops, police and experts on mission.

Geography [TOP](#)

Southern Sudan consists of a great clay plain with few mountains. During the rainy season the lowland area around the White Nile becomes a huge swamp, the Sudd, forcing the nomadic population onto the higher ground. The equatorial south experiences steady wet weather from April to October, although there is neither a monsoon nor a totally dry season.

Demography [TOP](#)

Distribution and ethnicity [TOP](#)

The African southern Sudanese were geographically isolated from Arab/Islamic movements from the north until comparatively recently and therefore maintained their traditional African animist identities. The two most significant southern groups are the Dinka and the Nuer. Despite being closely related, a considerable rivalry exists between them and the Dinka are also divided into several smaller clans across a large area of southern Sudan. These have been the core of the SPLM/A. Luo groups related to the peoples of northern Uganda and northwestern Kenya are also significant in the southeast, while the Zande and Bari are numerous on both sides of the Congolese border. Among these larger peoples are scores of smaller peoples and clans. Arab population in the south is concentrated along the Nile watercourse and in government garrison towns.

Religion [TOP](#)

The predominantly animist and Christian peoples of the south and Nuba mountains have resisted the Islamisation that the Arab north has attempted to impose. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement set out "freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all religions or beliefs or customs".

Language [TOP](#)

Standard Arabic is the state language of Sudan, and Arabic is the native language of about 60 per cent of Sudanese and language of education for most others. The 40 per cent non-Arab population speak an estimated 140 languages and dialects of several non-Semitic linguistic families. In the south, Dinka and Nuer dialects predominate but the standard language of education and officialdom is English, reflecting the influence of British colonialism and of Kenya and Uganda as bases for the insurgent movements and aid agencies.

Infrastructure [TOP](#)

Roads [TOP](#)

In mid-2004, a USD20 million programme was under way to repair roads in the south of Sudan and to improve links from Rumbek and Juba to Uganda and Kenya respectively in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief by road from these sources. Included is a 250 km route from Lokichokio in northwest Kenya to Kapoeta in Sudan. Large sums from the multi-billion dollar reconstruction package approved in early 2005 are also to be devoted to the reconstruction of roads in the south and north, with more ambitious infrastructure projects planned for a second phase programme between 2008 and 2011.

In 2008/2009, a key bridge (the Bandame, on the Yei-Maridi road in Central Equatoria state, which helps connects the south to Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) was also rebuilt with USAID assistance, forming part of the USAID-GOSS Sudan Accelerated Infrastructure Programme. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was an implementing partner. According to an USAID October 2009 update, some of the projects

planned for completion in December 2010 include the paving a 190 km road between Juba and Nimule in Eastern and Central Equatoria, and improvement of gravel roads in Western Equatoria state.

Railways [TOP](#)

Sudan's rail network is concentrated in the north of the country; one line extends down to Wau in the south. In early 2004, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda proposed that Uganda's rail network, which links to Mombasa and Dar es Salam ports in Kenya and Tanzania, be extended north from Gulu to Juba, the largest city in southern Sudan.

Economy [TOP](#)

The economic outlook in Sudan depends directly on whether the country is able to consolidate and protect its peace or whether it goes back to war. Although much wealthier than in the past, Sudan's newfound wealth is also fuelling grievances from groups and peripheral areas who are not seeing the benefits of the oil wealth. The bulk of Sudan's developed oil reserves now sit at the front line between SPLA and SAF forces. Should conflict resume and the CPA collapse, the oil fields are likely to be the site of some of the fiercest fighting. However, this would be a lose-lose scenario, where either side ultimately hurts its own interests in order to hurt its enemy. Both parties will be aware of the risk and there is hope that their mutual interests will act as some restraint, but it is far from guaranteed.

The government in the south has enjoyed an influx of money on the back of high oil prices since the CPA was signed. However, a July 2009 report on the Staff-Monitored Program for Sudan for 2009-2010 pointed to the significant impact the global financial crisis has had on Sudan, mostly in terms of a sharp drop in oil revenues. According to the report, oil made up 60 per cent of national government revenues and 95 per cent of national exports in 2008, while accounting for approximately 98 per cent of revenues of southern Sudan. This highlights the south's dependence on such revenues.

Non-oil activity is concentrated around Juba and economic diversification is key. A Southern Sudan Investment Authority (SSIA) was launched in April 2009 in order to promote investment in the south.

Southern Sudan also benefits from substantial donor aid, for example under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which looks to provide capacity building support.

Oil and wealth sharing [TOP](#)

The Naivasha peace talks between the government and SPLM resolved issues of wealth-sharing and banking for a transitional administration. Revenues from oil fields in the self-administering south would be divided 50 per cent to Khartoum, 48 per cent to the southern administration and two per cent to the producer state governments. While there would be one new national currency and one central bank, the latter would have two 'windows', allowing for interest-free Islamic banking in the north and Western-style banking in the south. There would

be a single National Petroleum Committee with representation from both sides but a Southern Sudan Land Commission separate from a National Land Commission would be established to arbitrate land disputes.

The issue of oil wealth and revenues remains a potentially divisive issue in the demarcation of the wider north-south border.

Agriculture [TOP](#)

Agriculture accounts for around 33 per cent of Sudan's output and gives work to about two-thirds of the population, explaining the ambitious plans of past governments to make Sudan a breadbasket of Africa. There is great potential for expansion, but a lack of investment, drought, war, famine, flooding, desertification and disputed rights to Nile waters have been among factors that have stunted growth. The south of Sudan is even more heavily dependent on agriculture than the more developed north, but commercial development has been hampered by issues such as poor transport links to the north and neighbouring countries and capital constraints.

Projects that have been launched to boost agriculture production and marketing capacity include, for example, USAID's Southern Sudan Agriculture Revitalization Project. This five-year USD22.5 million project aimed to help increase access to agricultural skills and technology, increase access to capital for agricultural enterprises and increase capacity of commodity networks for expanded trade, according to USAID.

Food insecurity remains a significant issue in the south, with the World Food Programme (WFP) indicating in August 2009 that it was increasing its food assistance to southern Sudan by 25 per cent to 118,000 tonnes. According to the WFP, 1.3 million people were facing severe food shortages in the south, with key contributing factors listed as poor rainfall (which in turn affect harvests), high food prices and conflict.

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[2 Images](#)

Maps, Sudan

Date Posted: 09-Dec-2009

Maps

[Infrastructure](#)

Infrastructure

TOP

Sudan's current oil wealth and distribution as well as the oil companies involved

1350281

Nile and Nile basin

1041874

NEW ENTRY

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External affairs, Sudan

Date Posted: 25-Nov-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

[Foreign Policy Overview](#)

[Multilateral Relations](#)

[African Union \(AU\)](#)

[Arab League](#)

[Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa \(COMESA\)](#)

[Intergovernmental Authority on Development \(IGAD\)](#)

[Nile Basin Initiative \(NBI\)](#)

[Sudan-Ethiopia-Yemen Security Axis](#)
[United Nations \(UN\)](#)
[Relations with the Central African Republic](#)
[Relations with Chad](#)
[Relations with China](#)
[Relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo](#)
[Relations with Egypt](#)
[Relations with Eritrea](#)
[Relations with Ethiopia](#)
[Relations with Iran](#)
[Relations with Kenya](#)
[Relations with Libya](#)
[Relations with Saudi Arabia](#)
[Relations with Uganda](#)
[Relations with the United States](#)
[Trade and External Assistance](#)
[Exports](#)
[Imports](#)
[External Assistance](#)
[Historical Background](#)
[Unification, Colonialism and Independence](#)
[Regional Dimensions of Civil War \(1956-89\)](#)
[Regional Dimensions of Islamist Sudan \(1990-99\)](#)
['Rogue' Status](#)
[Sudan Normalises its Relations \(1999-2001\)](#)
[US Intervention in the Peace Process](#)

Foreign Policy Overview

[TOP](#)

Sudan lies firmly within the Islamic diplomatic bloc and the government considers that the country is Arab North African, rather than African. Sudan became internationally isolated during the 1990s, due to a reputation for harbouring and training activists and promoting Islamist subversion in other states. Consequently Sudan was given 'rogue' status and put under a sanctions regime by the US Department of State in 1993 as a country supportive of international terrorism.

Having sidelined more extreme elements in the regime, there were clear indications throughout 2000 that President Omar al-Bashir wanted to distance himself from this image. Between declaring a state of emergency in December 1999 and May 2000, Sudan restored ties with Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. Relations with Eritrea, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had already been restored in 1999. The UK reopened its embassy in Khartoum in June 1999

and restored its ambassador to Khartoum in November that year.

Attempts to improve relations with the US, which reached a nadir with the cruise missile attacks in 1998, were also made. Washington and Khartoum started a counter-terrorism dialogue in mid-2000 and Sudan co-operated with Washington following the 11 September attacks on the US. However, while Washington is deeply engaged in resolving the crisis in Darfur and in mediation efforts between the signatories of Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), it has not yet normalised relations with Khartoum.

Sudan's relations with some among the international community have deteriorated amid, for example, the conflict in Darfur, as well as following the International Criminal Court's issuing of an arrest warrant for President Bashir in 2009 over alleged crimes in Darfur, which he and Khartoum strongly deny. Meanwhile, China's interests in Sudan provides Khartoum with a potential ally on the UN Security Council.

Both regionally and internationally, the upcoming southern referendum on self-determination, due in January 2011, will be followed closely amid concerns that the outcome of the vote could lead to fresh instability.

Multilateral Relations [TOP](#)

African Union (AU) [TOP](#)

Regardless of its Arab orientation, Sudan was a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and acceded to the successor African Union (AU) in 2002. This membership is essential to prevent Khartoum's isolation from its neighbours and allows it to advance its diplomatic position in a forum including several allied states. Since 2004, however, the AU has taken a lead in attempting to negotiate a ceasefire in Darfur and, from June, deploying a small ceasefire monitoring (later expanded to peacekeeping) force to the region. The ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur also prevented Sudan from taking up the chairmanship of the AU in January 2006, a further message to Khartoum to get its house in order.

Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the government and one rebel faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in May 2006, the AU became increasingly frustrated at Khartoum's continued opposition to a UN takeover of the peacekeeping mission. Although it extended the mandate of its peacekeeping force (AMIS), it lacked the funds, equipment and troops to ensure effective security on the ground in Darfur. A donor conference in Brussels in mid-July 2006 was aimed at boosting the AU's peacekeeping mission in the interim while negotiations with Khartoum over a UN handover continued. Khartoum finally agreed to the hybrid joint UN-AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur (subsequently named UNAMID) in June 2007, although the composition of the force remained a sticking point. UNAMID subsequently took over from AMIS at the end of December 2007.

The AU remains involved in peace efforts in Darfur and also urged the deferral of the legal process initiated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor in 2008 against the

Sudanese president in relation to the conflict in Darfur. Its request to the UN Security Council in July 2008, published in a communiqué following an AU Peace and Security Council meeting, pointed to the "need to ensure that the ongoing peace efforts are not jeopardised, as well as the fact that, in the current circumstances, a prosecution may not be in the interest of the victims and justice".

The AU sent monitors to Sudan to observe its April 2010 elections.

Arab League [TOP](#)

The Sudanese government has sought an active role in pan-Arab politics and considers contacts with richer states through the Arab League to be an important arm of its diplomacy. As part of Sudan's realignment strategy, in February 2000, President Bashir conducted a tour of Gulf States in a bid to improve ties that were soured when Khartoum sided with Baghdad during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis. Gulf states and pan-Arab agencies provide most of the limited development aid that reaches Khartoum.

As part of the regional security committee, ministers of interior and justice from Sudan, as well as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates signed a communiqué in Jeddah in August 1999 calling for closer co-operation in combating terrorism. They also agreed to set up a technical group to draft measures to implement the anti-terrorism agreement signed the previous year. The agreement prohibits Arab League members from financing, organising or carrying out terrorist acts against each other. The signatories must also extradite any defendants or convicts wanted by other signatories. In March 2000, a joint statement following President Bashir's visit to Algeria stated that Khartoum backed Algerian government's crackdown on militant Islamic groups.

Meeting in emergency session in Cairo in August 2004, the Arab League made clear its opposition to UN attempts to dictate human rights and disarmament policy to Sudan and to any attempt to impose retributive sanctions on Khartoum. An Arab League mission to Darfur earlier in 2004 had reported that the conflict was largely the result of local structural factors beyond the direct influence of Khartoum.

Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, it urged the hold-out rebel movements to sign the deal and also urged Khartoum to consider a UN peacekeeping mission. The Arab League has called for further reinforcements for the cash-strapped AU mission in Darfur.

After the announcement of the ICC prosecutor's application for an arrest warrant for the Sudanese president in July 2008 in relation to alleged crimes in Darfur (denied by Khartoum and al-Bashir), the Arab League proposed a plan to Sudan for dealing with alleged crimes in Darfur.

Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) [TOP](#)

As with its neighbours Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan is a member of the COMESA economic grouping. COMESA was set up in 1994, replacing the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) that had existed in the same geographical area since 1981. As the name suggests, the organisation aims to develop a common trading market in the region to pursue both higher economic growth in its 20 member states and to work towards regional integration. In 2000, Sudan joined the core COMESA Free Trade Area, which also includes Djibouti, Egypt and Kenya. Since 2003, oil exports from Sudan to Ethiopia and Kenya have been covered by the Common Market's reduced tariffs commitment. This increases its regional bargaining power. However, the COMESA area still constitutes a small percentage of Sudanese trade relative to Arabia, Asia and Europe.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) [TOP](#)

IGAD was formed (as IGADD) in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda to provide a regional forum for addressing drought, famine and development issues. Eritrea joined in 1993. Despite prolonged open or proxy warfare between its member states, IGAD's mandate has evolved since the 1990s to take in regional co-operation and economic integration through promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, intra-regional trade and development of communications infrastructure. Member states drew up an initiative to combat international terrorism in mid-2003. In regard to Sudan, its most important activity was official mediation of the peace talks between the government and the former rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and the organisation has reiterated its commitment to seeing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, reached in 2005, implemented fully. It has also urged a speedy resolution to the Darfur crisis.

Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) [TOP](#)

Sudan is one of the nine riparian states that launched the NBI in 1999 to manage the water resources of the great river. This is very important for Sudan's plans to exploit the hydroelectric and irrigation potential of the Nile, and greatly influences its relations with Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopia and Uganda.

Sudan-Ethiopia-Yemen Security Axis [TOP](#)

Since mid-2002 an informal alliance of Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen has existed, primarily to put pressure on their prickly common neighbour, Eritrea, with which all three have fought since 1995. In January 2004, the alliance was given public form as an 'anti-terror axis', taking advantage of the US interest in the region. All three countries are eager to shed their image as havens for Islamic militants, and operations may involve information or even military co-operation between the three countries. Nonetheless, Eritrea feels its encirclement very keenly, and has denounced the alliance as an 'axis of belligerence'.

United Nations (UN) [TOP](#)

Given the near constant state of civil war in Sudan, its appalling human rights record and the enormous humanitarian burden of its displaced population, Sudan has long been of concern to

the UN, which has backed peace processes in the south (in association with IGAD) and authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005 and, more recently, in Darfur (in association with the AU). However, the UN Security Council resolutions on the situation in Sudan (Darfur) of July, September and November 2004 were the first such official pronouncements on the crisis. During this period, the UN also agreed to send an advance mission to Sudan to prepare for a UN peacekeeping mission in the south following the anticipated conclusion of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) government peace process.

Security Council monitoring of the situation in Darfur commenced in May 2004, after the Council had decided not to take follow-up action on a report from the UN Commission on Human Rights describing the situation as a "reign of terror". At the end of June, the UN Special Rapporteur in Darfur concluded that crimes against humanity had been committed but that there was not yet evidence of ethnic cleansing or genocide. With this in mind, and on the recommendation of then secretary-general Kofi Annan, who visited Khartoum and Darfur in June/July, a US-drafted resolution (1556) was passed by the Security Council on 30 July 2004. Much revised under pressure from Algeria, Angola, Brazil, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and Russia, this called for the Sudanese government to take action to end violence and disarm the Janjaweed within 30 days or face unspecified actions (specific mention of sanctions was removed from the draft resolution). Sudan agreed to do this and newly appointed UN Special Representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, was responsible for monitoring implementation and reporting back to New York.

Reporting to the Security Council at the end of August, he found that Sudan had failed to end violence or pursue disarmament but that it had improved the security and relief access situation somewhat. While the Council agreed to take no punitive action, a second resolution (1564) was passed on 18 September threatening Sudan with sanctions, with specific mention of its oil industry, should it not enforce Resolution 1556. However, the wording was still vague and the specific time limit was amended to periodic verification by Pronk's monthly reports. Resolution 1564 also called for a commission to be established to determine whether genocide had been committed in Darfur; this began work in Sudan in early October.

By mid-November, when the Security Council met in session in Nairobi (only the fourth time it had met away from its headquarters in New York) to discuss the progress of peace processes in Sudan, no action had been taken on the two previous resolutions. Resolution 1574, passed in Nairobi, demanded that the two Darfurian rebel movements, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and any other armed groups, cease violence on pain of individual or collective sanction. This reflected a general shift in the international position on Darfur towards recognising the culpability of the insurgents in initiating and sustaining the conflict. As such, the onus was partially removed from Khartoum. In this respect, the veto-wielding presence in the Security Council of China, which dominates the Sudanese oil sector, and Russia, which has made significant arms sales, always made the imposition of significant international sanctions unlikely.

By March 2005, however, the UN Security Council imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on those suspected of having committed human rights abuses and violating the Darfur ceasefire

agreement. It also put a ban on the sale or supply of military equipment to rebel movements and the government. Resolution 1593 of March 2005 saw the UN Security Council refer the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a result, the ICC launched investigations into human rights abuses in June 2005.

Further action was taken in April 2006, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution to impose travel restrictions and financial sanctions on four Sudanese nationals over the ongoing conflict in Darfur. While a peace agreement was reached between the government of Sudan and one rebel faction the following month (May), escalating violence in Darfur, particularly between the various rebel factions, made a bolstered peacekeeping mission ever more necessary. Despite repeated calls by the AU, UN, US and other parties, Khartoum remained vehemently opposed to a UN takeover of the cash-strapped and under-equipped AU mission, only finally agreeing to this in June 2007, with the mission (UNAMID) subsequently launched at the end of December 2007.

International attention has also continued to focus on the central government and southern leadership's progress in implementing the 2005 peace pact. In October 2010, a UN delegation visiting Sudan emphasised that the referendum granted to southerners must be held on time and according to the provisions of the 2005 agreement.

Relations with the Central African Republic

[TOP](#)

The border with Sudan is the third longest of the Central African Republic's borders, but it is in some ways the most vulnerable as it touches the remotest part of the country. Just over the border on the Sudanese side is territory in which civil war and instability caused grave problems. In mid-2001 an offensive by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) pushed its control of the Sudanese side of the border well up towards Chad. The presence of nearly 20,000 Sudanese refugees in the east of the Central African Republic led to strained relations with Khartoum in the past, as it accused the Central African Republic of allowing its territory to be used as a conduit for arms supplies to the SPLA. Bangui consistently denied that it allowed the SPLA to use its territory, however, with limited security capacity for a large, easily penetrated area it is hard to see what control it could exercise over the border area.

As far as Bangui is concerned, another problem in relations with Sudan has been cattle raiders and poachers penetrating into its vulnerable eastern territory. Following the overthrow of then-president Patassé in March 2003, new leader General François Bozizé called for the revival of a joint border commission to investigate armed activities on either side, which had been set up following an escalation in attacks in mid-2002. Sudan, which had maintained a minor peacekeeping presence of about 50 men in Bangui in 2002 under Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) auspices, supplied the new regime with a number of vehicles to improve its mobility in the east. The commission was formally re-established in December 2003, when Bozizé visited Khartoum.

African observers deployed monitoring teams along the troubled Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic borders in April 2006, but as the Central African Republic's borders are easily penetrable, the country's use as a potential rear base by rebels and spillover of conflicts from

Sudan and Chad will remain a problem and a security issue. In September 2007, the UN Security Council authorised a "multi-dimensional" force for eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, which was to comprise a new UN mission, to be known as MINURCAT, as well as EU troops, both of which were given an initial one-year mandate. With the EUFOR bridging operation coming to an end in mid-March 2009, the UN Security Council in January 2009 authorised a military component for MINURCAT, the mandate of which was also extended until 2010. MINURCAT is currently due to complete its drawdown by 31 December 2010.

Meanwhile, like the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, both Sudan and the Central African Republic have suffered from attacks by Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Relations with Chad [TOP](#)

In contrast to its relations with other neighbours, Khartoum's relations with N'Djamena improved markedly in the early 1990s. Chadian President Idriss Déby Zaghawa Bideyat clan has strong links with Sudan, which provided a launch pad and assistance for his successful invasion of Chad in early 1990. Sudanese forces had occupied Chadian villages, but efforts to settle the border dispute were initiated in October 1993, with demarcation of the frontier beginning in December 1994. In July 1995 the two countries signed an agreement to revive mutual trade and transport links.

While indicative of positive relations that endured through the 1990s, most of these formal agreements have meant nothing in practice as the border is impossible to regulate, has few reliable transport links and recorded bilateral trade is negligible. In most respects, Chad remains oriented southwest towards the transport connections and markets of francophone Central Africa and Nigeria, while Sudan looks north and east to Egypt and Arabia.

Tension in the relationship derives from the two governments' contrary positions with regard to the political dominance of Arab and African interests in the Sahel region. Chad, where Arabs are a minority, has resented Arab influence since its war against Libyan expansionism in the 1970s-80s. As such, growing Arab militancy in Sudan's Darfur region has been a source of increasing concern, especially as this effects the interests of Déby's ruling Zaghawa people on both sides of the border. Clashes between Mesalit Africans and Arab tribesmen in Western Darfur in early 1999 left some 300 people dead, and forced 50,000 mainly Mesalit to take refuge in Chad. The Mesalit are one of at least four non-Arab ethnic groups that live on both sides of the Chad-Darfur border, others being the Zaghawa, Fur and Taju.

There were reports of Chadian involvement in the new insurgency that emerged in Darfur in February 2003. Several bodies found after a raid on el-Fashir airport in April 2003 were reportedly Chadian Zaghawa. More generally, Zaghawa influence is much stronger in the JEM, which is considered to have stronger links and support across the Chadian border.

Presidents Bashir and Déby met to discuss the issue in April 2003 and reportedly agreed that Chadian forces could intervene on Sudanese territory in pursuit of rebel fighters.

Subsequently, opposition sources accused Chadian troops of entering Sudan in order to assist the government's suppression of the rebels. This was unconfirmed and Déby came under greater pressure from his Zaghawa peers either to stay neutral or provide covert assistance to the JEM or the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). The constructive influence of Chad was best seen through its hosting of peace talks in Abéché (from September 2003) and then N'Djamena (from April 2004). These talks resulted in ceasefire agreements but not in any lasting cessation of hostilities or breakthrough agreements.

The first confirmed use of Chadian troops across the border occurred in mid-March 2004 in pursuit of Sudanese Arab cattle raiders, thought to be from the Janjaweed militias. Chad mobilised forces and deployed them along the frontier in late April 2004 in response to increasing raids by the Janjaweed across the frontier and against refugee camps. The Sudanese air force is also alleged to have bombed Chadian border towns on several occasions in early 2004 in pursuit of rebel fighters. From May 2004 there were direct clashes between Chadian and Khartoum-backed forces along the border, leading to Chadian accusations of belligerency against Sudan and the convening of crisis talks. In one clash alone in mid-June, Chad claimed to have killed 69 Janjaweed raiders within its borders, leading to Chadian claims that the militia was recruiting Arabs from within eastern Chad.

While neither side was likely to favour a conflict, President Déby was under considerable pressure from his Zaghawa political and military inner circle to resist the Sudanese Arab onslaught, and it was increasingly questionable whether Khartoum had the ability to restrict the activities of its Janjaweed allies to the Sudanese side of the frontier. A series of confidence-building measures were agreed upon in July 2004, including joint patrols of the border. From this point, while Chad continued to play a role in attempting to mediate the conflict, in association with Libya and the AU, its pre-eminence was assumed by Nigeria, in its role as head of the AU in 2004/05. Moreover, the neutrality of Chad was challenged by the JEM, which accused it of co-operating with the Sudanese government.

Relations steadily deteriorated further between Sudan and Chad. Tensions flared up again after rebels attacked the Chadian border town of Adre on 18 December 2005 and each side has accused the other of backing rebels operating in their respective countries. A peace deal was brokered by Libya and the African Union in February 2006, but by early March Chad had already accused the Sudanese janjaweed militia of a new raid on Chadian territory. On 14 April, Chad severed all its ties with Sudan after a rebel assault on the Chadian capital N'Djamena. Nevertheless, in late July, efforts were being made to normalise relations between the two countries, with an agreement signed on 26 July. Following this agreement, the two presidents were expected to meet at a summit in Senegal in early August, with the AU requesting Senegal to mediate a peace accord between the two countries. Prior to this, at Déby's inauguration for another term in office on 8 August, it was announced that diplomatic relations between the two countries had been restored. However, as previously, a restoration of relations was short-lived, and diplomatic ties continued to deteriorate amid renewed accusations against the other following rebel advances on N'Djamena (February 2008) and Khartoum (May 2008).

A 3 May 2009 reconciliation pact between the neighbours was also immediately put to the test,

amid reports by 4 May that Chadian rebels had crossed into eastern Chad from Sudan. Under the May accord, struck in Doha, Chad and Sudan had agreed not to interfere in each others' internal affairs and to move towards implementation of previous reconciliation agreements. However, following the renewed Chadian rebel activity, N'Djamena launched fresh accusations of involvement against Khartoum, which in turn later that month also accused Chad of backing Darfur rebels.

Fresh efforts to improve bilateral relations in 2010 have proven longer lasting and also saw Chad try to help advance a peace deal between Sudan and JEM in February 2010.

