Black, Blanc and a lot of *Beurs*
From Islam in France to French Islam?

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REVIEW OF JONATHAN LAURENCE AND JUSTIN VAISSE
Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France
Foreword by Olivier Roy
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French national identity is changing. The direction and shape of this change is the subject of great debate, particularly because large waves of immigrants have altered the ethnic composition of France in the post-colonial era. In the wake of France's 1998 World Cup victory, politicians, echoing many newspaper headlines, proclaimed that the France that won was *"black, blanc, et beur,"* not just *"bleu, blanc, et rouge."*[1] Touting ethnic diversity as a pillar of the nation's success was a milestone given France's poor record in dealing with its colonial legacy. But the spark emanating from the soccer pitch electrified France—an outside observer might have thought that the country's social integration model was the most successful in the West. That model—promoting the citizen and *laïcité*—had succeeded in creating a stronger and more unified *République,* demonstrating a vibrant Gallic alternative to the seemingly stalled "Anglo-Saxon" model based on multiculturalism and affirmative action.[2]

Yet the feel-good times of the late 1990s would not last forever. On October 27, 2005, the accidental death of two young men of North African descent, in what was perceived as a racially motivated police pursuit in the northern *banlieues* (suburbs) of Paris, led to rioting that spread from one

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urban area to another. The ensuing three weeks of looting and car burning painted a new, disturbing image of France for the world. The violence and intensity of the riots, led predominantly by youths with a recent immigrant past (many of whom were Muslims of North African descent), revealed not just cracks on the surface of the French nation, but large, treacherous chasms that seemed to pit the French on one side against a mass of immigrants on the other. The international media, especially in the United States, seized the occasion to speak of a benighted French society unable to integrate its immigrant populations due to intolerance and racism. The fact that the riots were led almost exclusively by Muslim teenagers fed into the rhetoric of many U.S. commentators that France was becoming another frontier in Washington's war on terror, another battleground in the clash of civilizations, and another home to a burgeoning wave of terrorist sleeper cells.

Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, professors of Political Science at Boston College and Sciences-Po in Paris, respectively, are quick to dispel this myth in their engaging book *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. They state that while the French riots may have been led by youths of Muslim descent, the driving force behind the violence was not a sinister Islamic awakening. Rather, their angst was directed against the difficulties of daily life in the *banlieues*, where problems revolve more around economic and social factors (high unemployment, for example) than religious ones. Moreover, these circumstances have impacted the ways in which these immigrants have come to define their identities. If you ask any young Arab man in the maze of public housing projects in the *banlieues* if he is French, he will most likely reply that "Frenchness" is the unique purview of the native, white population. Still, the authors admit a clear trend toward re-Islamization among French Muslim youths, but insist on the need to disassociate the riots from that re-Islamization. Though social and economic exclusion may have led to both, they should be treated as parallel, but ultimately separate, phenomena. Young French Muslims are changing the way they interpret Islam, but are not rising up against France as a result.

Exactly how successful, then, has France been at integrating its growing Muslim population? Is Islam compatible with the ardently secular French republican model, or with any Western society for that matter? Has France been correct in rejecting the conception of its minority populations as separate communities (the dreaded *communautarisme*)? How should the Republic deal with the trend toward re-Islamization in the *banlieues*? These and other complex questions raised in the aftermath of the riots in late

2005 have since consumed public debate in France, and constitute the underlying framework of Laurence and Vaisse's analysis.

France has the largest Muslim population in the EU. Its 5 to 6 million Muslims comprise more than one-third of Europe's total and represent close to 10 percent of France's population. To live in the north of Paris (or in the suburbs of virtually any French city) can be quite a Muslim experience—one could eat at *Beurger King* and wash down a *halal* treat with a gulp of *Mecca Cola* while watching the men at the local mosque spread out their rugs on the sidewalk in preparation for prayer. Yet claims such as those made by Bernard Lewis that the Muslim population portends the inevitable "reverse colonization" of France, or that it will inevitably lead to an explosion of Salafist-inspired terror attacks, are specious at best and irresponsible at worst.[3] Laurence and Vaisse systematically dispel the idea of French Muslims as a fifth column, ready to avenge the problems of the Middle East on the streets of France.

