

(MALD) CAPSTONE

TITLE:

Conflict Resolution in the South China Sea
- The New Role of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force -

SUBMITTED TO: **Professor Eileen Babbitt**

COURSE: **313** (Spring 2017, Independent Study supervised by Professor Eileen Babbitt)

NAME OF STUDENT: **Kosuke Sato**

12 April 2017

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

1. China's Rise in Asia-Pacific Region 6

Overview of the Current Situation 7

China's Strategy 11

Brief Summary 26

2. Analysis of the conflict situation by Power-Based Theory 27

Power-Based Theory 27

Analysis of the Regional conflict in the South China Sea 33

Limit of the Power Theory – Security Dilemma 40

Brief Summary 48

3. Non-Military Approach to the Conflict Resolution by the military 49

Cooperative Inclusive Engagement as Non Power-Based Approach 52

Mandate and potential of the JMSDF

as a Function of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement 60

Conclusion 73

Introduction

Many conflicts keep arising in the current world and each conflict has its own cause and content. For example, some conflicts have been caused by motives to become independent or separate from one country, some caused among more than two ethnicities, and others caused among several countries. It is true that there are many kinds of conflicts in the world and more than one third of the global population is involved in some kind of conflict.¹ Of course, studies have been done on conflict resolution in order to manage this situation. By the end of the Cold War, however, it has been more difficult to deal with complicated conflict structure.² That is because there was a third wave of democracy, and over half the world's states are were weak, failing or failed and unable to control their territory or unable govern effectively. This encouraged some states, groups and movements to pursue their objectives by means of conflicts. Regional and communal conflict was the most likely, and they have been caused mainly by ethnicity and religion.³ On the other hand, it seems like major interstate war will not be probable in the world because it may cost too much and is not beneficial to the countries. In this kind of situation, it should be necessary to analyze the background and root causes of each of potential conflicts accurately and create appropriate measures according to each of them, in order not to confuse them.

¹ Giving Hands, *世界の現実* (accessed July 1, 2016); available from <http://giving-hands.jp/worldfact7.html>.

² Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse. 2011. *Contemporary conflict resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. 3rd ed. (Malden, MA; Cambridge, UK;: Polity, 2011), 55-62.

³ Rupert Smith, *The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world*. 1st Vintage Books. ed. (New York: Vintage, 2008), 269-307.

If we turn our attention to the Asia-Pacific region, for example, some researchers argue in a loud voice that rise of China is threatening other countries, and in fact there are some territorial disputes in this region. If the escalation of China's aggressive behavior would continue, and other countries would fail to deal with it, the possibility not only of economic and diplomatic but also military conflict will rise dramatically.⁴ In other words, especially in the South China Sea (SCS), because the national interests of some countries are intricately intertwined there and SCS is a chief part of economy and political influence in the world, we have to deal with these frictions among some countries in a complicated world structure.

In this paper, I will explore a possible new role for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in the conflicts in SCS. In SCS, relevant countries have currently tried to solve the conflicts by the power-based approach. However, they have not been able to overcome the biggest obstacle of such an approach, the security dilemma. Therefore, they are required to find another approach to such conflicts, and it should not be based on a power-based one. Although the JMSDF is regarded as a kind of power-based organization such as the military, the JMSDF itself has potential in non-power-based and non-military approaches, which could create a new and stable pathway to the peace in Asia Pacific region.

⁴ COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS, *Armed Clash in the South China Sea* (accessed July 5, 2016); available from <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883#>.

As an analytical framework of conflict resolution, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) proposes the Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA). While CDA “was designed as a practical tool to better understand the linkages between development and conflict, with a view to increasing the impact of development on conflict,”⁵ the methodology is useful to conflicts in SCS as well because the CDA includes some features which are needed in order to analyze and seek peaceful approach to the conflicts in SCS such that it is “applicable to any type or stage of conflict,” “strategic and focused on structural causes of violent conflict,” “Participatory” and “aimed at consensus-building at the country level.”⁶ These features should be beneficial for an analytical framework of this paper. In CDA process, analysis of conflict is composed of three stages; Analysis of Conflict, Analysis of Current Responses, and Identification of Ways Forward.⁷ This paper uses this framework to analyze the conflicts in SCS and to derive the possible role of the JMSDF. First, in part of Analysis Conflict, background and causes of the conflicts in SCS are analyzed, and China’s grand strategy is discussed from the viewpoints of psychology, geography and history. This discussion leads that China’s grand strategy is strongly ‘defense-oriented’ and it is difficult for the international community to change it. This situation generates one of the conditions in which the security dilemma is likely to occur. Second, in part of the Analysis of Current Responses, causes of conflicts are analyzed

⁵ United Nations Development Program, *Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA)*, October, 2003 (accessed July 14, 2016); available from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/cpr/documents/prevention/CDA_complete.pdf.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

by power-based theory, and both China's strategy and the reaction of the U.S. side is dominated by power-based approach. These analyses conclude that it is useful to analyze causes of conflict, but it cannot solve them peacefully because the security dilemma is a product of the 'power-based approach,' any response by power would rather contribute to more dilemma than solve or mitigate it. Finally, in part of Identification of Ways Forward, this paper suggests 'Cooperative Inclusive Engagement' as an approach to overcome the security dilemma and create a cooperative environment through the concept of Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW), Security Community and Interactive Problem-Solving. These discussions and the unique position of Japan offers the JMSDF the 'fourth' role other than being military, police and diplomacy. This paper concludes that the JMSDF can and should play a significant role in SCS not only as 'balancer' but also as 'coordinator for peace and stability.'

It is enough to say that the conclusion of this paper does not deny the purely military aspect of the military. It is still very important to use the military as a means of hedge, containment and engagement under power-based approach, and it is clear that only the military can play such roles, not excepting the JMSDF. However, the security dilemma is more likely to occur in SCS, and therefore peace and stability may not prevail unless any country is seeking to get over the security dilemma. The military, especially the JMSDF, will enhance its capability of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement and take a balance between it and power-based approaches,

which enable the JMSDF to protect the nation and contribute peace and security proactively in the Asia Pacific region and the world.

1. China's Rise in Asia-Pacific Region

The first stage of my analysis is 'Analysis of Conflict' including a background of the situation and causes.⁸ Hence, before analyzing the conflict situation in SCS, the background of China's rise should be considered. In this chapter, the current conflict situation in SCS is overviewed, and China's grand strategy is analyzed. No one can oppose the opinion that China has recently increased its presence in the international community. It is the world's most populous country, has a vast landmass and long and unique history. Its economic growth is remarkable and it has been playing a certain role in non-traditional security areas. In recent years, China seems to have been trying to play a main role in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, it has caused several disputes and conflicts relating to territory, trade imbalances, currency rates, and human rights. There is no doubt that China is one of the countries attracting the most attention now. Many people have similar doubts to these; "What is China's real intention?" and "Where is China going?" By getting a valid answer to them, we can understand the security dilemma facing relevant countries and the limit of the power-based approach.

China's leaders state that China itself will play an important role not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the entire international community, and its strategy is purely defense-oriented as its history demonstrates. Its "defense-oriented" strategy, however, does neither necessarily express "balanced-oriented" nor "peace-oriented" policy. That's because China aims to become a regional "hegemon" in order to heighten its stability, and will not

⁸ United Nations Development Program.

hesitate to take coercive or aggressive action if necessary to avoid the obstacles. Through this perspective, current China's posture can make sense, and its longer-term "goals", "grand strategy" and "military strategy" are almost consistent. In this section, the current situation in SCS is overviewed, and China's strategy is analyzed. China's longer-term "goals" are analyzed from a psychological, geographical and historical perspective, and also the obstacles to make this goal come true and the means to remove them are clarified.

Overview of the Current Situation

Importance of the South China Sea

The importance of SCS has been increasing dramatically in changing world affairs in terms not only of economic aspects but also strategic ones. If some countries have a border with each other and there are some valuable resources, conflicts between those countries are likely to happen because such conflicts are caused by a clash of national interests. SCS is no exception, and there are many countries sharing the same borders and many valuable resources in SCS. With regard to resources, there are huge quantities of proved and probable oil reserves, and it is also said that the East China Sea is a rich repository of natural gas⁹. In addition, there are good fishing grounds and "unknown quantities of hydrocarbons and other seabed minerals"¹⁰ there,

⁹ The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *18 MAPS THAT EXPLAIN MARITIME SECURITY IN ASIA* (accessed July 7, 2016); available from <http://amti.csis.org/atlas/>.

¹⁰ Patrick M. Cronin, "The Strategic Significance of the South China Sea," (*paper presented at the conference of CSIS Managing Tensions in the South China Sea Conference*, June 2013, available from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Cronin_ConferencePaper.pdf.)

and therefore these valuable resources have heightened the importance of SCS. Besides, the importance as sea lines of communication has made the situation more complicated. “One-third of the world’s liquefied natural gas passes through the Straits of Malacca” and into SCS, and “much of this imported LNG is bound for Japan and South Korea.”¹¹ Not only LNG, but also \$5.3 trillion of trade passes through SCS, and “U.S. trade accounts for \$1.2 trillion of this total.”¹² In other words, the situation in SCS might affect the global economy. Hence, as President Obama pivots to Asia, SCS is collecting a lot of attention not only from Asian countries.

Furthermore, as Journalist Robert Kaplan calls SCS as “the throat of global sea routes,” it has not only economic importance but also strategic one for many countries because “more than half the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic.”¹³ It is not too much to say that whoever can rule SCS can rule the world. SCS is closely related to the world’s economy and one of the biggest countries in the world, China, is lying in a geographical location where it can have a great influence, which has increased its strategic importance at an accelerated pace. Especially, for another big country, the U.S., SCS is crucially important “to guarantee the secure movement of U.S. goods and deploy

¹¹ The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and The Center for Strategic and International Studies.

¹² COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS.

¹³ Robert D. Kaplan, *The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict: The 21st century’s defining battleground is going to be on water* (accessed July 7, 2016); available from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/the-south-china-sea-is-the-future-of-conflict/>.

military power worldwide” in order “to maintain global superiority at sea.”¹⁴ Accordingly, SCS is the stage of disputes not only between several countries that are sharing or overlapping their boundaries, but also between two big countries who have an argument or difference of opinion and conflicts of interest.

Territorial disputes and Freedom of Navigation

The more important SCS becomes, the more complicated and intense the disputes and

conflicts there become. Territorial and jurisdictional disputes in SCS have complicated and aggravated relationships between China and other countries in Asia and the possibility of a military clash has increased.¹⁵ There are many territorial disputes in SCS as shown in Figure 1¹⁶, and they can be summarized as follows;



Figure 1. Territorial disputes in South China Sea

¹⁴ STRATFOR, *Great Power Politics in the South China Sea* (accessed July 7, 2016); available from <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/great-power-politics-south-china-sea>.

¹⁵ COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS, *Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea* (accessed July 9, 2016); available from <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea>.

¹⁶ International Business Times, *Territorial disputes in South China Sea*, October, 2015 (accessed July 14, 2016); available from <http://www.ibtimes.co.in/photos/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea-4672-slide-33016>.

“Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.”

“A significant aspect of the territorial dispute in the South China Sea concerns China's construction in the area, particularly in the past few years. China has engaged in large-scale land reclamation activities in seven reefs (Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef) in the disputed Spratly Islands area of the South China Sea.”