Relations with China [TOP](#)

China has a relatively significant economic interest in Sudan in the form of the oil concessions held by the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC). Sudan is the CNPC's largest international operation and it is the largest shareholder (45 per cent) in the Greater Nile Oil Project.

In January 2006, China announced its intention to strengthen ties with Africa and this is likely to include Sudan. In April 2006, it abstained from a Security Council vote to impose sanctions on four Sudanese nationals over the ongoing conflict in Darfur. It said at the time that one of the reasons for this abstention was its concern at the timing of the sanctions, which coincided with peace talks being held in Abuja, Nigeria. China's economic priorities and ties with Sudan certainly play a role in the decisions it makes, although China also appears to be trying to improve its international image as a responsible state, for example sending Chinese peacekeepers in April 2006 to join the UN mission (UNMIS) in southern Sudan. Still, China in general maintains a neutral and 'no-strings attached' policy with its African partners, preferring mutually beneficial relationships and not involving itself with its partners' internal political affairs.

Relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo [TOP](#)

The cordial status of relations with Khartoum since Laurent-Désiré Kabila overthrew the Mobutu dictatorship does not seem to have changed since the assassination of the Congolese leader in January 2001. Laurent-Désiré Kabila visited Sudan several times as president and both states have shared a common animosity towards Uganda, which occupied the border area along with rebel proxies between 1998 and 2002.

Unconfirmed rebel reports claim that up to 2,000 Libyan-funded Sudanese troops were deployed around Kindu in support of the Kabila government in the early stages of the war, although these were almost certainly Chadians. Sudan also denied reports by Congolese rebels that its aircraft bombed northern towns in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) rebels claimed that 524 people died in an attack in early August 1999 by a Sudanese Antonov aircraft on its headquarters at Gbadolite.

Sudanese rapprochement with Uganda in 2001 under Egyptian-Libyan mediation further

diminished Sudan's interest in the Democratic Republic of Congo, especially as it has agreed to terminate assistance to insurgent groups that had raided Uganda from bases inside the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In his efforts to gain support from Western donor states Joseph Kabila initially seemed to distance himself from his father's close contacts with Sudan's pariah regime. However, with the temporary thawing of Sudan's wider relations, he made an official visit to Khartoum in February 2002 to underline the continuation of positive relations between the two regimes.

In December 2008, the Democratic Republic of Congo temporarily allowed the armed forces of southern Sudan and Uganda onto its territory for a joint operation aimed at flushing out rebels from the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA had dispersed into parts of northeastern Congo, southern Sudan and the Central African Republic in recent years, following increased efforts by the Ugandan military to reduce the rebel threat in northern Uganda. The joint military operation had come amid the stalling of a peace process with the rebels, originally launched in 2006 with south Sudanese mediation, and amid increasing concerns that the rebels were regrouping. Earlier in 2008, the three countries had already reached an agreement to flush out the LRA should peace talks fail. However, while the joint offensive will have put pressure on the rebels' Congolese hideouts, it did not succeed in crushing the group, with the LRA subsequently also accused of launching attacks and dispersing further into remote territories in the region.

Relations with Egypt [TOP](#)

The crucial issue for Egyptian-Sudanese relations is access to the Nile's water resources. With Sudan strategically positioned upstream, it is in Egypt's interest to maintain a working relationship with its neighbour. This, however, has not always been the case. After the unsuccessful 26 June 1995 assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, bilateral relations disintegrated when Mubarak accused the Khartoum government of being behind the attempt and of sponsoring Islamic terrorism in general. This resulted in border clashes in the disputed oil-rich Halaib Triangle, leaving a number of casualties, and the international border became recognised as a major regional flash-point.

However, with access to water dominating Egyptian foreign policy, Egypt needs good relations with Sudan so a comprehensive water agreement can be reached. A major shift in Egyptian policy towards Khartoum began at the end of 1997 with Cairo, in an effort to encourage a peaceful settlement to the civil war, moving towards reconciliation with the Islamic government it had long vilified. With several high-level meetings in Khartoum and Cairo since then, relations seem to be improving with Egypt and Libya jointly proposing a peace plan to reconcile Sudan's then warring factions and progress being made towards solving border disputes.

Relations improved further when Sudan's President Bashir declared a state of emergency in December 1999 and made moves against Hassan el-Turabi, the Islamist ideologue associated with Sudan's fundamentalist policies. This process was consolidated in the early months of 2000. During this period Egypt and Sudan formally resumed full diplomatic ties.

The joint Egyptian-Libyan peace plan was tentatively accepted by both the government and the rebels in June 2001. The plan, however, concentrated on Egypt's central objective of maintaining a unified Sudan and avoided the key issues of the conflict; the identities of the north and south and the relationship between religion and the state; and therefore failed to achieve an effective agreement. By offering their superficial support for the initiative, both the government and the rebel factions tried to demonstrate their commitment to peace to the international community and ensure that they did not alienate Egypt.

However, the Egyptian-Libyan initiative was sidelined by the IGAD initiative, which made progress in 2002 as the two sides came under increasing international pressure, especially from the US. The first round of IGAD-sponsored talks produced a framework agreement, the Machakos Protocol, in July 2002. The Protocol outlined a deal under which the south would become an autonomous part of Sudan for a six-year period, after which a referendum would be held to decide its future. The Egyptian press expressed deep concerns that the deal would lead to the division of Sudan. Egypt also feared that the new process would jeopardise long-standing agreements that give Egypt preferential access to the Nile.

Egypt regarded the 2003 emergence of a new conflict in Sudan's western region of Darfur as a national security threat. While Egypt, along with the vast majority of Arab states, is opposed to the use of sanctions, which it believes will hurt the Sudanese people rather than the Sudanese government, it continues to back regional and international efforts to end the crisis, in particular encouraging the engagement of the African Union.

Egypt supported UN Security Council resolution 1706 on Darfur and the agreement brokered in Addis Ababa in November 2006 that mandated the transition of the African Union force into a hybrid AU-UN force.

Relations with Eritrea [TOP](#)

Although Sudan was a staunch supporter of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) (which came to power in 1991 and declared Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia two years later) and was the first state to recognise the new government of President Isaias Afewerki, there has been recurrent tensions in the countries' relations. Asmara accused Khartoum of meddling in Eritrea's internal affairs by supporting Islamic movements and alleges that a number of attacks made by Islamist guerrillas on border and police posts were launched from Sudan. It broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan in December 1994, claiming that 400 insurgents had been trained in Sudan between August and December of that year, and a further 300 recruited. Sudan rejected these allegations.

For its part, Sudan accused Eritrea of supporting Sudanese rebel organisations, many of which assembled for a meeting in Eritrea in June 1995 to forge a new alliance against the Khartoum government. The umbrella organisation that stemmed from that meeting, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), remains headquartered in Asmara. In early 1997 it launched its initial co-ordinated military assault on eastern as well as southern Sudan, opening a new and dynamic front near Kassala and the Eritrean border. In response to the NDA's formation, 10 Eritrean opposition groups, all based in Sudan, formed the Alliance of Eritrean National

Forces with the stated purpose of overthrowing the EPLF government.

From 1998 Eritrea became increasingly preoccupied by its border conflict with Ethiopia. Consequently, Asmara tried to improve relations with its other neighbours, most notably Sudan. In May 1999 the presidents of Sudan and Eritrea agreed at a meeting in Qatar to refrain from mutual hostile propaganda, co-operate on security issues and restore diplomatic relations. The ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, mediated the agreement. President Bashir said a ministerial committee would meet in Doha to discuss the methods of improving bilateral relations, including the reopening of embassies in each capital. Although Sudan's defence minister accused Eritrea of further cross-border aggression in breach of the reconciliation agreement, the two countries' foreign ministers signed an agreement the following month to advance the normalisation of bilateral relations and to establish a joint reconciliation commission. Sudan agreed not to protest the NDA presence in Asmara provided that Eritrea refrained from providing military assistance.

Eritrea and Sudan agreed on 3 January 2000 to restore diplomatic relations and reopen their borders. The following day Eritrea handed back the Sudanese embassy which had been occupied by the NDA. President Bashir made a brief stopover in Eritrea on 18 January and held talks with Eritrean President Isaias. The land route between Sudan and Eritrea was reopened on 22 January. More than 30,000 Eritrean refugees crossed into Sudan's eastern Kassala district in three days in mid-May as Ethiopian troops pushed into Eritrea. Some Eritrean soldiers also fled into Sudan, where they were reportedly disarmed by the authorities.

In 2001, the former Sudanese prime minister Sadiq el-Mahdi returned to Khartoum from his self-imposed exile in Asmara and his party, the Umma, unilaterally withdrew from the NDA. Although the Umma party accepts the Asmara Declaration, which stipulates, among other things, the establishment of a secular state and recognition of Southern Sudan's right to self-determination, its understanding of the Egyptian-Libyan initiative to end the war in Sudan is not congruent to that of the NDA. As a result Eritrea's involvement in Sudanese politics diminished, as did Sudan's political clout over Eritrea. This was particularly so after the UNHCR persuaded Asmara to allow Eritrean refugees from camps in east and central Sudan to return. About 50,000 duly returned to Eritrea.

While Sudan and Eritrea had agreed to withdraw their support from each other's opposition organisations, Khartoum levelled fresh accusations in March and April 2002 that Eritrea was still supporting rebel activity in eastern Sudan and helping to organise a build-up of rebel forces inside Eritrea. Although Asmara denied the charges, further fighting broke out in Sudan's Kassala state in October 2002 and was strongly believed to have been backed by Eritrea. Sudan accused Eritrea of invading its territory and threatened to respond. In April 2003, Eritrea responded by accusing Sudan of backing the Eritrea Islamic Jihad group in its attacks on Western targets in Eritrea. The NDA held a major meeting in Asmara the same month. By January 2004, when the NDA met again and admitted the SLM/A, Sudan was accusing Eritrea of arming rebels in Darfur region, on its border with Chad, although this seems improbable. Asmara countered in October 2004 by making claims that Sudan had attempted to assassinate President Isaias.

Sudan meanwhile pursued its diplomatic campaign against Eritrea in regional diplomatic fora, successfully attempting to isolate Eritrea. In November 2002, the Arab League passed a resolution warning Eritrea against meddling in Sudan's internal affairs. Also in November 2002, Sudan requested that Eritrea's representative to the IGAD peace talks in Kenya should be removed after Eritrea was accused of leaking information on the negotiations. In October 2002, President Bashir visited Yemen for a summit with his Ethiopian and Yemeni counterparts. Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen continued this co-operation in 2003 and held a security summit in Addis Ababa in late December. As far as Asmara was concerned, its three enemies had formed an anti-Eritrean axis. Despite Khartoum's assurances to the contrary, containment of Eritrea appeared to be the nature of this alliance.

Since the appointment of Khartoum's national unity government (following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached in January 2005 to end the long-running civil war in Southern Sudan) efforts have been made to improve relations with Asmara. In September 2005, Sudan and Eritrea announced the resumption of diplomatic relations, while in 2006 Eritrea became the official mediator in peace talks between Khartoum and rebels from eastern Sudan.

Relations with Ethiopia [TOP](#)

During the Mengistu regime, bilateral relations were far from cordial. While Ethiopia supported the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in its fight against the Islamic north, Sudan supported the anti-Derg forces in Ethiopia. When the Ethiopian opposition was ultimately successful, relations improved. The new Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government discontinued Ethiopian support for the SPLA, putting an end to military operations from bases inside Ethiopia.

This relationship, however, was not particularly natural as Ethiopia was always going to remain suspicious of Sudan's Islamist activities. The 1995 attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa led to a major deterioration in relations. Ethiopia, embarrassed by the Islamist attack, heavily implicated Sudan in its investigation.

Relations have subsequently improved, primarily because Ethiopia, preoccupied with the Eritrean war, wanted no additional trouble on another border. Ethiopia, cut-off from Eritrea's Red Sea ports and heavily reliant on Djibouti, has also been looking towards Sudan for an alternative outlet.

Khartoum's refusal to extradite a group of Ethiopian military students who flew to Sudan in a hijacked aircraft in April 2001 threatened to damage the rapidly improving Sudanese-Ethiopian relations. Addis Ababa, however, did not ask Khartoum to extradite the hijackers and relations continued to improve when the two states signed a trade agreement in May. This warming of relations has continued since then, in part due to both states' antipathy towards Eritrea and the fact both have recently been involved in conflict with their common neighbour.

The Ethiopian-Sudan border has yet to be clearly demarcated, although in late 2005 China provided a grant to facilitate such demarcation with aim of helping implement an agreement

the Sudanese and Ethiopians had reached. The two countries held further talks on the issue in March 2006, although later that month Sudan accused Ethiopian troops and farmers of violating the border deal. In August 2006, Sudan and Ethiopia discussed further promotion of bilateral relations.

Relations with Iran [TOP](#)

Links between the Islamic government in Khartoum and the Islamic Republic of Iran were sealed in December 1991 when Iran's then president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, visited Sudan to sign a series of agreements, including military assistance. That alarmed Saudi Arabia, which saw its Iranian adversary vaulting the Arabian peninsula to establish a foothold on the kingdom's western flank. Sudan, it was believed, had become the centrepiece of Tehran's strategy in the Red Sea region. But the level of assistance it has received, outside of an Iranian Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) presence, does not appear to have been great - around USD180 million in aid, according to several estimates. While it was feared that Iran would use Sudan as a springboard to assist Islamist movements in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa, both Tehran and Khartoum subsequently attempted to improve their international reputations by distancing themselves from Islamist terrorism.

In January 2006, Sudan came out in support of Iran, saying it had the right to pursue peaceful use of nuclear technology, while Iran backed a Sudanese and AU solution to the crisis in Darfur, rather than foreign intervention. Later, in May, the Iranian agriculture minister indicated Iran's willingness to help in improving the technical capability of Sudan's agricultural sector. The following month, the 9th Iran-Sudan joint economic commission was convened, with talks covering economic, agricultural and technical issues.

Relations with Kenya [TOP](#)

Kenya acted as a peace broker in the civil war between the Sudanese government and rebel factions, including the SPLA. While visiting President Bashir in March 2001, then Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi announced that an emergency IGAD summit should be called as soon as possible. The Nairobi summit was duly arranged for June, although it failed to broker a ceasefire despite the attendance of both President Bashir and then SPLA leader John Garang. Kenya's status as an impartial mediator was damaged in January 2002 when Nairobi insisted that it would import Sudanese oil despite domestic opposition. While Kenya remained the host and venue for the round of IGAD talks that produced the Machakos Protocol agreement in July 2002, US rather than Kenyan engagement was considered the critical factor in brokering this agreement.

While relations with Sudan have generally improved since the visit to Nairobi of President Bashir in 1994, the long-standing northern border dispute with Khartoum over the Elemi Triangle, concerning the sovereignty of potentially petroleum-rich territory on the Kenyan side of the internationally-recognised frontier, remains unresolved. Nairobi continues to harbour suspicions about Khartoum's fundamentalist orientation. Cattle raids along the border are also a frequent occurrence. A number of people were killed in cattle raids from across the Sudanese border into Kenya in 2005 and another raid in January 2006 left 38 dead. Raiding is a common

problem among nomadic pastoralist communities across the region. In the largest raids, hundreds of people can be involved.

In September 2008, the international spotlight fell on both Kenya and southern Sudan following the hijacking of a Ukrainian ship carrying military equipment by Somali pirates. Although the MV *Faina* had been bound for the port of Mombasa in Kenya - and both Kenya and Ukraine stated that the cargo was intended for the Kenyan military - speculation mounted within the media that it might have been destined for southern Sudan. Such speculation continued despite vehement denials by Kenyan and southern Sudanese officials. Although southern Sudan is permitted to maintain its own army under the 2005 peace agreement, the ceasefire terms indicate that re-supply of armed forces' lethal items will be permitted only as deemed appropriate by the Joint Defence board (JDB).

Should there be an independent southern Sudan after the 2011 referendum on self-determination, it may give Kenya a new neighbour, one that could potentially look eastwards for its political and economic ties.

Relations with Libya [TOP](#)

Western suspicion that there is a clear political link between Libya and Sudan is reinforced by the history of military support that Tripoli has rendered Khartoum. A feeling of 'brotherhood' has developed through ties of religion and their mutual suspicion of the West. However, reports of violent incidents in Libya between security forces and Islamists in 1995 prompted a cooling of Tripoli's relations with Khartoum. Tripoli appeared to be concerned about the role of Sudanese Islamists. In September 1995, Libya began expelling large numbers of Arab expatriate workers who lacked proper work documents, including many Sudanese. Nevertheless, Bashir was the only foreign head of state to attend Libya's 1995 anniversary celebrations of the 1 September 1969 coup that brought Ghadaffi to power. Ghadaffi also telephoned President Bashir to express Libya's support for Sudan following the US air strikes of August 1998.

Libya's role in Sudan has become increasingly constructive. Ghadaffi, with Kenyan assistance, has helped to improve Sudan's troubled relations with Uganda. Under this initiative the two states revived direct diplomatic representation in 2001; Ugandan diplomats were previously based in the Kenyan embassy in Khartoum while Sudanese diplomats were based in the Libyan embassy in Kampala.

Ghadaffi has played a notable role in trying to mediate in the Darfur crisis. He hosted a series of informal talks and then a summit on the crisis in October 2004 that brought together a number of African leaders, including the Sudanese government. Libya remains keen for an African solution be found to the Darfur crisis. Libya has also allowed international humanitarian assistance through the World Food Programme to be transported through its eastern territory from Benghazi port via Chad to the displaced population in Darfur.

Libya further attempted to mediate in the low-level insurgency being waged in eastern Sudan. Despite drawing initial criticism from some parts of the Sudanese regime for meddling in the

country's internal affairs, Ghadaffi hosted a delegation from the Sudanese Eastern Front rebel movement in October 2005. As a result, the rebels agreed to engage in peace talks with Khartoum, something that was welcomed by the Sudanese government. However, the negotiations collapsed in December 2005 and, in 2006, was resumed with Eritrean rather than Libyan mediation.

Ghadaffi has objected to the ICC arrest warrant issued for the Sudanese president and in March 2009 Ghadaffi hosted Bashir in Libya.

Relations with Saudi Arabia [TOP](#)

Sudan's relations with Saudi Arabia have been gradually warming. President Bashir conducted a tour of Gulf States - including Saudi Arabia - in February 2000. He hoped to improve diplomatic relations and economic ties following the sidelining of the Islamist leader Hassan el-Turabi. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan suffered because of Khartoum's support for Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden, was subsequently based in Khartoum for four and a half years. In an early attempt to rebut US allegations that Sudan sponsored terrorism, bin Laden was ordered out in early 1996 and found sanctuary in Afghanistan.

In March 2005, Sudan and Saudi Arabia signed two security agreements to jointly combat crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, among other issues, between the two countries. Saudi Arabia has also made contributions to the rehabilitation of the south, following the long-running civil war, and has contributed aid towards food and medicine for the people of Darfur.

Relations with Uganda [TOP](#)

Relations between Sudan and Uganda were traditionally poor due to Kampala's support for the former southern SPLA rebels, with whom Ugandan groups have close ethnic/linguistic ties, and Khartoum's previous support for Uganda's rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda severed diplomatic ties with Sudan in April 1995 after LRA rebels killed more than 200 people in one attack in northern Uganda. From 1995 to 1999 Kampala continued to accuse Khartoum of launching air strikes against targets inside Uganda, while Khartoum accused Uganda of direct involvement in its civil war. Uganda admitted that its troops had entered southern Sudan in 1997, killing or capturing 180 Sudanese soldiers and 120 Ugandan rebels.

There were encouraging signs in December 1999, however, when peace talks in Nairobi, mediated by Kenyan president arap Moi and former US president Jimmy Carter, resulted in a peace accord being signed by presidents Yoweri Museveni and Bashir. The agreement stated that the two neighbours would cease hostilities against one another, end support for each other's dissident groups, exchange prisoners of war, facilitate the return of children abducted by the LRA and restore diplomatic ties by February 2000.

While both sides initially demonstrated their commitment to the accord by returning prisoners, by February Uganda was complaining that Sudan was not co-operating in the repatriation of the estimated 5,000-10,000 abductees and would not restore full diplomatic ties with

Khartoum until the Nairobi agreement had been fulfilled. Predictably the LRA was not disarmed and relations began to deteriorate again. In March Uganda's first deputy prime minister said that his country would not abandon its moral support of the SPLA, and in May the LRA announced that it rejected the accord.

However, in September 2000 a meeting between the foreign ministers of Sudan, Uganda, Egypt and Libya in Kampala succeeded in reaffirming the two sides' commitment to peace. It was proposed that the LRA should be moved at least 1,000 km from the Ugandan border, thus preventing any future abductions. The prospects of normalising diplomatic relations also looked promising after it was agreed that two Ugandan diplomats would be based in Kenya's Khartoum embassy while two Sudanese diplomats would be based in Libya's Kampala embassy. The situation continued to improve in October with the two sides planning the deployment of Egyptian and Libyan monitors to ensure that no Ugandan assistance was reaching the SPLA and to supervise the movement of the LRA. The LRA also ostensibly agreed to demobilise its child soldiers.

In March 2002, bilateral relations seemed to have reached an all-time high when Khartoum allowed the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) to launch Operation 'Iron Fist' against LRA rebels inside Sudanese territory. Khartoum withdrew the agreement in November 2002, however, the official reason being Uganda's inability to provide a date for the completion of its operations inside Sudan. But the move came after Museveni accused the government of Sudan of continuing to support the LRA. A senior SPLA officer claimed that the government had ordered the LRA to attack the SPLA's rear after the rebels captured the town of Torit in September. Meanwhile, there were also suspicions in Khartoum, which found it hard to believe that its rebels were capable of launching major military operations without extensive external backing, that Uganda had assisted the rebel offensive against Torit.

Regardless of these mutual accusations, a tenuous Ugandan-Sudanese co-operation was maintained in the border area through 2003, helped considerably by the SPLA's quiescence under ceasefire agreement.

By October 2003, as the Sudanese peace process broke its mid-year deadlock, the leadership of both countries renewed public unity. Museveni changed his tone to suggest that it was rogue elements of the Sudanese army that were arming the LRA. The eventual peace agreement reached between the SPLA and the Sudanese government in January 2005 was a milestone in the relationship between the two countries. While it did not spell the end to the LRA threat, which seemed to have developed its own momentum, it held out the promise of a much more secure regional environment allowing, for example, for talk of a sea outlet for Ugandan goods at Port Sudan via a new rail connection north from Gulu.

The August 2005 death of the Sudanese vice-president John Garang, while in transit from Kampala in the Ugandan presidential helicopter, seemed to have had little impact on relations between the two countries, despite being of enormous embarrassment to Kampala. It appeared that the crash was an accident, as Garang was close to Kampala. In mid-2005, the Ugandan government announced that Bashir had agreed to joint operations north of the 'red line' against Joseph Kony who, it was claimed, had retreated further into southern Sudan.

In 2006, mediation by the southern Sudanese led the LRA and Ugandan government to agree to enter peace talks. These were launched in the southern Sudanese city of Juba in July, although senior leaders of the LRA did not form part of the negotiating party and there was much distrust between the LRA and Kampala over each sides true intentions. The talks continued on a stop-start basis and although there appeared to be progress towards the signing of a comprehensive agreement in February and March 2008, LRA leader Kony failed to attend the signing ceremony, with renewed stalemate and an increasing leaning by Uganda to take renewed military action against the group by mid-2008. Subsequently, in December 2008, the militaries of Uganda, south Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo launched a joint offensive against the rebels' Congolese hideouts. However, while regional co-operation against the LRA improved, as of late 2010 this has not yet neutralised the group, which has launched retaliatory attacks and raids in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.

Relations with the United States

[TOP](#)

Sudan's relations with the US have been generally poor since the 1960s (with periods of crisis and severed relations on several occasions) and have yet to be normalised. Notable events prompting tension in bilateral relations include: Sudanese hostility to Israel and the US during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the murder of the US ambassador to Sudan by Palestinian terrorists in 1973; Sudanese support for Ghadaffi's Libya in the mid-1980s; the 1989 Islamist coup and subsequent opposition to US/UN military action in Arabia/Mesopotamia; the presence of international terrorist camps in Sudan up to at least 1996; and the alleged complicity of Sudan in the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998).

The latter prompted the only direct US attack on Sudanese territory: a cruise missile attack on a pharmaceuticals plant near Khartoum, erroneously believed to be producing chemical weapons agents. US policy of cultivating close security ties with the governments of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda was aimed at containment of the National Islamic Front regime, which Washington accused of seeking to destabilise these and other secular African governments. Sudan was designated a 'State Sponsor of Terrorism' by the US State Department in October 1993, a year after the US terminated arms sales and transfers. Economic sanctions on Sudan were introduced in October 1997 and ambassadorial representation was terminated the following year.

Relations only began to improve in mid-2000. From this point a security dialogue was pursued, with Khartoum pressured to share information on international groups such as Al-Qaeda, and this relationship clearly intensified after September 2001, when Sudan feared that it could be targeted for regime change.

The other main factor in bilateral relations is US pressure for comprehensive conflict resolution in Sudan. In September 2001, former Senator John Danforth was designated presidential envoy for peace in Sudan. Danforth's involvement in the region produced concrete results with first the ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains and implementation of a successful Joint Monitoring Mission there from January 2002, and second with the reinvigoration of the IGAD-led peace talks with the SPLM/A in Kenya that produced the July 2002 Machakos

Protocols and the late 2002 ceasefire in the south. Danforth also secured an unimpeded right of emergency humanitarian access to the conflict zone and established an Eminent Persons Group on the conduct of slavery in Sudan.

In June 2004, Danforth was appointed as the new US ambassador to the UN, where he continued to shape international policy towards Sudan. Then secretary of state Colin Powell visited Darfur in mid-2004 and made it clear that major US development and reconstruction assistance to Sudan would not be forthcoming until it dramatically improved its record on democracy and basic human rights.