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Indeed, throughout the work the authors cite numerous data that indicate that Muslims care less about foreign policy than other issues, stating, "it is not clear that French foreign policy would be any different if there were no Muslim minority in France." When there is concern in France over international events, sensitivity to such issues as multilateralism and international law is the norm for all, not simply the ambit of one specific community. As they show, French Muslims are decidedly more interested in events within France than with events in the larger *umma.*[4] Specific examples include the war in Iraq, which has actually been an issue of convergence for Muslim immigrant and native French populations.

Borrowing from Olivier Roy, the authors tell of the arrival of Arab Muslims in France in 1960, and how their approach to France and "Frenchness" has manifested itself differently throughout the three subsequent generations.[5] While the first generation remained close to its country of origin in matters of faith and family, the second generation of the 1980s (or civic *beurs*) struggled against perceived discrimination and racism by employing a "secular, left-leaning" agenda, thus distancing themselves from their Muslim identity. However, the young French Muslims that constitute today's third generation, like many young Muslim immigrants in the West, are trending toward re-Islamization. But they diverge from the Islam of

their grandparents by identifying more with global Islam than with local expressions of the faith as manifested in Algeria or Morocco. The overarching problem, Laurence and Vaisse state, is that each generation has been unable to shake the problems of social exclusion and collective economic hardship. The persistence of these problems, the authors claim, is perhaps the most significant driving force behind re-Islamization.

The authors also provide insightful commentary on the subtle changes in the approach of some French lawmakers in their efforts to avoid a foreign-manipulated, radicalized population of Muslims. The treatment of the 1905 law regarding interaction with religious entities is a case in point. Adherence to this law has fueled accusations that Islam in France is manipulated by foreign sources, as a significant level of funding for French mosques and prayer spaces comes from abroad. After a long struggle with the Roman Catholic Church over educational curricula in the late nineteenth century, a law was passed that ended all public funding for religious groups. In addition, all religious buildings were declared the property of the Republic. Many observers have criticized the law because, they say, it inherently favors the three main religions that were installed in France prior to 1905 (Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism). Most churches and synagogues were built before the law was passed, and thus are maintained largely at the government's expense. As the Muslim population is primarily a post-1960 reality, Muslims have to pay full price to found and maintain their facilities, which has led to an influx of cash and influence from foreign donor countries such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy has recently convened a panel to investigate the need for potential revisions to this law. The declared 2007 presidential candidate is open about his desire to see the French law against public funding of mosques and imams changed, as other high-ranking figures have declared support for Sarkozy's ideas, claiming that the Islam the French should be afraid of is not that which is preached in the mosques, but rather in cramped basements and other unofficial prayer rooms.

The authors' treatment of the fledgling French Council of the Muslim Religion (CFCM), the newest solution to the problems of the Muslim community's isolation vis-à-vis the government, leaves something to be desired. The authors steer away from criticism of the government's tactics to overcome this communal isolation and opt for a simply descriptive approach. The CFCM is ostensibly straying from its legally defined capacity as a governing body on spiritual affairs in France, considering the political role that the CFCM has played in the current conflict in Iraq. A case in point was the seemingly indefatigable efforts of the CFCM during

the negotiated release of the *Libération* journalist Florence Aubenas. While her release was certainly a positive development, the council's role has consequently been blurred and its future direction remains uncertain.

Laurence and Vaisse note another impediment to integration: the difficulty of finding imams who are culturally and linguistically connected to France and appropriate for their "French" Muslim constituencies. The authors note that the vast majority of imams are foreign-born and that "half are over the age of fifty, only one-third are proficient in the French language, and two-thirds are on welfare." The cultural and linguistic divide, in addition to the fact that many imams hail from conservative schools of thought, have led many to claim that this is an open door to radicalization. But Laurence and Vaisse show that, unlike the British, the French took an early hard-line stance to expel radical imams from France, and have since maintained a stringent surveillance system over Muslim prayer spaces on French soil. The result has been an insignificant amount of radicalized preaching at French Mosques and prayer spaces. In addition, in an effort to stymie the flow of French-Muslim religious students to conservative schools like Al-Azhar University in Egypt or Al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco (prime locations for potential radicalization), the French government initiated an official program for Islamic theological studies at the Sorbonne in 2004. It is too early to judge the effects of this nascent program, but the authors claim it is a step in the right direction.

