The Uses of Peacekeeping:

The United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti

JAN OLAF HAUSOTTER

When the president of the Republic of Haiti, René Préval, spoke before the United Nations General Assembly in September 2007, he stated that he was speaking on behalf of a country that had often and somewhat hastily been called a failed state—a state that had difficulties making its institutions function and organizing a way of life that was appropriate for its citizens; a state, also, that had been, time and again, preoccupied with "waging a war without tomorrow against its own children."[1] Having said that, the President looked at his international audience and added: "Ladies and Gentlemen, Haiti is saying 'Adieu' to that state. Slowly, patiently, but with determination."

Indeed, at the time of the General Assembly, President Préval could point to a number of improvements in the situation of his country, some of which many observers had not believed were achievable just a year ago: a victory over insecurity, the holding of democratic elections, improvement in governance, modest economic growth, and reinforcement of the judicial system. These achievements, President Préval observed, "were made possible, to a large extent, by the forces deployed by the United Nations within the framework of its peacekeeping program."[2]

Jan Olaf Hausotter is Political Affairs Officer in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Previously, he has held positions in the Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the German Parliament, the European Parliament, and the German broadcasting company Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF). Hausotter holds master's degrees from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and from The College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. The views expressed here are relayed in his private capacity.

For all those who are presently part of that peacekeeping operation, known as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the President's words were a well-received assessment of the mission's efforts over the past years to contribute to the stabilization of Haiti. However, while acknowledging the progress that Haiti has made, as well as the UN mission's contribution to it, MINUSTAH also shares the assessment of the Government of Haiti and its president of the difficult challenges that lie ahead.

This short paper seeks to explain both the successes of—and challenges to—MINUSTAH's work in Haiti today. It will do so, first, by placing MINUSTAH's general mandate within the overall concept of peacekeeping in order to clarify the framework in which MINUSTAH's efforts have to be assessed; second, by providing a brief overview of the general and political situation in Haiti and its principal problems to illustrate the background and environment relevant to implementation of the mission's mandate; and, third, by analyzing the progress of MINUSTAH in the concrete implementation of its current mandate, thereby identifying the challenges that the mission, in cooperation with Haiti's government, will need to address in the future.

WHY PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI IS "PEACE-BUILDING"

Of all the activities that the UN—including its funds, programs, and agencies—carries out around the world every day, peacekeeping is without doubt the most prominent in public attention, certainly the biggest in personnel and costs, and probably one of the most commonly misunderstood of the UN's efforts to maintain international peace and security. To be fair, misunderstanding peacekeeping is easy: the coincidental character of its origin, its changing nature over decades, and the variety with which it is applied today—all make an accurate assessment of any UN peacekeeping effort, past and present, a challenge in itself.

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As Sir Brian Urquhart, an eminence in UN affairs, once pointed out, the concept of peacekeeping was not planned for but rather discovered, like penicillin: "We came across it, while

looking for something else, during an investigation of the guerilla fighting in northern Greece in 1947."[3] Thus innovated and nowhere to be found in the UN Charter,[4] peacekeeping operations began a year later in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and in Palestine (UNTSO), and they have been (over decades and so-called generations of peacekeeping) further developed to this day. "Learning by doing" very much shaped the mandates of succeeding missions that were, initially, limited to unarmed monitoring and reporting of ceasefires and peace agreements and later included the right of self-defense (Suez in 1956). Today, more often than not, peacekeeping mandates incorporate elements under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing for the use of force to tame unruly elements, uphold human rights, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Further, drawing lessons from the tragedies of Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), peacekeeping finally also extends to the active protection of civilians, making the concept of "robust peacekeeping," as that approach has been called, a reality in the latest generation of UN peacekeeping.

In order to accurately assess peacekeeping efforts, one must understand that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. While UN missions around the world often display similar structures and conceptually "learn" from each other, every peacekeeping mission is constructed according to the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the stability or fragility of the negotiated stay of the hostilities. Consequently, peacekeeping missions are as diverse as are the conflicts that generate them. For instance, while UNTSO was deployed to monitor a ceasefire, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was placed between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to prevent both sides from crossing into the territory of the other. The mandate of the UN force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), on the other hand, included inspecting and verifying force sizes and weapons limits of both sides. Hardly any of those measures of classic peacekeeping are needed in Haiti.