In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, effectively ending the southern insurgency. The agreement was aided by the continuing efforts of IGAD and the international community, including the US. Relations warmed slightly following the agreement, although the ongoing conflict in Darfur has kept Sudan in the spotlight.

In April 2006, the US was heavily in favour of a UN Security Council resolution to impose travel restrictions and financial sanctions on four Sudanese nationals over the ongoing conflict in Darfur. US ambassador John Bolton said he did not believe the vote would interfere with the peace process, a concern raised by some African countries, as well as China, which had abstained from the vote. The US was putting much pressure on the Sudanese government and Darfur rebel groups to come to an agreement at the peace talks, which were being held in Abuja, Nigeria. While a peace deal was eventually signed on 5 May, it was only with one of the rebel factions and, thus, a shaky agreement.

As well as threatening potential penalties on Khartoum, US policy under President Barack Obama offers incentives. The US special envoy, Scott Gration, has visited Sudan and facilitated talks between the NCP and the former southern rebels during 2009 and 2010 in an effort to push the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement forward.

Trade and External Assistance [TOP](#)

Exports [TOP](#)

Main non-oil exports are livestock, sesame seeds, gold, cotton, sorghum, gum arabic, hibiscus, sugar and watermelon seeds. Agricultural products go mainly to other Arab countries.

Imports [TOP](#)

Main imports are machinery, foodstuffs, manufactures, petroleum, vehicles and spares, and chemicals.

External Assistance [TOP](#)

Almost two thirds of aid to Sudan is humanitarian in nature and overwhelmingly benefited the south, where it addresses the problems of displacement and famine. From the second quarter of 2004, massive international humanitarian assistance was also being mobilised for the Dafur

conflict zone. Unlike in the south, distribution of this aid is dependent on co-operation from Khartoum.

Little aid is available to the government in Khartoum as development assistance beyond that supplied by other Arab states and agencies. However, the improvement in Sudan's diplomatic position since 2000 and its more co-operative stance over international terrorism and its own insurgency was partially reflected in the near doubling of foreign aid receipts between 2001 and 2002.

An international donors conference was held in April 2005 in Oslo, Norway, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement earlier in January, raising some USD550 million in aid pledges.

Historical Background [TOP](#)

Date	Event
1820-22	Ottoman Egypt invaded, occupied and annexed Sudan.
1869	Suez Canal opened.
1877	General Gordon appointed Anglo-Egyptian governor-general of Sudan.
1884	Madhi rebelled; sacked Khartoum and expelled Egyptian forces.
1898	Battle of Omdurman; British forces suppressed domestic opposition.
1899	Anglo-Egyptian Condominium established over Sudan.
1910	Bahr el-Ghazal region (Lado district) restored to Sudan from 16-year Congolese administration.
1956	Sudan independent from Anglo-Egyptian condominium.
1967	Sudan supported Egypt, Jordan and Syria in their Six-Day War with Israel. Diplomatic relations with the US broken.
1991	Sudan critical of Saudi Arabia for allowing US and Western forces to be deployed on its territory against Iraq. The SPLA was evicted from Ethiopia after the Mengistu regime fell to rebel forces. Osama bin Laden took up residence in Khartoum.
1993	Sudan accused by Egypt of harbouring terrorists. US State Department declared Sudan a state sponsor of international terrorism. Sudan expelled British ambassador.
1994	UK expelled Sudanese ambassador (January). EU introduced a mandatory arms embargo on Sudan. Ilich Ramirez Sanchez ('Carlos the Jackal') snatched by French intelligence in Khartoum (August).
1995	Attempted assassination of Egyptian president in Ethiopia; Khartoum accused of complicity (June). Uganda broke relations with Khartoum over Sudanese support for the Lord's

	Resistance Army.
1996	The UN Security Council imposed diplomatic and travel sanctions on Sudan after Sudan refused to hand over three men suspected of trying to assassinate Egypt's President Mubarak (April). Osama bin-Laden asked to leave Sudan (May).
1997	President Clinton signed an executive order imposing additional comprehensive economic sanctions on Sudan for its perceived sponsorship of international terrorism, as well as its alleged efforts to destabilise neighbouring countries and its poor record on human rights.
1998	The US launched air strikes against Sudan, ostensibly as reprisal for the destruction of US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam by Al-Qaeda (August). Egypt hosted a coalition of Sudanese opposition groups (August). Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding with Eritrea on the strengthening of bilateral relations (November).
1999	UK Embassy in Khartoum reopened (June). Oil exports began (August). The foreign ministers of Sudan and Egypt met in Cairo for talks on proposals to end the civil war in Sudan (October). Sudanese Defence Minister Major-General Ibrahim Suleiman paid a surprise visit to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (December).
2000	The marginalisation of Hassan el-Turabi helped Sudan improve its international relations.
2001	Initiative launched to use Port Sudan as a primary port for Ethiopian trade; Ethiopia agreed to import oil from Sudan. Kenyan president arap Moi visited Khartoum and called for an emergency IGAD summit (March). Bashir visited Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni (May). Sudan gained observer status in OPEC (August). Bashir condemned the 11 September attacks on the US and offered to co-operate with anti-terrorist efforts. The UN sanctions were lifted when the US dropped its objections (September). US sanctions were renewed for a further year. US peace envoy John Danforth arrived in Sudan; brokered ceasefire for Nuba region (November).
2002	US-sponsored peace talks in Switzerland allowed for the deployment of international observers to monitor Nuba ceasefire (January). Kenya agreed to import Sudanese oil (January). US suspended peace efforts after government attack on aid camp killed 17 civilians (February). Khartoum agreed to allow Ugandan troops to enter Sudanese territory for Operation 'Iron Fist' against the LRA (March). Peace talks hosted by Kenya resulted in the signing of a framework agreement, the Machakos Protocol (March). Sudan-Russia military-technical agreement signed in Moscow (April).

	<p>US reopened its embassy in Khartoum but stopped short of normalising relations (May).</p> <p>The government and SPLA agreed on a ceasefire (October).</p> <p>Bush signed into law the Sudan Peace Act, under which additional sanctions could be imposed on Sudan if the government was deemed to be negotiating in bad faith (October).</p> <p>Khartoum accused Eritrea of invading Sudan after heavy fighting broke out with rebel forces in eastern Sudan. Asmara denied the accusations. Sudanese, Ethiopian and Yemeni heads of state held 'anti-Eritrean' summit in Yemen (October).</p> <p>Khartoum and Kampala signed military pact allowing Ugandan troops to operate against LRA rebels inside Sudan in return of a cessation of Ugandan military support to the SPLA (December).</p>
2003	<p>US Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher condemned Sudan for violating ceasefire, but added that the government now looked like it was taking steps to adhere to the accord (February).</p> <p>Sudan accused Eritrea of undermining its peace process (April).</p> <p>Chad co-operated with Sudanese military against the insurgency along the border in Darfur. Peace talks brokered by Chad.</p> <p>US embassy in Khartoum temporarily closed due to a 'specific' terrorist threat (November).</p> <p>Sudan-Ethiopia-Yemen security summit held in Addis Ababa (December).</p>
2004	<p>Sudan accused Eritrea of giving support to rebel groups in Darfur province (January).</p> <p>Chadian army and Sudanese Janjaweed militia raiders clashed on the Darfur border (March); Chad deployed troops along the border and killed 60 Sudanese raiders (April-May).</p> <p>UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan warned that Sudan could face international military intervention if it failed to allow humanitarian access to Darfur (May).</p> <p>US removed Sudan from its list of countries deemed uncooperative in the 'war against terrorism'; Sudan remained listed as a 'state sponsor of terrorism' (May).</p> <p>AU agreed to send an unarmed ceasefire monitoring force to Darfur (May) plus 300-strong protection force (July); deployed in late August.</p> <p>UN Resolution 1556 gave Sudan 30 days to end fighting in Darfur and disarm Janjaweed (July).</p> <p>Arab League foreign ministers gave their backing to Sudanese policy in Darfur and stated their opposition to sanctions (August).</p> <p>Government-SLM/JEM direct peace talks under UN/AU mediation in Nigeria (August-September; October-November).</p> <p>Security Council gives mixed reaction to Sudan's compliance with 1556 and passed a new resolution (1564) threatening unspecified sanctions on oil interests (September).</p> <p>US State Department accused Sudan of responsibility for genocide in Darfur (September).</p> <p>UN Commission established to investigate claims of genocide in Darfur (October).</p> <p>AU Mission in Sudan to be expanded to a peacekeeping mission of over 3,000 (October).</p> <p>UN Security Council met in Nairobi to discuss the situation in Sudan; passed</p>

	Resolution 1574 demanding an end to violence in Darfur and confirming a readiness to deploy UN peacekeepers to southern Sudan once a peace deal had been signed (November).
2005	<p>Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed, ending the long-running civil war in the south (January).</p> <p>UN Security Council imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on those suspected of having committed human rights abuses and violating the Darfur ceasefire agreement (March).</p> <p>Resolution 1593 saw the UN Security Council refer the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (March).</p> <p>ICC launched investigations into human rights abuses (June).</p> <p>Sudan and Eritrea announced the resumption of diplomatic relations (September).</p> <p>Tensions flared between Chad and Sudan following a rebel attack on the Chadian town of Adre (December).</p>
2006	<p>Ongoing conflict in Sudan prevented Khartoum from taking up the chairmanship of the AU when it hosted the annual summit (January).</p> <p>Peace deal brokered by Libya and the African Union to end tensions between Chad and Sudan (February).</p> <p>Chad accused the Sudanese janjaweed militia of a new raid on Chadian territory, raising tensions between the two neighbours again (March).</p> <p>African Union extended its peacekeeping mission's mandate in Sudan by six months until end September 2006 (March).</p> <p>African observers deployed monitoring teams along the troubled Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic borders (April).</p> <p>Chad severed all ties with Sudan after a rebel assault on the Chadian capital N'Djamena (April).</p> <p>UN Security Council passed a resolution to impose travel restrictions and financial sanctions on four Sudanese nationals over the ongoing conflict in Darfur (April).</p> <p>Darfur Peace Agreement signed between the government and only one rebel faction in Abuja, Nigeria (May).</p> <p>Eritrea became the official mediator in peace talks between Khartoum and rebels based in eastern Sudan (July).</p> <p>Peace talks between LRA and Ugandan government launched in Juba, southern Sudan, with Sudanese mediation (July).</p> <p>Donor conference in Brussels aimed at raising funds to boost the cash-strapped AU mission in Darfur as parties continue negotiations with Khartoum over a handover to a UN peacekeeping mission. Khartoum remained vehemently opposed to this option. (July).</p> <p>Efforts made to normalise relations between Sudan and Chad, an agreement signed. (July).</p> <p>Sudan and Chad announced resumption of diplomatic relations at Déby's presidential inauguration (August).</p>
2007	<p>Tensions high between N'Djamena and Khartoum after Chadian troops crossed the Sudanese border in pursuit of rebels (April).</p> <p>Khartoum finally agreed to a joint UN-AU peacekeeping mission for Darfur (June).</p>

	<p>UN Security Council authorised deployment of a 26,000-strong peacekeeping mission for Darfur (July).</p> <p>UNAMID started deployment (December).</p>
2008	<p>Chad accused Sudan of involvement in rebel advance on N'Djamena (February).</p> <p>Sudan severed diplomatic ties with Chad following JEM advance on Khartoum (May).</p> <p>The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requested an arrest warrant for Bashir in relation to investigations of alleged crimes committed in Darfur; Khartoum denied the accusations (July).</p> <p>AU sought deferral of ICC case against the Sudanese leader (July).</p> <p>Joint military offensive launched by Congolese, southern Sudanese and Ugandan militaries against LRA rebel bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo (December).</p>
2009	<p>Sudan and JEM rebels launched preliminary peace discussions in Qatar (February).</p> <p>ICC issued an arrest warrant for Bashir (March).</p> <p>UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNMIS for another year until 30 April 2010 (April).</p> <p>A fresh assault by Chadian rebels against Chad almost immediately tested a new reconciliation pact signed by Khartoum and N'Djamena in Doha, Qatar, in an attempt to normalise their relations (May).</p> <p>The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), based in The Hague, issued its ruling on the disputed Abyei borders (July).</p> <p>The US special envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, who had been facilitating talks between the NCP and SPLM, witnessed the signing of an agreement aimed at pushing forward implementation of the 2005 peace deal.</p> <p>Scott Gration visited Sudan to continue US-facilitated discussions (September).</p>
2010	<p>Khartoum and JEM rebels from Darfur signed a framework peace agreement in Doha after a preliminary deal was struck in N'Djamena a few days earlier. Work was to continue on a final deal (February).</p> <p>Three Rwandan peacekeepers were killed in West Darfur (June).</p> <p>ICC issued a second arrest warrant against President Bashir (July).</p> <p>UN Security Council delegation visited Sudan (October).</p> <p>Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan agreed to launch a joint task force to tackle the rebel LRA (October).</p>

Unification, Colonialism and Independence [TOP](#)

Like the majority of African countries, Sudan was shaped by external forces and is far from a natural political entity. Sudan's name, which means the 'land of the blacks' in Arabic, testifies to the influence that Arabia has had on the area, which was exploited for slaves and gold. The legacy of progressive Arabisation has left northern Sudan with close associations with the Arab world.

While Egypt's Muhammad Ali was responsible for establishing an entity that resembled a unified Sudanese state with his invasion of 1820, it would take British involvement to formalise the unnatural borders that have plagued Sudan since independence. As Africa's

geographically largest country, Sudan was always going to contain a myriad of ethnic groups. Within this general lack of homogeneity, it has been the division between the Islamic and Arabised north and the Christian/animist African south that has attracted most attention. The remote southern provinces had little contact with the Egyptian province of Sudan until the 19th century when northerners began to raid the area for slaves.

Britain, however, believed that securing the Nile was crucial to Egypt, which was crucial to the Suez Canal, which was crucial to India. Therefore, as Egypt was brought further into the British sphere towards the end of the 19th century, the British were keen to help Cairo add the White Nile basin to Sudan's territory. Indeed, Kitchener's Sudanese expedition (1896-99) was motivated more by the need to prevent French advances on the Nile than the need to punish the Mahdi for General Gordon's death at his hands in 1884. The result was a tense international stand off, known as the Fashoda Incident, when Kitchener met the French forces, led by Major Marchand, who had marched from Brazzaville to Fashoda (now Kodok) on the Nile. France eventually backed down and accepted British domination over the White Nile basin, which was included in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of Sudan (1899-1956).

The Condominium, which was far more Anglo than Egyptian, effectively ran separate administrations for the north and the less developed south. Many of the south's British administrators recognised the problems that Sudan's fundamental divisions would cause and advocated that the southern provinces should be unified with British East Africa (Kenya and Uganda) and thus secured from northern domination. These plans, however, were superseded in the run up to independence by Anglo-Egyptian rivalry, which became entwined with the Sudanese nationalist movements that had been growing since the 1920s. Sudan's National Unionist Party's (NUP now DUP) wanted to unify Sudan with Egypt, but this was unacceptable to the British, who consequently backed the NUP's rival, the Umma Party. While the Umma wanted to maintain an independent state, it also wanted the south to remain part of a united Sudan. With the NUP boycotting official institutions, the Umma negotiated independence for Sudan with the British and the plans for southern succession were shelved in favour of a post-independence referendum for the south. The referendum was never to happen.

Regional Dimensions of Civil War (1956-89)

[TOP](#)

The ensuing Civil War (1955-72 and 1983-), like many post-colonial internal conflicts, also had implications for neighbouring states. As the conflict ran along the 'fault-line' of the Arab/Muslim and African worlds, the issues of ethnicity and religion would help encourage Sudan's African and/or Christian-dominated neighbours to become involved. Uganda, which has close ties with the southern Sudanese, was one of the more consistent supporters of the southern rebels. This resulted in a typical situation whereby two neighbours, in the absence of the required resources for a full-scale confrontation, express their mutual hostility by supporting each other's rebel groups. From 1987, this principally meant that Sudan hosted and armed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and other Ugandan rebel groups while Uganda supported the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Ethiopian support for the southern rebels has been more fickle. While Haile Selassie helped end the initial round of civil war with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, by the time the

conflict re-emerged in 1983 the old emperor had been deposed and the socialist Mengistu regime (the *Dergue*) was happy to let the SPLA use southern Ethiopia as a safe haven. Khartoum's predictable response was to back the growing tide of anti-*Dergue* rebels including Eritrean separatists and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). After the *Dergue* fell to these rebels in 1991, Sudan's relations with Ethiopia, now under the EPRDF, became more cordial and the SPLA was evicted from Ethiopia.

Regional Dimensions of Islamist Sudan (1990-99)

[TOP](#)

While Mengistu's demise initially benefited Khartoum, the previously friendly opposition forces soon drifted away from Sudan, which in the wake of the 1989 coup was establishing a reputation as a fanatical Islamist regime. To secure Eritrean support against the *Dergue*, the EPRDF had also agreed to Eritrea's secession, which peacefully took place in 1993. Sudan, therefore, had another potentially hostile neighbour to deal with. Accusations of Sudanese involvement in the 1995 attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa ended Khartoum's relationship with the EPRDF. Ethiopia, in a successful attempt to appease a furious Egypt, launched an investigation that would heavily implicate Sudan.

The assassination attempt also ensured a further deterioration in Sudanese-Egyptian relations, which were already strained over the disputed Halaib border region and Cairo's fear of Sudan-sponsored Islamist activity. The Halaib dispute centres on a triangle of desert wilderness that is administered by Egypt but claimed by Sudan as part of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. When bilateral relations are good, such as under Nimeiri, the dispute is not a problem because the area contains virtually no people and has no proven resources. Tensions increased, however, when Cairo sold oil exploration rights in the disputed area in 1992. Although no oil was subsequently found, the charged atmosphere led to clashes in the wake of the 1995 assassination attempt.

'Rogue' Status

[TOP](#)

Although Sudan has had close associations with radical Islam since the Mahdi's revolt, the rise of the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum ensured that Sudan became isolated not just regionally, but also internationally. The 1989 coup came at a time when the West was recognising a new, post-Cold War, threat from a broad Islamic resurgence that might create a 'domino effect' that would topple pro-Western Arab governments. Western perceptions were not helped by Khartoum's support for Saddam Hussein during the 1990-91 Gulf War, its human rights record, the abolition of democracy and allegations that it supported international terrorism and had used chemical weapons.

In 1993 the US State Department awarded Sudan 'rogue' status, thereby increasing its isolation and reducing its access to financial aid. Iran remained one of Sudan's few friends. The US subsequently imposed a comprehensive sanctions regime on Sudan in 1996.

Washington's anti-Sudan policies were most clearly demonstrated by the August 1998 cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory outside Khartoum that was allegedly producing chemical weapons. The accusations were denied by Khartoum as were any enduring

associations with Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden had been based in Khartoum from 1991 until asked to leave in 1996.

Khartoum, however, had already weathered the worst of its international isolation and the missile attack won Sudan considerable sympathy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. While the start of 1998 saw Khartoum accuse Eritrea of direct military involvement in its internal conflict, by the end of the year a Sudanese diplomatic offensive had brought about cautious talks with Asmara. This was greatly helped by the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Eritrea, distracted by more pressing concerns, became increasingly keen to ensure that Sudan would not cause additional problems. Sudan and Eritrea began to normalise relations from May 1999, although the rapprochement was not to last.

Sudan Normalises its Relations (1999-2001) [TOP](#)

Sudan's relations with Egypt also began to improve as Cairo became less hostile towards Khartoum and started to look for a peaceful solution to the Sudanese conflict. These efforts were helped by more constructive Libyan involvement. In the past Libya and Egypt had often found themselves expressing their regional rivalry by supporting opposing Sudanese factions. However, from 1997, they started working together to form a reconciliation plan for Sudan as well as to calm the tensions with Uganda. With Uganda committed to supporting its Rwandan allies in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998, Kampala became increasingly receptive to initiatives that might relieve it of the persistent LRA nuisance on its northern border. Indeed, the gradual rapprochement brought about by the Egyptian-Libyan initiative had improved Sudanese-Ugandan relations to the extent that Khartoum agreed to allow Ugandan troops to conduct limited operations against the LRA inside southern Sudan from March 2002.

Internal developments were also making Sudan more acceptable. The 1999 Political Associations Law allowed for the formation of political parties for the first time since the 1989 coup, even if it was essentially a democratic façade. More significant was the power struggle between President Bashir and the Speaker of Parliament Hassan el-Turabi. In his role as NIF leader, Turabi was widely considered to be the real power in Khartoum and the ideological driving force behind the regime's Islamist enthusiasm. When Bashir declared a state of emergency in December 1999, dissolving the Turabi-controlled parliament in the process, it became apparent that the president was intent on marginalising his former ally. This process, which continued through 2000, made the Khartoum regime significantly more agreeable to the outside world.

Sudan's international relations continued to improve in May 2001 when President Bashir met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh. In the same month, Bashir attended Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni inauguration ceremony in Kampala. The Ugandan president said that his country was committed to improving relations with Khartoum. Meanwhile, increased US interest after the inauguration of President George W Bush apparently sparked a reinvigoration of the Kenyan-led IGAD peace initiative. When then Kenyan president arap Moi visited Khartoum in March 2001, he called for an emergency IGAD summit, which was duly arranged for June. Despite the attendance of both President

Bashir and rebel SPLA leader John Garang, as well as the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the summit failed to broker a ceasefire.

Increased US interest also resulted in Washington providing the NDA opposition alliance with USD3 million in assistance and a bill being passed by the House of Representatives that would make it illegal for any company involved in Sudan's oil industry to be listed on US stock-exchanges. This was part of a wider expression of consumer disapproval at Sudanese human rights record that compelled most Western oil companies to sell or suspend their stakes in Sudanese oil projects between 2001 and 2003.

US Intervention in the Peace Process [TOP](#)

Meanwhile, the US also sponsored efforts to help mediate between the government and the SPLA rebels. Danforth made surprising progress, brokering a limited ceasefire for the Nuba Mountains region. US-sponsored peace talks, which began in January 2002 in Switzerland, extended the ceasefire and allowed for the deployment of international monitors into the Nuba region. There was a setback in February 2002, when a government helicopter gunship attacked a humanitarian relief base killing 17 civilians. The US suspended its intervention. In an obvious attempt to get the US to re-engage, the government signed an agreement with the SPLA stating that neither side would target civilians.

Continued international mediation led to peace talks reopening in Machakos, Kenya, in June 2002. The negotiations led to the signing of a framework agreement, the Machakos Protocol, in July 2002. The Protocol outlined a deal under which the south would become an autonomous part of Sudan for a six-year period, after which a referendum would be held to decide its future. Islamic law would not be applied to the south during the interim period. Although the agreement was widely hailed as a major breakthrough, there were serious misgivings in Egypt, which feared that it would lead to the eventual division of Sudan.

The peace process ran into problems later in 2002 when heavy fighting broke out in Sudan. The talks were temporarily suspended in September after the SPLA scored a major victory when it captured the southern garrison town of Torit. Then in October, heavy fighting broke out in Sudan's eastern Kassala region, which borders Eritrea. The fighting served to sour Khartoum's relations with its some of its neighbours.

The peace talks continued, despite the fighting, and the government and the SPLA signed a poorly-observed ceasefire agreement in October. This success may have had something to do with then US president George Bush signing the Sudan Peace Act into law the same month. The Act threatened to impose additional sanctions on the government if it was deemed to be negotiating in bad faith. The president would review any intransigence every six months before making a decision.

By January 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement had been signed that effectively ended the long-running civil war. The conflict and escalating humanitarian crises in Darfur became the next international focal point. The US had already drafted several Security Council resolutions on the situation in Darfur since June 2004. Together with the EU, the US was a

leading voice in favour of imposing sanctions on Sudan should it fail to end the violence. The US also put pressure on the government and the rebel parties to reach an agreement when they met for peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, in April-May 2006. While this resulted in the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May, only one of the rebel groups had signed on to the peace deal. This situation remains unchanged, with the fragmentation of rebel groups since 2006 complicating efforts at launching new peace talks yet further.

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Internal affairs, Sudan

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Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

[Political Summary](#)

[Political System](#)

[Constitution](#)

[Executive](#)

[Legislative](#)

[Judiciary](#)

[Political Parties](#)

[National Congress Party \(NCP\)](#)

[Sudanese People's Liberation Movement \(SPLM\)](#)

[Historical Background](#)

[Early History](#)

[The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium](#)

[Independent Sudan](#)

[The Nimeiri regime](#)

[Bashir comes to power](#)

[The Civil War](#)

[Bashir versus Turabi](#)

[Renewed Peace Efforts](#)
[The Comprehensive Peace Agreement](#)
[The Darfur Crisis](#)

Political Summary [TOP](#)

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Federal Republic

HEAD OF STATE

President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir

HEAD OF GOVERNMENT

President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir

RULING PARTY

National Congress Party (NCP)

OPPOSITION

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), among others

NEXT ELECTIONS

January 2011 (southern Sudan self-determination referendum vote)

Political System [TOP](#)

Constitution [TOP](#)

Formerly an Anglo-Egyptian condominium, Sudan was proclaimed a sovereign independent republic on 1 January 1956. However, the constitution was twice suspended following coups: the constitution of 12 April 1973 on 6 April 1985, and an interim constitution dated 10 October 1985 as a result of the coup on 30 June 1989. Sudan subsequently adopted the federal system of government in accordance with the recommendations of the National Conference for Peace held later that year. A number of consecutive constitutional directives determined the states, and laid down the structure for forming the various federal and state bodies and for the relationship between them.

A new constitution was approved by presidential decree on 26 May 1998 and included a clause lifting the ban on opposition parties. The Sudanese constitution also contains a bill of rights. However, on 12 December 1999 President Omar al-Bashir dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution in a move to prevent amendments that would have curbed his power. The state of emergency declared at the time was extended to the end of 2000, when presidential and parliamentary elections were held. While parliament resumed in February 2001, the national emergency laws were still in effect in 2004.

