

**GLOBAL TRENDS IN DEMOBILIZING
GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS**
LEBANESE HIZBALLAH, FMLN IN EL SALVADOR, AND THE
SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT, 1989-2009

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the methods by which guerilla organizations are demobilized and converted into political parties through inclusion in post-conflict political processes. With the use of three case studies of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Sudanese People's Liberation Army / Movement (SPLM/A), and Lebanese Hizballah, this paper examines these movements on a spectrum from most to least successfully converted into mainstream political organizations. In order to do so this paper considers participation in democratic elections, along with the completeness of disarmament. Secondly, this paper assesses the role of the United Nations in establishing peace agreements in such conflicts, and its ability to enforce the criteria for political inclusiveness called for in the negotiated peace settlements. Finally, this paper discusses possibilities for future disarmament of political-guerilla organizations by examining the case of Hizballah.

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RESEARCH QUESTION

This paper sets out to examine the processes by which guerilla movements are demobilized and integrated into national political processes by transitioning to legitimate political parties in some countries. It specifically asks how violent groups accommodate political motives and go about the process of integrating themselves into the political system. Secondly, this paper addresses the role of the United Nations in brokering peace agreements and facilitating the emergence of peaceful parties into their respective political system systems. Finally, this paper looks at the status of current political integrations of paramilitary groups and the possibility of future disarmament by active guerilla organizations with political establishments, such as Hizballah in Lebanon.

In order to answer these questions, this paper is divided into three cases studies positioned on a spectrum of demobilization: the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, which provides the paramount example of successful demobilization and political incorporation of a guerilla movement into the political system with the facilitation of the United Nations as the main broker and enforcer of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army / Movement (SPLM/A) provides an intermediate example, with a 2005 peace agreement having brought to an end two decades of civil war and established a United Nations force in Sudan to uphold the agreement. In Sudan, the post-conflict process of political inclusion of the SPLM will not be complete until questions of national determination are addressed with a referendum for southern Sudanese independence currently planned for 2011. Finally, Lebanese Hizballah provides a third example of a robust guerilla movement that also manages to function as a mainstream and nationally legitimate political party in Lebanon with no signs of military demobilization, despite the presence of UN troops in the country since 1978.

OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

Contrary to public perception driven by headlines and images splashed across television news, global political violence has actually declined in the past twenty years. Outbreaks of war and internal fighting garner a great deal of media attention, while existing conflicts are oftentimes quietly settled.¹ Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a decline in both the number of wars between and within states. One of the key causes has been the end of colonialism, which had contributed to the outbreak of 60% to 100% of wars occurring in any given year from 1950 to 1980.² With colonialism's demise and the end of the Cold War, two of the major drivers of international conflict disappeared.³

However, the repercussions of colonialism continue to contribute to present-day conflicts. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), fight against the dominance of the Muslim Arab north over the largely Christian black African south that the movement represents. The ethnic and religious partition of the country is a product of the colonial period, during which Sudan's British administration did not want the Christian south to be influenced by its Muslim neighbors, and thus promoted its isolation.⁴ Modern tensions in Sudan arise in many respects from a historical domination of Arabs over blacks and a lingering perception of "otherness" of by each group.

¹ Human Security Report Project at the Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia., *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, Oxford University Press,[2005]], <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63> (accessed 31 March 2010).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Mohamed Abdel Rahim M. Salih, ed., *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance* (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2003), 102.

Similarly, Hizballah in Lebanon sees itself as fighting against an artificial partition, as it battles what it views to be the illegitimately established state of Israel, put in place by European interests. In reality, the modern borders of Lebanon and neighboring states were established in the same drawn out process of colonial wrangling between the British and French colonial administrations that led to the founding of Israel.⁵ Of course, the ethnic question in the instance of Lebanon is more complex, as many of the Israeli “occupiers” Hizballah fights against come from families that had emigrated from outside the Middle East. Yet these two conflicts—along with the larger Palestinian question—are among the final battles of colonialism being waged in the twenty-first century.

The end of the Cold War brought to an end the approximately one-third of post-World War II conflicts that had been given by its geopolitics, including the proxy wars instigated and supported by both sides in the developing world.⁶ In El Salvador the end of the Cold War was one of the driving factors that compelled the Salvadoran government to enter into negotiations with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), ending a twelve year internal struggle by a coalition of guerilla organizations against state repression, and to overthrow the military dictatorship then in power.⁷ With no further need to wage proxy wars against the Soviet Union, the United States threatened to cut off military assistance to the Salvadoran government,⁸ while the Soviet Union’s demise undercut

⁵ David Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace : The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, N.Y: H. Holt, 2009), 571.

⁶ Human Security Report Project at the Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia., *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, 148.

⁷ Margarita S. Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords* (Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Washington 20036): U.S. Institute of Peace,[2001]).

⁸ Ibid.

credibility for the communist model and in the Communist and Marxist ideological foundations of the factions making up the FMLN.⁹

Another important transformation since the end of World War II has been a global rise in the number of democracies, from 20 worldwide in 1946 to 88 by 2005.¹⁰ Historically, democracies have been less likely to fight against each other, decreasing the likelihood of war. Furthermore, there has been a rise in the influence of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) since its founding in the aftermath of World War II. Such institutions help reduce the incidence of conflict by promoting the interdependence between governments in the international system, and by promoting standards of global conduct that can hold nations accountable for their conduct in the outbreak of conflict and promote the use of international organizations as mediators in the settling of disputes.¹¹

However, the ability of international organizations to prevent conflict in practice rather than theory has been frequently put in doubt. The UN in particular has received a great deal of criticism for its questionable ability to actually carry the process of holding countries responsible for their actions, and to enforce punishments without being held hostage to political considerations. The inability of the international community to prevent the United States from going to war in Iraq in 2003 despite little international support seems to lend credence to this supposition.

⁹ Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer, *Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas : Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1995), xv, 197.

¹⁰ Human Security Report Project at the Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia., *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, 148.

¹¹ Ibid.

In spite of these failings, the one manner in which the UN has excelled has been its role as a mediator in the settling of conflicts. In El Salvador, the UN-brokered a peace settlement between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN ended the civil war and disarmed the leftist militias making up the FMLN. Due in large part to the UN and its lead in structuring the peace process, the FMLN has been completely demobilized and is today one of the two largest parties in El Salvador, from which the current president Mauricio Funes was elected in 2009. Funes, a civilian, was never a guerilla fighter, and since its demobilization the FMLN is regarded as having become a completely peaceable movement.¹²

In Sudan the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 ended the Second Sudanese Civil War and established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to ensure the upholding of the peace and political integration of the SPLM.¹³ Thus far, the SPLM remains the governing party of the semi-autonomous southern Sudan, the president of which also holds the office of the Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan. The south will settle the question of its independence with a referendum scheduled for 2011. However, low levels of development and infrastructure in the south that are likely to hinder development of a functioning government are complicated further by ongoing political unrest and ethnic clashes. Outbreak of local violence along with skirmishes between the

¹² Jeremy McDermott, "El Salvador Election: Former Guerrilla Party FMLN Wins Presidency," *The Telegraph* 16 March 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/elsalvador/5000831/El-Salvador-election-Former-guerilla-party-FMLN-wins-presidency.html>.

¹³ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1590 (2005)," http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1590%282005%29/page_1 (accessed 1 April 2010, 2010).

southern militias and the Sudanese government killed at least 2,500 and displaced 350,000 people in southern Sudan in 2009.¹⁴

Finally, in Lebanon, Hizballah has not been significantly disarmed or demobilized despite UN presence in the country in the form of UNIFIL (United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon) since 1978. The case of Hizballah provides a provocative counterfactual to the idea that a radical paramilitary force must be demobilized before it can join and prove effective in the mainstream political process. Hizballah offers an example of how a guerilla organization can function at once both militarily, pledging to protect the Lebanese Shi'a from Israeli aggression and to remove Israeli troops from the Shab'a farms, and politically, leading the opposition coalition in the Lebanese National Assembly while providing social services for impoverished Lebanese Shi'a, despite an internationally condemned history of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks, and a charter that continues to espouse violence.¹⁵

The reluctance of the international community to accept Hizballah as a legitimate political party within Lebanon comes from this terrorist legacy and its ongoing military operations, linked to Syria and Iran, targeting Israel, along with its past activities targeting foreign troops in Lebanon and Jewish interests abroad.¹⁶ Hizballah, however, has notably managed to accomplish many of its short term goals—widespread support within Lebanon, active political participation, and defeating Israel in the 2006 war—while representing a

¹⁴ "Swapping Guns for Peace in Southern Sudan," *BBC News* 1 April 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8589704.stm> (accessed 2 April 2010)., Stephane Mayoux, "Southern Sudan, a Country in Waiting?" *BBC News* 3 March 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/worldagenda/2010/03/100303_juba.shtml (accessed 2 April 2010).

¹⁵ "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 48 (Fall 1988), www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf.

¹⁶ Augustus R. Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 42, 71.

historically marginalized community in Lebanon without any help or recognition by the most powerful international actors.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Understanding the conditions under which guerilla organizations develop aspirations to operate within the existing political system—even if they aim to re-make that system in the process—and the methods by which they carry out these political aims requires an examination of the extant scholarship on the theories and processes that explain the outcomes of political integrations during and after internal conflict and civil war. There are many opportunities to explore the role of international organizations as mediators and upholders of peace agreements meant to guide political integrations, and the objective of this paper is to build upon past analyses of these processes and the literature on demobilization of terrorist movements and the transfer of former insurgents into the political process.

The diverse literature on ending insurgencies and transfers from civil war to democracy emphasize the importance of electoral institutions and fair participation in government by which to widen the inclusiveness of the political sphere and contribute to the establishment of stability. The literature assessing the role of the United Nations in these demobilizations often look to prominent cases such as the FMLN to explain the processes by which this demobilization is accomplished. Scholars seek to understand why the UN is able to function well in ending some conflicts while remaining at the margins in others. They draw on historical examples to explain why some insurgencies are conducive to negotiated settlements with the help of international organizations, and why some are unlikely to benefit from outside “interference” and can only end through a lengthy organic process of internal political wrangling.

Audrey Kurth Cronin examines the closing phases of terrorist campaigns in order to develop the intellectual framework by which to explain commonalities, recurrent patterns, and key characteristics leading to their demise. In order to do so, Cronin analyzes the record of terrorist organizations within a broad historical and political context to develop a framework by which to understand how such groups can be brought to an end. This includes examining the lengths of terrorist campaigns, and studying how targeting a group's leadership may affect its eventual end. Cronin importantly addresses how negotiations can lead to bringing terrorist organizations and their struggles to a close.¹⁷ In further study, the author examines specifically how these models may be used to address al-Qaeda.¹⁸

In her many works on the subject Martha Crenshaw addresses the underlying causes and processes of terrorism, as well as the evolution of its historical understanding by scholars. She asks if terrorism can be distinguished from other forms of political violence, examines how to explain such extreme manifestation of political violence, and assesses a variety of different approaches by which to explain terrorist behavior, including from strategic, organizational, and psychological perspectives. Most importantly for the analysis carried out by this paper, Crenshaw also addresses how terrorist campaigns end, drawing on organizational and psychological explanations that help analysts understand how and why such movements are brought to a close. She specifically examines how governments can contribute to the demise of terrorist movements, the consequences of such policies, and if is possible for governments to intervene in terrorist movements effectively.¹⁹

¹⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends : Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), xvi, 311.

¹⁸ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006), 7-48, <http://muse.jhu.edu/> (accessed 4 April 2010).

¹⁹ Martha Crenshaw, *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, 1st ed. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in*

Daniel Byman and Marianne Heiberg (along with collaborators Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman) address the methods by which protracted conflicts are brought to an end. While Heiberg looks directly at terrorism and insurgency specifically, Byman discusses how lasting solutions to ethnic conflicts can be established and held in place applied to internal conflicts more generally. He looks at the strategies governments can employ to end violent ethnic conflict in the long term in order to prevent the re-ignition of violence. The five key strategies that Byman identifies are coercing groups and leaders, elite co-optation, changing group identities, implementing power-sharing plans, and the portioning of states.²⁰ Heiberg and her collaborators take a series of case studies across a spectrum of types of insurgency to construct a comparative analysis that provides concrete examples by which to best understand how protracted conflicts involving terrorist organizations can be brought to an end.²¹

The most significant works on the FMLN in El Salvador often examine the organization in comparison to other Latin American paramilitary organizations, such as the Shining Path of Peru in the work on the FMLN's structure, history, and political integration by Cynthia McClintock.²² Mario Lungo and Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte contribute to the field of scholarship by studying the FMLN in depth to understand the movement in the context of

Context (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), xvi, 633., Martha Crenshaw and Irving Louis Horowitz, eds., *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power : The Consequences of Political Violence : Essays*, 1st ed. (Middletown, Conn; Scranton, Pa: Wesleyan University Press; Distributed by Harper & Row, 1983), x, 162.

²⁰ Daniel Byman, *Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2002).

²¹ Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary and John Tirman, eds., *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), viii, 499.

²² Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America : El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), xix, 492.

the dictatorial and oppressive political environment of El Salvador in the 1980s. As a counterinsurgency force seeking revolution against the harshly repressive government, Lungo and his co-author Arthur Schmidt provide historical and cultural insight into the evolution of the FMLN, while Bracamonte adds the additional element of the end of the Cold War and the Salvadoran Civil War's status as one of the Cold War's final proxy battles.²³ Tricia Juhn discusses the functions of the UN-brokered peace settlement between the Salvadoran military dictatorship and the FMLN in ending the war,²⁴ while Margarita Studemeister in her United States Institute of Peace study focuses specially on the minutiae of the United Nations in its role as implementer of the peace accords.²⁵

On the SPLM, a body of work comes from practitioners who have developed on-the-ground experience in southern Sudan as aid workers and employees of non-governmental and international institutions during the civil war period and since the development of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Øystein Rolandsen, an advisor to Norwegian People's Aid, focuses on the political changes within Sudan during the 1990s that led to the ending of the civil war and signing of the CPA. He also addresses the possibility of southern independence, which was initially rejected by SPLM leader John Garang, a committed unionist who died in a plane crash six months after the signing of the CPA. Rolandsen also looks at the impact of these political changes on the stability of Sudan

²³ Mario Lungo and Arthur Schmidt, eds., *El Salvador in the Eighties: Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, trans. Amelia F. Shogan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), vi, 240., Moroni Bracamonte and Spencer, *Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts*, xv, 197.

²⁴ Tricia Juhn, *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire England; New York, N.Y: MacMillan Press; St. Martin's Press, 1998), xviii, 208.

