Transatlantic Relations –

A Study in Complementarity

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<u>OUTLINE</u>

<u>ABSTRACT</u>

This paper will examine the Transatlantic relationship between the United States and its European allies. Some writers have described the relationship as complementary, but no one appears to have examined the meaning of "complementarity". This paper will show that Transatlantic complementarity is composed of three elements. Of the three elements, probably the most important is the need to establish a positive relationship based on mutual respect and consultation ("interpersonal complementarity"). Once this has been achieved, the other two elements will flow naturally, i.e. – "power and law" complementarity where partners work to legitimise the actions of the alliance as a whole, and "supplemental" complementarity where each partner brings their respective strengths into the relationship. Given the importance of promoting good "interpersonal complementarity" dynamics in the relationship, the paper goes on to support the establishment of an Atlantic Steering Group.

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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS - A STUDY IN COMPLEMENTARITY

Introduction

"…the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Inter-dependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the (United States)…"

Speech by John F. Kennedy, at Independence Hall Philadelphia, 4 July 1962[1]

This historic statement made shortly after the Berlin Wall was built in August 1961, is still relevant forty years later as we approach another critical point in the Transatlantic relationship. In 1962, at the height of the Cold War, the main priority was the protection of the free world against communist encroachment. Given the immediate threat facing the West, Kennedy felt that the best way to meet the challenge was for Europe to consolidate its economic and military strength through deeper integration. In due course, the two halves of the Atlantic alliance - the United States and Europe – would come together to forge an Atlantic partnership based on interdependence, equality and mutual benefit.

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[1] Full text available online - http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfk-independencehall-1962.html

Although the communist threat has disappeared, Kennedy's prescient statement still rings true today. New, and more dangerous threats to global and western security have emerged. Rogue states and non-state actors driven by religion and fanaticism have emerged and either have obtained, or are on the verge of obtaining nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) capability. Using conventional tools, the September 11 hijackers destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and killed around 5000 people. Future attacks using NBC weapons would likely cause many more deaths. While the Cold War adversaries could have destroyed the world many times over with their nuclear arsenals, there was a logic to their actions, and the threat of mutually assured destruction made it unlikely that the weapons would ever be used. However, rogue states and fanatical terrorists who have little to lose, and whose logic may not be entirely rational, are unlikely to be deterred through conventional methods of deterrence and the threat of force.

A multifaceted approach is needed for dealing with these new threats. Failed states must be rehabilitated to prevent terrorists from seeking shelter in them, economic development must be promoted to allow for more equal distribution of global wealth thereby removing a source of resentment against the west, festering sores like the Israeli-Palestinian problem have to be healed, a stronger regime against proliferation has to be put in place, anti-terrorism cooperation across borders has to be improved, and in the last resort military force must be applied. However, in today's world, the application of military force does not end when the last cruise missile is fired. The state or territory attacked must be rebuilt to prevent extremist elements from taking over in the wake of the

power vacuum left by the departing victors. Such massive tasks cannot be achieved by one country alone. The financial cost alone would be staggering, and specialised expertise would be required. The United States and Europe can meet these new threats more effectively by working together and pooling their resources.

However, instead of pulling together, the fall of the Iron Curtain has revealed cracks in the Transatlantic alliance. Europe has emerged from the Cold War an economic superpower. It has a common currency and has regained its confidence, absorbing the states of Central and Eastern Europe, extending the boundaries of the west. This new Europe sees less reason why it should continue to play second fiddle to the United States. The public disagreement over how to deal with Iraq is a manifestation of this new reality. On the other hand, the United States found itself after the Cold War as the world's only superpower and is unwilling to accept a relationship other than from a leadership position. This is the crux of the matter. While the first part of Kennedy's statement – the consolidation of Europe – has been realised, the United States is not willing to go on with the second part - to accept its former junior partner as an equal.

Nevertheless, while some countries in Europe precipitated a crisis by withholding its support for the United States in Iraq, the dynamic within Europe, and within the Transatlantic alliance will not let the crisis spin out of control. Instead of signalling its independence, the disagreement over Iraq had the effect of signalling to the United States the inter-dependence of the relationship, and Europe's desire for a more equal Transatlantic partnership. Instead of pulling apart, the United States and Europe should

recognise the complementarity of their relationship, and the importance of their continued cooperation for the maintenance of global stability and the pursuit of their common interests.

The first part of this paper will examine developments affecting Transatlantic relations since the end of the Cold War and show that the relationship is ultimately inter-dependent and complementary. The second part will focus on the concept of complementarity, and argue that complementarity on the basis of an equal partnership between United States and Europe should form the basis of a new Transatlantic bargain. As an afternote, the final part of the paper will examine the principle of complementarity and its application beyond United States-European relations. As this is a paper on the Transatlantic relationship, the terms EU and Europe will be used fairly interchangeably.

Drifting Apart?

Current tensions in the Transatlantic relationship over United States Iraq policy are the latest manifestation of a problem that has been simmering since the end of the Cold War. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, disagreements between the United States and Europe began to erupt over issues like the United States' refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the unilateral United States abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the backtracking of the United States position on the International Criminal Court, and on various trade disputes ranging from bananas to steel. Let us examine each of these

disagreements before studying the Iraq dispute to see if some common themes can be extracted.

The disagreement over the Kyoto Protocol was mainly over European attempts to get the United States to agree to take measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in order to slow down the rate of global warming. Under the Clinton administration, the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol, but the Bush administration declared that the United States would not ratify the Protocol as this would raise costs for American companies, affecting their global competitiveness. The Bush administration argued that developing countries like China and India were large producers of carbon dioxide and should also accept greater responsibility under the Protocol.[2] Europe's aim in pushing for the Kyoto Protocol was driven by its strong environmental lobby. European companies are already subject to many environmental regulations domestically, and perhaps an underlying motive behind their push for the United States to ratify the Protocol was an attempt to level the playing field between American and European companies. In rejecting the Protocol, the Bush administration may also have perceived an attempt by Europe to constrain it economically.

On trade issues, the most prominent disputes between the United States and Europe were over the EU's preferential treatment of banana imports from its former west African colonies, American anti-dumping measures which affected EU imports, European health concerns over American genetically modified crops, and over steel

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[2] Global Warming Dispute, PBS Report, 14 June 2001, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june01/bush_6-14.html

subsidies to American companies under the Byrd Amendment. Less well-known are continuing European attempts to ensure that the United States complied with a number of WTO rulings against it – for example over the export subsidies under the Foreign Sales Corporations legislation, and anti-dumping measures.[3] Although the trade disputes only account to 1% of the total volume of United States-EU trade, the poor atmospherics in the trade relationship could impact negatively on relations in other areas. For instance, the failure of the EU and the United States to resolve their trade differences, and the issue of agricultural subsidies prevented them from demonstrating leadership at the recent WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun in September 2003. This has been cited as one of the main reasons for Cancun's failure.[4]

Europe – including Britain, were concerned with the United States' decision to unilaterally terminate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. This was a bilateral treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The fear was that the unilateral termination was a potentially destabilising move which could trigger a new arms race between the United States and Russia. It would also represent a setback for international law. The United States, on the other hand, given the growing missile threat from rogue states, considered it necessary for national security to develop and deploy anti-missile defences in contravention of the treaty. The outcry over this issue has died down in the wake of September 11, and in view of US moves to placate Russia through closer consultation on the ABM issue.

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[3] EU Factsheet – US Non-Compliance with WTO Rulings, October 2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/items.htm
[4] Robert Looney, The Cancun Conundrum: What Future for the World Trade Organization?, US Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict, 1 October 2003,
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/oct03/trade.asp

The Bush administration decision not to proceed with ratification of the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute signed by the Clinton administration is another cause of friction between the United States and Europe. Following the Balkan wars, during which widespread atrocities were committed, the EU decided it was necessary to build up an international order whereby tyrants would not be able to hide behind the veil of national sovereignty to perpetrate crimes against humanity.[5] However, the United States was concerned that the ICC statute was flawed in that it gave too much power to international investigators. This could result in politically motivated attempts to prosecute American troops and government officials.[6] The issue remains unresolved, with Cherie Blair, the wife of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, firing the latest salvo of criticism at a panel discussion on human rights and international law at Washington's Georgetown University on 17 November 2003.[7]

The latest disagreement between the United States and Europe was over Iraq, and this has been described as the most serious Transatlantic rift since the end of the Cold War. During the run up to the American invasion of Iraq, France worked to actively with Germany to frustrate American goals in the UN Security Council. French opposition, by itself would not have been a major problem. However, French opposition began to

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[5] Speech on the International Criminal Court by Chris Patten, 25 September 2002, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_431.htm
[6] US Views regarding the International Criminal Court, Statement by Stephan Minikes, US Ambassador to the OSCE, 4 July 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11726.htm
[7] Blair's Wife Faults Bush's Opposition to International Criminal Court, Washington Post, 18 November 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54133-2003Nov17.html

manifest itself in European terms, i.e. that Europe should emerge as a counterweight against the United States in a multi-polar world order.

