

Maritime Strategy and Arms Procurement in Brazil and Argentina

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United States opposition to West Germany's sale of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology to Brazil, while encompassing an admirable desire to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons, has unfortunately been couched in phrases offensive to any independent sovereign nation. Add to this President Carter's Wilsonian campaign to upgrade the observation of human rights to a standard defined (but not always observed) by the

United States, and the effect seems to many Latin American leaders to be one of arrogant dictation by a superpower unable to understand the internal problems of Latin American countries.

This US crusade suffers from two major liabilities. One is the politically effective, if not legally recognized rebuttal of *tu quoque*. How can the US score the German-Brazilian nuclear deal when it continues to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons of its own and fails to agree with the Soviet Union on a limitation of those arms? How can the US cut off military aid on the grounds that certain Latin American countries do not measure up to US standards of human rights protection, while continuing to sell arms to Iran, South Korea and the Philippines? The second, and perhaps more important liability is that the manner chosen to promote US interests does not place sufficient emphasis on the fact that, in Latin America at least, the nations the US is trying to persuade have been politically independent for over one hundred years. Over that time these countries have developed domestic and foreign policies of their own, so to lecture them on their inadequacies may understandably appear to them to reimpose a colonial relationship which has long since passed away.

This is especially true in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. While their histories have been fraught with civil strife, coups, and revolutions, both countries have nevertheless nurtured a cultural self-awareness matching that of the United States. This is not to applaud the measures these countries have adopted to counter perceived threats. However, it is important for the US to understand that the underlying political philosophy which guides their leaders is not the same as that in the US.

According to Latin American scholar Jose Comblin, the underlying ideology of the leaders of Brazil and Argentina comprises three fundamental concepts of "national security." One is a geopolitical ethos which considers the state as a

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vital organism growing, struggling, expanding and defending itself. The individual's role is to serve the needs of the state. Second, the state is involved in perpetual war with alien belief systems; currently it is directed against communist ideology. It is a war for men's minds — total war — in which every weapon is used and every citizen is a combatant. Third, because the battle is unremitting, the military must be in control to direct the fight. The military, by training and inclination, is the only group cohesive and determined enough to lead.¹

An emphasis on the military may be self-serving but it does grow from genuinely-held fears. In Brazil the "glorious revolution" of 1964 is seen as lifting that country out of the chaos of ineffectual democratic rule and preparing her for the great economic boom which followed. In Argentina the currently ruling junta sees itself as the only group able to act in support of the country's true national interests. Political dissidence is seen as mere disgruntlement or worse, a concerted attempt by Marxists to pull down the Catholic, capitalist culture essential to sustain Argentine civilization. The ideology is both mystical and technocratic. Brazilian Generals speak of Brazil's tradition and training as based "on the cross of Christ."² They argue that Brazilian Congressmen must see themselves as experts in electoral affairs, charged not with debating the merits of a program but seeing to it that projects proposed by other experts are approved along proper procedural lines.³ The goal is not political freedom of speech but efficiency in mandating Brazil's economic and social development.

With such a world view, President Carter's criticism of transfers of nuclear technology or Brazil's failure to respect some foreign standard of human rights treatment is seen as naive and dangerously destabilizing. In the first instance, Brazilian leaders argue, the US is frustrating economic development. In the second, Carter fails to understand that if Brazilian police are occasionally excessive in suppressing dissent, their brutality is inspired by the state of siege into which marxist anarchists have placed Brazilian society. He doesn't understand, they point out, that this form of "total war" must be combatted vigorously with less regard for an individual's sensibilities than for the survival of the state.

1. Frank Maurovich, "The Hot War for Minds in South America," *Boston Sunday Globe*, January 30, 1977, p. A3, and, George F. Treverton, "Latin America in World Politics: The Next Decade," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 137, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer, 1977).

2. "4th Army Commander Speaks On National Objectives," Rio de Janeiro *Jornal Do Brasil*, in Portuguese, 30 March 1977, p. 16, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), (FBIS-LAT-77-63) p. D1.

3. "Paper Comments on Military Concepts of Democracy," Sao Paulo *O Estado Do Sao Paulo*, in Portuguese, 11 April 1977, p. 6, (FBIS-LAT-77-70) p. D4. See also, Treverton, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

This essay is primarily concerned with Brazilian and Argentinian naval missions and strategies. But, on another level, it is also a criticism of the rather superficial approach of United States policy toward the transfer of arms and technologies to Brazil and Argentina. It is important for US policymakers to understand these missions and strategies on their own merits, rather than assuming that technological and military aid to support these goals is simply contraband dictated by an essentially paternalistic US policy toward Latin America. If US policymakers can understand the world of threats and goals in which Brazilian and Argentinian leaders operate, they might have a better idea of how best to have US policies acknowledged and possibly accepted by these two nations.

Another reason for examining these naval strategies is that many of the missions envisioned by Brazilian and Argentinian naval planners are similar to those performed by Western navies, including regional defense and protection of national offshore resources. What is at question is whether the advanced naval technology purchases being made by these two countries are suitable for the missions identified, or whether these are just for increasing a show of domestic political strength. It is this writer's contention that there is, in fact, a coherent naval policy in each of these countries and that the ships and aircraft being purchased reflect careful study of requirements and allocation of resources.⁴ One must take account of the following factors when assessing the maritime weapons purchases of the two countries:

- a) the existence of territorial disputes which necessitate the use of a navy to assert sovereignty;
- b) the increasing dependence of all nations on resources extracted from continental shelf areas;
- c) the world-wide response to perceived needs for restricting foreign access to these resources;
- d) the growth of the country's international trade and the need to protect the flow of imported resources vital to economic development;
- e) the Western discomfort over Soviet activities in Africa;
- f) and the West's devotion of most of its naval strength to Europe and the approaches to it.

Each of these elements affects the naval strategy of these two South American — and South Atlantic — countries.

4. It should be noted, however, that warships and naval aircraft may not be the best measure of a country's determination to display baubles of power to overawe the populace. Most of their missions are performed out of sight of land and, with some exceptions do not directly enhance a military government's standing. Armored cars, tanks and supersonic aircraft are better suited to fulfill that role.