²⁵ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 62.

and especially its volatile south, and the referendum called for by the CPA by which to settle this question.²⁶

M.A. Mohamed Salih is a leading Sudanese scholar on post-conflict Sudan and its prospects for stability following the full implementation of the CPA. Salih emphasizes the role of ethnicity and religion to address the question of minority rights specifically in relation to north-south and Muslim-Christian tensions in Sudan.²⁷ This ethnic and religious divide was exacerbated by the British colonialist administration which pitted the two groups against each other and subjugated the Muslim north at the expense of the Christian south, enforcing the imaginary divide beneath them that would eventually do much to dehumanize each group in the eyes of the other in the context of decades-long civil war; translating into a driver of ethnic conflict.

A great deal has been written on Hizballah since its establishment as a rag-tag guerilla force in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Since then, it has evolved into a military, social, and political organization with an international reach, circumventing sanctions to receive funding and support from Iran and Syria.²⁸ Its military might has grown into a major “resistance force” strong enough to outmaneuver the Israeli army in the 2006 Lebanon war. Yet most incredibly, Hizballah has managed to simultaneously become an active player in the mainstream Lebanese political system since 1992, the year it first

²⁶ Oystein Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government : Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitute, 2005), 201.

²⁷ Salih, *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance*, xiii, 372., Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M. (Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics* (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2001), 234.

²⁸ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, vi, 187.

participated and won seats in democratic elections widely judged to be free and fair.²⁹ Since then, it has grown to dominate the opposition bloc in the National Assembly elections of 2009, and is regarded within Lebanon and in countries sympathetic to its cause as a legitimate political actor, in spite of its ongoing military activities and international condemnation for its past terrorist activities and violent rhetoric. Its domestic support is derived from its seeming lack of corruption and the services it provides for the historically marginalized Lebanese Shi'a community.³⁰

Judith Palmer Harik examines the evolution of Hizballah's political ambitions within this context, in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Accord that brought it to a close but did not succeed in demobilizing Hizballah, despite its call to disarm militias within Lebanon.³¹ Brent Talbot discusses potential strategies for the eventual disarmament of Hizballah; though he concedes such an action in the near future is extremely unlikely due to Hizballah's continued political support, and the lack of will in the Lebanese government to undertake such a drastic and largely unpopular action. Talbot judges the UNIFIL contingent in Lebanon to be a lethargic and ineffective force which contributes to internal problems and corruption within Lebanon, rather than to any possibility of securing Hizballah's disarmament.³²

²⁹ Barry M. Rubin, ed., *Revolutionaries and Reformers : Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), xi, 231.

³⁰ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 171.

³¹ Judith P. Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), x, 241.

³² Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, "Disarming Hezbollah," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (2008), 29-53, <http://muse.jhu.edu/> (accessed 14 January 2010).

For further exploration, additional comparative studies of guerilla movements and their disarmament and political integration are recommended. The Provisional Irish Republican Army presents an equally interesting case study in assessing the causes and processes of disarmament. Tim Pat Coogan provides an overview and background of the broader conflict,³³ while Ed Moloney describes the delicate process of establishing a cease-fire to end the fight to unify Ireland, despite being contrary to the Provisional IRA's constitution. Moloney's study focuses on the political party associated with the Provisional IRA, Sinn Fein, and on the actions of its leader Gerry Adams in securing this settlement.³⁴ Finally, Jonathan Stevenson points out differences and likenesses in the Provisional IRA and Hizballah, drawing on examples from each to discuss Hizballah's future as a political organization.³⁵

³³ Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles : Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace* (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996), xv, 472 p., [16].

³⁴ Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), xxi, 600 p., [16].

³⁵ Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, "Disarming Hezbollah: Advancing Regional Stability," The Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65921/steven-simon-and-jonathan-stevenson/disarming-hezbollah> (accessed 4 April 2010).

I. FROM GUERRILLA MOVEMENT TO POLITICAL PARTY: THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR

INTRODUCTION

The civil war of 1980-1992 devastated El Salvador, leaving 75,000 dead and 8,000 disappeared at the hands of the United States-backed Salvadoran military and death squads.³⁶ Fighting against the Salvadoran state was the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which began in 1980 as an umbrella movement of left-wing guerilla organizations combating state repression and inequality,³⁷ employing often-violent means in order to do so. Following the end of the civil war in 1992, all units of the FMLN were demobilized and re-shaped into an internally legitimate and internationally accepted political party. The party assumed power for the first time in the presidential election of 2009 with the elevation of FMLN leader Mauricio Funes to the presidency.³⁸

This chapter will discuss the role played by the FMLN in ending the civil war and will explore the process by which demobilization was achieved in El Salvador through a negotiated peace settlement backed by the United States and implemented by the United Nations with civil-military relations as its cornerstone, leading to the acceptance of the

³⁶ Blake Schmidt and Elisabeth Malkin, "Leftist Party Wins Salvadoran Vote," *The New York Times*, March 16, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/world/americas/17salvador.html?ref=americas> (accessed 16 December 2009).

³⁷ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 15.

³⁸ McDermott, *El Salvador Election: Former Guerrilla Party FMLN Wins Presidency*

FMLN as a legitimate political party.³⁹ It will also examine El Salvador's current prospects for stability and regional integration under the leadership of the FMLN.

BACKGROUND OF THE FMLN

The FMLN officially coalesced in 1980 as a revolutionary guerilla movement composed of five left-wing organizations.⁴⁰ Unlike the Shining Path of Peru, the FMLN did not possess a high level of organization or a rigid hierarchy. It was simply a coalition of guerilla organizations that maintained its own leaders, internal practices, and ideologies while possessing similar leftist underpinnings. A goal of the FMLN was to reach a consensus among the heads of the five groups despite a lack of common leadership. The ideologies of each group within the FMLN were forged during the 1970s when former members of the pro-Soviet Communist Party and the center-left Christian Democratic Party became involved in the intense ideological debates then consuming the National University of El Salvador in San Salvador.⁴¹ The Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS)—the only significant Marxist group in the country—came to be one of the most important components of the FMLN after forming electoral coalitions with the Christian Democratic Party in 1972 and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in 1977. Former PCS leader Cayetano Carpio founded in 1970 the Popular Forces for Liberation (FPL)—another faction of the FMLN—which set about working more intensely than other Salvadoran groups to recruit workers and peasants.⁴²

In addition, activists who had left the PCS and other leftist groups formed “El Grupo”

³⁹ Juhn, *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War*, 4.

⁴⁰ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties: Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 15.

⁴¹ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 48.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 48-50.

in order to undertake an electoral approach to social change. By 1972 this group had turned into the FMLN faction Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP), which carried out bombings in pursuit of its goals. In contrast to the FPL, the ERP was led by middle class youth who had broken away from the Christian Democratic Party. According to George Washington University Professor of International Affairs Cynthia McClintock, the ERP's leaders had not developed a clear ideological position at the time of the ERP's establishment; for the most part, in the words of a high-ranking defector from the FPL, "the ERP was a day-to-day movement that thought little about ideological things," and were not Marxist-Leninists in practice.⁴³ The FMLN is popularly regarded as having a Marxist or Communist orientation, but the groups within it clearly subscribed to different stripes of leftism.

During the FMLN's formative period in the 1970s, the Salvadoran economy performed well, especially for the middle classes, and despite increasing land scarcity there were no clear signs of poverty increasing or food shortages.⁴⁴ Such a scenario indicates that economic hardships were not the drivers of leftist organization or guerilla activity. At the same time, grassroots organizations attempting to resist repression and to meet the basic needs of the Salvadoran people sprang up throughout the country, which, according to Universidad Centroamericana of San Salvador Professor Mario Lungo Uclés "coalesced into mass popular organizations that affiliated with one of the five political-military groups," and proved crucial for the organizations of a popular revolutionary guerilla movement in El Salvador.⁴⁵ Pastoral practices influenced by liberation theology played a role in the

⁴³ Ibid., 50.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁵ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 15.

popularity of the FMLN in the Salvadoran countryside, leading to a wave of popular mobilization.⁴⁶

The FMLN was the strongest guerilla movement ever to emerge in Latin America on the basis of quantifiable indicators of military strength, but had probably been closest to achieving a successful revolutionary takeover several years before it had reached its zenith militarily. The emergence of the insurgency took place from 1970 to 1981,⁴⁷ while the period of greatest threat from the FMLN was from 1979 to 1982, though its guerilla arm continued to menace Salvadoran society until 1992.⁴⁸ McClintock explains that in Latin America, “revolutionary movements have triumphed in part because of their capacity to challenge the regime militarily, and in part because of the demoralization of the regime’s army and leadership.”⁴⁹ In El Salvador, poverty and inequality exacerbated that demoralization, with military dictators failing to employ legitimate use of power from their rise to power in the 1930s to the military coup of 1979.⁵⁰ Throughout the 1970s, the Salvadoran regime greeted widespread social mobilization with repressive brutality rather than compromise, complicating a lack of political development and economic diversification

⁴⁶ Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds., *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 186.

⁴⁷ Yvon Grenier, *The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador : Ideology and Political Will* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), 31.

⁴⁸ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America : El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁵⁰ Grenier, *The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador : Ideology and Political Will*, 1,13.

that offered Salvadoran society with few possibilities other than a revolutionary guerilla movement.⁵¹

Foreign involvement was crucial in the evolution of the insurgency and the response of the Salvadoran armed forces during the civil war. The FMLN received backing from various leftist factions including, “literally every guerilla faction in Latin America, with the exception of Peru’s Shining Path,”⁵² while the United States propped up the Salvadoran regime through its support of the armed forces. Since 1981, the US military assistance had prevented the defeat of the Salvadoran army. There is near-unanimous agreement among scholars of the conflict and political leaders in power at the time that American aid to the Salvadoran government prevented a takeover by the FMLN.⁵³

At the same time, Cuba and Nicaragua funneled weapons, money, and provided training to the FMLN as the PLO and Basque ETA offered advice. Lesser amounts of aid were provided by Vietnam, the Soviet Union, various Eastern bloc states and leftist African regimes including Ethiopia, Angola, and Algeria. The myriad sources and extreme volume of matériel and support to the FMLN made it impossible for the government to crack down on its influx or to reduce the flow of aid.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, American involvement prevented El Salvador from embarking on a revolutionary trajectory of the kind that had occurred in Cuba, though the FMLN’s revolutionary organization was by most accounts stronger than Fidel Castro’s pre-1959 organization. An increase in the American role in El Salvador

⁵¹ Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 179.

⁵² Grenier, *The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador : Ideology and Political Will*, 7.

⁵³ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America : El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 9.

⁵⁴ Grenier, *The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador : Ideology and Political Will*, 7.

contributed to the election of a Christian Democratic president, causing reduction in support for the FMLN, especially among the Salvadoran middle class. At the same time, continuing human rights violations in El Salvador made support for the regime controversial in the United States.⁵⁵

ENDING THE CIVIL WAR

The largest-ever offensive by the FMLN occurred in November 1989. The FMLN had found it more difficult to procure Western-made weapons and had re-armed itself with Soviet-produced weapons, which it used to attack the government forces occupying the neighborhoods around San Salvador. This offensive came to be regarded as a military failure for the FMLN but allowed it to gain political points internationally, leading most notably to a decline in US public support for the Salvadoran government due to the brutality of the regime's actions.⁵⁶ The reduction in support within the US population became especially acute when the Salvadoran Army brutally massacred six Jesuit priests, bringing attention to the conflict and worldwide condemnation.⁵⁷ The offensive made evident the necessity of a negotiated settlement to end El Salvador's protracted civil war, as the Salvadoran military had been unable to defeat the rebels while the FMLN was unable to overthrow the Salvadoran military dictatorship, ending in a stalemate.

Other factors, including the end of the Cold War, and a threat by the United States to cut off military assistance to El Salvador, forced the warring factions to consider

⁵⁵ McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America : El Salvador's FMLN & Peru's Shining Path*, 12.

⁵⁶ Grenier, *The Emergence of Insurgency in El Salvador : Ideology and Political Will*, 33-34.

⁵⁷ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 7.

negotiations.⁵⁸ The Cold War's end meant the loss of credibility for the Communist model and undermined the ideological foundation of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement.⁵⁹ The fall of the Soviet Union affected the Salvadoran government as well, as US policy to El Salvador lost its military focus. During Reagan's presidency the United States had given large sums of money to El Salvador to fight what the US viewed as a communist-led insurgency, but George H. W. Bush's election in 1988 led to a reduction in aid to the Salvadoran military. Bush threatened to cut off aid entirely following the murders of the Jesuit priests, and began to place emphasis on finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict.⁶⁰

However, according to Tricia Juhn, the main instigator of political change was the decision by the oligarchic elites to pursue negotiations to end the war, particularly in light of the fact that then-President Cristiani had the option to continue or escalate the fighting. Juhn calls the Salvadoran elites "the filter that transformed even the most global external changes, such as the disintegration of the Cold War, into instruments for forcing military extrication in El Salvador and, subsequently, peace."⁶¹ The decision to negotiate the end of the war was made possible only by the fragile state of Salvadoran democracy at the time when Cristiani assumed office. The new president endeavored strengthen democracy by reshaping political institutions. Furthermore, Cristiani was compelled to pursue an end to the violence due to his close allegiance with the entrepreneurial class who sought political

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Moroni Bracamonte and Spencer, *Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas : Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts*, xv, 197.

⁶⁰ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 52.

⁶¹ Juhn, *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador : Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War*, 10.

and economic stability to improve the business climate. He had been educated in the United States and had a great deal of familiarity with the US, endearing him to American diplomats. Cristiani had also made an early pact with ARENA founder Roberto D'Aubuisson, shielding him to some measure from the extreme right.⁶²

The Chapultepec Peace Accords signed in Mexico City in 1992 officially ended the conflict. The implementation of the peace accords drastically changed political life in El Salvador and, according to Juhn, represents the most successful negotiated end to an internal conflict since the end of the Cold War. Chapultepec was significant not only because it brought an end to a bloody civil war, but also because it laid the foundations for El Salvador's integration into the modern international political economy and for the FMLN to transition into a legitimate political party. As Juhn writes, "The key to a negotiated political solution hinged on redefining the role of the military in relation to civil society."⁶³ However, the major share of political sacrifice detailed in the agreement at Chapultepec was borne by the military, which saw its influence in politics sharply curtailed. Additionally, while during the war the FMLN fought under the banner of communism, the agreement at Chapultepec did not include a single economic reform. The agreement set out to end the war, but in order to do so had to extensively address the reform civil-military relations.⁶⁴

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS

The United Nations-sponsored peace talks ending the civil war proved to be among the most successful examples of a negotiated peace settlement in UN history, and were

⁶² Ibid., 10-11.