The concept that applies in the context of Haiti is the next step in the development of peacekeeping, so-called peace-*building*, which has been defined in former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" as "comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people."[5] These may include: "disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation." Laid

out in Boutros-Ghali's famous document of 1995, many of those measures are applied by MINUSTAH in Haiti today.

With Resolution 1542 (2004) of April 30, 2004, the Security Council established MINUSTAH as an integrated mission, composed of civilians, military, and police personnel with a complex agenda that, as has been rightly pointed out by experts, is a government-assistance mandate with a Chapter VII mandate that allows for the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.[6] In broad terms, the mandate, as set out in Resolution 1542, is composed of three main parts: first, restoring a secure and stable environment; second, promoting the political process; and third, strengthening of government institutions and rule of law structures as well as promoting and protecting human rights.

In reality, these three main tasks translate into a variety of measures that are listed in the subparagraphs of the Resolution and that correspond to the peace-building scheme of the "Agenda for Peace." Thus, MINUSTAH's initial mandate was to achieve stabilization of Haiti by: assisting the government in reforming the national police and in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups, as well as in the restoration of public order and the rule of law; supporting the constitutional and political process, assisting in the organization of elections, strengthening the government's structures, and promoting a process of national dialogue and reconciliation; and supporting the government in the promotion and protection of human rights. By the Security Council's succeeding resolutions, MINUSTAH's mandate was continuously adapted in order to reflect new developments on the ground and to adjust implementation where the initial approach taken by the mission did not achieve the desired results.

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In order to achieve the mandate's numerous objectives, MINUSTAH, as an *integrated* mission, has coordinated with the UN agencies that were already on site, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), among others. The fairly new integrated approach in peacekeeping seeks to give a consistent

response from the UN system as a whole ("one UN") in order to reestablish lasting stability in the country. Before turning to the concrete implementation of the various elements of MINUSTAH's mandate as described above, as well as to its continuous adaptation, a brief overview of the situation in Haiti and its most important developments is in order to illustrate the dimension of the task that the United Nations' latest mission in Haiti is trying to accomplish.

HAITI—FROM "MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE" TO "LAST CHANCE"

Over the past two decades, scholars and experts have often debated whether the stabilization of Haiti through international efforts is a realistic objective. It is not hard to see why: while Haiti, unlike many other hot spots where the UN is currently involved, is not victim to any ethnic, religious, or territorial conflict, it is, by all standards, in a precarious state and in dire need of international support. Haiti is frequently classified as the poorest nation in the western hemisphere: 78 percent of its citizens live below the poverty line, defined as two dollars per day, with 54 percent living in extreme poverty (i.e., earning less than a dollar per day).[7] In

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Woefully low levels of nutrition, a shortage of safe drinking water, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate state health services result in Haiti's catastrophic health indicators: according to the World Bank, in 2005, life expectancy at birth was just 52 years, and infant mortality stood at 74 per 1,000 live births—nearly three times the average of the Caribbean. Haiti has the highest incidence of AIDS outside of Africa, with infection rates as high as 12 percent for the urban population and five percent for the rural population. There are virtually no doctors in public health centers outside the capital, Port-au-Prince.[8]

Education standards are extremely low and the economy is lagging. Only 55 percent of children aged six to twelve are enrolled in school, and only 32 percent of primary education students reach fifth grade. At least

six out of ten Haitians cannot read or write. The Haitian economy's domi-
nant sector, agriculture, accounting for one quarter of GDP, has undergone a
steady decline as a result of decreasing farm size, soil erosion, and inadequate
investment in irrigation, storage, and transport. In the absence of any signifi-
cant job creation, as many as seven out of ten Haitians are unemployed.[9]