“China's land reclamation activities have been met with protest from several of the interested states, particularly the Philippines, the United States, Vietnam and Indonesia. China has proposed joint development as a provisional measure before settlement of sovereignty disputes. Sound in principle, most other claimants consider the presumption the nine-dash line would be the starting point of negotiations for joint development as fundamentally unfair. That line contradicts a cardinal principle of UNCLOS, to which all claimants are parties, namely that “the land dominates the sea”, so a coastal state can claim maritime zones based only on land over which it has sovereignty.”¹⁷

Under this situation, U.S. has committed the Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in order to sustain freedom of navigation and support other nations in Southeast Asia that have been suffering from “China’s assertive territorial claims and land reclamation efforts.”¹⁸ For example,

¹⁷ Peace Palace Library, *South China Sea Territorial Disputes* (accessed July 9, 2016), available from <http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/library-special/south-china-sea-territorial-disputes/>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

although U.S. “takes no position on the territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands,”¹⁹ it does take a strong position on sustaining the FON in SCS. U.S. is sharing “the concerns that the intentional ambiguity of China’s claims to vast stretches of water and seabed are a leading driver of tensions in the South China Sea.”²⁰ Therefore, it tries to place pressure on China to bring their disputes to international legal fields and solve them there.

However, it is clear that these efforts to solve the disputes have been unrewarded. China has taken more assertive actions in SCS, and other countries including U.S. are struggling with how to deal with them. Even recently, the Philippines filed its case when China seized a reef one-sidedly in 2013, and an international tribunal in The Hague delivered a rebuke that China’s behavior in SCS and its claim to sovereignty over the waters, so-called ‘九段線 (nine-dash line),’ had no legal basis. However, China states that it does not accept or recognize it.²¹ The cause of the complexity and a cat-and-mouse game between the Chinese side and the U.S. side are to be analyzed in the next chapter.

China’s Strategy

Before we start to discuss how to solve the conflicts in SCS, it is required to analyze China’s strategy in some detail. It is based just on a “defense-oriented” concept which has

¹⁹ CSIS, *The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea* (accessed July 10, 2016), available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-asserts-freedom-navigation-south-china-sea>.

²⁰ CSIS, *The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea*.

²¹ The New York Times, *Beijing’s South China Sea Claims Rejected by Hague Tribunal* (accessed July 12, 2016); available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines>.

complicated the situation and made it more difficult for other countries to deal with. Because China regards its strategy as purely a defense posture, it can continue to develop its influence and steadily aim at a regional hegemony in Asia-Pacific region in order to defend itself. By analyzing three features including psychological, geographical and historical ones, it is clarified that China's strategy is extremely rigid, and therefore it is very difficult or impossible to change these concepts by any approach of international society.

China's longer-term goals

In order to start the discussion on China's strategy, 'where China is going,' we have to consider 'where China came from.' China has very unique and long history as the phrase 'China's four thousand-year history' shows. When the four great ancient civilizations are described, one of them is the Chinese ancient. Therefore, its unique history might greatly affect current Chinese thought. At the same time, its geographical features also have directly shaped its strategy, especially regarding stability and security. Longer-term goals are backbones of a grand strategy, and China's longer-term goals should be concluded by considering its psychological, geographical and historical features. Through these three dimensional analyses, this paper describes that China's conceptual longer-term goals are to become regional hegemony, to

continue to protect its vast heartland strongly, and not to hesitate to take any coercive actions if its interests are threatened by other nations.²²

Psychological feature

China aims at a hegemonic state psychologically, which can be proved by its recent statements about policy suggestions by using ancient Chinese philosophy. It is an undoubted fact that China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a particular culture and civilization, and increased its presence due to her strong economic power in the international community. According to an article in *The Atlantic* in 2013, one of the classes about Chinese philosophy at Harvard University, “Classical Chinese Ethical and Political Theory”, has become the third most popular course.²³ Also in other countries, for example in Japan, ancient Chinese philosophy is very familiar to every generation not only because it had analyzed deeply human nature and holds true even in our day, but especially because the thought of Confucianism has pervaded its society.

²² The Diplomat, *China: New White Paper, Old Asia Conundrum* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/china-new-white-paper-old-asia-conundrum/>. In the China’s White Paper, there is no clear word that China seek the regional hegemon, the contents of it show, however, that “it buys it time to build up its capabilities, stabilize its periphery, and strengthen its hold on Asia while keeping other actors like the United States out.” If we consider the contents of it with its recent actions, it can be said that “China is more and more not just a taker, but [a] shaper and even [a] maker.” This must be hegemonic posture.

²³ The Atlantic, *Why Are Hundreds of Harvard Students Studying Ancient Chinese Philosophy?* (accessed July 1, 2016); available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-are-hundreds-of-harvard-students-studying-ancient-chinese-philosophy/280356/>.

In that sense, it is useful and persuasive to make use of ancient Chinese philosophy in order to derive the form of nation China aims for and the ways to achieve it. In fact, there are many Chinese researchers who try to propose their political policy from ancient Chinese philosophy. One of the key points is that it puts more emphasis on benevolence, justice and morals, and therefore the central attribute of political power was morally informed leadership.²⁴ Based on the idea of one of the most influential Chinese philosophers, Xunzi, there are three types of international power: humane authority, hegemony, and, tyranny. Humane authority is the highest form of international power and followed by hegemony and tyranny in that order. The famous ancient philosopher, Mencius states the difference between humane authority and hegemony; “humane authority aims at benevolence and justice, whereas hegemony seeks power through claiming to practice benevolence and justice.”²⁵ Yan Xuetong doesn’t reject that China will become a hegemonic state.²⁶ It is true that humane authority is the best form of state that China should aim for, but it is difficult for any country to become a humane authority inspiring the rest of the world with their morally superior way. Whether China aims at humane authority or hegemony, as the world leading state, China must create her own democratic moral principles. Then even when China tries to expand its ancient Chinese thought, Western notions of democracy and its thought are not mutually exclusive, but alike.²⁷

²⁴ The New York Times, *How China Can Defeat America* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html>.

²⁵ Yan Xuetong, Daniel Bell, Zhe Sun, and Edmund Ryden, *Ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese power* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011), 209.

²⁶ Yan, 15.

²⁷ Ibid, 219.

The common idea behind such statements is that China aims to be a world leading state by using its valuable ancient thought. Moreover, when these statements are linked to its current aggressive actions in the international community, it is clear that it is a part of its goals for China to become a hegemony which seeks power while persuading its people and other countries by taking advantage of the high morality of its ancient thought. In fact, there are many words like ‘moral,’ ‘justice’ and ‘benevolence’ in its official documents including the White Paper, and these are tightly connected to its ancient thought. China will continue to use the attractive ancient thought to force other countries to do what it wants.²⁸

Geographical feature

Chinese ancient strategists already had the idea of politics and put great emphasis on “geographical advantages in attaining hegemony.”²⁹ Robert S. Ross also states that “geography contributes to regional stability and order because it shapes the a priori causes of conflict: capabilities, interests, and security dilemmas.”³⁰ China’s geographical features drive it to act more aggressively along its periphery to defend potential threats, that is, offensive-defense.

The most persuasive theory for China’s geographical condition is Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland Theory’, and Nicholas J. Spykman’s ‘Rimland Theory.’ The former can be

²⁸ The Atlantic. As mentioned previously, ancient Chinese philosophy is one of the most attractive academic fields and full of ‘moral,’ ‘justice’ and ‘benevolence.’ It can be said that China recognizes the attractiveness and take advantage of it in its official documents to justify their policy and action.

²⁹ Yan, 120.

³⁰ Robert S. Ross, “Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the 21st Century,” *International Security*, 1999, 117.

summarized that the state that controls Central Asia would eventually have a great influence on international politics as the most powerful state.³¹ Although “Heartland Theory” shows Mackinder’s main concern that a rapidly industrializing and expanding Tsarist Russia could successfully compete with the Western countries at the beginning of 20th century, the theory itself is not obsolete. In fact, the United States has “deemed it a vital interest to prevent any power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian landmass” in a 1990 document for National Security Strategy.³² More than 100 years have passed since the emergence of ‘Heartland Theory’, and the main actor in the Heartland has changed from Russia to China. However, as Mackinder points out, if “the Chinese conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent.”³³ That means not only that China can get more accessibility to rich resources, but also that it would be threatened from the marginal sea, which is composed of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. “Those marginal seas control China’s access to the Pacific Ocean and the sea lanes of communication connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans,”³⁴ which infer ‘Rimland Theory’ by Spykman.³⁵ In sum, because China is situated “between the heartland and the marginal seas”, it cannot help but “function as a vast

³¹ Sir Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” *The Geographical Journal*, 1904.

³² Margaret Scott and Westeny Alcenat. *Revisiting the pivot: The Influence of Heartland Theory in Great Power Politics*, May, 2008 (accessed July 10, 2016); available from https://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/CCAS/departments/PoliticalScience/MVJ/docs/The_Pivot_-_Alcenat_and_Scott.pdf.

³³ Mackinder, 437.

³⁴ THE DIPLOMAT, *Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the Asiatic Mediterranean* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/nicholas-spykman-and-the-struggle-for-the-asiatic-mediterranean/>.

³⁵ Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, 1944.

buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power.”³⁶ China has been exposed to several kinds of threats from many directions, and therefore it must intend to possess stronger defense ability. “In order to protect themselves,” as Robert Jervis argues, China seeks “to control, or at least to neutralize, areas on their borders,” which “can alarm others who have stakes there, who



Figure 2. Geography of A2/AD Strategy

fear that undesirable precedents will be set, or who believe that their own vulnerability will be increased.”³⁷ In other words, China enhances its defense ability, which stimulates a certain country along its

periphery and the country enhances its defense ability as well. This is exactly the security dilemma. In China’s case, it has many ‘bordering’ countries. As China’s A2/AD strategy shows (Figure 2³⁸), it has worsened the situation that these border countries or territorial waters are within China’s critical area for its defense. Hence, both take their own defensive policy and the security dilemma might escalate for that amount. Although, at first glance, China’s behavior may

³⁶ Spykman, 41.

³⁷ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Volume 30, Issue 2 (January, 1978): 169.

³⁸ GlobalSecurity.org, *People's Liberation Navy - Offshore Defense* (Accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm>. China has increased its A2/AD capabilities especially within the second island chain.

appear to be perfectly aggressive, it is also true that China's strategy is actually very defense-oriented and is strongly tied with its geographical feature.

Historical feature

'History repeats itself.' This sentence accurately expresses the importance of analyzing history. China has been dramatically growing in the international community while Russia, one of the superpowers during the Cold War, has been gradually but steadily decreasing its influence on the same stage. This power transition has affected the entire world, however, it is not a unique case from the viewpoint of long-term historical cycle. The long-cycle theorists state "[s]uch power transitions come about once every 100 years and involve fundamental shifts in the relative power relationships,"³⁹ and meanwhile, the Greek historian's metaphor, The Thucydides Trap, "reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power."⁴⁰ With regard to where China will go on in the future, the significant analysis is where China's current position is in the long term cycle. China repeats the cycle that composes of ascent, stability, decline, collapse and founding in its long history. It is true that in the 4,000 billion dollars of the aggregate market value of listed stock had vanished in its market within one month this summer and its economy has decelerated, but China seems to limit the damage of the deceleration and

³⁹ Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2000), 1.

⁴⁰ The Atlantic, *The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?* (accessed July 10, 2016); available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>.

continue to grow its economy gradually (the annual growth rate in 2016 was 6.59%). At the same time, the annual growth target decreased from 7 percent to 6.5 percent, which reflects “the rebalancing of the economy and the focus on the quality of growth while still maintaining the objective of achieving a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020,”⁴¹ and focus not only on “ascent” but also “stability.” On the other hand, it has increased the military activities in East and South China Seas, where they realize their maritime periphery, in this decade. These facts show that China is now in the term between ascent and stability, which makes China more confident.

China's grand strategy

Although China has never presented its grand strategy explicitly, it has “pursued a grand strategy conditioned substantially by its historical experience, its political interests, and its geostrategic environment.”⁴² Once China’s longer-term goals are clarified through the above three dimensional analyses, its grand strategy becomes distinct. China’s grand strategy is a strategy in order that China will become a regional hegemon for its security and stability, and offered from the following three points; “core interests, external forces which threaten China and the national leadership.”⁴³

⁴¹ THE WORLD BANK, *China Overview* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.