Not surprisingly, the book's third section on the politics of Islam in France and in Europe is its most engaging component. As this is the *sujet du jour* for many, the authors do not disappoint as they construct a very clear vision of France's attempts to incorporate the Muslim electorate, combat the rise of anti-Semitism, and dismantle the outlets to radicalization and terrorism. The short section on the notable French success record in combating terrorism merits additional depth, particularly when it comes to French-American cooperation in this arena. The successes of the French anti-terrorism apparatus are mentioned, but largely through an American prism that ultimately weakens what could be the authors' strongest play for their American readers. Unfortunately, they let slip a wonderful occasion to show that there are many lessons to be learned from a Western democracy that, despite a significant legacy of struggling with terrorism, has avoided compromising its own legal and moral principles with its responses to it.

This is an important study for reasons that reach far beyond the borders of France. Muslim minorities are challenging what it means to be French, and, more widely, what it means to be European. Misplaced perceptions have hampered Islam since its arrival in Europe in the post-

colonial era of the 1960s. States have been increasingly confronted with uncomfortable questions of belonging, citizenship, and security. Yet, issues such as the trend toward re-Islamization of today's youth should not inspire fear of parallel radicalization. As Roy states, while re-Islamization is *necessary* for radicalization, it is not *sufficient*...it can also take on a humanist, even liberal mode of representation.[6] Laurence and Vaisse's study builds on this idea to sound an optimistic note about the future of France and its growing Muslim community. They are hopeful for the future, even considering the events of late 2005, and view Islam as more dynamic and capable of being shaped by the community in which it is found than many would like to believe. Accordingly, Laurence and Vaisse have found that France is well on its way to creating a French Islam, rather then just dealing with Islam's presence in France. ■

ENDNOTES

1 *Bleu, blanc, et rouge* (blue, white, and red) are the French national colors, composing the tricolor band of the nation's flag. *Beur(s)* is a commonly used French term, derived from *Arabe(s)*, used to refer to a person of Arab descent living in France.

2 In the francophone world, *laïcité* is a conception of separation of church and state and the absence of religious interference in government affairs (and vice versa). The concept is related to secularism, but does not imply hostility toward religious beliefs.

3 Christopher Caldwell, "Islamic Europe? When Bernard Lewis Speaks," *Weekly Standard*, October 4, 2004.

4 *Umma* is an Arabic word meaning community or nation. It is commonly used to mean either the collective nation of Islamic states or (in the context of pan-Arabism) the whole Arab nation. In the context of Islam, the word *umma* is used to mean the diaspora or community of believers (*ummat al-mu'minin*), and thus the whole Islamic world.

5 See Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

6 Ibid.

Reconfiguring Asia's Geostrategic Landscape

BRUCE KLINGNER

REVIEW OF ROLLIE LAL

Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World

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The simultaneous ascent of China and India, along with an increasingly assertive Japan and more independent South Korea, is triggering growing competition in Asia for regional leadership and economic supremacy. In particular, Chinese foreign policy has recently been driven largely by Beijing's insatiable demand for energy and raw materials to fuel a rapidly expanding industrial base, and aims, therefore, to ensure uninterrupted supplies of these resources. Moreover, China's expanding military and economic power has enabled it to challenge the United States for dominance in the Asia-Pacific, but has also raised concerns in capitals throughout the region.

Amid these developments, focus in official policy-making circles and the academic community has been limited primarily to the impact of a "rising China" on regional security dynamics. Often overlooked, however, is India's own drive to achieve a greater role in East Asia and the resultant implications for the Sino-Indian dynamic, as well as for power politics throughout Asia more generally. This shortcoming may be due in part to the traditional, though artificial, distinctions between "East Asia" and "South Asia" that have constrained broader strategic outlooks. East Asian analysts, themselves subdivided into Northeast and Southeast Asian specialties, are often unaware of New Delhi's growing aspirations to expand its influence beyond the subcontinent and play the United States and China off against each other. Rollie Lal's comparative study, *Understanding China*

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and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World, is, therefore, a valuable contribution to the field, and should help break down these analytic barriers.