Politically, Haiti is deeply marked by the tradition of one-man rule
ever since gaining independence from France in 1804 and, in spite of ef-
forts of the governments succeeding the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier
("Baby Doc") in 1986, has not succeeded in completing the process of tran-
sition toward a stable democracy. The first democratically elected president,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Catholic priest, was inaugurated in
1991. Only eight months later, Aristide, resented by Haiti's elite who had
previously controlled the country's economic and political establishment,
was overthrown in a military coup and forced to flee. The consequence
was a steep deterioration of the security situation, a mass outflow of refu-
gees, economic sanctions mandated by the Organization of American States
(OAS) and the UN Security Council, and failed mediation attempts until
finally a UN-sanctioned, multinational force led by the United States re-
stored public order and Aristide as president in July 1994.[10]

During the remainder of the 1990s, Haiti showed positive develop-
ments, including the restoration of some measure of democracy, the first
peaceful handover of power between two democratically elected presi-
dents, and the development of a political culture increasingly based on
democratic values. It also saw a sustained effort by the UN to assist in its
transition towards democracy: between 1993 and 2000, the International
Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), a joint operation by the UN and
the OAS, monitored the human rights situation and investigated allega-
tions of abuse. Following the departure of the multinational force in 1995,
the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was mandated to provide a secure
environment following Aristide's restoration and to train a police force.[11]
UNMIH, in turn, was succeeded by three follow-up missions: the UN
Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the UN Transition Mission in Haiti
(UNTMIH), and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH),
all of which, regardless of their varying denominations, attempted to in-
stitutionalize peace-building measures and coordinate the activities of the
key international parties but failed to produce significant results due to
either the short-term duration of their involvement or the limited scope of
international commitment. With the withdrawal of MIPONUH in March
2000, a decade of Security Council involvement in Haiti came to an end—
at least temporarily.[12]

In the absence of any serious engagement by the United Nations between 2000 and 2004, the security and human rights situation deteriorated while the economic situation remained dire.[13] On the political side, Aristide was voted back into power in 2000 in elections whose results were contested by the opposition and the OAS. Aristide's opponents, many of whom had supported the 1991 coup, sought to destabilize his government by organizing demonstrations and furthering civil unrest. Aristide responded and met public protests with systematic intimidation of the opposition, with his militia's supporters, the *Chimères,* bringing back collective memories of the *Tontons Macoutes* of the Duvalier dictatorship.[14]

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In February of 2004, due to a political stalemate with parliament, President Aristide reduced to governing by decree and, under threat of armed groups closing in on Port-au-Prince, was forced to flee the country.[15] For another time, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a multinational interim force, composed of American, French, Canadian, and Chilean troops, to restore law and order. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General[16] and based on the findings of a multidisciplinary assessment team, the Council decided to establish a multidimensional stabilization mission, MINUSTAH, whose mandate has been extended seven times since and most recently for a period of twelve months until October 2008.

IMPLEMENTING MINUSTAH'S MANDATE: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

As initially mentioned, just one year ago, many observers still considered the stabilization of Haiti a process with unknown outcomes. On the positive side, MINUSTAH had achieved one of its initial priorities: after two years of transitional governance in Haiti and several postponements, parliamentary and presidential elections were held with high voter turnout and substantial assistance of the mission in February 2006. Having won the elections, deemed to be free and fair, by a margin just short of 40 percent, René Préval was sworn in as president in May 2006, which was followed by the formation of a new government led by Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis.

While a certain degree of political stability had thus been achieved,

the security situation remained highly volatile, marked by high levels of gang violence and indiscriminate kidnappings. The lack of state control over Cité Soleil, a very densely populated shantytown with then around 300,000 inhabitants, continued to present a major challenge to stability.[17] Security around Cité Soleil is essential, as it is located on a main road out of Port-au-Prince next to major industrial parks and the airport. Given that a great number of criminal gangs manipulated by political factions or linked to the black market hid out there, their powerful leaders rejected any negotiations with the government over giving up their weapons voluntarily.[18]