On the other hand, Germany, unlike France, does not have an instinct for opposing the United States. It could be argued that German opposition was a result of circumstances not fully within its control. In Germany, the Iraq issue coincided with a closely fought election campaign. Given the poor state of the German economy, the incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder seized the opportunity to deflect attention from the economy by seizing on the Iraq issue. By declaring his opposition to war, Schroeder made a strong appeal to the German left and this was probably the decisive factor in his re-election by a razor thin margin in September 2002. However, Schroeder's election rhetoric put himself in a bind. Schroeder is a strong supporter of close relations with the United States and he probably felt that Bush would understand his need, for domestic purposes, to come out against the war in Iraq. Unfortunately, Bush felt personally betrayed by Schroeder. The problem was that Schroeder had given Bush a personal promise following September 11 that Germany would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States in the war against terrorism. France saw the sharp downturn of US-Germany relations as an opportunity to build a Franco-German axis against United States action in Iraq. Their weapons would be international law and the withholding of funds for an American operation against Iraq.

The Iraq war also brought into question the oft-quoted truism that the US and Europe have a common heritage, culture and traditions, and therefore share similar

values. A poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund in June 2003 after the Iraq war, brought out divergent views between US and European publics on the Iraq issue, on when the use of military force was justified, and on America's leadership role in the world. Less than half of the Europeans polled would support military action, compared to 84% of Americans. 60% of Americans felt that it was desirable to bypass the UN if vital interests were at stake compared to 43% of Europeans. Only 45% of Europeans would accept American global leadership compared to their ready support (64%) in a similar poll conducted the previous year. Each side also perceived a gap in values – 83% of Americans and 79% of Europeans agreed that Europeans and Americans held different social and cultural values.[8] These differences in attitude were further highlighted by the large anti-US, anti-war demonstrations in many European countries – even in those like the UK, Spain and Italy whose governments were strongly in favour of the war.

In all these disputes with the United States, Europe has asserted a policy of adherence to international law. One can see how this European attitude has come about. From the ruins of the last War, Europe has rebuilt itself into an economic superpower, not with arms, but with rules disavowing the use of arms. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the extension of the west into Central and Eastern Europe was seen by Europe more as a triumph of economic power, rather than military might. The dream of a united Europe is nearing fulfilment, and ironically, the dream of dictators and conquerors since Roman times, is being achieved with the pen – not the sword. In its own way, Europe

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[8] Transatlantic Trends 2003 Survey by the German Marshall Fund, available online at
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/apps/gmf/ttweb.nsf/0/A550833A2BCEE6CE85256D96007F118B/$file/
Transatlantic+Trends+Final+Report.pdf

sees itself as the "city upon a hill", and sees its mission in terms of building an international order based on the rule of law.

On the other hand, the United States which had established the international order following the Second World War, emerged from the Cold War as the world's only superpower and now wants to preserve its freedom of action without being constrained by international law. It is this fundamental difference in approach, and the growing divergence in attitudes between the United States and Europe, which has led some to question the continued relevance of the Transatlantic relationship.

Kagan's "Power and Weakness" Thesis

Probably the most well-known article on the faltering Transatlantic relationship is Robert Kagan's "Power and Weakness".[9] Kagan argued that because of the all-important question of power and the morality behind its use, American and European perspectives were diverging. While Europe was turning away from power towards international law and international cooperation, the United States still did not trust international law and relied on military force for security and for the promotion of its interests in the world. Because of their divergent worldviews, Kagan questioned whether America and Europe even occupied the same planet. In a reference to the present Bush administration and September 11, Kagan argued that the differences were so fundamental, that they were not the product of one American election or one catastrophic event.

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[9] Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, Policy Review Summer 2002

Kagan characterised the differences between the United States and Europe as a result of the diverging power differential. In the past, when the power equation was in Europe's favour, it was the United States that insisted on adherence to international law. Now with Europe's weakness revealed, and Europe going into decline, the roles are reversed, and the Europeans are now calling for negotiation and adherence to international law. This European approach was also considered as an attempt by Europe to constrain American power by insisting on its use in accordance with international law, and by channelling it through the UN. Kagan argued that while the US sometimes succumbed to pressure, the fact remained that it had the power to act unilaterally. The US also faced more dangerous threats, so it would be justified in using force even if the rest of the world did not agree with it.

According to Kagan, the divergence of American and European perceptions of power began with the end of World War II. Given the devastation of the war, Europe made a conscious policy to reject the *machtpolitik* of the past and entered into a "postmodern" phase that was based on the rejection of force and on self-enforced rules of behaviour. Because of its success in the past 50 years, Europe now believed that it had found the answer to perpetual peace, and sought to export that to other parts of the world. America's power represented a threat to Europe's new-found sense of mission. Because of this, Europe sought to oppose US use of power. However, Kagan says that Europe failed to see that it could afford to live in this postmodern utopia only because of the security umbrella provided by American power.

Kagan goes on to add that America can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe, because it already did so. He pays lip service to the common interests and values shared by America and Europe and concludes with a weak case for continuing the Transatlantic alliance, by suggesting that the EU could make an unlikely attempt to build up its military power and that America, though it does not really need Europe, could be less overweening in its approach.

The power/weakness argument is an interesting one. However, it tends to oversimplify. The first problem is that of over-generalising and putting all Europeans into the same boat. It is clear that there are many shades of views and opinions in Europe. Kagan ignores the fact that the very same German Foreign Minister whom he places squarely in the European postmodernist/pacifist camp, argued passionately in favour of deploying German forces in combat offensive missions in Kosovo. It also ignores the fact that a majority of Europeans (60%) are in favour of America using force to disarm Iraq if the use of such force was sanctioned by the UN.[10] Europeans are more war-like than Kagan would have us believe.

It is also not accurate to place all Europeans together with the French in seeking to constrain and challenge American *hyperpuissance*. This ignores the very visible split that occurred in Europe over the Iraq war. Forty-five percent of all Europeans still consider American global leadership desirable.[11] Even Germany which actively supported France before the war, started to backpedal and has begun to mend fences with the United States.

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[10] Worldviews Survey 2002, German Marshall Fund
[11] Transatlantic Survey 2003, German Marshall Fund. In the 2002 Worldviews Survey, the figure was 64%.

The split was not merely between "old" and "new" Europe. In fact, many countries of "old" Europe like Spain, Italy and Denmark also supported the US on Iraq.

We might also ask if it is fair for us to blame France for its obstructionist attitude? Didn't France work with the United States in most military operations since the first Gulf War? Some of the blame must go to the United States for its overbearing behavior, overriding very legitimate French concerns – i.e. a fear of instability in a strategic area of the world, a fear of increased global terrorism, a fear of what would come after Saddam. This was probably one of the main reasons why France decided to oppose a United States attack on Iraq.

Furthermore, it is not true that only Europeans are interested in establishing an international order based on international law. Such a statement negates the great vision and achievements of great Americans like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman, and ignores the continuing contribution of American jurists towards this ideal. Also, the Transatlantic Survey 2003 showed that a sizeable proportion of the American public (40%) would not condone American actions which bypass the UN.[12] Kagan's analysis of United States action might only be valid for this particular unilateral moment in United States history.

Perhaps most importantly, Kagan's analysis is flawed because by focusing only on military power, he takes a too narrow view of power. We must not forget that economic power is the basis of military power. Kagan glosses over this aspect of

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[12] Transatlantic Survey 2003 by the German Marshall Fund.