THE CASE OF BRAZIL

The phenomenon of Brazil's economic growth over the last fifteen years has been documented elsewhere.⁵ By 1976 her GNP was approximately 131 billion dollars. She has expanded exploitation of her mineral and agricultural resources and is now among the top ten producers in the world in many important minerals and grains. Her manufacturing capacity has mushroomed and she now produces and exports a wide variety of goods and in large amounts. However, the development process is by no means complete. In many categories of social development she still lags well behind Western developed nations; for Brazil, an important stage of development is just beginning.⁶

The emphasis is not only on sheer growth but on growing independence — self-sufficiency. Many Brazilians feel that to achieve this, they must make heavy use of the sea. The ocean presents an avenue toward an increased influence in international affairs. Hence many of Brazil's naval missions are based on a more general physical and cultural expansion to the status of a world power. The elements of a Brazilian maritime strategy may be seen as the following:

- a) the intention to increase exploitation on the continental shelf and the determination to prevent encroachments by others;
- b) the need to import vital materials including fuels and sophisticated technologies Brazil herself is not yet producing;
- c) the desire to develop a large, modern merchant fleet to carry industrial and agricultural exports to Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Japan;
- d) the fear that other powers, notably the Soviet Union will gain a presence in the South Atlantic, threatening Brazil economically, politically, and culturally;
- e) the wish to possess forces strong enough to discourage unfavorable activities or alignments by other countries on the continent.

One major concern of Brazilian planners is the continental shelf off Brazil's 4,500 mile coastline. As oil has come to power more of the Brazilian economy, the search for new sources by the government-owned oil company Petrobras has spread to offshore sites. Total production in Brazil for 1976 was 170,000 barrels a day; daily consumption was 900,000 barrels and is expected to rise to 1.2 million barrels by 1980. Petrobras feels that fields located offshore are the most promising means of reducing an 80 per cent oil import dependency. Exploration is taking place all along the coast, from the mouth of the Amazon

5. Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil, Foreign Policy of a Future World Power*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976).

6. See, *The World in Figures*, (London: The Economist, 1976), especially pp. 18, 20, 25, 26, 32, 35-36, and 45. See also, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1976 Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1976), pp. 172-183, *passim*.

to southernmost Rio Grande Do Sul province. It is hoped that by the end of the decade, exploitation of these reserves will trim import dependence from 80 to 50 per cent.⁷

While economists hope that offshore oil will ameliorate the effect of oil price rises and assist growth in Brazil, the Navy looks at the situation as giving them increased responsibility and greater claims on defense resources. Rear Admiral Monnerat has pointed out that only do the offshore wells need defending but also refineries and major industrial centers, all of which lie on or near the coast. He contends that the people of Brazil need to appreciate the fact that "our country's security depends primarily on the security of the sea."⁸

The fear of foreign interlopers is not without foundation. Disputes have arisen over exploitation of fish and shellfish off the Brazilian coast. In 1963, even before establishment of exclusive fisheries zones, Brazil and France (specifically Breton lobstermen) clashed over definitions of what resources were part of the continental shelf, and thus belonging to the littoral state, and what resources were free-swimming and hence, at that time, open for harvest by others. Brazil declared that, as lobsters "walk" on the shelf, they were part of it; France dissented. Brazil enforced its opinion by hauling three Breton lobster boats into Natal on January 30, 1963. After protests, the boats were let go to continue fishing. On February 19, Brazil reversed that decision and ordered all foreign boats out of Brazilian continental shelf waters. The French took umbrage and dispatched a destroyer to underline her disagreement; the Brazilians sent out two destroyers. After two weeks of accusations, the French recalled all of the Breton lobstermen and submitted the dispute to the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.⁹ In early 1964, agreement was reached permitting 26 Breton boats, leased to a Brazilian company, to take lobsters as long as 15 per cent of the catch was ceded to the lessee.¹⁰

A few years later, Brazil announced a 200 mile fisheries zone, of which the inner 100 miles was to be fished exclusively by Brazilians. Permits would be granted to foreign fishermen to work the outer 100 miles. When a Soviet fishing fleet appeared to ignore these regulations, Brazil made known her

7. Donald O. Croll, "Brazil: Major Effort Aimed at Offshore," *Petroleum Economist*, Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (March, 1977), pp. 97-99.

8. "Admirals Discuss Oil Defense," *Sao Paulo Folha de Sao Paulo*, in Portuguese, 15 January 1976, p. 4, (FBIS-LAT-76-13) p. D2. *See also*, "Navy Devising Defense Plans for Coastal Oilfields," Rio de Janeiro *O Globo*, in Portuguese, 9 September 1977, p. 5, (FBIS-LAT-77-173) p. D1.

9. "Brazil-France — The 'Lobster Dispute'," *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 15-22, 1963, p. 19474. According to D.P. O'Connell, the Brazilian naval task force included the Cruiser *Barroso* and five destroyers. *See*, note 39, *infra*.

10. "DeGaulle Visit to Brazil," *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 23-30, 1965, p. 20545.

determination to compel their observance. The Soviet Union, recently stung by an Argentinian demonstration of proprietary interest (see next section), sailed off to West African waters.

Brazilian planners are now concerned that a stronger Soviet navy may not be so amenable. Not only is the fleet more powerful and confident, but the Soviet Union must catch more fish to supplement its population's protein needs. To discourage depredation of fishing grounds requires, the Navy argues, a strong, modern, credible Brazilian fleet. This may become yet more clear with Brazil's decision not to sell fishing licenses to foreign fishermen after December 31, 1977.¹¹ As more nations declare fishery zones or extend their territorial limits outward, vigorous protection of continental shelf resources may acquire greater respectability. But Brazil's maritime interests extend beyond its continental shelf.

Another reason for the expansive character of naval planning is Brazil's heavy dependency on imported petroleum. In 1975, 84 per cent of its oil was imported and three-fifths of that had to be transported around the Cape of Good Hope. In addition to the great strain such imports impose on foreign exchange reserves and on the economy in general,¹² the oil route is seen to be quite vulnerable to interdiction.

Along with oil came manufactured goods, boosting the bill for imports to \$12 billion in 1975. But with export production strongly encouraged by the government, Brazil's exports totaled exceeded \$8 billion in the same year.¹³ Part of her maritime trade policy is a massive shipbuilding program which, in 1977, placed Brazil third in construction, behind Japan and the US with anticipated deliveries of over one million deadweight tons. By 1980, Brazilian shipyards may execute over \$1 billion worth of orders.¹⁴ This effort has a two-fold aim. One is to produce a Brazilian merchant marine with modern, competitive ships carrying Brazilian and foreign goods while reducing foreign exchange outlays now paid for foreign shipping services. The second is to export the ships themselves. In 1977, shipbuilding orders from other countries reached \$300 million. But large domestic shipbuilding capacity allows construction of warships as well as a merchant marine.

