

**Global Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force from the First Gulf War to the  
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq:**

**Universal Logics and National Characteristics**

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## **Global Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force from the First Gulf War to the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq: Universal Logics and National Characteristics**

Richard C. Eichenberg

In this paper, I test a number of hypotheses concerning cross-national variation in support for using military force in six historical episodes. Specifically, using public opinion data from six historical episodes involving the threatened or actual use of force, I analyze the extent to which cross-national variations in support for using force can be traced to two sets of variables: *universal logics* and the *national characteristics* of particular states. By *universal logics*, I mean a set of considerations that should have an impact on opinion in all societies, regardless of historical experience, geopolitical position, or cultural tradition. By *national characteristics*, I mean precisely those variables that measure each state's experience, relative geopolitical position, and cultural makeup. These two sets variables are evaluated in a statistical model. The particular features of each historical conflict are also examined.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the immediately following section, I provide a description of the public opinion data that I employ. In a subsequent section, I provide an initial overview of cross-national variation in public support for using military force in the six historical episodes. This overview also provides the opportunity for a tentative assessment of my hypotheses. Following this overview, I examine the effect of three sets of variables that I describe as universal logics: principal policy objectives, international legitimacy, and the role of risk and casualty aversion. Having analyzed the effect of these factors individually, I then provide an interim statistical assessment of the relative importance of each factor. Subsequent sections extend the analysis by examining the

impact of important national characteristics, such as relative wealth, power, political and economic alignments, and culture. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the robustness of the results and a discussion of the implications of the results for future situations in which the use of military force may be contemplated or indeed carried out.

### **The Cross-National Data Collection**

I intend to test hypotheses about citizen support for using military force in many countries, something that has not been done in the existing literature. An effective test of my hypotheses will require the analysis of responses to a large number of survey questions from a large number of countries. Moreover, as revealed in my similar analysis of American public opinion (Eichenberg 2005), the survey questions must contain specific and substantial variation in the question wording employed. For example, to study the importance of international legitimacy, it is necessary to compare questions that mention a United Nations mandate for military action to those that do not, and it is also useful to compare questions that mention a multilateral military intervention to questions that mention the use of American forces alone or the use of the forces of a particular survey country itself. Similarly, to study the importance of risk, we need to compare questions that invoke high risk, such as deploying ground troops, to those with presumably lesser risk, such as air strikes. The remainder of this section provides an overview of the procedures that I employed to guide the collection of survey data for this paper. Like my collection of questions on American public opinion (Eichenberg 2005), the overriding principal is to identify and code survey questions based on the exact wording of the question itself. The subsequent statistical analysis relies heavily on these

variations in question wording to test hypotheses about variation in support for the use of military force.

#### Sources of Cross-National Data on Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force

Over the last fifteen years, public opinion data from countries outside of North America and Western Europe have become much more accessible than was previously the case.

There are six principal sources. The first are compilations by scholars who study public opinion on national security issues. These compilations are based on press reports and the websites and publications of polling firms in many countries. Second, the Office of Research in the U.S. Department of State (ORDOS) has for many years conducted public opinion surveys on foreign policy and national security issues throughout the world. The coverage of these surveys is concentrated in Western Europe, but there are also surveys from the Middle East, Turkey, India, Australia, Japan, and other countries. Some of these surveys are reported in government memoranda that, while not classified, are also not widely circulated. Some older ORDOS surveys must be retrieved from public opinion archives.<sup>1</sup> One should also mention the *Eurobarometer*, conducted by the Commission of the European Union, a poll that occasionally includes questions about intervention in international conflicts. A third source of global public opinion is the growing number of international polls conducted on behalf of news organizations, such as the *Economist*, the

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<sup>1</sup> The current Office of Research in the U.S. Department of State (ORDOS) was part of the United States Information Agency (USIA) until 1999. For ease of exposition, I refer to the current office, ORDOS, throughout. Some ORDOS surveys from the early 1990s are archived at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut. A list of ORDOS surveys from earlier periods (available from the U.S. National Archives) is reported in Eichenberg (1989, 244). A substantial number of ORDOS surveys conducted in Germany since the 1950s are reported in Rattinger (1995); the original data for Germany and other European countries are available from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne; a catalog is accessible at <http://www.gesis.org/ZA/>.

*Guardian*, or the BBC. Fourth, a number of public affairs organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Pew Center for the People and the Press, now commission international polls on a regular basis. Finally, commercial polling organizations in many countries occasionally ask questions about military intervention, and some organizations conduct regular international surveys.<sup>2</sup>

I examined more than eighty individual sources in search of the opinion data for this paper. The resulting data collection contains 1685 questions from 81 countries covering the period from August 1990 through October 2004 (a list of the countries is contained in the Appendix). The largest share of the questions was drawn from the compilations of scholars who had already searched the sources listed above.<sup>3</sup> The surveys conducted by the Office of Research in the U.S. Department of State yielded the second largest share of questions.

### Defining Citizen “Support for the Use of Military Force”

In my research on public opinion in the United States, I define public support for using force as support for the “potential or actual use of military force [past, present, or future]... I include only those questions that actively (if sometimes hypothetically) query

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<sup>2</sup> One source of data from these organizations is *Polling the Nations*, a database accessible (by subscription) at <http://www.pollingthenations.com>. The Roper Center at the University of Connecticut has searchable archives of survey marginals from Japan and Latin America. In addition, individual commercial firms from around the world can be identified at the website of the World Association for Public Opinion Research, <http://www.wapor.org>. More recently, the Program on International Policy Attitudes has introduced a very useful website that compiles survey data from around the world: <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>.

<sup>3</sup> Researchers owe a large debt of gratitude to the scholars who assemble these compilations, in particular Philip Everts at Leiden University and Pierangelo Isernia at the University of Sienna. For their compilation of surveys on the Iraq war, see Everts and Isernia (2005). Their data compilations on other conflicts are available at <http://www.politicologie.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?c=279>.

approval or disapproval of an action involving military force as a means of policy. I required that questions actively inquire if respondents “favor” (or “approve” or “agree” to) a specific action involving the military means of policy.” This definition provided a specific operational guide for collecting the survey questions that I employed in my analysis of American public opinion (Eichenberg 2005, 153-156). As I began searching through survey materials from other countries, however, I became aware of a number of additional question formats that are used by pollsters around the world to gauge citizen support for military actions. To be sure, there are a great many survey items that meet the operational definition above: respondents are simply asked if they favor or oppose a military action or if they agree or disagree with the action. Approximately 75 percent of the survey items analyzed in this paper employ this format. Nonetheless, an even larger and cross-nationally richer data collection can be attained by expanding the definition somewhat to include other question formats that elicit a positive or negative evaluation of the use of force. For example, there are questions that ask if the use of force is “justified” or if it is the “right” or “appropriate” thing to do. Since the response percentages to these types of question differ little on average from the standard “approve/disapprove” type of question, I included these items in the data collection to increase both cross-national variation and the statistical power of the analysis.<sup>4</sup>

In summary, “support for using military force” in this paper is defined as any survey item that seeks a positive or negative opinion on “the potential or actual use of

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<sup>4</sup> The average level of support for each question format follows: “approve or favor” (49 percent), “agree” (44 percent), “justified”(40 percent), “right thing to do” (44 percent), and “appropriate thing to do” (37 percent). The somewhat lower figure for the “appropriate” format occurs in a question that asks if the survey country’s troops should be sent along with U.S. troops into Afghanistan in 2001. Since it was asked in only twelve countries at only one point in time, it has no effect on the overall averages reported later in this paper.

military force [past, present, or future]... including questions that actively (if sometimes hypothetically) query approval or disapproval of an action involving military force as a means of policy and also including questions that ask if the action is justified, appropriate, or the right thing to do.”

### Putting Question Wording to Work

The variation in the wording of public opinion survey questions can be frustrating for scholars who seek to ascertain comparable levels of support for particular policies or actions, but that same variation can be employed to test important hypotheses concerning support for using military force. Consider the following surveys questions that were posed by polling organizations in one or more countries during each of the following historical conflicts:

- Gulf War, January 1991: “Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to use military force against Iraq? ...Do you approve or disapprove of the role that [survey country’s] forces have taken in the Gulf?”<sup>5</sup> (ORDOS)
- Bosnia, October 1993: “Do you support or oppose the participation of your country’s military units with the military forces of the UN command in order to impose UN sanctions in the former Yugoslavia?” (ORDOS)
- Kosovo, April 1999: “As you may know, NATO has recently taken military action in Kosovo. Do you support or oppose NATO’s decision to carry out air and missile strikes against Serbian military installations?” (Angus Reid/ the *Economist*)
- War against terror (Afghanistan), December 2001: “Do you personally agree or disagree with the United States military action in Afghanistan?” (Gallup International)

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<sup>5</sup> In some countries, the specific actions of a survey country’s military forces are described (for example, naval support forces in the case of Australia and Spain).

- War against Iraq, June 2004: “Would you approve or disapprove of sending/keeping [survey country’s] troops to Iraq if the United Nations approves a multinational force to assist with security and reconstruction?” (German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends* 2004)
- War against Iraq, June 2004: “Would you approve of sending/keeping [survey country’s] troops to Iraq if the United Nations approves a multinational force under US command to assist with security and reconstruction?” (GMFUS, *Transatlantic Trends* 2004)<sup>6</sup>

These and other survey questions provide the basis for evaluating the impact of different “considerations” that may influence citizen attitudes toward using military force (Zaller 1992). Some questions mention general “military actions”, while others refer specifically to air strikes; other questions, not shown here, refer to “sending troops” or “sending ground troops”. The principal military actor (NATO, UN, the US, a particular country) is mentioned in some questions, while in others it is not. The questions also offer variety in terms of the degree of international legitimacy of the action by mentioning a UN mandate for the action in some questions but not in others. It is these variations in wording that provide the empirical leverage for testing the hypotheses below.

The exact procedures for classifying these and other specific considerations relevant to each hypothesis are presented in the appropriate sections of this paper. The overriding principal is that the hypothesis to be tested (principal policy objectives, legitimacy, risk) is classified from the wording of the question itself. I make no judgments about the purpose, risk, or legitimacy of the military actions mentioned in the survey items, despite the arguments of governments, political leaders, or scholars that often surrounds them. For example, if a question specifically inquires of support for

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<sup>6</sup>The two questions on the Iraq war during June 2004 were each posed to half the sample of 1,000 respondents in each country. The responses to these two questions are discussed in a subsequent section of this paper.



taking the side of one party to an internal conflict (for example, explicitly on behalf of Kosovo Albanians), I classify the policy objective as “internal political change”, even though the U.S. government, NATO, or other observers might argue that the intervention was really humanitarian in motivation. As we will see, even precise rules such as these leave some ambiguity concerning a small number of questions, but I respect the rule to the maximum extent possible. Furthermore, this principle for classification based on question wording is firmly grounded in what we know about how individuals respond to survey questions. Individuals often resolve ambivalent attitudes about a difficult policy choice by employing the “considerations” that are most salient to them at the moment. The wording of the survey question is the most immediate consideration at hand (Zaller 1992).

