

BOOK REVIEWS

Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force. By Kenneth J. Coffey, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1979, pp. 210, \$15.00.

Reviewed by JAMES W. REED

On 27 January 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the end of the military draft in the United States, thereby ushering in the era of the all-volunteer force. Since its inception, the all-volunteer force (AVF) has been a major issue in a continuing debate over questions of American military preparedness. Much of the discussion concerning the AVF has centered on the ability of the military to attract sufficient numbers of qualified recruits, on changes in the racial and socio-economic composition of the services, and on the larger ethical questions inherent in the decision by a democratic society to place the burdens of defense on volunteers.

Often omitted from much of the polemics has been a consideration of the broader strategic ramifications which accompany the decision to rely on an all-volunteer force. It is this omission which Kenneth J. Coffey, a defense manpower consultant, seeks to address in his book *Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force*.

Coffey outlines the changes which have occurred in the transition to a volunteer force and analyzes in detail the link between the manpower policies of the AVF and the capacity of the United States to fulfill its strategic commitments.

Coffey's central argument is that the current weaknesses of the AVF dictate a realignment of U.S. defense strategy to bring American military commitments in line with reduced American capabilities. In making this point, *Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force* focuses principally on the U.S. Army and especially on the army's ability to undertake the conventional defense of central Europe.

Coffey begins with a description of the social and political forces which led first to the amendment and later to the abandonment of conscription policies. Although the Military Selective Service Act remains on the books, the induction authority under that law was permitted to lapse. The pres-

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ent law requires the maintenance of a selective service organization — a mere ghost of its former self — and continues to require the registration of males. Congress has only recently reinstated funding for the registration of 19 and 20 year olds.

Changes in force composition have occurred across all of the services in shifting to the AVF but are most striking within the army. Coffey's data document the points that the AVF is drawn more heavily than the conscript force from middle and lower income groups, that it is geographically less representative, and that it is increasingly black (in 1964, 11 percent of army enlisted strength was black; in 1978, the figure was 28 percent). In seeking to achieve recruiting goals the services have relied increasingly upon women to fill their ranks (1.1 percent of active duty personnel in 1964; 6.2 percent in 1978). Coffey maintains that in its impact on strategic capabilities, the changed force composition has probably had less immediate effect on the active forces than on the reserves, where a measurable decrease in the quality of reserve personnel raises doubts concerning the ability of reserve forces to mobilize and retrain rapidly. Since the publication of Coffey's book, however, evidence has surfaced in Congressional hearings which suggests that the irregularities in induction testing procedures may be responsible for an active duty force of markedly lower caliber than had earlier been conceded by Defense officials.

But Coffey's thesis rests principally on manpower shortfalls in the reserve force structure. In moving toward the AVF, the Department of Defense has simultaneously placed greater stock in the "total force" concept: as a trade-off for leaner active duty forces, a greater portion of U.S. defense resources was to be devoted to the reinforcement capabilities of the reserves. Using 1964, the last year prior to Vietnam-related force increases, as a baseline, Coffey notes that in 1978 the active forces of the AVF were 22 percent below their 1964 level, the selected reserve had been reduced by about 20 percent, and the individual ready reserve and standby reserves were each about 60 percent below their 1964 levels. Under optimal circumstances, the army in 1978 could muster only 75 percent of its projected manpower requirements in the event of full mobilization.

The shortages in reserve manpower are exacerbated by the current inability of the Selective Service System to deliver new personnel in an emergency on a schedule at all in line with stated army requirements. Given the nearly defunct Selective Service machinery and the absence of any list of eligible inductees, Coffey cites estimates ranging between 70 and 135 days for delivery of new personnel to training centers.

It is difficult to challenge Coffey's description of the changes which have accompanied the transition to an all-volunteer force; the data are readily available and point generally in one direction. The question, then, is

whether all this makes a difference. In the larger context of defense capabilities based upon both conventional and nuclear forces, are the weaknesses in the AVF really significant?

Coffey argues that deficiencies in the AVF serve to undermine the fundamental premise upon which rests the conventional defense of Europe. Current NATO planning, in Coffey's terms, is based on a conventional capability adequate to avoid defeat in the "short-war" — roughly sixty days — while achieving victory in the "long-war" through the timely mobilization and deployment of reserve reinforcements. The decision to apportion responsibilities between the active and reserve forces under the "total force" concept has resulted in less emphasis being placed on the readiness of U.S. forces in place in the Central Region. Coffey cites evidence of shortages in equipment stockpiles and war reserves in Europe to buttress this assertion. "The army's inability to sustain combat in central Europe much beyond the first few weeks is the fundamental change in strategic capabilities which has occurred during the AVF years." But the weakened state of the reserves together with a dearth of airlift and sealift capabilities to deploy follow-on forces renders the notion of winning in an extended conflict problematic. In sum, the army is ready for neither a long nor a short war in Europe.