The growth in Brazil's shipbuilding industry and its level of international trade point to the importance of the Atlantic Ocean for that country. With increasing public awareness of this importance, the ways in which maritime

11. "Foreign Fishing Licenses Will Not Be Renewed," *Brazilia Domestic Service*, in Portuguese, 17 August, 1977, 2200 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-160) p. D6. The head of Fish and Industry Development noted that this would mean the Brazilian fishing industry would have to put at least 100 new boats into operation.

12. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), *Report 1976*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

14. *Adela Bulletin*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (December, 1977), p. 2, *and*, Schneider, *Brazil*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.

expansion might serve Brazil's international relations have become the focus of much discussion. Debate over an eastward-looking policy arose between the Ministry of External Affairs — Itamaraty — and some senior members of the armed forces during the Angolan revolution of 1975-76. In fact, the debate revolved around the larger question of where Brazil should place herself in international politics. Itamaraty felt that Brazil was best suited to be an industrial and political leader in the Third World. This meant, when applied to Brazil's position on Angola, that support of anti-colonial regimes was more important than opposition to Soviet "penetration" of Africa. The strategy behind this stand was to ingratiate Brazil with the new leaders of Africa in order to ensure acceleration of Brazil-West African trade.¹⁵

Two other factors affected Itamaraty's backing of "national liberation" or "anti-apartheid" forces. One was that many of the affected countries were Portuguese colonies with which Brazil, a Portuguese-speaking country, might establish close relations. The other facet was perhaps a desire to squelch accusations of racist sympathies which support of South Africa, even for national security reasons, might incite.¹⁶

The rebuttal, often attributed to "senior naval officials," was that in wooing people like Neto of Angola, Itamaraty disregarded threats to the Cape oil route, represented by the prospect of Soviet bases in Angola. An editorial in *O Estado De Sao Paulo* on September 24, 1976, observed: "Itamaraty speaks and acts as though the national interests related to the nation's security so seriously threatened in the ocean adjacent to our territory, on the African geopolitical scene and along the maritime route vital to our exports and imports, did not exist or did not matter."¹⁷

These Atlanticists note not increased African trade but what they see as the waning ability and will of NATO member states (especially the US) to protect allied naval forces in the South Atlantic area at a time when Soviet naval, fishing and commercial shipping activities are increasing. These advocates regard Brazil not as a Third World nation but as a country with strong ties to the West and one which holds a position of strategic importance for the West. To Itamaraty's suggestion that amity with marxist African states might

15. Over the last five years, Brazil-Africa trade totalled almost \$3 billion. As of 1976, 107 Brazilian companies had either a direct interest in Africa or operated through concessionaries (33 in all). Moreover, Brazilian trade is increasingly in manufactured goods, which makes the relationship a source of domestic development as well. See, "New Policy with West Africa to Center on Trade," *Sao Paulo O Estado De Sao Paulo*, in Portuguese, 7 January 1977, p. 10, (FBIS-LAT-77-8) p. D2.

16. See e.g., "Editorial Views Angola, South Atlantic Defense," *Rio de Janeiro Journal Do Brasil*, in Portuguese, 3 January 1976, p. 6, (FBIS-LAT-76-4) pp. D2-D3, and, Lt. Cmdr. P.J. Unwin, RN, "Brazil: A Maritime Role in the South Atlantic," *Navy International*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (February, 1976) p. 5.

17. "Silveira Lashed for 'Third World Policy,'" *Sao Paulo O Estado De Sao Paulo*, in Portuguese, 24 September 1976, p. 3, (FBIS-LAT-76-191) p. D3.

strengthen economic ties, *Jornal Do Brasil* on January 3, 1976, responded with a question: "What good will West Africa's friendship be for us if its price is to condone the construction and operation of Soviet and Cuban bases on the African coast facing our country?"¹⁸

Some have proposed creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), composed of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and South Africa. The head of Uruguay's Navy, Admiral Marquez, contended last year that formation of such a pact is only a matter of time.¹⁹ Itamaraty refused to consider the alliance on the grounds that it included South Africa. Moreover, in Navy Minister Azevedo Henning's view, there is really no need for it. Henning gave two reasons. One was that Soviet operations in Africa constituted a problem which concerned the African countries exclusively. He drew the defense line around the South American continent as a limit of Brazil's primary concern. In addition, he argued that "the navies of the American continent perfectly understand and complement each other, because their policies are similar and we do not have any particular political problem regarding neighboring countries." He concluded that the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty of 1947, which provides for peaceful settlement of disputes and collective defense against external attack, offered the needed unity.²⁰ For these two reasons, any new alliances would be superfluous at best and at worst might raise suspicions of malevolent Brazilian aspirations in the South Atlantic.

Interpretations like Admiral Henning's enraged the editorialist at *O Estado De Sao Paulo*. To reject an alliance on the grounds that South African's membership implied acceptance of apartheid was to juggle apples and oranges. SATO would not abet racism; it would defend "the security of the South Atlantic area and the political and cultural integrity of countries in South America, Brazil in the first place." The emphasis, the paper asserted, was misplaced: "Which is the greater peril for Brazil's survival: the existence of the Union of South Africa or the military expansionism of the Soviets?"²¹

Another reason for supporting SATO was the increased prestige that leadership of such an alliance would confer on Brazilian armed forces, especially the Navy. Brazil is a leading candidate to undertake many defense tasks in the South Atlantic now assumed by the major Western maritime powers. The case is put by Lieutenant Commander P.J. Unwin in an article in

18. "Editorial Views Angola . . ." *op. cit.*, p. D2.

19. "Atlantico Sur" in "Norticiario," *Revista General de Maritimo*, Tomo 192, (January, 1977) p. 107. See also, "Editorial Stresses Urgency of South Atlantic Defense Group," Buenos Aires *La Prensa*, in Spanish, 11 October 1977, p. 8, (FBIS-LAT-77-203) pp. B1-B2.

20. "Navy Head Sees No Need for Atlantic Alliance," Rio de Janeiro *Jornal Do Brasil*, in Portuguese, 14 October 1976, p. 3, (FBIS-LAT-76-201) p. D1. For the extent to which South American navies do cooperate, see, "Tortí Stresses Cooperation of South Atlantic Navies," Buenos Aires *Telam*, in Spanish, 12 January 1978, 1645 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-78-10) p. A1.