⁶³ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 9.

integral to the successful demobilization of the FMLN.⁶⁵ International pressure had been vital in advancing the negotiations for peace, but it weakened after 1992.⁶⁶ Twenty months of negotiations resulted in significant achievements, including constitutional reforms and persuasion of the oligarchy to participate in competitive politics. The UN-monitored ceasefire was critical to the demobilization of forces on both sides, and allowed the peace process to begin, initiating “a transition from war to peace and profoundly transformed political life in El Salvador.”⁶⁷ The UN facilitated peace building in El Salvador by implementing the peace accords, undertaking a process of institution-building, and mediating crises that arose during the peace process. Its role in El Salvador was guided by adherence to impartiality and a desire to enforce the peace accords so as to prevent a relapse of violence.⁶⁸

Implementation of the peace accords was vital in bringing former FMLN fighters into mainstream Salvadoran society. The accords also formed a new national civilian police force and an intelligence force separate from the military. Human rights measures were established along with electoral and judicial reforms, and some economic programs, including transfer of farmland, benefited members of the demobilized militias and war-ravaged communities.⁶⁹ The accords succeeded in accomplishing their main goals of demilitarizing Salvadoran life and opening up the country’s political system.⁷⁰ However,

⁶⁵ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 5,47.

⁶⁶ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 27.

⁶⁷ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 5, 47.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 27.

peace building is a long-term process that requires a great deal of commitment, working in conjunction with international financial agencies and donors and building a sustainable civil society, whose role is not dictated by the United Nations.⁷¹ This process is ongoing and requires continuing adherence to the goals of the peace accords to remain effective and beneficial to Salvadoran society.

Successful military reform was the most crucial aspects of building peace in El Salvador and the transition of the FMLN to a political party. From the beginning of negotiations, the absorption of the FMLN by the Salvadoran army was regarded as untenable. Instead, three measures for the dissolution of the armed forces were agreed upon, including a reduction of forces, constitutional reforms re-defining the role of the military, and removal of those from the armed forces who had committed the most egregious human rights abuses.⁷²

Achieving civilian control of the military and institution of the rule of law in El Salvador were absolutely vital to the establishment and maintenance of peace. Specifically, the size of the army was decreased while its role was restricted to national defense. Between January 1992 and February 1993 the armed forces reduced from 63,175 members to about 30,000. Some units including public security and intelligence were de-mobilized and reestablished as civilian controlled agencies.⁷³ The Salvadoran government eventually purged high-ranking members of the military while an amnesty law favored by both sides of the conflict exempted all those responsible for extrajudicial crimes during the war. Finally,

⁷¹ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 51.

⁷² Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 27.

⁷³ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 5,27.

El Salvador adopted a modern police doctrine focusing on the protection of citizens' rights and police's crime-fighting ability.⁷⁴

Land reform benefiting former combatants and inhabitants of war-torn communities was carried out concurrently with restructuring of the military as a dual goal of the peace accords. The reform program redistributed approximately 10% of agricultural land to 47,500 people, with preference given to former combatants from both sides and those living in contested areas combined with loans to the agricultural sector. This plan was criticized for excluding non-governmental organizations affiliated with the opposition from participating, but this was done in part due to a perception that the FMLN would try to exploit the reallocation funds for their political benefit.⁷⁵ Additionally, "reinsertion" programs were instituted to reintroduce former combatants to civilian life, but were met with uneven progress due to a lack of defined goals, available jobs, and economic instability. Despite their partial success, the economic support for ex-combatants provided by these programs in the period of demobilization and immediately thereafter contributed significantly to the political stability that was necessary for implementation of the peace accords.⁷⁶

During the civil war the lack of political control over the security forces contributed to serious violations of human rights and large-scale corruption in the management of resources, leading some public officials to concentrate on the pursuit of profit rather than efficiency and performance. As the war came to an end, the political repression in the security forces led to the creation of criminal gangs who were willing to engage both in

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

common and politically motivated crimes. Public security reform was therefore a crucial concession the government had to make to the FMLN in exchange for their demobilization. The FMLN was very much aware of risk of losing its leverage by agreeing to a cease-fire and demobilization before the Salvadoran government began to fulfill its obligations under the peace accords by implementing public security reforms. To prevent this, the FMLN turned to the UN to compensate for the power imbalances occurring between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN in the demobilization period.⁷⁷

The main goal of the peace accords was to guide the transition to a democratic political regime: the FMLN would renounce violence and pursue its agenda as political party in competitive elections, with some former FMLN guerilla fighters going on to join the new civilian police force. Meanwhile, the government would continue to pursue its reform of the judicial, military, and electoral institutions that make competition possible.⁷⁸ However, lessons drawn from disarmament following other conflicts show that the demobilization process must be intelligently managed in order to prevent post-conflict violence and crime. Major failings in this regard took place in El Salvador, as incomplete and poorly designed demobilization of the guerilla forces and the army left many former combatants displaced and unemployed, leading to a rise in public insecurity and crime.⁷⁹ The peace agreement has largely been incomplete, as although it was largely implemented by 1995, its provisions were never carried out uniformly.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 188.

⁷⁹ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 5.

⁸⁰ Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 189.

CONVERSION OF THE FMLN TO A POLITICAL PARTY

On December 15, 1992 the UN certified that the FMLN had turned in all of its weapons and demobilized adequately to register as a political party. Six months later, the peace accords were violated when a hidden FMLN arms cache exploded in Managua, Nicaragua. The UN undertook further investigation and found 11 other weapons deposits in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. These failures hurt the FMLN's credibility, as the acceptance of responsibility for the arms deposits by the FMLN "was a crucial moment in peace-building, marking its serious commitment, and acceptance of the political course mandated in the peace accords."⁸¹ Despite this setback, Elisabeth Jean Wood calls the FMLN's transition from a guerilla army to a political party "surprisingly effective".⁸² The FMLN's successful conversion to a political party and electoral reform as required by the accords have led to never before seen levels of political pluralism, competition in the political process, free and fair elections, and resurrection of political debate and civil society.⁸³

El Salvador is a very unusual case because its transition to democracy was forged from below. According to Wood, the outcome of capitalist democracy in El Salvador "is an instance of the classic democratic bargain in which both parties gain something valued by their adherents: Insurgent forces achieve political inclusion and agree to politics by democratic means, while economic elites protect their control of assets through constitutional provisions that [...] diminish any prospects for widespread nationalizations

⁸¹ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 29.

⁸² Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 191.

⁸³ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 5.

even if the erstwhile insurgents came to power through elections.”⁸⁴ At the same time, new issues arisen in politics included partisanship, party fragmentation, and the creation of a few new smaller parties.⁸⁵ A special commission of the Legislative Assembly enacted a new electoral code in 1993. Reforms created the Supreme Electoral Court to replace the Central Election Council, along with a special body to ensure the impartiality of this new institution. Irregularities within these reforms gave way to another set of electoral reforms including national voter registration.⁸⁶

A Truth Commission for El Salvador has been an important step in the process of national reconciliation, but has not been without controversy. The Truth Commission was a temporary body assigned for a six month period that led to the establishment of one permanent internal successor established in 1993, the Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal Armed Groups. The organization was charged with the investigation of death-squads of the kind that had existed during the civil war. It implicated virtually the entire High Command of the Salvadoran Armed Forces in the slaughter of the six Jesuit priests, their cook, and her daughter. The report issued on March 15, 1993 included specific findings on 32 notorious cases from the war and attributed the vast majority of the violations to the Salvadoran state and its agents, though it did find the FMLN responsible for serious crimes as well. The Truth Commission included a scathing indictment of the Salvadoran judiciary, explaining that without serious judicial reform attempts to prosecute crimes in the present system would be counterproductive, and called for the removal from public office of many officers and civilians found responsible for abuses. Despite these findings, implementation

⁸⁴ Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 188.

⁸⁵ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 5.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

of the wide-ranging recommendations of the international truth commission has been slow.⁸⁷

AFTERMATH OF THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

The political transition in El Salvador allowed previously unrepresented groups to become politically empowered and de-legitimized violence as a means to resolve political conflict.⁸⁸ At the time of the signing of the peace accords, decision-makers looked ahead to the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections set to take place in 1994 “as a significant instrument of the country’s postwar political normalization.”⁸⁹ The 1994 elections were El Salvador’s first inclusive elections. Political competition has increased over time, and the FMLN has gradually gained more acceptance as a political party.⁹⁰ By cooperating with the Democratic Convergence party (CD) and supporting Ruben Zamora as president, the FMLN was able to gain recognition as a legitimate political party, despite a sometimes “uncertain and confused” approach to politics.⁹¹ The 1994 election was judged to be a huge victory for ARENA, which came away with 49.3% and 68% of the vote in the first and second rounds, respectively. However, the FMLN gained 21 seats in the legislature and was generally thought to be the second largest political force in El Salvador, where it remains today.⁹²

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 29.

⁹⁰ Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 179.

⁹¹ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 29.

⁹² Ibid., 29-30

However, significant problems remain in leveling the Salvadoran political playing field and increasing the enfranchisement of voters. Measures undertaken to open up the political system and broaden its base of support have achieved varying levels of success. Human rights have notably improved, but judicial reform and land transfers to former combatants and disenfranchised people have been slow and incomplete.⁹³ New electoral rules have failed to engage the citizenry, and voter absenteeism remains above 50%. Modernization of justice and prison systems is still needed to complement the reform of the police force.⁹⁴

Most distressingly, a rise in criminal activity has taken place since the end of the war, due in part to the inability of the state to provide support or training for the large numbers of former soldiers and guerilla fighters.⁹⁵ Following the war, many organized gangs appeared in the cities and countryside, and became the chief source of public insecurity. Gino Costa, former political advisor to the chief of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, believes future reform processes must include the development of criminal investigation capacity to disband organized gangs. As private arms also contributed to post-war instability, Costa also recommends a strategy for decommissioning weapons, especially war weapons, held by private citizens after a conflict. He recommends programs similar to those that have been used in Haiti and Nicaragua, which resulted in economic benefits for those handing in weapons.⁹⁶

⁹³ Ibid., 29

⁹⁴ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 24,30.

⁹⁵ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 29.

⁹⁶ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 24.

El Salvador has had a difficult time gaining a level of trust among the people specifically in regard to societal institutions, and consensus about the general path of a country and its future.⁹⁷ Since the Truth Commissions report there have been no prosecutions, moral or material reparations, or official efforts to determine the fate or whereabouts of the “disappeared.” Nor has there been any official acceptance of responsibility for atrocities committed during the war. “The Truth Commission’s recommendations to promote national reconciliation were ‘largely ignored,’” without insistence from Salvadoran society or great emphasis by the United Nations.⁹⁸ The vast majority of people wronged in the war have never had a chance to obtain truth or justice “that could serve as a foundation for forgiveness and reconciliation.”⁹⁹

In the short-term, following de-militarization of public security, help is needed from multilateral banks, bilateral aid agencies, and other international groups that can assist civilians in strengthening their understanding of criminal threats and ways of tackling them, analyzing the performance of security forces, and learning how the forces are administered. A coherent development policy that gains the consent of the governed and is based on consensus among political parties does not yet exist. Additional programs that support the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life as part of a national development plan ought to also be established, as political instability comes in large part from the unaddressed social and economic needs of former combatants and war-ravaged communities. Programs must have clearly defined goals from the onset, along with measures of effectiveness. The international community can contribute to this process by

⁹⁷ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 30.

⁹⁸ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 12.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

providing technical advisors and instructors, along with political and diplomatic support to countries, which are undergoing demilitarization of the public security apparatus.¹⁰⁰

The advancement of Salvadoran ability to establish and uphold rule of law is an essential long-term process that could not be implemented solely by the peace treaty. Additionally, broad reconciliation based on truth and justice is still needed, and is more important than reconciliation of the country's political elite in persuading the population to trust the political system.¹⁰¹ In 2009 the Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes was elected from the FMLN, elevating the party's stature to the highest office in the land. Funes' election marked the country's first peaceful turnover of power since independence in 1821.¹⁰² The FMLN's 2009 victory adds it to the growing list of Latin American countries that have elected leftist governments since the rise to power of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998. According to *The New York Times*, "In part, the left's success is a response to disappointment with the failure of free-market policies promoted by Washington in the 1990s to generate economic growth and reduce the region's yawning inequality."¹⁰³ Funes differs from previous leaders of the FMLN because he is its first leader to have never been a guerilla, and is thus removed from its insurgent past.¹⁰⁴ In addition Funes has taken steps to distance the party from its Marxist heritage, pledging to govern from the center.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Forrest D. Colburn, "The Turnover in El Salvador," *The Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 3 (July 2009, 2009), 143-144.

¹⁰³ Schmidt and Malkin, *Leftist Party Wins Salvadoran Vote*

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ McDermott, *El Salvador Election: Former Guerrilla Party FMLN Wins Presidency*

CONCLUSION

The political transition in El Salvador allowed previously unrepresented groups to become politically empowered, and de-legitimized violence as a means to resolve political conflict.¹⁰⁶ The peace process has implications for other countries in Latin America suffering from many of the same pressures, including political repression, poverty, and active guerilla insurgencies, such as in Colombia. Yet four majors challenges remain for democracy in El Salvador, including low and declining rates of voter participation, institutional weaknesses such as an extremely cumbersome process of registering to vote that undermine the value of democracy as perceived by ordinary people, extremely high rates of non-political violent crime, and acute poverty and social exclusion.¹⁰⁷ The future of El Salvador will in large part depend on the ability of popular movements to organize groups that can address the needs of the people while building civil society, especially in light of a history of severe social inequality.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 27.

¹⁰⁷ Hagopian and Mainwaring, *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America : Advances and Setbacks*, 194.

¹⁰⁸ Lungo and Schmidt, *El Salvador in the Eighties : Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, 31.

II. AN INCOMPLETE PEACE: THE SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE

BACKGROUND: A LEGACY OF CIVIL WAR

Sudan spent the second half of the twentieth century embroiled in protracted civil war that ended in 2005, along with political, ethnic, and territorial conflicts that continue to present-day. Tension resulting from the economic, political, and social domination of the northern Arab Muslims centered around the capital Khartoum over the largely non-Arab and non-Muslim southern Sudanese provided a backdrop for the outbreak of the First Sudanese Civil War in 1956. The war continued until 1972, but broke out again in 1983.¹⁰⁹ The impetus for the civil war is usually regarded as the mutiny of southern soldiers in the Equatoria Corps resulting from their dissatisfaction with the decolonization process, though this followed several years of rebel activity.¹¹⁰

Since becoming the first independent sub-Saharan nation in 1956 when it gained independence from the UK and Egypt, Sudanese politics have been dominated by a succession of Islamic-oriented military regimes.¹¹¹ Indeed, Sudan has been unable to break

¹⁰⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA World Factbook: Sudan," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html> (accessed 14 March 2010).

¹¹⁰ Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government : Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s*, 24.

¹¹¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Sudan*, Ted Dagne, "Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement," *Congressional Research Service* (22 October 2009), www.crs.gov (accessed 15 March 2010).

a continuous cycle of democratic-to-military regimes.¹¹² Following independence and a period of self-determination, three democratic governments rose to power, each immediately succeeded by an authoritarian military regimes, which purported to improve the economic and political condition of the Sudanese people. According to Mohamed Salih, Professor of Politics of Development at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands, “in reality the situation always gets worse and a public uprising brings the regime down and replaces it with the same old politicians.”¹¹³ Neither type of regime seems to have learned from the lessons of the others, and neither democratic nor military regimes have so far been able to rid Sudan of many of its chronic problems.