In examining alternatives to current AVF policies, Coffey briefly considers the possibility of reimposing the draft, the concept of universal mili-

tary service or universal national service, and even the notion of an equity tax as a means of funding a larger AVF. He quite properly, though somewhat hastily, rejects each alternative as either politically or pragmatically infeasible. Seeing little likelihood that Americans will soon opt for any policy other than a volunteer force, Coffey draws the inevitable conclusion:

Perhaps, then, the total force policy and the commitment to maintain a long war-sustaining capability are anachronisms of a past era when a large mass army was the order of the day. In any case, in the era of volunteerism, the willingness of the American people to support the armed forces and to participate therein should determine the level of strategic commitments.

Absent any major changes in current manpower policies, Coffey suggests that the strategic capabilities of the AVF might be enhanced with a larger, better equipped active army; a larger, more self-sufficient combat force in Europe; improved strategic mobility and larger war reserve stocks; and a smaller but better trained and equipped reserve force. In effect, he argues for a strategy whose goal is to win a war in Europe in the short run.

The main criticism of this book is perhaps that it fails to press the argument as far as it should. The analysis seems to stop short in at least two respects. First, Coffey's discussion of the strategic implications of the AVF focuses exclusively on central Europe. He maintains that the defense of

Europe currently provides the army's "worst case" scenario. That may well be the case. But whatever may be the army's weaknesses in Europe, the argument can be made that the conventional defense of Europe is the challenge for which the army has planned, trained and equipped for at least thirty years. Are the problems likely to diminish if considered in another geographical context? Are we better situated for conventional conflict in the Persian Gulf? The recent activity to shape a rapid deployment force seems, in part, an answer to that question.

Secondly, and more importantly, Coffey's discussion pays scant regard to the question of how weaknesses in conventional forces may relate to broader questions of nuclear deterrence and defense. Western observers in general, and Americans in particular, often tend to treat issues of conventional and nuclear defense as somehow analytically distinct. There exists, however, an unavoidable, if ill-

defined, link between conventional and nuclear forces, and the strategic implications of a deficient AVF may be more ominous and profound than Coffey suggests when viewed in the context of a shifting theater and strategic nuclear balance.

The timing of Coffey's book is indeed fortuitous. At the threshold of a new decade, America clearly seems to be at a crossroads with regard to both its foreign and defense policies. The questions of whether and how to maintain an all-volunteer military force are but one example wherein the choice, as Coffey suggests, appears to be one of paring commitments to match capabilities or, alternatively, of augmenting capabilities to meet existing challenges. The policies surrounding the all-volunteer force are again being held up for public scrutiny and debate. Coffey's book deserves to be read carefully by those wishing to be informed participants in that debate.

An International Redistribution of Wealth and Power: A Study of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. By Robert F. Meagher, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 298, \$27.00.

Reviewed by CHRISTOPHER M. BROWN

To those whose hopes for Third World progress were kindled by the heady UN environment of the 1970s,

the 1980s must seem like dark times indeed. International bankers' fears are aroused at the thought of con-

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tinued lending to debt-ridden less-developed countries. The North-South dialogue seems to be stuck in neutral. Industrialized countries face mounting economic problems of their own, and these problems detract from the world's long march toward the developing countries' cherished New International Economic Order.

What, then, did the developing nations accomplish with their UN resolutions, their Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and their target aid quotas? After the disappointment of UNCTAD IV in Manila last year, where is the North-South dialogue headed? These momentous but exasperatingly complex questions lie at the heart of Robert Meagher's new book. His approach cuts through the complexity, skirts much needless confusion, and homes in directly on what seems to ail the dialogue.

This is a source-book, and contains some dense and heavily documented prose. But the patient reader is rewarded with a wealth of information and references (including fully 73 pages of "Notes"). The book also offers a unique and well-researched glossary of all those North-South buzzwords (Least Developed Countries, Most Seriously Affected Countries, Fourth World, Absolute Poverty, etc.) which so often go abused and undefined.

According to Meagher, the North-South dialogue is essentially a call for an international redistribution of wealth and power. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States "is a comprehensive statement which

consolidates a large part of the resolutions initiated by the Third World in various fora over the last 30 years," Furthermore, "private foreign investment and trade in commodities are the most prominent areas of debate" between the developed and developing countries. Meagher traces these issues to the Charter's statements concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and it is there that he seems to strike the core of the matter.