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, a National Constitutional Review Commission was established, tasked with drafting a legal and constitutional framework to govern the interim period - one that incorporates the peace agreement. While an interim constitution was promulgated in July 2005, there have been delays and controversies over subsequent proposed legislation and the revision of existing

laws.

Executive [TOP](#)

The president of Sudan is the head of state and the leader of the government, as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president should be elected by a popular vote for five years and directly appoints a Council of Ministers, although they report to the legislature. Together with the president, the Council constitutes the highest federal executive body. The Federal Government Bureau was established by the fourth constitutional directive to control the co-ordination of duties between the various organs and bodies.

Under the terms of the CPA, until elections (originally due by July 2009 but subsequently held in April 2010), the incumbent president remained the national head of state and commander-in-chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). There are two vice-presidents, with the chairman of the former rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) appointed first vice-president, as well as being president of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and commander-in-chief of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

In terms of the southern government, the peace agreement sets out that the president of southern Sudan appoints an executive Council of Ministers in consultation with the southern vice-president and approved by the Assembly of southern Sudan. This council is accountable to the southern president and southern Assembly.

Legislative [TOP](#)

The legislative branch consisted of the 360-seat Majlis Watani (National Assembly), 270 members of whom were directly elected for a four-year term in single-seat constituencies, with a further 35 seats reserved for women, 26 for university graduates and 29 for representatives of trade unions. This structure attempted to ensure that the National Assembly represented Sudanese people from all walks of life. The main task of the Assembly was to set general government and social policies.

Regional assemblies were suspended after the 1985 coup and the structure was replaced by the creation of 26 states in 1991. Each state had a wali (governor) elected for a maximum of two four-year terms, a legislature and an executive administration. However, in practice state policy was closely dictated by the federal government and branches of the ruling party.

Under the January 2005 CPA, a bicameral National Legislature is to be comprised of a National Assembly and a Council of States, in which southern Sudan is to receive equitable representation. In the transition period, before the parliamentary elections, the seats of the National Assembly were divided as follows: National Congress Party (NCP): 52 per cent; SPLM: 28 per cent; other northern political forces: 14 per cent; and other southern political forces: six per cent. The Council of States was to comprise two representatives from each state.

In terms of the Government of Southern Sudan, the peace agreement gave 70 per cent of seats

to the SPLM, 15 per cent to the NCP and 15 per cent to other southern parties in the Assembly until the elections, which were held in April 2010.

Judiciary [TOP](#)

The legal system is based on sharia (Islamic law). According to the constitution, the judiciary is an independent authority comprising courts with separate hierarchies for civil and for criminal matters. The lowest courts are known as Town Benches, the judgements of which may be appealed to District Courts. Province Courts with jurisdiction to hear cases concerning commercial issues and personal status cases for non-Muslims, also hear appeals on decisions rendered by the District Courts. Each provincial capital has a Court of Appeal, with the Supreme Court or Court of Cassation serving as the final court of appeal and sitting at the apex of the judicial structure. The High Council of the Judiciary exercises the administrative authority of the judiciary.

A Constitutional Court, separate from the judicial structure, was established in 1998 and consists of members appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly. Its role is to judge the constitutionality of laws, hear cases relating to the infringement of constitutionally guaranteed individual rights and to arbitrate between lower courts when there are jurisdictional conflicts.

In terms of the CPA, the southern Sudan judiciary will comprise a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal and any other courts and tribunals deemed necessary under the southern Sudan constitution. The south does not operate under Sharia law.

Political Parties [TOP](#)

A new Political Parties Act was passed in 2007, under interim constitutional measures following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Although parties registered under an earlier Political Parties and Organisations Act of 2001 can continue to exist, the new act also sets out that a party's manifesto is not to contradict the CPA or interim 2005 constitution. The vague 1998 law of political associations had previously also allowed for the formation of political parties with the government's consent.

Parties that have been formed in the past have presented little threat or challenge to the ruling National Congress (or National Islamic Front: NIF) party, with the main opposition political movements generally either remaining outside the official political system or having also been directly involved in military rebellion.

National Congress Party (NCP) [TOP](#)

The ruling party has its roots in Hassan el-Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which achieved significant success in pushing for the implementation of sharia during the Jaafar Muhammad el-Nemeiri regime. Although Turabi was temporarily arrested in the wake of Bashir's coup in 1989, the NIF provided the political support and ideological base for Bashir's regime. The NIF, operating as the National Congress,

is widely considered to exercise pervasive control over the official government and Turabi was initially seen to be the real power behind Bashir's presidency. This, however, proved an underestimation of the president's political capabilities. Turabi was steadily marginalised from December 1999, losing his positions as speaker of parliament and secretary-general of the party. Only two ministers followed him when he formed the opposition Popular National Congress party.

The NCP remained one of the main players in the government of national unity following the north-south peace agreement of January 2005, the other being the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The NCP subsequently consolidated its northern power base in the April 2010 general election, which had been boycotted in part by some of the main opposition parties. Bashir also held onto the presidency in the April poll, winning just over 68 per cent of the vote, according to results from the electoral commission. The NCP had previously stated that if it won the national elections, it would invite the opposition - including those who boycotted the polls - to join the government.

Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)

[TOP](#)

The SPLM is the political movement of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was formed by the rebel officer John Garang in 1983 when he led a mutiny against the Khartoum government. As the principal southern resistance movement, the SPLM/A advocated greater autonomy, rather than independence, for the Christian/Animist south. Although the organisation liked to stress its broad ethnic membership, it was dominated by the Dinka, Sudan's largest non-Arab ethnic group, and this created friction with other groups, especially the Nuer.

This rivalry led to a damaging split in 1991 when Riek Machar, the leader of the SPLA's Nuer forces, split with the organisation and subsequently led the SPLA-Nasir and later the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). Despite having the stated objective of complete independence rather than regional autonomy, Machar was brought into the government's camp and became minister of the southern states in 1997. Apparently disillusioned with the government, he quit his ministerial position in January 2000 and reconciled with Garang's SPLM in 2002.

Following the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the SPLM and NCP formed the core of the government of national unity. In July that year, Garang was appointed first vice-president of Sudan, in accordance with the peace agreement, but died shortly thereafter in a helicopter crash. He was succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardit. Machar was appointed vice-president of southern Sudan.

In the south, the SPLM is the dominant party in the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). It reconfirmed this position during the April 2010 elections, in which it dominated in the south having announced a partial boycott of the national elections. This included the withdrawal of its candidate, northerner Yasir Arman, from the national presidential election.

Meanwhile, Salva Kiir was re-elected as GOSS president, with 92.99 per cent of the vote. His

sole challenger, Lam Akol Ajawin, leader of SPLM splinter group the SPLM Democratic Change, took only 7.01 per cent, although he is set to challenge the result in court.

The SPLM is at risk of suffering some further divisions amid post-election tensions and work towards the 2011 self-determination referendum, which will remain the south's key focus in the coming months.

Historical Background

[TOP](#)

Date	Event
1820-1822	Ottoman Egypt invaded, occupied and annexed Sudan.
1869	Suez Canal opened
1877	General Charles Gordon appointed first British governor general of Egyptian Sudan.
1884	Madhis rebelled, sacked Khartoum and established an Islamic state.
1898	Battle of Omdurman; British forces suppressed the Madhi state and established an Anglo-Egyptian condominium over Sudan.
1916	Sultanate of Darfur annexed to Sudan condominium.
1952	Self-rule granted within condominium status.
1955	Hostilities commenced between north and south.
1956	Sudan granted independence under a five-member Sovereignty Council.
1958	Ibrahim Abboud Chairman of Supreme Council (effectively president).
1964	Five-member Committee of Sovereignty re-established under Ismail al-Azhari.
1969	Coup established Revolutionary Command Council under Jaafar Muhammad el-Nimeiri; Democratic Republic of Sudan proclaimed.
1971	New constitution adopted. Nimeiri confirmed as president. Sudanese Socialist Union declared sole legal party.
1972	Addis Ababa conference ended civil war. Southern provinces granted autonomous status.
1974	National Assembly established.
1975-1977	Repeated coup attempts.
1983	Nimeiri re-elected. Sharia (Islamic law) introduced.
1985	Nimeiri deposed in bloodless coup. Transitional Military Council set up under Abdel Rahman Swar el-Dahab. State of Emergency declared.
1986	40 political parties competed in general election. Coalition government led by Sadiq el-Madhi's Umma Party.

	Ahmad Ali al-Mirghani Chairman of Supreme Council (head of state).
1987	SPLA began hostilities in the south.
1988	Umma Party formed new coalition. Civil war between north and south. Floods left 1.5 million Sudanese homeless. Peace pact signed by SPLM and SPLA.
1989	President Sadiq el-Mahdi overthrown in coup. General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir became president (June).
1990	New SPLA offensive.
1991	Federal system introduced.
1995	Attempted assassination of Egyptian president; Khartoum blamed for complicity. SPLA and other rebels forces met in Eritrea to unite as National Democratic Alliance (June).
1997	Rebels, including northern dissident forces, for the first time launched major offensives in east and south, seizing large swathes of territory (January-April).
1998	First Vice-President Saleh killed in aircraft crash (February). Fighting intensified in the north. In the south an impending famine further complicated matters. The government continued to restrict relief agencies' access to starving areas. Peace talks resumed in Kenya but were inconclusive (May). The SPLA announced a three-month ceasefire to facilitate aid deliveries (August). IGAD-sponsored negotiations in Ethiopia collapsed (August). Hassan el-Turabi reinstated as speaker by parliament (December).
1999	New law introduced, ostensibly allowing political parties to register for the first time since the 1989 coup (January). Oil exports commenced (August). President Bashir dissolved parliament and called for a three-month state of emergency; former speaker and secretary-general of the National Congress Party, Hassan el-Turabi, called for a jihad against the decision (December).
2000	Vice-President Reik Machar resigned. Umma party withdrew from rebel NDA; Umma leaders returned to Khartoum (March-April). President Bashir dismissed Turabi as NCP secretary-general (May). Umma leader Sadiq el-Mahdi returned to Khartoum (November). Presidential and parliamentary elections held. Bashir re-elected for a second five-year term (December).
2001	Mahdi rejected offer to join the government (February). Turabi arrested after he announced the signing of an agreement with the SPLA; cabinet reshuffled (February). Turabi released from jail and placed under house arrest (March). Although a reunification of Riek Machar's SPDF and John Garang's SPLA/M was announced, Machar refused to endorse the alliance (May).

	<p>IGAD summit attended by Bashir and Garang but failed to agree a ceasefire (June). SPLA repelled government offensive in the Nuba Mountains and made significant territorial gains in western Bahr el-Ghazal (June). Government forces retook Raga in Bahr el-Ghazal (October). US peace envoy John Danforth dispatched to Sudan; ceasefire agreement for Nuba region signed (November).</p>
2002	<p>Riek Machar agreed to reunite his SPDF with John Garang's SPLA (January). US-sponsored peace talks in Switzerland allowed for the deployment of international observers to monitor Nuba ceasefire (January). US suspended peace efforts after government attack on aid camp killed 17 civilians (February). Government and SPLA agreed not to target civilians (March). Umma party turned down another power-sharing offer (April). SPLA captured strategic town of Kapoeta near the Kenyan border (June). Renewed IGAD peace talks began in Nairobi (June). Machakos Protocol signed between government and SPLA in Kenya. Bashir and Garang met in Uganda (July). Turabi moved to a high security prison; Popular Congress Party (PCP) members were arrested in connection with a sabotage plot (August). Second round of peace talks suspended due to heavy fighting around Torit (September). Government and SPLA signed a ceasefire agreement. The SPLA accused the government of breaking the truce within 10 minutes of it coming into force (October).</p>
2003	<p>The SLM/A emerged as a new rebel group in Western Darfur province (February). Peace talks resumed in Naivasha, Kenya (April). Vice-President Ali Osman Taha assumed leadership of direct talks with Garang in Naivasha (September). Agreement reached on security during six-year transition period; Sudan to create two national armies (September). Turabi and other detainees released; ban on PCP activity lifted (October). President Bashir praised Garang in a televised speech to NCP conference (October). SPLA sent its first 'goodwill' delegation to Khartoum (December). Government and NDA signed an agreement in support of the peace process (December).</p>
2004	<p>Wealth-sharing agreement reached between north and south (January). Government suspended contacts with the NDA after it admitted the SLM (February). Outbreak of SPLA factional fighting in Shilluk Kingdom of Upper Nile state (March). Turabi and several opposition politicians and army officers arrested over an alleged coup plot. PCP activity suspended (March). Agreements reached in Naivasha on the partial application of sharia in Khartoum, the division of powers within the transitional federal government, and the status of southern Blue Nile state, Nuba Mountains (Southern Kordofan state) and Abyei region (May).</p>

	<p>Direct but inconclusive talks between SLM, JEM and government convened in Abuja under Nigerian/AU/UN mediation (August).</p> <p>Coup attempt by PCP, JEM and allied security services announced foiled in Khartoum; further arrests of PCP members (September).</p> <p>Final SPLM-government talks convened in Nairobi (October), agreeing to conclude a comprehensive peace deal by end of year (November).</p> <p>SLM, JEM and government signed a new Darfur ceasefire in Abuja; broken within two weeks (November).</p>
2005	<p>Ruling NCP and SPLM/A sign the CPA in Nairobi, Kenya, effectively ending the civil war (January).</p> <p>Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions form the Eastern Front (February).</p> <p>Donor conference in Oslo, Norway, raises more than USD4.5 billion in pledges of aid to help with post-war recovery in the south (April).</p> <p>NDA signs a reconciliation agreement with the government, which enables it to become part of the power-sharing government (June).</p> <p>President announces release of political detainees, including Hassan al-Turabi (June).</p> <p>John Garang sworn in as first vice-president of Sudan (9 July); political tensions as Garang is killed later that month in a helicopter crash, believed to be an accident (July).</p> <p>Salva Kiir Mayardit replaced the late Garang as first vice-president of Sudan (August).</p> <p>Power-sharing Government of National Unity formed (September).</p> <p>Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) formed (October).</p>
2006	<p>African Union (AU) announced a six-month extension of its peacekeeping mission in Darfur until 30 September (March).</p> <p>UN Security Council passed a resolution imposing travel restrictions and financial sanctions on four Sudanese nationals over the ongoing conflict in Darfur (April).</p> <p>Peace talks between government and Darfur rebels in Abuja Nigeria (April/May).</p> <p>SLM/A faction of Minni Minnawi signs the Darfur Peace Agreement with the government; JEM and the SLM/A faction of Abdel Wahed Mohammed al-Nur refuse to sign (May).</p> <p>Peace talks between the Eastern Front rebels and Khartoum are launched in Asmara, Eritrea; lead to a declaration of principles to guide future negotiations and an agreement by both parties to cease hostilities (June).</p> <p>Sudanese president reiterated his opposition to the deployment of UN troops in Darfur, stating that his country would not be "recolonised" (June).</p> <p>Three Darfur rebel groups - JEM, al-Nur's SLM/A and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance - announced a new coalition, the National Redemption Front (NRF) (June).</p> <p>Peace talks between Eastern Front and Khartoum resume in Asmara (July).</p> <p>Donor conference held in Brussels to boost the cash-strapped AU mission in Darfur as negotiations continue with Khartoum over a handover to a UN peacekeeping mission (July).</p> <p>Minni Minnawi is sworn in as special assistant to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (August).</p>

	<p>UN Security Council adopted resolution 1706, to deploy a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur no later than 31 December 2006; drawing vehement opposition from Khartoum (31 August).</p> <p>Khartoum and Eastern Front rebels agreed power-sharing pact (October).</p> <p>African Union extended the mandate of its peacekeeping mission for another six months from January 2007 (November).</p>
2007	<p>Second anniversary of the signing of the CPA saw the NCP and SPLM lob accusations at each other over the slow implementation of the agreement (January).</p> <p>Leaked report compiled by a UN panel of experts alleged that Sudan had violated an arms embargo in Darfur; denied by Khartoum (April).</p> <p>The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council were sent a report detailing the joint AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping force being proposed for deployment in Darfur (May).</p> <p>The International Criminal Court (ICC) announced arrest warrants in Sudan over the Darfur conflict (May).</p> <p>UN Security Council authorised long-awaited deployment of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping mission for Darfur (July).</p> <p>SPLM temporarily suspended participation in government of national unity over CPA implementation delays (October).</p>
2008	<p>Supply convoy of newly deployed joint UN-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) came under attack (January).</p> <p>National census, as required by CPA, commenced (April).</p> <p>JEM rebel advance on the capital Khartoum, and clashes in Omdurman, raised tensions (May).</p> <p>Fighting erupted between southern forces and government troops in the disputed Abyei region (May).</p> <p>Sudanese president signed a road map agreement with the SPLM, aimed at easing tensions in Abyei (June).</p> <p>Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requested an arrest warrant for the Sudanese president over alleged crimes in Darfur. It was not alleged that he committed the crimes directly or personally. Khartoum and Bashir strongly denied the accusations (July).</p> <p>UNAMID peacekeepers killed in ambush in north Darfur (July).</p> <p>Khartoum appointed a special prosecutor to investigate alleged abuses in Darfur since 2003 (August).</p> <p>Nigerian soldier killed following an ambush of a UNAMID peacekeeping patrol in Darfur (October).</p> <p>Sudanese president announced a ceasefire with rebel groups in Darfur, but this was soon followed by reports of renewed fighting (November).</p>
2009	<p>Sudan launched an air strike on a town in western Darfur that had been captured by the rebel JEM. Clashes reported earlier between JEM and SLM/A (Minnawi faction) (January).</p> <p>Government and JEM launched preliminary Darfur peace discussions in Qatar; subsequently signed a goodwill and confidence-building agreement. A cessation of hostilities was not yet included (February).</p>

	<p>The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Bashir in relation to alleged crimes in Darfur (March).</p> <p>An electoral official indicated that general elections (due in 2009) would be held in February 2010 (April).</p> <p>JEM attacks reported around Kornoï in Darfur (May).</p> <p>Scores killed in tribal clashes in Southern Kordofan (May).</p> <p>Sudan postponed general elections from February to April 2010 (June).</p> <p>The international Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled on Sudan's disputed Abyei boundaries, with northern and southern officials voicing their commitment to the decision (July).</p> <p>Representatives of north and south Sudan signed an agreement aimed at pushing forward implementation of the CPA (August).</p> <p>Voter registration launched but ongoing sticking points between CPA partners over issues such as the census and referendum (November).</p> <p>Five Rwandan peacekeepers killed in Darfur (December).</p> <p>The arrest of a number of southern Sudanese and other opposition party members at a march to parliament in Khartoum added to political tensions ahead of the 2010 elections (December).</p>
2010	<p>Fifth anniversary of the signing of the CPA (January).</p> <p>JEM and Khartoum signed a preliminary peace deal in Chad (20 February), followed by a framework accord, which included a ceasefire, in Qatar (23 February).</p> <p>The government signed a framework peace deal with new Darfur rebel coalition, the Liberation and Justice Movement (March).</p> <p>Sudan held national and southern elections, with Bashir retaining the national presidency and the NCP consolidating its powerbase in the north. Salva Kiir maintained the southern presidency and the SPLM dominated in the south (April).</p> <p>Bashir and Salva Kiir sworn in as the presidents of Sudan and the GOSS respectively (May).</p> <p>JEM suspended peace talks with the government, claiming ceasefire violations (May).</p>

Early History [TOP](#)

The spread of Islam and Arab influences up the Nile valley and into modern-day Sudan was a very gradual process. The early Nubian kingdoms of the area were part of Byzantine Christendom, but after Muslim Arab invaders conquered Egypt in 640 AD these kingdoms became increasingly isolated from Mediterranean civilisation. The Nubian Kings eventually converted to Islam and Arabs gradually migrated further down the Nile and along the Red Sea coast in pursuit of grazing land and trade.

It was not until Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman pasha (governor) of Egypt, invaded in 1820 that something resembling the modern entity of Sudan was created. The Ottomans also increasingly brought European influences. European technology, especially firearms and steamboats, helped the slave industry - long Sudan's staple economic activity - to push further south and raid the African tribes who had previously been protected by their geographical isolation. Egypt's rulers, however, came under increasing European pressure to stamp out the

slave trade. The blossoming relationship between Egypt's King Ismail and Britain ensured that British adventurers were increasingly involved in Sudan. The most famous of these was Charles George Gordon, who in 1871 was made governor of the southern province of Equatoria with the dual tasks of suppressing the slave trade for the benefit of humanity and annexing the White Nile Basin for the benefit of Egypt. Gordon, who was made governor-general of Sudan in 1877, was successful in suppressing the powerful slave traders and disarming their slave armies.

By the time Gordon resigned his commission in 1880, however, he had created turmoil in Sudan. His crusade had created an economic crisis, weakened the bureaucracy and generated a deepening resentment of Christian interference. His successors failed to continue his policies and allowed the slave trade to resume - although not enough to satisfy the merchants that Gordon had put out of business. The Khartoum administration became increasingly apathetic, taxes rose arbitrarily and the army, which had been offended by attempts at modernisation, was underpaid and increasingly disorganised.

Into this turbulent political environment came Muhammad Ahmed, a charismatic Sufi mystic who declared himself to be the Mahdi sent to redeem the faithful and prepare the way for the second coming of the prophet. His calls for a return to the simplicity of early Islam were well received by Muslims and Sufi clerics who had been offended by the ulama, which he denounced as heretical. When he declared a jihad on the Turkiyah he was also supported by many of the powerful slave traders and merchants who had been damaged by the Anglo-Egyptian abolition of slavery. The Mahdist army, the Ansar (followers), quickly gained thousands of recruits and in 1882 inflicted a series of defeats on the Egyptian army.

The Ansar then proceeded to overrun nearly all the Egyptian garrisons, imposing a jihad state, generally based on traditional Islamic laws. The Mahdi ordered that the ulama and the old administrative system should be destroyed as they encouraged tribalism over religious unity. In this manner, the Turkiyah was overthrown, being replaced with the Mahdiyyah (the Mahdist regime) - the first nationalist Sudanese government.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium [TOP](#)

However, the Mahdiyyah was short-lived. The doctrine of permanent jihad led it into a succession of wars with its neighbours and their European protectors.

In 1899 the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of Sudan was declared. While Britain was technically governing the territory on behalf of Egypt, the governor ruled Sudan like a colonial administrator and started establishing Europeanised administrative institutions. There was little resistance to the Condominium and Sudan's borders were increasingly defined in relation to Ethiopia and the Belgian Congo, although the western boundary remained a problem. Cotton became the basis of Sudan's economy.

Under British rule, southern Sudan - a region usually defined as the provinces of Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile - was administered and developed separately. The influence of northerners and Islam was terminated and Christian missionaries proselytised with impunity

and success. It was decided that the black African south should be prepared for integration into British East Africa.

This proposed division became a contentious issue for a new wave of nationalists of northern Sudan, who had been educated but largely marginalised by the British who preferred to rule through the more traditional tribal network. The nationalists were split into two camps. The first, led by the Mahdi's son, wanted to see an independent Sudan and feared that if the south were to be joined to Uganda and Kenya, the north might be annexed by Egypt. This wing, considered more moderate even though it criticised Britain's southern policy, would go on to form the Umma (Islamic Nation) Party. The more radical nationalists, which eventually formed the National Unionist Party (NUP) under Ismail el-Azhari, supported a union with Egypt. The NUP was supported by the religious Khatmiyah brotherhood led by Sayyid Ali el-Mirghani.

The Condominium powers were also divided over Sudan's future status. As Cairo began to back the pro-Egyptian NUP, the British, who saw themselves as protecting Sudan against Egyptian domination, supported the Umma Party and acquiesced to its idea of a united independent Sudan. The Umma Party dominated a new partially elected consultative legislative Assembly after the NUP boycotted the 1948 elections. The Assembly had representatives from both north and south - the proposed division had been dropped - and the Umma Party started negotiating independence with Britain.

Egypt's King Farouq was furious and declared himself King of Sudan. However, after he was deposed in 1952, republican Egypt became more conciliatory towards the idea of Sudanese self-determination. In February 1953 Cairo and London signed an accord that outlined a three-year period for the transition to independence and the withdrawal of Egyptian and British troops. At the end of this period, the Sudanese would decide their future status in a plebiscite.

The Egyptian concessions were rewarded when the NUP won a majority in the parliamentary elections of 1953. In 1954, the party formed a new government under its leader Ismail el-Azhari. Popular opinion, however, had swung against the NUP's slogan of 'unity for the Nile valley' and the Azhari government dropped the idea of a union with Egypt in favour of Sudanese independence. On 1 January 1956 Sudan became an independent republic.

Independent Sudan [TOP](#)

With the onset of independence, the southerners became increasingly concerned about northern domination. Britain's separate southern administration, despite the protests of the south's British officers, was effectively ended when northern administrators were allowed back into the region. Because Arabic was declared to be the administrative language for the whole country, very few southerners were admitted as administrators when the colonial officials were replaced by Sudanese counterparts. Violent southern resistance emerged even before independence when southern soldiers mutinied against their new northern officers in 1955. Although the mutiny was crushed, the south was not pacified as rebels escaped to remote areas to organise continued resistance.

Sudan's experiment with liberal democracy was short-lived. Politics had previously only involved a small elite of educated Sudanese in Khartoum. The rest of the population had little comprehension of liberal Western political ideas and felt excluded from government. The Khatmiyah were increasingly irritated by Azhari's secular politics and in 1956 Mirghani formed the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP allied itself with the Umma Party to defeat the NUP and a coalition government, led by Abd Allah Khalil, was formed. Despite frictions between the coalition partners, the Umma-PDP won again in 1958.

Unfortunately factionalism and corruption began to dominate parliament at a time when decisive action was needed to resolve the southern issue and Sudan's precarious economic dependency on cotton. Consequently there was widespread disillusionment with the democratic system and there were many anti-government demonstrations in Khartoum. On 17 November 1958 the commander of the army, General Ibrahim Abbud, carried out a bloodless coup and reinstated authoritarianism.