In December 2006, following an alarming spike in kidnappings, the Haitian government requested MINUSTAH to go into Cité Soleil in order to disarm the gangs and detain their leaders. These operations exceeded not only the limits of earlier peacekeeping missions in Haiti but were also rightly described as a "new experience in UN peacekeeping"[19] in general: operating in an environment of blind alleys, urban trenches, and cardboard labyrinths, peacekeepers were met with extensive fire while trying to detain those responsible for the violence, search for arms, and retrieve ammunition without any collateral damage.[20]

The operations, conducted under Brazilian Force Commanders,[21] together with the Haitian National Police (HNP), reached their highest intensity in early 2007, at which point the gangs were dislodged from their enabling environment. The operations had the full support of the Haitian government and the Security Council[22] and led to the dismantling of the toughest gangs, the detention of the majority of their leaders, and the restoration of state authority in Haiti's biggest shantytown. The establishment of checkpoints and regular joint patrols by MINUSTAH and HNP enabled UN agencies and aid and development staff of NGOs to return to Cité Soleil and to work in relative safety.

TAKING CARE OF SECURITY: FROM CITÉ SOLEIL TO BORDER CONTROL

As is widely agreed today, the crackdown of MINUSTAH and the HNP on the gangs and criminal networks in Cité Soleil has led to a major improvement of the overall security situation and constitutes an important achievement in the stabilization of Haiti. It is worthwhile to note that incidents of kidnappings, while still persistent, have significantly decreased in 2007.[23] These positive developments notwithstanding, security remains fragile. In a detailed assessment in July 2007, MINUSTAH identified three principal threats: first, the likelihood of civil unrest due to deep socio-economic divide, compounded by poverty and high expectations of the

population; second, the renewed armed violence initiated by gang leaders who are still at large; and third, of critical importance, the illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, and contraband through Haiti, which, in turn, fuels the widespread corruption that affects all elements of government and is, in itself, considered one of the main destabilizing factors in the country.

A major problem in addressing these threats remains the state's current absence of an effective response capability, i.e., a body able to maintain law and order. The HNP so far remains unable to undertake crucial security tasks unaided, due to understaffing and corruption. An important part of MINUSTAH's mandate, therefore, is to contribute to a process of police reform through training and monitoring police officers and to assist in a comprehensive vetting process, including file investigation and background checks. Building up and professionalizing police capacity is a long-term process. Currently, approximately 8,000 officers of the HNP are undertaking policing duties. If, as envisaged by the HNP, 1,500 officers graduate per year, it will take four more years until the Haitian National Police can reach 14,000—the minimum number needed to accomplish basic policing duties.

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The improvement in the overall security situation has led to some adjustments in MINUSTAH's mandate in the security realm in order to increasingly address the abovementioned problem of illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, and contraband. Thus, by its recently adopted Resolution 1780 (2007) of October 15, 2007, the Security Council agreed to a modest reconfiguration of the mission's security forces, slightly reducing the ceiling of the military component to 7,060 and increasing the police forces to 2,091 officers.[24] A key emphasis was placed by the Security Council on assisting the Government of Haiti in border management, including the provision of technical expertise to help the government define a comprehensive border management strategy and to establish patrols along maritime and land border areas in support of the HNP.

Another challenge to MINUSTAH's mandate implementation in the field of security is disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). It is generally recognized today, by both the Haitian authorities and the UN, that traditional approaches to DDR do not address the unique circumstances in Haiti. In order to promote progress in this field, the Security Council, by Resolution 1702 (2006) of August 15, 2006, requested MINUSTAH

to reorient its DDR efforts toward a comprehensive community violence reduction (CVR) program adapted to local conditions. Accordingly, MINUSTAH's new CVR strategy seeks to build the capacity of Haiti's national mechanisms, such as the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration (NCDDR) and concentrates on labor-intensive projects such as the development of a weapons registry, the revision of current laws regulating the importation and possession of arms, and the reform of Haiti's weapons permit system.