21. "Silvera Lashed . . ." *op. cit.*, p. D3.

Navy International, a publication of Britain's Navy League. He finds Brazil ideally located for a major role in the South Atlantic and needing to go to sea in order to continue its development. Because the Cape route is so vital to both Brazil and the NATO nations, they share a common interest in its continued availability. Unwin has little expectation that the US or Britain will at present expand their roles to include Cape-route defense. Therefore, why not promote cooperation with the Brazilian Navy to permit it to assume that role? Unwin even dangles the carrot of respectability in front of Brazilian adherents to such an idea. Noting that the US has traditionally held that purchases of sophisticated weapons by Latin American countries are unnecessary and wasteful, he argues that a "strong Brazilian Navy could be more than a status symbol; it would make a significant contribution to the security of the South Atlantic."²²

If the Brazilian Navy can ignore a slight condescension implicit in both that comment and the hope expressed later on that Brazil can pick up the slack until the NATO navies can come in, it can feel satisfied that its expansion will not be adversely regarded by NATO. Thus, the clinching argument for a SATO could well be enhancement of Brazilian naval influence in deliberations on a military budget which is, after all, constrained by the needs on domestic development.

Admiral Henning's emphasis on the primacy of hemispheric affairs reflects, in part, the realization that Brazil's neighbors are somewhat wary of her growth in economic and political power. Argentine fears over a proposed deep water port in Rio Grande do Sul which could eclipse Buenos Aires, has apparently inspired Argentina to contract for a new port of her own.²³ Debates over Brazil's Itaipu and Argentina's Corpus dam projects on the Parana River have waxed acrimonious in both the Brazilian and Argentine press at times. Nevertheless, the general tenor of relations between Argentina and Brazil seems to be one of defusing potential conflict through negotiation. On many issues — the Soviet threat, suppression of dissidence, the right of South American countries to develop nuclear power, and positions at the Law of the Sea Conference — the two countries agree. Other areas of contention, notably Brazilian claims in the Antarctic which overlap those of Argentina and Chile, are latent at this time. This is not to say that alarm expressed in other countries

22. Unwin, *op. cit.*, p. 6. For a view arguing that Latin American navies are hindered in their development by a US belief that their mission should be anti-submarine warfare oriented, as well as comments on what these countries see as their roles, see, two articles by Robert L. Scheina, "Latin American Naval Purpose," *Professional Notes, United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 103, No. 9 (September, 1977) pp. 116-119, and "South American Navies: Who Needs Them?," *ibid.*, Vol. 104, No. 2 (February, 1978) pp. 61-66.

23. See, "Japanese Technicians Arrive to Help Plan Port," *Buenos Aires Telam*, in Spanish, 18 July 1977, 1842 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-140) p. B4. Construction is to begin in 1980; completion is expected in 1983.

over Brazil's great size and intentions are wholly without merit; nevertheless, the tone is presently one of detente.

Brazil's concern with external threats, both on its coastal sea areas and on more distant but crucial sea approaches to its territory, is confirmed by the kinds of naval arms purchases she has made. Over the last twenty years, when Brazil has had the choice of arms available, she has obtained warships which:

- a) are multi-purpose vessels capable of anti-submarine warfare (ASW), extended patrol and surface warfare;
- b) dispose weapons which are relatively easy to maintain yet possess performance appropriate for dissuasion of a small enemy force; and
- c) can be reproduced in Brazilian naval yards.

An emphasis on licensed production in Brazil will be part of all future arms agreements.

Brazilian aircraft purchases, save for 14 mach 2 fighters and 42 F5E and F5F short-ranged fighter bombers, have been either light ground attack aircraft, transport aircraft capable of operating in the Amazon, or maritime patrol planes. Development of her own aircraft designs has been concentrated on the latter two categories.

Both ships and aircraft reflect a desire to have a modest, but modern navy capable of responding to the kinds of threats Brazil is likely to face over the next ten to twenty years. Two examples in particular illustrate the policy. The *Niteroi* class frigate is the product of Brazilian specifications and British execution. It is a relatively inexpensive ship to purchase and maintain with a balanced weapons fit — although 4 have an ASW orientation while 2 have *Exocet* anti-surface ship missiles — and possesses sufficient speed and endurance to respond quickly to threats and to remain on station.²⁴ The Brazilian-designed Embraer EMB-110 *Bandeirante* is a twin-engine turboprop being built as a transport, trainer, and maritime patrol aircraft. As with the *Niterois*, this airplane is an inexpensive, all-purpose design which can be adapted to specific missions.²⁵

The ubiquity of these designs also conforms to a tacit NATO willingness to see Brazil take a larger role in South Atlantic defense. While not fully capable of obstructing Soviet military penetration, Brazil's maritime forces should be able to operate as a peacetime counterweight to foreign activities, something which, as noted above, many Brazilian naval officials consider essential.

24. Geoffrey Wood, "Brazil's Mk10 Frigates," *Navy International*, Vol. 19, No. 8 (August, 1974) p. 15, and see, Anthony Preston, "South America's Navies: 1. The General Picture," *Navy International*, Vol. 81, No. 7 (July, 1976) p. 13.

25. Roberto Pereira de Andrade, "Brazil Stresses Air Capability," *Air International*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September, 1976) p. 146. See also, "The Sea Searchers: A Status Report on the New Breed of Maritime Patrol Aircraft," *ibid*, Vol. 11, No. 6 (December, 1976) p. 266 f.

Another aspect of Brazil's arms transfer policy is the growth in her arms export trade. Brazil is selling training, transport, and maritime patrol aircraft not only to other South American nations but to African countries as well. Her well-designed armored cars and armored personnel vehicles are going to the Persian Gulf and other Middle Eastern states. There are two benefits for Brazil in these exports. One is the foreign exchange earnings — \$187 million in 1973-74 — although one can see what a small part of Brazil's foreign trade these shipments represent. The other is the practical experience Brazilian designers gain in operating their equipment in a variety of missions and conditions.²⁶

Brazil's growing success in arms exports poses an interesting problem for fulfillment of US desires to limit international arms trade. On the one hand, Brazil is included by US policymakers among those countries to which sophisticated arms sales are discouraged; it is thought that acquisition of these expensive weapons must result in excessive economic dislocations in such a less developed, thus poorer, nation. According to this US view, Brazil should forego these "prestige" purchases and apply the funds to domestic development needs instead. On the other hand, Brazil's sales to even poorer countries mark her as a supplier whose cooperation must be solicited by the US in order to help halt the worldwide increase of arms transfers.