Abbud banned all political parties and ruled with a council of military officers. While the junta quickly brought improved economic conditions, it also alienated the south by attempting to promote unity by closing missionary schools and spreading Islam and Arabic. The policy was a failure and only provoked more rebellion from the south which, in the absence of a parliament, had no official channel of complaint.

While the northerners cared little for their southern countrymen, the failure provided political ammunition for the Khartoum intelligentsia who were demanding a return to democracy. The military, with most of its forces committed to the south, were unable to control leftist-led protests at home. In October 1964 Abbud resigned as head of state and a transitional government was appointed.

A series of unstable governments was formed as the Democratic Unionist Party (a fusion of the PDP and the NUP) battled with the Umma, which was divided between traditionalist and progressive forces, for political domination. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), although banned, was also agitating and attempted an unsuccessful coup in 1966.

The Nimeiri regime [TOP](#)

This continuing atmosphere of divisive and ineffective party politics provoked a group of young officers, led by Colonel Jaafar Muhammad el-Nimeiri, to overthrow the government in May 1969 - narrowly pre-empting other coup plotters in the process. Under Nimeiri, the conservative Ansar faction of the Umma was violently crushed and the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) was established as Sudan's only party.

Nimeiri managed to broker the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that brought the war in the south to an end. The southern resistance had finally united under General Lagu and accepted the president's offer of extensive regional autonomy. The three southern provinces were unified under a regional government, which was to operate from the southern capital of Juba.

The peace agreement not only brought Nimeiri significant prestige abroad but freed Sudan's

economy from the burden of war. Oil-rich Gulf states and international organisations began investing extensively in Sudan. Major infrastructure projects, however, were disastrously handled and by 1980 Sudan, hit hard by high oil prices and a 'brain-drain' to rich Arab states, had relapsed into economic turmoil.

Sudan was also entering another period of political decline. Nimeiri's attempted national reconciliation with the conservative/religious forces resulted in the exiled Umma, DUP and the Muslim Brotherhood (a new player on the political scene) returning to Sudan and nominating candidates for the 1978 People's Assembly Elections. While Nimeiri received international praise for advancing democracy, the elections fostered discontent among the SSU, which could no longer count on a political monopoly.

The increasing influence of religious politics in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, especially those of the Muslim Brotherhood and its leader Hassan el-Turabi, had significant implications. The re-instatement of sharia as the basis of Sudan's legal system in 1983 was opposed by both secular Muslims and the southern Christians. The conservatives were also successful in convincing Nimeiri that the Addis Ababa agreement had been tantamount to surrender and agitated for the re-division of the south into three districts in an abrogation of the agreement.

The south had never been far from rebellion and the imposition of sharia and the unilateral re-division triggered a re-emergence of the civil war with even more ferocity. A mutinous southern army unit, led by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, became the focus of renewed rebellion under the banner of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

Nimeiri was increasingly beleaguered, and was ousted in a bloodless coup in April 1985 and exiled to Egypt.

Bashir comes to power [TOP](#)

The next three years were characterised by more political instability, although in 1988 a coalition government under Sadiq el-Mahdi concluded a peace agreement with the SPLA. The agreement outlined increased religious and political autonomy for the south and the end of sharia. Whether the agreement would have brought peace to Sudan is open to question - before its implementation a military coup, led by General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, ousted the government on 30 June 1989.

As chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS) that ran the country in the wake of the 1989 coup, Bashir was officially the country's leader. The RCCNS was in fact a vehicle for the National Islamic Front (NIF), the political party of Hassan el-Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood, which had left el-Mahdi's coalition over the abandonment of sharia. The new regime was therefore considered to be a religious-military alliance in which Bashir provided the muscle while Turabi supplied the ideology and politics.

The new government was not popular but maintained its power by suppressing dissidents. This resulted in the opposition forces - the Umma led by Sadiq el-Mahdi, the DUP/Khatmiyah led

by Muhammad Osman el-Mirghani and other more modern factions - being expelled and fresh rebellion emerging among northern factions.

The Civil War [TOP](#)

Sudan's civil war is normally seen as a north-versus-south conflict caused by the ethnic and religious differences of Sudan's conflicting African and Arabian legacies. This view, however, is something of a generalisation as Sudan, Africa's largest country, encompasses many ethnic groups and the civil war evolved into a far more complicated conflict with dissident northern groups joining the fight against Khartoum's Islamic government.

The fighting was particularly destructive and barbaric, especially in the south. Khartoum's locally organised Popular Defence Forces (PDF), mujahideen militia and proxy factions did much of the fighting, while the Sudanese Army was mainly deployed defensively in garrisons.

The SPLM/A was the predominant southern faction and although it contained a variety of ethnic groups, notably the Nuba wing which fought in the Nuba mountains of central Sudan, it was largely based on the Dinka tribe. The organisation, however, was beset by internal rivalries, such as that between Garang's Dinka-based mainstream, and Riek Machar's Nuer-based forces. These rivalries led to a damaging split in 1991 in which Machar formed the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army SSIM/A. Despite having the stated objective of complete independence rather than regional autonomy, Machar accepted government support in his struggle against Garang. In the ensuing fighting between the SPLA and the Khartoum-backed SSIA, many of the SPLA's previous gains were reversed. In 1997 Machar signed a peace agreement with Khartoum and allied with Anyanya II, a southern resistance group of dubious credibility, to form the pro-government South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). Machar, apparently disillusioned with Khartoum's manipulative tactics, resigned as minister for the southern states in January 2000. Although the SPLM/A announced that it was reuniting with Riek's Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF) in May 2001, the alliance was not formalised until January 2002.

The anti-government forces were given a significant boost when they formed the Asmara-based umbrella organisation called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1995. The NDA, along with the SPLA, included northern rebel and political opposition forces as well as ethnically based opposition movements such as the Beja Congress, which was based in Eritrea and demanded self-determination for eastern Sudan. The most significant military force after the SPLA was the Sudanese Alliance Forces (SAF), which was established in 1994 as a secular, democratic, non-regional political/military opposition. Formed from a coalition of Sudan's more liberal forces, the SAF's military efforts were led by former Sudanese Army officers.

By 1997 increased military co-operation saw unprecedented gains for the NDA forces, although they never managed either of the key strategic objectives - cutting the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway and capturing/disrupting the Roseires hydroelectric dam, which supplies most of the capital's electricity. By 1998, the serious onset of famine conditions in the south slowed the SPLA down and a ceasefire was called to allow non-governmental organisations to

distribute humanitarian aid.

While the NDA provided its members with an effective way of co-ordinating military activities, the organisation was far from homogenous. There was a natural division between the 'new Sudan' forces embodied in the liberal SAF and the 'old Sudan' forces of disaffected political parties - the Umma, DUP and SCP. While the DUP and Umma signed the NDA's secular charter, both parties were based on traditional religious movements (the Khatmiyah and Ansar respectively). Indeed, the Umma's membership of the NDA ended in 2000 when the party opened negotiations with the government and was allowed to return to Khartoum. The 'old Sudan' parties were also comparatively slow to mobilise armed forces, and were therefore somewhat marginal to the military alliance and remained more prominent as opposition (although illegal) political movements inside the sphere of Khartoum politics. There was also friction between the SAF and the SPLA.

Yet another rebel group emerged in Northern Darfur state in early 2003. The activities of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) were initially dismissed by the government as the work of bandits operating in the notoriously lawless Darfur region. Notable attacks in February and April 2003, as well as the SLM's issuing of political statements, detracted from the credibility of the government's dismissals. The group appeared to be a coalition of forces from local sedentary tribes that have suffered the raiding of nomadic tribesman, who were alleged to be tacitly backed by the authorities. Indeed, the emergence of the new group indicated in part that the long-running struggle between settled farmers and nomadic pastoralists over water and agricultural resources had become politicised. It was reported that the SLA had recruited fighters from neighbouring Chad to boost its military capabilities. These Chadian fighters, from the border-spanning Zaghawa tribe, were believed to be opponents of Chad's current regime and did not enjoy their government's support.

In February 1999 Bashir announced on Qatari television that, while he wanted to preserve Sudan's unity, he was prepared to accept its division as a better alternative to the continuing war. His comments, however, were greeted sceptically by opposition leaders and were probably an attempt to divide the rebel alliance between those who support unity and those with a more secessionist agenda.

Bashir versus Turabi [TOP](#)

When the RCCNS was dissolved in 1993 and replaced by a Transitional National Assembly, Bashir assumed the title of president. However, Hassan el-Turabi was generally believed to be the behind-the-scenes ruler even though his National Islamic Front (NIF) was technically illegal. The 1996 elections, when the Transitional National Assembly was replaced by the 400-seat National Assembly, saw Turabi formalise his political position when he became the speaker of the new parliament, which was dominated by NIF supporters.

While the 1996 elections were merely a facade of democracy, the increasing pressure from NDA forces and Sudan's desperate international isolation seemed to have led the government to adopt fresh approaches to solve its problems. In 1998 an ambiguous Political Associations Law effectively returned Sudan to a multi-party system, therefore giving an impression of

political liberalisation. Apart from the National Congress (the NIF renamed), only small parties registered as the main opposition rejected the changes to the constitution.

The government also made attempts to entice exiled opposition leaders back to Sudan. Former president Nimeiri returned to Sudan in May 1999 to a warm official welcome after he was granted amnesty. He formed a new party - the People's Working Forces Alliance - which he claimed would work to reconcile the differences between the government and opposition forces. In the same month, the former prime minister and leader of the Umma, Sadiq el-Mahdi, outraged his NDA allies by meeting Turabi in Geneva.

Sudan's international image was further improved by a developing power struggle between Turabi and Bashir. In December 1999 the president, amid heightening political tensions in which he accused Turabi of exercising dual leadership, declared a state of emergency and suspended the National Assembly. Turabi responded by calling for a jihad against the decision. Bashir, however, managed to marginalise Turabi. As chairman of the National Congress, Bashir dismissed Turabi from the post of secretary-general in May 2000 and in June a new secretary-general was elected. Government reshuffles further marginalised Turabi, who retaliated by forming a new party, the Popular National Congress, which was later renamed the Popular Congress Party (PCP). However, his calls for government ministers to resign in protest went relatively unheeded. While the president's actions were motivated by Turabi's perceived plans to weaken his position, the sidelining of the Islamic ideologue met with international approval.

These improving relations probably helped encourage Sadiq el-Mahdi to return to Sudan. With Eritrea and Ethiopia engaged in a bitter war and Uganda heavily committed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, external support for the opposition was probably waning. In January 2000 Bashir furthered reconciliation efforts with Sadiq el-Mahdi and in early April leading Umma figures returned to Khartoum and the party's membership of the NDA opposition coalition was frozen. In November 2000, Mahdi himself returned to Khartoum to a rapturous welcome.

Presidential and parliamentary elections, after twice being delayed, finally went ahead in December 2000. Bashir was re-elected as president after winning 86.5 per cent of the vote. Nimeiri, his closest rival, won 9.6 per cent. The main opposition parties, including Mahdi's Umma party and Turabi's PCP, did not participate in the elections. The Umma also turned down an offer to join the government in the wake of the election. The party said that it would only participate in a government in which all political organisations were represented.

Renewed Peace Efforts [TOP](#)

With the inauguration of George W Bush in January 2001, a president considered more open to Christian lobbying, Sudan was put firmly back on the international agenda. The increased interest in Sudan provoked Kenya into re-invigorating the moribund Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative. In March, then Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi called for an emergency IGAD summit while on a visit to Khartoum and, soon after then US secretary of state Colin Powell visited Kenya in May, IGAD announced that the summit

would be held in Nairobi in June. Despite the presence of both Bashir and SPLA leader John Garang (who did not meet in person) along with the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the summit failed to broker a ceasefire. Garang refused to agree to a ceasefire in the absence of a more comprehensive peace agreement.

While the regional initiatives continued to stall, the US stepped up its efforts and dispatched a peace envoy, former senator John Danforth, to Sudan in November 2001. Danforth made surprising progress, brokering a limited ceasefire for the Nuba Mountains region. The besieged Nuba rebels, geographically isolated from the rest of the SPLA, had repelled a government offensive earlier in 2001. US-sponsored peace talks, which began in January 2002 in Switzerland, extended the ceasefire and allowed for the deployment of international monitors into the Nuba region.

However, there was a setback in February, when a government helicopter gunship attacked a humanitarian relief base killing 17 civilians. The US suspended its intervention. In an obvious attempt to get the US to re-engage, the government signed an agreement with the SPLA stating that neither side would target civilians. While the Nuba ceasefire continued to hold, the war continued unchecked elsewhere in Sudan.

Even as fighting continued, the government and SPLA launched renewed peace talks in June 2002. On 20 July the government and the SPLA agreed on a framework for future peace talks. The so-called Machakos Protocol outlined a solution whereby the south would be given a degree of autonomy for a six-year period, after which a referendum would be held to decide its future. Sharia would only apply to the north. However, the second round of peace talks was suspended in September, when heavy fighting broke out around the town of Torit in the far south. Continuing pressure from the international community (such as Washington's threat to impose sanctions against the regime) forced the two sides to reconvene the talks. Still, negotiations were hampered by ongoing fighting. Indeed, the SPLA accused the government of breaking a ceasefire agreement signed in October within 10 minutes of it coming into force. The talks ended in November 2002 with the two sides failing to agree on the percentage of southern representation in the government and civil service and on the division of oil revenues.

The talks resumed in Kenya in April 2003, marking the start of 13 months of dramatic progress in which the ceasefire held and direct face-to-face negotiations between Garang and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha resolved all of the outstanding issues surrounding re-establishing southern autonomy in a series of protocols. Talks towards a comprehensive agreement recommenced in Kenya in early October 2004. Under international pressure, a memorandum of understanding was signed in mid-November pledging to complete a settlement by the end of 2004.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement [TOP](#)

The long-running civil war was effectively brought to an end in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The agreement provided for a government of national unity, comprising representatives of the former warring factions in the south, the Sudanese government and some elements of the Khartoum political opposition (essentially, the

NCP maintains 52 per cent of the positions, the SPML 28 per cent, other northern parties 14 per cent and other southern parties six per cent). The south was also granted self-government for a six-year period, following which there will be a referendum on secession. In terms of oil revenues, these are to be equally divided between the two sides, with two per cent also going to the producer state governments.

While John Garang was sworn in as first vice-president of Sudan on 9 July, as per the terms of the peace agreement, tensions rose and uncertainty grew following his death in a helicopter crash later that same month. Salva Kiir Mayardit, a veteran SPLA commander and long-term deputy to Garang, was appointed the next first vice-president and a power-sharing Government of National Unity was formed in September 2005. This was followed by the formation of an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan.

The Darfur Crisis [TOP](#)

However, conflict was continuing in another part of the country. From February 2003, the Darfur region of western Sudan had become the scene of an increasingly high-intensity conflict. By the end of 2008, it had displaced up to 2.7 million Darfurians (200,000 as refugees in neighbouring Chad), killed tens of thousands and threatened the lives of hundreds of thousands more through the collapse of local agriculture and humanitarian provisions.

The UN described the humanitarian situation in Darfur as the worst in the world as early as 2004, but the Sudanese government continued to restrict access to the conflict zone and deny the vast scale of the crisis. A region the size of Spain (500,000 km²) with a population of up to six million, Darfur accounts for one-fifth of Sudan but has long been neglected by the central government.

Emerging rebel groups included the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan's Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The SLM/A membership united the three main non-Arab peoples of the Darfur: the Mesalit, Zaghawa and, in particular, the Fur. The JEM was largely made up of the Zaghawa. In March 2003, the government began to negotiate with leaders of the Fur. However, hostilities soon resumed. Secretary-General Minni Minnawi, of the SLM/A, claimed that the government had agreed to a general amnesty for SLM/A fighters and to implement development projects in the region, but had instead continued to attack the rebels with helicopter gunships. In April 2003, the rebels launched a major attack on the airport at el-Fashir, the capital of northern Darfur, apparently in revenge for government air raids. In May 2003, Minnawi renewed his call for dialogue with the government.

An initial ceasefire was finally brokered between the SLM/A and the government in early September 2003, allowing for a 45-day break in hostilities while trilateral talks with Chadian mediators in Abéché, Chad, were conducted. While this ceasefire collapsed in practice within two days, its theoretical basis was perpetuated in late October with its formal extension for one month. Attacks against the JEM, which was not party to the ceasefire, continued as it grew in strength relative to the dormant SLM/A. By December 2003, even the latter had given up on the ceasefire.

A renewed government offensive in Western Darfur in January and February 2004 appeared to have a strong effect on the two rebel groups, with President Bashir declaring victory by February. During this period the number of locals displaced by the conflict also grew massively due to Janjaweed attacks on civilian targets. Under these circumstances, the two rebel groups began to actively seek a peace agreement with the government with the proviso of independent foreign mediation. Talks in N'Djamena agreed a 45-day ceasefire from 11 April but this had effectively collapsed by May.

Clashes between both rebel groups and government-backed forces continued throughout the second half of 2004. Preparatory talks for a new round of negotiations under Nigerian and UN mediation began in Geneva and Libya in late July 2004 - during which the SLM/A and JEM rejected the idea of cantonment and disarmament before a political settlement - leading to face-to-face talks in Abuja, Nigeria from late August. However, these talks collapsed without a deal in mid-September. Meanwhile, an African Union (AU) monitoring force of just 300 men was struggling to deploy to Darfur let alone influence the course of conflict on the ground. Since this point, the rebel groups began to be viewed with greater scepticism by the international mediators, which had previously saddled Khartoum and the Janjaweed with much of the responsibility for the conflict.

When talks reconvened in Abuja in late October, Khartoum, the SLM/A and JEM were under increasing pressure from international mediators to make a deal. This was finally achieved on 9 November 2004 with the signing of the Protocols on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation and on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur. The most significant concession in this was the government's agreement to a military no-fly-zone over Darfur. However, two weeks later, the SLA launched an assault on the north Darfur highland town of Tawila, prompting the Sudan Air Force to bomb rebel positions, effectively ending this ceasefire.

In March 2005, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to impose sanctions on those believed to have committed rights abuses in Darfur, and also referred war crimes suspects to the International Criminal Court. At the end of April 2005, the AU approved the expansion of its peacekeeping force from 3,600 (authorised) to 7,700 men, including 700 military observers, 5,500 troops, and 1,600 civilian police. International donors also pledged nearly USD300 million to boost the AU peacekeeping mission. While there appeared to be a slight improvement in stability for a short period and Khartoum and the two main rebel groups signed a Declaration of Principles in July, conflict had again escalated significantly by September and three Nigerian peacekeepers were killed in October. There were also divisions and factionalisation within the rebel movements.

In February 2006, the US and UK were drafting a Security Council statement asking UN officials to compile plans for a UN peacekeeping force for the Darfur region, where conflict was escalating further. By March 2006, international and AU pressure was mounting on the parties to come to a comprehensive agreement and for the handover of the AU peacekeeping mission to a UN peacekeeping force. While thousands of Sudanese gathered in Khartoum in March, protesting against such a UN force for Darfur, the AU that same month announced a six-month extension of its peacekeeping mandate to 30 September but also agreed in principle

to a UN takeover.

While peace talks between the government and rebels were launched again in Abuja, Nigeria, there was increasing frustration as a deadline of 30 April for the conclusion of talks was missed. The AU had proposed a draft peace deal that covered the three areas of security, power-sharing and wealth-sharing and it was believed that this would test the sincerity of the parties in finding a solution to the crisis. While this finally led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May, it was only between the government and the Minnawi faction of the SLM/A, therefore having limited impact on security.

There has been continued pressure for JEM and the SLM/A faction of Abdel Wahed Mohammed al-Nur to sign a deal, but further meaningful negotiation has also been made more difficult by factionalisation of the rebel groups since the signing of the DPA. Although a joint AU/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), authorised by the UN Security Council in July 2007, finally took over from the resource-strapped African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) at the beginning of 2008, lack of a peace process and deployment delays meant that the mission would face significant challenges in carrying out its mandate.

Tensions escalated between the government and JEM in May 2008, after the rebel group advanced close to the capital Khartoum, with clashes taking place in Omdurman, in what was potentially a show of its capabilities and willingness to extend its battle lines. Further clashes in early 2009 again heightened tensions.

Preliminary discussions between JEM and the government, facilitated by Qatar and including the AU chief mediator, led to a goodwill and confidence-building agreement on 17 February that year. However, the lack of a formal ceasefire underlined the fragility of this process.

In February 2010, the two sides signed a new framework peace accord, this time including a ceasefire agreement, although JEM subsequently suspended peace talks with Khartoum in early May amid claims of ceasefire violations. According to JEM, the Sudanese army had bombed rebel positions in West Darfur, while an army spokesman stated that Sudanese government forces had come under attack. Subsequent fighting between the two sides was reported in May, undermining the recent peace moves.

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Security and foreign forces, Sudan

Date Posted: 11-Oct-2010

SECURITY AND FOREIGN FORCES

[Police](#)

[Popular Police Forces \(PPF\)](#)

[Security Forces](#)

[Intelligence agencies](#)

[Popular Defence Force \(PDF\)](#)

[Border Guards](#)

[Foreign Forces](#)

[African Union Mission in Sudan \(AMIS\)](#)

[UN-AU Mission in Darfur \(UNAMID\)](#)

[United Nations Mission in Sudan \(UNMIS\)](#)

Police

TOP

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, law enforcement has been undergoing restructuring, with the new interim constitution pointing to the decentralisation of the police service at national, state and southern Sudanese levels in accordance with the pact.

Responsibilities previously falling under the mandate of the United Police Forces (UPF) included responsibility for public order, criminal investigations, civil defence, prisons, passport control, immigration and customs, traffic control and wildlife protection. The UPF was divided into different functional divisions operating within provincial commands. Provincial police commissioners would answer to the director general of police in Khartoum, who in turn answered to the minister of the interior. The sheer size of the country, however, made uniform policing difficult and traditionally tribal sheikhs were allowed to enforce law and order in rural districts, with the police maintaining a presence only in more urbanised areas. The war-torn southern and western areas were previously the responsibility of the military and other security forces.

Amid the signing of the CPA, a new police force (the Southern Sudan Police Service: SSPS) is being trained for southern Sudan, with institutional and training assistance from, for example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Following the Sudanese elections in April 2010, the south is keenly awaiting a January 2011 referendum on potential self-determination, as agreed under the CPA. The SSPS will be involved in securing polling centres and ballot boxes during the vote, as well as crowd control. In this regard, UNMIS indicated in October 2010 that UN police advisers have trained more

than 11,500 SSPS officers in referendum security procedures and regulations.

Popular Police Forces (PPF) [TOP](#)

The Popular Police Forces (PPF) were introduced by the National Islamic Front-based government that took power in 1989. These were effectively government-sponsored vigilante groups with the role of assisting the regular police. They tended to operate as a politicised Islamic militia, enforcing their interpretation of moral standards on the general public.

Security Forces [TOP](#)

Intelligence agencies [TOP](#)

The government of Sudan has operated two intelligence agencies, al-Amn al-Dakhili (Internal Security) and al-Amn al-Khariji (External Security).

An organisation called Islamic Security or Security of the Revolution (IS/SOR) was established by the National Islamic Front after its successful 1989 coup. IS/SOR was one of the regime's primary tools of internal political repression. There are indications that it has probably been disbanded or incorporated into other agencies.

Popular Defence Force (PDF) [TOP](#)

The Popular Defence Force (PDF) was formed by the government soon after it took power in 1989. The PDF could be considered as a loose amalgamation of various local defence forces and militias that was rapidly organised to relieve the army of local defence duties and allow it to concentrate on its primary duties of holding major garrisons and offensive action.

The PDF has also been described as the armed or paramilitary wing of the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime. In reality, it is likely that the PDF was a relatively disparate organisation that included all these different sorts of militias.

Operationally it appeared that the PDF militias were responsible for local defence, including roadblocks, and mobilised on a larger scale for dry season offensives.

Border Guards [TOP](#)

Sudan does not operate a designated border guard force. Passport control, immigration and customs at formal border crossing points were responsibilities of the UPF, while what border control is attempted elsewhere is the responsibility of the army and PDF.

Foreign Forces [TOP](#)

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) [TOP](#)

In response to international outrage over the escalation of the war in Darfur, the African Union

(AU) agreed with the Sudanese government to deploy a small monitoring mission to the region.

AMIS I: The initial AU mission (AMIS I) called for 120 unarmed monitors to be sent to Darfur to oversee a ceasefire that was never implemented. The EU pledged some EUR12 million from its Africa Peace Facility to support this deployment. In early July, 40 monitors were deployed in Darfur, when, with conflict still raging in most of the region, the AU agreed to deploy a further 300 lightly armed troops as a protection force for the monitors. Nigeria and Rwanda agreed to contribute a reinforced company (150 men) each to the mission, with Nigerian Brigadier General Festus Okonkwo, formerly commanding officer of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), appointed as chief monitoring officer. These troops were deployed from El-Fashir to El-Geneina, Nyala, Kabkabiya, Tiné and Abeché (Chad) in the second half of August.

Even before the full deployment of AMIS I (there were still only 80 monitors in place by October 2004), the AU had begun to negotiate with Khartoum for an enlarged force with clearly defined peacekeeping functions. Although Khartoum rejected this in early August, it began to reconsider in September in line with an AU suggestion that the force deal specifically with cantoning and disarming rebel combatants, while responsibility for overall security and disarmament of the Janjaweed could rest with the government forces.

AMIS II: Agreement was reached in early October for a much enlarged AMIS II. This would comprise: 450 observers; 641 unarmed troops; 1,700 protection force troops; and 815 civilian police. Some 164 civilian staff would support the mission, which would again be largely funded by the EU and US. Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Rwanda would cover most of the additional personnel, while Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda also offered troops.