"The most controversial article of the Charter," writes Meagher, "dealt with foreign private investment." He is referring to Article 2, the only one in the document which altered an earlier accord. The 1962 UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources required states nationalizing foreign capital investments to compensate the multinational corporation "in accordance with international law." But the Charter's Article 2, much to the dismay of the industrialized members of the UN, "moved disputed resolutions from international to national fora under national rules unless governments decided otherwise." Meagher sees this shift as a prime example of the Third World's ability to bring about structural change through law.

This view illustrates the way Meagher's calm and scientific analysis, which focuses on the evolution of international law, reveals some of the hotly debated questions lying at the core of the North-South dialogue. For example, what constitutes law in the international

arena? Are documents such as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States altering the very nature of the world legal system? Is this system being shifted, as Meagher writes, from one of "consent" (where international law binds only those who agree with it) to one of "consensus" (where the attitude of the world community's majority can dictate law to dissenting members)?

After two stage-setting chapters on the Third World and the evolution of the New International Economic Order, Meagher concludes his third chapter's article-by-article analysis of the Charter with a section on the document's "legal nature." The author musters the views of two leading experts on UN legal matters. First there is Richard Falk's concept of the shift from "consent to consensus" in international law. Then he introduces Jorge Castaneda's emphasis on the "norm-making rather than rule-making power of the Charter," to conclude that although "no major legal commentator argues that the Charter is a legally binding document, . . . UN resolutions (such as the Charter) may take on the status of quasi-law."

Meagher's book presents a good case study of the international legal system in transition. International legal norms do seem to be "emerging from the Assembly floor" but many nations (particularly the dissatisfied industrialized ones) do not feel that they are legally bound by these emergent norms. One might add that to the extent that the Charter shifts

jurisdiction into the hands of domestic governments, and to the extent that these governments base their domestic laws and policies on the document, the Charter can be seen as progressing toward the status of customary international law.

Meagher concludes that "the importance of General Assembly resolutions is increasing." Therefore, though the Charter is not yet a statement of international law, "it may become so with the evolution both of customary practice and of national views of the sources of international legal obligations."

But that's not the end of the controversy. An even deeper upheaval in international thinking becomes apparent. It relates to the sources of change in the international system. Robert Meagher is recognized as a leading scholar in the study of the implications of law for the implementation of social, political and economic change. This book applies what is usually a country-specific form of analysis to the broader global sphere.

Meagher's approach comes forth in a question which underlies much of his analysis: "Does law lead, or does it follow, change in the international sphere?" He asserts that the struggle in the "quasi-legal" UN forum does in some cases lead change in the world's wealth distribution system.

The last four chapters of the book trace the post-Charter reverberations and outline the contours and origins of today's North-South stalemate. In them Meagher reviews the chain of international conferences and sessions

of UNCTAD which witnessed the steady loss of Third World momentum. He also traces the gradual re-trenchment of the industrialized countries' policies on implementing the wealth and power redistribution which the Charter was meant to institutionalize.

He also reiterates his view that the 1960s Third World victories, such as the establishment of an international institution, UNCTAD, and the subsequent rise to economic power of the OPEC cartel, have allowed the developing countries to begin changing the international economic system to suit their own needs. Moreover, writes Meagher: "What is new about the Charter and the New International Economic Order is not particular programs or provisions but rather the goals of redistributing wealth and power in the developing countries." His book demonstrates how, especially in regard to foreign investment in the Third World, these goals are being realized through the international system.

But here, power politicians and economists may disagree with Meagher. They might argue that the key turning points in the North-South dialogue were not so much the 1960s events of colonial independence and the founding of UNCTAD, nor the OPEC muscle-flexing of 1973. Rather, the key shift may have occurred in 1956, the last time any industrialized power reacted to a Third World assertion of sovereignty over national resources with brute force. In 1956 Nasser's

Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and an Anglo-French and Israeli strike was made against Egypt in response. It is significant that the United States, itself an industrialized power, played a major role in calling off the military action and permitting Nasser to nationalize the canal. Walter LaFeber, in his book *America, Russia and the Cold War: 1945-1975*, draws the implications of this last exercise of Western military force against the economic interests of developing nations. He writes: "The Suez crisis was a graphic study of how the newly emerging people were reordering the power balance at the expense of the older and more powerful nations. These lessons were immediately taken to heart in Washington and Moscow." It is suggested that the Cold War and superpower competition, combined with Third World nationalism, forced an adjustment in the international economic system in favor of the developing countries. The industrialized powers, advocates of this view would argue, could no longer afford to back up economic exploitation with the gunboats of colonial times.