Concern over sales of sophisticated arms to Brazil is, however, premature. In the first place, Brazil is actually buying few supersonic jets, complicated tanks, or major warships of a primarily offensive nature such as large cruisers or aircraft carriers. Although this may not hold in the future, a less rigid proscription now might allow for greater US influence later on. In the second place, as Prof. Geoffrey Kemp has argued, if our restrictions are based on a desire to reduce the ability of developing nations either to seize territory or suppress internal dissent, we should be more worried about acquisitions by these countries of armored cars, light ground-attack aircraft, and fast patrol boats which are far more useful in counter-insurgency or border warfare.²⁷ The difficulty here, however, is that Brazil (and Argentina) already produces many of these weapons for itself, leaving the US very little leverage in the form of withholding arms or discouraging other developed nations' transfers of these arms.

This is not to advocate renunciation of US criticism of the pace of arms sales.

26. See e.g., "Official Source Reveals Arms Purchase Requests," Paris *AFP*, in Spanish, 2 January 1977, 0130 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-2) p. D1.

27. Geoffrey Kemp, "The Prospects for Arms Control in Latin America: The Strategic Dimensions," in Philippe C. Schmitter (ed.), *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives*, Progress Series on War, Revolution and Peacekeeping, Vol. III, (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1973) pp. 226-227. Kemp warns, however, that his conclusions are based on a model of "rational decisions to maximise the military utility of different military forces for different environments and missions." The model is useful for comparing actual procurements with advisable patterns, he continues. p. 227.

Rather, a more selective policy should be adopted, one aimed at discouraging purchase of counter-insurgency weapons by Brazil or the sale of such weapons by Brazil to other countries. This policy would respect Brazil's right to conduct herself as a "leading intermediate country . . . the chief industrial nation south of the equator,"²⁸ while calling to her attention her responsibilities for maintaining stability and participating in orderly development within the Third World.

This picture of Brazil's maritime strategy offers a coherent appreciation of her perceived threats and available resources. The question whether arms sales or technology transfers help to perpetuate a repressive regime overlaps, but should not obscure, the point that Brazil is a large, vigorous nation with identifiable security needs. The problem for the US is to express her opposition to Brazilian acts not as a parent but as a sovereign equal and to recognize Brazil as an emerging power in world affairs.

THE CASE OF ARGENTINA

While Brazil looks outward and flexes her economic muscle, Argentina seems to languish in enforced parochialism. Perhaps the single most compelling reason for Argentina's less active foreign policy has been the political turmoil which has upset her domestic stability for the last 40 years. For most of that time, the influence of Juan Peron (continuing even after his death) has hampered efforts of succeeding governments to establish their own legitimacy. Among the effects of constant struggles for power between rightist and leftist Peronists, military cliques and other dissident groups, has been a deeply-rooted anomie. Amelioration of this rootlessness will come only slowly as Argentine leaders struggle to maintain an ideological purity based primarily on Roman Catholic ideals, while, at the same time, encouraging development of a unified nationalist ethos among divergent political factions.

Argentina's economic base is quite strong, despite a wicked inflation brought on by the Peronist government. It is the product of extensive development during the 19th and early 20th centuries. In most major manufacturing categories, Argentine productivity is greater than Brazil's.²⁹ Moreover, Argentine energy supplies seem much more abundant, with new reserves of oil and natural gas being discovered every year. The prospects for oil and gas deposits under its continental shelf are most promising; the US Geological Survey concluded in 1975 that Argentina may have as much as 200

28. Ronald M. Schneider, "Geostrategic Perspectives and Capabilities of Brazil and Argentina With Regard to the South Atlantic Region Over the Next Fifteen Years," Paper delivered in February, 1977, for the South Atlantic Study Group, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 2.

29. See, *The World in Figures*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 20, 25.

billion barrels of oil deposits offshore (though many oil experts suggest much lower figures are more realistic).³⁰

Nevertheless, Brazil's boom has had its effect on Argentine morale. While the latter's economy stagnates, Brazil's seems to soar. The result has been a revival of the never very dormant fear of a Brazilian push to establish hegemony over South America, eclipsing Argentina altogether. The debate over the Itaipu and Corpus Dam projects centers around the fact that were the Brazilian project to generate full power, the down-stream Argentine dam might not get sufficient water to operate as planned. The Buenos Aires newspaper *Clarín* fears that without "effective counteractive measures," Brazil's Itaipu Dam would act "like a true suction pump drawing both economic and human resources into its area of influence. This would inevitably affect part of the Argentine north as well." This would take place in an area which, *Clarín* goes on, "in the terminology of Brazilian geopoliticians is called 'live' or 'sensitive'."³¹ To Argentine strategists, Itaipu is an example of Brazilian policy of manifest destiny which must be forestalled. At the same time, they bewail the fate of a militarily impotent Argentina opposing an insouciant Goliath.

But the declared need for "integrated national power" relates equally to matters affecting Argentina south of the 35th parallel. Argentine Major General (Ret.) Juan E. Gugliamelli identifies four matters with which maritime strategists are concerned:

- a) the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile;
- b) the Malvinas Islands/Falkland Islands disagreement with Great Britain;
- c) the need to protect the resources of the continental shelf;
- d) the need to clarify and protect territorial rights in Antarctica, which are legally inchoate.

Of these, the most recent development has come in an unfavorable decision of an arbitration tribunal convened to settle a dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel. The dispute involves possession of three islands, Picton, Nueva, and Lennox, which lie in the channel running south of Isla Grande del Tierra del Fuego in the extreme southern portion of Argentina. The terms of the settlement are discussed elsewhere,³² but it should be noted that the tribunal's May, 1977 award has not been wholly accepted by Argentina. There are several strategic reasons for Argentina's reservations. First,

30. "Official Sees Oil Self-Sufficiency in 3 Years," Buenos Aires *Telam*, in Spanish, 19 March 1977, 1725 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-56) p. B4, *and*, "World Oil Mid-Year Survey," *World Oil*, Vol. 183, No. 3 (August 15, 1976) p. 86.

31. [Enrique Alonso], "Comment," Buenos Aires *Clarín*, in Spanish, 12 April 1977, p. 8, (FBIS-LAT-77-71) p. B4.