Particularly during the interwar period, Sudanese democracy was hampered further by the retention of political institutions dating from before independence, which have had the effect of maintaining the status quo. In doing so the political elite have effectively harnessed political modernization to benefit a limited minority class without attention paid to the interests and aspirations of the population that might have created a more representative form of government.¹¹⁴ In addition, attempts at establishing Sudanese democracy have been marred by high rates of corruption and debilitating sectarianism. The 1958 parliamentary selection was the second parliamentary election in Sudan and the first since independence (the first was held in 1953 and was judged to have been largely peaceful, fair, and free by the Electoral commission) and resulted in the establishment of what at first appeared to be a stable political coalition but unraveled when rumors of

¹¹² Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M.(Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 77.

¹¹³ Salih, *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance*, 110.

¹¹⁴ Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M.(Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 77.

impending meddling by Nasserist Egypt caused the government in power to exclude one of the parties in favor of another.¹¹⁵

Mohamed Salih draws three lessons from Sudan's early experiments with democracy: the political elite allowed wrangling over office and prestige to override their elected responsibilities as they neglected pressing national issues, giving the public the impression that they were disorganized and cared little for public interests. Secondly, they simply created new political parties that "barely transcended the sectarianism of the political parties they rejected," and frequently retained allegiances to and dependence on the two main religious sects. Thirdly, the military was allowed to interfere in political rule, as the ruling Umma Party invited the military to take over in 1958, paving the way for another military coup in 1989 organized by the National Islamic Front.¹¹⁶

The first two lessons remain highly relevant today, as the SPLM engages in many of the same corrupt and self-enriching practices as Sudan's elected rulers in 1958. While officially a secular party, the SPLM's adherents are drawn from the southern Christian population, along with some supporters drawn from elsewhere in the country, including the religiously diverse and disputed Nuba Mountain region and Blue Nile state.¹¹⁷ However, the Christian character of the SPLM's electorate re-enforces the Christian/Muslim divide that has historically been the largest source of tension between the North and South, as the

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 87.

¹¹⁶ The 1958 transfer of power to the military is regarded as the first military coup; the second occurred in 1969 and was organized by Gaafar Nimeri, who became Sudan's fifth president. He was overthrown in another coup in 1985. Ibid., 86-88, 90, 92.

¹¹⁷ Peter Martell, "Will Sudan's Nuba Mountains be Left High and Dry?" BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8368189.stm> (accessed 20 March 2010, 24 November 2009).

south perceives itself as having been marginalized at the expense of the north and dominated by it.

President Gaafar Nimeri came to power in a 1969 military coup inspired by Nasser's Free Officers Movement, the Sudanese branch of which Nimeri was the leader within the Sudanese army. Nimeri achieved the greatest triumph of his rule with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, signed between the Sudanese government and the main southern rebel movement, *Anya Nya* (poisonous snake), also known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). This agreement bought peace to Sudan for the first time in decades and granted the south regional autonomy under a united Sudan.¹¹⁸

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SPLM/A

Nimeri moved away from Nasser-style secular socialism when he instituted Sharia law on a national scale in 1983. This widened the gulf between north and south and led to the outbreak of full-scale civil war in the south in reaction to the imposition of Islamic law upon a Christian population, and in response to Nimeri's decision to divide the south into three regions in contradiction to the Addis Ababa Agreement in order to enact a "divide and rule" policy.¹¹⁹ In response to these policies, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), were established, initially meant to represent the interests of all Sudanese people. According to Salih. It was this combination of "the South's division, the introduction throughout the country of the

¹¹⁸ Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M.(Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 91-92.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 91-92.

sharia, the renewed civil war, and growing economic problems” that eventually led to the demise of the Nimeri regime.¹²⁰

The Second Sudanese Civil War began with a mutiny in the southern town of Bor in 1983, when fighting broke out among officers who refused to accept the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the first civil war. Beginning in 1976, the Ethiopian Derg regime started to support the mutineers.¹²¹ During this period, rebel groups known collectively as *Anya Nya 2* rejected the deteriorating institutions set up by the Addis Ababa Agreement and became active particularly in the Upper Nile region and around the newly discovered oil fields.¹²²

Sudanese Army Colonel, and eventual Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A, John Garang, was sent from Khartoum to mediate between the rebels and the government. Instead, he ended up joining the mutineers and helped them organize the movement they named the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (or Movement). Likely in order to curry favor with the Marxist leader of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, the SPLM “published a quasi-Marxist manifesto allegedly to please Megistu.”¹²³

In Sudan, political turmoil and a renewed civil war continued from 1983 to 1991. The government of President Gaafar Nimeri was further hindered by the huge amounts of foreign debt owed by Sudan, which plunged the country into a deep economic crisis by 1985. Three major political parties gained ground in Sudan during the war period, including

¹²⁰ Ibid., 92.

¹²¹ Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government : Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s*, 25-26.

¹²² Ibid., 27.

¹²³ Ibid., 27.

the *Umma* led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Democratic Unionist Party, and the National Islamic Front headed by Hassan al-Turabi.¹²⁴ The violence of the Second Civil War and the famine that broke out as a result of it displaced more than four million people and caused—according to rebel estimates—more than two million deaths before it ended with a peace agreement in 2005.¹²⁵

SPLM/A had been Southern Sudan's main rebel organization beginning in the second Sudanese civil war of 1983 to 1994, although an attempted coup against its leader John Garang by three senior commanders had weakened it considerably in 1991.¹²⁶ Yet it is the 1994 National Convention of the SPLM/A that is regarded by most members as the movement's greatest achievement in the direction of improvement and reform. The convention brought together 516 delegates from the SPLM and other local groups to announce the birth of "New Sudan."¹²⁷ The National Convention was the major driver towards democratic reform and establishment of an extensive civil administration in areas under SPLM control.¹²⁸ As a result of the agreement, by the time of Garang's death the SPLM/A had achieved influence over southern political development that has "at the national level been matched only by the Government in Khartoum and its armed forces, and at the local level only by chiefs, who derive their power from the old system of 'indirect' rule established by the British during their colonial period."¹²⁹ Throughout this period, the

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹²⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Sudan*

¹²⁶ Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government : Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s*, 13.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

SPLM/A bolstered the political power of the South and led the rebellion against the government from its creation in 1983 until the signing of a final peace agreement in 2005.¹³⁰

INSTABILITY FROM SECTARIAN TENSIONS

Inter-communal conflicts in Sudan have long been exacerbated by ethnic differences between the two main groups: the largely Muslim Arabs centered around Khartoum, and the mostly Christian and animist black Africans of the south. The national fracture took on political significance starting with the period of British colonial administration, which cordoned off non-Muslim southern Sudan from the influence of the Arab Muslims in the north, leaving the south “economically and politically backward and unprepared for self-government.” Both regions were controlled by the British-run system of administration called the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which ruled both countries through a system of indirect colonial rule. In Sudan it sought to restrict the spread of Islam any influence by the northern Sudanese into the south, exacerbating existing differences between the regions.¹³¹

In modern times, ethnic divisions continue to be manipulated by the Sudanese political elite to sustain authoritarianism and delay the attainment and implementation of a peace agreement.¹³² Yet, as elsewhere on the continent, “ethnic divisions in contemporary Africa are largely imagined and encouraged by those who stand to gain from them, namely, the modern political elite whose egocentric struggle for state power has proved inimical to democracy of any kind,” hindering the institution of democracy in ethnically, religiously, and geographically diverse nations like Sudan.¹³³

¹³⁰ Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M.(Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 104.

¹³¹ Salih, *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance*, 102.

¹³² Ibid., 98

¹³³ Ibid., 98

In Sudan since independence, very few political parties have been ideologically based and rather dominant political parties have been drawn from specific ethnic or religious groups, often claiming a monopoly over their respective demographic constituencies. In practice, however, such sectarian politics means that the parties form a combination of autocracies that may give the appearance of multi-party democracy, but in fact do little else than enrich corrupt elected leaders at the expense of real democratic development.¹³⁴ As Mohammed Salih writes “while [the Sudanese political elite] gain credibility through the struggle for democracy, they simultaneously lose that same credibility by failing to heed democracy’s call for responsible governance.”¹³⁵ The SPLM/A, encompassing both a militia and political party meant to establish and democratic Sudan and to provide a democratic voice for the people of the south, has gradually become just another corrupt and authoritarian political party deaf to the aspirations of the people it supposedly represents.

Indeed, particularly since Garang’s 2005 death and the SPLM’s resulting disarray,¹³⁶ the party has ignored injustices by the Sudanese government and used Sudan’s ongoing sectarian issues to further its own political interests, most notably the eventual establishment of a southern Sudanese state. Such a state will essentially divide Sudan along ethnic and religious lines, and the SPLM claims that it will allow the southern Sudanese to throw off the yoke of oppression by their northern Muslim neighbors. However, such a state founded on sectarian lines is likely to remain fragile and subject to further confrontations

¹³⁴ Ibid., 98

¹³⁵ Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M. (Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 78.

¹³⁶ Jeffery Gettleman, "Africa's Forever Wars: Why the Continent's Conflicts Never End." *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars (accessed 19 March 2010).

with the Republic of Sudan, with him several significant outstanding territorial and security issues remain, and whose inhabitants the Southern Sudanese have come to view as adversaries from whom they should remain separate.

PROBLEMS OF THE SUDANESE STATE

In addition to civil war, major internal constraints and structural problems have sustained authoritarian regimes in Sudan and stifled the emergence of real democracy in the country. Authors Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed and Samia El Hadi El Nagar cite the inability of Sudan to partake in the three broad processes they see as having reshaped the global state structures over the last two centuries, including the development of bureaucracies to tax, regulate, and mobilize citizens in the service of state policy, an increase in political participation and legitimization of the state, and the “Westernization” of state structures and bureaucracy.¹³⁷ Ahmed and Nagar point out that because democratization is being introduced before the processes leading to the development of civil society, rule of law, and accountability have taken place, Sudan remains susceptible to authoritarian regimes. In addition, ethnic factors complicate the Sudanese landscape, as the political elite is adept at manipulating such differences to exacerbate divisions in society and sustain authoritarianism.¹³⁸

Like many resource-rich, politically weak nations, Sudan functions as a rentier state relying almost entirely on petroleum exports to sustain its economy. This is despite the fact that agriculture contributes a third of GDP and employs 80% of the Sudanese workforce.¹³⁹ Sudan’s emergence as a rentier state began in 1999 when Sudan became an exporter of oil,

¹³⁷ Salih, *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance*, 98.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 98

¹³⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Sudan*

and became stunningly economically successful until the second half of 2008, when the global financial crisis sharply curtailed Sudan's booming economy, registering more than 10% a year in 2006 and 2007.¹⁴⁰ According to Sudan scholar Abd al-Wahab Abdalla, since the death of SPLM leader John Garang in a 2005 airplane crash, "Southern Sudan has become an extreme rentier state with a bourgeois class wholly dependent on factional patronage which is eviscerating any emergent development and sending its money abroad."¹⁴¹ Since then, the SPLM's leaders have returned to the military radicalism that began the SPLM movement, as it pumps resources into an increasingly large military establishment.¹⁴² According to Abdalla, internal reform of the SPLM must be undertaken before a southern Sudanese state can be established so that such an entity does not become viewed by the SPLM leadership as a "license for continuing plunder."¹⁴³

External factors contributing to a democratic deficit in Sudan include a lack of accountability of leaders to the electorate, and lingering repercussions of the Cold War, during which many dictatorial African regimes were strengthened and sustained by superpowers acting in their own interests. Throughout the civil war period, the east-west Cold War rivalry was crucial in propping up destructive regimes across the continent, with Sudan being no exception. Complicating matters is that in many cases leaders feel accountable not to their electorate, but to international donors who largely fund Sudan's

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Social science research council, 20 June 2009.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

development in the vast areas beyond Khartoum where the influence of oil proceeds do not reach.¹⁴⁴

THE SPLM AND DARFUR

In February 2003 two rebels groups mounted a challenge against the National Congress Party (NCP), the governing party of Darfur and the ruling party of Sudan, in response to continued oppression of black Africans—who make up the majority of Darfuris—in favor of Arabs.¹⁴⁵ In Darfur the two principal rebels groups are the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These groups, which are derided by the Sudanese government as terrorist organizations, argue that the government has systematically discriminated against and targeted the Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur since the early 1990s, though the tensions between African-Muslim and Arab inhabitants of Darfur date back to the 1930s, with more recent tensions surfacing in the 1980s.¹⁴⁶ Since 2003, the conflict in Darfur has so far displaced nearly two million people and caused an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 deaths.¹⁴⁷

According to Sudan researcher Ted Dagne, “Most observers note that successive governments in Khartoum have long neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur, and have done little to prevent or contain attacks by Arab militias against non-Arabs in Darfur,” which in the past has led to non-Arab groups taking up arms against successive central governments in Khartoum, albeit unsuccessfully.¹⁴⁸ African-Arab clashes in the mid-1980s led to the creation of the Janjaweed, as the Sudanese government armed Arab militias in

¹⁴⁴ Salih, *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance*, 98.

¹⁴⁵ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 16.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 16

¹⁴⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Sudan*

¹⁴⁸ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 16.

order to prevent the African Darfuris from joining the SPLM/A-led rebellion against the central government. In response, the government increased its attack on Darfuri African tribes and on the Africans of the Nuba Mountains.¹⁴⁹



Darfur¹⁵⁰

The SPLM/A leadership reached out to Darfuris in the early 1990s, when Daoud Yahya Bolad, an SPLA commander and ethnic Fur, led a force into Darfur in 1991 in support to the Darfuris, who were being targeted by the government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militias. This operation allowed the African tribes to enjoy some measure of protection and allegiance with the SPLM-dominated south, but which led them to endure increased oppression and attacks by government forces, who were also fighting the SPLM/A insurrection.¹⁵¹

SPLA involvement in Darfur especially backfired when the 1991-1992 rebellion

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 19-21

¹⁵⁰ "What has Happened in Darfur?" SaveDarfur.com, <http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/primer> (accessed 24 March 2010).