⁴² Swaine, 8.

⁴³ Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, 2011, 68.

Core interests

A top official of the National People's Congress defined 'core interest' to encompass "the political regime; the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the nation; and people's livelihoods, sustainable economic development of society, and other major interests."⁴⁴ These core interests are easily interpreted from its longer-term goals.

During the Cold War, Deng Xiaoping had made economic growth its top priority, and China could have concentrated on it while the two superpowers had worn all their resources. China itself is approaching an economic superpower and now is in the term between ascent and stability in the Dynastic Cycle, and it will put more emphasis on its unity and territorial integrity because they are a critical source of stability in the point that what endangers the territorial integrity may threaten the Chinese Communist Party's existence.⁴⁵ With regard to core interests, China's grand strategy is to forge ahead with its unity and territorial integrity while heightening its power and making its strength more sustainable both economically and militarily.

⁴⁴ WORLD AFFAIRS, *China's 'Core Interests'* (accessed July 10, 2016); available from <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/ellen-bork/china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98core-interests%E2%80%99>.

⁴⁵ ATLAS Network, *DREAMING OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <https://www.atlasnetwork.org/news/article/dreaming-of-political-legitimacy-in-contemporary-china>. China has some territorial disputes 'within itself' such as Taiwan and Tibet. If China should allow them to become independent, it may destroy "one China policy" on which China's credibility at home and abroad depends.

External forces that threaten China

China's core interests cause necessities of increasing its "defensive" power along its periphery, augmenting its influence on sea lane of communication (SLOC) in Asia-Pacific region, and stabilizing its "internal" problems as represented by the Taiwan issue. It is not surprising that the actions taken in order to meet these necessities have caused political, economic and military frictions with other countries. The key actors of these frictions are the United States and its allies, and Taiwan.

First, China seeks to decrease U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. For that, China relies on increasing military deterrence to prevent the U.S. and its allies from interfering in Chinese core interests. China has expressed clearly that some issues about core interests are non-negotiable. In line with this strategy, China's defense spending has been steadily increasing (\$151.5 billion in defense spending in 2017 is second only to the U.S.).⁴⁶ Second, China has challenged U.S. alliances and thrown them off balance. China can keep the U.S. from taking a hard position against China by making full use of its economic power, which makes the allied countries doubt whether the U.S. has the will and capacity to maintain a long-term commitment in that region.⁴⁷ Third, China is always on the watch for an opportunity to unify Taiwan whether

⁴⁶ CSIS, *What does China really spend on its military?* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/>. "There is no universally accepted standard for reporting military spending." According to SIPRI, "China has increased its defense spending nearly fivefold over the last decade. China currently spends more on defense than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam combined, and China's military spending is second only to the United States."

⁴⁷ David Santoro and John K. Warden, "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the second nuclear age," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2015): 147.

peacefully or coercively. To say nothing of Taiwan's geostrategic importance, Taiwan is a symbol of China's non-unification. And therefore, Unification of Taiwan is vital for China from psychological, geographical and historical viewpoints.

The national leadership

From a psychological viewpoint, China's ideal national leadership is to become a strong country which can maintain peace both inside and outside its country. For that, China and its regime have to become strong enough politically, economically and militarily. As a responsible hegemon which is strong enough to keep peace and order in the region, China will continue to pay special attention to three issues; building comprehensive national strength, constituting an important pole in a multipolar world and promoting the building of a new international political and economic order.⁴⁸

Moreover, perfect democratization is both a value and a political goal for China. That's because heightening its transparency can lead China to become a reliable country globally. This democracy will be, however, not the same as the Western one, and utilized in order to strengthen its political influence in the international community. Although China should become a 'humane authority' and offers a better model for society than that given by the U.S., first of all, China has

⁴⁸ Ye Zicheng, Steven I. Levine, and Guoli Liu, *Inside China's Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People's Republic* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 84.

recognized that it has to become a regional hegemony and possessing enough power to wield influence all over the world.⁴⁹

From the above discussion, China's grand strategy is naturally fitting to its longer-term goals. However, the strategy cannot be expressed accurately by Hu Jintao's phrase “中国和平崛起” (Peace and Development). China will not hesitate to take coercive action for protection of its heartland security and its higher development. In other words, the process to peace sought by China and the development for that peace may not be peaceful, and peace and development are not simultaneous parallel processes. Hence, its strategy is not 'Peace and Development' but 'Peace after Development.'

China's Military Component

China has rapidly developed its military components both in size and in quality. Once it was said that China's military tactics were a few decades behind the U.S., but, now it may be well innovated and organized. Military components are the most important factor for China to achieve its grand strategy and longer-term goals.

China has put great emphasis on increasing maritime military power, which composes its the Navy and Air Force, and improving its operational capabilities and making a strong maritime strategy. There are three reasons why China has focused on maritime field. 1) SLOC is supporting its economic power; China's economy is heavily dependent on trade, which

⁴⁹ Yan, 15.

inevitably makes the seas of growing importance to national well-being. Moreover, during its policy of “Reform and Opening”, growing emphasis on international trade has shifted China’s economic center of gravity to the coast. Maritime defenses are, therefore, increasing the importance to protect its center of gravity. 2) China’s most vulnerable periphery is on the sea; in several decades, it has experienced the gravity transition from the land to the sea. 3) Command of the sea is vital both for deterring the U.S. and for unifying Taiwan.

Active Defense Strategy

China has to deter other countries’ military powers, mainly the U.S. one, as far from its territory as possible in case to control the SLOC and to try to unify Taiwan. As shown in the white paper, “China’s military leadership made active defense the core of its military strategy,” since the founding of the People’s Republic. Then, Chinese maritime strategy is based on the concept of “offshore active defense.” Although China’s leaders have improved and transformed its active-defense strategy in response to changing times and technological development, “the underlying principles remain, encoded in China’s strategic DNA.”⁵⁰ ‘Anti-Access/ Area-Denial (A2/AD)’ is a main part of its active-defense strategy that now China is setting for its goals. A2 refers to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering as operational area. AD refers to capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing

⁵⁰ James Holmes, “The Two Words That Explain China’s Assertive Naval Strategy: “Active defense” was a favorite tactic of Mao Zedong. How will China use it to harry U.S. ships in the Pacific?,” *Foreign Policy* (accessed July 12, 2016); available from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/03/the-two-words-that-explain-chinas-naval-strategy-active-defense/>.

force's freedom of action within the operational area.⁵¹ Its feature is an 'apparently defensive' strategy which is composed of several layers of defense. It can wear down the military power of the U.S. during long-term deployment, which deters the U.S. In the point of being thoroughly based on defensive posture, A2/AD is effective to the U.S. and perfectly fitting China's grand strategy.

China's nuclear policy is currently ambiguous. In the latter half of the Cold War, the two superpowers had monitored their nuclear powers and regulated each other. Meanwhile, China has steadily increased its nuclear capability. It is indeed that mutual assured destruction (MAD) had worked well during the Cold War, but that needs some specific conditions and it is definitely unclear that MAD can be applied to the China-U.S. case. China is now developing nuclear weapons, and "the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of reaching any point in the continental U.S. and carrying a MIRV, was under development, and that the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile was expected to be deployed".⁵² China's strategy is now balanced on the edge of security dilemma. Such nuclear capability is too coercive and aggressive to keep balance on the edge and to maintain its 'active-defense' strategy. However, if China continues to develop nuclear capability to possibly to attack the U.S. directly, that might destroy the balance and heighten the risk of a major war which divides the world into two spheres. Even if such nuclear capability does not pay not only for China but also other countries, as long as it believes

⁵¹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2014*, 4.

⁵² The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2015* (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, 2015); 123.

that its strategy is just defense-oriented from the viewpoints of its psychology, geography and history, the situation will become worse and worse.

Brief Summary

From the above analyses, China's longer-term "goals", "grand strategy" and "military strategy" are consistent. China's real intention is just 'defense-oriented', and as long as its strategy is realized as a purely defense posture by itself, it can continue to develop its influence and steadily aim at a regional hegemony in Asia-Pacific region. The most important point is that China's strategy is rigidly reinforced by three dimensions: psychological, geographical and historical ones. China is convinced that the strategy is strongly defense-oriented and it has percolated through to every level of society. Hence, it is very difficult, or impossible to change these concepts by external pressure. Its strategy now apparently seems to work well, however, it is just a double-edge sword, and China is now on the verge of corruption of balance. And therefore, if it mistakes steering the world community, security dilemmas will be escalated rapidly, which leads to an undesirable situation not only for China but also for other countries. Nowadays, all countries in the world are tightly knitted, and China is no exception. We, all the other countries, must cooperate with each other and prevent the escalation.

2. Analysis of the conflict situation by Power-Based Theory

In the previous chapter, the current situation in SCS and China's strategy were analyzed, and it was concluded that it is almost impossible to change its policy by any approach of international society, which has complicated the situation more. The complexity and China's rigid thinking of its strategy have made it difficult to deal with the territorial conflicts in SCS. Even so, we have to try to solve these conflicts peacefully. What is the problem about how to deal with them? The main problem is that most of the approaches for conflict resolution in SCS are power-based ones, and therefore escalation of security dilemma has been inevitable. In this chapter, power-based theory, its limit and mechanism of security dilemma in SCS are explained including analysis of the reactions to China's behavior by other countries.

Power-Based Theory

Through a paradigm shift in international environment, the world changed rapidly and dramatically. During the 20th Century, wars were dominated by some super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and conflicts occurred related to the struggle between them. But with the USSR gone in the beginning of the 1990s, there was a third wave of democracy, and over half the world's states were weak, failing or failed and unable to control their territory or govern effectively.⁵³ These situations provided the context for some states, groups and

⁵³ Robert H. Dorff, Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability, *Parameters*, Summer (1996); 17-31.

movements to pursue their objectives by means of conflicts. Regional and communal conflict was the most likely, and they have been caused mainly by ethnicity and religion.⁵⁴

As a defined field of study, conflict resolution started with the height of Cold War. Therefore, the conflict resolution field was forced to deal with the paradigm shift, which “brought greater scrutiny and the development of searching for critiques from different quarters.”⁵⁵ In this situation, power-based theory is one of the influential theories in the conflict resolution field. It is true that analysis of some conflicts by power-based theory are persuasive, but it cannot escape escalation of security dilemma which is the very reason for gray-zone conflicts “that do not allow the government to immediately mobilize” the military “but could pose a serious security threat.”⁵⁶ Gray-zone conflict is coercive and aggressive activity in nature, “but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war.”⁵⁷ Hence, if there is a gray-zone conflict including big power countries such as U.S. and China, aggravation of the tensed situation may affect international society catastrophically. We must need a method not only to analyze such a situation accurately but also to solve and ease that tension.

⁵⁴ Rupert Smith, *The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world*. 1st Vintage Books. ed. (New York: Vintage, 2008), 269-307.

⁵⁵ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary conflict resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999), 5.

⁵⁶ The Japan Times, *Government compiling defense guidelines to deal with ‘gray zone’ scenarios* (accessed March 22, 2017); available from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/13/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-compiling-defense-guidelines-deal-gray-zone-incidents/#.WNNEifk182w>.

⁵⁷ Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (accessed July 13, 2016); available from <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>.

First, this thesis tries to assess the validity of Morgenthau's power theory by applying it to the territorial disputes in SCS. As mentioned previously, in the field of international relations, the power theory has still been dominant, and many conflicts have been analyzed and understood from the viewpoint of powers and interests. However, other theories have challenged the power theory after WWII and its challenge has been strengthened through a paradigm shift after the Cold War. Undoubtedly, current international situations have made conflicts more complicated, which force us to analyze them from multiple aspects. Nevertheless, power by which a country can force others to do something, is still and continues to be a main factor of causes of conflicts, and some current conflicts such as in SCS show it vividly.