ENTERING THE ERA OF POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION: ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

With regard to the political dimension, Haitian national politics have had a certain degree of stability since the 2006 elections, and President Préval's multiparty government has generally benefited from public support, due to the aforementioned improvements in security. The President managed to maintain government stability through continued dialogue with political parties, legislators, the private sector, and civil society representatives. In accordance with its mandate, MINUSTAH continues to support the political process and to promote all-inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation. Further potential for progress in the consolidation of the state might lie in the increased integration of key actors of the private sector in the stabilization process, the incentive clearly being increased stability for business through good governance and a solidified and reliable legal framework.

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With regard to constitutional reform, in an address to the nation on October 17, 2007, the 101st anniversary of the death of the first president of Haiti, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, President Préval stressed the need to reform the constitution, which he characterized as a "source of instability." While there appears to be a broad consensus that the constitution needs to be modified—the main issues being dual nationality, the frequency of elections, and the final status of the army—there is a divergence of views regarding the methodology to be adopted in this regard. The President is expected to launch the process by forming a presidential commission, which would make recommendations on the amendment of the constitution. MINUSTAH has indicated to the President and other government interlocutors that it also stands ready to assist in this process.

BUILDING UP THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

Having successfully organized national elections and improved the security situation, MINUSTAH now faces new challenges: strengthening Haiti's government institutions and assisting the government as it reforms its rule of law structures. As for the former, while effectiveness of the institutions of Haiti's governance will depend first and foremost on the commitment of the political leadership and civil society to ongoing dialogue and constructive collaboration, the provision of expertise and material support will also be crucial. Haiti's government institutions are still weak and suffer from shortages of qualified personnel, inadequate infrastructure, and limited budgetary and material resources. In response, MINUSTAH is enhancing skills and promoting coordination among international assistance efforts, while providing urgent technical assistance and expert advice for the development of key institutions, including major ministries, the parliament, the judiciary, and relevant local bodies.

Welcoming the continuing contribution of MINUSTAH to the Haitian government's efforts to build institutional capacity at all levels, the Security Council has, by its recent Resolution 1780 (2007), called upon MINUSTAH to expand such support to strengthen self-sustainable state institutions, especially outside Port-au-Prince, including through the provision of specialized expertise to key ministries and institutions, taking into account the ongoing efforts by the Haitian authorities to fight all forms of crime. Accordingly, the mission, together with the UN country team, focuses on extending state authority and building local capacity, particularly with regard to public service delivery, the development of local taxation, and the promotion of good governance. In doing so, MINUSTAH pays

particular attention to fostering links between institutions at the local level, supporting state reform and decentralization, and promoting transparency to fight corruption.

As for the reform of Haiti's rule of law structures, besides the strengthening of and change in Haitian security capacities, MINUSTAH also assists in other pillars of that effort: reforming Haiti's judicial and prison systems, which President Préval has defined as priority issues. The reform of the judicial system has made some progress, particularly in connection with a legislative framework and strategic planning. In November 2007, both chambers of parliament passed three laws prepared by the Minister for Justice and Public Security on the status of magistrates; on the Superior Council, which oversees their functions; and on a school for magistrates. The adoption of those bills constitutes a crucial step in the process of judicial reform because they provide a framework, tools, and mechanisms to fight corruption, impunity, and ethical and disciplinary problems within the judiciary, and they establish arrangements for the certification of judges and prosecutors.

MINUSTAH, in coordination with its partners, provides technical advice both to institutions and to individual actors within the judicial system. Particular areas of activity include assistance to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, collaboration with Haitian efforts to professionalize judicial actors, including through mentoring (*accompagnement*) and certification programs, and support for the government's efforts to ensure effective legal follow-up to major criminal activities. The mission also assists the government in promoting the coordination of bilateral assistance, particularly in such areas as restructuring the ministry, certifying magistrates, providing legal aid for the most vulnerable, and modernizing key legislation.