Despite the Chinese dragon's lengthening shadow over Asia, Beijing must account for India's rising power and its goal to carve out an expanded role—not only in South Asia but also in greater Asia. The Chinese leadership now sees India as both a competitor and a junior partner to be used on the increasingly complex Asian chessboard to further Beijing's national interests, even as New Delhi attempts to do the same vis-à-vis China. India is driven to extend its horizons by its own reliance on foreign energy supplies and a nationalist sentiment that calls for the country to assume its proper place on the world stage (e.g., by acquiring a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council).

Often overlooked, however, is India's own drive to achieve a greater role in East Asia.

Dr. Lal points out that while China and India are both driven to achieve a greater regional role, the two powers have strikingly different national interests as motivators. For India, globalization is the major force pushing it toward economic reforms and defense modernization. Were India to fail to adapt to the new globalized world order, it would be left behind politically, militarily, and economically. On the other hand, Lal's research identifies a Chinese perception that maintaining state unity and the political stability of the communist party are the principal drivers for Beijing's quest for economic growth.

Probing into these differences, the book delineates how post-World War II developments shaped the formation of unique national identities in China and India despite the similar circumstances they faced. Lal explains how these national identities, in turn, have influenced strategic policies. Particularly useful are the author's comments on the domestic and bureaucratic components of national interest and how each impacts policymaker deliberations. Moreover, the study's use of extensive interviews with Chinese and Indian elites provides insight into each country's policy-making process. For example, a Chinese commentator explained the linkages between Taiwan, internal separatist movements, and military modernization programs: "Taiwanese are Han minorities, but in Xinjiang we have other kinds of minorities. So, if Taiwan has independence, then these areas will also want this. So, we need military power to deal with this Taiwan issue." Chinese respondents also noted that the communist party's inability to provide a comprehensive definition of national identity has exacerbated

negative feelings regarding the country's culture and politics. To respond to these challenges, the Chinese leadership is pursuing a military modernization program to quell internal disorder and initiating reforms to decrease economic disenfranchisement and bolster regime legitimacy.

On the foreign-relations front, India's progressively eastward focus is of concern to China, largely because it is a potential rival to Beijing in its quest to become recognized as the regional superpower. A manifestation of New Delhi's policy reprioritization is that, in 2004, India's trade with Asian nations surpassed its combined trade with the United States and Western Europe for the first time. To achieve this objective, New Delhi expanded its engagement with Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to improve its economy and garner political influence. India's ongoing efforts to liberalize its economy and augment its military capabilities have achieved sufficient results so that competing regional powers now court New Delhi. Moreover, India's potential role as a counterweight between the United States and China magnifies the effect it can have on regional dynamics and thus its appeal to other nations.

Accordingly, in April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced a new "strategic partnership" with India, pledging to boost trade and economic cooperation. In a clear signal to Washington, the two countries underscored the "global and strategic character" of Sino-Indian relations. Perhaps as a direct response to this development, the United States announced in July the next steps in its own bilateral partnership with India, including a landmark deal on nuclear technology cooperation. Ultimately, Dr. Lal assesses that the reduction of tensions between India and China represents a paradigm shift that could change the strategic realities of Asia. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003 and Premier Wen Jiabao's reciprocal 2005 trip reflect Beijing's quest to minimize the potential for military conflict on its periphery while concurrently recognizing India as an economic competitor.

While it remains to be seen whether the Sino-Indian relationship will be primarily a partnership or a rivalry, Dr. Lal's research provides preliminary insights into how policies will be implemented to further national goals. As she points out, Chinese and Indian views of their interests may not accurately reflect the countries' needs, but the perceived necessities of securing state unity and protecting state sovereignty in the international arena will continue to dominate policymaking in both capitals. The book would have benefited, however, from reduced emphasis on extensive presentations of the actual data collected (e.g., "Respondent A said...") and better use of the research to augment the author's own expertise. Additionally, the author

should have extrapolated from this research to provide a more robust conclusions and implications section. In doing so, the study could have used its comparative analyses of China and India to offer a more predictive analysis of how national interests will drive each country's policies toward the other, the United States, and Asia as a whole.