Power-Based Theory

It is the first step of conflict resolution to answer what causes a conflict fundamentally. In Hans Morgenthau's theory, the answer is "power" or "interests" of international politics, that is, power theory.

Morgenthau states that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." It is true that there are several approaches to achieve nations' goals and interests, but "whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for

power.”⁵⁸ He shows six principles of political realism, and three of them explain power and interests.

- *Principle 2, “interest is defined in terms of power”. Unlike economic, the driving force is self-interest for power, which is apparent in the world.*
- *Principle 3, “interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid”, but whose meaning can change. Occasionally, public interest will change; it is virtually impossible for any law to transform all self-interest into public interest.*
- *Principle 4, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract. Survival of the state will always be prioritized before morality.*⁵⁹

Although it is beyond doubt that the most important concept of Morgenthau’s international politics is power, it is still controversial what power is. But, power can be understood as abilities to force someone to do something by several effective methods in the process of seeking its interests through the arguments of Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and Joseph Nye. Morgenthau contends that “power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man”, and it involves “all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.”⁶⁰ He puts more emphasis on material strength, especially of a military nature, instead of its

⁵⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 31.

⁵⁹ Morgenthau, 4-17.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

immaterial aspects such as psychology and morality. Waltz defines power narrower as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”⁶¹ While these concepts are categorized in so-called ‘hard power’, the concept of power has expanded largely after the WWII. Nye proposes ‘soft power’ as another important aspect of national power. It is the ability to attract and co-opt rather than by hard power, and the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction of culture, political values, and foreign policies.⁶² Furthermore, he suggests ‘smart power’ as the third power concept. Smart power is some “strategies that combine the tools of both hard and soft power” because they cannot replace one another.⁶³ For example, he proposes five critical areas as smart power the United States should focus on as follows; 1) Alliance, Partnerships, and institutions, 2) Global development, 3) Public diplomacy, 4) Economic integration, and 5) Technology and innovation.⁶⁴ In sum, in the international relations field, there are three kinds of national power concepts; hard, soft and a fusion of them: smart power. In the process of conflict resolution, all of these powers matter because a certain country can force others to do something by using one or all of them.

⁶¹ E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism* (accessed February 25, 2016); available from <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/>.

⁶² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990), 153-171.

⁶³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” *Foreign Affairs* (accessed July 13, 2016); available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart>.

⁶⁴ CSIS, *CSIS COMMISSION ON SMART POWER, A smarter, more secure America* (accessed February 25, 2016); available from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf.

If struggles for interests defined by power cause conflict, what is the mechanism? Morgenthau states that all politics aim to keep power, increase power, or demonstrate power by nature and in these processes. Out of these, the former two have strong inclination toward conflict. It is easy to understand that if people are satisfied with the current status, they long to maintain it, and if not, they long to change it. In addition, Stephen Van Evera contends that “states’ perceptions of the structure of international power strongly affect the risk of war,” and the possibility of conflict or war rapidly increases when they perceive that they will prevail, they will be advantageous, their power is declining, their resource quantity is high, and conquest is easy.⁶⁵

International relations is inclined to maintain a balance by creating a balance of power between countries. However, a nation may overthrow the balance of power by seeking to increase its power in order to make more profit. Hence, the key point to analyze international conflict is the balance of power.⁶⁶ Balance of power is the concept of equilibrium between different actors such as groups, states and their geographic regions. The stable balance of power is difficult to achieve and maintain because national security is tightly knitted to the multiplicity of interests.⁶⁷ Since WWII ended, rapid globalization and expanding civilization has increased the number of interests dramatically, and multiple nations have competed for the same interests simultaneously, which has been accelerated since the Cold War ended. The stabilization process

⁶⁵ Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 255.

⁶⁶ Morgenthau, 52-85.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 187-197.

of the balance of power can be formed “either by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the weight of the lighter one”.⁶⁸ To put it another way, when the balancing process fails, conflict will occur.

The mechanism of generation of international conflict is that a nation seeking power provokes unbalance of power in a regional or international community. Therefore, in analyzing a current state-to-state conflict, a certain action seeking power related to the above concept(s) or a certain corruption of the power balance can be found.

In sum, when we think about state-to-state conflicts, one of the independent variables might be an imbalance of power. In any case that the balance is maintained either by one strong pole or by multi-poles, vibration of one pole may give a shock to the entire stability. In this sense, as Morgenthau forecasted, “China may well in the long run carry the gravest implications for the rest of the world” because it is one of the leading nations in terms of numbers and power potential.⁶⁹ While a half century has passed since Morgenthau’s influential book “POLITICS AMONG NATIONS” was first published, his predictions have become a clear and sharp reality.

Analysis of the regional conflicts in the South China Sea

The number of types of conflicts are wide-ranging in our world. Among them, the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea are conspicuous. That is not only because China’s rise

⁶⁸ Morgenthau, 198.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 377-378.

has been dramatic, but also because interests of several countries are intertwined complicatedly there. As long as conflicts there are deeply related to their national interests, it is beneficial and valid to analyze the conflicts by the Power Theory.

SCS is a place where national interests clash with each other. As explained previously, SCS is rich in natural resources such as hydrocarbons and natural gas and through which trillions of dollars of global trade flow. As China tries to expand its influence, it is disputing the territorial rights of the islands and resources with several neighbors including Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. SCS is a critical sea lane of communication (SLOC) for many nations as well, especially for the U.S, and twenty-three percent of the total trade that passes through SCS is U.S. trade. ‘U.S. pivot to Asia’ is an expression that the U.S. places an importance in SCS, which could change SCS “from thriving trade channels to arenas of conflict”.⁷⁰

In SCS, China has forged ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation works in the Spratly Islands, and it has been accused of militarizing the island because such activities would have strong impact on its coastal states and on the SLOC. The territorial disputes and intricately intertwined interests enhance the tensions in SCS, which “are shaping –and being shaped by– rising apprehensions about the growth of China’s military power and its regional intentions.” It is true that the possibility of a major military conflict between China and the U.S. is still low now,

⁷⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, *China’s Maritime Disputes* (accessed February 25, 2016); available from <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345>.

but the potential for a conflict in SCS is high, and a trivial collision in the region will provoke and escalate into an interstate war.⁷¹ In this sense, SCS is on the phase of unstable peace in the lifecycle of conflicts which include some big countries such as China, U.S. and Japan, and therefore conflict resolution and prevention are vital and necessary not only for the region but also for the world.

Analysis of conflicts in SCS by the Power Theory

In order to find the cause of the heightened possibility of conflicts, it is useful to analyze the balance of power in SCS. Morgenthau already made reference to the balance of power in the Far East in 1968. He states that after WWII, “it was not Japan but China that had to be checked as a would-be imperialist power” because China’s actions are determined in accordance with “national interests of China.” He also predicted that China would be strong enough and any military commitment to contain China would cause direct conflict.⁷² This prediction, however, has been neglected during the Cold War and no country has taken any effective measures to prevent China from growing its influence. In the meantime, China became a strong power, or much stronger than expected over past 30 years, which cause conflict with the U.S. and its allies who are trying to contain China.

⁷¹ Council on Foreign Relations, *Armed Clash in the South China Sea* (accessed February 26, 2016); available from <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.

⁷² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and power: Essays of a decade, 1960-70*. (New York: Praeger, 1970), 389-397.

There is no doubt that China has recently increased its presence in the international community. It is proud to be the world's most populous country and have a vast territory and long and unique history. Its economic growth is remarkable and it has been playing a certain role in non-traditional security areas. In recent years, China seems to have been trying to play a main role in the Asia-Pacific region, which heightens its smart power such as its role in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In addition, it has rapidly developed its military components both in size and in quality.⁷³ In this sense, China has increased both its hard and its smart power. On the other hand, the growing budget deficits of the U.S. government in recent years have forced it to review its military strategy and limit its deployment to SCS. The U.S. still remains the world's most powerful nation, but there is no doubt that its hard power has relatively declined especially in SCS,⁷⁴ which makes other countries in SCS concerned whether the U.S. can provide them enough security in their time of need. These changes of balance of power have affected the tendency of conflicts in SCS.

If a country having power seeks to become a hegemon, the regional balance of power is likely to be more unstable. Although China itself has never presented its grand strategy explicitly, as examined in the previous chapter, it is “conditioned substantially by its historical experience, its political interests, and its geostrategic environment,”⁷⁵ and it is a strategy in order that China

⁷³ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2014*, 32-52.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 7-12

⁷⁵ Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting china's grand strategy: Past, present, and future*. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), 8.

will become a regional hegemon for its security and stability.⁷⁶ It is clear that its actions have challenge the status quo, that is, the balance of power in SCS, and therefore it can be understood that China seeks to become a regional hegemonic or imperial state.

The process of China's advances into SCS also bears eloquent testimony to the importance of power in international relations. It can be said that "China has made advances into SCS exploiting power vacuums"⁷⁷ as below.

1950's: After France withdrew from French Indochina, China occupied half of Paracel Islands.

1970's: After U.S. withdrew from South Vietnam, China occupied entire Paracel Islands.

1980's: After Soviet presence in Vietnam decreased, China advanced to Spratly Islands and occupied six features of the islands.

1990's: After U.S. withdrew from the Philippines, China occupied Mischief Reef.⁷⁸

2000's: China advanced to Southern SCS.

⁷⁶ "Wang Fisi, China's Search for a Grand Strategy, A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way," *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2011): 68.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *China's Activities in the South China Sea* (Ichigaya, Tokyo:Ministry of Defense, 2015), 1.

⁷⁸ The New York Times, *PHILIPPINE SENATE VOTES TO REJECT U.S. BASE RENEWAL* (accessed March 23, 2017); available from <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/16/world/philippine-senate-votes-to-reject-us-base-renewal.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.htm>. Now there are the U.S. troops in the Philippines, but the vacuum had surely occurred in 1990's. "In 1991 anti-US sentiment in the Philippines forced the Philippine Senate to reject a new base agreement treaty that subsequently forced the removal of all US forces from Philippine soil." Although the Military Bases Treaty was set to expire," "talks between Manila and Washington to create a new treaty to replace it dragged on." Eventually, "in 1999 the Philippine Senate ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, allowing American forces to reenter the country to conduct joint exercises with the Philippine military."

2010's: China gained *de facto* control over Scarborough Shoal and started to conduct large reclamation and infrastructure building in SCS.⁷⁹




Figure 3. Power transformation image in SCS

The shift of power size in SCS can be illustrated as above if simplified deliberately. In this figure, the size of circles indicates ‘power’ including hard, soft and smart power. Based on the concept of power vacuum, China has expanded its power while U.S. has decreased its one. As shown previously, U.S. and U.S. partner troops had withdrawn from SCS, which had generated a ‘hard’ power vacuum. At the same time, the failure in the Vietnam War destroyed an image that the U.S. held the strong military and a better foreign policy, which had generated ‘soft’

⁷⁹ Japan’s Ministry of Defense, *China’s Activities in the South China Sea*, 1-19.

power vacuum.⁸⁰ China had taken advantage of those vacuums. In this situation, the balance of power and the stable peace had been maintained even in the middle of the power shift, but at one point it changed to unbalance of power and unstable peace. The reason why China started to conduct larger reclamation and infrastructure building and take more coercive actions in SCS in the 2010's is that China itself realized the power shift and perceived that China would be advantageous and conquest would be possible in the region.

In sum, the causes of the conflicts in SCS is that China has been increasing its hard and smart power and challenges to the status quo, which has led to an unbalance of power in the region and encouraged China to take imperialistic action. Therefore, the power theory can adequately explain the causes of the conflicts in SCS. China makes full use of other concepts such as Media, Psychological and Legal Warfares,⁸¹ and it tries to switch these conflicts from power struggle to other dimensions. However, in order to accurately grasp causes of the conflicts, we should not distract ourselves from the power theory.