#### Global Public Opinion in Six Historical Episodes: An Overview of the Data

The ideal circumstance for testing cross-national hypotheses about public opinion on the use of force would be to identify survey questions on every actual or threatened use of the military on the part of all countries in the world. For example, one would like to study not just global opinions on the recent wars in Iraq or Kosovo, but also to study Indian opinion concerning a possible military conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, Japanese opinion concerning the potential threat from North Korea or China, or African opinion on the deployment of peacekeepers in the Sudan. Unfortunately, although there are scattered data from several countries on specific historical incidents involving the use of force (the British in the Falklands or Korea or scattered Canadian or Dutch surveys on UN peacekeeping missions over the years), there is to my knowledge no source that would

allow a systematic comparison of many questions for many countries on similar issues or specific regional or bilateral conflicts.

One reason, of course, is that public opinion polling in many poorer countries is a relatively recent phenomenon. A second reason is access. I suspect that there may indeed be surveys of public opinion in many countries on the prospect of using military force in specific conflicts, but many of them are conducted by government agencies and are rarely available publicly.<sup>7</sup> Even those that might be publicly known (conducted perhaps for a major newspaper) are very difficult to find if they were published before the advent of modern information retrieval systems, and newspapers have the frustrating habit of publishing only partial wording and percentages. Moreover, even if one had the necessary money and linguistic skills to retrieve them all, I suspect the sample would still not yield a sufficiently large number of comparable questions to allow the sort of testing of hypotheses that I propose here.

As result, we are forced to focus the analysis on public opinion surveys during six recent historical episodes in which military force was contemplated or employed and in which many nations actually participated in the military actions or provided political or military support for those actions. The six episodes are listed in Table 1, together with the number of survey questions that were collected for each.

Note that these are episodes in which the global community formally or informally deliberated on proposed actions in the United Nations; in effect the entire global

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<sup>7</sup> There are some exceptions. For example, government agencies in Japan (Japan Defense Agency) and Mexico (Office of the Prime Minister) conducts surveys on defense issues. Original Mexican surveys are deposited in the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut; Japanese question marginals are retrievable through the Roper Center's JPOLL database at <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/jpoll/home.html>. Additional Japanese survey data are often listed in *Defense of Japan* (Japanese Defense Agency, various years).

community was involved in deciding whether to sanction the use of force (in two cases, Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003, the UN did not endorse the action). Three of the episodes deal with different phases of the confrontation with Iraq, beginning with the invasion of Kuwait in the late summer of 1990. After the Gulf War, of course, several coalition powers remained involved in the enforcement of the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, and there were also repeated threats or actual uses of force to compel compliance with UN resolutions regarding weapons inspections. When to date the end of this confrontation and the beginning of the most recent Iraq war is rather arbitrary. To some minds, the intent of the United States to invade Iraq was essentially signaled in late August 2002, in a famous speech by Vice-President Cheney to the convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Alternatively, one might date the start of the war phase from October 11, 2002, when the U.S. Congress passed resolutions authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq. Nonetheless, until the war began on March 19, 2003, there always remained the possibility that war could be avoided, and survey questions on the war remained hypothetical until that date. Survey questions posed after March 19 concern a war that was actually underway, so it seems most accurate to analyze public opinion after that date.

In any case, the information in Table 1 reveals something that is important to the interpretation of the analysis to follow: the available survey information provides a very solid basis for analyzing public opinion toward what might be called “internationalized conflicts” (those involving the entire global community or important regional institutions), but it does not provide information on public opinion toward specific bilateral or regional conflicts outside of the Middle East and Europe. What is more,

although the use of military force in most of these episodes was sanctioned by the United Nations (the exceptions are Kosovo and the Iraq war), in the end a substantial share of the military forces employed in the conflicts was provided by the more powerful, Western nations of North America and Western Europe. It also seems plausible that the United States was perceived as the major military actor in virtually all of these conflicts. There is a risk, therefore, that the data actually measure support for the use of force by the rich and the powerful rather than support for using force more generally.

Nonetheless, the risk concerns only the bounds of generalization. The survey data measure opinions towards the use of force in these six conflicts (and perhaps to those similar to them), but there is no question of generalizing any findings for these conflicts to other conflicts in entirely different contexts (such as the regional or bilateral conflicts mentioned above). In addition, as I describe immediately below, the collection of surveys does allow analysis of variations in support according to whose military force is referenced in the question, and the data collection further allows a detailed examination of the degree of international legitimacy and risk that attends each military action. Thus, although responses would surely be different if the survey questions concerned, say, defending India from a Pakistani threat, or defending Taiwan from threat or attack, there remains sufficient variation in the available data to allow inferences on the sensitivity of public opinion around the globe to a number of important considerations concerning the use of military force. Finally, it is worth noting that the future is likely to bring additional occasions when the question of threatening or using military force with or without the assent of the international community will be debated both in domestic

political settings and in international institutions. Under what conditions the world's citizens will support such actions is therefore an important question.

### **Global Variation in Support for Using Military Force: A First Cut**

I begin the analysis by providing the summary average level of citizen support in all countries for the threat or actual use of force of all kinds in each of the six historical episodes (see Figure 1). Although the figures displayed in the graphic are averaged across a number of types of military actions and many countries, they nonetheless provide initial confirmation of several hypotheses. First, it is clear that the principal policy objective of the action is important (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). The two conflicts that were fought to restrain or retaliate against a foreign adversary (the first Gulf War and War against Terror) are the two most popular actions. Similarly, the episode that was widely framed as a humanitarian action (the insertion of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and the actions that were carried out to protect them) also commanded majority support. In contrast, NATO's intervention against Serbia over Kosovo –an involvement in an ongoing internal conflict—was somewhat less popular. Finally, the two episodes involving confrontation and war with Iraq that became framed in terms of the wisdom of launching an attack to remove the Iraqi regime (a decided involvement in internal political change) were by far the least popular with citizens around the world.

In fact, the distinction with respect to conflict with Iraq before 2003 is even clearer if we examine two historical periods separately. Before 2001, when opinion surveys tended to ask about support for using military force to compel compliance with the post-Gulf War inspections regime, an average of 49 percent of public opinion

supported military action against Iraq. When compliance with inspections was specifically mentioned in survey questions, support averaged 55 percent. After September 11, 2001, when opinion surveys tended to reflect the emerging debate about removing the regime as the means to effect compliance (and, in the U.S., as an extension of the war on terror), the percentage dropped to 37 percent. In summary, the data provide initial support for Jentleson's argument that the objective for which military force is used is an important determinant of public support.

International legitimacy is just as clearly important in Figure 1. The Gulf War and the War against Terror were both sanctioned by the United Nations. In the former case, of course, the UN Security Council explicitly endorsed the employment of "all necessary means" to secure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In the case of the war against terror, the Security Council passed resolutions 1368 and 1373 which, while not endorsing American military action against Afghanistan, did condemn the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack and made reference to the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."<sup>8</sup> In addition, on October 20, 2001, the European Union was joined by Russia, Moldova and Ukraine in declaring "wholehearted support for the action in the framework of legitimate self-defence."<sup>9</sup> In Bosnia, a UN arms embargo was imposed on all parties to the conflict in 1991, and peacekeeping forces were introduced in 1992 with the authorization of the UN. The UN also imposed a "no fly" zone over Bosnia and authorized NATO to enforce it. In contrast, NATO's war against Serbia in 1999 was not sanctioned by the UN, a fact that caused considerable debate among NATO governments (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000,

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/othr/2001/5108.htm>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUU.S.Terror/EurConfDeclar.htm>

36-37; 44-45). Public support was lower for that intervention in the countries studied here, and although few surveys on Kosovo were conducted outside of European countries, I suspect that global support for the Kosovo intervention was even lower than what is shown in Figure 1.<sup>10</sup> Finally, as is well known, the United Nations did not pass a specific resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq in 2003, and this conflict has been by far the least popular of the six (and as noted above, support for using force to compel compliance with UN weapons inspections during 1998 was noticeably higher).

In summary, these data, although aggregated and therefore somewhat tentative, nonetheless provide some confirmation of the importance of two considerations that I have characterized as part of a universal logic: principal policy objectives and international legitimacy. However, there is also evidence, as shown in Table 2, that factors specific to individual nations are also important. The table shows average levels of support in 26 selected nations for the threat or actual use of force in all six episodes combined (these countries are shown because more survey questions are available for this group than for other states in the data collection). Although there are exceptions, the table reveals a fairly clear relationship between the wealth (and therefore relative power) of each nation and support for using military force: the poor and weak are more skeptical. The relationship is somewhat complicated by political relationships: the wealthier, western nations tend also to be allied with each other and indeed have carried out some of the military interventions together as an alliance. Yet the importance of relative economic development often reasserts itself: South Korea, Turkey, and Greece, although formal allies of the U.S., have been critical of the use of force. In summary, although

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<sup>10</sup> One survey conducted in Taiwan found only 24 percent supporting NATO's attacks against Serbia, compared to the 49 percent average in Western and Eastern Europe shown in the graphic.

there are exceptions (India), in general the table shows a correlation in which the poorer, weaker nations are generally more critical of the use of force. I pursue this relationship further after analyzing the importance of universal logics in more detail.

### **Universal Logics: Policy Objectives, Legitimacy, and Risk**

In this section I provide a more detailed analysis of factors that should have universal applicability, regardless of such national characteristics as relative power or cultural makeup. Universal logics include the objective for which force is used; the degree of international legitimacy that the military action enjoys; and the amount of risk entailed by specific military actions.

#### Principal Policy Objectives

There is substantial evidence from American public opinion for Jentleson's argument that the policy objective for which military force is used is the most important factor conditioning public support (Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998, Eichenberg 2005). Restraint of threatening adversaries (foreign policy restraint or FPR) should enjoy high support both because it is legitimate under international law and because the standard of success is clear: the goal is to successfully deter an adversary or defeat its military forces if deterrence fails. In contrast, actions that suggest involvement in internal political change (IPC) will be comparatively less popular, because such involvements enjoy lower normative and legal status and also because internal conflicts are dangerous, intractable, and costly. Involvement in internal conflicts may also engender participation in the job of establishing a stable political system in the aftermath of the conflict, a task for which military forces are less well prepared and perhaps less likely to achieve



success. Finally, I argue that humanitarian interventions (HI) and peacekeeping operations (PK) should fall somewhere in between. On the one hand, the tradition of neutrality that accompanies such missions should make them more popular, for it is this principle that offers the promise that military forces will not become a partisan of one side or become involved in actual combat. The point, quite simply, is to avoid a fight. The need is also frequently urgent. On the other hand, I have also speculated that HI and PK missions might enjoy less public support than clear cases of FPR because they place military forces in the midst of intractable conflicts (as in Bosnia and Somalia) and require military forces to engage in the political task of nation building in the aftermath of conflict (Eichenberg 2005).

In this section, I evaluate these arguments empirically. The first step is to classify each of the 1685 survey items in the data collection according to the principal policy objective that is communicated in the question. I developed a coding (classification) scheme to accomplish this task. The following is a summary of the rules by which I classified each survey question according to the principal policy objective:

Foreign policy restraint is coded when the question specifically states that the use of force is to defend or liberate an ally; to retaliate for an attack by a foreign adversary; or to prevent a state (always Iraq) from developing weapons of mass destruction or using such weapons.

Internal Political Change is coded when the question states that the use of force is intended to support one side engaged in an internal conflict; to overthrow a government or assist others attempting to overthrow a government; or generally to “stop the fighting”

or “help end” an internal conflict. Although the latter cases might be considered somewhat ambiguous, I code internal political change because, failing any other mention in the question, the wording explicitly indicates that fighting is still underway and also implies that military forces may become involved in the fighting.