European power, and how it has become essential to the use of American power. Although a military midget, Europe is an economic superpower. In terms of comparative GDP, the United States and EU are almost on par.[13] Competition between European and American companies is very keen. Airbus Industrie is a serious competitor to Boeing, and Daimler Benz recently took over Chrysler – an icon of American industrial power. Other companies considered American icons, like Brooks Brothers, Shell and Burger King are European-owned.[14] The euro is the world's second largest reserve currency after the US dollar. In terms of foreign aid, the EU spends far more than any other country, including the United States. This economic power translates into influence on the global stage.

In addition to its economic power, Europe has proven expertise in rebuilding failed states. Without European aid and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, the United States would be bogged down and would not be able to project power into other parts of the world. Even the puny European militaries provide an important peacekeeping role freeing up American power for use elsewhere. To a substantial extent, American military power and its ability to project force is underpinned by European power.

Even the Bush administration has started to back down from its unilateral moment. The high cost of the military occupation of Iraq, the mounting budget deficit, the daily "drip-drip" of casualties, the need for international legitimacy, and domestic

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[13] In 1999, combined European GDP was 7.8 trillion Euros. US GDP was 8.7 trillion Euros. (Source: EU website – http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/index.htm)
[14] Speech by Charles Ries, The US-EU Trade Relationship: Partners and Competitors, 14 November 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/15491.htm

dissatisfaction, have all combined to push the Bush administration back to the UN. The

Bush administration submitted a draft UN resolution on Iraq, which was approved on 16

October 2003 as Resolution 1511. In so doing, the United States has unlocked European

financial support for Iraq's reconstruction. Senior administration officials have started to

recognise the importance of European cooperation, and have started to float the idea of a

NATO mission for Iraq along the lines of the Afghanistan mission.[15]

Larger Interests at Stake

The Bush administration has finally come to realise the importance of

Transatlantic cooperation. But it is more than just cooperation. The United States and

Europe are inextricably linked. It is not just the massive volume of trade and investment

moving both ways across the Atlantic, though these figures by themselves are

compelling. Annual trade and investment flows across the Atlantic total around $3

trillion annually, the largest in the world. In 2000, combined exports between Europe and

America amounted to over $600 billion. Almost 4 million American workers owe their

jobs to European-owned companies doing business in the United States. The American

and European economies are increasingly integrated, as over 50 percent of American

exports to Europe are to European affiliates of American companies, and companies are

mutually dependent upon each other for critical inputs to products sold in home markets

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[15] Speech on <u>Expanding NATO's Mission</u> to NATO's Parliamentary Assembly by Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, 11 November 2003,
http://www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/Nov1103GrossmanNATO.html

or abroad.[16] "The real point is that the United States was born of Europe's rib."[17] This does not mean that one partner is necessarily subordinate to the other. Rather, it shows that Europe and the United States are part of one whole sharing a common heritage and common core values: democracy, human rights, open markets. The fact remains that both America and Europe share a common desire to make the world a better place.

The Transatlantic relationship has been the cornerstone of the global order since 1945. While there have been wars in various parts of the world during the last 50 years, there has been no major conflict matching anything like the two World Wars of the last century. Far from having failed, the UN system designed by the United States, and the European Union has succeeded in bringing about a substantial period of global peace.

This period of global peace has ushered in a dramatic period of development and of economic growth. While much remains to be done, large areas of the globe have been lifted out of poverty and into the modern world. Moreover, there has been staggering economic progress. In the last 50 years, we saw a six-fold increase in world output accompanied by a 20-fold increase in trade in goods. By the end of the 20th Century, the world was producing the same amount of goods and services every three years that it had taken the whole of the 19th Century to produce.[18] All this would not have been possible without Western investments, aid, technology, education and western models of governance. The continuation of this great age of global enlightenment requires the

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[16] Trade and Investment figures from EU website,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/items.htm
[17] Let's Put Away the Megaphones, IHT Op-Ed 9 April 2003 by Chris Patten and Pascal Lamy
[18] Cyril Foster Lecture by Chris Patten at Balliol College, Oxford, 30 January 2003. Full text available
from http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/oxford300103.htm

continued vitality of the Transatlantic partnership. This is not fluffy sentimentalism, but hard-nosed realism. America and Europe, as leading world commercial powers, have more to gain from a preservation of the current world order.

Transatlantic Complementarity

"We (Americans) do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner…Acting on our own…we cannot establish justice throughout the world…"

John F. Kennedy speech, Independence Hall Philadelphia, July 4, 1962

We can see from Kennedy's Independence Hall speech that the Transatlantic relationship has been a cornerstone of US policy since World War II.   Because Kagan's "Power and Weakness" thesis calls into question the Transatlantic alliance, it has been hotly contested. Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic consider Kagan's thesis a dangerous, and a potentially self-fulfilling one, and have come out to emphasise the crucial importance and complementarity of the Transatlantic relationship.

- Andrew Moravcsik says in his article that "A better approach to rebuilding the transatlantic relationship would aim at re-conceiving it on the basis of comparative advantage, recognising that what both parties do is essential and complementary. Europe may possess weaker military forces than does the United States, but on almost every other dimension of global influence it is stronger. Meshing the two sets of capabilities would be the surest path to

long-term global peace and security. Each side would profit from being responsible for what it does best. Complementarity is the key to transatlantic reconciliation."

- The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a Joint Declaration on Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership. The declaration issued by a stellar cast of US foreign policy experts noted that "The Transformation of NATO and advances within the EU…are naturally complementary. Suspicions that one might stand in the way of the other as an adversarial counterweight, and complaints that one lags behind the other as an economic or military free rider, should be put to rest. Neither NATO nor the EU is a full-service institution; neither is sufficient because both are necessary – to win a war, end a war, and deal with the aftermath. For the latter, the EU can provide stability tools that complement well the NATO security toolbox. In short, while it may not be possible for us to take on everything together, it is imperative to make sure that taken together we do everything."[19]

- In an IHT Op Ed piece on 9 April 2003 "Let's Put Away the Megaphones", Chris Patten and Pascal Lamy reminded both sides to recognise how much the United States and Europe need each other, acknowledge how much unites

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[19] Center for Strategic and International Studies, <u>Joint Declaration on Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership</u>, by Madeleine Albright, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Robert Dole, Lawrence Eagleburger, Stuart Eizenstat, Alexander Haig, Lee Hamilton, John Hamre, Carla Hills, Sam Nunn, Paul O'Neill, Charles Robb, William Roth, James Schlesinger, 14 May 2003. Available online at http://www.csis.org/europe

Europe and America and recall their shared responsibility to provide global leadership.

- Javier Solana in a speech "Mars and Venus Reconciled: A New Era for Transatlantic Relations" on 7 April 2003 reminded his audience of the depth of the Transatlantic relationship and stated that global problems in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans and elsewhere would only be solved if "we have a common purpose across the Atlantic and the most intimate and detailed cooperation".

These quotes show that the vast majority of foreign policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic disagree with Kagan and hold the view that the Transatlantic relationship is complementary. But what does complementarity mean?

Complementarity as a Concept

In examining the concept of complementarity, I have not been able to find reference to complementarity as it relates to international relations. Various principles of complementarity appear in other branches of knowledge, and it may be useful to summarise these concepts here to see if they can be applied to the study of international relations:

- The Complementarity Principle in physics was developed by Neils Bohr and refers dual nature of light and certain atomic and subatomic particles, in that they show characteristics of both a particle nature, and a wave nature.[20] This conception of complementarity is not applicable to our present field of study.

- In the field of psychology, the Interpersonal Principle of Complementarity describes ways in which a person's interpersonal behavior evokes certain predetermined types of behavior from an interactional partner. Complementary behavior is defined on the interpersonal circumplex[21] (see Figure 1 below) such that corresponding behavior occurs in casual situations (friendliness invites friendliness, and hostility invites hostility), and opposite behavior tends to occur in power relationships (dominance invites submission, and submission invites dominance). The study of interpersonal relationships, classification of personality types, and relating personality to behavior are very complex areas of study within the field of psychology. Since foreign policy is determined by human beings, we might be able to draw broad analogies from behavioral theory to the study of state-to-state relationships. However, one should be careful about stretching the analogy too far. Given the focus of this paper, I will not attempt an in-depth study of how states in general relate to each other and how interpersonal theory might apply to all

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[20] Encyclopedia Britannica

[21] The interpersonal circumplex, was first developed by T F Leary in his Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality (1957) Ronald Press, New York. The circumplex was further elaborated by Virginia Commonwealth University psychologist Donald J Kiesler in 1983, See Kiesler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 interpersonal circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. *Psychological Review, 90,* 185-214.

the various permutations of state-to-state relations. Instead, I will use the interpersonal complementarity principle to describe how the United States has elicited either positive or negative behavior from Europe, and what lessons can be drawn from this for promoting the Transatlantic relationship.