On the other hand, the power theory has a big problem which cannot be explained only by power. Robert Jervis mentions that if it is difficult to distinguish defensive weapons and policies from offensive ones, security dilemmas will increase, which heightens tensions that

⁸⁰ PROJECT SYNDICATE, *The End of US Soft Power?* (accessed March 23, 2017); available from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-presidential-election-soft-power-by-shashi-tharoor-2016-11?barrier=accessreg>. As Nye states, "a country's soft power arises from "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.)" The Vietnam War is a 'good example' of failure of the U.S' foreign policy.

⁸¹ The Huffington Post, *China's Non-Kinetic Three Warfares Against America* (accessed July 14, 2016); available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/chinas-nonkinetic-three-w_b_8914156.html.

create conflicts.⁸² In fact, China's strategy is defense-oriented and China has reacted sharply to defensive posture of other countries and vice versa. The current unstable tension in SCS is not irrelevant to security dilemma, which is likely to aggravate the current situation. When there is a conflict which has not been worsened to a kind of battle causing some casualties or a heavy loss but is likely to escalate into such a battle, cause of the conflict should be found out, and such a situation should be resolved or mitigated. That is, even if the cause of conflict is clash of interests, analysis should not be stopped, and efforts to mitigate the clash should be made. One of the key factors of the conflict in SCS must be the security dilemma, and it is necessary to verify the effectiveness of the power-based approach to solve security dilemma.

Limit of the Power Theory – Security Dilemma

The second stage of my analysis is 'Analysis of Current Responses' including mapping of current responses by other countries.⁸³ In this thesis, the analysis so far puts more emphasis on China's strategy and behavior. Next, the reactions to China's behavior are given the most attention. Resolution based on power theory only generates and provokes the security dilemma and it cannot overcome that dilemma to the end. The current relations and reactions between China and other countries prove it. Eventually, both U.S. and China sides are taking defensive action, even they are more or less coercive. While China has made a strong effort to 'defend' its

⁸² Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The use of force: Military power and international politics*. 7th ed. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 46-55.

⁸³ United Nations Development Program.

territory by all available means based on the firm thinking of its history, psychology and geography, other countries gathered around the U.S. also struggle to ‘defend’ their national interests such as freedom of navigation and the territories. In this situation, solution by power is not only ineffective but also nothing except a generator of a security dilemma.

Counter-strategies by U.S. and Japan

There are many actors of conflicts in SCS, but China is paying more attention to U.S. and “hopes to weaken the United States’ ability to intervene in” conflicts in SCS.⁸⁴ That is because the U.S. is the most powerful country in the countries whose national interests clash with China’s. Further, China is also paying much attention to Japan because the U.S. “relies principally on its security alliance with and presence in Japan to promote peace and stability in SCS.”⁸⁵ When it comes to China’s A2/AD strategy, it is targeting U.S. forces stationed or already deployed in the Asia Pacific region, which “means that Chinese strategy focuses on U.S. forces in Japan.”⁸⁶ For example, China had only short-range ballistic missiles reaching only to Taiwan and South Korea as of 1996. However, nowadays, “the PLA has the most active ballistic-missile program in the world and deploys more than 1,200 SRBMs, alongside medium-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles capable of targeting U.S. bases and other facilities

⁸⁴ Yoji Koda, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Responding to China’s A2/AD Threat*, Center for a New American Security, May, 2016 (accessed July 16, 2016); available from http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Koda-us-japan-alliance.pdf.

⁸⁵ Neil E. Silver, “The United States, Japan, and China: Setting the Course,” *Council on Foreign Relations Press*, March 24, 2000, 39.

⁸⁶ Yoji Koda, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Responding to China’s A2/AD Threat*.

in Japan.”⁸⁷ In addition, China’s official comments which criticize the U.S. activities in SCS and Japan’s activities supporting the U.S. are too numerous to count. These are part of expressions that Chinese strategy focuses on the U.S. forces in Japan. Moreover, for China, Japan is more noteworthy than other Asian countries in that it is highly influential because of a non-permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council, its GDP and so on.⁸⁸ Hence, China has paid more attention to the U.S. and Japan’s strategies and reactions against China.

The Pentagon states U.S. maritime strategy in SCS as below;

“Continued territorial and maritime disputes, combined with rapid military modernization, have led to the development of a more contested and potentially risky maritime environment. Although many states are pursuing efforts to reduce risk and resolve their disputes peacefully, the potential for miscalculation and instability remains high. Accordingly, U.S. allies and partners are seeking U.S. leadership and engagement.”

“The Department of Defense, in concert with our interagency partners, therefore is employing a comprehensive maritime security strategy focused on four lines of effort: strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the maritime domain; building the maritime capacity of our allies and

⁸⁷ RAND Cooperation, *Chinese Attacks on U.S. Air Bases in Asia: An Assessment of Relative Capabilities, 1996–2017* (accessed March 23, 2017); available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9800/RB9858z2/RAND_RB9858z2.pdf.

⁸⁸ U.S. News, *BEST COUNTRIES: Most Influential Countries*, January, 2016 (accessed July 16, 2016); available from <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/methodology>. Japan is ranked 7th to United States, United Kingdom, Germany, China, France and Russia.

partners; leveraging military diplomacy to reduce risk and build transparency; and, strengthening the development of an open and effective regional security architecture.”⁸⁹

Of course, U.S. has sought and will seek to reduce risk and resolve the conflicts peacefully. However, attention should be paid to the point that it pays much attention to strengthening its “military capability” and “maritime capacity” of its allies and partners. In other words, U.S. is trying to increase its ‘power’ in order to lead the conflicts to peaceful resolution.

As one of the most important allies of the U.S., Japan is playing an important role in the ‘power’ enhancement in SCS. Japan also intends to resolve the conflicts peacefully while holding out the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.⁹⁰ In fact, Japan prepared the new security laws “that will allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense without breaking the Constitution.”⁹¹ In terms of the conflicts in SCS, Yoji Koda, a retired Admiral of the JMSDF, states that Japan should increase its capabilities of the Japan Self Defense Force in order to protect its territory and sea lines of communication, which enable the U.S. military to deploy its military to other regions and to increase its flexibility.⁹²

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY*, July 27, 2015 (accessed July 16, 2016); available from http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.

⁹⁰ National Security Council, *National Security Strategy*, December 17, 2013 (accessed July 18, 2016); available from <http://www.cas.go.jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

⁹¹ Ayako Mie, Security laws usher in new era for pacifist Japan: ‘War legislation’ raises regional, public fears amid lack of Diet opposition, *Japan Times*, March 29, 2016 (accessed July 18, 2016); available from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/#.V4zn8rjhDb1>.

⁹² Yoji Koda, China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea and security of Japan, *Nippon.com*, July 28, 2015 (accessed July 18, 2016); available from <http://www.nippon.com/ja/currents/d00190/>.

These strategies have worsened rather than mitigated China's reaction and the situation in SCS. In order to protect its national interests, "China has adopted so-called assertive measures, including attempts to alter the status quo by coercive measures based on China's own assertion which is incompatible with the existing international law and order."⁹³ Such a tendency is proved not only by its military forces strengthened "broadly and rapidly by sustaining large increases in its defense budget"⁹⁴ but also by China's response to the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA) on July 12, 2016. In the case of PCA, even if these conflicts were discussed based on international law, China distinctly rejected the decision for the reason that it "sided unequivocally with the Philippines against China."⁹⁵ As a result, every mean, even international law, produced aspects of a vicious circle in SCS because controlling the power by the other power cannot overcome security dilemmas in interstate relations.

Two worlds for enhancement of security dilemma

Theoretically, SCS is complicated and intertwined with the security dilemma.⁹⁶ Jervis argues that conflict situation is divided to four worlds by using two variables; "whether the

⁹³ Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2014, 32.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ The Washington Post, *Beijing's claims to South China Sea rejected by international tribunal* (accessed July 19, 2016) available from

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-remains-angry-defiant-and-defensive-as-key-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling-looms/2016/07/12/11100f48-4771-11e6-8dac-0c6e4acc5b1_story.html.

⁹⁶ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January, 1950); 157. According to John Herz who firstly articulated the idea of a security dilemma, "Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders

offense or the defense has the advantage, and whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones.”⁹⁷ In case of the conflicts around SCS, the situation is categorized into both the first world and the second world in Figure 4 shown as follows;

	OFFENSE HAS THE ADVANTAGE	DEFENSE HAS THE ADVANTAGE
OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOT DISTINGUISHABLE FROM DEFENSIVE ONE	1 Doubly dangerous	2 Security dilemma, but security requirements may be compatible.
OFFENSIVE POSTURE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM DEFENSIVE ONE	3 No security dilemma, but aggression possible. Status-quo states can follow different policy than aggressors. Warning given.	4 Doubly stable

Figure 4. Four Worlds (Figure by Jervis, 211.)

To begin with, offense-defense differentiation is fairly difficult or impossible in the present world. Jervis argues that weapons and policies strongly affect a security dilemma,⁹⁸ but policy itself is strongly affected by how military technology and tactics are offensive or defensive.⁹⁹ On the other hand, it is quite difficult to distinguish a weapon clearly between offensive defensive “for the simple reason that the offensive or defensive potential of a weapon

the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.” “Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological but a social one.”

⁹⁷ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, Issue 2, January, 1984; 211.

⁹⁸ Jervis, 199.

⁹⁹ Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2, January, 1984; 223.

system is a matter not of range or other technical characteristics, but of contextual factors such as force employment and geography.”¹⁰⁰ In addition to some examples shown by Michael Haas in his article,¹⁰¹ it is also a good example of security dilemma in Asia Pacific region that China has strongly opposed the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) in South Korea.¹⁰²

From the macro-viewpoint of the relationship between U.S. and China, it is categorized into the world 2, “security dilemma, but security requirements may be compatible,” and both can maintain a comparatively good relationship without any possibility of a major war. That is because one decisive factor of the offence-defense balance: geography, strongly favors defense. That is, both think that defense is dominant. The geographic distance between the U.S. mainland and the Chinese one is considerable, which can be a strong barrier for the defenders.¹⁰³ In addition, both country’s large-sized militaries and nuclear capabilities are factors which shift the

¹⁰⁰ The Diplomat, *A MARred Alternative: Offense, Defense and U.S.-China Relations: Why the key to U.S.-China relations can only be found at the level of grand strategy* (accessed July 20, 2016); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/a-marred-alternative-offense-defense-and-u-s-china-relations/>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. In this article, Haas gives some examples, and one of them is introduced. “During the Cold War, the Soviet Union feared -with some justification- that weapons that were designed by NATO for theater defense could be used offensively to strike its strategic early warning and command & control systems.” In addition, He explains about the current situation of security dilemma in Asia-Pacific region as follows; “a Chinese missile that does not pose a threat to U.S. bases in Japan may very well be perceived as threatening by Taiwan or South Korea. Japanese air and missile defenses that can inflict no damage whatsoever on the Chinese mainland could be used to cover offensive amphibious operations in the East China Sea. The strategic mobility of U.S. strike forces is such that they can threaten Chinese interests, no matter where particular assets are based or deployed at any given point in time. And, to complicate the picture even further, an anti-ship ballistic missile that is not perceived as an offensive threat by the U.S. Navy is unlikely to fulfill what the Chinese construe as their legitimate self-defensive needs.” “In short, efforts to differentiate offensive from defensive weaponry are problematic at best.”

¹⁰² The Diplomat, *China Warns THAAD Deployment Could Destroy South Korea Ties 'in an Instant': China's ambassador to South Korea sends a dire warning about the impact of THAAD on bilateral ties* (accessed July 20, 2016); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/china-warns-thaad-deployment-could-destroy-south-korea-ties-in-an-instant/>.

¹⁰³ Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What is the offense-defense balance and can we measure it? (Offense, Defense, and International Politics),” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998; 65.

offense-defense balance to more defensive dominance.¹⁰⁴ If there should be no other factor between the U.S. and China than this macro-viewpoint, they might maintain a good relationship. However, the relation between two big powers is not so simple, and the relation in SCS makes it difficult to maintain a good relationship.