Humanitarian intervention is coded when the question states that military forces will be used to provide humanitarian relief generally or when the question mentions specific types of humanitarian relief, such as delivery of food or medicines. Humanitarian intervention is also coded if the question states that military forces will be used to protect those who are delivering relief supplies or to protect civilians from harm (but not if the question also states that in doing so the military forces would be supporting one side in an internal conflict, as noted above).

Peacekeeping is coded when question wording makes clear that troops will be (or have been) inserted only after a truce or other agreement has been reached. Thus, survey questions that inquire of support for sending troops “to serve as peacekeepers once an agreement has been reached” or “to help keep the peace” are coded as peacekeeping.

In summary, I evaluated each of the 1685 survey questions for the presence or absence of the words described above and classified the question according to the appropriate principal policy objective. Following this procedure, 1048 of the 1685 survey questions were coded according to principal policy objective. The remaining 637 questions could not be coded because they did not reveal any of the wordings described above. These unclassifiable questions are fairly evenly distributed among the six historical episodes. They arise from the proclivity of polling firms to ask very general questions about the use of military force, leaving the interpretation of the policy objective

to the respondent. For example, after the Persian Gulf War had begun in February 1991, the U.S. Office of Research asked the following question in many countries: “Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to use military force against Iraq?” The question does not explicitly mention whose decision, whose military force, or for what purpose force was used. Similarly, during the civil war in Bosnia, the European Commission employed a question that asked if the EU, UN, and NATO “should intervene militarily” in the former Yugoslavia, without specifying against whom –if at all—the intervention would be directed and without specifying exactly what type of “military intervention”. Quite general questions were also asked in many countries about the “military interventions” in Afghanistan in October, 2001 and against Iraq from the late 1990s through the commencement of the war in 2003.

These unclassifiable questions present something of a dilemma. The generality of the questions might argue for excluding them from analysis, but as the questions cited above make clear, they do inquire of support or opposition to using military force in important, well-publicized circumstances. Ignoring them would sacrifice 38 percent of the available data. Substantively, one might argue that, when asked in the context of a widely publicized action (the coalition offensive to liberate Kuwait in 1991 or the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example), the purpose of that action should be clear to survey respondents and thus classified accordingly. Yet a moment’s reflection reveals that in each of the historical episodes, a number of policy objectives were announced by the states that participated in the military actions or were ascribed to them by others. When the Gulf War started in 1991, for example, there was discussion of the possibility (or desirability) of removing Saddam Hussein from power in addition to

driving his forces from Kuwait; survey questions about this option were actually fielded. Similarly, NATO and the U.S. government justified the air war against Serbia in 1999 on a variety of grounds, including the humanitarian objective of stopping the atrocities in Kosovo, the interest in preserving the credibility of the NATO Alliance, and the security interest in maintaining stability in southeastern Europe. When survey respondents were read a question that asked if they “approve or disapprove of NATO’s military intervention,” it is unclear which of these objectives the respondents might have had in mind. The same sort of problem arises from the large number of questions about the Iraq war in 2003. The U.S. government offered numerous objectives for the invasion and the subsequent occupation, but each of these objectives was much debated and disputed. We cannot know from vaguely phrased survey questions which of several contentious objectives were paramount in the minds of survey respondents.

With one important exception discussed below, my approach is therefore to leave the matter to survey respondents rather than attempt to impose a particular view of what principal policy objective was dominant in each of the episodes. In the analyses to follow, I therefore include “unclassified” principal policy objective as a separate category. If survey respondents perceived the Gulf War as an act of foreign policy restraint, then the survey results should reveal it in similar averages for the two categories. Similarly, if the war against Serbia was perceived as humanitarian, the results should make that clear as well.

The exception concerns the war against terror, which began with the American military attack against the Taliban government and Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan in October 2001. Three aspects of this war convinced me that otherwise unclassifiable

questions from this episode should be treated as foreign policy restraint. First, the global publicity surrounding the September 11 attacks as the causus belli for the war against terror was extraordinarily intense –perhaps uniquely so in history. As a result, there seems little prospect that survey respondents around the globe did not know that the U.S. was retaliating for an attack against its soil and also attempting to prevent further attacks. It was, in short, about as clear a case of foreign policy restraint as one is likely to find.<sup>11</sup> Second, it remains possible to maintain the distinction between these general questions and other questions that do refer explicitly to other policy objectives. For example, there were twenty-four questions during the war against terror that refer to regime change or participation in internal conflicts, and these are coded as internal political change as described above.

Table 3 displays total average support for using military force by principal policy objective together with the breakdown for each historical episode separately. The figures include support for all types of military actions in all countries for which surveys are available. Taking the overall totals at the top of the table, it is clear that principal policy objectives are important, although the exact ranking of objectives is not as hypothesized. The clearest finding is that involvement in internal conflicts is the least popular among the world's citizens, finding support among only 42 percent. The other three objectives all enjoy majority support, with humanitarian intervention by far the most popular. In addition, the totals at the top of the table confirm a pattern found in my research on American public opinion: involvement in internal conflicts is much less popular than

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<sup>11</sup> This is not to say that the attack was unequivocally justified or wise; views will differ on these questions. Rather, my argument is that, unlike generally stated survey questions during other conflicts, one can reasonably assume that survey questions about the attack against Afghanistan would be interpreted by respondents as part of an American intention to protect its security interests, that is, as a case of foreign policy restraint.

foreign policy restraint or humanitarian intervention (Eichenberg 2005, 164). However, there is also a contrast between American opinion and these opinions from other countries. In the United States, support for using military forces for peacekeeping missions is the least popular objective with public opinion (47 percent), whereas the data from other countries show support for peacekeeping that is ten percentage points higher (57 percent). Americans seem to have the same wariness for peacekeeping missions that they have for actual involvement in internal conflicts, perhaps because they fear that the former could lead to the latter given the strife that led to the need for peacekeepers in the first place. In addition, throughout the 1990s, the Republican Party in the U.S. was very hostile to peacekeeping and “nation building” and criticized President Clinton harshly for his interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. This sort of partisan polarization over peacekeeping has not characterized debates in other political systems, although other aspects of military interventions have been divisive.

The figures for the individual historical episodes in Table 3 are also revealing. Setting aside the first Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict for a moment, the remaining four historical episodes show a very similar rank ordering of public support according to policy objectives. Consider the confrontation with Iraq during the period from 1992 through March 18, 2003. The overall rank ordering of objectives is similar to that of the total figures, with humanitarian interventions and foreign policy restraint more popular than involvement in internal conflicts (most of the latter are questions inquiring of support for overthrowing the Iraqi regime). The similarity in the low support levels for internal political change and the “unclassified” questions suggests that questions that were posed generally without mentioning a specific objective were nonetheless

interpreted by respondents to imply an intervention to remove the Hussein regime, a conclusion that is understandable given the prominence of regime change in American policy statements. This conclusion is strengthened if we separate the period prior to September 11, 2001 from the period thereafter, for it was after the terror attacks against the U.S. that debate about the desirability of regime change in Iraq became most prominent and survey questions on this policy option also became prominent. In addition, many survey questions during the 1990s concerned military strikes to enforce UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq, arguably a more popular objective. The data bear out this reasoning. Prior to September 11, 2001, support for foreign policy restraint against Iraq was much higher than that shown in Table 3 (66 percent versus the 44 percent in the table), and the support level in unclassified questions was also higher (46 percent versus 34 percent in the table). In summary, the survey data concerning confrontation with Iraq strongly confirm the importance of principal policy objectives: prior to 2001, support levels were generally higher and indeed a strong majority of 66 percent supported the military actions taken to enforce weapons inspections (foreign policy restraint). After 2001, support for any military action against Iraq declined as speculation and debate intensified over the possibility of intervening to remove the Iraqi government.

The same pattern characterizes three additional historical episodes. In Bosnia, the War against terror, and the Iraq war and occupation, humanitarian objectives, peacekeeping, and foreign policy restraint are the more popular objectives, and intervention to influence internal political change is always the least popular. In the case of the Iraq war, in which questions about regime change were frequent, support for this internal change objective was particularly low, but it also characterizes the questions on

internal changed asked in questions about the war against terror, which was otherwise supported in global public opinion. Comparing across these episodes, it is of course noteworthy that the Iraq war of 2003 was far less popular in any category of objectives than the actions taken in Bosnia and the war against terror, suggesting perhaps not only that participation in regime change is rejected by citizens, but also that an intervention without an international, institutional mandate is unlikely to attract support (I return to this hypothesis in the next section of this paper).

I have reserved discussion of the first Gulf War and the war against Serbia over Kosovo because each displays a peculiarity that runs against the principal policy objective hypotheses. In the first Gulf War, support for participation in internal political change is actually the most popular, and in the war over Kosovo it is ranked a close second to humanitarian objectives. Why the reversal in the normal pattern? In the case of Kosovo, two plausible answers come to mind. The first is that the overwhelming majority of the survey items inquire of support for NATO's military action against Serbia, thus communicating to respondents any legitimacy that might be associated with a multilateral action. In addition, about one-third of the questions ask about support for air strikes specifically, which may communicate less risk than questions that mention sending troops. And of course, in announcing the commencement of NATO's action, President Bill Clinton explicitly ruled out the use of NATO ground troops.

In the case of the first Gulf War, the unusual popularity of internal political change objectives contains an additional surprise: the average support level of 72 percent is associated solely with questions on using force to remove Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War. It will no doubt surprise many to learn that using force to remove Hussein



was actually very popular in 1991. In fact, in countries where public opinion subsequently opposed the war in 2003, the objective of removing Hussein in 1991 was enthusiastically endorsed in Italy (90 percent), France (87 percent), Japan (82 percent), Germany (70 percent), Turkey (84 percent), and Spain (69 percent).<sup>12</sup> The reason for the high level of support revealed in these 1991 responses compared to the extremely low support for removing Hussein in 2002 and 2003 seems clear: the first Gulf War was carried out in response to obvious aggression and with the mandate of the United Nations. All of the countries listed above were contributing in some way to the military effort against Iraq. Of course, the 2003 war was not conducted under such a mandate, and international participation was much more limited. Moreover, there is some evidence that objection to removing Hussein was not the principal reason for opposition to the war against Iraq during 2002 and early 2003. In fact, in the fall of 2002, majorities in France and Britain and a near majority in Germany said they would support international action “to remove Saddam Hussein from power” (Bell and McGuire 2004, 14).

In summary, Table 3 demonstrates that principal policy objectives are an important correlate of support for using military force. The employment of military force to influence internal political change is least popular in almost all circumstances. Humanitarian and peacekeeping missions are significantly more popular and foreign policy restraint most popular. Nonetheless, data from the Kosovo war and the first Gulf war demonstrate that other factors also influence global public opinion. International legitimacy appears to be most important among them.

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<sup>12</sup> These figures are from ORDOS surveys conducted in late January 1991 and may have been affected by the “rally effect” that accompanies the beginning of international conflicts. Later in the spring of 1991 (May), support for removing Hussein had dropped considerably in France, Italy and Spain. Still, support for removing Hussein remained well over a majority in France and the UK. The question was not repeated in other countries.