The third element of the rule of law structures, the prison system, is still in urgent need of action and reform. The security and human rights situations in Haitian prisons remain unacceptable. As of August 2007, more than 6,000 detainees were being held in 17 prisons in an area that, in accordance with international standards, should not accommodate more than 1,088 inmates. The National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince currently houses 2,700 inmates in accommodation adequate for eight hundred. As of July 2007, 82.5 percent of prisoners are pretrial detainees (of whom 90.4 percent are male adults, 5.3 percent female adults, 3.6 percent male minors, and 0.7 percent female minors).

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The early work of the Consultative Commission on Prolonged Pretrial Detention, which was established in February 2007, is encouraging. On July 2, 2007, the commission submitted its first report, leading to the release of 150 persons, including pregnant women and minors. Given the high rate of illegal pretrial detention, the initiative is of key importance. On August 6, 2007, the commission presented its second report, on juvenile detention and justice. The commission has also supported measures by the minister for justice and public security and the chief prosecutor to improve due process and safeguard the penal chain.

The National Prison Administration, with assistance from MINUSTAH and UNDP, developed a comprehensive strategic plan for prison reform for the next five years, and it was approved by the Prime Minister on August 7, 2007. The plan aims at improving the prison conditions, restructuring the prison system, and training prison staff. In addition, MINUSTAH and UNDP support the National Prison Administration in facilitating donor coordination. Both MINUSTAH and UNDP have also provided technical advice regarding the building of new facilities consistent with international standards.

The deficiencies in Haiti's rule of law structures frequently allow for human rights abuses by state authorities. Of particular concern are reports of arbitrary arrests, unlawful police custody, ill treatment, and excessive use of force. The Haitian National Police still needs to make improvements in the areas of respect for judicial oversight, legal procedures, professional and scientific investigation techniques, and the maintenance of operational and legal records. Meanwhile, lack of technical expertise, poor communications, negligence, and apparent corruption on the part of judicial authorities have resulted in numerous unlawful arrests, prolonged pretrial detention, and a small number of court decisions.

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In order to promote human rights, MINUSTAH regularly monitors police *commissariats*, prosecutors' offices, justices of the peace, courts, and prisons. It has also provided local authorities and the public with information on developments in the human rights situation and on the institutional functioning of key rule of law institutions. In February 2007, MINUSTAH organized two national seminars during which judicial and police authorities dealt with complex challenges pertaining to the protection of judicial guarantees.

The mission has also supported the institutional development of the Haitian National Police General Inspectorate in human rights through training and the exchange of information on individual cases. Following its mandate to assist the Government of Haiti in meeting its treaty obligations, MINUSTAH organized a seminar in November 2007 on techniques for reporting to treaty monitoring bodies for senior-level political representatives and technical staff from the ministries of foreign affairs, justice and security, social and labor affairs, health, education, and youth and sports, as well as representatives from the HNP, the prosecutor's office, and courts in Port-au-Prince.

MINUSTAH will continue its monitoring and training activities that are intended to strengthen capacities and facilitate institutional reform. The mission will produce periodic and thematic reports to inform key public institutions, including the police, the judicial system, local administrative authorities, and the parliament, about the protection of human rights, the fight against impunity, and institutional reform.

WORKING TO BECOME THE LAST MISSION IN HAITI

All peacekeeping missions of the UN, regardless of their environment or mandate, have one thing in common that has not changed over the years: they are deployed to a country upon request of the host government. MINUSTAH makes no exception to that rule. It has become a partner of its host government in a major operation to restore the State of Haiti, to overcome chronic instability, and to build a foundation for a democracy based on the rule of law. The operation seems to work: slowly, patiently, and with determination. Over the past three years, Haiti's public order has been restored, free and fair elections were held, government institutions have been developed, initial reforms with regard to Haiti's rule of law structures have been introduced, and thousands of Haitian police officers have been trained.