When focusing more on SCS, the relationship between the U.S. side and China's is categorized into world 1, "doubly dangerous," and the situation is riskier than world 2. First, the allies with U.S. are located in the vicinity of China, which decreases the effect of the distance. Second, SCS is absolutely closer to China than U.S. and within a critical buffer or barrier for China to protect its territory. Finally, it is hard for U.S. to maintain the force deployment enough to compete with China especially in SCS, that is, the U.S. influence has comparatively declined in SCS, which enables China to think that conquest of SCS has become easier.¹⁰⁵ The point is that, in this case, the world 2 is under world 1. In other words, the riskier situation in world 1 gives strong impact to the security dilemma in world 2, which makes it more difficult to create a cooperative relationship and fosters a situation in which the security dilemma is more likely to occur. Although this escalation might be stopped by the balance of power like the Cold War structure, it is very unclear whether the 'unbalance' balance of power will continue to maintain its balance because every factor of it is completely different from the Cold War. Hence, we

¹⁰⁴ Glaser and Kaufmann, 66.

¹⁰⁵ Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998; 5. In this article, he states that "'offense dominant' means that conquest is fairly easy; 'defense dominant' means that conquest is very difficult."

should not rely on balance of power by a power-based approach and should seek another approach.

Brief Summary

It is true that the power-based approach is still useful and effective to analyze causes of conflicts especially when they are interstate conflicts are purely about national interests and suffer little influence of ethnicity or religion. However, an effective approach to analyze ‘causes of conflicts’ is not necessarily an effective one to analyze “solutions of conflicts.” As shown in the former part of this chapter, territorial conflicts in SCS can be sufficiently analyzed by power-based theory. Nevertheless, SCS is under the situation in which security dilemma is more likely to occur. As long as security dilemma is a product of a ‘power-based approach,’ any response by power would rather contribute to more dilemma than solve or mitigate it. Therefore, ‘another approach’ for the conflict resolution replacing a power-based one is necessary.

3. Non-Military Approach to the Conflict Resolution by the military

The current situation and strategies adopted by countries concerned in SCS have enhanced the security dilemma. The security dilemma has generated more suspicion and wariness. In particular, as analyzed above, the U.S. and China are likely to fall into security dilemma. If either will fail to manage the dynamics of security dilemma, it will lead to an unwanted situation for both sides such as an unlimited arms race, economic friction, and eventually war. As long as a power-based approach is based on a 'win-lose' idea, there is a winner and a loser. However, in the current world, the gain of the winner is not necessarily equal to loss of the loser and the entire world. Rather, there is a high probability that the former is much less than the latter because all countries are closely related politically, economically and even ideologically. Moreover, such relations have become firmer and firmer, and loss of the loser must negatively affect other parts of the world. It is clear that the more influence the competitors has had, the stronger the impact the winning/losing result will give to the world. There is no doubt that both the U.S. and China are much influential countries, and therefore the outcome of their rivalry covered with security dilemma must give negative impact to the world and even to the winner comprehensively in the long run. Another approach other than a power-based one should be sought by countries concerned, and it should overcome and mitigate security dilemma. In this section, such an approach is derived theoretically at first and applied to the current

situation in SCS. Finally, this paper discusses what the JMSDF can and should do through the approach.

Some points are clarified before the discussion. First of all, a suggestion in this paper is not ‘engagement’-oriented. When it comes to international politics and diplomatic strategy, ‘containment’ and ‘engagement’ are straightforward expressions because both can express strategies that one country or its allies can take in order to compete with a powerful country or its allies. In fact, the U.S. has been using them for different purposes in accordance with the competitor and its focus has been shifted from the Soviet Union or Russia to China. ‘Containment’ policy was proposed by George Kennan at the beginning of the Cold War, and it stated a competitor should be “contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of” its policy.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, the concept and definition of the word ‘engagement’ are vague. If we focus on the U.S’ foreign policy toward China, there are three types of engagement. The first is “cooperative engagement,” which means building and maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with China. The second is “balancing,” which means creating a favorable balance of power surrounding China to affect its behavior. The third is “hedging,” which means maintaining a regional military presence and closer alliance

¹⁰⁶ Foreign Policy Journal, *The United States’ (Mis)interpretation of Containment Theory* (accessed January 5, 2017); available from <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/03/16/the-united-states-misinterpretation-of-containment-theory/>.

management in case China emerges as a challenger to US hegemony.”¹⁰⁷ The purpose of this paper is not to clarify the definition of these words or to decide the success or failure of this foreign policy toward China. More emphasis should be put on the point that any foreign policy adopted by the U.S. and its allies have been based on the power-based approach, and therefore most of the policies have continued to generate security dilemmas. In other words, any policies above are based on a strategy ‘against’ China, not ‘including’ it. Although many researchers have mentioned and analyzed what kind of foreign policy is appropriate against China, most of them remain within the range from containment to engagement or appeasement, and they have applied the focus to the degree of containment or engagement. For example, Aaron L. Friedberg advocates “coengagement” which is a combination of both containment and engagement and put more emphasis on containment, and states that the U.S. should build military forces capable of overcoming China’s in the western pacific.¹⁰⁸ However, it is clear that even such a new word is based on a power-based approach. While John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt state that the U.S. should refine a strategy of “offshore balancing” by which the U.S. “would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary,”¹⁰⁹ it is also a kind of ‘containment enhanced by engagement.’ As they admit, “p[P]romoting peace,

¹⁰⁷ The Tokyo Foundation, *US Engagement Policy toward China; Realism, Liberalism, and Pragmatism* (accessed January 5, 2017); available from <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2014/us-engagement-policy-toward-china>.

¹⁰⁸ Aaron L. Friedberg, *A CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY: China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011)

¹⁰⁹ Foreign Affairs, *The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy* (accessed January 6, 2017); available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing>.

although desirable, is not among them.”¹¹⁰ In addition, while “cooperative engagement” does not seem like a power-based approach and seeks to cooperate with China economically and politically, it is not enough as the required approach in the point that it excludes the most significant element: the military. It seems like someone is offering cooperation with the other while shoving him/her with a pistol, which causes more suspicion, more uncertainty and more security dilemma. Therefore, the military, appearing at first glance to be ‘a violent institution’ and drawn as it is sociologically and historically, should be included in the cooperative structure and can play an essential role in promoting cooperation with other countries. While the importance of containment and engagement should not be slighted, another approach which is clearly different from them is necessary in order to manage the current situation in SCS peacefully. It should be not simply ‘cooperative engagement’ but ‘cooperative inclusive engagement.’

Cooperative Inclusive Engagement as Non Power-Based Approach

It is easy to say but difficult for countries concerned to cooperate each other in order to avoid an occurrence of the security dilemma. The problem is how to make it more “likely that the players will cooperate and arrive at” the situation and both prefer cooperation to defection.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Foreign Affairs, *The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy*. Mearsheimer and Walt recognize the limit of “offshore balancing” and mention that it “is a realist grand strategy, and its aims are limited. Promoting peace, although desirable, is not among them.”

¹¹¹ Jervis, 171.

Jervis states that there are three factors to increase the chances of the incentive to cooperate as below.

1) Anything that increases incentives to cooperate by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation and/or decreasing the costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not.

2) Anything that decreases incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the other and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation.

3) Anything that increases each side's expectation that the other will cooperate.¹¹²

The security dilemma itself can be categorized to the second point because it decreases the incentive for cooperation and increases the cost of mutual cooperation. There is much dilemma between the U.S. side and China's, which seems enough thrust for both sides to recognize the critical cost. In addition, the current world economy proves clearly the benefit of mutual cooperation. It is evident that the world economy will grow and flourish more if the U.S, China, Japan and other countries can cooperate. The first point will be improved by the third point, that is, an increase of each side's expectation of cooperation encourages incentives to cooperate. Hence, the third point, means to increase each side's expectation that the other will cooperate, is attached more importance in this paper.

¹¹² Jervis, 171.

It is true that it is dangerous to simply state that cooperation is important because seeking only to cooperate could easily give too many carrots which may make the other's ambition bloated. However, as many researchers point out, to balance stick and carrot is significant, and "[T]he more firmly one is committed at an early stage to carrying out a threat, the more damaging that threat is to one's negotiating power."¹¹³ Roger Fisher mentions that 'stick' is a last resort and "in most cases it is a mistake to attempt to influence the other side by making a negative commitment of any kind at the outset of the negotiations, and that it is a mistake to do so until one has first made the most of every other element of "¹¹⁴ problem-solving power. In short, well-balanced strategy is necessary. There is no shortage of examples of either stick or carrot, and therefore a kind of a bridge between them is necessary and should possess function to suppress the security dilemma. Cooperation with "inspection device" holds the promise of ameliorating the security dilemma.¹¹⁵ As Jervis states, "by relieving immediate worries and providing warning of coming dangers, inspection can meet a significant part of the wish to protect oneself against future threats, and so make current cooperation more feasible."¹¹⁶ My argument in this section is that a military organization has the capacity and potential to promote such cooperation. As discussed, "cooperative engagement" is lacking the military

¹¹³ Willian J. Breslin and Jeffery Z. Rubin, ed., *Negotiation Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: PON Books, 1991), 130.

¹¹⁴ Willian J. Breslin and Jeffery Z. Rubin, ed., *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, 138.

¹¹⁵ Jervis, 181. "Inspection devices" are something by which "each can see whether the other has cooperated; and its losses, if the other defects." That is, they are certain means to understand the other's real intention continuously. It is true that they literally inspect, or monitor, the other's action and intention, but the prospect of cooperation is high "since what either side would gain by one defection is slight compared to the benefits of continued cooperation."

¹¹⁶ Jervis, 181.

element, which may cause more suspicion, more uncertainty and more security dilemma. I would argue that the military, appearing at first glance to be ‘a violent institution’ and drawn as it is sociologically and historically, can play a significant role in promoting cooperation with other countries as a purely peaceful institution. Before that, peaceful use of the military is discussed through two concepts; security community and Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW).

Security Community

As Jervis discusses, it is difficult to cooperate under the security dilemma. On the other hand, there are some regional organizations in which the member countries have been successful to avoid military conflict and restrain the security dilemma to a certain extent such as EU and ASEAN. Although it goes without saying that these are special cases and countries concerned cannot always cooperate like them, it is true that there are “the various forms of cooperative relationships states form with each other to pursue security, ranging from attempts to create global collective and common security to alliances, regimes and security communities.”¹¹⁷ While the strength of the connections is getting weak from alliances to security communities, it is useful to create cooperative relationships even if it is security communities. Mike Bourne, a lecturer in International Security Studies at Queen’s University Belfast, states that “security communities are formations in which there is profound transformation of security relations between actors beyond a few specific issues” and in which “d[D]ecision making remains

¹¹⁷ Mike Bourne, *Understanding Security* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 115.

national, but decisions are shaped by a sense of community, thus they have some communality with medium-level forms of collective security.”¹¹⁸ As Karl Deutsch mentioned, it is one type of social structure that contrasts with the security dilemma,”¹¹⁹ that is, security communities can reduce the security dilemma. While a security dilemma is caused by mutual distrust and uncertainty about each other’s intentions, security communities are composed of mutual trust and certainty or expectation about each other’s behavior.¹²⁰ In short, if countries concerned can meet some requirements for creating a security community, it can overcome the security dilemma and foster more cooperation. The key essential requirements are “mutual compatibility of core values, unbroken links in social communication, and mutual predictability of behavior.”¹²¹

Military-Military (MM) interactions have much potential to meet the requirements for a security community. In particular, if some countries’ militaries persistently have interactions, it can create unbroken links in communication and mutual predictability of behavior. Because the military is more likely to foment the security dilemma, the MM interactions is more effective to reduce it. The points are whether the military itself has an operational concept which leads to the MM interactions, and if any, under what kind of situation such operations are more likely to be performed.