If these power considerations dictated the New International Economic Order, then one might argue that UN resolutions, the Charter, and international law have all followed, rather than led, international social, economic and political change. Professor Meagher is not insensitive to this view. He acknowledges the increasing control Third World governments have over multinational cor-

porations and the impact (even if it is not likely to recur in other markets) of the OPEC cartel. Nevertheless, he argues that international "quasi-laws" and organizations play a growing catalytic role in the evolution of the international economic order.

"Looking back over the past sixty years," he writes, "it is clear that the conception of the proper role of international organizations in economic and social issues has consistently broadened over time." However force-minded one might be, it is hard to dispute this statement. His book demonstrates, moreover, that developing countries have infected these bodies with the notion that international law can act to right the im-

balance in the world's wealth and power. This too is a significant change.

Indeed, asks Meagher, why shouldn't multinational corporations accept economic regulation in the international sphere? Much of the proposed international regulation, he points out, bears a striking resemblance to long-accepted domestic regulatory policies in their own home countries. In any case, if these trends continue, and Meagher believes they will, the current impasse in the North-South dialogue should indeed prove to be a mere stopping-point on the Third World's path toward a new international economic system — one that serves them as well as the industrialized powers.

Foreign Policy by Congress. By Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 357, \$15.95.

Reviewed by ALFRED P. RUBIN

Tensions between the executive and legislative branches of the United States government are consciously built into our Constitution; it is no accident that there are some powers significant to international relations reserved for one branch to the exclusion of the other, some which cannot be exercised without discretionary action on the part of both, and some which are not clearly within the purview of either. Historically, the distri-

bution of these legal powers between the two branches has varied in practice depending upon the political dynamics of the times, the personalities involved, and the persuasiveness of legal arguments, including occasional formal opinions of the Attorney General and some major opinions of the Supreme Court.

Franck and Weisband analyze the practical working out, in the foreign affairs area, of the crisis in the rela-

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tionship between the executive branch and the legislative branch from 1973 to the present. Popular opposition to the continuation of American involvement in the Vietnam conflict, exacerbated by increasing evasiveness by the highest officials of the executive branch over the whole range of foreign affairs issues, gave a focus to real concerns in Congress over the evolution of the system. In choosing between the integrity of the system (which depends on honesty, though not on complete openness) on the one hand, and the supposed wisdom of executive branch experts on the other, the choice by Congress as a whole was for the system. The ironic result was not only increased expertise in foreign policy, but also the creation of a foreign policy bureaucracy within the legislative branch. The intrusion of an expertly staffed legislative branch into the process of policy formation, outside of the executive branch but in close cooperation with it, creates a danger of confusion and rashness in which all the faults of the past seem likely to be repeated in a subtler and more expensive way.

Foreign Policy by Congress begins with three examples, set forth with specific details, of how Congress followed the lead of some of its younger members in bluntly rejecting executive branch proposals for action and using the weapon of the Congress's constitutional control over funding to force executive compliance. The three examples are the ending of our military involvement in Vietnam, the cutoff of military assistance to Turkey

following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the refusal to allow an investment of United States personnel or money in Angola after it became clear that Cuba was active there.

In each case, what prompted Congress to act was not only disagreement with the policies urged by executive branch officials, but outright lying by those officials. Franck and Weisband's careful reconstruction of the three situations provides the reader with good reason to conclude that the amateurs of the Congress were right about their policy preferences and the executive branch experts wrong.

The bulk of the book is a meticulous analysis of the procedures that evolved to allow Congress to exercise more wisely the legal powers it had come to assert concerning foreign policy. The former reliance on "information" from the executive branch and their self-image as a mere "support" for executive branch policy proposals were changed. Congress staffed and steeled itself to play the role of consultant and codeterminant. Thorough research — including interviews with congressional staff, executive branch officials, concerned scholars, and others — has disentangled the constitutional and foreign policy disagreements with remarkable clarity, considering the complexity of the issues and the backstage maneuvering involved. No delicate questions are avoided. There are sections on ethnic lobbying, including the so-called "Jewish Lobby;" corruption in Congress, including the "Koreagate" allegations; and the as yet incom-

pletely resolved problem of providing meaningful oversight of intelligence community operations. As with any dynamic situation, there is no clear end to the tale. The authors properly content themselves with evaluating the revised structure and procedures of Congress and the executive branch as they exist now, with the main lines of the new "establishment" clear.