¹⁵¹ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 19-21.

failed and the commander of the SPLA force decided to withdraw its troops, causing the limited protection by the SPLA that the Darfuris enjoyed to evaporate. Against the advice of SPLA leadership, Bolad attempted to negotiate directly with the National Islamic Front, the political organization whose National Congress Party has dominated Sudanese politics since the 1980s, believing he might make a deal with them in the interests of Darfuris. Instead, Bolad was captured, tortured, and executed, according to Sudanese sources.¹⁵²

Despite these setbacks, the SPLM has attempted to take an active role in addressing the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur, with limited success. The SPLM has attempted to send representatives to participate in each round of peace talks, though their impact is generally limited. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan and a former SPLA military leader, has suggested tactics for government negotiators, saying that “from our experience [negotiating the CPA], when the Government gave its mediators a looser mandate, the negotiations went better. If they had a freer mandate in Darfur, it would be a big step to bring peace.”¹⁵³

The Darfur conflict, with sporadic bursts of violence ongoing despite the signing of a truce in early 2010, has further destabilized Sudan in the aftermath of more than two decades of civil war. The lack of infrastructure in many areas and the reliance of most inhabitants on subsistence agriculture in the arid region means that much of the population remains even more impoverished than the rest of Sudan.¹⁵⁴ In January 2008 the joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force (UNAMID) replaced an under-funded and under-

¹⁵² Ibid., 19-21

¹⁵³ Mike Jobbins, "Africa Program: A Director's Forum with H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=152220 (accessed 20 March 2010, 4 November 2005).

¹⁵⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Sudan*

equipped African Union mission and has been in control of peacekeeping in Darfur. However, like the earlier force the UNAMID remains without the necessary resources to adequately protect the nearly three million internally displaced people in the region.¹⁵⁵ As of 2009, UNAMID was still struggling to stabilize the situation or stop the violence from flowing into neighboring Chad, which it proved unable to control.¹⁵⁶

REACHING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

Important obstacles to the establishment of a successful and functioning state are numerous and exist in spite of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which ended one of Africa's bloodiest and conflicts, and was meant to settle many of the issues between north and south. It granted the southern rebels autonomy for six years under the condition that a national referendum for independence be held at the end of that period, in 2011.¹⁵⁷ While largely establishing peace in a region that had not known it since at least the 1950s and beginning the process of converting the SPLM to a political party, the CPA did little to resolve many of the outstanding issues between north and south, instead calling for future resolutions to these problems.

The most significant issues addressed by the CPA include the establishment of a wealth-sharing agreement by which to split the proceeds from the nation's vast oil resources. Despite the fact that most of Sudan's oil is found in the south, the CPA sets out a complex scheme by which revenue is to be shared throughout the country, making it one of the most contentious issues coming from the CPA. The scheme allocates 49% of southern oil proceeds to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and another 2% to state

¹⁵⁵ *What has Happened in Darfur?*

¹⁵⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Sudan*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

governments in the south, but considerable dissention remains over how much of the total oil revenue can be shared under this scheme.¹⁵⁸ Since 2005 President Kiir has reportedly warned Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir repeatedly that the unfair distribution of oil proceeds would increase separatist sentiment in the South and leave many southerners mistrustful of the Sudanese government headed by Bashir and the National Congress Party, which is the official governing party of Sudan to which Bashir belongs.¹⁵⁹

Disagreement over the demarcation of boundaries between north and south remain contentious issues. The people of the Nuba Mountains in the state of Kordofan, and of the Blue Nile, both in central Sudan, were important enclaves of the SPLM during the civil war but are not contiguous with the rest of its territory.¹⁶⁰ The protocols on Power Sharing signed in May 2004 by the north and south regarding the status of the disputed territories was meant to settle all outstanding issues between the parties and was an integral step towards the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan in June of the same year, and finally the CPA signed in Nairobi on January 9, 2005.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Jobbins, *Africa Program: A Director's Forum with H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit*

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., Martell, *Will Sudan's Nuba Mountains be Left High and Dry?*, "Road to 2011 Referendum is Full of Obstacles - South Sudan's Kiir," *Sudan Tribune* 12 July 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22813> (accessed 20 March 2010).

¹⁶¹ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 2.



South Sudan and Nuba Mountains¹⁶²

However, these territories are located geographically in north Sudan and will not be part of the 2011 national referendum. Instead, each region will hold a popular consultation to decide if its territory will remain as part of The Republic of the Sudan or join the southern Sudanese state. According to BBC reporting, these consultations “are poorly defined and offer little realistic chance of settlement for the regions... They include no set steps for either autonomy or to join the south,” which inhabitants of the regions assume will take place.¹⁶³ The International Crisis Group postulates that the fertile Nuba Mountains region could be the “next Darfur,” due to its importance in agricultural production, large number of small arms, its volatile makeup of more than 50 African ethnic groups more closely related to inhabitants of the south rather than the Arabs of the north.¹⁶⁴

Other significant sticking points between the north and south that are likely to lead to a renewal of violence in spite of the CPA include a delay in government force redeployment from South Sudan, particularly in the oil fields, where thousands of members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) remain in violation of the CPA. In addition the SAF

¹⁶² Martell, *Will Sudan's Nuba Mountains be Left High and Dry?*

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

increased its forces in the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile, also in violation of the CPA and increasing fear of a renewed outbreak of war, until its withdrawal in 2008 on the condition that the SAF reduce its presence and deploy the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) mandated by the CPA.¹⁶⁵ The JIUs were called for by the CPA to constitute a post-referendum army of Sudan, consisting of equal numbers from the SAF and SPLM militias, and to be dissolved if a referendum fails to preserve a united Sudan.¹⁶⁶ As of January 2009, six years after the creation of the JIUs in 2003 agreement, the Congressional Research Service estimated 85% of JIU forces had been deployed.¹⁶⁷

Complicating the issue of military deployment, without significant improvements in infrastructure there is little hope for repatriation of most of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled their villages in southern Sudan during the civil war. These refugees are in addition to the thousands who fled the western Darfur region since 2003. According to President Kiir, delays in reconstruction and development continue to hamper transition to a lasting peace, because: "There must be a peace dividend. There is little reason for people to support peace if they have the same living conditions as they did in wartime."¹⁶⁸ At the same time, oversight procedures must be put in place to ensure that reconstruction funds as well spent and that endemic corruption with which the post-2005 SPLM is said to be rife is minimized.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 14.

¹⁶⁶ "Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Chapter VI, Security Arrangements," Conciliation Resources, 25 September 2003, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/key-texts-cpa-security.php> (accessed 20 March 2010).

¹⁶⁷ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 14.

¹⁶⁸ Jobbins, *Africa Program: A Director's Forum with H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Abdalla, *Making Sense of Sudan: Sudan at the Crossroads*, 2

Time for such reforms is limited, as the referendum for an independent southern state called for by CPA has been set for January 2011.¹⁷⁰ This referendum will allow the government of south Sudan to control a sovereign state in the already semi-autonomous southern region, which already possesses a constitution, legislature, judiciary, and executive structures governing the ten largely Christian and animist southernmost states. President Kiir, himself a former SPLM military leader, uses the existence of these structures as called for by the CPA as evidence supporting the ability of the SPLM to govern a fully independent southern Sudanese state.¹⁷¹ As recently as 2009, bitter ethnic clashes in the south, particularly in the eastern Jonglei state took the lives of more than 2,000 people.¹⁷²

CONCLUSION: SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE AND THE FUTURE OF THE SPLM/A

The 2011 National Referendum is meant to allow south Sudan to exercise its right to seek autonomy as a separate state as called for in the 2005 CPA. But before the referendum can take place, Sudan is scheduled to vote in April 2010 in its first multiparty national elections since 1986, in which people will cast ballots for the president, regional governors, national legislature, and the leadership of the GoSS, the president of which serves by tradition as the vice president of the Republic of Sudan.¹⁷³ However, international observers report that the election is likely to be rife with corruption and massive fraud meant in

¹⁷⁰ *Road to 2011 Referendum is Full of Obstacles - South Sudan's Kiir*, "Terms for Sudan Referendum Agreed," *BBC News* 16 October 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8310928.stm> (accessed 20 March 2010).

¹⁷¹ *Road to 2011 Referendum is Full of Obstacles - South Sudan's Kiir*, "Africa Program: A Director's Forum with H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 4 November 2005, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=152220 (accessed 20 March 2010).

¹⁷² *Terms for Sudan Referendum Agreed*

¹⁷³ Simon Tisdall, "An African Success Story in Sudan," *The Guardian* 16 March 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/16/sudan-elections-april-2010-progress> (accessed 23 March 2010).

particular to disenfranchise voters in the south and in Darfur, where citizens are least likely to support the governing party.¹⁷⁴

The SPLM, counting on the success of the 2011 National Referendum, has largely condoned the Sudanese government's efforts to suppress voters in these regions by allowing the government to vastly underground the inhabitants of the south and west in the 2009 census.¹⁷⁵ As reported in the Guardian, "SPLM members are rightly furious that their party leaders are effectively colluding with the government, averting their eyes from the obvious attempts at election rigging... Such is the SPLM's desperation to get to the polls in 2011, and their faith that they will then secede, that they are prepared to hand this electoral victory to the NCP."¹⁷⁶ However, this strategy may well backfire if any of the outstanding issues between the two regions—oil revenue sharing, citizenship for SPLM/A allies in the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains region, or the census—lead to a breakdown of the fragile peace between the regions and make a successful referendum impossible.¹⁷⁷

Regarding Sudan's prospects for internal stability, the quality of its leadership, and the ability of political parties to represent the interests of the southern Sudanese in a satisfactory manner that will prevent the resurgence of violence. Differing perceptions of the ability of the Sudanese political establishment to fulfill these requirements exist. Salih believes that the combination of militancy of religion and the protection of ethnicity that Sudan's political parties represent will ensure that "even the most rebellious modern

¹⁷⁴ Louise Roland-Gosselin, "It's Far Too Early to Celebrate Democracy in Sudan," *The Guardian*, 23 March 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/23/no-cause-celebration-democracy-sudan> (accessed 23 March 2010).

¹⁷⁵ Dagne, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, 7.

¹⁷⁶ Roland-Gosselin, *It's Far Too Early to Celebrate Democracy in Sudan*

¹⁷⁷ Tisdall, *An African Success Story in Sudan*, Roland-Gosselin, *It's Far Too Early to Celebrate Democracy in Sudan*

political elite will find it hard to come up with alternative party structures and organizations.”¹⁷⁸ For Salih, the real challenge to Democracy in Sudan is political leadership. He does not view the political elite of Sudan as capable of successfully instituting or upholding democracy, despite the fact that these same political elite are the ones held up by Western political scientists as the best hope of democracy.¹⁷⁹ For this reason, he sees little hope for enduring democracy in Sudan.

Ahmed and Nagar take on a rosier view. They believe that civil society institutions in Sudan are beginning to fill the vacuum in Sudan and present a “sound alternative to traditional parties,” especially in their opposition to the return of authoritarian rule and are starting to increase the enfranchisement of women. However, civil society remains in an embryonic stage in Sudan.¹⁸⁰ President Kiir takes a middle stance, pointing out that as of January 2007, the SPLM/A has largely successfully transformed itself from a guerilla movement into a political party. It is up to the SPLM/A chapters to transform themselves into political structures that reflect what the SPLM political party stands for, because it is meant to no longer be an armed movement. Key in this transformation Kiir sees the enfranchisement of women, who should make up 25% of the party’s members.¹⁸¹

External factors could play a role in Sudanese democratization. Increased oil production in Sudan and its availability on the world market has given other countries an

¹⁷⁸ Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M.(Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 105-106.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 105-106.

¹⁸⁰ Salih, *African Political Parties : Evolution, Institutionalism and Governance*, 111-112.

¹⁸¹ *Road to 2011 Referendum is Full of Obstacles - South Sudan's Kiir*

interest in improving ties with Sudan.¹⁸² So far, China in particular has made inroads in this manner but Khartoum is hungry for foreign investment, and prior to the financial crisis of 2007 the hydrocarbon sector in Sudan was booming. The 2008 indictment of President Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur by the International Criminal Court in The Hague shows that the international community is aware of Sudan's internal turmoil and that it is willing to hold Sudan to the standards of conduct of justice and security.¹⁸³

Sudan's reputation as a sponsor of terrorism comes as a result of allowing Osama bin Laden sanctuary in the country during the 1990s, and has led the government to work hard to counter this image since the US terrorist attacks of 2001. While the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan became targets for retaliation, "[i]n Sudan the Bush administration chose the less expensive and potentially more prestigious path of promoting peace and reform."¹⁸⁴ This was due in no small part of the efforts of Bashir and his government to become allies of the US government in its war on terror.

Historically, Sudanese political culture "expected to support democracy is such that affiliation to a political party is secondary to religious belief in the divinity of the leadership." Indeed, despite a peace settlement and upcoming referendum on Southern independence, Sudan's prospects for long-term democratic success are remote. Since

¹⁸² Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government : Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s*, 173.

¹⁸³ *ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur*, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur, CC-OTP-20080714-PR341 2008), [http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20\(2008\)/a](http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/a) (accessed 25 March 2010).

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Sudanese independence and the establishment of free elections during the periods during which it was not under military dictatorship, Sudan has been unable to uphold democracy for more than five years at a time.¹⁸⁵

The SPLM's lack of internal reform in policy and administration weaken it substantially and put its ability to survive in the divided and sectarian post-conflict political climate into question.¹⁸⁶ The movement suffers from a dearth of leadership since the death of John Garang, and the prospect for its current leaders to become bogged down in the type of internal squabbling and grabs for power that plagued Sudan's early experiments with democracy in the 1960s is very real. Without substantial reform, the SPLM will fall further into disarray even if the 2011 referendum succeeds in the South's favor, making the CPA unlikely to remain in effect. As a result, Sudan will become likely to fall back into its legacy of violence.

¹⁸⁵ Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim M. (Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed), *African Democracies and African Politics*, 103.

¹⁸⁶ Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government : Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s*, 176.

III. CONTINUING THE RESISTANCE: HIZBALLAH'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY DUALITY

BACKGROUND OF HIZBALLAH

Hizballah, or "Party of God," rose in the 1980s in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.¹⁸⁷ At the time of the invasion, Israel enjoyed usually favorable political conditions within Lebanon to further its political agenda and improve relations between the two countries. Important allies like Bashir Gemayel, soon to be elected president, presented a friendly face to the Israelis in Beirut.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, some of the Shi'a inhabitants of southern Lebanon, an economically stagnant region largely overlooked by the Lebanese state, had expressed support for the Israeli invasion due to their desire to see the Palestinian guerillas driven out of the south.¹⁸⁹ However, the ultimate effect of the Israeli invasion was to create a power vacuum in Lebanon by annihilating the PLO militia, which permitted the influence of Syria to expand dramatically, and allowed the establishment of a new Islamic order among the Shi'a community. This movement would later coalesce as Hizballah, and eventually supplant the Amal Movement as the largest Shi'a militia and political party.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 157.

¹⁸⁸ William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 387.

¹⁸⁹ Mark A. Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 579 .

¹⁹⁰ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 160-161.