¹¹⁸ Bourne, 125.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ nailing whispers to the wall, *Defeating the Security Dilemma: Security Communities and Conflict Management* (accessed January 21, 2017); available from <https://nailingwhisperstothewall.wordpress.com/2016/03/31/defeating-the-security-dilemma-security-communities-and-conflict-management-literature-review/>.

MOOTW

When it comes to an approach for peaceful conflict resolution by the military, that is, an operational concept which leads to the MM interactions, the concept of military operation other than war (MOOTW) is worth being mentioned. While military organizations are created as a combat organization by nature, the idea that the military can be used for a noncombat mission is not absolutely new. As Carl von Clausewitz states, war is the continuation of politics by other means and the military should be a part of means to achieve political goals. In fact, the military has been used for showing one nation's intention and one of the important diplomatic tools for the long history, and the role of the military has changed. In the changing dynamics of the international community, the concept of MOOTW was created in the early 1990's.¹²² It focuses on "deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities" and covers a wide range of activities because it "may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations."¹²³ (see Figure 3)

¹²² Katherine K. Tucker, "*ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)*" (Thesis, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, 1998).

¹²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 1995 (accessed January 13, 2017); available from http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07.pdf.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
	Military Operations	General US Goals	Representative Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large Scale Combat Operations Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/NEO Nation Assistance Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure 5. Range of Military Operations¹²⁴

After the WWII, while likelihood of a huge interstate war has decreased, the military, mainly the U.S' one, had been forced to correspond to the situations such as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Unconventional Warfare (UW), which the military needs to deal with even if they do not reach an interstate war or a huge military conflict. Hence, it had placed more emphasis on the aspect of coercive and combat operations included in Deter War & Resolve Conflict. However, under the dramatically changing situation after the Cold War, it can be said that it has been forced to give more attention to the aspect of cooperative and noncombat operations included in Promote Peace & Support Civil Authorities. As *Joint Vision 2020* (JV 2020) which is a document released by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2000 mentions, the ultimate goal of noncombat

¹²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 1995.

operations is “full spectrum dominance,”¹²⁵ and neither JV 2020 nor Joint Publication 3-07 (Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War) adequately mention the potential of noncombat aspects among MOOTW which promote trust and cooperation. Nevertheless, the concept of MOOTW can be a key of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement in that it focuses on a role of the military to promote peace in peace time by noncombat means.

China has also focused more on MOOTW in recent years. China’s National Defense White Paper of 2006 puts an emphasis on the need to expand the PLA’s capabilities by conducting MOOTW including counter-terrorism operations, participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, emergency disaster relief operations, international humanitarian assistance, and counter-piracy patrols.¹²⁶ The objective is to enhance its clout to international community by gaining “international prestige, demonstrate China’s willingness to contribute to global security and stability, and provide practical experience to Chinese military personnel”¹²⁷ which seems to be purely for its national interest. Depending on how one looks at it, it is evidence that China’s leadership recognizes that involvement in MOOTW can enhance their country’s reputation as a responsible player in the world, and China is forced to conduct such operations and improve the capability to maintain its influence.

¹²⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Vision 2020. America’s Military - Preparing for Tomorrow* (accessed January 13, 2017); available from <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a526044.pdf>.

¹²⁶ The JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, *The PLA’s Multiple Military Tasks: Prioritizing Combat Operations and Developing MOOTW Capabilities* (accessed January 14, 2017); available from <https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-multiple-military-tasks-prioritizing-combat-operations-and-developing-mootw-capabilities/>.

¹²⁷ The JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, *The PLA’s Multiple Military Tasks: Prioritizing Combat Operations and Developing MOOTW Capabilities*.

Because MOOTW is recognized as an important concept for the military of countries including the U.S. and China, it can be an effective bridge among them by making the most of opportunities of such operations.

Mandate and potential of the JMSDF as a Function of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement

Japan can be a key player to solve the territorial conflicts in SCS. In fact, China is paying much attention to Japan because the U.S. “relies principally on its security alliance with and presence in Japan to promote” peace and stability in SCS.¹²⁸ Not only for China but also for other Asian countries, Japan is more noteworthy in that it is highly influential because of a non-permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council, its GDP, military power and so on.¹²⁹ For example, from the view point of hard power, it is a non-controversial fact that Japan’s economy is very powerful and “ranks third in terms of nominal GDP.”¹³⁰ In addition, its military, the JSDF, ranks fourth if military might is defined in purely quantitative terms.¹³¹ Moreover, it can be said that Japan holds strong soft power in the area of the “government, culture and digital,

¹²⁸ Neil E. Silver, “The United States, Japan, and China: Setting the Course,” *Council on Foreign Relations Press*, March 24, 2000, 39.

¹²⁹ U.S. News, *BEST COUNTRIES: Most Influential Countries, January, 2016* (accessed July 16, 2016); available from <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/methodology>. Japan is ranked 7th to United States, United Kingdom, Germany, China, France and Russia.

¹³⁰ INVESTPEDIA, *The World's Top 10 Economies* (accessed March 24, 2017); available from <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economies.asp>.

¹³¹ Business Insider, *RANKED: The world's 20 strongest militaries* (accessed March 24, 2017); available from <http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9/#20-canada-1>. “The factors under consideration for military strength and their total weights are: number of active personnel (5% of total score), tanks (10%), attack helicopters (15%), aircraft (20%), aircraft carriers (25%), and submarines (25%). The ranking defines military might in purely quantitative terms and does not account for the actual quality of the arms and training that the militaries may have.”

earning praise for its ‘unique’ culture and ‘pursuit of perfection.’”¹³² Yet, it is also clear that Japan has not been able to play enough of a role as mediator or an influential party in the territorial dispute so far. However, Japan has and should have the capacity to do it through Cooperative Inclusive Engagement, and Japan’s unique security environment and history is not a constraint to it but appropriate to it. In particular, the JMSDF surely has the huge potential to take this vital role.

Basic Principle - Proactive Contribution to Peace

Japan’s security policy is unique, characterized as “proactive contribution to peace (積極の平和主義)” and, at the same time, has been forced to be limited within the policy historically and psychologically. It is defined as foreign policy that Japan “needs to contribute more actively to the peace and stability of the region and the international community, while coordinating with other countries including its ally, the United States.”¹³³ As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the reason why Japan is taking such a policy is that it “has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has been achieving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community.”¹³⁴ It has economic and political influence on the world nowadays and has more responsibility as such a

¹³² THE DIPLOMAT, *Asia’s Soft Power Deficit* (accessed March 24, 2017); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/asias-soft-power-deficit/>.

¹³³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan’s Security Policy* (accessed January 10, 2017); available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/index.html>.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

nation. In addition, from the strategic viewpoint, Japan needs to be a good partner with the U.S. in order to deal with China's rise in Asia-Pacific region. Hence, Japan's security policy is required to be more 'proactive' than before. On the other hand, since the end of the World War II Japan has been permitted to have the military to engage only in self-defense by its Constitution, the so-called "Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy,"¹³⁵ and the large and technologically advanced armed forces was more constrained than other nations' ones.¹³⁶ Moreover, through the defeat in WWII and the postwar education, many Japanese consider that militarization or reinforcement of defense capability must disturb the stability not only of the Asia-Pacific region but of the world. Due to the historical factor, Constitutional constraints and public sensitivity, reinforcement of Japan's defense capability tends to cause considerable resentment, that is, it is more likely to engender the security dilemma from countries around Japan including China. In the case that Japan seeks to have a more proactive role in the security field, it is required to take a more peace-oriented policy simultaneously. In this sense, 'proactive contribution to peace' is a kind of a last resort to deal with the responsibility, historical background and the security situation all together. In sum, according to the 'restrictive' security policy, Japan is forced to focus more not on a coercive approach but a cooperative one. Defense of Japan 2016 truly seems

¹³⁵ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2016* (accessed January 9, 2017); available from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_3-2-1_web.pdf, 167. "Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy" means that "defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense."

¹³⁶ The New York Times, *Japan and the Limits of Military Power* (accessed January 10, 2017); available from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/opinion/japan-changes-limits-on-its-military.html?_r=0. That is why Japan's military is called the 'Self-Defense Force,' not Army, Navy nor Air Force.

to put more emphasis on the former such as “Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force” and “Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.” However, based on its security policy, Japan does and should focus more on the latter such as “Active Promotion of Security Cooperation.”¹³⁷ In other words, Japan should create and adopt individual policy based on “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” not simply to comply with the U.S’ policy.¹³⁸ Far from being in conflict with Proactive Contribution to Peace, Cooperative Inclusive Engagement fits tightly to it.

The Role and the Mandate of the JMSDF in SCS

Because Japan is an island country surrounded on all sides by the sea, it can be said that any threats will always approach it via the sea. For Japan, which lacks natural resources and largely relies on countries overseas for most of the materials, a maritime transport network is one of the most critical factors. The Defense Program Guidelines defines the role of the defense forces as “effective response to the new threats and diverse situations,” “Proactive efforts to improve the international security environment,” and “preparation for full-scale invasion,”¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2016*, 390-397. According to NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond, under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, “Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.”

¹³⁸ CSIS, *PacNet #22 - A new security policy for Japan: HA/DR capacity building and disaster-mitigation social infrastructure export* (accessed January 11, 2017); available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-22-new-security-policy-japan-hadr-capacity-building-and-disaster-mitigation-social>.

¹³⁹ The National Security Council and The Cabinet of Japan, *NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond* (accessed January 9, 2017); available from http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.

and the JMSDF plays an important role in Japan's security especially about the stability in SCS.

It is clear that Cooperative Inclusive Engagement will be categorized in the second role.

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2016 describes Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation as follows;

*“Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. From a broad and a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan it is necessary for both countries to strive to construct and enhance a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to comply with international norms of behavior, as well as to improve transparency with regard to its advancing military capabilities in the context of its rapidly increasing military budget. As part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense exchange, Japan will urge China to demonstrate greater transparency in its military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations.”*¹⁴⁰

This shows that the JMSDF has an important role in Proactive Cooperation to Peace in the point that it is entrusted to establish cooperative relationship with China by enhancing a “Mutually

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2016* (accessed January 9, 2017); available from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_3-2-1_web.pdf, 327.

Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China.” From the viewpoint of both Japan’s security policy and the expected role of the JMSDF, Cooperative Inclusive Engagement is one of the important roles of the JMSDF in SCS. Its mandate and achievement should contribute to the success of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement.

When considering mandate of the JMSDF with Cooperative Inclusive Engagement, a concept of “Noncombat Military Operation,” or NCMO (pronounced “Nocomo”) which is introduced by Takuya Shimodaira, a captain of the JMSDF, is beneficial. NCMO is defined as “a military operation not involving combat” including “rendering assistance to military forces employed in the pursuit of global peace, policing that contributes to the maintenance of international order, and offering humanitarian assistance in times of international disaster.”¹⁴¹

The humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) capacity of the JMSDF should be specially mentioned. There are many countries which have islands within their territory and are surrounded by the sea in Asia, and the region is known for a large number of natural disasters. In fact, the risk of natural disasters including earthquakes, tsunami, typhoon/cyclone, and flood in the Asia-Pacific is much more than other regions, and the Great East Japan Earthquake (2011), the Great Sichuan Earthquake (2008) and the Indian Ocean Earthquake (2004) are still fresh in our memory.¹⁴² In case of a large scale disaster, special and strong logistics capacity such as

¹⁴¹ Takuya Shimodaira, “The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Age of Multilateral Cooperation,” *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 2 (2014): 61-63. The examples of NCMO include countermeasures against “piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, major natural disasters, environmental destruction, and the need to acquire resources.”