FIGURE 1. Classification of Interpersonal Behavior into Sixteen Mechanisms or Reflexes. Each of the sixteen interpersonal variables is illustrated by sample behaviors. The inner circle presents illustrations of adaptive reflexes, e.g., for the variable *A*, *manage*. The center ring indicates the type of behavior that this interpersonal reflex tends to "pull" from the other one. Thus we see that the person who uses the reflex *A* tends to provoke others to *obedience*, etc. These findings involve two-way interpersonal phenomena (what the subject does and what the "Other" does back) and are therefore less reliable than the other interpersonal codes presented in this figure. The next circle illustrates extreme or rigid reflexes, e.g., *dominates*. The perimeter of the circle is divided into eight general categories employed in *interpersonal diagnosis*. Each category has a moderate (adaptive) and an extreme (pathological) intensity, e.g., *Managerial-Autocratic*.

From T F Leary, <u>Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality</u>, (1957), page 65

- In the statute of the International Criminal Court, the Complementarity Principle defines the relationship between the International Criminal Court and national courts. The principle emerged as a compromise position during the negotiation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute, and took account of states' concern that they would be giving up too much of their sovereignty to the ICC. A principle emerged that the ICC's jurisdiction would be complementary to that of national courts. So in the case of war crimes, national courts would have primary jurisdiction to try an offender, and the ICC would only come into play if the national courts are unwilling or unable to exercise their primary jurisdiction.[22] This concept of complementarity – in the sense of two parts of an international system working in concert to form a complete system – is similar to the sense in which the term complementarity is used in describing Transatlantic relations.

Having been unable to find an existing complementarity principle that relates to international relations, it would be necessary to study the natural meaning of the term complementarity to see if a principle can be derived from it. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines complementarity as "the interrelationship or the completion or perfection brought about by the interrelationship of one or more units supplementing, being dependent upon, or standing in polar position to another unit". Three different conceptions of complementarity are contained in Webster's definition:

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[22] Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 1 read with Art 17. See also Olympia Bekou, The Complementarity Regime of the ICC, http://www.weltpolitik.net/sachgebiete/zukunft/article/722.html

- Where both sides "supplement" each other.

- Where one side is "dependent upon" the other.

- Where one side is "standing in polar position" to the other.

The Kagan approach of American power in opposition to European weakness refers to the third type of complementary relationship – the "polar opposites" approach. This is not to say that Kagan sees the future in terms of Transatlantic conflict. His thesis refers to what he considers their respective viewpoints and approaches to international relations as polar opposites.

As for the other commentators calling for a complementary Transatlantic alliance, it is clear they are not calling for a relationship where the United States is in opposition to Europe. Andrew Moravcsik, in expanding his ideas on complementarity in a debate with Fraser Cameron, Director of Studies at the European Policy Studies in the NATO Review[23] proposed a division of labor between the EU and the United States. He argues that it would not be a cost effective strategy for the EU to try to match American military capabilities. Instead, the EU should focus on its core competencies – reconstruction, peacekeeping and peacemaking. Seen in this light, the United States and the EU are complementary in the sense that the United States should focus on the application of force, and the EU should focus on the peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts after the

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[23] <u>Andy-Fraser Debate on whether the European Union should be able to do everything NATO can</u>, NATO Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/debate.html

war.   This is what he means by "meshing the two sets of capabilities" to promote global peace and stability.

This is also the sense in which the CSIS declaration uses the term "complementarity":

"Neither NATO nor the EU is a full-service institution; neither is sufficient because both are necessary – to win a war, end a war, and deal with the aftermath… In short, while it may not be possible for us to take on everything together, it is imperative to make sure that taken together we do everything."

Relating these ideas back to the dictionary meaning, we can see that the "supplemental" form of complementarity is referred to in these arguments. That both the United States and Europe should work together, each bringing their strengths into the relationship in order to fulfil their global priorities and to further their global interests.

There is yet another way of looking at complementarity. Javier Solana in his "Mars and Venus Reconciled" speech refers to the United States methods of "power", and the EU's "law" approach. He notes that some people pretend that there is some kind of opposition inherent in the two approaches. However, Solana believes that "law and power are two sides of the same coin. Power is needed to establish law, and law is the legitimate face of power". The enforcement of international law, as in the domestic

sphere, requires the application of power and force to persuade recalcitrant states to observe their obligations.

Although Solana does not elaborate, we can see immediately that he has made an important point. The United States is often described as a benign superpower, as a giant with a conscience, as a global policeman. What this means is that the United States does not use its power in an arbitrary or tyrannical manner. This is not to say that the United States does not or has not in the past sometimes flouted a rule of international law. Who hasn't broken some rule or other at some time in his/her life? In fact, more often than not, the United States uses its power to redress perceived breaches of the world order. Thus, the use of force by the United States has to be legitimised – not only to itself, but also to its people and to the world at large. Europe on the other hand has been seen in recent years as working to extend the application of international law. In contrast to its past behavior, Europe since the Second World War has been the model international citizen, and even goes to the extent of trying to persuade the United States to abide by both the form and substance of international law. Europe can therefore be seen as the United States' second conscience. If Europe condones the action taken by the United States, it is more likely to be seen as legitimate. Therefore, there is value for the United States to work with Europe. The two approaches – "power and law" - supplement each other, and are therefore complementary.

Having dealt with two of the three dictionary meanings of "complementarity", let us now consider if the relationship is one where one party is "dependent on" the other.

Looking at Moravcsik's article, and the CSIS Declaration, it is not so clear whether the relationship should continue to be one where the United States maintains its dominant role, or whether there should be movement towards a more equal partnership between the United States and Europe.

When Europe was weak in the aftermath of World War 2, and the Soviet threat loomed, Europe was content to play second fiddle to the United States. After all, the United States provided Europe's security umbrella, allowing the Europeans to rebuild their economies. A State Department memo of 1952 noted that the United States had more troops in Europe than all other NATO countries combined, and that its per capita defense spending was six times above the NATO average. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship was clearly United States dominant, Europe dependent.

The end of the Cold War coupled with Europe's growing confidence and its status as a global economic power, has resulted in Europe calling for a shift towards an equal partnership, ie the "supplemental" form of complementarity. In substance, the relationship between the US and its European allies is more equal than America wants to acknowledge. Europe's strengths are in peacekeeping, reconstruction and nation building. While America wins the war, Europe wins the peace. Europe also provides vital economic and financial underpinning of American military power.

Therefore, the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration on European Community – United States Relations states that:

"The United States…and the European Community and its member states…acting on the basis of a pattern of cooperation proven over many decades, and convinced that by strengthening and *expanding this partnership on an _equal_ footing* they will greatly contribute to continued stability, as well as to political and economic progress in Europe and in the world…"[24]

In his "Mars and Venus" speech, Solana notes that:

"We must begin by reaffirming that we are partners and we are allies. Treat your friends like allies and they will behave like allies. Partnerships and alliances bind. They allow for and legitimise leadership by providing a forum for talking and for listening, for determining common tasks and identifying the means to accomplish them. The alliance should determine the mission. This is not code for a de facto European veto on American initiatives. It is the best hope of restoring our joint sense of purpose…Most of us would prefer to be called an ally or a partner rather than a tool in a box."[25]

So the relationship should not be considered one of dependency. To work, the United States must recognise Europe as an equal. However, the words in Solana's speech above also contain another element of complementarity. The words "treat your friends

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[24] Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations, 1990. Full text available online at http://www.eurunion.org/partner/transatldec.htm
[25] Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 7 April 2003.

like allies and they will behave like allies" relate back to the Interpersonal Principle of Complementarity in that the United States' positive behavior towards Europe will elicit a correspondingly positive response from Europe. Second, if that response is positive, a consultative mode of leadership will elicit a more constructive approach from Europe (Interpersonal Complementarity) in order to determine common tasks and the means to accomplish them ("Supplemental" complementarity).