## International Legitimacy

The importance of international legitimacy to public support for military operations involves three aspects. First, under international law, only military operations that are endorsed by the international community are legal, with the exception of operations undertaken in self-defense. Second, the requirement of internationally legitimized military interventions provides a protection for the weak against the strong. Finally, military operations that are sanctioned or indeed carried out by the international community are more likely to attract the political, economic, and military support of other states. The burdens and risks of intervention are shared.

Of course, each of these arguments has been hotly debated, but the question in this section is not whether one or the other is correct but whether public support for military intervention is affected by considerations of legitimacy. However, the task of answering this question is complicated by the format of survey questions that are often used to explore public sentiment on international institutions and legitimacy. Many survey questions ask respondents if they support or oppose a military action but also offer a third response alternative such as “support only if approved by the UN”. The percentages for this last response option are always very high, which should certainly be taken as evidence of the strong resonance that international legitimacy has with citizens, but it may also reflect the tendency of respondents to put off the reckoning –that is, to choose the most “peaceful” response option when the unpleasant prospect of violent conflict looms on the horizon.

An alternative approach is to compare support for using military force in questions that explicitly mention an international mandate to those that do not. That is

the initial approach that I follow here. I coded each of the survey questions for the presence or absence of an international mandate for military action in the wording of the question. The presence of an international mandate was coded if the question mentioned that the purpose of the military action was to enforce UN-mandated weapons inspections, to enforce UN-mandated “no fly zones”, to enforce UN-sponsored embargoes, or to contribute to UN-sponsored peacekeeping, reconstruction, or security forces.

Following this rule, I determined that 183 of the 1685 survey items explicitly mentioned an international mandate; the resulting effect on support for using military force is reported in Table 4.<sup>13</sup> Once again setting aside the first Gulf War, we see that mentioning an international mandate always increases support for using force, although not always by the same amount and not always sufficiently to overcome the unpopularity of a particular military intervention. Note that in the Bosnia case, about which public opinion was equivocal, even an international mandate increases support only slightly, from 51 to 55 percent. In the case of confrontation with Iraq before the war in 2003, I divided the responses into two sub-periods. Before September 11, 2001, the mention of an international mandate increased support for forceful actions against Iraq to 54 percent (these questions involved enforcement of the UN weapons inspections regime). After September 11, 2001 the increase of ten percentage points leaves support at a very low 42 percent. Obviously, the looming prospect of a war to change the regime—even when a hypothetical UN mandate was mentioned—remained unpopular with public opinion.

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<sup>13</sup> I also coded question wording for the mention of any international or multilateral institution at all, regardless of whether an international mandate was mentioned. The results strengthen those shown in Table 4. For example, mentioning the NATO alliance increased support during the Kosovo conflict by 5 percentage points, and mentioning any international institution increased support for the war against terror by 14 percentage points. These codes for specific international institutions are employed in the statistical analysis presented in later sections of this paper.

The cases involving war with Iraq, in 1991 and 2003, are surprising. In the first case, the Gulf War of 1991, it does not appear that mentioning the UN mandate had any positive effect. Quite the opposite, it is negative. The explanation has to do with a peculiarity of the data collection for the Gulf War: only 14 of the 145 questions mentioned an international mandate, and 12 of these questions were asked in Mexico. In Mexico, the office of the Prime Minister conducted several surveys in January and February 1991 that asked citizens if they approved of the Security Council's resolution authorizing the use of force and also asking (separately) if Mexican military forces should contribute to the use of force under this resolution. As the table shows, Mexicans were not enthusiastic. What this suggests, of course, is that even the endorsement of the UN did not override other considerations that influence Mexican opinion on using force, and I suspect that power considerations are the most likely candidate. Since the United States played the most prominent role in securing the approval of the Security Council resolution and led the military efforts of the coalition, I suspect that Mexicans were expressing skepticism of the exercise of American military power. This is a theme that I pursue in later sections of this paper.

The second surprise in Table 4 concerns the Iraq war and occupation during 2003 and 2004. In this case, when survey questions mentioned a UN mandate for sending military forces to Iraq or maintaining the presence of troops already involved in the occupation, citizen support increased by almost 20 percentage points over questions that did not mention such a mandate, reaching a very surprising majority of 52 percent on average. It is surprising because, in well over two hundred surveys on the subject of

military intervention in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, average support is a very low 35 percent (recall Table 3 above).

The explanation is worth pursuing in some detail. The first is that all of the questions in Table 4 that mention a UN mandate for intervening in Iraq after 2003 were fielded in European countries and Australia, all allies of the United States. Still, we know that the war against Iraq was hugely unpopular even in many of these allied states (which include France, Germany, Spain, Slovakia, and Turkey, among others). This is strong evidence that the legitimacy of the war was the primary issue even for citizens in countries allied with the United States. That point of view is even stronger if we examine some of the questions in detail.

The most interesting survey in this regard was conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in ten countries during June 2004 (GMFUS 2004). In this survey, respondents were asked if their country should send, keep, or return troops to Iraq (as appropriate) if the “UN approves a multinational force to assist with security and reconstruction in Iraq”. Surprisingly, 52 percent of citizens in 10 countries approved of sending or keeping troops in Iraq under these circumstances. Adding similar questions fielded in Australia brings the average to 58 percent. This figure is extraordinary when we consider that an average of only 33 percent approved of contributing troops to the war or occupation when a UN mandate was not mentioned. Furthermore, the importance of a truly internationalized presence in Iraq was reinforced in a second variant of the question fielded by GMF. In this second variant (posed as an experiment to half the respondents in the survey), respondents were asked if they would approve of sending troops to Iraq or keeping them there, if the “UN approves a multinational force under U.S. command to

assist with security and reconstruction in Iraq.” Obviously, this change in wording challenges respondents to choose between an affinity for an international mandate and the practical reality of American implementation of that mandate. The results are clear: in this variant of the question, support for contributing troops to Iraq drops to 43 percent when the phrase “under U.S. command” is mentioned in the question. It is 62 percent when the U.S. command is not mentioned. This survey makes clear that citizens are expressing a desire for a truly international intervention rather than one dominated by Americans.

Whether this is unique to the Iraq war of 2003 is an interesting question. The Iraq war was particularly divisive, and even before the war Europeans were already hostile to a number of the policy decisions of President George W. Bush. It may be that the Iraq war was a unique situation, colored by a particularly unilateralist American president who had already alienated global public opinion. Furthermore, the data in Table 4 are somewhat thin. There are only 183 questions of a total of 1685 that specifically mention an international mandate. Although the comparisons in the table are suggestive, it would be useful to have a stronger test of the importance of international legitimacy.

Fortunately, there is a second way to evaluate the importance of international legitimacy. When asking about the prospect of using military force or about military interventions already underway, survey organizations usually specify what actor –whose military forces-- would be used. For example, some questions inquire about the use of “international forces”, “UN forces”, or “NATO forces”, while others refer to “U.S. forces” or “U.S. and allied forces”. Additional formulations include the prospect of deploying the forces of the survey country only or the prospect of the survey country

joining with international, NATO, or U.S. forces. In summary, the degree of multilateralism that characterizes each actual or prospective military operation is communicated in the question by the description of whose military forces are to be employed. We can therefore ascertain the willingness to support the use of force depending on the extent to which the military force to be used is “internationalized”.

As displayed in Figure 2, the resulting differences in average support for using force are very clear indeed. When international or UN forces are mentioned in the question, support is unequivocal (65 percent). Questions that mention NATO forces also evoke majority support. At the other extreme, when the question refers to U.S. military forces acting alone, support is only 40 percent, and there is also little enthusiasm for joining the U.S. in military operations. Clearly, citizens around the globe are more supportive of multilateral military interventions. Nor is this sentiment confined to a single conflict. Although not shown here, the pattern is much the same within each of the historical episodes. Coupled with the clear finding concerning the importance of an international mandate for military action, these results suggest that the degree of international legitimacy associated with an intervention is a very strong correlate of citizen support.

### Risk and Casualties

Building on findings in the broader scholarly literature as well as my findings for American public opinion (Eichenberg 2005), I have argued that the risk and human cost of military conflict is manifested in public opinion in three ways.<sup>14</sup> The first is the relative risk of the military action proposed or undertaken. Since survey questions often

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<sup>14</sup> For recent contributions that deal with the issues of casualties as a cost/benefit calculation, Eichenberg (2005), Larson (2005), Voeten and Brewer (2005), and Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2005/06).

mention specific types of military action –sending troops or conducting air strikes, for example—it is possible to analyze the level of public support for a number of different types of action with a varying risk of casualties. Second, although direct questions about casualties in combat are rarely asked as part of questions seeking approval or disapproval of military action, there are a few that do, and these provide a first assessment of the impact of casualty considerations on levels of support.<sup>15</sup> Finally, a more thorough assessment of the impact of casualties can be conducted by comparing the level of casualties actually suffered to the level of support for military action in the relevant historical episodes.

I begin in the top of Table 5 by comparing citizen support for a number of specific military actions. With one exception (maintaining troops in place), support for using force does indeed decline from less risky actions, such as the use of naval or air forces or the provision of training or advisors, to more risky actions, such as sending or increasing troops or approving the presence of troops already in place. The high level of support for “maintaining troops” is actually somewhat misleading, because it is an artifact of the influence of international legitimacy discussed in the previous section. The questions on “maintaining troops” (which includes opposition to withdrawing them) all arise from two episodes. The first is Bosnia, in which all of the questions specify that “the UN, European Union, and NATO are all involved in the former Yugoslavia” and ask if troops under these organizations should remain. The second is the case of the Iraq occupation during 2004; these are the GMF questions described above in which respondents from countries with troops in Iraq are asked if they should stay “if the UN authorizes a multinational force...?” It seems clear that the positive responses for “maintaining

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<sup>15</sup> This includes questions that ask if the military action is “worth the loss of human life”.



troops” results from the high value placed on an international mandate for their presence, and it is surely significant that the existence of such a mandate outweighs the risk of maintaining troop deployments in dangerous circumstances. In American public opinion, support for maintaining troops in place is only 43 percent (Eichenberg 2005, 158).

The bottom half of Table 5 directly addresses the sensitivity of public opinion to the prospect of casualties by comparing support for military action in questions that mention civilian or military casualties to questions that do not. Interpretation of the data requires caution, because only 51 of the 1685 survey questions actually mentioned casualties as part of a question seeking approval or disapproval of the use of force. Nonetheless, the data that do exist show that the public is indeed sensitive to casualties. In four historical cases, there was majority support for using force when casualties were not mentioned, but there was a majority in only one case when casualties were mentioned (the first Gulf War). In the confrontation and war with Iraq, there has never been a majority favoring military action, and in the case of the Iraq war and occupation in 2003 and 2004, mention of casualties has a particularly strong downward effect.

Given the latter figures, it is tempting to conclude that the continuing casualty toll in Iraq decreased support for the war and occupation. Most of the casualty questions on Iraq ask if the war was “worth the loss of human life”, and after many months of war and occupation, it would not be surprising were the continuing death of civilians and soldiers to push respondents to a negative conclusion. However, a comparison of support for all six wars and the level of casualties suffered in those wars yields a more complicated picture. Consider the support levels for each episode that were displayed in Table 3. The highest level of support occurs for the Persian Gulf War of 1991; 57 percent of citizens in

all countries supported it in surveys in 1990 and 1991 (the average after the war's end is the same 57 percent). Yet we know that almost 500 coalition troops and several thousand Iraqis lost their lives in the war.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, almost 150 military casualties had been suffered in Afghanistan during the timeframe covered by my data collection, yet support for that action is also above a majority in Table 3. It appears that considerations of policy objective and international legitimacy are the more important factors affecting these levels of support. Although the Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan were costly in terms of human life, citizens seemed to override their concerns about the costs because the interventions were considered legitimate. In the case of the War against Iraq in 2003, that was not the case, and support for that war was low even before any casualties were suffered.