32. For a brief summary of the dispute, *see*, F.V., "The Beagle Channel Affair," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 71, No. 4, (October, 1977) p. 733 *f*.

the Argentines maintain a naval base at Ushusia which, if the decision is allowed to stand, will lie in the Chilean portion of the channel. Second, the boundary line, if extended to the South Pole, affects Argentine claims in Antarctica. Third, and perhaps most important, Argentina feels that the award violates an understanding between itself and Chile first reached in 1810 which established the Atlantic littoral as Argentine and the Pacific littoral as Chilean. Chilean possession of these three islands give that country an opening to the Atlantic. If Chile declares a 200 mile fishing or extended economic zone eastward, Argentine control of certain rich fishing grounds and oil deposit areas is threatened. The balance of the "Southern Cone" is upset. The tribunal's finding that later treaties show the 1810 agreement to affect only Tierra del Fuego and areas north is unacceptable to Argentina.

In the months following the tribunal's award, news accounts reported an increase in naval maneuvers along the southern part of Argentina as well as recounts and accusations of Chilean harassment of other islands in the area.³³ At the same time, however, conciliatory statements also appeared noting that the Beagle Channel dispute was the only source of friction along the 5,000 kilometer border between the two countries. Negotiations on how to settle the matter were just beginning in March, 1978.

Until the Beagle Channel award was announced, the maritime controversy most urgent for the Argentinian government was the question of sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. In 1833, the Argentinians assert, British warships forcibly and illegally occupied the Falklands. George Pendle, an English writer on Argentina, not surprisingly finds custody of this child of discord to lie with Britain, claiming British discovery in the sixteenth century. The islands received their English christening in 1690 in honor of Lord Falkland who was Treasurer of the Navy at the time. Intermittent settlements in 1764 by the French — who gave them the name *les Iles Malouines* after the sailors from St. Malo who first saw them — and the British in 1765, gave way to Spanish possession, although a 1771 treaty granted Britain the right to resettle without prejudice to the question of sovereignty. The British withdrew in 1774 and the last Spaniard left in 1811. In the 1820s, Argentinians planted their flag on the *Isles Malvinas*, as the Falklands were renamed, but in 1831, three US warships protesting molestation of sealers chased out the Argentinians. Britain finally decided, in 1832, to take possession (or repossession) of the islands, driving out a newly arrived Argentine garrison.³⁴

The Falklands are not rich or verdant but they are strategically located for interdiction of Cape Horn traffic. In both World Wars, British warships based

33. Maneuvers took place in August and September, 1977 and January, 1978. Chilean harassment was reported on September 21, 1977, see FBIS-LAT-77-184, p. B1. In January, 1978, Argentina declared the decision of the Tribunal to be null and void.

34. George Pendle, *Argentina*, (London: 1963) 3d ed., pp. 163-164.

at Port Stanley contributed to the destruction of German warships. Their value as resource bases comes from the fact that an extended economic zone would embrace the Burdwood Bank, an underwater mesa potentially rich in oil and teeming with pelagic fish and crustaceans, including large amounts of krill.

The Argentinians have not forgotten what they regard as an imperialistic seizure of their territory. The editor of one Argentine periodical, Hector Garcia of the *Cronica*, made invasion of the islands his *cause celebre*. In the ten years between 1965 and 1975, his importunations brought a response at least twice, as revanchist Argentinians landed on the Falklands. A third attempt was free-lance, masterminded by some Peronist hijackers. Needless to say, none of these *ad hoc* demonstrations of will succeeded. By 1975, the Argentine government, by now long aware that negotiation was the only feasible road to success, responded to Garcia's latest appeal for 20,000 recruits and his front-page advertisements for DC-4 airplanes to transport the invasion force to the Falklands, shutting down his paper.³⁵

The government, with an eye toward the potential wealth of the Burdwood Bank, stepped up its own pressure on the British. In February, 1976, a British research vessel, the *Shackleton*, was just completing a survey of continental drift and steaming toward Port Stanley. The Argentine destroyer *Admiral Stormi* was sent out to investigate and, when the *Shackleton* failed to heave to as ordered, fired several shots across the bow of the British ship. The captain of the *Shackleton* advised the *Stormi* that she had explosive material on board (for seismic tests) which might go off if the *Stormi*'s fire hit the ship. The *Stormi* relented and merely shadowed the *Shackleton* until she made Port Stanley. The London *Times* accounts referred to the British captain's use of a Nelsonian "blind eye"; the Argentine stories stressed the *Stormi* commander's forbearance.³⁶

This incident, along with other events such as the refusal of an Argentine cruise ship to fly the Union Jack when she entered Port Stanley, caused everyone concerned — especially the 2,000 Falkland Islanders — to review the course of the dispute. A British report on the dispute, entitled the Shackleton Report, brought matters to a head in late July, 1976, fortunately in the direction of negotiation. The visit in the spring of 1977 by Edward Rowlands, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to Argentina and the Falklands was greeted with quiet hopefulness in the Argentine press. Commentators emphasized the need to consider the sensibilities of the islanders and

35. "Invasion Postponed," *The Economist*, January 4, 1975, pp. 42-43.

36. For the Argentine version, see, "Warning Shots Fired at British Research Ship," Buenos Aires *Telam*, in Spanish, 4 February 1976, 2120 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-76-25) p. B1. For British accounts, see, "British Ship Fired on by Argentine Warships," *The Times* (London), February 5, 1976, pp. 1, 8.

to play down vigorous Argentine assertions of sovereignty. *Clarín* felt that, on balance, the talks were positive. They were, the paper noted, face-to-face. The British had not used the unease of the islanders to obstruct the talks and the two countries had agreed to exchange ambassadors once again. *Clarín* rebutted the *Time's* warning that the issue of sovereignty must not be allowed to impede the talks as there was no question that the islands were British by gently reminding the London paper that the issue of sovereignty was central to the debate. The *Herald* of Buenos Aires suggested that the dispute over sovereignty might be frozen, with attention being paid to cooperation directed at economic exploitation of the resources around the islands and upgrading the standard of living on them.³⁷ This compromise has, in fact, been pursued and Argentine papers wait hopefully for the integrationist sympathies they see growing in the islanders themselves to become manifest in request for commonwealth or territorial status within Argentina.³⁸

The assertion to sovereignty over the Falklands is related to Gugliamelli's third issue — exploitation of the continental shelf. Since 1958, the shelf has been generally recognized in international law as subject to the exercise of sovereignty by the adjacent littoral state. In Argentina's case, the shelf is quite substantial, and it is within this area that most oil exploration will take place. In addition, the fisheries of Patagonia have been under-exploited, largely because of restrictions, which require all foreign fishermen to incorporate in Argentina and operate out of Argentine ports. These regulations have been in effect since the late 1960s.