The US began airlifting troops from Abuja and Kigali at the end of October and Germany also offered to provide logistic support to AMIS. However, the hope that the enlarged force could deploy as planned within one month proved impracticable. In mid-November, South Africa was asked to provide an infantry company, an engineer explosive ordnance disposal team, additional military observers and staff officers. These were deployed in early March 2005.

Even so, there were only 2,200 AMIS personnel in Darfur by mid-March. On the ground, AMIS found it extremely difficult to function, partly through lack of manpower over a huge area, partly through the lack of infrastructure in Darfur, partly through lack of clarity in its mandate and partly through obstructionism from both the government and rebel forces.

AMIS III: In response to these problems and in concert with the March 2005 UN decision to deploy a large peacekeeping mission in southern Sudan, the AU was encouraged to expand the scale and scope of its mission. At the end of April 2005, the AU approved the expansion of the force from 3,600 (authorised) to 7,700 men, including 700 military observers, 5,500 troops, and 1,600 civilian police. The AU stated that AMIS could subsequently be extended to 12,000 men in 2006, as advised by the UN.

Although Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal pledged additional contributions and talks

were opened with NATO to provide logistical and planning assistance, it was not at all clear that the extended force would be able to find and deploy sufficient suitable troops. AMIS II took seven months to find and deploy less than 3,000 extra troops. Meanwhile, most African militaries were already overstretched by commitments to UN operations across the continent.

Although the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006, it was only between the government and one rebel faction, meaning that security did not improve on the ground. With a lack of funds and resources also hindering the mission's work, there was an increasing push in 2006 for it to be taken over by the UN, although this still needed to gain Sudanese approval. Approval was finally given in June 2007, although Sudan wanted any incoming force to maintain a largely African character. The formation of the hybrid force would mark the final phase of a three-pronged approach to deploying to Darfur, announced by then UN secretary general Kofi Annan in December 2006. The first phase involved a 'light support package', according to which the UN provided, for example, medical items to AMIS; the second phase involved the UN providing heavier support in the form of some troops, police, civilian staff, helicopter gunships and other resources to the AU peacekeeping mission. Authorised by the UN Security Council in July 2007, UNAMID finally took over from AMIS at the end of 2007.

UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) [TOP](#)

In July 2007, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a joint United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to take over from the resource-strapped AMIS. According to Resolution 1769 (2007), which was unanimously adopted by the body's members, the mission is authorised to comprise up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, a civilian component including up to 3,772 international police and 19 special police units with up to 2,660 officers. It would therefore be more than three times the size of AMIS, which was to be incorporated into the new joint force. The mission was further given a Chapter VII mandate, allowing it to take "necessary action" to protect civilians, humanitarian workers and its own personnel and facilities. The force finally took over from AMIS at the end of 2007, although it also suffered its own deployment challenges. While one of the challenges of deployment had been gaining Sudanese approval for the mission's composition - with Khartoum wanting it to consist mainly of African troops - other key issues included limited resource commitments from UN member countries and ineffective logistical support.

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) [TOP](#)

For two decades, the main internal threat to Khartoum was posed by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which fought for an autonomous or independent southern Sudan, and associated opposition groups that opposed the Sudanese regime. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, UNMIS was established under UN Security Council resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005. UNMIS has a Chapter VII mandate (protection of observers and civilians) and is tasked with the following roles: observation of the ceasefire; assistance and monitoring of the formation of joint integrated units between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and government forces; assistance in the disarmament and demobilisation of remaining forces; restructuring of the national and

southern police forces; promoting human rights and the rule of law; facilitating the status referendum in 2011; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons; and conduct mine clearance activities.

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Non-state armed groups, Sudan

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Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

Non-State Armed Groups

[Overview](#)

[Sudan Liberation Movement/Army \(SLM/A\)](#)

[Justice and Equality Movement \(JEM\)](#)

Overview

[TOP](#)

While the insurgency from southern Sudan - previously the main threat to Khartoum - was effectively ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005, conflict has continued in Darfur. Peace talks in 2006 led to the Darfur Peace Agreement, but with only one rebel faction (the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) of Minni Minnawi) having signed up to the deal, this failed to improve security. The fragmentation of the rebel movements since 2006 has complicated ongoing efforts to relaunch inclusive talks, despite numerous internal and external efforts to help unify the ranks and gain a common negotiating platform among the key SLM/A (including Abdel Wahid Mohammed al-Nur's faction) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) groups - in addition to the numerous other active factions in Darfur.

Tensions were raised further in Sudan in May 2008 after JEM advanced to within 20 km of the capital Khartoum. The clashes between the rebels and government forces on 10 May took place in Omdurman, which is situated across the Nile from Khartoum. The attack near the capital highlighted JEM's willingness to extend the battle lines, as well as having been potentially an attempt by the group to strengthen its position ahead of any fresh political negotiations.

In February 2009, preliminary discussions between JEM and the government, facilitated by Qatar and including the AU chief mediator, led to the signing of a goodwill and confidence-building agreement that month. However, the lack of a formal ceasefire underlined the fragility of this process.

Subsequently, in February 2010, the two sides signed a new framework peace accord in Doha, Qatar, this time including a ceasefire, although they failed to finalise a deal by an original (and optimistic) 15 March deadline. The accord in Qatar had been preceded by a preliminary agreement a few days earlier in Chad, with fresh rapprochement efforts between N'Djamena and Khartoum in early 2010 likely to have initially helped to advance this deal. Chad and Sudan have previously sporadically accused each other of backing the other's insurgent groups, raising tensions between the two neighbours. While their insurgencies remain interlinked, reconciliation efforts between the two neighbours may continue to be short-lived.

JEM subsequently suspended peace talks with Khartoum in early May amid claims of ceasefire violations. According to JEM, the Sudanese army had bombed rebel positions in West Darfur, while an army spokesman stated that Sudanese government forces had come under attack. Subsequent fighting between the two sides was reported in May, undermining the recent peace moves.

Moreover, there has been little progress in pushing forward with serious, inclusive negotiations with the various rebel movements. Indeed, the issue of rebel 'inclusiveness' has been a point of contention, with JEM critical of a framework deal Khartoum later signed with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a new umbrella movement of small rebel factions, on 18 March. There has also been little success in securing the participation of al-Nur's SLM/A. As long as key rebel factions fail to participate in an inclusive peace process, and unless the rival sides show clear will to push forward with what would involve challenging negotiations and compromise, prospects for achieving comprehensive peace in Darfur will be limited.

Meanwhile, north-south tensions over delays in full implementation of the CPA have raised concern over the risk of renewed conflict in future. With the delayed national and southern elections finally held in April 2010, the focus shifts to the 2011 southern self-determination referendum, the outcome of which may arguably hold a greater risk of fresh instability. Post-election, there have also been some tensions and divisions in the south, which poses further security risks.

Insecurity is also caused by overspill of regional insurgencies, such as attacks by the rebel Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in southern Sudan. The LRA had dispersed into parts of northeastern Congo, southern Sudan and the Central African Republic in recent years, following increased efforts by the Ugandan military to reduce the rebel threat in northern Uganda. Southern Sudan helped facilitate peace talks between Kampala and the LRA from around mid-2006, but hopes that LRA leader Joseph Kony would sign a peace deal collapsed in 2008. By mid-December that year, the Ugandan, Congolese and south Sudanese militaries launched a joint operation against the LRA's Congolese bases. However, the operation did not achieve its primary aim of capturing the LRA leadership, with subsequent rebel raids and

reprisal attacks further aggravating issues of human security and population displacement in already fragile regions.

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

[TOP](#)

- **Group name:** Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A).
- **Level of threat:** Although one faction of the SLM/A signed the 5 May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), a larger SLM/A group refused to sign and, along with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other active rebel factions, continues to present a significant, albeit less coherent, challenge to the central government's control of the three states that constitute the Darfur region in west Sudan. A JEM attack on the national capital Khartoum in May 2008 shocked Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and led to widespread detentions and summary trials of Zaghawa tribesmen resident in Khartoum. SLM/A factions have not demonstrated the same ability to mount major operations outside of Darfur though they continue to engage in fighting against the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and even other SLM/A factions. Since the discovery of oil in Darfur was announced in April 2005 the stakes in the Darfur conflict have been raised, resulting in greater factionalisation of rebel movements and intensified fighting. The SAF is now engaged in trying to secure parts of Darfur to allow exploration companies to begin work. Chinese-operated oil facilities in neighbouring Kordofan province have also come under attack several times since November 2006 by JEM and its allies. The mainstream SLM/A movement led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur has also threatened Chinese oil operations, warning them that agreements with the Khartoum government are not enough to provide for their security. The SLM/A teamed with the National Redemption Front (NRF) to attack the Abu Jabra oil field in West Kordofan in November 2006.
- **Status:** Active.
- **Date of founding:** March 2003. Until then, it was known as the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), which was formed by various tribally based self-defence militias that had emerged in previous years.
- **Group type:** Political.
- **Aims and objectives:** The stated aim of the SLM/A is to compel Sudan's military-Islamist government to pursue a democratic political settlement that advances the interests of all Sudan's peoples and regions, not just the Arab centre and animist/Christian south. It also opposes growing Arab political dominance in the Darfur region and the military campaign of local Arab militias. There have been growing calls from some SLM/A factions for regional autonomy and also for independence, while other factions espouse a pan-Sudanese ideology. The DPA offers a future referendum on reuniting the three current states of Darfur into a single entity, compensation for the displaced, as well as guarantees of disarmament of the pro-government militias and a senior post in the presidency for the SLM/A leadership. The rebels opposed to the DPA insist that these offers be implemented immediately.
- **Leaders:** Mini Minawi heads the SLM/A faction that signed the DPA in 2006. Abdel Wahid al-Nur is leader of the main rival (predominantly Fur) SLM/A faction.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

[TOP](#)

- **Name:** Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) or Harakat al-Adl wa al Muswaa.
- **Type:** Political.
- **Status:** Active.
- **Leader:** Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad Achar Foudeil Taha.
- **Summary:** The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is the largest and most militarily capable of Sudan's Darfur rebel groups. While JEM has also suffered from the factionalisation which has been characteristic of other Darfur rebel groups, its experienced leadership core has been successful in ensuring the group remains at the forefront of the Darfur resistance. Although primarily focused on attacking Chinese-operated oilfields in Kordofan province, JEM launched a well-organised raid on Khartoum on 10 May 2008, coming to within less than 20 km of the capital, demonstrating a new level of capability and ambition. Since then there have been periodic clashes between the military and JEM in Darfur, punctuated by Qatari-sponsored peace negotiations in Doha. While a ceasefire agreement was signed in Doha in February 2010, progress in reaching a comprehensive peace deal have been threatened by increasing tension and JEM allegations of continuing military offensives in Darfur.

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Air force, Sudan

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Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

AIR FORCE

[Summary](#)

[Assessment](#)

[Adaptability](#)

[Sustainment](#)

[Readiness](#)

[Deployments, tasks and operations](#)

[Role and Deployment](#)

[Recent and Current Operations](#)

[Command and control](#)

[Organisation](#)

[Order of Battle](#)

[Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine](#)

[Bases](#)

[Training](#)

[Military Exercises](#)

[Equipment in service](#)

[Fixed Wing](#)

[Rotary Wing](#)

[Missiles](#)

Summary

TOP

STRENGTH

3,000

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

MiG-29SE 'Fulcrum', A-5C 'Fantan', Su-25 'Frogfoot'

COMBAT HELICOPTER

Mi-24/35 'Hind', Mi-171

TRANSPORT

C-130H Hercules, An-26 'Curl', An-30 'Clank', An-74 'Coaler', SAC Y-8

Assessment

TOP

The overall status of the Sudanese Air Force (*Silakh al-Jawwiya as-Sudaniya*) was believed to be showing signs of improvement at the beginning of 2008, after a long period of inadequate maintenance and lack of investment. Iraqi and Iranian technicians were employed through the 1990s and more recent deals with Russian firms were expected to help maintain current equipment in good order by supplying support technicians and spares.

More significantly, since oil exports commenced in 1999, Sudan has begun to invest in new procurement programmes. Since 2001, this has included orders for MiG-29 'Fulcrum' multirole fighters and Mi-24/35 'Hind' attack helicopters from Russia, as well as a number of new An-74 'Coaler' transport aircraft from Ukraine plus A-5C 'Fantan' attack aircraft and K-8 Karakorum armed trainers from China. In late 2008, at least 10 Su-25 'Frogfoot' attack aircraft were also received, apparently from Belarus.

Khartoum is believed to be working on the modernisation of its air force through forging agreements with Pakistan as well as Russia and China. An agreement on military co-operation

at all levels was signed by Sudan and Pakistan in 2005, with some subsequent reports alluding to the possibility of Sudan acquiring the JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft.

An unconditional, unilateral, ceasefire in the Darfur region was announced by President Omar al-Bashir on 12 November 2008 and was immediately rejected by members of the Justice and Equality Movement, which is one of the main rebel groups active in the area. Aerial operations in Darfur may have been curtailed for a while, but air force aircraft have returned to action and are known to have targeted rebel strongholds in mid-January 2009, prompting a statement by incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the US was contemplating the creation of a 'no-fly zone' over the region. There is no evidence that this has been imposed.

Adaptability [TOP](#)

There is insufficient information to be able to judge how well the new aircraft have been absorbed into the air force. Sudanese Air Force (SAF) pilots are believed to have relatively low levels of expertise and it is thought likely that contract personnel are employed to fly and maintain some of the newer types in the inventory. The ability of air force pilots to respond to changing threats and opposing tactics therefore cannot be assessed.

Sustainment [TOP](#)

There do not appear to be any reserve personnel attached to the Sudanese Air Force.

Readiness [TOP](#)

The rapid deployment capabilities of the Sudanese Air Force, if any, are not known.

Deployments, tasks and operations [TOP](#)

Role and Deployment [TOP](#)

Sudan's air arm is organised to provide support for land forces, particularly those engaged in fighting rebel forces active in the south and west of the country. During counter-insurgency operations in the south, this has entailed deployments to the Juba area. In the west (Darfur), aircraft have operated more covertly from at least three locations, including Al Fashir, Geneina and Nyala; all these locations are known to have been utilised by 'Hind' combat helicopters during March and April 2007, with Nyala also supporting a detachment of A-5C 'Fantans' in direct contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1591. Al Fashir was also used as a forward base for Su-25 attack aircraft in mid-2009. At least three Mi-171s, including one seen at Nyala in March 2007, have been given white overall colour schemes, presumably to mask their hostile intentions by making them resemble aircraft engaged on United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. Transport aircraft have also been known to undertake combat sorties, being employed to deliver free-fall bombs in both areas of conflict.

Three SAF divisions rotate regularly through the vast western region on the border with Chad, which remains locked in a humanitarian crisis with millions of people displaced both

internally and externally.

Recent and Current Operations [TOP](#)

No recent contributions to UN operations have been made.

Command and control [TOP](#)

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces:	President Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
Minister of Defence:	Major General Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn
Chief of Joint Staff:	General Muhammad Abd-al-Qadir Nasr-al-Din
Commander of the Air Force:	Lieutenant General Ahmad Ali al-Faki

Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir holds both the posts of national president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces and People's Defence Forces (PDF). The minister of defence has operational command of the armed forces. There is a defence planning body, known as the National Defence Council, which operates through the defence ministry. The commander of the armed forces now has the title Chief of Joint Staff.

Organisation [TOP](#)

Air force structure is thought to be based on the former Soviet regimental system, and, in conjunction with the land forces, is responsible for national and strategic air defence. Fighter aircraft and ground defences are linked.

Order of Battle [TOP](#)

Current status and capabilities are believed to be improving with the acquisition of new equipment, notably MiG-29s, Su-25s and A-5s. The main operating base for combat aircraft is Wadi Sayyidna, while the transport fleet resides at Khartoum (al-Khurtum). Other airfields at al-Fashir, al-Ubayyid, Geneina, Juba, Khashm al-Qirbah, Nyala and Port Sudan (Bûr Sudan) are available to be used operationally if required. The recently delivered MiG-29s are said to be assigned to No 2 Squadron.

Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine [TOP](#)

The most commonly reported operations are the much criticised bombing sorties against undefended targets in rebel-held territory. Accounts from the area indicate that these normally involve Antonov transport aircraft with bombs and/or explosive devices simply being pushed out from the rear cargo doors and allowed to free-fall to the ground.

In Darfur, attack helicopters and close support aircraft have routinely been used to provide close support for irregular ground forces and militia. The aircraft generally clear a village or

rural area of rebel forces before ground forces move in. However, the Sudanese military command has consistently denied playing a direct role in any such actions.

Bases [TOP](#)

El Fashir	(13° 36' 53" N; 25° 19' 28" E)
Al Ubayyid	(13° 09' 11" N; 30° 13' 57" E)
Geneina	(13° 29' 00" N; 22° 28' 00" E)
Juba	(04° 52' 19" N; 31° 36' 04" E)
Khartoum	(15° 35' 22" N; 32° 33' 11" E)
Khashim al Qirbah	(14° 55' 39" N; 35° 52' 44" E)
Nyala	(12° 03' 12" N; 24° 57' 22" E)
Port Sudan/Bûr Sudan	(19° 35' 00" N; 37° 12' 50" E)
Wadi Sayyidna	(15° 48' 57" N; 32° 30' 56" E)

Training [TOP](#)

Until recently Sudan lacked training aircraft, but acquired 12 Chinese-built K-8 Karakorums from 2006. Prior to this, training of Sudanese pilots had been provided by Iran, China and possibly North Korea.

With relatively low levels of expertise, it seems that contract personnel have been and continue to be employed to fly and maintain some of the newer types in the inventory. This is certainly true of the MiG-29, with a Russian contract pilot known to have died when his aircraft was shot down by small arms fire near Omdurman in May 2008. In mid-2008 the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that China was training Sudanese Air Force pilots to fly fighter jets.

Military Exercises [TOP](#)

In December 2008, the army conducted an exercise named 'Dawn is one' using air force combat and transport aircraft, as well as artillery and air defence systems.

Equipment in service [TOP](#)

Fixed Wing [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	First Delivery
MiG-29SE 'Fulcrum-C'	MiG	Fighter - Multirole	20	18	2004
A-5C 'Fantan'	HAI	Fighter - Ground	15	15	2003

		Attack / Strike			
Su-25 'Frogfoot-A'	Sukhoi	Attack	10	10	2008
An-30 'Clank'	Antonov	Transport	2	2	n/a
An-26 'Curl'	Antonov	Transport	n/a	2	n/a
An-32 'Cline'	Antonov	Transport	2 ¹	2	2007
An-74TK-200 'Coaler'	Antonov	Transport	4	4	2005
An-74TK-300 'Coaler'	Antonov	Transport	2	2	2005
C-130H Hercules	Lockheed Martin	Transport	6	4 ²	1978
Y-8	SAC	Transport	2	2	1991
K-8 Karakorum	HAI	Trainer / Light Attack	12	12	2006
MiG-29UB 'Fulcrum-B'	MiG	Trainer	3	2	2003
Su-25UB 'Frogfoot-B'	Sukhoi	Trainer	1	1	2008

Notes:

1. Total of six reported to have been ordered, but only two have been observed in service.
2. Probably unserviceable.

Rotary Wing [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	First Delivery
Mi-24V 'Hind-E'	Mil	Attack	6	5	1996
Mi-35P 'Hind-F'	Mil	Attack	40	30	2001
Mi-171	Mil	Attack / Assault	n/a	10	n/a

Missiles [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role
AA-2 'Atoll'	Vympel	Air-to-Air

AA-7 'Apex'	Vympel	Air-to-Air
AA-8 'Aphid'	Vympel	Air-to-Air
AA-10 'Alamo'	Vympel	Air-to-Air
AA-11 'Archer'	Vympel	Air-to-Air
AA-12 'Adder'	Vympel	Air-to-Air
PL-2 'Atoll'	CATIC	Air-to-Air
PL-3	CATIC	Air-to-Air
PL-5	CATIC	Air-to-Air
SA-7 'Grail'	Turopov	Surface-to-Air
AS-7 'Kerry'	Zvezda	Air-to-Surface
AGM-65 Maverick	Raytheon	Air-to-Surface
AT-3 'Sagger'	Kolomna	Air-to-Surface

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Defence production and R & D, Sudan

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Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

DEFENCE PRODUCTION AND R & D

[Summary](#)

[Assessment](#)

[Exports and markets](#)

Summary

[TOP](#)

Key Figures (millions)

	2006 (USD)	2005 (USD)
Total defence expenditure	500	450

Total procurement expenditure	n/a	n/a
Total defence exports	n/a	n/a
Total defence imports	n/a	n/a

Key Companies

Company	Description	Revenue
Military Industry Corporation (MIC)	State-run defence corporation which started production in the early 1960s. Operates a number of plants near Khartoum producing a range of defence products, including ammunition and light infantry weapons.	n/a
Alshagara Industrial Complex (AIC)	Part of MIC. Manufactures ammunition of calibres 7.62 mm, 9 mm, 12 mm and 12.7 mm, as well as rounds of 60 mm, 82 mm and 120 mm.	n/a
Yarmouk Industrial Complex (YIC)	Part of MIC. Manufactures non-military and defence products, including what are described as "conventional weapons" and ammunition. YIC currently produces 29 military products.	n/a
Elshaheed Ibrahim Shamseldeen Complex for Heavy Industries	Part of MIC and established in 2002. Factories produce a range of products, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery and bulldozers and excavators for civil and military purposes. Factories in the complex include the Body Construction Factory and the Maintenance and Modernisation Factory for Rehabilitation of the Tank (DIGNA).	n/a
Zargaa Engineering Complex (ZEC)	Part of MIC and inaugurated in 2004. Produces and distributes electronic devices, laser and optical equipment for both military and civil purposes, as well as HF and VHF communication and wireless equipment. ZEC also provides research and consultancy services.	n/a
Safat Aviation Complex (SAC)	Part of MIC. The complex was inaugurated in 2005 with the aim of supporting the air force with avionics technology and of importing technology to facilitate the maintenance and assembly of aircraft in Sudan. SAC comprises six sectors: fighter aircraft, helicopters, cargo aircraft, light aircraft, radars and training.	n/a

Assessment

[TOP](#)

Any Sudanese military research is believed to be limited to conventional and unsophisticated weapons programmes.

US claims that the Sudanese Al-Shifa pharmaceuticals factory in Khartoum was developing

chemical weapons agents or precursor chemicals have never been confirmed and appear to have been based on inaccurate intelligence. Similarly, allegations in the German newspaper *Die Welt* that Sudanese and Syrian troops tested chemical weapons against civilians in joint operations in Darfur during June 2004 have not been substantiated. Such stories appear to have been circulated to increase pressure on Syria, which is known to have an unconventional weapons programme but has limited connections to Khartoum.

The IAEA confirmed in January 2002 that Sudan was not pursuing nuclear weapons technology.

In 2005, Sudan and Pakistan signed an agreement on joint military co-operation at all levels and, in August 2008, a Sudanese Army delegation visited the Joint Staff Headquarters in Pakistan to discuss joint co-operation in military production. A year later the Sudanese Chief of Joint Staff met with Pakistan's Minister for Defence Production. Sudan has also looked to expand its indigenous defence industry with Russian and Chinese assistance so that it can produce more sophisticated equipment.

Exports and markets [TOP](#)

There is no information available relating to Sudanese exports.

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Procurement, Sudan

Date Posted: 12-Jan-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

PROCUREMENT

[Assessment](#)

[Army procurement](#)

[Modernisation](#)

[Air Force procurement](#)

[Requirements](#)

[Navy procurement](#)

[Requirements](#)

[Modernisation](#)

[Major conventional military procurement](#)

Assessment

TOP

Since oil revenues came on-stream in 1999, Sudan has been one of the most active procurers of military equipment in Africa. Modern weapons systems, mostly of Russian design, were purchased with the aid of the new oil wealth, including Hind attack helicopters, advanced fighter aircraft, main battle tanks and artillery pieces, as well as assault rifles. Sufficient detail is unavailable to judge how well some of the equipment has been absorbed by the forces. In more recent times there have also been reports of imported equipment being controversially deployed in the troubled Darfur region.

The switch, from the mid-1990s, to ex-Soviet states as a primary source of surplus weaponry mainly favoured Russia and Belarus, although small quantities of hardware have come from Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and (inadvertently, via Yemen) from Poland. Russia looks set to be the main supplier of more modern equipment in coming years following the USD120 million contract to supply a dozen MiG-29SE/UB multirole fighter aircraft between 2003 and 2004.

Chinese support has been fairly constant, regardless of regime in Khartoum, and Beijing continues to supply weapons systems, possibly in association with Iran. Such sources of weapons are generally the most difficult to track. Traditionally, Libya and Iran supplied arms for the war against the SPLA. The first reported Libyan delivery was of MiG-23 fighter aircraft from 1986 and then of some USD280 million worth of unspecified equipment in 1989. Iran became more influential in the early 1990s, as Sudan's Islamist government began to suffer greater isolation from regional governments.

With Russian and Chinese assistance, Sudan has also looked to expand its indigenous defence industry so that it can produce more sophisticated equipment.

Procurement links with Iran date back to the time of the Shah, when naval vessels were transferred from the Iranian Coast Guard. These still form the basis of the Sudanese Navy, which has also received training from Iran. Since 1989 there have been a considerable number of weapon imports, including 50,000 Heckler & Koch G3 automatic rifles from Iranian production facilities. In May 1995 Khartoum was reported to have received aircraft, tanks, artillery and other heavy weaponry and spares from China. Iran is believed to have either helped pay for the arms or guaranteed repayment to China. According to Egyptian sources, Sudan's military procurement debt to China had already risen to USD300 million by December 1991. The debt to Iran was estimated to be USD400 million. The Former Yugoslavia was the main supplier of Sudan's naval equipment from 1989 until the imposition of the UN embargo in 1992.

The US played an important role in the 1980s in upgrading Sudanese equipment, with special

emphasis on airlift capability and logistics. US military assistance ceased following the 1989 coup. Other Western suppliers have had minimal impact in Sudan.