Hizballah began by positioning itself as a resistance movement against the actions of Israel and its Western allies, which it saw as furthering oppression and subjugation in the developing world. At the time of its establishment, Hizballah's objective was to secure "the final departure" of the United States, France, and their allies from Lebanon along with ending the influence of any imperialist power in the country.¹⁹¹ Additionally, the rise of Hizballah during the 1980s was aided by a religious revival among the Lebanese Shi'a in the 1970s, and through revolutionary fervor spread by the newly coined Islamic Republic in Iran following its 1979 revolution.¹⁹²


Since its birth as a revolutionary resistance movement—then just one of dozens of militias based on communal or local identity that emerged in the midst of the Lebanese Civil War—Hizballah has strengthened to exert near total control over large swaths of Southern Lebanon and the Bekka valley, along with Shi'a neighborhoods in Beirut. According to Jeroen Gunning, Deputy director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence at the University of Wales, Hizballah has rapidly grown from "an underground militia to a political party with a highly efficient apparatus, an extensive welfare network and a small semi-professional resistance organization."¹⁹³ These social services have led to vastly increased support for Hizballah among the middle class in Lebanon who feel overlooked by the state, and even among some non-Shiites. Since 2006, Maronite Christian leader and former Lebanese military commander Michel Aoun has allied his Free Patriotic Movement with Hizballah, with Aoun's Christian supporters throwing

¹⁹¹ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 38.

¹⁹² Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 159.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 158

their electoral weight behind Hizballah, indicating significant cross-communal support for the party.¹⁹⁴



Lebanon: Majority Shi'a Areas¹⁹⁵

Despite Hizballah's innovations in social services for the Lebanese Shiites, the United States and many Western nations including the UK, Canada, and Australia continue to consider Hizballah a terrorist organization and routinely condemn its activities.¹⁹⁶ Yet throughout the Islamic world it enjoys a great deal of support and is viewed as a legitimate

¹⁹⁴ Andrew Lee, "Hizballah's Christian Soldiers?" *Time*, 6 August 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1650192,00.html> (accessed 30 January 2010).

¹⁹⁵ File:Lebanon Jul06.Png: Wikipedia, 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lebanon_Jul06.png (accessed 29 January 2010).

¹⁹⁶ Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God : From Revolution to Institutionalization*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 201.

resistance organization fighting in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and against the aggression of Israel,¹⁹⁷ which occupied southern Lebanon from 1978 to 2000. The varying classifications of Hizballah's legitimacy and status have led to it occupying a precarious position at the edges of the global political system. As Eitan Azani writes, "While the United States was acting to obliterate it, Hezbollah's leaders were meeting diplomats from all over the world, including UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, during his visit to Lebanon."¹⁹⁸ This split in its international perception has meant that Hizballah—along with its sponsors Syria and Iran, whose actions are routinely condemned by the same powers that decry Hizballah—is able to navigate around American pressure; the differing positions of various EU countries, and the UN. These conflicting perceptions of Hizballah's purpose and legitimacy make a united stance by the international community against Hizballah's actions impossible and increase the difficulty of disarming the movement.¹⁹⁹

According to Gunning and Judith Harik, a Professor of Political Science at the American University of Beirut, Hizballah has made a remarkable transformation from a radical, clandestine militia and absolutist resistance movement in the 1980s to a moderate and mainstream political party currently. Gunning and Harik see this evolution as part of an ongoing process as Hizballah continues to become even more accommodating to a wider variety of supporters, while drastically tempering its political goals.²⁰⁰ Yet while Hizballah officially disavowed violence against domestic rivals in 1992 as a condition for entering the

¹⁹⁷ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 31.

¹⁹⁸ Azani, *Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God : From Revolution to Institutionalization*, 201.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 201.

²⁰⁰ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 157., Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 1.

political process, it continues to receive financing from Iran and Syria²⁰¹ and officially adheres to an ideology of violent resistance against Israel.²⁰² Furthermore, Hizballah's Shura council, which administers the movement and is headed by Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, is in charge of both its social-political agenda along with its military-terrorist activity, with an extensive network abroad that is believed to have carried out terrorist attacks targeting Jewish or Israeli targets in South America during the 1990s, and may possibly collude with Iranian intelligence to engineer attacks against American targets in Iraq during the current occupation.²⁰³ Nasrallah, however, denies these accusations and did not officially sanction military actions outside Lebanon's border until doing so in his 2008 eulogy for senior Hizballah operative Imad Mughniyah,²⁰⁴ who is believed to have been assassinated by Israel, although no such known actions have yet taken place.

LEGACY OF VIOLENCE

Despite its integration into the political system and outward appearances of moderation, the movement's history of violence and previous calls for the imposition of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon puts into question Hizballah's official commitment to Lebanese democracy. However, since the 1990s there have been no acts of international terrorism concretely attributable to Hizballah. Prior to the bombings in South America in 1992 and 1994 respectively, the organization was deemed responsible for the June 1985 hijacking of

²⁰¹ Rubin, *Revolutionaries and Reformers : Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, 92.

²⁰² Azani, *Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God : From Revolution to Institutionalization*, 107-109.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 247.

²⁰⁴ "H.E. Sayyed Nasrallah Speech in Full: History Will Mark Martyr Moghnieh Blood as the Start of the Fall of "Israel", " Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, <http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=2366&fid=11> (accessed 30 January 2010).

TWA flight 847 from Athens to Rome masterminded by Mughniyah as a measure intended to free Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails.²⁰⁵ The most spectacular terrorist attack to which Hizballah has been linked occurred with the 1983 bombing of the US marine barracks in Beirut and a simultaneous strike on French military barracks, killing a total of 299. This fiery attack was carried out by Lebanese Shi'a militants claiming to be part of an organization called Islamic Jihad—a precursor to Hizballah—at the behest of Iran,²⁰⁶ and had great impact on US decision in 1983 to withdraw from Lebanon.²⁰⁷

Hizballah's violent origins caused difficulty in attracting more moderate supporters, which would prove necessary for Hizballah to enter the political process in Lebanon, especially as the civil war drew to a close. In 1985, Hizballah issued an open letter to justify its use of violence and refute what it believed to be US attempts to portray it as "nothing but a bunch of fanatic terrorists whose sole aim is to dynamite bars and destroy slot machines".²⁰⁸ The "Open Letter: The Hizballah Program" came as part of Hizballah's efforts to discredit the terrorist label as an American imposition, while distancing itself from bombings and hijackings attributed to its members.²⁰⁹ The letter stressed the importance of Hizballah's military force:

"No one can imagine the importance of our military potential as our military apparatus is not separate from our overall social fabric. Each of us is a fighting soldier. And when it becomes necessary to carry out the Holy War, each of us takes

²⁰⁵ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 42.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁰⁸ "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 48 (Fall 1988), www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf.

²⁰⁹ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 1.

up his assignment in the fight in accordance with the injunctions of the Law, and that in the framework of the mission carried out under the tutelage of the Commanding Jurist.”²¹⁰

While its history of violence may belie Hizballah’s official commitment to democracy, the open letter clarified Hizballah’s standing on the imposition of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon and, curiously, expressed support for a hallmark of democratic institutions, elections, when the letter proclaimed that the “adoption of the Islamic system [would occur] on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not on the basis of forced imposition.”²¹¹

According to Eitan Azani, As Hizballah institutionalized, “It changed its activity policy from uncontrolled violence and from terrorist attacks as the leading strategy to controlled violence and guerilla warfare and commenced a dialogue with the Lebanese political system.”²¹² Judith Harik postulates that “guerilla warfare techniques were used by the Party of God to achieve its primary mission—the removal of an illegal occupation.”²¹³ The use of such a targeted strategy significantly undermined Israel’s capacity to foster perception and outrage against Hizballah as a terrorist organization, while at the same time the small victories gained by Hizballah against what was viewed as the Israeli aggressor elevated the organization to almost mythical status among Arabs and Muslims in many parts of the world.

²¹⁰ *An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program*

²¹¹ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 40., *An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program*

²¹² Azani, *Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God : From Revolution to Institutionalization*, 241.

²¹³ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 2-3.

DEVELOPMENT OF A POLITICAL STRATEGY

Military force used against Israel could not by itself secure a future for Hizballah as a popular movement in Lebanon. As a result, Hizballah developed an integrated political strategy “that would sustain popular support during the lengthy period when Hezbollah’s hit-and-run missions were slowly taking their toll and beginning to provoke massive retaliations from Israel.”²¹⁴ This strategy succeeded in cultivating popular support that became vital in countering Hizballah’s terrorist image and persuading the Lebanese public that Hizballah was not actually a radical Islamist militia bent on replacing the Lebanese state with an Islamic Republic in the vein of Iran.²¹⁵

When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hizballah gained fame for being the first-ever Arab force to defeat the powerful Israeli military, with its guerilla tactics largely responsible for the Israeli exit. However, despite the IDF’s departure Hizballah stayed on and set about improving its arsenal as if it were still at war with an Israeli occupying force.²¹⁶ Israel’s troop withdrawal in 2000 from southern Lebanon and the IDF’s loss of the 2006 war with Hizballah has not tempered Hizballah’s military goals or aims regarding Israel and makes it unlikely that it will change its outlook soon, despite having achieved its goal of securing Israel’s evacuation from south Lebanon.

Several factors contributed to Hizballah’s transition from radical resistance movement to political organization. Foremost among these was the expansion from a violent resistance militia to include a civil organization that provides much-needed services for the underserved Shi’a population of southern Lebanon and Shiite areas of Beirut. Since

²¹⁴ Ibid., 3.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

²¹⁶ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 26.

the 1980s, Hizballah's local presence has come to include a vast network of welfare and support services benefiting the Lebanese Shi'a, which have been historically neglected by the Lebanese central government. According to Gunning: "the very effort of setting up charities in cooperation with local communities had begun to have a moderating effect."²¹⁷ The expansion of welfare and charitable activities has done much to change the makeup of Hizballah's supporters from a core group of hard-line revolutionaries to moderate members of the middle class. It has also proven to be the main moderating factor on Hizballah's violent path, as "the expansion of Hizballah's welfare services has introduced a conservatism that mitigates against radical resistance activities."²¹⁸

Indeed, the investments in infrastructure that Hizballah has made in southern Lebanon render Israeli military strikes on that area more costly and thus more likely to be avoided.²¹⁹ The 2006 was extremely costly in terms of infrastructure, causing \$7 billion in damage and the destruction of 130,000 houses and apartments, 100 bridges, and many more buildings and miles of roads.²²⁰ Its responsibilities to its electorate compel it to uphold its end of the bargain and attend to affected areas while supporting citizens in their rebuilding efforts: a process at which it has appeared to excel. However, Hizballah cannot continue to bring about this kind of damage to Lebanon in terms of monetary costs or civilian casualties without further destabilizing Lebanon politically and economically. Such actions will lead to a loss of support for Hizballah not only in the major population centers where its support has already declined somewhat, but in Southern Lebanon where civilians

²¹⁷ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 166.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 164-165

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 165

²²⁰ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 31.

are most affected by conflict with Israel, and where support for Hizballah remains strongest.²²¹

This pragmatic shift has had repercussions in the internal structure of Hizballah, comprising the second major factor explaining Hizballah's transition into a moderate party. While the upper classes tend to shy away from Hizballah, most of its supporters come from lower or lower middle class backgrounds, through an increasing number with university education support the organization. Because it does not draw support from the traditional elite, Hizballah is seen as a counter-elite movement.²²² Its efforts to present itself as a moderate, national party in order to attract more liberal Lebanese and some non-Shi'a Muslims to its support have also required internal changes away from its previous rigidity.²²³ Finally, employment of modern political tactics including the establishment of a media department and al-Manar, a satellite television channel controlled by the party, have allowed Hizballah to get its message to the masses and expand its appeal for support in the fight against Israel elsewhere in the world throughout Muslim communities.²²⁴

Thirdly, a decline in support for the previously most powerful Shiite party, Amal, has contributed to Hizballah's electoral success. These disillusioned Amal supporters were members of the Shi'a middle class and had come to admire Hizballah, but were uninterested in the establishment of an Islamic Lebanese state,²²⁵ further moderating the movement. Amal, though officially secular and non-ideological, was frequently seen to be corrupt and

²²¹ Ibid., 31

²²² Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 168.

²²³ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 3-4.

²²⁴ Ibid., 4.

²²⁵ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 46.

riddled with nepotism. As a result, by presenting itself as incorruptible, egalitarian, and decidedly ideological, Hizballah was able to absorb many of Alma's disaffected supporters.²²⁶

In addition, changes in the foreign policy goals of Iran and Syria have aided Hizballah's transformation and integration.²²⁷ Syria's military dominance expanded in Lebanon from the time of the civil war until Syria's withdrawal in 2005, though it is widely accepted that Syria continues to exert an influence on Lebanese politics and the decision-making strategies of its leaders.²²⁸ Although its ability to control Hizballah has declined since Hizballah's entry into politics in 1992, Syria still possesses the ability to restrict some of its ambitions.²²⁹ Syrian political ascendancy in Lebanon throughout the 1990s allowed Hizballah to continue its jihad activities against Israel and, according to Harik, "legitimated the Party of God as an authentic Lebanese party and cast its struggle against the Israeli military and SLA [Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army] in the guise of national resistance."²³⁰

In the regime of Hizballah's other major foreign backer, Iran, significant events occurred since the establishment of Hizballah that indirectly altered the party's trajectory. The death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution that brought forth the Islamic Republic of Iran, permitted the rise of a less dogmatic elite and made possible

²²⁶ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 168.

²²⁷ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 3, 30-36.

²²⁸ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 45.

²²⁹ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 163.

²³⁰ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 44.

the emergence of internal debates and tensions in Iran. Khomeini had been seen as an early spiritual leader of Hizballah, but the death of his personality lessened the Iranian commitment to Hizballah, which, until the early 1980s, “existed less as a concrete organization than as a cat’s paw of Iran.”²³¹ In fact, Norton believes that much of the terrorism in the 1980s and early 1990s can be attributed to Iran rather than Hizballah.²³²

Furthermore, the end of Iran-Iraq War in 1988 brought to a halt the dream held by some of the Iranian revolutionary elite of spreading the Islamic revolution to the Levant. Since then, Iran’s influence in Lebanon has diminished. “If intelligence estimates are to be believed, not only have Iran’s financial contributions dropped to but a third of Hizballah’s overall estimated income but also Hizballah’s power has come to rest increasingly on the popular and financial support it enjoys within Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora, and the backing of the Syrian government.”²³³ As a result of these factors, previously radical Hizballah has evolved into an organization that remains a thorn in the side of Israel by undertaking resistance activities against it, while also simultaneously engaging wholeheartedly in the Lebanese confessional political system that Hizballah had previously denounced.²³⁴

IMPACT OF TAIF ACCORD

According to Jeroen Gunning, Hizballah’s entrance into the political system would not have been possible without the 1989 Document of National Reconciliation, also known as the Taif Accord, which reformed the constitution to give greater power to the positions of

²³¹ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 45, 72., Heiberg, O’Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 166.

²³² Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 77.