That analysis might have gone something like this: Washington and Beijing will continue to play the Indian pawn to outmaneuver each other. The United States sees India as another means to encircle China while Beijing assesses that the growing regional acceptance of its expanding influence offsets, to some degree, U.S. attempts to isolate it. Increasingly, India will be a significant player in its own right, using the United States and China to counterbalance each other. New Delhi has masterfully balanced competing threat assessments of its neighbors to simultaneously improve its relations with China, Japan, and the United States, while gaining some advantage over Pakistan. Whether India will seek to maintain or alter the existing regional balance of power remains an open question.

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As Dr. Lal points out in her conclusion, the research conducted in *Understanding China and India* provides the platform for further empirical study of national interest-based policy formation. A better understanding of the internal dynamics of China and India would enable analysts to more accurately predict their policy decisions as well as judge how the United States can ensure its continued influence in Asia. These topics, of critical importance to policymakers and the academics that influence them, would provide an excellent basis for future studies by Dr. Lal. ■

Chaos and Confusion

Stanley Hoffman on Globalization, Failed States, and Terrorism

STEVEN MICHAEL WARD

REVIEW OF STANLEY HOFFMAN

Chaos and Violence

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In a time marked by an American foreign policy increasingly divorced from reality and wedded to ideology, one is tempted to celebrate Stanley Hoffman's refusal to endorse any one particular paradigm in his latest collection of essays, *Chaos and Violence.* Indeed, it is refreshing to read that Hoffman plans to "leave models behind and start from realities." However, the reader is soon reminded of Kenneth Waltz's observation that a theory or model loses explanatory power as it approaches an approximation of reality.

In attempting to do justice to the complex state of international relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Hoffman provides in-depth description but little explanation. Due to his reluctance to embrace parsimony for the sake of explanatory power—and, to be fair, in part because of the nature of the work as a collection of essays—Hoffman's insights do little more than contribute to a sense of frustrated confusion.

Hoffman's argument, as articulated in the first six chapters, is that the dynamics of international relations have been fundamentally transformed by globalization over recent decades. This transformation, which Hoffman claims became apparent on September 11, 2001, renders existing models and paradigms inadequate. Specifically, Hoffman argues that existing mod-

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els fail because globalization makes the logic of sovereignty and the state system obsolete. To clarify his argument, Hoffman invokes Hobbes, stressing that states arose because the "international state of nature was less catastrophic than the state of nature within a group of men and women." As long as the state of nature among nations was less dangerous than the state of nature among individuals, the state system remained viable. However, Hoffman claims that this condition is no longer reflective of reality today; the state has ceased to mitigate the effects of anarchy on the individual. Thus the very "logic that made the internal Leviathan necessary...should now push toward a worldwide Leviathan." Hoffman is realistic and therefore skeptical that a worldwide Leviathan will emerge. His point remains, though, that the logic of sovereignty has been destroyed.

Hoffman's insights do little more than contribute to a sense of frustrated confusion.

The erosion of sovereignty consequently undermines what Hoffman views as the two major established paradigms: liberalism and realism. Thus, a new way of thinking about international politics is necessary—an approach that privileges realities over models.

True to his word, Hoffman departs from a model-centric approach. In the essays concerned with specific global issues, he describes reality instead of providing a conceptual framework. His detailed analyses of humanitarian intervention, America's role in the post-9/11 world order, the Iraq war, and U.S.-Europe relations—each of these cases is useful for identifying the many challenges and complexities of the contemporary international system.

The lack of a robust theoretical framework, however, limits Hoffman's ability to prescribe solutions and leads him to some confusing, and at times, contradictory, conclusions. Two examples—Hoffman's treatment of sovereignty and his discussion of intervention—illustrate this point. Throughout the work, it seems that Hoffman cannot decide whether he is describing a world in which sovereignty no longer exists or a world in which sovereignty should no longer exist. Hoffman begins by arguing that the logic of sovereignty has been destroyed, that states are no longer primary actors, and that the fall of the state system is imminent. When discussing global governance, however, Hoffman refers to the "defenders of national sovereignty" as the enemies of the rise of a cosmopolitan community and authority. This argument contradicts his previous claim, as it seems to prove that sovereignty not only still exists, but that it must be overcome. Hoffman treats sovereignty similarly in his three essays on intervention. The defenders of

sovereignty are labeled as critics of intervention, which, Hoffman asserts, "must go on." For those—like himself, presumably—who favor humanitarian intervention, sovereignty and its advocates must be stripped of power and legitimacy. But, it is important to note that the very same concept of intervention cannot exist without the reality of sovereignty; there must be a coherent entity in which to intervene.