¹⁴² CSIS, *PacNet #22 - A new security policy for Japan: HA/DR capacity building and disaster-mitigation social infrastructure export*.

transportation, accommodation, and command, control, computer, communication, information, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Only the JSDF can have these kinds of capability in Japan.¹⁴³ The JMSDF has played a central role in it, and the importance has been increasing.

Moreover, the JMSDF has high capability of the counter-piracy operation as well, and it has been highly praised by the international community.¹⁴⁴ Since 2009, two Japanese destroyers have escorted Japan-affiliated vessels, while P-3C patrol aircraft has also conducted warning and surveillance operations in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In this area, the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), which is one of the Task Forces operated by Combined Maritime Force (CMF) in which 31 member nations participate, has conducted warning and surveillance against pirate activities. Although China is not a member state of CMF, its People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has deployed the antipiracy forces in areas such as the Gulf of Aden, which shows that "China can contribute in parallel with, rather than threaten to destabilize, existing maritime governance mechanisms."¹⁴⁵ The JMSDF has led some training to enhance cooperation among counter-piracy units and tactical skills, and it can play a leading role in counter-piracy cooperation. By including China into this cooperation, the JMSDF can build a foundation of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement.

¹⁴³ CSIS, *PacNet #22 - A new security policy for Japan: HA/DR capacity building and disaster-mitigation social infrastructure export*.

¹⁴⁴ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 343.

¹⁴⁵ THE DIPLOMAT, *China and the International Antipiracy Effort* (accessed January 11, 2017); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-and-the-international-antipiracy-effort/>.

Similarly, the JMSDF can build their capacity of HA/DR and other noncombat fields. In fact, the MOD has put more emphasis on capacity building assistance. Among its objectives, the following points are strongly related to Cooperative Inclusive Engagement; 1) “strengthening bilateral relationships with the countries receiving such support,” and 2) “promoting Japan’s efforts to work proactively and independently to realize regional peace and stability, thereby increasing trust in the MOD/SDF, as well as Japan as a whole.”¹⁴⁶ Other than HA/DR and counterpiracy, the JMSDF has some advantages. Assuming it can make full use of them not for beating or provoking China but for fostering trusting and a cooperative relationship with China, it can be said that the JMSDF has huge capacity of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement.

Potential of the JMSDF from the viewpoint of Interactive Conflict Resolution

As discussed, Japan has been constrained by the historical factor, the Constitutional constraints and public sensitivity, which has made it more difficult to reinforce Japan’s defense capability. There are some opinions that any kind of improvement of defense capability may meet with strong opposition from the public and cause the security dilemma with China even if it is purely for cooperation and mutual interests. Hence, enough transparency is necessary in the process both for the people and for the international community. Fortunately, the JMSDF has had many opportunities to ensure the transparency in international arena through HA/DR, counter-piracy operations and capacity-building measures, which is gradually changing the

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 319.

people's common understanding of the military organization. In fact, according to an opinion survey in 2015, more than 90 percent of the people have a good impression of the JSDF, and the biggest reason for this is the JSDF's contribution to disaster relief operations in the Great East Japan Earthquake.¹⁴⁷ This change of attitude and understanding can be strong impetus for the Japan's leadership to take more proactive defense policy for cooperation, and the JMSDF can become a driving force for the change. In addition, NCMO by the JMSDF has been highly evaluated by the international community including China, and the reputation has no small effect on China's leadership and the people.

This mechanism can be explained by "Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR)." While ICR itself, as Ronald J. Fisher mentions, is a theory of conflict resolution which "involves problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of groups or states engaged in violent protracted conflict,"¹⁴⁸ this paper would put more emphasis on the point that some ICR workshops focus on transferring social/individual change to decision-making bodies and may be used as part of preparation of the whole conflict resolution process, "to identify and address barriers to negotiation and to improve the parties relationship."¹⁴⁹ One of the biggest barriers against enhancement of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement capability of the JMSDF is the common understanding that 'military power is basically violent' and therefore 'capability of the

¹⁴⁷ Japan's Cabinet Secretariat, *Public Opinion Poll* (accessed January 20, 2017); available from <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index.html>.

¹⁴⁸ Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 239.

¹⁴⁹ Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict (OTPIC), *ARTICLE SUMMARY "Interactive Conflict Resolution" by Ronald J. Fisher* (accessed January 20, 2017); available from <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/zartman-cpt7.htm>.

JSDF should be kept to a bare minimum in order to avoid the same mistake as WWII.’ To remove this barrier is a necessary condition for using the JMSDF as an important source of cooperation with China. At the same time, Cooperative Inclusive Engagement by the JMSDF will literally foster cooperation-oriented environment in PLA, which will encourage China’s leadership to take more cooperative action with international community in order to obtain reputation as a responsible big power and change the people’s understanding of the military. Not only are these running and mutually enhancing process, but also it does not allow the security dilemma any chance to generate. It is schematized referring to a diagram by John Paul Lederach¹⁵⁰ as follows. (Figure 6)




Figure 6. Mechanism of the Effect of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement

¹⁵⁰ John Paul Lederach, *Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

- 1) Japanese government (top leaders) will clarify and declare the new role of the JMSDF as Cooperative Inclusive Engagement (CIE).
- 2) Japanese government will promote the people's understanding of CIE through MOOTW or NCMO, which will mitigate resentment against improving the JMSDF's capability and enable the JMSDF to improve the capability of CIE.
- 3) By including PLA in CIE operations, both military can enhance mutual understanding, which foster more cooperative relationship, not only military-military but also government-government.
- 4) Japan and China can obtain international credibility and standing, which encourages both to take more cooperative action. Both are required to take necessary actions as responsible big powers and these activities meet the requirement. They may increase cooperative actions, but they never decrease it because it undermines their reputation.
- 5) Improvement of international credibility through the cooperative operations among them will ameliorate mutual understanding among the people and promote mutual communication in the civil and society level. According to research, public sentiment between Japan and China has mutually ebbed and flowed and the root causes are their territorial disputes and historical problem.¹⁵¹ The sentiment has been escalated with escalation of the territorial disputes. On the other hand, the cooperative MM interaction is broadcasted to the world through their government, mass media and the internet, which ameliorates mutual unfavorable views and promotes mutual

¹⁵¹ PewResearchCenter, *How Asians View Each Other* (accessed March 24, 2017); available from <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/>. While there are few fans of China in Japan (7% favorable view of China), “just 8% of Chinese like Japan, a distaste that also has its roots in history.”

communication. Even if they have unfavorable views of each other, they acknowledge the goodness of each other and already have strong connections in several fields.¹⁵² Therefore, once mutual communication is promoted, it will accelerate cooperative relationship in the civil society level.

6) The change of the above civil society level is important because “when political relations at the top remain lukewarm at best, citizen exchange at the grassroots becomes”¹⁵³ one of the strong driving forces to change China’s foreign policy. Hence, China cannot take coercive or unilateral action by a rise of both international and domestic expectation. However, it is not any loss but much profit for China and other countries.

¹⁵² THE DIPLOMAT, *People-to-People Diplomacy in China-Japan Relations* (accessed March 24, 2017); available from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/people-to-people-diplomacy-in-china-japan-relations/>. They still have strong connection of economy, tourism, culture and so on.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

The new role of the JMSDF




Figure 7. The functions of navies

Ken Booth defines the functions of navies from three aspects; military, police and diplomacy as in figure 6. It is true that this interpretation has been widely recognized in the world and

navies have enjoyed these functions, but all of them are based on power-based role. As described above, navies, especially the JMSDF, have sought the new possibilities through NCMO, or a part of MOOTW and sufficiently proved the effectiveness as the new role.




Figure 8. The new functions of navies

Although the importance of these three roles have not lost appeal, in the current world where many countries have strengthened their ties with each other in the processes of cooperation and confrontation, the importance of the new role is clearly increasing.

Conclusion

There are too many opinions of China's rise and the impact to the Asia-Pacific region and international society to mention. It is true that there are some territorial disputes in this region and countries concerned are on the alert for the rise of China. If China will continue to take actions which arouse wariness, or security dilemma by others, and if they cannot resolve the dilemma appropriately, it will continue to cause political and economic frictions, which may lead to sporadic military conflict. In SCS, national interests of some countries are intricately intertwined and therefore the structure of the security dilemma is considerably complicated. In this situation, although it is easy for each country concerned to let itself go with the political dynamics; it is clear that such an attitude cannot solve the security dilemma, and it will worsen the situation. Each country has to take its own action of its own accord. Japan can definitely play an important role in the conflict resolution in SCS; in other words, Japan has to consider not only what they can do but also what they should do in order to solve the conflict peacefully.

From the viewpoints of psychology, geography and history, China's grand strategy is strongly 'defense-oriented,' and it shall continue to take actions which are regarded as coercive, aggressive and expansive. It is difficult or impossible to be changed by external 'pressure or power,' because it is purely defense-oriented. Rather, any external pressure based on power enhances the security dilemma and exacerbates the friction with one another. Practically speaking, the reaction of the U.S. side including Japan is mainly based on power-based approach.

The U.S. side is trying to protect freedom of navigation and their own national interests from China's coercive actions in SCS, and in this sense they are also defense-oriented. In this situation, as long as both sides take power-based approaches even if it is defense-oriented, the security dilemma will be produced unlimitedly, which will lead to several unwanted situations such as an unlimited arms race, economic friction, and war eventually.

It is true that power-based approach is one of the most significant diplomatic tools and it is more understandable to analyze and react to the current complicated international relations, but, as we see, too strong a tendency to use power-based approach does not only put off dealing with the conflict resolution but create an unstable balance of power. Therefore, another approach is necessary to mitigate the security dilemma and to encourage cooperation with each other. I would argue 'Cooperative Inclusive Engagement' as such an approach to overcome the security dilemma and create a cooperative environment through the concept of Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW), Security Community and Interactive Problem-Solving. It is not power-based, but a means to foster a cooperative relationship with 'our adversary' by taking it in 'our' security community which will be reconstructed by both 'us' and 'them.' It does not allow the security dilemma a chance to take advantage. Of course, this paper does not deny the purely military aspect of the military, and it should be used as a mean of hedge, containment and engagement under the power-based approach. However, the security dilemma is more likely to occur in SCS, and therefore peace and stability may not prevail unless any country is seeking to

get over the security dilemma. This situation should have asked the military, especially the JMSDF to seek and play its new role in the conflict resolution. The military, appearing at first glance to be ‘a violent institution’ and drawn as it is sociologically and historically, can play a significant role in promoting cooperation with other countries as a purely peaceful institution. In addition, because of Japan’s unique history and policy, the JMSDF can enhance its capability of Cooperative Inclusive Engagement and take balance between it and the power-based approach. This approach enables the JMSDF not only to protect the nation but also to contribute to peace and security proactively in the Asia Pacific region and the world. Cooperative Inclusive Engagement should be added as the ‘fourth’ role of the military other than military, police and diplomacy.

Although it is not clear yet how the Trump administration will deal with the conflict in SCS, it is undoubtedly important that the U.S. and its allies are trying to keep the balance of power in Asia-Pacific region. The wheel of time has continued to turn, and international relations has been changing. Ironically, China, which has been persuaded to open its economy mainly by the U.S, now portrays itself as “the last defender of globalization.”¹⁵⁴ This irony is not historical defeat for the U.S. but one of the inevitabilities of history. In other words, even rising China cannot mount an opposition against the dynamic movement of globalization, and therefore it is necessary for other countries to include China and create a cooperative relationship together.

¹⁵⁴ The New York Times, *Isolating China Doesn't work* (accessed February 12, 2017); available from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/opinion/isolating-china-doesnt-work.html?_r=0.

Regardless of what the Trump administration will do, Japan can play a significant role in the peaceful conflict resolution based on the concept of “proactive contribution to peace.” The JMSDF has enough potential for this concept, and it can and should play a significant role in SCS not only as ‘balancer’ but also as ‘coordinator for peace and stability.’