The impetus for such laws came after Soviet fishing fleets conducted extensive predations of Patagonian hake in 1966 and 1967. The Soviet response to the rules was to send two stern trawlers into the area in June, 1968 without permission. Argentina dispatched a destroyer with orders to stop and search the Soviet trawlers but the Soviet captains refused to accede to this request. The destroyer opened fire, hitting one of the trawlers amidships. Persuaded, the trawlers obediently followed the destroyer into port to be reprimanded and later released. Soviet fishing in the area dropped to nothing in 1969.³⁹

37. "Clarín Comments on Communique," Buenos Aires *Clarion*, in Spanish, 24 February 1977, p. 3, (FBIS-LAT-77-38) p. B3, and, "Herald: Falklanders Must Overcome Fears of Losses," Buenos Aires *Herald*, in English, 16 February 1977, p. 6, (FBIS-LAT-77-34) p. B1. and, "UK Official Interview on Malvinas, Belize Disputes," *Asuncion Hoy*, 22 June 1977, p. 13, (FBIS-LAT-77-121) p. A3.

38. See e.g., "Oil Important to Future of Malvinas Talks," Buenos Aires *La Opinión*, in Spanish, 10 December 1977, p. 9, (FBIS-LAT-77-239) p. B1. It should be noted that Argentina lays claim to all of Britain's Scotia Ridge dependencies. For an example of the kind of action the Argentine Navy takes to keep these claims alive, see, "Navy Reportedly Lands in South Sandwich Islands," Buenos Aires *La Opinión*, in Spanish, 15 February 1977, p. 12, (FBIS-LAT-77-33) p. B1.

39. D.P. O'Connell, *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1925) pp. 67-68.

Unfortunately, the Argentine fishing fleet is antiquated and the 1974 catch of 301,000 tons did not come near potential yields. In December, 1976, the Ministry of Economy proposed letting one-year leases to foreign countries on the grounds that the proper research necessary to make full use of the hake fisheries could not be conducted by Argentina. Foreign companies with more money, it was hoped, would find and exploit the fisheries for a short time and leave with the data amassed being used to improve the efficiency of Argentine fishing fleets. In addition, the plan foresaw development of a fish-processing industry in economically-depressed Patagonia.

The plan was assailed by fishing interests, who advanced potent arguments against it. First, they averred, the law may discourage modernization of the Argentine fishing fleet by aborting a scheme in which foreign shipbuilders would accept delay in payment until the first catch came in. Further, opponents argued, the prediction of a thriving fish-processing industry in Patagonia ignores the fact that foreign fishers package their catch on board and thus would have little need for such facilities. Finally, critics discussed South Africa's experience with concession selling; foreign fishers raced in and, using intensive methods, nearly exhausted the fishing grounds off Namibia. Not being concerned with the need to preserve fishing stocks for continued harvest, the foreign fleets took no precautions against depletion.⁴⁰

That any attempt by foreign fishers to take fish, through whatever mechanism, from Argentine waters was going to be strictly prohibited became evident in September and October, 1977. In one week, Argentine destroyers and a cruiser dispersed a fleet of stern trawlers of Soviet and Bulgarian registry fishing off Puerto Madryn. Angered that clever Soviet sailing tactics had forced the Argentine navy to settle for seizure of only five trawlers out of a total of 19, the Argentine ships later fired on four additional trawlers as soon as any resistance was offered. All sustained hits and one had to be towed into port. The Soviet vessels were kept for over a month, the Bulgarian ships for almost two months. Their catches were confiscated and sold and fines were levied on the captains.⁴¹

It is apparent that Argentine thoughts of maritime strategy are vitally concerned with protecting territory and resources. The attention paid toward maintaining claims over Antarctic territory is another example. Although territorial claims have been suspended by the terms of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty until 1991, Argentina, Brazil and Chile are concerned that, because the

40. "Industry Protesting New Fishing Law," Buenos Aires *Review of the River Plate*, in English, 21 January 1977, pp. 62-63, (FBIS-LAT-77-24) p. B4.

41. See, "Suspected East Bloc Ships Said Fishing Illegally," Buenos Aires *Telam*, in Spanish, 17 September 1977, 1500 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-181) p. B5, and, "FBIS Digests of Reports Published," 26 September 1977, (FBIS-LAT-77-186) pp. B2-B3, and, 3 October 1977, (FBIS-LAT-77-191) pp. B1-B4. See also, "Captured Fishing Vessels Arrive in Argentine Port," Buenos Aires *Latin*, in Spanish, 3 October 1977, 1458 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-192) p. B1.

Treaty does not mention economic exploitation, the more industrialized states equipped to do so will undertake Antarctic resource development, excluding the three poorer Latin American countries.

The issue only simmers at the moment. But Argentina and Chile periodically remind the other treaty signatories that they maintain territorial claims. An April 4, 1977 broadcast by Buenos Aires's *Telam* related news of a fourth Argentine base in Antarctica. After describing the rather prosaic scientific mission and conveying the Army's gratitude for the Navy's assistance, the broadcast ended: "The new base which our country now has in the Antarctic, our national patrimony, is another step forward toward progress and the strengthening of our sovereignty."⁴²

Of the four questions enumerated by Gugliamelli, claims in Antarctica are the most nebulous and the furthest from realization. However, surely the day will come when "national patrimony" in Antarctica is vital to all three of the South American countries concerned.

Subsidiary issues affect Argentine naval planning as well. The Chileans are exploring for oil in the Straits of Magellan and have already begun bringing it ashore. At the same time, Argentina is building a pipeline across the eastern mouth of the Strait from its gas fields on Tierra del Fuego. Questions of rights of innocent passage and interference with oil platforms and pipelines may arise.

In analyzing the issues outlined by Gugliamelli, several missions for the Argentine Navy may be discerned. One is similar to the sovereignty patrol duties of the Brazilian Navy. As fisheries are developed and oil rigs put in place, the Argentine Navy will be charged with protecting these resources. The navy, able and aggressive, is not hesitant about carrying out these tasks, as shown in the cases of the Russian trawlers.