The same pattern held once the war and occupation began. Between June 2003 and June 2004, 60 British and 2 Dutch soldiers were killed in Iraq, but the percent of respondents in the two countries who thought that the war was “worth the loss of human life” was almost identical (32 and 34 percent respectively).<sup>17</sup> In fact, there is no correlation between the number of casualties suffered by a country's troops in Iraq and the level of support for the war or in the judgment that the war has been “worth it”. In general, citizens who supported the war before it began remain comparatively higher in their support, and those who opposed it remain opposed. Clearly, factors other than the loss of military and civilian lives determined support and opposition to the Iraq war and

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<sup>16</sup> U.S. casualties figures are taken from Table 7 in Eichenberg (2005); coalition casualty figures are from <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/17/sprj.irq.casualties/>.

<sup>17</sup> Coalition casualty figures for the Iraq war of 2003 are from [www.icasualties.org](http://www.icasualties.org), accessed November 10, 2004.

occupation. As noted above, principal policy objective and international legitimacy appear primary among these factors.

The interplay of yet additional considerations is visible in the United Kingdom, the one country for which there are data for a single question over a long period of time. Figure 3 shows the answers to a series of polls for the *Guardian* newspaper that asked if respondents “approved” of an attack against Iraq (through June of 2003) and later if they considered the attack to have been “justified”(after June 2003). As the graphic shows, the responses to the “justified” question may be systematically higher –the average after the end of the war phase in April 2003 is over ten percentage points higher than the average before the war began. Nonetheless, the figures reveal some interesting patterns. First, as was true in American public opinion, British ambivalence before the war gave way to a rally effect once the war began. In identical question wording, support for the war surged from an average of 35 percent before the onset of war to an average of 56 percent during the war in March and April. During these two months, 33 British service personnel lost their lives. As was true in the U.S. after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, British citizens seemed to have calculated that the loss of life given the rapid success of toppling the regime was worth the cost. The subsequent pattern is similar. Support for the war declined throughout the summer and fall of 2003 (during which 20 British soldiers were killed) but was interrupted by a surge of support after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December. Once again, the failure of summer and fall gave way to a short-term increase in support for the war when a clear success could be seen. Successes have been few since the capture of Hussein, and support for the war has drifted downward in Britain, although not nearly so steeply as in the U.S. The important point is

that the casualty toll alone does not appear to be the single determining factor in British opinion. Rather, as was true for the United States, support for the war is part of a cost/benefit calculation: when the results of using military force appear to be successful, support increases, because the benefit appears to outweigh the cost. When success is elusive, as it has been for much of the period of occupation in Iraq, the costs of the war will obviously dominate the calculation, leading to an erosion of support.<sup>18</sup>

#### Universal Logics: A Statistical Summary

To this point the analysis has demonstrated that all of the factors that I described as universal logics are important correlates of cross-national variation in support for using military force. Across 81 states in six historical episodes, principal policy objectives, international legitimacy, risk, and casualty sensitivity all have an impact when taken individually. However, there remains the question of the relative impact of each factor. Just how much does multilateral participation or the fear of casualties affect citizen support, holding the other factors constant?

In this section, I provide a statistical summary of the relative effects of the factors analyzed in previous sections of this paper. The regression analysis is similar to my published analysis of American opinion (Eichenberg 2005, 173). The results are presented in Table 6.<sup>19</sup> The beginning point is a baseline average level of support

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<sup>18</sup> On casualties and the success or failure of an operation, see Larson (1996, 2005) Eichenberg (2003, 2005), Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005/06), and Berinsky (2006).

<sup>19</sup> These figures are the parameters from a multiple regression analysis containing all of the factors (variables) listed in the table. Because the question wording variables take the values of 1 and 0 (indicating the presence or absence of a particular question wording), they are readily interpretable as the percentage change in opinion due to the presence of a particular wording. Based on previous analysis, only those factors that are statistically significant are reported in the table. The baseline average is the constant in the regression, and the  $R^2$  is .28.

representing the questions that were labeled “unclassified” in previous sections (43.7 percent). The impact of a different question wording (say, a question that mentions a multilateral organization or specifies U.S. troops as the principal actor) can be read as the deviation from this baseline average. For example, average support for humanitarian intervention is 23 percentage points higher than the baseline average (+23.2), but support drops by almost eight percentage points (-7.95) when the question mentions that U.S. troops will carry out a military action alone.

Based on the findings in previous sections of this paper, I streamlined the analysis of several factors to facilitate interpretation. For example, rather than analyze all of the individual categories of military actors that were shown in Figure 2, a procedure that would prove cumbersome to interpret, I grouped categories that exhibit similar levels of public support. Thus, the category “UN forces” in Table 6 contains all questions that mention the United Nations or “international forces” as a military actor. The category “U.S. forces” combines all questions that mention the U.S. as a military actor, and “NATO forces” represents a similar combination (all of the possible categories are visible in Figure 2).

The results are very clear: most of the factors discussed in previous sections are significant influences on global variation in support for using military force. Principal policy objectives stand out for their high and consistent impact. Support for humanitarian intervention is twenty-three percentage points higher than the average, and both peace keeping and foreign policy restraint are 12 percentage points higher than the average. What this means is clear: variation in global support for military actions depends to a very large extent on the purpose for which military force is used –the magnitude of the

parameters for policy objectives are among the highest in the analysis. Humanitarian actions are supported to the point of being uncontroversial, while foreign policy restraint and peacekeeping also enjoy majority support. Involvement in internal conflicts is not shown because it is not significantly different from the average of 44 percent and thus enjoys low support.

Jentleson's reasoning once again receives strong confirmation. Actions that enjoy some legitimacy under international norms and law are supported; the less legitimate purpose –or perhaps more contested purpose—of involvement in internal conflicts enjoys less than majority support. The importance of legitimacy is further reinforced by two additional findings in Table 6: mention of the UN or the NATO Alliance as the military actor increases support, while mentioning the U.S. as a military actor decreases support. Second, any mention of a multilateral organization in the question also increases support.<sup>20</sup>

The importance of legitimacy and policy objectives is revealed in another way. Any mention of the word “terror” or “terrorism” in survey questions increases support for using military force by 12 percentage points. Since all but a few of these questions occur in the context of the war against terror, we can infer that survey respondents tended to agree with the assessment of the UN and the EU (cited above), that the response to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks was legitimate self-defense –foreign policy restraint (notice that the increase of twelve percentage points is close to identical to the change for foreign policy restraint shown at the top of the table). In contrast, when “weapons of mass destruction” are mentioned in the question, support drops by 6 percentage points. Since

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<sup>20</sup> The mention of an international mandate, discussed earlier in this paper, does not prove statistically significant at this point, perhaps because of the small number of times that it occurs in the data collection. I reevaluate the impact of this variable in the next section of this paper.

all of these questions occur in surveys concerning the war against Iraq, we can draw the opposite inference: even though the threat of destructive weapons was mentioned in the question, approval was withheld because the war had not been legitimized through international institutions. Or, perhaps what amounts to the same thing, the war was opposed because the US seemed determined to pursue it alone. There is thus a stark disagreement between much of the world's population and the position represented by the American and British governments concerning the legitimacy of military action to preempt the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction. For much of global public opinion, a preventive war—even one fought to limit the threat of destructive weapons—is illegitimate unless sanctioned by international bodies.

Finally, public opinion also displays risk aversion and sensitivity to casualties in particular. The mention of either military or civilian war casualties (treated together in Table 6) results in a drop of 17 percentage points in support for military action. Any mention of sending or increasing troops also lowers support. At least as concerns the wording of public opinion surveys, therefore, dangerous military actions are likely to meet with a nervous public reaction.

An overall summary of the statistical analysis is that global public opinion is indeed influenced by universal logics. Employing the largest available cross-national collection of public opinion data, I have demonstrated to this point that citizens around the world are sensitive to a universal set of considerations: policy objectives, international legitimacy, and risk and casualty aversion. Given the paucity of comparative research on these issues, this is no small finding, but I should emphasize that these factors, taken together, explain less than one-third of the statistical variation in

survey questions on the use of military force. Put differently, there are additional factors, as yet omitted from the analysis, that also affect variations in global opinion. One way to appreciate this fact is to evaluate the precision of the statistical “predictions” that result from the combined influence of the factors in Table 6. That is, using the formula that is yielded by the increases and decreases in support associated with each factor in the table, we can calculate an estimated support level for each survey question and compare it to the level of support that was actually measured in the survey. Although the specific results are not shown here, analysis reveals that the predictions for the wealthier nations of Western Europe, such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, tend to be slightly on the low side. In other words, the actual support for using military force in these countries is higher than the formula in Table 6 would predict. The predictions for poorer countries, such as Argentina, Jordan, Mexico, Indonesia, and Pakistan, are much too high –their support levels are actually much lower than the model in Table 6 would suggest.

What this implies is that some additional set of factors that are not included in the analysis in Table 6 must explain the higher than expected support among the European nations and the lower support among nations of the less developed world. It seems plausible that wealth, power, political alignments, and cultural characteristics such as religion are likely candidates to explain the pattern. I turn now to the analysis of these factors.

### **National Characteristics**

In this section, I extend the statistical analysis to include what I call national characteristics, that is, characteristics descriptive of each state’s society and relative



position in terms of wealth and power. Rather than present the results for each variable sequentially, I first describe all of the variables that are included in the analysis together with the data used to measure them.<sup>21</sup> Following that, I present a summary regression analysis that estimates the combined impact of universal logics and national characteristics on support for using military force.

### Wealth, Power and Public Opinion

There are two competing hypotheses concerning the influence of national wealth and relative national power on the level of citizen support for using military force. One hypothesis, which I label the “wealth and welfare” hypothesis, argues that wealthy, mature welfare states gradually de-emphasize martial values in favor of egalitarian values and are increasingly unwilling to allocate national resources to military purposes. The second, competing hypothesis predicts the opposite: In part because wealthy states are aware of their relative power advantage, and in part because poorer societies fear the power dominance of the rich and strong, there should be a positive relationship between wealth, military power, and support for using military force. The plausibility of the second hypothesis is strengthened by the generally positive relationship between wealth and support for using force that was displayed in Table 2 above and by the fact that, in the six historical episodes analyzed here, wealthy, powerful states took the lead in using force against substantially weaker opponents.

To test these hypotheses, I assembled several measures of national wealth and relative power for all the countries and years for the survey questions in the dataset. In

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<sup>21</sup> The sources for the data employed in this section are described in the Appendix.

preliminary analysis, I examined the impact of per capita gross domestic product and total military spending as obvious measures of absolute wealth and military capability. In addition, because of the theoretical importance of measuring wealth and power relative to strong military powers, I also constructed a measure of each country's GDP and military spending relative to the GDP and military spending of the U.S., the lead military power in the six episodes under examination here. Perhaps not surprisingly, the preliminary analysis showed that the absolute and relative measures are very strongly correlated with each other and are thus largely interchangeable. For example, GDP/capita is correlated at .90 with GDP relative to that of the U.S., so only one can be appropriately used in statistical analysis. Perhaps not surprisingly given arguments about *relative wealth*, it is GDP relative to the U.S. that proves to have the strongest correlation with public opinion, so it is used here. Similarly, a country's absolute military spending and military spending relative to the U.S. are correlated at .98, and once again it is the relative measure that proves most strongly correlated with public opinion, so it is used in the summary analysis presented below.