²³³ Heiberg, O’Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 166,162.

²³⁴ Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 45.

Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament, traditionally Sunni and Shi'a posts, respectively.²³⁵ Most significantly the Taif Accord increased the representative equity of the Muslim communities in Lebanon, guaranteeing that henceforth:

“Parliamentary seats shall be divided...

- A. Equally between Christians and Muslims.
- B. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
- C. Proportionately between the districts.”²³⁶

This marked a change in political representation and a vast improvement for the Muslim communities who had been undercounted in determining the National Pact of 1943, which used of an outdated 1932 census—at which time Christians had made up a majority of the Lebanese population—to allocate seats in the national assembly on a 6-to-5 Christian to Muslim ratio.²³⁷ The Shi'a, Hizballah's chief constituency, now constitute about 40% of the population of Lebanon, though they remain underrepresented and in many cases marginalized.²³⁸

The accord gave expanded powers to Syria, stipulating that Syria was to assist the Lebanese government in extending its authority over Lebanese territory by disarming militias and providing security in place of the Lebanese Army, which was meant to be

²³⁵ Hassan Krayem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement," The American University of Beirut, <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html> (accessed 10 January 2010), Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 45.

²³⁶ *The Taif Agreement* (Boston, MA: The Middle East Information Network, 1989)

²³⁷ Mark Farha, "Demography and Democracy in Lebanon," *Mideast Monitor* 3, no. 1 (2008), http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0801/0801_2.htm

²³⁸ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 169.

reconstructed. Pragmatic leaders of Hizballah were able to use the Taif Accord to benefit the organization and resist disarmament, while the other militias of the civil war period disarmed.²³⁹ At the same time, Syria virtually controlled Lebanon but required “a Shi’i opposition party to keep its, at times, truant ally Amal in check”, making Hizballah the ideal candidate for its support, “provided it could tone down its Islamist goals.”²⁴⁰ The accord also included a timetable for the 40,000 Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon within two years (by 1991);²⁴¹ this did not actually occur until 2005.

Although Lebanon’s constitution was modeled on the French constitution, it did not prohibit clergy from holding elected office, and Hizballah’s “constitution” established that participation in elections was a legitimate and Islamic way of conducting politics. Additionally, the Lebanese state had a vested interest in co-opting Hizballah, making it a part of the state in order to weaken its threat to the status quo, and to preserve it as a proxy resistance force against Israel so that it could eventually force it to withdraw.²⁴² Indeed, Hizballah’s participation in the Lebanese political system was eased by the movement’s increasing commitment to consultative politics: a shift that was both political and cultural. “Parallel to the structural reforms of the late 1980s, Hizballah’s political culture appears to have undergone a subtle change, away from a rigid centralism centered on the will of

²³⁹ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 45, 4.

²⁴⁰ Heiberg, O’Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 169.

²⁴¹ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, 45.

²⁴² Heiberg, O’Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 170.

Khomeini, to a more consultative style of decision-making,” which was more responsive to the views of a larger selection of leaders and the general Shi’a population.²⁴³

EFFECTS OF INCLUSION

Inclusion into the Lebanese political system has had a moderating effect on Hizballah and its domestic goals and methods, and has had somewhat of an impact of Hizballah’s resistance operations. However, “It has not dimmed the leadership’s opposition to Israel, or its support for the Palestinian resistance, including its controversial tactic of targeting civilians,” but has introduced electoral accountability which makes escalating resistance operations more costly.²⁴⁴ Additionally, it has largely abandoned its revolutionary goal of establishing an Islamic state by overthrowing the Lebanese regime in order to operate within the framework of the existing political system.²⁴⁵

Azani points out that on the contrary, “it is important to note that Hezbollah’s integration into the Lebanese political system is not necessarily an indication that it had abandoned its goals of overthrowing the existing regime and establishing an Islamic republic.”²⁴⁶ Instead, Hizballah’s political integration can be viewed as another step in its long-term strategy of consolidating its control over parts of Lebanon. In undertaking this top-down approach, pragmatic Hizballah members could combine control of Lebanese institutions with a bottom-up approach targeting social services, while the fundamentalist

²⁴³ Ibid., 167

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 157

²⁴⁵ Azani, *Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God : From Revolution to Institutionalization*, 243.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 75.

members continued to pursue a revolutionary strategy strengthening Hizballah in Lebanon.²⁴⁷

Entrance into mainstream politics in 1992 required Hizballah to refrain from violence against domestic rivals while submitting to the mediating mechanism of the state. Since 1992, Hizballah has largely managed to avoid the use of violence to settle disputes between parties, which is a sharp contrast to the sectarian infighting that took place in the 1980s between Hizballah, Amal, and the Lebanese Communist Party.²⁴⁸ Additionally, through inclusion in the political process Hizballah's goals have moved away from the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. According to Gunning, Hizballah has replaced its call for an Islamic state with a return to "humanitarian" values including integrity and accountability for politicians. Most notably for Lebanon's domestic politics according to Gunning, Hizballah's new objectives include a rejection of the confessional system used to determine political representation in Lebanon.²⁴⁹ Interestingly, Hizballah chooses to address this issue through active and wholehearted participation in the sectarian political system, going so far as to serve as the leader of the March 8 opposition coalition.

Without Hizballah as a part of the political system, Israel would have had a much harder time negotiating an end to its two major offensives during the 1990s. Hizballah's political institutionalization gave it a vested interest in the Lebanese system and an incentive to end the conflicts, along with its responsibility to its supporters who would be at

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 76.

²⁴⁸ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 170.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 158 The confessional system allocates proportional representation to the three main religious communities in Lebanon based on the outdated 1932 census and revised in 1989 as a result of the Taif Accord. Under this system, the Presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the Prime Ministership for a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'a Muslim.

heightened risk in the case of a prolonged war.²⁵⁰ Political inclusion has also altered Hizballah's antagonistic relationship with Israel by curtailing Hizballah's ability to carry out resistance operations against Israel, as general welfare and good governance is most important to Hizballah's supporters, while its leaders continue to focus on more esoteric goals in stressing importance of maintaining a "resistance culture."²⁵¹

Finally, as previously mentioned, Hizballah's entrance into politics has also caused a further change in the type of adherents the party attracts. Hizballah's supporters, previously dominated by religious hard-liners now include the nominally religious, those educated at secular institutions, and non-religious businessmen in favor of Hizballah's stance against corruption.²⁵² Electoral success and the provision of social services to those overlooked by the mainstream Lebanese system has given Hizballah credibility in the eyes of moderate Lebanese otherwise unlikely to support a Shi'a religious party, and endowed Hizballah with an aura of credibility among its supporters both domestic and abroad.

THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY AID

Since its first electoral victories in 1992, the Hizballah political party has become deeply engrained into the fabric of the Lebanese confessional system, representing the interests of large parts of the Shi'a community just as other established parties such as the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange represent the interests of some factions of the Maronite community. However, because the military arm of Hizballah remains linked to its political apparatus under direction of its Shura council, any attempts to complete Hizballah's transition into moderate political movement through disarmament of its militia will

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 197

²⁵¹ Ibid., 172

²⁵² Ibid., 171

dramatically alter the organization. According to Brent Talbot, Professor of Military Strategy at the US Air Force Academy, “The United States, in short, supports democracy in Lebanon, yet hopes for a destabilized Hezbollah,”²⁵³ which is the result that would occur if the organization was forced to put down arms.

Moreover, Hizballah “forces the United States to grapple between traditional support for Israel and new-found support for Lebanese democracy.”²⁵⁴ In fact, contrary to common perceptions, Hizballah’s platform is not inherently anti-democratic. Since its political inclusion and conversion into a major civilian party began in the early 1990s, it has benefited greatly from the democratic process in Lebanon by giving a much-needed voice to the historically underrepresented and politically excluded Shiite population. As Talbot writes, “Hezbollah hampers the government’s efforts to strengthen democracy mainly due to the Syrian political influences it invites into Lebanon and not, as commonly assumed, because of its antidemocratic beliefs.”²⁵⁵ Yet at the same time, the strongest enemy of Lebanese democracy and its historic nemesis— Syria—is able to flourish in Lebanon due to Hizballah, which allows Syria to negatively impact Lebanese sovereignty by interfering in elections, political affairs, and civil liberties.²⁵⁶

According to Talbot, Hizballah is now a liability to Lebanon because it allows continued Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon, obstructs any possible peace accords with Israel, or an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hizballah allows Syria and Iran to exert a destabilizing presence in Lebanon through its continued influence on Hizballah and

²⁵³ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 39.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 29

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 33

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 33

provision of financial support and weapons to its armed wing, while Iran is able to spread extremist ideology in Lebanon through Hizballah.²⁵⁷ Iran's influence continues despite the fact that Hizballah's supporters have long since fallen away from looking to Khomeini and other Iranian ayatollahs for spiritual guidance, and instead possess their own religious leaders, including most significantly Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah, who is widely regarded as Hizballah's spiritual leader.

A militarized Hizballah threatens Lebanese internal dynamics and compromises domestic security by exacerbating pre-existing sectarian differences between the Christian, Sunni, and Shi'a communities within the country. It poses a threat to regional security by provoking military action by Israel that disproportionately affects civilians, especially the Shi'a community of southern Lebanon.²⁵⁸ Indeed, an armed Hizballah obstructs any kind of peace between Lebanon and Israel, and allows Syria to further insert itself into the ongoing conflict. Although the 1989 Taif Agreement called for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, Syria has continuously supported Hizballah's armament in order to assist Syria in eventually re-taking the Golan Heights from Israel. According to Talbot and Harriman, a significant destabilizing effect exerted by Hizballah further complicates the position of the United States in the Middle East by compelling the US administration to reconcile its historical support for Israel with its goal of upholding Lebanese democracy.²⁵⁹

Finally, Hizballah continues to undermine the authority of the Lebanese central government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by exerting control over a large swath of Lebanese territory and its own military force. The LAF currently possesses outdated and

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 29, 31, 34

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 32

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 35, 31

ineffectual arsenals that are mostly inferior to Hizballah's, and has lost power and legitimacy in Lebanon by having "implicitly ceded military primacy to Hezbollah."²⁶⁰ According to Talbot, in order to challenge Hizballah's military supremacy, the LAF must modernize its ground forces and to improve its naval and air forces, because "As long as the LAF remains militarily weaker than Hezbollah, the latter will feel little pressure to relinquish its position of military supremacy to legitimate government forces."²⁶¹ The United States has historically provided funding to the Lebanese government for the purposes of enhancing its security forces and clamping down on Hizballah's abilities to re-arm through weapons smuggling and carry out terrorist activities within the country. The US has awarded Lebanon more than \$600 million in security assistance for these purposes since 2005.²⁶² It is likely that US support of the Lebanese Armed Forces will continue indefinitely, as long as Hizballah is perceived as a threat.

Indeed, American assistance to the LAF has expanded since the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, which led the US to refocus its security policy toward Lebanon to increase the operational capacity of the LAF and its internal counterpart (ISF) so that the security forces can assert control over the entirety of the country through a program of enhanced military assistance.²⁶³ According to the United States Department of State, foreign military assistance to Lebanon is also intended to assist the LAF implementation of United States Security Council Resolution 17091, which calls for the disarmament of Hizballah and a weapons-free zone south of the Litani River to prevent weapons smuggling across the

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 34

²⁶¹ Ibid., 45-46

²⁶² Casey L. Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,[2009]) (accessed 13 February 2009).

²⁶³ Ibid.

border with Syria.²⁶⁴ While the LAF and ISF have to date failed to secure all of Lebanese territory even with US assistance, it has nonetheless gained valuable military equipment including spare parts for helicopters and tactical vehicles, small arms and ammunition, and 60 humvees. As of 2009, the Department of Defense was processing requests to provide the LAF with tube-launched, optically tracked anti-tank launchers and missiles, communications equipment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) equipment, night vision sights/binoculars, towed Howitzers, and small naval craft, among other items.²⁶⁵ In light of the unstable security situation within the country, U.S. efforts to enable Lebanon to secure its territory and fight terrorism could be easily thwarted if any part of this influx of weaponry falls into the hands of Hizballah.

This massive arming of the LAF in an attempt to bolster it against Hizballah is likely to prove ultimately fruitless, as Hizballah possesses well-trained guerilla fighters and mostly Iranian-made military equipment chosen for its small size and ease of mobility, which should make it no match for the powerful modern weapons offered to the LAF by the U.S. government.²⁶⁶ Indeed, the huge amounts of security assistance including funding and equipment to the LAF, with which it is intended to fight against a much smaller, internal militia, demonstrate that the continued existence of Hizballah as an antagonistic paramilitary force is not due to a lack of funding for the LAF or military inferiority compared with Hizballah. Rather, the popularity of Hizballah in Lebanon and among those who support its continued fight against Israel elsewhere in the world and Hizballah's political presence as an elected party in the Lebanese National Assembly support the thesis that the continued armament of Hizballah in spite of U.N. Resolution 1701 is due to a lack of

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Foreign policy blogs, 4 December, 2009.

political will in Beirut and general acceptance of Hizballah as an armed group within Lebanon. Thus, while aggressive US support of the LAF may make it seem as if the armed forces are getting ready to take on Hizballah, a lack of domestic consensus and institutionalization of the organization as both a political party and militia indicate that a militarized Hizballah is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, further any dampening prospects of peace with Israel.

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE DISARMAMENT

Hizballah remains well armed and prepared not only for further conflict with Israel, but for renewed internal divisions and possible descent into another civil war. This lack of commitment to stability further destabilizes the Lebanese state.²⁶⁷ According to Talbot and Harriman, “Until Hezbollah is disarmed, the group will continue to challenge stability and prevent peace in Lebanon by acting as an autonomous political and military body.”²⁶⁸ Yet these contributing factors make it unlikely that Hizballah will demobilize its military force in the near future. Gunning writes that due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the U.S.-led war in Iraq there “still appears to be sufficient popular support for maintaining a military wing—as long as it is not seen a provoking ‘unavoidable’ Israeli retaliations.”²⁶⁹ Therefore, disarmament of Hizballah can only be accomplished through a multilateral strategy engaging all parties affected by or involved with Hezbollah while offering “attractive incentives to each to encourage cooperation in the disarmament process.”²⁷⁰ A multilateral disarmament settlement would have several complicated and far-reaching aims

²⁶⁷ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 34.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 32

²⁶⁹ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 174.

²⁷⁰ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 30.

with immediate implications for Lebanon, Syria, and Israel but would also alter Lebanese relations with the United States.