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The effects of some of these measures are visible: residents of Cité Soleil walk the streets without fear of violence, schools and hospitals have opened (or reopened), and young Haitian National Police officers proudly show off their brand-new uniforms in Port-au-Prince. Other initiatives, such as the three judicial reform laws,

MINUSTAH's assistance and advice in the respective ministries, or the training of state officials in human rights will take time to show their effects. The problem is that no matter how great their importance, this kind of institution and capacity building remains virtually invisible to the average citizen who has yet to see or feel an improvement in her or his own living conditions. Despite some macroeconomic improvements, the majority of the population remains in dire poverty. The continued lack of employment opportunities and public services has become a source of growing frustration, as are ongoing socio-economic disparities. It remains urgent to address the humanitarian needs and socio-economic realities of daily life, the extreme hardship of which poses an implicit threat to all efforts to stabilize the country.

It is in this respect that MINUSTAH can make only a limited contribution. The mission depends to a large extent on cooperation and strong support from bilateral donors and on the reengagement of the private sector. Therefore, while the presence of MINUSTAH in Haiti remains indispensable to consolidate the emerging stability in the country, it will require the will of the international community to provide the necessary resources and make long-term, concerted, and coordinated commitments in order to enable the government to deliver a credible peace dividend, which the people of Haiti expect and deserve. Once this is achieved, MINUSTAH will, finally, be the UN's last mission in Haiti. ■

ENDNOTES

1 Speech delivered by President of Haiti René Préval at the 62nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 26, 2007.

2 Ibid.

3 Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping," in Alan K. Henrikson, ed., *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986), 59.

4 Due to its nature that falls somewhere between Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter, former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold once poignantly expressed that classic peacekeeping is authorized by "United Nations Chapter Six and a half." See Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," *Washington Quarterly* 16 (Winter 1993): 51-52.

5 *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992,* UN General Assembly document A/47/277 - S/24111, June 17, 1992.

6 Amélie Gauthier, "Haiti: A last-chance mission?," *Enjeux internationaux, Investigations* <http:// www.enjeux-internationaux.org/articles/num16/haiti_the_mission_of_the_last_chance.htm> (accessed November 29, 2007).

7 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Haiti Country Profile 2006* <http://www.eiu.com.ezproxy. library.tufts.edu/index.asp?layout=displayIssueArticle&issue_id=1381420323&opt=full> (accessed on December 28, 2007).

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. and Charles Arthur, *Haiti in Focus: A Guide to the People, Politics and Culture* (Northampton, MA: Interlink Books, 2007).

10 "Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti," *International Peace Academy Seminar Report*, January 2002, 2.

11 Aristide, learning from his first presidency, quickly disbanded the army. This, incidentally, resulted in no further military expenditures.

12 On December 17, 1999, the UN General Assembly mandated the Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) to follow up on MIPONUH's efforts (General Assembly Resolution 54/193, December 17 1999). MICAH's mandate was terminated in February 2001, upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General, who considered, in his report of November 9, 2000 (UN General Assembly document A/55/618), the continuation of MICAH due to the deteriorating political situation, rampant crime, violent protests, and incidents of violence directed at the international community unadvisable. See David Malone and Sebastian von Einsiedel, "Peace and Democracy in Haiti: A UN mission Impossible?" *International Relations* 20 (2): 160.

13 Ibid., 163.

14 Ibid.

15 The circumstances of Aristide's departure have been the subject of extensive debate, with his supporters claiming that the international community had forced the President to leave against his will.

16 *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, UN General Assembly document S/2004/300, April 16, 2004.

17 *Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean*, International Crisis Group document 21, July 18, 2007: 5.

18 Gauthier.

19 Statement by David Wimhurst, Director of Communications, MINUSTAH. See "U.N. Pushes Deeper Into Haitian Slum," *Associated Press*, February 10, 2007.

20 Ibid.

21 Lt. Gen. José Elito Carvalho, and, as of January 11, 2007, Maj. Gen. Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz.

22 By UN Security Council Resolution 1743 (2007), the Security Council requested that MINUSTAH "continue the increased tempo of operations in support of the Haitian National Police against armed gangs as deemed necessary to restore security, notably in Port-au-Prince."

23 About 20 reported kidnappings occurred in November 2007, compared to 78 in November 2006. MINUSTAH, Press Conference, November 29, 2007.

24 Previously set at 7,200 for the military and 1,951 for the police component.