One major lesson is implied by Franck and Weisband but not directly addressed. The issue-by-issue approach of foreign policy, which makes a political and constitutional crisis of each disagreement between the executive and legislative branches, results in an image of the United States lurching from one ill-conceived initiative to another, from one reactive spasm to the next, without any place for a broad overview of the general outlines of policy. Since the confrontational crisis-reaction approach is chosen by the executive branch time after time, and the policy arguments advanced by the executive branch officials do not take account of deeper currents affecting the particulars, it cannot be said that the appearance of foreign policy confusion is the result of congressional initiatives. The executive branch has not supplied the deeper analyses that would legitimate its plea to leave ultimate discretion to the "experts." But the failures of the executive branch in this regard do not seem to be compensated for by the increased involvement of equivalent crisis-oriented "experts" on legislative staffs. Despite the optimism expressed by the authors and

their confidence that the legislative branch is now adequately staffed for its new assertion of power, they do not seem to notice that there is no qualified international lawyer on any of the active congressional committee staffs, or that the current Legal Advisor to the Department of State has no visible qualifications to match his job description. I mention that gap not because international law expertise should dominate policy, but because the lack of it has become such an obvious hindrance to sensible action that it is difficult to believe that the reordering has truly solved the problems of spasmodic reaction and lurching policy. As an international lawyer that gap is the one most noticeable to me; there are undoubtedly other, perhaps even more serious, instances of amateurs masquerading as experts in both branches of government, or simple failures to staff the foreign policy establishment with able people despite the new tables of organization.

Serious evidence of the fundamental problem of incompetence in staffing in both branches is implied in the authors' analysis of the constitutional implications of both the War Powers legislation and the Panama Canal Treaty. Franck and Weisband take a basically pro-Congress, pro-treaty position and ignore alternative interpretations and possible alternative accommodations — not because alternatives did not exist, but apparently because they were not perceived by the participants in the struggles. For example, the fact that

the Constitution entrusted to Congress the power to declare war in the same clause as the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal makes it overwhelmingly clear to those familiar with classical legal distinctions that the war-declaring power was connected with the status of merchants. Neutral merchants had very profitable possibilities connected with the carrying trade of belligerents, while merchants operating as privateers, or others exercising belligerent rights had quite different opportunities which called for a careful readjustment of mercantile risks. Franck and Weisband rely unduly on an influential work by Sofaer* to suggest that the reason for the many undeclared wars of the eighteenth century was that the practice of declaring war was losing its legal meaning. In fact, the actual reason was the political desire of merchants to take advantage of legal distinctions between the clear rights and obligations of neutrals and the clear rights and obligations of belligerents. Thus, in the leading American case on the subject, *Bas v. Tingy* (1800), some of the benefits of privateering were accorded to American merchants by a legal construction of 1778 congressional legislation enacted during the so-called undeclared war with France. This is not the place to go into detail, but there is historically little doubt that the war-declaring power is an inappropriate constitutional peg on which to hang congress-

sional opposition to the discretionary power of the President to issue orders to our troops as Commander in Chief. The opposition should have been political; the President's use of his discretionary constitutional authority in Vietnam was unwise. The constitutional peg on which to hang opposition was obvious from the start: the appropriations power. Indeed, it was precisely this power which Congress ultimately used to stop the American participation in the Vietnam conflict.

Similarly, with regard to the Panama Canal imbroglio, congressmen opposed to the diminishment of American involvement in Panamanian affairs proved incapable of formulating their position in non-polemical and realistic language, thus leaving the foreign policy decisions to be made on the basis of irrelevancies. In fact, the United States has wide-ranging responsibilities to maintain the Canal, and owes those responsibilities legally to Great Britain, under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, and to the world shipping community in general, not to Panama. While it may have been politically wise to bargain away our legal rights in the Canal Zone, it was legally impossible to transfer our responsibilities to a third party, Panama. All the major shipping powers of the world now know that the United States is an unreliable ally, a situation we could have avoided, while still retreating from our unwanted and in-

* Abraham D. Sofaer, *War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Powers* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1976).

defensible "rights." This could have been done by simply transferring control over the Canal to a users conference, the Organization of American States, or some other multilateral body able to insulate the Canal from Panamanian politics better than we could or can. In the thirteen years of negotiation, that rather simple solution was apparently never seriously considered in either branch. Nor do Franck and Weisband consider it, because their analysis is really of American constitutional politics, not of constitutional law or international affairs. The result is an unwitting exposition of the weakness of the foreign affairs establishment of the United States and evidence that the reordering of legal and political powers, while highly desirable for many reasons, is insufficient to solve the real problems of lurching policy and spasmodic reaction.

It may be reluctantly concluded that the book's clear and deeply researched analyses of the executive

branch's forfeiture of the national confidence needed to support its former foreign policy role, and of the consequent assumption by Congress of a position as codeterminer and partner in consultation, indicates why the major problems will continue.