#### The Heritage of Power Competition and War

Joshua Goldstein (2001) has articulated an argument about how citizens are socialized to support war and the preparation for war. Over time, a society that competes or fights to ensure its security must socialize its citizens to a "warrior mentality" to maintain a cadre of soldiers who are willing to participate in war. Scholars such as Michel Howard (1983) and Jack Snyder (1993) have made similar arguments about the role of the state in socializing citizens to a nationalistic and even militaristic spirit. If so, public support for

using military force should be highest in those societies with the longest experience of power competition and participation in war.

Once again there is an opposite hypothesis, however: After two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, many societies came to see war as dysfunctional. Especially in Western Europe and Japan, alternatives to war were pursued. And although the specific reasoning may have varied in different national contexts, the common element is the social exhaustion and revulsion that war had wrought upon society.

To test these competing hypotheses, I gathered measures of war experience for each of the states included in the public opinion data collection.<sup>22</sup> The measures tap the magnitude of each country's war experience and includes: The number of days and years that each country has been involved in wars; the cumulative number of battlefield casualties suffered in wars; and the cumulative total of battle casualties per 1000 population (to control for the differing population size of the countries under study).

Not surprisingly, the various measures of war experience are strongly correlated; it makes little difference whether one employs the number of days or years that a state engaged in war or the absolute level of battle casualties versus the level of casualties relative to population. For this reason, I employ the number of battle casualties per 1000 population in the analyses below.

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<sup>22</sup> My original intent was also to study the effect of power competition by constructing a measure of the duration of a state's historical experience as a major power. As it turns out, however, history's major powers remain today's most powerful states: The correlation between a state's total history as a major power and its relative military power today is .95. As a result, the two are interchangeable and cannot be used in the same statistical analysis.

### Alignments and Interests: Alliances, War, Trade, and Aid

The tentative results displayed in Table 2 above suggest that support for using military force is related to a society's politico-military alignments, its trading relationships, and to the benefit –and perhaps dependence—that arise from the receipt of economic or military aid from other states. Each of these variables will be employed in the statistical analysis to follow.

Alliances. The theoretical impact of these variables is straightforward. Citizens in states that are members of the same alliance or committed to mutual security treaties should be more supportive when military force is used by their fellow allies.<sup>23</sup> For practical reasons, I employed alliance with the U.S. as the basis for constructing the alliance measures. Although the U.S. was not the sole actor to employ military force in the episodes under study here, the fact is that in all of them the U.S. was the leading – even driving—actor in mobilizing for war, and in each episode it was the U.S. that contributed the overwhelming share of military forces actually employed. In the analysis to follow therefore, I include a dummy (binary) variable representing the NATO allies of the United States at the time of each survey. In addition, in 2002 several states were invited to begin negotiating membership in NATO; these states are coded as “Future NATO members” for all survey years after 2002 (and coded as NATO members after they gained membership in 2004). Finally, I also created a variable for states that were allies of the U.S. through other mutual defense treaties.

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<sup>23</sup> I also expected that states that have traditionally disdained alliances altogether would be disproportionately skeptical of any use of force by members of military alliances, regardless of the specific characteristics of the conflict, since alliances represent a feature of global politics that neutrals and the nonaligned tend to criticize. I examined this possibility in preliminary analysis but found no significant correlation between neutral or nonaligned status once the other variables discussed here were included in the analysis.

Disputes and war. A society's outlook on international conflicts is likely to be affected not just by its military partnerships; it is also likely to be affected by past conflictual relationships. Surely states will be skeptical or even critical of states that engage in the use of military force if they have themselves engaged in overt military conflict with those states in the past. For this reason, I created a variable to measure this past conflict experience, once again using the U.S. as the point of reference, since the U.S. often took the lead in advocating the use of force in the episodes studied here. The variable "Disputes and War" is a dummy (binary) variable that takes the value of 1 if a.) the state has engaged in an interstate war with the United States or its allies since 1945 (Vietnam, Argentina), or b.) the state has been engaged in a "militarized interstate dispute" with the United States or its allies. The term "militarized interstate dispute" refers to the Correlates of War data collection that seeks to measure the number and intensity of "near war" military encounters among states. The Correlates of War project defines a "militarized interstate dispute" as a situation in which "states threaten, display, or use force against one or more other states" (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). The Correlates of War dispute dataset includes four countries that have engaged in militarized disputes with the United States or its allies: Russia, Serbia/Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of China, and Venezuela.<sup>24</sup>

Aid and Trade. Convincing arguments exist both for the proposition that the provision of foreign aid garners goodwill and political support among recipient nations and also that the mutual material interests that arise from strong trading ties may lead to supportive political attitudes. On the other hand, limited existing research does not point

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<sup>24</sup> The Correlates of War data do not include colonial wars. All data from the Correlates of War dataset can be downloaded from <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/Datasets.htm>.

to any consistent, significant relationship between aid, trade, and support for the use of force by the U.S (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi 2005). That result may nonetheless be due to the limited data examined (one survey about one war). With the substantial survey data on six historical episodes that are employed in this paper, we are in a position to gain stronger leverage on the relationship between economic ties and support for using force.

In measuring these factors, I once again use the U.S. as the point of reference, since it was the United States that took the lead in mobilizing for the use of force in the six episodes studied here. The measures of economic ties are straightforward. First, to measure the influence of foreign aid, I evaluated three measures: economic assistance, military assistance, and total assistance, all of which include outright grants and loans. In preliminary analysis, however, I found that the three are largely interchangeable: The correlation of each with support for using force –controlling for all other factors—was largely the same. In the analysis to follow, I therefore use the measure of total assistance (military plus economic). Similarly, the value of a country’s trade ties might be measured in terms of its exports to the U.S., in terms of the imports it receives from the U.S., or by the total of the two. Since all three produce close to identical results, I used the value of a survey country’s exports to the U.S.

Culture. In four of the historical episodes studied here, the use of force was carried out against governments in majority Muslim societies, although in no case was the announced motivation for the wars religious. In the case of Iraq, the announced motivation of the coalition powers in 1991 was to undo an aggressive act and during the 1990s to coerce compliance with weapons inspections. In 2002 and 2003, the U.S. and

Britain also emphasized security motivations for the war to remove Saddam Hussein. True, the Taliban government in Afghanistan was theocratic, but the U.S. government removed the regime not because of its religious tenets but because it provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden. Indeed, as late as October 2001, President Bush offered to avert the war if those responsible for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks were delivered to U.S. custody. In short, none of these conflicts was explicitly “civilizational”, to use Huntington’s term (1998).

Yet limited evidence in the research literature tends to suggest that Muslims have been disproportionately critical of the use of force. For example, Table 2 above showed that three of the four states with the lowest level of support for using force were majority Muslim societies: Jordan, Pakistan, and Morocco. Further, one study of global support for the attacks against Afghanistan found that societies with a higher percentage of Muslims were disproportionately critical of the war (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi 2005, 424). Surveys of global attitudes about the United States and U.S. foreign policy more generally show highly critical attitudes in predominantly Muslim societies (Kohut 2005).

Nonetheless, one should be careful with this smattering of evidence. One danger is that the correlation is spurious: after all, most majority Muslim societies are also relatively poor and weak militarily, which might suggest that the critical sentiment arises from the considerations of relative power discussed above. Note in Table 2 that support for these wars was lower in Mexico than in Turkey and essentially the same in Argentina as in Morocco.

Whether Muslim societies are indeed more critical of the use of force must therefore remain an open question. To test for the influence of this variable, I employ the percentage of Muslim's within a society in the statistical analysis below. The measure is taken from a recent data collection on societal fractionalization collected by Alberto Alesina and his colleagues (Alesina *et. al.* 2003).<sup>25</sup>

#### Findings: Universal Logics and National Characteristics

The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 7. The column on the left of the table reproduces the regression employing the universal logic variables only; the parameters for these variables can be interpreted as the percentage change in support for the use of force given the presence of a particular variation in question wording (or combinations of wordings). The column on the right reports the full regression that now includes both universal logic variables and the variables measuring national characteristics. Some of these variables –such as the alliance and dispute measures—are also binary dummy variables and thus can be interpreted as the percentage change in support when they are present. Other national characteristics are measured in their “natural” units (percent, dollars) and are interpretable as the percent change in support given a 1 unit change in the relevant variable.

In previous sections of this paper, I have observed that there are often competing theoretical hypotheses concerning particular variables. For example, some hypotheses argue that support for using force should increase with national wealth and power, while others argue just the opposite. Table 7 will tell us which is the case, but there is an

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<sup>25</sup> I also evaluated alternative measures, such as the dummy variable for “predominantly Muslim societies” constructed by Fish (2002). The results for the Fish measure are essentially the same as those for the measure that I report here, but they are slightly weaker statistically.



additional question: are universal logics and national characteristics competing or complementary explanations? There are two possibilities. On the one hand, the variables representing national characteristics might eliminate or substantially weaken the statistical relationships with the universal logic variables, especially if those relationships arise from an association with national characteristics themselves. For example, if the logic of principal policy objectives is largely an inheritance of western legal and intellectual traditions, the relationships between PPO's and support for force that we saw earlier in this paper would be eliminated once a variable related to this "western community" (such as NATO membership) is entered into the analysis.

On the other hand, I have reviewed compelling theoretical reasons to expect that the two explanations will be complementary. As we have seen, there is strong theoretical reason to expect that national characteristics will condition the support of a nation's citizens for the use of force, for such national characteristics as wealth, military power, and political and economic alignments are important in defining a nation's geopolitical interests. On the other hand, there is also strong theoretical reason to expect that the universal logics will be compelling to those citizens as well, for considerations such as the objective for which force is used, the extent to which it is perceived as legitimate, and the degree of risk associated with using force are not obviously confined to any society or culture. Indeed, I have argued precisely that they may be universal.

The results, presented in Table 7, demonstrate clearly that the complementary argument is correct: variables representing both universal logics and national characteristics are highly significant in the full regression specification. Several features of the results stand out. First, the addition of national characteristics substantially

improves the explanation of cross-national variation in support for using force, as revealed by the increase in the  $R^2$  statistic from .28 to .45. Second, with very few exceptions, the regression parameters (coefficients) for universal logics do not change when national characteristics are added to the analysis, an indication that the two explanations are complementary: When national characteristics are entered into the analysis, they improve the analysis but do not change it. Third, the explanatory power of both groups of variables is substantial in many cases. For example, principal policy objectives remain among the most important determinants of support. Humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and foreign policy restraint are more popular than the baseline average (constant) by a range of 12 to 23 percentage points. Similarly, wealth, military power, and political alignments are very substantial influences on the variation in support. Consider, for example, the increase of 1.29 percentage points in support that results from every 1 percent increase in a country's military power relative to the U.S. (the interpretation of the regression coefficient for military expenditure relative to the U.S.). Since the range of values for relative military spending is from 1 percent of US spending in countries whose militaries are dwarfed by the U.S. to 16 percent in others, the resulting change in opinion support can be as high as 19 percentage points (15 times the coefficient of 1.29). The impact of relative GDP/capita is smaller but no less substantial given the wide disparities in wealth between the poor and the rich.<sup>26</sup>

Other universal logics and national characteristics have important impacts, although they are somewhat smaller in magnitude than the variables discussed above. Political alignments in particular are very important; support is higher by 12 percentage

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<sup>26</sup> Excluding Luxembourg, which has a larger per capita GDP than the US, the range of the relative GDP/capita variable is from a low of 2 percent of the US to a high of 90 percent of US GDP/capita.

points among mutual defense allies of the U.S. and 8 to 9 percentage points among NATO members and “soon to be” NATO members. Similarly, the level of U.S. economic and military assistance is strongly and positively associated with support. A history of conflict rather than cooperative alignment (disputes and war) has the opposite effect of lowering support by about 8 percentage points.