Thus the Transatlantic relationship contains at least three conceptions of complementarity:

- An application of the Interpersonal Principle of Complementarity – "Treat your friends like allies, and they will behave like allies";

- "Power and Law" complementarity to describe how the United States and Europe can work together to achieve their objectives in a legitimate manner; and

- "Supplemental" complementarity, to describe the sharing of responsibilities or division of labor between the United States and Europe to enable both to achieve their mutual aims.

Transatlantic Complementarity in Action

Now that we have set out the parameters for Transatlantic complementarity, we can turn to some real-life examples to see how the concept might work in practice.

Bosnia - The Balkan Wars of the 1990s began when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. In February 1992, Bosnia followed suit. Supported by Serb dominated Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serbs rebelled and set up a separate state. Reports of rape and "ethnic cleansing" of Muslims in Serb areas started to come out of Bosnia. Fighting in and around Sarajevo caused many civilian casualties. UN sanctions and peacekeepers were unable to bring an end to the fighting. A combination of US reluctance to put troops on the ground, a weak UN mandate, and European governments' fear for the safety of their peacekeepers resulted in a weak response to Serb aggression. An attempt to use NATO airpower in May 1995, which led to almost 400 peacekeepers being taken hostage, convinced policy makers that airstrikes would cause more harm than good. The failure of the UN and NATO to act decisively emboldened the Serbs. In one of the darkest episodes in UN peacekeeping history, Serbs surrounded the UN safe haven of Srebenica in July 1995 and massacred over 7000 Bosnian Muslims while Dutch peacekeepers looked on.[26]

The Srebenica massacre galvanised the US and its European allies into action. Convinced that only force would deter further Serb aggression, the US persuaded its

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[26] Report of the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 – The Fall of Srebenica, 15 November 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf

allies that a military strategy was required to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table. On

30 August 1995, NATO launched a prolonged campaign of airstrikes on Serb military

positions. The combined pressure of NATO airstrikes, and a successful Croatian-Bosnian

offensive which reversed a substantial proportion of Serb territorial gains held since

1992, forced the Serbs to the negotiating table. By 21 November 1995 the Dayton Peace

Accords were concluded. In December 1995, the peace was implemented by 60,000 US

and NATO peacekeepers under the IFOR (Implementation Force) mandate.[27]

Since December 1995, the EU's High Representative for Bosnia has had overall

responsibility for implementing the Dayton Peace Accords, and for coordinating the EU's

reconstruction effort. Between 1996 and 2001, more than €2.6 billion in reconstruction

and humanitarian aid has been spent by the EU and its member countries in Bosnia. The

EU's efforts have been focussed on promoting democratisation, building infrastructure

and institutions, revitalising the economy, and holding out eventual EU membership for

cementing the country's progress thus far. This intense peacebuilding effort has provided

the necessary framework for peaceful elections to be held in October 2002. The success

of the NATO peacekeeping effort (now named SFOR – Stabilization Force) has allowed

a reduction of the number of peacekeepers to 12,000 troops by end-2002.[28]

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[27] Ivo H. Daalder, Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended, Foreign Service Journal,
December 1998
[28] Information variously from the EU website
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/bosnie_herze/index.htm), 24th Report of the High
Representative to the UN Secretary General (http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=31003), NATO's IFOR website (www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm)

The initial peacekeeping operation in Bosnia was a shambles. Weak European foreign policy is often blamed for this. But the United States must also share some of the blame. At the time, the United States was recovering from the failed operation in Somalia and was loathe to get involved in more peacekeeping operations. As a result, the initial UN mandate for Bosnia was a very weak one. European countries with troops on the ground were reluctant to take military action against the Serbs as that might endanger their troops. Sensing weakness, the Bosnian Serbs went on a rampage. The situation was redressed only after the Srebenica massacre shamed the west into action.

However, from that point on, Bosnia can be cited as a classic success story for Transatlantic complementarity in all three senses of the term. First, the United States applied good "interpersonal complementarity". There was close consultation between the Clinton administration and the various European allies through the International Contact Group on Bosnia and the North Atlantic Council. This allowed the necessary consensus for the use of force to be built up. Second, the operation demonstrated the "supplemental" form of complementarity with each partner contributing their strengths. The application of force through American-led NATO airstrikes brought the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table, and the threat of force ensured that their obligations were kept. Europe then applied its economic power and expertise by taking the lead in the peacekeeping and reconstruction phase. Finally, by working closely throughout the whole process, "power and law" complementarity was built up. There was no question of the legitimacy of the use of force, nor of subsequent European intervention in the reconstruction and peacekeeping phase.

Kosovo – Problems had been simmering in Kosovo since the 1991 referendum for independence and the election of Ibrahim Rugova as Kosovo's shadow President. Serbia refused to recognise the referendum and Rugova's election. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed soon after to fight for Kosovo's independence. By February 1998, the violence had escalated into a full civil war with atrocities committed on both sides. A NATO-brokered ceasefire negotiated in October 1998, broke down in December. Another attempt by NATO to broker a peace settlement between the warring factions (the Ramboulliet talks) broke down on 19 March 1999 because Serbia was unwilling to accept the deployment of NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo.

By that time, NATO had learnt from the Bosnian debacle, that the timely application of force would be more effective in bringing about a satisfactory conclusion to the war, and alleviate human suffering. Broad consensus among the United States and its NATO allies were reached on the use of force in Kosovo even though the use of force was not expressly mandated by the UN.[29] NATO countries nevertheless felt their actions justified as they were intervening to prevent another massacre by Serbian troops. On 24 March 1999, NATO began an intensive bombing campaign against Serbian military targets in Kosovo. Continued Serbian intransigence led NATO to widen the air campaign to include political, military and infrastructure targets inside Serbia. By 9 June, Serbia capitulated and signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo. The pullout began the next day and NATO announced the suspension of airstrikes. NATO

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[29] Ivo H Daalder, Emerging Answers – Kosovo, NATO and the Use of Force, Brookings Institution Review, Summer 1999. UNSC resolution 1199 calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for Serbian withdrawal did not specifically authorise the use of force.

then deployed KFOR on 12 June 1999 to keep the peace in Kosovo pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244. The bulk of the 50,000-strong KFOR are European, while the US provided 7000 troops.[30]

By 2003, KFOR's current strength has been reduced to 30,000 troops. According to Janes Defence Weekly, this number could be halved by the end of 2003.[31] The bulk of KFOR's strength continues to come from European countries. The reconstruction effort in Kosovo is headed by the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and EU nationals have been in charge of UNMIK since its formation in 1999. The EU also provides the bulk of financial aid to Kosovo totalling some €350 million annually.[32] As with Bosnia, UNMIK's mission is to maintain law and order, revive the economy, rebuild infrastructure and institutions, and promote democratisation. In addition, UNMIK is tasked with facilitating a political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.[33]

Like Bosnia, the Kosovo episode demonstrates how United States-European complementarity has succeeded to bring about peace, and to rebuild a ravaged land. Through close consultation among allies, NATO reached a consensus on the application of military force. The key players were President Clinton, Secretary Albright and NATO Secretary General Solana. Clinton consciously gave Solana leeway in order to strengthen his authority to build a consensus among the European allies.[34] Working together, they

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[30] KFOR: The Task Ahead, BBC Report 13 June 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/363314.stm
[31] KFOR Strength Could Be Halved This Year, Janes Defence Weekly, 27 January 2003, http://www.janes.com/defence/land_forces/news/jdw/jdw030127_1_n.shtml
[32] EU website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm
[33] UNMIK website, http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm
[34] Ryan C Hendrickson, NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis, Journal of International Relations and Development September 2002

managed to get the required consensus for the use of force in Kosovo. The consensus on

the use of force is all the more remarkable when we recall that there was no explicit UN

Security Council resolution authorising the use of force. Instead, Allied consensus led to

the creation of a new doctrine – humanitarian intervention – to legitimise the use of force

in the absence of a UN resolution. [35] In this regard, Kosovo differed from Iraq because of

the urgent need to intervene in Kosovo to prevent another Srebenica. The same sense of

urgency did not exist among the NATO allies for intervention in Iraq. In the military

phase, the United States led the military operation, with active European participation

which included France and Germany. In fact, Germany went so far as to risk the

downfall of its government to participate in the military strikes on Kosovo – the first

offensive missions undertaken by the German military since the end of World War Two.