A thoughtful reading of *Foreign Policy by Congress* suggests that the key to a resolution of those problems may lie in a more serious consideration by the Senate of its role in advising and consenting to the appointment of key officials by the President. It is the Senate's consent to successive appointments of demonstrably unqualified Legal Advisors to the Department of State that strikes a professional international lawyer as evidence of the failure, probably extending across the entire spectrum of appointed leadership in the executive branch, that makes wisdom in actual policy choices unlikely. Shifts in constitutional assertions and numerical increases in legislative staff do not address that problem.

Nationalism in Iran: Updated through 1978. By Richard W. Cottam, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, pp. 376, \$15.95 cloth, \$6.95 paper.

Reviewed by STEVEN THOMAS

In his own words, Richard Cottam conceives of his *Nationalism in Iran* as "a case study in nationalism as a be-

havioral determinant." First published in 1964, *Nationalism in Iran* analyzes Iranian society and politics

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with special consideration of ethnic politics and external intervention. He shows how the former was an obstacle to nationalism, while the latter encouraged its development. Cottam's book is much more than a political analysis; it is a primer for American policymakers which warns against the dangers of simply viewing Iran as an American surrogate in the Middle East. In 1979, Cottam reissued the book with an "I told you so" conclusion.

Perhaps the greatest merit of Cottam's study is his overview of Iranian history and society since the 1890s, especially the last years of the Qajar dynasty. Cottam focuses on the complex development of a national reaction against foreign intervention in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. During the 1890s, the Qajars permitted both the British and the Russians to encroach upon their rule. The Qajar reaction to British and Russian imperialism was to permit them to develop equally large spheres of influence. The Qajars hoped that, given the presence of both powers, neither would push for excessive control of Iran.

The Iranian people, however, rebelled against both the foreign powers and the Qajars who had tolerated them. At different times Kurds, Azerbaijani Turks, and Bakhtiari groups took to armed rebellion. When the British attempted to establish a tobacco monopoly, the Shi'ite mullahs declared a ban on tobacco. This declaration led to a national boycott of tobacco and the collapse of the British monopoly.

Cottam examines these reactions in an attempt to discern if they were true manifestations of Iranian nationalism. He probes the capacity of different ethnic/tribal groups to envisage themselves as part of a greater Iranian political community and inquires into the conditions under which they would join such a community. In a similar manner, he weighs the power and interests of the Shi'ite religious authorities in mobilizing Iranian national sentiment.

Cottam's initial conclusions were that a liberal democracy would hold the best hope for forging a viable Iranian political community — a community which would see itself as "a combination of political subgroups that, unified, would provide statehood, loyalty, independence and dignity." However, Cottam illustrates how the deeply embedded ethnic and political divisions of Iran seem to make unity and hence liberal democracy an unattainable goal. These tendencies were exacerbated in the 1920s when the Russian-trained commander of the Iranian Cossack Brigade came to power, toppling the Qajars as well as the last vestiges of Iran's first constitutional democracy. The commander, Reza Shah Pahlevi, modeled himself after his Turkish contemporary Kemal Atatürk; but where Atatürk had sought to lay the foundations for a parliamentary democracy, Pahlevi sought to establish an empire. Pahlevi's significance for Cottam lies in his centralization of national authority and his adept manipulation of rival ethnic interests. Pahlevi brought members of

competing ethnic groups into his central government, and relied upon their mutual animosity to prevent them from rebelling.

Cottam sees Mossadeq, who seized power from the young Shah in 1950, as having fostered an Iranian liberal democracy that seemed to unite Iran's different ethnic polities under a single popular government. As quickly as Mossadeq came to power, however, the unpopular Shah overthrew him with foreign help. For Cottam, in 1964, these events seemed to dash the hope of a liberal democratic expression of Iranian nationalism, one which would be compatible with the self-expression of the ethnic minorities.

With the rise of massive civil dissent in Iran in 1977 and 1978, Cottam has reviewed his 1964 conclusions about Iran. In his new conjectures, he is careful neither to predict to what degree non-Persian speaking and non-Shi'ite groups will ultimately support the 1978-1979 revolution, nor to divine whether or not they will seek autonomy. He takes the opportunity to compare the fall of the Qajars and the fall of the Shah by narrating the events of the late 1970s with emphasis on those aspects that are similar to the events preceding the fall

of the Qajars. On the one hand, both ruling groups ruled with a utilitarian strategy of divide and conquer, and both sought to play foreign powers against one another in order to survive. On the other hand, the opposition to the Qajars was not as well coordinated as that against the Shah. Furthermore, the anti-Qajar movement lacked the broad cooperation between Persian and non-Persian elements that characterized the early stages of the 1977 and 1978 Iranian civil disorders.