While it is almost impossible to track Sudanese procurement, it is clear that since oil revenues came onstream in 1999 the country has had one of the most active procurement programmes in Africa. It has procured scores of MBTs, and quantities of other armoured vehicles and artillery pieces, as well as attack helicopters and fighter aircraft. With the expansion of the oil industry it is likely that Sudan will have a larger procurement budget in the future. The country's 'rogue' status has been of little deterrent to many arms dealers that sell basic ex-Soviet hardware. It was thought for a period that Sudan's standing might improve as it co-operated more closely with the US and with moves that resulted in the ending the war in the south. However, since 2004 the brutal war in Darfur has undermined such rapprochement. Emphasis looks likely to continue to be on armoured vehicles, artillery and attack aircraft, probably of more advanced technology than those procured from surplus stocks in the 1990s.

Sudan has been under a mandatory EU arms embargo since 1994. The US terminated arms sales and transfers to Sudan in late 1992 and designated Sudan as a country supporting international terrorism in October 1993. UN sanctions imposed on air traffic to Sudan in August 1996 did not constitute an arms embargo and were repealed in 2001 without having been applied effectively. Non-EU/US suppliers were thus able to supply arms to Sudan and, as elsewhere in Africa, Eastern European brokers selling Warsaw Pact surplus equipment have been predominant since the 1990s. In 2004 the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the troubled Darfur region, expanding the terms of the embargo the following year. The embargo did not exclude deliveries to the Sudan government that would not be used in Darfur.

A British Broadcasting Corporation television programme shown in July 2008 alleged that China had breached the UN embargo on Darfur, imposed since March 2005, and included footage of a Chinese-made military truck, thought to be part of a batch of Dong Feng military trucks manufactured in July 2005, and details of a second similar truck. There were also photographs of Chinese-made A5 Fantan aircraft being serviced by technicians. According to an Amnesty International report published in May 2007, trade figures from 2005 show that Sudan imported USD24 million in arms and ammunition from China, as well as nearly USD59 million in helicopter and aircraft parts and equipment.

A new UN report, seen by *Jane's* on 6 November 2009 prior to its public release, recorded repeated violations of the arms embargo imposed against the procurement of weapons for use in Darfur by the Sudanese government. Amongst other violations, the Sudanese Air Force (SAF) has regularly hired commercial aviation companies to supply aircraft to transport troops and materiel, including weapons, into Darfur. More than 100 uniformed SAF personnel were seen in May 2009 boarding a commercial transport aircraft in Khartoum and disembarking an hour later at the El Fasher airport in North Darfur. Crates of military materiel were offloaded from the aircraft, operated by the Azza Aviation Company, according to the panel report, one of two flights operated by the company that day into Darfur from Khartoum. The report was rejected by the Sudanese government.

Army procurement [TOP](#)

The Sudanese Government has been seeking additional main battle tanks (MBTs) since 1999, when it emerged that Sudan had received 20 Polish T-55 MBTs by way of Yemen. These were the first of a batch of 50 to be supplied to Yemen. Following protests from the US, Poland suspended arms exports to Yemen and the remaining 30 MBTs were not delivered to either Yemen or Sudan. Sudan has continued to acquire obsolete T-55 tanks from former-Soviet sources. Russia has been an important supplier. Belarus has also become a particularly important source of equipment, both main battle tanks and other armoured vehicles. Sixty T-55s were delivered from Belarus in the period 1999 to 2001. The Sudanese Army uses the T-55 as an infantry fire-support weapon. While comparatively easy to maintain, these ageing tanks are not considered particularly appropriate for Sudan's terrain or for mobile, counter-insurgency warfare.

Long range artillery pieces and armoured fighting vehicles have also been sought in recent years. BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and BRDM-2 amphibious scout cars have all been delivered since 2001, as have additional howitzers (towed and self-propelled) and BM-21 multiple launch rocket systems. More modern Russian-designed armoured vehicles and missile systems may be procured in coming years.

Modernisation [TOP](#)

In April 2002, Russia offered to upgrade Sudanese MBTs and APCs at low cost but there is no indication that the offer has been taken up. The then Defence Minister, Bakri Hassan Saleh, visited the Tula KBP Instrument Design Bureau, which offered upgrade programmes for Sudan's IFVs.

Air Force procurement [TOP](#)

Requirements [TOP](#)

Compared with land forces, Sudan's air arm received only limited attention at the start of the oil boom, although matters have markedly improved in the past few years, with new types having been obtained to satisfy the requirement for more sophisticated battlefield helicopters and combat aircraft able to undertake ground attack missions. Air defence has been a secondary priority, although this has also been significantly enhanced. In 1996, the delivery of six Mi-24 'Hind' helicopter gunships from Belarus was reported, followed by as many as 16 Mi-35s from Russia in 2001-02. Further deliveries of helicopters are known to have occurred, with Russia acknowledging the supply of no fewer than 45 between 2001 and 2007. Many (possibly all) are likely to have been Mi-35P 'Hind-F' helicopters, although this quantity may also include examples of the Mil Mi-171 assault/transport helicopter.

In 2002, Sudan ordered 10 MiG-29SE single-seat and two MiG-29UB two-seat multirole fighters from RSK MiG, following an agreement concluded in December 2001. The aircraft were delivered during 2003-04 and feature improved electronic and electro-optic sighting and navigation systems that allow the use of extended range air-to-air guided missiles, including

the Vympel AA-12 'Adder' (R-77M), plus an increased bomb load. The MiG-29 sale was believed to be worth as much as USD120 million. At around the same time, China is understood to have supplied as many as 20 A-5C 'Fantan' attack aircraft, with more recent acquisitions from this source comprising a number of K-8 Karakorum trainers. The defence minister confirmed in November 2008 that 12 Russian MiG-29 fighters had been received.

Other reports indicate that Khartoum previously received F-7 fighters from China, paying for them with oil revenues, but there has been little evidence to support these claims and it is possible that they actually related to the supply of A-5s.

The most recent acquisition, revealed by Defence Minister Hussein in November 2008, relates to a follow-on batch of 12 MiG-29s, which will presumably include at least a pair of two-seaters. There were also reports in mid-2008 of an order for Sukhoi Su-25 'Frogfoot' attack aircraft, with subsequent sightings indicating that at least 11 had been acquired later that year, evidently via Belarus, which may also have supplied an additional dozen or so MiG-29s.

Efforts to develop an indigenous aviation industry have made some progress, with the first example of the Safat-01 being unveiled by President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in early July 2009. A light aircraft, similar in appearance to the Piper Super Cub, has been developed and built with Chinese and Russian assistance and is apparently intended to fulfil a training role, although it is not known if any are to be acquired by the air force.

The Safat Aviation Complex was founded in 2005 and is mainly tasked with support of the air force, being part of Sudan's military manufacturing commission. At least two other products are in prospect, comprising the Safat-02 light helicopter, which appears to be based on the Ukrainian Aerokopter AK1-3; and the Safat-03, which appears to have its origins in the Utva 75 light aircraft and which could find employment with the air force in the primary training role.

Navy procurement [TOP](#)

Requirements [TOP](#)

In general, the navy has received little attention in procurement programmes due to the low maritime threat to the government. With the retirement of Sudan's larger patrol vessels, there is an ongoing requirement to replace the ageing fleet of patrol craft, both riverine and sea-going. China and Iran were approached to assist with this programme but there have been no reports of orders being placed. Attempts to improve serviceability of the fleet have been hampered by a lack of funds.

In May 2008, the Pakistani media reported that the Sudanese Chief of Naval Staff met with the managing director of Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works and expressed interest in the possibility of having the company design ships for the Sudanese Navy.

Modernisation [TOP](#)

There are no reported plans to upgrade the existing flotilla of patrol craft. Most of the supply vessels have been immobilised for use as store facilities.

Major conventional military procurement

[TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Quantity	Origin	First Delivery
K-8 Karakoram	HAIC	Trainer/Light Attack	12	China	2006
BTR-80	Arzamas Machinery Plant	Armoured Combat Vehicle	30	Russia	2006
A-5 Fantan	HAIC	Fighter - Ground Attack/Strike	15	China	2003
MiG-29	RSK MiG	Fighter - Multirole	12 ¹	Russia	2003
122 mm 2S1	State Arsenal	Self-Propelled Howitzer	10	Russia (via Belarus)	2003
BRDM-2	Arzamas Machinery Plant	Amphibious Scout Car	39	Russia (via Belarus)	2003
BMP-2	Kurgan Machinery Plant	Infantry Fighting Vehicle	9	Russia (via Belarus)	2003
122 mm D-30	Joint Stock Company Spetstehnika	Howitzer	24	Russia (via Belarus)	2002
122 mm BM-21/9P138	Splav SPC	Multiple Launch Rocket System	12	Russia (via Belarus)	2002
Mi-35	Mil	Helicopter - Attack	16	Russia	2001
BTR-80	Arzamaz	Armoured Combat Vehicle	30	Russia	2001
T-55M	State Arsenal	Main Battle Tank	20	Russia (via Belarus)	2001
T-55M	State Arsenal	Main Battle Tank	40	Russia (via Belarus)	1999
T-55AM-2	Zakłady Mechaniczne Bmar-Labedy SA	Main Battle Tank	20	Poland (via Yemen)	1999
BMP-2	Kurgan Machinery Plant	Infantry Fighting Vehicle	6	Ukraine	1996
Mi-24	Mil	Helicopter - Attack	6	Russia (via Belarus)	1996

T-55	State Arsenals	Main Battle Tank	9	Russia (via Belarus)	1996
F-7M	Shenyang	Fighter - Ground Attack/Strike	6	China	1996
Various	Arm Scor	Small Arms	n/a	South Africa	1995
Various	Arm Scor	Ammunition	n/a	South Africa	1995
Various	State Arsenals	Aircraft Parts	n/a	Russia	1995
Various	NORINCO	Ammunition	n/a	China	1995
Mi-24D	Mil	Helicopter - Attack	1	Kyrgyzstan	1995
T-55	n/a	Main Battle Tank	100	n/a	1994
Type 63	NORINCO	Rocket Launcher	600	China	1994
Various	DOI	Ammunition	n/a	Iran	1994
IAR-330	IAR	Helicopter - Transport	8	Romania	1994
n/a	n/a	Artillery System	18	China	1992
Y-8	SAC Shaanxi	Electronic Intelligence	2	China	1991

Note:

1. Includes 10 MiG-29SE and 2 MiG-29UB.

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Navy, Sudan

Date Posted: 12-Jan-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

NAVY

[Summary](#)

[Assessment](#)
[Adaptability](#)
[Deployments, tasks and operations](#)
[Role and Deployment](#)
[Recent and Current Operations](#)
[Command and control](#)
[Organisation](#)
[Bases](#)
[Training](#)
[Equipment in service](#)
[Surface Fleet](#)
[Auxiliaries](#)

Summary [TOP](#)

STRENGTH 1,300 PATROL CRAFT - INSHORE 15

Assessment [TOP](#)

The Sudanese Navy is one that has a littoral and riverine capability. The overall standard and performance of the Sudanese Navy has declined, largely as a result of low budgetary priority and consequent poor maintenance and lack of spares. This constrains its ability to participate in regional co-operation, orchestrated by the International Maritime Organisation through various initiatives to combat threats to coastal waters in the area.

This lack of operational capability also does not allow the navy to deter smuggling that occurs in the Red Sea and to offer some capability in the area of maritime search and rescue in an area known to have problems with maritime safety.

The reported attack by Israel in January 2009 on a vessel docking in Sudan that was alleged to be carrying military supplies destined for Hamas has further illustrated the current lack of operational capability of the Sudanese Navy concerning its ability to defend coastal harbours and waters.

However, this has not always been the case and in the past the Sudanese Navy has been able to maintain an operational capability with the help of some specific partnerships. There was, for example, some Iranian assistance in the maintenance of vessels during the 1990s and the return to service of others. Almost all of the current vessels operated by the Sudanese Navy were supplied from either Iran or the former Yugoslavia. The remaining boats were provided by the United States.

Nothing has been reported to have been procured by the Sudanese Navy in the last decade. In 2003, the last coastal patrol craft (two Iranian-supplied Rasmussen-class 70 tonne craft) was withdrawn from service, leaving Sudan with only an inshore capacity of fast, machine gun-armed boats. Activity involving the vessels has been reported up until 2007 in operations patrolling the coastline of 853 km.

The riverine force on the White Nile appears to be better equipped and better maintained. Thus, it is able to patrol the 4,000 km of inland waterways in line with the importance of the White Nile as a supply route to garrisons in the south.

Adaptability [TOP](#)

Sudan has neither the political nor military capability to launch amphibious operations. There are no combat craft in the navy which, therefore, does not have a realistic chance of deterring a foreign power intent on threatening the country's maritime interests.

Deployments, tasks and operations [TOP](#)

Role and Deployment [TOP](#)

Naval operations appear to be concerned with preventing the spread of the insurgency in the south of the country through the Nile river system and protecting the harbour at Port Sudan. Those vessels deployed at Flamingo Bay (Sewart and Ashoora I-class) are tasked with operations in the Red Sea and those at Khartoum (Kurmuk-class) and Kosti (supply ships) are tasked with riverine patrol and resupply along the White Nile.

Recent and Current Operations [TOP](#)

There have been no major operations in recent years.

Command and control [TOP](#)

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces:	President Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
Minister of Defence:	Major General Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn
Chief of Joint Staff:	General Muhammad Abd-al-Qadir Nasr-al-Din
Commander of the Navy:	Lieutenant General Al-Zain Hamad Balla

Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir holds both the posts of national president and commander in chief of the armed forces and People's Defence Forces (PDF). The minister of defence has operational command of the armed forces. There is a defence planning body, known as the National Defence Council, which operates through the defence ministry. The commander of the armed forces now has the title chief of joint staff. A series of promotions and appointments carried out in April 2008 led to the current military staffing structure.

Organisation [TOP](#)

The Sudan Navy was established in 1962 and is an all-volunteer force that is considered a branch of the army. It has two commands, one to operate on the Red Sea coast and one to operate on the River Nile. Maritime patrol aircraft (C-212MP) are no longer operated by the Sudanese air force.

Bases [TOP](#)

Flamingo Bay (Red Sea)
Khartoum (Nile HQ)
Kosti (White Nile)
Port Sudan (Red Sea HQ)

Training [TOP](#)

Training agreements between Egypt and Sudan were abandoned in April 1993. Since then, the presence of Iranian advisers has been reported by the Cairo media. This led to reports that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) personnel, besides regular Iranian naval officers, were involved in training. Iranian personnel were believed to have been repatriated in the late 1990s and since then Sudan is likely to have cut back its training programme.

Equipment in service [TOP](#)

Surface Fleet [TOP](#)

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	Commissioned
Kurmuk Type 15	n/a	Patrol Craft - Inshore	4	4	1989
Sewart	n/a	Patrol Craft - Inshore	4	4 ¹	1975
Ashooraa I	n/a	Patrol Craft - Inshore	8	7 ²	1992

Notes:

1. Transferred from Iranian Coast Guard. All are based at Flamingo Bay but operational status is doubtful.
2. Four vessels based at Flamingo Bay and three at Khartoum but operational status is doubtful.

Auxiliaries [TOP](#)

Class	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	Commissioned
Supply Ships	n/a	Supply Ship	2	2	1969
Type II LCVP	n/a	Landing Craft	5	n/a	n/a ¹
<i>Baraka 21</i>	n/a	Water Boat	1	1	n/a
Rotork 512	Rotork	Support Craft	1	1	n/a
<p>Note:</p> <p>1. Delivered from Yugoslavia in 1991.</p>					

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[1 Image](#)

Army, Sudan

Date Posted: 12-Jan-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

ARMY

[Summary](#)

[Assessment](#)

[Adaptability](#)

[Sustainment](#)

[Readiness](#)

[Deployments, tasks and operations](#)

[Role and Deployment](#)

[Recent and Current Operations](#)

[Command and control](#)

[Organisation](#)

[Towards a New Sudanese Army](#)

[Order of Battle](#)

[Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine](#)

[Bases](#)

[Training](#)

[Training Areas](#)

[Military Exercises](#)

[Equipment in service](#)

[Armour](#)

[Artillery](#)

[Anti-Tank Weapons](#)

[Air Defence Weapons](#)

[Infantry Weapons](#)

Summary

[TOP](#)

STRENGTH

100,000 + associated militias

INFANTRY

Division × 6

Independent Brigade × 7

Mechanised Division × 1

Independent Mechanised Brigade × 1

ARMOUR

Division × 1

ARTILLERY

Regiment × 3

SPECIAL FORCES

Airborne Division × 1

Special Forces Battalion

Assessment

[TOP](#)

Over the years the Sudanese Army has been beset by recruitment problems as northern Sudanese became increasingly reluctant to fight in the civil war in the south of the country. The ranks of the army are believed to have been swollen with southerners forced into service. Soldiers have also protested over delays in pay. The army has also been weakened by political purges, internal divisions and widespread corruption. President Bashir, a former army officer, is generally assumed to command the army's loyalty, and there appears to have been significant investment with regards to procurement provided by the expanding oil industry.

The government of Sudan announced on 9 January 2008 that it had completed withdrawing all of its troops from southern Sudan to north of "the 1956 border in accordance with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement" between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

Major General James Hoth of the southern Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is reported to have confirmed that most government troops had been withdrawn, saying that about 1,000 were still in the south, delayed by transport problems, but they, too, had been withdrawn by 12 January 2008. The withdrawal should have been completed in July 2007.

The continued presence of government troops in parts of the south came close to causing the 2005 peace agreement to fail towards the end of 2007. At that stage the SPLM government of the south was reported as believing that as many as 17,000 northern troops remained south of the line, although Khartoum said that only 3,600 personnel were still deployed there. International aid agencies warned in January 2010 that increasing violence in the south was again putting the peace deal at risk. They said that potential flashpoints over Sudan's oil resources, a general election in April 2009 and an independence referendum due in 2011, could see a return to civil war between the north and south of the country.

Sudanese government troops continued to clash with the SPLA in the oil-rich town of Abyei during a string of encounters beginning on 13 May 2008. The Sudanese Army blamed the violence on the SPLA, which it says "besieged the barracks" of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) that is supposed to be responsible for the security of Abyei. The SPLM, however, accused the army's 31 Brigade of triggering the clashes and of using artillery and mortars to bombard the town. A fragile peace deal between north and south Sudan was restored the following month with agreement concerning Abyei. Both northern and southern Sudanese officials have voiced their commitment to a July 2009 ruling on the disputed Abyei boundaries by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based in the Hague.

Adaptability [TOP](#)

The Sudanese Army is mainly concerned with combating the regional insurgency of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Darfur region in the west of the country. In the absence of recent operational experience against foreign forces it is not possible to offer an evidential analysis of how the force operates against conventional or asymmetrical forces in different environments.

Sustainment [TOP](#)

There do not appear to be any reserve personnel to provide support for regular forces in the army.

Readiness [TOP](#)

The army is understood to include a Special Forces battalion but it is not known if it has a rapid deployment capability.

Deployments, tasks and operations [TOP](#)

Role and Deployment [TOP](#)

Counter-Insurgency

During the decades of rebellion in the south, the main focus of the army was on counter-insurgency operations in that region, until the peace process came into being. While army units participated in large-scale offensive manoeuvres during the dry season, much of the force was committed to garrisoning strategic towns in the south and units were often unable to move far from these bases due to rebel activity.

Since early 2003 Sudan has been deploying the army in considerable strength in the Darfur region in the west of the country to combat the regional insurgency of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). However, while the air force has been deployed in strength against rebel and civilian targets, it appears that much of the ground fighting has been tasked to *ad hoc* local Arab militias and the Popular Defence Force (PDF) rather than to the army.

The SPLA was instructed to increase its presence near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following an attack by the rebel Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Sudan in June 2008. The following December the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) decided to close and secure its borders and major supply routes leading to Kenya, Uganda and the DRC as the crisis with the LRA intensified.

Internal Security

In October 2001 President Bashir relieved the army of its internal security role so that it could concentrate on fighting the civil war. The Interior Ministry was charged with assuming the responsibility of guarding Sudan's highways and national resources; it was not clear whether this included the oil infrastructure. Previously, the army had an extensive police role, helping to combat armed criminals and smugglers. In recent years the Sudanese Government has been investing heavily in the police forces and police air arm who are increasingly becoming a more paramilitary-type force complete with military uniforms, military ranks and being armed with light machine guns.

In May 2008 Sudan's largest and most militarily capable Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) made an ambitious assault on the Sudanese capital Khartoum after crossing more than 600 km of bush and desert from their launching point on the Chadian border. The attack was repulsed after reaching the suburbs of Omdurman (part of the tri-city national capital region), but shocked the ruling elite, which immediately began rounding up Darfuris residing in the capital, especially those of the Zaghawa tribe, on suspicion of aiding the JEM rebels. Those detained included army officers from Darfur. There were no signs, however, of simultaneous disturbances in the capital during the JEM assault. The Sudanese government and the JEM subsequently signed a goodwill and confidence-building agreement on 17 February 2009, paving the way for further Darfur peace talks.

Recent and Current Operations [TOP](#)

No contributions to UN operations have been made. However, a very small deployment was

made to neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002 to act as a peace support force under the nominal command of the Libyan-led Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). In March 2008, over 500 Sudanese soldiers played a significant role in the successful combined Comoros National Development Army (NDA) and African Union force that removed rebel Anjouan leader Mohammed Bacar from power in the Comoros.

CEN-SAD Mission to CAR

Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and Sudan agreed in January 2002 to contribute troops to a peacekeeping force for the CAR to operate under the auspices of CEN-SAD, a regional body of northern and central African states established in February 1998 to facilitate economic and security co-operation in the region, which extends from Senegal to Somalia, with the CAR at its southern edge. Sudan, which held the CEN-SAD presidency in 2002, offered to lead the force, which would be deployed in Bangui. CEN-SAD did not specify the number of troops to be sent.

An initial deployment of 50 Sudanese troops to Bangui in mid-February 2002 joined about 200 Libyan troops deployed with the Presidential Guard since May 2001. CAR defence sources indicated that they expected at least another 150 Sudanese and Djiboutian troops to arrive to patrol the Chadian border. These forces proved effective at guarding the president but there was never a sense that the Libyan troops - which were again bolstered in late October 2002, including the deployment of attack aircraft - operated under anyone else's mandate, while command and mandate of the Sudanese and Djiboutian troops was unclear.

The domestic opposition and foreign donors objected strongly to the prolonged deployment of Libyans in Bangui and secured the replacement of the CEN-SAD force with a more neutral, if ineffective, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) force in December 2002.

African Standby Force

Sudan joined 12 regional states to form the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) of the African Union's (AU) planned African Standby Force (ASF) in February 2004. Other countries involved were Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi was admitted as an additional member of the regional grouping in January 2008 whilst Tanzania subsequently joined SADC BRIG, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) contribution to the African Standby Force. Sudan initially pledged one light infantry battalion with transport for the brigade.

More than 20,000 soldiers, engineers and other specialist personnel have been pledged by countries in the region, although the bulk of fighting units are expected to comprise soldiers from the 'Big Five': Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda.

EASBRIG is intended to make rapid military interventions in the East Africa and Horn sub-region. Initial work on co-ordinating the development of EASBRIG was delegated to the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which represents seven of the countries and has its secretariat in Djibouti. The EASBRIG Co-ordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) was set up in March 2007 by the East African heads of state and government to act as the political secretariat of the force, replacing IGAD which had previously served in this role. It is expected that EASBRIG will have at least interim operating capacity by 30 June 2010 to conduct the range of mandated tasks, including observer missions, peacekeeping and peace support missions. In October 2009 military experts from Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland were in Kenya to help fast-track the process of setting up the brigade.

East Africa will also establish a regional early-warning system with a situation room linked to an AU continental early-warning system. It will also co-ordinate and harmonise resource contributions and commitments and verify what is actually available to ensure that the brigade can be fielded and that there is a pool of force elements to allow redundancy and possible multi-mission scenarios, as well as the necessary logistic and training infrastructure.

The primary management authority over EASBRIG is an Assembly of Heads of State of Eastern Africa acting through a council of ministers of defence and security. A committee of chiefs of defence staff handle oversight and direction. The functional organisation comprises a planning element (PLANELM) and the brigade. The PLANELM is based in Nairobi, Kenya, together with EASBRICOM, and will plan and implement the establishment of EASBRIG. It will develop and update the relevant standard operating procedures (SOPs) within the framework of generic AU SOPs and in line with UN doctrine. In February 2009, Kenya established a standing headquarters for personnel to meet the rapid deployment capability (RDC) requirement for the East African component of the ASF. EASBRIG has its brigade headquarters and a logistics base in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In June 2008 the Kenyan government received KES120 million (USD2.79 million) from the UK for the construction of the Kenya Rapid Deployment Capacity (KRDC) facility which opened the following February at Embakasi garrison and can host a force of up to 7,000 as part of the ASF.

The PLANELM is also responsible for evolving a concept of combined force preparation, including the planning and conduct of regional combined training exercises; establishing a concept of mobilisation and pre-deployment training to ensure mission readiness; and developing the requisite databases, option sets and contingency plans for rapid deployment. It is also tasked to investigate sealift to deploy forces along the East African seaboard.

The PLANELM has been given four initial mission scenarios for planning guidelines:

- AU/regional military advice to a political mission;
- AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission;
- Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission;
- AU/Regional peacekeeping force and preventative deployment missions and peace-building.

The concept is initially to focus the brigade's capabilities on the last scenario, which will also allow it to handle the three simpler missions. In the longer term, PLANELM has been asked to develop a capability to deal with two further mission scenarios:

- AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers;
- AU intervention.

The brigade, one of five that will make up the Africa Standby Force, will comprise four light infantry battalions and a military observer unit. Soldiers assigned to the brigades will remain in their countries and peace-keeping forces will be sent into war zones within a month after approval by the AU and United Nations or, in the event of genocide, within two weeks.