Captain Roberto Ornstein, international affairs adviser for the Naval General Command, interviewed on April 5, 1977, gave an interpretation of Argentine naval missions which seems primarily defensive in nature. He agreed that defense of the Cape of Good Hope sea lanes was important to all of South America but emphasized the need to protect the fisheries and oil deposits in the more immediate area. "Other threats," he continued, "in the empty space of the ocean basin . . . would require a different kind of national defense organization involving the Latin American area. But this would be subject to thorough study by the government."⁴³

42. "Army Opens Fourth Base in Antarctic," Buenos Aires *Telam*, in Spanish, 4 April 1977, 2245 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-68) p. B4. See also, "Details of Navy Antarctic Operation Reported," Buenos Aires *Domestic Service*, in Spanish, 4 April 1977, 2000 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-235) p. B4.

43. "Naval Official Studies South Atlantic Defense Strategy," Buenos Aires *Telam*, in Spanish, 5 April 1977, 2130 GMT, (FBIS-LAT-77-68) p. B3. For newspaper opinion in Argentina during the Angolan conflict, reflecting a somewhat more expansive tone, see, "South Atlantic Naval Strategy Termed Important," Buenos Aires *La Nacion*, in Spanish, 8 April 1976, p. 1, (FBIS-LAT-76-70) p. B1.

This last statement can be interpreted in different ways. One possibility is that Captain Ornstein is less alarmed by the Soviet naval presence than his Brazilian counterparts, seeing it as a problem for the future rather than the present. On the other hand, his caution may be derived from the refusal of Brazil to agree to the formation of a SATO. In any event, Captain Ornstein seems to be describing a defense in depth rather than a springboard for Argentine ventures into world trade and international politics. His sights appear to be set distinctly lower than those of Brazil's Navy.

Argentina's preoccupation with local security issues does not necessarily mean a weak navy. The extent of Argentina's continental shelf demands a capable naval strength. Conflicts with Britain over the Scotia Ridge Dependencies means that the Argentine Navy must be able to protect its country's interests almost a thousand miles east of the mainland. Furthermore, support of Antarctic bases leads Argentina to extend her naval activities a thousand miles southward.

The large radius and complex nature of these responsibilities helps explain why Argentina is investing in a modern surface navy. Most of these missions place a premium on visibility, endurance, the ability to transport troops, and the capacity to react to foreign naval (and civil) incursions with credibility. Argentina's arms purchases can be justified, indeed they are inspired by these missions.

Argentina, like Brazil, looked to Great Britain for the first major warships in her Navy after World War II. Unlike Brazil, however, Argentine warships will have much more offensive power per unit if present plans to place *Exocet* SSM on older, US-made destroyers and to procure six frigates from Britain are carried out. Joining the fleet in 1977 was the first of two, fleet defense ships based on Britain's Type 42 destroyer. In concert with a recently refitted carrier employing a tactical data coordinating system, this destroyer — named *Hercules* — and her sister ship resemble more closely a miniature US task force than comparable elements of the Brazilian Navy.⁴⁴ Adding to the offensive nature of these warships is the increasing preeminence of Admiral Massera, the naval member of the junta headed by General Videla. It is not clear whether Massera's higher profile can be ascribed to a greater awareness of the power of the *Armada Republica Argentina* (ARA) to defend Argentina from external enemies while the other armed forces deal with internal disruption or to a more personal move on the Admiral's part to gain control of the junta.

Regardless which supposition is correct, it does seem that Argentina looks more and more to its continental shelf to provide economic stability and

44. See, Preston, *op. cit.*, and, "ARA Type 42 GMDs," *Navy International*, Vol. 75, No. 9, (September, 1970) pp. 275-296, and, Cdr. C.W. Eason, OBE, "A Day at Sea in ARA Hercules," *Navy International*, Vol. 38, No. 10, (October, 1977) pp. 33-34.

perhaps even to provide the strength to challenge Brazil for leadership of the South American continent.

CONCLUSION

This essay has examined the maritime strategies and problems of Brazil and Argentina, trying to determine if arms purchases and the search for new technologies over the last decade are justified. Acquisitions were not thoughtless aggrandizements for the sake of placating a strong military within these countries. In one respect the deck has been stacked in favor of sanity. The source of much of the West's objection to seeing money in developing countries poured into defense spending comes from the use of sophisticated weapons to overawe and repress local populations. Of all the weapons one could select, it appears that warships are least well adapted to perform that function. To that extent the choice of naval weapons detracts from one's ability to generalize about arms sales to the Third World.

It is also true that inspecting trends of defense budgets and finding them — as in the case of both Argentina and Brazil — to be relatively modest (never more than 2.3 per cent of GNP in the period 1965 — 1974) obscures the fact that the military is in control in both countries and is in control of the allocation of resources. However, the direction that the military government in Brazil is taking is toward economic development with emphasis on the industrial sector, of which defense is a part. In this respect, the military does not seem to be mortgaging the economy for the sake of military procurement. The ideology outlined above has, for the military, a note of *noblesse oblige* married to a technocratic view of society. As such, it regards democratic give and take as counterproductive. At its worst, it discounts individual freedom in favor of public order, resulting in abuses which cannot be dismissed through rationalization.

However, it is not clear that restraints on arms sales and transfers to these countries would affect internal politics. As Prof. Kemp showed, the kinds of conflicts likely to occur between countries in the Third World would not necessarily require weapons discussed in this paper. Moreover, those weapons which are necessary are already being produced in these countries. An embargo on arms shipments, for example, would not necessarily end the fighting. These countries are not invulnerable to outside pressure but that pressure might be better applied through other means.

In addition, the purchase of warships and airplanes by Argentina and Brazil has been directed at filling specific requirements which are derived from specific maritime strategies. If one wishes to argue that ships armed with *Exocet* SSM are not needed for sovereignty patrol, one must also be able to convince the South American navies that the Soviet Navy will not take advantage of their

weaknesses and that, if they do, NATO is committed to aiding them. One must also persuade Argentina that the UK would discuss sharing the Burdwood Bank resources if the ARA did not have a capable force. Nor do current procurement programs of either navy suggest that they are "racing" against each other. To seaward, the maritime problems of the two countries do not overlap except perhaps in merchant marine competition.

If the United States wishes to shed some of the weight of its own military expenditures by asking other navies to perform regional defense missions on their own, it cannot, at the same time, unilaterally apply rigid standards of conduct and expect her compunctions to be honored with abashed compliance.