The successful application of force brought the Serbs to the negotiating table. A UN

Security Council Resolution was negotiated authorising a UN peacekeeping and

reconstruction mission. After the Serbian withdrawal agreement was concluded, NATO

deployed troops to keep and enforce the peace. In addition, the EU took the lead and

embarked on reconstruction. All three aspects of complementarity can be seen. First,

"interpersonal complementarity" in consulting allies, not being overbearing, treating them

as equals leads to the required consensus being formed. Second, working closely with

Europe allows "power and law complementarity" to be built up to help legitimise the use

of force even though there was no UN authorization. Third, "supplemental

complementarity" is demonstrated by each party contributing their strengths to the

successful execution of the military and reconstruction phase.

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[35] Speech by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on Humanitarian Intervention, 20 September 2002

<u>Middle East Peace Process</u> – Finding an acceptable solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a major challenge, but one that could potentially reap big dividends given that it is inextricably linked with the problem of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. The problem defies traditional logic given that the starting points of both sides are not entirely rational, and are based on historical and religious claims. For the people of Israel, Palestine is seen as the promised land given by God to his chosen people. The promised land is all the more precious given the persecutions, pogroms, and the Holocaust which the Jewish people had to suffer before they were finally allowed to reclaim their God-given right. For the Palestinian people, who had settled the land in the interregnum between the scattering of the Jewish people and 1948, Palestine is their home. In addition to that, Jerusalem is the site of the Dome of the Rock, which is one of the holiest shrines in the Islamic world. They resent deeply the occupation of Palestine by the Israelis, and their goal is to drive the occupiers out of their homeland. On the other hand, the parties of the religious right in Israel call for a reversion to Israel's biblical borders. There can be no peace so long as both sides deny the other's right to exist. To outsiders looking in, finding a solution which recognises both sides' right to exist appears to be the crux of the matter. But a solution is not easy to achieve given the emotion-charged rhetoric surrounding the issues, and the seemingly unending cycle of violence and revenge.

The United States has waded into this quagmire and has tried to bring the parties towards a lasting peace. Hopes were high after the historic Camp David talks of 1978 when the Israel-Egyptian peace treaty, mediated by the United States, was signed.

However, each time Israel and the Palestinians appeared to be coming close to some form of accommodation, the fragile consensus is shattered by extremist violence – even to the point of assassination of key leaders. Furthermore, despite its best efforts, the United States is perceived as too closely linked to Israel to play the honest broker. In more extremist quarters, the United States with its strong pro-Jewish lobby, is considered to be part of the problem.

Europe, on the other hand is perceived as being more pro-Arab. As such, its involvement in the process can have a moderating influence on the Palestinian and Arab positions. Although the Middle East Road Map launched on 30 April 2003 by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia and the UN) is thought to have been derailed by escalating violence on both sides, the impetus behind the Road Map can be attributed to EU intervention to the extent of persuading the United States to focus on the Middle East problem despite its preoccupation with Iraq. The EU also had a role in the drafting of the Road Map to ensure that it was not too skewed to any particular party. As the largest non-military aid donor to the Middle East Peace Process (about $180 million per year has been given to support the Palestinian Authority, and bilateral aid of more than $630 million annually has been given to the four countries directly neighbouring Israel.[36]), the EU would also have a major role in implementation of the Road Map, which envisaged the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Despite the apparent failure of the Middle East Road Map, any future plans for Middle East peace would require active EU participation.

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[36] Facts and figures from EU website:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/index.htm

On a wider, regional level, the EU is also well-placed to support political and economic stability in the Middle East. Military security is just one part of the problem. If the countries of the Middle East can be persuaded to see real benefit in cooperating with each other, they may be persuaded to turn from violence and to concentrate their efforts on economic development and competition. This is the thinking behind President Bush's offer to conclude Free Trade Agreements with Middle Eastern countries announced in June 2003. The EU has the capability and expertise to support American policy by helping to develop functioning market economies in the region. A positive side-effect of economic revitalisation is that it could help undercut the appeal of Islamic radicals in the region, thus helping to deprive terrorist networks of a source of recruits. In acknowledging the importance of United States-EU complementarity, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, in a speech on 12 November 2003, acknowledged the potential for Transatlantic coordination and cooperation in all these areas.[37]

The model for Transatlantic complementarity could also be applied to the more complex situation in the Middle East. Let me emphasise at the outset that this is not a simple recipe for a solution to the Middle East problem. A solution to the Middle East conflict will be extremely difficult to find given the depth of feeling on the various issues, but the chances of finding one will be enhanced if both the United States and Europe consult with each other, coordinate their actions, bring pressure to bear on the respective

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[37] US-Europe Face Four Policy Challenges in the Greater Middle East, speech by US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns, 12 November 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/

parties, and support the peace process through development assistance, financial aid and economic incentives. In the first place, both the United States and Europe should apply good "interpersonal complementarity" among themselves to consult and coordinate their efforts closely so that a framework for peace in the region can be agreed upon. Second, by recognising that their actions in the Middle East supplement each other, they could coordinate their activities to complement each others' activities. The United States could put pressure on Israel, while Europe pressures the Palestinians. Europe at the same time provides aid to the Palestinians to build up their infrastructure and their law and order capabilities. Both the United States and Europe can also apply their economic power to help stimulate economic progress and prosperity. Such moves would support the United States plan for a Middle East Free Trade Area, and help underpin peace efforts. "Power and law" complementarity is not relevant in the Middle East Peace Process since there is no issue about the use of American force.

Afghanistan – Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the NATO Treaty declaring that an attack on one was an attack on them all. Shortly thereafter, the United States identified Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda as the mastermind behind the attacks. Bin Laden was sheltered by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, from where he coordinated global terrorist operations. When the Taliban failed to extradite Bin Laden to face charges, American and British forces commenced an air and special forces campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Given the need to act swiftly, the US decided to act largely on its own. Nevertheless, in a demonstration of allied unity, NATO allies (including France,

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada) pledged ships, fighters and special forces units which fought alongside American forces in the campaign.

Following the swift victory over the Taliban regime, European countries have now taken the lead in keeping the peace and rebuilding the country. Germany hosted the December 2001 Bonn Conference which laid down the framework for a future representative Afghan government. At the International Donors' Conference held in Tokyo in January 2002, out of a total of $4.5 billion pledged, the largest proportion – $2.1 billion – came from EU countries.[38] NATO – in its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area - took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan on 11 August 2003. NATO also supplies the vast majority of the peacekeeping troops – over 90%.[39] Within this European framework, the Germans have emerged as the leading nation. Within the total EU aid pledge of $2.1 billion, Germany provides the largest total – over $270 million. A German general is in command of ISAF, Germany has 2500 troops on the ground, the largest contingent in the 5500-man force. Germany has taken the lead in building up an Afghan Police force. It is also taking the lead in providing health care and education to the Afghan people.

Once again, Afghanistan demonstrates how complementarity applies to the Transatlantic relationship. In the first place, given that this was a clear attack on the United States with devastating consequences and with clear evidence pointing towards

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[38] Michael Bohnet, Ralf M Mohs, Annette Kaiser, <u>Reconstruction of a Devastated Land – Germany's Contribution to Rebuilding Afghanistan, German Institute for International Development,</u>
http://www.dse.de/zeitschr/de502-6.htm
[39] NATO website, www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm

Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan, there was no question of allied support. NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter demonstrating their solid support for the United States. In this case, a different "interpersonal complementarity" dynamic applied. The United States was not asking for allied agreement to act militarily. Instead, Europe expressed sympathy for the United States and expressed its support for military action without the need for the United States to ask for it. "Power and law" complementarity between the United States and Europe was less important in this instance. The case for military action was clear. There was no need to legitimise the use of force. During the military phase, America played the lead role, but NATO allies also contributed special forces troops and aircraft to fight alongside their American allies. "Supplemental" complementarity is most evident in the reconstruction phase, where active European engagement provide expertise and vital financial resources for Afghan reconstruction. Furthermore, NATO's peacekeeping role frees up US forces for continuing combat operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda elements still in the country. Allied engagement also frees up US forces for potential deployment in other parts of the world.