Variables related to international legitimacy have consistent impacts in the expected positive direction. Mentioning that the use of force will be conducted by “U.N. forces” increases support by 6 percentage points, and there are smaller but significant increases given any mention of multilateral organizations, NATO forces, or an international mandate for the use of force. Conversely, mentioning that the use of force will be carried out by U.S. only decreases support. In addition, mentioning “terrorism” – which evokes foreign policy restraint—substantially increases support. As was true in the prior analysis, the risk of a military action (including the mention of casualties) lowers support, and the negative effect of mentioning the phrase “weapons of mass destruction” remains –because of its association with an unpopular war against Iraq.

Finally, several additional findings are of note, either because they address competing hypotheses discussed earlier or because they contradict the direction of the hypothesis. First, it seems clear that a warlike history –as measured by cumulative battle deaths in war—decreases rather than increases support for the use of force. When this relationship is examined closely, we find that it results from the tepid to low support for using military force within states that have suffered greatly from war in the past (in particular Russia, Germany, Japan, China, and Turkey). War, it seems, dilutes rather than

cultivates the martial spirit, at least as concerns support for the wars studied here.<sup>27</sup>

Second, a large trading relationship with the U.S. —as measured by exports to the U.S.— actually has a negative impact on support for using force. Once again further examination provides a clarification: The largest trading partners of the U.S. have been lukewarm at best and opposed in many cases to the use of force in the cases examined here. Indeed, of the five largest exporters to the U.S. since 1990 (Canada, Japan, China, Germany, and Mexico), only Canada and Japan show levels of support for using force that is above average (and only by a tiny fraction at that). The other three are well below average in support. The average level of support for using force among the top ten exporters to the U.S. is below the average for all countries (39 versus 47 percent) because many top exporters (Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan) exhibit very low support for using military force. In sum, a profitable trading relationship with the U.S. does not guarantee support for the military interventions that the U.S. has led.

Finally, societies with significant percentages of Muslims do indeed show lesser support for using force in the conflicts studied here, even controlling for relative economic development and relative military power, but note that the statistical significance of this coefficient is tenuous ( $p = .10$ ). Below, I will explain that this relationship is not uniform across historical episodes; during the first Gulf War in 1991, for example, many Muslim societies supported the use of force against Iraq, a fact that has important implications for the contemporary tensions that characterize relations between the West and the Muslim world.

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<sup>27</sup> Public opinion in these countries might be different if the context involved a conflict that more directly confronted their own national interests. Nonetheless, it remains significant in my view that we do not find any evidence of a generalized martial spirit, as Goldstein (2001) suggested.

### Universal Logics and National Characteristics: A Summary

The statistical results reported above suggest a model of the political dynamic that unfolds as citizens across the globe contemplate the threat or actual use of force. It seems plausible that the experience and geopolitical interests that are captured by national characteristics form something of a structural baseline in national perspectives. Citizens of a state that is poor, militarily weak, and outside the alliance orbit of the international system's dominant powers are unlikely to look positively on the use of military force to resolve conflicts, especially when it is the military of the system's most powerful actors that forms the core—the spearhead—of the forces involved.

Nonetheless, this structural baseline is not immutable. There are also universal political and normative logics that move support above and below the national baselines of support. Not surprisingly, the restraint of aggression is a consideration that increases support, as are humanitarian considerations and the use of force with the mandate or formal involvement of the international community. Among the factors that lower support—even within the more powerful nations—are risky actions, involvement in the internal affairs of other states, and actions taken without the sanction of the international community.

These complexities must be kept in mind in contemplating citizen reactions to future conflicts that might involve the use of force. Each conflict will have its own complexities, in terms of the actors and issues involved, the involvement (or absence) of international institutions, and the degree of risk surrounding military action. Nonetheless, the analysis presented above does suggest that the likely contours of global public opinion are predictable given a certain constellation of these factors.

## **Conclusions and Implications**

Before concluding this paper, it is useful to evaluate the limits to the generalization of the conclusions stated immediately above. One caution has already been stated: The six historical episodes analyzed here are quite specific conflicts in specific contexts. They represent what I have called “internationalized conflicts” – episodes in which the international community debated an endorsement of military action and in several cases actually provided a mandate for action in the form of a resolution of the United Nations (Gulf War, Bosnia, and to some extent the war in Afghanistan). In one episode (Kosovo), the United Nations had been involved in prior attempts to mediate the conflict, and the NATO Alliance rather than any one nation actually carried out the action. In the case of Iraq, the U.N. had passed formal resolutions on weapons inspections during the 1990s, and the eventual war in Iraq was debated –but not approved—by the Security Council. Thus, although the degree of international consensus on military action varied, these conflicts differ from many potential conflicts that might arise between specific states or groups of states and which may not be “internationalized” in this way. Public opinion in such circumstances could very well take on different patterns, so there can be no question of generalizing the results in this paper to other sorts of conflicts.

Beyond this caveat, it is worth noting that the results proved very robust in a number of additional tests to evaluate the impact of omitted variables, the disproportionate impact of a specific historical episode, and the impact of any disproportionate weighting that might arise from the large number of survey items that

come from the wealthier, more powerful Western states.<sup>28</sup> Specifically, no single historical episode determines the overall structure and significance of the major variables in the analysis. Put differently, no single episode is driving the result that support for using military force is strongly influenced by variables representing universal logics – especially principal policy objectives—and by important national characteristics, especially relative wealth and power and political alignments. The sequential exclusion of episodes, however, does highlight specific contextual details of each historical conflict. For example, the particular statistical salience of NATO in the Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan conflicts is highlighted when these episodes are excluded (by diluting the impact of the NATO variable). The importance of international legitimacy and policy objectives is highlighted by the stronger support among Muslim states for using force in the Gulf War in 1991, versus the much weaker support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. In no case, however, do these contextual variations reverse the overall substantive conclusions drawn earlier. Public support is driven by universal logics and national considerations and only secondarily by the contextual details of each conflict.

Nonetheless, one particular contextual finding should be emphasized: the statistical significance of the Muslim population variable –tenuous in the final equation reported Table 7—turns highly significant when the Gulf War of 1991 is excluded from the analysis. The reason is not hard to find. Many of the highest positive errors (residuals) from the final equations reported in Table 7 can be traced to five states in the Gulf region with substantial Muslim populations: Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Support for the Gulf War in these states was much higher

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<sup>28</sup> The tests for robustness are reported in greater detail in a longer version of this paper that will be included as a chapter in my forthcoming book (Eichenberg forthcoming); I am happy to provide them on request.

than one would expect given the generally negative views of Muslims in other historical episodes. The Gulf War was fairly popular in the majority Muslim states that were surveyed, and this popularity attenuates what is otherwise a strong negative correlation between the size of Muslim populations and support for the use of force across all episodes. During the Gulf War, nineteen survey questions about coalition military action against Iraq were asked in the five states listed above. Support for military action against Iraq averaged 50 percent in these countries and approached 60 percent in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the other historical episodes, support for using force averages 25 percent in predominantly Muslim societies.

This finding indirectly reinforces the importance of policy objectives and international legitimacy to support for using force. The restraint of a demonstrably aggressive neighbor in the Persian Gulf in 1991 overrode whatever doubts Muslims in the area might have had about the use of force. The fact that the coalition military effort had been endorsed by the United Nations may also have been a factor. This reasoning is further confirmed through closer examination of the pattern of support during the War against terror and the Iraq War in 2003. When excluding either the war against terror (essentially Afghanistan) or the war in Iraq, the significance of the Muslim population variable is reduced to essentially zero. Put simply, it was the war in Afghanistan and the war against Iraq that were unpopular with Muslims.

Given the tensions that currently exist between the West and the Muslim world, this finding is certainly important, but it should not be exaggerated. As Table 7 showed, variables representing universal logics and the national characteristics of states are far more important determinants –as read from the magnitude of the regression coefficients.



This point is important to emphasize as we contemplate future situations of potentially “internationalized global conflicts”. At the moment, the list of such potential conflicts is depressingly long and includes the potential threat of some states to use force against Iran and North Korea because of their nuclear ambitions and the pressing need for energetic peacekeeping in the Sudan.

How will citizens around the globe view these conflicts, and in what circumstances will they approve or disapprove of military solutions? The analysis that I have presented above suggests some guidance on these questions. Clearly the use of force by strong states against weak states will divide the global community. I have termed this a “baseline” of global opinion. Nonetheless, the historical data also show that circumstances related to universal logics will also influence global opinion. The purpose for which military forces are used is clearly the most important. Humanitarian and peacekeeping missions enjoy majority support. Restraint of aggression is also supported. Involvement in internal political conflicts is not. In addition, the endorsement of the international community through formal mandates and the deployment of international forces also increase support for military interventions.

Whether military force is the answer to a particular conflict is a decision that politicians must make. Nonetheless, I have shown here that the issue need not always divide the global community’s citizens. On some issues in some contexts, there is support for military actions, especially when it is the global community that endorses or conducts these actions and when the purpose of the action is considered legitimate. Indeed, it is the very universality of the norms and considerations that I have analyzed here that gives some basis for optimism that a world order rooted in citizen preferences is

not beyond reach. Given the conflicts and tensions that currently divide the world community, this ray of optimism is particularly welcome.

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
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**Table 1. Summary of Survey Questions and States Included in the Data Collection**

<b>Episode</b>	<b>Number of survey questions available</b>	<b>Number of states for which questions are available</b>
Gulf crisis and war (1990-1991)	149	23
Confrontation with Iraq (1992- March 18, 2003)	309	51
Bosnia peacekeeping and Air strikes (1991 – 1997)	406	25
Kosovo war and peacekeeping (1998-1999)	273	26
War against terror (2001- 2004)	325	66
Iraq War and occupation (March 19, 2003 – October 5, 2004)	223	52
<b>Total</b>	<b>1685</b>	<b>81</b>

*Note:* The mean sample size of surveys in the data collection is 780.



**Figure 1. Average Support for Using Military Force in Six Historical Episodes**

*Note:* Includes support for all types of military actions in all states.

**Table 2. Support for Using Military Force in Selected States**

	<b>Average Support (%)</b>	<b>Number of Survey Questions</b>
Czech Republic	58	8
France	56	261
United Kingdom	56	227
Netherlands	54	86
Australia	51	41
Denmark	51	37
Canada	50	49
India	50	8
Italy	50	125
Japan	49	17
Germany	48	204
Poland	46	24
Kenya	42	3
Hungary	41	16
Spain	41	65
Slovakia	40	14
Sweden	38	16
Turkey	36	27
South Korea	32	6
Greece	31	32
Mexico	29	17
Russia	28	15
Pakistan	15	8
Morocco	11	5
Argentina	10	4
Jordan	7	6
Total	49	1321

*Note:* Includes support for all types of military actions in all historical episodes.