In his essay on the United States in the post-9/11 world, Hoffman returns to his original conception of sovereignty as an eroded institution. The terrorist attacks "brutally drew our attention to a phenomenon that had long been partly hidden from sight by the Cold War." This phenomenon was the emergence of an international system characterized by heterogeneous units. While states retain the "appearance and trappings of sovereignty," their sovereignty has been undermined because globalization has effectively erased the boundaries between state and global society. This analysis only confuses the reader, who is left wondering whether sovereignty is a dependent variable or an independent variable. Is Hoffman explaining the decline of sovereignty as an event in the past, or is he predicting the consequences that would follow if actors succeed in defeating sovereignty in the future?

While Hoffman's treatment of sovereignty is confusing, his approach to interventions leads to a contradictory conclusion within the context of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. After articulating the advantages and pitfalls of intervening in a state's domestic affairs, the author concludes that the non-interventionist, "realist prescriptions appear neither moral nor politically sophisticated." Adding to our confusion regarding the nature of sovereignty, he then proceeds: "If one believes that a world of sovereign states and of international institutions tightly dependent on and controlled by them is both increasingly unrealistic politically...and morally unacceptable when states fall into murderous chaos...then one has to choose the path of reform of the international system so that it can begin to cope adequately with the protection of these rights." In other words, domestic intervention by the international community, even in the face of immense difficulties, "must go on."

In an essay entitled "Out of Iraq," Hoffman lists criticisms of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The first three grounds for his objection to the 2003 invasion of Iraq are eerily similar to what Hoffman characterized as realist objections to intervention. First, Iraq did not threaten American security. Second, al-Qaeda was in no way connected to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Third, the war in Iraq distracts from the (security-driven) war on terror. All three objections are indisputably valid criticisms, and they assume that realist concerns with the protection of the sovereignty of the United

States are more important than the Bush administration's professed desire to spread democracy and free the Iraqi people from tyranny. But, in light of Hoffman's endorsement of the principle of intervention, these criticisms represent an inconsistency.

Hoffman might reply that the Iraq war does not qualify as a legitimate intervention for two major reasons. First, it was conducted unilaterally. Second, there was no recognized violation of human rights at the time of the invasion. However, in an earlier essay, Hoffman himself advanced positions that argued against the need for an intervention to be multilateral and conducted in response to a recognized massive violation of human rights.

In "The Debate about Intervention," Hoffman addresses what he calls "the principle of last resort." Put simply, intervening states wait to act until human rights violations have already begun. By this time, though, it is too late to intervene effectively. A proposed solution is for states to be ready to intervene when major humanitarian violations seem likely to occur. This, of course, involves a trade-off. Early, effective interventions are less likely to be endowed with the legitimacy of multilateral authority, since the human rights violation is not yet obvious and calculations of its probable severity will vary across states.

Even in the face of these difficult times, Hoffman still favors interventions. In this context, it is therefore difficult to see why he would so vociferously oppose the Iraq war, which could be viewed as a unilateral action taken to prevent potentially egregious human rights violations from occurring in the future. It seems that Hoffman, relying on his own framework, might at least excuse the Bush administration's overly enthusiastic embrace of intervening in the domestic affairs of other states. After all, says Hoffman, interventions must continue—with or without a satisfactory method of investing authority or determining criteria for taking action.

Hoffman's accounts of the complex relationships and problems that characterize international relations in the twenty-first century are a valid reason to read *Chaos and Violence.* His lack of a coherent theoretical framework, however, does not allow him to shift from mere description to the explanation of the phenomena he analyzes. After reading *Chaos and Violence,* the reader is left more confused and frustrated than before. Perhaps this is appropriate. Recognizing that there is no easy way of understanding international politics today, Hoffman has avoided the unproductive attempt to construct satisfying paradigms and models. ■