Iraq – The episodes above demonstrate the complementarity of the Transatlantic relationship. Reference can also be made to the first Gulf War to strengthen the argument even further. "Power and law" complementarity was less important to legitimise the use of force since Iraq clearly violated the UN Charter by invading Kuwait. The case for the use of force in this instance was clear. Through the process of "interpersonal complementarity", the United States built up a broad international coalition to fight Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War. "Supplemental

complementarity" was demonstrated when substantial allied financial contributions (mainly from Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States) meant that the United States only had to bear 12% of the $61 billion cost of that war.[40] In addition, France and Britain deployed substantial numbers of combat troops which fought alongside US forces to drive Saddam out of Kuwait. Allied troops from 32 nations formed 24% of the total number of troops deployed in the campaign.

In contrast, "interpersonal complementarity" also applied during the run up to the second Iraq war, but the results were different. The case for war in Iraq was not so clear. Iraq had not invaded a neighbour, it had not committed gross human rights violations, the threat from its weapons of mass destruction program did not appear to be imminent. Thus some European countries were not convinced of the need for war. The United States' overbearing attitude towards Europe prompted these European countries to adopt an opposing stance. In this case, where countries are not convinced of the need to use force, is it fair to label them obstructive? They have their own independence of action, their own domestic constituencies to answer to as well. Furthermore, France had cooperated with the United States in all previous military operations since the first Gulf War. By labelling France obstructionist and trying to force it to take a path which it was not convinced was the right one, the United States must share some of the blame for pushing France into adopting a policy of opposition to the United States. The split within the Atlantic alliance meant that "power and law" complementarity to legitimise the use of force was not forthcoming. This in turn meant that the United States had to provide the vast majority of the troops, plus bear the full cost of that war – estimated at between $40-

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[40] Conduct of the First Gulf War, Final Report to Congress by the Dept of Defense, April 1992

60 billion for 2003, with the cost of the continuing military occupation averaging $4 billion a month.[41] Given the high cost of the war, President Bush recently had to ask Congress for an additional $74.7 billion for Iraq. The mounting cost of the war will also take its toll on the economy, with the US deficit rising to an estimated $401 billion this year.[42]

The stark realisation of the high costs of going into Iraq alone has dawned on the Bush administration. In August 2003, President Bush decided to ask the UN for help in reconstructing Iraq. In seeking a UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, the US had to accommodate France, Germany and Russia by agreeing to a timetable for handing power over to an Iraqi administration by 15 December 2003, and by allowing a greater role for the UN in Iraqi reconstruction. Resolution 1511 was passed on 16 October 2003, and by 24 October 2003, at an International Donors' Conference for Iraq, EU countries as a whole pledged contributions totalling €750 million for Iraqi reconstruction for 2004.[43] The conference brought together 73 countries and 20 international organisations, and a total of $33 billion until 2007 was pledged to support the political, economic and social reconstruction of Iraq.[44] In addition, Britain, Germany and France have also offered to help train Iraqi police.[45] The administration policy reversal from unilateralism to more

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[41] Cost of Iraq War and its Aftermath could top 100 billion, IHT Report, 22 March 2003. Pentagon: Iraq War Cost now $48 billion, AP report, 16 July 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,92029,00.html
[42] A Tally of the US Taxpayer's Tab on Iraq, Christian Science Monitor, 25 August 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0825/p16s01-coop.html
[43] Must we Help Reconstruct Iraq?, Article by EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, 23 October 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/artiraq_en.htm
[44] Conclusions of the Chair, International Donors Conference on the Reconstruction of Iraq, 24 October 2003. http://www.comisionadoiraq.org/donors/comun/discursos/summary%20final_ing.pdf
[45] British Volunteers Sought to Train Iraqis, The Guardian, 22 September 2003, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1046839,00.html. Germany won't send Troops, but may train Police, Deutsche Welle report, 8 September 2003, http://www.dw-

reliance on its European partners also paves the way for possible NATO involvement in Iraq. The Bush administration has begun to float suggestions in this direction.[46] The message to the administration is clear. The United States cannot act alone. It requires the help of its European allies to supplement and legitimise its actions.

These case studies demonstrate the three facets of Transatlantic complementarity. "Interpersonal complementarity" means that the United States must take care how it treats its European allies – "treat your friends like allies, and they will behave like allies". If the United States consults, coordinates and respects their views, then they are more likely to respond positively. On the other hand, the second Iraq war shows that if the United States acts in an arrogant, overbearing manner, it is likely to elicit opposition. The type of behaviour elicited by "interpersonal complementarity" would have implications for allied cooperation in other areas. A positive response means that "power and law" complementarity to legitimise military action will be more forthcoming. Kosovo showed that legitimacy for the use of force could also extend to a situation where there is no UN authorisation. Contrast this with the second Iraq war where a split within the Atlantic alliance did not allow for the use of force to be legitimised. Finally, the cases above also demonstrate that the United States and Europe are complementary in the "supplemental" sense. Together they can achieve more than if they tried to act unilaterally. While the US leads in the military phase, Europe leads in the reconstruction and peacekeeping phase. Both also contribute financially to an operation, and the United

world.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_965820_1_A,00.html, France Willing to Help Train Police, USA Today, 18 September 2003

[46] Speech on Expanding NATO's Mission to NATO's Parliamentary Assembly by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, 11 November 2003, http://www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/Nov1103GrossmanNATO.html

States would not be able to achieve as much without Europe's assistance. European money and expertise help in vital post war reconstruction. European peacekeepers in the Balkans and in Afghanistan free up American forces for operations elsewhere. While not as "glamorous" as the military phase of operations (read: not commanding prime time news slots), Europe provides a vital contribution toward the successful achievement of United States and western foreign policy objectives.

NATO and ESDP

In some of the cases above, NATO emerged as the cornerstone – the main vehicle for coordinating and mobilising Transatlantic cooperation. NATO provided the forum for the United States and Europe to agree upon a course of action, and ultimately implement it. NATO airstrikes and peacekeeping forces brought the Bosnian and Kosovo wars to an end. NATO provides peacekeepers for Afghanistan to free up American forces to conduct combat operations. However, the EU has embarked on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which some fear might threaten NATO's relevance and lead to a decoupling of the Transatlantic relationship. It would be relevant at this point to trace the development of the ESDP to see if it could threaten the cohesion of the Transatlantic relationship.

Following the Balkan wars, impetus built up for Europe to develop its defence capabilities through the ESDP. In 1998, French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair declared that ESDP should also have the capacity for "autonomous"

action. By the end of 1999, Europe agreed to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 men that would be ready by 2003 to perform the Petersberg tasks – mainly peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian relief missions.

As the ESDP gained momentum, the United States – which had since the 1950s pressed for greater European responsibility for providing its own defence – started to fear that ESDP might lead to a de-emphasis on NATO, and a decoupling of the Atlantic alliance. These concerns led to the EU and NATO formal establishment of relations in January 2001, and the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP in December 2002. This declaration was strengthened by the conclusion of the "Berlin-Plus" package in March 2003 which clarified the relationship between the EU and NATO to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources between NATO and the ESDP, and to emphasise a "NATO first" policy. Berlin-Plus also provided that EU would have access to NATO operational planning resources, NATO capabilities and common assets, European command options for EU-led NATO operations, and the adaptation of the NATO defence planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations.

Unfortunately, the split within the EU, and between some EU countries and the United States over Iraq threatened EU-NATO cohesion. Following the United States' attack on Iraq, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 announced an intention to create a separate EU military headquarters at Tervuren, Belgium, which would allow the EU to plan operations and deploy troops separate from NATO.   This development coupled with statements by French President Chirac to the effect that a

strong EU was needed to counterbalance the US in a multi-polar world order, led US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns to describe the Tervuren proposal as "one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship".[47]

Realising the potential danger to Transatlantic relations, EU leaders started to call for both sides to work towards healing the Transatlantic rift. By November 2003, the rift appears to have healed. NATO has taken over the ISAF mission in Afghanistan with a German general in command. NATO has handed over peacekeeping operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the EU. NATO also supports the Polish –led multinational division in Iraq. On 21 November 2003, NATO launched its new Response Force bringing together French paratroopers, Spanish marines, Turkish special forces, German attack aircraft and US troops.[48] On the Tevruven issue, Germany appears to have backed down on the proposal to have a separate EU military headquarters independent of NATO,[49] and at the latest Anglo-French Summit, British Prime Minister Blair voiced his support for NATO while agreeing that the EU should have the power to act where NATO was not engaged – i.e. a "NATO-first" approach.[50] Italy, Spain and Poland also opposed the plans for a separate EU military headquarters which was independent of NATO.[51] With several EU countries supporting the primacy of NATO's role, the French gambit to set up a separate EU military headquarters independent of

[47] NATO News, 17 October 2003, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/10/s031017.htm
[48] NATO's New Strike Force on Display in War Games, IHT report, 21 November 2003
[49] Germany Backs Down on EU Military HQ, Deutsche Welle report, 14 November 2003
[50] Blair and Chirac Defend EU Force, BBC Report, 24 November 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3231820.stm
[51] UK States Case against Separate Base for EU, IHT report, 22 October 2003. Also see NATO News, 17 October 2003, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/10/s031017.htm

NATO appears to be dead. Instead, ESDP is more likely to develop in a manner to complement NATO.