**Table 3. Support for Using Military Force According to Principal Policy Objectives**

	Average Support (%)	Number of Survey Questions
Humanitarian	72	87
Peacekeeping	57	93
Foreign policy restraint	52	427
Internal political change	42	441
Unclassified	42	637
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>1685</b>
 <b>Gulf Crisis and War</b>		
Internal political change	72	11
Foreign policy restraint	57	47
Unclassified	56	86
Humanitarian	44	1
Subtotal	57	145
 <b>Confrontation with Iraq 1992-March 18, 2003</b>		
Humanitarian	75	2
Foreign policy restraint	44	88
Internal political change	35	54
Unclassified	34	169
Subtotal	37	313
 <b>Bosnia</b>		
Humanitarian	72	80
Peacekeeping	65	31
Unclassified	48	118
Internal political change	40	177
Subtotal	51	406

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	<b>Average Support (%)</b>	<b>Number of Survey Questions</b>
<b>Kosovo</b>		
Humanitarian	59	4
Internal political change	52	101
Peacekeeping	47	38
Unclassified	47	129
Subtotal	49	272
<b>War against terror</b>		
Peacekeeping	84	9
Foreign policy restraint	54	292
Internal political change	38	24
Subtotal	53	325
<b>Iraq war March 19, 2003 - October 5, 2004</b>		
Peacekeeping	47	15
Internal political change	37	73
Unclassified	33	135
Subtotal	35	223

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*Note:* Includes support for all types of military actions in all states.

**Table 4. The Effect of an International Mandate on Support for Using Military Force**


<b>Episode</b>	<b>Mandate Not Mentioned (%)</b>	<b>Mandate Mentioned (%)</b>	<b>Number of Questions</b>
Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991	60	32	145
Bosnia	51	55	406
Confrontation with Iraq	34	43	313
1992- September 10, 2001	45	54	35
September 11, 2001 - March 18, 2003	32	42	278
Iraq War, March 19, 2003 – October 5, 2004	33	52	223

*Note:* Includes questions on all military actions in all states.

**Table 5. The Effect of Risk and Casualty Aversion on Support for Using Military Force**


<b>Military Action</b>	<b>Average Support (%)</b>	<b>Number of Questions</b>
Naval forces/blockade	66	5
keep/maintain troops	59	73
provide advisors or training	53	35
air/missile strikes	51	174
war/all out conflict	48	2
Military action(general)	47	788
presence of troops	47	28
send troops	47	301
increase troops	46	25
sell/send arms	40	178
unspecified action type	37	76
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>1685</b>

	<b>Casualties Not Mentioned</b>	<b>Casualties Mentioned</b>
Gulf Crisis and War	57	51
Bosnia	51	43
Kosovo	50	37
War against terror	54	47
Confrontation with Iraq	38	35
Iraq War	37	20
Total	48	30



**Figure 2. Support for Using Military Force According to the Military Actor Mentioned in the Survey Question**

*Note:* Includes questions on all types of military actions in all historical episodes and all countries.



**Figure 3. British Support for Going to War in Iraq**

*Note:* From August 2002 through April 2003, the question read: “Do you approve or disapprove of a (the) military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein?” From June, 2003, the question was changed to read “From what you have seen or heard, do you think the war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein was justified or unjustified?”

**Table 6. Regression Analysis of Support for Using Military Force**


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<i>Baseline of support (constant)</i>	43.66***
<i>Principle Policy Objectives</i>	
Humanitarian intervention	23.20*** (1.37)
Peace keeping	12.86*** (2.10)
Foreign policy restraint	12.03*** (1.31)
<i>International legitimacy</i>	
Multilateral organization mentioned	3.97*** (1.17)
UN forces mentioned	8.05*** (1.75)
NATO forces mentioned	4.42*** (1.43)
U.S. forces mentioned	-7.95*** (1.10)
<i>Risk</i>	
Civilian or military casualties mentioned	-17.28*** (2.22)
Send or increase troops	-4.96*** (1.15)
Sell or provide arms	-11.38*** (1.46)
<i>Other variables</i>	
Weapons of mass destruction mentioned	-6.28** (2.61)
Terror or terrorism mentioned	12.18*** (1.75)
<hr/>	
Observations	1685
R-squared	.28
<hr/>	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

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**Table 7. Regression Analysis: Universal Logics and National Characteristics Compared**

	<b>Universal logics only</b>	<b>Universal logics and National Characteristics</b>
<i>Universal Logics Variables</i>		
Humanitarian intervention	23.24*** (1.39)	21.97*** (1.40)
Peace keeping	13.07*** (2.13)	13.90*** (1.94)
Foreign policy restraint	11.98*** (1.31)	15.11*** (1.13)
International mandate	0.05 (1.72)	3.80*** (1.42)
Multilateral organization	3.73*** (1.27)	3.75*** (1.12)
UN forces mentioned	7.81*** (1.77)	6.07*** (1.61)
NATO forces mentioned	4.18*** (1.49)	3.32** (1.44)
Survey country's forces mentioned	-1.06 (1.80)	-2.54 (1.65)
U.S. forces mentioned	-8.31*** (1.26)	-4.79*** (1.20)
Civilian or military casualties mentioned	-17.46*** (2.29)	-17.73*** (2.15)
Send or increase troops	-4.86*** (1.18)	-5.18*** (1.04)
Sell or provide arms	-11.48*** (1.50)	-11.66*** (1.44)
Weapons of mass destruction mentioned	-6.28** (2.83)	-11.85*** (2.44)
Terror or terrorism mentioned	12.24*** (1.76)	7.93*** (1.58)
<i>National Characteristics Variables</i>		
GDP/capita relative to US GDP/capita		0.18*** (0.02)
Military expenditure relative to US		1.29*** (0.13)
Battle deaths per 1000 population		-0.09*** (0.02)
Member of NATO		9.40***



Future NATO member 2004	(1.39)
	8.55***
	(2.86)
Mutual defense ally of U.S.	12.22***
	(2.08)
Past dispute or war with U.S.	-8.45**
	(4.14)
Total military and economic assistance from U.S.	12.07***
	(2.25)
Exports to U.S.	-.08***
	(.01)
Percent Muslim population	-0.06*
	(0.03)

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Constant (baseline of support)	44.08***	20.87***
	(1.15)	(2.14)
Observations	1685	1658
R-squared	0.28	0.45

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

## Appendix

### List of Countries Included in the Data Collection

A complete list of the countries studied is displayed in Appendix Table 1 together with the average support for using military force in each country and the number of survey items available for each. The average includes all questions from all historical episodes and includes all types of military actions.

### Sources of Data Employed in Table 7 Regressions

*GDP/capita relative to U.S. GDP/capita (U.S. dollars in current prices):*

For years 1990-2000, data are from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table Version 6.1*, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002, [http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php\\_site/pwt\\_index.php](http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php). For years after 2000, relative GDP is calculated from data available from World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2005*, <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query>.

*Military expenditure relative to US (in constant 2003 U.S. dollars):*

All data are from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, [http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex\\_database1.html](http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html).

*Battle deaths per 1000 population (interstate wars only through 1997):*

All battle death information is from Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2000). "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 18/1: 123-144, and available for download at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>.

*Member of NATO:*

Dummy variable for members at the time of the opinion survey. All data are taken from the Correlates of War Alliance dataset available for download at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/Alliances/alliance.htm>.

*Ally of US:*

Dummy variable for members of mutual defense treaties with the U.S. at the time of the opinion survey. The following are coded as allies of the U.S.: Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Taiwan.

*Future NATO members 2004:*

Dummy variable for states that became NATO members in 2004. The following states received invitations from NATO in November 2002 to begin membership negotiations and became full members in 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For surveys conducted in 2003, they are treated as future NATO members. For surveys conducted in 2004 and after, they are treated as NATO members (see above). Data are from Correlates of War alliance dataset, as listed above, supplemented by British Broadcasting Corporation, *Profile: NATO*, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/1549072.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1549072.stm).

*Total military and economic assistance from U.S. (billions of current U.S. dollars):*

Includes all grants, loans, and obligations for purposes of economic or military assistance. All data are from United States Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook)*, <http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>.

*Exports to U.S. (billions of current U.S. dollars):*

Exports to U.S. of survey country in the year the opinion survey was administered, taken from U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 2004-2005* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), 814 (and previous years of same table). The data are also available for download from <http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/foreign.pdf>.

*Muslims as percent of total population:*

Data from Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 8, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 155-194, available for download from <http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls>. The "predominantly Muslim" dummy variable that is mentioned in footnote 25 is taken from M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics*, 55/1 (2002), 4-37.

**Appendix Table 1. List of Countries Included in the Data Collection**

	<b>Average Support For Use of Force (%)</b>	<b>Number of Survey Questions</b>
Albania	59.0	3
Argentina	9.5	4
Australia	50.9	41
Austria	27.7	17
Azerbaijan	14.0	1
Bahrain	43.9	4
Belgium	48.0	37
Bolivia	22.0	2
Bosnia	17.0	2
Brazil	18.0	2
Bulgaria	26.1	8
Cameroon	31.7	3
Canada	49.9	49
China	36.0	1
Colombia	32.0	2
Costa Rica	42.0	1
Croatia	60.0	5
Cyprus	8.8	4
Czech Republic	58.0	8
Denmark	51.5	37
Dominican Republic	44.0	1
East Germany (DDR)	43.6	22
Ecuador	22.5	2
Estonia	32.7	7
Finland	32.0	19
France	56.0	261
Georgia	27.2	9
Germany	48.0	204
Greece	30.6	32
Guatemala	46.0	1
Hungary	40.8	16
Iceland	38.7	3
India	49.6	8

**Appendix Table 1 continued**

Indonesia	15.0	1
Ireland	44.9	37
Israel	76.3	6
Italy	49.7	125
Japan	48.6	17
Jordan	6.8	6
Kenya	41.7	3
Kyrgyzstan	47.0	1
Latvia	21.7	6
Lithuania	36.3	6
Luxembourg	47.8	33
Macedonia	18.7	3
Malaysia	8.0	3
Malta	14.8	4
Mexico	28.6	17
Morocco	11.2	5
Netherlands	53.8	86
New Zealand	44.2	6
Nigeria	46.0	2
Norway	44.2	9
Oman	33.9	4
Pakistan	14.9	8
Panama	43.0	1
Peru	38.0	1
Philippines	58.0	2
Poland	45.5	24
Portugal	41.0	42
Romania	43.6	8
Russia	27.9	15
Saudi Arabia	57.2	4
Serbia/Yugoslavia	7.5	2
Slovakia	39.5	14
Slovenia	24.3	4
South Africa	29.5	2
South Korea	32.3	6
Spain	40.9	65
Sweden	38.1	16
Switzerland	26.4	7
Taiwan	23.9	1
Turkey	36.4	27

**Appendix Table 1 continued**

Uganda	37.0	1
Ukraine	19.5	2
United Arab Emirates	56.5	4
United Kingdom	56.0	227
Uruguay	15.7	3
Venezuela	53.0	1
Vietnam	9.0	1
Zimbabwe	17.0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>1685</b>