Since 1964, what new conclusions has Cottam reached? Above all, he points to the emergence of a vigorous Iranian nationalism without liberal democratic institutions to provide the unifying framework. But Cottam is now less willing to make predictions about Iran's future as bold as those made in 1964.

Nationalism in Iran is a solid, scholarly investigation offering insights that are useful in considering Middle Eastern politics. It is clearly written, well-documented and accurate. Cottam's efforts to found his arguments in Iranian history are especially useful and provide a basis from which to view Iran apart from the politics of the Cold War and the current hostage stalemate.

Petals of Blood. By Ngugi wa Thiong'o, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1978, pp.295, \$9.95.

Reviewed by JOHN DUPREE

It was a habit of my old history tutor to make sudden and decisive statements concerning life and education, one of which has remained with me to this day. "The only two things worth studying as an undergraduate," he said, "are history and literature." Considering his chosen profession, this may have been somewhat self-serving, but I like to think that despite his one-sidedness he may in this instance have pointed the way to something true. A recent reading of the Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood* has prompted the question whether any education in international relations, and certainly in development studies, which does not include the study of fiction can be considered adequate.

Ngugi wa Thiong'o is one of the few African writers to have gained an international reputation. His fame and influence began with his sensitive and powerful early novels depicting the sorrows and contradictions of colonial Kenya. As post-independence chairman of the literature department at the University of Nairobi, Ngugi's stature as one of Kenya's leading intellectuals grew and he was acclaimed both within and without Kenya. However, in the early 1970s he re-

jected his Westernized name, "James", and began to use his Kenyan name. At this time his works began to concern themselves with post-colonial Kenyan society, and he rapidly fell out of favor with the Kenyan government. In 1977, when for the first time Ngugi abandoned English and authored a play in Kikuyu, a language more accessible to the general populace, he embarked upon a course which many contend precipitated his subsequent arrest. A month after the play opened it was closed by the government, and it became clear that Ngugi's ideas had become a major source of irritation to Kenyan officials. In December 1977, only months after the African publication of his fourth novel, *Petals of Blood*, Ngugi was arrested and held without trial by the Kenyan authorities, causing a major international outcry among human rights groups, writers, and intellectuals.

Petals of Blood looks at the Africa of the villagers from the perspective of a native Kenyan. The novel tells of the investigation of a triple murder in upcountry Kenya and centers around the four suspects taken in for questioning: Abdullah, an ex-freedom fighter who comes to the village of Il-

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morog as a petty trader after Kenyan independence in 1963; Wanja, a bar maid and prostitute who returns from the city to the village of her grandmother; Karega, a student radical and trade unionist; and above all Godfrey Munira, headmaster of the village primary school. All have come to Ilmorog to somehow deal with their past, but once there they find their lives inextricably bound together and joined to the life of Ilmorog itself. For *Petals of Blood* is much more than a simple murder mystery; it is Ngugi's blazing indictment of the desecration of Ilmorog in the name of development, a shattering story of failed expectations and of a village and nation betrayed by its new elite of former brothers.

The narrative unfolds in flashback by means of Godfrey Munira's police statement, which outlines the events leading up to the murder of three of the village's new elite. As Munira's story begins, Ilmorog is in the throes of a drought. In time, the village is mobilized by Karega, Wanja, and others to do something about the situation. A delegation from the village is selected to journey to Nairobi to speak with Ilmorog's parliamentary representative in hopes of gaining emergency assistance from the government. The trip from Ilmorog to Nairobi becomes a journey of personal discovery in which the participants realize how much of Kenya's past and present are represented in each of them. As the villagers narrate incidents from their own pasts and

face a series of adventures in the present, they encounter the frightening and bewildering faces of post-colonial Kenya.

In Nairobi the travellers gain access to their M.P., who at first has little time for his scruffy rural constituents. Nevertheless a twist of fate and the timely aid of a Nairobi lawyer turn the plight of Ilmorog into a highly publicized human interest story. Consequently, Ilmorog suddenly becomes the reluctant recipient of industrial overkill. A new road is built past the village, a large brewery is constructed, and entrepreneurs from Nairobi and Europe descend upon the tiny community until the old village is little more than an industrial slum dwarfed by New Ilmorog, created and controlled by the insensitive and wealthy new Kenyan elites, both African and European. It is in this New Ilmorog that the murder investigation culminates in a finale of frustration and tragedy.