The NATO-ESDP episode demonstrates another important facet of the Transatlantic relationship. Within Europe, there is a core of countries that are strongly Atlanticist in outlook, and they will act as a stabilising force to ensure that Transatlantic differences don't spin out of control. General Klaus Naumann, a German general and former Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee of NATO, put it more starkly at a talk in Boston University on 11 November 2003. He said that because of dynamics within the EU, those who tried to rally the EU against the United States would fail. Furthermore, Henry Kissinger in his book "Does America Need a Foreign Policy" thinks it is "nonsensical" to argue that a separate EU force would decouple the Transatlantic relationship. The use of such a force would have to be approved by all EU members. Given these mechanics, and the fact that ESDP would have to rely on NATO logistical assets, it is unlikely that any future European force would be used in situations which go against American and NATO interests. Instead, ESDP, and its use in support of American and NATO operations would enhance the EU's claim towards a more equal partnership.

These developments demonstrate the importance of NATO as an instrument for enhancing Transatlantic cohesion. While governments bickered across the Atlantic, NATO officials noted that they had seen it all before and buckled down to heal the rift.[52] Berlin-Plus was revived to ensure that the ESDP would develop in cooperation with, and

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[52] Former US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, talk at Tufts University, 7 October 2003.

not in competition with NATO. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo kept the Transatlantic relationship alive, and plans for a NATO Response Force continued unabated.

In fact, at the present time, NATO appears to be the only Transatlantic institution which brings together all three aspects of Transatlantic complementarity. First, through the North Atlantic Council and NATO Summits, NATO helps promote positive "interpersonal complementarity" dynamics among the various partners. It also provides a forum for partners to reach consensus on a particular course of action. Second, through its consensus building mechanisms, NATO provides a forum for partners to agree on the legitimate use of force – "power and law" complementarity. Finally, in actually planning, coordinating and executing the mission, NATO is the vehicle for "supplemental" complementarity.

Anchoring the Transatlantic Relationship

Although NATO has done a good job thus far in anchoring the Transatlantic relationship, the second Iraq War shows that more needs to be done. In the last 10 years, the EU has become more integrated. Its Common Foreign and Security Policy – though it still has flaws, is much better coordinated now. It also has a "Foreign Minister" – the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU has also started to play a more active role on the world stage and it is developing its own

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This growing EU role means that a gap is developing in NATO, which does not include the EU in its formal structures.

Although the EU-United States Summit is a process which tries to improve Transatlantic coordination, it tends to get bogged down with the minutiae of the relationship and does not look at issues on the grand strategic level.[53] It is also an incomplete vehicle for Transatlantic coordination because it does not include NATO.

Therefore, the idea suggested by Henry Kissinger in his book <u>Does America Need a Foreign Policy</u>, and Alan K Henrikson in his paper to the Greek EU Presidency, <u>A Structural Approach to Transatlantic Unity</u>, calling for an Atlantic Steering Group that would include the United States, the EU and NATO makes eminent sense. The actual mechanics of the Atlantic Steering Group, its institutional structure, the frequency of meetings and number of representatives should be worked out by the professionals in the field. However, the important point to note is that it should be a regular process – meeting at the Summit and Foreign Ministers' level once or twice a year. It should include all the key partners in the Transatlantic relationship, including the NATO Secretary General, the EU Presidency, and the EU's High Representative for CFSP. It should be conducive to promoting discussions on the grand strategic level. Therefore, the meeting should not be too large. The professionals would have to work out the technical details like whether all the individual EU and NATO member states should be included in the meeting, whether only EU members currently serving on the UN Security Council

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[53] Alan K Henrikson, <u>A Structural Approach to Transatlantic Unity</u>, paper contributed to the Greek EU Presidency, http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2635/

should be included, or whether it would be sufficient to limit it to a small group comprising the United States, the EU Presidency, the High Representative and the NATO Secretary General.

Whatever the professionals decide, the point to be kept uppermost in mind is that the Atlantic Steering Group should promote good "interpersonal complementarity" dynamics among the Transatlantic allies. It should therefore promote free and frank discussions on objectives, priorities, and strategy. Potential problem areas should be discussed and consensus should be reached on the course of action to be taken. Once consensus is reached, actual implementation can be delegated to either one, some or all of the partners – the United States, all or some of the EU countries and NATO. Implementation will involve "power and law" complementarity – to legitimise use of force or intervention, and "supplemental" complementarity – pooling of resources or division of labour for joint action.

Summing Up

Throughout this survey, I have tried to demonstrate that the Transatlantic relationship is complementary, and that the maintenance of this complementary relationship is important for the maintenance of global peace and stability. Indeed, as status quo powers, it is in the national interests of both the United States and Europe to work together to perpetuate the present world order.

Many writers have spoken about the complementarity of Transatlantic relations, but as far as I am aware, none have analysed the concept in detail. In doing so, this paper demonstrates that Transatlantic complementarity is made up of three inter-related concepts:

- Good "interpersonal complementarity" is required – "treat your friends like allies, and they will behave like allies";

- "Power and law" complementarity shows that the United States and Europe can work together to deter or redress breaches of international law through the legitimate use of force; and

- Having agreed on a course of action, through "supplemental" complementarity, the United States and Europe can bring their resources and special strengths to bear to restore order.

Studying some key situations since the end of the Cold War – Bosnia, Kosovo, the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan and Iraq – has shown the validity of the three facets of complementarity above. In fact, of the three, perhaps the most important is the first "interpersonal complementarity". If good relations can be promoted, and consensus reached, then it is more likely that the other forms of complementarity will flow naturally. This could even extend to legitimising the use of force where no UN mandate exists (eg Kosovo). On the other hand, the second Iraq war shows that if an overbearing

attitude is taken where partners are unsure if the proposed action is justified, this is likely to provoke opposition. While the United States can declare its right to act freely and independently of the UN and its allies, the second Iraq War shows that such an approach would ultimately be detrimental to United States interests. Thus complementarity is hard-nosed realism. The best way for the United States to promote its interests is to work with its Transatlantic allies.

Given the importance of promoting good "interpersonal complementarity" and the current gap in Transatlantic institutions, this paper supports the ideas of Henry Kissinger and Alan K Henrikson to establish an Atlantic Steering Group to bring together all the key players in the Transatlantic relationship – the United States, the EU Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP and the NATO Secretary General.

Through all this, it is hoped that the great dream of President John F Kennedy can be realised:

"We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations."

John F Kennedy, Independence Hall Speech, Philadelphia, 4 July 1962

A Wider Principle of Complementarity?

"No nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations." - Dwight D. Eisenhower

It is often said that the United States needs allies around the world. This is not just empty talk. It is a real necessity. The United States cannot be everywhere at once. The Pentagon has built up the military capacity to fight two wars simultaneously. But can the economy sustain such an enormous drain on resources?

Can America protect all its global interests by itself? The burden would be eased if the United States could work with regional partners with similar interests. It has often been said that the United States is a status quo power. It is in its interest to preserve the current global order. Many countries also have a stake in preserving the status quo. Such countries are potential partners and allies. Japan, Australia, India and ASEAN come to mind.

Naturally, each relationship will differ in substance from the Transatlantic one. Some countries will be more dependent on the United States than others. However, for these relationships to work, the United States must recognise the level of complementarity that each country brings to the relationship. Good "interpersonal complementarity" is required to maximise the level of cooperation from its allies. Once

good relations are developed, other forms of complementarity can come into play to help the United States achieve its objectives. To be overbearing and to adopt a unilateralist policy would be self-defeating. It is only when the United States can build a global network of regional allies that its best interests can be served.

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