To this end, Talbot and Harriman propose a multi-step process by which to disarm Hizballah. Firstly, disarmament must guarantee Hizballah a continued legislative presence in the Lebanese parliament. The international community must demand that Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah defer to the Lebanese government in disarmament talks—a position Nasrallah is otherwise unlikely to take unless pressured by Lebanese political figures along with Syria. Potential participants in disarmament talks such as the US, France, Syria, and Saudi Arabia must treat the Lebanese government with respect to reinforce that it—not the Hizballah leadership—is the legitimate government of Lebanon.²⁷¹

Secondly, it is important that the LAF receive international support so as to make it clear that Hizballah is not a legitimate defense arm of the Lebanese state. Syria must also be taken into account, but its concerns are largely territorial, and if Syria sees the return of the Golan Heights as a realistic objective, it will be likely to participate in international talks. Thus, a deal must be reached with Israel ahead of time in order to make this a viable possibility, probably by granting Israel some continuing water rights to the Sea of Galilee.²⁷²

In addition, efforts must be made to dissuade Lebanese public support for Hizballah's militant actions so that continued armament of the militia becomes viewed as unacceptable and unnecessarily promoting violence, rather than as legitimate resistance activities against Israel. This strategy would likely require Israeli cooperation to make sure that it tempered its military response to any rocket launches or minor aggression by Hizballah. If the above actions can be undertaken together, they would be likely to promote

²⁷¹ Ibid., 40

²⁷² Ibid., 46-48

the eventual establishment of a non-aggression treaty between Lebanon and Israel, which could become an initial step toward a peace agreement.²⁷³

While Talbot feels that the United Nations should not be included in securing the disarmament of Hizballah due to the perceived ineffectiveness of the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mission, and the continued flaunting of U.N. Resolution 1701 by Hizballah. Talbot also alleges that UNFIL peacekeepers inadvertently shield Hizballah forces in south Lebanon, and have failed to increase security there.²⁷⁴ However, the usefulness of the United Nations in brokering an end to other conflicts and disarming militias such as the FMLN in El Salvador, which ended that nation's civil war in 1992, proves that the UN possesses the experience and ability to bring about negotiated ends to conflicts. In fact, the ongoing UNIFIL presence since 1978 provides a UN force in Lebanon with on the ground knowledge and international legitimacy.

CURRENT IMPLICATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT: JUNE 2009 ELECTIONS

In an April 1, 2009 speech announcing Hizballah's district candidates for the June 2009 National Assembly elections, Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah spoke about the confessional system, saying: "Whether we like it or not, sectarian and confessional quotas exist in this sectarian system which effectively presently still exists."²⁷⁵ Nasrallah went on to indicate that the confessional system is unlikely to be done away with soon, and Hizballah has accepted this in contrast to its previous stance calling for the overthrow of the confessional system:

²⁷³ Ibid., 30

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 43

²⁷⁵ *Text in Full: Hizballah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah Announces Hizballah's Candidates for all Districts*, ed. Hassan Nasrallah, Vol. 1 April 2009 (Beirut, Lebanon: Islamic Resistance in Lebanon Official Web Site, 2009)

“We accept the existing formula in the country, we are convinced that in the interests of the country's future to address its problems, stability, security and safety the country's strength lies in internal understanding among the Lebanese, a co-sharing of governing its affairs under the motto of "shoulder to shoulder - arm in arm.”²⁷⁶

These words indicate that while Hizballah may oppose the sectarian allocation of seats in Lebanon—a system which, if abolished, would leave the Lebanese Shi'a with vastly increased political power than it currently possesses, with Muslims and particularly Shi'a with their historically higher birthrate than Christians underrepresented in the current method of allocating seats.²⁷⁷

Hizballah's popularity, previous electoral victories, and success in the 2006 war against Israel meant that it was widely expected to prevail in the June 2009 National Assembly elections in Lebanon. However, Hizballah won 11 seats out of a total of 128; less than the 14 it gained in the previous 2005 election²⁷⁸ but equal to the number of candidates that the part put forth out of deference to its coalition partners, meaning that Hizballah candidates had a 100% success rate in the 2009 National Assembly elections.²⁷⁹ Furthermore, in December 2009 the Lebanese National Assembly overwhelmingly approved

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Oren Barak, "Towards a Representative Military? the Transformation of the Lebanese Officer Corps since 1945," *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006), 81 (accessed 9 February 2010).

²⁷⁸ *Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'Llah)* (New York, NY: The Council on Foreign Relations,[2009]), <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/#p7> (accessed 9 January 2010).

²⁷⁹ Esam Al-Amin, "What really Happened in the Lebanese Elections?" *Axis of Logic*, 15 June 2009, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_56035.shtml (accessed 9 January 2010)., *Text in Full: Hizbullah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah Announces Hizbullah's Candidates for all Districts*

a unity government that would Hizballah to remain armed in spite of U.N. Resolution 1701.²⁸⁰ These results indicate that Hizballah is able to exert a far wider influence by affecting the whole of the Lebanese population through its participation in representative politics than by attempting to circumvent the system or to establish an Islamic state in place of the present confessional system.

As Gunning points out, it is paradoxically this wider influence and inclusion in representative politics that has moderated Hizballah's aims and brought it closer to a mainstream political organization.²⁸¹ In a Lebanese context it is not even necessary to discount the presence of Hizballah's military arm to judge it a "mainstream" organization, as most confessions and political groups maintained their own militias beginning in the civil war period. What is notable about Hizballah's militia is that unlike other non-state military actors within Lebanon it is not targeted at domestic forces, but rather at Israel via their mutual southern border. In addition, unlike Hamas, Hizballah's suicide bombings have not usually been civilian directed. While abhorrent and shocking to many Western observers, "the twelve suicide attacks launched by Hezbollah [during the period of Israeli occupation] were all targeted against the occupation force and its allies, all legitimate resistance targets."²⁸² Thus the international reach of Hizballah and its propensity for regional destabilization and escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via territorial disputes with Israel and other grievances remains worrisome for Lebanon, while the impact of other militias has sharply declined since the end of the civil war.

²⁸⁰ "Lebanon Vote Lets Hezbollah Keep Weapons," *The New York Times*, December 10, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/world/middleeast/11lebanon.html> (accessed 14 February 2010).

²⁸¹ Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State : Ending Protracted Conflicts*, 157.

²⁸² Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 86.

Past suggestions of possible incorporation of Hizballah guerilla fighters into the LAF following the dissolution of the militia are unlikely to be successful. Though such a strategy has worked in other conflicts including the FMLN disarmament, an influx of Shi'a personnel into the national military is likely to upset the delicate sectarian balance that all institutions in Lebanon are careful to preserve. The officer corps of the LAF is primarily Sunni Muslims loyal to the pro-Western March 14 governing coalition, while the rank and file soldiers are largely Shiite, some of whom retain allegiances to Hizballah.²⁸³ Christians are also heavily represented in the officer corps though very few sign on as enlisted personnel,²⁸⁴ exacerbating the sectarian and socioeconomic-based division between the three main religious groups in Lebanon.

However, many obstacles stand in the way of Hizballah's disarmament. Notably, an armed Hizballah enjoys significant support as a legitimate resistance organization among Arabs and Muslims in many countries that support its anti-Israel stance. In fact, Hizballah's sympathizers "argue that the group continues to be necessary to Lebanese security despite the fact that the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and from the temporary incursion during 2006."²⁸⁵ The war in Iraq creates further complications for Hizballah's disarmament, by offering new training grounds for guerilla fighters, expanded opportunities for contact with Iran, and new routes for weapons trafficking into Lebanon. Additionally, the war in Iraq has deepened the entanglement of the United States in the region. Clearly, successful

²⁸³ Barak, *Towards a Representative Military? the Transformation of the Lebanese Officer Corps since 1945*, 88., Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 7.

²⁸⁴ Barak, *Towards a Representative Military? the Transformation of the Lebanese Officer Corps since 1945*, 87-88.

²⁸⁵ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 30.

disarmament of Hizballah will depend on the ability of the international community to contain the situation in Iraq and address the destabilizing role played there by Iran.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 52

IV. CONCLUSIONS

There is no one method or process by which disarmament and political integration of a guerilla movement can be accomplished. Nor can any one example epitomize the correct process on which a movement, a country, and the international community should embark. However it is useful to study movements in varying stages of demobilization and political participation to understand how specific institutions and individuals have taken action to reshape the political system and bring the formerly combative movement into its fold, usually by bringing an end to the violence with a peace settlement negotiated with the assistance of an international organization. However, sometimes organizations are able to adhere to their military or revolutionary goals while managing to function and fully participate as a political party in a system of democratic elections.

One commonality that can be drawn from studies of the FMLN, SPLM/A, and Hizballah is that a post-conflict environment provides an excellent opportunity for the emergence of a political party. In each case, a settlement following civil wars provided the method by which the movements could begin to carry out their political ambitions within the mainstream system. This occurred not only as a result of UN presence in the countries in order to uphold the peace agreements, but significantly because the experience of civil war and upheaval caused by it had lowered the barriers to entry of actors into the political system.

The FMLN is regarded in many respects as one of the most successful examples of a guerilla movement demobilized following a civil war and with the assistance of the UN. It has certainly been the most triumphant of these three instances in having been effectively demobilized, laid down its arms, and joined the political process. The FMLN reached the pinnacle of political success and domestic legitimacy with its attainment of the highest

office in the land, with the ascension of Mauricio Funes to the presidency in 2009, following the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords. In Sudan, the SPLA could be well on its way to a similar path to demobilization as a guerilla force—though perhaps through legitimization as the proper army of South Sudan—if the 2011 National Referendum on southern independence is resolved in the south’s favor. In any case, the SPLM/A has made major strides in only five years since the ending of two decades of civil war with the CPA. While violence between north and south continues to claim lives and cause mass displacement of civilians, the decline in both since the end of the civil war is significant, and is remarkable all the more in the context of Sudan, where the conflict between African villagers and the Sudanese government continues to rage on and to pose massive humanitarian challenges in Darfur.

In contrast, Hizballah remains an active guerilla force despite the signing of the Taif Accord in 1989, which called for the disbanding and disarmament of all militias in the country.²⁸⁷ Hizballah was ultimately allowed to remain as a “resistance force” in the Lebanon, but continued to maintain many of the same aims and tactics that it had employed during the civil war period, including terrorist attacks on Western interests.²⁸⁸ A significant difference in this case is that Hizballah enjoys a great deal of popular support in Lebanon, not only among the Shi’a community it represents, but among others who admire its supposed incorruptibility, which is particularly exemplified by its leader Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah is especially renowned for his behavior at the time of his 18 year-old son’s death in 1997 while fighting the Israelis, after which Nasrallah refused any special treatment and

²⁸⁷ *The Taif Agreement*

²⁸⁸ Harik, *Hezbollah : The Changing Face of Terrorism*, x, 241., Norton, *Hezbollah : A Short History*, 42.

insisted his son be regarded as any other Hizballah fighter who gave his life for its cause.²⁸⁹ Hizballah is further well-regarded both in Lebanon and internationally in communities sympathetic to its message for its commitment to social services, and its stand against what are viewed as unjust tactics of Israel.

In Sudan, especially since the death of much-loved leader John Garang in 2005, the SPLM has come to be widely viewed as a corrupt body looking out for the interests of the elites at the expense of the general population.²⁹⁰ In light of such a perception, maintaining support of the populace becomes difficult, if not impossible. Even if the south achieves independence in the 2011 referendum, there is no guaranteeing that the SPLM will be able to maintain its grip on power. Even now it is attempting to preserve its control of the south by returning to the military radicalism that began the SPLM movement, pumping resources into an increasingly bloated military establishment.²⁹¹ Without popular support, even this robust military force is likely to do little more than allow the SPLM leadership to hold on its grip of power while further unsettling the volatile southern region.

Hizballah, in contrast, does an excellent job of largely separating its military and political aims by keeping its military operations outwardly directed towards Israel as a “resistance force”, while directing its political aspirations at policies to benefit its Shi’a constituency within Lebanon. The SPLM has been unable to achieve either this separation of goals or this attention to the needs of its electorate, and if it wished to do so, would do well to emulate Hizballah in these measures to strengthen its chances of maintaining power over the long term.

²⁸⁹ Lucy Fielder, "Nasrallah has Come," *Salon.Com* 24 August 2006, <http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/08/24/nasrallah> (accessed 4 April 2010).

²⁹⁰ Abdalla, *Making Sense of Sudan: Sudan at the Crossroads*, 2.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

In El Salvador, a major reason for the successful demobilization and political integration of the FMLN has been the firm hand by which the UN implemented the peace settlement between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. This settlement was limited in scope, with civil-military relations as its cornerstone. Addressing this key issue, and making sure the agreement was implemented with the full backing of international allies including the United States, at the time the key supporter of the Salvadoran government, was absolutely integral in leading to the acceptance of the FMLN as a legitimate political party.²⁹² The demobilization process did not occur without significant setbacks, such as the discovery of an arms cache in Managua, Nicaragua six months after the signing of the peace accords. Although its credibility was temporarily injured, the FMLN took responsibility for the arms deposits, which resulted in a crucial step in peace building towards successful fulfillment of the peace accords.²⁹³

In Lebanon, the UNIFIL force is frequently regarded as ineffective in carrying out any of its obligations, most notably the implementation of the U.N. Resolution 1701 which was meant to end hostilities between Hizballah and Israel following the 2006 war by calling for Hizballah to end its attacks in Lebanon.²⁹⁴ UNIFIL has largely failed to accomplish this mission, and enjoys little support within Lebanon. Conversely, in Sudan, the CPA set up the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which has been integral in driving the political integration of the SPLM, as called for by the peace agreement.²⁹⁵ The differing roles laid out for the UN forces that were established to put into effect and uphold peace

²⁹² Juhn, *Negotiating Peace in El Salvador : Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War*, 4.

²⁹³ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 29.

²⁹⁴ Talbot, Brent J. and Heidi Harriman, *Disarming Hezbollah*, 43.

²⁹⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1590 (2005)*

agreements, along with the support such forces enjoy both domestically and internationally, indicate to a large degree the success of each political integration. From these examples it seems clear that more robust peacekeeping on the part of the UN and support within the country and by the international community is necessary to ensure the preservation of peace agreements in post-conflict countries, especially following protracted negotiated resolutions to conflicts.

In all three instances, the political transition from guerilla force outside the political system to integrated participant has allowed previously un- or underrepresented groups to become politically empowered, and has done much to de-legitimize violence as a means to resolve political conflict.²⁹⁶ As such, the political transitions of the FMLN, SPLM, and Hizballah can each be judged a success—though one that is incomplete in both Sudan and Hizballah, where hostilities continue. In these countries, it is demonstrated that organizations with continuing military aims can function as political organizations, if they manage to separate their political aims from their military goals. In each case, the ultimate hope for long-term stability of the country lies in the ability of the guerilla organization to lay down its arms, which the international system aims to bring about by constructing mechanisms and UN institutions to negotiate the long processes of such peace settlements, and to enforce the final agreement.

²⁹⁶ Studemeister and United States Institute of Peace, *El Salvador : Implementation of the Peace Accords*, 27.

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