Ngugi writes of rural Kenya with ease and passion. His narrative is flavored with the names, sounds, and words of Africa, to which he gives an intoxicating subtlety and naturalness. The villagers of Ilmorog are neither Westernized sophisticates nor monosyllabic primitives; they are passionate, self-aware, and intelligent. They know what was expected of independence and yet are forced to acknowledge the inevitable failings of human nature. Above all the villagers of Ilmorog are witness to what happens as the greed and insensitivity of

their new leaders turns their village into an industrial slum. Ngugi's up-country Kenya is the setting for high drama in the same way as Hardy's rural Wessex, or Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County. Godfrey Munira wishes only to live his life as headmaster of an out of the way village school. He is confused by the new Kenya but wants to remain, above all, a spectator of the political scene: "Let me remain burrowed into the earth. Why should I dare?" But Ilmorog will not allow spectating and Munira's life, like the lives of his fellow villagers, becomes so connected to Ilmorog that, in the end, personal and political passion are inseparable.

A book such as this is worthwhile in its own right, but to any student of political development it is especially important. In his article "Thinking Historically,"* Alan Henrikson claimed that an historian "in order to explain an event, seeks an imaginative 'empathy' with the subjects involved in it." The academic study of development demands a similar effort, one which is all the more important because the purely technical and quantitative aspects of development are so seductive. This is not to say that development practitioners are unaware of the human element in their work; woe to the cost-benefit analysis which does not include some mention of "social costs and benefits." But in many cases the unquantifiable aspects of development are ignored because they do not lend themselves to pro-

cessing, analysis, and easy dissemination. Development includes fear, frustration and the shortened horizons of day to day living as well as calorie counts and capital. It is precisely in providing access to the unquantifiable side of poverty that the novelist can contribute to the development specialist's understanding. This does not mean "understanding" as the simple acknowledgment of facts, but rather the giving life to facts, the re-creation within one's self of another existence. In history this re-creation is of the past, while in a novel it is of an imaginary situation, but in both cases the end result is the same: the reading of the work allows for vicarious experience and a consequent growth in wisdom. Although Ngugi's artistry is brilliant in showing that, though often poor, African village society is rich in insight and subtlety of expression, his main contribution is to compel us to experience life with Munira, Karega, and the others.

This is essential for those in the developed world who truly wish to understand the bewildering nature of various attitudes toward social change. Despite our intellectual acknowledgment of various political alternatives and our own revolutionary traditions, we in the West are often still surprised by those who choose radical opposition instead of incremental change. It is not easy to understand why a group embarks on a radical road to social change which

* Alan Henrikson, "Thinking Historically," *The Fletcher Forum*, vol. 2 no. 2 (May 1978).

may threaten the existing social fabric to such an extent that even the radicals cannot be certain where it will lead. It is difficult for us to glean from academic observation of the Third World the crisis of conflicting voices, of hope, anger and disillusionment, which forms the course of social unrest. Development studies which fail to address themselves to such tensions, including the possibility of irrationality, are in danger of misperceiving the heart of the matter. Such a failure reflects the inability of the 'haves' to understand the 'have nots,' and the gap between academic knowing and empathetic understanding.

These passions are the stuff of the artist, the re-creator. Nutritionists may accurately explain vital dietary considerations and the causes of malnutrition, but when one of the Ilmorog Primary School pupils collapses from hunger on the schoolhouse floor while Karega is teaching about the glory of the African past, the shortened horizons of subsistence living are made painfully clear. The "tunnel effect" is a convenient intellectual explanation of variations in the tolerance of social inequality, but not until Abdullah, the ex-freedom fighter, realizes that the struggle for a new Kenya has benefited only the new black elite at the expense of the people, does Albert Hirschman's theory begin to come to life. For it is the frustration and despair of these individual reactions which forms the foundation for mass movements and radical opposition. These are matters that scholars will never comprehend

without the aid of their colleagues the artists, for development is the product of the heart as well as the mind. Intellectual understanding presents an essential side of the problem, true but incomplete, just as a black and white photograph represents reality: accurate in form but lacking in the depiction of its essential color.

It is no accident that many of the truly great works of history from the likes of Schiller and Michelet are known not for their presentation of objective truth but for the genius of their poetic re-creation. A comparable fusion of fact and feeling in the study of development perhaps awaits the arrival of similar genius, but it is certain that a much more purposeful attempt must be made by theorists and practitioners to exercise the empathetic side of their awareness as a complement to their analytical and factual expertise. This is no easy task for us in the West because our society has virtually eliminated the desperation of poverty and oppression from the mainstream of social intercourse. The disparity of wealth that does exist has come to be accepted as a necessary side effect of our social order, and those occupying the lower rungs of opportunity are complacently acknowledged by society as being only relatively, not absolutely, impoverished. Thus our capacity to empathize with subsistence living is gradually being undermined by our affluence, making it difficult to understand the rising demands for radical social change.

To understand it in the purest sense we must live it; but few, if any, of us