However, one of the most acute problems is the shortage of tactical lift. In EASBRIG alone, only two countries - Ethiopia and Sudan - have the transport aircraft necessary to lift equipment or personnel, while none of the countries in the region has the required sealift capability. Another area where there is a near-total dependence on international support is logistics. None of the militaries has the capacity to co-ordinate the logistical support necessary to sustain a lengthy peacekeeping operation. Responding to that need as part of the peace-support process co-ordinated by the UK Armed Forces, extensive logistics training is planned for 2010.

A Command Post Exercise (CPX), Exercise Amani, took place in Nairobi in November 2008 with the aim of confirming the Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) of the Brigade HQ and PLANELM mechanisms. Around 1,500 soldiers and police officers representing ten of the East African countries completed five days of a field training exercise in Djibouti in early December 2009, marking a significant step on the way to achieving initial operability of a standby brigade, and an exercise involving all the regional standby forces has been scheduled for early 2010. Code-named Amani Africa, this exercise will test the operationalisation of the ASF security architecture.

Command and control [TOP](#)

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces:	President Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
Minister of Defence:	Major General Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn
Chief of Joint Staff:	General Muhammad Abd-al-Qadir Nasr-al-Din
Commander of the Joint Operations and Training Administration:	Lieutenant General Ali Al-Sharif
Commander of the Land Army:	Lieutenant General Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Zayn

Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir holds both the posts of national president and commander in chief of the armed forces and People's Defence Forces (PDF). The minister of defence has operational command of the armed forces. There is a defence planning body, known as the National Defence Council, which operates through the defence ministry. The commander of the armed forces now has the title chief of joint staff.

Following the agreement of September 2003 to end the civil war in the south, both the government and the opposition agreed to the setting up of a Joint Defence Board (JDB), which was formally established by decree by President Bashir in December 2005. It was stated that the JDB, under the authority of the presidency, would comprise the chiefs of staff of the Sudan Armed Forces and the former rebel force, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, their deputies and any number of senior officers to be agreed to by the parties. It was agreed that all decisions will be reached by consensus, that the JDB would be chaired alternately by the respective chiefs of staff, and that the JDB would facilitate co-ordination between the two forces and command of the joint/integrated units.

Organisation [TOP](#)

From a territorial point of view, the army is organised on the basis of regional military commands. There were traditionally six military regional commands - central, eastern, western, northern, southern and Khartoum, with the Khartoum district further divided into three sub-divisions. Currently, the army's greatest focus is on the western regional command, which covers the troubled Darfur region.

There are a number of infantry divisions, divided among regional commands. The commander of each military region traditionally commanded the divisional and brigade commanders within his territory. It is understood that there are six infantry divisions and seven independent infantry brigades; a mechanised division and an independent mechanised infantry brigade; and an armoured division. Other elements are understood to include a Special Forces battalion with five companies; an airborne division and a border guard brigade. Support elements include an engineer division.

Military Intelligence, a branch of the General Staff, operates border intelligence guard units.

Sudan: Army Organisation

1293462

Towards a New Sudanese Army [TOP](#)

Sudan has embarked on an ambitious UN-backed disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) programme aiming to integrate more than 180,000 former combatants into civilian life, among them tens of thousands of children forcibly recruited to fight in Africa's longest civil war.

Agreed under the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement, signed between the government in the north and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which leads the semi-autonomous south, the staggered scheme will draw personnel equally from both government and SPLM forces.

Each demobilised combatant will receive USD400, 10 weeks of rations for a family of five

and a package of basic tools including a mosquito net, plastic sheeting and a wind-up radio, according to the UN development programme (UNDP), which is helping to co-ordinate the programme. A further USD1,750 will be available to each demobilised combatant for re-integration support.

Sudan is expected to contribute some USD45 million to the USD385 million programme, largely funded by international donors and the UN itself. Initial lists of combatants have run to some 50,000 names - though none of them include fighters in the five-year-old conflict in the western Darfur region, which has devolved into full-scale banditry waged by militias on both sides of the border with Chad.

In addition to the Darfur crisis, Sudan faces the possibility of mounting tensions between north and south in the wake of clashes in May over the disputed oil-rich town of Abyei. Further destabilisation of the peace pact may come from the series of shipments of main battle tanks (MBTs) and other weaponry into south Sudan - the most recent of which was seized by Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden.

A senior military official familiar with the details of the deal confirmed to *Jane's* that the Ukrainian-made T-72 MBTs aboard the MV Faina were bound for south Sudan, the third such shipment. South Sudan officials have vehemently denied they were the designated recipients of the shipment, which also included various small arms.

DDR organisers have established a three-year timetable for the process, slated to begin in January 2009 and continue up to June 2012. The process began in the north a month later than planned and got underway in Southern Sudan the following June. According to the UN, more than 15,000 former combatants had gone through the DDR process by November 2009. National elections, which were due to take place in 2009, were postponed until April 2010 and will be followed by a 2011 referendum on independence in the south.

The framework agreement covers security arrangements for a six-year transition period before the south votes in a referendum on secession from Khartoum. It permits the SPLA to retain its forces in southern Sudan - the main area of conflict - while government and rebel forces will be 'integrated' in the capital, Khartoum, and three areas of conflict in central Sudan. The redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan to south of the South/North border of 1956 will be completed within one year from the beginning of the pre-interim period. An internationally monitored ceasefire will come into effect once both sides have reached a comprehensive peace agreement.

The government and the SPLA have agreed to establish a 39,600 strong army comprising fighters from both sides. This would be in addition to independent forces maintained by both sides within their respective areas of control, North and South. Joint/integrated units will be formed consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA during the interim period. These units will constitute a nucleus of a new national army if the referendum produces a majority in favour of maintaining Sudan's current territorial structure. If the outcome of the referendum supports partition they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.

The size and deployment of the joint/integrated units throughout the interim period has been agreed at:

Southern Sudan: 24,000
 Nuba Mountains: 6,000
 Southern Blue Nile: 6,000
 Khartoum: 3,000
 Abyei: 600

As part of a peace agreement both parties agreed that the two forces will remain separate during the interim period. They also concurred that both forces should be considered and treated equally as Sudan's national armed forces during the interim period. No armed group allied to either party will be allowed to operate outside the two forces.

The SAF and SPLA have agreed to the principle of proportional reductions of the forces following the completion of the comprehensive ceasefire arrangements. Neither force will have any internal law and order mandate except in constitutionally specified emergencies.

Order of Battle [TOP](#)

Unit	Location	Comments
Western Military Command	HQ: El Fasher, North Darfur	Commands two infantry divisions covering three Darfur states
6th Infantry Division	HQ: El Fasher	Covers Northern and Western Darfur
16th Infantry Division. Elements reportedly include: 7th Infantry Brigade 96th Infantry Brigade	HQ: Nyala, Southern Darfur HQ: Kebkabiya HQ: Zalingei	Covers Southern Darfur

Proposed interim Order of Battle for Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

Unit	Location	Comments
1st Infantry Division	HQ: Juba town	Covers Equatoria region
Torit Brigade	HQ: Torit town	Covers Equatoria region
Mariti Brigade	HQ: Maridi town	Covers Equatoria region
2nd Infantry Division	HQ: Malakal town	Covers Upper Nile area
Malakal Brigade	HQ: Malakal town	Covers Upper Nile area
Bentiu Brigade	HQ: Bentiu town	Covers Upper Nile area
3rd Infantry Division	HQ: Wau town	Covers Bahr el Ghazal area

Wau Brigade	HQ: Wau town	Covers Bahr el Ghazal area
Aweil Brigade	HQ: Aweil town	Covers Bahr el Ghazal area
Elements also to include: JIU Independent Infantry Battalion	HQ: Abeyi	Covers Abeyi area
4th Infantry Division	HQ: Dindiro town	Covers southern Blue Nile region
Dindiro Brigade	HQ: Dindiro town	Covers southern Blue Nile region
Takamui Brigade	HQ: Takamui town	Covers southern Blue Nile region
5th Infantry Division	HQ: Kadugli town	Covers southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains
Kadugli Brigade	HQ: Heiban	Covers southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains
Deleng Brigade	HQ: Deleng town	Covers southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains
Khartoum Independent Brigade	HQ: Khartoum	To be deployed with Republican Guard in Soba

Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine [TOP](#)

The army's tactical doctrine and force structure follow a 'colonial Soviet' pattern.

Under the Framework Agreement of September 2003, both the Sudanese Army and the SPLA should develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the joint/integrated units, as well as a basis for a post interim period army of the Sudan, if a mooted referendum vote favours unity after 2011. The common doctrine would be developed within one year from the beginning of the interim period and would be likely to draw upon substantial Western military assistance.

Bases [TOP](#)

Atbara
Dongola
El-Fashir
El-Geneina
Juba
Kassala
Khartoum
Nyala

Omdurman

Port Sudan

Training [TOP](#)

Sudanese Army officers have traditionally been trained at the Military College in Omdurman, which opened in 1948. A Staff College at Omdurman provided advanced courses to officers. It emerged in 2007 that a number of mid and senior ranking officers of the Sudanese Armed Forces were receiving training in UK military establishments as part of an effort by the UK Ministry of Defence to support the 2005 peace deal that marked the end of the civil war in the south. A media report in 2002 claimed that the government contracted South African-based military experts to provide training to Sudanese special forces officers in counter-insurgency operations to guard the oil fields.

During the 1990s, elements of the army and the national militia were trained by a small team from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is understood that Iranian advisers were active in the counter-insurgency war in the Equatorial and Upper Nile provinces. Most analysts believe that the success of the Sudanese Army in its operations in the south during the early 1990s was due to the influence of Iranian advisers teaching tactics and logistical support, previously lacking in the planning staff of the Sudanese Army. These advisers left Sudan in the late 1990s.

During the proposed interim administration period agreed to in September 2003, it was agreed that the training of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (in the South), the Sudan Armed Forces (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) would be based on a common doctrine and programme.

Around 300 Kenyan military officers travelled to southern Sudan in August 2009 to train members of the country's army in specialist skills following a request by the Sudanese government two years earlier. The training, which was due to last for four months, was expected to focus on the transformation of the SPLA from a former rebel guerrilla force into a conventional army.

USD300,000 was requested in the 2010 US budget for International Military Education and Training (IMET) in Sudan, following an estimated figure of USD400,000 in FY2009 and an actual figure of USD96,000 in FY2007, the first time since 1989 that funding for this programme had been requested for Sudan. The IMET programme provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations with funding appropriated from the International Affairs budget of the Department of State. IMET courses in Sudan focus on civil-military relations, defence resources management, military justice, and English language training in order to support security sector reform efforts.

Training Areas [TOP](#)

Sudan has compulsory military service and conscripts receive basic training in local army barracks in each state. Army officers are trained at the Military College with advanced courses

available to them at the Staff College, both of which are in Omdurman, a suburb of Khartoum.

Military Exercises [TOP](#)

Around 1,500 soldiers and police officers representing 10 East African countries (Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) completed five days of a field training exercise in December 2009, marking a significant step on the way to achieving initial operability of the East African Standby Force (EASF).

Scenarios for exercise 'Amani Carana' included simulations of the likely incidents that would occur during a peace-enforcement or peace-support mission. In one instance, the participants had to secure a convoy carrying internally displaced refugees involved in a road accident, eliciting an angry response from the local population.

Equipment in service [TOP](#)

Armour [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	First Delivery
T-72	Former Soviet state factories	Main Battle Tank	100	n/a	n/a ¹
T-54/55	Former Soviet state factories	Main Battle Tank	270 ²	250	n/a
Type 96	NORINCO	Main Battle Tank	n/a	n/a	2006
Type 59	NORINCO	Main Battle Tank	60	60	n/a
n/a ³	NORINCO	Main Battle Tank	n/a	n/a	n/a
Type 63	NORINCO	Light Tank	45	40	n/a
Type 62	NORINCO	Light Tank	70	25	n/a
Saladin Mk2	Alvis	Reconnaissance Vehicle	40	20	n/a
AML-90	Panhard General Defense	Reconnaissance Vehicle	6	6	n/a
Ferret	Daimler Company Limited	Reconnaissance Vehicle	50	50	n/a
Type 92 (6 × 6)	NORINCO	Infantry Fighting Vehicle ⁴	n/a	n/a	2006
BRDM-1/BRDM-2 ⁵	n/a	Reconnaissance Vehicle	60	50	n/a
BMP-1/2	n/a ⁶	Armoured Fighting Vehicle (Tracked)	30	20	n/a
BTR-50	Former Soviet state	Armoured Personnel	60	30	n/a

	factories	Carrier (Tracked)			
BTR-80A	Arzamas Machinery Plant	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Wheeled)	60	60	2001
BTR-70	Arzamas Machinery Plant	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Wheeled)	n/a	n/a	2003
BTR-152	Former Soviet state factories	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Wheeled)	50	40	n/a
OT-62	Former Czechoslovakian state factories	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Tracked)	20	10	n/a
OT-64	Former Czechoslovakian state factories	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Wheeled)	50	50	n/a
M113A1	BAE Systems	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Tracked)	36	30	n/a
Walid Mk1/2	Kader Factory for Developed Industries	Armoured Personnel Carrier (Wheeled)	100	96	n/a

Notes:

1. The deal for the T-72 tanks was signed in early 2005 with Ukraine.
2. Figure uncertain. 20 additional T-55 MBTs were acquired from Poland via Yemen in 1999 and another 60 T-55M followed from Russia via Belarus in 1999-2001.
3. A 105 mm armed Chinese MBT.
4. The Chinese Type 96 MBT is a development of NORINCO Type 85 MBT.
5. The manufacturer is Russian with some vehicles supplied from Belarus.
6. BMP-1 and BMP-2 are Russian Infantry Fighting Vehicles and some of the BMP-2s are from Ukraine and Belarus.

Artillery [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	First Delivery
155 mm Mk F3	Nexter Systems	Self-Propelled Howitzer	6	6	n/a
122 mm 2S1	Former Soviet state factories	Self-Propelled Howitzer	10	10	2003
155 mm M114	Rock Island Arsenal	Howitzer	18	18	n/a
122 mm M1938	Joint Stock Company Spetstechnika	Howitzer	24	24	n/a

122 mm Type 54	NORINCO	Howitzer	76	60	n/a
122 mm D-30	Joint Stock Company Spetstechnika	Howitzer	50	24	2002
105 mm M56	Oto Melara SpA	Howitzer	12	12	n/a
105 mm M101	Rock Island Arsenal	Howitzer	20	18	n/a
25-pounder	n/a	Field Gun	350	n/a	n/a
130 mm Type 59-1	NORINCO	Field Gun	35	35	n/a
130 mm M-46	Motovilikha Plants Corporation	Field Gun	40	40	n/a
122 mm Type 60	NORINCO	Field Gun	10	10	n/a
100 mm M1944	Russian Federation state factories	Field Gun	50	n/a	n/a
85 mm D-44	Joint Stock Company Spetstechnika	Field Gun	100	n/a	n/a
120 mm Brandt	n/a	Mortar	24	12	n/a
82 mm M43	Former Soviet state factories	Mortar	20	20	n/a
81 mm M37M	Former Soviet state factories	Mortar	150	150	n/a
122 mm BM-21	Former Soviet state factories	Multiple Rocket System	90	50	n/a
107 mm Type 63	NORINCO	Multiple Rocket System	600	n/a	1994

Note:

There are reports that six 155 mm AMX Mk F-3 self-propelled vehicles are included in the inventory. Although they have been identified from television footage, there is no indication of their origin. Those systems listed as none in service are currently in store.

Anti-Tank Weapons [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total	In Service	First Delivery
Swingfire	MBDA	Anti-Tank Guided Missile	n/a	5	n/a

RPG-7	Kovrov Mechanical Plant	Rocket-Propelled Grenade	3,000	3,000	n/a
85 mm D-48	Joint Stock Company Spetstechnika	Anti-Tank Gun	n/a	25	n/a
76 mm Type 54	n/a	Anti-Tank Gun	n/a	30	n/a
106 mm M40A1	n/a	Recoilless Rifle	100	90	n/a

Note:

Almost all Swingfire ATGMs are thought to be unserviceable, with an estimated five systems still in service.

Air Defence Weapons [TOP](#)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Original Total ¹	In Service	First Delivery
9K32/9K32M Strela-2/2M (SA-7a/b 'Grail')	KBM Kolomna	Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile	250	100	1981
FN-6	Chinese state factories and CPMIEC	Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile	10	10	2007
S-75 Dvina (SA-2 'Guideline')	Almaz / Antei	Surface-to-Air Missile	18	n/a	1984
20 mm M163 VADS	General Dynamics	Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun	8	n/a	1981
100 mm KS-19	Russian State Factories	Anti-Aircraft Gun	10	10	n/a
85 mm KS-12	Russian State Factories	Anti-Aircraft Gun ²	35	35	n/a
40 mm Bofors L/60	Bofors Defence	Anti-Aircraft Gun	n/a	n/a	n/a
37 mm M1939	Czech State Factory's and Plant No 8 Kaliningrad and NORINCO	Anti-Aircraft Gun	120	100	n/a
20 mm M167 VADS	General Dynamics	Light Anti-Aircraft Gun (Towed)	8	n/a	n/a
23 mm ZU-23-2	Bulgaria, Finland,	Light Anti-	50	20	n/a

	Russia and Egypt	Aircraft Gun (Twin)			
14.5 mm ZPU-2	China, North Korea, Romania and Russia	Light Anti-Aircraft Gun (Twin)	20	n/a	n/a
14.5 mm ZPU-4	China, North Korea, Romania and Russia	Light Anti-Aircraft Gun (Quad)	5	5	n/a
Notes:					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> All figures are estimates. Air defence weapons are nominally under the air force command. Operate with Fire Can radars. 					

Infantry Weapons [TOP](#)

Type	Role
9 mm Helwan	Pistol
9 mm H&K P9S	Pistol
9 mm FN 35	Pistol
7.62 mm SKS	Rifle
7.62 mm G3	Rifle
7.62 mm AK-47, AKM	Rifle
9 mm Sterling	Sub-Machine Gun
9 mm H&K MP5	Sub-Machine Gun
9 mm Beretta M12	Sub-Machine Gun
9 mm Uzi	Sub-Machine Gun
7.62 mm RPD, RPK	Light Machine Gun
7.62 mm RP-46	Machine Gun
7.62 mm SGM	Medium Machine Gun
7.62 mm MG3	Medium Machine Gun
7.62 mm HK21	General-Purpose Machine Gun
7.62 mm M60	General-Purpose Machine Gun

UPDATED

Armed forces, Sudan

Date Posted: 12-Jan-2010

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

ARMED FORCES

[Summary](#)

[Assessment](#)

[Military Reform](#)

[Joint Forces Interoperability](#)

[Force Projection](#)

[Force Readiness](#)

[Force Sustainment](#)

[Adaptability](#)

[Doctrine and strategy](#)

[Defence structure](#)

[Chain of command](#)

[Logistics](#)

[Communications](#)

[Military Transport](#)

[Engineering Services](#)

[Munition Services](#)

Summary

[TOP](#)

	Total Strength	Army	Air Force	Navy
Active Personnel	104,300	100,000	3,000	1,300
Reserves	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Note: All figures are estimates				

Assessment

[TOP](#)

Sudan has been seeking to enhance the capabilities of the armed forces by procuring modern

weapons systems. Historically, Sudan's military forces were handicapped by limited and outdated equipment. The Sudanese Government was assisted by the US during the 1980s in upgrading the forces' equipment, with a particular emphasis on airlift capabilities and logistics. However, following the military coup of 1989, US military assistance came to an end and Sudan looked to other suppliers.

Since oil revenues came on-stream in 1999, Sudan has been one of the most active procurers of military equipment in Africa. Modern weapons systems, mostly of Russian design, were purchased with the aid of the new oil wealth, including Hind attack helicopters, advanced fighter aircraft, main battle tanks and artillery pieces, as well as assault rifles. This equipment is often in a very poor state of repair and sufficient detail is unavailable to judge how well some of the equipment has been absorbed by the forces. In more recent times there have also been reports of imported equipment being controversially deployed in the troubled Darfur region.

During the 1990s, the ruling Islamist regime carried out periodic purges of the professional officer corps and, as a result, command authority was eroded and operational capabilities were adversely affected. The Sudanese government conceded that in seeking to carry on its military campaign in southern Sudan against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), it was obliged to deploy former rebel and Arab militias in support of regular troops. During the conflict in Darfur in more recent times, the government clearly did not trust the armed forces, many of whose members were originally from Darfur, and relied on the 'Janjaweed' militias as the main ground forces for the government's counter insurgency campaign in the region, supported by the air force.

The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) formally took over from the existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on 31 December 2007 for an initial period of 12 months. The mandate was extended on 31 July 2008 for a further 12 months and again on 6 August 2009 until 31 July 2010. UNAMID's 2009-2010 budget of USD1.6 billion is the largest for UN peacekeeping operations. At full strength, it is expected to be one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations in history with almost 20,000 troops, in excess of 6,000 police plus a substantial civilian component. However, full deployment has been hampered by a lack of co-operation from the Sudanese government, delays in the readiness of contributors to deploy, the prohibitive environment, and the immense logistical challenges inherent to Darfur. The force on the ground at the end of November 2009 included units from Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia together with small contributions from 31 other countries, comprising in total 14,681 troops, 4,636 police officers and 271 military observers supported by 1,053 international civilian personnel, 2,357 local civilian staff and 406 United Nations volunteers. The number of troops represented 75 per cent of the 19,555 mandated by the UN and the number of police officers 72 per cent of the 6,432 mandated. Tanzania had said it would send an entire infantry battalion of about 900 and advance party including engineers in 2009 but by the end of November only 287 troops were deployed with the mission plus 66 police officers and 15 military observers. Lieutenant General Patrick Nyanvumba of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) was appointed overall force commander for UNAMID by the UN Security

Council for one year with effect from 1 September 2009.

The new US command for Africa (AFRICOM) is co-ordinating its first-ever airlift to transport an estimated 75 tonnes of equipment from Rwanda to Sudan in support of UNAMID. Speaking to *Jane's* on 7 January 2009 from the command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, AFRICOM spokesman Vince Crawley said that two US Air Force (USAF) Boeing C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft would "in the next several weeks" move nine oversized vehicles, five other vehicles and an array of other equipment to support the Rwandan contingent of peacekeepers. The first two missions were completed a week later with C-17 Globemaster aircraft each carrying about 30 tons of materiel.

The UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was set up following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1547 on 11 June 2004 and given the task of preparing for a fully-fledged UN peace support mission to be deployed during the interim period following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). UNAMIS was transformed into the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005, with the UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1590, which tasked UNMIS with supporting the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in the implementation of the CPA. UNMIS was initially established for a period of six months and has a mandate authorising up to 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 715 civilian police personnel. UNMIS is scheduled to stay in Sudan for a total of seven years, which covers the six-year interim period from July 2005 until July 2011, as well as the six-month pre-interim period and the six-month phase-out stage. The mandate is currently authorised until 30 April 2010. Mission strength at the end of November 2009 stood at 9,955 uniformed personnel comprising 8,806 troops, 477 military observers and 672 police officers. 66 countries were contributing personnel at that time with the largest contingent coming from India (2,679) followed by Pakistan (1,519), Bangladesh (1,500) and Egypt (1,269).

Military Reform [TOP](#)

Sudan has a long-term plan to develop the capabilities of the armed forces. In December 2003, the then defence minister, Major General Bakri Hassan Salih, referred to "an ambitious 20 year plan for the revival and development of the Sudanese Army".

In March 2006, Sudan's minister of defence announced a new structure for the High Command of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to enable it to be more effective. It was thought likely that one of the aims of the re-organisation was to enhance the effectiveness of joint operations, and as part of the process, new senior appointments in the military were made as part of the restructuring. The restructuring and reshuffle may have been prompted by the conflict in the Darfur region in western Sudan, where Sudanese land forces and proxy militias, supported by the air force, were engaged in a highly controversial counter-insurgency campaign. President Bashir subsequently appointed new staff to all the major armed forces positions in April 2008, with the exception of the commander of naval forces.

Joint Forces Interoperability [TOP](#)

As part of the peace settlement in southern Sudan, it was agreed that joint integrated units (JIUs) would be formed by the SAF and the former southern rebel SPLA with a total target size of 39,600 troops. Divided equally between SPLA and SAF, 24,000 personnel will be based in South Sudan, 600 in Abyei, 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains, 6,000 in Blue Nile, and 3,000 in Khartoum. The Joint Integrated Units Act was endorsed by the National Assembly in January 2006. The formation of these JIUs has been one of the recent challenges facing the SAF. The units come under the direct command and control of the Joint Defence Board (JDB), the chairmanship of which rotates between the SAF and SPLA. By the latter part of 2007, it was reported that the formation, training and deployment of the JIUs remained well behind schedule. A report by the UN secretary general to the Security Council in October 2007 found that joint command and control was largely ineffective, with the SAF and SPLA components of the JIUs reporting to their respective headquarters, rather than through the JIU chain of command. By the following March, the JIUs were still not fully deployed and continued to face confusion over their force composition, as well as suffering from command and control issues and a lack of systematic and co-ordinated training. Time frames for their deployment have been frequently renegotiated and later ignored.

Tri-Service Interoperability

Whilst the Sudanese Air Force is organised to provide support for land forces, there are no significant instances of the three branches of the armed forces operating on a joint basis.

Multinational Interoperability

Sudan has not made any contributions to UN operations. However, a very small deployment was made to neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002 to act as a peace support force under the nominal command of the Libyan-led Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). In March 2008, over 500 Sudanese soldiers played a significant role in the successful combined Comoros National Development Army (NDA) and African Union force that removed rebel Anjouan leader Mohammed Bacar from power in the Comoros.

Sudan is a member of the East African Brigade (EASBRIG), one of five regional brigades being established by the African Union (AU) as an African Standby Force (ASF).

Force Projection